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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
S; 2006-0040-F[1]; 2007-0547-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series:
Speech File Draft Files
Subseries:
Chron File, 1989-1993
OA/ID Number:
13493
Folder ID Number:
13493-011
Folder Title:
Talking Points - Strategic Defense Initiative 6/30/89
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<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
July 11, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISS WINSTON
FROM:
WILLIAM KRISTOL WK
SUBJECT:
TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
With reference to your June 30 suggested "Talking Points on
the Strategic Defense Initiative", OVP believes the following
changes would improve this fine set of talking points.
-
The third point categorizes SDI's "primary obstacles"
as "technological, strategic, political, and economic." "
This is a pointless observation, which would be better
left unsaid. SDI's principal problems lie in the
political and budgetary realms, as strategic and
technological problems are being rapidly resolved.
This bullet should therefore be deleted.
-
The seventh point incorrectly identifies SDI"s
"ultimate goal" as "the devaluation in strategic
utility of ballistic missiles." This is a goal for
SDI's first phase, but is hardly its "ultimate"
objective. To say otherwise would signal radical
change in the purpose and direction of the program.
-
The final sub-point on page one forecasts that the
Soviets will have a "hefty first strike capability" in
the 21st century. The term "hefty" is inappropriate.
Its evasiveness and imprecision understate the severity
of the problem. The Soviet emphasis on first-strike
weapons should be described as "threatening,"
"destabilizing," "disconcerting," etc.
-
The first point on page 2 observes that "most experts"
feel that our capacity to verify mobile missiles is
"far from perfect." This understates an important
point. Nothing in arms control is "perfectly
verifiable;" but mobile missiles pose unique
verification problems that would be enormously
burdensome in the absence of strategic defense, and we
should say this.
We look forward to seeing the final set of talking points
and to using them.
Document No.
051260SS
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
DATE: 7/6/89
7/7/89 5:00 PM
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
SUBJECT:
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE N/C
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
STUDDERT
BATES
UNTERMEYER
ROGERS
BREEDEN
CARD
WINSTON
CICCONI
PINKERTON
DEMAREST
Ra
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
REMARKS:
68
Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, (Rm. 122,
x2930, no later than 5:00 PM, Friday, July 7, 1989, with an info
copy to my office. Thank you.
RESPONSE:
7 P12: 46
James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
June 30, 1989
TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
*
The President is committed to the development and deployment of
Strategic Defenses when they are ready.
*
By developing the means to defend against ballistic missiles
that threaten us, we also lessen the incentives for aggression
thus enhancing stability and deterrence.
issues concerning
*
The primary obstacles to SDI can generally be categorized as
technological, strategic, political and economic,
Technology and SDI
Though many complex scientific and engineering problems remain,
there appear to be no technological show-stoppers for SDI.
In some areas such as kinetic kill technological break breakthroughs advances
Important
have been achieved. A system popularly known as Brilliant
Pebbles is one example.
(what
it
Strategy and SDI
On June 29, 1989, Vice President Quayle outlined how SDI will
one day alter the strategic equation between offense and defense.
SDI's ultimate goal is the devaluation in the strategic utility
deter a Hack on the U.S. and its allies by
of ballistic missiles,
We are seeking a more stable balance that relies increasingly on
defense. It would be preferable, but not necessary, if the
Soviets would work with us to develop a cooperative arrangement
for making this transition.
*
Progress on strategic offensive arms reductions and strategic
defense are not mutually exclusive -- on the contrary, START and
SDI are complementary.
**
In general, the more progress we make toward offensive
reductions, the more we will need to rely on SDI to help us
deter, or deal with, possible Soviet cheating or breakout.
SDI is an insurance policy for START.
*** First, the Soviets' largely modern land-based ICBM
force is projected to ensure them a hefty first-strike
capability well into the 21st century. A reasonably
reliable system of strategic defenses would diminish
our anxiety over this ICBM threat.
marke
improve our security
in the face of His
*** Second, the U.S. would be better able to deal cope with the
problem of Soviet mobile ICBMs. SDI would complement
a mobile verification regime in START that most has
experts feel would be far from perfect, many unresslved
and important details
*** Third, the sheer complexity of the proposed START
treaty will probably result in unavoidable loopholes
that arms control on its own cannot plug. In turn,
this situation would jeopardize treaty ratification,
Strategic defenses could help plug the loopholes.
*
Finally, Strategic Defense could will be the only thoroughly reliable
way to address the problem of accidental, unauthorized, or
third world "madman" launches of ballistic missiles.
william webster
** Concerns are no longer hypothetical. The Director of
Central Intelligence testified recently that up to 15
developing nations could have a ballistic launch capability
by the turn of the century.
** The instability of many regimes raises another frightening
scenario -- who has authority to release missiles during
periods of intense civil strife? As the nuclear and
chemical club grows, this question will be asked more often.
also
** Controlling missile technology from the supply side is not
enough -- ultimately we must have the capability to defend
ourselves against ballistic missiles,
Guodler
**
One interesting possibility is that with a space-based
defense, the U.S. could also defend other countries against
rogue launchesx is another possible use of an a space- based defense.
Politics and Economics of SDI
*
The recent recommendation by the majority of the members of the
House Armed Services Committee to cut the SDI budget by over a
billion dollars is a shortsighted move.
*
Just at the time American ingenuity is starting to produce
technological breakthroughs, SDI opponents are trying to reduce
the funding to a level which could not sustain a viable program.
The strategic rationale for SDI must be made clearer to the
American public and to their representatives in Congress.
*
Strategic modernization and strategic defense should not be
allowed to become an either/or proposition -- as pointed out
above, offenses and defenses are synergistic.
What Next?
make sound
*
In order to support an deployment decision in three or four
years, the President must be able to depend on the results of his
carefully designed research and development program. It must be
adequately funded.
The program schedule for the next two years includes a number of
very important tests and experiments. These include:
**
The first-ever test of a Neutral Particle Beam in Space.
**
Space tests of tracking, pointing, sensor, and
communications technologies.
**
Numerous interceptor tests for kinetic kill systems such as
Brilliant Pebbles.
All these early tests comply with the ABM Treaty. Later on,
however, tests that fall outside the Treaty will be required
decision before the President can confidently make a deployment
Bottom Line
The Congress and the public it serves must come to recognize
that SDI is one of several answers to the many strategic
problems the U.S. faces going into the next century.
**
the confidence or incentive
SDI would dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war by
denying an aggressor the ability to execute a first strike.
**
SDI would provide the American people with much-needed
insurance against an accidental or inadvertent attack or
against a deliberate launch by an irrational government.
The Bush Administration continues to believe that strategic
defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary,
and morally imperative.
STATE AND AND SECUTIVE BUDGE UNITED OFFICE of The PRESCEIN
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
NOTICE:
Enclosed are comments from staff members of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). Such comments do not necessarily
represent the official position of the Director of OMB or of the
Office of Management and Budget. If you wish to have the
Director's personal comments, please let me know -- and contact
me if you have any questions.
David J. Haun
Executive Assistant
to the Director
89 JUL 7 P5: 10
Document No.
051260SS
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
7/6/89
7/7/89 5:00 PM
DATE:
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
SUBJECT:
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
STUDDERT
BATES
UNTERMEYER
ROGERS
BREEDEN
CARD
WINSTON
CICCONI
PINKERTON
DEMAREST
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
REMARKS:
Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122,
x2930, no later than 5:00 PM, Friday, July 7, 1989, with an info
copy to my office. Thank you.
RESPONSE:
See comments
James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
June 30, 1989
TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
*
The President is committed to the development and deployment of
Strategic Defenses when they are ready.
By developing the means to defend against ballistic missiles
that threaten us, we also lessen the incentives for aggression
thus enhancing stability and deterrence,
The primary obstacles to SDI can generally be categorized as
technological, strategic, political and economic.
Technology and SDI
*
Though many complex scientific and engineering problems remain,
there appear to be no technological show-stoppers for SDI.
Howard
In some areas such as kinetic kill, technological breakthroughs
have been achieved. A system popularly known as Brilliant
X4624
Pebbles is one example.
we are initiating the potential of the most rapidly advancing
Technologies Such as SDI.
Strategy and SDI
On June 29, 1989, Vice President Quayle outlined how SDI will
one day alter the strategic equation between offense and defense.
*
of ballistic missiles,
SDI's ultimate goal is the devaluation in the strategic utility
We are seeking a more stable balance that relies increasingly on
defense. It would be preferable, but not necessary, if the
Soviets would work with us to develop a cooperative arrangement
for making this transition.
*
Progress on strategic offensive arms reductions and strategic
defense are not mutually exclusive -- on the contrary, START and
SDI are complementary.
Howard
** In general, the more progress we make toward offensive
reductions, the more we will need to rely on SDI to help us
deter, or deal with, possible Soviet cheating or breakout.
SDI is an insurance policy for START.
*** First, the Soviets' largely modern land-based ICBM
force is projected to ensure them a hefty first strike
capability well into the 21st century. A reasonably
reliable system of strategic defenses would diminish
our anxiety over this ICBM threat.
grow in destructive capability
*** Second, the U.S. would be better able to cope with the
problem of Soviet mobile ICBMs. SDI would complement
a mobile verification regime in START that most
Howard
experts feel would be far from perfect.
***
Third,
the sheer complexity of the proposed START
could result in ambiguities that the Soviets might seek Exploit to
treaty will probably result in unavoidable loopholes
that arms control on its own cannot plug. In turn,
this situation would jeopardize treaty ratification,
Strategic defenses could help plug the loopholes would
add to security and help treaty ratification.
Finally, Strategic Defense will be the only thoroughly reliable
way to address the problem of accidental, unauthorized, or
third-world "madman" launches of ballistic missiles.
** Concerns are no longer hypothetical. The Director of
Central Intelligence testified recently that up to 15
developing nations could have a ballistic launch capability
by the turn of the century.
**
The instability of many regimes raises another frightening
scenario -- who has authority to release missiles during
periods of intense civil strife? As the nuclear and
chemical club grows, this question will be asked more often.
** Controlling missile technology from the supply side is not
enough -- ultimately we must have the capability to defend
ourselves against ballistic missiles,
** One interesting possibility is that with a space-based
defense, the U.S. could also defend other countries against
rogue launches.
Politics and Economics of SDI
The recent recommendation by the majority of the members of the
House Armed Services Committee to cut the SDI budget by over a
billion dollars is a shortsighted move.
Just at the time American ingenuity is starting to produce
technological breakthroughs, SDI opponents are trying to reduce
the funding to a level which could not sustain a viable program.
*
The strategic rationale for SDI must be made clearer to the
American public and to their representatives in Congress.
Strategic modernization and strategic defense should not be
allowed to become an either/or proposition -- as pointed out
above, offenses and defenses are synergistic.
What Next?
*
In order to support a deployment decision in three or four
years, the President must be able to depend on the results of his
carefully designed research and development program. It must be
adequately funded.
*
The program schedule for the next two years includes a number of
very important tests and experiments. These include:
**
The first-ever test of a Neutral Particle Beam in Space,
**
Space tests of tracking, pointing, sensor, and
communications technologies.
** Numerous interceptor tests for kinetic kill systems such as
Brilliant Pebbles.
All these early tests comply with the ABM Treaty. Later on,
however, tests that fall outside the Treaty will be required
decision. before the President can confidently make a deployment
Bottom Line
answers major
*
The Congress and the public it serves must come to recognize
Howard
that SDI is one of several answers to the many strategic
problems the U.S. faces going into the next century.
**
any incentive
denying an aggressor the ability to execute a first strike.
SDI would dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war by
** SDI would provide the American people with much-needed
insurance against an accidental or inadvertent attack or
against a deliberate launch by an irrational government.
*
The Bush Administration continues to believe that strategic
defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary,
and morally imperative.
Document No.
051260SS
5360
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
7/6/89
7/7/89 5:00 PM
DATE:
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
SUBJECT:
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
STUDDERT
BATES
UNTERMEYER
ROGERS
BREEDEN
CARD
WINSTON
CICCONI
PINKERTON
DEMAREST
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
REMARKS:
89
Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122,
x2930, no later than 5:00 PM, Friday, July 7, 1989, with an info
copy to my office. Thank you.
or
RESPONSE:
July 10, 1989
TO:
Chriss Winston
NSC concurs with the attached as annotated.
10
James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
Brent Scowcroft
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
CC: James Cicconi
June 30, 1989
TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
*
The President is committed to the development and deployment of
Strategic Defenses when they are ready.
*
By developing the means to defend against ballistic missiles
that threaten us, we also lessen the incentives for aggression
thus enhancing stability and deterrence,
issues with respect to
*
The primary obstacles to SDI can generally be categorized as
technological, strategic, political and economic.
Technology and SDI
*
Though many complex scientific and engineering problems remain,
there appear to be no technological show-stoppers for SDI.
In some areas such as kinetic kill, technological breakthroughs advances
important
have been achieved. A system popularly known as Brilliant
Pebbles is one example.
Strategy and SDI
*
On June 29, 1989, Vice President Quayle outlined how SDI will
one day alter the strategic equation between offense and defense,
to
deter
attack
on
the
U.S.
and
*
of ballistic missiles.
SDI's ultimate goal is the devaluation in the strategic utility on Allies by
*
We are seeking a more stable balance that relies increasingly on
defense. It would be preferable, but not necessary, if the
Soviets would work with us to develop a cooperative arrangement
for making this transition.
*
Progress on strategic offensive arms reductions and strategic
defense are not mutually exclusive -- on the contrary, START and
SDI are complementary.
**
In general, the more progress we make toward offensive
reductions, the more we will need to rely on 7 SDI to help us
deter, or deal with, possible Soviet cheating or breakout.
SDI is an insurance policy for START.
*** First, the Soviets' largely modern land-based ICBM
force is projected to ensure them a hefty first-strike
capability well into the 21st century. A reasonably
reliable system of strategic defenses would diminish
our anxiety over this ICBM threat.
*** Second, the U.S. would be better able to cope with the
problem of Soviet mobile ICBMs. SDI would complement
a mobile verification regime in START that most
experts feel would be far from perfect has many un resolved
and important d efails
Third, the sheer complexity of the proposed START
treaty will probably fesult in unavoidable loopholes
that arms control on its own cannot plug. In turn,
this situation would jeopardize treaty ratification
Strategic defenses could help plug the loopholes.
could
*
Finally, Strategic Defense will be the only thoroughly reliable
way to address the problem of accidental, unauthorized, or
third-world "madman" launches of ballistic missiles.
** Concerns are no longer hypothetical. The Director of
Central Intelligence testified recently that up to 15
developing nations could have a ballistic launch capability
by the turn of the century.
** The instability of many regimes raises another frightening
scenario -- who has authority to release missiles during
periods of intense civil strife? As the nuclear and
chemical club grows, this question will be asked more often,
also
** Controlling missile technology from the supply side is not
enough -- ultimately we must have the capability to defend
ourselves against ballistic missiles,
** One interesting possibility is that with a space-based
defense, the U.S. could also defend other countries against
rogue launches.
Politics and Economics of SDI
*
The recent recommendation by the majority of the members of the
House Armed Services Committee to cut the SDI budget by over a
billion dollars is a shortsighted move.
*
Just at the time American ingenuity is starting to produce
technological breakthroughs, SDI opponents are trying to reduce
the funding to a level which could not sustain a viable program.
The strategic rationale for SDI must be made clearer to the
American public and to their fepresentatives in Congress.
7
*
Strategic modernization and strategic defense should not be
allowed to become an either/or proposition -- as pointed out
above, offenses and defenses are synergistic.
What Next?
*
In order to support a deployment decision in three or four
years, the President must be able to depend on the results of his
carefully designed research and development program. It must be
adequately funded,
The program schedule for the next two years includes a number of
very important tests and experiments. These include:
**
The first-ever test of a Neutral Particle Beam in Space,
Space tests of tracking, pointing, sensor, and
communications technologies.
Numerous interceptor tests for kinetic kill systems such as
Brilliant Pebbles,
All these early tests comply with the ABM Treaty.
however tests that fall outside the Treaty will be L required
Later on-
decision. before the President can confidently make a deployment
the
Bottom Line
The Congress and the public it serves must come to recognize
that SDI is one of several answers to the many strategic
problems the U.S. faces going into the next century.
and the Fidence
SDI would dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war by
denying an aggressor the ability to execute a first strike.
SDI would provide the American people with much-needed
insurance against an accidental or inadvertent attack or
against a deliberate launch by an irrational government.
The Bush Administration continues to believe that strategic
defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary,
and morally imperative.
Document No.
051260SS
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
7/6/89
7/7/89 5:00 PM
DATE:
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
SUBJECT:
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
STUDDERT
BATES
UNTERMEYER
ROGERS
BREEDEN
CARD
WINSTON
CICCONI
PINKERTON
DEMAREST
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
REMARKS:
Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122,
x2930, no later than 5:00 PM, Friday, July 7, 1989, with an info
copy to my office. Thank you.
89 10 A10 51
RESPONSE:
Needs re-witing
James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
June 30, 1989
TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
The President is committed to the development and deployment of
Strategic Defenses when they are ready.
By developing the means to defend against ballistic missiles
that threaten us, we also lessen the incentives for aggression
thus enhancing stability and deterrence,
The primary obstacles to SDI can generally be categorized as
technological, strategic, political and economic,
Technology and SDI
Though many complex scientific and engineering problems remain,
there appear to be no technological show-stoppers for SDI.
!
tellus
In some areas such as kinetic kill, technological breakthroughs
whis
have been achieved. A system popularly known as Brilliant
Pebbles is one example.
Strategy and SDI
On June 29, 1989, Vice President Quayle outlined how SDI will
one day alter the strategic equation between offense and defense.
[iswhatfollows what he said to enhance our defenses by reducing
of ballistic missiles,
SDI's ultimate goal is the devaluation in the stet strategic utility
We are seeking a more stable balance that relies increasingly on
defense. It would be preferable, but not necessary, if the
Soviets would work with us to develop a cooperative arrangement
for making this transition,
make marking
Progress on strategic offensive arms reductions and strategic
defense are not mutually exclusive -- on the contrary, START and
SDI are complementary.
**
In general, the more progress we make toward offensive
reductions, the more we will need to rely on SDI to help us
deter, or deal with, possible Soviet cheating or breakout.
SDI is an insurance policy for START.
*** First, the Soviets' largely modern land-based ICBM
force is projected to ensure them a hefty first-strike
re talk security
capability well into the 21st century. A reasonably
reliable system of strategic defenses would diminish
not "anpiety
our anxiety over this ICBM threat.
*** Second, the U.S. would be better able to cope with the
problem of Soviet mobile ICBMs. SDI would complement
a mobile verification regime in START that most
experts feel would be far from perfect.
*** Third, the sheer complexity of the proposed START
treaty will probably result in unavoidable loopholes
that arms control on its own cannot plug. In turn,
this situation would jeopardize treaty ratification,
Strategic defenses could help plug the loopholes.
*
Finally, Strategic Defense will be the only thoroughly reliable
way to address the problem of accidental, unauthorized, or
third-world 'madman' launches of ballistic missiles.
William Webeth
** Concerns are no longer hypothetical. The Director of
Central Intelligence testified recently that up to 15
developing nations could have a ballistic launch capability
by the turn of the century.
** The instability of many regimes raises another frightening
scenario -- who has authority to release missiles during
periods of intense civil strife? As the nuclear and
chemical club grows, this question will be asked more often.
** Controlling missile technology from the supply side is not
enough -- ultimately we must have the capability to defend
ourselves against ballistic missiles,
** One interesting possibility is that with a space-based
defense, the U.S. could also defend other countries against
rogue launches.
Politics and Economics of SDI
*
The recent recommendation by the majority of the members of the
House Armed Services Committee to cut the SDI budget by over a
billion dollars is a shortsighted move.
*
Just at the time American ingenuity is starting to produce
technological breakthroughs, SDI opponents are trying to reduce
the funding to a level which could not sustain a viable program.
The strategic rationale for SDI must be made clearer to the
American public and to their representatives in Congress.
*
Strategic modernization and strategic defense should not be
allowed to become an either/or proposition -- as pointed out
above, offenses and defenses are synergistic.
What Next?
justify decision to deplay
*
In order to support a deployment decision in three or four
years, the President must be able to depend on the results of his
carefully designed research and development program. It must be
adequately funded.
*
The program schedule for the next two years includes a number of
very important tests and experiments. These include:
**
The first-ever test of a Neutral Particle Beam in Space,
** Space tests of tracking, pointing, sensor, and
communications technologies.
** Numerous interceptor tests for kinetic kill systems such as
Brilliant Pebbles.
All these early tests comply with the ABM Treaty. Later on,
however, tests that fall outside the Treaty will be required
decision. before the President can confidently make a deployment
Bottom Line
*
The Congress and the public it serves must come to recognize
that SDI is one of several answers to the many strategic
problems the U.S. faces going into the next century.
** SDI would dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war by
denying an aggressor the ability to execute a first strike.
** SDI would provide the American people with much-needed
insurance against an accidental or inadvertent attack or
against a deliberate launch by an irrational government.
The Bush Administration continues to believe that strategic
defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary,
and morally imperative.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 7, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISS WINSTON
FROM:
ROGER B. PORTER RBP
SUBJECT:
Talking Points on the Strategic Defense
Initiative
We have no suggested changes from a policy standpoint and
approve of the draft in its present form.
CC: James W. Cicconi
89 JUL 10 A9:11 A9: 11
Document No.
051260SS
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
7/6/89
7/7/89 5:00 PM
DATE:
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
SUBJECT:
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
STUDDERT
BATES
UNTERMEYER
ROGERS
BREEDEN
CARD
WINSTON
CICCONI
PINKERTON
DEMAREST
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
REMARKS:
Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122,
x2930, no later than 5:00 PM, Friday, July 7, 1989, with an info
copy to my office. Thank you.
RESPONSE:
James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
June 30, 1989
TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
The President is committed to the development and deployment of
Strategic Defenses when they are ready.
By developing the means to defend against ballistic missiles
that threaten us, we also lessen the incentives for aggression
thus enhancing stability and deterrence.
The primary obstacles to SDI can generally be categorized as
technological, strategic, political and economic,
Technology and SDI
*
Though many complex scientific and engineering problems remain,
there appear to be no technological show-stoppers for SDI.
In some areas such as kinetic kill, technological breakthroughs
have been achieved. A system popularly known as Brilliant
Pebbles is one example.
Strategy and SDI
*
On June 29, 1989, Vice President Quayle outlined how SDI will
one day alter the strategic equation between offense and defense.
*
of ballistic missiles.
SDI's ultimate goal is the devaluation in the strategic utility
*
We are seeking a more stable balance that relies increasingly on
defense. It would be preferable, but not necessary, if the
Soviets would work with us to develop a cooperative arrangement
for making this transition.
*
Progress on strategic offensive arms reductions and strategic
defense are not mutually exclusive -- on the contrary, START and
SDI are complementary.
** In general, the more progress we make toward offensive
reductions, the more we will need to rely on SDI to help us
deter, or deal with, possible Soviet cheating or breakout.
SDI is an insurance policy for START.
*** First, the Soviets' largely modern land-based ICBM
force is projected to ensure them a hefty first-strike
capability well into the 21st century. A reasonably
reliable system of strategic defenses would diminish
our anxiety over this ICBM threat.
*** Second, the U.S. would be better able to cope with the
problem of Soviet mobile ICBMs. SDI would complement
a mobile verification regime in START that most
experts feel would be far from perfect,
*** Third, the sheer complexity of the proposed START
treaty will probably result in unavoidable loopholes
that arms control on its own cannot plug. In turn,
this situation would jeopardize treaty ratification,
Strategic defenses could help plug the loopholes.
*
Finally, Strategic Defense will be the only thoroughly reliable
way to address the problem of accidental, unauthorized, or
third-world "madman" launches of ballistic missiles.
** Concerns are no longer hypothetical. The Director of
Central Intelligence testified recently that up to 15
developing nations could have a ballistic launch capability
by the turn of the century.
** The instability of many regimes raises another frightening
scenario -- who has authority to release missiles during
periods of intense civil strife? As the nuclear and
chemical club grows, this question will be asked more often.
** Controlling missile technology from the supply side is not
enough -- ultimately we must have the capability to defend
ourselves against ballistic missiles,
** One interesting possibility is that with a space-based
defense, the U.S. could also defend other countries against
rogue launches.
Politics and Economics of SDI
*
The recent recommendation by the majority of the members of the
House Armed Services Committee to cut the SDI budget by over a
billion dollars is a shortsighted move.
*
Just at the time American ingenuity is starting to produce
technological breakthroughs, SDI opponents are trying to reduce
the funding to a level which could not sustain a viable program,
The strategic rationale for SDI must be made clearer to the
American public and to their representatives in Congress.
*
Strategic modernization and strategic defense should not be
allowed to become an either/or proposition -- as pointed out
above, offenses and defenses are synergistic.
What Next?
In order to support a deployment decision in three or four
years, the President must be able to depend on the results of his
carefully designed research and development program. It must be
adequately funded.
The program schedule for the next two years includes a number of
very important tests and experiments. These include:
**
The first-ever test of a Neutral Particle Beam in Space,
Space tests of tracking, pointing, sensor, and
communications technologies.
Numerous interceptor tests for kinetic kill systems such as
Brilliant Pebbles.
All these early tests comply with the ABM Treaty. Later on,
however, tests that fall outside the Treaty will be required
decision. before the President can confidently make a deployment
Bottom Line
The Congress and the public it serves must come to recognize
that SDI is one of several answers to the many strategic
problems the U.S. faces going into the next century.
**
SDI would dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war by
denying an aggressor the ability to execute a first strike.
SDI would provide the American people with much-needed
insurance against an accidental or inadvertent attack or
against a deliberate launch by an irrational government.
The Bush Administration continues to believe that strategic
defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary,
and morally imperative.
Document No.
051260SS
U
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
7/6/89
7/7/89 5:00 PM
DATE:
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
SUBJECT:
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
STUDDERT
BATES
UNTERMEYER
ROGERS
BREEDEN
CARD
WINSTON
CICCONI
PINKERTON
DEMAREST
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
REMARKS:
Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston Rm. 122,
x2930, no later than 5:00 PM, Friday, July 7, 1989, with an info
copy to my office. Thank you.
RESPONSE:
11 :6v 01 01 70
commont
No
James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 7, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISS WINSTON
FROM:
STEPHEN G. RADEMAKERSR
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Talking Points on the Strategic Defense Initiative
Pursuant to James Cicconi's request, Counsel's Office has
reviewed the above-referenced matter. We note that the second
paragraph of the section on page 3 entitled "Bottom Line" appears
to overstate the case for SDI. Even with SDI deployed, an
aggressor could "execute" a first strike, in that he could launch
his missiles and confidently expect some of them to reach their
targets. It would be more accurate say that SDI would reduce the
risk of war by "denying an aggressor the ability to confidently
launch a first strike.'
Apart from this suggestion, Counsel's Office has no legal
objection to the talking points.
Thank you for bringing this matter to our attention.
CC: James W. Cicconi
28 : Id L 7nr 68
ID # 05126055 CU
WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
O OUTGOING
H INTERNAL
I INCOMING
Date Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)
/
/
Name of Correspondent:
James W. Ciccone
MI Mail Report
User Codes: (A)
(B)
(C)
Subject:
Defense protiative
Talking auts on the phrategic
ROUTE TO:
ACTION
DISPOSITION
Tracking
Type
Completion
Action
Date
of
Date
Office/Agency
(Staff Name)
Code
YY/MM/DD
Response
Code
YY/MM/DD
Cuofc
ORIGINATOR Referral Note: 89,07.07
/
/
Cuat14
Referral
Regiotion Note:
389,07,07 / 5:00 pm /
/
/
Referral Note:
/
/
/
/
-
Referral Note:
/
/
/
/
Referral Note:
ACTION CODES:
DISPOSITION CODES:
A . Appropriate Action
I . Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
A Answered
C Completed
C - Comment/Recommendation
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
B - Non-Special Referral
S Suspended
D Draft Response
S For Signature
F Furnish Fact Sheet
X Interim Reply
to be used as Enclosure
FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing
Comments: Peape to Comments
directly Chris Rm 122, X2930
Yrs latch than 5:00 p.m., Treday July 121989 W/an
Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Info to Ciccose
As Thanks!
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.
5/81
Document No.
051260SS
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
7/6/89
7/7/89 5:00 PM
DATE:
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
SUBJECT:
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
STUDDERT
BATES
UNTERMEYER
ROGERS
BREEDEN
CARD
WINSTON
CICCONI
PINKERTON
DEMAREST
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
REMARKS:
Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122,
x2930, no later than 5:00 PM, Friday, July 7, 1989, with an info
copy to my office. Thank you.
RESPONSE:
James W. Clcconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
June 30, 1989
TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
The President is committed to the development and deployment of
Strategic Defenses when they are ready.
By developing the means to defend against ballistic missiles
that threaten us, we also lessen the incentives for aggression
thus enhancing stability and deterrence,
The primary obstacles to SDI can generally be categorized as
technological, strategic, political and economic.
Technology and SDI
Though many complex scientific and engineering problems remain,
there appear to be no technological show-stoppers for SDI.
In some areas such as kinetic kill, technological breakthroughs
have been achieved. A system popularly known as Brilliant
Pebbles is one example.
Strategy and SDI
On June 29, 1989, Vice President Quayle outlined how SDI will
one day alter the strategic equation between offense and defense,
of ballistic missiles.
SDI's ultimate goal is the devaluation in the strategic utility
We are seeking a more stable balance that relies increasingly on
defense. It would be preferable, but not necessary, if the
Soviets would work with us to develop a cooperative arrangement
for making this transition,
Progress on strategic offensive arms reductions and strategic
defense are not mutually exclusive -- on the contrary, START and
SDI are complementary.
**
In general, the more progress we make toward offensive
reductions, the more we will need to rely on SDI to help us
deter, or deal with, possible Soviet cheating or breakout.
SDI is an insurance policy for START.
*** First, the Soviets' largely modern land-based ICBM
force is projected to ensure them a hefty first-strike
capability well into the 21st century. A reasonably
reliable system of strategic defenses would diminish
our anxiety over this ICBM threat.
*** Second, the U.S. would be better able to cope with the
problem of Soviet mobile ICBMs. SDI would complement
a mobile verification regime in START that most
experts feel would be far from perfect.
*** Third, the sheer complexity of the proposed START
treaty will probably result in unavoidable loopholes
that arms control on its own cannot plug. In turn,
this situation would jeopardize treaty ratification,
Strategic defenses could help plug the loopholes.
Finally, Strategic Defense will be the only thoroughly reliable
way to address the problem of accidental, unauthorized, or
third-world "madman" launches of ballistic missiles.
** Concerns are no longer hypothetical. The Director of
Central Intelligence testified recently that up to 15
developing nations could have a ballistic launch capability
by the turn of the century.
** The instability of many regimes raises another frightening
scenario -- who has authority to release missiles during
periods of intense civil strife? As the nuclear and
chemical club grows, this question will be asked more often,
** Controlling missile technology from the supply side is not
enough -- ultimately we must have the capability to defend
ourselves against ballistic missiles,
** One interesting possibility is that with a space-based
defense, the U.S. could also defend other countries against
rogue launches.
Politics and Economics of SDI
The recent recommendation by the majority of the members of the
House Armed Services Committee to cut the SDI budget by over a
billion dollars is a shortsighted move.
Just at the time American ingenuity is starting to produce
technological breakthroughs, SDI opponents are trying to reduce
the funding to a level which could not sustain a viable program.
The strategic rationale for SDI must be made clearer to the
American public and to their representatives in Congress.
*
Strategic modernization and strategic defense should not be
allowed to become an either/or proposition -- as pointed out
above, offenses and defenses are synergistic.
What Next?
*
In order to support a deployment decision in three or four
years, the President must be able to depend on the results of his
carefully designed research and development program. It must be
adequately funded.
The program schedule for the next two years includes a number of
very important tests and experiments. These include:
**
The first-ever test of a Neutral Particle Beam in Space,
** Space tests of tracking, pointing, sensor, and
communications technologies.
** Numerous interceptor tests for kinetic kill systems such as
Brilliant Pebbles,
All these early tests comply with the ABM Treaty. Later on,
however, tests that fall outside the Treaty will be required
decision, before the President can confidently make a deployment
Bottom Line
*
The Congress and the public it serves must come to recognize
that SDI is one of several answers to the many strategic
problems the U.S. faces going into the next century.
** SDI would dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war by
denying an aggressor the ability to execute a first strike.
** SDI would provide the American people with much-needed
insurance against an accidental or inadvertent attack or
against a deliberate launch by an irrational government.
The Bush Administration continues to believe that strategic
defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary,
and morally imperative,
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
June 30, 1989
Mary Kate -
Here is the cabled
public diys lomacy material I menhoned
the D ther day. To my knowledge,
no one from your office or any
0 ther white House office (besides NSC)
had any part in The preparation and
approval of parts:
3. "Press themes"
4. "NST Qs and As"
5. "Qs and As on Verification
and Stability Measures."
In 0 ther words, d don't have any
sense that any Bush political appointee
(other than me whose in volvement was al most
accidental) played a role in developing
most of this stuff.
Joe Duspan
UNCLASSIFIED
OUTGOING
JO
TELEGRAM
Department of State
PAGE 01 OF 85 STATE 207986
6738
STATE 207986
6733
ORIGIN Pi1-18
OF ALL THE OUTSTANDING START ISSUES, VERIFICATION MAY BE
THE MOST COMPLEX. IT WILL BE ESPECIALLY CRITICAL 111
INFO
LOG-00
ADS-00
INR-07
EUR-00
SS-00
AF-00
CIAE-00
DETERMINING WHETHER START ENHANCES U.S. SECURITY AND
DODE-00
10-19
NEA-04
ARA-00
NSAE-00
SS0-00
EAP-00
STRATEGIC STABILITY. AS PART OF OUR OVERALL NEGOTIATING
AIT-02
PA-02
NRRC-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 AS-02 USIE-00
EFFORT AS THE TALKS-RESUME IN GENEVA, THE UNITED STATES
SP-02
MMP-01
SNP-01
PRS-01
01G-04
SDEL-04
SART-01
WILL ALSO PROPOSE THAT THE TWO SIDES MAKE A SPECIAL
P-32
/075 R
EFFORT TO AGREE ON, AND TO BEGIN IMPLEMENTING AS SOCN AS
POSSIBLE, CERTAIN VERIFICATION AND STABILITY MEASURES
DRAFTED BY: WHITE HOUSE TEXT
DRAWN FROM PROPOSALS THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE ALREADY
APPROVED BY: PM/SNP: KNBROWN
ADVANCED IN START OR OTHER CONTEXTS. THESE MEASURES WILL
S/S-0: LGERSON
S/S:JFCOLLINS
ENHANCE VERIFICATION OF A START TREATY AND CONTRIBUTE TO
305471 3002512 /72
STRATEGIC STABILITY. EARLY AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
P 3002281 JUN 89 ZEX
OF THEM WILL SPEED RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES, AND
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
GIVE ADDED MOMENTUM TO THE EFFORTS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS PRIORITY
TO CONCLUDE EXPEDITIOUSLY A START AGREEMENT.
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY
INFO CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
OUR APPROACH TO THESE ARMS NEGOTIATIONS AND TO OUR FORCE
MSC WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS ARE COMPLEMENTARY AND MUTUALLY
DOD WASHDC PRIORITY
REINFORCING. MAINTAINING CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR
DETERRENT FORCES IS ESSENTIAL BOTH TO OUR SECURITY AND TO
UNCLAS STATE 207986
OUR ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE SOUND AND STABILIZING
E.O. 12356: N/A
AGREEMENTS. A SUCCESSFUL START TREATY WILL REDUCE THE
TAGS: PARM, NST, US
RISK OF WAR, BUT WILL NOT DIMINISH OUR NEED TO RELY ON
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY MATERIALS ON RESUMPTION OF
MODERNIZED, EFFECTIVE STRATEGIC FORCES FOR CONTINUED
NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS (NST)
DETERRENCE. INDEED, OUR SECURITY WOULD BE REDUCED RATHER
THAN ENHANCED IF WE DO NOT MODERNIZE OUR FORCES WHILE THE
1. THIS CABLE CONTAINS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY MATERIALS FOR
SOVIETS CONTINUE TO MODERNIZE THEIRS. WE MUST CONTINUE
THE RESUMPTION OF THE NST (START AND DEFENSE & SPACE
TO PURSUE BOTH OUR FORCE MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL,
TALKS), FOR USE IN BRIEFINGS OR FOR RESPONDING TO PRESS
AND NOT MAKE THE MISTAKE OF TREATING ONE AS A SUBSTITUTE
INQUIRES. PARAGRAPH TWO IS TEXT OF A WHITE HOUSE PRESS
FOR THE OTHER.
RELEASE OF JUNE 19, PARAGRAPH THREE is GENERAL PRESS
THEMES FOR NST, PARAGRAPH FOUR IS NST Q'S AND A'S, AND
OUR NEGOTIATORS RETURN TO THE BARGAINING TABLE WITH MY
PARAGRAPH FIVE IS Q'S AND A'S ON THE NEW U.S.
FIRM PLEDGE THAT WE WILL WORK VIGOROUSLY TO ACHIEVE FAIR
VERIFICATION AND STABILITY PROPOSAL.
AND FAR-REACHING AGREEMENTS THAT STRENGTHEN PEACE.
NOTHING HAS HIGHER PRIORITY. I AM HEARTENED BY THE
2. STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
GROWING EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO
NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ABOUT AGREEMENTS THAT PROMISE TO
REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR. MUCH HAS ALREADY BEEN
TODAY MARKS THE OPENING OF ROUND XI OF THE NUCLEAR AND
ACCOMPLISHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS; MUCH REMAINS TO BE
SPACE TALKS IN GENEVA. AMBASSADOR RICHARD BURT, THE
DONE. OUR COMMITMENT IS UNWAVERING. WE MUST BUILD ON
OUR ACHIEVEMENTS THUS FAR TO REACH AGREEMENTS THAT
FULFILL OUR OBJECTIVES OF REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR AND
CHIEF NEGOTIATOR TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS,
ENHANCING SECURITY AND STABILITY.
HEADS THE U.S. DELEGATION. AMBASSADOR HENRY COOPER IS
OUR CHIEF NEGOTIATOR TO THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS.
3. PRESS THEMES
MY OBJECTIVE FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS TO ACHIEVE
VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS THAT IMPROVE OUR SECURITY WHILE
ON JUNE 19, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION
ENHANCING STABILITY AND REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR. IN THE
RESUMED THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS IN GENEVA.
STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS, OUR EMPHASIS WILL BE ON
AMBASSADOR RICHARD BURT, THE CHIEF NEGOTIATOR FOR THE
CREATING A MORE STABLE NUCLEAR BALANCE AND STRENGTHENING
STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS, HEADS THE U.S.
DETERRENCE BY REDUCING AND CONSTRAINING THOSE STRATEGIC
DELEGATION. AMBASSADOR HENRY COOPER IS THE CHIEF
NUCLEAR FORCES WHICH POSE THE GREATEST THREAT TO SECURITY
NEGOTIATOR FOR THE DERENSE AND SPACE TALKS.
AND STABILITY. WE WILL PURSUE COMPLEMENTARY GOALS IN THE
DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS, SEEKING AN AGREEMENT ON A
-- OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS, WHICH
COOPERATIVE TRANSITION TO A MORE STABLE NUCLEAR BALANCE
COMPRISE THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS AND THE
THAT RELIES INCREASINGLY ON DEFENSES.
DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS, ARE TO CONCLUDE EQUITABLE AND
VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS THAT WILL IMPROVE OUR SECURITY,
AFTER EXTENSIVE DELIBERATIONS WITH MY ADVISERS, I HAVE
ENHANCE STABILITY AND REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR.
APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE U.S. START DELEGATION.
THESE INSTRUCTIONS REAFFIRM MUCH OF THE TREATY TEXT
-- IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS, OUR EMPHASIS
NEGOTIATED WITH THE SOVIETS BY THE PREVIOUS
WILL BE ON CREATING A MORE STABLE NUCLEAR BALANCE AND
ADMINISTRATION. MODIFICATIONS WILL BE PROPOSED IN SOME
STRENGTHENING DETERRENCE BY REDUCING AND CONSTRAINING
CASES. THE U.S. WILL BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS ALL THE
THOSE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES WHICH POSE THE GREATEST
ISSUES ON WHICH THE TWO SIDES HAVE NOT REACHED AGREEMENT
THREAT TO SECURITY AND STABILITY.
AS THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED. IN ADDITION, I HAVE
RESERVED THE RIGHT TO INTRODUCE NEW INITIATIVES AIMED AT
-- WE WILL PURSUE COMPLEMENTARY GOALS IN THE DEFENSE AND
FURTHER ENHANCING SECURITY AND STRATEGIC STABILITY.
SPACE TALKS, SEEKING AN AGREEMENT ON A COOPERATIVE
TRANSITION TO A MORE STABLE NUCLEAR BALANCE THAT RELIES
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
OUTGOING
TELEGRAM
Department of State
PAGE 02 OF 05 STATE 207986
6738
STATE 207986
6738
MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS AND ARMS CONTROL, AND NOT MAKE THE
INCREASINGLY ON DEFENSES, SHOULD THEY PROVE FEASIBLE,
MISTAKE OF TREATING ONE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE OTHER.
WHILE PRESERVING OUR OPTIONS TO DEPLOY STRATEGIC DEFENSES
WHEN THEY ARE READY.
WE WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT ALL THE RIGHTS
ACCORDED BY A START AGREEMENT AND THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY
OUR PROPOSALS IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS ARE FOR
IT WILL APPLY EQUALLY TO BOTH SIDES.
DEEP REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AIMED AT
CREATING A MORE STABLE NUCLEAR BALANCE. THE REDUCTIONS
:- IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATIONS, AS IN START,
WE PROPOSE ARE NOT FOR THEIR OWN SAKE. THEY ARE DESIGNED
OUR FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE IS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR BY
TO SUPPORT OUR GOAL OF STRENGTHENING DETERRENCE BY
ENHANCING SECURITY, STABILITY, AND PREDICTABILITY. WE
REDUCING THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH A FIRST STRIKE, EVEN IN
BELIEVE THAT ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY OFFER NEW PROMISE FOR
A CRISIS.
DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE DEFENSES TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE.
THE OBJECTIVES OF OUR START PROPOSALS ARE:
-- WE WILL PURSUE DISCUSSIONS IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE
TALKS ABOUT MOVING COOPERATIVELY TOWARD A MORE STABILE
TO FOCUS REDUCTIONS ON THOSE FORCES WHICH POSE
STRATEGIC BALANCE WITH INCREASED RELIANCE ON STRATEGIC
THE GREATEST THREAT TO SECURITY AND STABILITY,
DEFENSES, SHOULD THEY PROVE FEASIBLE, AND TO PRESERVE OUR
AND ENCOURAGE MOVEMENT TO MORE STABILIZING
OPTIONS TO DEPLOY ADVANCED DEFENSES WHEN THEY ARE READY.
SYSTEMS;
U.S. NEGOTIATORS HAVE WORKED TOWARD A DEFENSE AND
TO FOSTER GREATER PREDICTABILITY AND LOWER THE
SPACE TREATY BUILDING ON THE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED AT THE
UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT THE FUTURE STRATEGIC THREATS
DECEMBER 1987 WASHINGTON SUMMIT. LAST YEAR, THE U.S.
THAT EACH SIDE WILL FACE;
PRESENTED DRAFT PROTOCOL PROVISIONS ON PREDICTABILITY OR
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC
TO ENABLE US TO VERIFY EFFECTIVELY THAT THE OTHER
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE.
SIDE IS COMPLYING WITH THE AGREEMENT.
WE WILL NOT AGREE TO ALLOW THE COMPLETION OF A START
WE HAVE ALREADY MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD A
AGREEMENT TO BE HELD HOSTAGE TO COMPLETION OF A DEFENSE
START TREATY: A 400 PAGE JOINT DRAFT TREATY TEXT
AND SPACE AGREEMENT. WE WILL ALSO NOT CONCLUDE NEW
REFLECTS BROAD AREAS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES. WE
STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION
INTEND TO PROCEED IN THIS NEW ROUND OF TALKS ON THE BASIS
OF THIS DOCUMENT, AND WILL LOOK FOR WAYS TO REINFORCE OUR
CORRECTS ITS KRASNOYARSK VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY.
EMPHASIS ON SECURITY, SURVIVABILITY AND STRATEGIC
STABILITY.
-- THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION LEFT AN EXCELLENT
FOUNDATION UPON WHICH TO BUILD. PRESIDENT BUSH WAS PART
VERIFICATION IS ONE OF THE MOST COMPLEX ISSUES IN THE
OF THAT EFFORT WHEN HE WAS VICE-PRESIDENT. THERE WILL
NEGOTIATIONS, AND ONE OF THE MOST CRITICAL TO OUR
NATURALLY BE CONSIDERABLE CONTINUITY IN OUR APPROACH TO
SECURITY. AS PART OF OUR OVERALL NEGOTIATING EFFORT AS
THESE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT WE RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE
THE TALKS RESUME IN GENEVA, THE UNITED STATES PROPOSES
CHANGES AND INTRODUCE NEW IDEAS IN THE COURSE OF THE
THAT THE TWO SIDES MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT TO WORK OUT, AND
TALKS.
BEGIN IMPLEMENTING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, CERTAIN
VERIFICATION AND STABILITY MEASURES DRAWN FROM PROPOSALS
4. NST Q'S AND A'S
THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE ALREADY ADVANCED IN START OR OTHER
CONTEXTS.
Q. YOU STATE THAT THE U.S. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO
THESE MEASURES WILL ENHANCE OUR EFFORT TO ACHIEVE AN
INTRODUCE NEW IDEAS IN THE DRAFT START TREATY. CAN YOU
EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME FOR THE START TREATY AND
PROVIDE ANY SPECIFICS AS TO WHAT NEW IDEAS YOU MIGHT BE
CONTRIBUTE TO STRATEGIC STABILITY. EARLY IMPLEMENTATION
CONSIDERING?
OF THEM WILL SPEED RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES, AND
GIVE ADDED MOMENTUM TO THE EFFORTS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES
A. AS WE HAVE SAID, THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION LEFT AN
EXCELLENT FOUNDATION UPON WHICH TO BUILD IN THE AREA OF
TO CONCLUDE A START AGREEMENT.
ARMS CONTROL, AND THERE WILL BE A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF
CONTINUITY IN THIS ADMINISTRATION. NEGOTIATIONS ARE A
OUR APPROACHES TO START AND TO OUR STRATEGIC FORCE
GIVE-AND-TAKE PROCESS, SO WE RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE
MODERNIZATION PROGRAM ARE COMPLEMENTARY AND MUTUALLY
CHANGES AND TO INTRODUCE NEW IDEAS. WE HAVE AND WE WILL
REINFORCING. MAINTAINING CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR
PRESENT PROPOSALS TO THE SOVIETS IN THE COURSE OF THE
DETERRENT FORCES IS ESSENTIAL BOTH TO OUR SECURITY AND TO
NEGOTIATIONS.
OUR ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE SOUND AND STABILIZING
AGREEMENTS. OUR AIMS IN BOTH THE NEGOTIATIONS AND OUR
Q. CAN YOU TELL US WHICH ELEMENTS OF THE REAGAN
STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM ARE TO ENSURE A MORE
ADMINISTRATION. START POSITION YOU ARE PREPARED TO
STABLE NUCLEAR BALANCE BY REDUCING THE NATURE AND SCOPE
REAFFIRM?
OF THE THREAT TO U.S. FORCES, TO DECREASE THE
VULNERABILITY OF OUR FORCES TO THE THREAT THAT REMAINS,
A. AS I HAVE SAID, THERE WILL BE A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT
AND TO LOWER THE UNCERTAINTIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF FORCES
OF CONTINUITY: WE WILL BE WORKING FROM THE JOINT DRAFT
BETWEEN THE SIDES.
TREATY TEXT WHICH IDENTIFIES AREAS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE TWO SIDES. IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE, HOWEVER, TO
A SUCCESSFUL START TREATY WILL NOT DIMINISH OUR NEED
COMMENT ON SPECIFICS AT THIS TIME.
FOR MODERNIZED, EFFECTIVE STRATEGIC FORCES FOR CONTINUED
DETERRENCE. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO MODERNIZE THEIR
Q. HAVE YOU COMPLETED YOUR OVERALL REVIEW OF STRATEGIC
FORCES. WE MUST CONTINUE TO PURSUE BOTH OUR FORCE
POLICY BEFORE RETURNING TO THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS?
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
OUTGOING
TELEGRAM
Department of State
PAGE 03 OF 05 STATE 207986
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STATE 207986
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- AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. THE TWO SIDES
A. ALL PORTIONS OF THE REVIEW RELEVANT TO THE RESUMPTION
HAVE AGREED ON THE NEED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CATEGORIES
OF THESE TALKS ARE COMPLETE. OF COURSE, WE WILL CONTINUE
OF HEAVY BOMBERS WITH DIFFERENT ARMAMENTS, FOR THE RIGHT
TO REVIEW OUR OPTIONS AS THE NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS.
TO CONVERT BOMBERS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER, AND FOR
SOME OF THE COUNTING RULES FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND THEIR
Q. DISCUSSIONS OF THE U.S. START POSITION SEEM TO PUT
ARMAMENTS. HOWEVER, IMPORTANT ISSUES STILL NEED TO BE
LESS EMPHASIS ON THE CONCEPT OF DEEP REDUCTIONS. IS THAT
RESOLVED, INCLUDING THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS TO BE
A CHANGE IN THE U.S. POSITION?
ATTRIBUTED TO HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR ALCMS,
HOW TO TREAT HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS
A. NO. THE U.S. GOAL IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAS ALWAYS
ONLY, HOW TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL
ALCMS, AND THE RANGE THRESHOLD ABOVE WHICH NUCLEAR-ARMED
BEEN TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR BY CONCLUDING AN
AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WOULD BE SUBJECT TO START LIMITS
EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT FOR
ON NUCLEAR ALCMS.
REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARSENALS, FOCUSING ON THE MOST
DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS. THAT OBJECTIVE HAS NOT CHANGED.
SOVIET LINKAGE OF START TO ABM. THE U.S.
THE REDUCTIONS ARE NOT MERELY FOR THEIR OWN SAKE BUT ARE
BELIEVES THAT START AND DEFENSE AND SPACE TREATIES MUST
DESIGNED TO ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY AND SECURITY.
EACH STAND ON THEIR OWN MERITS. THE CURRENT SOVIET
POSITION, WHICH WOULD ALLOW EITHER SIDE TO SUSPEND
Q. WILL THE U.S. BE INTRODUCING NEW IDEAS IN THE DEFENSE
IMPLEMENTATION OF START REDUCTIONS IF THEY CLAIMED THE
AND SPACE TALKS AS WELL?
OTHER SIDE HAD VIOLATED THE ABM TREATY, IS NOT
ACCEPTABLE. SUCH LINKAGE WOULD CRIPPLE THE SDI PROGRAM
A. THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED THAT OUR GOALS FOR SD1 AND
AND UNDERMINE THE CONFIDENCE NEEDED TO UNDERTAKE
OUR APPROACH IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS ARE SOUND AND
FAR-REACHING START REDUCTIONS.
REMAIN UNCHANGED. BUT WE RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE
CHANGES AND PRESENT NEW IDEAS AS WELL.
VERIFICATION. OF ALL THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES,
VERIFICATION MAY BE THE MOST COMPLEX. AS PART OF OUR
Q. WHAT ARE THE MAJOR ISSUES THAT REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED
OVERALL NEGOTIATING EFFORT AS THE TALKS RESUME, THE U.S.
IN START?
IS PROPOSING THAT THE TWO SIDES MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT TO
AGREE ON, AND BEGIN IMPLEMENTING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE,
A. MAJOR ISSUES REMAINING TO BE RESOLVED INCLUDE:
CERTAIN VERIFICATION MEASURES -- AS WELL AS CERTAIN
STABILITY MEASURES DRAWN FROM PROPOSALS THAT BOTH
MOBILE ICBMS. THE PRESIDENT HAS STATED THAT
SIDES HAVE ALREADY ADVANCED IN START OR IN OTHER
HE CONSIDERS MOBILITY ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE THE
CONTEXTS. (SEE BELOW)
SURVIVABILITY OF OUR ICBM FORCES. HE HAS, THEREFORE,
ASKED THE CONGRESS TO FUND THE RE-BASING OF THE
Q. HOW SOON CAN YOU GET A START AGREEMENT?
PEACEKEEPER (MX) TO MAKE IT RAIL-MOBILE, AND THE
DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE ROAD-MOBILE SMALL ICBM.
A. WE ARE NOT NEGOTIATING AGAINST ANY DEADLINE. WHILE
CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARD A START
THE CURRENT U.S. POSITION IS TO BAN MOBILE ICBMS. WE
AGREEMENT, THE ISSUES WHICH REMAIN ARE COMPLEX AND
CANNOT CHANGE OUR POSITION UNTIL CONGRESS INDICATES ITS
DIFFICULT. WE RETURN TO GENEVA READY TO TACKLE THESE
APPROVAL OF THE MOBILE MISSILE PROGRAMS WHICH THE
PRESIDENT HAS PROPOSED.
DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. IF THE SOVIETS ARE SIMILARLY
PREPARED, FURTHER PROGRESS CAN BE ACHIEVED.
LET ME NOTE THAT TO CONCLUDE A START TREATY THAT
PERMITS MOBILE MISSILES, WE WOULD NEED TO BE SURE BOTH
Q. WHERE DO WE STAND IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS?
THAT CONGRESS WILL SUPPORT MOBILE ICBMS OF OUR OWN AND
THAT, LIKE ALL TREATY LIMITS, THE START PROVISIONS ON
A. U.S. NEGOTIATORS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO WORK TOWARD A
MOBILE MISSILES ARE EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE.
JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF A DEFENSE AND SPACE AGREEMENT,
BUILDING ON THE UNDERSTANDING OUTLINED AT THE DECEMBER
ICBM WARHEAD SUBLIMIT. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT
1987 WASHINGTON SUMMIT. WHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE REFUSED
AGREED TO A SUBLIMIT OF 3,000-3,300 ON THE NUMBER OF ICBM
TO PREPARE SUCH A TEXT, PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON DRAFT
WARHEADS. THE PURPOSE OF THE U.S.-PROPOSED SUBLIMIT IS
PROTOCOL PROVISIONS ON PREDICTABILITY AND
TO ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY BY FOCUSING REDUCTIONS IN
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC
THESE DESTABILIZING WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND TO ENCOURAGE
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES.
MOVEMENT TOWARD MORE STABILIZING STRATEGIC FORCES.
IMPORTANT AREAS OF DIFFERENCE REMAIN:
SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. AT THE
WASHINGTON SUMMIT THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO FIND A MUTUALLY
NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABH TREATY. WHILE
ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF LIMITING
THE U.S. COULD ACCEPT A LIMITED COMMITMENT NOT TO
DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE, NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS OUTSIDE THE
WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY FOR A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF
TIME IN ORDER TO DEPLOY SDI, IT INSISTS THAT NORMAL
6000 WARHEAD AND 1608 STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLE
INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED WITHDRAWAL RIGHTS BASED ON
LIMITS, AND TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AND EFFECTIVE
SUPREME NATIONAL INTERESTS AND MATERIAL BREACH BE
METHODS OF VERIFICATION OF SUCH LIMITS. DESPITE OUR
INCLUDED IN THE D&S TREATY. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, WANT
EXTENSIVE EFFORTS, THE U.S. HAS NOT YET FOUND WAYS TO
AN UNCONDITIONAL COMMITMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW, WHICH NO
EFFECTIVELY VERIFY LIMITS ON NUCLEAR ARMED SLCMS. IN THE
SOVEREIGN NATION COULD ACCEPT.
ABSENCE OF A WORKABLE PLAN FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION,
THE U.S. HAS PROPOSED THAT THE SIDES SHOULD MAKE
ABM TREATY RESTRICTIONS ON RESEARCH,
NON-BINDING DECLARATIONS OF PLANNED NUCLEAR SLCM NUMBERS.
DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING. THE SOVIET UNION SEEKS GREATER
RESTRICTIONS THAN THOSE AGREED TO IN THE ABM TREATY IN AN
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
OUTGOING
TELEGRAM
Department of State
PAGE 04 OF 05 STATE 207986
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STATE 207986
6736
EFFORT TO LIMIT THE U.S. SDI PROGRAM. THE U.S. SEEKS TO
PRESERVE THE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING RIGHTS
AS WE CONTINUE TO TRY TO RESOLVE ALL OTHER OUTSTANDING
PROVIDED IN THE ABM TREATY.
ISSUES. THE MAJORITY OF MEASURES ARE DESIGNED TO SUPPORT
VERIFICATION, WHICH IS ONE OF THE MOST COMPLEX AREAS, AND
THE REGIME THAT WOULD FOLLOW THE END OF THE
WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE A START TREATY CAN BE
NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. THE SOVIET UNION SEEKS
COMPLETED. OTHER MEASURES WOULD IMPROVE STABILITY.
CONTINUATION OF AN UNSPECIFIED RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION
EARLY AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH MEASURES WOULD
OF THE ABM TREATY FOLLOWING THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD.
GIVE BOTH SIDES PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE, WHICH IN TURN WOULD
THE U.S. AGREES THAT THE ABH TREATY WOULD REMAIN IN
SPEED THE PROCESS OF RESOLVING OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND
EFFECT AFTER THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD, BUT EITHER PARTY
FACILITATE THE EFFORTS OF THE TWO SIDES TO CONCLUDE A
WOULD BE FREE TO CHOOSE TO DEPLOY STRATEGIC MISSILE
START AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
DEFENSES THAT ARE BEYOND THE LIMITATIONS IN THE ABM
TREATY UPON GIVING THE OTHER PARTY SIX MONTHS WRITTEN
THE MEASURES WE PROPOSE TO WORK ON INCLUDE:
NOTIFICATION OF ITS INTENTION TO DO so. IN THAT CASE,
THE PARTY COULD DEPLOY STRATEGIC DEFENSES WITHOUT FURTHER
-- ESTABLISHMENT NOW OF ON-SITE PERIMETER/PORTAL
REFERENCE TO THE ABM TREATY.
MONITORING OF CERTAIN MISSILE PRODUCTION FACILITIES;
PREDICTABILITY MEASURES. THE U.S. HAS
-- AN EXCHANGE OF DATA ON EACH SIDES' STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
PROPOSED A SET OF FAR-REACHING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
FORCES;
MEASURES TO ENHANCE PREDICTABILITY ABOUT THE SIDES'
-- PROHIBITING ENCRYPTION OF TELEMETRY ON ICBMS AND SLBMS:
FUTURE ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC BALLISTIC
MISSILE DEFENSE. THE SOVIET UNION HAS PROPOSED A SET OF
FAMILIARIZATION WITH PROCEDURES FOR INSPECTION OF
UNWORKABLE MEASURES IN AN EFFORT TO ENHANCE VERIFICATION
BALLISTIC MISSILES;
OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY, RATHER THAN ADD
PREDICTABILITY TO THE D&S TREATY.
ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF SHORT-TIME-OF-FLIGHT SLBMS;
Q. IS SDI A STUMBLING BLOCK?
-- NOTIFICATION OF STRATEGIC EXERCISES; AND
A. THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID WE WILL VIGOROUSLY PURSUE SDI
-- EXPERIMENTATION ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF MISSILES
AND DEPLOY IT WHEN IT IS READY. THE SOVIETS SHOULD
("TAGGING").
UNDERSTAND - PARTICULARLY SINCE PRESIDENT GORBACHEV HAS
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY HAVE THEIR OWN PROGRAM IN THIS
Q. ARE YOU SAYING THAT THE TWO SIDES HAVE TO AGREE ON
VITAL AREA -- OUR INSISTENCE ON INVESTIGATING FULLY THE
THESE VERIFICATION MEASURES BEFORE YOU CAN NEGOTIATE AND
FEASIBILITY OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES.
SETTLE THE OTHER ISSUES IN THE TREATY? IN OTHER WORDS,
IS AGREEMENT ON THIS VERIFICATION PACKAGE A PRE-CONDITION
Q. WHAT IS THE U.S. POSITION ON THE BROAD INTERPRETATION
FOR A TREATY?
OF THE ABM TREATY?
A. NO. THIS IS NOT A "TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT PACKAGE" OR A
A. IT HAS NOT CHANGED. IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS,
PRE-CONDITION. WE ARE GOING TO BE NEGOTIATING IN GENEVA
WE SEEK TO PRESERVE OUR RIGHT UNDER THE ABM TREATY TO
ON ALL OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES AS WELL AS VERIFICATION
DEVELOP AND TEST ADVANCED ABM SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS.
AND STABILITY MEASURES. IT is A LIST OF PROPOSALS AND
IDEAS ON AREAS WHERE WE THINK WE CAN GET A HEAD START ON
Q. WHAT MUST THE SOVIET UNION DO TO RESOLVE THE
RESOLVING SOME OUTSTANDING ISSUES.
KRASNOYARSK VIOLATION? WHY IS THE U.S. EVEN NEGOTIATING
IF IT WILL NOT SIGN ANY AGREEMENT UNTIL THE KRASNOYARSK
WHAT WE PROPOSE IS TO MAKE AN ACCELERATED EFFORT IN THIS
VIOLATION IS CORRECTED?
AREA AS PART OF OUR OVERALL NEGOTIATING EFFORT.
A. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE WILL NOT
WE BELIEVE THESE IDEAS WILL FACILITATE AGREEMENT ON
CONCLUDE ANY NEW STRATEGIC AGREEMENT UNTIL THEY CORRECT
EFFECTIVE AND WORKABLE PROVISIONS FOR THE TREATY, WHICH
THEIR VIOLATION AT KRASNOYARSK, WHICH IS A VIOLATION OF A
CENTRAL ELEMENT OF THE ABM TREATY. WE BELIEVE THE
WOULD SPEED CONCLUSION OF A START TREATY.
VIOLATION CAN ONLY BE CORRECTED BY DISMANTLEMENT OF THE
RADAR AND DESTRUCTION OF THE TRANSMITTER AND RECEIVER
Q. WHAT HAPPENS IF THE SOVIETS DON'T AGREE? WHAT
BUILDINGS, INCLUDING THEIR FOUNDATIONS, BUT WE WILL
HAPPENS IF YOU DON'T MAKE QUICK PROGRESS? WILL THIS
CONSIDER OTHER SOVIET PROPOSALS THAT WILL MEET OUR
DELAY COMPLETING THE TREATY?
CRITERIA. THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY
AT THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS, SEEKING PROGRESS ON ALL
A. WE WILL WORK ON THOSE THINGS NOW IN WHICH THE SOVIETS
THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES, so THAT WE WILL BE PREPARED TO
EXPRESS AN INTEREST. REMEMBER, THIS IS A LIST, NOT A
MOVE FORWARD QUICKLY AS SOON AS THE KRASNOYARSK PROBLEM
PACKAGE. BUT, IN THE END, ALL THESE ISSUES NEED TO BE
IS. CORRECTED.
ENGAGED.
5. Q'S AND A'S ON VERIFICATION AND STABILITY MEASURES
Q. ARE YOU PROPOSING NEW VERIFICATION PROCEDURES?
A. THIS PROPOSAL CAPITALIZES ON A LOT OF GOOD WORK THAT
Q. WHAT ARE THE VERIFICATION AND STABILITY MEASURES YOU
HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE ON THE START TREATY, AND WE WANT TO
ARE PROPOSING?
BUILD ON THAT. IT DRAWS ON PROPOSALS, BOTH SIDES HAVE
ADVANCED III THE START NEGOTIATIONS AND IN OTHER CONTEXTS.
A. THE U.S. IS PROPOSING TO ACCELERATE WORK IN THE START
NEGOTIATIONS ON VERIFICATION AND STABILITY MEASURES EVEN
THE NEW ELEMENT OF THE PROPOSAL IS TO ACCELERATE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
OUTGOING
Department of State
TELEGRAM
PAGE 05 OF 05 STATE 207986
6738
AGREEMENT AND EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF SOME OF THESE
MEASURES TO HELP WITH VERIFICATION AND WITH THE
NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY AS A WHOLE.
Q. ARE YOU PROPOSING VERIFICATION MEASURES IN START
NOW BECAUSE THERE HAVE BEEN PROBLEMS IN VERIFICATION OF
THE INF TREATY?
A. NO. THE POINT IS THAT THE INF EXPERIENCE HAS
UNDERLINED THE-NEED TO ADDRESS VERIFICATION ISSUES EARLY
ON IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE AMOUNT OF DETAIL IN THE INF
TREATY IS ENORMOUS, AND WE EXPECT THAT VERIFICATION FOR A
START TREATY WOULD BE EVEN MORE COMPLEX. BY GETTING A
HANDLE ON THESE DETAILS NOW, EVEN AS WE CONTINUE TO
NEGOTIATE THE START PROVISIONS, WE CAN FACILITATE
RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS AND EXPEDITE
CONCLUSION OF A START AGREEMENT.
WE DO NOT WANT TO FIND OURSELVES IN THE POSITION OF
HAVING REACHED SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT ON ALL OF THE START
ISSUES, BUT UNABLE TO COMPLETE THE TREATY BECAUSE WORK ON
VERIFICATION REMAINS TO BE DONE.
Q. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY STABILITY MEASURES? WHAT ARE THE
PROPOSALS THERE?
A. CERTAIN MEASURES CAN ALLAY CONCERNS AND ENHANCE BOTH
SIDES' CONFIDENCE AGAINST CERTAIN THREATS.
THE PROPOSAL WE HAVE MADE IN GENEVA WILL INCLUDE THIS
OBJECTIVE AS WELL AS VERIFICATION.
Q. IS IT TRUE THAT YOU ARE PUTTING VERIFICATION ISSUES
UP FRONT IN THE START NEGOTIATIONS?
A. WE ARE NOT PUTTING VERIFICATION FIRST AT THE EXPENSE
OF OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE NEGOTIATION. WE CONTINUE TO
WORK ON VERIFICATION AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE START
TREATY SIMULTANEOUSLY. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO EXPAND THE
SCOPE OF THE VERIFICATION ISSUE BY, HYPOTHETICALLY FOR
EXAMPLE, ESTABLISHING TECHNICAL GROUPS WHICH CAN SIT DOWN
AND DISCUSS THE TYPES OF EQUIPMENT THAT MAY BE NECESSARY
FOR VERIFICATION MEASURES. THIS MAY INCLUDE, FOR
EXAMPLE, VISITS TO SITES IN EACH OTHER'S COUNTRY. THIS
KIND OF APPROACH IS DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT WHEN THE
SUBSTANCE OF THE START NEGOTIATIONS IS AGREED UPON, WE
WILL BE FULLY READY TO MOVE FORWARD WITH IMPLEMENTATION.
Q. SOME CRITICS SAY THAT THIS PROCEDURE WILL SLOW DOWN
THE START NEGOTIATIONS. IS THIS TRUE?
A. ACTUALLY, THIS APPROACH WILL ACCELERATE THE
NEGOTIATIONS. VERIFICATION IS ONE OF THE MOST COMPLEX
AREAS TO DEAL WITH, THEREFORE, IT MAKES SENSE TO WORK ON
IT INTENSIVELY NOW. IN ANY EVENT, A START TREATY CANNOT
BE CONCLUDED UNTIL EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS ARE
AGREED, so WE NEED TO TACKLE THE VERIFICATION ISSUE
SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH OTHER START ISSUES.
THE U.S. PROPOSAL IN NO WAY INVOLVES ANY PRE-CONDITION.
6. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. BAKER
UNCLASSIFIED
//.
Mary Kate,
Here is a clean,
original copy
of Re material
I foxed you.
Ive
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
June 30, 1989
TO: MARY KATE GRANT
OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, THE WHITE HOUSE
Fax 456-6218
Confirmation No. 456-2930
FROM: JOSEPH DUGGAN
OFFICE OF AMBASSADOR ROWNY
647-4153
Attached are draft talking points we have prepared on SDI, following the
format of the talking points you showed me earlier this week.
The talking points are drawn largely from up-to-date information
from the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization at the Pentagon
and from the Vice President's definitive speech on SDI delivered yesterday
at the National Academey of Sciences.
June 30, 1989
TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
The President is committed to the development and deployment of
Strategic Defenses when they are ready.
By developing the means to defend against ballistic missiles
that threaten us, we also lessen the incentives for aggression
thus enhancing stability and deterrence,
The primary obstacles to SDI can generally be categorized as
technological, strategic, political and economic.
Technology and SDI
*
Though many complex scientific and engineering problems remain,
there appear to be no technological show-stoppers for SDI.
In some areas such as kinetic kill, technological breakthroughs
have been achieved. A system popularly known as Brilliant
Pebbles is one example.
Strategy and SDI
*
On June 29, 1989, Vice President Quayle outlined how SDI will
one day alter the strategic equation between offense and defense.
SDI's ultimate goal is the devaluation in the strategic utility
of ballistic missiles.
*
We are seeking a more stable balance that relies increasingly on
defense. It would be preferable, but not necessary, if the
Soviets would work with us to develop a cooperative arrangement
for making this transition,
Progress on strategic offensive arms reductions and strategic
defense are not mutually exclusive -- on the contrary, START and
SDI are complementary.
In general, the more progress we make toward offensive
reductions, the more we will need to rely on SDI to help us
deter, or deal with, possible Soviet cheating or breakout.
SDI is an insurance policy for START.
First, the Soviets' largely modern land-based ICBM
force is projected to ensure them a hefty first-strike
capability well into the 21st century. A reasonably
reliable system of strategic defenses would diminish
our anxiety over this ICBM threat.
-2-
Second, the U.S. would be better able to cope with the
problem of Soviet mobile ICBMs. SDI would complement
a mobile verification regime in START that most
experts feel would be far from perfect.
Third, the sheer complexity of the proposed START
treaty will probably result in unavoidable loopholes
that arms control on its own cannot plug. In turn,
this situation would jeopardize treaty ratification,
Strategic defenses could help plug the loopholes.
*
Finally, Strategic Defense will be the only thoroughly reliable
way to address the problem of accidental, unauthorized, or
third-world "madman" launches of ballistic missiles.
Concerns are no longer hypothetical. The Director of
Central Intelligence testified recently that up to 15
developing nations could have a ballistic launch capability
by the turn of the century.
The instability of many regimes raises another frightening
scenario -- who has authority to release missiles during
periods of intense civil strife? As the nuclear and
chemical club grows, this question will be asked more often.
Controlling missile technology from the supply side is not
enough -- ultimately we must have the capability to defend
ourselves against ballistic missiles.
One interesting possibility is that with a space-based
defense, the U.S. could also defend other countries against
rogue launches.
Politics and Economics of SDI
The recent recommendation by the majority of the members of the
House Armed Services Committee to cut the SDI budget by over a
billion dollars is a shortsighted move.
*
Just at the time American ingenuity is starting to produce
technological breakthroughs, SDI opponents are trying to reduce
the funding to a level which could not sustain a viable program.
The strategic rationale for SDI must be made clearer to the
American public and to their representatives in Congress.
Strategic modernization and strategic defense should not be
allowed to become an either/or proposition -- as pointed out
above, offenses and defenses are synergistic.
-3-
What Next?
*
In order to support a deployment decision in three or four
years, the President must be able to depend on the results of his
carefully designed research and development program. It must be
adequately funded.
*
The program schedule for the next two years includes a number of
very important tests and experiments. These include:
The first-ever test of a Neutral Particle Beam in Space.
Space tests of tracking, pointing, sensor, and
communications technologies.
Numerous interceptor tests for kinetic kill systems such as
Brilliant Pebbles.
*
All these early tests comply with the ABM Treaty. Later on,
however, tests that fall outside the Treaty will be required
before the President can confidently make a deployment
decision.
Bottom Line
*
The Congress and the public it serves must come to recognize
that SDI is one of several answers to the many strategic
problems the U.S. faces going into the next century.
SDI would dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war by
denying an aggressor the ability to execute a first strike.
SDI would provide the American people with much-needed
insurance against an accidental or inadvertent attack or
against a deliberate launch by an irrational government.
*
The Bush Administration continues to believe that strategic
defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary,
and morally imperative.
ARMS CONTROL AGENCY
TEL: 202-647-6721
Jun 30,89 15:31 No.003 P.01
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
June 30, 1989
TO: MARY KATE GRANT
OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, THE WHITE HOUSE
Fax 456-6218
Confirmation No. 456-2930
FROM: JOSEPH DUGGAN
OFFICE OF AMBASSADOR ROWNY
647-4153
Attached are draft talking points we have prepared on SDI, following the
format of the talking points you showed me earlier this week.
The talking points are drawn largely from up-to-date information
from the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization at the Pentagon
and from the Vice President's definitive speech on SDI delivered yesterday
at the National Academey of Sciences.
ARMS CONTROL AGENCY
TEL: 202-647-6721
Jun 30,89 15:31 No.003 P.04
-3-
What Next?
*
In order to support a deployment decision in three or four
years, the President must be able to depend on the results of his
carefully designed research and development program. It must be
adequately funded.
*
The program schedule for the next two years includes a number of
very important tests and experiments. These include:
**
The first-ever test of a Neutral Particle Beam in Space.
**
Space tests of tracking, pointing, sensor, and
communications technologies.
Numerous interceptor tests for kinetic kill systems such as
Brilliant Pebbles,
*
All these early tests comply with the ABM Treaty. Later on,
however, tests that fall outside the Treaty will be required
decision, before the President can confidently make a deployment
Bottom Line
*
The Congress and the public it serves must come to recognize
that SDI is one of several answers to the many strategic
problems the U.S. faces going into the next century.
**
SDI would dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war by
denying an aggressor the ability to execute a first strike.
**
SDI would provide the American people with much-needed
insurance against an accidental or inadvertent attack or
against a deliberate launch by an irrational government.
*
The Bush Administration continues to believe that strategic
defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary,
and morally imperative,
ARMS. CONTROL AGENCY
TEL: 202-647-6721
Jun 30,89 15:31 No.003 P.03
-2-
Second, the U.S. would be better able to cope with the
problem of Soviet mobile ICBMs. SDI would complement
a mobile verification regime in START that most
experts feel would be far from perfect,
*** Third, the sheer complexity of the proposed START
treaty will probably result in unavoidable loopholes
that arms control on its own cannot plug. In turn,
this situation would jeopardize treaty ratification,
Strategic defenses could help plug the loopholes.
*
Finally, Strategic Defense will be the only thoroughly reliable
way to address the problem of accidental, unauthorized, or
third-world "madman" launches of ballistic missiles.
Concerns are no longer hypothetical. The Director of
Central Intelligence testified recently that up to 15
developing nations could have a ballistic launch capability
by the turn of the century.
The instability of many regimes raises another frightening
scenario -- who has authority to release missiles during
periods of intense civil strife? As the nuclear and
chemical club grows, this question will be asked more often.
Controlling missile technology from the supply side is not
enough -- ultimately we must have the capability to defend
ourselves against ballistic missiles,
One interesting possibility is that with a space-based
defense, the U.S. could also defend other countries against
rogue launches.
Politics and Economics of SDI
*
The recent recommendation by the majority of the members of the
House Armed Services Committee to cut the SDI budget by over a
billion dollars is a shortsighted move,
*
Just at the time American ingenuity is starting to produce
technological breakthroughs, SDI opponents are trying to reduce
the funding to a level which could not sustain a viable program.
*
The strategic rationale for SDI must be made clearer to the
American public and to their representatives in Congress.
*
Strategic modernization and strategic defense should not be
allowed to become an either/or proposition -- as pointed out
above, offenses and defenses are synergistic.
ARMS CONTROL AGENCY
TEL: 202-647-6721
Jun 30,89 15:31 No. .003 P.02
June 30, 1989
TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
*
The President is committed to the development and deployment of
Strategic Defenses when they are ready.
*
By developing the means to defend against ballistic missiles
that threaten us, we also lessen the incentives for aggression
thus enhancing stability and deterrence,
*
The primary obstacles to SDI can generally be categorized as
technological, strategic, political and economic,
Technology and SDI
*
Though many complex scientific and engineering problems remain,
there appear to be no technological show-stoppers for SDI.
*
have been achieved, A system popularly known as Brilliant
In some areas such as kinetic kill, technological breakthroughs
Pebbles is one example.
Strategy and SDI
*
On June 29, 1989, Vice President Quayle outlined how SDI will
one day alter the strategic equation between offense and defense,
*
of ballistic missiles,
SDI's ultimate goal is the devaluation in the strategic utility
*
We are seeking a more stable balance that relies increasingly on
defense. It would be preferable, but not necessary, if the
Soviets would work with US to develop a cooperative arrangement
for making this transition,
*
Progress on strategic offensive arms reductions and strategic
defense are not mutually exclusive -- on the contrary, START and
SDI are complementary.
**
In general, the more progress we make toward offensive
reductions, the more we will need to rely on SDI to help us
deter, or deal with, possible Soviet cheating or breakout.
SDI is an insurance policy for START.
*** First, the Soviets' largely modern land-based ICBM
force is projected to ensure them a hefty first-strike
capability well into the 21st century. A reasonably
reliable system of strategic defenses would diminish
our anxiety over this ICBM threat.