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Drop-By for Flight 103 Families 5/15/90 [OA 5374]
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2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
1330 MAY 14 FM 7:57
May 14, 1990
INFORMATION
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
5/15/90
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Through:
CHRISS WINSTON CW
From:
MARK DAVIS MD
Subject:
Pan Am Families
I. SUMMARY
You will acknowledge receipt of the President's Commission
on Aviation Security and Terrorism report to the families of the
Pan Am 103 victims tomorrow, at 11:45 a.m., in Room 450. There
will be about 230 people in attendance. Your brief remarks will
be on cards.
II. DISCUSSION
These remarks salute the families for their determination in
avoiding another, similar tragedy. It announces that the Cabinet
will quickly evaluate the Commission's recommendations. And it
reassures them that their government shares their persistence in
seeking justice.
small edit
Davis/Martin
May 15, 1990
Draft three
a:panam
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROP-BY FLIGHT 103 FAMILIES
ROOM 450
TUESDAY, MAY 15, 1990
11:45 a.m.
I want to begin by thanking Chairman Ann McLauglin, the
members of the Commission and their staff for a comprehensive,
independent review of aviation security. Earlier this morning, I
was briefed by the commission and their report sets a course of
action for future efforts to protect the American traveling
public from criminal and terrorist attacks. But most of all, I
want to thank the families of the Pan Am 103 victims for their
leadership and principled determination.
This report, born of your trauma and grief, holds the
promise of helping to prevent future tragedies. And our
our
government-wide effort, born of your outrage, may one day lead to
justice.
While flights and passenger-miles flown by air carriers
increase, bombings and hijackings decrease. Air travel remains
one of the safest modes of transportation today, and travel
aboard U.S. flag carriers is particularly safe and secure. But
you know better than anyone, that a near-perfect safety record
can still be tragic. And the tragedy of Pan Am 103 must be an
everlasting reminder for vigilance: vigilance to counter new
tactics and new equipment, vigilance against remote-control
2
cowards who continually probe for a "weak link" in the world's
aviation security system.
The Commission concludes that there remains much to be done
to enhance aviation security. So those commission
recommendations, will be taken under urgent review by Secretaries
Baker, Skinner and the rest of the Cabinet. And we will do one
all
thing more -- changes are being made to ensure that departments
of your government will from now on treat families of terrorist
victims with sensitivity and professionalism.
But the United States cannot alone ensure the safety of the
skies. Sadly, more than one thousand passengers on civil
aircraft from 14 different member states of the International
Civil Aviation Organization have been victims of sabotage over
the last decade. So air terrorism is a global problem. And it
requiresa global solution -- beginning with a commitment to
increase minimum security standards for all airlines.
Finally, let me say that the bombing of Pan Am 103 was not
only a crime, it was a cowardly attack against the United States.
American citizens were killed because they were on an American
aircraft with an American flag emblazoned on its tail. On
December 21, 1988, it was the U.S. under terrorist attack.
Tomorrow, it could be any nation in the world that terrorist
forces define as an enemy. The insanity of this kind of violence
respects no borders.
This report suggests that we cannot solely rely on criminal
judicial processes that limit the range of responses to acts of
3
terror against our people. The criminal process is essential to
bring terrorists and murderers to justice; but it is only one way
in which we can respond to state-sponsored terrorism. Do not be
misled by what you may read or hear about our resolve.
I hope you take comfort from the hope that from this report,
lives may be saved. But in the end, I know that even this will
not compensate your loss. I can only promise you action --
action to stop the terror and, I pray, one day, to see the
murderers of the innocent victims of flight 103 brought to
justice.
# # #
Counsel's comments
per John Garaner
Davis/Martin
May 15, 1990
Draft two
a:panam
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROP-BY FLIGHT 103 FAMILIES
ROOM 450
TUESDAY, MAY 15, 1990
I want to begin by thanking Chairman Ann McLauglin, the
members of the Commission and their staff for a comprehensive,
independent review of aviation security. Their report sets a
standard for future efforts to protect the American traveling
public from criminal and terrorist attacks. But most of all, I
want to thank the families of the Pan Am 103 victims for their
leadership and principled determination.
This report, born of your trauma and grief, holds the
promise of helping to prevent future tragedies. And our
government-wide effort, born of your outrage, may one day lead to
justice. \\\
Of course, it is true that while flights and passenger-
miles flown by air carriers increase, bombings and hijackings
decrease. But you know better than anyone, that a near-perfect
safety record can still be tragic. And the tragedy of Pan Am 103
must be an everlasting reminder for vigilance: vigilance to
counter new tactics and new equipment, vigilance against remote-
control cowards who continually probe for a "weak link" in our
aviation security system.
The Commission concludes that there were lapses in security
procedures. If mistakes were made, we must learn from them. So
those commission recommendations, not already implemented, will
2
be taken under urgent review by Secretaries Baker, Skinner and
the rest of the Cabinet. And we will do one thing more --
changes are being made to ensure that departments of your
government will from now on treat families of terrorist victims
with sensitivity and professionalism.
But the United States cannot alone ensure the safety of the
skies. Sadly, more than one thousand passengers on civil
aircraft from 14 different member states of the International
Civil Aviation Organization have been victims of sabotage over
the last decade. So air terrorism is a global problem. And it
will require a global solution -- beginning with a commitment to
increase minimum security standards for all airlines.
Finally, let me say that the bombing of Pan Am 103 was not
only a crime, it was a cowardly attack against the United States.
American citizens were killed because they were on an American
aircraft with an American flag emblazoned on its tail.
This report suggests that we cannot solely rely on criminal
judicial processes that limit the range of responses to acts of
terror against our people. The criminal process is essential to
bring terrorists and murderers to justice; but it is only one way
in which we can respond to state-sponsored terrorism. Do not be
misled by what you may read or hear about our resolve.
I hope you take comfort from the hope that from this report,
lives may be saved. But in the end, I know that even this will
not compensate your loss. I can only promise you action --
action to stop the terror and, I pray, one day, to see justice
Kne murderers brought
to justice.
3
for the murderers who deserve the same mercy they showed-their r
victims
.
# # #
+ Terrorism.
Pres. Comm on Aviation - Security
230
Document No.
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
5/14/90
7:00 PM TODAY
DATE:
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROP-BY FOR PAN AM 103 FAMILIES
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
ROGICH
BATES
UNTERMEYER
CARD
WINSTON
CICCONI
ROGERS
DEMAREST
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
REMARKS:
Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122,
x2930, no later than 7:00 PM TODAY, Monday, May 14, with a copy
to my office. Thank you.
RESPONSE:
James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
Davis/Martin
1990 MAY 14 PM 4: 17
May 15, 1990
Draft two
a:panam
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROP-BY FLIGHT 103 FAMILIES
ROOM 450
TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1990
I want to begin by thanking Chairman Ann McLauglin, the
members of the Commission and their staff for a comprehensive,
independent review of aviation security. Their report sets a
standard for future efforts to protect the American traveling
public from criminal and terrorist attacks. But most of all, I
want to thank the families of the Pan Am 103 victims for their
leadership and principled determination.
This report, born of your trauma and grief, holds the
promise of helping to prevent future tragedies. And our
government-wide effort, born of your outrage, may one day lead to
justice.
Of course, it is true that while flights and passenger-
miles flown by air carriers increase, bombings and hijackings
decrease. But you know better than anyone, that a near-perfect
safety record can still be tragic. And the tragedy of Pan Am 103
must be an everlasting reminder for vigilance: vigilance to
counter new tactics and new equipment, vigilance against remote-
control cowards who continually probe for a "weak link" in our
aviation security system.
The Commission concludes that there were lapses in security
procedures. If mistakes were made, we must learn from them. So
those commission recommendations, not already implemented, will
2
be taken under urgent review by Secretaries Baker, Skinner and
the rest of the Cabinet. And we will do one thing more --
changes are being made to ensure that departments of your
government will from now on treat families of terrorist victims
with sensitivity and professionalism.
But the United States cannot alone ensure the safety of the
skies. Sadly, more than one thousand passengers on civil
aircraft from 14 different member states of the International
Civil Aviation Organization have been victims of sabotage over
the last decade. So air terrorism is a global problem. And it
will require a global solution -- beginning with a commitment to
increase minimum security standards for all airlines.
Finally, let me say that the bombing of Pan Am 103 was not
only a crime, it was a cowardly attack against the United States.
American citizens were killed because they were on an American
aircraft with an American flag emblazoned on its tail.
This report suggests that we cannot solely rely on criminal
judicial processes that limit the range of responses to acts of
terror against our people. The criminal process is essential to
bring terrorists and murderers to justice; but it is only one way
in which we can respond to state-sponsored terrorism. Do not be
misled by what you may read or hear about our resolve.
I hope you take comfort from the hope that from this report,
lives may be saved. But in the end, I know that even this will
not compensate your loss. I can only promise you action --
action to stop the terror and, I pray, one day, to see justice
3
for the murderers who deserve the same mercy they showed their
8
victims.
# # #
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 14, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISS WINSTON
FROM:
ROGER B. PORTER
RBP
SUBJECT:
Presidential Remarks: Drop-By for Pan Am 103
Families
We have reviewed the attached remarks and suggest the
following revisions:
On page 2, paragraph 3, line 1, reverse the order of
"rely" and "solely."
On page 3, delete the phrase "who deserve the same mercy
they showed their victims." We believe that this sort of
statement is unbecoming of the President of the United States.
CC: James W. Cicconi
90 : Ld PI MAY 06
THE WHITE house
WASHINGTON
May 14, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISS WINSTON
FROM:
STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER SR
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Presidential Remarks: Drop-by for Pan Am 103
Families
Pursuant to Jim Cicconi's request, Counsel's Office has reviewed
the above-referenced matter. We believe that the final sentence
of the remarks, which appears to endorse an extrajudicial
resolution of the Pan Am 103 case, is unseemly. We suggest that
the final sentence be revised to read "
one day, to see the
murderers brought to justice."
Subject to this change, Counsel's Office has no objection to the
draft remarks.
CC: James W. Cicconi
Document No.
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
5/14/90
7:00 PM TODAY
DATE:
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROP-BY FOR PAN AM 103 FAMILIES
SUBJECT:
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
ROGICH
BATES
UNTERMEYER
CARD
WINSTON
CICCONI
ROGERS
DEMAREST
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
REMARKS:
Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122,
x2930, no later than 7:00 PM TODAY, Monday, May 14, with a copy
to my office. Thank you.
RESPONSE:
N/C
5/14/90
James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
Document No.
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
5/14/90
7:00 PM TODAY
DATE:
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROP-BY FOR PAN AM 103 FAMILIES
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
ROGICH
BATES
UNTERMEYER
CARD
WINSTON
CICCONI
ROGERS
DEMAREST
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
REMARKS:
Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122,
x2930, no later than 7:00 PM TODAY, Monday, May 14, with a copy
to my office. Thank you.
RESPONSE:
James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
Davis/Martin
1990 MAY 14 PM 4: 17
May 15, 1990
Draft two
a:panam
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROP-BY FLIGHT 103 FAMILIES
ROOM 450
TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1990
I want to begin by thanking Chairman Ann McLauglin, the
members of the Commission and their staff for a comprehensive,
independent review of aviation security. Their report sets a
standard for future efforts to protect the American traveling
public from criminal and terrorist attacks. But most of all, I
want to thank the families of the Pan Am 103 victims for their
leadership and principled determination.
This report, born of your trauma and grief, holds the
promise of helping to prevent future tragedies. And our
government-wide effort, born of your outrage, may one day lead to
justice.
Of course, it is true that while flights and passenger-
miles flown by air carriers increase, bombings and hijackings
decrease. But you know better than anyone, that a near-perfect
safety record can still be tragic. And the tragedy of Pan Am 103
must be an everlasting reminder for vigilance: vigilance to
counter new tactics and new equipment, vigilance against remote-
control cowards who continually probe for a "weak link" in our
aviation security system.
The Commission concludes that there were lapses in security
procedures. If mistakes were made, we must learn from them. So
those commission recommendations, not already implemented, will
2
be taken under urgent review by Secretaries Baker, Skinner and
the rest of the Cabinet. And we will do one thing more --
changes are being made to ensure that departments of your
government will from now on treat families of terrorist victims
with sensitivity and professionalism.
But the United States cannot alone ensure the safety of the
skies. Sadly, more than one thousand passengers on civil
aircraft from 14 different member states of the International
Civil Aviation Organization have been victims of sabotage over
the last decade. So air terrorism is a global problem. And it
will require a global solution -- beginning with a commitment to
increase minimum security standards for all airlines.
Finally, let me say that the bombing of Pan Am 103 was not
only a crime, it was a cowardly attack against the United States.
American citizens were killed because they were on an American
aircraft with an American flag emblazoned on its tail.
This report suggests that we cannot solely rely on criminal
judicial processes that limit the range of responses to acts of
terror against our people. The criminal process is essential to
bring terrorists and murderers to justice; but it is only one way
in which we can respond to state-sponsored terrorism. Do not be
misled by what you may read or hear about our resolve.
I hope you take comfort from the hope that from this report,
lives may be saved. But in the end, I know that even this will
not compensate your loss. I can only promise you action --
action to stop the terror and, I pray, one day, to see justice
3
for the murderers who deserve the same mercy they showed their
victims.
# # #
Document No.
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
5/14/90
7:00 PM TODAY
DATE:
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROP-BY FOR PAN AM 103 FAMILIES
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
ROGICH
BATES
UNTERMEYER
CARD
WINSTON
CICCONI
ROGERS
DEMAREST
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
REMARKS:
Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122,
x2930, no later than 7:00 PM TODAY, Monday, May 14, with a copy
to my office. Thank you.
RESPONSE:
See comments.
5-14-90
Holywilliamson
James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
Davis/Martin
1990 MAY 14 PM 4: 17
May 15, 1990
Draft two
a:panam
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROP-BY FLIGHT 103 FAMILIES
ROOM 450
TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1990
15
I want to begin by thanking Chairman Ann McLauglin, the
aff.)
)
members of the Commission and their staff for a comprehensive,
Earlier this morning wasbrieted by
independent review of aviation security. ^ Their report sets a the commission
(DOT)
course of action
and their
standard for future efforts to protect the American traveling
public from criminal and terrorist attacks. But most of all, I
want to thank the families of the Pan Am 103 victims for their
leadership and principled determination.
This report, born of your trauma and grief, holds the
promise of helping to prevent future tragedies. And our
government-wide effort, born of your outrage, may one day lead to
justice. \\\
While
(the commission)
of course, it is true that while flights and passenger-
miles flown by air carriers increase, bombings and hijackings
n
insert by
Air travel remains one of the Safest modes of transportationtally, and travel
(Dept of Transp)
decrease. But you know better than anyone, that a near-perfect abound
us Hag
safety record can still be tragic. And the tragedy of Pan Am 103 carriers
parti-
must be an everlasting reminder for vigilance: vigilance to
cularly safe +
counter new tactics and new equipment, vigilance against remote
Secure.
the world
control cowards who continually probe for a "weak link" in our
(DOT) (It's not just the US that has been attacked
aviation security system.
14 other flagged carriers have also been attached,
remains much to be done
The Commission concludes that there were lapses in security ty
to enhance aviation security. (DOT)
procedures. (If If mistakes were made, we must learn from them. So
those commission recommendations, not already implemented, will
(The commission)
DOT says lapses are not proven and
are concerned about saying this.
the President has ashed the Cabinet to upon
backtohim with their recommendations.
2 shouldn 't emention that? (Cab.off.)
be taken under urgent review by Secretaries Baker, Skinner and
the rest of the Cabinet. And we will do one thing more --
changes are being made to ensure that departments of your
government will from now on treat families of terrorist victims
with sensitivity and professionalism.
But the United States cannot alone ensure the safety of the
skies. Sadly, more than one thousand passengers on civil
aircraft from 14 different member states of the International
Civil Aviation Organization have been victims of sabotage over
the last decade. So air terrorism is a global problem. And it
will require a global solution -- beginning with a commitment to
increase minimum security standards for all airlines.
Finally, let me say that the bombing of Pan Am 103 was not
DOT
only a crime, it was a cowardly attack against the United States.
wants delete paragraph. to this
American citizens were killed because they were on an American
aircraft with an American flag emblazoned on its tail.
It American are the
ones
This report suggests that we cannot solely rely on criminal
onesbeing Mans
like carriers "twant sounds been asif attacked we if are to
judicial processes that limit the range of responses to acts of
terror against our people. The criminal process is essential to
bring terrorists and murderers to justice; but it is only one way
in which we can respond to state-sponsored terrorism. Do not be Commissio
not other
wasa
misled by what you may read or hear about our resolve.
little concerned
raveals
by this, but
I hope you take comfort from the hope that from this report,
pefers
attacked
lives may be saved. But in the end, I know that even this will to
NSC
don't sound unsife
not compensate your loss. I can only promise you action --
(Bob
action to stop the terror and, I pray, one day, to see justice
(oates).
51
it
fly
can
*
to
*
have this not a problem it thinks isufancilies the want hear.
of
SENT. BY: :Xerox Telecopier 7020 ; 5-14-90 : 4:41PM ;
2024562397-
CABINET AFFAIRS:# 4
the murders of the innocent victims 3 of filight 103
for the murderers who deserve the same mercy they showed their
victims. brought to Justice.
# # #
On December 21, 1988, it was the US
terrorist attack. Tomorrow, it
could under be and mation in the world.
tenorist forces decide define as
that eveny. The insainty of this curd
an of violence respects no borders,
Document No.
3831
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
5/14/90
7:00 PM TODAY
DATE:
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROP-BY FOR PAN AM 103 FAMILIES
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
ROGICH
BATES
UNTERMEYER
CARD
WINSTON
CICCONI
ROGERS
DEMAREST
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
REMARKS:
Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122,
x2930, no later than 7:00 PM TODAY, Monday, May 14, with a copy
to my office. Thank you.
RESPONSE:
May 14, 1990
TO: CHRISS WINSTON
The NSC concurs with the attached draft.
Brent 0 Scowcroft
James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
CC: James Cicconi
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
Davis/Martin
1990 MAY 14 PM 4: 17
May 15, 1990
Draft two
a:panam
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROP-BY FLIGHT 103 FAMILIES
ROOM 450
TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1990
I want to begin by thanking Chairman Ann McLauglin, the
members of the Commission and their staff for a comprehensive,
independent review of aviation security. Their report sets a
standard for future efforts to protect the American traveling
public from criminal and terrorist attacks. But most of all, I
want to thank the families of the Pan Am 103 victims for their
leadership and principled determination.
This report, born of your trauma and grief, holds the
promise of helping to prevent future tragedies. And our
government-wide effort, born of your outrage, may one day lead to
justice.
Of course, it is true that while flights and passenger-
miles flown by air carriers increase, bombings and hijackings
decrease. But you know better than anyone, that a near-perfect
safety record can still be tragic. And the tragedy of Pan Am 103
must be an everlasting reminder for vigilance: vigilance to
counter new tactics and new equipment, vigilance against remote-
control cowards who continually probe for a "weak link" in our
aviation security system.
The Commission concludes that there were lapses in security
procedures. If mistakes were made, we must learn from them. So
those commission recommendations / not already implemented, will
2
be taken under urgent review by Secretaries Baker, Skinner and
the rest of the Cabinet. And we will do one thing more --
changes are being made to ensure that departments of your
government will from now on treat families of terrorist victims
with sensitivity and professionalism.
But the United States cannot alone ensure the safety of the
skies. Sadly, more than one thousand passengers on civil
aircraft from 14 different member states of the International
Civil Aviation Organization have been victims of sabotage over
the last decade. So air terrorism is a global problem. And it
will require a global solution -- beginning with a commitment to
increase minimum security standards for all airlines.
Finally, let me say that the bombing of Pan Am 103 was not
only a crime, it was a cowardly attack against the United States.
American citizens were killed because they were on an American
aircraft with an American flag emblazoned on its tail.
This report suggests that we cannot solely rely on criminal
judicial processes that limit the range of responses to acts of
terror against our people. The criminal process is essential to
bring terrorists and murderers to justice; but it is only one way
in which we can respond to state-sponsored terrorism. Do not be
misled by what you may read or hear about our resolve.
I hope you take comfort from the hope that from this report,
lives may be saved. But in the end, I know that even this will
not compensate your loss. I can only promise you action --
action to stop the terror and, I pray, one day, to see justice
3
for the murderers who deserve the same mercy they showed their
victims.
# # #
TALKING POINTS/PAN AM FAMILIES
I want to begin by thanking Chairman Ann McLauglin, the
members of the Commission and their staff for a comprehensive,
independent review of aviation security. Their report sets a
standard for future efforts to protect the American traveling
public from criminal and terrorist attacks. But most of all, I
want to thank the families of the Pan Am 103 victims for their
leadership and principled determination.
This report, born of your trauma and grief, holds the
helpmg to
promise of preventing future tragedies. And our government-wide
effort, born of your outrage, may one day lead to justice. III
Of course, it is true that while flights and passenger-
miles flown by air carriers increase, bombings and hijackings
decrease. But you know better than anyone, that a near-perfect
con
be
safety record is still, tragic. And the tragedy of Pan Am 103
must be an everlasting reminder for vigilance: vigilance to
counter new tactics and new equipment, vigilance against remote-
control cowards who continually probe for a "weak link" in our
aviation security system.
The Commission concludes that there were lapses in security
procedures. If mistakes were made, we must learn from them. So
those commission recommendations, not already implemented, will
be taken under urgent review by Secretaries Baker, Skinner and
the rest of the Cabinet. And we will do one thing more --
changes are being made to ensure that departments of your
government will from now on treat families of terrorist victims
with sensitivity and professionalism. III
But the United States cannot alone ensure the safety of the
skies. Sadly, more than one thousand passengers on civil
aircraft from 14 different member states of the International
Civil Aviation Organization have been victims of sabotage over
the last decade. So air terrorism is a global problem. And it
will require a global solution -- beginning with a commitment to
increase minimum security standards for all airlines.
Finally, let me say that the bombing of Pan Am 103 was not
only a crime, it was a cowardly attack against the United States.
American citizens were killed because they were on an American
aircraft with an American flag emblazoned on its tail.
This report suggests that we cannot solely rely on criminal
judicial processes that limit the range of responses to acts of
terror against our people. The criminal process is essential to
bring terrorists and murderers to justice; but it is only one way
in which we can respond to state-sponsored terrorism. Do not be
misled by what you may read or hear about our resolve
I hope you take comfort from the hope that from this report,
lives may be saved. But in the end, I know that even this will
not compensate your loss. I can only promise you action --
to stop the terror
to see
action for prevention, and, I pray, one day, action or justicek
for the murdereds
who deserve the
same merces they
showed their
Nictims
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DROP-BY MEETING OF THE PAN AM 103 FAMILIES
DATE:
May 15, 1990
LOCATION:
Room 450
TIME:
11:45 a.m.
FROM:
DAVID Q. BATES
My for
I.
PURPOSE
To express your sorrow and deep concern to the families of
the victims of this tragic incident and to express your
gratitude to them for supporting the Commission in its
efforts to make civil aviation less vulnerable to criminal
acts of terrorism.
II. BACKGROUND
On April 3, 1989, you met with five representatives of the
families of victims of Pan Am 103. At that time, you asked
Secretary Skinner to remain in contact with the group and to
keep them advised of security issues of concern to them.
Prior to your drop-by, the families will have been briefed
by Chairman McLaughlin and the commissioners. For many
families, this event will serve as the final memorial
service for their relatives -- with both the completion of
the Commission's report and your recognition of their
personal loss.
III. PARTICIPANTS
The President, Ann McLaughlin, Senator Frank Lautenberg,
Senator D'Amato, Congressman Jim Oberstar, Congressman John
Paul Hammerschmidt, Edward Hildago, General Thomas Richards
and approximately 220 family members.
IV. PRESS PLAN
Closed press.
V.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
--
You enter Room 450.
--
You make brief remarks.
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
Report of the
THE
PRESIDENT'S
OF
STATES.
COMMISSION
on
AVIATION
SECURITY
and
TERRORISM
E-M-B-A-R-G-O-E-D
HOLD FOR RELEASE UNTIL 2 PM EDT
TUESDAY, May 15, 1990
"...a comprehensive study
and appraisal of practices and
policy options with respect
to preventing terrorist acts
involving aviation."
Executive Order 12686
August 4, 1989
Report to the President
By The
PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION
on Aviation Security
and Terrorism
May 15, 1990
Washington, D.C.
CHAIRMAN
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON AVIATION
Ann McLaughlin
SECURITY AND TERRORISM
MEMBERS
Sen. Frank R. Lautenberg (D-NJ)
1825 K Street, N.W., Suite 519
Sen. Alfonse M. D'Amato (R-NY)
Rep. James L. Oberstar (D-MN)
Washington, D.C. 20036
Rep. John P. Hammerschmidt (R-AR)
(202) 254-3166
Mr. Edward Hidalgo
Gen. Thomas C. Richards USAF (Ret.)
May 15, 1990
Dear Mr. President:
I am privileged to present the report of the President's
Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism.
Since the Commission began its work in November 1989, we
have evaluated the existing aviation security system, options
for handling terrorist threats and the treatment of families
of victims of terrorist acts. The Commission interpreted your
charge as requiring an independent and comprehensive review of
these matters using the Pan Am 103 tragedy as a point of
reference.
This report presents a series of recommendations designed
both to improve aviation security and the ability of the
government to respond to a Pan Am 103. The nation must also
act to deter and prevent the use of terrorism against civil
aviation as a deadly tool of political policy. The Pan Am
experience demands nothing less.
The unyielding determination of the families of the
victims of Pan Am 103, who sought this inquiry, provided the
energy for our work. The sensitive and caring response of the
people of Lockerbie, Scotland provided the passion. We trust
this report reflects their determination and passion. We are
confident that its recommendations can enhance the security of
the traveling public. For this is surely our first and
highest responsibility.
Sincerely,
Ann McLaughlin
Chairman
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
In compliance with the Executive Order 12686 of August 4, 1989
the undersigned present the report of the
President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism.
ann me Laughlin
Honorable Ann McLaughlin
Chairman, District of Columbia
Hdnorable Member, Alfonse New M. York D'Amato
John Honorable Caul John Hommerschmitt Paul Hammerschmidt
Member, Arkansas
Ederind Honorable Edward Hid ato
Hidalgo
Member, Virginia
Phone Honorable Member, Frank R. New Landenberg R. Jersey Lautenberg
James Honorable James Oberta L. Oberstar
Member, Minnesota
Annas
General Thomas C. Richards, USAF (Ret.)
Member, Texas
Table of Contents
Page
Executive Summary
i
Chapter 1
Introduction
1
Chapter 2
Pan Am Flight 103
3
Chapter 3
The Aviation Security System
27
Chapter 4
Research and Development
63
Chapter 5
Intelligence
69
Chapter 6
Aviation Threat Notification-A National Standard
83
Chapter 7
Treatment of the Families of Victims of Terrorism
97
Chapter 8
National Will
113
Final Thoughts
119
Recommendations
121
Commission Members
126
Commission Staff
128
Appendix A
The Victims of Pan Am Flight 103
131
Appendix B
Witnesses, Selected Interviews and Resources
138
Appendix C
Executive Orders
142
Appendix D
Review of Statistical Data with Respect to Pan American Flight 103 on
December 21, 1988
144
Appendix E
Acts of Aviation Sabotage
160
Appendix F
International Civil Aviation Organization
170
Appendix G
Organizational Charts
172
Appendix H
Selected Aviation Security Initiatives by the Department of Transportation
175
Executive Summary
National will and the moral courage to exer-
to Flight 103, during the day of the tragedy,
cise it are the ultimate means for defeating ter-
and-notably-for nine months thereafter.
rorism. The President's Commission on Avia-
These are the major findings and conclusions
tion Security and Terrorism recommends a
of the Commission, which began its work in
more vigorous U.S. policy that not only pur-
mid-November of 1989 and reports to the
sues and punishes terrorists but also makes
President on May 15, 1990.
state sponsors of terrorism pay a price for their
The destruction of Pan American World Air-
actions.
With other nations of the free world, the
ways Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on
United States must work to isolate politically,
December 21, 1988, was the reference point for
the mission of this Commission. Pursuit of the
diplomatically and militarily the handful of
outlaw nations sponsoring terrorism. These
full story of Flight 103 led the Commission also
to a series of conclusions on counterterrorism
more vigorous policies should include planning
and training for preemptive or retaliatory mili-
policy in general, as detailed in the section on
tary strikes against known terrorist enclaves in
National Will at the end of the main body of
nations that harbor them. Where such direct
this Report.
strikes are inappropriate, the Commission rec-
The Commission also conducted a thorough
ommends a lesser option, including covert op-
examination of certain civil aviation security re-
erations, to prevent, disrupt or respond to ter-
quirements, policies and procedures surround-
rorist acts.
ing Flight 103. It is a disturbing story.
Rhetoric is no substitute for strong, effective
The destruction of Flight 103 may well have
action.
been preventable. Stricter baggage reconcilia-
The Commission's inquiry also finds that
tion procedures could have stopped any unac-
the U.S. civil aviation security system is serious-
companied checked bags from boarding the
ly flawed and has failed to provide the proper
flight at Frankfurt. Requiring that all baggage
level of protection for the traveling public. This
containers be fully secured would have prevent-
system needs major reform.
ed any tampering that may have occurred with
The Commission found the Federal Aviation
baggage left in a partially filled, unguarded
Administration to be a reactive agency-preoc-
baggage container that was later loaded on the
cupied with responses to events to the exclu-
flight at Heathrow. Stricter application of pas-
sion of adequate contingency planning in an-
senger screening procedures would have in-
ticipation of future threats. The Commission
creased the likelihood of intercepting any un-
recommends actions designed to change this
knowing "dupe" or saboteur from checking a
focus at the FAA.
bomb into the plane at either airport.
Pan Am's apparent security lapses and
The international criminal investigation has
FAA's failure to enforce its own regulations fol-
not yet determined precisely how the device
lowed a pattern that existed for months prior
was loaded onto the plane. Until that occurs
i
and subject to the conclusions reached, the
concluded, "it appears the minimum [FAA] re-
Commission cannot say with certainty that
quirements can and are being met."
more rigid application of any particular proce-
Passenger/baggage reconciliation is the bed-
dure actually would have stopped the sabotage
rock of any heightened civil air security system.
of the flight.
Under current FAA requirements for interna-
This Report contains more than 60 detailed
tional flights, implemented since Pan Am 103,
recommendations designed to improve the civil
every bag carried on an aircraft must belong to
aviation security system to deter and prevent
someone who is also on that flight.
terrorist attacks. Before new laws are passed
A key focus of the Commission's inquiry was
and more regulations are promulgated, existing
the FAA written regulation in effect in Decem-
ones must be fully enforced and properly car-
ber 1988 that unaccompanied baggage should
ried out. The Commission emphasizes that no
be carried only if it was physically searched.
amount of governmental reorganization or
When Pan Am Flight 103 pushed away from
technological developments can ever replace
the gate at Frankfurt and again at Heathrow,
the need for well-trained, highly-motivated
on December 21, 1988, no one knew whether
people to make the security system work.
the plane was carrying an "extra" interline bag
The Commission salutes the thousands of
that had been checked through to Pan Am
men and women in the public and private sec-
from another airline. Months before Pan Am
tors of the U.S. civil aviation security system.
stopped reconciling or searching interline bag-
The recommendations in this report are de-
gage and began simply X-raying this luggage.
signed to help them perform their jobs more
Records examined by this Commission indi-
effectively. The Commission urges manage-
cate that Pan Am Flight 103 might have carried
ment to face up to the security system failures
one such interline bag that did not belong to a
disclosed by this investigation.
passenger on the flight. While this extra bag
A few facts can be stated with certainty about
would have been X-rayed, the explosive semtex
Pan Am 103. A terrorist element did succeed in
cannot be reliably detected by X-ray used at
having a bomb placed aboard the aircraft. That
airports.
bomb blew the aircraft apart at 31,000 feet
Pan Am officials told the Commission that
over Lockerbie, killing 259 persons on the air-
the FAA Director of Aviation Security had
plane and 11 on the ground.
given the airline verbal approval to X-ray inter-
The criminal investigation has indicated that
line bags rather than searching or reconciling
the bomb was placed in a radio cassette player
them with passengers. The FAA official denied
and packed in a suitcase loaded into the plane's
this.
baggage hold. The Commission, therefore, was
Passenger screening procedures required by
able to concentrate its investigation on security
FAA at Frankfurt and Heathrow included ques-
procedures for checked baggage.
tioning to identify for additional screening
Authorities also believe that the bomb was
those fitting a "profile" as most likely-know-
made of a very small quantity of semtex, a plas-
ingly or unknowingly-to be carrying an explo-
tic explosive, and that it probably was placed
sive in any manner, including checked baggage.
aboard at Frankfurt, West Germany, where the
The subsequent FAA investigation of Pan
flight began.
Am 103 found that several interline passengers
At the end of an October 1988 inspection of
who boarded at Frankfurt were not even initial-
Pan Am's security operations at Frankfurt, the
ly screened. Several others identified at the
FAA inspector was troubled by the lack of a
check-in counter for further screening did not
tracking system for interline bags transferring
receive that additional screening at the gate. A
from other airlines and the confused state of
large container holding baggage waiting to be
passenger screening procedures. Overall, the
loaded on Flight 103 arriving at Heathrow
inspector wrote, "the system, trying adequately
from Frankfurt was left open and unattended
to control approximately 4,500 passengers and
for half an hour. At the time, however, that
28 flights per day, is being held together only
practice did not violate any FAA regulations.
by a very labor intensive operation and the ten-
The FAA investigation of the Pan Am 103
uous threads of luck." Even so, the inspector
disaster began immediately and concluded on
ii
January 31, 1989. While the results were not
from the May inspection remained uncorrected,
announced for over three more months, the
especially unguarded airplanes and failure to
FAA proposed fines totaling $630,000 against
search personnel maintaining the aircraft.
Pan Am for violations of regulations, both on
Pan Am came to a September 12 meeting
December 21 and during the five-week period
with FAA on security at Frankfurt with yet an-
thereafter.
other "action plan." A later gathering, however,
The FAA, significantly, did not cite Pan Am
included a private session between the FAA
for substituting X-ray for interline passenger/
Administrator and the chief executive officer of
baggage reconciliation. The official FAA report
the airline. That same evening, a team of high-
made no reference to the fact that the investiga-
level Pan Am managers, accompanied by FAA
tion had found that one interline bag loaded on
security inspectors, flew to Frankfurt.
Flight 103 could not be accounted for in any
Within one week, personnel changes at the
passenger records. The agency also noted in its
station had been ordered and all security viola-
announcement that none of the violations cited
tions and deficiencies corrected. At the next
by its investigation had contributed in any way to
FAA regular inspection, Pan Am at Frankfurt
the bombing.
was rated a model station. This corrective
Both the public and the regulatory spotlight
action occurred nine months after the Flight
were focused on just those types of security
103 bombing.
problems throughout early 1989. Congression-
The bombing of Flight 103 occurred against
al hearings were held. The Secretary of Trans-
the background of warnings that trouble was
portation set up a task force expressly to look
brewing in the European terrorist community.
into the matter. The Commission would have
Nine security bulletins that could have been
expected the FAA to give top priority to securi-
relevant to the tragedy were issued between
ty operations at the two airports that loaded
June 1, 1988 and December 21, 1988. One de-
and dispatched Flight 103.
scribed a Toshiba radio cassette player, fully
Separate from the Flight 103 probe, the FAA
rigged as a bomb with a barometric triggering
found numerous security discrepancies by Pan
device, found by the West German police in
Am at Frankfurt and London in January and
the automobile of a member of the Popular
February of 1989 but took no official action
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
against the airline.
Command (PFLP-GC). The FAA bulletin cau-
In a major inspection conducted May 8-23,
tioned that the device "would be very difficult
1989, the FAA found that major security viola-
to detect via normal X-ray," and told U.S. car-
tions still existed in Pan Am's Frankfurt oper-
riers that passenger/baggage reconciliation
ations.
procedures should be "rigorously applied."
One FAA inspector wrote in the report dated
On December 5, 1988, an anonymous tele-
June 7, 1989, that while the operations of the
phone caller to the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki,
four other U.S. carriers operating at Frankfurt
Finland, said that sometime within the next two
were "good," Pan Am was "totally unsatisfac-
weeks a Finnish woman would carry a bomb
tory."
aboard a Pan Am aircraft flying from Frankfurt
Wrote the FAA inspector: "Posture [of Pan
to the United States. The FAA Security Bulletin
Am] considered unsafe, all passengers flying
on that threat was issued December 7 and was
out of Frankfurt on Pan Am are at great risk."
redistributed by the State Department to its
When the FAA Associate Administrator with
embassies worldwide December 9.
responsibility for the security division learned
At the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, the senior
of the May inspection results, he called a June
staff, with concurrence of the Ambassador, de-
14 meeting with Pan Am officials, who present-
cided that the warning should be made public.
ed a plan for corrective action while contesting
Thus the Helsinki threat information was pub-
some of FAA's allegations.
licly posted at the Embassy on December 14
Still, the security violations and deficiencies
and was generally made available throughout
at Pan Am's Frankfurt station continued. An
the 2,000-member community of Americans,
unannounced inspection in August of 1989
including news media and private contractor
found that many of the same security problems
personnel, in Moscow. For these Americans,
iii
Pan Am through Frankfurt was the most acces-
rected against this country more than just proc-
sible and most commonly used route to the
essing the return of remains and personal ef-
United States.
fects, however important that may be. Accord-
The Commission found no passenger who
ingly, the Commission recommends that the
changed his or her travel plans because of the
United States extend financial benefits to these
Helsinki threat except one civilian who was
victims and develop appropriate ceremonies to
scheduled to fly Pan Am to the United States
recognize their sacrifice. The outdated Warsaw
through Frankfurt on December 16 and
Convention should be revised to speed in-
switched to a direct flight on December 18.
creased compensation to passengers' families.
While there were no passengers from Moscow
The Commission also finds that the FAA's
on Flight 103, the connecting Pan Am, flight
research and development program should be
from Moscow was not scheduled to fly on that
significantly intensified to keep pace with the
date.
changing terrorist threat to civil aviation.
Any distribution of threat information to one
Under a contract awarded in 1985 to Science
segment of the population, such as the posting
Applications International Corp. (SAIC), the
of the Helsinki threat in Moscow, creates the
FAA has purchased six thermal neutron analy-
perception of a "double standard"-the inten-
sis (TNA) machines to detect plastic explosives.
tional choice to warn some people but not
others. At the same time, the Commission be-
These machines, by design specification and
lieves that public notification of aviation threat
by actual performance as observed by the Com-
information is appropriate under certain cir-
mission at JFK Airport in New York, will detect
cumstances, described in detail in this Report.
plastic explosives in an operational mode only
Therefore, the Commission recommends that a
in amounts far greater than the weight of the
mechanism be established to consider in indi-
most sophisticated bombs actually used by ter-
vidual cases when and how to provide public
rorists. For example, the bomb that destroyed
notification.
Pan Am Flight 103 is believed to have weighed
half or less than the amount the TNA machine
As for the Helsinki threat, Finnish police
quickly determined that the call was unreliable.
would reliably detect in an operational mode at
All subsequent investigations by other govern-
an international airport.
ments have also concluded that the call had no
Despite these limitations, FAA has an-
connection to Flight 103. The Commission
nounced a program to require U.S. airlines op-
found no evidence suggesting otherwise.
erating internationally to purchase 150 TNA
The Pan Am 103 families registered bitter
machines (or the equivalent, although there is
complaints over the treatment they received
no competing equipment available) and to in-
from the State Department, and the Commis-
stall them at 40 international airports at an esti-
sion found that the Department was unpre-
mated cost of $175,000,000. The Commission
pared to respond effectively and compassion-
recommends that this program be deferred,
ately to the largest aviation terrorist disaster in
pending development of more effective TNA
U.S. history.
machines or an alternative technology.
The Commission found that the Department
The Commission's examination of the securi-
failed to obtain a list of passengers, develop a
ty program applied by U.S. carriers at foreign
list of next of kin, and notify the families in a
airports revealed that much has been done to
timely and compassionate fashion, and failed to
strengthen them since December 1988, espe-
staff adequately its consular services effort in
cially at high threat airports. However, foreign
Lockerbie.
governments have not imposed equally strin-
Although the State Department appears to
gent requirements on carriers under their juris-
have begun to recognize the scope of its Pan
diction, and the U.S. has relied on weak inter-
Am 103 failures, it has only begun to institu-
national standards for foreign carrier security.
tionalize mechanisms that will remedy the
As a result, there are significant imbalances.
problems. More must be done, and the Com-
The Commission recommends steps to improve
mission's recommendations help point the way.
aviation security internationally and to promote
The Commission firmly believes the U.S.
the use of bilateral agreements negotiated by
Government owes victims of terrorist acts di-
the State Department as the mechanism to
iv
achieve a consistently high level of internation-
mestic airports through a system of federal se-
al aviation security.
curity managers.
As part of its mandate, the Commission as-
The State Department should conduct ne-
sessed the coordination and evaluation and dis-
gotiations with foreign governments to permit
semination of intelligence information collect-
U.S. carriers operating there to carry out FAA-
ed. The Commission found that, because of the
required screening and other security proce-
government's increased intelligence activities
dures. Airlines cannot be expected to conduct
targeted at terrorism and the increased re-
international negotiations in order to comply
sources being devoted to intelligence functions
with regulations of their own government.
The FAA and the Federal Bureau of Investi-
by the FAA, the system is working reasonably
well.
gation should proceed with plans to conduct an
assessment of the security threat at domestic
The Commission's review showed that no
airports.
warnings specific to Flight 103 were received
The FAA should launch a top priority re-
by U.S. intelligence agencies from any source
search and development program to produce
at any time. It also showed that no information
new techniques and equipment that will detect
bearing upon the security of civil aviation in
small amounts of plastic explosives, operation-
general and flights originating in Frankfurt in
ally at airports. The program to require U.S.
particular was received beyond that which was
carriers to purchase and deploy the existing
promptly disseminated to the FAA and, in turn,
TNA machine should be deferred. However,
immediately to U.S. air carriers.
the Commission expects the FAA to continue
Major recommendations of the Commission,
aggressively its new emphasis on upgrading the
as contained in this report, include:
aviation security system's human and technical
The United States should pursue a more
capabilities.
vigorous counterterrorism policy, particularly
Public notification of threats to civil aviation
with respect to nations sponsoring terrorists.
should be made under certain circumstances.
Congress should enact legislation to create
As a rule, however, such notification must be
a position of Assistant Secretary of Transporta-
universal, to avoid any appearance of favored
tion for Security and Intelligence, an appoint-
treatment of certain individuals or groups.
Victims of terrorist actions aimed at the
ment with tenure to establish a measure of in-
dependence.
United States Government should qualify for
special financial compensation as victims of acts
The FAA security division should be elevat-
of aggression against their country.
ed within the agency to a position that reports
The State Department must take major
directly to the Administrator.
steps to ensure that the families of victims re-
Through existing FAA resources, the feder-
ceive prompt, humane and courteous treatment
al government should manage security at do-
and service in overseas disasters.
V
Chapter 1
Introduction
The explosion that destroyed Pan Am Flight
These members brought a number of per-
103 at 31,000 feet over Lockerbie, Scotland, on
spectives, experiences, and areas of expertise to
December 21, 1988, sent repercussions
the Commission, complemented by a staff
throughout America and the world. Shocked
drawn in large part from the investigative and
and grieved, but determined to learn what had
security agencies of the Executive and Legisla-
happened, many of the families of the Ameri-
tive branches of government.
can victims traveled to Lockerbie in the imme-
The Commission was empowered to request
diate aftermath of the tragedy. Thus began an
and receive information, receive testimony,
odyssey that continues with this Commission's
conduct hearings, and hold meetings.
Report. The families organized to urge the for-
The Commission held five public hearings.
mation of an independent investigative body to
determine the how and why of the final flight
November 17, 1989. Members of the families
of Pan Am 103, and to seek to assure that
of the victims of Pan Am Flight 103 and
others could be spared their loss and their suf-
Union des Transports Aeriens Flight 772
fering.
testified, followed by representatives of the
This Commission is a response to the unwav-
aviation community, including pilots, flight
ering dedication of these families. To the
attendants, the air carriers, airports, and
extent that the Commission's Report can
consumer groups.
answer their questions, and help to prevent
December 18, 1989. The General Accounting
future terrorist acts, it will have succeeded.
Office reported its findings on the Fed-
The Executive Order provided for seven
eral Aviation Administration's aviation se-
Commissioners to be appointed by the Presi-
curity program; FAA representatives dis-
dent: two members from the U.S. Senate, two
cussed the agency's programs and aspects
from the U.S. House of Representatives, repre-
of Pan Am 103; and the Department of
senting both parties equally; and three other
State testified on its treatment of families
members chosen from the private sector with
of the victims.
expertise in aviation transportation, aviation se-
curity or counterterrorism.
February 2, 1990. Scientists, the FAA, air-
The President named Ann McLaughlin,
port security experts and manufacturers
former Secretary of Labor, Chairman; Alfonse
presented testimony on the development
M. D'Amato (R-NY) and Frank R. Lautenberg
of counterterrorist and aviation security
(D-NJ), from the Senate; and John Paul Ham-
technology.
merschmidt (R-AR) and James L. Oberstar
March 9, 1990. The Chairman of the
(D-MN), from the House of Representatives.
House Foreign Affairs Committee testified
From the private sector, the President named
on international aviation security; person-
Edward Hidalgo, former Secretary of the Navy,
nel from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow
and General Thomas C. Richards, USAF (Ret.).
spoke on the posting of the "Helsinki
1
warning" and a Pan Am representative
tinuing review of aviation security and meas-
from its Moscow office presented testimo-
ures to deter and defeat the terrorist threat.
ny on the impact of that warning.
The Commission will never forget its visit to
Lockerbie, Scotland, where the members
April 4, 1990. Executives from various air-
shared and sought to understand the families'
lines testified on their companies' aviation
and the community's grief. It should be re-
security policies and programs, including
membered that the last to perish were 11 resi-
the Chairman and President of Pan Am;
dents of this small town.
and again the FAA, including the Adminis-
The Commission found more reminders of
trator, discussed public policy issues.
the terrors of this tragedy, but was also pro-
The Commission and staff reviewed security
foundly moved by the understated and gentle
measures in place at airports in the United
caring for those who died in and over their
States and Europe; met with officials of govern-
town. Some of the victims' possessions are still
in Lockerbie waiting to be claimed. These
ment here and abroad charged with directing
items-clothing, Christmas presents, and chil-
and implementing aviation security and intelli-
dren's toys, neatly and tenderly arranged-are
gence-gathering and evaluation. They met with
eloquent testimony to the dimensions of this
security specialists, representatives of airlines
tragedy, both the terrible human sorrow and
and airports, and with officials of the U.S. con-
the gentle, complete response by the Scottish
sular, intelligence and counterterrorism com-
people.
munities. The staff conducted over 250 investi-
The Commission's Report is factual and ana-
gative interviews and received sworn testimony
lytical; but underlying its findings, conclusions
from witnesses.
and recommendations are our memories of the
The Commission believes that this report will
visit and our lasting gratitude to the extraordi-
mark a new beginning, not the end, of a con-
nary people of Lockerbie.
2
Chapter 2
Pan Am Flight 103
The Executive Order directed the Commis-
rounding it. The story neither begins nor ends
sion to conduct its review "with particular ref-
on that evening seventeen months ago.
erence to the destruction on December 21,
In total, the story of Flight 103 reveals the
1988, of Pan American World Airways Flight
pattern of a tragedy that could happen. On De-
103." The Commission has used the events
cember 21, 1988, it did.
surrounding Flight 103 as a basic reference
point for its work.
Preceding Events
The Executive Order made clear the Com-
mission was to avoid interfering with the ongo-
ing criminal investigation into the destruction
The story of Flight 103 begins at least as
of Flight 103. The Commission's mission was
early as 1986, when the FAA's "extraordinary
not to determine who planted the bomb on
security" procedures were firmly in place under
Flight 103 but to ascertain how the device
Section XV of its Air Carrier Standard Security
could have made its way onto the plane. The
Program (ACSSP). The FAA had implemented
Commission, however, was able to benefit from
these tightened procedures during 1985 in re-
the extraordinary work of the law enforcement
sponse to the hijacking of TWA Flight 847
effort.
from Athens airport. U.S. air carriers were re-
Information made public by law enforcement
quired to implement the procedures at speci-
officials established that the bomb that de-
fied airports, which by mid-1986 included
stroyed Flight 103 was in a radio cassette
London/Heathrow and Frankfurt.
device, packed in a suitcase which was loaded
Among the procedures was a requirement
into a cargo container stowed at position 14 in
that all personnel servicing aircraft be subject
the left of the plane's baggage hold, just for-
to screening procedures. Another requirement
ward of the wing. The Commission, therefore,
prohibited any carrier from transporting bag-
was able to concentrate its Flight 103 investiga-
gage that was not either accompanied by a pas-
tion on security systems and procedures for
senger or physically inspected. Section 508 of
checked baggage.
Pan Am's Security Manual set forth the "ex-
Law enforcement authorities informed the
traordinary security" requirements as applied
Commission that, although no final determina-
specifically to Pan Am operations. The FAA ap-
tion had yet been made, the balance of prob-
proved the language of Section 508 on April
abilities was that the device had been loaded
16, 1986.
onto the initial leg of Flight 103, which began
Two months later Pan Am advertised that it
in Frankfurt, Germany.
was initiating "one of the most far-reaching se-
The Commission's investigation has shown
curity programs in our industry." Called Alert,
that the importance of Flight 103 to the work
the program was "to involve Pan Am's own
of this Commission extends beyond the horror
highly trained experts" and "would screen pas-
of that day and the events immediately sur-
sengers, employees, airport facilities, baggage
3
and aircraft with unrelenting thoroughness,"
sonnel who boarded the aircraft were not ap-
according to Pan Am's advertisement.
propriately examined" at Frankfurt airport, as
At about the same time, Pan Am retained an
required by the ACSSP. In April 1986, Pan Am
outside security consulting firm, K.P.I., Ltd., to
had decided after "discussion with the FAA"
evaluate Pan Am's security system and to rec-
not to screen its own uniformed and badged
ommend improvements. K.P.I.'s report in Sep-
servicing personnel, regardless of what was
tember 1986 found substantial security gaps in
written in the ACSSP. Sonesen told the Com-
the screening of passengers and the control of
mission that Pan Am had "a working agree-
baggage at Pan Am's operations in Frankfurt
ment" with the FAA on this practice. Pan Am
and Heathrow, among other airports. Lapses in
never received from the FAA a written exemp-
the distribution of warning information were
tion from the personnel inspection require-
noted, as was the potential that an extra bag
ments. None of the FAA inspectors at Frankfurt
could be inserted into the system in Frankfurt
cited Pan Am for a violation of these require-
and loaded on a plane. Only "good fortune,"
ments over the next three years.
the report stated, had prevented an "act of ter-
rorism."
Another of the FAA extraordinary proce-
K.P.I. told this Commission that top Pan Am
dures that Pan Am found problematic con-
management would not allow it to present its
cerned screening interline, or transfer, passen-
report directly to the Pan Am Board or to
gers who connected with a Pan Am flight from
other Pan Am managers. Pan Am's Chief Exec-
another air carrier. Connection times could be
utive Officer testified before the Commission
close, especially at an airport with many con-
that management saw these K.P.I. efforts
necting flights such as Frankfurt. Under the
simply as an attempt to obtain a "lucrative on-
FAA extraordinary measures, interline passen-
going security consulting contract." He said
gers often fit into a risk "profile," or category,
that most of the substantive K.P.I. recommen-
necessitating special screening, including an X-
dations within Pan Am's control were eventual-
ray of their checked baggage. This process
ly put into effect in Frankfurt.
could cause delays if the bag of a particular
In any event, by the fall of 1986, the FAA
passenger had to be located.
was becoming increasingly concerned about
To alleviate this problem, Pan Am purchased
Pan Am's implementation of the agency's ex-
additional equipment and in early 1987 began
traordinary security requirements. This concern
X-raying checked baggage of all interline pas-
grew to a point where the FAA convened an
sengers, whether or not they were selected for
unusual meeting with the carrier on October
further screening. This procedure satisfied the
7-8, 1986, at the FAA's regional headquarters
FAA requirements for screening baggage ac-
in Brussels. The reason for the meeting, the
companying passengers who boarded Pan Am
FAA told the carrier, was "the apparent wide-
flights. It did not, however, satisfy FAA ex-
spread failure of Pan Am to implement the Ex-
traordinary measures for positive passenger/
traordinary Procedures in Section XV of the
checked baggage match, which were intended
Air Carrier Standard Security Program."
to control unaccompanied bags.
Among those attending the October meeting
was Daniel Sonesen from Pan Am headquarters
The FAA written procedures concerning un-
in New York. Sonesen was Systems Director,
accompanied baggage at airports such as
Heathrow and Frankfurt were clear. U.S. air
Corporate Security, with worldwide responsibil-
ity within Pan Am for interpretation of the
carriers there were prohibited from transport-
ACSSP. Several security problems were cov-
ing any checked baggage not matched with a
ered at the meeting. Pan Am either sought to
passenger who actually boarded a flight, unless
justify its procedures or agreed to request writ-
the baggage was opened and physically
ten waivers from the FAA when local condi-
searched.
tions prevented Pan Am from complying with
In the event of a "no-show" passenger whose
the requirements.
baggage already had been loaded onto a plane,
The FAA's memorandum of the meeting,
for example, the plane could not depart until
however, shows that at least one problem was
that baggage was located, off-loaded and
raised but not resolved: Pan Am "servicing per-
searched. This process was a particular prob-
4
Connecting Flight
Baggage Transfer
L
Baggage transfer from one airline to another poses a security problem for all airlines. Currently, at high risk airports, baggage
unaccompanied by a passenger may not be loaded on U.S. carriers unless separated from a passenger due to no fault of his own.
lem for Pan Am at airports with substantial
gage reconciliation procedure. Berwick said he
interline operations.
always had believed that "total reliance on X-
Martin Huebner, Pan Am's chief of security
ray itself was not necessarily a good thing." He
for West Germany, told the Commission:
saw X-ray as "only a tool" and "only part of a
"Frankfurt station had problems with the rec-
procedure, a process."
onciliation of interline baggage.
That
Berwick asked Pan Am's Corporate Security
interline baggage had to be sorted out. It had
headquarters whether X-raying baggage elimi-
to be checked out with the number of interline
nated the need for positive baggage reconcilia-
passengers and, of course, was a lot of work."
tion at Heathrow and Frankfurt airports.
Huebner raised these concerns in March
Huebner sent a similar inquiry from Frankfurt.
1988 during a telephone call with Alan James
Dated March 10, 1988, Berwick's written re-
Berwick, Pan Am's head of security for the
quest succinctly stated: "I am very much aware
United Kingdom and Europe. Berwick, sta-
of the limitations of the X-ray equipment and
tioned in London, previously had talked with
more important [of] those persons who operate
Allan Tucker, Pan Am's security manager for
it."
Heathrow, who said he believed passenger/
Sonesen responded on behalf of Pan Am
baggage reconciliation was no longer required
headquarters by telex on March 28, 1988, that
for interline baggage because Pan Am was X-
Pan Am had "fixed the problem" existing at
raying all of that baggage.
airports where "interline [baggage] was going
Berwick was skeptical. Testifying before the
to be a problem, i.e., off loading on the no
Commission, Berwick confirmed he "had
show [passenger]." He explained that Pan Am
doubt" at the time that X-raying would be an
had purchased X-ray equipment, and he said
acceptable substitute for the passenger/bag-
that Raymond Salazar, Director of FAA's Office
5
of Civil Aviation Security, had "granted X-ray
Overall, the inspector found that "the
as an alternative to searching passenger bag-
system, trying adequately to control approxi-
gage."
mately 4,500 passengers and 28 flights per day,
Sonesen instructed Berwick in London and
is being held together only by a very labor in-
Huebner in Frankfurt that "in the event of a no
tensive operation and the tenuous threads of
show interline passenger and his bag is
luck." Even so, the inspector concluded, "it ap-
load[ed] in the belly [of the plane] we go!!!!!"
pears the minimum [FAA] requirements can
By April 1988, Pan Am was not following the
and are being met."
FAA's written procedure at Heathrow or Frank-
At the end of the October inspection, the
furt for interline baggage. Pan Am had begun
FAA agent specifically pointed out to Pan Am's
X-raying all interline bags and loading them
Huebner the lack of a tracking system for inter-
without either a passenger/baggage match or a
line bags and the confused state of the passen-
physical search. Huebner confirmed this critical
ger screening procedures.
change in procedure in a communication to
Huebner was already well aware of the exist-
Pan Am headquarters in October 1988: "Since
ence of problems like those surfaced by the Oc-
Frankfurt [Pan Am] introduced the X-ray of all
tober inspection. As he would testify to the
transit baggage there is no longer a reconcilia-
Commission, Huebner had concerns that Alert
tion of the number of transit baggage made."
personnel were "less well educated" and "not
FAA agents inspected Pan Am twice at
qualified" in all instances. Even before the Oc-
Frankfurt and once at London Heathrow
tober inspection, he had concluded that the
during April-December 1988. The last of these
number of Alert personnel was "inadequate" to
inspections occurred at Frankfurt in October
guard Pan Am aircraft and that the passenger
1988. Pan Am was not cited for a violation for
screening procedures were not working proper-
its passenger/baggage reconciliation proce-
ly.
dure, or for any other deficiency.
On October 31, 1988, Huebner cabled the
During the October inspection in Frankfurt,
results of the October FAA inspection to
however, the inspector did note that "in theory
Edward Cunningham, chief of security for all of
all [interline] baggage is X-rayed" and that
Pan Am, concluding: "I have discussed these
there was "no verifiable tracking system" for
items in the past with [Pan Am] station man-
interline baggage. He recommended the X-ray
agement at Frankfurt. It has been pointed out
screener keep a log of the interline bags X-
to me that for financial reasons the security
rayed and that occasional spot checks be con-
staff has to be kept to a minimum."
ducted. But, the inspector did not say that Pan
The FAA did not cite Pan Am for any viola-
Am's procedure violated FAA's baggage recon-
tion as a result of the October 1988 inspection.
The FAA did send Pan Am a letter October 28,
ciliation.requirement.
requesting written evidence of the procedures
The inspector in October 1988 also was trou-
that were in place for the passenger screening
bled by the absence in Pan Am's operation of
system. Pan Am's response was received at the
any clearly understood system for tracking pas-
FAA's regional office in Brussels on December
sengers identified for screening. Pursuant to
21, 1988.
FAA regulations, all passengers were subject to
questioning at check in, with those fitting a
profile subjected to further screening. The in-
The Warnings
spector found that passengers identified for
In the period from June 1, 1988, to Decem-
further questioning were not being screened
ber 21, 1988, the FAA issued 14 security bulle-
correctly because employees would often im-
tins (with three followups), nine of which, in
properly identify and track them. The inspector
retrospect, could have been relevant to what
also noted there was no formalized testing pro-
became the Flight 103 tragedy. The carriers in
cedure for airplane searchers and X-ray opera-
Western Europe, and particularly in Frankfurt,
tors. He also identified a "lack of clearly de-
should have been alerted by the cumulative
fined procedures" for the operations staff and
FAA bulletins to the potential for trouble.
noted that a single manager was providing
Two of these nine bulletins warned generally
training, supervisory and managerial functions.
of the possibility of Iranian retaliation for the
6
downing of the Iranian civilian airbus over the
PFLP-GC members, had been fully rigged as a
Persian Gulf in July 1988. In the bulletins, the
bomb and equipped with a barometric trigger-
FAA commented that the retaliation might take
ing device.
the form of an attack on U.S. civil aviation.
On November 10, 1988, the Hessen State au-
Two other bulletins gave warnings about par-
thority responsible for Frankfurt airport hand-
ticular Middle Eastern terrorists operating
carried a telex to the U.S. carriers there, in-
within Western Europe whose targets, the FAA
cluding Pan Am. The telex described the con-
commented, might include U.S. civil aviation
figuration of the Toshiba bomb device in
interests. Another of the seven bulletins con-
detail, and cautioned that it would be "very dif-
tained information about suitcase bombs in the
ficult to detect on an X-ray screen" and prob-
possession of a Middle Eastern terrorist group
ably was intended for use in "the controlled
that might be targeting Western interests in
area of air traffic." The report said the
Europe, Africa or the Middle East.
PFLP-GC had used this kind of altered elec-
Two more bulletins passed on information
tronic device before to attack civilian aircraft,
about possible attempts to breach security at
and warned it was possible that the group had
Western European airports. One described in-
other camouflaged electronic devices.
cidents during the summer of 1988 at Heath-
The telex concluded: "It has to be assumed
row Airport in which an individual attempted
to have other United States-bound passengers
that there will be further efforts to bring simi-
check in bags for him. The other described
lar prepared explosive devices aboard air-
crafts."
more general attempts to test and learn
about security procedures at Frankfurt airport
On November 18, the FAA issued a security
during the late November-early December 1988
bulletin which contained a similarly detailed de-
period.
scription of the Toshiba device. The bulletin
The eighth bulletin detailed events in the
also cautioned that the device "would be very
Frankfurt area during October 1988. The ninth
difficult to detect via normal X-ray inspection,
bulletin, in December 1988, concerned Pan Am
indicating that it might be intended to pass un-
specifically. Each of these will be discussed in
discovered through areas subject to extensive
greater detail.
security controls, such as airports." The bulle-
tin stated that, among other procedures re-
Radio Cassette Bulletin
quired by the ACSSP, the passenger/checked
On October 26, 1988 West German authori-
baggage match should be "rigorously applied"
ties raided a number of residences where mem-
by all U.S. carriers with international oper-
bers of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
ations.
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), a
The FAA, however, had no procedure in
Middle East terrorist group, had been ob-
place to verify that all affected carriers received
served. Among other places, the raids were
the bulletin information, or to learn what ac-
conducted in and around Frankfurt and Neuss.
tions, if any, the airlines took as a result.
The authorities seized a large cache of weapons
At Frankfurt, Pan Am's Huebner found the
and explosives as a result of the raids. Among
communications concerning the radio cassette
these materials was a Toshiba radio cassette
bomb on his desk on November 28, 1988,
player that had been tampered with.
when he returned from a three week vacation.
A total of 16 persons were arrested in the
After first discussing the documents with the
raids. By the end of October, however, all but
Pan Am station manager, Huebner immediately
three of those arrested had been released from
gave them directly to Ulrich Weber, who was in
custody by the German courts. U.S. intelligence
charge of Alert, the Pan Am security arm at
officials had been briefed concerning the raids
Frankfurt.
the day before they occurred. They did not
Huebner did not determine what, if anything,
learn of the release of any of the individuals
Weber did with the information. Nor did he de-
until after the releases had occurred.
termine whether any special procedures were
Days later, the German officials discovered
then being followed concerning electronic de-
that another Toshiba radio cassette player,
vices. Edward Cunningham subsequently con-
found in the automobile of one of the
firmed in testimony before the Commission
7
that Pan Am had "no formal recommended
regions, as well as to FAA representatives in lo-
procedure" for examination of electronic de-
cations as disparate as Tokyo, Rio de Janeiro,
vices carried in baggage in December 1988.
and Amman. As a matter of course, the FAA
Nor did Pan Am then have any set procedure
also provided its security bulletins to the State
at either Frankfurt or Heathrow for distribution
Department for redistribution, so that U.S. em-
of FAA security bulletin information, such as
bassies in the areas affected by the bulletins
that for the Toshiba radio device. There was
would be in a position to assist U.S. carriers
no pre-shift briefing of security personnel to
through liaison with foreign government securi-
update them on developments. The informa-
ty officials.
tion could be put in "drop boxes" for employ-
In a standard distribution which mirrored
ees who might not check the boxes for days.
that given the FAA security bulletin by FAA,
Otherwise, the information was passed on
the Department of State on December 9 for-
orally, in hit-or-miss fashion.
warded the text of the Helsinki threat bulletin
Helsinki Threat Bulletin
to all European diplomatic posts, and to U.S.
embassies in locations such as Singapore and
On December 5, 1988, an anonymous caller
Dakar. The Department of Defense also trans-
telephoned the American Embassy in Helsinki,
mitted the warning to its security units in all of
Finland, stating that sometime within the next
its worldwide commands.
two weeks a Finnish woman would carry a
By conservative estimate, thousands of U.S.
bomb aboard a Pan Am aircraft flying from
Government employees saw the Helsinki threat
Frankfurt to the United States. The caller, who
information.
spoke with a Middle Eastern accent, provided
By December 10, the Finnish police had con-
names of two individuals who he said would
cluded the threat was not a credible one. The
engineer the bombing and who had ties to the
threat information in the December 5 call
Abu Nidal terrorist organization.
closely paralleled information in calls received
Shortly after the call, the Embassy notified
by the Israeli Embassy in Helsinki earlier in
the State Department Operations Center in
1988. The Finnish police informed senior U.S.
Washington of the threat. On December 7, the
officials of details of their investigation, and of
Embassy sent a classified cable to the State De-
partment which was copied, for informational
their firm judgment that the call was not credi-
ble.
purposes, to the American Consulate in Frank-
furt and to other agencies, including the FAA.
Those U.S. officials accepted the Finnish as-
The Regional Security Officer at the U.S. Con-
sessment. They decided, however, against pass-
sulate in Frankfurt immediately notified Pan
ing this information on to the FAA for dissemi-
Am officials there of the threat information.
nation to the air carriers. The officials ex-
Upon learning that Pan Am already had the
plained to the Commission that they were con-
information, the FAA decided to issue a securi-
cerned the carriers would misinterpret the in-
ty bulletin concerning the Helsinki threat even
formation as a signal to relax their security pre-
though the threat was anonymous and its credi-
cautions. In the officials' view, this would have
bility had not been fully assessed.
been the wrong signal to send to the airlines.
The FAA's reasoning, agency officials told
As reflected by information in other bulletins
the Commission, was that the State Department
sent out by the FAA during the previous
cable said that the local authorities take such
months, U.S. intelligence officials remained
calls "very seriously." The threat mentioned
concerned about indications of increased ter-
the Abu Nidal organization at a time when
rorist activity and movement in Western
other world events made an attack by that ter-
Europe.
rorist group plausible. FAA personnel also said
The FAA was not informed of the intelli-
they wanted to ensure all U.S. carriers operat-
gence community's conclusion about the threat
ing in Europe had accurate information, rather
call. But, by December 12, a State Department
than having the threat information spread by
official in Helsinki had told a Pan Am security
rumor and second-hand reporting.
official that the call had been discounted. Pan
FAA sent out Security Bulletin ACS-88-22
Am officials also testified before the Commis-
on the evening of December 7 to all of its U.S.
sion that the British Department of Transport
8
told Pan Am on December 15 that the British
cable was given a routine circulation to many
intelligence community had concluded the
members of the Embassy staff.
threat was not real.
The information raised concern among those
Pan Am, nevertheless, did pass the Helsinki
on the Embassy staff who saw it. The informa-
threat information to its station in Frankfurt. At
tion was specific as to the carrier, the route,
least some Pan Am security personnel inter-
and the time period involved. It covered a
viewed by the Commission staff seem to have
route that most U.S. Government employees
been aware of that threat warning. Pan Am in-
departing Moscow would routinely take if they
stituted special screening procedures for Finn-
were traveling back to the United States. Also,
ish women and their companions transferring
those on the staff who had access to the cable
to Pan Am flights from Frankfurt to the United
States.
felt they could not justify having seen it while
In that respect, Huebner was particularly
others had not, in that the information was un-
concerned about the vulnerability of Pan Am's
classified and relevant to the U.S. community
then standard process of X-raying interline
in Moscow.
baggage, without any further security check. He
The Acting Deputy Chief of Mission in
asked Sonesen "whether X-ray of checked bag-
Moscow during December 1988 later testified
gage will be sufficient." Huebner later told the
before the Commission: "Basically, the situa-
Commission he was concerned that in an envi-
tion we were faced with there was that
ronment of "before Christmas and maybe high
whoever the Communications Officer had dis-
loads out of Helsinki" it would be difficult to
tributed the cable to, had information that was
sort out bags that had originated in Helsinki.
in the cable
so the choices we had were
Huebner suggested a change in interline proce-
either to simply leave that
situation con-
dures to prevent baggage originating in Fin-
tinue to exist
or to make a decision to
land from being automatically transferred in
provide the information more broadly."
Frankfurt to a Pan Am flight.
These concerns were raised at a regular
Other than screening of Finnish passengers,
meeting of the senior Embassy staff on either
however, Pan Am's security procedures at
December 12 or 13. The staff reached a tenta-
Frankfurt remained unchanged. No other
tive decision that an administrative notice on
changes were made in the interline process. No
enhanced procedures were put in place as a
the threat information should be posted. The
dissemination of such a notice was the Embas-
result of the Toshiba radio cassette information
or the other bulletins during June-December
sy's broadest distribution system. Informed of
1988. Huebner's testimony before the Commis-
the staff's recommendation, the U.S. Ambassa-
sion, corroborated by that of other Pan Am of-
dor concurred.
ficials, reflected Pan Am's attitude in Frankfurt:
Because Embassy security personnel did not
have on hand a 1987 State Department cable
Q. In December 1988, was the secu-
which supposedly provided guidance concern-
rity operation of Pan Am in Frankfurt
ing dissemination of FAA bulletin information,
on any heightened state?
and because the FAA bulletin itself was unclear
A. We followed the security proce-
in that regard, the Embassy sent a cable
dures set up by the FAA.
marked "action" to the FAA. That cable, dated
December 13, 1988, told the FAA: "Post plans
As will appear, a substantial question exists
to issue an internal administrative notice warn-
whether Pan Am followed even the stated FAA
ing employees of the threat."
requirements.
The Embassy officer responsible for sending
the cable to FAA explained to the Commission
Moscow Posting
that he "wanted FAA to be aware that we were
The United States Embassy in Moscow re-
intending to make a dissemination of their bul-
ceived the Helsinki threat information on De-
letin
[so] they could respond to us, and
cember 9 by way of the unclassified State De-
either say, 'Don't disseminate it; disseminate it
partment cable which repeated the text of FAA
with the following caveats.' The FAA never
Security Bulletin ACS-88-22. The unclassified
responded (a "procedural error," according to
9
the testimony of the FAA's Director of Civil
The employee asked for guidance on how to
Aviation Security).
respond to questions from customers who had
The Embassy posted the administrative
read the notice.
notice on the morning of December 14. The
Ms. Young sent a telex to her security super-
notice was distributed in a manner so as to re-
visor in Frankfurt, indicating that "approxi-
ceive the broadest distribution possible within
mately 80 per cent of Pan Am holiday traffic
the American community in Moscow and was
from Embassy is now rebooking to other air-
intended to reach contract employees such as
lines out of Frankfurt," and asking for public
painters and chauffeurs, as well as U.S. journal-
information guidelines for use by the sales of-
ists, business people and students in Moscow.
fices on the subject of the threat information.
Ms. Young's use of the 80 per cent figure
351-88
was apparently designed as an attention-getter
to her superiors. As she made clear in subse-
ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE
quent testimony to the Commission, Ms. Young
American Embassy, MOSCOW
had "no specific numbers" at all and sent the
December 13, 1988
telex out "no more than an hour" after receiv-
TO
:
All Embassy Employees
ing the call from the Pan Am employee at the
SUBJECT: Threat to Civil Aviation
Embassy sales office. She had no knowledge,
Post has been notified by the Federal Aviation Administration
then or now, about any passenger cancellations
that on December 5, 1988, an unidentified individual
telephoned a U.S. diplomatic facility in Europe and stated
that sometime within the next two weeks there would be a
because of the posting, Ms. Young testified.
bombing attempt against a Pan American aircraft flying from
Frankfurt to the United States.
After Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed, the
The FAA reports that the relibility of the information cannot
Finnish authorities, with cooperation from the
be assessed at this point, but the appropriate police
authorities have been notified and are pursuing the matter.
U.S. Government, conducted an extensive in-
Pan Am has also been notified.
In view of the lack of confirmation of this information, post
vestigation into both the suspected caller and
leaves to the discretion of individual travelers any
decisions on altering personal travel plans or changing to
the person named in the Helsinki threat phone
another American carrier. This does not absolve the traveler
from flying an American carrier.
call. Every government which has investigated
this matter has concluded that the December 5
threat call was unrelated to the destruction of
Flight 103.
Willin-CKelly
The Commission staff spoke to law enforce-
ment and intelligence officials from England,
Administrative
Scotland, Finland, and the United States. All
categorically stated their conclusion that the
Helsinki threat had no connection with the
The notice was distributed to all internal of-
bombing of Flight 103. The Commission has
fices within the Embassy, to the press office of
found no evidence suggesting otherwise.
the Embassy, to contracting companies, to the
U.S. commercial office, to the U.S. Information
Passenger Reservations
Service, to the American Community Associa-
tion offices and to the Anglo-American school.
Hoax or not, the Helsinki threat information
The notice additionally was posted on many
was assumed to be real when it was posted in
bulletin boards within the Embassy compound
Moscow and most definitely could have been
in plain view of visitors.
used as a basis for persons to change their
Ultimately, the notice was available to most
travel plans.
of the approximately 2,000 members of the
The Commission obtained from Pan Am
U.S. community in Moscow. The notice was
records that could allow analysis of passenger
provided to journalists, but no stories were
load, booking and cancellation patterns rele-
published concerning it during the next week.
vant to Flight 103 and other Pan Am flights
Almost immediately after the posting, Jenni-
from Frankfurt to the United States during De-
fer Young, Pan Am's Director of Operations in
cember 1988. A statistician retained by the
the Soviet Union, received a call from a part-
Commission analyzed those records.
time Pan Am employee who operated the small
The analysis, contained in Appendix D to
Pan Am ticket office at the American Embassy.
this Report, shows no significant variation in
10
bookings, passengers carried, or cancellations
elsewhere. The Commission found only one
for Pan Am flights from Frankfurt to the
passenger who changed travel plans because of
United States during December 1988 relative
the Helsinki threat. A civilian under contract
to the same flights during December 1987 or
with the U.S. Government in Moscow was
1989. The data also show that the passenger
scheduled to fly Pan Am via Frankfurt to the
loads for Pan Am flights from Frankfurt to the
United States on December 16, 1988, but
United States during December 1988 paralleled
switched to a direct Pan Am flight to the
those for TWA flights departing from Frankfurt
United States which departed Moscow on De-
at approximately the same times during the
cember 18.
same period.
The part-time employee who operated Pan
Review of Pan Am data also shows that Flight
Am's office at the Moscow Embassy told Com-
103 had never been fully booked and that there
mission staff that she had booked a U.S. jour-
was no unusual pattern of bookings or cancella-
nalist, without telling him, on a carrier other
tions for it during the pre-Christmas period.
than Pan Am on December 21 because of the
Allegations that Pan Am offered a special one-
Helsinki threat. The Commission was unable to
half fare discount for Flight 103 were "abso-
substantiate this assertion.
lutely false," according to Pan Am testimony
No passenger from Moscow was aboard
before the Commission. Pan Am told the Com-
Flight 103 on December 21, 1988, but there
mission, and the Commission confirmed, that
was no connecting Moscow flight scheduled to
London to New York fares for December 21,
fly on that day of the week. Even on days when
1988, were in effect for at least the previous 30
Pan Am flights left Moscow, because of the
days.
"Fly America" Act it was difficult for U.S. Gov-
Pan Am records show that only two of the
many fare classes available for Flight 103 had
ernment travelers to shift travel plans from Pan
been fully booked at one time or another. Pan
Am, the only U.S. carrier serving Moscow.
Am sold those two classes, H and L, solely to
The Commission's investigation also deter-
wholesalers and consolidators, who resold them
mined that two U.S. civilians, other than those
to the public.
in Moscow, heard at least generally about the
The Commission was told of several in-
Helsinki threat information. Yet, both of them
stances in which one particular travel agency
boarded Flight 103 on December 21.
was unable to obtain tickets on Flight 103 for
student passengers. Personnel at that agency
December 21, 1988
explained to Commission staff that the agency
is permitted to sell only H category (student
Frankfurt
fare) tickets. When that class is fully booked for
a flight, as it was from time to time for Flight
As passengers for Flight 103 checked into
103, the agency tells students who call for res-
Frankfurt the afternoon of December 21, 1988,
ervations that the flight is fully booked.
they were met by employees of Alert Manage-
Commission staff confirmed that it is
ment Systems, Inc., who were to conduct the
common in the airline travel business for a par-
initial screening of all passengers. Alert had
ticular fare class on a given flight to be sold
begun operations at Frankfurt in June 1988. Al-
out one day and open the next or even opened
though technically a corporate affiliate, Pan Am
and closed on the same day. The result is that
senior management viewed it "in practice, [as]
on the same day some people may be able to
a functioning, operating arm" of Pan Am.
obtain reservations in a given fare class while
According to written procedures, the Alert
others cannot.
screeners were to apply FAA-developed criteria
Commission staff also conducted extensive
to all passengers to identify those persons who
interviews and reviewed all relevant travel
were "profiled" as possible threats. These per-
records of personnel in the Moscow Embassy.
sons were to be tracked through a markings
Staff followed all rumors brought to the Com-
system and would be subject to further screen-
mission's attention concerning alleged changes
ing. As written, the procedures appeared to sat-
in travel plans by military and civilian person-
isfy FAA requirements. The FAA requirements
nel, whether the personnel were in Moscow or
were intended to identify passengers who,
11
knowingly or not, might be carrying or check-
er, were the same as recognized by the FAA in-
ing an explosive device onto a plane.
spector two months earlier. And, they were the
However, many of the Alert and Pan Am em-
same problems as Pan Am's chief of security
ployees on duty at Frankfurt that day were not
for West Germany had brought to the attention
familiar with the passenger screening proce-
of Pan Am headquarters.
dures or misunderstood their responsibilities.
Several of the passengers who boarded the
Also, some employees did not know what was
flight in Frankfurt had no baggage. Their bags
being done at other points in the screening
had departed, unaccompanied by the passen-
system, why they were undertaking the proce-
gers, on earlier flights that day. Pan Am's
dures or what they were trying to prevent.
Ground Security Coordinator for those flights
The training of the Alert employees on duty
later claimed he exercised his discretion in let-
generally was minimal. Many of the Frankfurt
ting the earlier flights depart with unaccompa-
screeners had received no training since joining
nied baggage. FAA written security measures,
Alert, although several had a two-day training
then in effect, permitted no such discretion.
session with Pan Am's previous security con-
Baggage destined for Flight 103 was loaded
tractor. Others had received a small amount of
in the cargo area at the rear of the terminal in
on-the-job training under supervision. Many
Frankfurt. Pan Am uniformed employees were
Pan Am ticket agents also had no security train-
handling the baggage designated for its flights.
ing. Nor had personnel been tested since Alert
Pursuant to its "working agreement" with the
began operations six months earlier.
FAA, Pan Am did not search these employees
As was discovered during the subsequent
before they boarded the aircraft. Pan Am was
FAA investigation, several gaps existed in the
the only airline at Frankfurt which employed its
screening program for passengers on Flight
own baggage handlers. This was pursuant to a
103. Four interline passengers apparently were
long-standing agreement between Pan Am and
not even initially screened, as required, before
the Frankfurt Airport Authority, which handled
they boarded Flight 103. Five other passengers,
baggage for all other carriers.
who had been identified by Alert at the check-
It is unclear how many, if any, of the employ-
in counter for further screening, did not re-
ceive that screening at the gate.
ees in the baggage area had been made aware
of the Toshiba radio information, or whether
Pan Am subsequently denied that passengers
X-ray operators were on the lookout for radio
on Flight 103 were not initially screened and
cassette recorders in particular. The X-ray op-
claimed that any redundant screening at the
erator for interline baggage that day had begun
gate was prohibited by West German authori-
ties. The passenger tracking problems, howev-
working for Alert on November 1, 1988. For
training, he had spent half a day with a col-
league, and a few hours with a supervisor on
another occasion. The rest of his knowledge
was self-taught, on-the-job.
Until interline passengers checked in at
Frankfurt, Pan Am often had no record of
them, or their baggage, in its computer. Never-
theless, Pan Am personnel made no attempt to
reconcile the number of interline bags being
loaded into any plane with the number of bags
checked by interline passengers who actually
boarded that plane. Bags with distinctive inter-
line tags were simply X-rayed on the baggage
loading ramp, taken directly to the aircraft and
loaded.
Pan Am employees did not determine wheth-
er any given interline bag loaded onto Flight
Screening of passengers at busy airports is complicated by the
103 was accompanied by the passenger who
large number of travelers, particularly during holiday seasons.
presumably had checked it onto an earlier
12
flight into Frankfurt or, for that matter, wheth-
Bags coming in from Frankfurt were treated
er that bag had ever been accompanied by any
as "on-line" baggage. Passenger/baggage rec-
passenger.
onciliation was done by computer so that if an
The Boeing 727 pushed away from the gate
online passenger did not show at the gate,
at 4:54 p.m. local time, carrying 128 passen-
those bags were supposed to be off-loaded and
gers. Flight 103 had begun. Pan Am and Alert
physically searched.
personnel subsequently would say that, from
This system, however, was not sufficient to
their perspective, the flight left free of any
identify a bag that had been loaded in Frank-
problems or extraordinary circumstances. The
furt but was unaccompanied by any passenger.
cargo load sheet also showed "no known secu-
Baggage checked through to New York in
rity exceptions."
Frankfurt was merely transferred at Heathrow
Baggage was loaded in the hold of the plane
to the baggage hold of the plane that would
loosely within netting, not in cargo containers.
take Flight 103 to New York. No count of that
No one in Pan Am security knew whether or
baggage was made or compared with the
not Flight 103 was carrying an "extra" bag, un-
accompanied by any passenger.
number of bags checked by Frankfurt passen-
gers who continued on Flight 103 in London.
Heathrow
Inside the Heathrow terminal, Flight 103
passengers were checking in and preparing to
At London's Heathrow airport, Pan Am bag-
board. As in Frankfurt, the training provided to
gage handlers were pulling interline bags des-
Alert employees was nominal. Several employ-
tined for the London-New York leg of Flight
ees had undergone a three-day session in 1987.
103 from the conveyer belts. No physical
By December 1988, the training consisted of
search was made of them, nor was there any
three hours of classroom training and video-
control to ascertain that bags were accompa-
tapes.
nied by passengers who boarded the plane. As
in Frankfurt, the bags were X-rayed and loaded
On-line passengers from Frankfurt went di-
into a baggage container intended for Flight
rectly from their arrival gate to the adjacent
103.
gate to board the continuing Flight 103 to New
That container, then partially loaded, was
York. There was no additional security check of
towed over to an area outside of Pan Am's of-
these passengers or their baggage. Pan Am
fices at approximately 4:45 p.m. local time. Fif-
relied on the security procedures at Frankfurt.
teen minutes later, the Pan Am employee who
The screening procedure for those passen-
had delivered the container departed, leaving
gers originating in London was essentially the
the container with its curtain open and sitting
same as that used in Frankfurt, with several
unattended. No FAA regulation then expressly
minor differences including the precise manner
prohibited this practice. The regulation requir-
in which passengers were supposed to be
ing that all containers be sealed and under con-
tracked. What remained the same was the in-
stant surveillance would not be proposed until
consistency with which the employees under-
14 days later.
stood the program.
Flight 103 from Frankfurt touched down at
It was soon discovered that the records for
Heathrow at 5:40 p.m. local time and taxied to
38 passengers who boarded Flight 103 had no
Terminal 3, gate K-16. The larger Boeing 747,
security markings on them whatsoever. Pan Am
"Maid of the Seas," that was to continue the
subsequently said that this absence did not nec-
flight to New York was waiting at the adjacent
essarily mean that all passengers were not
gate.
screened. It remains at best unclear how many,
The partially loaded baggage container was
if any, of these 38 passengers were screened in
taken to the 727 that had just landed from
any manner before boarding the flight in
Frankfurt. Bags continuing through to New
London.
York were put into this container immediately
One passenger registered for Flight 103 on
after they came down the conveyor belt from
the computer did not arrive at the gate; never-
the hold of the 727. The filled container was
theless, the duty manager believed he had the
then towed over to the 747 and loaded into the
discretion to let the plane go without removing
belly of the aircraft.
the passenger's baggage. Again, FAA written
13
requirements permitted no such discretion.
Sections of the aircraft fell upon and around
The duty manager also never notified the pilot
the quiet town of Lockerbie, in the rolling hills
or the flight crew on Flight 103 of the missing
of Scotland. The wings and attached fuselage
passenger. The passenger was later found in
section plummeted into the edge of the town,
the airport, having inadvertently missed the
gouging a crater 140 feet long and 40 feet wide
flight.
and exploding into a fireball that towered
The Boeing 747 pushed back from the gate
10,000 feet. A piece of window frame from a
at 6:07 p.m. local time, with 243 passengers
nearby house landed three miles away. Winds
and a crew of 16. In all, citizens of 21 different
scattered debris from the aircraft all the way to
nations were aboard. The passengers included
the coast of England, 80 miles to the east.
over 30 employees of the U.S. Government.
The worst security-related disaster in U.S.
The plane carried about 20 tons of cargo, in-
civil aviation history had happened. All aboard
cluding 43 bags of U.S. military mail.
the plane and 11 residents of Lockerbie per-
After an air traffic delay, it took off at 6:25
ished.
p.m. and assumed a radar reading of 350 de-
grees. The plane climbed to 12,000 feet and
The Aftermath
then to 31,000 feet, leveling off at that altitude
at 6:56 p.m. Just under eight minutes later, it
An immense investigation immediately began
disappeared from the tracking radar screen.
in Lockerbie to establish the cause of the air-
An explosion had torn through the lower fu-
craft's destruction. The investigators would
selage just in front of the left wing. The Boeing
eventually conclude that an explosive device
747 ripped apart.
utilizing a plastic explosive was likely concealed
The flight deck and forward portion of "Maid of the Seas" came to rest in Tundergarth Field, approximately three miles from
Lockerbie, Scotland.
14
in a radio cassette recorder carried within a
Deficiencies included no written bag match
suitcase stowed in the cargo hold.
procedures; no challenging of unbadged per-
A huge effort by the citizens of Lockerbie
sonnel; inadequate tracking of passenger
also began in order to deal with the aftermath
screening; failure to secure gates or ramps, and
of the tragedy. Personnel from Pan Am and
failure to search servicing personnel. An im-
Boeing among many others arrived at Locker-
proved baggage reconciliation system was in
bie, as did officers from the U.S. Department of
place, but even it was found to have exploitable
State. State Department activities will be re-
gaps.
viewed in Chapter 7 of this Report. Represent-
The January inspection report noted that the
atives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
also arrived to assist in the investigation. The
Pan Am procedures standing alone were basi-
Central Intelligence Agency told the Commis-
cally sound. However, the "erratic application
sion that it did not send anyone to the site.
of guidelines and poorly trained and supervised
Through an emergency rule-making, the FAA
security is presently creating a breakdown of
amended the Air Carrier Standard Security
the system," the FAA report said. The FAA
Program in the days after the Lockerbie atroci-
agents briefed the Pan Am station manager
ty. By December 31, 1988, all affected carriers
during the inspection and upon its completion.
were required to meet more stringent require-
As in Frankfurt, the determination trip in
ments, including total reconciliation between
London uncovered a security operation replete
passengers and checked baggage. Under the
with violations involving the screening of se-
new standard, bags could not fly unless specifi-
lected passengers and servicing personnel and
cally matched with a passenger. There could be
the failure to seal and guard cargo containers.
no more "extra" bags. Pan Am implemented
The inspectors stated in their report that lack
the procedure at Frankfurt on January 4, 1989.
of professional leadership from Pan Am was at
The FAA also began its own special investi-
the root of the problem, noting "Alert was
gation of the Pan Am procedures at Frankfurt
there for the show more than to do a complete
and Heathrow. The Frankfurt phase was com-
and thorough job."
pleted by mid-January, and the Heathrow
The inspection reports prepared during
review by the end of January. The inquiries
these determination trips were sent both to the
covered the six-week period beginning on De-
FAA regional headquarters in Brussels and to
cember 21, 1988.
the FAA in Washington. But no enforcement
Upon leaving Frankfurt and Heathrow the
action was ever taken as a result of these in-
FAA inspectors, as was customary, briefed Pan
spections.
Am on their findings. The first deficiency noted
in Frankfurt was that the passenger/bag match
In February 1989, two FAA inspectors revis-
system in place for interline bags was "inad-
ited Pan Am at Frankfurt. They listed one
equate." The investigators told Pan Am they
minor problem but none of the many other
had found that "interline bags were X-rayed
significant ones discovered during the
only with no correlation between the passenger
December-January reviews. One FAA agent
boarding the aircraft and the bag being placed
who conducted this inspection became a princi-
on board."
pal security inspector for the FAA a year later,
In late January and early February 1989, the
with oversight responsibility for all of Pan Am's
FAA sent teams of investigators on "determina-
security operations.
tion trips," intended to assess how carriers
Meanwhile, formal FAA letters resulting from
were complying with the new procedures the
the special investigation of Flight 103 were
FAA had mandated at the end of December
being prepared. These "letters of investiga-
1988. While at the airports in Frankfurt and
tion" were not sent out to Pan Am until May 5,
London, the determination teams decided to
1989. During this time the alleged violations
conduct full compliance inspections of Pan Am
were reviewed by security officials in Brussels
as well.
and Washington. Drafts of the letters of investi-
The January inspection at Frankfurt revealed
gation were sent back and forth between the
that many of the same problems existing on
two offices. The agency wanted to be sure of
December 21, 1988, continued uncorrected.
its actions.
15
Even so, one matter documented by the in-
unsatisfactory," citing "major violations" in all
vestigators in Frankfurt was not cited in the of-
areas of the ACSSP.
ficial letter of investigation. The inspectors had
The Trip Report left no doubt about the in-
reported that, contrary to FAA written require-
spector's assessment. He said: "posture [of Pan
ments, there was "no correlation between an
Am] considered unsafe, [and] all passengers
interline passenger checking in or boarding a
flying out of Frankfurt on Pan Am are at great
flight and their baggage being placed on the
risk."
aircraft." According to the investigators' report,
As a result of the May inspections in Frank-
Pan Am's station manager for Frankfurt had
furt and London, the FAA Brussels office sent
said he "was positive the X-ray of interline bags
formal letters of investigation to Pan Am on
was sufficient to satisfy FAA requirements."
May 25 and 26. The vast majority of FAA's
The investigators also had found that one
charges at Frankfurt concerned Pan Am's fail-
interline bag loaded on Flight 103 could not be
ure to search its service employees. Pan Am re-
accounted for through any passenger records.
sponded that it interpreted the ACSSP to ex-
Nevertheless, the May 5 letter to Pan Am made
clude its own uniformed employees from
no reference to these circumstances.
screening and that the FAA had consented to
The next regularly scheduled inspection of
this interpretation for years.
Pan Am at Frankfurt occurred during May
Pan Am did not dispute that its training and
8-23, 1989. While on its face the February in-
employee records should have been provided
spection seemed to have indicated that most of
in Frankfurt. The airline did dispute the find-
the problems had been rectified, by the end of
ings that passengers had not been screened
the May inspection it was clear that this was not
adequately; only the record-keeping was "inad-
the case.
equate," Pan Am said. With respect to other al-
The FAA inspection report for May 8-23 re-
leged violations, Pan Am was "taking steps to
vealed continued, multiple violations of the
address the situation."
ACSSP. These deficiencies mirrored many of
In the interim, the May 25 FAA letter of the
those from the January inspection and included
recent Frankfurt investigation found its way to
failure to use sealed containers; failure to
the FAA Headquarters and eventually to Monte
search servicing personnel; failure to provide
Belger, the FAA Associate Administrator to
training records; failure to provide records on
whom the security division reports. Because the
employees' background checks; failure to track
Brussels office did not regularly send copies of
passengers properly; failure to conduct redun-
its letters of investigation to Washington,
dant screening; and failure to guard aircraft.
Belger would rarely see such a letter. He found
An inspection in London completed May 12
the report, which in his view showed "continu-
showed similar deficiencies, including a failure
ing noncompliance at Frankfurt," to be "unbe-
to adequately screen the baggage of interline
lievable" and "frustrating."
passengers selected for further profiling.
After a briefing from the Frankfurt investiga-
The May inspection team in Frankfurt saw an
tor, Belger set up a meeting on June 14, 1989
attitude of "indifference" and "a complete lack
with Pan Am's corporate chief of security and
of management oversight of the [security] op-
with its vice president in charge of the airport
eration." The inspectors spent over a week
station managers. Belger and several other offi-
trying to correct the deficiencies. The Frankfurt
cials, including the Frankfurt inspector, attend-
inspection team telephoned their findings to
ed the meeting. The FAA officials pointed out
the FAA's principal security inspector for Pan
the deficiencies found in Pan Am's security op-
Am. Stationed in New York City, the principal
erations in Frankfurt. They also said that "pres-
security inspector was "shocked" by the find-
sure to get Flight[s] out seemed more impor-
ings. He had been unaware of the problems.
tant than security compliance" for Pan Am at
One of the FAA inspectors at Frankfurt pre-
Frankfurt, explaining as well that some Pan Am
pared a Trip Report, dated June 7, 1989, in
security employees at Frankfurt had said "they
which he found the security operations of four
are forbidden from holding up a Flight."
other carriers at Frankfurt to be "good." The
According to notes made on June 14 by one
reporting inspector judged Pan Am as "totally
of the FAA officials at the meeting, the Pan Am
16
executives replied that a "strong message" had
According to notes made by an FAA official
already been sent to their manager in Frankfurt
during the September 12 meeting, one of the
and that a "noticeable difference" would be
Pan Am senior executives near the end of the
seen in Pan Am security operations there.
meeting reflected upon the security operations
The two Pan Am representatives who attend-
run for Pan Am by Alert. "Pan Am needs to be
ed the entire June 14 meeting disagreed about
more involved," he said, "and it took [Pan Am]
what had happened. One executive recalled in
a long time to recognize it."
testimony before the Commission that "the
The Administrator of the FAA, who had
point of the meeting" was to hear what the
been confirmed in July 1989, immediately
FAA investigator had found and to present to
called Pan Am's Chief Executive Officer to set
the FAA "a plan of what we were doing in
up a meeting on September 14. The session
Frankfurt." The other executive testified that
occurred at FAA headquarters in Washington.
the subject of Pan Am's Frankfurt operations
Part of it involved a one-on-one meeting be-
never came up during the June 14 meeting. He
tween the Administrator and Pan Am's Chief
remembered the meeting as covering only a
Executive Officer. That same evening, a team
slide presentation of a field services security
of top-level Pan Am managers, accompanied by
plan that he had developed for all of Pan Am.
FAA inspectors, flew to Frankfurt.
In any event, Belger told the Commission he
After one week, personnel changes were
had been "impressed" when he left the meet-
made by Pan Am at Frankfurt, and all of the
ing on June 14 by what Pan Am had said.
identified security deficiencies were remedied.
When Belger visited Frankfurt later in June on
Pan Am's security operation at Frankfurt was
a previously scheduled trip to see other carri-
ers, however, he took the occasion to meet with
judged a model station at the next regular in-
spection. In Heathrow a similar transformation
Pan Am's station manager. Although the man-
occurred in Pan Am's security procedures.
ager said that new security procedures had
been adopted, it appeared to Belger that this
The FAA sent its civil penalty letter on Flight
policy had not been implemented effectively at
103 to Pan Am on September 19, 1989. This
the working level.
letter proposed fines totaling $630,000 for
cited violations at Frankfurt and Heathrow
An unannounced inspection of Pan Am at
Frankfurt was conducted in late August 1989.
during Flight 103 and immediately thereafter.
Again, the inspectors reported to Washington
In its press statement concerning the pro-
that many of the same security problems re-
posed fines, the FAA carefully pointed out that
mained uncorrected, especially with respect to
"the letter to Pan American contained no alle-
guarding airplanes and searching the personnel
gations that any of the violations contributed to
maintaining those aircraft. The "common strain
the Flight 103 tragedy."
in Frankfurt," Belger told the Commission, was
"general confusion about what the security re-
Findings
quirements were," as well as "lack of a compli-
ance attitude by the senior management
at
Until it is established exactly how the bomb
the station."
was placed aboard Flight 103, it is impossible
Another meeting with Pan Am officials oc-
to say whether the failure of any specific securi-
curred on September 12, 1989. When FAA in-
ty procedure was directly related to the sabo-
spectors described the security déficiencies in
tage of the flight. Law enforcement efforts,
Frankfurt, Pan Am officials expressed surprise,
however, have established the bomb was in
saying they were told by their Frankfurt station
baggage checked onto Flight 103. Unquestion-
manager that the inspection had gone well. Ac-
ably, there were severe shortcomings in the
tually, Cunningham, the Pan Am security chief,
screening of baggage, and of passengers, that
had sent Sonesen, a high security official, to
could have contributed to the terrorist act that
Frankfurt following the FAA's inspection there
placed the bomb aboard the plane.
in August. Sonesen had called back to say
"there is a problem here." Pan Am came to the
Baggage Procedures
meeting prepared with still another multi-point
The Commission has established that Pan
"action plan."
Am in December 1988 did not reconcile the
17
number of interline bags loaded into the belly
any "extra" bag. Those requirements called for
of any plane leaving Frankfurt with the number
physical search of any unaccompanied bags. If
of bags previously checked by the interline pas-
sengers who actually boarded the plane. Based
upon Sonesen's "we go" advice from corporate
headquarters in March 1988, Pan Am made no
determination in Frankfurt whether a given
interline bag ever had been checked in by any
passenger.
When Flight 103 backed away from the gate
in Frankfurt, Pan Am security personnel did
not know whether or not it was carrying an
"extra" bag. If so, the bag continued right
through Heathrow airport, where no further se-
curity control was applied.
Records reviewed by the Commission sug-
gest Flight 103 may well have carried at least
one such bag. The operator of the X-ray ma-
chine for interline bags loaded onto Flight 103
in Frankfurt maintained a detailed list of the
bags X-rayed. The FAA agent, during the in-
spection in October 1988, had suggested to
Pan Am that such a list be maintained precisely
because Pan Am at Frankfurt had no verifiable
tracking system for interline baggage.
This list shows that 13 parcels (including two
garment bags and a box appearing to contain
six wine bottles) passed through the machine
on the way to the flight. Other records, howev-
The wings and attached fuselage from Pan Am Flight 103 gouged
er, account for only 12 parcels (11 checked by
a crater 140 feet long and 40 feet wide.
passengers who boarded the flight and one so-
called "rush" bag of a passenger who had left
locked, a bag would not have been permitted
on an earlier flight of another carrier).
to be loaded on the plane. If unlocked, a bag
The Commission does not know whether a
would have been physically searched.
"thirteenth bag" loaded on Flight 103 in
Finally, if on December 21, the FAA or Pan
Frankfurt in fact contained the device that ulti-
Am had required that baggage containers be
mately devastated Flight 103.
secured at all times, there now would be no
If on December 21, 1988, the FAA or Pan
question about possible tampering with the
Am had required that baggage could not be
container that sat open and unguarded for 30
carried on any flight unless it was accompanied
minutes at Heathrow, waiting for the leg of
by a passenger, there now would be no ques-
Flight 103 to arrive from Frankfurt. The FAA
tion about an "extra" bag. No such bag would
did not impose express standards prohibiting
have been allowed on the plane. But that rec-
this circumstance until January 1989.
onciliation procedure (without an exception
even for physical search) was not required by
Again, the Commission does not know
whether the destruction of Flight 103 would
the FAA or by Pan Am until after Flight 103
was destroyed and 270 lives were lost.
have been prevented if stronger security stand-
If Pan Am in Frankfurt had at a minimum
ards had then been observed. What we do
followed even the written requirements of the
know is that compliance with them would have
FAA in effect on December 21, there now
eliminated the need now to even ask these
would be no question about the contents of
questions.
18
Passenger Procedures
This procedure was contrary to written secu-
rity standards at the time for Heathrow and
The Commission's review equally confirmed
Frankfurt. Both before and after March 1988,
that passenger screening by Pan Am personnel
the FAA's ACSSP and Pan Am's own Security
at Frankfurt and Heathrow was at best con-
Manual set forth those standards. Specifically,
fused.
Section XV C(1)(a) of the ACSSP required car-
The FAA's October 1988 inspection of
riers to "conduct a positive passenger/checked
Frankfurt showed that the Pan Am employees
baggage match resulting in physical inspection
who were supposed to apply the tracking
or non-carriage of all unaccompanied bags"
system for passengers did not understand the
(emphasis supplied). Section 508 of Pan Am's
procedures. Even before the FAA inspection in
Security Manual, in effect at the time, repeated
October 1988, Huebner of Pan Am had found
that requirement verbatim.
that "Pan Am staff fails to advise Alert person-
Commission staff questioned Sonesen about
nel when passengers show up for check-in" in
Pan Am's March 1988 change. He categorically
order for proper screening procedures to be
stated under oath that the change had been ap-
applied.
proved by Salazar during a meeting of industry
Passenger screening procedures are intended
security personnel in October 1987. Sonesen
to sort out persons who, wittingly or unwitting-
testified:
ly, may be carrying explosives. That had OC-
curred at Heathrow during April 1986, when a
Q. Do I understand you to say that
"dupe" was identified as a part of redundant
Mr. Salazar explained that X-ray in-
screening procedures. A suitcase her fiance had
spection was an acceptable practice,
asked her to carry for him actually contained,
despite paragraph C(1)(a)?
without her knowledge, an explosive device in-
tended to blow up the El Al plane she was
A. Yes.
about to board.
Q. Is there any doubt in your mind
The Commission does not know whether
about that?
complete and proper passenger screening pro-
cedures could have prevented the tragedy of
A. No.
Flight 103. We do not know whether adequate
profiling would have detected any "dupe." We
Upon subsequent examination, however,
do know that, by apparently failing to accom-
Sonesen did not recall that Salazar had made
plish even its own written screening proce-
specific reference during the October 1987
dures, Pan Am may have missed opportunities
meeting to "the written procedures then in
to prevent the bombing.
effect in the SSP for extraordinary security air-
ports." Rather, he testified, "I honestly don't
Interline Baggage Gap
believe" that Salazar had said anything about
creating an exception to a procedure which "al-
Because of the possible critical significance of
ready existed" at those airports. Sonesen re-
these apparent lapses in screening baggage and
called that the context of the discussion was ap-
passengers, the Commission investigated in
plication of a proposed procedure of the Inter-
detail how they occurred. The gap in passen-
national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for
ger/bag reconciliation for interline baggage can
passenger/baggage reconciliation at extraordi-
be traced specifically to March 1988.
nary security airports. Sonesen testified that
Pan Am's chief of security for Europe asked
Salazar was granting "relief" from that pro-
headquarters on March 10, 1988 whether X-
posed procedure.
raying of interline baggage alone was a suffi-
Commission staff also asked Edward Cun-
cient security control. On March 28, Daniel
ningham, chief of security for Pan Am about
Sonesen responded in the affirmative. Sonesen
the matter. He testified initially that "several
said in his telex that Raymond Salazar, Director
FAA people" had said X-ray was an acceptable
of FAA's Office of Civil Aviation Security, had
form of security control for checked baggage at
"granted X-ray as an alternative to searching
extraordinary security (Section XV) airports.
passenger bags."
Upon further questioning, the "several" people
19
turned out to be Donnie Blazer, an official in
air carriers as an alternative to the pas-
Mr. Salazar's office at the FAA, and Salazar
senger/baggage match requirement, i.e.,
himself.
x-ray inspection
Cunningham knew nothing about Salazar's
statement other than what Sonesen had told
None of the minutes in 1987, however, state
him. Cunningham, however, had heard Blazer
that Mr. Salazar also had said the ICAO proce-
during a meeting of air carrier security person-
dure could be used in lieu of the more strin-
nel in March 1988. In that respect Cunningham
gent Section XV procedure already in effect at
testified:
airports such as Frankfurt and Heathrow.
Q. Tell me, again, what Mr. Blazer
Minutes of the March 1988 meeting referred
said during the March 1988 meeting
to by Cunningham indicate some general dis-
concerning passenger baggage recon-
cussion of the new ICAO standard and confirm
ciliation at Section XV airports?
that Mr. Blazer addressed the meeting. They
do not contain any reference to Section XV of
A. Mr. Blazer indicated that in accord-
the ACSSP.
ance with Section VIII and ICAO, X-
Representatives of several air carriers which
ray was an acceptable form of security
had operations at Section XV airports attended
control, and a bag did not have to be
removed from an aircraft if it was X-
the meetings in October 1987 and March 1988.
Interviewed by Commission staff, none of those
rayed.
representatives recalled that anyone had said
Q. And did he say that procedure also
X-ray could substitute for passenger reconcilia-
applied at Section XV airports?
tion at Section XV airports or that their carriers
A. It was my understanding that it
had made such a substitution.
was-
It would seem reasonable to expect that Pan
Q. No, did he say that?
Am would have confirmed its "understanding"
in writing with the FAA before changing a basic
A. Well, it was my understanding that
security standard. Pan Am did seek written ex-
he said that.
emptions from the FAA on other matters
during 1988. Yet, Pan Am never sought or re-
The proposed ICAO procedure referred to
ceived a written FAA exemption permitting the
in the Cunningham and Sonesen testimony
alternative X-ray procedure at Section XV air-
became effective at the end of 1987. Set forth
ports. Pan Am could not point the Commission
in Section VIII of the ACSSP, that provision
to even one piece of paper from its files on the
permitted unaccompanied bags to be flown if
subject other than Sonesen's "we go" commu-
they had been processed through specified se-
nication.
curity controls including, as alternatives, "phys-
The Commission also questioned FAA per-
ical inspection" and "X-ray inspection." But
Section VIII also made clear that "the require-
sonnel about any understanding that permitted
ments of Section XV apply in addition to those
Pan Am to substitute X-ray for physical search
in this section." The stricter provision in Sec-
of baggage. Mr. Blazer testified that he could
not remember "whether or not" he had dis-
tion XV allowed only "physical inspection" in
order to fly baggage unaccompanied by a pas-
cussed the physical search requirement or the
ICAO standard during the meeting in March
senger.
Minutes of the meeting in October 1987
1988. Mr. Salazar testified that it was "abso-
show that Mr. Salazar had said the FAA would
lutely clear" in his mind that he had not ap-
fully support the proposed procedure. In fact,
proved any alternative X-ray procedure for Pan
minutes of a similar meeting in July 1987 read:
Am at Section XV airports. He also testified
that any such change would have required a
Mr. Salazar stated that the FAA will
formal exemption from the FAA, which he said
require implementation of the [ICAO]
did not exist.
standard by the effective date of Decem-
The FAA testimony, like that of Pan Am,
ber 19, 1987. FAA will, however, ap-
should be viewed against the established facts.
prove certain security controls for use by
There is no dispute that Pan Am openly substi-
20
tuted X-ray for physical search of unaccompa-
line bag X-rayed for Flight 103 had not been
nied interline bags at Frankfurt and Heathrow
accounted for, and (3) pointed out the substi-
airports during 1988. The Commission, there-
tute X-ray procedure was a violation of FAA's
fore, would have expected that, absent any spe-
written requirements. The FAA security bulle-
cial understanding, the FAA would at least have
tin concerning the Toshiba radio information
cited Pan Am for a violation of the FAA's writ-
transmitted to Pan Am on November 18, 1988,
ten standard at London or Frankfurt.
had confirmed that physical search of unaccom-
panied baggage, among other procedures, was
to be "rigorously applied."
Testifying before the Commission, Mr. Sala-
zar agreed that Pan Am's substitute X-ray pro-
cedure constituted "a violation of noncompli-
ance." Nevertheless, all reference to the ab-
sence of the required passenger/baggage
match procedure for interline baggage loaded
on Flight 103 at Frankfurt was deleted from the
FAA's official "letter of investigation" concern-
ing the flight, as a result of comments from a
senior official in Mr. Salazar's office that more
specifics were needed. The FAA subsequently
emphasized that its civil penalty letter con-
tained "no allegations that any of the violations
contributed to the Flight 103 tragedy."
As to the necessity for a formal FAA exemp-
tion permitting the substitute X-ray procedure,
the Commission notes that Pan Am also had
not sought or received such an exemption from
the FAA's standard requiring Pan Am to search
its service employees at Frankfurt airport. Pan
Am testified it had a "working agreement" with
This is the reconstructed exterior of the forward baggage hold
the FAA since at least April 1986 on this sub-
believed to be the spot where the bomb responsible for the de-
ject. For several years Pan Am did not search
struction of Pam Am 103 was placed.
its uniformed maintenance employees at Frank-
Teams of FAA agents inspected Pan Am se-
furt airport but was not cited by the FAA for
curity operations at Frankfurt twice and Heath-
such a violation.
row once during April-December 1988. None
Another U.S. carrier with operations at
of them cited this practice of only X-raying
Frankfurt airport did formally request an ex-
interline bags as a violation. Because FAA in-
emption from the FAA in October 1988 that
spections are announced in advance, it is con-
would permit X-ray rather than physical search
ceivable the procedure could have been altered
of unaccompanied baggage in certain circum-
at those times. But the report of the FAA spe-
stances. The FAA denied the request, but not
cial agent who inspected Frankfurt in October
until April 1989-four months after Flight 103
1988 shows that he was aware of Pan Am's sub-
had been destroyed, the interline baggage lapse
stitute X-ray procedure.
had been identified and the FAA had tightened
In addition, the FAA's investigation of Flight
its passenger/baggage requirements.
103 in the weeks immediately following the
The FAA provided the Commission with an
crash (1) confirmed that Pan Am officials had
April 20, 1990 survey of 53 FAA agents who
conceded the substitute X-ray procedure for
had inspected Section XV airports during 1988.
interline baggage, (2) explained that one inter-
No inspector recalled a U.S. carrier substituting
21
X-ray for physical search of unaccompanied
The information that was disseminated
baggage or stating it had done so.
during 1988, based on data received from the
The Commission is not in a position to re-
intelligence community, was substantial. It
solve the direct conflict between sworn testimo-
showed repeated concern that retaliation might
ny of Pan Am and FAA officials. Nor is it nec-
occur for the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 in
essary to do so.
July 1988; that there were indications of terror-
Unquestionably, the circumstances surround-
ist movements in Western Europe during 1988;
ing Pan Am's interline baggage procedure at
and that the arrest of terrorists in Frankfurt
Frankfurt on December 21, 1988, are of direct,
had led to the discovery of an improvised ex-
if not critical, importance to the question of
plosive device disguised as a radio cassette
how the bomb could have been placed on
player that would be extremely difficult to
Flight 103.
detect through normal airline X-ray proce-
The undisputed facts before the Commission
dures.
show that passenger/baggage reconciliation is a
The FAA also told carriers that "testing" of
bedrock component of any heightened security
security procedures at Frankfurt airport by un-
system; that Pan Am employees concededly did
known persons had occurred during
not follow even the FAA's written reconcilia-
November-December 1988 and that an anony-
tion requirement for interline baggage at
mous caller to the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki
Frankfurt; and that the FAA did not cite Pan
had said a Pan Am flight from Frankfurt to the
Am for failing to follow the FAA's mandated
United States would be destroyed sometime
procedure in that respect for Flight 103.
during December 5-19, 1988.
Finally, given the high level of threat warning
As noted earlier, the cumulative weight of
in Frankfurt during December 1988, nothing
this information should have alerted the FAA
prevented Pan Am from instituting, or the FAA
and U.S. carriers to the potential for trouble in
from imposing, complete passenger/bag recon-
Western Europe. The problem was in the use
ciliation just as was done in January 1989.
of the information received. The FAA did not
The systems, both private and public, which
require that additional measures be taken
allowed the interline baggage gap to continue,
beyond those procedures then prescribed in its
were fundamentally flawed.
ACSSP. Other than screening any Finnish
women who boarded Pan Am flights for the
Warning Information
United States during December 1988, Pan Am
took no special precautions.
Commission staff has reviewed intelligence
traffic that, even in retrospect, would appear to
Broader Conclusions
have warned of a possible terrorist act such as
Flight 103. The review showed that no warn-
The circumstances in December 1988 were
ings specific to Flight 103 were received by
U.S. intelligence agencies from any source at
not unique. They reflected a larger pattern of
any time. It also showed that no information
complacency at both Pan Am and the FAA.
bearing upon the security of civil aviation in
Pan Am
general and flights originating in Frankfurt in
particular was received beyond that which was
Alert Management Services, Inc., then a
promptly disseminated to the FAA and, in turn,
wholly owned Pan Am affiliate, became respon-
immediately to U.S. air carriers.
sible for security at Heathrow airport in early
Also, repeated interviews of law enforcement
1987 and at Frankfurt airport in June 1988.
and intelligence officials in the United States
Alert, according to testimony of Pan Am's
and abroad, as well as extensive review of clas-
Chief Executive Officer, functioned as an inte-
sified materials, revealed no foundation for
gral part of Pan Am. Even so, the Pan Am se-
speculation in press accounts that U.S. Govern-
curity managers in London and Frankfurt who
ment officials had participated, tacitly or other-
were responsible for European operations in
wise, in any supposed operation at Frankfurt
general and West German operations in par-
airport having anything to do with the sabotage
ticular had no lateral authority over Alert's se-
of Flight 103.
curity activities in those countries. Control and
22
direction of Alert and its policies came only
FAA inspectors reported Pan Am's oper-
from top Pan Am management in New York.
ations at Frankfurt and Heathrow were in com-
Financial constraints also appear to have lim-
pliance with FAA standards as late as October
ited hiring of security personnel by Alert.
1988. Yet the FAA proposed large fines for de-
Throughout 1988, Alert had less than 90 em-
ficiencies found at those same airports as the
ployees at Heathrow and less than 70 at Frank-
result of its post-Flight 103 inspection under-
furt. Today that number is about 200 at each
taken approximately 60 days after the October
location. FAA investigators found in December
1988 inspection. True, the investigation of Pan
1988 that Alert was limited in Heathrow by Pan
Am operations during December 1988-January
Am to a total of 600 man-hours per day, in-
1989, following Flight 103, presumably was
cluding time taken to train security personnel.
more thorough than a "routine" FAA inspec-
The low level of training for Alert employees at
tion. Obviously, however, the problems found
both Heathrow and Frankfurt reflected these
during this investigation did not suddenly arise
restrictions.
during the two months before Flight 103.
The absence of management control and di-
rection was apparent in the day-to-day working
The October 1988 security inspection of Pan
level of these Pan Am security operations. Ex-
Am at Frankfurt did find substantial problems.
perience and qualifications seemed to have had
But, the FAA security system was not set up so
little to do with the hiring of at least some
that this sort of inspection report would ring an
Alert security personnel. Pan Am had no set
alarm, let alone lead to a quick, decisive regula-
procedure at either Frankfurt or Heathrow for
tory response even for a carrier like Pan Am
distribution of FAA security bulletin informa-
with a history of security problems. The report
tion, such as that for the radio bomb, to these
of the October Frankfurt inspection was not
security workers.
even finalized in FAA's Brussels headquarters
Given the circumstances then prevailing, it is
until after December 21, 1988.
not surprising that the FAA inspector who re-
It might be unrealistic to expect that FAA
viewed Pan Am's Frankfurt security operation
headquarters could or would react to each se-
in October 1988 could conclude that it had
curity flaw identified by any of its agents after a
very substantial problems. It is astonishing,
field inspection. Nor should it be necessary for
however, that Pan Am permitted those prob-
senior FAA management to become involved
lems and others to continue at that level month
before adequate security will be assured in the
upon month after the disaster.
field. But the circumstances at Frankfurt in the
The problems repeatedly reflected in Pan
fall of 1988 were anything but routine.
Am's Frankfurt operations could be solved-as
Also troubling is the FAA's response to the
events would prove-with only a relatively brief
problems of Pan Am at Frankfurt after Flight
but concentrated amount of management atten-
103 had exploded.
tion. It took just one week of that attention in
Both the public and the regulatory spotlight
September 1989, following a meeting between
were focused on just those types of security
the Pan Am Chief Executive Officer and the
problems throughout early 1989. Congression-
Administrator of the FAA.
al hearings were held. The Secretary of Trans-
The Federal Aviation
portation set up a task force expressly to look
into the matter. The Commission would have
Administration
expected the FAA to give top priority to securi-
For years, FAA security personnel questioned
ty operations at the two airports that loaded
Pan Am's commitment to implementation of
and dispatched Flight 103. If anything, the re-
the FAA extraordinary security procedures. As
verse seems to have been true.
early as October 1986, the FAA had convened
It was not without some difficulty that the
an unusual meeting of Pan Am's security man-
Commission was able to determine what hap-
agement at FAA's regional headquarters in
pened in 1989. Pan Am flatly refused to pro-
Brussels, to discuss Pan Am's implementation
vide the Commission materials concerning that
of the extraordinary security procedures the
period, other than limited, official correspond-
FAA had promulgated.
ence, even though its lawyers conceded the ma-
23
terials were irrelevant to the pending litigations
report. Still, those same officials sat through
over Flight 103.
two rounds of Pan Am "action plans" and
The FAA, in turn, was in a self-defensive
"promises" during three more months. Finally,
posture. In its briefing material submitted to
in September 1989 the newly confirmed FAA
the Commission for the record of a public
Administrator took decisive action. The prob-
hearing on December 18, 1989, the FAA de-
lem was fixed in one week.
scribed its "deployment of security specialists
For nearly a year Pan Am had continued, and
in January through March 1989 to ensure com-
the FAA had permitted, security operations in
pliance" with its new, tighter security require-
Frankfurt identified two months before Flight
ments in Western Europe. "Teams documented
103 as "held together only by
the tenuous
areas of less than full compliance regardless of
threads of luck" and five months after Flight
the reasons for noncompliance," the FAA told
103 as "unsafe [for] all passengers." These
the Commission. And, the FAA explained, "at
problems remained unsolved for nine months
the present, each of the U.S. carriers is in full
after the Nation's most tragic security-related
compliance" with baggage screening require-
civil aviation disaster, and for nearly a year
ments.
As it turned out, the "security specialists"
after the problems had been identified by the
FAA.
who visited Pan Am's operations at Frankfurt
and Heathrow during January 1989 had found
It is the Commission's responsibility to assess
that problems similar to those identified by
the procedures and performance of the FAA.
FAA investigators in December 1988 had con-
In that respect, the story of Flight 103 starkly
tinued and actually had increased. Yet no en-
illustrates what the Chairman of the House
forcement action was ever taken by the FAA
Foreign Affairs Committee, Dante Fascell
based on these findings. The explanation given
(D-FL), identified in testimony before the
by FAA personnel to the Commission: there
Commission as a "daily check list" mentality at
was "miscommunication," and it "fell between
the FAA and what the General Accounting
the cracks."
Office had identified over several years as the
Despite the terrible events of December 1988
FAA's purely "reactive" attitude.
and the findings in January 1989, FAA did not
Although the FAA has had procedures to
set up any special procedures for monitoring
identify problems, those procedures tend to
Pan Am operations during early 1989 in Frank-
limit inspectors solely to the items set forth on
furt or Heathrow. FAA inspections continued
their "check list." More significantly, the FAA
on a regular schedule.
appears to have had no mechanism to audit a
One inspection team which visited Pan Am in
pattern of those problems or to anticipate
Frankfurt during February 1989 checked off the
problems and solve them before disaster
"satisfactory" boxes on the FAA inspection
occurs.
form with virtually no comment. The next in-
Pan Am operations, found to be minimally
spection team, which reviewed Pan Am's Frank-
furt security operation during May 1989, found
satisfactory in October 1988, were the subject
a diametrically opposite security situation.
of a proposed $630,000 fine after an investiga-
Only when the urgent concerns of the May
tion beginning in December 1988. Those same
inspector somehow made it to FAA headquar-
operations were assessed as "very poor" in Jan-
ters did FAA management begin to focus on
uary 1989 but checked off as "satisfactory" in
Pan Am security at Frankfurt. That subject ob-
February, only to be found "totally unsatisfac-
viously had not been a priority for them before
tory" in May 1989.
then, regardless of the horror of December 21,
The destruction of Flight 103 and its horri-
1988, and the apparent security lapses associat-
ble loss of innocent lives is a reality. The po-
ed with Flight 103. No one in FAA manage-
tential for terrorist sabotage of another aircraft
ment with responsibility for security had even
cannot be eliminated entirely. The apparent
visited Pan Am in Frankfurt.
lack of priority placed on this problem by the
Nevertheless, senior FAA officials told the
carrier and the lack of action by the FAA in en-
Commission that they felt "frustrated" when
forcing its own standards, however, are lapses
they heard about the May 1989 inspection
that must not recur.
24
The United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Board has reconstructed a major portion of the fuselage of Pam Am Flight 103. This
is the end section showing the lower baggage hold and the passenger deck of the doomed airliner.
The attitude that prevailed both before and
right direction. However, as discussed else-
after Flight 103 must be changed permanently.
where in this Report, much more remains to be
The initiative shown by the new FAA Adminis-
done.
trator in September 1989 is a good step in the
25
Chapter 3
The Aviation
Security System
Overview
million others who annually fly internationally
to and from the United States. While this trage-
Created in 1958, the Federal Aviation Ad-
dy brought home to the American public the
ministration is responsible for ensuring the
risks in aviation security, the United States is
safety of air travel. As part of that mission, the
not the only target of international terrorism.
FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security estab-
Since the Pan Am 103 tragedy, terrorist bomb-
lishes security requirements, inspects airline
ings have destroyed two other flights: the
and airport security operations and issues civil
French UTA Flight 772, from Brazzaville,
penalties for noncompliance with those require-
Congo, to Paris in September 1989, killing 171;
ments. Security at foreign airports is provided
and the November 1989 downing of the Co-
primarily by the host country. At selected, high
lombian Avianca Flight 203 from Bogota to
risk airports, the FAA requires U.S. air carriers
Cali, Colombia, claiming 107 lives.
to conduct security procedures that go beyond
These attacks grimly underscore the reality
the host country's requirements. For domestic
that unless international aviation security meas-
airports, security is a joint effort between the
ures are substantially strengthened, aircraft will
air carriers and the airport operators.
In 1961, the first hijacking of an American
continue to be targets of opportunity for the
flag carrier occurred in the United States. The
terrorist. The bombing of the Colombian air-
domestic aviation security system that has
liner may also signify the entry of an additional
evolved since that date has been partially effec-
terrorist threat, on this side of the Atlantic,
tive in meeting this hijacking threat. There
from the drug cartels.
were two hijackings of U.S. aircraft in both 1988
Currently, there is no uniform international
and 1989, the lowest number since 1976.
civil aviation security system in place to assure
FAA's role in aviation security expanded sig-
a consistent level of security for passengers.
nificantly in 1985 with passage of Public Law
Many nations have adopted the standards of
99-83, the International Security and Develop-
the International Civil Aviation Organization
ment Cooperation Act. The Act required FAA
(ICAO), a U.N. body, which recommends
to assess the adequacy of security at foreign
standards and practices for aviation security.¹
airports served by U.S. carriers, and the securi-
However, the ICAO standards prescribe a very
ty procedures of foreign air carriers flying to
basic or low level of security that is inadequate
the United States.
for high threat international airports. ICAO
lacks any oversight authority or ability to
International Security
impose sanctions for noncompliance. Neverthe-
less, the Commission believes the United States
The Americans and foreign nationals who
should continue to support ICAO and to push
died in the Pan Am 103 tragedy were among
for more stringent ICAO standards worldwide,
an average of 26 million U.S. citizens and 19
while recognizing that the organization likely
*Endnotes appear at end of chapter.
27
will be most effective at low-threat airports in
sessments are measured against the minimum
smaller, less industrialized countries.
standards set by ICAO.
The international civil aviation security
The Secretary of Transportation, in conduct-
system is complicated by differences among
ing these assessments under the Foreign Air-
countries in security approaches, technical ca-
port Assessment Program, must consult with
pabilities, and financial resources and priorities.
the Secretary of State on the extent of the ter-
The U.S. approach, which assigns a major por-
rorist threat in each country. If the assessment
tion of the responsibility for passenger security
determines that an airport's security proce-
to the air carriers, forces U.S. airlines operating
dures are deficient, the Secretary of Transpor-
internationally to satisfy the requirements of
tation notifies the foreign government. This
foreign governments and those of the FAA.
occurs after advising the Secretary of State.
Under the existing international civil aviation
The notification includes recommended steps
security structure, the American carriers fre-
necessary to correct the deficiencies.
quently must negotiate with a foreign airport
A finding of deficiency sets in process a 90-
or foreign government officials in order to
day period during which the foreign govern-
carry out FAA-required security measures. The
ment must bring its airport up to standard. If it
Commission believes such negotiations should
fails to do so, the Act imposes a series of sanc-
be the responsibility of the State Department,
tions:
in consultation with the Department of Trans-
portation.
the Secretary of State must issue a travel
advisory;
The United States: A Sovereign
the identity of the airport must be pub-
Nation in the International Arena
lished in the Federal Register;
Passengers flying to or from the United States
the decision must be advertised publicly;
from any airport aboard any airline, do so under
and
the protection of U.S. laws and the FAA's securi-
ty requirements.
a travel advisory must be included with all
tickets between the United States and that
The authority for this protection resides pri-
marily in two statutes: the Foreign Airport Se-
airport.
curity Act, signed into law as part of the Inter-
All assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act
national Security and Development Coopera-
of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act to
tion Act of 1985, and the Federal Aviation Act
that country may also be suspended.
of 1958 (Public Law 85-726), as amended.
In addition to the 90-day process, the Act
Securing Foreign Airports
provides for immediate notification, issuance of
the travel advisory, and suspension of air serv-
The Foreign Airport Security Act was en-
ice to any airport if the Secretary of Transpor-
acted in the wake of the June 14, 1985 hijack-
tation determines that a condition exists which
ing of TWA Flight 847 out of Athens, during
threatens the safety and security of passengers,
which a U.S. Navy Petty Officer, Robert
crews or aircraft.
Stethem, was murdered, and amid a growing
A total of 247 foreign airports in 99 coun-
number of other terrorist acts directed against
tries currently must be assessed under the pro-
foreign international airports and the interna-
gram. The FAA's goal is to assess each of these
tional aviation industry in general. The Act
annually, typically involving a three- to five-day
draws its ultimate authority from the U.S. sov-
visit by a two-member team. Severe FAA per-
ereign right to control landing rights in this
sonnel shortages generally limit the depth of
country.
these assessments to interviews and observa-
The Act directs the Secretary of Transporta-
tions. The FAA regional office in Brussels for
tion to conduct periodic security assessments of
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, for in-
foreign international airports used by American
stance, has a staff of 13 to cover 42 countries
carriers and airports from which foreign carri-
and 123 airports. Inspectors do not substan-
ers last depart to the United States. These as-
tively test the operational effectiveness of secu-
28
rity procedures. The FAA inspectors do, how-
assess U.S. airports serving their carriers. Sev-
ever, describe in detail the security measures in
eral countries have done so.
place for each ICAO standard.
The Commission believes the Act provides
Since the program began in 1986, the FAA
an appropriate mechanism for improving secu-
has conducted 957 foreign airport assessments
rity for American travelers at foreign airports.
and made 1,082 recommendations. Significant-
To improve the program, the State Department
ly, only four assessments triggered the 90-day
must be persuaded to accept the FAA's con-
period; and only in one case, Manila in 1986,
tinuing efforts to assign and maintain overseas
were the sanctions invoked.
more personnel who are familiar with foreign
According to FAA officials, in most cases the
airports. As will be discussed, the Commission
foreign airports move immediately to correct
believes that some of these additional person-
deficiencies and to implement improvements.
nel should be assigned permanently to foreign
When a 90-day countdown does begin, FAA
airports in security management positions.
calls upon the assistance available from other
U.S. agencies and ICAO to facilitate improve-
U.S. Air Carriers
ments. The Foreign Airport Security Act, there-
Section 315 of the Federal Aviation Act di-
fore, generates security compliance and im-
rects the Administrator of FAA to prescribe
provements in a low-key and generally coopera-
regulations requiring the screening of all pas-
tive fashion.
sengers and carry-on baggage for weapons.
In an additional effort to preserve good will
Section 316 of the Act also requires regulations
between nations, the FAA has offered assessed
to protect persons and property aboard aircraft
countries the reciprocal opportunity to visit and
from acts of criminal violence and piracy.
SECURING FOREIGN AIRPORTS
# Airports Assessed
Total 957
Noncomplying Airports
Total 1082
# of Recommendations
# of 90-Day Actions
Total 4
1
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
29
American carriers must comply with FAA
by hand. The purpose of matching, or "recon-
regulations abroad as well as domestically. At
ciling", baggage is to assure that a terrorist
most foreign airports, the FAA security require-
does not check a suitcase containing a bomb
ments are the same as those for most domestic
and then simply walk away from the airport,
airports. The important exception is that the
leaving the bomb to take innocent lives.
FAA requires a matching of all baggage with
Once screened and in the hands of the air-
passengers on international flights.
line, the bag must be accessible only to author-
More stringent procedures are required at
ized personnel, and under surveillance at all
the airports of 34 nations considered by FAA
times. If it is placed in a container, the contain-
to present a higher threat. At the highest threat-
er must be closed securely.
airports, "extraordinary procedures" are in
In addition to greater scrutiny of passengers
place which require more intensive scrutiny of
and baggage, the extraordinary security proce-
passengers, baggage and other persons having
dures prescribed by FAA call for controlled
access to the airplane. These extraordinary pro-
access to the aircraft by servicing personnel,
cedures were strengthened on an "emergency"
searches of the aircraft cabin and holds be-
basis nine days after the bombing of Pan Am
tween flights, and modest controls over cargo.
Flight 103.
In reality, the FAA oversees security controls
Currently, these procedures include checking
only for checked or carry-on items screened by
passports and asking a series of questions of
the carrier. Third parties, whose security pro-
each passenger designed to determine if they
grams lie outside of the FAA jurisdiction, con-
might intentionally or unwittingly be carrying a
trol security procedures for other items. Cargo
bomb or weapon. Certain answers will single
and mail pose particular problems, which are
out a passenger for additional security screen-
addressed in a subsequent section.
ing. One FAA question concerning battery-op-
erated or other electronic devices in baggage
Foreign Air Carriers
was not added by the FAA until seven months
after the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. A list
The Federal Aviation Act gives FAA jurisdic-
of potentially suspicious electronic items was
tion over foreign carriers on the last leg of
also provided with some suggested questions
their flight to the United States. In May 1989,
for detecting them.
the FAA embarked on a new program requiring
A second tier of screening, for selected pas-
foreign air carriers to adopt certain measures
sengers based on their responses to the ques-
for each point of operation within the United
tions, involves a physical search or more exten-
States and for the last point of departure to the
sive X-ray of all checked baggage, and further
United States. As of December 1989, 135 for-
search of passengers and carry-on items, even
eign air carriers were subject to this require-
though the passenger has already passed
ment.
through a magnetometer or has been hand
FAA has accepted 52 programs, most of
wand searched immediately prior to the second
which were the model program offered to the
screening. Foreign travelers to or from certain
carriers by the FAA. However, 39 carriers from
airports and a random sample of all other pas-
20 countries also exercised the option to refer
sengers are also subject to the additional
FAA to the foreign government responsible for
screening.
security at the last point of departure into the
U.S.-bound baggage checked abroad on U.S.
United States. This has both complicated and
airlines can only be accepted at the check-in
increased the FAA's workload. In these cases,
counter inside the terminal. This contrasts with
FAA must work through the State Department
curbside baggage check permitted on U.S. do-
to deal with each of the foreign governments
mestic flights. Some European airlines even
rather than the carriers.
permit baggage to be checked at train stations.
The passenger and baggage screening re-
Since the extraordinary measures were tight-
quirements imposed by FAA on foreign air car-
ened following Pan Am 103, U.S. carriers must
riers at overseas locations are not as stringent
match every bag to a passenger who has
as those required of U.S. carriers there. FAA
boarded the aircraft. At highest threat airports,
does not have the authority under existing
all baggage must also be X-rayed or searched
international agreements to impose require-
30
ments on foreign carriers in foreign countries
tional support for ICAO. The French, in 1987,
that exceed the standards and recommended
began providing aviation security assistance to
practices of ICAO. For example, while both
African nations.
U.S. and foreign carriers perform a positive
Each of these countries performs the positive
match of passengers and checked baggage, the
passenger/baggage match for international
U.S. carriers must X-ray or physically search all
flights to ensure that no unaccompanied bag-
baggage as well, whereas the foreign carriers
gage that might conceal a bomb is placed on an
have to X-ray or physically search only that
aircraft. Both the U.K. and France also require
baggage for which no passenger has boarded
100 per cent X-ray screening of hold, or
the airplane. As will be discussed later, this less
checked baggage on international flights, as
stringent requirement for foreign carriers raises
does the United States. West Germany does
concerns for the security of U.S. passengers
not require X-ray screening of checked bag-
who fly foreign airlines.
gage. West German authorities question the
value of this practice because of the limited ca-
Foreign Approaches to Security
pability of the existing X-ray equipment to
To gain an understanding of aviation security
detect bombs.
abroad, the Commission visited three European
In the United States and abroad, the Com-
countries: the Federal Republic of Germany,
mission found the adequacy of security back-
France, and the United Kingdom. The U.K.
ground checks to be an area of concern. In the
and West Germany were selected because of
United States, airport employers are required
their connection with Pan Am Flight 103 and
to conduct 5-year employment history checks
France because of the more recent UTA Flight
of prospective employees, although a check of
772 bombing. Among those killed on the UTA
criminal records is illegal in some states. West
flight were seven Americans, including the wife
German law limits the degree of background
of the U.S. Ambassador to Chad.
checking of employees, including those em-
The Commission discussed security with for-
ployed at airports. Background checking in
eign and U.S. diplomatic officials as well as
West Germany is further complicated by a
U.S. and foreign airline and host country air-
large guest worker population from other
port officials.
countries. The British are requiring more thor-
These three countries provided a study in
ough background screening of prospective air-
contrasting philosophies, legal systems, govern-
port employees, including checking references,
ment organizations, and aviation responsibil-
prior to the issuance of passes for access to re-
ities, policies and procedures. Passenger and
stricted airport areas.
carry-on baggage screening are in place at the
international airports in each nation. In West
West German labor law limits the testing of
Germany, the state government conducts pas-
airport screener performance. Other European
senger and carry-on screening. In France,
countries also limit testing, whether by those
screening is done by the federal government.
governments or the FAA, of screener perform-
The British Airport Authority, a private enter-
ance. Where testing is done by foreign authori-
prise, provides passenger security in the U.K.
ties, the results may not be shared with either
Like the United States, each of the three
the FAA or the carriers who rely on the screen-
countries visited has a complex jurisdictional
er performance. In the United States the FAA
interaction at the airports, among a number of
has a formal procedure for testing security
federal, state and local agencies with responsi-
screening personnel. The Commission is con-
bilities for immigration, customs, drug interdic-
vinced that this quality control is vital. Since
tion, and law enforcement, as well as aviation
the advent of screener testing in the United
security.
States, performance at screening points has im-
Each country is meeting the ICAO standards
proved substantially.
and recommended practices. As a result of the
Pan Am 103 tragedy, the British Parliament is
Conflicts with Host Governments
moving toward enactment of new legislation to
The Foreign Airport Assessment Program
upgrade security control at U.K. airports. Inter-
principally derives its strength and leverage
nationally, the British are also providing addi-
from the United States ability to withhold other
31
nations' landing rights in this country. FAA as-
ment, which the Commission believes should
sessments of foreign airports under this pro-
more appropriately be resolved by the State
gram are hampered, however, by the necessity
Department at the government-to-government
of obtaining the permission of the host govern-
level.
ments. FAA inspection teams must obtain per-
Timothy R. Thornton, Executive Vice Presi-
mission to inspect abroad and announce their
dent and General Counsel for Northwest Air-
visits in advance. They are generally not free to
lines, described the problem succinctly at the
roam the secure parts of the airport at will. In
Commission's April 4, 1990, hearing:
the past, FAA inspectors have not tested, ob-
served or evaluated airports' security systems,
We had a dispute with a foreign gov-
out of respect for sovereignty and to retain the
ernment that went on for six months,
good will of foreign airport and host govern-
where we were out of compliance with
ment officials.
the FAA mandate as it related to ex-
The General Accounting Office testified
traordinary X-ray security of all
before the Commission's December 18, 1989
checked baggage. [The foreign gov-
hearing on the crucial need for this evaluation.
ernment] told us not to do it and the
Kenneth M. Mead, Director, Transportation
federal government told us to do it.
Issues, of the Resources, Community and Eco-
Sometimes we were in violation of
nomic Development Division, stated:
American laws. Sometimes we were in
By not verifying the adequacy of secu-
violation of the foreign laws of the air-
rity controls and systems at domestic
port where we operated. We were in
and foreign airports, FAA inspectors
the middle. Finally we got some help
did not provide a true and complete
from the Federal Government but, for
assessment of the overall level of secu-
six months, it was whose jail did we
rity on inspection reports
We rec-
want to go to.³
ommended that the foreign airport as-
sessment process be strengthened by
In France, until passage of new legislation in
making analyses of host country secu-
mid-1989, it was illegal for anyone but a gov-
rity evaluations, including observing
ernment employee to search people and their
and evaluating host country testing, to
belongings. France agreed to "look the other
assess the operational effectiveness of
way" as U.S. carriers or their private contract
various security measures. FAA agreed
security companies conducted searches. The
with our recommendation and told us
applicable provision of the new French law has
they plan to begin evaluating security
not yet been implemented, as inter-agency dis-
testing at foreign airports in 1990.2
cussions continue over its implications for
French civil rights. Even when the law finally
FAA initiated the program in January 1990.
becomes effective, searches by private compa-
nies will be subject to supervision by the
U.S. Carriers Caught in the Middle
French Ministry of Justice, and will need au-
thorization by the U.S. Attorney General.
U.S. carriers are private entities required
U.S. screening by private individuals is illegal
under U.S. regulations to conduct their own se-
under West German law, but is tolerated by
curity screening. In Europe, the U.S. carriers
West German authorities. Frankfurt Airport re-
find themselves caught between the require-
quires that U.S. searches be conducted "out of
ments of FAA, exercising the sovereign right of
sight" of the German screeners. The West Ger-
the United States to protect its passengers and
mans, who rely on the police for their security,
planes, and the sovereign host government,
also question the qualifications and training of
which already has in place what it believes to
U.S. security services.
be adequate screening procedures. The FAA-
U.S. carriers may also face problems in the
required additional screening procedures de-
U.K. related to differences in U.S. and British
scribed earlier cause legal and logistical prob-
regulations. Since Pan Am 103, the United
lems between the carriers and the host govern-
Kingdom Department of Transport (U.K.
32
DOT) has begun to impose new security re-
FAA security liaison officer positions, for over-
quirements which may duplicate those already
seas assignment to provide more permanent
mandated by FAA. The FAA requires U.S. car-
aviation security expertise at U.S. embassies.
riers to search manually a certain percentage of
After initial opposition by the State Depart-
checked baggage. U.K. DOT is considering re-
ment, almost all of these positions have been
quiring a search of a larger percentage of bag-
negotiated with host governments.
gage. It is unclear at this point whether the
The Commission finds an urgent need for
U.S. carriers will get "credit" for their searches,
the State Department, in coordination with the
or whether these searches will have to be con-
Department of Transportation, to become
ducted in addition to those required by U.K.
more directly involved in aviation security, and
DOT.
to do so before the carriers become caught in a
U.S. screening procedures, especially the
conflict between FAA and foreign security pro-
hand search of baggage and the extensive ques-
cedures. U.S. privately-owned airlines are at a
tioning of certain passengers, impose space de-
disadvantage in dealing with host nations which
mands on airports already pressed for terminal
perceive security as an integral function and re-
capacity. These procedures create long lines in
front of check-in counters, sometimes stretch-
sponsibility of government.
ing out the door of an airport onto the side-
West German officials, along with those of
walk. These lines cause delays and frustration
other European countries, oppose the extensive
for the passengers, and expose them to the risk
U.S. questioning process, which causes long
of terrorist actions by concentrating the passen-
lines and congestion in their airports. They be-
gers for long periods in the least secure parts
lieve it virtually impossible to isolate the sui-
of the airport.
cide bomber or the innocent dupe who un-
The U.K. DOT warned the Commission that
knowingly carries a bomb aboard a plane.
Heathrow Airport was not designed and built
The West Germans also believe language
to accommodate the long lines of passengers
problems may prevent some passengers from
for U.S. flights. Similarly, France has told U.S.
fully understanding the questions put to them.
carriers that it might limit the number of secu-
They prefer to educate passengers not to
rity firms allowed at Charles de Gaulle Airport.
accept packages or to leave their bags unat-
According to French authorities, security firms
tended. They further question the qualifica-
hired by U.S. carriers, with their large numbers
tions of the private firms or airline personnel
of personnel, could themselves present a secu-
conducting the screening for U.S. carriers, in
rity risk.
comparison to the West German police as-
Some European and Scandinavian countries
signed the task under German law.
will license only a single local firm to provide
Rather than putting so much effort into find-
all airport security. This could force U.S. air-
ing the dupe or the suicide bomber, the West
lines to terminate service to one or more of
Germans rely above all on baggage reconcilia-
these countries. Charles A. Adams, Senior Vice
tion to catch the bag planted by the "no show"
President-International Division for Trans
terrorist unwilling to die for the cause.
World Airlines, told the Commission at its
The FAA, on the other hand, is reluctant to
April 4 hearing:
yield control of security to foreign organiza-
tions whose screeners may not have undergone
We're in a situation in Oslo right now that
I have to make a very difficult decision. It's
satisfactory background checks, whose security
systems it has not been able to test or evaluate,
whether we continue to fly to Oslo because
if I'm not satisfied with the security in Oslo
and over whom FAA has no regulatory author-
ity.
we're not flying there, period.
As it
stands right now, we're not satisfied with
As with foreign governments, U.S. airlines
the security in Oslo if we are forced to use
complain that FAA's screening requirements
the security company that the Norwegian
are unnecessarily burdensome and less effective
CAA is requiring us to use.⁴
than the carrier's own procedures. They argue
that FAA's criteria for questioning selects too
Transportation Secretary Samuel K. Skinner,
many people who pose no threat. The carriers
on April 3, 1989, announced the creation of 20
contend the time spent on many such low risk
33
AIRPORT SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS
FAA Foreign Airport Assessment Program
Misc. 1.0%
Access Secure Areas 42.4%
Screening 17.2%
National Program 1.0%
Checked Baggage 5.0%
Cargo 1.0%
Law Enforcement 5.1%
Airport Program 27.3%
Source: FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security, International Security Briefing for the Commission, January 8, 1990
passengers limits the attention that could be
tive to placing the entire burden on the air-
devoted to the higher risk ones.
lines.
The privately-owned U.S. airlines are re-
The U.S. carriers seek a system in which
quired to bear the costs of security, some of
competitors who fly the same routes would be
which are paid by other carriers' governments.
required to implement the same security proce-
This fosters complaints by U.S. airlines of a
dures. While unable to provide the Commis-
distinct financial disadvantage compared to
sion with hard evidence, several U.S. carriers
their foreign competition. (It should be noted,
alleged that they are losing full fare business
however, that foreign carriers must pay for se-
travelers who are unwilling to wait in the
curity when they land in U.S. airports.) U.S.
lengthy American carrier check-in lines, or to
arrive at the airport two hours before takeoff,
carriers also complain that delays from FAA-re-
to clear screening.5 As Northwest Airlines'
quired security procedures compound the com-
Thornton explained:
petitive disadvantage.
Arguing that terrorist attacks are directed
[W]hen the vice president of interna-
against governments, not airlines, the U.S. car-
tional marketing for 3M is traveling
riers began pushing in 1986, through the Air
every month or every week to Germa-
Transport Association, for a greater U.S. Gov-
ny, he's already accepted that there is
ernment role in aviation security as an alterna-
a certain risk associated with interna-
34
tional travel. The thing that person [as
at poorly secured airports. UTA now carries its
opposed to an infrequent, nonbusiness
own security personnel on flights to airports it
traveler] is focusing on is the conven-
considers vulnerable.
ience issue. It's not even necessarily
Most threats to civil aviation have come pri-
the efforts of the European carriers to
marily from Middle East-based terrorist cells
market to that person. Through their
and factions. The destruction of the Avianca
own experience, they know the differ-
airplane over Colombia demonstrated a terror-
ence between going through American
ist capability in South America to destroy air-
security and going through German
lines in flight. Future threats may develop from
security. [German security] gives you
the "war" against the drug cartels in Central
an extra half hour or hour to do what-
and South America.
ever you need to do.⁶
ICAO has responded to these threats with a
The carriers also point out that the fact that
technical assistance and training program for
they alone are required to employ enhanced se-
specific countries where funds are unavailable
curity measures may signal to the world that
for aviation security.
they are more at risk, regardless of the stand-
This program, financed by the United Na-
ards followed by other nations' carriers.
tions Development Program, details for govern-
Forty-five per cent of U.S. international pas-
ment officials the shortcomings of aviation se-
sengers fly on foreign carriers, some in the ex-
curity systems, assesses airport security, and
pectation that foreign carriers are "safer."
recommends ways to comply with ICAO stand-
These passengers, also a responsibility of the
ards. ICAO provides on-the-job training for se-
U.S. Government, may in fact receive less pro-
curity personnel and conducts intercountry and
tection than if they were to fly on U.S. carriers.
interregional assistance seminars.
The Commission, therefore, believes that for
ICAO's recent $1.2 million assessment for 22
security reasons, the U.S. Government should
Asian/Pacific countries found inadequate train-
work to assure that U.S. passengers on foreign
ing of personnel in the proper use of security
carriers receive the same level of protection
equipment. Many of the countries lack the re-
they do flying on U.S. carriers.
sources and know-how to perform satisfactory
All parties in Europe expressed concern to
passenger/baggage reconciliation. While most
the Commission over airport security in less in-
of those countries have enough security work-
dustrialized countries, particularly in Africa.
ers, they lack the capability to train them.
Should the world aviation community succeed
The State Department under the Anti-terror-
in substantially securing some 40 major world
ism Assistance Program also provides aviation
airports, terrorists could readily move to target
security technical assistance. A small portion of
less secure airports and routes. Many less in-
the program's annual $9.8 million funding is
dustrialized countries lack the resources to give
used for civil aviation security training.
priority to aviation security. Many of these air-
FAA foreign airport assessment reports help
ports have no perimeter fencing, no security
the State Department to determine where and
for airplanes, and no screening procedures for
what type of training is needed and is appropri-
passengers. Those airports with security equip-
ate. Through an agreement with FAA, courses
ment have few people trained to operate it,
are offered to personnel from selected coun-
while airport workers trained abroad frequently
tries. The Anti-terrorism Assistance program
leave for better-paying security positions else-
also provides equipment, such as hand-held
where.
and walk-through magnetometers and X-ray
Poorly secured airports in less industrialized
machines.
nations thus offer easy access to terrorists. A
Both the ICAO and State Department pro-
"rogue bag" containing explosives, with or
grams are limited in funds and scope. ICAO
without an accompanying passenger, might be
has targeted its limited resources toward poten-
placed aboard a foreign carrier at some small
tial threats in Africa, virtually ignoring the rest
airport for transfer later to a U.S. plane. This
of the world. The State Department views avia-
threat is very real. The destruction of the
tion security as merely one portion of its larger
French UTA 772 illustrates the vulnerabilities
counterterrorism program.
35
The FAA has only provided direct technical
ary, and other cases disclosed to the Commit-
assistance on civil aviation security to foreign
tee. He cited as examples FAA's favorable as-
countries in specific and unusual cases. As an
sessment of Seoul and Hong Kong airports de-
example, at the 1988 Summer Olympics in
spite the fact that each publicly posted lists of
Seoul, South Korea, the FAA deployed special-
all arriving passengers. One such list included
ists to monitor security for U.S. carriers with
the name of a U.S. ambassador under threat of
service to Seoul and to ensure compliance with
assassination.⁷
security requirements.
The FAA responds that such deficiencies as
As future threats increase in specific parts of
the widespread custom of posting passenger
the world, the U.S. may wish to concentrate its
lists in Asian airports, are not covered by ICAO
aviation security resources and efforts in those
and are, therefore, not assessed by the FAA re-
areas, including Central and South America. A
ports. However, such issues are covered rou-
majority of U.S. carriers fly to Central and
tinely in conversations between FAA and the
South American airports, potentially in peril
host airport officials. For instance, at FAA's
from terrorists linked to the drug cartels.
behest the passenger manifests were not posted
during the 1988 Olympics in Seoul.
Securing the International
The agency in January of this year changed
Aviation System
the format for its airport assessments from the
The disparity among nations' resources, pri-
"check list" for which it has been criticized to a
orities, and especially political will, brought
more narrative style. It is still too early to
home to the Commissioners the need for closer
assess the effect of these changes on the pro-
international cooperation to achieve a more co-
gram. However, the posting of passenger lists
ordinated approach to aviation security.
is an example of the kind of non-ICAO security
The jurisdictional problems encountered by
concerns the FAA inspectors must spot and
private U.S. carriers in high-threat countries
raise with the host government.
like those of Western Europe, point up the
The Commission emphasizes that the assess-
need for a strong leadership role by the U.S.
ment teams must be willing to look beyond the
Government, rather than private airlines, in
assessment sheets to view the full range of po-
dealing with foreign governments.
tential vulnerabilities and that the FAA and the
The fluid nature of the terrorist threat adds a
Department of Transportation must be willing
sense of urgency to this problem.
to exercise the full force of the Act.
The U.S. has a broad range of options within
which to seek increased international aviation
Bilateral Agreements
security, ranging from the unilateral under the
The Commission believes that the bilateral
Foreign Airport Security Act, to the multilater-
approach offers the best and most realistic
al, through ICAO.
hope for improved relations on aviation securi-
ty between the United States and its major
The Foreign Airport Security Act
aviation partners. The framework for such ne-
The Commission finds the Foreign Airport
gotiations already exists.
Security Act, especially its Foreign Airport As-
The United States is a party to bilateral civil
sessment Program, to be an effective means of
aviation agreements with 72 countries. These
correcting deficiencies and triggering other im-
agreements are ideal vehicles for negotiating
provements in aviation security abroad. The
aviation security compacts nation by nation.
sanctions authorized by the Act have been nec-
The compacts generally cover broad topics
essary only a few times.
including levels of air service between the
However, this Act is only as good as the
countries, pricing guidelines and market ar-
FAA's performance in carrying out its provi-
rangements. The agreements also provide
sions. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair-
mechanisms to resolve disputes, complaints
man Dante Fascell, at the Commission's March
and problems as they arise. Issues include who
9, 1990 hearing, noted security deficiencies at
will handle aircraft on the ground in a foreign
airports visited by the Committee's Staff Study
country and the availability of adequate airport
Mission to several European countries in Janu-
space to conduct operations.
36
U.S. civil aviation negotiating teams are typi-
Multilateral Agreements
cally composed of representatives from the De-
partments of State and Transportation, with
The Bonn Declaration
the State Department usually chairing the dele-
In 1978, the United States and its fellow
gation and the Department of Transportation
members of the Economic Summit (U.K.,
providing policy guidance.
Canada, Japan, France, Italy, and West Germa-
Aviation negotiations between the United
ny), also known as Summit Seven, agreed to
States and its major civil aviation partners are
cut off air service to and from any country that
conducted on a continuing basis: three or four
does not extradite or prosecute a terrorist for
times a year with countries such as the U.K. or
hijacking. This agreement, known as the Bonn
Japan, and annually or less frequently with
Declaration, was implemented only once,
countries with less air service to the United
against Afghanistan in 1981 following the hi-
States.
jacking of a Pakistani aircraft. The Venice
Annex, agreed upon in June 1987, expanded
the Bonn Declaration to include halting air
Security Articles
service in cases of sabotage. The Summit Seven
In response to the 1985 hijacking of TWA
has yet to apply the Venice Annex to a specific
incident.
Flight 847, the United States developed a
model security article to strengthen the na-
Although terrorist attacks at airports have de-
tion's ability to take unilateral action when
creased in recent years, the Commission urges
other countries fail to meet minimum aviation
the Summit Seven to agree to adopt an annex
to the Bonn Declaration stating that members
security standards. To the credit of U.S. nego-
will halt air service in cases of unpunished at-
tiators, 53 nations have signed such articles
tacks at airports and airline ticket offices.
after individual bilateral negotiations. Thirty ar-
These multilateral agreements, however,
ticles have taken effect and 23 have been
have their limitations. To be effective, a uni-
signed and await future action.
fied, aggressive and expeditious response to
While security articles set the framework for
terrorist incidents by all parties to the agree-
cooperation, they do not address the specific
ment is essential. The political will is not
disagreements plaguing U.S. carriers and Euro-
always forthcoming. Although the United States
pean airports.
has unilaterally cut off air service to state spon-
The Commission supports continued efforts
sors of terrorism, not all of the Summit Seven
to include security articles in these bilateral
partners have taken this step. In fact, the Bonn
agreements to resolve the problems outlined
Declaration was invoked only against Afghani-
above. In addition, negotiations could resolve
stan, where little economic impact was at stake
such thorny issues as a means of conducting
for Summit Seven carriers. The United States is
testing and inspections of security procedures
not the only Summit Seven partner to experi-
satisfactory to both nations.
ence frustration in this regard. Following the
The Commission, therefore, believes that the
discovery of Syria's involvement in an attempt-
position of Coordinator for International Avia-
ed bombing of an El Al plane from Heathrow
in 1986, the British government requested that
tion Security, with the rank of Ambassador,
the economic partners not only cut off air serv-
should be created in the Department of State.
ice to Syria but also impose diplomatic sanc-
The coordinator would intercede when negoti-
tions. The British were left to fight this battle
ation impasses are encountered. This would
virtually alone.
enable the United States to elevate the security
element to the highest level of government. It
ICAO
should be emphasized that this recommenda-
Despite ICAO's inherent limitations in the
tion does not reduce in any way the urgent
area of civil aviation security, it does serve an
need for the assignment of additional FAA per-
important function in countries where the ter-
sonnel abroad.
rorist threat is low and host country security is
37
TOTAL INTERNATIONAL SCHEDULED PASSENGERS
Carried on Summit Seven and Other Carriers
U.K. 11%
Japan 4%
U.S. 17%
Italy 2%
Germany 4%
France 5%
Canada 3%
Other Countries 54%
* Total international scheduled passengers
worldwide: 242,559,000
otherwise minimal. In high threat countries, na-
countries cannot afford higher levels of securi-
tions rely on additional measures.
ty. Therefore, ICAO develops standards that
ICAO's inherent limitations include:
can be adhered to worldwide. Moreover, if the
No enforcement mechanism. ICAO cannot
standards are too high, they will not be admin-
impose sanctions on a violating member state.
istered.
In fact, ICAO is not even allowed to inspect
Slow to react. As a political, legislative body,
airports to determine if countries are comply-
ICAO is slow to react. Following the bombing
ing with its standards; inspection would violate
of Air India in 1985, ICAO took two years to
a country's sovereignty.
enact new standards requiring baggage-passen-
State sponsors of terrorism are ICAO mem-
ger reconciliation. ICAO currently is under
bers. ICAO's membership includes nations
pressure to respond to the threat from radio
widely accused of sponsoring terrorism. ICAO
bombs and plastic explosives. The organization
can take no action against these states for pro-
has just begun issuing information on these de-
viding sanctuary, training camps and funding
vices and pursuing markings on explosives.
However, these terrorist devices have been
for terrorists. Moreover, ICAO must provide
these same states with the very document it
known for years. It took a tragedy, Pan Am
prepared to fight terrorism, its Security
103, to bring about ICAO actions.
Manual.
Conclusions
Standards based on the lowest common de-
nominator. ICAO's security standards generally
The Commission believes the responsibility
are low level measures in order for all coun-
for negotiating aviation security must be placed
tries to comply. Many economically starved
on the U.S. Government, not the private air
38
carriers. The FAA requirements have a number
of security awareness in the international avia-
of important implications for security and for-
tion community has increased dramatically.
eign relations. American carriers find them-
Many governments have taken steps to improve
selves in the middle, caught between FAA and
air carrier and airport security. The process of
the host government, and forced to negotiate
limiting the vulnerabilities and ensuring con-
directly with that government in order to carry
sistent security wherever Americans travel is
out the required security program. The Depart-
only in the early stages. The Commissioners
ment of State, in consultation with the Depart-
believe the legacy of the Pan Am 103 tragedy
ment of Transportation, should negotiate these
should be a firm resolve around the world to
aviation security arrangements with the foreign
prevent a similar incident. In that context,
governments where American carriers fly, and
broad and major improvements to the aviation
should complete the negotiations before re-
security system have just begun. The Commis-
quirements are imposed on the carrier.
sion believes that the United States must take
The additional security measures opposed by
the lead in this initiative.
some foreign governments were prescribed be-
cause the FAA believes they are necessary,
Recommendations
above and beyond the procedures already in
place at host airports. The United States must
negotiate with these governments to rectify
1. The lead negotiating role in aviation secu-
these discrepancies, or in some other way ad-
rity should be shifted from U.S. carriers to the
dress these very real concerns.
Department of State, which is the appropriate
The Commission supports ICAO despite its
entity to deal with foreign governments, to
weaknesses, as the appropriate international
assure that all airlines are treated equally by
forum for upgrading aviation security world-
these governments. The Department of Trans-
wide. ICAO standards and recommendations
portation should have a strong supporting role.
work well as a baseline for all nations. The
Further, new requirements should be negotiat-
Commission believes the United States should
ed before they are imposed on carriers, rather
continue to work through ICAO to strengthen
than after the carriers are required to imple-
aviation security internationally, particularly in
ment them.
the less industrialized countries.
2. The United States should continue to
Some nations, though willing, are unable to
press vigorously for security improvements
provide a consistent, adequate level of security.
through the Foreign Airport Security Act and
While the FAA utilizes U.S. assistance pro-
the Foreign Airport Assessment Program.
grams of other agencies, the Commission be-
lieves that the FAA should also have its own
3. The United States should rely on bilateral
formal and active technical assistance program
agreements to achieve aviation security objec-
for other nations to improve airport security.
tives with foreign governments. These should
This step is essential for the United States to
aim at providing a level of security significantly
lead the rest of the world to provide the same
higher than that currently provided by either
level of aviation security the FAA requires of
the United States or the host government. The
U.S. carriers. The United States should be in a
United States must strike a strong negotiating
position through FAA to help upgrade air carri-
posture, with the goal of assuring that U.S. pas-
er and airport security wherever the threat war-
sengers, whether they fly on U.S. or foreign
rants. To the extent that the intelligence com-
airlines, are afforded the same level of protec-
munity perceives a growing aviation security
tion. Specifically, bilaterals must address the
threat in Central and South America, due to
issues of testing foreign security procedures,
U.S. drug interdiction activity, FAA resources
access to the entire airport, adequate back-
should be concentrated in the region to assist
ground checks of security employees, and must
the host governments and the American carri-
assure the United States a role in oversight of
ers.
those procedures.
The Commission has found that the state of
4. The State Department should create the
international aviation security has improved
position of Coordinator for International Avia-
since the destruction of Pan Am 103. The level
tion Security. The President should nominate
39
the holder of that position for the rank of Am-
that access to operations areas (taxiway, jetway,
bassador while serving in that position.
etc.) is restricted.
5. The U.S. should continue to work through
ICAO to improve aviation security internation-
Assessing the Threat
ally.
6. The FAA should complement its foreign
The FAA's view of the nature of the threat to
assessment program with an active formal tech-
domestic flights has not changed for almost
nical assistance program to provide aviation se-
two decades. In the agency's most recent
curity help to countries upon request. Since
report to Congress on the civil aviation security
U.S. aviation security resources are not ade-
program, filed after the bombing of Pan Am
quate to meet the world need, the United
Flight 103, FAA stated that "American interests
States should be in a position to concentrate its
also continue to be targeted by terrorist organi-
efforts wherever the threat is greatest.
zations and those countries supporting interna-
7. The Summit Seven should amend the
tional terrorist activities." However, FAA makes
Bonn Declaration to extend sanctions for all
clear that it views the terrorism problem as re-
terrorist acts, including attacks against airports
stricted to the international arena. FAA has
and airline ticket offices.
said that at domestic airports, efforts will con-
Domestic Security
tinue to focus on the hijacking threat, while re-
search and development will emphasize im-
proved passenger and baggage screening
The Regulatory Approach to
equipment.⁸
Domestic Security
Yet, the FBI has informed the Commission
Working with the air carriers and airport op-
that, while terrorist incidents in the United
erators, FAA has established domestic security
States have declined since 1986, the threat of
requirements that primarily address hijacking,
terrorism in the United States does exist. In-
still viewed by the agency as the principal
cluded in this threat are potential attacks
threat to domestic flights. FAA's approach is
against the civil aviation industry in the United
based on interrelated security measures which
States. The Commission finds this conflict in
are intentionally redundant. If any one security
views of the potential threat for domestic air-
measure fails, another will support or replace
ports to be a major concern that cannot be ig-
it, according to this theory. For example, fenc-
nored. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, a
ing and personnel identification systems alone
are insufficient security for the most sensitive
joint FAA-FBI vulnerability assessment of do-
airport areas, but the addition of lighting, law
mestic airports is planned.
enforcement personnel, and vigilant aviation
The Commission believes strongly that such
employees produce a more complete security
assessments are critical to ensure that the secu-
system.
rity is adequate to meet the current threat and
The air carriers are responsible for the most
that contingency plans are developed to ad-
visible security measures-screening passengers
dress potential vulnerabilities as changes in the
with metal detectors and X-raying their carry-
threat warrant, including the need for new
on articles. Air carriers have generally elected
technology.
to contract with private security firms to per-
form this function. Nevertheless, the air carrier
is held accountable by FAA for the effective-
ness of the screening operation.
The airport operator is charged with provid-
ing a secure operating environment for the air
carrier. To achieve this, FAA has established
security requirements for ensuring (1) that the
law enforcement officials respond to various se-
curity threats; (2) that physical security such as
airport perimeter fencing be provided; and (3)
Congested airports across the country compound security problems.
40
Recommendations
of minimum airport security measures applied
nationwide.
1. The Commission recommends that the
The ownership and operation of domestic
FAA seek the assistance of the FBI in making a
commercial airports varies considerably. Air-
thorough assessment of the current and poten-
ports may be public or private, owned by the
tial threat to the domestic air transportation
city, county, state, or specialized airport author-
system.
ity. The New York Port Authority, a bi-state
2. The Commission further recommends that
commission, owns and operates the John F.
FAA initiate immediately the planning and
Kennedy, La Guardia, and Newark airports. In
analysis necessary to phase additional security
Chicago, the largest commercial airports are
measures into the domestic system over time.
city-owned. Baltimore-Washington Internation-
al (BWI) Airport is state-owned. The Dallas-
Airports
Fort Worth airport authority was created by a
contractual agreement between the cities of
Dallas and Fort Worth. McCarran International
Operations
Airport in Las Vegas is county-operated. Until
In the United States, the federal government
recently, National Airport and Dulles Interna-
has a relatively small operational role in air car-
tional airports serving Washington, D.C., were
rier and airport security. The domestic system
federally-owned and operated.
relies on the FAA to set standards and provide
Airport ownership also shapes law enforce-
guidance, the airport to ensure a safe environ-
ment support structure at airports. The pri-
ment, and the air carrier to secure passengers,
mary organizations providing this support are
baggage and cargo entering the aircraft. The
state and local police forces, or special airport
operational role of the FAA in airport security
authority forces. Regardless of the entity pro-
is limited to the dissemination of intelligence
viding the law enforcement support, the FAA
and threat information.
requires that specific criteria be met to ensure
National attention focused on aviation securi-
a consistent level of service. Most airports also
ty in the 1960s as a consequence of a rash of
employ security forces responsible for the phys-
aircraft hijackings. The industry responded with
ical security within the airport. In some cases
air carrier screening of passengers to detect hi-
this function is provided by private contractors.
jacker weapons. When hijackings continued,
airport operators were given the responsibility
Physical security at many airports is further
to support the screening for weapons with law
subdivided between the airport operator and
enforcement officers. The division of responsi-
the air carrier by exclusive area agreements.
bility today for security at U.S. airports is virtu-
These agreements transfer to the carriers the
ally unchanged from the early hijacking days.
responsibility for physical security in their
The FAA issues broad general guidelines for
operational areas leased from the airport, in-
airport security. Airports rely on individually
cluding air operations areas, cargo buildings,
developed security programs that are approved
and airline spaces within the terminal building.
by the FAA. In contrast, all U.S. carriers
As many as 25 different organizations may
comply with a single air carrier standard securi-
share security responsibility at a single airport
ty program developed by the FAA. A result is
as a result of exclusive area agreements. With
that specific security measures vary from air-
security responsibility so fragmented, it is diffi-
port to airport. A 1987 Department of Trans-
cult to maintain a consistent level of security
portation Task Force recommended that the
throughout an airport. It also becomes more
FAA develop a single standard airport security
difficult to implement contingency plans in re-
program, recognizing that while airports differ
sponse to higher levels of threat, when coordi-
in many ways, an effective security program in-
nation and cooperation is required of so many
cludes many of the same elements. The Com-
parties. Air carriers believe they are entitled to
mission supports the concept of a standard set
control their leased space and provide the ap-
41
Here, carry-on luggage is examined before a passenger clears the security check point.
propriate security as long as the airlines comply
without requiring specific measures to address
with FAA regulations.
particular threats.
The Commission believes that security ac-
A subsequent report by the Department of
countability at each domestic airport should
Transportation in January 1989 revealed that
rest with a single federal airport security man-
the contingency plans it reviewed (1) lacked
ager, as detailed later in this Report.
specificity; (2) did not adequately fix roles and
responsibility; (3) failed to establish adequate
Contingency Plans
coordination among airport tenants; and (4)
did not define the role of the FAA in determin-
The March 1987 Department of Transporta-
ing the threat level. 10 The FAA has worked to
tion Task Force recommended that each air-
improve the quality of the plans, focusing on
port develop a phased contingency alert pro-
the largest domestic airports. Yet the responsi-
gram that could be implemented at different
bilities of air carriers and other airport tenants
levels of potential terrorist or criminal threats.⁹
are still not normally defined in the plans.
In July 1987, the FAA issued guidance to its
Sandia National Laboratories is also evaluat-
field offices requiring that each airport security
ing contingency plans as part of a larger study
program contain contingency plans. Later guid-
of aviation security at Baltimore-Washington
ance listed topics for inclusion in the plans
International Airport. The Commission be-
42
lieves that contingency plans are a critical part
to require a criminal record check for employ-
of domestic airport security strategy, requiring
ment. The cost of criminal record checks is
additional emphasis.
small. They are performed by the FBI, on a
cost reimbursable basis, for a fee of $20 per
Background Checks
employee. The Commission believes that crimi-
On November 26, 1985, the FAA began a
nal background checks should be conducted for
program to require that all airport security em-
all prospective airport employees and urges
ployers conduct employment background
Congressional action.
checks for all employees who have unescorted
access to secure areas. The checks verified em-
Airport Expansion
ployment history for the preceding five years.
DOT Secretary Skinner has stated that the
This emergency security program was enacted
domestic airport system soon will undergo a
by Congress in 1985 after members of the CBS
major expansion. It is essential that security
"60 Minutes" staff were hired to work in air-
features be incorporated into all new airport
port security without background checks. A "60
designs. While individual airport design and
Minutes" followup six months later, after FAA
construction projects may include certain secu-
action to correct the problem, found that little
rity features, currently there are no FAA securi-
had changed.
ty design standards for new airport construc-
While the FAA requires the five-year employ-
tion, and there is no formal process within the
ment checks, it is the employers who conduct
FAA for review of airport facility designs by the
and certify the checks. No further clearance is
FAA security office. The Commission believes
required. FAA issues no guidance on what con-
that FAA should determine the security fea-
stitutes an acceptable employment history.
tures necessary for new airport facilities and
Criminal record checks are not required. In
ensure that such features are included in
some states, such background checks are pro-
hibited in determining employment suitability.
design and construction.
Other states allow only law enforcement au-
Access Control
thorities to request or conduct the checks.
These background check limitations enable em-
The major concern at airports is a lack of
ployees to have access to airport secure areas
controls over those having access to aircraft.
without the FAA, the airport operator, or the
For example, caterers (those delivering food
air carriers knowing if they pose a security risk.
and drink to an aircraft) are allowed access to
The Commission was told of cases where em-
the aircraft with few security checks. Cleaning
ployees with criminal records have been given
crews also enter aircraft without having their
unaccompanied access to the secure areas of
equipment, such as buckets and vacuum clean-
airports. The Commission believes that the
ers, screened or examined. While procedures
case for mandatory criminal record checks for
require that employees challenge anyone not
airport employees is at least as compelling as
wearing proper identification in the Air Oper-
for employees in industries such as securities or
ations Area (AOA), these procedures are of
banking, where criminal record checks are re-
limited effectiveness. Various methods to en-
quired. The Commission believes that airline
courage more vigorous challenging have been
employees should be similarly checked.
adopted, including a "bounty" paid to employ-
DOT submitted to Congress in 1986 and
ees for challenging unauthorized persons.
again in 1988 legislation to allow FAA to re-
In its January 1989 report, the DOT Safety
quire criminal history background checks and
Review Task Force found that its investigators
to prohibit access to aircraft or to secured areas
were able to gain access to the AOA at several
to persons convicted for felonies or certain
airports without being challenged-a problem
other crimes. Congress has not acted on the
the Task Force also had reported in 1986. Air-
proposed legislation, which will probably be re-
port operators and air carrier representatives
submitted during the current session.
confirmed to the Commission that these condi-
There is a consensus among the airport op-
tions still exist.
erators, air carriers, law enforcement officials
FAA inspection results point to access con-
and the FAA that federal legislation is needed
trol as the most frequent security violation at
43
airports. Over the last four years, 80 to 85 per-
had raised sufficient concern about the final
cent of all airport violations have been access-
rule that the Senate Appropriations Committee
related. The inspection results obviously mirror
included, in the FY 1990 Department of Trans-
the inspection methodology, which concen-
portation Appropriations, language requiring
trates heavily on access issues. Thirty-five of 64
the FAA to conduct pilot programs at four air-
line items on the inspection check list are
ports.
access-related. FAA oversight should focus on
To date, 66 airports' programs have been ap-
the adequacy of contingency plans and the ca-
proved. The FAA believes that pilot testing is
pability to address a higher threat level.
no longer necessary, and would unnecessarily
On December 7, 1987, Pacific Southwest Air-
delay program implementation, now that there
lines Flight 1771, en route from Los Angeles to
are numerous potential model programs for
San Francisco, crashed after a recently dis-
airport operators to follow.
missed company employee shot the pilot and
The airports believe the requirement should
crew. All 43 passengers and crew members per-
carry with it the necessary additional federal
ished. The disgruntled former employee re-
funding. The accelerated implementation
portedly brought the weapon aboard after by-
schedule of the new access rule will place a sig-
passing pre-board screening by showing com-
nificant strain on available federal resources.
pany identification.
Cost estimates for the new security measures
In response to the incident, the FAA moved
vary widely. The FAA estimated the total cost
to amend domestic airport security programs to
of the system nationwide at about $170 million
require that no one entering a secure airport
in 1987 dollars when the proposed rule was an-
area could bypass the security checkpoints. The
nounced. Airport industry organizations esti-
FAA proposed access control rule is designed
mate the cost of installing the systems at $1 bil-
to restrict access to the airport operations area
lion.
to only authorized persons. 11 The proposal
While there is a general recognition that an
further required that the security program dis-
automated access control system can be a good
tinguish those who have access to all restricted
airport areas from those who have access to
management information tool, there is no con-
sensus on how much security is enhanced by
limited airport areas.
The proposed rule did not specify a comput-
such a system. Even with a sophisticated access
er access card system, although it envisioned
control system, security will still depend on
such a system at most primary airports. Full
human factors and the procedures for issue and
system implementation was to be required
return of employee access cards. The Commis-
within six months of system approval by the
sion believes that a better approach would
FAA.
place more emphasis on controls over access by
The proposed rule brought an outcry about
airport employees, combined with stricter FAA
virtually every provision from the aviation in-
enforcement. Meanwhile, automated access
dustry. Questions were raised about the degree
control systems would be tested, debugged,
of the threat being countered, the evidence
and refined at selected airports.
supporting the need for such security meas-
ures, the implementation schedule, the estimat-
Department of Transportation Reports
ed cost, the funding, the degree of additional
The Secretary of Transportation, in February
security to be gained, and the expertise within
1986, directed a Safety Review Task Force to
the industry and the FAA to evaluate such sys-
conduct a comprehensive review of domestic
tems. Nearly every respondent objected to the
aviation security. The year and a half long
proposed rule. The industry demanded that
study issued a series of reports that made more
automated access control systems be pilot-
than 70 recommendations, In January 1988, the
tested at several airports.
DOT Office of Safety Program Review initiated
On January 6, 1989, two weeks after the Pan
a follow-up review, at the request of the Secre-
Am 103 tragedy, the FAA determined that the
tary, to assess the status of previous recommen-
proposed rule should be immediately approved
dations and analyze existing security. It made
and implemented without pilot tests and with
37 additional recommendations, and to date 22
only minor modifications. The aviation industry
of the more than 100 recommendations have
44
been fully implemented. The majority of the
As the FAA looks to the future, airport ex-
remaining recommendations are to be ad-
pansion should factor security needs into the
dressed in the rewrite of the FAA regulations
design and construction of facilities. The FAA
governing airports and air carriers. The Com-
Civil Aviation Security Office should have a
mission supports the recommendations of the
formal role in the approval of airport facilities'
Task Force and the Office of Safety Program
designs.
Review and believes they should be implement-
The most critical elements in aviation securi-
ed expeditiously.
ty will continue to be people and the proce-
dures which guide them. Effective security can
The BWI Study
best be achieved with a single strong manager
The FAA is currently conducting with Sandia
who directs a highly-integrated system, staffed
National Laboratories an important security
by well-trained, motivated workers. To that
demonstration project at Baltimore-Washington
end, qualification and training standards for
International Airport. The project seeks to
airport personnel are crucial.
design an integrated security system that pro-
Recommendations
vides (1) detection, assessment, and effective
threat response; (2) continuous protection
against higher level threats; and (3) contingen-
1. The FAA should take the necessary action
cy measures to protect against escalating ter-
to clearly define responsibilities under exclu-
rorist threat levels. Sandia is assessing security
sive area agreements and contingency plans to
throughout the airport including concourses,
ensure that existing problems are corrected
screening points, ramps, baggage handling
and the contingent security system is capable of
areas and airport access roads. The project is
meeting the specified threat levels.
also weighing the costs and benefits of upgrad-
2. The Congress should require criminal
ed security measures in an operating environ-
record checks for all airport employees. The
ment. The Commission believes that more re-
legislation should identify certain criminal
search of this nature is necessary to advance
records that indicate a potential security risk
the state of aviation security. The Commission
and enable airport operators to deny employ-
strongly supports the FAA security demonstra-
ment on that basis.
tion project at BWI.
3. The FAA should determine the security
features necessary for new airport facilities and
Conclusions
ensure that such features are included in air-
port facility design and construction.
The existing FAA approach to domestic secu-
4. The Commission endorses the recommen-
rity under ordinary circumstances is to maintain
dations of the Office of the Secretary of Trans-
a low level of security consistent with the as-
portation Office of Safety Review Task Force
sessed threat and to rely on well-developed
and recommends full implementation expedi-
contingency plans to upgrade security when the
tiously.
threat dictates. This approach minimizes the
disruption of domestic operations. To be effec-
Air Carriers
tive, it is essential that airports, air carriers and
other airport tenants be capable of moving to-
In the United States, the threat is deemed to
gether immediately to a high level of security,
be much less than that faced in certain foreign
based on well-conceived contingency plans.
airports. Security requirements for the carriers
The most recent Secretary of Transportation
differ accordingly. Nevertheless, the singular
report on domestic security indicates that seri-
purpose of the air carrier security program re-
ous problems persist in contingency planning.
mains the same: to protect the traveling public
The airports also need more information to
from aircraft hijacking, sabotage or other crimi-
limit the threat from within the ranks of their
nal acts. 12
own workers. Criminal record checks must be
A total of 119 U.S. scheduled and public
required for all airport employees, and employ-
charter air carriers of various sizes are required
ment should be denied where necessary.
by the FAA to provide security. Each of these
45
Baggage, cargo and mail security is a critical component of a comprehensive aviation security plan.
carriers has adopted a standard security pro-
Executive Officer and/or Chairman of the
gram developed by FAA in consultation with
Board. Since security requirements can have a
the air carrier industry. Therefore, each carrier
substantial impact on operations, including
must implement a similar set of security proce-
flight schedules and passenger processing
dures at its operating stations. 13 In addition,
times, security personnel are often responsible
135 foreign air carriers operating into and from
to operations officials. 15
the United States must have security programs
The responsibilities of an airline corporate
for those flights that are acceptable to the
security office usually include interpreting FAA
FAA. 14
security requirements, setting policies and pro-
Organizational Structure of U.S. Carriers
cedures for compliance by the airlines, auditing
and inspecting the security operations and rep-
The placement of the security function varies
resenting the carrier in security-related matters.
within the corporate structures of U.S. airlines.
The airline security office also is responsible
Typically, security is a stand-alone function or
for other security matters such as theft and
separate office several rungs down the corpo-
fraud. All air carriers queried by the Commis-
rate ladder. The security office usually reports
sion stated that security has high priority within
to a vice president, who reports to the Chief
their organizations. 16
46
Airline security at domestic airports is typi-
The responsibility for ensuring that all secu-
cally contracted out to private firms which pro-
rity requirements are monitored prior to each
vide the personnel and training to operate the
flight is the job of a carrier's Ground Security
passenger screening check-points. 17 The feder-
Coordinator (GSC). Security is only one part of
al government purchased the original X-ray
the typical GSC's job, but those duties are ex-
equipment for screening in the 1970s. Air car-
tremely important to the traveling public's
riers have since upgraded that equipment at
safety. The Commission has some concerns
their own expense. Moreover, an impending
about the adequacy of FAA's requirements for
change to improve weapons detection capabili-
GSC training and actual on-the-job activity.
ties may require the replacement of much of
FAA requires the carriers to provide training in
today's passenger screening equipment, accord-
accordance with a course outline provided by
ing to an FAA security official.
FAA. The training requirements span nine
Most carriers originally elected to contract
major subject areas and 72 subtopics. 21 Up to
out for security because the initial screening of
a quarter of the course may be presented in
passengers was conducted in the various con-
"home study media" materials and testing is
courses rather than at the gates. Since con-
left up to the carrier.
courses are used by passengers of different air
The FAA has not, in the Commission's view,
carriers, the carriers often found it practical to
set the minimum number of required training
hire third parties to serve them all and to share
hours at an adequate level. A carrier can meet
the costs. This approach has evolved to the
the FAA requirement by providing the 25
point where one air carrier, 18 has contracts
hours of initial training and six hours of annual
with 30 private security companies at the vari-
recurrent training. The recurrent training is
ous airports and concourses where the carrier
supposed to cover all of the topics.
has primary responsibility for security.
Passenger and Carry-On Item Screening
Security Responsibilities
The air carrier's local station manager is typi-
The most visible aspect of domestic airline
cally responsible for all operational activities at
security is screening of passengers and carry-on
the airport, and exercises oversight over day-
items. For all practical purposes, the focus of
to-day activities of the security contractor. 19
the security procedures for domestic flights is
The air carriers share security responsibilities
to deter hijackings and has been so since their
with the airport operator. The airport operator
inception seventeen years ago. Aided substan-
is responsible for securing access to the Air
tially by the closing of Cuba as a safe harbor
Operations Area, controlling the movement of
for hijackers, this emphasis has been successful.
persons and vehicles on the AOA, and provid-
The Air Transport Association reports that
ing the general law enforcement response to
since the air carriers started screening passen-
any security breaches or problems. The air car-
gers and their carry-on items in 1973, over 10
riers are generally responsible for screening of
billion passengers and 11 billion carry-on items
passengers and carry-on baggage, including
have gone through screening points. Forty-two
training and testing of persons responsible for
thousand firearms have been detected. Obvi-
the screening; securing the aircraft against the
ously, as one carrier told the Commission, most
introduction of any explosive or incendiary de-
persons found with weapons at screening
vices; monitoring and securing all sterile areas
points have no intention of hijacking a plane. 22
under carriers' control, and controlling the
Nonetheless, ATA refers to this security meas-
handling and loading of baggage and cargo.
ure as the "first line of defense". It may, in
For the domestic flights, there is no regular
fact, be the "last line of defense." If someone
screening of checked baggage or cargo, catered
is able to defeat this security measure, that
food or other supplies placed on board. 20 In
person can gain access to passengers, crew, and
effect, FAA imposes no security controls on any
aircraft with relative ease.
items other than hand-carried baggage. The ex-
FAA's testing of the effectiveness of the
ception is hazardous cargo, for which special
screening process-which utilizes X-ray ma-
procedures are applied.
chines to screen the carry-on items and magne-
47
tometers (metal detectors) which the passenger
walks through-is relatively unsophisticated.
The agency uses test weapons, such as three
sticks of simulated dynamite, tied together with
a large clock and attaching wires, to test the X-
ray and the ability of the operator to detect a
potentially lethal weapon. The test bomb is
placed in a bag or briefcase with little effort to
conceal or disguise it. The bag or briefcase is
then taken by an FAA security inspector,
posing as a passenger, to the screening point
and submitted to the X-ray operators.
FAA inspection reports note that nationwide
these screening systems are identifying test
weapons about 90 per cent of the time. The
system's performance has improved since 1987,
when GAO noted the tests found an average
detection rate of about 80 per cent (with a low
Curbside check in is a great convenience for air travelers, but
raises security concerns.
at one location of 34 per cent). 23 Nevertheless,
the FAA criteria for these most obvious weap-
could check baggage with an explosive device
ons is 100 per cent detection. The DOT Task
for a specific flight and leave the airport while
Force reported in January 1989 that while there
the baggage is loaded aboard.
had been improvement in the detection rates,
The FAA has established a "profile" of a hy-
"further improvements are still needed." This
pothetical passenger who could pose a poten-
Commission concurs. In fact, the Commission
tial security threat. If a passenger meets the
observed firsthand how an FAA security inspec-
profile, his or her baggage is to be subjected to
tor's "dynamite bomb" went undetected by a
additional security measures. The profile is
screening point even though it was thinly dis-
based upon known characteristics of a potential
guised in a briefcase with only a few sheets of
bomber. Such controls are easily circumvented,
paper.
however, through curb-side check-in. More-
For metal detectors, FAA's test calls for the
over, even if the person fits the profile, if he or
equipment to alarm two of three times an FAA
she produces an acceptable form of identifica-
security inspector attempts to pass through
tion, such as a driver's license, the baggage is
with a test weapon. The inspector must carry
accepted without X-ray.
the test weapon at a certain place on his or her
The Secretary of Transportation, in written
body. Again, there is little attempt to disguise
testimony submitted to the Senate Appropria-
the weapon. The testing procedure permits a
tions Committee in March 1989, stated that if
device to be returned to service even if it fails
passenger/baggage reconciliation (making sure
one out of three times to detect a simulated
that a bag is not transported without the corre-
weapon carried in a vertical position at waist
level.
24
sponding passenger on board) was required for
domestic flights, delays at hub airports prob-
In its latest report, the DOT Task Force
noted that new X-ray equipment is available
ably would paralyze the air transportation
which can do a much more effective job of
system. He said the current threat at U.S. air-
screening. Nevertheless, FAA has not required
ports does not warrant these measures for the
the air carriers to replace their outdated
1.1 billion bags annually checked on domestic
models with this new equipment.
flights.
Checked Baggage
Bomb Threats
At domestic airports, baggage may be
Air carriers have both major responsibilities
checked either at curb-side or in the terminal.
and considerable discretion in dealing with
Once checked, the baggage must remain sepa-
bomb threats. In receiving bomb threats, the
rate from the passengers. As a result, a person
airlines are responsible for searching aircraft
48
and notifying pilots, the FAA, the FBI, other
plosive devices in checked baggage for domes-
air carriers, the airport authority and law en-
tic flights.
forcement officials. However, the circumstances
The Commission believes the FAA has vested
in which the carrier must report a threat imme-
too much discretion in the carriers to decide
diately are extremely narrow. For example, an
whether to report bomb threats immediately,
anonymous threat that, "There will be a bomb
and to control searches of aircraft and other fa-
on one of your flights to New York this week,"
cilities in bomb threat cases. Searches of air-
would not have to be reported immediately if
craft and other facilities for possible explosive
the carrier had more than one flight from that
devices should be controlled and carried out by
airport.
official public authorities.
Periodically (but unspecified by FAA), all
threats not meeting the specific criteria for im-
Recommendations
mediate reporting must be reported to FAA.
The FAA, however, does not stipulate the con-
ditions for informing passengers that a threat
1. The Commission recommends that the
has been made against their intended flight.
FAA eliminate the discretion afforded private
The standard FAA security program is silent on
carriers for reporting bomb threats and
this subject.
searches of aircraft and facilities, and require
FAA also considers the air carrier to be the
the immediate reporting of all threats to FAA,
"only appropriate party to determine whether
airport and public safety authorities, and recog-
inspection of an airplane or a ground facility is
nize that public safety authorities have the re-
necessary" as the result of a bomb threat. 25 At
sponsibility for deciding whether and how
one major domestic airport visited by the Com-
searches should be conducted.
mission staff during this inquiry, certain airport
2. The FAA should change the minimum
officials took issue with the FAA practice of en-
training requirements for ground security coor-
trusting broad powers and discretion with the
dinators so that minimum training periods are
private carriers in bomb threat incidents. These
in line with the amount of material that has to
officials said the airport's public safety depart-
be covered.
ment personnel were better trained and
3. The FAA should establish and apply
equipped to conduct searches, handle suspi-
standardized testing requirements for ground
cious parcels and take other steps to protect
security coordinators and expedite the develop-
the public.
ment of standards for actions to be taken prior
to each flight.
Conclusions
4. The Commission recommends that the
The Commission believes that FAA's training
FAA require carriers to assure that all baggage
requirements for ground security coordinators
associated with passengers who meet FAA's cri-
need to be changed. Specifically, the prescribed
teria as possibly having explosive devices in
minimum hours need to better reflect the
checked baggage, are subject to security con-
amount of time that should reasonably be re-
trols and then are not carried unless the pas-
quired to absorb the required material. The
senger is on board the aircraft.
Commission also believes that FAA should de-
velop its own test requirements for GSC's so
Mail and Cargo Security
their job knowledge can be checked systemati-
cally. Also, FAA should expedite its develop-
U.S. airlines carry mail and cargo on almost
ment of standard duties that GSC's should
all of their passenger flights both within the
carry out for each flight.
continental United States and abroad. Pan Am
The Commission also believes that the FAA
103 alone carried 43 bags of mail 26 and over
needs to strengthen its requirements for air
20 tons of cargo ranging from electrical trans-
carrier operational testing of passenger screen-
formers to sewing needles and comic books. 27
ing devices being returned to service.
Yet the FAA requires strikingly different securi-
Effective security controls must also be de-
ty standards for mail and cargo in comparison
veloped and applied for those passengers who
to those procedures imposed for passengers
meet FAA's criteria for potential carriers of ex-
and their baggage.
49
Legal restrictions generally prevent mail on
tary mail. Still, the number of instances world-
American passenger aircraft from being techno-
wide where mail is screened are few and far be-
logically screened for explosive or incendiary
tween.
devices (absent special circumstances) by either
the airlines or the United States Postal Service
Legal Considerations
(USPS). Furthermore, the FAA has focused its
Federal law provides that all USPS regula-
regulatory efforts for air cargo away from the
airports, on "indirect air carriers," business en-
tions pertaining to air mail must be consistent
with the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and the
tities which ship parcels and cargo on the air-
lines. Although the USPS is taking steps to im-
rules and regulations promulgated under the
prove the security of air mail, both the mail
Act. Nevertheless, the FAA has consistently re-
and cargo areas constitute a huge gap in the
linquished to the USPS responsibility for air
security umbrella for domestic and internation-
mail security. As Monte Belger, the FAA Asso-
al flights.
ciate Administrator with security responsibil-
ities, testified before this Commission: "The
Mail
Postal Service has authority and responsibility
for the safety of the mail." 29
The USPS is required by law to "maintain
Current Measures
one or more classes of mail for the transmis-
Air mail is big business for the airlines. Ac-
sion of letters sealed against inspection." 30
cording to USPS figures, the Postal Service
That statute also states that "no letter of such a
paid in excess of $1 billion to air carriers in
class of domestic origin [those sealed against
fiscal 1989 to carry mail. 28 Yet there is no reg-
inspection] shall be opened except under au-
ular, technological screening of domestic mail
thority of a search warrant authorized by
carried by commercial airlines. Carriers which
law.
USPS regulations also state that no
contract with the USPS generally receive mail
person may "open, read, search, or divulge the
in bound bags with a marked destination. The
contents of mail sealed against inspec-
airlines simply place the bags on the appropri-
tion
" without a warrant, unless extraordi-
ate flights without any further examination. All
nary circumstances create a reasonable suspi-
letter mail and parcels can be sent air mail
cion to an inspecting authority that a letter or
simply by stamping the items with the proper
parcel could be dangerous. 31 Federal law also
postage and depositing them in drop boxes.
imposes a criminal penalty on anyone who
The USPS uses commercial carriers exclu-
delays the mailing of a letter or parcel "with
sively for its international mail shipments, and
design to obstruct the correspondence, or to
uses American carriers whenever it can do so.
pry into the business or secrets of another, or
Most incoming mail on American international
opens, secretes, embezzles, or destroys the
flights is military mail from U.S. posts. Al-
same.
32 Accordingly, the FAA has not
though technically an agent of the USPS, the
issued any regulations requiring the screening
Military Postal Service (MPS) has the authority
of air mail.
and discretion to adopt special security meas-
ures for the mail it handles.
The FAA/USPS Memorandum of
For legal reasons, the USPS has taken the
Understanding
position that general X-ray or other screening
of mail "sealed against inspection" cannot be
One federal program to begin security
undertaken by the airlines without first obtain-
screening of air mail parcels never got off the
ing a search warrant except in extraordinary
ground. On December 11, 1979, the FAA and
circumstances. The MPS, however, has cabled
the USPS entered into a Memorandum of Un-
instructions to military posts to allow the air-
derstanding (MOU) requiring all direct and in-
lines to screen the military mail delivered to
direct carriers, including USPS, to implement
them when the carriers see fit. Northwest Air-
an air parcel security program with procedures
lines recently confirmed that it had begun
to prevent, detect, and deter the introduction
screening all mail it carries into the United
of any unauthorized explosive or incendiary
States from Frankfurt airport, most of it mili-
device into air mail parcels.³³
50
Both the FAA and USPS have told the Com-
unless it comes from established customers.
mission, however, that the MOU never was
The exception is cargo that has been out of
workable and soon foundered. 34 This agree-
possession of the originator for a certain
ment resulted from pressure on FAA and USPS
period of time. 37
to do something after a mail bomb exploded
As long as the international cargo is coming
aboard an American Airlines aircraft in 1979.
from known shippers, therefore, the U.S. air-
The security program was apparently imple-
lines are under no specific obligation to screen
mented in some fashion in about 40 cities, but
it. Moreover, even the tightest screening re-
was inherently flawed in that there were no
quirement may be satisfied merely by holding
controls on parcels placed in drop boxes. The
the shipment a certain length of time. Since
USPS legal department also adhered to the po-
cargo generally goes to consolidators at these
sition that the airlines could never screen the
airports before being delivered to the airlines,
mail and that even USPS could screen sealed
the carriers lose some physical control over
mail only under very limited circumstances. In
what goes into their holds. At these foreign air-
sum, the MOU never was fully implemented and
ports, items for the airlines' small parcel service
soon was disregarded by both parties.
systems must be physically searched or X-
rayed.
Cargo
Indirect Air Carrier Program
Air Carrier Standards
For domestic air cargo, the FAA has spared
Air cargo also is big business for the airlines.
the airlines from the screening function in most
The legal restraints to searching cargo are not
instances and imposed the responsibility on the
as strict as those for mail. Nevertheless, the
indirect air carriers and freight forwarders who
safety of air cargo on U.S. carriers depends
deliver cargo to the airlines for transport.
more on good faith than on security proce-
An emergency rule for indirect air carriers
dures.
was promulgated in 1979 after a bombing inci-
Domestic air cargo is placed on the carrier's
dent. An indirect air carrier is an entity which
next flight to its destination upon presentation
is in business, at least in part to accept and
of the appropriate identification or shipping
ship items on the commercial airlines. The rule
documents. The shipper does not have to be
focuses, therefore, on the point of acceptance
"known" to the carrier. 35 Upon any suspicion,
of the cargo, rather than on the natural bottle-
the cargo may be refused, held for 24 hours or
neck occurring at the airport.
inspected. The major carriers also have small
Codified as FAR Part 109,38 the rule re-
parcel service systems for acceptance at the air-
quires indirect air carriers to develop and file
port of certain smaller items for direct air
for FAA approval a security program based on
transport. All carriers with such programs are
the FAA-developed standard security program
required to keep a record identifying the ship-
designed solely for Part 109 carriers.
pers; parcels from unknown shippers may un-
This standard security program exempts
dergo further security controls. 36
from screening cargo from known shippers.
As a practical matter, there are no real re-
FAA-developed selection criteria then are ap-
strictions on who may ship domestic air cargo.
plied to the remaining cargo to determine what
In fact, an employee of one carrier told the
should be screened. The screening procedures,
Commission staff the airline will rent to
however, can vary from a physical inspection to
anyone, known or unknown, the cargo contain-
an X-ray inspection or a mere identification
ers that are loaded aboard its planes. Indirect
check.
39
carriers, or even individuals, can take the con-
Ever since 1979, the FAA has had problems
tainers; load, seal, and return them to the carri-
with the Part 109 air cargo security program.
er for transport. The carriers later told the
At this time, the FAA admittedly does not even
Commission that this practice should be limited
know the identity of most of the indirect carri-
to known shippers.
ers. Part 109 carriers formerly were certificated
At "high threat" airports overseas, air cargo
by the Civil Aeronautics Board. When the CAB
for U.S. carriers is subject to security controls
went out of existence, this oversight capacity
51
was lost. 40 In fact, the FAA believes there are
ing less than a specified limit, USPS could con-
from 4,000 to 6,000 indirect air carriers in op-
tinue to protect the sender's privacy while re-
eration and supposedly subject to the Part 109
moving from the "sealed" category those larger
security requirements. 41 The last CAB listing
parcels with more capacity to contain devices
included 1,600 indirect air carriers. 42 FAA ef-
sufficient to pose a threat to an aircraft. USPS
forts to date have identified only 408 indirect
or the airlines then could screen these parcels
carriers. 43 The FAA further admits that only
legally for explosive or incendiary devices.
random, spot-check inspection is feasible of
even this limited number of indirect air carri-
The Commission recognizes the special
ers.⁴⁴
status afforded mail and the right of privacy of
A package can be forwarded through several
those mailing the parcels. Thus, technology for
indirect air carriers before it reaches the airline.
screening any parcels should be as unobtrusive
The last indirect carrier might be in perfect
as possible and aimed specifically at detecting
compliance with Part 109, inasmuch as it re-
explosives.
ceived the package from a known shipper. Yet,
USPS representatives acknowledged to this
as the FAA's Director of Security, Raymond Sa-
Commission that the screening of all mail out-
lazar, testified to the Commission: "there is no
side the "sealed" category would be consistent,
way for the carrier to know" who the original
as a matter of policy with the X-raying of carry-
shipper was or whether additional screening
on baggage at airports. 48 The USPS has pro-
should have been, or was, imposed. 45
posed a regulatory change to enable the Chief
Additionally, unknown individuals conceiv-
Postal Inspector to call for X-raying in the
ably could obtain pre-printed forms of known
event of a major threat. 49 Such a proposal is a
shippers or use fake identification. Indeed, the
USPS testified before the Commission that any
step in the right direction, but the Commission
"point of acceptance" screening program is "so
believes a more far-reaching revision of USPS
easily subject to circumvention as to be of little
regulations is necessary to lay the groundwork
real benefit.
for any systematic air mail screening proce-
Finally, any shipper who wants to avoid the
dures.
profile system prescribed for indirect carriers
The air carriers, rather than the USPS or the
need only go direct to the airline at the airport.
MPS, should be initially responsible for the
Since the carriers are not subject to Part 109, it
screening of mail. The airlines will already have
is likely that the shipment will be accepted and
the operational technology and can screen the
loaded on showing of personal or company
mail along with baggage. USPS or MPS would
identification, without any screening. Even at a
have to purchase new screening equipment,
high threat international airport, the cargo
retrofit facilities and train personnel in explo-
might only be held for a certain period before
sives detection. The airlines also are truly in a
being shipped.
better position to screen all military mail from
Conclusions
abroad and foreign mail entering the United
States.
Since it is impractical and too costly to re-
Mail
quire that all non-sealed mail be screened at
Without first removing the legal hurdles to
the outset of this new program, the initial
technological screening, no security control
screening should be limited to carrier oper-
system can be established for air mail. The
ations at airports with extraordinary security
Commission believes the USPS itself can ac-
measures in place. Thus, the entire security
complish this change without legislation. USPS
procedure at these airports would be consistent
could define more narrowly the category of
for all categories of entry to the aircraft, includ-
mail "sealed against inspection." Currently, the
ing passengers and checked baggage. Screening
category includes different types of mail, some
of non-sealed mail then should be extended to
of which can weigh up to 70 pounds. 47
U.S. international flights; next to other flights
By limiting this category of mail to letters, or
parcels containing written materials and weigh-
which screen checked baggage.
52
Cargo
The Federal Aviation
The Commission believes the FAA's Part 109
Administration
program should be replaced. The FAA cannot
regulate indirect carriers when it cannot even
As we have previously discussed, significant
identify them. This system can be easily cir-
aviation security problems exist both at domes-
cumvented by false identification or the use of
tic and foreign airports. These problems are
multiple shippers. Accordingly, the FAA must
long-standing and difficult to address. Howev-
concentrate cargo security efforts on airline
er, the consequences of not adequately ad-
cargo operations at the airports.
dressing them are tragic.
Ideally, the screening procedures for cargo
The Federal Aviation Administration is the
should correspond closely with those for
checked baggage, both domestically and inter-
responsible governmental agency for providing
nationally. To the extent that screening meas-
solutions to these problems. The agency has
not risen to the challenge. In this section of
ures are undertaken, responsibility should
our report, the Commission details the factors
remain with the airlines. Currently deployed se-
curity equipment and operational technology
contributing to this failure and offers a blue-
cannot screen large cargo items for explosives.
print of specific actions to correct these prob-
The Commission urges the FAA to foster a re-
lems. These proposed actions are designed to
search program to provide technological solu-
create an active-not reactive-FAA approach
tions necessary to screen bulk cargo, as well as
to security.
checked baggage.
A Pattern of Reaction
Until technological screening of cargo at the
airports is a practical solution, interim meas-
Since the Pan Am 103 bombing, FAA's per-
ures must recognize that cargo poses as great a
formance in carrying out its security responsi-
threat to an aircraft as checked baggage. Op-
bilities has been examined by several sources.
tions could include an FAA requirement that
Congressional hearings, audits, reviews and in-
air carriers train and assign security personnel
vestigations have focused on the agency. All of
to observe and spot inspect all cargo for explo-
these reviews have concluded that the agency is
sives, and to secure cargo areas.
far too reactive to problems instead of antici-
pating them. This view was probably best ex-
Recommendations
pressed by Chairman Dante Fascell, in testimo-
ny before the Commission on March 9, 1990,
1. The USPS should effect a regulatory
when he stated, "The U.S. Government is play-
change redefining the category of mail "sealed
ing catch-up ball with respect to aviation secu-
against inspection" to include written materials
rity rather than taking innovative steps to get
and those parcels below a specific weight.
ahead of the curve."50 Indeed, the head of the
2. The air carriers must be initially responsi-
FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security, in a
ble for any screening of air mail.
speech before ATA in January 1990, acknowl-
3. Any screening of mail should be instituted
edged that FAA is a "reactive agency." He said
first at "extraordinary security measures" air-
the agency's approach to security is largely dic-
ports and then phased in at other airports as
tated by incidents and reaction to those inci-
the threat warrants.
dents.
4. The FAA Part 109 program should be re-
In the Commission's view, the FAA's reliance
placed. Instead, responsibility for the screening
upon a reactive approach to aviation security
of cargo should rest with the air carriers and
issues results from several factors: a lack of visi-
procedures should correspond closely with
bility of the security function within the agency;
those measures pertaining to checked baggage.
a lack of an effective information base; insuffi-
5. The FAA should foster research and de-
cient staff resources for the security-related re-
velopment of a technology designed to screen
sponsibilities; and a division of security respon-
cargo for explosives; until this system is devel-
sibilities that leaves no one entity accountable.
oped, interim screening measures must be in-
Currently, FAA is reviewing its basic security
stituted.
requirements. Most of these requirements are
53
U.S. Department of Transportation
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Administrator
Deputy Administrator
Associate
Office of
Office of
Office of
Office of
Administrator for
the Chief
Counsel
Civil Rights
Government &
Public Affairs
Aviation Safety
Industry Affairs
Office of
Office of
Aviation Safety
Aviation Safety
Analysis
Oversight
Executive Director for
Executive Director for
Executive Director for
Executive Director for
Policy, Plans, and
Regulatory Standards
System Development
System Operations
Resource Management
and Compliance
Associate
Associate
Associate
Associate
Associate
Office of
Associate
Associate
Associate
Associate
Associate
Office of
Administrator
Administrator
Administrator for
Administrator
Administrator for
Program and
Administrator
Administrator
Administrator for
Administrator
Administrator
Operations
for
for Human
Policy, Planning,
for Aviation
Regulation and
Resource
for Airports
for NAS
Advanced Design
for Airway
for
Planning and
Administration
Resource
and International
Standards
Certification
Management
Development
and Management
Facilities
Air Traffic
Policy
Management
Aviation
Control
Office of
Office of
Office of
Office of
Aircraft
Office of
Automation
Advanced
Program
Air Traffic
Office of
Accounting
Human
Aviation
Accident
Certification
Airport
Service
System
Engineering
Operations
Operations
Resource
Policy and
Investigation
Service
Planning and
Design
Service
Service
Resource
Development
Plans
Programming
Service
Management
Office of
Office of
Office of
Office of
Flight
Office of
Advanced
Management
Systems
Air Traffic
Budget
Labor and
Environment
Aviation
Standards
Airport
System
Control
Maintenance
Plans and
Employee
and
Medicine
Service
Safety and
Acquisition
Service
Service
Requirements
Relations
Energy
Standards
Service
Service
Logistics
Office of
Office of
Office of
Office of
Airport System
NAS
Operations
Office of
Service
Personnel
International
Civil
Rulemaking
Capacity
Transition
Research
Air Traffic
Aviation
Aviation
Planning
Service
Office
Program
Security
Office
Management
Office of
Office of
Europe,
Aviation
System
Office of
Management
Training and
Africa, and
Standards
Engineering
FAA
Air Traffic
Systems
National
and Program
Technical
Higher
Middle East
System
Education
Office
Field Office
Management
Center
Effectiveness
Office
Alaskan
Central
Eastern
Great Lakes
New England
Northwest
Southern
Southwest
Western-Pacific
Mike Monroney
Region
Region
Region
Region
Region
Mountain Region
Region
Region
Region
Aeronautical Center
2/22/90
FAA-CHART-M-100
about ten years old and grew out of specific in-
agency also is proposing the assignment of ad-
cidents or events.
ditional security inspectors to Europe.
As noted earlier, in December 1987, a U.S.
carrier flight was boarded by a fired employee
FAA's Inattention to Human
who shot and killed the flight crew, causing the
Factors and Training
aircraft to crash and kill 43 passengers. The
fired employee was able to bypass the screen-
Effective implementation of security pro-
ing point and board the aircraft with a weapon
grams is necessarily dependent on adequate
by using his employee identification card. Con-
FAA guidance in selection of screeners and in
sequently, FAA amended its screening require-
their training, as well as on the importance
ment to require that all persons, including car-
which individual airlines place on security. FAA
rier and airport employees, go through the
identifies in its security program the core re-
screening points. In January 1989, FAA re-
quirements and guidance for the initial, recur-
quired that airports comply with new access
rent, and on-the-job training of airline screen-
control requirements as previously described.
ing personnel at domestic airports. The quality
These actions also grew out of this incident.
of this training varies widely among the air-
The most recent security requirements re-
lines. It also varies within an airline. Most
sulted from the Pan Am 103 bombing. Subse-
American carriers provide far more training for
quent to the bombing, FAA issued additional
security agents assigned to international depar-
security requirements for U.S. carriers at select-
tures compared with those responsible for do-
ed high risk foreign airports, including 100 per
mestic flights.
cent screening of checked baggage, and a new
Each airline has adopted different approach-
question for screened passengers about any
es to carrying out procedures such as addition-
electronic devices they might be carrying. At
al questioning of passengers, profile applica-
the same time, the FAA required- carriers to
tions, and detection of explosives, Moreover,
meet an explosive detection capability. The
the FAA does not evaluate airline security
54
training at high-risk foreign airports. We found
tions posed to him in English concerning the
that one airline provides videotapes to instruct
extent of any training he may have received.
non-English speaking screeners at Frankfurt
The Air Transport Association has recog-
airport, but these tapes are in English and are
nized the need for improvement in the screen-
apparently translated for the German-speaking
ing process. It encourages air carriers to con-
screeners by a supervisor.
duct tests for the screeners on a regular basis.
The importance of having a consistent set of
These tests use the identical testing objects
training standards for required additional secu-
used by the FAA inspectors. In 1989 there
rity measures at high-risk foreign airports was
were 56,000 tests performed by the air carriers
demonstrated by the FAA's Pan Am 103 inves-
with a reported 96 per cent detection rate. In
tigation. The investigation suggested that the
order to further improve on this performance,
security deficiencies found could be connected
ATA has developed a profile on the attributes
to breakdowns in airline training. For example,
of a superior screener. This test instrument has
the investigation found that Pan Am security
32 questions that can be administered and
personnel failed to screen 38 passengers at
graded on-site.
Heathrow airport to determine whether they
ATA also developed a training course both
should have received additional screening.
for trainers of screeners and for the screeners
During testimony in September 1989, the
themselves. Each training program consists of a
GAO stated:
lesson plan, the curricula and competency tests.
ATA hopes that this effort will heighten and
Despite additional security measures
standardize training for all screeners. It is also
imposed following the loss of Pan Am
promoting motivational concepts for carriers to
Flight 103, FAA cannot be assured
recognize the "screener of the month" and to
that currently required procedures are
pay a bounty for each item of contraband de-
being properly carried out by airlines
tected.
at designated high-risk foreign air-
Although FAA has reviewed the ATA train-
ports. FAA's investigation of Pan Am
ing model and is considering making it part of
Flight 103 and subsequent FAA airline
the standard security program under Part 108,
security inspections found deficiencies
the FAA has provided to the airlines and air-
in the way airline security personnel
ports very little guidance and few standards for
were carrying out extra security meas-
their use.
ures. We believe these deficiencies oc-
FAA has paid little attention to how to re-
curred largely because FAA has not es-
cruit, train and motivate a security work force,
tablished in its security program mini-
and to integrate that work force with modern
mum training requirements and stand-
technology to achieve a systems approach to
ards for extra security measures re-
security. At hearings before the Commission on
quired at high-risk overseas airports. 51
February 2, 1990, it was again pointed out to
FAA officials that study of the human factors in
All eight major air carriers responding to a
security was noticeably absent from the agen-
Commission survey indicated that their security
cy's research and development effort. The FAA
personnel are trained in the detection of explo-
Associate Administrator for Aviation Standards
sive devices and materials. 52 But the carriers
agreed, saying, "That is something we ought to
provided little information on the nature and
be looking at."
scope of the specialized training. Moreover,
The Commission strongly urges that this
while procedures have been issued there are no
long overdue "look" be followed by positive
associated training standards for this process.
action. The Commission believes that effective
Indeed, the Commission's own investigations
security screening requires well-trained people
at Baltimore-Washington International Airport
operating the best available equipment. The
disclosed a screener's failure to identify an ob-
Commission is also concerned that FAA has
vious explosive device in a briefcase put
failed to implement the 1989 DOT Safety
through the standard X-ray machine. The
Review Task Force recommendation on the
screener was incapable of understanding ques-
human factors in aviation security.
55
A Lack of Clarity and Visibility
resentative testified before the Commission on
April 4:
FAA's security regulations primarily set per-
formance standards but do not prescribe how
Airlines do not have the authority or
these standards should be met. The regulations
require the air carriers and airports to submit
the clout to negotiate with foreign
proposed security plans, but say little about
governments about the implementa-
what should be in the plans. Rather, the FAA
tion of security directives. When the
has developed a model plan, the Air Carrier
FAA tells us to do one thing at a for-
Standard Security Plan, for air carriers and is
eign airport and the foreign govern-
considering developing a comparable plan for
ment tells us to do another, we are in
airports.
an impossible situation. These differ-
While both the safety and security functions
ences need to be resolved with both
of FAA use inspections as their primary en-
governments at the table before we
forcement tool, FAA's safety side collects data
are ordered to proceed. 53
from the individual inspection reports in its En-
forcement Information System, and carries out
FAA procedures require that certain U.S. air-
trend analysis to pinpoint pervasive safety
ports be inspected monthly. Inspectors find
problems. The FAA security function does not
that as soon as they complete a required in-
perform this type of data collection and prob-
spection, including the paperwork, they must
lem analysis.
start over again. The inspection itself follows a
The FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security is
checklist of items with little interpretation. The
one of five offices reporting to the Associate
inspectors complain that their role now is one
Administrator for Aviation Standards, who re-
of handing out violations, rather than actively
ports to the Executive Director for Regulatory
seeking solutions.
Standards, who reports to the FAA Administra-
At the Commission's March 9, 1990, hearing,
tor, who reports to the Secretary of Transpor-
Chairman Dante Fascell described FAA's ap-
tation. In contrast, the FAA Associate Adminis-
proach to inspecting foreign airports as a
trator for Safety reports directly to the Admin-
"daily checklist mentality." He said that while
istrator.
FAA has conducted over 800 security assess-
While the Office of Civil Aviation Security
ments of some 200 foreign airports over the
has grown from about 200 persons in 1984 to
last four years, FAA inspectors continued to
over 550 currently and is projected to rise to
"demonstrate a lack of understanding and ap-
700 in 1991, the total resources committed to
preciation for the changing threat environment
aviation security represent about one per cent
of individual foreign international airports and
of FAA's operational budget. FAA lacks enough
regions." He concluded that FAA must train its
security inspectors overseas to perform the re-
inspectors to perform better assessments of
quired inspections of foreign airports and U.S.
foreign airport vulnerabilities to terrorism.
carriers' operations at those airports. Conse-
FAA collects large quantities of data through
quently, the agency must augment its existing
overseas staff with inspectors from the various
its security inspections of most domestic air-
security offices in the United States. This ineffi-
ports and over 40 foreign ones. U.S. carriers
cient use of inspectors, many of whom are un-
with domestic and international operations are
familiar with the foreign airport operations, re-
similarly inspected and assessed for security
sults in inconsistent inspections and reporting.
compliance. All of this data is provided to the
U.S. carriers operating overseas complain of
FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security. However,
inconsistent interpretation of FAA security re-
that office lacks a centralized data base for the
quirements caused by constant change in in-
inspection information. The agency cannot,
spectors and of being left to deal with host
therefore, reliably identify trends and correct
country officials by themselves. The carriers be-
system-wide weaknesses before they result in
lieve the FAA should have a continuing pres-
tragedies.
ence in major host countries to help resolve se-
The Office of Civil Aviation Security also
curity-related problems. As one air carrier rep-
lacks the staffing to properly evaluate the data
56
from inspections and perform system-wide
erators. The Task Force concluded that mecha-
analyses.
nisms "need to be developed to improve the
The question of the relative priority of secu-
process by which these parties are involved in
rity within FAA, given the agency's other re-
security matters."
sponsibilities, is difficult to assess. Agency offi-
At a March 13, 1990, meeting of the Policy
cials have maintained that security has always
and Procedures Subcommittee of the FAA's
been a top priority. Yet it was not until 1990
Aviation Security Advisory Committee, the
that FAA formally identified security as one of
Subcommittee stressed the need to study who
the agency's top priorities-along with 22 other
is responsible for security. This Subcommittee
issues.
consists of representatives of air carriers, air-
port operators, trade organizations, and other
A Lack of Accountability
aviation-related groups. Recently formed, the
Security is a shared responsibility, both at
purpose of the group is to provide input to
U.S. and foreign airports. FAA sets the security
FAA management on the operational issues re-
requirements, inspects both air carriers and air-
lating to aviation security. The Commission be-
port operators for compliance with the require-
lieves strongly that this group can and should
ments, and proposes civil penalties for non-
play an important advisory role in shaping se-
compliance. Implementation of this split re-
curity policy and procedures that are effective
sponsibility results in a lack of clear account-
in an airport environment. It is important to
ability for security. For instance, when a pas-
note that FAA's Office of Civil Aviation Securi-
senger arrives at an airport, the first security
ty, also represented on the Subcommittee, re-
encountered (i.e. fencing, terminal area, etc.) is
sponded that a current review of security re-
the responsibility of the airport operator.
quirements will include the question of roles in
Inside the terminal, the passenger encounters
security responsibility.
the next ring of security, namely the passenger
screening and X-raying of passengers and their
Conclusions
carry-on items-the responsibility of the air
carriers, a function frequently carried out by
Domestic Airports are Vulnerable
contractor personnel. Once the passenger has
passed through the screening checkpoint, re-
Despite the current security requirements at
sponsibility for security reverts back to the air-
the nation's airports, potential vulnerabilities
port operator. When the passenger enters the
exist. As a former head of law enforcement for
aircraft, the air carrier assumes responsibility
one of the country's largest airports said: "FAA
for security again.
should move in the direction of closing the
Moreover, each airport must provide law en-
gaps now, not wait until we have a significant
forcement personnel to respond to security
domestic problem."
threats. That role can be filled by local or state
The Commission is concerned over the mini-
police or by airport police with the power to
mal security controls for the shipping of cargo
arrest. Overseas, the local government provides
by aircraft and the absence of controls for mail;
the airport security while U.S. carriers must, at
the lack of controls over checked baggage; lim-
certain high risk airports, augment or supple-
ited employment checks for airport employees;
ment the host country security to meet FAA re-
limited control over those gaining access to an
quirements.
aircraft, such as caterers and cleaning crews;
This division of responsibility is an issue of
and the limited effectiveness of screening pas-
continuing concern in seeking a consistent level
sengers and their carry-on articles. These po-
of security performance and accountability. The
tential vulnerabilities are described in other
results of this split responsibility were evident
sections of the Commission's Report. Both the
to the Commission staff in visiting various air-
General Accounting Office and the DOT Safety
ports.
Review Task Force expressed concern over
In its analysis of domestic airport security, a
many of these vulnerabilities in a series of re-
DOT Task Force reported that effective securi-
ports dating from 1986. GAO reported that it
ty requires coordination and consultation be-
found at six major U.S. airports "weaknesses
tween FAA, the air carriers, and the airport op-
[that] could have resulted in the access of un-
57
authorized persons to the airport operations
3. Improved testing of security sys-
areas". 54
tems with modern test weapons and a
A combination of improved technology, like
more realistic effort to disguise them.
the latest X-ray equipment and improved skills
The testing standard for magneto-
of the screener personnel, is needed to meet
meters should be strengthened.
the FAA performance requirement of 100 per
4. Use of the most modern X-ray
cent detection of weapons. More importantly,
equipment for the screening of pas-
the combination will provide a higher degree of
sengers and their carry-on luggage.
confidence that those who would attempt to
commit violence against civil aviation will fail.
FAA must also lead in stressing the role of
Current FAA testing does not give an accu-
human factors in the security equation. This in-
rate picture of the effectiveness of the security
cludes working with the aviation community to
systems. Use of test weapons with little or no
implement the newly adopted hiring and train-
attempt to disguise or hide them is of little
ing standards, and assessing their impact on
practical value when considering the types of
the performance of the security work force.
sophisticated weapons available today and the
The Commission recommends that the integra-
ease with which they can be hidden. Yet, secu-
tion of people and technology into a systems
rity workers are trained only in the detection of
approach to security be part of FAA's pilot
these relatively unsophisticated test weapons.
project.
Consequently, the tests results do not truly re-
Another area which the Commission believes
flect the health of the aviation security system.
warrants studying now for future use is the pre-
Working with the FBI, the FAA must per-
screening of passengers. The pilot project
form individual airport threat and vulnerability
offers an excellent test bed for evaluating the
assessments. This information is critical to de-
feasibility of this concept.
signing security programs to address the cur-
Congress should provide DOT with the legal
rent threat and providing the basis for im-
authority to require criminal background
proved security if the threat changes.
checks for prospective workers at airports.
FAA must seek remedies to the vulnerabili-
FAA Fails to Plan
ties described in this report. Working with the
air carriers and airport operators, FAA needs
The Commission was charged with assessing
to develop a systems approach to security that
the adequacy of current aviation security poli-
integrates well-trained people with effective
cies and procedures to provide for a safe avia-
technology. The Commission recognizes that
tion system. FAA is the agency responsible for
FAA has launched a pilot project to examine
developing those policies and ensuring compli-
ance with them.
the application of new security technologies.
The Commission recommends that this project
The Commission finds that the agency's
include the following areas, to achieve an inte-
senior security managers have not provided the
grated systems approach to security:
leadership or oversight to effectively carry-out
that mission. Furthermore, FAA's organization-
1. Controls over checked baggage.
al structure for security failed to facilitate the
Some air carriers have adapted tech-
timely exchange of information and guidance
nology to code baggage for electronic
from headquarters to the field and from the
direction and routing to the correct
field to headquarters. The Commission also be-
lieves that FAA is not making effective use of
destination. FAA needs to develop and
its field resources, a valuable asset in address-
expand this technology toward achiev-
ing the ever changing day-to-day security prob-
ing a workable, electronically con-
lems.
trolled and economically feasible pas-
The agency must be ahead of potential prob-
senger/baggage reconciliation system.
lems rather than reacting to them. The FAA
2. Controls over those persons with
has not done so. Aviation security must be rec-
access to aircraft, including caterers
ognized as a top priority. The necessary human
and cleaning crews.
and financial resources must be committed to
58
supporting aviation security as a top priority.
ble for developing an aviation security program
The analysis of security-related data must go
based on a systems approach to security.
hand in hand with the decision-making process.
This office will also have the responsibility
Finally, responsibility for security must be
for the intelligence function. As with security,
clearly identified and clear lines of accountabil-
the Secretary would decide whether to establish
ity established.
this function for all modes. The office must es-
tablish strong working relations with the intelli-
A Blueprint for Improvement
gence community at the highest level. Moving
The Commission recommends a series of sig-
this function to DOT will help to assure that
nificant actions designed to bring about an
security field managers receive all pertinent
active approach to aviation security. These rec-
threat information. The office must ensure the
ommendations address the need to raise securi-
timely and complete communication of intelli-
ty to a senior level of attention by elevating it
gence data to the field managers, as well as to
within the FAA, and by establishing an office
the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security, as re-
within the Department of Transportation to ad-
quired. The Commission is also recommending
dress security and intelligence on a national
in Chapter 5 the designation by the Director of
level.
Central Intelligence of one or more intelligence
First, to ensure that security receives top
officers to serve in this office.
management attention, the FAA Administrator
This new office would evaluate trends in se-
should establish an office reporting directly to
curity and report to both the Secretary and to
him which will have as its primary functions:
the Congress on the health of the aviation se-
curity system. It would receive the results of all
day-to-day operational guidance to field se-
curity resources;
FAA security inspections and would have the
authority and discretion to perform its own in-
pursuit of all security-related enforcement
spections.
actions;
To ensure the proper commitment of re-
research and development of security-relat-
sources the Commission recommends that the
ed projects; and
new office within DOT be fully staffed, and the
inspections of security systems.
overseas security offices and liaison positions
be filled to authorized capacity. These positions
This office will not have an intelligence func-
will report directly to the FAA office of securi-
tion.
ty. Therefore, the Commission recommends
The Commission also recommends that the
that the FAA Administrator abolish the security
Secretary of Transportation appoint a Secretar-
function in the Brussels office and reassign
ial Assistant Secretary for Aviation Security and
these resources to positions at high risk air-
Intelligence as an interim step pending Con-
ports overseas. It is recognized that administra-
gressional establishment of an Assistant Secre-
tive support for the airport security offices will
tary of Transportation for Security and Intelli-
be needed, and this need can best be met by
gence. This position should be an appointment
the continued support of the Brussels office.
with tenure, to ensure continuity and a meas-
To ensure accountability, a clear line of re-
ure of independence, and should be filled with
sponsibility for security must be established.
a person uniquely qualified by extensive experi-
Since the federal government is ultimately re-
ence and background in the intelligence field.
sponsible for the safety and security of the trav-
Because the threat of international terrorism
eling public, it must provide the leadership and
has national importance, the Secretary should
take the responsibility for security at the air-
authorize this official to develop (1) an aviation
ports. The Commission has wrestled with how
transportation security policy; and (2) a long-
to structure this federal role.
term strategy for dealing with a potential in-
The Commission was advised repeatedly that
crease in the threat. The Secretary would have
the federal government must play a more active
the option to use this resource to develop simi-
role in aviation security because the terrorist
lar strategies in transportation security on an
act is directed against the government, not the
inter-modal basis. This office will be responsi-
air carriers. At the Commission's April 4, 1990
59
hearing, representatives of several U.S. air carri-
intelligence. In this manner, security proce-
ers spoke with strong conviction on the need
dures and intelligence can be monitored and
for federal leadership in aviation security. As
coordinated on a daily basis.
the chairman of one major air carrier stated in
The Flight 103 story best illustrates the need
his recommendations to the Commission:
for this presence. Such a federal security man-
"Governments of all nations must accept and
ager could have played a key role in Frankfurt
implement their direct responsibility for securi-
and London, not only to ensure the proper
ty, as distinguished from a passive, regulatory
measures were being implemented before the
role." 55 The Commission agrees with this
flight, but also to take immediate corrective
premise.
action-long before the nine months it took for
With this greater responsibility and account-
FAA and Pan Am to correct security problems
ability for aviation security must also go the
identified by FAA.
necessary authority to carry it out. There is
The security systems would be tested and
currently a strong core of hard-working, experi-
evaluated with the goal of making improve-
enced FAA personnel in the field. Therefore,
ments. These tests also would be monitored
the Commission recommends that existing FAA
and assessed by an outside source, such as the
resources in place at the Nation's major domes-
Inspector General, to ensure their objectivity
tic airports, as well as overseas become the ac-
and effectiveness.
countable entity for security-the federal secu-
The Commission recognizes limitations to
rity manager.
the federal security manager's authority at for-
Specifically, the federal security manager
eign airports. It is expected, however, that the
should have the ultimate responsibility for se-
federal security manager will have responsibil-
curity. These officials would work with the air
ity for the U.S. carrier security operations and
carriers and airport operators in designing one
will work closely with the host country to
security plan for each airport, based upon the
known and potential threat. This plan will iden-
ensure that adequate security support is provid-
tify the role and responsibilities of the air carri-
ed to the U.S. carriers. The federal manager
ers, the airport operator, and the local law en-
would also assist the State Department in any
forcement participation in terms of what each
negotiations with the host country on aviation
will do, how they will do it, and what resources
security-related matters.
will be committed to security, including the
The Commission recommends that this ap-
qualifications of the security personnel. The
proach begin with the FAA resources already in
federal manager must approve this plan.
place at the major airports. It is recognized that
Furthermore, the federal security manager
it is not feasible to station a federal security
will oversee air carrier and airport operators in
manager at all of the over 440 airports in the
the implementation of this plan. This will in-
country. For the smaller airports, it is expected
clude requiring the re-direction of air carrier or
that the federal resources will review and ap-
airport security resources should the federal
prove an individual security plan for each of
manager decide that additional security re-
the smaller airports and inspect against that
sources are needed or that the resources are
plan.
not being effectively used. The federal manager
In summary, the federal security manager
will retain the authority to initiate civil penal-
will work with the air carriers and airport oper-
ties for noncompliance with the security plan
ators to design and approve security systems,
and be given the regulatory authority to change
and oversee the carriers' and airport operators'
the plan to address any weaknesses or problem
implementation of the security systems to
areas. As in the overseas operation, this manag-
ensure compliance.
er will report directly to the FAA headquarters,
eliminating the need for regional security man-
Recommendations
agement. Again, it is recognized that these field
offices will need administrative support which
1. The FAA must begin to develop stronger
can be met by the various FAA regional offices.
security measures for controls over checked
Additionally, the federal security manager
baggage, controls over persons with access to
will serve as the conduit for all aviation-related
aircraft, testing of security systems, the use of
60
modern X-ray equipment, and the pre-screen-
cember 31, 1988" Administrator, Federal Aviation Administra-
ing of passengers.
tion (hereinafter referred to as the "Semiannual Report"), p. 19.
9 Report of the Secretary's Safety Review Task Force on Do-
2. The FAA must take the lead in stressing
mestic Aviation Security 1986-1987, U.S. Department of Trans-
the role of human factors in the security equa-
portation.
tion; training must be improved.
10 Office of Safety Program Review Report on the Federal
Aviation Administration's Implementation of the Safety Review
3. The FAA Administrator should establish
Task Force Recommendations on Domestic Aviation Security
an office of security reporting directly to him.
(January 1989).
4. The Secretary of Transportation should
11 Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administra-
appoint, on an interim basis, a Secretarial As-
tion, 14 CFR Part 107, Access to Secure Areas of Airports; Final
Rule.
sistant Secretary for Aviation Security and In-
12 Air Carrier Standard Security Program (ACSSP), p. 10.
telligence. The Secretary should obtain legisla-
13 Semiannual Report, p. 6.
tive authorization to appoint an Assistant Sec-
14 FAA Briefing Material, section I.D., Commission Hearing,
December 18, 1989.
retary of Transportation for Security and Intel-
15 Air Carrier Survey responses to Commission Questionnaire
ligence and authorize this official to develop an
(hereinafter referred to as the "Air Carrier Survey Responses").
aviation transportation security policy and long
16 Commission staff meeting with air carrier security officials
term strategy for dealing with a potential in-
and Air Transport Association of America representatives,
(March 22, 1990).
crease in the threat.
17 Air Carrier Survey Responses.
5. The Secretary of Transportation and the
18 Id.
Administrator of FAA should ensure that the
19 Commission staff meeting with air carrier security officials
and Air Transport Association of America representatives,
necessary resources are provided to fully staff
(March 22, 1990).
the respective security offices, both at the head-
20 ACSSP, pp. 20, 70, and 80.
quarters and field levels.
21 Id., pp. 136-139a.
6. The FAA resources currently in place at
22 Air Carrier Survey Responses.
23 General Accounting Office report entitled FAA Preboard
the major domestic airports, as well as over-
Passenger Screening Test Results (GAO/RCED-87-125FS) dated
seas, should become the accountable entities for
April 1987.
security-the federal security managers.
24 ACSSP, p. 41.
25 Id., p. 101.
26 Telex from 7025 AIRPS KAPAUN to Executive Director
Endnotes
Military PSTL SVC (January 1989).
1 ICAO's international aviation security standards and recom-
27 Interview with John Gilmour.
mended practices are found in the "International Standards and
28 Letter from Kenneth McFadden to Brian Hyland (January 5,
1990).
Recommended Practices, Security, Safeguarding International
Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference, Annex 17,
29 Testimony of Monte Belger, Commission Hearing, Decem-
to the Convention on International Civil Aviation," (4th edition).
ber 18, 1989, p. 189.
2 Prepared statement of Kenneth M. Mead, Commission Hear-
30 39 U.S.C. 3263.
ing, December 18, 1989, pp. 9-10 (hereinafter referred to as the
31 USPS Regulations, Part 115.4 and 115.5.
"Mead Statement").
32 18 U.S.C. 1702.
3 Testimony of Timothy R. Thornton, Commission Hearing,
33 Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States
April 4, 1990, p. 203 (hereinafter referred to as the "Thornton
Postal Service and the Federal Aviation Administration, dated
Testimony").
December 11, 1979.
4 Testimony of Charles A. Adams, Commission Hearing, April
34 Prepared Statement of Raymond A. Salazar (March 23,
4, 1990, p. 197.
1990, Examination Under Oath); Prepared Statement of U.S.
5 The Commission asked the Department of Transportation's
Postal Service (March 23, 1990, Examination Under Oath), p. 5.
Office of Information Resources for statistics to determine
35 ACSSP, p. 90.
whether safety or convenience considerations had affected travel
36 Id.
on U.S. airlines. The statistics show that, of the 2.6 million U.S.
37 Id., p. 150.
citizens who traveled by air to the U.S. from Europe in the first
38 14 C.F.R. 109.
half of 1988, 1.4 million flew on a U.S. carrier. Of the 2.8 million
39 Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security Program, Sec. II.
U.S. citizens who traveled by air to the U.S. from Europe in the
40 Sworn Testimony of Raymond Salazar (March 23, 1990, Ex-
first half of 1989, in the immediate aftermath of Pan Am 103, 1.5
amination Under Oath) pp. 85-86.
million flew on U.S. carriers. In both periods, the percentage of
41 Id., p. 84.
Americans flying on U.S. carriers-53 percent-remained the
42 Id.
same. These figures, however, do not distinguish among business
43 Id., p. 88.
and other fare classes.
44 Id., pp. 90-94.
6 Thornton Testimony, p. 203.
45 Id., p. 112.
7 Prepared Statement of Rep. Dante Fascell, Commission Hear-
46 Written Testimony of U.S. Postal Service (March 23, 1990
ing, March 9, 1990, p. 5 (hereinafter referred to as the "Fascell
Examination Under Oath) p. 6.
Statement").
47 Id., Attachment A, p. 4.
8 Report, "Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effective-
48 Sworn testimony of George C. Davis (March 23, 1990 Exam-
ness of the Civil Aviation Security Program-July 1, 1988-De-
ination Under Oath) p. 42.
61
49 Written Testimony of U.S. Postal Service (March 23, 1990
53 Prepared Statement of Timothy R. Thornton, Commission
Examination Under Oath), Attachment A.
Hearing, April 4, 1990, p. 4.
50 Fascell Statement, p. 4.
54 General Accounting Office report entitled Corrective Ac-
51 Testimony of Victor Rezendes, before the House Govern-
tions Underway, but Better Inspection Guidance Needed (GAO/
ment Operations Subcommittee on Government Activities and
RCED-88-169), (August 1988).
Transportation (September 27, 1989).
55 Prepared Statement of Thomas G. Plaskett, Commission
52 Air Carrier Survey Responses.
Hearing, April 4, 1990, p. 6.
62
Chapter 4
Research and
Development
The increasing sophistication of terrorists,
that it takes only a very small amount of semtex
and their ability to exploit technological im-
to destroy a jumbo jet. With at least 1,000 tons
provements, makes effective detection of weap-
of "untagged" semtex in the world, therefore,
ons and explosive devices critical to aviation se-
any international agreement to identify plastic
curity. The challenge for the FAA has been to
explosives in the manufacturing process, even
meet that sophistication and anticipate those
if enforceable, would offer only distant hope to
improvements by the development of effective
air travelers.
detection technologies.
Plastic explosives pose serious problems for
Unfortunately, FAA has not met this chal-
detection. They have no metal content, which
lenge. The agency has not planned for the
future, but rather has reacted to past events.
traditional detection devices can reliably dis-
Long lead times in technological development
cern.² Semtex bombs can be shaped to fit into
items like radios, or formed into thin sheets in
demand that the United States stay ahead of
the threat rather than lag behind it. Only a
luggage, making detection even more difficult.
massive effort now will bring our technology
In short, these weapons defy reliable detection
ahead of the destructive devices of terrorist ad-
by X-ray, or any other equipment now oper-
versaries.
ational at airports.
Different techniques exist for the interdiction
Most of the latest devices for the effective de-
of explosives carried on passengers, in passen-
tection of explosives measure the physical or
ger baggage and in cargo. X-ray technology
chemical properties of a bag's contents to
looks for a particular geometry of a bomb.
detect the presence of organic explosives con-
Other technologies measure the physical or
taining nitrogen, such as semtex. The best
chemical properties of the contents of a bag
known of these devices is the thermal neutron
without opening it, or sniff the vapors or parti-
analysis (TNA) machine, which we discuss below
cles emanating from the bag. Magnetometers
in detail. Other nuclear-based technologies in-
are used to detect metal carried on passengers.
clude time-of-flight, neutron-gamma techniques
The dominant technologies now employed
and resonance absorption analysis.
are magnetometers to screen passengers and
Since TNA equipment uses nuclear radiation,
X-rays to screen baggage.
albeit in very small quantities, it is unsuitable
Since at least the early 1980s, however, ter-
for screening passengers or carry-on luggage.
rorists have used plastic explosives as their pre-
Vapor-detector technology is very sensitive and
ferred bomb material. Large quantities of
discriminating and may offer real promise for
semtex, a particularly powerful plastic explosive
detecting plastic explosives concealed on
compound, are available to terrorists. The
people. To date none has been fully developed
President of Czechoslovakia recently confirmed
or tested to determine whether it can function
that his country under the previous regime had
within acceptable levels of speed and sensitivity
sold 1,000 tons of semtex to Libya,¹ and noted
at airports.
*Endnotes appear at end of chapter.
63
The Commission is also aware of a device
At the time of the initial design competition
that will soon become available commercially to
and the subsequent production contract, the
identify explosives by spotting the lead and
FAA required that any electronic detection
mercury used in detonators. Backscatter X-ray
system (EDS) machine be able to detect certain
equipment, which promises to be far more dis-
amounts of known explosive materials. The
criminating than the standard X-ray equipment
FAA set these amounts without any scientifical-
currently in use, is also nearing production.
ly-based study. Rather, the specification repre-
The potential of electromagnetic technologies
sented the best guess of FAA personnel based
for explosives detection is not yet known.
on their accumulated experience with aviation
It is evident, therefore, that new technologies
bombs. No computer modeling was performed
now being developed offer great promise of ef-
to arrive at this specification. No instrumented
fective plastic bomb detection in luggage and
testing was performed on aircraft hulls to de-
on passengers, but more research must be per-
termine the minimum amount of explosive that
formed. Until such technologies are scientifical-
would destroy given airplane models.
ly tested, they are promises at best.
Accordingly, without first knowing what it
Cargo placed aboard an aircraft can theoreti-
really needed to guard against, the FAA
cally be checked by a TNA device or by vapor-
launched a multi-million dollar development
detection. In practice those technologies, how-
program that has dominated the R&D expendi-
ever, have not been adapted to cargo screen-
tures of the agency ever since. The FAA's spec-
ing. The FAA specifications for TNA equip-
ifications were, at best, of doubtful utility, for
ment, for example, anticipate its use for suit-
terrorists had been using plastic bombs at least
cases no more than 16 inches wide, but not for
since 1982 that are lighter than the weight
the larger boxes, crates or containers used for
specifications for detection of plastic explosives
cargo.
by an EDS machine.
One foreign airline uses atmospheric-pres-
Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed in Decem-
sure chambers to examine all cargo carried on
ber 1988 by what almost all authorities agree
their planes. Within the chamber, the cargo is
was less than half the amount of plastic explo-
pressure "landed" as often as the flight will
sive material the TNA machine is expected to
land, and it is "flown" to the altitude the plane
reliably detect. Nevertheless, the FAA still has
will reach. This process might delay dispatch of
not changed the specifications for explosive-de-
cargo for a day, but it warrants serious atten-
tection devices in any respect. The TNA ma-
tion. Unfortunately, the FAA has not adopted a
chine manufactured by SAIC remains the only
program for serious screening of air cargo at
machine qualified under this outdated stand-
airports. Therefore, neither industry nor the
ard.
FAA has focused on techniques to screen cargo
Despite these drawbacks to TNA and the ab-
effectively for explosives.
sence of any other approved explosive-detec-
Beginning in 1985, FAA greatly expanded its
tion system, FAA issued a rule effective Octo-
research in the threat posed by explosive de-
ber 5, 1989, permitting it to require U.S. air
vices carried or placed aboard aircraft. This
carriers to use explosive-detection systems to
shift occurred roughly 30 years after the first
screen checked baggage for international
bombing of a U.S. commercial aircraft. In
flights. FAA intends to require deployment
1988, the FAA asked the National Academy of
within the next two years of 150 TNA or other
Sciences to evaluate its research programs in
EDS systems at approximately 40 international
explosive-detection systems. The Academy's
airports (15 domestic airports and 25 abroad)
report has not yet been submitted.
served by U.S. carriers.⁴ FAA believes this
FAA's major R&D effort to counter the ex-
action will create an incentive for manufactur-
plosive threat has been focused on develop-
ers to make technological advances and
ment of a thermal neutron analysis machine.
produce smaller, less costly EDS equipment.5
Science Applications International Corporation
FAA did not provide the Commission with any
(SAIC) won an FAA design competition for
factual basis for that belief.
TNA in 1985, and in 1988 was awarded an
Absent the use of the TNA machine, the
FAA production contract.³
FAA Administrator states, there is no effective
64
check today for plastic explosives in baggage.
the testing has consisted of strapping simulated
Passenger safety, he argues, dictates deploy-
explosives onto the outside of suitcases.
ment of TNA simply because it is the best
The results of the Commission's tests were
available device.
startling. Although calibrated to detect the EDS
The Commission disagrees. The inescapable
specification set out by the FAA, the TNA ma-
fact is that today's TNA machines cannot, with-
chine failed to detect the explosive in two out
out an unacceptably high rate of false positive
of 10 passes; it failed to detect the amount
alarms, detect the amount of semtex widely be-
equal to 60 percent of the EDS specification
lieved to have blown up Pan Am 103.
seven out of eight passes; and it failed to detect
The TNA machine produced under the SAIC
30 per cent of the EDS specification on any of
contract, although never scientifically tested,
eight passes.
was approved by the Administrator of FAA for
The Commission learned from SAIC person-
use as meeting the specifications for the detec-
nel present at the JFK test that the TNA-Xenis
tion of plastic and other explosives in checked
machine can usually detect semtex in the
luggage. This was done without approval from
FAA's Technical Center that the TNA met the
amounts set forth in the FAA rule 80 per cent
EDS standards.
of the time. False positives (bags that falsely
alarm the system and need to be opened to be
The FAA has purchased six of these ma-
sure they do not contain explosives) are re-
chines, each combined with a special X-ray
duced by running bags through the system a
unit, called Xenis, to provide a dual-sensor sys-
tem.⁶ The first machine has been installed at
second time. Thus, if 100 bags with explosives
are tested, an 80 percent detection rate will let
JFK International Airport, in New York City,
and is being used by TWA to screen interline
20 bags go through undetected on the first
and intraline baggage for its international
pass. The second pass will permit an additional
flights. Of the five additional machines, one is
16 bags to go through undetected (80 per cent
being installed in Miami International Airport,
of the remaining 80) for a 64 percent total de-
tection rate.⁷
another is to be installed at Gatwick in London,
and the FAA is negotiating for the placement
The SAIC equipment can apparently be ad-
of the additional three machines in U.S. and
justed to discern smaller quantities of plastic
foreign airports.
explosive, similar to the quantity thought to
The Commission notes that although the
have been used to destroy Pan Am 103. But
FAA's specification for an EDS system requires
when it is so adjusted, the rate of false alarms
that it be fully automated, addition of the Xenis
rises sharply, far in excess of the acceptable
X-ray, approved by the FAA, requires operators
false-alarm rate permitted under the FAA's
to oversee the detection process using the
EDS specifications. This false identification rate
SAIC TNA-Xenis equipment. The machine is
would require that a very large number of bags
not, therefore, fully automated.
be opened in the presence of the passengers, a
The Commission viewed the TNA-Xenis ma-
time-consuming task. This prospect argues for
chine in use in the TWA terminal area at JFK
the placement of the TNA machines in the ter-
Airport on April 21, 1990. The Commission
minal area where passengers are processed, but
staff arranged to test the machine with three
because of its massive weight and size, and be-
suitcases containing various amounts of semtex:
cause it uses nuclear radiation, this might not
an amount equal to the EDS specification; an
always be feasible.
amount equal to 60 per cent of that amount
The FAA claims that the order requiring air-
and an amount equal to 30 per cent of that
lines to deploy EDS equipment will stimulate
amount. The amount of semtex believed to
new technologies that may outperform the
have destroyed Pan Am 103 was between 30
TNA.⁸ This belief appears to the Commission
and 60 per cent of the EDS specification. Even
to be unfounded. To require airlines within the
though the TNA machine at JFK has been un-
next two years to spend $175,000,000 for the
dergoing testing at JFK since mid-1989, this
SAIC TNA-Xenis machines will inevitably stifle
was the first time it had been tested at the air-
interest in developing new and superior tech-
port using actual explosive material. Instead,
nologies.
65
Until the threat is scientifically defined and
As of the Commission's Hearing on April 4,
machines capable of countering that threat are
1990, no FAA detection equipment, including
approved, the widespread deployment of the
the current generation of TNA machines, had
SAIC TNA machine would mislead the flying
been tested by independent authorities under
public by offering a false sense of protection.
scientifically-developed testing protocols. Scien-
The facts argue strongly instead for the FAA to
tists told the Commission that such testing
suspend the proposed SAIC TNA deployment
should become routine for FAA approval of
by the carriers, to continue to improve the vari-
any new equipment, including the TNA ma-
ous technologies, and to quickly reach a valid
chines. To provide assurance of impartiality,
scientific determination of the threat to be
the Commission was urged to recommend that
countered by such equipment.
the testing board should be independent of the
In the interim, the FAA needs to bridge the
FAA or DOT, and comprised of scientists and
gap between what can destroy aircraft and what
engineers without commercial interest in the
can be reliably detected by addressing some
results of any tests. The Commission believes
fundamental questions. Can steps be taken to
that the establishment of such a board is vital.
modify airframes to minimize the damage that
The Commission concludes that the security
would otherwise be caused by explosive de-
of the nation and the traveling public have not
vices? Should manufacturers be encouraged to
been adequately served by the FAA's R&D ac-
develop hardened baggage containers for use
tivities. The FAA must give higher priority and
on specific routes, and what material would be
allocate more federal funds to R&D. The FAA
appropriate for that purpose? Should efforts be
must seek independent scientific advice for its
made to isolate and protect the "avionics" bay
research and testing activities, while paying
in aircraft to safeguard sensitive electronic and
closer attention to the establishment of training
navigational equipment? Should all aircraft
standards for surveillance personnel. Until all
electronic equipment be specially located in the
of these efforts produce better detection equip-
least vulnerable location of the cargo hold?
ment, manned by skilled personnel, multiple
The best and most inventive minds in science
approaches to detection offer the best ap-
and industry need to answer these questions.
proach.
While the Commission agrees that the nation
cannot wait for the perfect detection device,
Recommendations
the quest for it can at least start by asking the
right questions.
1. FAA should undertake a vigorous effort to
FAA has used R&D funds in modest amounts
marshal the necessary expertise to develop and
for development of vapor-detection systems for
test effective explosive-detection systems.
screening passengers for concealed plastic ex-
2. The FAA should establish an expert panel
plosives. A prototype machine was tested at
of persons from the national laboratories, other
Boston's Logan Airport in 1988 and proved
government agencies, academia and industry to
unacceptably slow. Thus far, FAA has not ap-
oversee the design and development of this
proved any equipment to detect plastic explo-
high priority initiative.
sives being carried on the person of a passen-
3. The FAA should undertake an intensive
ger, nor any equipment suitable for use at
program of research and experimentation with
boarding gates to screen for plastic explosives
the structure of aircraft to determine the kind
in carry-on luggage.
and the minimum weight of explosives which
After at least five years of experience in de-
must be detected by any technology.
veloping a device to detect plastic explosives
4. In the interim, the requirement for wide-
used to destroy aircraft, the FAA is now asking
spread use of present TNA equipment should
industry and the academic community for re-
be deferred while the technology is developed
search proposals for possible future develop-
further.
ment. The FAA for years did not have a con-
5. The FAA should conduct research to de-
tinuing scientific and engineering advisory
velop the means of minimizing airframe
committee of independent, acknowledged ex-
damage that may be caused by small amounts
perts to advise on its research programs.
of explosives.
66
6. To avoid the undesirable reliance on any
3 55 Fed. Reg. 36938-36946 (September 5, 1989).
single commercial source for TNA equipment,
4 Testimony of Raymond Salazar, Director of FAA's Office of
Civil Aviation Security, and Monte Belger, FAA's Associate Ad-
the FAA must make every possible effort to en-
ministrator for Aviation Standards, Commission Hearing, Febru-
courage the development of additional sources.
ary 2, 1990, pp. 153-155, and 157-158.
7. FAA must think ahead and anticipate how
5 Testimony of Admiral James B. Busey, Commission Hearing,
to counter the next generation of terrorist
April 4, 1990, pp. 361-62.
6 The first six TNA production units cost over $1,000,000
weapons before they are used to kill innocent
each. The six X-ray units produced under the SAIC contract cost
people.
$2,042,000. Installation, maintenance, and indemnification/insur-
ance costs also add to the installed cost of the TNA, enhanced by
Endnotes
the use of the Xenis X-ray devices.
7 At the lower weights of explosives, virtually all the bags will
1 "The Washington Post" (March 23, 1990).
go though undetected.
2 Prepared Statement of Professor Lee Grodzins, Commission
8 Testimony of Monte Belger, Commission Hearing, February
Hearing, February 2, 1990, pp. 11 and 14.
2, 1990, pp. 157-158.
67
Chapter 5
Intelligence
Introduction
and field level. The Commission is satisfied
that all those officers interviewed were forth-
If security measures at airports are the last
coming, as the President had directed in the
line of defense against civil aviation terrorism,
Executive Order creating the Commission.
the first line of defense is the collection of ac-
The Commission believes strongly that its
curate and timely intelligence concerning the
findings and conclusions concerning the co-
intentions, capabilities and actions of terrorists
ordination and effectiveness of U.S. intelligence
before they reach the airport. An important
activities directed at terrorism should be avail-
part of the Commission's mission was to assess
able to the public. Therefore, the Commission
the effectiveness of intelligence on threats to
chose not to submit this portion of its report in
civil aviation, and the coordination within and
classified form, as permitted by the Executive
among U.S. Government agencies with intelli-
Order.
gence responsibility for terrorist activities.
In particular, the Commission wanted to ex-
The U.S. intelligence effort on terrorism tar-
amine the effectiveness of the evaluation and
geted at civil aviation has two general compo-
dissemination of information concerning terror-
nents. The first encompasses the intelligence
ism targeted at civil aviation, given the number
community members with responsibility for
of different agencies within the U.S. Govern-
international activities, and the Federal Bureau
ment that have some interest in terrorist re-
of Investigation with comparable responsibility
porting. The Commission also sought to assess
within the United States. The second compo-
the level of priority accorded to civil aviation
nent is the Intelligence Division of the FAA,
by the intelligence agencies dealing with terror-
which serves as the conduit for intelligence in-
ism.
formation collected and evaluated by the intel-
The Commission sought and received the
ligence community and the FBI for dissemina-
full cooperation of the intelligence and law en-
tion to the private air carriers and/or airports
forcement communities within the United
that must ultimately take defensive action.
States. With the appropriate security clear-
The Commission's mandate was to assess the
ances, the Commission staff was able to inter-
coordination and evaluation of intelligence in-
view the intelligence officers with responsibility
formation collected, as well as the timeliness of
for counterterrorism and, in particular, those
dissemination of that information. The Com-
officers with any involvement with intelligence
mission's mandate did not include assessing the
information about the destruction of Flight
adequacy or effectiveness of intelligence collec-
103. The Commission reviewed classified intel-
tion efforts against terrorism.
ligence information from 1988 that may have
The Commission's review found that, be-
had a bearing upon terrorist activities targeted
cause of the government's concerted intelli-
at civil aviation. The Commission interviewed
gence activities on terrorism and the increased
U.S. intelligence officers at the headquarters
resources being devoted to intelligence func-
69
tions by the FAA, the system is working reason-
fense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Federal
ably well.
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Department
Improvements, however, can still be made.
of Justice (DOJ). The National Security Council
In particular, the Commission recommends em-
(NSC) is also involved at a policy level. Recog-
phasis on ensuring that information suggesting
nizing the elusiveness of the target and the po-
terrorist threats, collected by U.S. law enforce-
tential for missed opportunities because of the
ment agencies abroad, continues to be made
number of agencies involved in the intelligence
available to the intelligence community in gen-
effort, the United States has made significant
eral and to the FAA in particular, bearing in
strides in recent years to better coordinate its
mind the need for appropriate confidentiality
counterterrorism intelligence effort.
when law enforcement proceedings are directly
In February 1986, the Vice President's Task
involved. Domestically, the Commission recom-
Force on Combatting Terrorism recommended
mends that the FAA and the FBI cooperate, as
new emphasis on all facets of intelligence gath-
now planned, to assess the vulnerability of U.S.
ering, processing and dissemination to combat
airports to the threat of terrorist violence. Ad-
terrorism.¹ Building on the task force report
ditionally, the FBI must continue to evaluate
and a reorganization effort then underway in
the terrorist threat in the United States, and
the CIA, in 1986 a counterterrorist center was
the FAA must work to ensure the proper level
created within the CIA to coordinate intelli-
of security at domestic airports.
gence efforts against international terrorism.
The Commission also recommends that more
The center includes a crisis management capa-
attention and resources be devoted to an in-
bility that can bring all source intelligence in-
creased strategic, as opposed to operational, in-
formation to bear on terrorist incidents as re-
telligence effort. This is particularly so within
the FAA, where intelligence should be coordi-
quired. All members of the intelligence com-
munity now coordinate their efforts concerning
nated with the agency's technical research com-
international terrorism through that center.
ponent.
Finally, given the fundamental importance of
By this coordinated effort, intelligence infor-
intelligence evaluation and dissemination in the
mation on terrorism is shared among all con-
context of civil aviation security, the Commis-
cerned parties, regardless of the originating
sion believes the function of the FAA Intelli-
agency. Communications systems have been de-
gence Division, now located within the Office
veloped to permit immediate comment from all
of Civil Aviation Security, should be elevated in
involved agencies on any significant informa-
importance by moving it to an office reporting
tion. In turn, this effort permits a joint evalua-
to the Secretary of Transportation.
tion and determination of threat information,
and dissemination to agencies like the FAA.
Counterterrorism
The intelligence community also participates in
Intelligence Coordination
exercises designed to anticipate potential ter-
rorism strategies. Day-to-day counterterrorism
efforts attempt to discern trends, based upon
Terrorism is an elusive intelligence target.
assessments of prior incidents.
Terrorists, particularly state-sponsored terror-
ists, are technologically sophisticated, mobile,
Domestically, the FBI is responsible for the
well-funded and highly compartmentalized.
U.S. counterterrorism effort, a national priority
for the Bureau since 1982. The FBI has also
Collecting and assessing intelligence informa-
tion on terrorist intentions is especially diffi-
enhanced its section devoted to coordinating
U.S. domestic counterterrorism efforts at the
cult. Often this task is like attempting to deter-
mine where a piece of a jigsaw puzzle fits with-
federal level.
out knowing the size, shape or picture of the
Terrorism directed at civil aviation, both do-
puzzle, or even if the piece fits that puzzle at
mestically and internationally, has high priority
all.
in the intelligence centers and among U.S. in-
The U.S. intelligence effort aimed at combat-
telligence officers in the field.
ting terrorism is divided among the Central In-
Most significantly, management and oper-
telligence Agency (CIA), Department of State
ations personnel in each intelligence center re-
(DOS), National Security Agency (NSA), De-
peatedly stated that they place the highest pri-
70
ority on protecting lives first, even if this policy
The CT also chairs an inter-agency committee
means foregoing ongoing law enforcement in-
that includes representation from more than 20
vestigations and regardless of what must be
different federal agencies involved in the com-
done to make intelligence concerns fit within
prehensive effort to deal with terrorism-related
this priority. Civil aviation figures prominently
matters.
in this consideration, the officials said.
The State Department, in addition, coordi-
The FAA has had its own intelligence oper-
nates all U.S. Government anti-terrorism assist-
ation since 1986. The FAA is a "consumer" of
ance programs to other countries in their fight
intelligence, regularly receiving intelligence in-
against terrorism. This assistance includes
formation relating to international terrorism
training services and equipment.
from the CIA counterterrorist center and other
The State Department's Bureau of Intelli-
intelligence agencies. The FAA assesses that in-
gence and Research (INR) and its Bureau of
formation and determines whether to issue a
Diplomatic Security, Threat Analysis Division
security notice to air carriers and airport au-
(TAD), directly support the CT's mission by
thorities. The FAA intelligence unit also re-
ceives information from the FBI counterterror-
providing time-sensitive, critical analysis of in-
ism section when there is a specific domestic
telligence information. The INR is responsible
threat requiring action. For various legal and
for the overall intelligence analysis in support
law enforcement reasons, information concern-
of the CT's efforts. The TAD provides analyti-
ing domestic terrorism is closely held within
cal support to the CT and the intelligence com-
the FBI counterterrorism section. That section,
munity, particularly in matters dealing with
in turn, is responsible both for operational in-
threats and risk to U.S. facilities and personnel
abroad.
telligence relating to domestic terrorism
threats, and for evaluating and assessing
The FAA has recently delegated a full-time
trends.
representative to the TAD staff to serve as a li-
aison between FAA and TAD. This FAA repre-
Intelligence Community
sentative will focus on civil aviation issues.
Several agencies are involved in the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency
counterterrorism effort.
In early 1986, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence established a counterterrorist center de-
State Department
signed to apply CIA resources more effectively
The State Department has lead agency re-
against the terrorist target. The center is a
sponsibility for U.S. counterterrorism policy
unique amalgam of resources within the CIA.
abroad. Its Office of the Coordinator for Coun-
The center is headed by a senior CIA oper-
terterrorism (CT) has existed in various forms
ations officer, and its deputy is a senior officer
since the early 1970s. The Coordinator for
from the Directorate of Intelligence, which is
Counterterrorism is the senior U.S. Govern-
the CIA component charged with collating and
ment official on counterterrorism policy
analyzing information, and interpreting it for
abroad.
the President and other high-level policymak-
The CT is responsible for focusing on the
ers. The center's staff includes a variety of spe-
policy issues related to the U.S. counterterror-
cialists, including analysts, operations officers,
ism effort. The CT has the important responsi-
translators, explosives experts and other tech-
bility for determining whether public notifica-
nical specialists.
tion is to be made about terrorist threats over-
Building upon the recommendation of the
seas. During the life of this Commission, the
Vice President's Task Force, an inter-agency
CT coordinated and released two separate
effort concerning terrorism has been estab-
public statements on terrorist threat activity in
lished in conjunction with the CIA's counterter-
Western Europe and Africa. Another concerned
rorist center. Representatives from all members
a terrorist threat in the Philippines. Although
of the intelligence community, as well as many
none of the alerts dealt expressly with civil
consumer agencies, serve as full working mem-
aviation, the FAA sent to the carriers informa-
bers of the center's staff. These non-CIA staff
tion circulars on each State Department notice.
members are integrated into the total day-to-
71
day operations of the center, and have access
highly specialized intelligence functions in sup-
to all incoming counterterrorism material. They
port of U.S. Government activities.
also serve as immediate liaisons to their
NSA is a collector and processor of intelli-
"home" agencies and can focus particularly on
gence information. It services the intelligence
information and activities of interest to those
community and its collection priorities are set
agencies.
at the national level. Terrorism has always been
The FAA has recently added a full-time rep-
and remains among NSA's highest priorities.
resentative to the counterterrorist center's staff.
NSA works in concert with the three other core
This person will also be integrated into the
intelligence agencies (CIA, State, and DIA) to
workings of the center, and will focus particu-
provide timely information.
larly on any intelligence information of particu-
lar interest to civil aviation.
Defense Intelligence Agency
The center receives and assesses the raw in-
telligence data from the field. Worldwide intel-
Two components of the DIA which deal with
ligence relating to terrorism is processed, ana-
terrorism reporting on a regular basis are the
lyzed and disseminated to members of the in-
Terrorism Analysis Branch of the Global Analy-
telligence community as well as to intelligence
sis Division, and the Requirements and Valida-
tion Branch of the Central Reference Division.
consumer agencies by the center. The center
has established a planned effort to project
The Terrorism Analysis Branch supervises the
Counterterrorism Section and the Threat Anal-
trends and information to provide a strategic,
global approach to countering terrorism. As-
ysis Section.
sessments are also made on possible intelli-
The Threat Analysis Section produces a daily
gence gaps, methods and operations.
summary of selected terrorism intelligence
In the drive to gather better intelligence on
items derived from the reporting of the Depart-
the plans and activities of terrorists, the intelli-
ment of Defense and other agencies, and mans
gence community faces a difficult problem that
a 24-hour desk which screens all incoming mes-
is common to other intelligence collection ef-
sage traffic for indications of terrorist threats.
forts. Sensitive sources or methods often
The Counterterrorism Section is responsible
produce the most specific and credible intelli-
for the coordination of intelligence collection
gence information. The better the information,
and for operational support in the event of a
the more useful it is likely to be, either for
terrorist attack, which includes the develop-
taking steps to interdict planned terrorist activi-
ment of options to support appropriate contin-
ty or for warning the intended target or the
gency plans.
public. Yet either course may well run the risk
The DIA Central Reference Division man-
of interfering with intelligence operations
ages the dissemination of intelligence reports
which produced the critical information. Senior
and finished studies to its approximately 2,500
U.S. policymakers must constantly strike a bal-
customers, including FAA. The Requirements
ance between acting on current intelligence in-
and Validation Branch reviews the requesting
formation and protecting sources and methods
agency or unit's mission, need-to-know, and se-
in hopes of gathering more vital information.
curity accreditation. The Document Analysis
As noted above, U.S. intelligence officials
Branch indexes and catalogues incoming intelli-
emphasized that they subscribe to a policy of
gence and matches it with the customer's pre-
protecting lives first and make certain that in-
registered requirements.
telligence concerns are shaped to accomplish
this priority. This Commission has found no
Foreign Intelligence Services
evidence that intelligence officials fail to adhere
The intelligence effort against international
to this policy.
terrorism requires continuing cooperation
among many countries. Yet because of sover-
National Security Agency
eignty concerns, no nation, including the
The National Security Agency is under the
United States, may be compelled to share with
direction, authority, and control of the Secre-
other countries information that is acquired
tary of Defense. It is responsible for centralized
through its own intelligence efforts. Countries
coordination, direction and performance of
face a continuing internal struggle to improve
72
cooperation within their own borders among
years ago the President's Commission on CIA
the various intelligence agencies that may have
Activities Within the United States recommend-
different jurisdictions and institutional rivalries.
ed that "a capability should be developed
The exchange of intelligence information be-
within the FBI, or elsewhere within the Depart-
tween and among countries is at bottom de-
ment of Justice to evaluate, analyze and coordi-
pendent on the willingness of each of those
nate intelligence and counterintelligence col-
countries to share it. For example, sharing of
lected by the FBI concerning
terror-
information concerning the October 1988 ar-
ism
2
rests of PFLP-GC terrorists in West Germany
The FBI has established a Counterterrorism
that uncovered the Toshiba radio cassette
Section within the Criminal Investigative Divi-
bomb was a matter within the control of the
sion. This section collects information from nu-
West German authorities.
merous sources to establish an intelligence data
Foreign intelligence and/or police agencies
base. This data is gathered using techniques
have established formal and informal channels
such as interviews, informants, undercover op-
to exchange terrorist threat information with
erations, physical surveillance and court-au-
their U.S. counterparts. All government-to-gov-
thorized electronic surveillance. Additionally,
ernment threat information on terrorism, secu-
information is received from the U.S. intelli-
rity or criminal matters is relayed through these
gence community and foreign intelligence and
liaison channels. The FAA is not a direct part
of this process of intelligence exchange. There-
law enforcement agencies.
fore, the FAA usually receives threat informa-
The field evaluation process is conducted by
tion originating from foreign governments that
field agents who refer all pertinent intelligence
might affect civil aviation from the receiving
data concerning domestic terrorist activity to
U.S. intelligence or law enforcement agencies.
FBI headquarters. Terrorist information is ana-
During the Commission's European trip in
lyzed and evaluated at the headquarters level
February, the Commission met with various
by the Counterterrorism Section.
foreign intelligence and law enforcement offi-
According to the FBI, since 1986 there has
cials. All expressed their commitment to inter-
been a decline in the number of terrorist inci-
national cooperation in this area and recog-
dents recorded in the United States. Neverthe-
nized that terrorism is an international concern.
less, the FBI told the Commission that it would
The bombings during 1989 of UTA Flight 772
be incorrect to conclude that the threat of do-
from Brazzaville to Paris and of Avianca Flight
mestic terrorism has significantly decreased.
203 from Bogota to Cali, have underscored the
The threat of terrorist violence to Americans
importance of this conviction. International co-
from both foreign and domestic groups contin-
operation in intelligence concerning terrorism
ues and is projected to remain significant in the
must remain a high priority.
future. The Counterterrorism Section evaluates
intelligence information to establish trends and
Law Enforcement
patterns of both domestic and international ter-
rorist groups.
Within the United States, counterterrorism is
The FBI's Counterterrorism Section pro-
the responsibility of law enforcement agencies.
duces an annual report on domestic terrorism
Several of these agencies by law also have re-
that is disseminated to the FAA, all federal law
sponsibilities with international components.
enforcement agencies and some 2,000 state and
local police departments, with statistics, trends
Federal Bureau of Investigation
and patterns, and current terrorism topics. The
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is
section also produces and disseminates reports
the lead federal agency for combatting terror-
on terrorist groups, country profiles, and spe-
ism within the United States. The FBI mandate
cific counterterrorism investigations.
is to prevent terrorist acts before they occur,
The FBI recently initiated a terrorist threat
and, if they occur, to mount an effective inves-
warning system designed to convey new infor-
tigative and prosecutorial response.
mation to those responsible for monitoring and
The significance of the domestic counterter-
countering ongoing terrorist threat situations
rorism effort has long been recognized. Fifteen
within the United States.
73
The FBI has also established the Strategic In-
FAA Intelligence Division
formation Operations Center, staffed by FBI
personnel and intelligence community mem-
To effectively use terrorist threat information
bers, who monitor imminent and ongoing ter-
from the U.S. intelligence community, it must
rorist incidents.
be transmitted to those responsible for the se-
curity measures to discourage or interdict the
Other Federal Law Enforcement
threatened attack. The United States is unusual
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and
among its allies in that aviation security is han-
the U.S. Customs Service (USCS) are two addi-
dled primarily by the private sector and by
tional federal law enforcement agencies with an
state and local entities. This adds a layer of
interest in terrorist tactics and activities. DEA is
complexity to the intelligence function because
information must be declassified for receipt
exclusively interested in the shipment and sale
and use by these non-federal entities. The FAA
of illegal drugs, and draws on intelligence re-
Intelligence Division's central function is to
porting from both its own agents in the field
serve as the bridge between the intelligence
and reporting from the intelligence community.
community, which gathers intelligence informa-
The USCS is strictly an intelligence consumer,
tion, and these private sector and non-federal
focusing on the prevention of smuggling of
entities which need the information to take ap-
drugs and other contraband into the United
propriate security steps.
States. Both of these agencies participate in an
In June 1985, TWA 847 was hijacked by
established working group of all U.S. Govern-
Middle Eastern terrorists who held 153 passen-
ment agencies with a role in counterterrorism.
gers prisoner and tortured and murdered a
U.S. Navy diver on board. The hijacking of
INTERPOL
Egyptair 648 in November 1985 saw terrorists
The International Criminal Police Organiza-
murder one U.S. citizen and seriously wound
tion (INTERPOL) is a worldwide organization
two others, while 50 persons were killed in the
that serves as a conduit for a cooperative ex-
rescue attempt. In December 1985, airports in
change of criminal information to help detect
Rome and Vienna were attacked by terrorists,
and combat international crime. INTERPOL
with a total of 17 people killed and 113 wound-
does not maintain an international police force,
ed, including five Americans killed and 17
but serves merely as a communications link be-
wounded.
tween various national law enforcement agen-
According to the FAA, the agency then real-
cies.
ized that it needed an intelligence capability for
For years the organization had a "hands-off"
the civil aviation security program.
policy toward the issue of terrorism. In 1984,
In March 1986, the FAA Intelligence Division
INTERPOL changed its definition of terrorism
(ID) was created, charged with determining and
from that of an act with political motivation to
assessing current threats of criminal and/or ter-
that of a crime against society, and established
rorist actions against U.S. civil aviation and,
a special unit in its headquarters to coordinate
when appropriate, disseminating that informa-
tion in an unclassified form to the airlines or
cases from around the world involving terror-
airports affected by the threat. Thus, the FAA
ism. The anti-terrorism group is comprised of
receives information collected by U.S. intelli-
representatives from five countries: United
gence and law enforcement agencies, U.S. air
States, United Kingdom, Italy, France and West
carriers, foreign governments and other avail-
Germany.
able sources.
In some cases intelligence reporting will
Local Law Enforcement
come to the FAA fully analyzed and with a
In addition to obtaining threat information
"tearline," which is an unclassified version of
from federal law enforcement agencies, the
the classified reporting that can be immediately
FAA also receives threat and terrorist informa-
disseminated to the appropriate airline and air-
tion from state and local police and airport se-
port personnel. The unclassified version con-
curity personnel within the United States.
tained below the tearline is written to protect
74
any sources or methods of collection. In those
United States during the 1980s.³ One responsi-
cases, the FAA ID serves principally as a con-
bility of the ID is to evaluate this information
duit for the intelligence information to the af-
and distribute information circulars when nec-
fected airlines and airports.
essary to quell rumors or to prevent repetitious
Some intelligence information relevant to
reporting. On occasion, the FAA ID will send
civil aviation comes to the FAA with no tear-
out circulars that are neither time-sensitive, nor
line, and the ID must seek from the originating
specific but more in the nature of a "heads-
agency a "sanitized" version which will main-
up."
tain the essence of the information without
jeopardizing sources or methods.
Analysis
Anonymous calls and correspondence consti-
tute the most common and the most unreliable
Threat information flows from receipt by the
type of threat information that must be as-
FAA ID, to its analysis, to dissemination to car-
sessed by FAA for the private sector. Over
riers and other elements in the following se-
6,000 of these threats were received in the
quence as shown on the accompanying chart:
75
RECEIPT, ASSESSMENT and DISSEMINATION
of INTELLIGENCE/THREAT INFORMATION
Receipt of Intelligence/
Threat Information
Risk Assessment
Threat
Assessment
U.S. Intelligence
Director of Civil
Agencies
Aviation Security
Coordinates
(ACS-1)
merging of other
divisions at this
STATE DEPARTMENT
point in the
(including Embassies)
process.
Assesses vulner-
ability and draws
FBI
Civil Aviation
up recommended
Security Division
or required
(ACS-100)
countermeasures.
MILITARY
INVESTIGATIVE
Intelligence/
THREAT
RISK
Federal Air
AGENCIES
Threat Information
Intelligence
ASSESSMENT
ASSESSMENT
Marshal Program
Division
Model used is
for hijacking
Model Used is
Classified and
(ACS-400)
capabilities +
threats. Aviation
Threat +
Unclassified
intentions = Threat
Security Tech-
Vulnerability =
OTHER U.S. FEDERAL
Risk
LAW ENFORCEMENT
Special Programs
nology Branch for
Division
threats involving
(ACS-200)
explosives.
Develops
FOREIGN
appropriate
GOVERNMENTS
countermeasures
No
(Minimal)
for above.
threat
exits
Continues input
AIR CARRIERS
from previously
Intelligence
completed threat
Division
assessment.
(ACS-400)
STATE and LOCAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT
76
Dissemination
Security Directive or
Information Circular
Threat cannot be
countered with
additional security
measures flight
cancelled
Department
of
Transportation
Additional
countermeasures
needed-
Security
Directive
Department
Appropriate
Embassy
Host
Foreign Airport
of
Embassies and
Security Officer
Government
Security structure
State
Missions
and FAA Liaison,
Agencies
varies by country,
FAA
responsible for
but is frequently
Representative
Airport Security
Draft of Directive
conducted by
several levels of
or Circular
prepared by
Signed
government.
by
Intelligence
ACS-1
Division
(ACS-400)
Appropriate
U.S. Intelligence
and Law
Enforcement
Agencies on
case by case
U.S. CARRIER
No additional
basis
Must acknowledge receipt of
countermeasures
Directive within 24 hours.
needed-
Must specify action taken on
Information
Directive within 72 hours
Circular
FAA Regions,
FAA Principal
U.S. Carriers
U.S. Carrier
U.S. Carrier
U.S. and
Corporate
Station
Security
Security Directive
Overseas
Inspector
Security
Representative
requires enhanced
Office
(at airport)
security and/or
U.S. Carrier
countermeasures.
Retype Directives and
Ground Security
Information
Coordinator
Circular is used
Telex
U.S. Carrier
for informational
In-flight Security
purposes only.
ATA
Coordinator
Carrier
Representative
FAA Aviation
Approximately
(where
500 (Part 107)
appropriate)
Security Field
Offices or Units
Airports serving
(CASFO's)
commerical
traffic (where
appropriate)
77
The FAA's basic approach to evaluating ter-
ings of specific threats, or of general conditions
rorist threat information, at the time of Pan Am
which dictated a high degree of concern or cau-
103 and today, consists of a five-step risk man-
tion. In 1987, the ID issued 38 security bulle-
agement model:
tins, and in 1988 it issued 27 more, based on
the receipt of approximately 20,000 cables and
1. capability combined with intentions
other specialized intelligence products annually
produces threat
from the intelligence community. The bulletins
2. threat combined with vulnerability
ranged from very specific information (for ex-
produces risk
ample, one gave the names and passport num-
3. FAA cannot control threat
bers of potential hijackers in Western Europe)
to very general information (for example, one
4. FAA can lower vulnerability to de-
noted that a car-bombing outside a USO facili-
crease risk
ty in Europe, together with other events, point-
5. aviation security countermeasures
ed to a rise of anti-U.S. activity in Europe and
lower vulnerability
the Middle East).
As previously detailed, from June to Decem-
The initial step in this process, threat evalua-
ber 1988, a series of FAA bulletins concerning
tion, is done strictly by the FAA Intelligence
terrorism in Western Europe were distributed
Division, working closely with the relevant U.S.
to carriers. Even so, the FAA at that time had
intelligence agencies. In the FAA model, threat
no means of requiring air carriers to take any
exists only when a person or entity has both
action in light of the security bulletins, nor did
the capability to carry out a particular type of
it have in place a means for determining wheth-
attack and the intention to do so. Either of
er the carriers had even received the informa-
these factors, standing alone, does not consti-
tion. As a result, the FAA headquarters in
tute a credible threat. The model used by FAA
Washington had no idea what, if anything, air
is widely accepted and used by the majority of
carriers in Frankfurt had done as a response to
U.S. intelligence and law enforcement commu-
the FAA security bulletins about the Toshiba
nity agencies.
radio cassette recorder or the Helsinki threat.
Once the threat is determined, the process
moves to the risk assessment phase, which is
Security Bulletin Process After Pan Am
coordinated by the Director of Civil Aviation
103
Security. The Civil Aviation Security Division
After the destruction of Flight 103, the Sec-
participates in assessing the vulnerability of the
retary of Transportation formed a high level
target and recommending countermeasures.
task force which focused primarily on the "col-
The Federal Air Marshal Program comes into
lection, analysis, and dissemination of informa-
play in a hijacking threat. The Aviation Security
tion concerning threats to civil aviation." The
Technology Branch may be called in for its ex-
work of the task force resulted in several rec-
pertise in the case of threats involving explo-
ommendations designed to remedy some of the
sives.
clear inefficiencies in the FAA security bulletin
Security Bulletins
process. FAA now produces two separate types
of communications to the air carriers: security
According to the FAA, before the establish-
directives and information circulars.
ment of the Intelligence Division in March
Security bulletins were renamed security di-
1986, the system of alerts, bulletins and sum-
rectives, and now contain specific and manda-
maries served mainly to provide recipients with
tory actions which must be taken by the affect-
general information about such topics as lost
ed air carriers. Air carriers are now required:
identification cards and new types of handguns
(1) to prepare written procedures to ensure
appearing on the market. Bulletins were typi-
that FAA security directives can be received
cally mailed to the recipients and were usually
and acted upon at any hour; (2) to acknowl-
vague and of limited use to the airlines.
edge, within 24 hours and in writing, receipt
As the Intelligence Division established itself,
and understanding of all the FAA security di-
the focus of the bulletin system shifted to warn-
rectives referred to them; and (3) to document
78
in detail all actions taken at all stations in re-
measures result from the relevant intelligence
sponse to the FAA security directives within 72
reporting.
hours of receipt. This much needed improve-
ment remedied a significant flaw in the system
Dissemination of Security Bulletins
which was obvious to the Commission from its
From 1986 through all of 1988, FAA security
review of the circumstances concerning Flight
bulletins were routinely disseminated to all
103.
FAA representatives abroad and to all FAA re-
The information circular now produced by
gional security offices in the United States,
the FAA has no mandatory requirements or in-
whether a security bulletin discussed a terrorist
structions for the air carriers. The circular pro-
threat affecting Peoria or Paris. The security
vides carriers with background information for
bulletin in 1988 on the "Helsinki threat,"
carrying out their security duties. The distinc-
which concerned flights originating in Frank-
tion between directives and circulars, which
furt, was disseminated to locations as disparate
separates information that requires action from
as Rio de Janeiro and Dakar.
that which is more in the nature of background,
After the destruction of Flight 103, the FAA
is also a significant improvement in the system.
began to narrow the dissemination of its securi-
For all of 1989, the FAA issued 11 security
ty information. Today, the FAA states that se-
directives (eight of which were still designated
curity directives and information circulars are
as security- bulletins) and 22 information circu-
disseminated only to the FAA representatives
lars. In the first quarter of 1990, the FAA
in the geographic areas affected by the direc-
issued only one security directive, while issuing
tives. Both, are still disseminated, however, to
23 information circulars. The lower rate of se-
all FAA regional security offices.
curity directives is a clear refinement; those
FAA security directives and information cir-
documents now focus on the more time-sensi-
culars are also provided to the U.S. Depart-
tive or serious threats deemed to require im-
ment of State, so that affected embassies can
mediate action by the carriers. The less time-
assist U.S. carriers through liaison with foreign
sensitive nature of information circulars has
government security officials. Since the content
also allowed the FAA to better communicate
of the security directives and information circu-
with the carriers on a variety of subjects, from
lars might reach airport or host government of-
State Department travel advisories to world
ficials through contact with U.S. airline securi-
events to the general nature of disguised explo-
ty, embassy officers need to be in a position to
sives.
respond to inquiries from foreign officials. The
Despite these improvements in the system,
State Department cable reiterating the Helsinki
the carriers still complain that the information
threat followed the same broad distribution
they receive from the FAA is too vague and
given it by the FAA. With the narrowing of the
general to be of much value to them. These
FAA directive distribution process, the State
complaints may result in part from the necessi-
Department redissemination has also been nar-
ty to "sanitize" classified information for distri-
rowed.
bution to private sector security representa-
tives. Despite the efforts of the FAA ID, by the
Strategic Branch
time the information has been "sanitized," it
In October 1989, the FAA Intelligence Divi-
sometimes lacks important details that would
sion reorganized into two branches, an Oper-
more fully guide airline security officials.
ations Branch and a Strategic Branch. The Op-
To counter this perceived problem, carriers
erations Branch continues to have day-to-day
have suggested granting security clearances to
responsibility for threat assessment, analysis,
senior airline security officials.⁴ The Commis-
and dissemination. The Strategic Branch is in-
sion prefers that federal resources at airports
tended to focus on long-term planning and
receive classified intelligence reporting which
analytic assessments of terrorist groups, tactics,
impacts on that airport. The Commission is
and other developments which might affect
recommending an increased security role for
civil aviation in the future.
those federal airport personnel, and this will
This group's primary focus to date has been
enable them to ensure that adequate security
on studies of prior incidents in which terrorist
79
groups or individuals have attacked civil avia-
Similarly, the full-time presence will help
tion. Because credible intelligence information
strengthen the FAA's good working relation-
providing specific warning of an upcoming
ship with the State Department and its Threat
attack is extremely rare, FAA believes that anal-
Analysis Division.
ysis of the past behavior of terrorist groups
The FAA Intelligence Division also has a
provides the best evidence of future capabilities
good day-to-day working relationship with DIA
and general intentions of terrorist groups.
personnel, and apparently has corrected prob-
This creation of a Strategic Branch is a good
lems found by the Commission in FAA's receiv-
first step by the FAA in this area. Much more
ing some terrorism reports from the DIA Cen-
needs to be done.
tral Reference Division. The Commission em-
phasizes the important need for this coopera-
Conclusions
tion to continue.
In general, the government's concerted effort
The FBI states that information detailing im-
to coordinate intelligence activities concerning
minent civil aviation threats is disseminated im-
terrorism, particularly terrorism directed at civil
mediately. Its stated policy is to continue to
aviation, appears to be working reasonably
furnish FAA with any specific information on
well.
civil aviation threats, regardless of source or
The Commission's investigation into the flow
method of intelligence collection.
of intelligence traffic prior to the bombing of
The Commission has found no reason to be-
Flight 103, however, indicates that there are
lieve that this kind of terrorist threat informa-
still instances where communication and coop-
tion is not being shared domestically with the
eration can be improved. The FBI representa-
FAA. The Commission recognizes that the law
tive in Bonn did not attend a meeting on No-
enforcement community must operate within
vember 15, 1988, hosted by the West German
the mandate of U.S. laws on subjects including
authorities to pass on detailed information
grand jury secrecy, which sometimes restrict
about the Toshiba radio cassette bomb. An Air
the degree of information sharing. Recognizing
Force representative did attend that meeting,
these constraints, the Commission underscores
but the information received there did not
the continuing importance of the FBI's sharing
make its way to DIA headquarters until mid-
with the FAA domestic threat information on
January 1989, and was never forwarded to
civil aviation.
FAA. These information lapses could have
The FBI has told the Commission that the
been critical. As it was, however, the West
threat of domestic terrorist violence continues
German authorities, and eventually the FAA,
distributed information on the Toshiba device
and will remain significant. Although bombings
of domestic aircraft have been limited, they
to the affected U.S. carriers substantially before
have occurred. It would be totally unacceptable
December 21, 1988.
to this Commission to rest on any conclusion
Cooperation among all U.S. agencies against
that there is no domestic threat of terrorist vio-
terrorism depends on rapid and timely sharing
of information. This critical effort cannot afford
lence against civil aviation until a plane is
blown out of the U.S. skies.
gaps or lapses.
It appears that the FAA has an excellent
Therefore, the Commission urges that the
working relationship with the CIA and its coun-
FAA and the FBI proceed as planned to assess
terterrorist center. Numerous interviews, as
the vulnerability of U.S. airports. Additionally,
well as an extensive review of documents con-
FAA and FBI must work together so that the
cerning Flight 103, have shown no reason to
level of terrorist threat domestically is moni-
conclude other than that all relevant intelli-
tored adequately and proper levels of aviation
gence information on terrorism that could
security are provided.
affect civil aviation was and is being relayed to
Since legislation in 1985 increased the pres-
the FAA Intelligence Division by the CIA and
ence of FBI representatives overseas, the FBI is
the counterterrorist center in a timely fashion.
receiving a substantial amount of information
The recent addition of an FAA representative
relating to terrorism abroad. The Commission
as a full-time CIA counterterrorist center staff
approves the objectives of this legislation, but
member will further improve these capabilities.
it may have produced an unintended side-
80
effect. Because terrorism overseas is often han-
The Commission recommends that the func-
dled primarily by the law enforcement and
tion of the Intelligence Division be moved to
police agencies of each country, it is reasonable
the Department of Transportation, where it
to expect that the FBI may become the primary
would report directly to the Secretary through
U.S. recipient of an increased amount of terror-
a newly created post of Assistant Secretary of
ism reporting from these entities. Policies and
Transportation for Security and Intelligence.
procedures should be reinforced to ensure that
this kind of international terrorism reporting
This move would accompany the move of the
will be shared with other members of the U.S.
security function that has been outlined in a
intelligence community, as well as with the FAA
previous chapter of this Report. The Intelli-
where appropriate.
gence Division will provide timely and com-
The Commission also recommends greater
plete intelligence to personnel responsible for
emphasis within the intelligence community on
implementing all appropriate security meas-
developing a specific unit whose principal func-
ures.
tion will be long-term strategic thinking and
planning on terrorism. The objective is to be
Elevating the intelligence element will allow
better able to anticipate future terrorist strate-
it to interact more easily with other high-level
gies and tactics, rather than simply to react to
components within the intelligence and law en-
incidents as they occur.
forcement communities. Having the intelli-
Counterterrorism is an all-consuming oper-
gence element report directly to the Secretary
ational effort, 24 hours a day. To expect that
may also provide the Secretary the ability to co-
U.S. counterterrorism personnel in charge of
ordinate intelligence efforts affecting other
operations will also be able to stand back from
transportation concerns, such as maritime secu-
their work to conduct strategic studies and
rity. It will clearly provide the Secretary with an
long-term planning, may be asking too much of
immediately available source of intelligence
them. In order to increase U.S. counterterror-
advice concerning matters of importance to the
ism capabilities, the Commission believes that
Department.
consideration should be given to the creation
of a greater independent strategic effort than is
To this end, the Commission also recom-
currently in place.
mends that the Director of Central Intelligence
The FAA ID's recent creation of a Strategic
promptly designate one or more intelligence
Branch is a positive first step in this direction.
officers, from the Central Intelligence Agency
However, its activities to date have focused on
or other appropriate intelligence agencies, to
studies of past attacks, not projections of the
future terrorist threat to civil aviation. More
serve in a senior capacity in the new intelli-
forward-looking projections and analyses are
gence element.
needed to stay ahead of new terrorist weapons
Finally, the Commission's investigation has
and tactics.
found that some written agreements between
All strategic efforts concerning aviation
the FAA and other intelligence community and
should be more directly linked with the FAA's
research and development needs. The R&D
law enforcement agencies are seriously outdat-
effort should be driven by the best available in-
ed. Some Memoranda of Understanding
telligence information.
(MOU's) were written before the creation of
The Commission has also heard recommen-
the FAA Intelligence Division in 1986, and fail
dations from several different elements within
to recognize the changing role of FAA as it has
the intelligence and law enforcement communi-
become a more sophisticated intelligence user.
ties that the FAA Intelligence Division, and
The Commission, therefore, recommends that
indeed the entire security function would be
these agreements between the FAA and the in-
able to better fulfill its function over time if it
telligence and law enforcement community
were elevated to a position of greater impor-
members be reviewed and updated, where ap-
tance within the DOT structure. Currently, the
propriate, to acknowledge and incorporate the
intelligence function within FAA falls under the
changing roles of the FAA and DOT in the in-
Director of Civil Aviation Security.
stitutional intelligence relationship.
81
Recommendations
report directly to the Secretary through a newly
created post of Assistant Secretary of Trans-
1. Policies and procedures should be put in
portation for Security and Intelligence. This
place to ensure that international terrorism re-
move should accompany the move of the secu-
porting received by U.S. law enforcement offi-
rity function that has been outlined in a previ-
cials abroad will be shared with other members
ous chapter of this Report.
of the U.S. intelligence community, as well as
5. The Director of Central Intelligence
the FAA where appropriate.
should promptly designate one or more intelli-
2. The FAA and the FBI should work togeth-
gence officers, from the Central Intelligence
er, as is now planned, to assess the vulnerabil-
Agency or other appropriate intelligence
ity of U.S. airports to the threat of terrorist vio-
agency, to serve in a senior capacity at the
lence. Additionally, the level of terrorist threat
Office of the Secretary of the Department of
in the United States must be analyzed and
Transportation. In doing so, the Director
monitored on a continuing basis to ensure the
should consult closely with the Secretary of
proper level of security at domestic airports,
Transportation.
and the FAA and FBI should work together to
6. All MOU's and written working agree-
arrive at the most effective method for this to
ments between FAA and the intelligence and
be done.
law enforcement community members should
3. Consideration should be given to placing
be reviewed and updated where appropriate.
greater emphasis within the intelligence com-
munity on strategic (as opposed to operational)
Endnotes
efforts, by developing a specific unit with limit-
ed day-to-day responsibility, whose principal
1 Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism (Feb-
ruary 1986).
function would be long-term strategic thinking
2 Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities
concerning terrorism.
Within the United States (June 1975) p. 129.
4. The function of the FAA's Intelligence Di-
3 Letter from Donnie R. Blazer, Manager Special Programs Di-
vision, now located within the Office of Civil
vision, FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security (March 28, 1990).
4 See, e.g., Written Statement of Thomas G. Plaskett, Pan Amer-
Aviation Security, should be moved to the De-
ican World Airways, Commission Hearing, April 4, 1990, pp.
partment of Transportation, where it will
9-10.
82
Chapter 6
Aviation Threat
Notification-A
National Standard
As the Commission has reviewed, the intelli-
An intense public debate over the question
gence agencies cast a wide net to catch all pos-
of public notification of aviation threats 2 is un-
sible aviation threat information ranging from
derscored by the serious current weaknesses in
public sources, such as newspaper articles and
the aviation security system. While no govern-
trade publications, to extremely sensitive
ment or airline can assure 100 per cent security
sources, such as agents in the field. This intelli-
from terrorism, the question of public notifica-
gence information can vary widely in type and
tion becomes particularly compelling when it is
quality, but much of it is more mundane than
plain that certain credible threat information
the public may suspect. Culling the "wheat
must be taken quite seriously. On the other
from the chaff" is a daunting task, considering
hand, the Commission's review reveals that in-
the mass of data that must be analyzed, wheth-
telligence and law enforcement agencies suc-
er from the intelligence and law enforcement
cessfully sift out the "noise." Most of the loud-
network or the anonymous telephone call to an
est threats are just that-noise. The reality is
airline. Some threat information is literally
that the terrorists rarely announce their inten-
thrust upon the intelligence and law enforce-
tions. Thus the government must carefully ad-
ment agencies, the air carriers, and other insti-
dress what to do when the sounds are heard.
tutions, in the form of threats actually deliv-
ered. The classic example is the anonymous
telephoned bomb threat.
Importance of a Single
The particular issue is whether, under what
Notification Standard
circumstances, how and by whom should the
public be made aware of such information.
On December 5, 1988, the U.S. Embassy in
This question arises in the context of Flight
Helsinki received an anonymous telephone
103 largely because of the so-called Helsinki
threat that a bomb would be carried aboard a
warning previously described in this Report.
Pan Am flight from Frankfurt to New York
Although later determined to be a hoax, the
within the next two weeks. Although all au-
warning and the public posting by the U.S. Em-
thorities have since concluded the threat was a
bassy in Moscow of its substance, dramatically
hoax, at the time the threat was taken very seri-
drove home the importance of developing a na-
ously.
tional standard for the release of aviation threat
The FAA issued a security bulletin to certain
information. Furthermore, although there is no
regions and representatives overseas and
basis to conclude that the Embassy posting was
through the State Department to numerous
designed solely to warn U.S. Embassy person-
embassies abroad.
nel,¹ that episode exposed the risks and pitfalls
On December 14, the U.S. Embassy in
of any "double standard," i.e., where persons
Moscow posted and distributed the substance
are selectively warned against aviation threats
of the FAA bulletin describing the Helsinki
while the public is left in the dark.
warning.³ News of this posting was widely re-
*Endnotes appear at end of chapter.
ported by the news media soon after Flight 103
83
was destroyed and resulted in an angry and
them. Warnings which posts plan to
bitter reaction. Although it is now known that
distribute to official personnel and de-
the Moscow posting was available to the entire
pendents should be referred, unless
American community in Moscow and was not
immediate notice is critical, in advance
limited to personnel at the Embassy, the per-
to the department for a determination
ception was created widely that the government
about dissemination to a broader e.g.
warned only its own. The basis for this percep-
non-USG audience.⁶
tion is easy to understand. The government
possesses the intelligence information and con-
Unfortunately, the State Department's stand-
trols its release-what, when and to whom.
ing policy for its posts in effect in December,
Therefore, when there is any distribution of
1988 was opaque at best-providing little or no
threat information to a segment of the popula-
guidance to officials like those at the Embassy
tion, such as the posting in Moscow, the per-
in Moscow. The Department's subsequent
ception is created that the government, as a
statements highlight the importance of clear
matter of policy, applies a "double standard"-
the intentional choice to warn some people but
guidance on this matter.
not others. For the families of Flight 103 vic-
The Commission cannot state too strongly
tims, the Moscow episode raised the possibility
that any double standard or system of selective
that people warned by the posting saved their
notification is unacceptable and should not be
own lives, while the Flight 103 passengers went
tolerated as a matter of policy or practice. The
unwarned to their deaths. In such a case, the
only government personnel who should receive
policy implications of such a dual standard are
travel security information are those involved
devastatingly obvious, and particularly if those
in intelligence or providing security. There is
who were warned were government employees.
no justification for disseminating threat infor-
The State Department has characterized the
mation to a wider government audience, or for
Moscow posting as a mistake and has denied
using the information to affect travel plans of
that it reflected a double standard policy.4
the family and friends of even those who have a
Moreover, as previously detailed, the Commis-
legitimate need to know the information.
sion has attempted to ascertain whether any
The Commission fully recognizes that this
Embassy personnel actually altered their plans
tight rein on the distribution of threat informa-
to avoid Pan Am flights out of Frankfurt during
tion may sometimes put State Department and
the period of the Helsinki warning, including
other government personnel in a difficult posi-
Flight 103 on December 21. The Department
tion: they are aware of a credible threat, they
of State has testified that it is not aware of any
are aware that their family members, friends,
cancellations by U.S. Government personnel
subordinates, co-workers or superiors might
and that 31 U.S. Government personnel were
alter their plans if they were aware of the
killed on Flight 103, including "three State De-
threat; yet they are forbidden to reveal the in-
partment employees.⁵ The Commission recog-
formation. This moral dilemma was concretely
nizes that it may never be known how many
and clearly set out for the Commission at its
people were aware of the Helsinki warning and
March 9 hearing by Raymond F. Smith, of the
decided not to fly on Pan Am from Frankfurt
U.S. Moscow Embassy:
during this period. The Commission, however,
is aware of only one, and that passenger was
When I looked at this [the FAA bulle-
not booked on Flight 103, December 21, 1988.
tin on the Helsinki warning], and
In the aftermath of Flight 103, the Depart-
ment of State has underscored its policy:
thought about it, I said to myself, if I
were planning to travel during this
no double standard or appearance of
period of time, would I take this infor-
one can exist regarding our warning
mation into account? Would I want my
systems. Official Americans cannot
family to have this information to take
benefit from receipt of information
into account? And the answer was yes.
which might equally apply to the trav-
And the second question I asked
elling public but is not available to
myself is well, what right do I have to
84
use this information and not to make
criticism as reflecting a "double standard." The
it available to other people?⁷
State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Secu-
rity currently offers an electronic data base, the
Unfortunately, this dilemma cannot be avoid-
Overseas Security Electronic Bulletin Board
ed. The State Department and other govern-
(EBB), to disseminate, free of charge, security
ment channels must make it clear to those who
information to "any enterprise incorporated in
hold positions with this sensitive responsibility
the United States doing substantial business
that this difficulty is simply part of their job.
overseas." 8 This definition is not very limiting,
The guidance and direction for these personnel
but excludes individual travelers.
must be clear and unambiguous: either the in-
The EBB was established at the recommen-
formation remains closely held by those with a
dation of the Overseas Security Advisory Coun-
legitimate need to know, or it must be made
cil, a 25-member "joint venture between the
public. There can be no middle ground; there
is no justifiable premise for any system of se-
Department of State and the private sector"
lective notification, whether official or informal.
that was created at the urging of Secretary
The likelihood that threat information will be
Shultz in 1985.9 Twenty-one of the 25 OSAC
improperly distributed is greater if the number
members are from the private sector, and have
of people who have the information is large.
included major organizations such as Exxon,
Indeed, if the universe of people handling such
United Airlines, Bristol-Myers, Coca-Cola, GE,
information is large enough, there can be an
CARE, American Express, DuPont, and IBM. 10
appearance of a double standard, even if the
OSAC performs an important function in
information is kept within appropriate chan-
providing assistance particularly to American
nels. These two problems were illustrated by
business enterprises that may have installations
the distribution of the Helsinki warning.
and offices overseas. The State Department has
Although the Helsinki warning concerned a
been sensitive to claims of a double standard,
threatened bombing of a Pan Am flight from
and the EBB does not contain any classified in-
Frankfurt to the United States, this unclassified
formation or FAA-issued directives or circulars.
information was distributed to literally thou-
The EBB does contain, however, information
sands of people around the world with respon-
such as reports on security and crime incidents,
sibilities remote from the threat. This practice
by country; profiles of terrorist groups, by
inevitably invites the question whether this dis-
country; and "updates on new or unusual situa-
tribution had the effect (whether intended or
tions overseas." 11 Some of this information
not) of a de facto double standard.
could be relevant to travelers as well as busi-
In early 1989, the State Department sent to
nesses.
all diplomatic and consular posts an extensive
The EBB did not contain the so-called Hel-
set of instructions and guidance that repeated
sinki warning. However, during the period
and clarified its position on the dissemination
from July 1988 through December 1988 it did
of FAA security bulletins. These instructions
contain significant terrorist threat information
make clear that FAA security bulletins are dis-
not irrelevant to aviation, including, for exam-
tributed to posts in affected areas to keep intel-
ple, information concerning possible retaliation
ligence, security and other necessary personnel
for the downing of the Iranian airbus, the
informed of the information being given to the
attack on the Greek ship "City of Poros," possi-
air carriers in their area and to enable them to
ble disruption of the Seoul Olympic games,
arrange any necessary coordination of addition-
and the arrest of PFLP-GC members in West
al security measures with host country officials.
Germany and the discovery of radio cassette
The State Department cable also emphasized
bombs. All of this information was unclassified,
that FAA bulletins should have limited distribu-
and derived from a variety of sources, including
tion within the post, and are not intended for
press reports. But the EBB, by design, is an ex-
use to warn U.S. Government employees of
cellent single source of security information.
threats against civil aviation.
The Commission supports the efforts that
There is one U.S. Government mechanism
have been made to clarify for U.S. Government
for the dissemination of threat information that
personnel that a double standard of threat noti-
the Commission believes remains subject to
fication is not acceptable and to reduce the
85
prospect of a double standard. However, more
analysis from intelligence and law enforcement
needs to be done to limit the distribution of
agencies, and (2) threats against aviation actual-
FAA security directives and information circu-
ly delivered to various entities, including air-
lars within U.S. Government channels, and
lines, airports, private citizens, law enforcement
access to the OSAC EBB should be broadened.
agencies, and public officials.
In the United States, airlines and airports re-
Recommendations
ceive an average of 600-700 anonymous threats
per year. The FAA reports that from
1. The Commission recommends that the in-
1980-1989, a total of 6,322 bomb threats were
telligence and law enforcement communities,
made concerning U.S. aircraft; not one has come
and those that receive information collected or
true. 13 There were no actual explosions, and
analyzed by those communities, review their
no actual device was ever found related to
procedures to reduce to the minimum the
those threats. In one case, in 1980, a hoax
number of persons with access to information
device was found on the aircraft. 14 Yet, it is im-
on civil aviation threats. 12 The Commission has
possible to determine how many, if any, attacks
no desire to compromise or otherwise interfere
were deterred or prevented by increased law
with the legitimate needs of intelligence and
enforcement and security efforts taken in re-
law enforcement agencies, or the agencies they
sponse to these threats.
serve. This recommendation is intended to be
By the nature of anonymous threats, the
consistent with the needs of the intelligence
caller or writer often leaves law enforcement
community and those agencies that might re-
and intelligence agencies little to go on but the
spond to the threat.
content of the threat itself. In these cases, little
2. The Commission recommends that the
or no information is available to help deter-
State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Securi-
mine how seriously the threat should be taken.
ty daily transfer a copy of the content of the
The FAA's statistical evidence supports the
OSAC EBB to the Bureau of Consular Affairs,
presumption that anonymous threats are not
and that the Bureau of Consular Affairs estab-
credible; that is not to say that this presump-
lish a system of public access to that informa-
tion is not rebuttable. 15
tion. Such access could be accomplished either
In contrast to the large number of anony-
directly by the Bureau of Consular Affairs,
mous threats, the occasions when our intelli-
through an electronic bulletin board it might
gence efforts produce solid information about
establish, or through a private sector service
upcoming terrorist attacks is exceedingly rare.
available to public subscribers. In this fashion
Only a portion of those rare occasions produce
the traveling public will have the opportunity
terrorist threat information directed at U.S.
to access the same threat information available
civil aviation targets.
to the business community. Further appropria-
The Commission reviewed the number of se-
tions may be necessary to support this expand-
ed access.
curity bulletins (now directives or circulars)
issued by the FAA in the last three years. The
Current Notification Practices
FAA issued 27 security bulletins in 1988, 11
bulletins or directives and 22 information circu-
In considering the question of whether there
lars in 1989, and one security directive and 23
should be public notification of aviation securi-
information circulars in the first quarter of
ty threats, the Commission examined the scope
1990. These bulletins, directives and circulars
of the issue (how much and what kinds of
were derived from intelligence reporting and
threat information), current policies for access
other sources that in many cases would not
to aviation threat information, and the State
easily translate into specific additional security
Department's various advisories.
measures by the air carriers or precautions by
passengers were they privy to the information.
The Universe of Threats
The limited number and general nature of
Aviation security threat information takes
those reports reflects the difficulties inherent in
many forms. The Commission's analysis fo-
any effort to gather firm information about
cuses on two types: (1) threat information and
small, mobile, compartmentalized groups which
86
operate predominantly on foreign soil. The ob-
On March 14, 1989, at the first Senate hear-
vious is worth repeating: terrorists do not nor-
ings held in the aftermath of Flight 103's de-
mally telegraph their intentions, and they do
struction, DOT Secretary Skinner testified:
not typically call in warnings of their planned
attacks.
Again, let me emphasize that when we
believe an element of the civil aviation
Current Aviation Threat
system cannot be adequately protected
Information Access Policies
against a credible threat from some-
one or some organization with the
One of the FAA's most important functions
clear intent and capability to carry out
is to issue security directives and information
a criminal act, the U.S. Government
circulars. By this process, threats to aviation are
will: 1) recommend that airlines cancel
shared with airlines and airports, and host gov-
threatened services; and 2) if neces-
ernments.
sary, issue a public travel advisory to
Although the FAA Intelligence Division re-
alert air travellers. 18
ceives a great deal of both finished and raw re-
porting on terrorism from the intelligence com-
Ambassador Clayton E. McManaway, Jr., then
munity, it does not distribute classified infor-
Associate Coordinator for Counterterrorism at
mation. When the FAA's Civil Aviation Security
the State Department, testified at another
and Intelligence divisions determine that threat
Senate hearing in April 1989:
information warrants distribution as a directive
or information circular, it is prepared in an un-
If we have a specific and credible
classified form to be shared with airport and
threat to civil aviation security which
airline security personnel, who are responsible
cannot be countered, we will strongly
for providing aviation security. 16 The classified
recommend to the air carrier that it
intelligence reporting often is "sanitized," dis-
cancel the threatened flight. If it is a
tilling the report to protect either the source or
U.S. carrier, the FAA will cancel the
the method by which it was collected.
flight if the airline will not. If neces-
The end product of this process is usually an
sary, the Department of State will
FAA security directive or information circular,
issue a public travel advisory to alert
which can then be used by the affected airlines
the American traveling public to this
threat. 19
to enhance security procedures to meet the
threat. These warnings from the FAA to the
private sector are also disseminated to various
While these are the official positions, to date
there has never been a public notification of a
government agencies on a "need to know"
basis. For example, FAA bulletins are distribut-
terrorist threat to civil aviation by the State De-
ed to the State Department posts in any coun-
partment, DOT, or FAA. Flight cancellations
have occurred, however. The State Department
try where FAA originally disseminates the in-
has testified that it has not recommended to an
formation to airlines. The State Department
air carrier that it cancel a threatened flight. 20
said of the procedures: "The contents of these
In contrast, the FAA has testified that it has
bulletins may come to the attention of airport
recommended that carriers cancel flights under
or host government officials through airline se-
a variety of circumstances, and that the carriers
curity channels, (thus) it is also important that
have agreed to do so. 21 The FAA has also indi-
officers at post who deal with these matters be
cated that it has the authority to cancel flights,
in a position to respond to inquiries from for-
but has never exercised that authority. 22 These
eign officials." 17
policies, which emphasize cancellation of
The U.S. Government's policy on whether
flights, appear focused on threats against spe-
and/or when the public should be notified of
cific flights. The airlines historically have not
threats against civil aviation is set forth in vari-
publicly announced threats, although some
ous public statements made by the Depart-
have notified passengers at the gate that threats
ments of State and Transportation.
have been received. 23
87
port. The current security system will have a
will not likely catch the plastic explosive or
high confidence level that the threatened hi-
the bomber or (3) Cancel all Widget Air
jacking can be foiled or interdicted. On the
flights from Madrid to New York for a
other hand, other threats may be more difficult
month-roughly 50 flights.
to counter.
Threat Hypothetical. Many of the elements
Conclusions
critical to the decision of whether to notify the
public of at least some terrorist threat informa-
The Commission believes that public notifi-
tion are best assessed by reference to a hypo-
cation would be appropriate in circumstances
thetical set of facts.
like the above hypothetical case. The threat in-
formation is credible, has enough specificity for
Threat: Known Middle East terrorist group
travelers to act but not enough specificity to
plans to bomb a "Widget Air" flight from
tailor special interdiction efforts; and there is a
Madrid to New York some time in the next
low level of confidence that the threat of plastic
month, by use of a plastic explosives se-
explosives can be countered. 34
creted in either a suitcase or in a parcel.
Enhancing security measures is not by itself a
The plastic explosives are disguised in a
viable option when these measures would be
common object of unknown shape and
unlikely to prevent the threatened attack.
configuration. This same group has had
The option of cancelling some 12 flights a
previous success in an aviation bombing,
week for a month appears to be a completely
but few of the members are known.
unreasonable alternative that neither the air-
Credibility: Intelligence analysts feel strongly
lines nor the public would prefer. Public notifi-
that the information is credible and has a
cation of the threat will still allow the airline to
reasonable probability of being accurate.
fly, and will permit attempts at enhanced secu-
Sources and Methods: Intelligence analysts
rity to lessen its risk of attack. The cost and
have multiple sources for the threat infor-
disruption to the airline and passengers of can-
mation and are not concerned that disclo-
cellations of flights will presumably be much
sure of the threat may compromise sources
higher than the costs associated with public no-
or methods.
tification, a much more reasonable and realistic
solution.
Specificity: The threat is specific enough
The above hypothetical case presents a com-
that telling the public about it would give
pelling case. The hypothetical case is not the
the public enough information to change
only type of circumstances where public notifi-
their plans and lower their risk if they
choose to do so. Yet the threat is not so
cation is appropriate; nor must all of those
same elements be present to qualify the threat
specific as to make it easy to cancel
for public notification. Other situations will
flight(s)-because Widget Air has roughly
12 flights a week from Madrid to New
present tougher calls, but there is no mechani-
York.
cal test by which the decision can be made, nor
is there any easy formula to which the decision
Assurance That Can Counter Threat: The
can be reduced. It is simply designed to dem-
threat of plastic explosives in an impro-
onstrate why a system of public notification
vised device of unknown shape or configu-
must be in place, and illustrate the kinds of cir-
ration is difficult to detect with current
cumstances that should influence any decision
technology, and it may be impractical to
concerning notification.
hand-search all baggage, parcels and
The responsibility for notification. This deci-
cargo. The group had demonstrated past
sion-making process is imbued with policy con-
success with similar devices. Thus, there is
siderations. The Commission strongly believes
a low degree of confidence that the threat
that the primary responsibility for public notifi-
can be countered.
cation is and should be a government responsi-
Options: (1) Notify the public-inform them
bility. 35 This will assure that a single standard
of the threat and let them make their own
is applied consistently, instead of leaving the
choice and/or (2) Enhance security meas-
decision to many different national and region-
ures-but know that all measures probably
al air carriers, each of which might have a dif-
92
ferent policy on the issue. This policy also is
ously described, broad-scale public notification
consistent with the Commission's recommenda-
will be more appropriate and effective. Because
tions that the responsibility for security be
the hypothetical threat covered a month's
more squarely shifted to the government, and
worth of flights, it is likely the press would
that threat information not be widely dissemi-
learn of notification warnings made directly to
nated outside of government channels. For
passengers. To avoid confusion and possible
threats to aviation abroad, this responsibility
overreaction, a broad-scale notification would
appropriately rests with the State Depart-
be appropriate in that circumstance.
ment.
36
The Commission cannot predict with certain-
For domestic threats, the Commission rec-
ty how often public notifications will occur, or
ommends that the responsibility be given to the
how best to be sure that broad-scale notifica-
Department of Justice, where policymakers
tions are available to the traveling public. In
would have a close working relationship with
some cases press coverage will be effective; in
the source of most domestic threat information,
other cases it may not. We encourage the De-
the FBI-the lead domestic counterterrorism
partments of State and Justice to explore vari-
agency. 37 The Department of Justice should
ous mechanisms to facilitate public notification,
work closely and coordinate all notification de-
including an 800 number, as envisioned by S.
cisions with the Department of Transportation
596, and adding aviation threat information to
and the FAA.
the OSAC EBB which, under the Commission's
The Commission emphasizes the importance
recommendation, will be available to public
of clear government accountability and respon-
access.
sibility for the notification decision. The Com-
mission has detailed the various considerations
Recommendation
that should be incorporated in the notification
decision process, and we have acknowledged
that the process is imbued with public policy
The Commission believes that public notifi-
choices. Public confidence in any system of no-
cation of aviation threat information is appro-
tification is dependent on there being identifia-
priate under certain circumstances and after
ble public officials in whose hands the decision
taking into account the various considerations
to notify or not to notify rests.
described in this Report. The U.S. Government
The Commission recognizes that government
should, as a matter of course and policy, con-
cannot bar the airlines from communicating
sciously consider the question of notification
threat information to their passengers. For ex-
and carefully review the factors outlined. To
ample, an airline might choose to notify its pas-
implement this recommendation, the Depart-
sengers of an anonymous bomb threat. The
ment of State, and the Department of Justice,
Commission has learned from the air carriers
in close cooperation with the Department of
that at least some of them notify individual pas-
Transportation, should establish a process and
sengers at the gate on specific threatened
a mechanism by which clearly identifiable offi-
flights. Airlines would be free to notify their in-
cials will consider when and how to provide no-
dividual passengers in any case where the infor-
tification to the traveling public.
mation is unclassified and in the proper posses-
sion of the carrier. 38 Naturally, the Commis-
Endnotes
sion believes that the public would be best
1 See discussion in Chapter 2.
served by coordination between the airlines
2 S. 596, introduced on March 15, 1989, would require that
and the government with respect to the dis-
certain aviation threat information be made available to the
public by the Department of Transportation.
semination of threat information.
3 Although this posting occurred after the United States and
How to notify. The method and manner of
foreign intelligence agencies had determined that the Helsinki
notification (passengers at the gate or wide
warning was a hoax, the Moscow Embassy personnel responsible
public dissemination) must depend on the cir-
for the posting testified that they did not learn it was a hoax until
April 1989. Testimony of Mark Sanna, Commission Hearing,
cumstances of the threat. In a typical threat
March 9, 1990, p. 105.
case against a specific flight, notification of in-
4 See e.g., Testimony of Ambassador Clayton E. McManaway,
dividual passengers at the gate is appropriate.
Jr., "Aviation Security," Senate Appropriations Committee
Transportation Subcommittee, S. Hrg. 101-110 (March 14,
In other cases like the hypothetical one previ-
1989), pp. 39-40 and 53) (hereinafter "S. Hrg. 101-110" and
93
Chapter 7
Treatment of the
Families of Victims
of Terrorism
In the Commission's view, the general issue
Citizens Services (OCS).4 OCS is itself divided
of the treatment of the victims of terrorist acts,
into two components: the Citizens Emergency
and the bombing of Flight 103 in particular, is
Center (EMR), to render assistance in "crisis
divided into two parts: (1) the provision of con-
situations" (e.g., the repatriation of Americans
sular services by the State Department and (2)
who die overseas), and the Office of Citizens
compensation, which is further divided between
Consular Services (CCS), which handles non-
international treaties that govern the recovery
emergency services (e.g., estate matters and the
of damages from international air carriers, and
return of property).
the provision of compensation by the U.S. Gov-
In the Lockerbie disaster, the nearest U.S.
ernment.¹
diplomatic post was the U.S. Consulate in Edin-
At numerous Congressional hearings and in
burgh, which reports to the U.S. Embassy in
testimony submitted to the Commission, the
London. The location of this disaster was in
families of Flight 103 victims have registered
many ways advantageous to the delivery of con-
bitter complaints over their treatment by the
sular services:
State Department and its Bureau of Consular
1. The disaster occurred in an English speak-
Affairs. The complaints of the families focused
ing country, with which the United States has
on poor delivery of the consular services that
excellent relations. The police, other govern-
the Department attempted to provide, and on
mental authorities and local residents provided
other vital services families contend were total-
assistance and cooperation.
ly ignored. The families' bitterness was com-
2. The applicable legal system is similar to
pounded by the legal environment. U.S. law
that of the United States.
provides no monetary benefits for private civil-
3. The carrier involved was American owned
ian victims of terrorist acts. The Warsaw Con-
and operated.
vention, an international treaty, impedes the
4. Although Lockerbie is a small town (3,500
families in recovering compensation from Pan
population) in a rural area, the U.S. Edinburgh
Am, an American carrier.
Consulate is 80 miles away, and reachable by
car and scheduled train in less than two hours.
State Department Practices
5. The London Embassy had revised its dis-
and Policies
aster plan two years earlier, with specific guid-
ance to Embassy and Consulate staff in the
Consular Services
event of a disaster.⁵
6. Exactly one week earlier, "[t]wo consular
The responsibility for delivery of consular
officers [from the London Embassy] participat-
services 2 rests primarily with State Department
ed in an emergency exercise at Heathrow Air-
posts overseas in conjunction with the Bureau
port, with Pan Am as the participating air-
of Consular Affairs 3 and its Office of Overseas
line" 6 and six months earlier the Embassy had
held a crisis management exercise according to
*Endnotes appear at end of chapter.
subsequent State Department accounts.⁷
97
In June 1989, President George Bush met at the White House with several persons who lost family members on Pan Am Flight 103.
Pictured left to right are White House Chief of Staff John Sununu; family members Victoria Cummock, Paul Hudson and Bert
Ammerman; President Bush; Transportation Secretary Samuel Skinner; and family members Wendy Giebler and Joe Horgan.
While response to any aviation disaster or
sistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs
terrorist incident is difficult, it is easy to imag-
testified:
ine circumstances that would have posed addi-
tional impediments: a truly remote or inhospit-
it wasn't until later, until March o[r]
able site, a hostile or corrupt government or
April, that we began to recognize that
legal system, a non-English speaking local pop-
there were some real serious problems
ulation, a distant or small U.S. diplomatic mis-
with how the families felt they were
sion, or a lack of basic emergency, communica-
being responded to.⁸
tions, forensic and mortuary facilities or capac-
ity.
The Response to Flight 103
From the Commission's inquiry of the avail-
able evidence, it is apparent that the State De-
After Flight 103 exploded and fell, State De-
partment was simply unprepared for the Lock-
partment in Washington, the Embassy in
erbie disaster. It did not recognize, much less
London and the Consulate in Edinburgh react-
have the plans in place to provide, the level of
ed immediately.
services expected in the case of the mass
In Washington, D.C., at about 5:00 p.m.,
murder of Americans at the hands of terrorists.
local time, after learning that Flight 103 was
Indeed, a review of officials' testimony and
destroyed over Lockerbie, the Department es-
the staff interviews of consular personnel sug-
tablished a "Working Group" to manage the
gest that the State Department did not even re-
crisis.9 A Bureau of Consular Affairs "shift" re-
alize until much later that it had not provided a
sponded to telephone inquiries from concerned
level and quality of service that the Flight 103
relatives and friends, but could not provide or
families expected. For example, the current As-
confirm identification of victims. Although Pan
98
Am was asked for a copy of the manifest, or
one on the ground. Likewise, the four jet en-
passenger list, none was produced for more
gines landed in Lockerbie, but caused little
than seven hours. That evening, according to
damage. 17 The wings, loaded with aviation
the State Department's account, the "number
fuel, fell on Sherwood Crescent, creating an
of inquiries continue[d] to mount [and] [m]any
immense fireball and crater-killing 11 persons
callers [we]re frustrated at the lack of informa-
on the ground. 18
tion currently available.' 10
The Scottish police searched an area of 845
The U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, ac-
square miles-extending to the coast of Eng-
companied by five consular officers, two public
-land to the east, where lighter material fell.
affairs officers and a military attache, flew from
Their guiding principle was "if it's not grass,
London to Carlisle, Scotland, on U.S. Air Force
pick it up." 19 The remarkable police and vol-
transportation, and was escorted by Pan Am
unteer effort resulted in the identification of all
and the Scottish police to Lockerbie. They ar-
but 17 of the persons killed, recovery of more
rived at 3:00 a.m. Lockerbie time. 11 In the
than 16,000 items of personal effects, and per-
meantime, the Consul General at the Consulate
mitted an astounding reconstruction by the
in Edinburgh, 80 miles away, had arrived in
British Air Accidents Investigation Branch of
Lockerbie by car four hours earlier. 12 This
much of the wreckage. This reconstruction also
group surveyed the scene, held discussions with
led to promising leads in a criminal investiga-
Scottish authorities and Pan Am, and secured
tion that remains open.
office space and telephones.
The London Embassy staff also attempted to
The Scottish police early on classified the
get the manifest from Pan Am, and formed an
tragedy as a murder investigation. All bodies
inter-agency Embassy work group and an Em-
were autopsied. 20 In this regard it must be re-
membered that the United States was one of 21
bassy consular work group (phone bank) to re-
spond to calls and coordinate the flow of infor-
countries with victims, and that the standard
mation between Lockerbie and Washington. 13
set by Scottish authorities throughout was no
Over the next several days, after the manifest
less than 100 per cent conclusive proof of iden-
was received, consular staff in Washington,
tification. Despite this, all of the bodies which
Lockerbie and London attempted to put to-
were recovered and identified were released
gether a complete list of passengers and their
during the 28 days following the disaster. In
next of kin. 14 The next of kin information
this regard, the consulate officers prepared
came primarily from passport records. 15 A core
copies of Consular Mortuary Certificates and
group of four consular officers manned an
later, the Consular Reports of Death, the legal
office at the Lockerbie Academy (where many
documentation under U.S. law. 21
other organizations were provided space). By
The necessary demands of the criminal inves-
December 23, families had already begun arriv-
tigation, rather than a lack of effort or interest
ing in London, and continued to arrive over
by consular personnel, gave rise to delays in
the next few weeks. Many continued on to
the return of personal effects. The Procurator
Lockerbie.
Fiscal (equivalent to a U.S. Attorney and Coro-
The scope and breadth of the disaster that
ner) has indicated that State Department per-
occurred at Lockerbie challenges description.
sonnel in Lockerbie made every effort to secure
The Boeing 747, fully loaded with aviation fuel
the prompt release of the personal effects of
(having left Heathrow only 37 minutes earlier),
American citizens.
carried 259 passengers and crew, their bag-
Nearly 85 per cent of the 16,000 personal ef-
gage, and about 20 tons of cargo. 16 The air-
fects that were catalogued have been re-
craft exploded at approximately 31,000 feet,
turned. 22 Under Scottish law, officials could
breaking into many pieces, strewing debris and
have held all personal effects until completion
bodies over a wide area. The flight deck and
of the investigation or subsequent proceedings.
forward portion of the fuselage fell into a field
However, they permitted a phased release of
about three miles from Lockerbie in an area
items in groups, beginning in February 1989,
known as Tundergarth. The main portion of
with certain valuables (jewelry, watches and
the fuselage fell in a Lockerbie neighborhood
rings) deemed not germane to or needed in the
known as Rosebank, but miraculously killed no
criminal investigation. Some items still are
99
held, and the next of kin have been so ad-
rectly to communications with the families of
vised.²³
victims: (1) to be satisfied the next of kin are
A dedicated group of Scottish police have
notified or to make the notification themselves;
worked closely and personally with the families
(2) to provide all "appropriate information to
to identify as much of the personal effects as
families about" the return of remains and per-
possible. When items are identified and cleared
sonal effects; and (3) in the case of an airplane
for release, they are inventoried and trans-
(or similar) tragedy, to organize task forces to
ferred to the U.S. Consulate, which contacts
respond to public inquiries and seek to ascer-
the families for instructions on disposition. 24
tain the welfare of Americans believed to be in-
In 1989, nearly 1,000 shipments of personal ef-
volved.27
fects were sent to family members. 25 Although
Yet the Department apparently lacks a con-
the entire process of identifying and returning
sistent policy on how to secure a list of passen-
remains and property has not been free of
gers involved in airline disasters and their next
complaints and mistakes, this massive, sensitive
of kin, nor is there a clear policy on who has
and difficult job generally has been handled
the responsibility to notify the next of kin of
with care and commitment.
the deaths. In the case of Flight 103, Assistant
Notwithstanding these efforts, the Commis-
Secretary of State Elizabeth M. Tamposi testi-
sion's review of the Department's actions re-
fied. before the Commission that "Pan Am took
veals how the families concluded that the State
the lead role in the initial death notification
Department was insensitive to their needs. Ac-
and in the follow up of information and service
cording to testimony to the Commission:
that families required
Pan Am did not
Pan Am took the lead role in the initial
provide the State Department the passenger
death notification and follow-up informa-
manifest and next of kin information early on
tion and services;
[and] they wanted to be the first in notifying
the passengers' relatives
28
The State Department yielded to Scottish
authorities the primary role at Lockerbie of
The manifest the State Department received
briefing and dealing with the families; and
from Pan Am after more than seven hours,
Pan Am made the necessary arrangements
"consisted of surnames and first initials only,"
for shipping forensic information, and pro-
then Assistant Secretary of State Joan Clark re-
vided for the return of remains. 26
ported. 29 "In many cases, we found it useless
for locating next-of-kin in our passport
In addition, Pan Am and Kenyon Emergency
records. 30 At about noon on December 23,
Services, Ltd. arranged with the families the
almost two full days after the bombing, we fi-
disposition of remains as they were identified.
nally received Pan Am's contact list. This list
In fact, it is difficult to find an area where the
had much more complete data on the identity
State Department took a leading role. As a
of next-of-kin. Pan Am advised us that they al-
result, the families became increasingly de-
ready had notified all the families," Clark
pendent on the Scottish police and Pan Am for
said.³¹
information and assistance-while the State De-
It is unclear to the Commission why the De-
partment appeared to be a background crew of
partment did not press more vigorously for Pan
paper shufflers.
Am to provide the Department with the mani-
Two areas illustrate the problems that the
fest. While the Department has testified it lacks
State Department encountered and now must
the legal authority to force an airline to
remedy in order to provide compassionate and
effective consular services: communications
produce a passenger list,32 the Department's
internal written guidelines and procedures
with the families, and consular support at the
clearly assume that it will obtain the manifest
disaster scene.
"as soon as possible." 33 Although requests for
Communications with the
the manifests were apparently made to Pan Am
in London and in New York, 34 it remains un-
Families
clear exactly how much pressure the Depart-
Three of the actions the Department says it
ment brought to bear at what levels. There is
takes when an American dies overseas relate di-
no indication that, for example, the Assistant
100
Secretary of State for Consular Affairs attempt-
tact as soon as reasonably possible-and tell
ed to contact Pan Am directly, or sought assist-
the family what the government will do to assist
ance from her superiors at the State Depart-
in the prompt return of remains and personal
ment. 35 The matter apparently was not pur-
property. Thus, initial communication estab-
sued by the Department above the chairman of
lishes the link-a link that is critical to a con-
the Working Group established for the crisis,
tinuing relationship and the compassionate
who did not pursue the matter with Pan Am
treatment of the family.
above the vice president for legal affairs. 36 One
Even though Pan Am took the lead in notify-
member of the Commission observed that this
ing families of Flight 103 victims, the switch-
may have been one of those cases where
board handling the 28 lines for the State De-
"somebody had to pick up the phone and call
partment task force to take incoming calls, was
Tom Plaskett," the chairman of Pan Am. 37 The
"swamped," an official said later. 44 Although
Commission has difficulties reconciling the De-
the State Department has testified that it has
partment's current concern with this matter
"installed trunk lines for the 800 numbers to
with its failure at the time to take the steps nec-
be given only to families of victims for use in
essary to get the passenger list from Pan Am. 38
contacting and communicating with us during
Failure to secure the manifest promptly had a
the crisis," 45 an 800 number was not yet a re-
negative ripple effect on the State Depart-
ality at the time the Department testified before
ment's image in subsequent activities. Thereaf-
ter, the Department appeared to lack control or
the Commission. Thus, a question is raised
authority over who should notify next of kin,
whether the Department even now has the re-
sources to handle the volume of communica-
an accurate list of next of kin, and communica-
tions with the families.
tions required in the event of a major disaster
The Department began notifying Pan Am
like Flight 103. 46
103 next of kin by telephone but stopped
Even when callers made contact, the results
doing so after some who had been contacted
often left them dissatisfied. The Department
by Pan Am objected to "being contacted again
has acknowledged to the Commission:
by a second source," according to Tamposi. 39
The Department has "learned that [its] failure
Our system did suffer from our failure
to persist in notifying all the families was inter-
to assign each family a specific case
preted as indifference on [their] part by some
worker so that they would speak to the
of the family members, and that [they] had
same person each time that they
missed an opportunity to reassure them that
called. Since task force workers an-
the department was actively engaged in dealing
swered the calls as they came in, it was
with this tragedy," she said. 40 In addition, offi-
sometimes the case that an individual
cials failed to send written messages to the next
didn't have all the information that he
of kin to notify them officially of the deaths, 41
or she should have when dealing with
as required by Department regulations. 42 The
a particular family.47
State Department Task Force Handbook, re-
vised September 1989, underscores the impor-
Many callers also were unable to get informa-
tance of notification by consular officers:
tion about matters reported by the news media.
Immediate notification made to the
The Department initially testified in response:
family as soon as there is an incident
We do not like to give out any infor-
involving their family member. These
mation if in fact we are not sure or
individuals should be contacted with-
have not had it verified. Sometimes
out delay, even if the information im-
the press has information which we do
mediately available is scanty.43
not have. But until we can verify it as
The issue is not whether the airline or the De-
being official, we do not like to pass
partment should be the first to notify the pas-
on that information to the families. 48
sengers' next of kin. Instead, the critical point
This attitude may be appropriate for the
is that the Department of State must make con-
spokesman for the Department, but not for
101
sular duties is not enough. The families wanted
believes that crisis teams (public affairs, foren-
information of all kinds, including, where the
sic and bereavement experts) are critical; this is
bodies were located, how the identification
more efficient than training staff at each embas-
process was going, what additional forensic evi-
sy and consulate to handle all aspects of a
dence would be needed, and what conclusions
major disaster, an event that occurs rarely, if
were being drawn with respect to the existence
ever, in those areas. These teams would join
of a bomb.
in-country staff familiar with the local language,
Yet the Department did not have one person
laws, customs, and personalities.
assigned to brief families, or to be their om-
With a crisis team, however, the resident
budsman with the local social service agencies,
State Department post would remain in charge
governmental authorities and Pan Am, or to
of, and responsible for, the delivery of consular
provide consolation and comfort. 65 Indeed, be-
services. Therefore, the availability of these
cause the small staff could not handle a large
support teams should not diminish the training
number of incoming calls, the telephone
and planning that is still the responsibility of
number for the Consulate's temporary Locker-
the posts, including crisis plans, unique to
bie office was generally not given out. 66 The
the circumstances of the post.
conclusion appears inescapable that the consul-
5. Unfortunately, the Commission found no
ar staff at Lockerbie was focused on, if not
evidence that the Department has shared with
overwhelmed by, the paperwork and adminis-
its embassy and consulate posts any assessment
trative tasks required of them. This, however,
of the Flight 103 experience or new guidance
left many families with the impression of cal-
on response to terrorist disasters. This is a crit-
lous neglect.
ical first step that needs to be complemented
with clear direction, training, financial and
Recommendations
equipment support.⁶⁹
1. In each and every case of a terrorist disas-
Government's Responsibility to
ter, the Commission believes that at least one
the Families
senior official from the Bureau of Consular Af-
fairs should be dispatched to the scene. In the
The Commission believes it is also important
case of Pan Am 103, it is hard to understand
to address the question of whether the U.S.
why the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs
Government has a special obligation to the vic-
did not even visit Lockerbie to assure the fami-
tims of terrorist acts directed against the
lies that their State Department was indeed at
United States.
their side.
The government provides special treatment
2. The State Department should promulgate
for members of the military who are killed
criteria for staffing disaster scenes that also
overseas. The Air Force transported the caskets
define responsibility for these decisions. In the
of military personnel killed on Flight 103, flag
event of a disaster, the resources of individual
draped and removed by honor guard on arriv-
posts must be monitored under these new cri-
al. In contrast, the civilian families' caskets
teria, and supplemented if necessary.
were flown as cargo on Pan Am,7° without
3. The Department should require that in
ceremony.
any disaster at least one person be assigned the
The State Department did not send a repre-
sole function of providing on-site assistance to
sentative to the individual funerals. Although
families who may visit, and be the ombudsman
the current Assistant Secretary of State for
in matters involving local government authori-
Consular Affairs, Elizabeth Tamposi, has testi-
ties and social service agencies. This person
fied that she "personally believe[s] that the U.S.
must have the stature, personal skills and sensi-
Government should be represented at the fu-
tivities for these critical duties.
nerals of the Americans killed abroad by terror-
4. Since Lockerbie, the Department has de-
ists," 71 and although State Department repre-
ployed "crisis teams" to disaster scenes to aug-
sentatives have attended some funerals recent-
ment the embassy and consulate staff. The De-
ly, the policy question remains under develop-
partment told the Commission it is "working to
ment. 72 The current Secretary of State has sent
regularize the procedures." 67 The Commission
individually signed letters of condolence to
104
families of victims of terrorism (subsequent to
The Warsaw Convention-Carrier
Flight 103), and the Commission encourages
Liability
this practice.
Since 1934, the United States has been a
Recommendations
party to the Warsaw Convention of 1929, a
treaty that governs carrier liability for accidents
1. The Commission believes the U.S. Gov-
in international air travel and establishes a gen-
ernment owes special treatment to those who
eral presumption of carrier liability for death or
are killed in terrorist acts against this Nation,
injury in connection with these flights. The
and their families. The Department of State's
Warsaw Convention, however, limits carrier li-
Bureau of Consular Affairs should assign per-
ability to approximately $10,000 per victim
sonnel qualified in terrorism cases to assist
absent a showing of "willful misconduct." 73
families in the recovery and disposition of re-
Although a variety of "protocols" have been
mains and personal effects, and to act as their
proposed to revise the Warsaw Convention, the
ombudsman with foreign authorities and agen-
United States has ratified none of them. 74 Nev-
cies.
ertheless, under the Montreal Agreement of
2. The State Department should provide
1966 for flights to or from the United States
some ceremony appropriate to recognize the
the carriers agreed to accepting an increase in
sacrifice of the victims. For some families, the
liability to $75,000.75 Nonetheless, the Montre-
most the Department can offer is privacy.
al Agreement did not alter the Warsaw Con-
Others may wish to have government repre-
vention's provision that permits the cap on car-
sentatives at funerals and memorial services as
rier liability (increased from $10,000 to
an expression of respect and support. We send
$75,000) to be exceeded only upon a showing
reception teams when hostages are released; we
of willful misconduct.
should offer no less when the circumstances
The Warsaw Convention applies only to
are more tragic. The State Department should
international flights, and the Montreal Agree-
have discretion, in consultation with our Armed
ment only to international flights to, from or
Services, to adopt appropriate ceremonial pro-
with a stopover in the United States. Thus, no
cedures compatible with the families' own pref-
less than three legal scenarios might apply to a
erences. Whatever the procedures, the State
U.S. citizen's death or injury on a flight: (1) a
Department must institutionally recognize the
domestic U.S. flight would be governed by
special status of U.S. citizens who are victims of
state law, a system of common law negligence
acts of terrorism against this Nation.
that generally does not impose a limit on com-
pensatory or punitive damages; (2) an interna-
Compensation and Monetary
tional flight itinerary not involving travel to or
Benefits
from the United States would be governed by
the Warsaw Convention, but not the Montreal
There are no federal statutory provisions that
Agreement; and (3) an international flight itin-
specifically provide government payments or
erary involving travel beginning, ending or
other monetary benefits for the families of pri-
stopping in the United States would be gov-
vate civilian victims of acts of terrorism. Several
erned by the Montreal Agreement. For Flight
provisions of federal law provide financial ben-
103, which was destined for New York from
efits and relief for the families of federal gov-
London, the $75,000 limit of the Montreal
ernment employees and contractors, and mem-
Agreement applies. However, in pending litiga-
bers of the uniformed services who are killed
tion, certain Flight 103 claimants seek a finding
or injured in terrorist acts, but not for other ci-
that Pan Am engaged in willful misconduct. 76
vilians.
Pending revisions (awaiting U.S. ratification),
Moreover, when terrorism involves death or
known as Montreal Protocol 3, would establish
injury aboard an international flight, such as
absolute liability in cases of death or injury oc-
Flight 103, the Warsaw Convention limits com-
curring on international flights and increase the
pensation families may recover from the air
current liability limit to an International Mone-
carrier, absent a finding of willful misconduct.
tary Fund index now equivalent to approxi-
105
Endnotes
11 "Consular Staff Log,' p. 1.
12 Interviews with Douglas Jones and Elizabeth Leighton; "The
1 Mission Statement at 4-5 (November 20, 1989). We consid-
American Consulate General in Edinburgh's Role in Pan Am 103
ered, but rejected as infeasible, the likelihood that families of vic-
Follow-Up," (hereinafter referred to as the "American Consulate
tims of international terrorist acts might use the United States
Follow-up"), p. 1.
court system to seek recompense from individual terrorists or
13 London Embassy Assessment par. 1, p. 1.
states that sponsor their activities. The practical problems are ob-
14 Interviews with Consulate and Embassy staff revealed that
vious, and, in any event, foreign governments are not subject to
these contemporaneous efforts resulted in the creation of many
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. See Persinger V. Islamic Republic of
"lists." These staff all indicated that the absence of computer
Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, (1984)
equipment, with appropriate database software, impeded harmo-
discussed in Compensating Victims of Terrorism: The Current Framework
nization of the various lists.
in the United States, 22 Texas Int'l L.J. 383, 393-96 (1987).
15 The passport application has a non-mandatory data field
2 The Department's own statement of the actions it takes when
that calls for the name, address and telephone of a person to
an American dies overseas, include:
notify in case of an emergency. However, reliance on this infor-
To be satisfied the next of kin are notified or to make the
mation can be hazardous. The information contained on applica-
notification themselves.
tions for recently issued passports may not yet be computerized,
To transfer money, if needed, for the preparation and
and the information from older passport applications may have
return of the remains to the United States.
become inaccurate-this is particularly true now that passports
To prepare a Foreign Service Report of Death (which is
are valid for 10 years.
accepted under United States law as a death certificate).
16 See Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) Special Bulle-
To serve as provisional conservators of an estate of an
tin S1/89, p. 1-2 (hereinafter referred to as the "AAIB Special
American dying abroad if authorized kin is not at hand.
Bulletin").
To provide all "appropriate information to families about"
17 AAIB Special Bulletin, p. 1. Part of what the Scottish Police
the return of remains and personal effects.
call the "miracle of Lockerbie" is that one of the engines fell
In the case of an airplane (or similar) tragedy, the Depart-
harmlessly in a parking lot, but only 50 feet from a house.
ment also organizes task forces to respond to public inquir-
18 Dumfries and Galloway Regional Council, "LOCKERBIE: A
ies and seeks to ascertain the welfare of Americans believed
local authority response to the Disaster," p. 1 (November 1989).
to be involved.
The Sherwood Crescent crater measured 140 feet by 40 feet.
Aviation Security, Senate Committee on Appropriations Trans-
AAIB Special Bulletin, p. 1.
portation Subcommittee, S. Hrg. 101-110, pp. 50-51 (March 14,
19 Quoted during interviews with Procurator Fiscal James Mac-
1989) (hereinafter referred to as "S. Hrg. 101-110").
Dougall and Detective Chief Superintendent Stuart Henderson,
3 The Bureau of Consular Affairs was created by a 1978 De-
Senior Investigating Officer.
partment of State reorganization designed to join in "one direc-
20 All the bodies were X-rayed, and teams of pathologists per-
torate all the various services performed for American citizens
formed autopsies. The bodies were then embalmed and the on-
abroad." Overseas Consular Services-Overview (June 5, 1989).
going identification process continued. The Scottish police have
4 See generally "Disaster Assistance Handbook" printed in Citi-
made it clear, notwithstanding the preferences of some of the
zens Consular Services Procedures for Handling Reports of
families, that the autopsy reports (including any photographs) are
Death and Estates of Victims of Disasters and Emergency Travel
under Scottish law and procedure, police property and part of
Documentation for Survivors of Disasters Abroad, and reprinted as
the criminal investigation. As such, they will not be released to
Tab D to "Consular Affairs Task Force Assistance Handbook"
the families or the public. Interviews with Procurator Fiscal James
(September 1989). The Consular Affairs Task Force Assistance
MacDougall and Chief Constable George Esson.
Handbook was submitted as Exhibit B to the Commission Hear-
The Commission has no basis upon which to question this pro-
ing, December 18, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the "Task
cedure or practice.
Force Handbook").
21 See 7 FAM 231; Interviews with Elizabeth Leighton and
5 Interview with Taylor Blanton; Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland
Taylor Blanton.
December 21, 1988 Embassy London Assessment, par. 7(A), p. 4
22 Statement of Chief Constable George Esson, Dumfries and
(March 13, 1989) (hereinafter referred to as the "London Embas-
Galloway Constabulary, Press Release (December 15, 1989) and
sy Assessment"). The Embassy's Chief of American Citizen Serv-
Present Position of Property Being Held at L.I.C.C. (Lockerbie Incident
ices revised the Embassy's disaster plan, and forwarded it to the
Control Center, where the Lockerbie / Flight 103 investigation is
Department in Washington.
headquartered).
6 London Embassy Assessment, par. 5(A), p. 4. Department of
23 The Scottish police sent letters to the families formally noti-
State, "Pan Am Flight 103 Chronology of Events, p. 1 (herein-
fying them in October, 1989.
after referred to as the "State Department Chronology").
Some additional items are unreturned because they remain un-
7 London Embassy Assessment, par. 7(A), p. 4; State Depart-
identified. In order to facilitate the identification of valuables, the
ment Chronology, p. 1.
Scottish police met with some of the families and circulated a pic-
8 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Tamposi,
ture catalogue of these items. The State Department and the FBI
Commission Hearing, December 18, 1989, p. 253 (hereinafter re-
are coordinating distribution of the catalogue to families that did
ferred to as the "Tamposi Testimony").
not meet with the Scottish police. Interview with Chief Constable
9 State Department Chronology, p. 1. The Working Group,
George Esson.
similar but less formal than a Task Force, was created at the di-
24 See American Consulate Follow-up; Interviews with John Gil-
rection of the Executive Secretary to respond to the crisis, and it
mour, Harvey Thomson, Sheila Meads, Julie Rethmeier and Eliz-
remained in effect until it was disbanded on January 4, 1989.
abeth Leighton; State Department Chronology, p. 36.
State Department Chronology, p. 22. The Bureau of Consular
Much of the clothing, soiled by aviation fuel and fluids, was
Affairs is but one of several bureaus represented. Task Force
washed by Lockerbie volunteers before it was turned over to the
Handbook, p. 4-6.
Consulate.
At the time the Working Group was established, it was as-
25 American Consulate Follow-up, p. 2.
sumed that this was a plane crash rather than an act of terrorism.
26 Tamposi Testimony, pp. 218, 220 and 224.
10 State Department Chronology, p. 2.
27 S. Hrg. 101-110, pp. 50-51.
108
28 Tamposi Testimony, pp. 218.
a Crisis, par. 2.B.(2), attached to letter from Assistant Secretary of
29 Prepared Statement of Joan M. Clark, Assistant Secretary of
State Elizabeth Tamposi to Commission Chairman Ann
State for Consular Affairs submitted to the Senate Foreign Rela-
McLaughlin (January 4, 1990)).
tions Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International
39 Tamposi Testimony, p. 219. According to the Department's
Operations (April 7, 1989), p. 3 (hereinafter referred to as "Clark
chronology of consular actions, about two hours after the mani-
Foreign Relations Prepared Statement").
fest was received, the Department began calling those persons
30 Ms. Clark earlier had testified that "if you have a name like
who had previously called the Department about relatives. See
mine Clark, or Smith, or something which is fairly common, it is
State Department Chronology, pp. 3-4.
difficult to go through millions and millions of passport applica-
40 Tamposi Testimony, p. 219.
tions that we have on file and retrieve those." Hearings and
41 Tamposi Testimony, p. 220.
Markup on H.R. 1487, p. 116 (March 8, 1989) (hereinafter "H.R.
42 "The Department has a statutory obligation to make notifi-
1487 Hearings").
The problem was compounded in the case of Pan Am 103 by
cations of death. Notification by traveling companions and others
the existence of multiple lists-the London Embassy list, Pan
does not relieve the Department of the responsibility of inform-
Am's London list, the State Department's list and the list gener-
ing the closest relative to ensure that all proper notification has
been made and that all available information has been dissemi-
ated by Pan Am in New York. Each list in turn was supplemented
and annotated by the information generated or received at each
nated. The consular officer must be certain that the proper
location. The benefits associated with a single, complete list (or a
person is notified 7 FAM par. 221.
mechanism to assure that all information is harmonized) appear
It is not at all clear that even a large post with good communi-
obvious.
cations facilities, such as London, has the resources to send out
31 Clark Foreign Relations Prepared Statement, p. 3. See also
the large number of cables required in a major disaster such as
Testimony of Ambassador Clayton E. McManaway, S. Hrg. 101-
Flight 103. In its assessment, the London Embassy noted:
110, p. 75 (hereinafter referred to as the "McManaway Testimo-
We have wondered how we would have coped if we had
ny").
been required to send 189 or more notification cables.
32 Compare McManaway Testimony, p. 48, with Tamposi Testi-
London Embassy Assessment, par. 8(B), p. 6.
mony, p. 218.
43 Task Force Handbook, p. 21.
33 Compare Disaster Assistance Handbook, p. 5 (Disaster Action
Checklist, item #4) "Obtain an accurate passenger manifest as
44 Testimony of Joan Clark, H.R. 1487 Hearings, p. 116.
soon as possible and cable the names of passengers to the De-
45 Tamposi Testimony, p. 225.
partment" with Disaster Assistance Handbook, p. 10, "If at all
46 Indeed, one consular officer suggested that in contrast Pan
possible, a passenger manifest of the plane, train, bus, etc.,
Am had a very sophisticated telephone system that could handle
should be obtained from the carrier involved as soon as possi-
a large volume of calls. Interview with Elizabeth Leighton.
ble."
47 Tamposi Testimony, pp. 221-22. It was not until March
34 Clark Foreign Relations Prepared Statement, p. 2.
1989 that the Bureau adopted something akin to a "buddy"
In the exercise conducted one week earlier at Heathrow, it was
system, such as the one used by Pan Am, where each family
contemplated that Pan Am would make the manifest available to
would have an assigned person to be their "liaison." State De-
the U.S. Embassy in London. Indeed, it appears that on the
partment Chronology, p. 45
evening of December 21st, Pan Am (Heathrow/London) was
48 Testimony of Joan Clark, H.R. 1487 Hearing, p. 116. In
agreeable to making the Flight 103 manifest available, at least for
subsequent testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign
the Embassy's internal use. However, Pan Am New York corpo-
Relations Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and Interna-
rate headquarters instructed that the Pan Am 103 manifest not
tional Operations on April 7, 1989, Ms. Clark added:
be released. London Embassy Assessment, par. 5.(A), pp. 2-3;
Early on we were asked a lot of questions which we were
State Department Chronology, p. 3; Interviews with Taylor Blan-
unable to provide the answers to because as representatives of
ton and Jeffrey Garrison.
the government we provide information only of an authoritative
35 The Commission had expected Joan Clark, who was Assist-
ant Secretary for Consular Affairs at the time of Pan Am 103, to
nature, and we do not provide any information of a speculative
nature.
testify at its December 18, 1989 hearing. Unfortunately, Ms.
Clark did not appear during the hearing. Commission Hearing,
Unedited Transcript, p. 13 (emphasis added)
December 18, 1989, p. 235.
49 The Commission also heard from consular officers con-
36 In the event of a crisis, either a Task Force or Working
cerned about maintaining a "professional" relationship with the
Group is established, which is "chaired by an officer of the geo-
families. In some cases, the posture of the "professional" ap-
graphic bureau responsible for the country where the event is
peared to the families as cold and uncaring.
taking place." Task Force Handbook, pp. 4-6. In this case, the
50 Interview with Joan Clark. The State Department in Wash-
desk officer for the United Kingdom, Mr. Perlow, chaired the
ington received ample communications from Lockerbie and
Working Group.
London. For example, 53 situation reports (cables) were sent
37 See remarks of Commission Member, Congressman James
from Lockerbie/London to Washington from December 21-27,
Oberstar at the Commission Hearing, December 18, 1989, p.
1988.
274.
51 Tamposi Testimony, p. 224.
38 The State Department's current Consular Affairs Task Force
52 Id.
Handbook informs consular staff that they should normally
53 "Update on Crisis Management," p. 1 (February 1, 1990).
expect to receive a preliminary manifest in 12 to 24 hours (Task
54 Even if the ATA and the Department were to reach some
Force Handbook, p. 19), but Ms. Clark testified that the 7 hours
accord, that agreement would not govern procedures applicable
it took for the Department to receive any manifest information
to foreign carriers or charters.
from Pan Am was "a long period of time." H.R. 1487 Hearing, p.
55 The airlines have expressed concern over the administrative
115. Yet, the Department has now sought from the Air Transport
and cost burdens imposed by requiring the airlines to collect
Association its agreement that the member airlines would provide
these data. We suggest that the airlines explore alternatives, such
the Department a "working manifest
within one hour of the
as the one suggested by Flight 103 family member, Mrs. Georgia
incident" (Draft Guidelines for the Consular Affairs Bureau, U.S. State
Nucci, which would require passengers to submit the information
Department and the International Airline Companies in the Management of
on a portion of the boarding pass collected by the airline.
109
Chapter 8
National Will
The free world has been lurching from ter-
gression which can and must be deterred.
rorist attack to terrorist attack, attempting to
Those outlaw nations-properly labelled "the
agree on how to respond to each event. This
league of terror" for harboring and sponsoring
approach will not work.
terrorism-should be held accountable for their
Several facts about terrorism have been dra-
"crime."
matically made clear:
The Commission believes strongly that the
-Terrorism is a deadly weapon of the
time is now for the United States to take a
weak and the cowardly. Terrorism lever-
more active leadership role in the fight against
ages violence against innocent victims. As
international terrorism. The American public
Lenin put it: "The purpose of terrorism is
must be prepared to exercise its national will
to terrorize."
and support U.S. Government action to in-
-Terrorism is cheap, especially in terms
crease dramatically the cost to terrorists and
of the political results it may achieve. One
their patrons. Elected leaders, in turn, must be
act of terrorism can cause changes in the
prepared to act on this national will as a foun-
policies of major nations.
dation for taking more aggressive action
-Unchecked, terrorism creates a shift in
against both terrorists and their state sponsors.
the balance of power toward those nations
Once America clearly adopts this consistent,
that sanction terrorism and use it as an in-
aggressive policy, terrorist groups should
strument of foreign policy.
quickly get the message that terrorist acts will
-Historically, terrorism consisted of isolat-
not be condoned. They must understand that if
ed acts of individuals or small groups of fa-
they pursue terrorist actions against the United
natics. Over recent decades, however, ter-
States, this country will act to protect its inter-
rorism increasingly is state-sponsored.
est to the fullest extent allowed by domestic
and international law.
-Terrorism is a form of surrogate warfare.
Conventional warfare is too difficult, too
Air travelers are particularly vulnerable to
costly and, indeed, impossible for some na-
terrorist violence. It is estimated that over one
tions to conduct. Terrorism offers an alter-
billion passengers used commercial airlines to
native.
travel throughout the world in 1989. Yet a
handful of terrorist groups, willing to commit
-Acts of state-sponsored terrorism against
their cowardly and despicable crimes, have the
a nation's citizens are acts of aggression
capacity to plunge the world's passengers into
against that nation. In today's world, the
a hostage-like grip of fear.
principal targets are the values and inter-
ests of democratic nations.
Significantly, the wave of hijackings of the
1960s and 1970s stopped when nations refused
A consensus must be reached among law-
to give refuge to hijackers. In the 1980s, terror-
abiding nations that terrorism is an act of ag-
ists turned to bombs to attack passenger air-
113
terms of higher fares and time spent in check-
in procedures.
In-Flight Explosive Sabotage
Even if aviation security improves dramatical-
Incidents
ly, the terrorist will simply turn to other target
areas where people congregate. Securing gov-
Number
Average
of
Persons
Number
ernment targets, like embassies, has had the
Period
Incidents
Killed
Killed
ironic effect of directing terrorist attacks to
more vulnerable and more civilian targets. With
1949-1958
8
97
12
an infinite number of civilian targets, it will
never be possible to defend against all terrorist
1959-1968
11
254
23
attacks. Perhaps most importantly, no state has
taken a retaliatory action in response to an air-
1969-1978
18
624
34
craft bombing.
While the world aviation system again moves
1979-1988
12
849
70
to make this terrorist tactic more difficult,
through better detection equipment, tighter
Source:
screening, improved training practices and
Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation-1988
better access controls, we must squarely face
the reality that even the combination of all of
these improvements cannot guarantee civil
aviation security.
lines, resulting in 1,030 deaths and 112 injuries
in the last five years alone.
DEATHS AND INJURIES
The materials necessary to make bombs from
Due to Explosives Onboard Aircraft
plastic explosives like semtex are readily avail-
1977-1989
able to terrorists. Czechoslovakian President
350
Vaclav Havel said recently that his country,
Year
Deaths
Injuries
1977
0
under the previous regime, exported to Libya
300
1978
8
3
1979
0
4
1000 tons of semtex, an amount Havel said is
1980
0
2
1981
2
13
250
1982
1
15
sufficient for the world terrorist community to
1983
112
0
1984
0
24
make bombs for 150 years.
200
1985
330
0
1986
20
112
Every airport, every departure, every passen-
1987
115
0
1988
287
0
150
1989
278
0
ger and every suitcase, mail bag or cargo con-
tainer, presents a possible opportunity for a
100
terrorist to introduce small but deadly amounts
of explosives that are effectively invisible to X-
50
ray and other detection equipment currently in
0
use at airports.
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
The security of U.S. civil aviation has been
Year
increased. The Commission believes this secu-
Incidents where the explosion aboard the
rity will continue to improve, especially if the
Deaths
aircraft occurred during a hijacking are not
Injuries
reflected in these summaries
recommendations of this Commission are car-
Source: Federal Aviation Administration
ried out. In reality, however, there will never
be 100 per cent security against every terrorist
There is, however, an alternative: addressing
technique.
the problem of international terrorism at its
The more security measures are imposed, the
source.
more fundamental freedoms are restricted.
The current strategic policy of the United
Searching bags and screening passengers con-
States on counterterrorism consists of four ele-
stitute intrusions upon privacy. Flight delays or
ments:
cancellations for security reasons limit the free-
dom of travel. Moreover, the cost of security
First, make no concessions of any
procedures to the public is incalculable, both in
kind to terrorists. Do not pay ransom,
114
release convicted terrorists, or change
proach will rarely result in the prosecution of
policies to accommodate terrorist de-
more than a few individual members of any ter-
mands.
rorist group, and it is neither designed for, nor
Second, make state sponsors of ter-
can it be effectively used against the state spon-
rorism pay a price for their actions.
sors of terrorism.
This may entail the use of military
While a law enforcement approach must
force as was used in 1986 in the
always be a part of our response to terrorism,
bombing raids of Libya. It might also
this Commission finds unacceptable the idea of
include sanctions of a political, eco-
holding ourselves in all cases to a criminal
nomic or diplomatic nature.
standard of proof before we act. The United
Third, work with friends and allies
States must be ready to view some terrorist at-
to identify, track and apprehend, pros-
tacks as a matter of national security, and
ecute and punish terrorists. This pro-
indeed, in some cases should be prepared to
gram is designed to bring terrorists to
treat the act for what it is, as an act of aggres-
justice, to disrupt their operations, and
sion against the United States. It may well be
to destroy their networks.
that the perpetrators of a terrorist act may be
Fourth, provide training in antiter-
identified quickly through intelligence oper-
rorism techniques to law enforcement
ations and techniques.
officials around the world.
A swift response could be directed against
the terrorist group responsible and/or its state
The Commission recommends strongly that a
sponsor. In this context, the Commission rec-
policy of "zero tolerance" towards terrorist at-
ommends planning, training and equipping for
tacks be adopted through a heightened empha-
direct preemptive or retaliatory military actions
sis on the second element of U.S. counterter-
against known terrorist hideouts in countries
rorism policy-to make state sponsors of ter-
that sanction them.
rorism pay a price for their actions.
Where such direct strikes are unwise or inap-
Pursuing terrorists and responding swiftly
propriate, the Commission recommends use of
and proportionately to their acts against hu-
middle-level options, including covert oper-
manity must become U.S. policy in deed as well
ations to preempt, disrupt or respond to ter-
as in word. What is required is effective action,
not simply strong rhetoric.
rorist actions. The Commission recognizes the
To date, the United States has too often
many reasons, historical and otherwise, why the
treated terrorism only as a law enforcement
United States Government must proceed with
problem. The Commission recognizes that
caution in the use of covert operations. Cer-
taking a law enforcement approach to terrorist
tainly such tactics must not be used to circum-
attacks has many advantages, including: the
vent basic democratic values. Terrorists, how-
lawful gathering of evidence; the confrontation
ever, have relied upon the adherence by others
of the accusers in an open court of law with all
to these values to permit them to attack thou-
the evidence made public; the assurance of a
sands of innocent victims with impunity.
defense attorney; and the opportunity to
Major steps have been taken in the last few
present evidence in support of the defense. If
years by the United States and her allies to im-
successful, a law enforcement approach also re-
prove international cooperation in the fight
sults in the punishment of those individuals
against terrorism. Major democratic powers
who were directly responsible for the acts per-
have begun to recognize that an effective coun-
petrated.
terterrorism policy requires mutual cooperation
However, a law enforcement approach is, by
and support. In 1978 the United States and its
its very nature, reactive. It is also an extremely
fellow members of the Economic Summit
time-consuming process requiring proof of
(U.K., Canada, Japan, France, Italy, and West
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It may be hin-
Germany) agreed to cut off air service to and
dered by an inability to gather evidence or by
from a country that does not extradite or pros-
difficulties in arresting or extraditing the ac-
ecute a terrorist for hijacking. The Venice
cused. Most importantly, a law enforcement ap-
Annex, agreed upon in June 1987, expanded
115
upon the Bonn Declaration to include halting
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS
air service in cases of sabotage.
1980-1989, BY TYPE OF VICTIM
Despite this strong rhetoric, countries in the
past too often have chosen to act solely in their
1980
own self-interest rather than recognizing and
1981
acting in support of the combined interests of
the international community. However, as ter-
1982
rorism's ugly hand affects more and more
1983
countries (citizens of 21 countries were on Pan
Am 103), prospects grow for a more unified
1984
international response to terrorism.
1985
Recent events in the Soviet Union and East-
ern Europe also present new opportunities to
1986
foster wider cooperation on terrorism. Discus-
1987
sions were reportedly held with the Soviets on
the issue of terrorism at the Malta Summit in
1988
1989. The Soviets have taken a more construc-
tive approach recently by condemning specific
1989
terrorist acts, but there is still much room for
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
improvement. Because terrorism is not only an
Number of Incidents
assault on democratic principles but an act
against all humanity, the United States and her
Military
Government
Business
Diplomat
Other
allies should continue to urge the Soviet Union
Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism-1989
to exercise its leadership to ensure that con-
crete and effective steps are taken to minimize
Recommendations
if not to eradicate the threat of terrorism
worldwide.
In the view of this Commission, the United
Many of these steps can be taken with the
States must:
help and support of our U.S. allies. Such a bi-
lateral or multilateral approach should be en-
First, heighten emphasis on the second
couraged. With other like-thinking nations, the
element of U.S. counterterrorism policy,
United States should work to elevate the ac-
that state sponsors should be made to pay
ceptable standards of international behavior,
a price for their actions.
and treat as outlaws states sponsoring terror-
Second, refuse to allow terrorist attacks to
ism. But, the United States itself must stand
alter U.S. political and economic policies.
ready to act.
Third, improve human intelligence-gather-
To continue as a world leader conducting an
ing on terrorism, in cooperation with other
effective foreign policy and influencing events,
nations.
the United States must remain engaged. State-
Fourth, work with other nations to treat as
sponsored terrorism must be faced and must
outlaws state sponsors of terrorism-isolat-
be deterred-with methods that are consistent
ing them politically, economically, and
with the nature of the threat and the U.S.
militarily.
system and values. Otherwise, terrorism will
force a change in the world balance of power
Fifth, develop through the Congress and
fundamentally adverse to U.S. interests.
the people a clear understanding that
The United States has vital interests. It needs
state-sponsored terrorism threatens U.S.
values and interests, and that active meas-
only the will to defend them against those few
ures are needed, overt and covert, to
states living outside an acceptable standard of
counter more effectively the terrorist
international behavior.
threat.
116
Sixth, ensure now that all U.S. Govern-
countries well-known to have engaged in
ment resources are prepared for active
state-sponsored terrorism.
measures-preemptive or retaliatory, direct
National will-and the moral courage to use
or covert-against a series of targets in
it-is the ultimate means to defeat terrorism.
117
Final Thoughts
This Report represents an important first
dent, the Congress and the American people in
step in improving aviation security. But because
one year on actions taken in conjunction with
of the dynamic nature of the terrorist threat
this Commission's Report, and the results of
and the evolving nature of detection technolo-
those actions.
gy, this Report must be only a beginning.
Therefore, the Commission recommends that
The criminal investigation of Flight 103 con-
the Secretary of Transportation and the Secre-
tinues, hopefully to result in the indictment,
tary of State be directed to report to the Presi-
arrest, trial and conviction of the killers.
119
Recommendations
International Security
the current and potential threat to the do-
The lead negotiating role in aviation secu-
mestic air transportation system.
rity should be shifted from U.S. carriers to
The FAA should initiate immediately the
the Department of State.
planning and analysis necessary to phase
The United States should continue to press
additional security measures into the do-
vigorously for security improvements
mestic system over time.
through the Foreign Airport Security Act
The FAA should take the necessary action
and the Foreign Airport Assessment Pro-
to clearly define responsibilities under ex-
gram.
clusive area agreements and contingency
The United States should rely on bilateral
plans to ensure that existing problems are
agreements to achieve aviation security ob-
corrected and the contingent security
jectives with foreign governments.
system is capable of meeting the specified
threat levels.
The State Department should create the
position of Coordinator for International
The Congress should require criminal
Aviation Security and the President should
record checks for all airport employees.
nominate that office holder for the rank of
The legislation should identify certain
Ambassador.
criminal records that indicate a potential
security risk and enable airport operators
The U.S. should continue to work through
to deny employment on that basis.
ICAO to improve aviation security interna-
tionally.
The FAA should determine the security
features necessary for new airport facilities
The FAA should create an active formal
and ensure that such features are included
technical assistance program to provide
in airport facility design and construction.
aviation security help to countries upon re-
quest and concentrate its efforts wherever
The Commission endorses the recommen-
the threat is greatest.
dations of the Office of the Secretary of
Transportation Office of Safety Review
The Summit Seven should amend the
Task Force and recommends full imple-
Bonn Declaration to extend sanctions for
mentation expeditiously.
all terrorist acts, including attacks against
airports and airline ticket offices.
The FAA should eliminate the discretion
afforded private carriers for reporting
Domestic Security
bomb threats and searches of aircraft and
facilities, and require the immediate re-
The FAA should seek the assistance of the
porting of all threats to FAA, airport and
FBI in making a thorough assessment of
public safety authorities, and recognize
121
123
required. In the interim, the State Depart-
miliar with the local language, laws, cus-
ment should pursue agreements with indi-
toms, and personalities.
vidual carriers.
The State Department should share with
The State Department should always con-
its embassy and consular posts any assess-
tact the families of victims, even when the
ment of the Flight 103 experience and new
airline has made a prior notification of the
guidance on response to terrorist disasters.
deaths. In addition, it is essential for the
This action needs to be complemented
Department promptly to provide a person-
with clear direction, training and equip-
al written notification.
ment support.
The State Department should, wherever
The State Department's Bureau of Consul-
possible, assign to each family one person,
ar Affairs should assign personnel qualified
and an alternate, to act as designated liai-
in terrorism cases to assist families in the
son. Two separate 800 numbers should
recovery and disposition of remains and
also be established, one just for the fami-
personal effects, and to act as their om-
lies.
budsman with foreign authorities and
agencies.
The State Department is encouraged to
consult further with death and bereave-
The State Department should provide
ment counselors to assure that the entire
some ceremony appropriate to recognize
consular services corps is sensitized to the
the families' sacrifice. The Department
demands posed by tragedies such as Pan
should have discretion, in consultation with
Am Flight 103. The Department should
our Armed Services, to adopt appropriate
consider supplementing its training pro-
ceremonial procedures compatible with the
grams by either (1) providing specialized
families' own preferences. Whatever the
training to create a team of "disaster spe-
procedures, the Department must institu-
cialists" to deploy immediately in a crisis
tionally recognize the special status of U.S.
or (2) securing outside experts to be
citizens who are victims of acts of terrorism
brought in during the initial phases to
against this Nation.
assist consular personnel.
The United States should ratify Montreal
The State Department should dispatch at
Protocol 3 together with a supplemental
least one senior official from the Bureau of
compensation plan that would provide all
Consular Affairs to the scene of each and
U.S. citizens and permanent residents, for
every terrorist disaster.
any international flight, full recovery of all
economic and non-economic damages. Fol-
The State Department should promulgate
lowing ratification, the United States
criteria for staffing disaster scenes that also
should commence a diplomatic initiative to
define responsibility for these decisions. In
increase the $130,000 limit on carrier li-
the event of a disaster, the resources of in-
ability.
dividual posts must be monitored under
these new criteria, and supplemented if
The Congress should enact legislation to
require the FAA to commence a civil pen-
necessary.
alty proceeding whenever there is reason
The State Department should require that
to believe that a carrier's violation of FAA
in any disaster at least one person be as-
requirements may have contributed to loss
signed the sole function of providing on-
of life or serious injury. If the FAA so
site assistance to families who may visit,
finds, it should be required to levy fines.
and be the ombudsman in matters involv-
The President should seek legislation to
ing local government authorities and social
authorize and permanently appropriate
service agencies.
funds to provide monetary benefits and tax
The State Department should establish
relief for any American victim of an act of
"crisis teams" to handle all aspects of a
terrorism. The President may wish to con-
major disaster, to join in-country staff fa-
sider a board to develop criteria for com-
124
pensation in terrorist cases. One question
The United States should work with other
at the outset should be whether benefits
nations to treat as outlaws state sponsors
should be made available retroactively for
of terrorism, isolating them politically, eco-
the victims of Flight 103.
nomically, and militarily.
National Will
The United States must develop a clear
understanding that state sponsored terror-
The United States must heighten emphasis
ism threatens U.S. values and interests,
on the second element of U.S. counterter-
and that active measures are needed to
rorism policy; that state sponsors should
counter more effectively the terrorist
be made to pay a price for their actions.
threat.
The United States must refuse to allow ter-
The United States should ensure that all
rorist attacks to alter U.S. political and eco-
government resources are prepared for
nomic policies.
active measures-preemptive or retaliatory,
The United States must improve human in-
direct or covert-against a series of targets
telligence-gathering on terrorism, in coop-
in countries well-known to have engaged in
eration with other nations.
state-sponsored terrorism.
125
President's Commission on
and Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. He is
Aviation Security and Terrorism
a graduate of Syracuse University and the Syra-
cuse University School of Law. He was admit-
Ann McLaughlin, Chairman
ted to the New York State Bar in 1962 and
practiced law in that state until 1976.
Former U.S. Secretary of Labor (1987-1989),
Under Secretary of the U.S. Department of In-
John Paul Hammerschmidt
terior (1984-1987) and an Assistant Secretary
of the U.S. Department of Treasury (1981-
Elected to the United States House of Repre-
1984). For 15 years prior to her government
sentatives from Arkansas' Third District in
service, she had extensive corporate and other
1966. Before entering the political arena, he
private sector experience. Currently, she is a
was a lumber business executive. Currently he
Visiting Fellow and Board Member at the
is the Ranking Member on the Committee on
Urban Institute in Washington, D.C. and a
Public Works and Transportation (former
member of the Board of Directors for five
Ranking Member, Aviation Subcommittee), and
major corporations and several not-for-profit
senior Republican on the Veterans' Affairs
institutions. She is a graduate of Marymount
Committee and the Select Committee on
College, Tarrytown, New York, and has studied
Aging. Founding member of the Environmental
at the University of London and the Wharton
and Energy Study Conference and holds mem-
School of Business, University of Pennsylvania.
bership on the Congressional Rural Caucus and
In 1989, President Reagan awarded her the
the U.S. Congressional Travel and Tourism
Presidential Citizen's Medal in recognition of
Caucus. Attended the Citadel, Oklahoma State
her public service.
University and the University of Arkansas.
During World War II, served as a pilot in the
Alfonse M. D'Amato
China-Burma-India theatre earning numerous
Elected to the United States Senate from
citations including the Distinguished Flying
Cross four times and five Air Medals.
New York in 1980. Prior to his election, he
served as vice chairman, Nassau County (NY)
Board of Supervisors (1977-1980); supervisor
Edward Hidalgo
of the Town of Hempstead (1971-1977), and
Former Secretary of the Navy (1979-1981);
the Nassau County public administrator
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Man-
(1965-1968). He is the founder and co-chair-
power Reserve Affairs Installations - Logistics
man of the Senate Anti-Terrorism Caucus, es-
(1977-1979); General Counsel and Congres-
tablished to help find ways to combat interna-
sional Liaison, United States Information
tional terrorism. He serves on three Senate
Agency (1973-1976), and Special Assistant for
Committees: Appropriations (Ranking Member
Economic Affairs to the Director of USIA
of Transportation Subcommittee); Intelligence;
(1972-1973). Partner in the law firm of Cahill,
126
Gordon and Reindel in charge of the European
Oversight; Water Resources, and Public Build-
office (1966-1972). Currently an independent
ings and Grounds. He is also a member of the
attorney with the Washington office of Vorys,
Budget Committee. Serves as at-large Demo-
Sater, Seymour and Pease. Served in the Pacific
cratic whip, is a member of the Democratic
during World War II as an air combat intelli-
Steering and Policy Committee; and serves on
gence officer and was awarded the Bronze Star
executive committees of the Democratic Study
Medal. Holds a BA, magna cum laude, from Holy
Group, National Water Alliance, Northeast-
Cross College. Earned a law degree from Co-
Midwest Congressional Coalition, and the Steel
lumbia Law School and a degree in civil law
Caucus. He is Secretary-Treasurer of the Con-
from the University of Mexico. Recipient of the
gressional Travel and Tourism Caucus and co-
"Mexican Aztec Eagle" decoration from that
chairs the Conference of Great Lakes Con-
government.
gressmen. Holds a BA degree, summa cum laude,
Frank R. Lautenberg
from the College of St. Thomas and earned an
MA at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium.
Elected to the United States Senate from
New Jersey in 1982. President (1969-1975) and
General Thomas C. Richards, USAF
chairman of the board and chief executive offi-
(Retired)
cer (1975-1982), Automatic Data Processing,
Inc.; Commissioner, New York and New Jersey
Deputy Commander in Chief, Headquarters,
Port Authority (1978-1982); Commissioner,
U.S. European Command (1986-1989) until his
New Jersey Economic Development Authority.
retirement from active duty. Commissioned in
Serves on the Committee on Appropriations
the Air Force in 1956. Subsequently served as
and chairs its Transportation Subcommittee.
an aircraft commander in Vietnam; Group
Also chairs the Superfund, Ocean and Water
air officer commanding, U.S. Air Force Acad-
Protection Subcommittee, as a member of the
emy (1969-1972); Chief, Leadership and Mo-
Environment and Public Works Committee.
tivation, Pentagon (1975-1976); Commander,
Serves also on the Budget Committee and
Air Reserve Personnel Center, Denver
the Helsinki Commission. Served in the U.S.
(1976-1977); Vice Commandant and Comman-
Army Signal Corps during World War II
dant of Cadets, U.S. Air Force Academy
(1942-1946). Earned a BS degree in economics
(1977-1981); Commander, Air Force Recruit-
from the Columbia University School of Busi-
ing (1981-1982); Commander, Electronic
ness.
Technical Training Center (1982-1984); Vice
Commander, 8th Air Force; Commander, Air
James L. Oberstar
University (1984-1986). He earned a BS
Elected to the United States House of Repre-
degree from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
sentatives from Minnesota's Eighth District in
an MA in communications from Shippensburg
1974. Present Committee assignments include
State College. His military decorations and
Public Works and Transportation where he
awards include the Distinguished Service
chairs the Subcommittee on Aviation, member
Medal; Silver Star; Legion of Merit, and the
of the Subcommittees on Investigations and
Distinguished Flying Cross.
127
The President's Commission Staff
Professional Affiliation
James B. Weidner, Executive Director
Rogers & Wells
Nina Bang-Jensen, Deputy Executive Director
Rogers & Wells
Michael J. Bayer, Counsellor
Private Sector Consultant
Harry R. Van Cleve, General Counsel
General Accounting Office, General Counsel
(Retired)
Thomas J. Barchi, Staff Investigator
General Accounting Office, Resources, Commu-
nity, and Economic Development Division
Gary R. Carney, Associate Counsel
Rogers & Wells
John F. Collins, Staff Investigator
Department of the Treasury, U.S. Secret Service
Gregory Conway, Staff Investigator
Department of Defense, Office of Assistant In-
spector General for Analysis and Followup
Rechell Y. Crumpé, Secretary
Department of Transportation
Francis J. Duggan, Family Liaison
Attorney, Former Assistant Secretary of Labor
Tammuel V. Edelen, Secretary
Department of Transportation
Caroline D. Gabel, Staff Investigator
U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee
on Aviation, Committee on Public Works and
Transportation
Nicholas P. Geier, Staff Investigator
General Accounting Office, Office of Special In-
vestigations (Retired)
Michael B. Gritton, Associate Counsel
Rogers & Wells
Abraham E. Haspel, Special Assistant
Department of the Interior, Minerals Manage-
ment Service
J. Brian Hyland, Staff Investigator
Department of Labor, Inspector General
(Retired)
Douglas M. MacKenzie, External Affairs
Department of Agriculture
Susan L. Malone, Staff Investigator
Department of Defense, Office of Inspector
General, the Defense Criminal Investigative
Service
Frances L. Mason, Secretary
Department of Transportation, United States
Coast Guard
Margaret A. Matthews, Secretary
Consultant
Joseph M. McGrail, Staff Investigator
Aviation Consultant
Michael V. Miller, Editor
MVM Public Affairs
Patricia Kielty Moran, Media Relations
General Accounting Office, Office of Public In-
formation
Refahel M. Muskin, Staff Investigator
Aviation Consultant
Richard K. Pemberton, Administrative Officer
Department of Transportation, Office of the
Secretary
Susan L. Pickrel, Executive Secretariat
Department of Transportation, Maritime Ad-
ministration
Robert G. Planansky, Executive Assistant to the
Chairman
Ann McLaughlin
Charles H. Powers, Media Relations
Pro Bono
Alan R. Schwartz, Counsel
Attorney, Consultant
Robert F. Taylor, Security Adviser
Department of Health and Human Services,
Office of the Secretary
Betsy R. Warren, Congressional Liaison
Warren and Company
128
The President's Commission Staff-Continued
Professional Affiliation
Eleanor L. Wozniak, Secretary
Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation
Administration
Kerstin L. Zedalis, Secretary
Department of Transportation
129
Appendix A
The Victims of Pan Am Flight 103
Airline Staff
Reina, Jocelyn, 26, Isleworth, England.
American
Cockpit Crew
Royal, Myra Josephine, 30, Hanwell, London,
Captain: MacQuarrie, James Bruce, 55, Ken-
England. American
sington, New Hampshire. American
Skabo, Irja Synove, 38, Oslo, Norway.
First Officer: Wagner, Raymond Ronald, 52,
Finnish
Pennington, New Jersey. American
First Engineer: Avritt, Jerry Don, 46, West-
Passengers
minster, California. American
Ahern, John Michael Gerard, 26, Rockville
Pursers
Center, New York. American
Murphy, Mary Geraldine, 51, Twickenham,
Aicher, Sarah Margaret, 29, London, Eng-
England. British
land. American
Velimirovich, Milutin, 35, Hounslow, Eng-
Akerstrom, John David, 34, Medina, Ohio.
land. American
American
Flight Attendants
Alexander, Ronald Ely, 46, New York, New
Avoyne, Elisabeth Nichole, 44, Croissy-sur-
York. Swiss
Seine, France, French
Ammerman, Thomas Joseph, 36, Old
Berti, Noelle Lydie, 41, Paris, France. Ameri-
Tappan, New Jersey. American
can
Apfelbaum, Martin Lewis, 59, Philadelphia,
Engstom, Siv Ulla, 51, Windsor, England.
Pennsylvania. American
Swedish
Asrelsky, Rachel Marie, 21, New York, New
Franklin, Stacie Denise, 20, San Diego, Cali-
York. American
fornia. American
Atkinson, William Garreston, 33, London,
Garrett, Paul Issac, 41, Napa, California.
American
England. American
Kuhne, Elke Ehta, 43, Hanover, West Germa-
Bacciochi, Clare Louise, 19, Tamworth, Eng-
ny. West German
land. British
Larracoechea, Maria Nieves, 39, Madrid,
Bainbridge, Harry Michael, 34, Montrose,
Spain. Spanish
New York. American
Macalolooy, Lilibeth Tobila, 27, Kelsterbach,
Barclay, Stuart Murray, 29, Farm Barnard,
West Germany. American
Vermont. Canadian
131
Bell, Jean Mary, 44, Windsor, England.
Butler, Steven Lee, 35, Denver, Colorado.
British
American
Benello, Julian MacBain, 25, Brookline, Mas-
Cadman, William Martin, 32, London, Eng-
sachusetts. American
land. British
Bennett, Lawrence Ray, 41, Chelsea, Michi-
Caffarone, Fabiana, 28, London, England.
gan. American
British
Bergstrom, Philip, 22, Forest Lake, Minneso-
Caffarone, Hernan, 28, London, England.
ta. American
Argentinian
Berkley, Alistair, 29, London, England.
Canady, Valerie, 25, Morgantown, West Vir-
British
ginia. American
Bernstein, Judith Ellen, 37, London, Eng-
Capasso, Gregory, 21, Brooklyn, New York.
land. American
American
Bernstein, Michael Stuart, 36, Bethesda,
Cardwell, Timothy Michael, 21, Creso, Penn-
Maryland. American
sylvania. American
Berrell, Steven Russell, 20, Fargo, North
Carlsson, Brent Wilson, 50, New York, New
Dakota. American
York. Swedish
Bhatia, Surinder Mohan, 51, Los Angeles,
Cawley, Richard Anthony, 43, New York,
California. American
New York. American
Bissett, Keneth John, 21, Hartsdale, New
Ciulla, Frank, 45, Park Ridge, New Jersey.
York. American
American
Boatmon-Fuller, Diane, 35, London, Eng-
Cohen, Theodora Eugenia, 20, Port Jervis,
land. American
New York. American
Boland, Stephen John, 20, Nashua, New
Coker, Eric Michael, 20, Mendham, New
Hampshire. American
Jersey. American
Bouckley, Glenn, 27, Liverpool, New York.
Coker, Jason Michael, 20, Mendham, New
British
Jersey. American
Bouckley, Paula, 29, Liverpool, New York.
Colasanti, Gary Leonard, 20, Melrose, Massa-
American
chusetts. American
Boulanger, Nicole Elise, 21, Shrewsbury,
Concannon, Bridget, 53, Banbury, England.
Massachusetts. American
Irish
Boyer, Francis, 43, Toulosane, France.
Concannon, Sean, 16, Banbury, England.
French
Irish
Bright, Nicholas, 32, Brookline, Massachu-
Concannon, Thomas, 51, Banbury, England.
setts. American
Irish
Browner (Bier), Daniel Solomon, 23, Parod,
Corner, Tracey Jane, 17, Millhouses, Eng-
Israel. Israeli
land. British
Brunner, Colleen Renee, 20, Hamburg, New
Cory, Scott, 20, Old Lyme Court, Connecti-
York. American
cut. American
Burman, Timothy Guy, 24, London, Eng-
Coursey, Willis Larry, 40, San Antonio,
land. British
Texas. American
Buser, Michael Warren, 34, Ridgefield Park,
Coyle, Patricia Mary, 20, Wallingford, Con-
New Jersey. American
necticut. American
Buser, Warren Max, 62, Glen Rock, New
Cummock, John Binning, 38, Coral Gables,
Jersey. American
Florida. American
132
Curry, Joseph Patrick, 31, Fort Devens, Mas-
Gannon, Matthew Kevin, 34, Los Angeles,
sachusetts. American
California. American
Daniels, William Allen, 40, Bell Mead, New
Garczynski, Kenneth Raymond, 37, North
Jersey. American
Brunswick, New Jersey. American
Dater, Gretchen Joyce, 20, Ramsey, New
Gibson, Kenneth James, 20, Romulus, Michi-
Jersey. American
gan. American
Davis, Shannon, 19, Shelton, Connecticut.
Giebler, William David, 29, London, Eng-
American
land. American
Della Ripa, Gabriel, 46, Floral Park, New
Gordon, Olive Leonora, 25, London, Eng-
York. Italian
land. British
Di Mauro, Joyce Christine, 32, New York,
Gordon-Gorgacz, Linda Susan, 39, London,
New York. American
England. American
Di Nardo, Gianfranca, 26, London, England.
Gorgacz, Anne Madelene, 76, Newcastle,
Italian
Pennsylvania. American
Dix, Peter Thomas Stanley, 35, London,
Gorgacz, Loretta Anne, 47, Newcastle, Penn-
England. Irish
sylvania. American
Dixit, Om, 54, Fairborn, Ohio. Indian
Gould, David, 45, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Dixit, Shanti, 54, Fairborn, Ohio. American
American
Dornstein, David Scott, 25, Philadelphia,
Guevorguian, André Nikolai, 32, Sea Cliff,
Pennsylvania. American
New York. American
Doyle, Michael Joseph, 30, Voorhees, New
Hall, Nicola Jane, 23, Sandton, South Africa.
Jersey. American
Australian
Eggleston, Edgar Howard III, 24, Glens
Halsch, Lorraine Frances, 31, Fairport, New
Falls, New York. American
York. American
Ergin, Turhan, 22, West Hartford, Connecti-
Hartunian, Lynne Carol, 21, Schenectady,
cut. American
New York. American
Fisher, Charles Thomas IV, 34, London,
Hawkins, Anthony Lacey, 57, Brooklyn, New
England. American
York. British
Flick, Clayton Lee, 25, Coventry, England.
Herbert, Pamela Elaine, 19, Battle Creek,
British
Michigan. American
Flynn, John Patrick, 21, Montville, New
Hilbert, Rodney Peter, 40, Newton, Pennsyl-
Jersey. American
vania. American
Fondiler, Arthur, 33, West Armonk, New
Hill, Alfred, 29, Sonthofen, West Germany.
York. American
West German
Fortune, Robert Gerard, 40, Jackson Heights,
Hollister, Katherine Augusta, 20, Rego Park,
New York. American
New York. American
Freeman, Paul Matthew Stephen, 25,
Hudson, Josephine, 22, London, England.
London, England. Canadian
British
Fuller, James Ralph, 50, Bloomfield Hills,
Hudson, Melina, 16, Albany, New York.
Michigan. American
American
Gabor, Ibolya Robertine, 79, Budapest, Hun-
Hudson, Sophie Ailette Miriam, 26, Paris,
gary. Hungarian
France. French
Gallagher, Amy Beth, 22, Quebec, Canada.
Hunt, Karen Lee, 20, Webster, New York.
American
American
133
Hurst, Roger Elwood, 38, Ringwood, New
Ludlow, Lloyd David, 41, Macksville, Kansas.
Jersey. American
American
Ivell, Elizabeth Sophie, 19, Robertsbridge,
Lurbke, Maria Theresia, 25, Balve Beckum,
England. British
West Germany. West German
Jaafar, Khalid Nazir, 20, Dearborn, Michigan.
McAllister, William John, 26, Sunbury-on-
Lebanese/American
Thames, England. British
Jeck, Robert van Houten, 57, Mountain
McCarthy, Daniel Emmet, 31, Brooklyn, New
Lakes, New Jersey. American
York. American
Jeffreys, Paul Avron, 36, Kingston-upon-
McCollum, Robert Eugene, 61, Wayne, Penn-
Thames, England. British
sylvania. American
Jeffreys, Rachel, 23, Kingston-upon-Thames,
McKee, Charles Dennis, 40, Arlington, Vir-
England. British
ginia. American
Jermyn, Kathleen Mary, 20, Staten Island,
McLaughlin, Bernard Joseph, 30, Bristol,
New York. American
England. American
Johnson, Beth Ann, 21, Greensburg, Pennsyl-
Mack, William Edward, 30, New York, New
vania. American
York. American
Johnson, Mary Alice Lincoln, 25, Wayland,
Malicote, Douglas Eugene, 22, Lebanon,
Massachusetts. American
Ohio. American
Johnson, Timothy Baron, 21, Neptune, New
Malicote, Wendy Gay, 21, Lebanon, Ohio.
Jersey. American
American
Jones, Christopher Andrew, 20, Claverack,
Marek, Elizabeth Lillian, 30, New York, New
New York. American
York. American
Kelly, Julianne Frances, 20, Dedham, Massa-
Marengo, Louis Anthony, 33, Rochester,
chusetts. American
Michigan. American
Kingham, Jay Joseph, 44, Potomac, Maryland.
Martin, Noel George, 27, Clapton, England.
American
Jamaican
Klein, Patricia Ann, 35, Trenton, New Jersey.
Maslowski, Diane Marie, 30, New York, New
American
York. American
Kosmowski, Gregory, 40, Milford, Michigan.
Melber, Jane Susan, 27, Middlesex, England.
American
American
Kulukundis, Minas Christopher, 38, London,
Merrill, John, 35, Hertfordshire, England.
England. British
British
Lariviere, Ronald Albert, 33, Alexandria, Vir-
Miazga, Susanne Marie, 22, Marcy, New
ginia. American
York. American
Leckburg, Robert Milton, 30, Piscataway,
Miller, Joseph Kenneth, 53, Woodmere, New
New Jersey. American
York. American
Leyrer, William Chase, 46, Bay Shore, New
Mitchell, Jewel Courtney, 32, Brooklyn, New
York. American
York. American
Lichtenstein, Joan Sherree, 46, New York,
Monetti, Richard Paul, 20, Cherry Hill, New
New York. American
Jersey. American
Lincoln, Wendy Anne, 23, North Adams,
Morgan, Jane Ann, 37, London, England.
Massachusetts. American
American
Lowenstein, Alexander Silas, 21, Morristown,
Morson, Eva Ingeborg, 48, New York, New
New Jersey. American
York. American
134
Mosey, Helga Rachael, 19, Warley, England.
Porter, Walter Leonard, 35, Brooklyn, New
British
York. American
Mulroy, Ingrid Elizabeth, 25, Lund, Sweden.
Posen, Pamela Lynn, 20, Harrison, New
Swedish
York. American
Mulroy, John, 59, East Northport, New York.
Pugh, William, 56, Margate, New Jersey.
American
American
Mulroy, Sean Kevin, 25, Lund, Sweden.
Quiguyan, Estrella Crisostomo, 43, London,
American
England. Filipino
Noonan, Karen Elizabeth, 20, Potomac,
Ramses, Rajesh Tarsis Priskel, 35, Leicester,
Maryland. American
England. Indian
O'Connor, Daniel Emmett, 31, Boston, Mas-
Rattan, Anmol, 2, Warren, Michigan.
sachusetts. American
American
O'Neil, Mary Denice, 21, Bronx, New York.
Rattan, Garima, 29, Warren, Michigan.
American
American
Otenasek, Anne Lindsey, 21, Baltimore,
Rattan, Suruchi, 3, Warren, Michigan. Ameri-
Maryland. American
can
Owen, Bryony Elise, 1, Bristol, England.
Reeves, Anita Lynn, 24, Laurel, Maryland.
British
American
Owen, Gwyneth Yvonne Margaret, 29, Bris-
Rein, Mark Alan, 44, New York, New York.
tol, England. British
American
Owens, Laura Abigail, 8, Cherry Hill, New
Rencevicz, Diane Marie, 21, Burlington, New
Jersey. American
Jersey. American
Owens, Martha, 44, Cherry Hill, New Jersey.
Rogers, Louise Ann, 20, Olney, Maryland.
American
American
Owens, Robert Plack, 45, Cherry Hill, New
Roller, Edina, 5, Hungary. Hungarian
Jersey. American
Roller, Janos Gabor, 29, Hungary. Hungarian
Owens, Sarah Rebecca, 14, Cherry Hill, New
Jersey. American
Roller, Zsuzsana, 27, Hungary. Hungarian
Pagnucco, Robert Italo, 51, South Salem,
Root, Hanne Maria, 26, Toronto, Canada.
New York. American
Canadian
Papadopoulos, Christos Michael, 45, Law-
Rosen, Saul Mark, 35, Morris Plains, New
rence, New York. Greek/American
Jersey. American
Peirce, Peter Raymond, 40, Perrysburg,
Rosenthal, Andrea Victoria, 20, New York,
Ohio. American
New York. American
Pescatore, Michael, 33, Solon, Ohio.
Rosenthal, Daniel Peter, 20, Staten Island,
American
New York. American
Philipps, Sarah Susannah Buchanan, 20,
Rubin, Arnaud David, 28, Waterloo, Bel-
Newtonville, Massachusetts. American
gium. Belgian
Phillips, Frederick Sandford, 27, Little Rock,
Saraceni, Elyse Jeanne, 20, East London,
Arkansas. American
England. American
Pitt, James Andrew Campbell, 24, South
Saunders, Scott Christopher, 21, Macungie,
Hadley, Massachusetts. American
Pennsylvania. American
Platt, David, 33, Staten Island, New York.
Saunders, Theresa Elizabeth, 28, Sunbury-
American
on-Thames, England. British
135
Schauble, Johannes Otto, 41, Kapppellen-
Tager, Marc Alex, 22, London, England.
weg, West Germany. West German
British
Schlageter, Robert Thomas, 20, Warwick,
Tanaka, Hidekazu, 26, London, England.
Rhode Island. American
Japanese
Schultz, Thomas Britton, 20, Ridgefield,
Teran, Andrew Alexander, 20, New Haven,
Connecticut. American
Connecticut. British/Peruvian
Scott, Sally Elizabeth, 20, Huntington, New
York. British
Thomas, Arva Anthony, 17, Detroit, Michi-
gan. American
Shapiro, Amy Elizabeth, 21, Stamford, Con-
necticut. American
Thomas, Jonathan Ryan, 2 months, South-
field, Michigan. American
Shastri, Mridula, 24, Oxford, England. Indian
Thomas, Lawanda, 21, Southfield, Michigan.
Sigal, Irving Stanley, 35, Pennington, New
American
Jersey. American
Tobin, Mark Lawrence, 21, North Hemp-
Simpson, Martin Bernard Carruthers, 52,
stead, New York. American
Brooklyn, New York. American
Smith, Cynthia Joan, 21, Milton, Massachu-
Trimmer-Smith, David William, 51, New
setts. American
York, New York. American
Smith, Ingrid Anita, 31, Berkshire, England.
Tsairis, Alexia Kathryn, 20, Franklin Lakes,
British
New Jersey. American
Smith, James Alvin, 55, New York, New York.
Valentino, Barry Joseph, 28, San Francisco,
American
California. American
Smith, Mary Edna, 34, Kalamazoo, Michigan.
van Tienhoven, Thomas Floro, 45, Buenos
American
Aires, Argentina. Argentinian
Stevenson, Geraldine Anne, 37, Esher, Eng-
Vejdany, Asaad Eidi, 46, Great Neck, New
land. British
York. American
Stevenson, Hannah Louise, 10, Esher, Eng-
Vrenios, Nicholas Andreas, 20, Washington,
land. British
D.C. American
Stevenson, John Charles, 38, Esher, England.
Vulcu, Peter, 21, Alliance, Ohio. American
British
Waido, Janina Jozefa, 61, Chicago, Illinois.
Stevenson, Rachael, 8, Esher, England.
American
British
Walker, Thomas Edwin, 47, Quincy, Massa-
Stinnett, Charlotte Ann, 36, New York, New
chusetts. American
York. American
Weedon, Kesha, 20, Bronx, New York.
Stinnett, Michael Gary, 26, Duncanville,
American
Texas. American
Stinnett, Stacey Leeanne, 9, Duncanville,
Weston, Jerome Lee, 45, Baldwin, New York.
Texas. American
American
Stow, James Ralph, 49, New York, New York.
White, Jonathan, 33, North Hollywood, Cali-
American
fornia. American
Stratis, Elia G., 43, Montvale, New Jersey.
Williams, Bonnie Leigh, 21, Crown Point,
American
New York. American
Swan, Anthony Selwyn, 29, Brooklyn, New
Williams, Brittany Leigh, 2 months, Crown
York. Trinidadian
Point, New York. American
Swire, Flora Margaret, 24, London, England.
Williams, Eric Jon, 24, Crown Point, New
British
York. American
136
Williams, George Waterson, 24, Joppa, Mary-
Zwynenburg, Mark James, 29, West Nyack,
land. American
New York. American
Williams, Stephanie Leigh, 1, Crown Point,
Residents of Lockerbie
New York. American
Flannigan, Joanne, 10.
Wolfe, Miriam Luby, 20, Severna Park, Mary-
land. American
Flannigan, Kathleen Mary, 41.
Woods, Chelsea Marie, 10 months, Willing-
Flannigan, Thomas Brown, 44.
boro, New Jersey. American
Henry, Dora Henrietta, 56.
Woods, Dedera Lynn, 27, Willingboro, New
Henry, Maurice Peter, 63.
Jersey. American
Lancaster, Mary, 81.
Woods, Joe Nathan, 28, Willingboro, New
Murray, Jean Aitken, 82.
Jersey. American
Somerville, John, 40.
Woods, Joe Nathan, Jr., 2, Willingboro, New
Jersey. American
Somerville, Lyndsey Ann, 10.
Wright, Andrew Christopher Gillies, 24,
Somerville, Paul, 13.
Surrey, England. British
Somerville, Rosaleen Later, 40.
137
Doty Boyd
John P. Devine
Stuart Henderson
Richard Lally
Robert Boyer
Carmen DiPlacido
Christopher Henley
Ran Langer
Stephen Boykin
Clark Dittmer
Earl Herbert
Yassi Langotsky
Micke Boyle
David L. Divan
Karl Herman
Ralph Laurello
Homer Boynton
Jay Dobbins
Dan Hoban
David Leach
Hadi Bozorgmanesh
Alvy J. Dodson
Charles Hodges
Walter J. Leamy
Lydia Breckon
Thomas Dome
Stefan Hoffer
Tom Leavitt
John V. Brennan
Donna Dorothy
Harold Hoffman
Major Ernie Lee
Lt. Col. R. Bretschneider
Major Douglas
Henk Hogervorst
Walter Lehmann
Anthony Broderick
Conrad Dresher
John Holden
Elizabeth Leighton
Philip Brown
Vauncile Dunkelberg
Donald Holm
Kathy Leitzke
Larry Bruno
James Dunn
Michael Hooks
Michael Lemov
John Bullard
Kevin Dupart
William Hoover
L. R. Lentz
Quentin Burgess
Robert Ebdon
Joanne Horne
George Lewis
H. Bridget Burkart
Carolyn-Edens
Michael Horowitz
Len Limmer
Carl Burleson
Donald Epstine
Clint Howard
E. F. Lintott
Frank Burns
George Esson
Paul Hudson
Jurgen Loos
Admiral James Busey
William Evans
Martin Huebner
Paul Lozito
Robert Butrick
Richard Everett
Michael Hurley
Mel Lundberg
Gwen Buttling
Ann Fegan
Capt. Peter Hutchhausen
Ronn Luskie
Donald Byrne
Anthony Feinberg
Vanja Huth
Edward Luttwak
Gwen Callman
Michael Fink
William Huth
Ken Luzzi
Robert Cammarta
William Fink
Donald F. Huycke
James Lyons
Tony Cantu
Debra Fischer
David Hyde
Daniel Mahoney
Col. John Canyock
Matilde Flores
Richard Hyman
Michael Mahoney
Peter Caram
Kathleen Flynn
Ronald Ives
Kurt Maier
Robert Carpenter
Lord Peter Fraser
Jim Jack
Richard Mainey
Patricia Carr
Darlene Freeman
Wilfred A. Jackson
Lyle Malotky
Charles Carrington
Kerstin Frowick
William Jackson
Claude Manno
Douglas Casipit
Mrs. Robert H. Frowick
Alon Jaffe
Richard Marquise
Lawrence Chanen
Sabrina Fuchs
Peter Jenkins
Cathy Marrs
Mick Charles
Jane C. Fuller
Steven Jenkins
Willard Marsden
Cathy Christianson
Neil Gallagher
John Johnson
Irina Martynova
Chris A. Christie
Delia Gardner
Lawrence Johnson
Stan Maslowski
Joan Clark
Jeffrey Garrison
Michael Johnson
Roy Mason
Evelyn Cohn
Thomas Gibson
P. R. Johnson
Ray Mathis
Nancy Cohn
Charles Giddens
Quinten Johnson
Jack C. Matlock
Kathy Collins
James Gilchrist
Don E. Jones
Ann Matthews
Yvonne Conde
Karen Gilmore
Douglas Jones
Ken Maxwell
Anthony Cooke
Sandy Gilmore
Ralph K. Joseph
Sgt. Michael McCarthy
Donald Cooper
John Gilmour
John Joyce
Carl W. McCollum
Lt. Col. Dan Corm
Geoff Goslin
Frank Kataria
James McDougall
Lt. Col. William Corr
Terrence Grady
Keelin Kavanagh
Alec McElroy
Doyle R. Cowden
Thomas Graham
Encu Kebede
Kenneth W. McFadden
Terry Cox
Maurice Gralnek
William C. Kelley
John B. McGowan
William Creelman
Joan Gravett
LaRae Kemp
Neil McIntosh
Victoria Cummock
Jack Gregory
Christopher Kenyon
Ray McIntyre
Edward Cunningham
Michael Gulino
Laurence Kerr
Beulah McKee
Ambassador Henry Catto
Janet Gunther
David Keyes
Greg McLaughlin
James Dahl
Christian Haefner
Robert R. Kierce
Scott McMahen
Eric Dahlston
Angelynn C. Hall
Michael King
Angella Meadows
Ross Daly
Ian Hamilton
Daniel J. Kinghorn
Sheila Meads
Joseph A. Daniels
Rebecca Hammelright
David Knudsen
Varsha Mehta
Kevin Darcey
Mark Hansen
Jean Kobis
Sonny Merrick
Jane Davis
Hart Hanstein
Ronald Koch
Julius Meszaros
Anthony A. Dean
Capt. Ed Harris
Walter Korsgaard
Wolfgang Meurer
Raymond DeCarli
Chris Harris
Art Kosatka
Jane F. Miller
Marina DeLarracoechea
Robert Harris
Norbert Krieg
Norio Mitsuya
Karen Decker
Stephen Haynes
Wolf Krommes
Elizabeth Monro
Henry I. DeGeneste
Doug Heeps
Stephen J. Kruchko
Thomas Montgomery
Tom Delare
Doug Helfer
Alfred Kunz
Joyce Moody
Benjamin Demps
Duncan Henderson
Deborah Kyle
Thomas G. Moore
140
John Moran
John Rodgers
Elmer Torro
John Whitby
Heather Morris
Ross Rodgers
Jim Treweek
Robert Whittington
Michael Morse
A. Rommel
Theofolus P. Tsacoumis
Caroline Whorley
Frank E. Moss
Pete Rose
Louis Turpen
Kenneth Wilde
James Mottley
Frank Rosenkranz
Kilins Aslan Tuzcu
Beverly M. Wiley
Rolf Mowett-Larson
Glenn Ross
Donald Tyson
Anthony Wilkins
Gunther Mueller
Robert Rota
Syndee Tyson
Peter Wilkins
George Murphy
Peter Saguardis
Raymond Uhl
Paul Wilkinson
Patrick Murphy
Raymond A. Salazar
Nancy H. Van Duyne
Edgar Williams
Berry D. Nassberg
Mark A. Sanna
Ed Vasquez
Frank Williams
Nancy Wright Nassberg
Naomi Saunders
Calvert Walbert
Karin Winhold
Gerry Neill
David Schaffer
Brian Wall
Glen E. Winn
Jean Neitzke
Manfred Schoelch
William Wall
Rosemary Wolfe
Donald Ness
Uwe Schroeder
Gaston Wallace
David Wookey
George Clay Nettles
James Schuler
James Wallace
Jerry Wright
John Nicholls
Lt. John Schultz
Rodney Wallis
Betty Young
Vera Nordall
Andrea Caslis-Schwab
Lyle Webb
Gerald R. Young
Richard Norland
Wolfgang Schwab
Steve Weglian
Jennifer Young
John Norman
Floyd Seeley
A. Daniel Weingendt
Posey Young
Ralph Noyes
Bertram Seesaran
Michael Weinstein
S. Donald Youso
Robert O'Brien
Norman Shanks
Ron Welling
Ben Zaduk
Janet H. Oliver
James M. Shaughnessy
Dan Weygandt
Philip Zagloo
Curtis Olsen
Alan Shaw
Alan R. Whetlor
Philip Zimmer
Roland O'Neill
David Shaw
James E. Orlando
David Schiele
Resource Persons
Chris Lionel Osborn
Thomas Shehan
Chris Osborne
Herbert K. Shera
David Abshire
Alton Keel
Lynne Osmus
Paul Shilling
Thomas Blatchford
Edward Lutwak
Cecil Parkinson
Allison Shropshire
Barry Bowman
Ted Macklin
Maureen Parks
John Shutty
Charles Bowser
Thomas Miller
Sir Norman Payne
Phyllis DE Smet-Howard
Robert Kent Boyer
Robert C. Odle, Jr.
Margery Pedry
Bruce Smith
Terry Bresnihan
Robert Odom
Larry Peer
David A. Smith
Claude Brinnegar
Davis Robinson
John Pervis
Ray Smith
Edward C. Bryant
William P. Rogers
George Pfromm
Raymond F. Smith
James Burnley
Donald Rumsfeld
Patrick Poe
Daniel Sonesen
William Cohen
Pierre Salinger
John Polanskey
Robert Sorenson
William Colby
Andre Serena
C. L. Price
Margo Squire
Walter Cruickshank
Jeffrey Shane
Brad Primeau
Herr Stark
Peter Dailey
John L. Sullivan
Joe Del Principe
Richard Steiner
Brian Duffy
Paul Schott Stevens
Gideon Pringle
Mark Stenetz
Steven Emerson
Malik Ramzan
David F. Traynham
Keri Stoddard
Michael Epstein
Toni Verstandig
Alexander L. Rattray
Joan Suter
Milton Finger
Kent Walker
Lt. Col. Phil Raymond
Chris Swan
Robert Gates
Vernon Walters
Ronald Reams
Beverly Sweatman
Michael Goldfarb
William Webster
J. Brayton Redecker
Ann Swift
Michel Guyard
Phil Reed
John Whitehead
Otis Talley
David A. Heymsfeld
Carrie Reilly
Charles Ziegler
Elizabeth Tamposi
Brian Jenkins
Peter Reiss
David Teitelbaum
Paul Rendich
Daniel Tennenbaum
Our special thanks to Rear Admiral Bennett
Julie Rethmeier
Michael Theobald
Oliver B. Revell
"Bud" Sparks, USCGR, and the Reserve Offi-
Gregg Thielmann
Ron Reynolds
Harvey Thomson
cers Association for hosting the Commission's
Max R. Robinson
Richard Todd
hearings.
141
Appendix C
Executive Orders
Title 3-
Executive Order 12686 of August 4, 1989
The President
President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the
United States of America, and in order to establish a Commission on Aviation
Security and Terrorism, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Establishment. (a) There is established the President's Commission
on Aviation Security and Terrorism to review and evaluate policy options in
connection with aviation security, with particular reference to the destruction
on December 21, 1988, of Pan American World Airways Flight 103. The
Commission shall consist of seven members appointed by the President. Two
members shall be Senators, and two shall be Members of the House of
Representatives; they shall represent both parties equally. The President shall
consult with the Majority and Republican Leaders of the Senate and the
Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives in making
appointments from the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively.
(b) The President shall designate a Chairman from among the members of the
Commission.
Sec. 2. Functions. (a) The Commission shall conduct a comprehensive study
and appraisal of practices and policy options with respect to preventing
terrorist acts involving aviation. In conducting this effort, the Commission
shall evaluate the adequacy of existing procedures for aviation security,
compliance therewith, and enforcement thereof. The Commission also shall
review options for handling terrorist threats, including prior notification to the
public. Further, the Commission shall investigate practices, policies, and laws
with respect to the treatment of families of victims of terrorist acts.
(b) Within 6 months of the date of this order, the Commission shall submit a
report to the President, which shall be classified if necessary, containing
findings and recommendations. If the Commission's report is classified, an
unclassified version shall be prepared for public distribution.
Sec. 3. Administration. (a) To the extent permitted by law and fully protecting
intelligence sources and methods and the ongoing investigations into the
destruction of Pan American World Airways Flight 103 of December 21, 1988,
the heads of executive departments, agencies, and independent instrumental-
ities shall provide the Commission, upon request, with such information as it
may require for purposes of carrying out its functions.
(b) Members of the Commission appointed from among private citizens may
receive compensation for their work on the Commission at the daily rate
specified for GS-18 of the General Schedule. While engaged in the work of the
Commission, members appointed from among private citizens of the United
States may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsist-
ence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in the Govern-
ment service (5 U.S.C. 5701-5707).
(c) To the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of appropria-
tions, the Department of Transportation shall, among other Administrative
functions, provide the Commission with administrative services, funds, facili-
ties, staff, and other support services necessary for the performance of its
functions, and the Secretary of Transportation shall perform the functions of
the President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5
U.S.C. App. 2), except that of reporting to the Congress, in accordance with the
142
guidelines and procedures established by the Administrator of General Serv-
ices.
(d) The Commission shall adhere to the requirements set forth in the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, as amended. All executive branch officials assigned
duties by the Federal Advisory Committee Act shall comply with its require-
ments with respect to this Commission.
Sec. 4. General Provision. The Commission shall terminate 30 days after
submitting its report to the President.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
ay Bush
August 4, 1989.
[FR Doc. 89-18760
Filed 8-7-89; 2:50 pm]
Billing code 3195-01-M
Editorial note: For a White House statement, dated Aug. 4, on the establishment of the Commis-
sion, see the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 25, no. 31).
Title 3-
Executive Order 12705 of March 3, 1990
The President
Extending the President's Commission on Aviation Security
and Terrorism
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the
United States of America, and in order to extend the President's Commission
on Aviation Security and Terrorism, it is hereby ordered that the first sentence
of section 2(b) of Executive Order No. 12686 is amended to read as follows:
"No later than May 15, 1990, the Commission shall submit a report to the
President, which shall be classified if necessary, containing findings and
recommendations.'
THE WHITE HOUSE,
ay Buch
March 3, 1990.
[FR Doc. 90-5312
Filed 3-5-90; 10:44 am]
Billing code 3195-01-M
143
Appendix D
Review of Statistical Data with Respect to Pan American
Flight 103 on December 21, 1988
by Edward C. Bryant (Consultant in Statistics)
Introduction
John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK). Passengers on
This report presents an analysis of available
Flight 103 could book passage from Frankfurt
data with respect to passengers flown, booking
to London, from Frankfurt to New York, or
histories and cancellations designed to deter-
from London to New York. Flight 103 has been
mine whether such data are consistent with pat-
redesignated Flight 11 following the Lockerbie
terns shown by other Pan American flights
tragedy.
before and after December 21, 1988, and
whether the Pan American flight data are con-
Two other Pan American flights serve the
sistent with patterns of another American carri-
Frankfurt to New York route. They are Flight
er serving the same route. The objective of the
67 and Flight 73. Both fly nonstop from Frank-
analysis is to assist in answering questions
furt to New York. As an initial indication of
raised by families of victims of the December
whether 1988 traffic differed materially from
21, 1988 bombing and others.
other years, the total passengers carried by the
The sections that follow present data on pas-
three flights on each day were compared for
sengers carried, bookings (i.e., reservations)
1987, 1988, and 1989. Only the passengers on
and cancellations and no-shows. A final section
the London to New York leg of Flight 103 (or
offers some conclusions. To facilitate cross ref-
Flight 11 in 1989) were used in the compari-
erencing, charts and tables presenting data on
son, since the equipment used on this leg of
passengers carried begin with the letter "P",
the flight is comparable to the equipment used
those presenting data on bookings with the
on the other two flights. The data on total pas-
letter "B" and those concerned with cancella-
sengers carried are compared for the three
tions with the letter "C." The numbers follow-
years in Fig. P-1 for each day in December for
ing the letter designations are consistent be-
which data were available. The actual data from
tween the figures and tables, that is, the data
which the three curves are drawn are shown in
for Figure P-3 are shown in Table P-3, and so
Table P-1.
on.
It will be observed that the 1988 data
Passengers Carried
reached a peak on December 15 and thereafter
dropped to a lower level. In comparing the
Passengers Carried by Pan Am in 1987,
three years of data, one should be aware that
1988 and 1989
weekends came on different days of the month
Pan Am Flight 103 originated in Frankfurt
for each of the three years, making compari-
(FRA), carried passengers to London Heathrow
sons somewhat imprecise. Even so, the three
(LHR), where passengers were transferred to a
years show substantial similarity in the pre-
larger aircraft, and continued on to New York's
Christmas traffic.
144
Comparison of Passengers Carried on
and 73. The comparison is shown in Figure
Flight 103 with Passengers Carried on
P-5. Because there are differences in the aggre-
other Pan Am Flights from Frankfurt to
gate number of passengers flown on the three
New York
flights, the number of passengers on each day
Fig. P-2 shows that the drop in passenger
was expressed as a percentage of the average
traffic after December 15, 1988 was caused by a
of the daily number of passengers carried on
drop in the passengers carried by the London
the given flight during the period December 7
to New York leg of Flight 103. Note that, al-
through December 21, 1988. The consistency
though the Helsinki warning referred to a Pan
between TWA and Pan Am during the pre-
Am flight from Frankfurt to the United States,
Christmas period of 1988 is remarkable.
the two nonstop flights from Frankfurt showed
TWA also provided service in 1988 through
no unusual drop in passengers comparable to
London on Flight 715. New York passengers
the drop on Flight 103 from London to New
arriving in London on TWA Flight 715 were
York. Fig P-2a compares number of passengers
transferred to a larger aircraft and proceeded
carried on the two legs of Flight 103 during
on to New York on a continuation of that
December, 1988. The levels are quite different
flight. Two additional graphs compare TWA
but the patterns of movement are quite similar,
Flight 715 with Pan Am Flight 103, after ex-
although the peak in traffic on the 14th and
pressing the daily passenger loads as a percent-
15th of December from London to New York is
age of average loads in the period December 7
more extreme than the peak on the same dates
through 21, as described above. Fig. P-6 com-
from Frankfurt to London.
pares the two flights with respect to the Frank-
Fig. P-3 compares passengers carried in De-
furt to London leg and Fig. P-7 compares them
cember by Flight 103 in 1987 and 1988. Note
with respect to the London to New York leg.
that the 15th of December came on Thursday
Again, the patterns are remarkably consistent.
in 1988. The comparable Thursday in 1987
One must conclude, then, that the data on
came on December 17. Taking this two day
passengers carried do not indicate any unusual
shift into account and the fact that the 18th
patterns, either with respect to all passengers
(the absolute peak in 1987) came on Friday, the
carried from Frankfurt to JFK or, specifically,
two series of data are quite comparable.
with respect to passengers carried on Flight
Pan Am also provided data on passengers
103.
carried during December, 1987 on two other
flights from London to New York, Flights 1
Booking Histories
and 101. These flights originate in London.
Pan Am provided a cumulative history of pas-
Fig. P-4 shows that the pattern of passengers
sengers booked on Flight 103, by fare class, for
carried during December, 1987 is quite similar
each day leading up to the day of the fatal
for the three flights serving this route. In par-
flight. It also provided similar data for flights
ticular, all three flights showed a decrease in
67, 73 and 11 (the renumbered 103) for 1989.
passengers carried after the December 17 (or
No such data are available for 1987. The aggre-
18) peak in the year prior to the tragedy. The
gate bookings data (the sum of first class, busi-
graph also shows that the decrease in passen-
ness class, and economy) are shown in Fig. B-1
gers is greater for Flight 103 than for Flights 1
for Flight 103 for 1988 and the other three
and 101. Similar data were not available for
flights for 1989. The data for Flight 103 in
1988, but Fig. P-4 shows that a drop in passen-
1988 and Flight 11 for 1989 are for the
ger traffic on Flight 103 after December 15,
1988 was not unexpected.
London to JFK leg. It may be seen that Flight
103 was never fully booked prior to its depar-
Comparison with Passengers Carried by
ture and that bookings continued to rise as the
TWA
date for departure neared. Note also, that a
substantial shortfall in bookings existed prior
The route from Frankfurt to New York is
to the receipt of the Helsinki warning on De-
also served by TWA. TWA's Flight 741 is a
cember 5, so that the light passenger load was
nonstop flight from Frankfurt to JFK, and thus
due to factors that occurred prior to the Hel-
is directly comparable with Pan Am Flights 67
sinki warning.
145
In view of some reports from family mem-
within seven days of flight departure, and (2)
bers that Flight 103 was at some time "fully
those occurring in the previous two weeks. A
booked" it is important to know something
substantial number of cancellations were undat-
about the way space is allocated for the various
ed, and "no-shows" were not available for
fare classes. Information supplied by Pan
1987.
American identifies bookings on each date for
Dividing the number of cancellations in the
first class, F, business (or Clipper Class), C,
seven days prior to departure by the number in
and economy (or coach class), Y. In addition,
the previous two weeks provides a rough index
there are up to five different segments of Y
of the rate of cancellation as time for departure
class, not all of which are used on any given
approaches. For the dominant leg of the flight
flight. There is a flight manager for each flight
(LHR to JFK) the ratio is 1.74 for 1987 and
departure who allocates space to the various
1.64 for 1988, so that there was actually a rela-
classes on the aircraft. An "authorization
tive decrease in cancellations as flight time ap-
limit", usually greater than the amount of seats
proached in 1988 as compared to 1987. Thus,
allocated, is assigned to each class and when
the smaller number of passengers carried in
the authorization limit is reached no more
1988 is not due to an increase in cancellations
bookings are permitted for that class. Depend-
over those in 1987. Adding the other two legs
ing on the demand for space as flight departure
(FRA to LHR and FRA to JFK) provides a ratio
approaches the flight manager may reallocate
of 1.93 for 1987 and 1.87 for 1988. Again, can-
space, so that it is possible that a given class
cellations as flight time approached were rela-
could be fully booked at a given time and yet
tively smaller for 1988 than for 1987. The
be available for further booking at a later date.
numbers of cancellations are small and a shift
Cancellations and upgrades further complicate
of a few cancellations from one period to an-
the interpretation of bookings data.
other might have changed their relative values,
Keeping in mind the complexities identified
but the observed data do not indicate any dif-
above, the data supplied by Pan American with
ference between the two years.
regard to bookings on Flight 103 on December
21, 1988 show that, at some time prior to de-
Moscow to Frankfurt
parture, one of the Y classes was fully booked,
that is, that no further bookings were permitted
Pan Am also provided data on cancellations
in that fare class.
on Flight 065 from Moscow to Frankfurt for
Fig. B-2 compares the bookings on the
various dates. This flight departs twice per
Frankfurt to London leg of the flight for 1988
week and did not fly on the day of the fatal Pan
and 1989. Recall that Flight 11 is the renum-
Am 103. It did fly on December 20. This was
bered Flight 103. The same shortfall as shown
almost a week after the posting of the Helsinki
for the London to JFK leg, above, appears in
warning by the U. S. Embassy in Moscow.
the period prior to the Helsinki warning.
Therefore, it should be informative to compare
One must conclude, then, that the booking
the cancellations on that flight of December 20
histories reveal nothing unusual in the period
with the cancellations on flights leaving Decem-
between the Helsinki warning and the depar-
ber 6 and December 9, before the Helsinki
ture of the flight on December 21, 1988.
warning was posted.
The data provided by Pan Am permitted an
Cancellations
identification of the cancellations of persons
who had been booked from Moscow to JFK. A
Frankfurt to New York
summary of the data for the three flights is
Pan American supplied data that made it pos-
shown in Table C-2. Seven cancelled in the
sible to construct the number of cancellations,
week prior to departure of the December 20
by day of cancellation, for Flight 103 for each
Flight, compared to 19 who cancelled two
of the three legs of the flight. The relevant data
weeks earlier, for a ratio of 0.37. For the other
are shown in Table C-1. Because the number
two departures, the ratio is 15 compared to 20
of cancellations could be related to the passen-
or a ratio of 0.75. Thus, there is no evident in-
ger load, cancellations were subdivided into
crease in cancellations prior to departure time.
two groups for each year: (1) those occurring
Again, however, the numbers are small.
146
The cancellations were examined by individ-
total passengers carried by Pan Am during the
ual date as well as by seven day periods and no
period studied or with respect to passengers
increase in number of cancellations above that
carried on Flight 103 on the day of the bomb-
expected due to normal variation was observed
ing. Also, patterns of bookings are consistent
in the days immediately following the posting
with patterns on other flights for which data
of the Helsinki warning.
are available. Finally, the data on cancellations
prior to the fatal flight show no unusual pat-
Conclusions
terns.
Examination of data on passengers carried
reveals no unusual patterns with respect to
147
Fig. P-1. Total Passengers Carried during 1987 through 1989
by Pan Am on Flights 67 and 73 (FRA/JFK) and 103 (LHR/JFK)
1200
1000
Passengers Carried
800
1987
600
1988
1989
400
1
5
9
13
17
21
25
December
Table P-1. Total Passengers Carried by Pan Am for Years 1987
through 1989, Flights 67 and 73 (FRA/JFK) and Flights 103 and 11
(LHR/JFK), December 1 through December 24.
December
1987
1988
1989
1
759
2
591
3
591
4
941
5
869
6
7
719
911
8
563
711
711
9
900
784
10
657
781
723
11
1122
805
12
1110
762
651
13
705
615
747
14
974
1160
15
940
1174
1067
16
1064
962
1199
17
1049
1020
954
18
1169
813
1153
19
1117
952
1023
20
969
1038
1150
21
1008
923
1196
22
1016
23
1008
24
741
Note: Blanks appear on days when any of the three flights did
not occur, or data were otherwise unavailable.
148
Fig. P-2. Passengers Carried on Pan Am Flights 67 and
73 (FRA/JFK) and 103 (LHR/JFK), December, 1988
500
PA67
PA 73
400
PA 103
Passengers Carried
300
200
100
1
5
9
13
17
21
25
December
Fig. P-2a. Passengers Carried during December, 1988
on the Two Legs of Pan Am Flight 103
500
LHR/JFK
400
FRA/LHR
Passengers Carried
300
200
0
100
0
1
5
9
13
17
21
25
December
149
Table P-2. Passengers Carried on Pan Am Flights from Frankfurt to
New York during December, 1988.
FRA/JFK
FRA/JFK
LHR /JFK
FRA/LHR
December
PA67 88
PA73 88
PA103 88
PA 103 88
1
262
348
71
2
235
231
92
3
327
293
39
4
279
49
5
270
63
6
242
65
7
203
190
61
8
292
224
195
105
9
347
236
122
10
368
294
119
35
11
304
225
106
12
323
215
224
51
13
263
137
215
53
14
374
387
124
15
366
407
401
114
16
369
290
303
115
17
410
412
198
96
18
343
277
193
71
19
366
319
267
69
20
412
404
222
81
21
354
330
239
114
22
406
356
144
23
310
367
139
24
288
73
Note: Blanks appear on days when flight did not occur, or data were
otherwise unavailable.
150
Fig. P-3. Passengers Carried in December 1987 and
1988 on Pan Am Flight 103, London to New York
500
400
Passengers Carried
300
200
100
1987
OFD
1988
0
1
5
9
13
17
21
25
29
December
Table P-3. Passengers Carried in December, 1987 and
1988 on Pan Am Flight 103, London to New York
LHR/JFK
LHR /JFK
December
PA103 87
PA103 88
1
228
2
150
3
142
4
288
5
122
6
160
7
139
190
8
221
195
9
372
236
10
177
119
11
370
225
12
409
224
13
171
215
14
242
387
15
313
401
16
293
303
17
348
198
18
408
193
19
338
267
20
274
222
21
286
239
22
299
23
293
24
118
25
26
90
27
91
28
145
29
148
30
358
31
Note: Blanks appear on days when flight did not occur,
or data were otherwise unavailable.
151
Fig. P-4. Passengers Carried on Pan Am Flights
103, 1, and 101, (LHR/JFK), December, 1987
500
400
Passengers Carried
300
200
PA 103
100
PA 1
PA101
0
1
5
9
13
17
21
25
29
December
Table P-4. Passengers Carried, LHR/JFK, on Pan Am
Flights in December, 1987
December
PA103
PA 1
PA 101
1
228
232
276
2
150
264
224
3
142
226
204
4
288
263
226
5
122
287
280
6
160
329
314
7
139
163
186
8
221
205
208
9
372
165
228
10
177
296
355
11
370
379
312
12
409
399
289
13
171
175
270
14
242
217
247
15
313
238
265
16
293
377
364
17
348
403
359
18
408
357
333
19
338
342
378
20
274
328
317
21
286
340
318
22
299
368
398
23
293
310
323
24
118
226
256
25
296
26
90
242
212
27
91
188
210
28
145
223
248
29
148
226
198
30
358
270
299
31
229
245
Note: Blanks appear on days when flight did not occur, or
data were otherwise not available.
152
Fig. P-5. Passengers Carried FRA/JFK as Percent of
Daily Average for December 7 through December 21, 1988
180
160
Pan Am 67
% of Passengers 12/7 thru 12/21
Pank Am 73
140
TWA 741
120
100
80
60
40
1
5
9
13
17
21
25
29
December
Table P-5. Passengers Carried on Pan Am Flights 67 and 73 and
TWA Flight 741, (FRA/JFK) during December, 1988, as a
Percent of Average Daily Number of Passengers, December 7
through December 21
December
PA67
PA73
TW 741
1
77.1
119.8
102.7
2
69.2
79.5
76.1
3
96.3
100.8
80.3
4
82.2
73.7
5
79.5
47.5
6
71.3
80.3
7
59.8
72.3
8
86.0
77.1
60.6
9
102.2
74.1
10
108.4
101.2
93.4
11
89.5
63.4
12
95.1
74.0
74.8
13
77.4
47.1
81.3
14
110.1
129.9
15
107.8
140.1
129.5
16
108.7
99.8
129.5
17
120.7
141.8
137.1
18
101.0
95.3
99.6
19
107.8
109.8
106.4
20
121.3
139.0
136.4
21
104.2
113.6
111.6
22
119.6
122.5
107.1
23
91.3
126.3
112.0
24
84.8
48.2
25
74.5
111.8
63.0
26
53.3
109.1
78.2
27
92.5
92.6
93.7
28
98.4
75.0
83.0
29
71.3
112.5
73.4
30
89.8
70.9
77.9
31
90.7
81.9
67.9
Note: A blank appears on days when flight did not occur, or
data were otherwise unavailable.
153
Fig. P-6. Passengers Carried, FRA/LHR, as Percent of
Daily Average for December 7 through December 21, 1988
200
% of Passengers 12/7 thru 12/21
100
PHO
of
TWA 715
Pan Am 103
0
1
5
9
13
17
21
25
29
December
Fig. P-7. Passengers Carried, LHR/JFK, as Percent of
Daily Average for December 7 through December 21, 1988
200
% of Passengers 12/7 thru 12/21
100
Pan Am
103
TWA 715
0
1
5
9
13
17
21
25
29
December
154
Table P-6(7). Passengers Flown on Pan Am Flight 103 and TWA Flight 715
in December, 1988, by Leg of Flight, as a Percent of Average Daily Number
of Passengers Carried between December 7 and December 21, 1988
PA Flt 103
PA Flt 103
TWA Flt 715
TWA Flt 715
December
FRA/LHR
LHR/JFK
:
FRA/LHR
LHR/JFK
1
87.5
113.6
100.1
2
113.4
151.4
54.8
3
48.1
53.5
87.0
4
60.4
95.8
76.0
5
77.7
104.7
120.6
6
80.1
46.8
84.8
7
75.2
78.9
104.7
81.1
8
129.5
80.9
102.4
78.9
9
27.1
98.0
88.5
10
43.2
49.4
42.3
51.9
11
130.7
93.4
149.2
89.2
12
62.9
93.0
57.9
106.7
13
65.4
89.2
100.2
92.8
14
152.9
160.6
106.9
163.0
15
140.6
166.5
91.3
120.6
16
141.8
125.8
124.7
67.3
17
118.4
82.2
153.7
95.0
18
87.5
80.1
100.2
129.4
19
85.1
110.8
75.7
94.3
20
99.9
92.2
86.9
112.6
21
140.6
99.2
102.4
128.7
22
177.6
173.7
105.3
23
171.4
189.3
107.5
24
90.0
64.6
25
145.5
26
91.2
150.6
27
155.4
81.9
28
99.9
63.6
29
149.2
91.4
30
148.0
37.3
31
50.6
67.3
Note: A blank appears on days when flight did not occur, or data were
otherwise unavailable.
155
Fig. B-1. Booking Histories during December of Pan Am
Flights to JFK Departing December 21, 1988 and 1989
500
400
Bookings
PA 67, '89, F/J
300
PA 73, '89, FU
PA 11, '89, LJ
PA 103, '88, L/J
200
100
1
5
9
13
17
21
December
Fig. B-2. Booking Histories of Pan Am Flights, FRA to LHR,
Departing on December 21, 1988 and 1989
140
120
100
Bookings
80
60
40
PA 11, 89, F/L
20
PA 103, '88, F/L
0
1
5
9
13
17
21
December
156
Table B-1. Booking Histories during December of Pan Am Flights from Frankfurt to JFK, 1988 and 1989
FRA/JFK
FRA/JFK
LHR/JFK
LHR/JFK
FRA/LHR
FRA/LHR
December
"Flt 67, '89"
"Flt 73, '89"
"Flt 11, '89"
"Flt 103, '88"
"Flt 11, '89"
"Flt 103, '88"
1
461
466
312
134
104
2
453
463
310
135
104
3
451
458
306
139
104
56
4
452
463
329
140
102
59
5
447
464
356
145
115
64
6
444
463
368
143
116
68
7
455
464
368
160
115
67
8
443
462
370
165
117
69
9
451
465
375
170
118
74
10
451
462
379
171
116
75
11
460
472
381
175
121
72
12
457
466
400
179
124
71
13
456
456
418
177
132
71
14
465
465
425
185
127
73
15
462
465
423
134
16
453
469
433
192
138
82
17
450
468
433
200
135
82
18
466
476
436
205
131
81
19
467
480
443
229
136
89
20
460
468
447
253
136
106
21
460
468
447
253
136
106
Note: A blank appears on days for which booking information is not available.
157
158
Table C-1. Cancellation Histories of Pan Am Flights 103 Leaving Frankfurt, Wednesday, December 23,
1987, and Wednesday, December 21, 1988 by Leg of Flight.
Flight and Periods
Frankfurt to London
London to JFK
Frankfurt to JFK
Compared
Total
Rebooked on PA
Total
Rebooked on PA
Total
Rebooked on PA
Dec. 23, 1987
Dec. 17 - Dec. 23
9
3
33
5
12
1
Dec. 3 - Dec. 16
4
1
19
7
5
1
Undated
2
1
28
8
11
5
No-Shows
(Not available)
Dec. 21, 1988
Dec. 15 - Dec. 21
7
41
5
8
1
Dec. 1 - Dec. 14
4
25
4
1
Undated
2
2
45
19
8
4
No-Shows
13
35
17
Table C-2. Cancellations of Passengers Booked on Pan Am Flight 065
from Moscow to Frankfurt for Flights Leaving Moscow on December 6,
9, and 20, 1988.
Flights and Periods Compared Total Cancellations
Rebooked on Pan Am
December 20, 1988
Dec. 14 through Dec. 20
7
0
Nov. 30 through Dec. 13
19
0
Undated
15
8
December 9, 1988
Dec. 3 through Dec. 9
4
0
Nov. 19 through Dec. 2
7
2
Undated
10
6
December 6, 1988
Nov. 30 through Dec. 6
11
0
Nov. 16 through Nov. 29
13
0
Undated
3
1
Totals for Dec. 6 and 9 Flts.
Week before Departure
15
0
2nd and 3rd week before
Departure
20
2
Undated
13
7
Note: The data are for passengers booked from Moscow to New York
through Frankfurt.
159
Appendix E
Acts of Aviation Sabotage
EXPLOSIONS ABOARD AIRCRAFT-1949 THROUGH 1989
Airline
Aircraft Location when
Date
Circumstances
Casualties
Explosion Occurred
05/07/49
Philippine Airlines
Between Daet and
Crashed into sea. Time bomb delivered to the aircraft
13 killed
(Philippines)
Manila, Philippines
by two ex-convicts who were hired for the job by a
woman and a man who were attempting to kill the
woman's husband, a passenger on the aircraft.
09/09/49
Quebec
Airways
Near Sault Au Cochon,
Aircraft exploded 40 miles from Quebec. Explosion
23 killed
(Canadian Pacific
Quebec Canada
due to bomb in No. 1 forward baggage compart-
Airlines)
ment. Three individuals executed for the crime.
(Canada)
04/13/50
British
European
English Channel near
Explosion in lavatory severe damage to rear of aircraft.
1 injured
Airways
(Great
Hastings, England
Aircraft flown back and landed at Northolt at night.
Britain)
Explosive device was placed in used towel receptacle
in lavatory.
09/24/52
Mexicana (Mexico)
Near Mexico City,
Explosion in flight 15 minutes after takeoff. Seven-
2 injured
Mexico
foot hold in fuselage. Bomb exploded in a suitcase
in forward baggage compartment. Aircraft landed
successfully. Two men convicted and sentenced to
30 years.
04/11/55
Air India (India)
Near Great Natuna
About 5 hours after takeoff violent explosion in No. 3
16 killed
Island in South China
engine nacelle. Aircraft caught fire and crashed.
Sea
Explosive device with clockwork timing device was
in starboard wing root in wheel wall.
11/01/55
United Air Lines
Near Longmont, CO,
11 minutes after takeoff an explosion disintegrated
44 killed
U.S.A.
the aircraft in flight. A dynamite bomb detonated in
No. 4 baggage compartment. 39 passengers; 5 crew.
J. Graham executed for the crime.
03/04/56
Skyways
Ltd.
On ground at Nicosia,
Explosion in forward freight compartment while on the
None
(Great Britain)
Cyprus
ground at Nicosia airfield.
07/25/57
Western Airlines
Over Daggett, CA,
47 minutes after takeoff, cruising at 7,500 feet, cabin
1 killed
U.S.A.
pressurized at 4,000 feet, explosion occurred in the
lavatory. A hole was blown through the side, and a
passenger who had detonated the bomb (a charge
of dynamite) was blown out of the aircraft. The
plane landed successfully 17 minutes after occur-
rence. 13 passengers; 3 crew.
12/19/57
Air France (France)
Over Central France
An explosion due to a bomb being detonated in
None
lavatory. The damaged aircraft with its 89 passen-
gers and crew landed successfully at Lyons airport.
160
EXPLOSIONS ABOARD AIRCRAFT-1949 THROUGH 1989-Continued
Date
Aircraft Location when
Airline
Circumstances
Casualties
Explosion Occurred
09/08/59
Mexicana (Mexico)
Over Central Mexico
In-flight explosion tore a hole in the side of the
1 killed,
fuselage and one of the passengers believed to have
8 injured
detonated the bomb fell 11,000 feet to his death.
The aircraft, with its 13 passengers and 3 crew, was
landed successfully. Eight occupants injured, and a
small fire extinguished in flight.
01/06/60
National Airlines
Over Bolivia, NC,
3 hours 4 minutes after takeoff, while in cruising
34 killed
U.S.A.
flight, the aircraft exploded at 18,000 feet. Wreck-
age scattered some 13 miles. Explosion due to
detonation of dynamite by means of dry cell batter-
ies located in passenger compartment right of seat row
No. 7 under seat. Flew 16 miles before loss of
control.
04/28/60
Linaea Aeropostal
Near Calabozo,
On scheduled flight when about 14 km from Calabozo
13 killed
Venezolana
Venezuela
airport, an explosion totally destroyed the cockpit.
(Venezuela)
An explosion device detonated in the cockpit de-
stroyed the aircraft.
05/22/62
Continental
Air
Over Unionville, MO,
While flying at 39,000 feet an explosion in the right
45 killed
Lines
U.S.A.
rear lavatory blew off the tail of the aircraft. Wreck-
age scattered many miles. Some pieces down wind
120 miles. Dynamite detonation is towel container.
12/08/64
Alas Airlines (Bo-
Over Bolivia
Aircraft crashed after in-flight explosion occurred.
15 killed
livia)
Probable cause determined dynamite charge planted
by heavily insured passenger.
07/08/65
Canadian
Pacific
Over British Columbia,
An explosion occurred separating the tail section. An
52 killed
Airlines (Canada)
Canada
explosive device detonated within the fuselage
caused the aircraft to crash.
11/22/66
Aden
Airways
Near Aden, Southern
Shortly after the aircraft reached 6,000 feet and about
8 killed
(Aden-now
Yemen
20 minutes after taking off, from Meifah (Maysaah)
Southern
an explosion occurred which disintegrated the air-
Yemen)
craft. An explosive device had been detonated in a
hand baggage on port side of passenger cabin.
05/29/67
Aerocondor
(Co-
Between Barranquilla
On flight to Bogota with 18 passengers and 4 crew,
None
lombia)
and Bogota, Colombia
an explosion tore a 3-foot diameter hole in the rear
fuselage. Safe landing made at Bogota. Investiga-
tion disclosed evidence of a time bomb.
06/30/67
Aden
Airways
On ground at Aden,
An explosion occurred while the empty aircraft was
None
(Aden-now
Southern Yemen
parked on the tarmac at Aden airport. The aircraft
Southern
caught fire and was destroyed. Plastic explosive
Yemen)
thought to have been used in forward compartment
with time device. Piece of time detonator pencil
found.
10/12/67
British
European
Over Mediterranean off
On scheduled flight Athens to Nicosia, at about
66 killed
Airways
(Great
Island of Rhodes
29,000 feet, explosive device detonated in tourist
Britain)
passenger cabin. Aircraft crashed into sea and was
lost. A few floating pieces of debris recovered to-
gether with some bodies. Two cushions and one
body revealed evidence of detonation of a high
explosive which had occurred in the passenger
cabin.
11/12/67
American Airlines
Over Alamosa, CO,
About 1 hour 4 minutes after takeoff, en route Chica-
None
U.S.A.
go-San Diego and when over Alamosa, Colorado, a
small explosion occurred in rear baggage compartment.
Three bags destroyed. Aircraft landed successfully 3
hours after taking off. Homemade and crude explo-
sive device found. FBI arrested man; 72 passengers
and 6 crew on board. Landed 1 hour 45 minutes
after occurrence.
11/19/68
Continental
Air-
Over Gunnison, CO,
Fire and explosion in lavatory at 24,000 feet. Fire
None
lines
U.S.A.
extinguished by crew, and aircraft landed safely; 63
passengers and 8 crew. One of the passengers was
arrested.
161
EXPLOSIONS ABOARD AIRCRAFT-1949 THROUGH 1989-Continued
Date
Airline
Aircraft Location when
Circumstances
Casualties
Explosion Occurred
03/11/69
Ethiopian Airlines
On ground at Frankfurt,
Two explosions in tourist class passenger compartment.
None
(Ethiopia)
West Germany
Aircraft was parked on the ground. Passengers had
deplaned.
08/05/69
Philippine Airlines
Near Zamboanga,
Passenger apparently set off an explosive, believed
1 killed,
(Philippines)
Philippines
gelignite, in lavatory and blew himself out of air-
4 injured
craft; 27 passengers and 4 crew. Aircraft landed
successfully.
08/29/69
Trans World Air-
On ground at
Two Arab terrorists hijacked the aircraft shortly after
No injuries due
lines
Damascus, Syria
departure from Rome and diverted it to Damascus.
to explosion,
Upon landing, the passengers and crew were evacu-
but several
ated through emergency chutes. One hijacker threw
injured during
hand grenades and a canister explosive device into
evacuation of
the cockpit causing an explosion which destroyed the
aircraft.
front section of the aircraft.
12/2/69
Air Vietnam (South
Near Nha Trang, South
Explosion in lavatory in flight injured pilot and dam-
32 killed,
Vietnam)
Vietnam
aged braking systems. On landing, the aircraft ran
many others
off end of runway and crashed into a school; 70
injured
persons aboard aircraft.
02/21/70
Swiss Air Trans-
Over Wurenlingen,
About 9 minutes after takeoff from Zurich pilot re-
47 killed,
port Co.
Switzerland
ported explosion in aft compartment. A few minutes
no survivors
later reported fire and smoke. Lost control and
crashed in forest.
02/21/70
Austrian
Airlines
Near Frankfurt, West
Twenty minutes after takeoff from Frankfort explo-
None
(Austria)
Germany
sion in freight hold blew hole 3' X 2' through bottom
of fuselage. Aircraft landed safely at Frankfurt, Ger-
many; 33 passengers and 5 crew.
03/14/70
United Arab Air-
Near Alexandria, Egypt
During approach to land, explosion occurred in land-
2 injured
lines (Egypt)
ing gear well. Extensive damage; device in rear of left
engine. Aircraft landed safely.
04/21/70
Philippine Airlines
Near Pant Bangan, 75
At 10,500 feet in clear air, explosion in rear of aircraft
36 killed,
(Philippines)
miles north of Manila,
ripped off the tail section. Evidence of explosive
no survivors
Philippines
device in lavatory.
06/02/70
Philippine Airlines
Over Roxas, Philippines
At 13,000 feet a hand grenade located under a seat
1 killed,
(Philippines)
exploded. Nine square foot hole in fuselage; 40
12 injured
passengers and 4 crew. Aircraft landed safely at
Roxas.
09/07/70
Pan
American
On ground at Cairo,
Two Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
No injuries due
World Ariways
Egypt
(PFLP) guerrillas hijacked aircraft at gunpoint on
to explosion
09/06/70, shortly after departure from Amsterdam
but several
en route to New York and diverted it to Beirut,
persons injured
Lebanon. A third man boarded at Beirut with de-
during
molitions which he enplaned during flight to Cairo.
evacuation.
The aircraft was demolished on the ground at Cairo
following emergency evacuation of crew, passen-
gers, and hijackers.
09/12/70
Trans World Air-
On ground at Dawson
Aircraft hijacked by PFLP guerrillas on 09/06/70.
None
lines
Field, Jordan
Diverted to Dawson Field, Zerka, Jordan, and sub-
sequently destroyed by demolitions on the ground.
09/12/70
Swissair
(Switzer-
On ground at Dawson
Aircraft hijacked by PFLP guerrillas on 09/06/70.
None
land)
Field, Jordan
Diverted to Dawson Field, Zerka, Jordan, and sub-
sequently destroyed by demolitions on the ground.
09/12/70
British
Overseas
On ground at Dawson
Aircraft hijacked by PFLP guerrillas on 09/06/70.
None
Airways
(Great
Field, Jordan
Diverted to Dawson Field, Zerka, Jordan, and sub-
Britain)
sequently destroyed by demolitions on the ground.
08/24/71
Royal
Jordanian
On ground at Madrid,
Explosive device in aft lavatory complex. Aircraft was
None
Airlines (Jordan)
Spain
parked on ground. Hole blown in top of fuselage
with tear 3 feet long.
11/20/71
China
Airlines
Over South China Sea
Explosion-probable bomb. Aircraft crashed at sea.
25 killed
(Taiwan)
162
EXPLOSIONS ABOARD AIRCRAFT-1949 THROUGH 1989-Continued
Aircraft Location when
Date
Airline
Circumstances
Casualties
Explosion Occurred
12/29/71
General Aviation
In a hangar at Elkhart,
An explosive device placed on a seat in a cabin deto-
Unknown
(United States)
IL, U.S.A.
nated, destroying the aircraft and making a large
hole in the roof of the hangar. Door of hangar and
door of aircraft had been forced open prior to the
explosion. Suspect identified.
01/26/72
Jugoslovenski
Over Ceske Kamenice,
Homemade bomb in forward luggage compartment. Air-
27 killed,
Aero- transport
Czechoslovakia
craft crashed; 28 persons aboard. (Note: Sole survi-
1 injured
(Yugoslavia)
vor fell approximately 15,000 feet in tail section.)
03/08/72
Trans World Air-
On ground at Las
Explosive device in right rear portion of cockpit. Air-
None
lines, U.S.A.
Vegas, NV
craft parked.
05/25/72
Lan-Chile (Chile)
Over Caribbean Sea,
Homemade pipe bomb in ice water fountain service com-
None
near Cuba
partment. Extensive damage to rear end of aircraft.
Landed safely at Montego Bay, Jamaica.
06/15/72
Cathay Pacific Air-
Over Central Highlands
Bomb in suitcase under passenger seat on right side over
81 killed,
ways
(Hong
of South Vietnam
wing. Aircraft crashed. A police officer whose fian-
no survivors
Kong)
cee and daughter were aboard was charged with the
crime.
08/16/72
El Al Israel Airlines
Over Rome, Italy
Bomb in portable phonograph record player stored in the
None
(Israel)
aft baggage compartment exploded shortly after take-
off. Approximately 200 grams of explosive. Crack in
rear of door and hole in baggage compartment.
Aircraft landed safely at Rome.
09/16/72
Air Manila (Philip-
Near Roxas, Philippines
Explosion occurred at about 11,000 feet. Large hole
None
pines)
blown in cargo compartment, and one propeller dam-
aged. Landing made at Roxas City; 38 passengers
and 4 crew. No injuries. Explosion due to hand
grenade. Two hand grenades found in aircraft.
12/08/72
Ethiopian Airlines
Near Addis Ababa,
During attempt to hijack aircraft, security guards and
6 killed,
(Ethiopia)
Ethiopia
the seven hijackers shot at each other. Six hijackers
11 wounded
killed; one seriously wounded. One hijacker ex-
by small
ploded hand grenade which tore a 12 to 15 inch
arms fire
diameter hole in the floor in first class cabin section.
and grenade
Electrical wires and some control cables damaged.
explosion.
Aircraft landed safely.
03/19/73
Air Vietnam (South
Over Ban Me Thuot,
During approach to land, explosion occurred in the
59 killed,
Vietnam)
South Vietnam
cargo area near the main wing span.
no survivors
04/24/73
Aeroflot (USSR)
Near Leningrad, USSR
Hijacker standing in area between passenger compartment
2 killed
and cockpit caused a bomb device to explode. Hole
blown in right side of fuselage. Aircraft landed
safely.
07/20/73
Japan Air Lines
Over Germany and on
Woman hijacker killed and purser wounded in acci-
In flight
(Japan)
ground at Benghazi,
dental explosion of explosive carried by the woman.
explosion (one
Libya
After stops at Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and at
hijacker killed,
Damascus, Syria, aircraft finally landed at Benghazi,
purser
Libya, on 07/24/73. All passengers and crew were
wounded).
released. An explosion blew up the cockpit, and
Explosion on
subsequent explosions destroyed the entire aircraft.
ground (no
casualties).
09/21/73
General Aviation
On ground at
Explosion occurred in the front of a privately owned
Unknown
(United States)
Crestwood, IL, U.S.A.
aircraft. Device was placed in the engine manifold
and ignited by an exterior fuse.
12/17/73
Pan
American
On ground at Rome,
While the aircraft was loading passengers, a group of
30 killed,
World Airways
Italy
Arab males shot at the plane and threw exploding
many injured
incendiary grenades, probably phosphorous,
through the open doors. Explosions and fire oc-
curred in the cabin area causing severe fire damage to
forward and aft sections of the fuselage. Following
this, the Arabs hijacked a Lufthansa Airlines B-737
standing nearby.
163
EXPLOSIONS ABOARD AIRCRAFT-1949 THROUGH 1989-Continued
Date
Airline
Aircraft Location when
Circumstances
Casualties
Explosion Occurred
02/20/74
Air Vietnam (South
On ground at Hue,
Hijacker ordered the flight to go to Dong Hoi, North
3 killed
Vietnam)
South Vietnam
Vietnam. Pilot convinced hijacker that fuel was low,
engines were malfunctioning, and that landing at
Dong Ha (a North Vietnamese controlled area) was
necessary. Actually landed at Hue, South Vietnam.
Hijacker detonated the explosives he carried in a
bag when he realized he had been tricked. A hole
about 2 by 3 meters was made in the port side of
the fuselage, and three starboard windows were
broken. The aircraft was not considered economi-
cally repairable. Hijacker and two passengers killed.
03/22/74
Air Inter (France)
On ground at Bastia,
Bomb placed in forward landing gear compartment on
None
Corsica
movable flap of the wheel housing. Exploded at
0400 hours. Forward landing gear, everything
under forward galley floor and flight deck mangled.
Parts of fuselage, underflooring and cabin area
damaged.
08/22/74
Trans World Air-
On ground at Rome,
After aircraft landed, a fire was discovered in aft
None
lines
Italy
baggage compartments. Fire was confined to area near
a suitcase which contained an explosive device
which malfunctioned, causing the fire.
09/08/74
Trans World Air-
Over Ionian Sea the
Pilot radioed that he was having trouble with one
88 killed
lines
Coast of Greece
engine. Aircraft subsequently entered a steep climb
and then went into a steep nose down spin and
crashed into the sea. National Transportation Safety
Board determined that the detonation of a high
order explosion took place in the aft cargo compart-
ment.
09/15/74
Air Vietnam (South
Over Phan Rang, South
Hijacker ordered flight to Hanoi, North Vietnam. The
70 killed
Vietnam)
Vietnam
pilot attempted to convince hijacker that landing at
Phan Rang was necessary to refuel. While in land-
ing pattern hijacker, who was in cockpit detonated
two hand grenades. Aircraft veered off course, blew
up and crashed.
02/03/75
Pan
American
Approximately 60 miles
A passenger poured petrol from a whiskey bottle into
1 injured
World Airways
west of Rangoon,
a restroom toilet bowl and then broke the filler
Burma
needle off a butane refill cartridge causing the
fumes to spray around the room. He repeated the
same procedure in another restroom. He then
struck a match and a fire and explosion occurred in
the restroom. The fire was quickly extinguished by
the crew. The passenger who set the fire received
minor burns.
06/03/75
Philippines Airlines
200 miles Southwest of
A bomb placed in a lavatory in the rear of the plane
1 killed,
Manila, Philippines
exploded, badly damaging the tail section of the
45 injured
aircraft. The plane made a safe emergency landing.
07/05/75
Pakistan
Airlines
On ground at
A bomb placed under a passenger seat exploded while
None
(Pakistan)
Rawalpindi, India
the plane was on the ground. The explosion ripped
a 3- to 4-foot hole in the-aircraft fuselage.
12/19/75
General Aviation
On ground near Angels
Blasting caps placed near fuel tank detonated causing
None
(United States)
Camp, CA U.S.A.
$10,000.00 in damage to the aircraft.
01/01/76
Middle East Air-
Between Saudi Arabia
The jetliner crashed into the Arabian desert after an
82 killed
lines (Lebanon)
and Kuwait
explosion aboard the aircraft caused a high order
explosion in forward baggage compartment.
05/21/76
Philippine Airlines
On ground at
Moslem rebels, during course of hijacking, exploded
13 killed,
(Philippines)
Zamboanga,
grenades on aircraft.
14 injured
Philippines
07/02/76
Eastern Airlines
On ground at Boston,
Explosive device placed between strut and landing gear
1 injured
MA U.S.A.
detonated, completely destroying the aircraft.
09/07/76
Air France (France)
On ground at Ajaccio,
Masked group of 7 men set dynamite charges aboard
None
Corsica
aircraft and caused the explosion to occur.
164
EXPLOSIONS ABOARD AIRCRAFT-1949 THROUGH 1989-Continued
Aircraft Location when
Date
Airline
Circumstances
Casualties
Explosion Occurred
10/06/76
Cubana (Cuba)
Barbados, West Indies
Internal explosion reported 9 minutes after takeoff.
73 killed
Forced to ditch about 5 miles west of Barbados
near Bridgetown, Barbados.
05/01/77
General
Aviation
On ground at Salinas,
Explosions occurred on 5 helicopters parked at Sali-
None
(United States)
CA, U.S.A.
nas Airport. Minor damage was sustained.
05/24/78
General Aviation
Over Nairobi, Kenya
Explosion occurred aboard the aircraft shortly before
4 killed
(Kenya)
it crashed near Nairobi.
08/18/78
Philippine Airlines
In flight over
Explosion occurred in rear lavatory. Explosion blew a
1 killed,
(Philippines)
Philippines
hole in fuselage, killing the bomber and injuring 3
3 injured
others.
09/07/78
Air Ceylon (Sri
On ground at Colombo,
Aircraft destroyed by blast which occurred shortly
None
Lanka)
Sri Lanka
after all had disembarked at Colombo.
04/26/79
Indian
Airlines
Airborne over Madras,
Explosion occurred in the forward restroom. Explosion
8 injured
(India)
India
blew out the walls, severed controls leading from
the cockpit and blew a hole in the fuselage.
11/15/79
American Airlines
In flight 30 minutes
Bomb device in a wooden box in a small bag which was
None
after leaving Chicago
in a metal postal container detonated causing a hole
IL, U.S.A.
in the side and a fire in the metal container. Pres-
sure fluctuations were noted on instruments and
smoke appeared in cabin. Aircraft landed safely at
Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C.
09/09/80
United Airlines
At boarding gate,
Explosion occurred in cargo hold while passengers
2 injured
Sacramento, CA,
were deplaning and cargo being unloaded. Damage
U.S.A.
to baggage and aircraft minimal.
08/31/81
Middle East Air-
On ground at Beirut,
Explosion estimated at 5 kilograms of dynamite se-
None
lines (Lebanon)
Lebanon
verely damaged the empty aircraft. Explosion oc-
curred shortly after the aircraft completed a flight
from Libya.
10/13/81
Air Malta (Malta)
On ground at Cairo,
As luggage was being off loaded two parcels exploded
2 killed,
Egypt
about 15 minutes apart. The baggage compartment was
8 injured
severely damaged, a third bomb which did not
detonate was located later.
12/12/81
Aeronica
(Nicara-
On ground at Mexico
Explosion occurred between the rearmost cabin seat on
5 injured
gua)
City, Mexico
the left aisle and the cabin wall. The blast tore a hole 3
feet in diameter in the left side of the fuselage and
broke windows in the terminal building.
07/25/82
CAAC
(People's
In flight between Xian
Explosive device carried aboard by hijackers was
None
Republic
of
and Shanghai, China
thrown and exploded in or near a restroom between the
China)
forward and rear passenger compartments. The explosion
blew a hole in the fuselage but did not cause the
plane to depressurize. Twelve people were injured
as a result of the hijacking; however, no one was
injured by the blast. The aircraft landed safely at
Shanghai.
08/11/82
Pan
American
140 miles from
Bomb located under seat cushion in rear cabin seat. Explo-
1 killed,
World Airways
Honolulu, Hawaii
sion caused damage in area of the seat, the ceiling
15 injured
and overhead racks were torn, a hole was ripped in
the floor and rivets were popped causing a break in
the fuselage. No decompression. Aircraft landed
safely at Honolulu.
08/19/83
Syrian
Airlines
Rome, Italy
Incendiary device located under seat in passenger area.
None
(Syria)
Fire swept through the aircraft a few minutes before
departure for Damascus. Aircraft was completely
gutted. All passengers evacuated safely.
09/23/83
Gulf Air (Bahrain)
30 miles from Abu
Bomb exploded in the baggage compartment. The aircraft
112 killed
Dhabi United Arab
crashed in the desert while preparing to land.
Emirates
165
EXPLOSIONS ABOARD AIRCRAFT-1949 THROUGH 1989-Continued
Date
Airline
Aircraft Location when
Explosion Occurred
Circumstances
Casualties
01/18/84
Air France (France)
70 miles from Karachi,
Aircraft departed Karachi for Dharan en route to
None
Pakistan
Paris. 70 miles from Karachi the pilot heard a noise
then experienced a loss in pressurization. Aircraft
returned to airport and landed safely. Inspection
revealed a 2 by 2 meter hole external to right rear
cargo hole #4.
03/10/84
Union Des Trans-
On ground at
During a stopover at N'djamena Airport in Chad,
24 injured
port (France)
N'djamena, Chad
bomb exploded in central baggage compartment 20
minutes after landing, injuring 4 passengers. The
aircraft was completely destroyed.
07/31/84
Air France (France)
On ground at Tehran,
The aircraft was hijacked by 3 men. The hijackers
None
Iran
took the passengers and crew off the aircraft while
in Tehran and destroyed the cockpit by explosion.
01/23/85
Lloyd Aereo Boli-
In flight between La Paz
A passenger went into a forward lavatory reportedly
1 killed
viano (Bolivia)
and Santa Cruz,
carrying dynamite in a briefcase. The dynamite
Bolivia
exploded killing the passenger and caused some
damage to the aircraft. Although the cockpit filled
with smoke, the pilot was able to land normally.
03/03/85
General
Aviation
On ground at Bieber,
The twin engine aircraft was blown up while parked at
None
(United States)
CA, U.S.A.
the airport. Reportedly the bomb was a high veloci-
ty explosive.
03/09/85
Royal
Jordanian
On ground at Dubai,
A bomb in a suitcase exploded in a baggage compart-
None
Airlines (Jordan)
United Arab Emirates
ment. The aircraft was not damaged. Reportedly the
bomb had unsuccessfully been timed to explode
after the aircraft was in the air.
06/11/85
Royal
Jordanian
On ground at Beirut,
The aircraft was hijacked by 5 men after flying to
None
Airlines (Jordan)
Lebanon
Cyprus, Sicily and then back to Beirut, Lebanon.
The passengers and crew were released. The hijack-
ers using explosives then blew up the cockpit.
06/23/85
Air India (India)
About 90 miles off the
As the aircraft neared Ireland, it disappeared from the
329 killed
coast of Ireland
radar screen and crashed in the ocean. After exam-
ining the wreckage, scientists reported a powerful
explosion occurred in the front cargo hold.
10/30/85
American Airlines
On ground at Dallas/Ft.
Explosion occurred in a forward baggage compartment
None
Worth, TX, U.S.A.
shortly after the aircraft landed while the baggage
was being unloaded. The device was located in a
tote bag in a cargo unit load container. The only
damage to the aircraft was scorched panels in the
cargo bay.
11/23/85
Egyptair (Egypt)
On ground at Valletta,
The aircraft was hijacked and flown to Valletta where
60 killed,
Malta
after several hours of negotiations, Egyptian troops
35 injured
broke into the aircraft. During the ensuing battle in
the passenger cabin, the hijackers threw hand gre-
nades. The explosion and resulting fire caused
severe damage to the aircraft.
04/02/86
TWA
Near Athens
Located in cabin area. Landed safely.
4 killed,
9 injured
05/03/86
Air Lanka
On ground at Colombo,
Located in cargo hold.
16 killed,
Sri Lanka
41 injured
10/26/86
Thai Airways
Near Japan
Located in rear lavatory. Landed at Osaka.
62 injured
11/29/87
Korean Air
Destroyed in flight
Located in cabin area.
115 killed
03/01/88
BOP Air (Republic
Destroyed in flight
Located in cabin area.
17 killed
of South Africa)
12/21/88
Pan Am
Lockerbie, Scotland
Located in baggage compartment.
259 killed
on aircraft,
11 killed on
ground
09/19/89
UTA
Over Sahara, Niger
Mid-air explosion.
171 killed
11/27/89
Avianca
Soacha, near Bogota,
Bomb located under seat.
107 killed
Colombia
Sources: Collected from various public source documents including: Explosions Aboard Aircraft. Updated: January 1, 1986, Department
of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration-Office of Civil Aviation Security. Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation: 1988, Appendix
C, Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration-Office of Civil Aviation Security.
166
Appendix E-Continued
Other Sabotage Attempts
The following are selected items involving
December 29, 1983
sabotage attempts which did not lead to the de-
struction of an aircraft. It should be noted that
A terrorist attempted to check a piece of
this is not an exhaustive listing of the sabotage
luggage on an Alitalia flight from Istanbul,
Turkey to Rome, Italy and then to New
acts against civil aviation. The source of this
listing is testimony given by Billie H. Vincent
York on a Pan Am B-747 flight as interline
before this Commission on November 17,
luggage. The Turkish Police removed the
1989, and his follow-up letter of April 19,
bag and discovered a bomb after the pas-
1990. This compilation is presented to demon-
senger failed to board the Alitalia flight to
Rome.
strate the extent of the terrorist bombing threat
against civil aviation.
May 18, 1984
August 25, 1982
Two men were arrested at the Leonardo
An unexploded, improvised explosive
Da Vinci International Airport after explo-
device was discovered on a Pan Am B-747
sives, without detonators, were discovered
at the Rio de Janeiro Airport. The FAA
beneath false bottoms in their suitcases.
and FBI were given custody of the bomb
Additional searches of their carry-on lug-
and returned it to the U.S. for examination
gage revealed detonators and false Iraqi
and testing. The bomb's triggering mecha-
passports. The two arrived in Rome via
nism contained an electronic timer, a baro-
Syrian Arab Airlines from Damascus, Syria.
metric sensor, and two AAA batteries. The
They were making a connection with an
explosive was a 4 by 10-inch sheet of 1/8
Iberian Airline flight to Madrid, Spain.
inch thick plastic explosive [approximately
300 grams (2/3 lb)].
June 25, 1984
Police in West Berlin, acting on a tip that
December 1983/January 1984
Palestinian terrorists might attempt to
A British national unknowingly carried a
transport suitcases filled with explosives
bomb concealed in the lining of her suit-
into the city, searched an apartment in the
case from Athens, Greece to Tel Aviv,
U.S. sector and found two suitcases. Each
Israel, to London, England, and back to
suitcase contained approximately two
Athens. The suitcase bomb failed to deto-
pounds of explosives concealed in sheet
nate as designed and was recovered by the
form inside the lining of the suitcases. The
Greek Police. The bomb's triggering mech-
bombs had electric blasting caps for initia-
anism contained an electronic timer and a
tors, although no power sources were
barometric sensor. The suitcase had 1/8
found. It is believed that the two suitcases
inch sheets of plastic explosive concealed
were being transported for use at another
inside the lining of the suitcase.
location, possibly for an aviation target.
167
August 2, 1984
June 23, 1985
As many as 40 people were killed and 19
Within one hour of the loss of an Air India
injured when a suitcase bomb exploded in
B-747 in the Atlantic Ocean southwest of
the International Arrival Hall at Madras
Cork, Ireland, a bomb aboard another Air
International Airport, Madras, India. The
India B-747 detonated in the baggage han-
powerful explosion ripped apart the air-
dling area of the Narita Airport, Tokyo,
port terminal and caved in the ceiling of
Japan, killing two baggage handlers and in-
the arrival lounge. The bomb was inside a
juring several others. A bag, which con-
suitcase of an individual who purchased a
tained the bomb, was being transferred
ticket to Sri Lanka, checked two bags, ob-
from a Canadian Pacific flight to an Air
tained a boarding pass, but never boarded
India B-747. The explosive device was
the flight. A passenger/bag match isolated
concealed in a radio. The amount of explo-
the two bags, which were taken to the cus-
sives is thought to have been around one
toms area for disposition.
pound.
November 7, 1984
July 1, 1985
Security forces at the Frankfurt Interna-
Fifteen baggage handlers were injured
tional Airport arrested a Palestinian with a
when a bomb, apparently contained in a
forged Tunisian passport attempting to
suitcase, exploded at Leonardo Da Vinci
board a Lufthansa flight to Athens, Greece.
Airport. The explosion occurred in an
Physical examination of his suitcases re-
open-air luggage bay under the main air-
vealed a false bottom containing approxi-
port building, shattering glass and causing
mately three pounds of plastic explosives.
minor structural damage. The bomb scat-
There were no detonators found.
tered dozens of suitcases over the tarmac.
Since the baggage had not been sorted at
December 29, 1984
the time of the explosion, authorities were
A Lebanese woman was arrested at Beirut
unable to determine where the suitcase
International Airport after a security offi-
came from or its destination.
cial discovered explosives in her luggage.
The suitcase contained one kilo of explo-
October 15, 1985
sives and two detached detonators. The
Two individuals arriving from Baghdad,
woman, who was scheduled to travel to
Iraq aboard an Iraqi Airlines aircraft were
Athens, Greece, on Middle East Airlines,
arrested in Rome, Italy. One of the two,
claimed that she had bought the suitcase
arrested at the Rome Airport with a 20
enroute to the airport and that she had no
pound bomb concealed in the false bottom
idea that the suitcase contained explosives.
of his suitcase, was quoted as saying that
Reportedly, the woman was also carrying a
he intended to use the device against Is-
false passport.
raelis and Americans but not Italians. The
second man was arrested as he got off an
February 19, 1985
airport bus at the central train station
Authorities at Frankfurt International Air-
where a similar bomb was found in his
suitcase.
port discovered a suitcase and carton con-
taining bomb components and apprehend-
ed a passenger who was transporting these
February 1986
items from Damascus, Syria to Barcelona,
A sophisticated suitcase bomb was discov-
Spain. The 10 1/2 kilos of explosives were
ered by the Israeli authorities at one of
concealed in the suitcase and detected by a
their security screening points. This bomb
security dog searching for drugs in the
had plastic explosives molded into the
baggage area. The passenger had in his
sides, corners, bottom, and top of the suit-
possession two passports, which appeared
case concealed beneath the lining. The
to have been falsified.
bomb had a barometric sensor, a timer,
168
and an electric blasting cap either entirely
pect indicated his objective was to attack
or partially embedded in the plastic explo-
Americans or Israelis in the Netherlands.
sives. A connector was provided to attach
the batteries for the power source. An
June 26, 1986
arming switch permitted the suitcase bomb
A suitcase bomb exploded at the El Al Air-
to be safely transported.
lines check-in counter at Barajas Interna-
tional Airport, Madrid, Spain. The bomb
April 17, 1986
began to smoke while the suitcase was
An Irish national attempted to board an El
open and was being inspected by a
Al flight at the Heathrow Airport in
member of the El Al security team. The in-
London, England on April 17, 1986. She
dividual transporting the suitcase was ar-
rested, and a Palestinian associated with
was discovered to be unwittingly carrying a
the Abu Musa group was later apprehend-
functioning bomb in a handbag. The bomb
ed. The Spaniard carrying the suitcase was
detonating mechanism, including the initia-
reportedly duped into thinking that he was
tor (electric blasting cap), a small amount
transporting illegal drugs. If the bomb had
of plastic explosive, and timer, was con-
escaped detection and if the timing device
tained in a fully functioning calculator. The
had functioned properly, it would have ex-
calculator was lying on the bottom of the
ploded two hours after takeoff.
bag. Concealed inside the false bottom
were approximately 3 pounds of plastic ex-
January 13, 1987
plosives.
West German authorities arrested Moham-
med Ali Hamadei at the Frankfurt Interna-
May 1, 1986
tional Airport when he was found to be
A Japanese national who resided in Athens,
carrying a powerful liquid explosive con-
Greece, was arrested by Dutch authorities
cealed in liquor bottles. Hamadei had
after components of an explosive device
flown to Frankfurt from Beirut, Lebanon
were discovered in his luggage at Schiphol
on a Middle East Airlines flight and was
Airport, Amsterdam. Concealed in the suit-
carrying a false passport when arrested.
case in separate containers was approxi-
The intended destination of the explosive
mately one kilogram of explosives (possibly
is not known. Hamadei has since been con-
TNT). Reportedly, the individual arrived in
victed of the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight
Amsterdam from Belgrade, Yugoslavia, via
847 from Athens, Greece to Beirut, Leba-
Yugoslavia's national carrier JAT. The sus-
non.
169
Appendix F
International Civil Aviation Organization
ICAO CONVENTIONS,
provide for universal jurisdiction, arrest
PROTOCOL AND ANNEX 17
and custody over the suspected offender;
and
provide that prosecution or extradition of
The Chicago Convention on International
the suspected offender take place without
Civil Aviation established ICAO in 1944. There
restrictions.
are three additional Conventions and one Pro-
The Montreal Convention of 1971, Convention
tocol which govern aviation security. Annex 17
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
to the Chicago Convention establishes interna-
the Safety of Civil Aviation. Parties: There are
tional aviation security standards and recom-
143 parties to the Convention including the
mended practices.
United States.
The Tokyo Convention of 1963, Convention on
Provisions:
Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed
on Board Aircraft. Parties: There are 138 par-
consider sabotage, and other violent acts
ties to the Convention including the United
against a person on board an aircraft; and
States.
provide for universal jurisdiction over the
offender and, in general, contains provi-
Provisions:
sions on custody, extradition, and prosecu-
ensure that there will always be a jurisdic-
tion similar to those in the Hague Conven-
tion in which a person who has committed
tion.
a crime on board an aircraft can be tried;
The Montreal Protocol of 1988, Protocol for the
provide the pilot with law enforcement au-
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at
thority aboard an aircraft; and
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,
Supplementary to the Montreal Convention.
provide for Contracting States to take
Parties: There are 17 parties to the Protocol.
measures to restore control of the aircraft
The United States has signed the Protocol but
to the pilot before and during cases of in-
it is not yet in effect.
terference.
Provisions:
The Hague Convention of 1970, Convention for
provide for acts of violence `against civil
the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Air-
aviation which occur at airports and ticket
craft. Parties: There are 142 parties to the Con-
offices which were overlooked in the Mon-
vention including the United States.
treal Convention. The Protocol is a re-
Provisions:
sponse to the Rome and Vienna airport
massacres which took place in the airports,
define unlawful seizure, hijacking;
not on board a plane.
170
Annex 17, International Standards and Rec-
ensure 100 percent baggage passenger rec-
ommended Practices, Security, Safeguarding
onciliation;
International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Un-
lawful Interference, fourth edition-October
control transfer and transit passengers and
1989. Parties: There are 162 Contracting States
their cabin baggage to prevent unauthor-
including the United States.
ized items from being brought aboard an
aircraft;
Provisions:
protect against the tampering of cargo,
establish 40 standards and 17 recommend-
baggage and mail;
ed practices to be applied by Contracting
States;
prevent unauthorized access to aircraft and
require each State to create a national civil
to secure parts of the airport;
aviation program which includes measures
recommend the inclusion of aviation secu-
to prevent weapons and explosives on
rity clauses in bilateral agreements; and
board planes;
recommend pre-flight checks of aircraft to
arrange for surveys and inspections of se-
discover weapons and bombs.
curity measures;
171
172
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
SECRETARY
Organizational Charts
Appendix G
DEPUTY SECRETARY
OFFICE OF SMALL
OFFICE OF
OFFICE OF
BOARD OF
& DISADVANTAGED
COMMERCIAL SPACE
CIVIL RIGHTS
CONTRACT APPEALS
BUSINESS UTILIZATION
TRANSPORTATION
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OFFICE OF
FOR SECURITY
GENERAL COUNSEL
FOR POLICY &
FOR BUDGET
FOR GOVERNMENTAL
FOR ADMINISTRATION
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
INSPECTOR GENERAL
AND INTELLIGENCE
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
AND PROGRAMS
AFFAIRS
NATIONAL HIGHWAY
URBAN MASS
SAINT LAWRENCE
RESEARCH AND
FEDERAL AVIATION
FEDERAL HIGHWAY
FEDERAL RAILROAD
MARITIME
TRAFFIC SAFETY
TRANSPORTATION
SEAWAY DEVELOPMENT
SPECIAL PROGRAMS
U.S. COAST GUARD
ADMINISTRATION
ADMINISTRATION
ADMINISTRATION
ADMINISTRATION
ADMINISTRATION
ADMINISTRATION
CORPORATION
ADMINISTRATION
----
Proposed New Assistant Secretary
U.S. Department of Transportation
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Administrator
Deputy Administrator
Associate
Associate
Office of
Office of
Office of
Administrator for
Administrator for
the Chief
Office of
Aviation Security
Counsel
Civil Rights
Government &
Public Affairs
Aviation Safety
Industry Affairs
Office of
Office of
Aviation Safety
Aviation Safety
Analysis
Oversight
Executive Director for
Executive Director for
Executive Director for
Executive Director for
Policy, Plans, and
Regulatory Standards
Resource Management
and Compliance
System Development
System Operations
Associate
Associate
Associate
Associate
Associate
Office of
Associate
Associate
Associate
Associate
Associate
Office of
Administrator
Administrator
Administrator for
Administrator
Administrator for
Program and
Administrator
Administrator
Administrator for
Administrator
Administrator
Operations
for
for Human
Policy, Planning,
for Aviation
Regulation and
Resource
for Airports
for NAS
Advanced Design
for Airway
for
Planning and
Administration
Resource
and International
Standards
Certification
Management
Development
and Management
Facilities
Air Traffic
Policy
Management
Aviation
Control
Office of
Office of
Office of
Office of
Aircraft
Office of
Automation
Advanced
Program
Air Traffic
Office of
Accounting
Human
Aviation
Accident
Certification
Airport
Service
System
Engineering
Operations
Operations
Resource
Policy and
Investigation
Service
Planning and
Design
Service
Service
Resource
Development
Plans
Programming
Service
Management
Office of
Office of
Office of
Office of
Flight
Office of
Advanced
Management
Systems
Air Traffic
Budget
Labor and
Environment
Aviation
Standards
Airport
System
Control
Maintenance
Plans and
Employee
and
Medicine
Service
Safety and
Acquisition
Service
Service
Requirements
Relations
Energy
Standards
Service
Service
Logistics
Office of
Office of
Aviation
Office of
Airport System
NAS
Operations
Office of
Service
Personnel
International
Standards
Rulemaking
Capacity
Transition
Research
Air Traffic
Aviation
National
Planning
Service
Office
Program
Field Office
Office
Management
Office of
Office of
Europe,
System
Office of
Management
Training and
Africa, and
Engineering
FAA
Air Traffic
Systems
Higher
Middle East
and Program
Technical
System
Education
Office
Management
Center
Effectiveness
Office
Alaskan
Central
Eastern
Great Lakes
New England
Northwest
Southern
Southwest
Western-Pacific
Mike Monroney
Region
Region
Region
Region
Region
Mountain Region
Region
Region
Region
Aeronautical Center
Proposed New Associate Administrator
173
174
OFFICE OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
54-6
ACS-1
Advice and assistance to the Administrator on civil
aviation and internal security programs
Accountability for agency investigations and security
programs
Represents FAA in meetings with other agencies on
security matters
Direction of the office and field
CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY
SPECIAL PROGRAMS
INVESTIGATIONS AND
INTELLIGENCE
DIVISION
DIVISION
SECURITY DIVISION
DIVISION
54-10
ACS-100
ACS-200
54-12
ACS-300
54-11
54-13
ACS-400
Aviation incident management
Federal Air Marshal Program
Investigation in support of
Intelligence activities with
FAA mission
Domestic and foreign air
Prevention of crimes against
other Government agencies
carrier, corporate and general
domestic international aviation
Physical security policies and
Assessment of the threat of
standards
aviation and airport security
Liaison with domestic inter-
criminal actions against
policies, standards, systems,
agency, intergovernmental,
Identification media programs
domestic and international
procedures, and program plans
and foreign aviation security
Personnel and industrial
aviation and FAA facilities
Prevention of crimes against
committees and law enforce-
security programs
International interagency and
domestic and international
ment agencies
Technical and communication
intergovernmental aviation
aviation
Aviation explosives security
security programs
security committees and
Coordination of international
and K-9 programs
Automatic information security
working groups on Intelligence
matters
aviation security matters
Atmospheric/radiological
Information security program
Assessment of the threat of
contamination incidents
Semiannual Report to
Support to law enforcement
criminal actions against avia-
program
Congress Section 315(a) of
agencies
tion from domestic and inter-
the FAA Act
Research and development
FAA drug interdiction program
national sources
Liaison with other Government
Technical assistance
Liaison with interagency and
International airport assess-
agencies having special
Support of the Department of
intergovernmental law
ment program
security interests
State Anti-Terrorism Assistance
enforcement agencies on
Safe air transportation of
FAA support of El Paso
Program
personal crime matters
hazardous materials
Intelligence Center
Appendix H
Selected Aviation Security Initiatives by the Department
of Transportation
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
SELECTED AVIATION SECURITY INITIATIVES
- EMERGENCY SECURITY RULE. On December 29, 1988, the FAA issued
an emergency rule setting forth "extraordinary" security measures
for U.S. airlines in Western Europe and the Mideast, including
requirements to x-ray or physically search all checked baggage,
conduct additional random checks of passengers' baggage and
achieve a positive match of passengers and luggage to keep
unaccompanied bags off airplanes.
- AIRPORT ACCESS TO SECURED AREAS.
On January 8, 1989, the FAA published a final rule requiring
domestic airports to install computer controlled access systems,
or similar systems, to limit unauthorized entry into secure areas.
Since that time, the FAA has worked closely with airports to
develop guidance material related to implementation of the rule.
On May 3, 1989, an Advisory Circular was issued which explained
how the requirement was interpreted.
The FAA has agreed to conduct a test program at Baltimore-
Washington International Airport to examine and evaluate an
integrated systems approach to airport and air carrier security.
The results of the test program, which will be completed by the
end of the year, will assist all airports and air carriers, as
well as the FAA, by providing viable concepts for enhancing
security.
- ICAO. On February 2, 1989, Secretary Skinner led a U.S.
delegation to a special session International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) session in Montreal on aviation security to
discuss more stringent international security standards. ICAO
already has in place a set of minimum security standards and
recommended practices, incorporated into Annex 17 of the Chicago
Convention, which created ICAO. Over 160 countries have acceded
to that convention. Although the measures described in Annex 17
and ICAO's security manual are fundamentally sound, they are being
continually reviewed and updated with the U.S. delegation. Nine
other ministers responsible for civil aviation attended the
February meeting, as well as representatives from 23 other Member
States.
As a result of that meeting, the 33-member ICAO Council
unanimously adopted a resolution describing a high priority plan
of action to review and improve all existing international
standards applicable to all operations. ICAO also agreed to
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consider developing a set of extraordinary measures for use when
increased threat levels exist. DOT has since been working
multilaterally with the Department of State to accelerate efforts
to develop uniform approaches and broaden international security
standards.
ICAO has also encouraged States to expedite research and
development on the detection of explosives and is actively working
on establishing an international regime for the marking or
"tagging" of explosives to facilitate detection. On January 11,
1990, the FAA participated in the work of a special subcommittee
of the ICAO Legal Committee which completed work on a draft treaty
to require the addition of taggants to explosives manufactured by
Contracting States. The taggants would render explosives
detectable by gas analysis methods which are currently available.
On April 12, 1990, the United States participated as one of 68
countries represented on the full ICAO Legal Committee in the
preparation of a new international convention on taggants. The
Legal Committee will present the draft convention to a Diplomatic
Conference for consideration in early 1991.
The Triennial Session of the ICAO Assembly, to which the Council
reports, was held from September 19 through October 6, 1989. The
Assembly discussed the implementation of the current Assembly
resolution on aviation security, drafted a new resolution and
developed a statement of "continuing ICAO policies related to the
safeguarding of international civil aviation against acts of
unlawful interference". Generally, we are quite pleased with the
results of the Assembly and very pleased with its new resolution
on aviation security. The scheduled May session of the Aviation
Security Panel has been moved up to April 17-28, 1990 so that the
Panel can immediately begin to implement the new aviation security
resolution and draft Amendment 8 to ICAO Annex 17 on Security.
The FAA has arranged to have two FAA security experts detailed to
ICAO. The first expert is on site and will serve as Chief of the
Security Implementation and Assistance Section in the new Aviation
Security Branch. The other expert has been selected and is
awaiting only formal confirmation by ICAO.
ICAO now has the capability to conduct more security surveys and
airport security assessments, and provide more training. The U.S.
has been paired by ICAO with seven countries in need of special
assistance and the FAA in partnership with the State Department
has been providing it. In addition, the U.S. has pledged
$100,000 to ICAO expressly to support international aviation
security enhancement. Contributions have also been pledged by
Finland, France, Greece, India, Saudi Arabia and Switzerland.
- SECRETARIAL INITIATIVES.
On April 3, 1989, Secretary of Transportation Skinner announced
several new aviation security initiatives after an intensive
internal review of the U.S. aviation security system and after
meeting with the families of the Pan Am 103 victims, Members of
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Congress and the President. A status report on each of those
initiatives is given below.
o Deployment of explosives detection systems (EDS). The rule
enabling the FAA to require U.S. air carriers to deploy
explosives detection systems (EDS) over the next few years to
screen checked baggage for international flights is in effect.
Thus far, only two of six FAA owned units have been installed,
as TNA deployment has encountered a number of legal and
insurance problems in both the United States and abroad. The
status of the six FAA-owned TNA deployments follows:
-- JFK International. The first operational unit is in place
at TWA's terminal at JFK and has been actually screening
baggage since September 18, 1989. The unit is only being used
a few hours a day, but the results have been encouraging.
Through April 1, over 58,000 bags were run through the system.
-- Miami International. The second unit is installed at Miami
for use by Pan American. A press conference announcing the
installation was held in Miami on February 9. Delays resulted
from protracted negotiations on insurance liability related to
the use of radioactive materials. The unit became operational
in March and after calibration, will start screening bags in
April.
-- Dulles International. Negotiations for the installation of
the third unit for United Airlines next to their check-in
counter are in their final stages. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has granted permission for a public area license,
which is necessary for the TNA to be placed near the ticket
counter. The unit can now be installed after site preparation
and machine modifications have been made. Our present schedule
calls for installation in May 1990.
-- London Gatwick. Consultations with the U.K. authorities
have concluded, and the unit is scheduled to be shipped to
London in May.
-- Frankfurt. Discussions with the German authorities
regarding testing of a TNA system are continuing. The tests to
be conducted with live explosives at SAIC's labs are
tentatively scheduled for MaY 1990.
-- The Sixth TNA. A number of locations here and abroad are
being considered. No final decision has been made on the
location for the last FAA-TNA.
SAIC is already working on a next-generation device which is a
smaller version, possibly available in 1991. Gamma Metrics, in
a joint venture with the French, will have a TNA machine for
the FAA to test in June. This machine will use an electronic
neutron source, rather than a radioactive isotope. To ensure
that the FAA is prepared to evaluate these and other explosive
detection systems, the FAA has contracted with Sandia, an
independent testing laboratory, to develop test protocols.
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These protocols will allow the FAA to evaluate and certify
systems that meet the regulatory requirements for explosive
detection systems.
o Deployment of additional FAA security specialists overseas.
An additional 120 security positions were requested and
approved in the FY 1990 budget, including a net increase of 27
overseas for a total of 41 positions to cover Europe, the
Middle East and Africa. The total FAA security force will now
be almost 700. The FAA is also requesting 164 additional
positions for FY 1991, including additional overseas positions
subject to approval by the Department of State. The latter
request is currently being discussed within the Department.
The Ambassador in Brussels has agreed to the establishment of a
Civil Aviation Security International Field Office (CASIFO) and
an augmented headquarters staff with regional responsibilities.
In fact, a Brussels based Civil Aviation Security Liaison
Officer (CASLO) has been selected and is in place. The
location of the Middle East regional CASIFO has been agreed
upon and will be announced shortly.
The Ambassador to the United Kingdom has agreed to station a
CASLO at his post, and on March 3, 1990, the Security Liaison
Officer arrived in London. This security specialist has over
10 years experience with the Minneapolis/St. Paul airport
police department and has served for the last three years as an
FAA security specialist in Brussels, Belgium. Security liaison
officers have been approved for assignment in Copenhagen,
Madrid and Paris. In addition, personnel assignments are
planned for two other locations in Europe. The most important
element of the deployment is that we will have 10 liaison
officers overseas who will be able to provide on-site technical
expertise and the full range of liaison and coordination
functions to U.S. and foreign air carriers as well as the host
governments to promote and enhance cooperation at the
operational level.
o The FAA security bulletin process. Information Circulars
are now used to notify U.S. airlines of general situations and
security information for which the FAA will not require
mandatory countermeasures. Security Directives are used to
pass on specific, credible threats and mandatory
countermeasures, requiring acknowledgment of receipt and a
report of implementation. It is a regulatory violation,
subject to a civil penalty to fail to comply with a security
directive or to release information from security directives
without authorization.
The process does not provide for public notification of
threats. We firmly believe that threats against aviation are
best handled by security professionals who are in a position to
implement countermeasures. If a specific, credible threat
cannot be countered, the flight should be cancelled. The FAA
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will recommend that airlines cancel the threatened services.
If they choose not to do so, the FAA will order the airlines to
cancel the threatened flights. In addition, the Department of
State may issue a public travel advisory to alert air travelers
in a timely manner.
In an effort to consider fully the issue of public notification
of threats, the FAA Administrator conducted a series of
informal meetings with air carrier, airport, passenger interest
group and employee union organization representatives. These
discussions focused on actions taken by airlines to counter
credible threat information, including the cancellation of
flights and the notification of passengers prior to boarding
flights against which threats are received.
o Elevating standards for x-ray and metal detection equipment.
Revision of these standards continues. An NPRM to phase out
old x-ray equipment that does not meet new, higher performance
standards is being developed. Work on metal detector standards
is also underway. Proposed Standard Security Program (SSP)
changes are to be completed and published later this year for
both metal detector and x-ray standards.
o The Aviation Security Advisory Committee. The first meeting
of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) was held on
October 20 and the second was held on December 15, 1989. The
Committee at its second session decided upon the creation of
four subcommittees: Threat Analysis and Communications;
Security Operations; Equipment and Technology; and Policy,
Procedures and Public Awareness. This last subcommittee was
the first to hold a formal session on February 14. The
Committee will have substantive input into FAA decisions.
o Review of U.S. carriers compliance with security require-
ments. A comprehensive review of carrier compliance with the
extraordinary security measures required on December 29, 1988
was completed last year. All carriers are now in compliance
with the requirement for screening checked baggage in
extraordinary security countries.
Carriers are having some difficulty complying with other parts
of their approved security programs because of conflicts with
host country laws, regulations and traditional practices. For
example, U.S. carriers lose direct supervision over screening
when they are required to hire locally approved security
contractors which cannot be tested by the FAA. When
discrepancies cannot be solved on site by the carriers,
government to government negotiations are necessary. Again,
the placement of civil aviation security liaison officers
overseas is designed to alleviate many of these problems.
In June, 1990, the FAA will issue changes to the Standard
Security Program to strengthen passenger bag match procedures
179
in accordance with new ICAO standards, and to institute new
procedures for reporting threat information to the FAA.
o Discussions with foreign governments. Secretarial trips to
selected European capitals last April and the recent trip this
March included productive discussions with high level officials
about the deployment of both personnel and equipment, and
arrangements for the exchange of information on threats and
security in general. The Secretary and the Administrator of
the FAA met with the Secretary of State for Transportation from
the United Kingdom to discuss the status of the investigation
of the Pan Am 103 bombing and other security matters of
interest. In addition, the FAA has negotiated directly with
foreign civil aviation and airport authorities on many
occasions at high levels to solve specific security problems.
The deployment of additional security specialists abroad
charged with the task of improving coordination with foreign
governments will greatly assist these efforts. This is an on-
going process involving many elements of both the Department of
Transportation and the Department of State, as well as other
agencies.
- FOREIGN AIRPORT SECURITY ASSESSMENTS.
The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
1985 requires an assessment at intervals determined by the
Secretary of Transportation of the effectiveness of security
measures at those foreign airports served by U.S. air carriers
and those foreign airports from which foreign air carriers
serve the U.S. Since the inception of this program in 1986,
the FAA has conducted more than 900 visits to over 200 foreign
airports in more than 100 countries. These assessments are
conducted in a manner which emphasizes the need for cooperation
rather than a unilateral approach to solving security problems.
The procedures for public notification of uncorrected problems
at foreign airports as prescribed by the Act are both workable
and appropriate. Generally speaking, the Department has been
pleased by the cooperation shown by host governments and the
overall success of the program in encouraging additional
security improvements at many foreign airports.
By the end of 1991, the FAA will develop a comprehensive system
to use information from the Foreign Airport Assessment Program
to prioritize security technical assistance needs. This
information will be coordinated with the Department of State
and the ICAO security assistance matching program to ensure
that FAA resources are directed to the highest priority needs.
- FOREIGN AIRLINE SECURITY PROGRAMS.
In March of last year, Federal Aviation Regulation Part 129.25
was amended to require foreign airlines flying to the U.S. to
submit their security programs in writing and in English to the
180
FAA for acceptance. The standards and recommended practices
contained in ICAO Annex 17 are used as the yardstick against
which security programs are measured. A total of 136 foreign
air carriers are required to submit security programs or
acceptable interim responses. All except two new carriers have
done so and 65 have been reviewed and "accepted". However, 41
carriers from 21 countries have referred the FAA to their
governments for last point of departure information as an
interim response.
In cases when the carrier refers the FAA to its government, the
carrier is nevertheless required to provide the FAA with last
point of departure information, the name of the pertinent
government agency, the responsible official therein and a list
of the specific security services provided by the government.
The FAA is contacting the governments involved through the
State Department. Cooperation has been good, considering the
sensitivities involved with issues of extraterritorial
application of U.S. laws. In taking these actions, the FAA is
better able to ensure that the security precautions followed by
foreign airlines serving the United States are adequate to meet
the level of threat ascribed to those operations.
Through these security programs, the FAA will be able to
require foreign air carriers to implement procedures to test
the effectiveness of their security systems through the use of
test objects, to incorporate ICAO standards for passenger bag
match, to prohibit off-airport baggage acceptance in the United
States, and to prohibit passengers and others from bypassing
security screening in the United States.
- SCREENING OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES.
In June of 1989, in an action related to the bombing of Pan Am
103, the FAA established new screening procedures for portable
electronic equipment before it can be checked or carried aboard
an aircraft operated by U.S. air carriers departing from cities
in Europe and the Middle East. The new security requirement
for pre-flight screening includes radios, cassette players,
laptop computers and other electronic devices to ensure they
are not being used to hide an explosive device. A careful
screening process is conducted using criteria designed to
identify suspicious articles. These items are then subjected
to close examination by security personnel using a system of
progressively greater scrutiny until the item can be cleared.
Any item that can not be cleared will be kept off the aircraft.
- INTELLIGENCE LIAISON.
The FAA has negotiated the placement of intelligence liaison
officers at the Central Intelligence Agency and the State
Department. A liaison officer reported to the CIA on April 2,
1990; the second officer is expected to report to the State
Department on April 25, 1990. These experts will enhance the
181
flow of information relating to civil aviation from the
intelligence community, through the FAA, to the security
specialists placed overseas and the airlines. In addition to
filling these new liaison positions, the FAA hired 7 additional
personnel in its Intelligence Division, to increase its
effectiveness, and to improve the quality of its intelligence
analysis and threat assessments.
- PASSENGER SCREENING.
The FAA plans to require U.S. carriers, by the end of 1990, to
adopt and use a Comprehensive Passenger Screening Profile at
designated foreign airports. This new system will identify
passengers and baggage which should undergo additional scrutiny
and screening. It has been tested by the FAA in cooperation
with one of the major air carriers.
For over a year, the FAA has been working with the Air
Transport Association to improve selection and training
standards for security screeners at U.S. airports. On March 6,
1990, ATA presented the FAA with a proposed program that will
require improved testing, training and evaluation of screeners,
as well as enhanced employment benefits and compensation. The
FAA accepted the proposed program and is developing a revision
to the Standard Security Program to incorporate these standards
into each air carrier's program.
******
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* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1990 o - 266-884