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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
S; 2003-0372-F
S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series:
Speech File Draft Files
Subseries:
Chron File, 1989-1993
OA/ID Number:
13538
Folder ID Number:
13538-001
Folder Title:
Aspen Institute 40th Anniversary 8/2/90 [OA 5376] [1]
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26
16
4
2
July 31, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THROUGH:
DAVID DEMAREST
FROM:
DAN MCGROARTY
SUBJECT:
ASPEN INSTITUTE 40TH ANNIVERSARY
I. SUMMARY
On Thursday, August 2, at 3:30 p.m. you will address
the opening session of the Aspen Institute's 40th
Anniversary Symposium. Prime Minister Thatcher will attend
the event, as well as Ambassador and Mrs. Catto.
Lodwrick Cook, Chairman and CEO of ARCO, will introduce
you. Following the speech, Ann Hudson, a trustee of the
Aspen Institute, will present you with a gift.
II. DISCUSSION
The speech (20 min./teleprompter) discusses national
security and defense, and the new challenges the U.S. faces
in this rapidly changing world.
# # #
THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
3:30 P.M.
THANK YOU, LOD {COOK}. / DAVID MCLAUGHLIN
{PRESIDENT OF ASPEN INSTITUTE. JOHN PHELAN {CHAIRMAN.}
HENRY CATTO, OUR AMBASSADOR TO GREAT BRITAIN. ASPEN
ALUMNI, AND ALL OUR DISTINGUISHED GUESTS: MANY THANKS
FOR THIS WARM WELCOME. / AND OF COURSE OUR SPECIAL
GUEST, MY GOOD FRIEND, MARGARET THATCHER. / MADAME
PRIME MINISTER, LET ME SAY THAT, FOR MORE THAN A DECADE
NOW, AMERICA HAS KNOWN NO BETTER FRIEND OF FREEDOM. /
IT'S AN HONOR TO JOIN YOU TODAY. //
[[KIND OF IRONIC, ISN'T IT? WASHINGTON'S GETTING
MORE AND MORE LIKE A 3-RING CIRCUS -- AND HERE I AM
UNDER THE BIG TENT.]] [[OF COURSE IT'S A PLEASURE TO
EXPERIENCE THE SPLENDOR OF ASPEN IN AUGUST. / THE
CLIMATE IN WASHINGTON'S TOUGH THIS TIME OF YEAR. LOTS
OF HEAT. TEMPERATURES RISING. EVERYONE'S HOT UNDER
THE COLLAR. / THE WEATHER'S FINE: / I'M TALKING
ABOUT THE BUDGET SUMMIT. //]]
[ CAND WHEN IT COMES TO POLITICS, IT'S NOT THE
HUMIDITY. IT'S THE HEAT. //]]
- 2 -
I AM DELIGHTED TO CELEBRATE WITH ALL OF YOU THE
40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS ASPEN INSTITUTE. /
IN THOSE 40 YEARS, THE SPIRIT OF ASPEN HAS COME TO
SIGNIFY THE ATTEMPT TO BRIDGE THE WORLDS OF THOUGHT AND
ACTION. // AND OF COURSE, TO UNDERSTAND THE
TREMENDOUS CHANGES TAKING PLACE AROUND US. / THINK
BACK TO THE HEADLINES 40 YEARS AGO, THE TIME OF THAT
FIRST ASPEN CONFERENCE IN 1950. / NORTH KOREA ROARED
ACROSS THE 38TH PARALLEL. KLAUS FUCHS WAS CAUGHT AND
CONVICTED FOR REVEALING THE SECRETS OF THE ATOM BOMB TO
THE SOVIETS. THE COLD WAR -- A TERM INTRODUCED INTO
OUR POLITICAL VOCABULARY BY BERNARD BARUCH -- HAD COME
INTO ITS OWN, AS THE SHORTHAND TO DESCRIBE THE HALF-
WAY HOUSE OF AN ARMED AND UNEASY PEACE -- A WORLD
DIVIDED, EAST FROM WEST. /
THAT WAS THE WORLD AS ASPEN CAME INTO BEING -- THE
WORLD ASPEN SOUGHT TO STUDY, AND TO SHAPE. //
- 3 -
THE FORTY YEARS SINCE THEN HAVE BEEN A TIME OF
TREMENDOUS PROGRESS -- FOR THE NATIONS OF THE WEST, AN
ERA OF UNPARALLELED PROSPERITY, PEACE AND FREEDOM. /
BUT AT THE SAME TIME, WE LIVED IN A CONSTANT CONDITION
OF TENSION, COLD WAR AND CONFLICT. //
THAT WORLD IS NOW CHANGING. // THE DECADES-OLD
DIVISION OF EUROPE IS ENDING -- AND THE ERA OF
DEMOCRACY-BUILDING HAS BEGUN. IN GERMANY -- THE
DIVIDED NATION IN THE HEART OF A DIVIDED CONTINENT --
UNITY IS NOW ASSURED, AS A FREE AND FULL MEMBER OF THE
NATO ALLIANCE. / THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF IS IN THE
MIDST OF A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION THAT
HAS BROUGHT UNPRECEDENTED OPENNESS -- A PROCESS THAT IS
AT ONCE FULL OF HOPE, AND FULL OF UNCERTAINTY. //
- 4 -
WE'VE ENTERED A REMARKABLE STAGE IN OUR
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR. MY DISCUSSIONS WITH
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV HAVE BEEN OPEN AND HONEST. ALL THE
ISSUES ARE ON THE TABLE -- WE DON'T DODGE THE TOUGH
ONES. THAT'S BEEN THE SECRET TO OUR SUCCESS so FAR,
AND OVER TIME, THAT'S HOW WE'RE GOING TO NARROW OUR
DIFFERENCES -- AND SEIZE THIS HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO
CREATE LASTING PROGRESS.
THE CHANGES I'M TALKING ABOUT HAVE TRANSFORMED OUR
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. WE ARE ENTERING A NEW ERA: THE
DEFENSE STRATEGY AND MILITARY STRUCTURE NEEDED TO
ENSURE PEACE CAN -- AND MUST -- BE DIFFERENT. THE
THREAT OF A SOVIET INVASION OF WESTERN EUROPE LAUNCHED
WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING IS TODAY MORE REMOTE THAN AT
ANY OTHER POINT IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD. / WITH THE
EMERGENCE OF DEMOCRACY IN EASTERN EUROPE, THE WARSAW
PACT HAS LOST ITS MILITARY MEANING -- AND AFTER MORE
THAN FOUR DECADES OF DOMINANCE, SOVIET TROOPS ARE
WITHDRAWING FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. /
- 5 -
OUR TASK TODAY IS TO SHAPE OUR DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES TO THESE CHANGING STRATEGIC CIRCUMSTANCES.
/ IN A WORLD LESS DRIVEN BY AN IMMEDIATE THREAT TO
EUROPE AND THE DANGER OF GLOBAL WAR -- IN A WORLD WHERE
THE SIZE OF OUR FORCES WILL INCREASINGLY BE SHAPED BY
THE NEEDS OF REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES AND PEACETIME
PRESENCE - -- WE KNOW THAT OUR FORCES CAN BE SMALLER. /
SECRETARY CHENEY AND GENERAL POWELL ARE HARD AT WORK
DETERMINING THE PRECISE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCES WE
NEED. BUT I CAN TELL YOU NOW, WE CALCULATE THAT BY
1995 OUR SECURITY NEEDS CAN BE MET BY AN ACTIVE FORCE
25% SMALLER THAN TODAY'S. / AMERICA'S ARMED FORCES
WILL BE AT THEIR LOWEST LEVEL SINCE 1950.
WHAT MATTERS NOW IS HOW WE RESHAPE THE FORCES THAT
REMAIN. OUR NEW STRATEGY MUST PROVIDE THE FRAMEWORK TO
GUIDE OUR DELIBERATE REDUCTIONS TO NO MORE THAN THE
FORCES WE NEED TO GUARD OUR ENDURING INTERESTS -- THE
FORCES TO EXERCISE FORWARD PRESENCE IN KEY AREAS, TO
RESPOND EFFECTIVELY TO CRISES, TO RETAIN THE NATIONAL
CAPACITY TO REBUILD OUR FORCES SHOULD THIS BE NEEDED.
- 6 -
THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE ILL-SERVED BY FORCES
THAT REPRESENT NOTHING MORE THAN A SCALED-BACK OR
SHRUNKEN-DOWN VERSION OF THE ONES WE POSSESS AT
PRESENT. IF WE SIMPLY PRO-RATE OUR REDUCTIONS -- CUT
EQUALLY ACROSS THE BOARD -- WE COULD EASILY END UP WITH
MORE THAN WE NEED FOR CONTINGENCIES THAT ARE NO LONGER
LIKELY -- AND LESS THAN WE MUST HAVE TO MEET EMERGING
CHALLENGES. / WHAT WE NEED ARE NOT MERELY REDUCTIONS
-- BUT RESTRUCTURING.
WHAT WE REQUIRE NOW IS A DEFENSE POLICY THAT
ADAPTS TO THE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES WE ARE WITNESSING --
WITHOUT NEGLECTING THE ENDURING REALITIES THAT WILL
CONTINUE TO SHAPE OUR SECURITY STRATEGY. // A POLICY
OF PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT EVERY BIT AS CONSTANT AND
COMMITTED TO THE DEFENSE OF OUR INTERESTS AND IDEALS IN
TODAY'S WORLD AS IN THE TIME OF CONFLICT AND COLD WAR.
//
- 7 -
AND IN THIS WORLD, AMERICA REMAINS A PIVOTAL
FACTOR FOR PEACEFUL CHANGE. / IMPORTANT AMERICAN
INTERESTS IN EUROPE AND THE PACIFIC -- IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF -- ALL ARE KEY
REASONS WHY MAINTAINING A FORWARD PRESENCE WILL REMAIN
AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF OUR STRATEGY.
WE ALL REMEMBER WHEN THE SOVIET UNION VIEWED OUR
FORWARD PRESENCE AS A THREAT. WHEN WE MET, THEIR
MILITARY MEN CAME ARMED WITH MAPS, PURPORTING TO SHOW
AMERICAN ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION. I'VE TALKED
ABOUT THIS WITH MR. GCRBACHEV. I THINK HE UNDERSTANDS
NOW THAT WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF THREATENING HIS
COUNTRY -- AND I HAPPEN TO THINK THAT IT'S THE KIND OF
CONVERSATIONS WE'VE HAD AT CAMP DAVID THAT HELP MAKE
SUCH PROGRESS POSSIBLE. //
- 8 -
I WAS CANDID WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. / I TOLD
HIM THAT -- FOR ALL THE POSITIVE CHANGES WE HAVE SEEN
-- THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS A WORLD-CLASS MILITARY
POWER. EVEN AFTER THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS WE
ARE NOW NEGOTIATING, THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO
MAINTAIN 2 TO 3 MILLION MEN UNDER ARMS. AND OF COURSE,
OUR NUMBER ONE CONCERN: THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO
MAINTAIN AND MODERNIZE THEIR ARSENAL OF STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. //
WE AND OUR ALLIES WELCOME THE NEW COURSE THE
SOVIET UNION HAS CHOSEN. BUT PRUDENCE DEMANDS THAT WE
MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT -- ONE THAT SECURES THE
PEACE NOT ONLY IN TODAY'S CLIMATE OF REDUCED TENSIONS,
BUT THAT ENSURES THAT RENEWED CONFRONTATION IS NOT A
FEASIBLE OPTION FOR ANY SOVIET LEADERSHIP.
- 9 -
THE SOVIETS WILL ENTER A START TREATY WITH A FULLY
MODERNIZED, HIGHLY CAPABLE AND VERY LARGE STRATEGIC
FORCE. / TO MAINTAIN CLEAR AND CONFIDENT STRATEGIC
DETERRENCE INTO THE NEXT CENTURY, WE NEED THE B-2.
SECRETARY CHENEY HAS ALREADY SCALED BACK THE PROGRAM.
75 AIRCRAFT MAKES STRATEGIC SENSE. FURTHER DELAYS WILL
ONLY INCREASE COSTS. / WE NEED TO COMPLETE THE
TRIDENT PROGRAM. THOSE 18 SUBMARINES WILL ENSURE A
SURVIVABLE, SUBMARINE-BASED DETERRENT. / WE CAN DEFER
FINAL DECISIONS ON OUR LAND-BASED ICBMS -- AS WE SEE
HOW THE START TALKS PROCEED -- BUT WE MUST KEEP OUR
OPTIONS OPEN: AND THAT MEANS COMPLETING THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SMALL ICBM AND THE RAIL-BASED
PEACEKEEPER. / AND FINALLY, I AM CONVINCED THAT A
DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC DETERRENT MAKES MORE SENSE IN THE
'90S THAN EVER BEFORE. WHAT BETTER MEANS OF DEFENSE
THAN A SYSTEM THAT DESTROYS ONLY MISSILES LAUNCHED
AGAINST US -- WITHOUT THREATENING A SINGLE LIFE? / WE
MUST PUSH FORWARD THE GREAT PROMISE OF SDI -- AND
DEPLOY IT WHEN READY. //
- 10 -
AND THE U.S. WILL KEEP A FORCE IN EUROPE AS LONG
AS OUR ALLIES WANT AND NEED US THERE. / AS WE AND OUR
ALLIES ADAPT NATO TO A CHANGING WORLD, THE SIZE AND
SHAPE OF OUR FORCES WILL ALSO CHANGE, TO SUIT NEW AND
LESS THREATENING CIRCUMSTANCES. BUT WE WILL REMAIN IN
EUROPE TO DETER ANY NEW DANGERS, TO BE A FORCE FOR
STABILITY -- AND TO REASSURE ALL OF EUROPE -- EAST AND
WEST -- THAT THE EUROPEAN BALANCE WILL REMAIN SECURE.
//
OUTSIDE OF EUROPE, AMERICA MUST POSSESS FORCES
ABLE TO RESPOND TO THREATS IN WHATEVER CORNER OF THE
GLOBE THEY MAY OCCUR. / EVEN IN A WORLD WHERE
DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM HAVE MADE GREAT GAINS, THREATS
REMAIN. TERRORISM. HOSTAGE TAKING. RENEGADE REGIMES
AND UNPREDICTABLE RULERS -- NEW SOURCES OF INSTABILITY
-- ALL REQUIRE A STRONG AND ENGAGED AMERICA. //
- 11 -
IN SPITE OF OUR BEST EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE SPREAD
OF CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND BALLISTIC MISSILE
TECHNOLOGIES, MORE NATIONS ARE ACQUIRING WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION -- AND THE MEANS TO DELIVER THEM. /
RIGHT NOW, 20 COUNTRIES HAVE THE CAPACITY TO PRODUCE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS. AND BY THE YEAR 2000, AS MANY AS 15
DEVELOPING NATIONS COULD HAVE THEIR OWN BALLISTIC
MISSILES. // IN THE FUTURE, EVEN CONFLICTS WE ONCE
THOUGHT OF AS LIMITED OR LOCAL MAY CARRY FAR-REACHING
CONSEQUENCES. ///
TO COPE WITH THE FULL RANGE OF CHALLENGES WE MAY
CONFRONT, WE MUST FOCUS ON READINESS AND RAPID
RESPONSE. AND TO PREPARE TO MEET THE CHALLENGES WE MAY
FACE IN THE FUTURE, WE MUST FOCUS ON RESEARCH -- AN
ACTIVE AND INVENTIVE PROGRAM OF DEFENSE R&D. //
- 12 -
LET ME BEGIN WITH THE COMPONENT WITH GREAT LONG-
RANGE CONSEQUENCES -- RESEARCH. TIME AND AGAIN, WE
HAVE SEEN TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTIONIZE THE BATTLEFIELD. /
THE U.S. HAS ALWAYS RELIED UPON ITS TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE
TO OFFSET THE NEED TO MATCH POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES'
STRENGTH IN NUMBERS. / CRUISE MISSILES, STEALTH
FIGHTERS AND BOMBERS, TODAY'S "SMART" WEAPONS WITH
STATE-OF-THE-ART GUIDANCE SYSTEMS, AND TOMORROW'S
"BRILLIANT" ONES: THE MEN AND WOMEN IN OUR ARMED
FORCES DESERVE THE BEST TECHNOLOGY AMERICA HAS TO
OFFER. //
AND WE MUST REALIZE THE HEAVY PRICE WE WILL PAY IF
WE LOOK FOR FALSE ECONOMIES IN DEFENSE R&D. MOST
MODERN WEAPONS SYSTEMS TAKE A MINIMUM OF 10 YEARS TO
MOVE FROM THE DRAWING BOARD TO THE BATTLEFIELD. / THE
NATURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE DEMANDS THAT WE PLAN NOW FOR
THREATS ON THE DISTANT HORIZON. THE DECISIONS WE MAKE
TODAY -- THE PROGRAMS WE PUSH FORWARD, OR PUSH ASIDE
-- WILL DICTATE THE KIND OF MILITARY FORCES WE HAVE AT
OUR DISPOSAL IN THE YEAR 2000 -- AND BEYOND. //
- 13 -
SECOND, WE MUST FOCUS ON RAPID RESPONSE. AS WE
SAW MOST RECENTLY IN PANAMA, THE U.S. MAY BE CALLED ON
TO RESPOND TO A VARIETY OF CHALLENGES FROM VARIOUS
POINTS ON THE COMPASS. IN AN ERA WHEN THREATS MAY
EMERGE WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING, OUR ABILITY TO DEFEND
OUR INTERESTS WILL DEPEND ON OUR SPEED AND AGILITY. //
WE WILL NEED FORCES THAT GIVE US GLOBAL REACH. NO
AMOUNT OF POLITICAL CHANGE WILL ALTER THE GEOGRAPHIC
FACT THAT WE ARE SEPARATED FROM MANY OF OUR MOST
IMPORTANT ALLIES AND INTERESTS BY THOUSANDS OF MILES OF
WATER. //
IN MANY OF THE CONFLICTS WE COULD FACE, WE MAY NOT
HAVE THE LUXURY OF MATCHING MANPOWER WITH PRE-
POSITIONED MATERIEL. WE WILL HAVE TO HAVE AIR AND SEA-
LIFT CAPACITIES TO GET OUR FORCES WHERE THEY ARE NEEDED
-- WHEN THEY ARE NEEDED. A NEW EMPHASIS ON FLEXIBILITY
AND VERSATILITY MUST GUIDE OUR EFFORTS.
- 14 -
FINALLY, AS WE RESTRUCTURE, WE MUST PUT A PREMIUM
ON READINESS. FOR THOSE ACTIVE FORCES WE'LL RELY ON TO
RESPOND TO CRISES, READINESS MUST BE OUR HIGHEST
PRIORITY. TRUE MILITARY CAPABILITY NEVER EXISTS ON
PAPER -- IT IS MEASURED IN THE HOURS SPENT, AND
EXPERIENCE GAINED, ON THE TRAINING GROUND, UNDER SAIL,
AND IN THE COCKPIT. NOTHING IS MORE SHORT-SIGHTED THAN
CUTTING BACK ON TRAINING TIME TO CUT COSTS -- AND
NOTHING IS MORE DEMORALIZING FOR OUR TROOPS. // OUR
SOLDIERS, SAILORS, AIRMEN AND MARINES MUST BE WELL-
TRAINED, TRIED AND TESTED -- READY TO PERFORM EVERY
MISSION WE ASK OF THEM. 11
IN OUR RESTRUCTURED FORCES, RESERVES WILL BE
IMPORTANT, BUT IN NEW WAYS. THE NEED TO BE PREPARED
FOR A MASSIVE, SHORT-TERM MOBILIZATION HAS DIMINISHED.
WE CAN NOW ADJUST THE SIZE, STRUCTURE AND READINESS OF
OUR RESERVE FORCES, TO HELP US DEAL WITH THE MORE
LIKELY CHALLENGES WE WILL FACE.
- 15 -
OUR STRATEGY WILL GUARD AGAINST A MAJOR REVERSAL
IN SOVIET INTENTIONS BY INCORPORATING INTO OUR PLANNING
THE CONCEPT OF RECONSTITUTION OF OUR FORCES. BY THE
MID-90S, THE TIME IT WOULD TAKE THE SOVIETS TO RETURN
TO THE LEVELS OF CONFRONTATION THAT MARKED THE DEPTHS
OF THE COLD WAR WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW US TO RELY
NOT SOLELY ON EXISTING FORCES -- BUT TO GENERATE WHOLLY
NEW FORCES. THIS READINESS TO REBUILD -- MADE EXPLICIT
IN OUR DEFENSE POLICY -- WILL BE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT
IN OUR ABILITY TO DETER AGGRESSION. ///
A RATIONAL RESTRUCTURING OF THE KIND I'VE OUTLINED
WILL TAKE FIVE YEARS. I AM CONFIDENT WE CAN MEET THE
CHALLENGES I'VE OUTLINED TODAY -- PROVIDED WE PROCEED
WITH AN ORDERLY BUILD-DOWN -- NOT A FIRE SALE. ANY
BUILD-DOWN OF THIS MAGNITUDE MUST BE MANAGED CAREFULLY
TO MINIMIZE DISLOCATIONS -- NOT JUST TO THE MILITARY
BALANCE, BUT TO MORALE. AND I CAN SAY RIGHT NOW, AS
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, THAT WE WILL TAKE EVERY STEP
POSSIBLE TO MINIMIZE THE TURBULENCE THESE CHANGES WILL
CREATE FOR OUR SOLDIERS, SAILORS, AIRMEN AND MARINES.
I WILL NOT BREAK FAITH WITH THE YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN WHO
HAVE FREELY CHOSEN TO SERVE THEIR COUNTRY. 11
- 16 -
ALL OF US KNOW THE CHALLENGES WE FACE ARE FISCAL,
AS WELL AS MILITARY. / THE BUDGET CONSTRAINTS WE FACE
ARE VERY REAL -- BUT SO TOO IS THE NEED TO PROTECT THE
GAINS THAT 40 YEARS OF PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH HAVE
EARNED US. THE SIMPLE FACT IS THIS: WHEN IT COMES TO
NATIONAL SECURITY, AMERICA CAN NEVER AFFORD TO FAIL OR
FALL SHORT. ///
LET ME SAY ONCE AGAIN HOW PLEASED I AM TO APPEAR
HERE TODAY -- ESPECIALLY WITH OUR HONORED FRIEND, MRS.
THATCHER. / TODAY, OF COURSE, IS NOT THE ONLY TIME
PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER HAVE SHARED THE STAGE.
THE WORLD REMEMBERS THAT DAY 44 YEARS AGO -- IN FULTON,
MISSOURI, WHEN CHURCHILL DELIVERED WHAT HISTORY CALLS
THE "IRON CURTAIN" SPEECH. / BUT THAT WASN'T WHAT HE
CALLED IT. HE TITLED IT / "THE SINEWS OF PEACE. //
BY THAT, HE MEANT TO SUMMON UP A VISION OF THE STRENGTH
OF FREE NATIONS -- UNITED IN DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY. //
- 17 -
AT LONG LAST, WE ARE WRITING THE FINAL CHAPTER OF
THE 20TH CENTURY'S THIRD GREAT CONFLICT. THE COLD WAR
IS NOW DRAWING TO A CLOSE. / AFTER FOUR DECADES OF
DIVISION AND DISCORD, OUR CHALLENGE TODAY IS TO FULFILL
THE GREAT DREAM OF ALL DEMOCRACIES: A TRUE
COMMONWEALTH OF FREE NATIONS. / TO MARSHALL THE
GROWING FORCES OF THE FREE WORLD -- TO WORK TOGETHER,
TO BRING WITHIN REACH FOR ALL MEN AND NATIONS THE
LIBERTY THAT BELONGS BY RIGHT TO ALL. //
THANK YOU, AND MAY GOD BLESS THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA.
# # #
CLOSE HOLD SENSITIVE No. 162623
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
90 JUL 31 P8: 07
DATE: 07/31/90
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
----
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
(07/31 4:45 p.m. draft)
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE
9
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
\
ROGICH
CARD
UNTERMEYER
CICCONI
WINSTON
DEMAREST
)
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
HOLIDAY
REMARKS:
The attached has been forwarded to the President.
RESPONSE:
SENSITIVE Cicconi
Assistant to the President
CLOSE HOLD
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
1990 JUL 3, PM 5:0,
July 31, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THROUGH:
&
DAVID DEMAREST
FROM:
DAN MCGROARTY mely
SUBJECT:
ASPEN INSTITUTE 40TH ANNIVERSARY
I. SUMMARY
On Thursday, August 2, at 3:30 p.m. you will address
the opening session of the Aspen Institute's 40th
Anniversary Symposium. About 3000 people will attend, 500
of whom are special guests of the Aspen Institute, including
Prime Minister Thatcher, Ambassador and Mrs. Catto, business
executives, public servants and academics from around the
world.
Lodwrick Cook, Chairman and CEO of ARCO, will introduce
you. Following the speech, Ann Hudson, a trustee of the
Aspen Institute, will present you with a gift.
II. DISCUSSION
The speech (20 min./teleprompter) discusses national
security and defense, and the new challenges the U.S. faces
in this rapidly changing world.
# # #
McGroarty/Dooley
July 31, 1990
4:45 pm
[ASPEN]
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
5:30 P.M.
[Introductory acknowledgements: Aspen officials, alumni.
Prime Minister Thatcher, Ambassador Catto.] I am delighted to
celebrate with you the 40th anniversary of the illustrious Aspen
Institute. //
In those 40 years, the spirit of Aspen has come to signify
the attempt to bridge the worlds of thought and action. // And
of course, to understand the tremendous changes taking place
around us. / Think back to the headlines 40 years ago, the
summer of that first Aspen conference in 1950. / North Korea
roared across the 38th parallel. Klaus Fuchs was caught and
convicted for revealing the secrets of the atom bomb to the
Soviets. The Cold War -- a term introduced into our political
vocabulary by Bernard Baruch -- had come into its own, as the
shorthand to describe the half-way house of an armed and uneasy
peace -- a world divided, East from West. /
That was the world as Aspen came into being -- the world
Aspen sought to study, and to shape. //
The forty years since then have been a time of tremendous
progress -- for the nations of the West, an era of unparalleled
prosperity, peace and freedom. / But at the same time, we lived
in a constant condition of tension, Cold War and conflict. //
2
That world is now changing. // The decades-old division of
Europe is ending -- and the era of democracy-building has begun.
In Germany -- the divided nation in the heart of a divided
continent -- unity is now assured, as a free and full member of
the NATO alliance. / The Soviet Union itself is in the midst of
a political and economic transformation that has brought
unprecedented openness -- a process that is at once full of hope,
and full of uncertainty. //
These changes have transformed our security environment. We
are entering a new era. The defense strategy and military
structure needed to ensure peace can -- and must -- be different.
/ The threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe launched
with little or no warning is today more remote than at any point
in the post-war period. / With the emergence of democracy in
Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its military meaning --
and after more than four decades of dominance, Soviet troops are
withdrawing from Central and Eastern Europe. /
Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to these
changing strategic circumstances. / In a world less driven by
an immediate threat to Europe and the danger of global war -- in
a world where arms control agreements contribute to stability --
we know that our forces will be smaller. / Secretary Cheney and
General Powell are hard at work determining the precise size and
composition of the forces we need. But I can tell you now, when
all the calculations are complete -- when all our roles and
missions are reviewed -- we will be looking at a military force
3
that, within five years, will be 25% smaller than today's. /
America's Armed Forces will be at their lowest level since 1950.
What matters most is how we reshape the forces that remain.
The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent
nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the
ones we possess at present. If we simply pro-rate our reductions
-- cut equally across the board -- we could easily end up with
more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely --
and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. / What
we need are not merely reductions -- but restructuring.
What we require now is a defense policy that adapts to the
significant changes we are witnessing -- without neglecting the
enduring realities that will continue to shape our security
strategy. // A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as
constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals
in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War. //
And in this world, America remains a pivotal factor for
peaceful change. / American interests in Europe and the Pacific
-- in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf -- all are key
reasons why maintaining a forward presence will remain an
indispensable element of our strategy.
And the fact remains for all the positive changes we have
seen, the Soviet Union remains a world-class military power.
Even after the conventional arms reductions we are now
negotiating, the Soviets will continue to maintain 2 to 3 million
men under arms. / And of course, our number one concern: the
4
Soviets continue to maintain and modernize their arsenal of
strategic nuclear weapons. 11
We and our allies welcome the new course the Soviet Union
has chosen. / But prudence demands that we maintain an
effective deterrent -- one that secures the peace not only in
today's climate of reduced tensions, but that ensures that
renewed confrontation is not an option for any Soviet leadership.
The Soviets will enter a START Treaty with a fully
modernized, highly capable and very large strategic force. / We
need the B-2. Secretary Cheney has already scaled back the
program as much as makes sense. Further delays will only
increase costs. / We need to complete the Trident program -- to
ensure a survivable, submarine-based deterrent. / We can defer
a decision on our land-based ICBMs -- as we see how the START
talks proceed -- but we must keep our options open: and that
means completing the development of the small ICBM and the rail-
based Peacekeeper. / And finally, I am convinced that a
defensive strategic deterrent makes more sense than ever before.
We must push forward the great promise of SDI -- and we must
deploy SDI when ready. //
And the U.S. will keep a force in Europe as long as our
allies want and need us there. / The size and shape of those
forces will change, to suit the new and less threatening
circumstances. But we will remain in Europe to deter any new
dangers -- and to reassure all of Europe -- East and West -- that
the European balance will remain secure.
//
5
Outside of Europe, America must possess forces able to
respond to threats in whatever corner of the globe they may
occur. / In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of
chemical and nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies,
more nations are acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- and the
means to deliver them. / [[Right now, over 100 countries have
cruise missiles. 20 countries have the capacity to produce
chemical weapons. And by the year 2000, as many as 15 nations
will possess ballistic missiles. //]] In the future, even
conflicts we once thought of as limited or local may carry far-
reaching consequences.
Even in a world where democracy and freedom have made great
gains, threats remain. Terrorism. Hostage taking. Renegade
regimes and unpredictable rulers -- new sources of instability -
- all require a strong and engaged America. 11
To cope with the full range of challenges we may confront,
we must focus on readiness and rapid response -- and to prepare
today to meet the challenges we may face in the future, we must
focus on research -- an active and inventive program of defense
R&D. //
Let me begin with the component with the greatest long-
range consequences -- research. Time and again, we have seen
technology revolutionize the battlefield. / The U.S. has always
relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to match
potential adversaries' strength in numbers. / Cruise missiles,
Stealth fighters and bombers, today's "smart" weapons with state-
6
of-the-art guidance systems, and tomorrow's "brilliant" ones:
the men and women in our Armed Forces deserve the best technology
America has to offer. 11
And we must realize the heavy price we will pay if we look
for false economies in defense R&D. Most modern weapons systems
take a minimum of 10 years to move from the drawing board to the
battlefield. / // The nature of national defense demands that
we plan now for threats on the distant horizon. The decisions we
make today -- the programs we push forward, or push aside -- will
dictate the kind of military forces we have at our disposal in
the year 2000 -- and beyond. 11
Second, we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most
recently in Panama, the U.S. may be called on to respond to a
variety of challenges from various points on the compass. In an
era when threats may well emerge without warning, our ability to
defend our interests will depend on our speed and agility.
We will need forces that give us global reach. No amount of
political change will alter the geographic fact that we are
separated from many of our most important allies and interests by
thousands of miles of water. //
And in many of the conflicts we may face in the future, we
may not have the luxury of matching manpower with pre-positioned
materiel. That will require air and sea-lift capacities to get
our forces where they are needed -- when they are needed. A new
emphasis on flexibility and versatility should guide our efforts.
And finally, as we restructure, we must put a premium on
7
readiness. / Readiness must be our highest priority. / True
military capability never exists on paper -- it is measured in
the hours spent, and experience gained, on the training ground,
under sail, and in the cockpit. Nothing is more short-sighted
than cutting training time to cut costs -- and nothing is more
demoralizing for our troops than to deny them the training time
they need. // Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines must be
well-trained, tried and tested -- ready to perform every mission
we ask of them. 11
In our restructured forces, reserves will be important, but
in new ways. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-term
mobilization has diminished. We can now adjust both the size and
readiness of our reserve forces, to help us deal with the more
likely challenges we will face.
Our strategy will guard against a major reversal in Soviet
intentions by incorporating into our planning the concept of
regeneration of our forces. By the mid-90s, the time it would
take the Soviets to return to the levels of confrontation that
marked the depths of the Cold War will be sufficient to allow us
to rely not solely on existing forces -- but to generate wholly
new forces. / This readiness to rebuild -- made explicit in our
defense policy -- will be an important element in our ability to
deter aggression. ///
A rational restructuring of the kind I've outlined will take
five years. And I am confident we can meet the challenges I've
outlined today -- provided we proceed with an orderly build-down
8
-- not a fire sale. Any build-down of this magnitude must be
managed carefully to minimize dislocations -- not just to the
military balance, but to morale. And I can say right now, as
Commander-in-Chief, that we will take every step possible to
minimize the turbulence these changes will create for our
soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. / I will not break faith
with the young men and women who have freely chosen to serve
their country. //
All of us know the challenges we face are fiscal, as well as
military. / The budget constraints we face are very real -- but
so too is the need for a strong and secure America. The simple
fact is: when it comes to national security, America can never
afford to fail or fall short. ///
Let me say once again how pleased I am to appear here today
-- especially with our honored friend, Mrs. Thatcher. / Today,
of course, is not the only time President and Prime Minister have
shared the stage. The world remembers that day 44 years ago --
in Fulton, Missouri, when Churchill delivered what history calls
the "Iron Curtain" speech. / But that wasn't what he called it.
He titled it / "The Sinews of Peace." // By that, he meant to
summon up a vision of the strength of free nations -- united in
defense of democracy. //
At long last, we are writing the final chapter of the 20th
Century's third great conflict. The Cold War is now drawing to a
close. / And yet today -- as in Churchill's time -- the world
remains divided. For all the millions of men and women who won
9
their freedom this past year -- there are hundreds of millions
more not yet free. 11
Our challenge today is to overcome this deep division. To
marshall the growing forces of the Free World -- to work to bring
within reach for the unfree the liberty that belongs by right to
all. //
Thank you, and may God bless the United States of America.
# # #
pp.3+6.
3+6.
pp.
McGroarty/Dooley
August 1, 1990
2:30 p.m.
[ASPEN]
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
3:30 P.M.
Thank you, Lod {Cook}. [Acknowledge Aspen officials,
SEE SCHANGES
alumni. Prime Minister Thatcher. Ambassador Catto.] I am
ACKNOWL
delighted to celebrate with you the 40th anniversary of the
+
Humar
illustrious Aspen Institute. //
In those 40 years, the spirit of Aspen has come to signify
the attempt to bridge the worlds of thought and action. // And
of course, to understand the tremendous changes taking place
around us. / Think back to the headlines 40 years ago, the time
of that first Aspen conference in 1950. / North Korea roared
across the 38th parallel. Klaus Fuchs was caught and convicted
for revealing the secrets of the atom bomb to the Soviets. The
Cold War -- a term introduced into our political vocabulary by
Bernard Baruch -- had come into its own, as the shorthand to
describe the half-way house of an armed and uneasy peace -- a
world divided, East from West. /
That was the world as Aspen came into being -- the world
Aspen sought to study, and to shape. //
The forty years since then have been a time of tremendous
progress -- for the nations of the West, an era of unparalleled
prosperity, peace and freedom. / But at the same time, we lived
in a constant condition of tension, Cold War and conflict. //
2
That world is now changing. 11 The decades-old division of
Europe is ending -- and the era of democracy-building has begun.
In Germany -- the divided nation in the heart of a divided
continent -- unity is now assured, as a free and full member of
the NATO alliance. / The Soviet Union itself is in the midst of
a political and economic transformation that has brought
unprecedented openness -- a process that is at once full of hope,
and full of uncertainty. //
We've entered a remarkable stage in our relationship with
the USSR. My discussions with President Gorbachev have been open
and honest. All the issues are on the table -- we don't dodge
the tough ones. That's been the secret to our success so far,
and over time, that's how we're going to narrow our differences -
- and seize this historic opportunity to create lasting progress.
The changes I'm talking about have transformed our security
environment. We are entering a new era: The defense strategy
and military structure needed to ensure peace can -- and must --
be different. The threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe
launched with little or no warning is today more remote than at
any other point in the post-war period. / With the emergence of
democracy in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its
military meaning -- and after more than four decades of
dominance, Soviet troops are withdrawing from Central and Eastern
Europe. /
Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to these
changing strategic circumstances. / In a world less driven by
Our new strategy must provide the framework to guide our
deliberate build down to the minimum forces we need to guard our
enduring interests -- the minimum forces to exercise forward
presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crises, to
retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces should this be
needed.
an immediate threat to Europe and the danger of global war -- in
a world where the size of our forces will increasingly be shaped
reductions
by the needs of regional contingencies and peacetime presence --
to no more
we know that our forces can be smaller. / Secretary Cheney and
than the
General Powell are hard at work determining the precise
composition of the forces we need. But I can tell you now, we
calculate that by 1995 our security needs can be met by an active
force 25% smaller than today's. / America's Armed Forces will
be at their lowest level since 1950.
What matters now is how we reshape the forces that remain.
The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent
nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the
ones we possess at present. If we simply pro-rate our reductions
-- cut equally across the board -- we could easily end up with
more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely --
and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. / What
we need are not merely reductions -- but restructuring.
What we require now is a defense policy that adapts to the
significant changes we are witnessing -- without neglecting the
enduring realities that will continue to shape our security
strategy. // A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as
constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals
in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War. //
And in this world, America remains a pivotal factor for
peaceful change. / Important American interests in Europe and
the Pacific -- in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf -- all
4
are key reasons why maintaining a forward presence will remain an
indispensable element of our strategy.
We all remember when the Soviet Union viewed our forward
presence as a threat. When we met, their military men came armed
with maps, purporting to show American encirclement of the Soviet
Union. I've talked about this with Mr. Gorbachev. I think he
understands now that we have no intention of threatening his
country -- and I happen to think that it's the kind of
conversations we've had at Camp David that make such progress
possible. //
I was candid with President Gorbachev. / I told him that -
- for all the positive changes we have seen -- the Soviet Union
remains a world-class military power. Even after the
conventional arms reductions we are now negotiating, the Soviets
will continue to maintain 2 to 3 million men under arms. And of
course, our number one concern: the Soviets continue to maintain
and modernize their arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. //
We and our allies welcome the new course the Soviet Union
has chosen. But prudence demands that we maintain an effective
deterrent -- one that secures the peace not only in today's
climate of reduced tensions, but that ensures that renewed
confrontation is not a feasible option for any Soviet leadership.
The Soviets will enter a START Treaty with a fully
modernized, highly capable and very large strategic force. / To
maintain clear and confident strategic deterrence into the next
century, we need the B-2. Secretary Cheney has already scaled
5
back the program. 75 aircraft makes strategic sense. Further
delays will only increase costs. / We need to complete the
Trident program. Those 18 submarines will ensure a survivable,
submarine-based deterrent. / We can defer final decisions on
our land-based ICBMs -- as we see how the START talks proceed --
but we must keep our options open: and that means completing the
development of the small ICBM and the rail-based Peacekeeper. /
And finally, I am convinced that a defensive strategic deterrent
makes more sense in the '90s than ever before. What better means
of defense than a system that destroys only missiles launched
against us -- without threatening a single life? / We must push
forward the great promise of SDI -- and deploy it when ready. //
And the U.S. will keep a force in Europe as long as our
allies want and need us there. / As we and our allies adapt
NATO to a changing world, the size and shape of our forces will
also change, to suit new and less threatening circumstances. But
we will remain in Europe to deter any new dangers, to be a force
for stability -- and to reassure all of Europe -- East and West -
- that the European balance will remain secure. //
when necessary, our Fures must be ablet
Outside of Europe, America must possess forces able to
respond to threats in whatever corner of the globe they may
occur. / Even in a world where democracy and freedom have made
great gains, threats remain. Terrorism. Hostage taking.
Renegade regimes and unpredictable rulers -- new sources of
instability -- all require a strong and engaged America.
//
particularly
?
America must sustain a presence in key regions to help influence
Japen
peaceful progress. We must remain stalwart partners with Japan
and our other friends in the Pacific. And we must continue to
support our friends in the Middle East.
6
In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of
chemical and nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies,
CHANGE
more nations are acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- and the
means to deliver them. / Right now, over 100 countries have
cruise missiles 20 countries have the capacity to produce
chemical weapons. And by the year 2000, as many as 15 developing A nations
could
have their own
possess ballistic missiles. // In the future, even
conflicts we once thought of as limited or local may carry far-
FROM
NSC,
reaching consequences. ///
To cope with the full range of challenges we may confront,
Hayden x 4970
we must focus on readiness and rapid response. And to prepare to
meet the challenges we may face in the future, we must focus on
research -- an active and inventive program of defense R&D. //
Let me begin with the component with great long-range
consequences -- research. Time and again, we have seen
technology revolutionize the battlefield. / The U.S. has always
relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to match
potential adversaries' strength in numbers. / Cruise missiles,
Stealth fighters and bombers, today's "smart" weapons with state-
of-the-art guidance systems, and tomorrow's "brilliant" ones:
the men and women in our Armed Forces deserve the best technology
America has to offer. //
And we must realize the heavy price we will pay if we look
for false economies in defense R&D. Most modern weapons systems
take a minimum of 10 years to move from the drawing board to the
battlefield. / The nature of national defense demands that we
7
plan now for threats on the distant horison. The decisions we
make today -- the programs we push forward, or push aside -- will
dictate the kind of military forces we have at our disposal in
the year 2000 -- and beyond. 11
Second, we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most
recently in Panama, the U.S. may be called on to respond to a
variety of challenges from various points on the compass. In an
era when threats may emerge with little or no warning, our
ability to defend our interests will depend on our speed and
agility. 11 We will need forces that give us global reach. No
amount of political change will alter the geographic fact that we
are separated from many of our most important allies and
interests by thousands of miles of water. //
In many of the conflicts we could face, we may not have the
luxury of matching manpower with pre-positioned materiel. We
will have to have air and sea-lift capacities to get our forces
where they are needed -- when they are needed. A new emphasis on
flexibility and versatility must guide our efforts.
Finally, as we restructure, we must put a premium on
readiness. For those active forces we'll rely on to respond to
crises, readiness must be our highest priority. True military
capability never exists on paper -- it is measured in the hours
spent, and experience gained, on the training ground, under sail,
and in the cockpit. Nothing is more short-sighted than cutting
back on training time to cut costs -- and nothing is more
demoralizing for our troops. // Our soldiers, sailors, airmen
8
and marines must be well-trained, tried and tested -- ready to
perform every mission we ask of them. 11
In our restructured forces, reserves will be important, but
in new ways. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-term
mobilization has diminished. We can now adjust the size,
structure and readiness of our reserve forces, to help us deal
with the more likely challenges we will face.
Our strategy will guard against a major reversal in Soviet
intentions by incorporating into our planning the concept of
reconstitution
regeneration of our forces. By the mid-90s, the time it would
take the Soviets to return to the levels of confrontation that
marked the depths of the Cold War will be sufficient to allow us
to rely not solely on existing forces -- but to generate wholly
new forces. This readiness to rebuild -- made explicit in our
defense policy -- will be an important element in our ability to
deter aggression. ///
A rational restructuring of the kind I've outlined will take
five years. I am confident we can meet the challenges I've
outlined today -- provided we proceed with an orderly build-down
-- not a fire sale. Any build-down of this magnitude must be
managed carefully to minimize dislocations -- not just to the
military balance, but to morale. And I can say right now, as
Commander-in-Chief, that we will take every step possible to
minimize the turbulence these changes will create for our
soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. I will not break faith
9
with the young men and women who have freely chosen to serve
their country. 11
All of us know the challenges we face are fiscal, as well as
military. / The budget constraints we face are very real -- but
so too is the need to protect the gains that 40 years of peace
through strength have earned us. The simple fact is this: when
it comes to national security, America can never afford to fail
or fall short. 111
Let me say once again how pleased I am to appear here today
-- especially with our honored friend, Mrs. Thatcher. / Today,
of course, is not the only time President and Prime Minister have
shared the stage. The world remembers that day 44 years ago --
in Fulton, Missouri, when Churchill delivered what history calls
the "Iron Curtain" speech. / But that wasn't what he called it.
He titled it / "The Sinews of Peace." // By that, he meant to
summon up a vision of the strength of free nations -- united in
defense of democracy. //
At long last, we are writing the final chapter of the 20th
Century's third great conflict. The Cold War is now drawing to a
DONEY
close. / After four to decades of division and discord, our
challenge today is fulfill the great dream of all democracies: a
Done
true commonwealth of free nations. / To marshall the growing
forces of the Free World -- to work together, to bring within
reach for the all men and nations the liberty that belongs by
right to all. //
Thank you, and may God bless the United States of America.
CLOSE HOLD SENSITIVE
No. 162623SS
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
DATE: 7/30/90
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 7/30/90 3:00 PM
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ASPEN INSTITUTE
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE N/C
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
ROGICH N/C
CARD
UNTERMEYER
CICCONI
ROGERS
DEMAREST
WINSTON
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
HOLIDAY
REMARKS:
Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122,
x2930, no later than 3:00 PM, Tuesday, July 31, with a copy to
my office. Thank you.
RESPONSE:
James W. Cicconi
CLOSE HOLD SENSITIVE
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
McGroarty/Dooley
July 30, 1990
1990 JUL 30 PM 3.55
3:30 pm
[ASPEN]
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
5:30 P.M.
[Introductory acknowledgements: Aspen officials, alumni.
Prime Minister Thatcher, Ambassador Catto.] I am delighted to
celebrate with you the 40th anniversary of the illustrious Aspen
Institute. //
In those 40 years, the spirit of Aspen has come to signify
the attempt to bridge the worlds of thought and action. // And
of course, to understand the tremendous changes taking place
around us. / Think back to the headlines 40 years ago, the
summer of that first Aspen conference in 1950. / North Korea
roared across the 38th parallel. Klaus Fuchs was caught and
convicted for revealing the secrets of the atom bomb to the
Soviets. The Cold War -- a term introduced into our political
vocabulary by Bernard Baruch -- had come into its own, as the
shorthand to describe the half-way house of an armed and uneasy
peace -- a world divided, East from West. /
That was the world as Aspen came into being -- the world
Aspen sought to study, and to shape. //
The forty years since then have been a time of tremendous
progress -- for the nations of the West, an era of unparalleled
prosperity, peace and freedom. / But at the same time, we lived
in a constant condition of tension, Cold War and conflict. //
2
That world is now changing. 11 The decades-old division of
Europe is now ending -- and the era of democracy-building has
begun. In Germany -- the divided nation in the heart of a
divided continent -- unity is now assured, as a free and full
member of the NATO alliance. / The Soviet Union itself is in
the midst of a political and economic transformation that has
brought unprecedented openness -- and begun a process of change
that is at once full of hope, and full of uncertainty. 11
This change has had an undeniable impact on national
security strategy as well. / The threat of a large-scale land
war -- a Soviet invasion of Western Europe launched with little
or no warning -- is today more remote than at any point in the
post-war period. / With the emergence of democracy in Eastern
Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its military meaning -- and
after more than four decades of dominance, Soviet troops are
beginning to withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe. /
But the fact remains for all these positive changes that the
Soviet Union remains a world-class military power. Even after
the conventional arms reductions we are now negotiating, the
Soviets will continue to maintain 2 to 3 million men under arms -
- a force far larger than any other nation in Europe. / And of
course, our number one concern: in spite of severe economic
hardship, the Soviets continue to maintain and modernize their
arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. 11
We and our allies welcome the new course the Soviet Union
has chosen. / But prudence demands that we maintain an
3
effective deterrent -- one that secures the peace not only in
today's climate of reduced tensions, but provides a safeguard
against any future reversal from the Soviet Union's present,
positive course. [[NSC INSERT ON STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION. ]]
Above all, we cannot mistake the great gains democracy has
made this past year as proof that America's work in the world is
complete. // All of us agree that never before in the post-war
era has the likelihood of global war been lower. And yet, for
all the distance we have travelled from the depths of the Cold
War, we must also recognize that we have not yet entered an era
of perpetual peace. //
What we require now is a policy that adapts to the
significant changes we've witnessed -- without neglecting the
enduring realities that will continue to shape our security
strategy. // A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as
constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals
in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War. // A
policy that recognizes that our enemy is instability -- and that
a strong America must remain a force for stability in the world.
11
As long as the United States remains a nation with global
interests -- we must maintain a global balance. / American
interests in Europe and the Pacific -- the enduring reality of
Soviet power -- all are key reasons why maintaining a forward
presence will remain an indispensable element of our strategy.
4
For instance -- while we may well change our present
operating procedures and patterns of deployment -- no amount of
political change will alter the geographical fact that the U.S.
must remain a maritime power. 11
And the U.S. will keep a force in Europe as long as our
allies believe our presence contributes to stability. / The
size and shape of those forces will change, to suit the new and
less threatening circumstances -- and to adapt to a new political
climate that calls for forces organized along multinational
lines. But for the sake of stability, the overall capability of
U.S. forces in Europe will remain substantial. 11
In addition to these enduring security interests, America
must possess forces capable of responding to emerging threats in
corners of the globe that may not at present seem to pose great
danger. / In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies, more nations
are acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- and the means to
deliver them. / Right now, over 100 countries have cruise
missiles. 20 countries have the capacity to produce chemical
weapons. And by the year 2000, as many as 15 nations will
possess ballistic missiles. // In the future, even conflicts we
once thought of as regional may carry far-reaching consequences.
In this past year, democracy has indeed made great gains.
But our world remains one where radicalism, fanaticism, and a
destructive form of nationalism continue to breed violence and
terror -- aggression and instability. / In a world of renegade
5
regimes and unpredictable rulers -- the U.S. must stand with its
allies in defense of our democratic values. ///
Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to the
changing strategic circumstances I've just spoken of. / We know
that our forces will be smaller. / Secretary Cheney and General
Powell are hard at work determining the precise size and
composition of the forces we need. But I can tell you now, when
all the calculations are complete -- when all our roles and
missions are reviewed -- we will be looking at a military force
that, within five years, will be 25% smaller than today's. 11
What matters is how we reshape the forces that remain. The
United States would be ill-served by forces that represent
nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the
ones we possess at present. We could easily end up with more
than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely -- and
less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. / What we
need are not merely reductions -- but restructuring.
This restructuring must emphasize three key components
essential to sustain American security: To cope with the full
range of challenges we may confront, we must focus on readiness
and rapid response -- and to prepare today to meet the challenges
we may face in the future, we must focus on research -- an active
and inventive program of defense R&D. //
Let me begin with the component with the greatest long-
range consequences -- research. Time and again, we have seen
technology revolutionize the battlefield. / The U.S. has always
6
relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to match
potential adversaries' strength in numbers. / Cruise missiles,
Stealth fighters and bombers, today's "smart" weapons with state-
of-the-art guidance systems, and tomorrow's "brilliant" ones --
all of these and more will be a necessary part in prevailing in
any future conflict -- and at the same time, saving lives. //
We must realize the heavy price we will pay if we look for
false economies in defense R&D. Most modern weapons systems take
a minimum of 10 years to move from the drawing board to the
battlefield. / The decisions we make today -- the programs we
push forward, or push aside -- will dictate the kind of military
forces we have at our disposal in the year 2000 -- and beyond.
// The nature of national defense demands that we plan now for
threats on the distant horizon. / /
Second, as we restructure, we must put a premium on
readiness. // True military capability never exists on paper -
-it is measured in the hours spent, and experience gained, on the
training ground, under sail, and in the cockpit. Nothing is more
short-sighted than cutting training time to cut costs -- and
nothing is more demoralizing for our troops than to deny them the
training time they need. 11 Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and
marines must be well-trained, tried and tested -- ready to
perform every mission we ask of them. //
In our restructured forces, reserves will continue to play a
special role. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-term
mobilization has diminished -- along with the threat of Soviet
7
aggression. Instead of measuring warning time in terms of days
and weeks as we were forced to do for the past 40 years -- by the
mid-90's, we expect much longer notice of any return to the
levels of confrontation that existed in the depths of the Cold
War: signs that we could recognize at least one to two years
before the outbreak of aggression. // Today we must focus on
the capacity to reconstitute our forces -- to rebuild essential
capabilities -- in a time of increased instability.
Finally, we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most
recently in OPERATION JUST CAUSE, the U.S. may be called on to
respond to threats from various points on the compass. In an era
when threats may well emerge without warning, our ability to
defend our interests will depend on our speed and agility.
In many of the conflicts we may face in the future, we will
not have the luxury of matching manpower with pre-positioned
materiel. That will require air and sea-lift capacities at the
very least equal to if not more capable than those we possess
today. //
A rational restructuring of the kind I've outlined will take
five years. And I am confident we can meet the challenges I've
outlined today -- provided we proceed with an orderly build-down
not a fire sale. Any build-down of this magnitude must be
managed carefully to minimize dislocations -- not just to the
military balance, but to morale. And I can say right now, as
Commander-in-Chief, that I will not break faith with the young
men and women who have freely chosen to serve their country. //
8
All of us know the challenges we face are fiscal, as well as
military. / The budget constraints we face are very real -- but
so too is the need for a strong and secure America. The simple
fact is: when it comes to national security, America can never
afford to fail or fall short. ///
Let me say once again how pleased I am to appear here today
-- especially with our honored friend, Mrs. Thatcher. / Today,
of course, is not the first time President and Prime Minister
have shared the stage. That was 44 years ago -- in Fulton,
Missouri. // Mrs. Thatcher, the world remembers the address
Churchill delivered that day as the "Iron Curtain" speech. /
But that wasn't what he called it. He titled it / "The Sinews of
Peace." // By that, he meant to summon up a vision of the
strength of free nations -- united in defense of democracy. //
At long last, we are writing the final chapter of the 20th
Century's third great conflict. The Cold War is now drawing to a
close. / And yet today -- as in Churchill's time -- the world
remains divided. For all the millions of men and women who won
their freedom this past year -- there are hundreds of millions
more not yet free. 11
Our challenge today is to overcome this deep division. To
marshall the growing forces of the Free World -- to work to bring
within reach for the unfree the liberty that belongs by right to
all. 11
Thank you, and may God bless the United States of America.
# # #
curu
NSC REVISED Draff
F41-
1
Dan
27 July 90
28 July 90
a.m.
3 pm
(Introductory remarks appropriate to the setting.)
For nearly half a century, we and our Allies have
been challenged the world over by ideological
struggle and military confrontation. Because we
prized liberty, we responded to these challenges.
Two generations have stood watch, and manned the
ramparts behind which freedom and free people could
thrive.
Nowhere was this more true than in Europe, a
continent cruelly divided by Soviet power, where we
have had to maintain a strong defense against
powerful forces, offensively arrayed, with the
capacity for sudden and massive invasion. But now,
after more than 40 years, we find that it was not
Soviet tanks that swept westward but the ideals of
democracy that have swept through the East.
2
We see fledgling democracies in Eastern and Central
Europe, the old pattern of Soviet dominance broken,
and Germany on the threshold of unity in peace and
freedom.
The Warsaw Pact no longer functions as an effective
military alliance, Soviet troops are beginning to
withdraw from Eastern Europe, and CFE negotiations
promise more will follow. We no longer face the
threat of a massive conventional attack, launched
with little or no warning.
In fact, the Soviet Union itself is undergoing a
transformation -- the final outcome of which is
uncertain -- but a transformation that so far has
given us the chance to move beyond containment.
In short, the third great conflict of the 20th
3
century -- the Cold War -- is coming to a close.
Our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union is
being transformed. We are entering a new era. The
defense strategy and military forces needed to
ensure peace and security can -- and must -- be
different. But, in a world marked by rapid change
and continuing uncertainty, we must not repeat the
historical error of massive demobilization, nor take
fleeting comfort in a false sense of insularity. We
are forging a strategy suited to the opportunities
and challenges before us, one that reflects
continued engagement underwritten by an approach to
deterrence appropriate for both new and enduring
realities.
Continued Engagement
Our strategy will be shaped by a key fact: we are --
and will remain -- a superpower. We are inescapably
4
a leader, the connecting link in a global alliance
of democracies, the pivotal factor of stability. We
will not shrink from this responsibility. To do so
would serve no one's interests, least of all our
own. We want a world in which fundamental values --
could be condenied but the Charman
the free movement of ideas, people and commerce --
evant, the underlined thought to a phear
will not only survive, but flourish. Such a world
will be beyond our reach if we turn inward and
foolishly squander the heritage of security and
international cooperation that has sustained us over
more than four decades. This means that we will
maintain a forward presence to defend our interests
and those of our allies throughout the globe. We
aren't the "world's policeman". That would be
beyond our means and beneath our principles -- but
our role in ensuring security is indispensable,
irreplaceable.
5
New Demands of Deterrence
In this role, we will be guided by the new demands
of deterrence -- a deterrence suited to likely
dangers, the growing strength of our allies, and the
unique contributions we can make to the common
defense. I see two broad requirements
First, we must continue to maintain a global
balance. Even in a new era the Soviet Union will be
there, still a formidable military power. The
Soviets surely will maintain their modern, effective
strategic arsenal -- an arsenal that has become the
last unquestioned hallmark of their superpower
status.
They will enter a START Treaty with a fully
modernized, highly capable, very large strategic
force. It is this force that is a number one
concern to us. It must be for only the Soviet Union
has the capacity to destroy the United States.
6
We will continue to press ahead with our START
negotiations, but both strategy and prudence demand
we pursue the modernization of our strategic
offensive forces and the promise of strategic
defenses.
[INSERT]
We must also remember that even after negotiated and
unilateral reductions in conventional arms take
place, we expect the Soviet Union to field a modern,
well-equipped force of 2-3 million men -- dwarfing
all others in Europe. These basic facts of power
and geography will endure, even in a world where the
likelihood of superpower conflict is greatly reduced
and the confrontation in Europe is decidedly
altered.
For over forty years we and our Allies have
"light fare" light
7
maintained sufficient strength so that major
conflict -- nuclear or conventional, in Europe or
elsewhere -- was not an option for the Soviets.
That strength was essential in creating the
conditions for the remarkable changes we are seeing
today. Now, as the evolution of the Soviet system
takes them into historically uncharted waters, we
must maintain sufficient strength -- actual and
potential
so that not even renewed confrontation
is an attractive option for any Soviet leadership.
The second broad requirement of today's deterrence
is to be prepared for those other contingencies
that, even in a new era, can threaten our well-being
and security. For all the positive developments we
have seen, the world is still a place where hope and
peace live side by side with fear and turbulence.
Today crises are not only made more dangerous by the
8
proliferation of advanced weaponry and battle-
hardened armies proficient in their use, they are
also made more likely by a tide of new and dangerous
currents loose in the world -- currents like
resurgent nationalism, a new radicalism, religious
fanaticism.
I am often asked to peer into the future to predict
just exactly where and how our forces will be used
next. The same answer always comes to mind. We use
them everyday. We use them to keep us free. We use
them to stand guard. We use them to deter the
unthinkable. We use them to ferry food and medical
supplies. We use them to evacuate Americans in
danger in far-off lands. Our forces are a living
symbol of our responsibilities and our commitment to
peace and freedom. Our forces demonstrate our sense
of responsibility toward distant events and our
delets
delete
9
commitment to peace and freedom.
We cannot predict with certainty the direction from
which future threats may come. But we can say with
certainty that democracies with far-flung interests
must have modern, effective military forces that are
capable of defending those interests -- and ideally
of deterring anyone from threatening them.
New Requirements for Forces
The demands of deterrence in a new era will shape
the kinds of forces we will need, as well as their
size. We would be ill-served by forces that were
simply a scaled back version of those we designed
for global war with the Soviet Union.
In the future our forces can clearly be smaller.
Secretary Cheney and General Powell are working hard
gmaller. the exact size and composition of their
10
base force. But I can tell you -- when all the
calculations are in, when all the programs are set
-- we will be looking at a military force that
within five years will be 25% smaller than today's.
The premium we have long placed on naval forcès has
reflected the geographical facts of life more than
the capabilities of a potential adversary. We need
not be forever tied to today's operating procedures
and deployment patterns, but so long as we remain an
"island nation", we will need a Navy second to none.
The most likely military challenges we will face
will require speed and agility.
Our forces must be
able to fight and win quickly, as in Grenada or in
Panama. This will require very ready and very
competent active forces -- the kind that are created
11
by intense levels of rigorous peacetime training.
We could make no greater mistake than to pretend
that usable military power can be created in any
other way.
compart C to / point on deployment in U.S.
Our forces must also be even more deployable than
they have been in the past. They will require air
and sealift at least equal to today's levels to get
where they are needed, when they are needed. And
these forces must also be better able to operate in
austere environments -- independent of the kind of
extensive infrastructure we have prepared in Europe.
And these forces must be able to rely on the most
modern and sophisticated weapons in our arsenal.
The Soviets talk about -- and are planning for -- a
technical revolution that will transform the
Chency
battlefield. In addition, the proliferation of
12
sophisticated weapons makes almost any theater a
potential technological challenge. Our ability to
Chency
lead this military technologies revolution will
largely determine our future security. This will be
especially true at lower force levels and in the
complex political and military environment in which
our forces may operate. // We will always be reluctant
to involve U.S. forces in any conflict, but -- when
we engage -- we must use our best. Cruise missiles,
stealth fighters and bombers, "brilliant"
munitions -- these and other modern technologies
will win conflicts and save precious lives. We will
protect our future with a substantial investment in
research and development.
Reserve forces will also remain important, but in
new ways. The Cold War demanded we be able to field
a force capable of responding to a global
13
confrontation in a very short order, a few weeks at
best. This put a great burden on both the size and
readiness of our reserve forces. We can now adjust
both as we shape our reserves to help us deal with
the more likely challenges we will face.
Class
Our strategy will guard against a major reversal in
Soviet intentions by incorporating into our planning
the concept of national reconstitution of our forces
-- a concept significantly different from our
concept of mobilization over the past 40 years. By
the mid-90s we expect much longer notice of any
return to the levels of military confrontation that
marked the Cold War -- notice of at least one to two
years. This will allow us to plan to rely not just
on existing forces but to generate wholly new
forces. This explicit determination to remain ready
to rebuild our forces will be an important element
potential trem but, keep to it you the
14
in our ability to deter.
The threats posed by terrorism, insurgency and
instability will continue. Where appropriate, we
will work to sustain economic and security
assistance -- even at the expense of spending on our
own forces -- as a long-term investment in global
stability and our own security.
We will also
trytor
maintain an appropriate forward presence, presence
retain
that communicates our commitment to continued
engagement
The alternative to helping our friends
and allies defend the values we have in common is
ultimately being forced to defend them everywhere
ourselves -- the very "policeman" role we have
rightly rejected.
Even as we respond to the changing nature and
magnitude of the threat in Europe, that Continent
15
remains of paramount importance. As I said last
year in Brussels and reaffirmed recently in London,
we will keep a force in Europe as long as our Allies
desire our presence as part of a common security
effort. In size, this force will be smaller than
today's but it will still be substantial -- far more
than a token. In form, it will reflect the
hma.
transformation of military strategy announced at the
agrees
NATO summit: more mobile and versatile, organized in
multinational corps; reliant more on the ability to
3
build-up larger forces and less on the need to
full.
resort to nuclear weapons. In mission, it will be
there to deter any revival of Soviet military
adventurism or intimidation; to reassure all of
Europe, East and West, that the European balance
will remain secure, that stability is assured, and
that America is there -- and will remain -- helping
to prevent new dangers.
also
JCS.
See
16
The Transition
These are the basic elements of a new defense
posture for the 90s and beyond. In the coming days,
ching
the Secretary of Defense will expand on these
concepts.
Our mission will change --from one that contains a
known and powerful enemy to one that preserves the
peace in the face of instabilities that today are
only dimly foreseen. America will help maintain the
global balance, deter new conflicts, and promote
stability so that democracy can flourish. We will
have a "peace dividend" -- but we must remember that
the biggest dividend is peace itself and that we
must continue to pay the premiums on our insurance
policy so that the peace will last.
17
The challenge before us now is to get from here to
there -- safely. A rational restructuring of our
forces will take five years. We cannot accept
defense cuts so rapid or so deep that the forces
that remain will be too disrupted to perform the
missions that will still be demanded of them. This
will be an orderly build down -- not a fire sale.
The danger will be particularly acute if, in the
rush for quick savings, we savage those accounts
where dollars are spent the fastest -- operations,
and especially personnel. As we build down, we must
protect our most important military asset: highly
trained, highly motivated and exceptionally
dedicated people. It has taken more than a decade to
recover from the hollow force of the 70s and I will
not break faith with the young men and women who
have made today's success possible. We must take
18
every step available to minimize the turbulence
these changes will create for our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines, and their families.
I want to say a few final words today directly to
our men and women in uniform. Let me tell you that
your President, the American people and indeed
people the world over know of your contribution to
freedom. General Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, tells
of an event that occurred in Germany last Autumn,
before the wall came down, when East Germans were
taking every opportunity to go west. One group was
leaving Czechoslovakia by train, crowded into every
available space, traveling through a dark night with
no familiar landmarks, anxious to be across the
border into freedom. As they pulled into the border
town of Hof, in West Germany, one of them noticed a
mounted patrol from the U.S. 2nd Armored Cavalry
19
Regiment and shouted out, "Look! There are the
Americans. We are free!"
May it always be so. God bless each and everyone of
you and God bless the United States of America.
19
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 31, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WILLIAM KRISTOL
EDE HOLIDAY
TIMOTHY MCBRIDE
ANDREW CARD
ROSE ZAMARIA
JAMES CICCONI
PAUL BATEMAN
DAVID DEMAREST
RICHARD TREFRY
MARLIN FITZWATER
DAVID VALDEZ
BOYDEN GRAY
BILLY DALE
FRED MCCLURE
JAY ALLISON
BONNIE NEWMAN
JOHN HERRICK
ROGER PORTER
LAURIE FIRESTONE
SIG ROGICH
PEGGY SWIFT
BRENT SCOWCROFT
KIM BRADY
CHASE UNTERMEYER
TOM HUFFORD
SUSAN PORTER ROSE
DEB ANDERSON
ED ROGERS
TONY BENEDI
JOE HAGIN
USSS/PPD OPS
DAVID CARNEY
WHCA AUDIO/VISUAL
CHRISS WINSTON
WHCA OPERATIONS
BOBBIE KILBERG
WHTV
SICHAN SIV
MEDICAL UNIT
PATTY PRESOCK
PRESIDENTIAL
LINDA CASEY
DOCUMENTS
AIRLIFT OPS
THROUGH:
SIG ROGICH
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
PUBLIC EVENTS AND INITIATIVES
FROM:
JOHN G. KELLER, JR. JGK.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
DIRECTOR OF PRESIDENTIAL ADVANCE
SUBJECT:
TRIP OF THE PRESIDENT TO ASPEN, COLORADO,
AUGUST 2 - 3, 1990
For your use and planning purposes, the attached is a preliminary
outline schedule for the Trip of the President to Aspen,
Colorado, August 2 - - 3, 1990. Please keep in mind the following
information has not been finally approved and is subject to
change.
Attachments
PROPOSED SCHEDULE
Thursday, August 2, 1990
GUEST AND STAFF INSTRUCTIONS:
NOTE:
THE PRESIDENT will travel on
a C-20 directly to Aspen with
Essential Staff. Remaining
Guests and Staff will travel
on a C-137.
6:00 am
Baggage Call. Please place all
unlocked baggage outside
Room 89 1/2 OEOB at this
time for those traveling on
either C-20 or C-137.
NOTE: Baggage for both the
C-20 and C-137 will be placed
on the C-137.
7:30 am
Vans depart West Basement
en route Andrews Air Force
Base for Staff traveling on
C-137.
7:30 am
Those with own transportation
with baggage should arrive
Andrews Air Force Base,
Distinguished Visitors'
Lounge at this time.
7:45 am
Those with own transportation
without baggage should arrive
Andrews Air Force Base,
Distinguished Visitors'
Lounge at this time.
8:30 am
C-137 departs Andrews Air
Force Base.
9:45 am
Guests and Staff manifested on
Marine One should proceed to
South Lawn at this time.
10:20 am
C-137 arrives Grand Junction
(M.D.T.)
Airport, Grand Junction,
Colorado.
Upon arrival at Grand Junction
Airport, Guests and Staff should
board C-130 immediately for
transport to Aspen, Colorado.
10:30 am C-130 departs Grand Junction en
route Aspen, Colorado.
11:05 am
C-130 arrives Pitkin County
Airport, Aspen, Colorado.
9:50 am
MARINE ONE departs White House en route Andrews
Air Force Base.
(Flying Time: 10 Minutes)
10:00 am
MARINE ONE arrives Andrews Air Force Base.
10:05 am
AIR FORCE ONE (C-20) departs Andrews Air Force
Base en route Grand Junction, Colorado.
(Flying Time: 3 Hours 35 Minutes)
(Interchange: No)
(Time Change: Back 2 Hours)
11:40 am
AIR FORCE ONE (C-20) arrives Pitkin County
(M.D.T.)
Airport, Aspen, Colorado.
11:45 am
MOTORCADE departs Pitkin County Airport en route
Catto Residence.
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
12:00 pm
MOTORCADE arrives Catto Residence.
*
PRIVATE TIME
(12:05 pm - 12:25 pm)
*
BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
THATCHER
- Photo Opportunity (at beginning only)
(12:30 pm - 2:00 pm)
Page Two
*
PRESS AVAILABILITY
- Expanded Pool
(2:10 pm - 2:30 pm)
*
PRIVATE TIME
(2:35 pm - 2:55 pm)
3:00 pm
MOTORCADE departs Catto Residence en route Aspen
Institute.
(Drive Time: 25 Minutes)
3:25 pm
MOTORCADE arrives Aspen Institute.
*
ADDRESS ASPEN INSTITUTE SYMPOSIUM
- Open Press
- Remarks
(3:37 pm - 4:05 pm)
opening session
4:10 pm
MOTORCADE departs Aspen Institute en route Catto
Residence.
(Drive Time: 25 Minutes)
4:35 pm
MOTORCADE arrives Catto Residence.
*
PRIVATE TIME
(6:00 pm - 7:30 pm)
*
PRIVATE DINNER
- 20 - 30 guests
(7:30 pm - 9:30 pm)
RON Catto Residence, Aspen, Colorado.
Friday, August 3, 1990
9:00 am
MOTORCADE departs Catto Residence en route Pitkin
County Airport.
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
Page Three
9:15 am
MOTORCADE arrives Pitkin County Airport.
9:20 am
AIR FORCE ONE (C-20) departs Pitkin County Airport
en route Grand Junction, Colorado.
(Flying Time: 55 Minutes)
(Interchange: Yes)
(Time Change: None)
10:15 am
AIR FORCE ONE (C-20) arrives Grand Junction
Airport, Grand Junction, Colorado.
10:25 am
AIR FORCE ONE (C-137) departs Grand Junction en
route Andrews Air Force Base.
(Flying Time: 3 Hours 5 Minutes)
(Interchange: No)
(Time Change: Ahead 2 Hours)
3:30 pm
AIR FORCE ONE (C-137) arrives Andrews Air Force
(E.D.T.)
Base.
3:35 pm
MARINE ONE departs Andrews Air Force Base en route
Camp David.
(Flying Time: 35 Minutes)
4:10 pm
MARINE ONE arrives Camp David.
Page Four
X Chairman Powelli. aldernative cloring:
Conclusion
We will keep America strong as we look to a future filled
with promise. And, as we do, I want to share with you three
principles that will guide my actions in defense of our nation.
First, I will not break the bond between power and purpose.
Between our values and our strength. Without our strength we
cannot defend. Without our values there is nothing to defend.
We do not look for missions or roles. We will always be
reluctant to involve US forces in any conflict. But when we do,
it will be to defend those values that have sustained us for over
two centuries.
Second, I will not allow the insurance premium on our
national security to lapse. We cannot and will not entrust our
security to declarations or intentions. We will reduce our
defense budget but not our defenses. If we cut precipitously, if
we try to cash in our insurance premium to buy a peace dividend,
we will get neither.
Third, I will never forget the most precious asset this
nation has in defense of its liberties: the men and women in the
armed forces of America. The ones who have volunteered to deter
war, to preserve the peace, to keep us safe and strong. I took
pride in doing my part in defeating aggression. They take pride
in doing their part in deterring war. They take pride in doing
their part in preserving the peace. There is a bond between the
2
American people and those elected to serve. It is a sacred
trust: you have given us your sons and daughters, your brothers
and sisters. We will never break faith with the young men and
women in union who have made today's success possible.
We will work to maintain the finest peace-time armed forces
in our history. We will provide our soldiers with the best
equipment drawing on our technological strength. We will ensure
the most rigorous training. And we will do all in our power to
minimize the disruptions caused by the unfolding new environment.
I want to say a few final words today directly to our men
and women in uniform. Let me tell you that your President, the
American people and indeed people the world over know of your
contribution to freedom. General Vuono, Army Chief of Staff,
tells of an event that occurred in Germany last Autumn, before
the wall came down, when East Germans were taking every
opportunity to go west. One group was leaving Czechoslovakia by
train, crowded into every available space, traveling through a
dark night with no familiar landmarks, anxious to be across the
border into freedom. As they pulled into the border town of Hof,
in West Germany, one of them noticed a mounted patrol from the
U.S. 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and shouted out, "Look! There
are the Americans. We are free!"
May it always be so. God bless each and everyone of you and God
bless the United States of America.
2