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Aspen Institute 40th Anniversary 8/2/90 [OA 5376] [2]
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Aspen Institute 40th Anniversary 8/2/90 [OA 5376] [2]
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S
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This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series:
Speech File Draft Files
Subseries:
Chron File, 1989-1993
OA/ID Number:
13538
Folder ID Number:
13538-002
Folder Title:
Aspen Institute 40th Anniversary 8/2/90 [OA 5376] [2]
Stack:
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26
16
4
2
who's the Per event
McGroarty/Dooley
July 30, 1990
2:00 pm
[ASPEN]
FIRST THE ASPEN INSTITUTE DRAFT
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS:
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
5:30 P.M.
dawn
[Introductory acknowledgements: Aspen officials, alumni.
Prime Minister Thatcher, Ambassador Catto.] I am delighted to
celebrate with you the 40th anniversary of the illustrious Aspen
Institute. //
In those 40 years, the spirit of Aspen has come to signify
laddrth. to of
the attempt to bridge the worlds of thought and action. // And
course, to understand the tremendous changes taking place
around us. / Think back to the headlines 40 years ago, the
Who's
summer of that first Aspen conference in 1950. / North Korea
Theremy
roared across the 38th parallel. Klaus Fuchs was caught and
convicted for revealing the secrets of the atom bomb to the
Soviets. The Cold War -- a term introduced into our political
vocabulary by Bernard Baruch -- had come into its own, as the
shorthand to describe the half-way house of an armed and uneasy
peace -- a world divided, East from West. /
That was the world as Aspen came into being -- the world
Aspen sought to study, and to shape. //
The forty years since then have been a time of tremendous
progress -- for the nations of the West, an era of unparalleled
prosperity, peace and freedom. / But at the same time, we lived
in a constant condition of tension, Cold War and conflict. //
2
That world is now changing. // The decades old division of
Europe is now ending -- and the era of democracy-building has
begun. In Germany -- the divided nation in the heart of a
divided continent -- unity is now assured, as a free and full
member of the NATO alliance. / The Soviet Union itself is in
the midst of a political and economic transformation that has
brought unprecedented openness -- and begun a process of change
that is at once full of hope, and full of uncertainty. //
This change has had an undeniable impact on national
security strategy as well. / The threat of a large-scale land
war -- a Soviet invasion of Western Europe launched with little
or no warning -- is today more remote than at any point in the
post-war period. / With the emergence of democracy in Eastern
Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its military meaning -- and
after more than four decades of dominance, Soviets troops are
beginning to withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe. /
But the fact remains for all these positive changes that the
Soviet Union continues to be a world-class military power. They
continue to devote 1/4 of their faltering economic capacity to
military spending -- and to funnel billions of dollars worth of
aid to anti-democratic client-states from Cuba to North Korea. /
Even after the conventional arms reductions we are now
negotiating, the Soviets will continue to maintain 2 to 3 million
men under arms -- a force far larger than any other nation in
Europe. / And of course, our number one concern: in spite of
3
severe economic hardship, the Soviets continue to maintain and
modernize their arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons.
//
We must, therefore, maintain an effective deterrent -- one
that secures the peace not only in today's climate of reduced
tensions, but provides a safeguard against any future reversal
from the Soviet Union's present, positive course. [[NSC INSERT
ON STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION. ]]
Above all, we cannot mistake the great gains democracy has
made this past year as proof that America's work in the world is
complete. We are all aware of the voices urging America that it
can now safely retreat into isolationism -- that we can turn
inward again, now that democracy has won the war of ideas. //
All of us agree that never before in the post-war era has
the likelihood of global war been lower. And yet, for all the
distance we have travelled from the depths of the Cold War, we
must also recognize that we have not yet entered an era of
perpetual peace. //
What we require now is a policy that adapts to the
significant changes we've witnessed -- without neglecting the
enduring realities that will continue to shape our security
strategy. // A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as
constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals
in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War. //
As long as the United States remains a nation with global
interests -- we must maintain a global balance. / American
interests in Europe and the Pacific -- the enduring reality of
4
Soviet power -- all are key reasons why maintaining a forward
presence will remain an indispensable element of our strategy.
For instance -- while we may well change our present
operating procedures and patterns of deployment -- no amount of
political change will alter the geographical fact that the U.S.
# 1
must be a maritime power -- with a Navy second to none.
And the U.S. will keep a force in Europe as long as our
allies believe our presence contributes to stability. The size
and shape of those forces will change, to suit the new and less
threatening circumstances -- and to adapt to a new political
climate that calls for forces organized along multinational
lines. But for the sake of stability, the overall capability of
U.S. forces in Europe will remain substantial. //
In addition to these enduring security interests, America
must possess forces capable of responding to emerging threats in
corners of the globe that may not at present seem to pose great
danger. / In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies, more nations
are acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- and the means to
deliver them. / Right now, over 100 countries have cruise
missiles -- and 20 countries have the capacity to produce
chemical weapons. In the future, even conflicts we once thought
of as regional may carry far-reaching consequences. //
In this past year, democracy has indeed made great gains.
But our world remains one where radicalism, fanaticism, and a
destructive form of nationalism continue to breed violence and
leadus, requires
5
terror, aggression and instability. In this world, American
strength is often the paramount force for peace and freedom.
/
Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to the
changing strategic circumstances I've just spoken of. / We know
that our forces will be smaller. / Secretary Cheney and General
Powell are hard at work determining the precise size and
composition of the forces we need. But I can tell you now, when
all the calculations are complete -- when all our roles and
missions are reviewed -- we will be looking at a military force
that, within five years, will be 25% smaller than today's. //
What matters is how we reshape the forces that remain. The
United States would be ill-served by forces that represent
nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the
ones we possess at present. We could easily end up with more
than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely -- and
less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. / What we
need are not merely reductions -- but restructuring.
This restructuring must emphasize three key components
essential to sustain American security: To cope with the full
range of challenges we may confront, we must focus on readiness
and rapid response -- and to prepare today to meet the challenges
we may face in the future, we must focus on research -- an active
and inventive program of defense R&D. //
Let me begin with the component with the greatest long-
range consequences -- research. Time and again, we have seen
technology revolutionize the battlefield. / The U.S. has always
6
relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to match
potential adversaries' strength in numbers. / Cruise missiles,
Stealth fighters and bombers, today's "smart" weapons with state-
of-the-art guidance systems, and tomorrow's "brilliant" ones --
all of these and more will be a necessary part in prevailing in
any future conflict -- and at the same time, saving lives. //
We must realize the heavy price we will pay if we look for
false economies in defense R&D. Most modern weapons systems take
a minimum of 10 years to move from the drawing board to the
battlefield. / The decisions we make today -- the programs we
push forward, or push aside -- will dictate the kind of military
forces we have at our disposal in the year 2000 -- and beyond.
// The nature of national defense demands that we plan now for
threats on the distant horizon. //
Second, as we restructure, we must put a premium on
readiness. // True military capability never exists on paper -
-it is measured in the hours spent, and experience gained, on the
training ground, under sail, and in the cockpit. Nothing is more
short-sighted than cutting training time to cut costs -- and
nothing is more demoralizing for our troops than to deny them the
training time they need. // Our soldiers, sailors airmen and
marines must be well-trained, tried and tested -- ready to
perform every mission we ask of them. //
In our restructured forces, reserves will continue to play a
special role. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-term
mobilization has diminished -- along with the threat of Soviet
7
aggression. Instead of measuring warning time in terms of days
and weeks as we were forced to do for the past 40 years -- by the
mid-90's, we expect much longer notice of any return to the
levels of confrontation that existed in the depths of the Cold
War: signs that we could recognize at least one to two years
before the outbreak of aggression. // Today we must focus on
the capacity to reconstitute our forces -- to rebuild essential
capabilities -- in a time of increased instability.
Finally, we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most
recently in OPERATION JUST CAUSE, the U.S. may be called on to
respond to threats from various points on the compass. In an era
when threats may well emerge without warning, our ability to
defend our interests will depend on our speed and agility.
In many of the conflicts we may face in the future, we will
not have the luxury of matching manpower with pre-positioned
materiel. That will require air and sea-lift capacities at the
very least equal to if not more capable than those we possess
today. //
A rational restructuring of the kind I've outlined will take
five years. And I am confident we can meet the challenges I've
outlined today -- provided we proceed with an orderly build-down
-- not a fire sale. Any build-down of this magnitude must be
managed carefully to minimize dislocations -- not just to the
military balance, but to morale. And I can say right now, as
Commander-in-Chief, that I will not break faith with the young
men and women who have freely chosen to serve their country. //
8
All of us know the challenges we face are fiscal, as well as
military. / The budget constraints we face are very real --- but
so too is the need for a strong and secure America. The simple
fact is: when it comes to national security, America can never
afford to fail or fall short. ///
Let me say once again how pleased I am to appear here today
-- especially with our honored friend, Mrs. Thatcher. / Today,
of course, is not the first time President and Prime Minister
have shared the stage. That was 44 years ago -- in Fulton,
Missouri. // Mrs. Thatcher, the world remembers the address
Churchill delivered that day as the "Iron Curtain" speech. /
But that wasn't what he called it. He titled it / "The Sinews of
Peace." // By that, he meant to summon up a vision of the
strength of free nations -- united in defense of democracy. //
At long last, we are writing the final chapter of the 20th
Century's third great conflict. The Cold War is now drawing to a
close. / And yet today -- as in Churchill's time -- the world
remains divided. For all the millions of men and women who won
their freedom this past year -- there are hundreds of millions
more not yet free. //
Our challenge today is to overcome this deep division. To
marshall the growing forces of the Free World -- to work to bring
within reach for the unfree the liberty that belongs by right to
all. //
Thank you, and may God bless the United States of America.
# # #
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 31, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THROUGH:
&
DAVID DEMAREST
FROM:
DAN MCGROARTY mely
SUBJECT:
ASPEN INSTITUTE 40TH ANNIVERSARY
I. SUMMARY
On Thursday, August 2, at 3:30 p.m. you will address
the opening session of the Aspen Institute's 40th
Anniversary Symposium. About 3000 people will attend, 500
of whom are special guests of the Aspen Institute, including
Prime Minister Thatcher, Ambassador and Mrs. Catto, business
executives, public servants and academics from around the
world.
Lodwrick Cook, Chairman and CEO of ARCO, will introduce
you. Following the speech, Ann Hudson, a trustee of the
Aspen Institute, will present you with a gift.
II. DISCUSSION
The speech (20 min./teleprompter) discusses national
security and defense, and the new challenges the U.S. faces
in this rapidly changing world.
# # #
McGroarty/Dooley
July 31, 1990
4:45 pm
[ASPEN]
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
5:30 P.M.
[Introductory acknowledgements: Aspen officials, alumni.
Prime Minister Thatcher, Ambassador Catto.] I am delighted to
celebrate with you the 40th anniversary of the illustrious Aspen
Institute. //
In those 40 years, the spirit of Aspen has come to signify
the attempt to bridge the worlds of thought and action. // And
of course, to understand the tremendous changes taking place
around us. / Think back to the headlines 40 years ago, the
summer of that first Aspen conference in 1950. / North Korea
roared across the 38th parallel. Klaus Fuchs was caught and
convicted for revealing the secrets of the atom bomb to the
Soviets. The Cold War -- a term introduced into our political
vocabulary by Bernard Baruch -- had come into its own, as the
shorthand to describe the half-way house of an armed and uneasy
peace -- a world divided, East from West. /
That was the world as Aspen came into being -- the world
Aspen sought to study, and to shape. //
The forty years since then have been a time of tremendous
progress -- for the nations of the West, an era of unparalleled
prosperity, peace and freedom. / But at the same time, we lived
in a constant condition of tension, Cold War and conflict. //
2
That world is now changing. // The decades-old division of
Europe is ending -- and the era of democracy-building has begun.
In Germany -- the divided nation in the heart of a divided
continent -- unity is now assured, as a free and full member of
the NATO alliance. / The Soviet Union itself is in the midst of
a political and economic transformation that has brought
unprecedented openness -- a process that is at once full of hope,
and full of uncertainty. //
These changes have transformed our security environment. We
are entering a new era. The defense strategy and military
structure needed to ensure peace can -- and must -- be different.
/ The threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe launched
with little or no warning is today more remote than at any point
in the post-war period. / With the emergence of democracy in
Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its military meaning --
and after more than four decades of dominance, Soviet troops are
withdrawing from Central and Eastern Europe. /
Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to these
changing strategic circumstances. / In a world less driven by
an immediate threat to Europe and the danger of global war -- in
a world where arms control agreements contribute to stability --
we know that our forces will be smaller. / Secretary Cheney and
General Powell are hard at work determining the precise size and
composition of the forces we need. But I can tell you now, when
all the calculations are complete -- when all our roles and
missions are reviewed -- we will be looking at a military force
3
that, within five years, will be 25% smaller than today's. /
America's Armed Forces will be at their lowest level since 1950.
What matters most is how we reshape the forces that remain.
The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent
nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the
ones we possess at present. If we simply pro-rate our reductions
-- cut equally across the board -- we could easily end up with
more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely --
and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. / What
we need are not merely reductions -- but restructuring.
What we require now is a defense policy that adapts to the
significant changes we are witnessing -- without neglecting the
enduring realities that will continue to shape our security
strategy. // A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as
constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals
in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War. //
And in this world, America remains a pivotal factor for
peaceful change. / American interests in Europe and the Pacific
-- in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf -- all are key
reasons why maintaining a forward presence will remain an
indispensable element of our strategy.
And the fact remains for all the positive changes we have
seen, the Soviet Union remains a world-class military power.
Even after the conventional arms reductions we are now
negotiating, the Soviets will continue to maintain 2 to 3 million
men under arms. / And of course, our number one concern: the
4
Soviets continue to maintain and modernize their arsenal of
strategic nuclear weapons. //
We and our allies welcome the new course the Soviet Union
has chosen. / But prudence demands that we maintain an
effective deterrent -- one that secures the peace not only in
today's climate of reduced tensions, but that ensures that
renewed confrontation is not an option for any Soviet leadership.
The Soviets will enter a START Treaty with a fully
modernized, highly capable and very large strategic force. / We
need the B-2. Secretary Cheney has already scaled back the
program as much as makes sense. Further delays will only
increase costs. / We need to complete the Trident program -- to
ensure a survivable, submarine-based deterrent. / We can defer
a decision on our land-based ICBMs -- as we see how the START
talks proceed -- but we must keep our options open: and that
means completing the development of the small ICBM and the rail-
based Peacekeeper. / And finally, I am convinced that a
defensive strategic deterrent makes more sense than ever before.
We must push forward the great promise of SDI -- and we must
deploy SDI when ready. //
And the U.S. will keep a force in Europe as long as our
allies want and need us there. / The size and shape of those
forces will change, to suit the new and less threatening
circumstances. But we will remain in Europe to deter any new
dangers -- and to reassure all of Europe -- East and West -- that
the European balance will remain secure. //
5
Outside of Europe, America must possess forces able to
respond to threats in whatever corner of the globe they may
occur. / In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of
chemical and nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies,
more nations are acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- and the
means to deliver them. / [[Right now, over 100 countries have
cruise missiles. 20 countries have the capacity to produce
chemical weapons. And by the year 2000, as many as 15 nations
will possess ballistic missiles. //]] In the future, even
conflicts we once thought of as limited or local may carry far-
reaching consequences.
Even in a world where democracy and freedom have made great
gains, threats remain. Terrorism. Hostage taking. Renegade
regimes and unpredictable rulers -- new sources of instability -
- all require a strong and engaged America. //
To cope with the full range of challenges we may confront,
we must focus on readiness and rapid response -- and to prepare
today to meet the challenges we may face in the future, we must
focus on research -- an active and inventive program of defense
R&D. //
Let me begin with the component with the greatest long-
range consequences -- research. Time and again, we have seen
technology revolutionize the battlefield. / The U.S. has always
relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to match
potential adversaries' strength in numbers. / Cruise missiles,
Stealth fighters and bombers, today's "smart" weapons with state-
6
of-the-art guidance systems, and tomorrow's "brilliant" ones:
the men and women in our Armed Forces deserve the best technology
America has to offer. //
And we must realize the heavy price we will pay if we look
for false economies in defense R&D. Most modern weapons systems
take a minimum of 10 years to move from the drawing board to the
battlefield. / // The nature of national defense demands that
we plan now for threats on the distant horizon. The decisions we
make today -- the programs we push forward, or push aside -- will
dictate the kind of military forces we have at our disposal in
the year 2000 -- and beyond. //
Second, we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most
recently in Panama, the U.S. may be called on to respond to a
variety of challenges from various points on the compass. In an
era when threats may well emerge without warning, our ability to
defend our interests will depend on our speed and agility.
We will need forces that give us global reach. No amount of
political change will alter the geographic fact that we are
separated from many of our most important allies and interests by
thousands of miles of water. //
And in many of the conflicts we may face in the future, we
may not have the luxury of matching manpower with pre-positioned
materiel. That will require air and sea-lift capacities to get
our forces where they are needed -- when they are needed. A new
emphasis on flexibility and versatility should guide our efforts.
And finally, as we restructure, we must put a premium on
7
readiness. / Readiness must be our highest priority. / True
military capability never exists on paper -- it is measured in
the hours spent, and experience gained, on the training ground,
under sail, and in the cockpit. Nothing is more short-sighted
than cutting training time to cut costs -- and nothing is more
demoralizing for our troops than to deny them the training time
they need. // Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines must be
well-trained, tried and tested -- ready to perform every mission
we ask of them. //
In our restructured forces, reserves will be important, but
in new ways. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-term
mobilization has diminished. We can now adjust both the size and
readiness of our reserve forces, to help us deal with the more
likely challenges we will face.
Our strategy will guard against a major reversal in Soviet
intentions by incorporating into our planning the concept of
regeneration of our forces. By the mid-90s, the time it would
take the Soviets to return to the levels of confrontation that
marked the depths of the Cold War will be sufficient to allow us
to rely not solely on existing forces -- but to generate wholly
new forces. / This readiness to rebuild -- made explicit in our
defense policy -- will be an important element in our ability to
deter aggression. ///
A rational restructuring of the kind I've outlined will take
five years. And I am confident we can meet the challenges I've
outlined today -- provided we proceed with an orderly build-down
8
-- not a fire sale. Any build-down of this magnitude must be
managed carefully to minimize dislocations -- not just to the
military balance, but to morale. And I can say right now, as
Commander-in-Chief, that we will take every step possible to
minimize the turbulence these changes will create for our
soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. / I will not break faith
with the young men and women who have freely chosen to serve
their country. //
All of us know the challenges we face are fiscal, as well as
military. / The budget constraints we face are very real -- but
so too is the need for a strong and secure America. The simple
fact is: when it comes to national security, America can never
afford to fail or fall short. ///
Let me say once again how pleased I am to appear here today
-- especially with our honored friend, Mrs. Thatcher. / Today,
of course, is not the only time President and Prime Minister have
shared the stage. The world remembers that day 44 years ago --
in Fulton, Missouri, when Churchill delivered what history calls
the "Iron Curtain" speech. / But that wasn't what he called it.
He titled it / "The Sinews of Peace." // By that, he meant to
summon up a vision of the strength of free nations -- united in
defense of democracy. //
At long last, we are writing the final chapter of the 20th
Century's third great conflict. The Cold War is now drawing to a
close. / And yet today -- as in Churchill's time -- the world
remains divided. For all the millions of men and women who won
9
their freedom this past year -- there are hundreds of millions
more not yet free. //
Our challenge today is to overcome this deep division. To
marshall the growing forces of the Free World -- to work to bring
within reach for the unfree the liberty that belongs by right to
all. 11
Thank you, and may God bless the United States of America.
# # #
THE OFFICE THE UNITED OFFICE BUDGET or ONE DERECT STATES
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
90 JUL 31 A4:14
NOTICE:
Enclosed are comments from staff members of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). Such comments do not necessarily
represent the official position of the Director of OMB or of the
Office of Management and Budget. If you wish to have the
Director's personal comments, please let me know -- and contact
me if you have any questions.
If our proposed substantive changes are not made, please let
us know before the material is prepared in final.
James UM C. Murr
Associate Director for
Legislative Reference
and Administration
CLOSE HOLD SENSITIVE ent
No. 162623SS
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
DATE: 7/30/90
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 7/30/90 3:00 PM
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ASPEN INSTITUTE
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
ROGICH
CARD
UNTERMEYER
CICCONI
ROGERS
DEMAREST
WINSTON
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
HOLIDAY
REMARKS:
Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122,
x2930, no later than 3:00 PM, Tuesday, July 31, with a copy to
my office. Thank you.
RESPONSE: see comments
James W. Cicconi
CLOSE HOLD SENSITIVE
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
McGroarty/Dooley
July 30, 1990
1990 JUL 30 PM 3. 55
3:30 pm
[ASPEN]
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
5:30 P.M.
[Introductory acknowledgements: Aspen officials, alumni.
Prime Minister Thatcher, Ambassador Catto.] I am delighted to
celebrate with you the 40th anniversary of the illustrious Aspen
Institute. //
In those 40 years, the spirit of Aspen has come to signify
the attempt to bridge the worlds of thought and action. // And
of course, to understand the tremendous changes taking place
around us. / Think back to the headlines 40 years ago, the
summer of that first Aspen conference in 1950. / North Korea
roared across the 38th parallel. Klaus Fuchs was caught and
convicted for revealing the secrets of the atom bomb to the
Soviets. The Cold War -- a term introduced into our political
vocabulary by Bernard Baruch -- had come into its own, as the
shorthand to describe the half-way house of an armed and uneasy
peace -- a world divided, East from West. /
That was the world as Aspen came into being -- the world
Aspen sought to study, and to shape. //
The forty years since then have been a time of tremendous
progress -- for the nations of the West, an era of unparalleled
prosperity, peace and freedom. / But at the same time, we lived
in a constant condition of tension, Cold War and conflict. //
2
That world is now changing. // The decades-old division of
Europe is now ending -- and the era of democracy-building has
begun. In Germany -- the divided nation in the heart of a
divided continent -- unity is now assured, as a free and full
member of the NATO alliance. / The Soviet Union itself is in
the midst of a political and economic transformation that has
brought unprecedented openness -- and begun a process of change
that is at once full of hope, and full of uncertainty. //
This change has had an undeniable impact on national
security strategy as well. / The threat of a large-scale land
war -- a Soviet invasion of Western Europe launched with little
or no warning -- is today more remote than at any point in the
post-war period. / With the emergence of democracy in Eastern
Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its military meaning -- and
after more than four decades of dominance, Soviet troops are
beginning to withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe. /
But the fact remains for all these positive changes that the
Soviet Union remains a world-class military power. Even after
the conventional arms reductions we are now negotiating, the
Soviets will continue to maintain 2 to 3 million men under arms -
- a force far larger than any other nation in Europe. / And of
course, our number one concern: in spite of severe economic
hardship, the Soviets continue to maintain and modernize their
arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. 11
We and our allies welcome the new course the Soviet Union
has chosen. / But prudence demands that we maintain an
The Soviets will enter a START Treaty with a fully modernized,
highly capable, very large strategic force. We must continue
with our strategic modernization. We need the B-2. Further
delays will only increase costs. We need to complete the Trident
program -- to ensure a survivable, submarine-based deterrent. We
must keep our ICBM options open: and that means completing the
development of the small ICBM and the rail-based Peacekeeper.
And finally, I am convinced that strategic defense makes more
sense than ever before. We must deploy SDI when it is ready.
Howard
X4657 4657
3
effective deterrent -- one that secures the peace not only in
today's climate of reduced tensions, but provides a safeguard
against any future reversal from the Soviet Union's present,
positive course. [[NSC INSERT ON STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION. ]]
Above all, we cannot mistake the great gains democracy has
made this past year as proof that America's work in the world is
complete. // All of us agree that never before in the post-war
era has the likelihood of global war been lower. And yet, for
all the distance we have travelled from the depths of the Cold
War, we must also recognize that we have not yet entered an era
of perpetual peace. //
What we require now is a policy that adapts to the
significant changes we've witnessed -- without neglecting the
enduring realities that will continue to shape our security
strategy. // A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as
constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals
in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War. // A
N.B.
policy that recognizes that our enemy is instability -- and that
Instability
a strong America must remain a force for stability in the world.
is sometimes
good e.g.
11
Peace and democracy
Howard
the dissolution
As long as the United States remains a nation with global
XH657
of the
warsaw
interests -- we must maintain a global balance. / American
pact
stability
interests in Europe and the Pacific -- the enduring reality of
is sometimes Soviet power -- all are key reasons why maintaining a forward
bad e.g. on
presence will remain an indispensable element of our strategy.
unchang Cuba ing
Noward
& 4657
4
For instance -- while we may well change our present
operating procedures and patterns of deployment -- no amount of
political change will alter the geographical fact that the U.S.
must remain a maritime power. //
And the U.S. will keep a force in Europe as long as our
allies believe our presence contributes to stability. / The
size and shape of those forces will change, to suit the new and
less threatening circumstances -- and to adapt to a new political
climate that calls for forces organized along multinational
lines. But for the sake of stability, the overall capability of
U.S. forces in Europe will remain substantial. //
In addition to these enduring security interests, America
must possess forces capable of responding to emerging threats in
corners of the globe that may not at present seem to pose great
danger. / In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies, more nations
are acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- and the means to
deliver them. / Right now, over 100 countries have cruise
missiles. 20 countries have the capacity to produce chemical
weapons. And by the year 2000, as many as 15 nations will
possess ballistic missiles. // In the future, even conflicts we
once thought of as regional may carry far-reaching consequences.
In this past year, democracy has indeed made great gains.
But our world remains one where radicalism, fanaticism, and a
destructive form of nationalism continue to breed violence and
terror -- aggression and instability. / In a world of renegade
5
regimes and unpredictable rulers -- the U.S. must stand with its
allies in defense of our democratic values. ///
Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to the
changing strategic circumstances I've just spoken of. / We know
that our forces will be smaller. / Secretary Cheney and General
Powell are hard at work determining the precise size and
composition of the forces we need. But I can tell you now, when
all the calculations are complete -- when all our roles and
missions are reviewed -- we will be looking at a military force
that, within five years, will be 25% smaller than today's. 11
What matters is how we reshape the forces that remain. The
United States would be ill-served by forces that represent
nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the
ones we possess at present. We could easily end up with more
than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely -- and
less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. / What we
need are not merely reductions -- but restructuring.
This restructuring must emphasize three key components
essential to sustain American security: To cope with the full
range of challenges we may confront, we must focus on readiness
and rapid response -- and to prepare today to meet the challenges
we may face in the future, we must focus on research -- an active
and inventive program of defense R&D. //
Let me begin with the component with the greatest long-
range consequences -- research. Time and again, we have seen
technology revolutionize the battlefield. / The U.S. has always
6
relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to match
potential adversaries' strength in numbers. / Cruise missiles,
Stealth fighters and bombers, today's "smart" weapons with state-
of-the-art guidance systems, and tomorrow's "brilliant" ones --
all of these and more will be a necessary part in prevailing in
any future conflict -- and at the same time, saving lives. //
We must realize the heavy price we will pay if we look for
false economies in defense R&D. Most modern weapons systems take
a minimum of 10 years to move from the drawing board to the
battlefield. / The decisions we make today -- the programs we
push forward, or push aside -- will dictate the kind of military
forces we have at our disposal in the year 2000 -- and beyond.
// The nature of national defense demands that we plan now for
threats on the distant horizon. //
Second, as we restructure, we must put a premium on
readiness. // True military capability never exists on paper -
-it is measured in the hours spent, and experience gained, on the
training ground, under sail, and in the cockpit. Nothing is more
short-sighted than cutting training time to cut costs -- and
nothing is more demoralizing for our troops than to deny them the
training time they need. // Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and
marines must be well-trained, tried and tested -- ready to
perform every mission we ask of them. 11
In our restructured forces, reserves will continue to play a
special role. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-term
mobilization has diminished --- along with the threat of Soviet
7
aggression. Instead of measuring warning time in terms of days
and weeks as we were forced to do for the past 40 years -- by the
mid-90's, we expect much longer notice of any return to the
levels of confrontation that existed in the depths of the Cold
War: signs that we could recognize at least one to two years
before the outbreak of aggression. // Today we must focus on
the capacity to reconstitute our forces -- to rebuild essential
capabilities -- in a time of increased instability.
Finally, we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most
recently in OPERATION JUST CAUSE, the U.S. may be called on to
respond to threats from various points on the compass. In an era
when threats may well emerge without warning, our ability to
defend our interests will depend on our speed and agility.
In many of the conflicts we may face in the future, we will
not have the luxury of matching manpower with pre-positioned
materiel. That will require air and sea-lift capacities at the
very least equal to if not more capable than those we possess
today. //
A rational restructuring of the kind I've outlined will take
five years. And I am confident we can meet the challenges I've
outlined today -- provided we proceed with an orderly build-down
-- not a fire sale. Any build-down of this magnitude must be
managed carefully to minimize dislocations -- not just to the
military balance, but to morale. And I can say right now, as
Commander-in-Chief, that I will not break faith with the young
men and women who have freely chosen to serve their country. //
8
All of us know the challenges we face are fiscal, as well as
military. / The budget constraints we face are very real -- but
so too is the need for a strong and secure America. The simple
fact is: when it comes to national security, America can never
afford to fail or fall short. ///
Let me say once again how pleased I am to appear here today
-- especially with our honored friend, Mrs. Thatcher. / Today,
of course, is not the first time President and Prime Minister
have shared the stage. That was 44 years ago -- in Fulton,
Missouri. // Mrs. Thatcher, the world remembers the address
Churchill delivered that day as the "Iron Curtain" speech. /
But that wasn't what he called it. He titled it / "The Sinews of
Peace." // By that, he meant to summon up a vision of the
strength of free nations -- united in defense of democracy. 11
At long last, we are writing the final chapter of the 20th
Century's third great conflict. The Cold War is now drawing to a
close. / And yet today -- as in Churchill's time -- the world
remains divided. For all the millions of men and women who won
their freedom this past year -- there are hundreds of millions
more not yet free. 11
Our challenge today is to overcome this deep division. To
marshall the growing forces of the Free World -- to work to bring
within reach for the unfree the liberty that belongs by right to
all. 11
Thank you, and may God bless the United States of America.
# # #
CLOSE HOLD SENSITIVE ent
No. 162623SS
90 JUL 30
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
DATE: 7/30/90
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 7/30/90 3:00 PM
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ASPEN INSTITUTE
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
ROGICH
CARD
UNTERMEYER
CICCONI
ROGERS
DEMAREST
WINSTON
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
HOLIDAY
REMARKS:
Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122,
x2930, no later than 3:00 PM, Tuesday, July 31, with a copy to
my office. Thank you.
RESPONSE:
Bok
James W. Cicconi
CLOSE HOLD SENSITIVE
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
McGroarty/Dooley
July 30, 1990
1990 JUL 30 PM 3. 55
3:30 pm
[ASPEN]
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
5:30 P.M.
[Introductory acknowledgements: Aspen officials, alumni.
Prime Minister Thatcher, Ambassador Catto.] I am delighted to
celebrate with you the 40th anniversary of the illustrious Aspen
Institute. //
In those 40 years, the spirit of Aspen has come to signify
the attempt to bridge the worlds of thought and action. // And
of course, to understand the tremendous changes taking place
around us. / Think back to the headlines 40 years ago, the
summer of that first Aspen conference in 1950. / North Korea
roared across the 38th parallel. Klaus Fuchs was caught and
convicted for revealing the secrets of the atom bomb to the
Soviets. The Cold War -- a term introduced into our political
vocabulary by Bernard Baruch -- had come into its own, as the
shorthand to describe the half-way house of an armed and uneasy
peace -- a world divided, East from West. /
That was the world as Aspen came into being -- the world
Aspen sought to study, and to shape. //
The forty years since then have been a time of tremendous
progress -- for the nations of the West, an era of unparalleled
prosperity, peace and freedom. / But at the same time, we lived
in a constant condition of tension, Cold War and conflict. //
2
That world is now changing. 11 The decades-old division of
Europe is now ending -- and the era of democracy-building has
begun. In Germany -- the divided nation in the heart of a
divided continent -- unity is now assured, as a free and full
member of the NATO alliance. / The Soviet Union itself is in
the midst of a political and economic transformation that has
brought unprecedented openness -- and begun a process of change
that is at once full of hope, and full of uncertainty. 11
This change has had an undeniable impact on national
security strategy as well. / The threat of a large-scale land
war -- a Soviet invasion of Western Europe launched with little
or no warning -- is today more remote than at any point in the
post-war period. / With the emergence of democracy in Eastern
Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its military meaning -- and
after more than four decades of dominance, Soviet troops are
beginning to withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe. /
But the fact remains for all these positive changes that the
Soviet Union remains a world-class military power. Even after
the conventional arms reductions we are now negotiating, the
Soviets will continue to maintain 2 to 3 million men under arms -
- a force far larger than any other nation in Europe. / And of
course, our number one concern: in spite of severe economic
hardship, the Soviets continue to maintain and modernize their
arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. //
We and our allies welcome the new course the Soviet Union
has chosen. / But prudence demands that we maintain an
3.
effective deterrent -- one that secures the peace not only in
today's climate of reduced tensions, but provides a safeguard
against any future reversal from the Soviet Union's present,
positive course. [[NSC INSERT ON STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION. ]]
Above all, we cannot mistake the great gains democracy has
made this past year as proof that America's work in the world is
complete. // All of us agree that never before in the post-war
era has the likelihood of global war been lower. And yet, for
all the distance we have travelled from the depths of the Cold
War, we must also recognize that we have not yet entered an era
of perpetual peace. //
What we require now is a policy that adapts to the
significant changes we've witnessed -- without neglecting the
enduring realities that will continue to shape our security
strategy. // A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as
constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals
in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War. // A
policy that recognizes that our enemy is instability -- and that
a strong America must remain a force for stability in the world.
11
As long as the United States remains a nation with global
interests -- we must maintain a global balance. / American
interests in Europe and the Pacific -- the enduring reality of
Soviet power -- all are key reasons why maintaining a forward
presence will remain an indispensable element of our strategy.
4
For instance -- while we may well change our present
operating procedures and patterns of deployment -- no amount of
political change will alter the geographical fact that the U.S.
must remain a maritime power. 11
And the U.S. will keep a force in Europe as long as our
allies believe our presence contributes to stability. / The
size and shape of those forces will change, to suit the new and
less threatening circumstances -- and to adapt to a new political
climate that calls for forces organized along multinational
lines. But for the sake of stability, the overall capability of
U.S. forces in Europe will remain substantial. //
In addition to these enduring security interests, America
must possess forces capable of responding to emerging threats in
corners of the globe that may not at present seem to pose great
danger. / In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies, more nations
are acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- and the means to
deliver them. / Right now, over 100 countries have cruise
missiles. 20 countries have the capacity to produce chemical
weapons. And by the year 2000, as many as 15 nations will
possess ballistic missiles. // In the future, even conflicts we
once thought of as regional may carry far-reaching consequences.
In this past year, democracy has indeed made great gains.
But our world remains one where radicalism, fanaticism, and a
destructive form of nationalism continue to breed violence and
terror -- aggression and instability. / In a world of renegade
5
regimes and unpredictable rulers -- the U.S. must stand with its
allies in defense of our democratic values. ///
Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to the
changing strategic circumstances I've just spoken of. / We know
that our forces will be smaller. / Secretary Cheney and General
Powell are hard at work determining the precise size and
composition of the forces we need. But I can tell you now, when
all the calculations are complete -- when all our roles and
missions are reviewed -- we will be looking at a military force
that, within five years, will be 25% smaller than today's. //
What matters is how we reshape the forces that remain. The
United States would be ill-served by forces that represent
nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the
ones we possess at present. We could easily end up with more
than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely -- and
less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. / What we
need are not merely reductions -- but restructuring.
This restructuring must emphasize three key components
essential to sustain American security: To cope with the full
range of challenges we may confront, we must focus on readiness
and rapid response -- and to prepare today to meet the challenges
we may face in the future, we must focus on research -- an active
and inventive program of defense R&D. //
Let me begin with the component with the greatest long-
range consequences -- research. Time and again, we have seen
technology revolutionize the battlefield. / The U.S. has always
6
relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to match
potential adversaries' strength in numbers. / Cruise missiles,
Stealth fighters and bombers, today's "smart" weapons with state-
of-the-art guidance systems, and tomorrow's "brilliant" ones --
all of these and more will be a necessary part in prevailing in
any future conflict -- and at the same time, saving lives. 11
We must realize the heavy price we will pay if we look for
false economies in defense R&D. Most modern weapons systems take
a minimum of 10 years to move from the drawing board to the
battlefield. / The decisions we make today -- the programs we
push forward, or push aside -- will dictate the kind of military
forces we have at our disposal in the year 2000 -- and beyond.
11 The nature of national defense demands that we plan now for
threats on the distant horizon. //
Second, as we restructure, we must put a premium on
readiness. // True military capability never exists on paper -
-it is measured in the hours spent, and experience gained, on the
training ground, under sail, and in the cockpit. Nothing is more
short-sighted than cutting training time to cut costs -- and
nothing is more demoralizing for our troops than to deny them the
training time they need. 11 Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and
marines must be well-trained, tried and tested -- ready to
perform every mission we ask of them. //
In our restructured forces, reserves will continue to play a
special role. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-term
mobilization has diminished -- along with the threat of Soviet
7
aggression. Instead of measuring warning time in terms of days
and weeks as we were forced to do for the past 40 years -- by the
mid-90's, we expect much longer notice of any return to the
levels of confrontation that existed in the depths of the Cold
War: signs that we could recognize at least one to two years
before the outbreak of aggression. // Today we must focus on
the capacity to reconstitute our forces -- to rebuild essential
capabilities -- in a time of increased instability.
Finally, we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most
recently in OPERATION JUST CAUSE, the U.S. may be called on to
respond to threats from various points on the compass. In an era
when threats may well emerge without warning, our ability to
defend our interests will depend on our speed and agility.
In many of the conflicts we may face in the future, we will
not have the luxury of matching manpower with pre-positioned
materiel. That will require air and sea-lift capacities at the
very least equal to if not more capable than those we possess
today. //
A rational restructuring of the kind I've outlined will take
five years. And I am confident we can meet the challenges I've
outlined today -- provided we proceed with an orderly build-down
-- not a fire sale. Any build-down of this magnitude must be
managed carefully to minimize dislocations -- not just to the
military balance, but to morale. And I can say right now, as
Commander-in-Chief, that I will not break faith with the young
men and women who have freely chosen to serve their country. //
8
All of us know the challenges we face are fiscal, as well as
military. / The budget constraints we face are very real -- but
so too is the need for a strong and secure America. The simple
fact is: when it comes to national security, America can never
afford to fail or fall short. 111
Let me say once again how pleased I am to appear here today
-- especially with our honored friend, Mrs. Thatcher. / Today,
of course, is not the first time President and Prime Minister
have shared the stage. That was 44 years ago -- in Fulton,
Missouri. // Mrs. Thatcher, the world remembers the address
Churchill delivered that day as the "Iron Curtain" speech. /
But that wasn't what he called it. He titled it / "The Sinews of
Peace." // By that, he meant to summon up a vision of the
strength of free nations -- united in defense of democracy. //
At long last, we are writing the final chapter of the 20th
Century's third great conflict. The Cold War is now drawing to a
close. / And yet today -- as in Churchill's time -- the world
remains divided. For all the millions of men and women who won
their freedom this past year -- there are hundreds of millions
more not yet free. 11
Our challenge today is to overcome this deep division. To
marshall the growing forces of the Free World -- to work to bring
within reach for the unfree the liberty that belongs by right to
all. //
Thank you, and may God bless the United States of America.
# # #
VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT TO ASPEN, COLORADO
03
AUGUST 2, 1990
PAGE
THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
SEATING FOR DAIS
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
PODIUM
AUG 1 11:22
1. Mr. - Mortimer Adler, Director
6. Mr. Lodwrick Cook, Chairman and
Institute forPhilosophical Research
CEO, ARCO
2. Mr. Michael I. Sovern, President, Columbia University
7. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Prime
3. Mr. John J. Phelan, Jr., Chairman, Board of Trustees,
Minister, Great Britain
The Aspen Institute
8. Mr. Henry Catto, Ambassador to
4. THE PRESIDENT
Great Britain
5. Mr. David T. McLaughlin, President,
9. Ms. Ann Frasher Hudson, Chairman
The Aspen Institute
40th Anniversary Committee, Th
Aspen Institute
10. Mrs. Jessica Catto
11. Mr. Leonard Lauder, Chairman an
Estee Lauder Companies
6128
CLOSE HOLD SENSITIVE
No. 162623SS
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
90 JUL 31 A : 50
DATE:
7/30/90
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 7/30/90 3:00 PM
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ASPEN INSTITUTE
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
ROGICH
CARD
UNTERMEYER
CICCONI
ROGERS
DEMAREST
WINSTON
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
HOLIDAY
REMARKS:
Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122,
x2930, no later than 3:00 PM, Tuesday, July 31, with a copy to
my office. Thank you.
July 31, 1990
RESPONSE: The National Security Council staff has reviewed and forwards
the attached comments.
Bo
Brent Scowcorft
James W. Cicconi
CLOSE HOLD SENSITIVE
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
McGroarty/Dooley
July 30, 1990
IS90 JUL 30 PH 3.55
3:30 pm
[ASPEN]
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
5:30 P.M.
[Introductory acknowledgements: Aspen officials, alumni.
Prime Minister Thatcher, Ambassador Catto.] I am delighted to
celebrate with you the 40th anniversary of the illustrious Aspen
Institute. //
In those 40 years, the spirit of Aspen has come to signify
the attempt to bridge the worlds of thought and action. // And
of course, to understand the tremendous changes taking place
around us. / Think back to the headlines 40 years ago, the
Stalin was at the pank of his power -- and Paranoia.
summer of that first Aspen conference in 1950. / North Korea
had just roared across the 38th parallel. Klaus Fuchs was caught and
convicted for revealing the secrets of the atom bomb to the
Soviets. The Cold War -- a term introduced into our political
vocabulary by Bernard Baruch -- had come into its own, as the
an
shorthand to describe the half way house of an an armed and uneasy
truce
peace -- a world divided, East from West. /
That was the world as Aspen came into being -- the world
Aspen sought to study, and to shape. 11
The forty years since then have been a time of tremendous
progress -- for the nations of the West, an era of unparalleled
prosperity, peace and freedom. / But at the same time, we lived
in a constant condition of tension, Cold War and conflict. //
2
That world is now changing. 11 The decades-old division of
Europe is now ending -- and the era of democracy-building has
begun. In Germany -- the divided nation in the heart of a
divided continent -- unity is now assured, as a free and full
member of the NATO alliance. / The Soviet Union itself is in
the midst of a political and economic transformation that has
brought unprecedented openness E and begun 2 process of change]
that is at once full of hope, and full of uncertainty. //
Thus, our security environment, too, IS transformed. we are entering a now era.
This change has had an undeniable impact on national
The defense strategy and military Forces needed to ensure peace can and must--
be different.
security strategy as well. / The threat of [& large scale land
war a Soviet invasion of Western Europe launched with little
or no warning AN is today more remote than at any point in the
post-war period. / With the emergence of democracy in Eastern
Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its military meaning -- and
after more than four decades of dominance, Soviet troops are
[beginning $7 withdraw ing from Central and Eastern Europe. /
our task today IS to shape our defense
capabilities to these changing strategic circumstances.
In a world less driven by an immediate threat to
Europe and global war -- in a world where arms
control agreements contribute to stability -- we know
3
that our forces will be smaller. / Secretary Cheney and General
Powell are hard at work determining the precise size and
composition of the forces we need. But I can tell you now, when
the prugrams
all the calculations are complete -- when all our roles and
are set
missions are reviewed -- we will be looking at a military force
that, within five years, will be 25% smaller than today's. 11
That will be the lowest level since 1950.
MOST
What matters is how we reshape the forces that remain. The
United States would be ill-served by forces that represent
nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the
ones we possess at present. We could easily end up with more
than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely -- and
less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. / What we
need are not merely reductions -- but restructuring.
destruct
What we require now is a^policy that adapts to the
we are witnessing
significant changes we ve witnessed -- without neglecting the
enduring realities that will continue to shape our security
strategy. // A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as
constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals
sharper East- west
in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War. 11EA A
policy that recognizes that our enemy is instability and that
strong America must remain a force for stability in the world.
11
4
we are inescapably a leader, the connecting link in a
global alliance of domocracies, the pivotal Factor Fur stability
peaceful chunge.
/ American
in the Mediterranean
interests in Europe and the Pacific the endurtro reality of
and the Persian Gulf
Soviet power all are key reasons why maintaining a forward
presence will remain an indispensable element of our strategy.
A world of terrorism, hostage crises, spreading
weapons technology, and new sources of instability 15
a world that requires a strong and engaged
America.
that,
we have seen,
And
the fact remains for all the positive changes
the
Soviet Union remains a world-class military power. Even after
the conventional arms reductions we are now negotiating, the
Soviets will continue to maintain 2 to 3 million men under arms,
a force far larger than any other nation in Europe / And of
course, our number one concern: spite of severe economic
hardship the Soviets continue to maintain and modernize their
arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. //
We and our allies welcome the new course the Soviet Union
has chosen. / But prudence demands that we maintain an
5
effective deterrent -- one that secures the peace not only in
that ensures that renewed
today's climate of reduced tensions, but provides a safeguard
confrontation IS not an option For any Soviet leadership
against any future reversal from the Seviet Union's present,
We must continue with our strategic modernization. We need the
B-2. Secretary Cheney has already scaled back the program as
much as makes sense. Further delays will only increase costs.
We need to complete the Trident program -- to ensure a
survivable, submarine-based deterrent. We can defer a decision
on our land-based ICBMs -- as we see how the START talks proceed
-- but we must keep our options open: and that means completing
the development of the small ICBM and the rail-based Peacekeeper.
I am convinced that strategic defense makes more sense
And finally, as long as technology holds out hope, we cannet
than ever before
remain without any defense against ballistic missiles attack by
of
of
choice. We must push forward/the very promising research being
done by SDI.
P
6
And the United states will Keep a torre in
Europe as long as we and our allies see a need For it
is part of a common security effort. The size and
shape of those Forces will change, to suit the nyw
and less threatening circumstances. But with all the
uncertainties about Europo's Future, on American departure
hould risk a gropolitical earthquake. That is historic
lesson. we will remain in Europe to deter any now dangers,
to re-assure all of Europe, East and West, that the
European balance will semain secure.
Outside of Europe,
In addition to these enduring security interests, America
to
must possess forces able respond to threats in
whatever corners of the globe that they may not at present seem to pose great
may occur.
chemical and
danger. / In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies, more nations
are acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- and the means to
deliver them. E Right now, over 100 countries have eruise
missiles 20 countries have the capacity to produce chemical cal
weapons. And by the year 2000 as many as 15 nations will
possess ballistic missiles. local II In the future, even conflicts we
once thought of as regional may carry far-reaching consequences.
In this past year, democracy has indeed made great gains.
But our world remains one where radicalism, fanaticism, and a
destructive form of nationalism continue to breed violence and
terror -- aggression and instability. / In a world of renegade
7
regimes and unpredictable rulers -- the U.S. must stand with its
to protect its citizens and to defand its
allies Gn defense of our) democratic values. ///
R
This restructuring must emphasize three key components
essential to sustain American security: To cope with the full
range of challenges we may confront, we must focus on readiness
and rapid response -- and to prepare today to meet the challenges
we may face in the future, we must focus on research -- an active
and inventive program of defense R&D. 11
Let me begin with the component with the greatest long-
range consequences -- research. Time and again, we have seen
technology revolutionize the battlefield. / The U.S. has always
relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to match
potential adversaries' strength in numbers. / Cruise missiles,
Stealth fighters and bombers, today's "smart" weapons with state-
of-the-art guidance systems, and tomorrow's "brilliant" ones --
these technologies will win conFlicts and save precious liws
all of these and more will be a necessary part in prevailing in
any future conflict and at the same time, saving lives. 11
We must realize the heavy price we will pay if we look for
false economies in defense R&D. Most modern weapons systems take
a minimum of 10 years to move from the drawing board to the
battlefield. / The decisions we make today -- the programs we
push forward, or push aside -- will dictate the kind of military
forces we have at our disposal in the year 2000 -- and beyond.
[1, The nature of national defense demands that we plan now for
threats on the distant horison. TY
4
Secondly Hamily, we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most
recently in [CRERATION Panama JUST CAUSE] the U.S. may be called on to
a variety OF challenges
respond to from various points on the compass. In an era
when threats may well emerge without warning, our ability to
defend our interests will depend on our speed and agility.
We will need Forces that give us global reach.
No amount if political change will alter the geographic
fact that we are separated from many of our most important
allies and interests by thousands of miles of water.
And, Xn many of the conflicts we may face in the future, we 1 may
not have the luxury of matching manpower with pre-positioned
materiel. That will require air and sea-lift capacities at the
very least equal to if not more cápable than those we possess
to get our Forces where they are needed when they
today # are needed. A new emphasis on Flexibility and
versatility should guide our efforts now that the
European Central Front no longer A so dominates our planning
3
Finally, as we restructure, we must adjust
the readiness levels of our total Force. For those
active Forces we will rely on to respond to crises,
readiness will of Our highest priority
- // True military capability never exists on paper -
-it is measured in the hours spent, and experience gained, on the
training ground, under sail, and in the cockpit. Nothing is more
short-sighted than cutting training time to cut costs -- and
nothing is. more demoralizing for our troops than to deny them the
training time they need. // Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and
marines must be well-trained, tried and tested -- ready to
perform every mission we ask of them. //
In our restructured Forces, reserves will be
important, but in now ways. The need to be prepared
-- that so long dominated 30/ planning
For a massive, short-notire mobilization ^ has diminished.
we can now adjust both the size and readines,
OF OUI reserve Force, to help US deal with the more
likely challenges we will Face.
10
Our strategy will guard against a major reversal in Soviet
intentions by incorporating into our planning the concept of
national regeneration of our forces -- a concept significantly
different from our concept of mobilization over the past 40
years. By the mid-90s, the much longer notice we can expect of
any return to the levels of confrontation that marked the Cold
War will allow us to plan to rely not just on existing forces but
to generate wholly new forces. This explicit determination to
remain ready to rebuild our forces will be an important element
in our ability to deter.
A rational restructuring of the kind I've outlined will take
five years. And I am confident we can meet the challenges I've
outlined today -- provided we proceed with an orderly build-down
-- not a fire sale. Any build-down of this magnitude must be
managed carefully to minimize dislocations -- not just to the
military balance, but to morale. And I can say right now, as
Commander-in-Chief, that I will not break faith with the young
men and women who have freely chosen to serve their country. 11
we will take every step possible to minimize the turbulence
these changes will rreate For our soldiers, sailors, airmun
and marines Let me tell you that your President,
the American people, and indead people the world
over
know of your contribution to Freedom
All of us know the challenges we face are fiscal, as well as
military. / The budget constraints we face are very real -- but
so too is the need for a strong and secure America. The simple
fact is: when it comes to national security, America can never
afford to fail or fall short. 111
Let me say once again how pleased I am to appear here today
-- especially with our honored friend, Mrs. Thatcher. / Today,
of course, is not the first time President and Prime Minister
have shared the stage. That was 44 years ago -- in Fulton,
Missouri. 11 Mrs. Thatcher, the world remembers the address
Churchill delivered that day as the "Iron Curtain" speech. /
But that wasn't what he called it. He titled it / "The Sinews of
Peace." // By that, he meant to summon up a vision of the
strength of free nations -- united in defense of democracy. 11
At long last, we are writing the final chapter of the 20th
Century's third great conflict. The Cold War is now drawing to a
close. / A
But, in a world marked by rapid change and continuing
uncertainty, we will not repeat the historical error of massive
demobilization, nor take fleeting comfort in a false sense of
insularity. We are forging a strategy, -- a strategy suited to
both the opportunities and challenges before us,
SENT BY:The TICKET CENTER
; 7-31-90 ; 8:53AM ; LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS-
2024566218;# 1
RCD.
CLOSE HOLD SENSITIVE
No. 1626235S
4:50pm
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
90 JUL 30 P9: 07
DATE: 7/30/90
7/31 /30/90 3:00 PM
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ASPEN INSTITUTF
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MCCLURE
SUNUNU
NEWMAN
SCOWCROFT
PORTER
DARMAN
ROGICH
CARD
UNTERMEYER
CICCONI
ROGERS
DEMAREST
WINSTON
FITZWATER
GRAY
HAGIN
HOLIDAY
REMARKS:
Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122,
x2930, no later than 3:00 PM, Tuesday, July 31, with a copy
to
my office. Thank you.
RESPONSE:
No Comment 7/30/90
James W. Cicconi
CLOSE HOLD SENSITIVE
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702
McGroarty/Dooley
July 30, 1990
3:30 pm
[ASPEN]
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
ASPEN, COLORADO
AUGUST 2, 1990
5:30 P.M.
[Introductory acknowledgements: Aspen officials, alumni.
Prime Minister Thatcher, Ambassador Catto.] I am delighted to
celebrate with you the 40th anniversary of the illustrious Aspen
Institute. //
In those 40 years, the spirit of Aspen has come to signify
the attempt to bridge the worlds of thought and action. // And
of course, to understand the tremendous changes taking place
around us. / Think back to the headlines 40 years ago, the
summer of that first Aspen conference in 1950. / North Korea
roared across the 38th parallel. Klaus Fuchs was caught and
convicted for revealing the secrets of the atom bomb to the
Soviets. The Cold War -- a term introduced into our political
vocabulary by Bernard Baruch -- had come into its own, as the
shorthand to describe the half-way house of an armed and uneasy
peace -- a world divided, East from West. /
That was the world as Aspen came into being -- the world
Aspen sought to study, and to shape. //
The forty years since then have been a time of tremendous
progress -- for the nations of the West, an era of unparalleled
prosperity, peace and freedom. / But at the same time, we lived
in a constant condition of tension, Cold War and conflict. //
2
That world is now changing. 11 The decades-old division of
Europe is now ending -- and the era of democracy-building has
begun. In Germany -- the divided nation in the heart of a
divided continent -- unity is now assured, as a free and full
member of the NATO alliance. / The Soviet Union itself is in
the midst of a political and economic transformation that has
brought unprecedented openness -- and begun a process of change
that is at once full of hope, and full of uncertainty. //
This change has had an undeniable impact on national
security strategy as well. / The threat of a large-scale land
war -- a Soviet invasion of Western Europe launched with little
or no warning -- is today more remote than at any point in the
post-war period. / With the emergence of democracy in Eastern
Europe, the Warsaw Pact has lost its military meaning -- and
after more than four decades of dominance, Soviet troops are
beginning to withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe. /
But the fact remains for all these positive changes that the
Soviet Union remains a world-class military power. Even after
the conventional arms reductions we are now negotiating, the
Soviets will continue to maintain 2 to 3 million men under arms -
- a force far larger than any other nation in Europe. / And of
course, our number one concern: in spite of severe economic
hardship, the Soviets continue to maintain and modernize their
arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. 11
We and our allies welcome the new course the Soviet Union
has chosen. / But prudence demands that we maintain an
3
effective deterrent -- one that secures the peace not only in
today's climate of reduced tensions, but provides a safeguard
against any future reversal from the Soviet Union's present,
positive course. [[NSC INSERT ON STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION. ]]
Above all, we cannot mistake the great gains democracy has
made this past year as proof that America's work in the world is
complete. // All of us agree that never before in the post-war
era has the likelihood of global war been lower. And yet, for
all the distance we have travelled from the depths of the Cold
War, we must also recognize that we have not yet entered an era
of perpetual peace. //
What we require now is a policy that adapts to the
significant changes we've witnessed -- without neglecting the
enduring realities that will continue to shape our security
strategy. // A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as
constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals
in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War. // A
policy that recognizes that our enemy is instability -- and that
a strong America must remain a force for stability in the world.
11
As long as the United States remains a nation with global
interests -- we must maintain a global balance. / American
interests in Europe and the Pacific -- the enduring reality of
Soviet power -- all are key reasons why maintaining a forward
presence will remain an indispensable element of our strategy.
4
For instance -- while we may well change our present
operating procedures and patterns of deployment -- no amount of
political change will alter the geographical fact that the U.S.
must remain a maritime power. //
And the U.S. will keep a force in Europe as long as our
allies believe our presence contributes to stability. / The
size and shape of those forces will change, to suit the new and
less threatening circumstances -- and to adapt to a new political
climate that calls for forces organized along multinational
lines. But for the sake of stability, the overall capability of
U.S. forces in Europe will remain substantial. //
In addition to these enduring security interests, America
must possess forces capable of responding to emerging threats in
corners of the globe that may not at present seem to pose great
danger. / In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies, more nations
are acquiring weapons of mass destruction -- and the means to
deliver them. / Right now, over 100 countries have cruise
missiles. 20 countries have the capacity to produce chemical
weapons. And by the year 2000, as many as 15 nations will
possess ballistic missiles. // In the future, even conflicts we
once thought of as regional may carry far-reaching consequences.
In this past year, democracy has indeed made great gains.
But our world remains one where radicalism, fanaticism, and a
destructive form of nationalism continue to breed violence and
terror -- aggression and instability. / In a world of renegade
5
regimes and unpredictable rulers -- the U.S. must stand with its
allies in defense of our democratic values. ///
Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to the
changing strategic circumstances I've just spoken of. / We know
that our forces will be smaller. / Secretary Cheney and General
Powell are hard at work determining the precise size and
composition of the forces we need. But I can tell you now, when
all the calculations are complete -- when all our roles and
missions are reviewed -- we will be looking at a military force
that, within five years, will be 25% smaller than today's. 11
What matters is how we reshape the forces that remain. The
United States would be ill-served by forces that represent
nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the
ones we possess at present. We could easily end up with more
than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely -- and
less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. / What we
need are not merely reductions -- but restructuring.
This restructuring must emphasize three key components
essential to sustain American security: To cope with the full
range of challenges we may confront, we must focus on readiness
and rapid response -- and to prepare today to meet the challenges
we may face in the future, we must focus on research -- an active
and inventive program of defense R&D. //
Let me begin with the component with the greatest long-
range consequences -- research. Time and again, we have seen
technology revolutionize the battlefield. / The U.S. has always
6
relied upon its technological edge to offset the need to match
potential adversaries' strength in numbers. / Cruise missiles,
Stealth fighters and bombers, today's "smart" weapons with state-
of-the-art guidance systems, and tomorrow's "brilliant" ones --
all of these and more will be a necessary part in prevailing in
any future conflict -- and at the same time, saving lives. 11
We must realize the heavy price we will pay if we look for
false economies in defense R&D. Most modern weapons systems take
a minimum of 10 years to move from the drawing board to the
battlefield. / The decisions we make today -- the programs we
push forward, or push aside -- will dictate the kind of military
forces we have at our disposal in the year 2000 -- and beyond.
// The nature of national defense demands that we plan now for
threats on the distant horizon. //
Second, as we restructure, we must put a premium on
readiness. // True military capability never exists on paper -
-it is measured in the hours spent, and experience gained, on the
training ground, under sail, and in the cockpit. Nothing is more
short-sighted than cutting training time to cut costs -- and
nothing is more demoralizing for our troops than to deny them the
training time they need. // Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and
marines must be well-trained, tried and tested -- ready to
perform every mission we ask of them. //
In our restructured forces, reserves will continue to play a
special role. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-term
mobilization has diminished -- along with the threat of Soviet
7
aggression. Instead of measuring warning time in terms of days
and weeks as we were forced to do for the past 40 years -- by the
mid-90's, we expect much longer notice of any return to the
levels of confrontation that existed in the depths of the Cold
War: signs that we could recognize at least one to two years
before the outbreak of aggression. // Today we must focus on
the capacity to reconstitute our forces -- to rebuild essential
capabilities -- in a time of increased instability.
Finally, we must focus on rapid response. As we saw most
recently in OPERATION JUST CAUSE, the U.S. may be called on to
respond to threats from various points on the compass. In an era
when threats may well emerge without warning, our ability to
defend our interests will depend on our speed and agility.
In many of the conflicts we may face in the future, we will
not have the luxury of matching manpower with pre-positioned
materiel. That will require air and sea-lift capacities at the
very least equal to if not more capable than those we possess
today. //
A rational restructuring of the kind I've outlined will take
five years. And I am confident we can meet the challenges I've
outlined today -- provided we proceed with an orderly build-down
-- not a fire sale. Any build-down of this magnitude must be
managed carefully to minimize dislocations -- not just to the
military balance, but to morale. And I can say right now, as
Commander-in-Chief, that I will not break faith with the young
men and women who have freely chosen to serve their country. //
8
All of us know the challenges we face are fiscal, as well as
military. / The budget constraints we face are very real -- but
so too is the need for a strong and secure America. The simple
fact is: when it comes to national security, America can never
afford to fail or fall short. ///
Let me say once again how pleased I am to appear here today
-- especially with our honored friend, Mrs. Thatcher. / Today,
of course, is not the first time President and Prime Minister
have shared the stage. That was 44 years ago -- in Fulton,
Missouri. // Mrs. Thatcher, the world remembers the address
Churchill delivered that day as the "Iron Curtain" speech. /
But that wasn't what he called it. He titled it / "The Sinews of
Peace." 11 By that, he meant to summon up a vision of the
strength of free nations -- united in defense of democracy. //
At long last, we are writing the final chapter of the 20th
Century's third great conflict. The Cold War is now drawing to a
close. / And yet today -- as in Churchill's time -- the world
remains divided. For all the millions of men and women who won
their freedom this past year -- there are hundreds of millions
more not yet free. 11
Our challenge today is to overcome this deep division. To
marshall the growing forces of the Free World -- to work to bring
within reach for the unfree the liberty that belongs by right to
all. //
Thank you, and may God bless the United States of America.
# # #
THE ASPEN INSTITUTE 40TH ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM
ASPEN, COLORADO
August 2-5. 1990
RENEWAL: LEADERSHIP AND VALUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
SYMPOSIUM GOALS
The Symposium is designed, on the occasion of the celebration of the
40th Anniversary of The Aspen Institute's first Executive Seminar, to
underscore the continuing, and growing, relevance of the themes that have
distinguished the Institute's programs since 1950:
The role of enlightened private and public sector leadership in
managing domestic and international challenges.
The central importance of the philosophical and ethical values
that have underpinned the democratic institutions and open
societies which, now more than ever, appear as the best and most
hopeful form of human community.
The Symposium aims to make a practical contribution to our
understanding of how these themes can enhance our ability to deal with major
domestic and international challenges that we can foresee in the next 40
years.
PROGRAM OUTLINE
The program of the Symposium will consist of:
Two major addresses, at the beginning and end.
Two plenary sessions, one addressed to major domestic issues and
the second to major international issues that will challenge
leadership and values in the next decade and beyond.
Two sessions in which the participants will break up into
Working Groups to address recommendations for practical action
on the key issues raised in the Symposium. The results of these
group discussions will be reported to a plenary session just before
the closing address.
Page 2
Keynote and Closing Addresses
These will be given by major public figures who will address the overall
themes of the Symposium.
Plenary Session 1: Rebuilding the U.S. National Community
The United States must resolve several major domestic problems if it is
to regain the social cohesion and economic strength to which the U.S. people
aspire, and which are essential if the nation is to continue to play a leadership
role in the world. U.S. society currently lacks the shared values and sense of
common purpose on which the leadership needed to resolve these problems
can be based. The session will address this need for shared values and a
stronger sense of community by reference to three specific issues -- education
and economic competitiveness, the challenges posed by the growing problems
of poverty and a disadvantaged underclass, with special emphasis on minority
communities, and the problem of providing adequate health care for all
Americans. The session will also address the respective roles of federal and
state governments and the private sector in addressing these issues.
Plenary Session 2: Shaping a New Global Community
Even though the major strategic questions of the post-World War II
period have not yet been finally resolved, the outline of the major challenges
to the international community in the coming decades is becoming evident --
the challenge of building democratic societies and market economies on the
ruins of totalitarian systems, the protection of the global environment, and
the problems of economic and social development and their relationship to
population growth. The international community is only starting to measure
the unprecedented demands for international cooperation and restraint that
will be needed to respond to these challenges. The session will discuss these
demands, the resources available in the private and public sectors, in the
United States and abroad, to address these problems, and the role that the
United States and others countries can and should play in guiding the
emergence of a true global community.
Page 3
Working Group Sessions:
Three Working Groups will be convened after each of the plenary
meetings. They will each be assigned one of the following topics:
Domestic Issues:
Education and Economic Competitiveness
Poverty and the Underclass
Health Care
International Issues:
Transforming Post-Communist Societies
Global Environment
Social and Economic Development in the
Developing Countries
Each group will be charged to develop practical proposals for action
that would help to increase the sense of shared values and goals in the
domestic and international communities and stimulate the leadership needed to
respond to emerging challenges.
Plenary Session 3:
At the final plenary session, the chairpersons of the Working Groups
will report on their groups and on their recommendations for action.
July 10, 1990
ASPEN INSTITUTE 40TH ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM
Program Outline
Thursday, August 2, 1990
4:00 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.
Introductory Session: The Aspen Institute at Forty
Chair:
David T. McLaughlin
President, The Aspen Institute
Speakers:
Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado
Michael I. Sovern, President, Columbia University
Mortimer J. Adler, Director, Institute for Philosophical Research
Keynote Address
Speaker:
President George Bush
Friday, August 3, 1990
9:00 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.
Plenary Session 1: Rebuilding the U.S. National Community
Chair:
Bill Moyers
Public Affairs TV
Speakers:
John J. Phelan, Jr., Chairman and CEO, New York Stock Exchange, Inc.
L. Douglas Wilder, Governor, Commonwealth of Virginia
Gloria Molina, Member, Los Angeles City Council
Albert Shanker, President, American Federation of Teachers
Donald E. Petersen, Former Chairman and CEO, Ford Motor Company
Richard D. Lamm, Former Governor of Colorado; Director,
Center for Public and Contemporary Issues,
University of Denver
ASPEN INSTITUTE 40TH ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM
PROGRAM OUTLINE
PAGE 2
Friday, August 3, 1990 (Continued)
2:30 P.M. - 5:30 P.M.
Working Group Sessions: Domestic Issues
Education and Economic Competitiveness
Chair: Ernest Boyer, President, Carnegie Foundation
for the Advancement of Teaching
Speakers:
William P. Hobby, Lt. Governor of Texas
Albert Shanker, President, American Federation
of Teachers
Poverty and the Underclass
Chair: Sol Trujillo, Vice President and General Manager,
US WEST Communications
Speakers:
Mary Jo Bane, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University
Douglas J. Besharov, Director of Social Policy
Studies, American Enterprise Institute
Health Care
Chair: Charles C. Edwards, President, Scripps Clinic and
Research Foundation
Speakers:
David U. Himmelstein, M.D., Chief, Division of Social
and Community Medicine, Cambridge Hospital, Harvard
Medical School
Alain C. Enthoven, Marriner S. Eccles Professor of
Public and Private Management, Graduate School of
Business, Stanford University
ASPEN INSTITUTE 40TH ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM
PROGRAM OUTLINE
PAGE 3
Saturday, August 4, 1990
9:00 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.
Plenary Session 2: Shaping a New Global Community
Chair:
Barbara Walters
ABC News
Speakers:
Paul A. Volcker, Former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System
Ivan Berend, Former President, Hungarian Academy of Science
Ambassador Olara A. Otunnu, President, International Peace Academy
Nafis Sadik, Executive Director, U.N. Fund for Population Activities
Kiichi Miyazawa, Member of Japanese House of Representatives;
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance
Giorgio La Malfa, Secretary, Italian Republican Party
2:30 P.M. - 5:30 P.M.
Working Group Sessions: International Issues
Transforming Post-Communist Societies
Chair: Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Director, Center for Science
and International Affairs, Harvard University
Speakers:
Rita Klimova, Ambassador of Czechoslovakia
Robert Legvold, Director, Harriman Institute for
Advanced Study of the Soviet Union, Columbia
University
Global Environment
Chair: Tim Wirth, U.S. Senator, Colorado
Speakers:
Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Vice President,
World Resources Institute
Thomas G. Schelling, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University
ASPEN INSTITUTE 40TH ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM
PROGRAM OUTLINE
PAGE 4
Saturday, August 4, 1990 (Continued)
Social and Economic Development in the Developing Countries
Chair: Robert S. McNamara, Former President, The World Bank
Speakers:
Barber B. Conable, President, International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development
Sir Shridath Ramphal, Secretary-General of the
Commonwealth
Paul S. Sarbanes, U.S. Senator, Maryland
Sunday, August 5, 1990
8:00 A.M. - 9:30 A.M.
Plenary Session 3: Working Group Reports
Chairs:
Bill Moyers
Public Affairs TV
Barbara Walters
ABC News
Concluding Address
10:00 A.M. - 11:00 A.M.
Chair:
Henry E. Catto, U.S. Ambassador, London
Speaker:
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
July 24, 1990