Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
323152479
label
Arrival Statement--Brussels, Belgium 5/28/89 [OA 6265] [1]
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
323152479
contentType
document
title
Arrival Statement--Brussels, Belgium 5/28/89 [OA 6265] [1]
citationUrl
identifierLocal
13670-008
collections
Records of the White House Office of Speechwriting (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Speech Backup Chronological Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
323152479
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
30abf416d9126467
ocrText
Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
S
S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series:
Speech File Backup Files
Subseries:
Chron File, 1989-1993
OA/ID Number:
13670
Folder ID Number:
13670-008
Folder Title:
Arrival Statement--Brussels, Belgium 5/28/89 [OA 6265] [1]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
26
19
1
4
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 23, 1989
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
DAN MCGROARTY Dur
THROUGH:
CHRISS WINSTON
w
RE:
ARRIVAL STATEMENT - BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
I. SUMMARY
On Sunday, May 28, at 6:00 p.m., you will deliver a
statement after you have arrived in Belgium. You will be greeted
by Belgian Prime Minister Martens.
II. DISCUSSION
The statement discusses the important role Belgium plays in
the Atlantic Alliance, and the opportunities you look forward to
in the course of the NATO discussions.
McGroarty/Dooley
May 23, 1989
6:00 p.m.
Draft 2
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: BRUSSELS ARRIVAL STATEMENT
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
MAY 28, 1989
It is a pleasure to be back once again in Brussels, and I am
especially pleased that my first visit as President of the United
States comes as the nations of NATO celebrate 40 years of
alliance -- and the longest period of peace and freedom Europe
has known in the modern age.
Americans and Belgians share the memories of war and hard-
won peace in this century. Flanders, the Battle of the Ardennes,
Bastogne: those names are part of our history as well as your
own -- part of our shared heritage of freedom, and the sacrifices
it requires.
Belgium -- no stranger to conquest and division --
recognized from the first the importance of alliance in the post-
war world. Today, as permanent home to NATO and the European
Community, Brussels stands at the center of a Europe free, at
peace, and prosperous as never before -- a Europe that is
steadily moving towards a single market, and unprecedented
political and economic opportunities. In Brussels, the signs of
this European renaissance are everywhere.
Belgium has been a good friend and a valued ally -- one that
has always acted with alliance interests in mind. Early in this
decade, Belgium was one of five NATO nations that made the
difficult decision to base INF systems on its soil. Those
deployments gave us the leverage we needed to negotiate the
first-ever arms reduction treaty. That's the kind of courageous
and realistic approach that explains NATO's success. NATO is at
once ready to ensure the common defense, and, when Soviet actions
-- not just words -- warrant it, to reduce arms and seek to
diminish tensions with the East.
I am looking forward to important discussions with King
Baudouin [BOW-DWIN] and the NATO heads of government. I look
forward as well to my meeting with Prime Minister Martens, my
discussions with President Delors of the European Community and
Secretary General Woerner of NATO.
The future of NATO depends on the Alliance's ability to deal
with our enduring security concerns and our evolving economic
relationship. We look to Belgium to continue to play its
important role in our close and cooperative transatlatic
partnership.
Thank you.
# # #
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 1, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF
BOBBIE KILBERG
DAVID BATES
PATTY PRESOCK
RICHARD BREEDEN
LINDA CASEY
ANDREW CARD
ROBERT GUTTMAN
JAMES CICCONI
TIMOTHY MCBRIDE
DAVID DEMAREST
ROSE ZAMARIA
MARLIN FITZWATER
TONY LOPEZ
BOYDEN GRAY
DAVID VALDEZ
FRED MCCLURE
BILLY DALE
BONNIE NEWMAN
JAY ALLISON
ROGER PORTER
BRUCE ZANCA
BRENT SCOWCROFT
LAURIE FIRESTONE
STEVE STUDDERT
CASEY HEALEY
CHASE UNTERMEYER
JEAN LAMB
SUSAN PORTER ROSE
DEB ANDERSON
ED ROGERS
USSS/PPD OPS
JOE HAGIN
WHCA AUDIO/VISUAL
JIM WRAY
WHCA OPERATIONS
CHRISS WINSTON
MEDICAL UNIT
PRESIDENTIAL
DOCUMENTS
THRU:
STEPHEN M. STUDDERT
FROM:
JOHN G. KELLER, JR. JGK
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
DIRECTOR OF PRESIDENTIAL ADVANCE
SUBJECT:
TRIP OF THE PRESIDENT TO ROME, BRUSSELS,
BONN, AND LONDON, MAY 26 - JUNE 1, 1989
For your use and planning purposes, the attached is the
proposed tentative schedule for the Trip of the President to
Western Europe, May 26 - June 1, 1989.
This schedule is subject to change.
DRAFT
DRAFT
Revised
4/28 12:30 pm
SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH
FOR
ROME, ITALY
MAY 26 - 28, 1989
Friday, May 26, 1989
6:45 am (B) Depart White House en route Andrews Air Force
Base.
(Flight Time: 10 Minutes)
6:55 am (B) Arrive Andrews Air Force Base.
7:00 am (B) Depart Andrews Air Force Base en route Rome,
Italy.
(Flight Time: 9 Hours)
(Interchange: Yes)
(Time Change: Ahead 6 Hours)
10:00 pm (B) Arrive Ciampino Airport, Rome, Italy.
(4:00 pm
E.D.T.)
* Possible Greeting by Prime Minister
10:15 pm (B) Depart Airport en route Macao Barracks LZ.
(Flight Time: 15 Minutes)
10:30 pm (B) Arrive Macao Barracks LZ and proceed to
Motorcade.
10:35 pm (B) Depart LZ en route Villa Taverna.
(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)
10:40 pm (B) Arrive Villa Taverna for RON.
DRAFT
Saturday, May 27, 1989
9:05 am
Depart Villa Taverna en route Villa Madama.
(Drive Time: 20 Minutes)
9:25 am
Arrive Villa Madama for Meeting with Prime
Minister De Mita.
* Participants: 3 on 3
10:00 am
Conclude Meeting and begin Expanded Meeting.
* Participants: 6-8 on 6-8
11:40 am
Depart Villa Madama en route Quirnale Palace.
(Drive Time: 20 Minutes)
12:00 noon
Arrive Quirnale Palace for Meeting with President
Cossiga.
*
Participants: 3 on 3
1:15 pm (B) Begin Lunch hosted by President Cossiga.
NOTE: Mrs. Bush will join the President at this
time.
*
No Toast
2:45 pm (B) Depart Quirnale Palace en route Villa Taverna.
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
3:00 pm (B) Arrive Villa Taverna for Private Time.
(Private Time: 1 Hour 45 Minutes)
4:45 pm
Depart Suite and proceed to Reception Room for
Reception hosted by President.
5:30 pm
Conclude Reception.
5:35 pm (B) Depart Villa Taverna en route Vatican.
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
2
DRAFT
5:50 pm
Arrive Vatican, Cortile San Damaso for Brief
Ceremony.
5:55 pm
Departs Cortile San Damaso and proceeds to Papal
Library.
6:00 pm
Arrives Papal Library for Private Audience with
His Holiness Pope John Paul II.
7:00 pm
Concludes Private Audience with His Holiness Pope
John Paul II.
(B) 7:00 pm Mrs. Bush joins Audience.
7:15 pm Other U.S. Party Members join Audience.
7:35 pm
(B)
Depart Papal Library and proceed to Sala
Clementina.
7:40 pm (B)
Arrive Sala Clementina for American Seminary
Greeting.
7:50 pm (B)
Depart Sala Clementina and proceed to Holding
Room.
*
Possible Tour of Chapels for President
7:55 pm (B) Arrive Holding Room.
8:10 pm (B) Depart Holding Room and proceed to Motorcade.
8:15 pm (B) Depart Vatican en route Villa Madama.
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
8:30 pm
(B) Arrive Villa Madama for Dinner hosted by Prime
Minister De Mita.
*
Toast
*
Dark Business Suit
10:20 pm (B) Depart Villa Madama en route Villa Taverna.
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
10:30 pm (B) Arrive Villa Taverna for RON.
3
DRAFT
Sunday, May 28, 1989
8:00 am (B) Depart Villa Taverna en route Macao Barracks LZ.
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
8:10 am (B) Arrive Macao Barracks LZ.
8:20 am (B) Depart LZ en route Nettuno Proving Grounds LZ.
(Flight Time: 25 Minutes)
8:45 am (B) Arrive Nettuno Proving Grounds LZ and proceed to
Motorcade.
8:50 am (B) Depart Nettuno Proving Grounds LZ en route San
Francesco Church.
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
9:00 am (B) Arrive San Francesco Church for Church Service.
9:55 am (B) Depart San Francesco Church en route Sicily-Rome
American Cemetery.
(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)
10:00 am (B) Arrive Sicily-Rome American Cemetery for Ceremony.
11:00 am (B) Depart Sicily-Rome American Cemetery en route LZ.
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
11:10 am (B) Arrive Nettuno Proving Grounds LZ.
11:15 am (B) Depart Nettuno Proving Grounds LZ en route Macao
Barracks.
(Flight Time: 25 Minutes)
11:40 am (B) Arrive Macao Barracks LZ.
11:45 am (B) Depart LZ en route Villa Taverna.
(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)
4
DRAFT
11:50 am (B) Arrive Villa Taverna
12:00 noon (B) Begin Lunch with Prime Minister De Mita.
1:15 pm (B) Conclude Lunch and begin Private Time.
(Private Time: 1 Hour 15 Minutes)
2:30 pm (B) Begin American Embassy Community Greeting.
3:00 pm (B) Depart Villa Taverna en route Macao Barracks LZ.
(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)
3:05 pm (B) Arrive Macao Barracks LZ.
3:10 pm (B) Depart LZ en route Airport.
(Flight Time: 15 Minutes)
3:25 pm (B) Arrive Airport.
3:30 pm (B) Depart Rome, Italy en route Brussels, Belgium.
(9:30 am
E.D.T.)
(Flight Time: 2 Hours 30 Minutes)
(Interchange: Yes)
(Time Change: None)
5
DRAFT
Revised
4/28 12:30 pm
SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH
FOR
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
MAY 28 - 30, 1989
Sunday, May 28, 1989
6:00 pm (B) Arrive Brussels International Airport, Brussels,
(12:00 noon
Belgium.
E.D.T.)
* Met by Prime Minister Martens
* Honor Guard
6:10 pm (B) Depart Airport, accompanied by Prime Minister
Martens, en route Chateau Stuyvenberg.
(Drive Time: 25 Minutes)
6:35 pm (B) Arrive Chateau Stuyvenberg and proceed inside.
6:40 pm
Begin Meeting with Prime Minister Martens.
* Participants: 6-8 on 6-8
7:10 pm
Conclude Meeting with Prime Minister Martens and
proceed to Suite.
7:15 pm
Arrive Suite for RON.
Monday, May 29, 1989
8:40 am
Depart Chateau Stuyvenberg en route NATO
Headquarters.
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
DRAFT
8:55 am
Arrive NATO Headquarters and proceed to Secretary
General's Office.
* Met by NATO Secretary General Woerner
PHOTO OPPORTUNITY
9:00 am
Arrive Secretary General Woerner's Office for
Meeting.
PHOTO OPPORTUNITY
9:30 am
Depart Secretary General's Office and proceed to
Conference Room 16 Foyer.
9:35 am
Arrive Conference Room 16 Foyer for Coffee.
9:45 am
Arrive Conference Room 16 for Opening Ceremony.
OPEN PRESS
10:00 am
Depart Conference Room 16 and proceed to
Conference Room One.
PHOTO OPPORTUNITY (outside Conference Room 16)
10:15 am
Arrive Conference Room One for First Working
Session.
CLOSED PRESS
12:35 pm
Depart Conference Room One and proceed to
Motorcade.
12:40 pm
Depart NATO en route King Baudouin's Downtown
Palace.
(Drive Time: 20 Minutes)
1:00 pm
Arrive King Baudouin's Downtown Palace for Lunch.
2:35 pm
Depart King Baudouin's Downtown Palace en route
NATO Headquarters.
(Drive Time: 20 Minutes)
2:55 pm
Arrive NATO and proceed to Conference Room One.
3:00 pm
Arrive Conference Room One for Second Working
Session.
2
DRAFT
6:00 pm
Depart Conference Room One and proceed to
Motorcade.
6:05 pm
Depart NATO Headquarters en route Chateau
Stuyvenberg.
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
6:20 pm
Arrive Chateau Stuyvenberg for Private Time.
(Private Time: 1 Hour 25 Minutes)
7:45 pm
Depart Chateau Stuyvenberg en route Val Duchesse.
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
8:00 pm
Arrive Val Duchesse for Working Dinner.
10:30 pm
Depart Val Duchesse en route Chateau Stuyvenberg.
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
10:45 pm
Arrive Chateau Stuyvenberg for RON.
Tuesday, May 30, 1989
8:40 am
Depart Chateau Stuyvenberg en route NATO
Headquarters.
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
8:55 am
Arrive NATO Headquarters and proceed to Conference
Room One.
9:00 am
Arrive Conference Room One for Third Working
Session.
11:30 am
Depart Conference Room One and proceed to Holding
Room.
11:35 am
Arrive Holding Room.
(Private Time: 50 Minutes)
12:25 pm
Depart Holding Room and proceed to Luns Press
Theatre.
12:30 pm
Arrive Luns Press Theatre for Press Conference.
3
DRAFT
1:00 pm
Depart Luns Press Theatre and proceed to
Motorcade.
1:05 pm
Depart NATO en route Berlaymont.
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
1:15 pm
Arrive Berlaymont for Meeting with EC President
De Lors.
* Participants: TBD
2:00 pm
Depart Berlaymont en route Brussels American
School.
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
2:15 pm (B) Arrive Brussels American School for Tri-Mission
Embassy Community Greeting.
2:50 pm (B) Depart Brussels American School en route Airport.
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
3:00 pm (B) Arrive Airport and proceed board Air Force One.
3:10 pm (B) Depart Brussels, Belgium en route Bonn, FRG.
(9:10 am
E.D.T.)
(Flight Time: 1 Hour 5 Minutes)
( Interchange: Yes)
(Time Change: None)
Jacques Delors d Pres.
HQ of Commission of EC
Berlaymont Bldg
Delors
Baker Pres. seowersft Fitz
Frano andressen VP
amb Kingon
Ridgeway
Martin Bangemann VP
David Williamson Sec. Gen.
moobaches
Pascal Lamy chet de cabinet
Norst Krenzler Dir. Gen.
Sumunu
DRAFT
Revised
4/28 12:30 pm
SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH
FOR
BONN, WEST GERMANY
MAY 30 - 31, 1989
Tuesday, May 30, 1989
4:15 pm (B) Arrive Bonn/Koln Airport, Bonn, FRG and proceed
(10:15 am
to board Marine One.
E.D.T.)
4:20 pm (B) Depart Airport en route Park LZ.
(Flight Time: 15 Minutes)
4:35 pm (B) Arrive Park LZ.
4:40 pm (B) Depart Park LZ en route Villa Hammerschmidt.
(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)
4:45 pm (B) Arrive Villa Hammerschmidt for Ceremony.
5:00 pm (B) Conclude Ceremony and proceed inside for Meeting
with President Von Weisacker.
* Participants: 5 on 5
5:25 pm (B) Depart Villa Hammerschmidt en route Chancellory.
5:35 pm
Arrive Chancellory for Small Meeting with
Chancellor Kohl.
* Participants: 1 on 1 (?)
6:40 pm
Depart Chancellory en route Ambassador's
Residence.
(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)
6:45 pm
Arrive Ambassador's Residence for Private Time.
(Private Time: 1 Hour 20 Minutes)
DRAFT
8:05 pm (B) Depart Ambassador's Residence en route Redoute
Castle.
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
8:15 pm (B)
Arrive Redoute Castle for Dinner hosted by
Chancellor Kohl.
* Toasts and Remarks
* Black Tie
10:30 pm
(B) Depart Redoute Castle en route Ambassador's
Residence.
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
10:40 pm (B) Arrive Ambassador's Residence for RON.
Wednesday, May 31, 1989
7:45 am
Depart Ambassador's Residence en route Villa
Hammerschmidt.
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
7:55 am
Arrive Villa Hammerschmidt for Breakfast.
9:00 am
Depart Villa Hammerschmidt en route Chancellory.
9:10 am
Arrive Chancellory for continued Talks with
Chancellor Kohl.
10:10 am
Depart Chancellory en route Sussmuth Residence.
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
10:20 am
Arrive Sussmuth Residence for Youth Program.
10:45 am
Depart Sussmuth Residence en route American Club.
(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)
10:50 am (B)
Arrive American Club for American Embassy
Community Greeting.
2
DRAFT
11:35 am (B) Depart American Club en route Park LZ.
(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)
11:40 am (B) Arrive Park LZ.
11:45 am (B) Depart Park LZ en route Mainz, FRG.
(Flight Time: 40 Minutes)
12:25 pm (B) Arrive LZ, Mainz, FRG.
12:30 pm (B) Depart LZ en route Rheingoldhalle.
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
12:40 pm (B) Arrive Rheingoldhalle for Speech.
1:35 pm (B) Depart Rheingoldhalle en route LZ.
(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)
1:40 pm (B) Arrive LZ.
1:45 pm (B) Depart LZ en route Oberwesel, FRG.
(Flight Time: 20 Minutes)
2:05 pm (B) Arrive Oberwesel, FRG and proceed to Riverboat.
2:15 pm (B) Arrive Riverboat for Ride to Koblenz, FRG.
4:30 pm (B) Arrive Koblenz, FRG and proceed to LZ.
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
4:40 pm (B) Arrive LZ.
4:45 pm (B) Depart LZ en route Rhein-Main Air Force Base.
(Flight Time: 25 Minutes)
5:10 pm (B) Arrive Rhein-Main Air Force Base for Open
Departure.
5:20 pm (B)
Depart Rhein-Main Air Force Base en route London,
(11:20 am
England.
E.D.T.)
(Flight Time: 1 Hour 40 Minutes)
(Interchange: Yes)
(Time Change: Back 1 Hour)
3
DRAFT
Revised
4/28 12:30 pm
SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH
FOR
LONDON, ENGLAND
MAY 31 - JUNE 1, 1989
Wednesday, May 31, 1989
6:00 pm (B) Arrive Heathrow Airport, London, England.
(1:00 pm
E.D.T.)
* Met by: Prime Minister Thatcher
* Honor Guard
6:15 pm (B) Depart Airport en route Winfield House.
* Accompanied by: Prime Minister Thatcher
(Flight Time: 15 Minutes)
6:30 pm (B) Arrive Winfield House for RON.
Thursday, June 1, 1989
10:15 am
Depart Winfield House en route Number 10 Downing
Street.
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
10:30 am
Arrive Number 10 Downing Street for Small Meeting
with Prime Minister Thatcher.
* Participants: 1 on 1
11:30 am
Conclude Small Meeting and begin Expanded Meeting.
* Participants: 4-5 on 4-5
12:40 pm
Depart Number 10 Downing Street en route
Buckingham Palace.
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
DRAFT
12:50 pm (B) Arrive Buckingham Palace for Lunch with Queen
Elizabeth.
* Ceremony
* Participants: 30 - 35
2:30 pm (B) Depart Buckingham Palace en route American
Embassy.
(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)
2:35 pm (B) Arrive American Embassy for Community Greeting.
3:00 pm (B) Depart American Embassy en route Winfield House.
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)
3:10 pm
Arrive Winfield House.
* SCHEDULE TO BE DETERMINED
5:10 pm
Arrive Winfield House for Private Time.
(Private Time: 2 Hours)
7:10 pm
Depart Winfield House en route Number 10 Downing
Street.
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)
7:25 pm
Arrive Number 10 Downing Street for Dinner.
* Toast or Speech ?
* Business Suit
* Participants: 40 - 45
9:30 pm
Depart Number 10 Downing Street en route Heathrow
Airport.
(Drive Time: 40 Minutes)
10:10 pm (B) Arrive Heathrow Airport.
10:30 pm
(B) Depart London, England en route Pease Air Force
(5:30 pm
Base.
E.D.T.)
(Flight Time: 7 Hour 15 Minutes)
(Interchange: Yes)
(Time Change: Back 5 Hours)
2
DRAFT
12:45 am
Arrive Pease Air Force Base and proceed to board
Marine One.
12:50 am
Depart Pease Air Force Base en route
Kennebunkport, Maine.
(Flight Time: 15 Minutes)
1:05 am
Arrive Kennebunkport for RON.
3
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE
2
2ND STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
Proprietary to the United Press International 1989
April 30, 1989, Sunday, BC cycle
ADVANCED-DATE: April 25, 1989, Tuesday, BC cycle
SECTION: Washington News
LENGTH: 1703 words
HEADLINE: The Bush Cabinet: Where the action is
DATELINE: WASHINGTON
KEYWORD: 100-Cabinet
BODY:
The following outlines, in capsule form, the actions of some of the most
active Cabinet department and the problems of others in the Bush
administration's first 100 days.
Agriculture The hottest agriculture-related matter of the administration
technically did not involve the agency, but concerned a ban Bush placed on the
import of Chilean grapes after two grapes were found to be contaminated with
cyanide. The administration generally was praised for its quick response. It
later began a new inspection procedure and imports resumed.
Agriculture Secretary Clayton Yeutter, however, was criticized for being slow
to respond to the public outcry over pesticide residues on food.
Yeutter also scored a modest victory with an agreement that keeps world
agricultural trade reform talks on track. Those negotiations were deadlocked for
four months because of a disagreement between Europe and the United States on
how far to move towards free trade.
Yeutter also expressed interest in changing farm policy to possibly allow the
government to cut farm spending while also giving farmers more freedom in
looking for money-making crops.
However, still ahead are major challenges in the congressional rewriting of
farm policy and in the handling of demands to aid drought-hit farmers. Only two
of the 10 sub-Cabinet posts at the Agriculture Department have been filled.
Defense The Pentagon was stalled for weeks as the administration and
Congress battled over Bush's choice of John Tower as defense secretary. Once
Tower was defeated and Dick Cheney approved, the administration began to outline
priorities in a defense budget that Bush had wanted frozen, but was actually
cut.
Cheney announced that some weapons programs would be slashed and the
administration also would scale back money being spent on the ''Star Wars''
missile defense program.
Bush, who promised to modernize the nation's nuclear arsenal, agreed to a
compromise that would include some MX missiles on railroad cars, favored by
LEXIS® ® NEXIS® LEXIS® ® NEXIS®
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE
3
Proprietary to the United Press International, April 30, 1989
Cheney, with some Midgetman missiles on trucks, favored by Congress.
Toward the end of Bush's 100 days, an explosion in a gun turret aboard the
battleship USS Iowa killed 47 sailors.
Education President Bush stressed in the campaign that he wanted to be
known as the ''education president'' and tried to highlight the issue through
public appearances. He kept President Reagan's education secretary, Lauro
Cavazos, in the post and proposed $441 million worth of new school programs.
Included was $250 million to reward schools showing great progress and another
$7.6 million in teacher awards. However, the plan came under fire from some
Democrats who complained it would take money from other deserving programs in
order to pay for the new initiatives.
Bush also surprised many Republicans when he countered a longstanding GOP
position by saying the government could not afford tuition tax credits for
people who send their children to private schools. He later said he favored the
idea, but could not push it because of budget restraints. HUD Bush's
nomination of energetic former Rep. Jack Kemp, R-N.Y., a conservative darling,
as secretary of Housing and Urban Development was widely hailed by critics who
have long complained the housing issue was being ignored.
In the first 100 days, Kemp kept up a steady stream of concern and
compassionate rhetoric, but the primary policy initiative to date has been aimed
at a smaller but more visible and immediate problem - drug dealing in public
housing complexes. A new Kemp initiative would loosen eviction rules to make it
easier for public housing authorities to rid their projects of drug dealers.
Health and Human Services The administration has moved slowly in this area,
mainly because many of key positions at the agency remain vacant. Health
Secretary Louis Sullivan took office in March after a somewhat rancous
confirmation process in which critics harshly criticized his abortion views.
Bush has been praised for a proposed expansion of Medicaid to help poor
women and infants, but harshly criticized for proposing to reduce Medicare by $5
billion for fiscal year 1990.
Bush also has proposed spending $5 million in Medicaid to immunize
preschool children who are eligible for food stamps. Children up to age 5 would
be able to get immunized simply by having their parents show the clinic a food
stamp card.
One of Bush's major initiatives has been in child care in which the
president has proposed giving low-income families a refundable tax credit of up
to $1,000 per child under age 4. He also proposed increasing funding for the
Head Start program, reducing homelessness with a new $25 million program and
encouraging adoption with $141 million in federal incentives.
Interior, EPA
Bush pleased environmentalists by appointing William Reilly, a
professional environmentalist, as head of the Environmental Protection Agency,
but there is growing concern about the president's commitment to protecting
federal lands.
LEXIS ® NEXIS® LEXIS® ® NEXIS®
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE
4
Proprietary to the United Press International, April 30, 1989
Reilly persuaded Bush to publicly support an accelerated phase-out of
chlorofluorocarbons, chemicals linked to depletion of the Earth's ozone layer.
The administration also won praise from environmentalists for opposing
construction of the Two Forks dam in Colorado. Bush has not yet unveiled his
promised proposal to reduce acid rain, but he has transformed the atmosphere in
Congress, where action now appears likely after eight years of stalemate.
However, environmentalists criticized the appointment of former Rep. Manuel
Lujan, R-N.M., as interior secretary, charging he was too 'pro-development.
The same charges have been raised against nominees to head the Forest Service,
Bureau of Land Management and National Park Service, some of whom worked for
controversial Interior Secretary James Watt in the Reagan administration.
The Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska aggravated Bush's image problems in
this area, especially since he has strongly supported legislation to open
Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil drilling.
Justice Unlike predecessor Edwin Meese, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh
avoided becoming a lightning rod for controversy since taking over the Justice
Department under Reagan last August.
In his handling of the Oliver North Iran-Contra case, the former Pennsylvania
governor demonstrated an agility for eluding the kind of political land mines
that could spoil his own future ambitions. He assented to protests from U.S.
intelligence agencies and, in an effort to protect classified information,
forced Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh to drop the central charges. Yet, he
also refused to block Walsh from prosecuting the other charges, allowing the
trial to go forward and blunting allegations of an administration cover-up.
Thornburgh, one of two Cabinet holdovers from the Reagan administration, has
not entirely dodged controversy. He thrust himself into the center of the
volatile abortion issue, urging that the Supreme Court overturn the 1973 Roe VS.
Wade ruling and let states decide the issue on their own.
He has also focused much energy on the war against drug traffickers.
Labor Bush's first 100 days were marked by two clashes with organized
labor. One, over how much to increase the minimum wage, could also provoke his
first veto fight with Congress. The other involved the strike against Eastern
Airlines.
Bush, under pressure during the campaign, proposed an increase from $3.35
an hour to $4.25 if it were tied to a six-month sub-minimum wage for beginning
workers. But congressional Democrats have pushed for a more substantial increase
of $4.55 an hour, with a 60-day training wage. Bush has promised to kill any
measure that does not conform to his levels. Democrats have vowed to continue to
push their increase until Bush signs it.
In the Eastern strike, the president rejected calls by labor to intervene and
prevent the walkout by ordering a 60-day cooling-off period. Bush also said if
striking machinists employed secondary boycotts he would seek new laws outlawing
them in the transportation industry.
State Unlike some administrations that controlled foreign policy from the
White House, the Bush administration's tone has been set by Secretary of
LEXIS® NEXIS® LEXIS® NEXIS R
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE 5
Proprietary to the United Press International, April 30, 1989
State James Baker, a very close friend of the president. With Baker's flair for
negotiation, the new key word in Foggy Bottom is accommodation - avoiding fights
with Congress over such issues as aid for the Nicaraguan Contra rebels.
So far, Baker has gotten high marks from Congress, which reached a deal with
the administration on humanitarian aid for the Contras. He also has been praised
by Western European governments and has begun an active plan to push the peace
process forward in the Middle East. One rumble of discontent comes from Israel,
and some its supporters in Congress, who fear Baker is putting too much pressure
on the Israelis to come to terms with the Palestine Liberation Organization.
The other rumbles, still like distant thunder, come from diverse sources:
foreign service officers and some allies who feel neglected.
Treasury In the Treasury Department, Bush did two things very early that
the Reagan administration avoided: drafting one plan to rescue hundreds of
ailing savings and loans and another to ease the burden of debt on Third World
nations.
The $157 billion thrift rescue received generally positive reviews, even
though taxpayers would have to foot much of the bill over 10 years. The Senate
approved a version that was backed by Bush, although the House had yet to act
by the end of Bush's first 100 days.
The debt-relief plan was welcomed as a more realistic approach than previous
policy, but critics hit it for being too little, too late.
On another economic matter, Bush and Congress struck a very early deal on
the federal budget. However, the pact was vague and critics said it used
gimmicks and flawed forecasts to meet deficit-cutting targets without raising
taxes.
Although praised by Bush as a good first step, the pact put off most of the
tough decisions that he and Congress will eventually have to face.
LEXIS® ® NEXIS® ® LEXIS® ® NEXIS ®
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE
6
7TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
Copyright (c) 1989 The Economist
April 29, 1989
SECTION: World politics and current affairs; AMERICAN SURVEY; Pg. 30 (U.K.
Edition Pg. 50)
LENGTH: 573 words
HEADLINE: Defence;
I'll take both
DATELINE: WASHINGTON, DC
BODY:
MR DICK CHENEY, the defence secretary, failed last week to persuade his boss
to abandon the Midgetman missile. So the decision, six years in the making,
about how to modernise America's land-based nuclear missiles has been taken in a
characteristic split-the-difference fashion. President George Bush has
decided to settle for neither his predecessor's rail-mobile MX, nor Congress's
road-mobile Midgetman. He wants both.
The defence budget Mr Cheney sent to Congress this week proposes to put the
existing 50 MSx on rail cars by 1992 (at a cost of $ 5.4 billion) and to build
no more. Mr Cheney has pledged to build and deploy between 250 and 500
single-warhead Midgetmen by 1997, two years later than would be achieved If work
began immediately, at a cost of at least $ 25 billion. Mr Les Aspin, chairman
of the House Armed Services Committee, says that congress will accept that
compromise.
Mr Cheney's new budget is not a bold document. His task was to adjust the
Reagan budget, which proposed 2% real growth this year, for President George
Bush's promises ---- first of zero real growth and then (in a deal with
Congress) of a $ 3.7 billion cut. So Mr Cheney has cut $ 10 billion from the
Reagan budget for fiscal 1990 and $ 9.9 billion from 1991. Instead of any big
bites, he chose to nibble around the edges. He plans to cancel only one big
programme, the V-22 or Osprey, a creature born of the unlawful union between a
helicopter and an aeroplane, and popular in the Marine Corps as a way of getting
from ship to shore without getting your feet wet.
Mr Cheney's biggest cut comes in the Strategic Defence Initiative, which will
get $ 4.6 billion, $ 1 billion less than Mr Reagan proposed in January. Over
four years he would give $ 33 billion to SDI instead of $ 40 billion. He could
justify this, if he wanted to, by saying that he is restoring deterrence by
making missiles mobile rather than striving to make deterrence obsolete. But
this would anger SDI's fervent apostles on the right, 50 Mr Cheney chose to wax
lyrical instead about "brilliant pebbles", a scheme for filling the sky with
10,000 little rockets equipped with tiny computers and designed to seek out
incoming missiles. It has the advantage over previous SDI schemes of being
cheaper, and the disadvantage of being, 50 far, mainly a dream in the
ever-fertile mind of Mr Edward Teller.
Mr Cheney slipped away from another cherished goal of the Reagan
administration, that of having 15 aircraft-carrier battle groups in the Navy, by
planning to retire the USS Coral Sea in 1990, earlier than planned. He will
LEXIS® ® NEXIS® ® LEXIS® NEXIS
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE
7
(c) 1989 The Economist, April 29, 1989
reduce the number of troops in the army by 7,900, or 1%. The remainder of his
cuts come from stretching out the costs of programmes over more years, something
begun under his predecessor. The Stealth bomber will yield $ 1 billion in
fiscal 1990 from a year's postponement and small savings come from slowing down
the rate at which Apache helicopters, anti-submarine aircraft, surface-to-air
missiles and coastal mine-hunting ships are acquired.
Some of these cuts will hurt. Grumman, which builds the Osprey and the F-14D
navy fighter, whose production will cease, is especially hard hit. Several
congressmen are prepared to do battle on its behalf. And yet Mr Cheney has done
little more than postpone inevitable decisions. Coming late to the job, he had
little time. He promises more interesting changes next year.
GRAPHIC: Illustration, no caption
LEXIS® ® NEXIS® ® LEXIS® ® NEXIS ®
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE
8
17TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
The Associated Press
The materials in the AP file were compiled by The Associated Press. These
materials may not be republished without the express written consent of The
Associated Press.
April 27, 1989, Thursday, PM cycle
SECTION: Washington Dateline
LENGTH: 605 words
HEADLINE: Missile Deal Has Opponents from Both Parties
BYLINE: By DONNA CASSATA, Associated Press Writer
DATELINE: WASHINGTON
KEYWORD: Congress-ICBM
BODY:
Lawmakers are predicting a fight over President Bush's proposal to develop
two kinds of land-based nuclear missiles and are targeting the committee
chairman who helped work out the deal without consulting colleagues.
House Democrats who support the Midgetman missile on Wednesday called the
Bush proposal a "sucker play" that will ultimately use financial constraints
to eliminate the single-warhead missile they support. Under the plan, a
10-warhead, rail-mobile MX missile would be deployed first.
But both supporters and opponents were upset with House Armed Service
Committee Chairman Les Aspin's failure to consult with them on what they
considered a deal between the White House and the chairmen of the Armed Services
panels - Aspin in the House and Sam Nunn, D-Ga., in the Senate.
"It is not a rebellion," Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., said after a meeting
Aspin held with about a dozen House Democrats. "It is a reminder to him that he
was never authorized to make this kind of deal."
The two-missile plan is putting Frank in the position of supporting the MX,
which liberal Democrats have opposed in the past, in order to avoid supporting
two mobile systems.
Rep. Les AuCoin, D-Ore., said the meeting became a bit testy when members
pointed out that "consultation is different than notification." The Oregon
Democrat said his colleagues left "a reminder card."
The genesis of the MX - Midgetman plan is Defense Secretary Dick Cheney's
original recommendation to move the nation's 50 MX missiles from silos to
deployment on railroad cars rather than developing the Midgetman.
But President Bush chose quick deployment of the MX and
research-and-development funding for the Midgetman.
LEXIS® ® NEXIS® ® LEXIS® ® NEXIS®
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE
9
The Associated Press, April 27, 1989
The Pentagon budget calls for $$1.2 billion funding in fiscal 1990 for the
MX and $$100 million on the Midgetman.
"If you go through with those figures you might as well kiss the Midgetman
missile good-bye," said Rep. Nicholas Mavroules, D-Mass.
"It's really a one-missile package," said AuCoin, who charged that
"sequencing MX first is just a sucker play."
Aspin, chairman since 1985, said he spoke for himself in discussions on the
MX and Midgetman missiles. "I was talking from my own point of view and what
was necessary to get through in the House," he said.
At the House Armed Services hearing with Cheney, Aspin sought assurances that
the Midgetman missile would not be squeezed out and suggested possible
legislation to ensure development of the strategic weapon.
Aspin also argued that the two land-based missiles are necessary as a
bargaining chip for U.S. arms control negotiators dealing with the Soviet Union.
"This issue of getting a consensus on where we go on land-based missiles is
fundamental to whether we get a START agreement," said Aspin, who told reporters
he raised that point after Frank left the meeting.
Frank said he had consulted with Republicans Vin Weber of Minnesota, Newt
Gingrich of Georgia and Joseph McDade of Pennsylvania about defeating the
Midgetman.
"I think Les (Aspin) miscalculated the extent to which the Democrats will
fall in line," Frank said. "And President Bush miscalculated Republicans
falling in line to support the Cheney plan."
Weber, who called the plan to fund Midgetman a "bad decision,' said
budgetary constraints and demands of various domestic programs may force the
hand of many lawmakers.
"While there has been debate in the House over MX VS. Midgetman that
debate has mainly taken place just among the defense intelligentsia of the
Congress," Weber said. "The problem among the rank-and-file membership has been
increasing hostility to defense spending."
LEXIS® ® NEXIS® LEXIS® NEXIS®
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE 10
24TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
Copyright (c) 1989 The Washington Post
April 27, 1989, Thursday, Final Edition
SECTION: OPINION EDITORIAL; PAGE A22
LENGTH: 548 words
HEADLINE: Mr. Cheney's First Budget
BODY:
THE BUSH administration's first defense budget takes some useful steps
toward the greater discipline and leaner programs that sound military and fiscal
policy both require. Major decisions are left unmade, but this may not be a
propitious time to make them. Not only is the secretary, Dick Cheney, still too
new. Negotiations aimed at reducing conventional forces in Europe have just
begun, while strategic arms control talks with the Soviets and further budget
talks with Congress both lie ahead. The context for defense budget decisions is
unusually unsettled.
At the strategic level, Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney want the Air Force to
improve the new weapons -- MX missile, B-1 bomber it already has. The MX
would be made rail-mobile, the B-1 merely made to work. A second missile, the
Midgetman, and a second bomber, the B-2 or Stealth, both of which would be
extremely costly, would be put on varying degrees of hold. The Stealth
particularly needs to be rethought, now that the B-1 has been built. The
Strategic Defense Initiative programs would likewise be scaled back and somewhat
better focused. All told, a kind of holding pattern.
The new budget would also abandon the never-affordable window-dressing of a
600-ship Navy led by 15 carrier battle groups. Some older ships would be retired
earlier than previously planned, and the carrier battle group goal reset at 14.
One quick effect would be to reduce the pressure on the Navy to buy more
aircraft. For the rest, Mr. Cheney would begin to close out this generation of
weapons to pave the way for the next. He would stop buying the current model of
attack submarine, the latest versions of the Air Force F-15 and Navy F-14
fighters and the Army's Apache attack helicopter. Instead the Navy would go
straight to a new model of attack sub, the Navy and Air Force to the advanced
ATF and ATA tactical aircraft they have been developing and the Army to the
futuristic LHX or light helicopter experimental that has been its goal.
The problem is that all these systems, plus the two strategic weapons on
hold, still won't fit within the likely future budget. Mr. Cheney did sturdily
propose to kill one major weapon from this next generation, the V-22 or Osprey
tilt-rotor aircraft the Marine Corps wanted to ferry troops to shore. The
secretary rightly said the cost of roughly $ 25 billion wasn't worth it. The
Osprey's advocates on the armed services committees quickly protested. But the
secretary has many more such decisions ahead of him if he is to bring military
policy and fiscal policy into synch.
What Congress needs to do now is to help instead of hinder Mr. Cheney. The
help should take two forms. The first is to maintain broad fiscal discipline on
both the administration's instincts and Congress' own. The budget should be held
relatively steady in real terms, not increased as the services would like it to
be but not used as a savings-and-loan to finance domestic spending programs,
LEXIS® NEXIS® ® LEXIS® NEXIS®
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE 11
(c) 1989 The Washington Post, April 27, 1989
either. The second is not to second-guess overmuch. Mr. Cheney is not going to
put national security at risk. If he wants and has the guts to kill the Osprey,
let him. The problem has never been that secretaries made too many such
decisions, but too few. For a man in just his sixth week on the job, Mr. Cheney
is doing fine.
TYPE: EDITORIAL
SUBJECT: BUDGET; ARMED FORCES; WEAPONS SYSTEMS
ORGANIZATION: DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
NAME: RICHARD B. CHENEY
LEXIS® ® NEXIS® ® LEXIS® ® NEXIS® ®
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE
12
37TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
Copyright (c) 1989 The Washington Post
April 26, 1989, Wednesday, Final Edition
SECTION: FIRST SECTION; PAGE A1
LENGTH: 1206 words
HEADLINE: Cheney Outlines $ 10 Billion In 'Painful' Defense Cuts;
Joint Chiefs Endorse Plan-With a Warning
BYLINE: George C. Wilson, Washington Post Staff Writer
BODY:
Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney yesterday outlined to the House Armed
Services Committee $ 10 billion in "very, very painful" budget cuts for next
year that he said represent "a fundamental shift in direction" in arming the
nation.
Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, endorsed
the lowered budget but warned in the bluntest terms since becoming the nation's
top military officer in 1985 that in the view of the leaders of the Army, Navy,
Air Force and Marine Corps the downward path of funding is uncomfortably risky
to the nation's defense capability.
"I would vastly prefer a dollar figure that would permit us to keep our
current force structure, without sacrificing quality, until we have a clearer
understanding of where the Soviet Union is going, of the arms reduction calculus
and of the international climate," Crowe said. "In my judgment, there are too
many uncertainties on the horizon at this time to justify force cuts."
Cheney cut both manpower and weapons in reducing President Ronald Reagan's
fiscal 1990 budget request from $ 305.6 billion to $ 295.6 billion, not counting
money the Energy Department contributes for nuclear warheads. Since not all the
money Congress appropriates will be spent at once, the cuts will reduce spending
from Reagan's projected $ 293.8 billion in fiscal 1990 to $ 289.8 billion.
Cheney's former colleagues focused on the decisions he made to achieve the $
10 billion reduction rather than on the question of the total amount of cuts,
since the House and Senate budget committees had dictated the lower defense
budget.
His intention to cancel the Marines' V22 Osprey troop-carrying plane and halt
production of the Navy's F14D fighter appeared to cause the most heartburn among
members of the hawkish House Armed Services Committee.
Committee Chairman Les Aspin (D-Wis.) told a reporter midway through the
hearing that Cheney "is in trouble" on those and other cancellations. A number
of lawmakers were vowing to reverse some of Cheney's decisions on cuts as the
defense authorization bill wends its way through the legislative mill.
Yesterday's hearing was the opening skirmish.
Even though $ 2.5 billion has already been spent on the Osprey, Cheney said
its mission of carrying Marines from ships to shore was too "narrow" to justify
the $ 27 billion it would cost to build the planned fleet of 602 planes. He
LEXIS® NEXIS® ® LEXIS® ® NEXIS®
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE 13
(c) 1989 The Washington Post, April 26, 1989
said Marines could be flown to shore in existing helicopters. Crowe endorsed the
cancellation. With propeller engines that tilt, the Osprey is designed to take
off and land like a helicopter, but fly horizontally at a conventional plane's
speed. The aircraft has made several hovering test flights, but has not
completed full flight trials.
As for the F14D, the defense secretary said that 50 few - 12 a year --- would
be built under the inherited Reagan budget that each aircraft would cost about $
75 million. Given budget restraints, Cheney contended, it makes more sense to
stop building new versions of the swing-wing twin-engined Tomcat and renovate
existing models instead. The renovation work would be done at the Grumman Corp.
plants on Long Island.
"You are putting Grumman out of business!" declared Rep. George J.
Hochbrueckner (D-N.Y.), in a protest that typifies the political pressure
Cheney's cuts have generated.
Although Congress is focusing on the fiscal 1990 budget, Cheney was obligated
to present a two-year defense budget covering fiscal 1990 and 1991. He disclosed
that he intends to make these additional economies over the two fiscal years:
Army. Deactivate one mechanized brigade of the 4th Infantry Division at Fort
Carson, Colo., as part of cutting the active-duty force of 772,000 men and women
by 8,000 people; cancel the new version of the 0H58 helicopter known as AHIP
(Army helicopter improvement program) and halt production of the AH64 Apache
attack helicopter at the close of 1991; cancel the M88 vehicle designed to tow
broken-down tanks.
Navy. Retire the aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea; build one rather than two
Los Angeles-class attack submarines; transfer four frigates of the 1052-class
from the active fleet to the reserves in fiscal 1990 and four in 1991; retire 33
old destroyers, 11 in 1990, 11 in 1991 and the rest later; retire 73 P3
antisubmarine aircraft and reduce active-duty manpower by 6,000 people.
Air Force. Slow development of the B2 Stealth bomber by one year to redress
technical problems; halt production of the F15 fighter with the 1991 buy;
transfer the National Aerospace Plane to the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration; retire WC130 aircraft used to plot hurricanes; cut 3,200 people
from the active-duty payroll.
Strategic Defense Initiative. Reduce Reagan's request from $ 5.6 billion to $
4.6 billion. Cheney said the Pentagon will focus on "brilliant pebbles, a
defense consisting of rings of orbiting rockets that could be directed to
destroy incoming warheads by collisions, not explosives.
In discussing these and other cuts, Cheney said he had decided it was
preferable to cancel programs outright "rather than go back to the hollow forces
of the 1970s." He said there was no way to squeeze $ 10 billion out of the
fiscal 1990 budget without "breaking some china, stepping on some toes."
In defending the administration's decision to lower the national goal of 15
carrier battle groups to 14, Cheney said he would not ask the Navy, with fewer
ships, to patrol the same areas of the world as it does now. Instead, he said,
the Navy would go into such areas as the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf less
often than it has in the past, barring emergencies.
LEXIS® ® NEXIS® LEXIS® ® NEXIS
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE 14
(c) 1989 The Washington Post, April 26, 1989
Crowe called this willingness to tailor commitments to forces available
"extremely significant. I agree with the secretary 100 percent that we can
adjust our deployment" and still have the Navy fleet cover the world's hot
spots.
Aspin sought assurances that the Midgetman missile would not be squeezed
out of the Pentagon budget if Congress went along with Bush's proposal to put
the existing 50 MX missiles on rails first and build the small missile later.
Cheney said this was not the administration's intention. The Midgetman under
Bush's plan would receive $ 100 million in fiscal 1989; $ 100 million in 1990;
$ 200 million in 1991; $ 250 million in 1992; $ 300 million in 1993, and $ 350
million in 1994.
If Congress appropriates the money, the 10-warhead MX could be mobile by
1992 and the first single-warhead Midgetman missiles would be deployed by
1995, Cheney said. He added that the administration plans to build between 250
and 500 Midgetmen.
Rep. Andy Ireland (R-Fla.) told Cheney that the Reagan five-year defense plan
he inherited would cost $ 45 billion more to implement than there was in the
Reagan budget, charging the failure to match the blueprint with money available
was "deceptive accounting."
Cheney replied that he understood the $ 45 billion shortfall listed in the
secret part of the Pentagon budget was a planning assumption, not a deceitful
practice, that defense programs would cost about 2 percent less a year than
projected. "If it's not a valid assumption, if it's dead wrong," said Cheney of
the $ 45 billion planning wedge, "we won't use it."
GRAPHIC: ILLUSTRATION, DEFENSE SECRETARY RICHARD B. CHENEY TESTIFYING ON BUDGET
PLAN YESTERDAY AT HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING. MICHAEL DREW; PHOTO,
JAMES K.W. ATHERTON
TYPE: NATIONAL NEWS
SUBJECT: WEAPONS SYSTEMS; BUDGET; ARMED FORCES
ORGANIZATION: DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
NAME: RICHARD B. CHENEY; WILLIAM J. CROWE JR.
LEXIS® ® NEXIS® ® LEXIS® NEXIS®
McGroarty/Dooley
May 23, 1989
6:00 p.m.
Draft 2
PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: BRUSSELS ARRIVAL STATEMENT
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
MAY 28, 1989
It is a pleasure to be back once again in Brussels, and I am
especially pleased that my first visit as President of the United
States comes as the nations of NATO celebrate 40 years of
alliance -- and the longest period of peace and freedom Europe
has known in the modern age.
Americans and Belgians share the memories of war and hard-
1918,1940
pp.142-1114
Encyclopedia
won peace in this century. Flanders the Battle of the Ardennes,
of Military
p.1113
p.485.pp.1059-1062
Bastogne: those names are part of our history as well as your
History
own -- part of our shared heritage of freedom, and the sacrifices
Supur R.Ernest Treve
it requires.
Belgium -- no stranger to conquest and division --
Harpert bupuy
recognized from the first the importance of alliance in the post-
war world. Today, as permanent home to NATO and the European
Community, Brussels stands at the center of a Europe free, at
peace, and prosperous as never before -- a Europe that is
steadily moving towards a single market, and unprecedented
political and economic opportunities. In Brussels, the signs of
this European renaissance are everywhere.
Belgium has been a good friend and a valued ally -- one that
has always acted with alliance interests in mind. Early in this
decade, Belgium was one of five NATO nations that made the
difficult decision to base INF systems on its soil. Those
deployments gave us the leverage we needed to negotiate the
first-ever arms reduction treaty. That's the kind of courageous
and realistic approach that explains NATO's success. NATO is ato
once ready to ensure the common defense, and, when Soviet actions
-- not just words -- warrant it, to reduce arms and seek to
diminish tensions with the East.
I am looking forward to important discussions with King
Baudoin and the NATO heads of government. I look forward as well
to my meeting with Prime Minister Martens, my discussions with
President Delors of the European Community and Secretary General
Woerner of NATO.
The future of NATO depends on the Alliance's ability to deal
with our enduring security concerns and our evolving economic
relationship. We look to Belgium to continue to play its
important role in our close and cooperative transatlatic
partnership.
Thank you.
# # #
MAY 22 '89 11:57
PAGE. 01
1 of 4
FAX
From Washington:
WHITE HOUSE ADVANCE OFFICE
Fax no. 395-2000-ask operator for
Brussels, Belgium
5516 (dial tone) 218
(WH 5516 (tone) 218
From Belgium:
217-0579, ext 21
DATE 5-22-89
FAX 202-456-6218
TEL
TO:
PEGGY
FROM:
ANDREA RAIFORD
SUBJECT:
Please pass attached message to above addressee as soon as possible.
Thank you.
MAY 22 '89 11:57
PAGE. 02
May 20 1:00 pm
VISIT OF PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH
TO
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
May 28-30, 1989
EVENT:
Luncheon with King Baudouin I
DATE:
Tuesday - May 29, 1989
TIME:
12:50 p.m. as 2:35 p.m.
LOCATION:
Royal Palace
Brussels, Belgium
HOST:
King Baudouin I
ATTENDEES:
U.S. Participants
THE PRESIDENT
Belgian Participants
King Baudouin I
Lt. Colonel Bem Gilbert Schrijvers, Master of
Ceremonies of the Court
Colonel Guido Mertens, Chief of
Military Household Staff
Ambassador Gerard Jacques, Grand Marshall of the Court
Manfred Woerner - Secretary General, NATO
NATO Participants
Prime Minister Martens (BE)
Prime Minister Mulroney (CA)
Prime Minister Schlueter (DE)
Chancellor Kohl (GE)
Prime Minister Papandreou (GR)
Prime Minister Hermansson (IC)
Prime Minister De Nita (IT)
Prime Minister Santer (LU)
Prime Minister Lubbers (NL)
Prime Minister Brundtland (NO)
Prime Minister Cavaco silva (PO)
Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales (SP)
Prime Minister Ozal (TU)
Prime Minister Thatcher (UK)
President Mitterand (FR)
MAY 22 '89 11:58
PAGE 03
May 20 1:00 pm
- 2 -
PRESS:
Pool Photo of NATO Participants with King Baudouin
OFFICIAL GREETING
SCENARIO:
OFFICIAL GREETING
THE PRESIDENT will arrive by motorcade at the
Court of Honor inside the Royal Palace. THE
PRESIDENT will be greeted inside the foyer by
Colonel Schrijvers, Master of Ceremonies of the
Court.
THE PRESIDENT will be escorted to a landing on the
second floor where he will be met by Ambassador
Jacques, Grand Marshall of the Court, and by Lt.
Colonel Goormans, Commander of the Palace.
RECEPTION
THE PRESIDENT will be escorted to the Salon du
Vase by Ambassador Jacques, where THE PRESIDENT
will be met by King Baudouin I.
After greeting the King, THE PRESIDENT will join a
reception in progress with the other NATO leaders
in the Salon du Vase. (NOTE: PRESIDENT Mitterrand
will arrive after THE PRESIDENT has greeted the
King and will briefly join the reception.)
PHOTO SESSION
THE PRESIDENT, King Baudouin I, the other NATO
country leaders, and Secretary General Woerner
will be escorted to the Salle de Musique (Music
Room) for a group photo.
PRESS POOL COVERAGE
MAY 22 '89 11:59
PAGE. 04
May 20 1:00 pm
- 3 a
LUNCHEON AND COFFEE
After the group photo has been taken, THE
PRESIDENT, King Baudouin I, the other NATO country
leaders, and Secretary General Woerner will
proceed to the Salon des Tapisseries for the
luncheon.
NO TOASTS
After the luncheon has concluded, the King will
either invite THE PRESIDENT and the other guests
to join him for coffee at the table or while
standing in the Salon du Vase.
Upon conclusion of the coffee, THE PRESIDENT and
the other guests will be jointly escorted by the
King to the ground level foyer for departure.
THE PRESIDENT will depart, in protocol order, en
route NATO Headquarters.
** TOTAL PAGE. 04 **
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE
2
2ND STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
Copyright (c) 1985 McGraw-Hill, Inc.;
Aviation Week and Space Technology
March 25, 1985
SECTION: MISSILE ENGINEERING; Pg. 28
LENGTH: 763 words
HEADLINE: Cruise Missiles Are Operational In Belgium
DATELINE: Brussels
BODY:
First flight of 16 nuclear cruise missiles has become operational at the
Belgian air force base near Florennes, 55 mi. southeast of Brussels. The
missiles arrived only hours after the Belgian cabinet decided to accept them.
The Belgian government said the remaining 32 missiles, which are to be
deployed in 1987, would be delayed up to six months if the Soviet Union
continues negotiating for a reduction in intemnediate range nuclear weapons.
The Belgian government survived a parliamentary no-confidence measure raised
as a result of the deployment on a 116-93 vote.
Netherlands' Deployment
The Dutch government, which is to make its decision on deployment Nov. 1,
supported the Belgian decision but said it would have no effect on the
Netherlands. Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers said "any other [Belgian]
decision would have given the wrong signal" to the Soviet Union. He said the
decision is a "signal to the Soviet Union that, without measures from their
side, NATO will not stray from its deployment timetable."
But Lubbers said he remains hopeful the Netherlands can avoid deploying its
own missiles. "We are proceeding according to our own criteria as laid down in
June, 1984," he said.
The Netherlands said last year it would definitely begin deploying 48
cruise missiles at a Dutch air force base at Woensdrecht in southwest Holland if
more Soviet SS-20 missiles are deployed on Nov. 1 than when the decision was
announced June 1 (AW&ST June 11, 1984, P. 24). U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization officials have increased their estimates of the number of Soviet
SS-20s twice since then.
The cruise missiles began arriving at Florennes less than three hours after
Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens announced his decision to Parliament,
and 19 hr. after the cabinet decision.
The 16 missiles and their nuclear warheads are being stored in a security
depot which has been modified for nuclear storage. They are to be moved to a
specially designed bunker later.
The cabinet made its decision to go ahead with deployment after foreign
minister Leo Tindemans failed to obtain concessions from the Soviets in a
LEXIS® ® NEXIS® ® LEXIS NEXIS®
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE
3
(c) 1985 McGraw-Hill, Inc., Aviation Week, March 25, 1985
meeting in Moscow. Tindemans asked Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko to
agree to disassociate the intermediate range nuclear weapons from strategic and
space weapons, but Gromyko refused.
"If the Soviet Union had been able to accept a separate accord on
medium-range weapons, Belgium would have delayed deployments of the first
nuclear missiles until the end of the first session of negotiations," Tindemans
said.
The Soviets' refusal means the Geneva negotiations are likely to take a long
time, so there 15 no reason to delay Belgium's deployment, Martens said.
"The Belgian government used all means at its disposal up until the last minute
to persuade the Soviet Union to make a serious gesture of disarmament,' he said.
"There was no sense in delaying.
Martens told the Parliament that the missile decision was the most
difficult Belgium has faced since World War 2.
"The Soviet Union's deployment of nuclear missiles aimed at Europe
beginning in 1977 seriously upset the balance of power," he said. "This is why
NATO took the dual-track decision in 1979 at the request of the countries of
Western Europe. This included an offer [to cancel deployment in return for a
reduction in Soviet missiles] which was intended to persuade the Soviet Union,
through negotiations, to dismantle the SS-20 missiles."
Belgium is the fourth European nation to begin deploying new intermediate
range nuclear missiles. Cruise missiles have previously become operational in
Britain and Italy, and improved Pershing 2 missiles are in service in West
Germany. Germany is scheduled to deploy cruise missiles later in the decade.
Antinuclear protestors, participating in a demonstration in Brussels Mar. 17,
said opposition to the missiles would continue despite the government decision.
More than 40,000 protestors, including many members of Martens' own party,
marched through Brussels during the peaceful protest. An estimated 400,000
protestors had taken part in a similar protest in 1983.
Parliamentary support for the deployment was stronger than expected because
support from right-wing members who are not part of the ruling coalition more
than offset defections by two coalition members. The ruling parties have only a
six-vote majority in the Parliament.
The Parliamentary vote Mar. 20 followed a 15-hr. debate. Martens had said
the decision was irrevocable even if his government failed to win the
no-confidence vote.
LEXIS NEXIS® ® LEXIS® ® NEXIS® ®
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE
4
5TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
Copyright (c) 1985 The New York Times Company;
The New York Times
March 21, 1985, Thursday, Late City Final Edition
SECTION: Section A; Page 10, Column 4; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 437 words
HEADLINE: BELGIAN PARLIAMENT BACKS DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES
BYLINE: AP
DATELINE: BRUSSELS, March 20
BODY:
The Belgian Parliament approved the deployment of cruise missiles today
after an all-night debate, and NATO officials said the decision should push
the Dutch Government to do the same.
The vote, 116 to 93, came just before 5 A. M. after a 15-hour debate. The
Government made the deployment decision last week, subject to parliamentary
approval, and the first 16 missiles were deployed immediately afterward.
Prime Minister Wilfried Martens said in the debate that his coalition
Cabinet had decided on deployment ''out of an intense sense of duty'' to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
The alliance decided in 1979 to deploy 572 medium-range cruise missiles
and Pershing 2 missiles in Belgium, Italy, Britain, West Germany and the
Netherlands to counter Soviet SS-20 missiles already in place.
NATO officials said they felt the Belgian vote was pivotal in moving the
Dutch Government toward a similar decision.
The Netherlands decided in June that it would take the 48 cruise missiles
assigned to it if the Russians deployed more SS-20's by November 1985, and
that it would deploy none if the number of Soviet missiles did not increase.
If an arms reduction agreement were to be reached in the meantime by the
United States and the Soviet Union, the Dutch Government said, the Netherlands
would deploy the number of missiles agreed upon by the two sides. A Dutch
decision is expected Nov. 1.
In Belgium, the first missiles arrived at the Florennes air base, 40 miles
south of here, hours after the Government made its decision last week.
Prime Minister Martens said the rest of the 48 cruise missiles to be
deployed in Belgium were due in 1987. The cruise missile is a low-flying,
pilotless craft. It was developed from the German Buzz Bomb of World War II.
Parliamentary approval was uncertain until, just before the debate began
Tuesday, dissidents in Mr. Martens's Christian Democratic Party said they
would reverse their position and vote with the Government.
LEXIS® NEXIS® ® LEXIS® ® NEXIS®
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE
5
(c) 1985 The New York Times, March 21, 1985
The chief maverick, Luc van den Brande, who is the party's floor leader,
said, ''I will vote 'yes' because personal reasons must sometimes take a back
seat to extraordinary circumstances, an allusion to party unity.
''I still believe the Government should not yet have decided on the
deployment, he said, adding that Belgium should have made a last effort to
enhance chances of an East-West accord on medium-range missiles.
Antimissile protesters in the parliamentary gallery threw down paper bags
filled with dirt from Florennes during the debate. The demonstrators were
removed from the chamber by security personnel.
SUBJECT: MISSILES; CRUISE MISSILE; UNITED STATES ARMAMENT AND DEFENSE; ARMAMENT,
DEFENSE AND MILITARY FORCES; MILITARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS; LAW AND LEGISLATION;
NATIONAL SECURITY
ORGANIZATION: NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION ( NATO)
GEOGRAPHIC: EUROPE; BELGIUM; NETHERLANDS
LEXIS ® NEXIS® ® LEXIS® ® NEXIS® ®
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE
2
4TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
Proprietary to the United Press International 1983
December 31, 1983, Saturday, PM cycle
SECTION: International
LENGTH: 370 words
HEADLINE: Pershing-2 missiles operational in West Germany
KEYWORD: Missiles
BODY:
The first U.S. Pershing-2 missiles deployed in West Germany now are
operational, and Belgium has given the go-ahead for deployment of U.S. cruise
missiles if no agreement is reached between the superpowers on medium-range
weapons.
Peter Kurt Wuerzbach, parliamentary state secretary in the West German
Defense Ministry, said a 1979 NATO plan to have the first Pershing-2
missiles operational before the end of the year has been carried out.
Wuerzbach gave no details, but government sources said nine Pershing-2
missiles have been made operational at the U.S. Army base at Mutlangen near
Stuttgart.
The missiles were shipped to the base, operated by the 56th U.S. Field
Artillery Brigade, last month after the West German parliament approved the
NATO deployment plan.
The plan calls for West Germany to receive all 108 Pershing-2 missiles to
be deployed in Europe and 96 of the 464 cruise missiles to counter Soviet
SS-20 missiles.
The other Pershing-2 missiles are to be deployed before 1988. Deployment of
the cruise missiles is scheduled to start in 1986.
Wuerzbach repeated Western readiness to negotiate with the Soviets to reach
an agreement limiting the number of medium-range missiles in Europe.
The Soviet Union walked out of the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on
limiting medium-range missiles last month, after the Bonn parliament approved
deployment.
''The missiles now deployed will be dismantled if the Soviet Union scraps
the missiles it has deployed in such a large quantity, he said.
In Belgium, Prime Minister Wilfried Martens said Friday his country would
continue with the NATO deployment program ''in the absence of a negotiated
solution' between the United States and the Soviet Union.
''This, however, is not an irreversible solution,' Martens said after the
Christian Democrat-Liberal government made its semi-annual evaluation of the
situation at its final meeting of the year.
LEXIS® NEXIS® ® LEXIS® NEXIS®
SF 112 +109J of FUE A6BL
CHARISTON долецишент WSQ6 IF? 26WI-SWUND EASIN97100 of FUS
WOM6A6L 12 NOT 9W POTACION' 2914 96566 ENE
POINCION, PEIMSEN FWS ANTI69 219162 sug FUE BOATES ANION"
CONSTURE MICH FUE ИАДИ brodigw , , TW FUG specuce of $
IN DETAINS' BLIWG NINIZIEL MITALIEQ 2910 ELIO9A HTS MONTH
FWG WI221J62 If P92 III 2000 9 T9686 NE 2919"
1111116 @T221J62 UOM MIJI p6 qiamsuffeq It FUS BOATES AUION 201962
TIWITING WEQINW-LSWOG #1221782 1926 money' 94166 FUG BOWN
IUS BOATED NNTON M9JK60 onf of FW6 CSTK2 IN @SW6AS ON
SW TIMIFING FHE UMWP6L of WIRRIJER TW Enlabs
MESICLU LG9QIU622 fo MIFH FUE BOATSIZ fo LEBCH
FHE CLAIMS WI221J62 12 fo 21961 TO 1889'
IHE OFFEL #1221J62 916 fo DE asbtorsq 1888' of
22-50 41
ps asbjorsq IW 900 39 at FNG TPI CLAIRS WI221J62 CO CONNIEL 201166
IN5 by90 csjje tol ME2F PSLM90A 10 15061A6 SII 108 belaping-s WISSIJG2 to
ИАТИ bygu"
VLEITERA BLIDSQ6' T92F MONTH 96566 FUG M52f BELWEN FUB
I.UE WIZZIJE? M516 aprobsq fo FUG p926' 0A FWG 28FM n"a" EJ6JQ
#1221562 HEAS PS6U W906 observition If FUE n'e' YOWA p926 If W69L
MAGLYPECH dgAs NO prif BOAGLUMBUR 2001062 2919 NING
#1221762 06016 FUS EWG of FUG 1696 255 0660 CELLIGE onf
DELEWSE WINTERLA' 2819 9 1838 MV10 bjsw FO USA6 THE times BELEWING-S
beter KILLI IN FUS M62f BELWSW
membous.
WIZZIJ62 It NO 12 FWE 2006 ON
BUQ BSIGINM US2 BIAEN FUG do-spegq tol of n"2" CLRIPS
THE LILEF n'2" WIRZIJEZ IN M62F PELWSUN WOM 966
BODA:
KEAMOBD: WI221J62
HEADRIME: #1221J62 IN M621
ГЕИЕДН: 310 MOLOR
2ECLION: INFERMATIONST
DECEMPEL 31° 1683' bW CACTE
fo FW6 66622 1883
VIH THOTE of ГБЛБ] I DLIVING IV EAFT TOLMS
672E
5
Services of Mead Data Central
PAGE
3
Proprietary to the United Press International, December 31, 1983
11 Belgium's ultimate aim remains the conclusion of an agreement that would
make any allied deployment superfluous,' he said.
Preparations for the installation in Belgium have begun at the Florennes
air force base, 45 miles south of Brussels. The Belgian deployment is
scheduled for 1985 or 1986.
LEXIS® ® NEXIS® ® LEXIS® ® NEXIS ®
Northern Ireland
e renamed Ghana (q.v.). His party won the general
battle of Alamein on 23 October 1942, carried allied forces across Libya and into
he became Prime Minister of the Gold Coast which, as
Tunisia (q.v.) within four months. British and American forces landed in French
on status in March 1957. Nkrumah became President
north-west Africa ("Torch', q.v.) on 8 November 1942. The two armies converged
:public within the Commonwealth on 1 July 1960. He
on Tunis, where the Germans offered a sustained defence. All Axis troops in
rican leader throughout the central and western regions
North Africa formally surrendered on 12 May 1943.
ging closer union with neighbouring states, supporting
remaining technically non-aligned but showing great
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.). A 'North Atlantic Treaty' was
rica and some sympathy for the Chinese and Romanian
signed in Washington on 4 April 1949 by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium,
strusted French-oriented groupings among the African
Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
unting influence of other independence leaders who did
Portugal and the United States, providing for mutual assistance should any one
Redeemer' and 'Africa's Gandhi'. At home, his rule
member of the alliance be attacked (although not automatically providing for
torial and from 1963 to 1965 he interfered with the
immediate military action). Greece and Turkey joined N.A.T.O. on 18 February
Governmental extravagance, both personal and for
1952, the German Federal Republic on 9 May 1955. The treaties were a product of
a slump in cocoa prices, led to inflation and economic
the 'cold war' and the blockade of Berlin (qq.v.), but the organization itself
1 of February 1966 Nkrumah travelled to China on an
was built up as an integrated military force under the later tensions imposed by
out of the country, his government was overthrown by
the Korean War from September 1950 onwards. Friction has developed at times
tuary briefly in Guinea, later travelling to Romania for
between American policies, which aimed at using N.A.T.O. as a means of creating
1 a sanatorium there at the end of April 1972. Ghana
a political and economic 'Atlantic Community', and the needs of the growing
im as a national leader at a funeral in his birthplace
European Community. President de Gaulle's suspicion of American intentions
led to the withdrawal of French forces from N.A.T.O. command in the spring of
1966, requiring the removal of N.A.T.O. headquarters from Fontainebleau to
Allied invasion of Europe began with landings on the
Brussels. Disputes between two N.A.T.O. members, Greece and Turkey, have at
le river Orne and St Marcouf on 6 June 1944 (D-Day).
times weakened the effectiveness of the Organization in the Mediterranean, the
vestern beaches: British and Canadian on the eastern.
Greeks withdrawing all their units from N.A.T.O. on 17 August 1964 because of
was Supreme Allied Commander, the immediate field
tension with Turkey over Cyprus (q.v.).
neral Montgomery (q.v.). Artificial harbours ("Mul-
the Channel and linked to the shore by articulated
Northcliffe, Lord (Alfred Charles William Harmsworth, 1865-1922, created a
bured vehicles, guns and equipment could be landed
baron 1905, viscount 1917), British newspaper magnate. Born the son of a Dublin
ting continued in Normandy for a month, the U.S.
barrister, became a journalist on leaving school in 1880 and founded Answers in
ort of Cherbourg on 27 June and the British and
1888, the first weekly to use a crisp style and sensationalism. Assisted by his
n 9 July, thus enabling tanks to break through the
younger brother, Harold (in 1913 created Viscount Rothermere, 1868-1940), he
liberated on 25 August, Brussels on 2 September and
built up a successful business in periodicals, branching out into daily journalism
crossed near Aachen on 12 September (D-Day + 68).
with the Evening News, 1894. In May 1896 he founded the Daily Mail, on sale at a
halfpenny, half the price of most dailies. By 1899 the Mail had twice the circula-
Vhen Italy entered the Second World War in June
tion of any other newspaper. He founded the Daily Mirror, 1903, and was
nal Graziani to advance from Libya to Cairo and the
proprietor of the Observer, 1905-11, and The Times, 1908-22, but always regarded
mperial prestige for the fascist regime and opening
the Daily Mail as his most important enterprise. Largely for publicity purposes he
t and the Persian oilfields. British strategy, at first
financed new ventures in motoring, aviation and polar exploration. Throughout
cerned with clearing the southern Mediterranean
the First World War he pressed for vigorous leadership, heading a diplomatic
g-stone to the Italian peninsula. Graziani's offensive
mission to America in 1917, and became director of propaganda to enemy
but petered out after penetrating some sixty miles
countries on his return. In this role he encouraged the subject-nationalities of
A major British offensive on-9-11 December 1940
Austria-Hungary to demand independence. In later years Northcliffe suffered
nd in two months occupied most of Cyrenaica. In
from megalomania, but his style and methods transformed British journalism,
(q.v.) and the Afrika Korps again advanced into
introducing the tendentious headline and the bright story which would appeal to
ell (q.v.) in June and repulsed by Auchinleck (q.v.),
a huge reading public.
1942. In May and June 1942 Rommel's second
at on the British Eighth Army, although Cairo and
Northern Ireland. In the seventeenth century Protestant immigrants, many of
uchinleck at the first battle of Alamein in July 1942.
them Scottish Presbyterians, settled in parts of Ulster (q.v.), imposing a social
ery (qq.v.) offensive, which began with the second
pattern on certain areas different from the rest of the country: this division was
283
27th+ 30th
31 aug- 2 sep 1918
37th + 915t
31 Oct - 4 nov
717-345-3611 3611
9 nov - 11 nov
ypres- - Ly Plensive
happy
Flandus,
f - n Tohn 8.8 sloncher 5/7-245- 3611
over Ypres -
wk
NY, 1 NCSC,
27 30 37 Gl Divisions
AES
E4
1934
VOLUME 20
Navajo to Opium
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
AMERICANA
INTERNATIONAL EDITION
COMPLETE IN THIRTY VOLUMES
FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1829
GROLIER INCORPORATED
International, Headquarters: Danbury, Connecticut 06816
420
NORTH AMERICAN PHALANX-NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)
NORTH AMERICAN PHALANX, fä'langks, the
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZ
most important colony founded by the Fourier-
(NATO), a collective defense alliance of
ists in the United States. It was organized in
European nations, the United States, and
1843 and located in Monmouth county, N. J.
created in 1949.
The organization was on the joint-stock principle,
The Postwar Setting of the Alliance, The
and all the members engaged in the cooperative
that was envisaged at the end of World
labor of the colony. They were paid a certain
involved a number of assumptions. The Was first
amount for labor, for talent (or administration),
these was that the Allies, associated in war
and for capital invested. The rule was to pay the
the defeat of common enemies, would remain
highest prices for the hardest and most disagree-
associated in time of peace. Another was
able labor.
the peace between the Allies and the
Work was at first mostly agricultural, with
enemy countries would be easily, and
products sold outside the colony, but later mills
readily, agreed upon. A third assumption
were built, and a considerable amount of manu-
that the peace would be effectively maintain
facturing was done. A common school education
on a universal basis, by a world organizati
was provided, and there was a library and read-
based on the principle of collective security
ing room. However, the colony lacked many of
Beginning with the Yalta Conference of
the elements of culture that. distinguished the life
Big Three in 1945, a serious divergence of
of Brook Farm in Massachusetts. Management
among the Great Powers became apparent.
was good and the colony prospered. But in 1853,
the first assumption was threatened. The AREA
dissensions resulted in the secession of some
powers had committed the making of the treath
members and the founding of a new phalanx. In
of peace to the Council of Foreign Ministry
1854 the mills burned, a serious loss that severely
which had been set up at the Yalta Conference
crippled the colony. The organization was
its functions and objectives being implement
formally dissolved in 1856.
considerably by the Potsdam Conference of
NATO
same year. After more than a decade of disc
NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, an American peri-
sion, however, only the Italian, Hungarian,
odical published in Boston, Mass., from 1815
garian, Romanian, and Finnish treaties had
Thes
to 1877 and then in New York City until 1940.
concluded. The council remained deadlock
because
Regarded as the most important American peri-
over the provisions of the German and Austri
bons an
odical of the review type, it was founded
treaties. Finally, on May 15, 1955, the Sovin
Nations
by William Tudor, Edward T. Channing, and
Union, the United Kingdom, the United States
busis.
Richard Henry Dana, Sr. It had as contributors
and France on one side and Austria on the oth
signed at Vienna a state treaty for the reests
press th
most of the leading American writers of the 19th
schieve
century, including Longfellow, Emerson, Henry
lishment of an independent and democratic Am
set wai
James, and Mark Twain.
tria. The prospects for a German treaty
Estonia,
been so discouraging that during 1954 the Wer
Finland,
NORTH ANDOVER, a town in Essex county,
ern occupation powers (the United Kingdo
were al:
Mass., situated on the Merrimack and Shawsheen
the United States, and France) entered into
5 milli
rivers about 30 miles (48 km) north of Boston.
number of major agreements with the Federal
(474,00
Originally settled in 1646 as part of Andover, it
Republic of Germany. These provided for the
also alto
became a separate town in 1855. Gov. Simon
termination of the occupation regime in westers
of the &
Bradstreet of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and
Germany, defining the relations between the
sted sat
his poet wife Anne lived there for several years.
selves and the republic, and arranging for
Bulgaria
The town's chief manufactures are woolen
admission to the North Atlantic and western
gry, ar
goods, textile machinery, wood products, plas-
European communities. A new attempt to bring
itatus 0
tics, and telephone-transmitter equipment. Merri-
about German reunification was made at the
the
Co
mack College and the Merrimack Valley Textile
Geneva Conference of the heads of government
Commui
Museum are located there. Population: 20,129.
of the United States, the United Kingdom
and in
France, and the Soviet Union in 1955. The for
Mutual
NORTH ARLINGTON, a borough in Bergen
eign ministers of the four powers met in Octo
bodies I
county, N.J., situated on the Passaic River about
ber 1955, but the views of the Soviet Union and
economi
5 miles (8 km) north of Newark. It is both a
the Western powers on the conditions of reund
states.
residential and an industrial community. Chief
fication were so diverse that the goal of reuns
the USS
industries are the manufacture of plastic products,
fication was abandoned.
tween tl
cement blocks, rubber and metal products, toys,
The United Nations could not maintain
the form
and paint and food processing. There are also
peace that the Allied powers had declined
addition
plant nurseries there.
make. The assumption of Great Power coopers
of over
First settled in 1677, North Arlington was
tion again failed of realization. The veto power
miles
(
incorporated in 1896. The borough is governed
vested in the permanent members of the Security
Soviet 0
by a mayor and council. Population: 16,587.
Council made impossible the employment of the
Trum
sanctions and security provisions of the United
the Mei
NORTH ATLANTIC CURRENT, also called North
Nations Charter regarding a breach of the peace
first pos
Atlantic Drift, an ocean current that forms the
The Soviet Union made repeated use of this do
munism
northern part of a general, clockwise circulation
vice to advance its own world policies and
tion to
pattern in the North Atlantic Ocean. From off
restrain the policies of the Western power
there W:
the east coast of the United States, it flows
Soon the postwar world became divided into tay
lost to
northeast and spreads around the British Isles
clearly defined and opposing camps, each seek
and the
into the North Sea and along the Norwegian
ing to attain its ends through delayed peace as
creased
coast, producing in these regions a climate
rangements and through the United Nations. The
trine en
warmer than it would be without the current.
rift that had opened between the Soviet Union
aid was
The Soviet port of Murmansk, for example, is
and the Western occupying powers widened
Mon
ice-free the year round because of this current.
include the Communist world led by the USSA
difficult
See also GULF STREAM.
and the free world led by the United States
Harvard
ORGANIZATION (NATO)
INTIC TREATY ORGANIZ
lective defense alliance of
ns, the United States, and Canada
9.
Setting of the Alliance. The
aged at the end of World W
mber of assumptions. The
t the Allies, associated in war
common enemies, would remain
time of peace. Another was
ween the Allies and the def
ies would be easily, and ind
1 upon. A third assumption
: would be effectively maintal
11 basis, by a world organiz
principle of collective security
with the Yalta Conference of
1945, a serious divergence of
eat Powers became apparent.
nption was threatened. The
mmitted the making of the trea
the Council of Foreign Minist
en set up at the Yalta Confere
and objectives being implement
NATO INFORMATION SERVICE
by the Potsdam Conference of
NATO honor guard stands at attention under member nations' flags at NATO headquarters in Belgium.
fter more than a decade of disc
only the Italian, Hungarian,
nian, and Finnish treaties had
These groups found themselves stalemated,
C. Marshall declared that Europe must "have
The council remained deadlock
Treause of the deadlock over the peace negotia-
substantial additional help, or face economic,
isions of the German and Austri
mins and because of the failure of the United
social, and political deterioration of a very
lly, on May 15, 1955, the Sovs
Nations to function on a universal and collective
grave character." Such aid, he said, would not
nited Kingdom, the United Stal
Lasis. Both therefore sought other means to
be against any country or doctrine, but "against
a one side and Austria on the oti
gress their policies, maintain their security, and
hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos." Sup-
nna a state treaty for the reest
schieve their objectives. The Soviet Union did
plementing the economic purpose of the Marshall
n independent and democratic A
ant wait long. During the war it had annexed
Plan or European Recovery Program was the po-
ospects for a German treaty
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Parts of Poland,
litical objective of preventing any Soviet domina-
uraging that during 1954 the W
Finland, Romania, Germany, and Czechoslovakia
tion of western Europe that might result from
on powers (the United Kingdo
were also annexed. This meant an addition of
economic depression or disaster. The Soviet
tates, and France) entered into
5 million people and over 183,000 square miles
Union not only declined to participate in any
ajor agreements with the Fede
(474,000 sq km) of territory. The Soviet Union
negotiations for aid, but attacked the proposals
Germany. These provided for
also altered by various means the composition
as entrenchments of American capitalism and
f the occupation regime in west
of the governments of certain enemy and liber-
imperialism.
fining the relations between the
ated satellite countries. By this means, Albania,
The new policy was not a one-sided opera-
he republic, and arranging for
Bulgaria, Romania, East Germany, Poland, Hun-
tion. The United States needed Europe in its
the North Atlantic and wests
ary, and Czechoslovakia were reduced to the
own plans for security. With twice the popula-
nmunities. A new attempt to br
Natus of Soviet satellites. In September 1947
tion of the United States and with great skills
in reunification was made at
the Communist governments organized the
and techniques, Europe is central to the non-
erence of the heads of governme
Communist Information Bureau (Cominform),
Communist world. Next to the United States,
ed States, the United Kingdo
and in January 1949 they set up a Council for
it has the most extensive industrial equipment
the Soviet Union in 1955. The
Matual Economic Assistance (Comecon). These
in the world. Its science and technology, cou-
S of the four powers met in Od
Indies provided the machinery for political and
pled with those of the United States, make pos-
t the views of the Soviet Union
economic cooperation among the Communist
sible effective resistance to Soviet aggression. Its
powers on the conditions of reus
Mates. A network of bilateral treaties between
military manpower and its weapons production
so diverse that the goal of retu
the USSR and each of these countries and be-
afford the West great striking power.
abandoned.
tween the satellite nations themselves completed
The aid extended under the Truman Doctrine
ted Nations could not maintain
the formation of the Soviet satellite system. The
and the economic assistance provided for under
he Allied powers had declined
addition of the satellites brought a population
the Marshall Plan did much to relieve an in-
assumption of Great Power cooper
of over 87 million and more than 390,000 square
creasingly acute situation. In addition, the or-
iled of realization. The veto pown
alles (1,010,000 sq km) of territory within the
ganizations established under the Marshall Plan,
permanent members of the Securi
Soviet orbit.
especially the Organization for European Eco-
e impossible the employment of
Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. It was in
nomic Cooperation, or OEEC (which set up a
d security provisions of the Unit
the Mediterranean area that the West made its
clearinghouse known as the European Payments
ter regarding a breach of the peso
list postwar stand against the spread of Com-
Union for its member states), afforded an op-
Jnion made repeated use of this
munism. Since Britain was no longer in a posi-
portunity for the "close economic cooperation"
ince its own world policies and
Non to give military and financial aid to Greece,
that was required "among the participating
policies of the Western pow
Dere was a real possibility that Greece would be
states." This development might be described
twar world became divided into
lest to the Communists. In that event Turkey
as the beginning of European or Atlantic com-
ed and opposing camps, each see
and the Middle East would be exposed to in-
munity regionalism.
its ends through delayed peace
creased Soviet pressure. Under the Truman Doc-
and through the United Nations
1.
Formation of Western European Union and Council
wine enunciated in 1947, financial and military
aid was extended to both Greece and Turkey.
of Europe. These measures, however, did not pro-
I opened between the Soviet Unit
stern occupying powers widened.
vide soldiers, weapons, or funds for se-
Moreover, western Europe was in financial
curity. They also meant that the United
Communist world led by the USS
disficulties. On June 5, 1947, in an address at
e world led by the United Stat
Harvard University, Secretary of State George
States was on the contributing end and that
the member nations were on the receiving end.
421
421a
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
Security, it was realized, must be a matter of
vakia coming under full Communist
mutuality, reciprocity, and regional effort, but-
that year. Communist successes in eastern control
tressed by a substantial degree of self-help. The
rope stirred the countries of
free nations of Europe felt compelled to take
action. The
regional action to defend their security as well as
the Netherlands, Belgium,
to protect their common cultural, social, and
at Brussels on March .4,
economic heritage. The idea was given valuable
establishment of Western European
support by the British foreign secretary, Ernest
(WEU) by means of a treaty of mutual
Bevin, who declared in the House of Commons
ance. On March 17 the Brussels Treaty of
in January 1948 that western Europe must con-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration
solidate, not by directive but through brother-
Mutual Defense was signed, to be in effect
hood, and on a regional basis, failing world
50 years. Canada and the United States
cooperation for this purpose.
kept informed of the objectives and achieveme
This regional security began modestly with
of the plenipotentiaries. The essential feat
the Dunkirk Treaty of March 4, 1947, under
of the treaty was the establishment of a
which Britain and France pledged alliance and
of mutual defense, supported by arrangement system
mutual assistance for a period of 50 years. Then,
for cultural and economic cooperation. The
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg put
cipal organ of the Brussels Treaty Organization
into effect a customs-union agreement that came
was the Permanent Consultative Council, consi
to be known as Benelux; it went into effect in
ing of the foreign ministers of the signatore
1948. From these two agreements there devel-
organized so that they could consider any thre
oped in 1948 what became known as the Western
to security or any economic disturbance.
European Union.
defense ministers were to constitute a Wester
Soviet domination of the satellite states pro-
Defense Committee, implementing Article
gressed rapidly early in 1948, with Czechoslo-
the treaty, which pledged to any attacked
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
PREAMBLE
their individual and collective capacity to
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith
armed attack.
in the purposes and principles of the Charter of
ARTICLE 4
the United Nations and their desire to live in
peace with all peoples and all governments.
The Parties will consult together whenever
They are determined to safeguard the free-
in the opinion of any of them, the territorial
dom, common heritage, and civilization of their
tegrity, political independence or security of
of the Parties is threatened.
peoples, founded on the principles of democracy,
individual liberty and the rule of law.
ARTICLE 5
They seek to promote stability and well-
The Parties agree that an armed attack against
being in the North Atlantic area.
one or more of them in Europe or North America
They are resolved to unite their efforts for
shall be considered an attack against them
collective defense and for the preservation of
and consequently they agree that, if such
peace and security.
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exerci
They therefore agree to this North Atlantic
of the right of individual or collective self-defeme
Treaty:
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the
ARTICLE 1
United Nations, will assist the Party or Partics
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the
so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and
Charter of the United Nations, to settle any
in concert with the other Parties, such action
international disputes in which they may be
it deems necessary, including the use of armed
involved by peaceful means in such a manner
force, to restore and maintain the security of the
that international peace and security, and justice,
North Atlantic area.
are not endangered, and to refrain in their inter-
Any such armed attack and all measures takes
national relations from the threat or use of force
as a result thereof shall immediately be reported
in any manner inconsistent with the purposes
to the Security Council. Such measures shall be
of the United Nations.
terminated when the Security Council has takes
the measures necessary to restore and maintain
ARTICLE 2
international peace and security.
The Parties will contribute toward the fur-
ARTICLE 6¹
ther development of peaceful and friendly
For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack
international relations by strengthening their free
on one or more of the Parties is deemed to
institutions, by bringing about a better under-
standing of the principles upon which these
1 This article was modified by the Greece-Turn
institutions are founded, and by promoting con-
protocol of Oct. 22, 1951, to read as follows:
ditions of stability and well-being. They will
"For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack
one or more of the Parties is deemed to include
seek to eliminate conflict in their international
armed attack-
economic policies and will encourage economic
(i) on the territory of any of the Parties in Europ
collaboration between any or all of them.
or North America, on the Algerian Departments
France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islas
under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North
ARTICLE 3
Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
In order more effectively to achieve the ob-
(ii) on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of
Parties, when in or over these territories or any
jectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and
area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the
jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-
Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty
entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or
help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop
North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.
TION
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
421b
under full Communist control
all military and other aid and assistance"
ropean integration or federalism rather than asso-
mmunist successes in eastern
the known as Uniforce, was also set up, with
power of the member nations. A military
ciation for security purposes on a mutual basis.
he countries of
The headquarters of the council was established
representatives
Fontainebleau, under the com-
at Strasbourg. A committee of ministers, one
ds, Belgium,
Marshal Viscount Montgomery of
from each country, is the principal governing
n March 4,
womein. establishment of the Western European
body. A Consultative Assembly, speaking for the
of Western European
council rather than as an instrument of individual
heans of a treaty of mutual
SHAM The proved to the USSR that aggression would
governments, and enjoying broad representation,
rch 17 the Brussels Treaty of
met with the combined power of western
has little power but is very articulate. Clashes be-
and Cultural Collaboration
and it convinced the United States of the
surope, and sincerity of the five nations.
tween the two bodies seem both perpetual and
se was signed, to be in effect
inevitable.
nada and the United States
was the fact that it led to
The position of the United States regarding
of the objectives and achievem
the North Atlantic Treaty
the security of western Europe on a regional
was the establishment of a feah
otentiaries. The essential
Anizational organization of western Euro-
basis became abundantly clear. On the day that
the Brussels Treaty was signed, President Harry
fense, supported by arrangeme
states, called the Council of Europe, was
Truman pledged that the consolidated effort of
d economic cooperation. The
getn used upon on Jan. 28, 1949. The statute
the free countries of Europe to protect them-
the Brussels Treaty Organizati
Frating the council was signed on May 5 of
selves would be matched by United States de-
ment Consultative Council, cont
that year. The new body included the five Brus-
termination to help them do so. Even more
reign ministers of the signatore
Treaty powers, with the addition of Norway,
impressive was the resolution sponsored by Sen.
hat they could consider any the
Exeden, Denmark, the Republic of Ireland, and
Arthur H. Vandenberg, which was passed by the
any economic disturbance.
Others joined later. It excluded all non-
Baly. European states and, unlike the Brussels Treaty,
Senate on June 11, 1948, by a vote of 64 to 4.
ers were to constitute a West
It urged that the president pursue the "progres-
nittee, implementing Article
actuded most of the western European nations.
sive development of regional and other collective
ich pledged to any attacked
The trend of this organization was toward Eu-
arrangements for individual and collective self-
EATY
Lade an armed attack on the territory of any of
each of the Parties of the deposit of each such
Parties in Europe or North America, on the
instrument of accession.
al and collective capacity to
Okerian Departments of France, on the occupa-
(ton forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands
ARTICLE 11
under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions
ARTICLE 4
Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on
carried out by the Parties in accordance with
S will consult together whenev
the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the
their respective constitutional processes. The in-
of any of them, the territorial
Parties.
struments of ratification shall be deposited as soon
al independence or security of
ARTICLE 7
as possible with the Government of the United
is threatened.
States of America, which will notify all the
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be
ARTICLE 5
other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty
interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights
shall enter into force between the states which
agree that an armed attack again
and obligations under the Charter of the Parties
have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the
them in Europe or North American
which are members of the United Nations, or
majority of the signatories, including the ratifica-
dered an attack against them
the primary responsibility of the Security Council
tions of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg,
ntly they agree that, if such
is the maintenance of international peace and
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the
occurs, each of them, in exem
security.
United States, have been deposited and shall
individual or collective self-defen
ARTICLE 8
come into effect with respect to other states on
Article 51 of the Charter of
s, will assist the Party or Parti
Each Party declares that none of the in-
the date of the deposit of their ratifications.
taking forthwith, individually
trmational engagements now in force between
ARTICLE 12
h the other Parties, such action
and any other of the Parties or any third state
After the Treaty has been in force for ten
ssary, including the use of arm
in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty,
and undertakes not to enter into any international
years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall,
e and maintain the security of
if any of them so requests, consult together for
area.
magement in conflict with this Treaty.
the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having re-
rmed attack and all measures take
ARTICLE 9
gard for the factors then affecting peace and
reof shall immediately be reports
The Parties hereby establish a council, on
security in the North Atlantic area, including
Council. Such measures shall
which each of them shall be represented, to con-
the development of universal as well as regional
en the Security Council has take
skier matters concerning the implementation of
arrangements under the Charter of the United
necessary to restore and maints
this Treaty. The council shall be so organized
Nations for the maintenance of international
eace and security.
is to be able to meet promptly at any time. The
peace and security.
ARTICLE 6¹
council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as
ARTICLE 13
rpose of Article 5 an armed attac
may be necessary; in particular it shall establish
immediately a defense committee which shall
After the Treaty has been in force for twenty
e of the Parties is deemed to
arommend measures for the implementation of
years, any Party may cease to be a party one year
Articles 3 and 5.
after its notice of denunciation has been given
was modified by the Greece-Tum
2, 1951, to read as follows:
to the Government of the United States of Amer-
pose of Article 5, an armed attack
ARTICLE 10
ica, which will inform the Governments of the
the Parties is deemed to include
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement,
other Parties of the deposit of each notice of
invite any other European state in a position to
denunciation.
territory of any of the Parties in Euro
ca, on the Algerian Departments
further the principles of this Treaty and to con-
territory of Turkey or on the islas
ARTICLE 14
tion of any of the Parties in the No
tibute to the security of the North Atlantic area
h of the Tropic of Cancer;
to accede to this Treaty. Any state so invited
This Treaty, of which the English and French
forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of
may become a party to the Treaty by depositing
texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in
or over these territories or any
of b instrument of accession with the Government
the archives of the Government of the United
1 which occupation forces of any of
tioned on the date when the Tres
the United States of America. The Govern-
States of America. Duly certified copies thereof
ce or the Mediterranean Sea or
ea north of the Tropic of Cancer."
ment of the United States of America will inform
will be transmitted by that Government to the
Governments of the other signatories.
421c
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
defense" in keeping with the provisions of the
United Nations Charter, and called for the "asso-
Command is under the Allied Command
Chief Channel (CINCHAN). There is
ciation of the United States, by constitutional
Canada-U. S. Regional Planning Group.
process, with such regional and other collective
the problems threatening the integrity and in
The NATO Crisis of the 1960's. Early
arrangements as are based on continuous and
effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect
the existence of NATO came to a head.
its national security." These presidential and
The major problem was the position of
legislative expressions of approval cleared the
on many NATO questions, coupled with
way for immediate negotiation.
transigence of French President Charl
North Atlantic Treaty. Preliminary negotiations
Gaulle. The German problem, the key
in advance of the North Atlantic Treaty were
new balance of power in Europe, remained
conducted among the five Brussels powers, the
The character and extent of the continuin
United States, and Canada, who agreed unani-
viet threat was always at the bottom of
mously on certain principles: (1) that the treaty
troversy. The debate on NATO strategy the
should be within the framework of the United
cially regarding nuclear weapons, widened
Nations; (2) that, while promoting peace and
deepened the breach between the powers.
security, it should positively resist aggression;
was also the question of what the future
(3) that it should be based on mutual aid and
tion of the alliance should be.
self-help; (4) that it should include nonmilitary
On March 7, 1966, President de Gaulie
Rom
features; and (5) that it should be implemented
formed U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson
by a formal organization. Those negotiating the
France, while adhering to the basic terms
treaty also wished to bring other countries of
Atlantic Alliance, would take measures "to
western Europe into the defense group. At
on her whole territory the full exercise
length, on April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic
sovereignty" now reduced by Allied troop
Treaty was signed in Washington by the Brus-
ence therein and by their use of her air
sels powers (the United Kingdom, France, Bel-
withdraw from the integrated commands;
gium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), the
end the use of her forces by NATO. On
United States, Canada, Portugal, Denmark, Nor-
10, 1966, a French aide-mémoire was address
way, Italy, and Iceland.
to the other 14 NATO members. The
On Oct. 22, 1951, the member nations of the
government argued that NATO no longer
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
to the world situation as it did in 1949, for
agreed to a protocol that would admit Greece and
following reasons: (1) threats to European
fuh
Turkey, and on Feb. 18, 1952, the two countries
curity were no longer seriously imminent or
NAT
acceded to the treaty. Subsequent protocols pro-
acing; (2) Europe, having been reconstruc
vided for the admission of West Germany, effec-
economically, recovered its own "means of
posed
tive May 9, 1955, as the 15th member of NATO,
tion"; (3) the United States monopoly of nucl
acce
and of Spain, effective May 30, 1982, as the orga-
power had yielded to a balance of nuclear DOW
nization's 16th member.
between the United States and the Soviet
support
Organization of NATO. The organization of
and (4) Europe was no longer the center
Pa
NATO is both complicated and elaborate. On
international crises.
Nigati
the civilian and policymaking side is the North
Accordingly, France proposed to withd
firee
N
Atlantic Council. Its meetings, held twice a year,
land and air forces stationed in Germany
of
are generally attended by the foreign, defense,
assigned to the Allied command in Europe.
dructio
and finance ministers of the member states. Each
step would require its withdrawal from the
nation.
member state also has a permanent representative.
integrated commands then covering the From
obligati
Acting together, these representatives form a
troops so assigned-Supreme Allied Comn
your 0
continuing body. The council determines major
Europe and Allied Forces Central Europe
Bec
NATO policies, assumes financial and administra-
mand, or AFCENT-and the transfer from Free
NW
ba
tive responsibility for NATO in behalf of the
territory of the headquarters of these commind
ation
member states, and supplies necessary linkages
(At that time both SHAPE and AFCENT health
Union
between NATO's civilian and military bodies.
quarters were located near Paris.) French
pressed
The International Secretariat is headed by
plementation of certain bilateral agreements,
specia
the secretary-general, who is the administrative
pecially those with the United States, world
could
and planning head of NATO. An international
cease. The French government insisted on
powers
staff that serves under him is recruited on the
continued participation in the alliance and
many
basis of merit and represents NATO as an inter-
its willingness to share in the military defense
many
national body.
the area covered by the treaty. A second aid
NATO
The military structure of NATO is determined
mémoire was sent by France to the other NATO
anread
by the North Atlantic Council. The Military
members on March 29, 1966, reaffirming
ended
Committee advises the council on military af-
implementing the first memorandum.
play in
fairs and directs the subordinate military bodies.
The 14 NATO partners of France, surprise
Diss
The committee's work is supported by the Inter-
and stung by the bold and unusual course France
NATO
national Military Staff.
had taken, issued a "common declaration
threat
There are three commands in the area covered
March 18, 1966. In it they reaffirmed the effer
Non,
by NATO: the European, the Atlantic Ocean,
tiveness of the Atlantic Alliance as an "instrument
Allianc
and the Channel. The European Command is
of defense and deterrence" and their belief in 17
Ge
under the Allied Command Europe (ACE),
necessity and permanence of the organization
in
which is subdivided into subordinate commands
"No system of bilateral arrangements," it
duced
and is headed bv the Supreme Allied Com-
clared, "can be a substitute." And the treaty
tion mi
mander Europe (SACEUR), with headquarters
organization were far more than mere "instru
States
(Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, or
ments of common defense."
sively
SHAPE) near Mons in Belgium. The Atlantic
President Johnson, on March 23, 1966, replice
defens
Command is under the Supreme Allied Com-
to President de Gaulle's letter of March 7, check
of the
mander Atlantic (SACLANT), and the Channel
lenging the validity of most of the positions
viet U
ZATION
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
421d
is under the Allied Comma
French and arguing for
Although admitting that the Soviet Union had
nel (CINCHAN). There
by France of its com-
changed the tone of its communications and soft-
;. Regional Planning Group.
United States replied,
ened the style of its procedures and approaches,
o Crisis of the 1960's. Early
12, 1966, to the second French aide-
many nevertheless argued that at bottom there
IS threatening the integrity
protesting the French interpretation of
was no change in the Soviet Union's ultimate
e of NATO came to a head.
and status of the organization and
objectives and that the subjection of Europe to
or problem was the position
action. It also criticized
its will remained its goal. "Peaceful coexistence"
ATO questions, coupled with of
United States military ac-
was represented as a temporary Soviet stance.
of French President Charl
under certain bilateral agreements. In
Soviet positions on Germany, on Europe, and on
e German problem, the key
of the French attitude, the United States
important phases of disarmament, it was held,
of power in Europe, remained
to remove its facilities from France.
remained fixed and inflexible. Those holding this
er and extent of the continul
"new" NATO, without France as a part-
view maintained that the Soviet Union was com-
vas always at the bottom of
under way. The Supreme Headquarters,
mitted to the destruction of NATO, the severance
e debate on NATO strategy
of Powers, Europe (SHAPE) was located at
of Europe from its American ties, and the isola-
ling nuclear weapons, widen
Casteau" near the Mons area in Belgium,
tion of the United States from world affairs. Nor,
e breach between the powers,
30 miles (50 km) southwest of Brussels.
according to their argument, should one be de-
question of what the future
CENT was transferred to Brunssum, the Neth-
luded by Soviet-bloc recommendations that the
alliance should be.
The NATO Defense College was moved
NATO and Warsaw pacts be terminated and
eh 7, 1966, President de Caul
tome. The North Atlantic Council and the
replaced with a general European security treaty.
President Lyndon B. Johnson
ary Committee were to have their headquar-
They contended that the threats of the Soviet
e adhering to the basic terms
Brussels. Clearly the action of France con-
Union, both current and potential, had not dis-
ance, would take measures "to
ably deranged the working and operations of
appeared; that no positive concessions to the
le territory the full exercise
110. Nevertheless, the 14 full members showed
Allies on major questions had been forthcoming;
now reduced by Allied troop
determination to carry on and a readiness
and that the Western Allies, by means of a gen-
and by their use of her air
dapt to changed situations and conditions.
eral and generous détente, could easily find them-
m the integrated commands:
secretary-general declared that France had
selves defenseless if NATO were weakened or
of her forces by NATO. On
drawn from the integrated military part but
abandoned. Their countries and peoples would
French aide-mémoire was add
toued to participate in the council, several
then be at the mercy of the Soviet Union.
14 NATO members. The
nittees, and several agencies. Finally, the
Conflict between Member-States. The first con-
argued that NATO no longer
and determination shown by the 14 active
flict between two NATO member-states occurred
situation as it did in 1949,
thers assured a continuing viable NATO for
in 1974. With Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in
asons: (1) threats to Europe
future.
July 1974 in response to a Greek-led coup on the
10 longer seriously imminent or
NATO and the Unification of Germany. The
island-republic, Greece withdrew from NATO's
Europe, having been reconstr
baffling continuing problem of NATO was
military wing, thus jeopardizing NATO's posi-
recovered its own "means
by Germany. One of West Germany's aims
tion in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Mid-
e United States monopoly of nuc
accepting integration into the European Com-
dle East. When Turkey blocked Greece's return
elded to a balance of nuclear
munity and the Atlantic Alliance was to secure
to NATO's military wing, Greece threatened to
United States and the Soviet
apport from the Allies for German reunification.
deny the United States the use of its naval bases
rope was no longer the center
The Paris Protocol of 1954 virtually imposes an
and facilities. Ultimately Greece and Turkey
crises.
Nigation for such support. It is true that only
composed their differences, which led to the
gly, France proposed to with
Aree NATO members were parties to the Proto-
reintegration of Greece into NATO's military
forces stationed in Germany
of Occupation and participated in the recon-
structure on Oct. 20, 1980.
ne Allied command in Europe.
nuction of Germany as a free and independent
Strategic Control of Nuclear Weapons. The
equire its withdrawal from the
ation. But membership in NATO shifted the
strategic debate on the use of nuclear weapons
mmands then covering the Fre
oligation of the three powers to a general Euro-
by NATO raised fundamental questions. Should
signed-Supreme Allied Comn
gran one.
the United States continue its exclusive control of
Allied Forces Central Europe
Because Germany could well determine the
the nuclear weapons of the Atlantic Alliance? Or
CENT-and the transfer from
balance of power in Europe, German reunifi-
should this control be shared? If so, how should
le headquarters of these comma
extion remained the pivotal problem. The Soviet
the sharing be allocated? Should there be a
both SHAPE and AFCENT
Valon understandably favored the status quo and
European nuclear force independent of the United
located near Paris.) French
pressed the argument against the Western Allies,
States? Should a "nonproliferation" treaty over-
of certain bilateral agreements,
specially West Germany. "Why not peace now?"
ride any and all arrangements for a nuclear force
e with the United States
could be a compelling argument. The NATO
within NATO? France had taken unilateral ac-
French government insisted on
powers could not forget their obligation to Ger-
tion regarding atomic weapons, and the United
rticipation in the alliance and
many without serious consequences within Ger-
States monopoly had been under serious attack.
to share in the military defense
many itself. French unilateral action had crippled
A nonnroliferation treaty, coupled with a binding
red by the treaty. A second
NATO's ability to meet this situation. Military
legal obligation, could seriously affect present and
sent by France to the other NATI
creadiness, whether multilateral or unilateral,
future nuclear policies and activities of the NATO
March 29, 1966, reaffirming
Inded to enhance the German status quo and to
allies. The idea of a separate European nuclear
the first memorandum.
play into the hands of the Warsaw powers.
force, both widely supported and attacked, seemed
ATO partners of France, surpris
Dispute over Soviet Intentions. An issue dividing
to hang on the possibility of European nuclear
the bold and unusual course Fra
NATO members was the seriousness of the Soviet
sufficiency without the United States.
sued a "common declaration
"threat" to the West. This threat was the occa-
By the late 1970's, NATO's Nuclear Planning
66. In it they reaffirmed the el
sion, if not the cause, of the original Atlantic
Group agreed on the stationing of medium-
Atlantic Alliance as an "instrum
Alliance and organization.
range U.S. nuclear missiles in western Europe
I deterrence" and their belief in
General de Gaulle argued that the threat, if it
and recommended that NATO's nuclear arms be
permanence of the organizati
still in fact existed, had been substantially re-
modernized. Nevertheless certain member-states
of bilateral arrangements," it
duced and modified, and therefore the organiza-
were wary of moving ahead with the deployment
e a substitute." And the treaty
Non might well be terminated. Some in the United
of nuclear weapons for fear that it would accel-
were far more than mere "instr
States wrote and spoke in behalf of an exclu-
erate the arms race with the Communist bloc.
mon defense."
evely European organization, both political and
Reorganization of NATO. There remained the
ohnson, on March 23, 1966, rep
defensive in nature, justified partly on the basis
organizational side of NATO. France, making a
le Gaulle's letter of March 7,
the supposedly changed character of the So-
fundamental distinction between the alliance
alidity of most of the positions
viet Union.
and the organization, would in theory at least
422
NORTH BAY-NORTH CAPE
continue the former and abandon the latter. It
NORTH BAY, a city in Ontario, Canada,
was clear that NATO, like all things of human
on the northeast shore of Lake Nipissing,
invention, must at certain intervals undergo fun-
Trans-Canada and Ferguson highways, 180 on
damental change. Such was the situation regard-
ing NATO. The organization showed remarkable
(290 km) north of Toronto. The leading ind
try is the manufacture of hardware, cull
firmness and flexibility in adjusting to the changes
mining equipment, frozen foods, and tools
dictated by French unilateral action. Some would
there are also planing mills, tanneries, and
continue the original treaty and organization on
yards. North Bay is a summer resort and
a multinational basis through the modification and
seat of Laurentian University and a teach
improvement of existing arrangements. Others
would develop a unified European political sys-
college. Nipissing Game Preserve and Timage
Provincial Forest are about 20 miles (32
tem with its own military command that could
northwest of the city.
function either independently or as a partner in
North Bay was founded in 1882. It
a world non-Communist system with the United
corporated as a town in 1890 and as a was city
States and Canada as the other principal partners.
1925. In 1953, uranium, tantalum, and CO
There was also the proposal of a political alliance
of states within which a nuclear force could be
bium were discovered in the Manitou Islands
miles (11 km) offshore. Population: 51,268
set up, with the power of decision committed to
the nuclear powers as well as to those non-
NORTH BERGEN, bûrgan, a township in
nuclear ones whose interests were most vitally
Jersey, situated in Hudson county, just north
affected.
of Jersey City. A residential and industrial
A question as old as the alliance itself was
munity, it has plants producing clothing, textil
how to achieve greater equality in planning and
knit goods, embroidery, buttons, jewelry, watch
decision making when the member-nations were
leather products, pens and pencils, metal good
so unequal in size, economic resources, popula-
batteries, electrical equipment, paper boxes,
tion strength, and military power. Despite con-
bulbs, beverages, lumber, and plumbing suppli
siderable cohesion, there were rival national
Incorporated in 1861, North Bergen is
concerns and conflicting national policies.
erned by a commission. Population: 47,019
Much criticism of the imbalance in consulta-
tion within NATO had been directed at the
NORTH BORNEO, formerly a British territory
United States. The United States was conscious
since 1963, the state of Sabah in East Malaysi
of the inequality of both responsibility and de-
occupying the northeast corner of the island
cision making among the Atlantic nations, and it
Borneo. See BORNEO; MALAYSIA.
proposed to share more generously the power to
Smc
decide and the obligation to assume regional and
NORTH BRABANT, bra-bänt, a province in
world responsibility. However, disunity within
Netherlands, bounded by the Dutch provinces
NATO, combined with divergent and sometimes
Zeeland on the west, of South Holland and
irreconcilable national policies, deterred the na-
Gelderland on the north, of Limburg on the earl
tions of Europe from exercising this right and
and by Belgium on the south. North Brabail
assuming this obligation.
(Dutch, Noord-Brabant) has an area of 1,89
Dealing with these problems was the major
square miles (4,911 sq km), and its capital
responsibility of the North Atlantic Council
's Hertogenbosch. Its economy is based
CA
s
and its subordinate bodies. However, its numer-
agriculture and the manufacture of electrics
ous communiqués, resolutions, and directives
equipment, pharmaceuticals, leather products
did not lead to final decisions and permanent
and textiles.
Section
solutions. Prime ministers and presidents as well
Once part of the medieval duchy of Brabant
L The La
as foreign, defense, and finance ministers were
it joined the United Provinces of the Netherland
Physical
likewise concerned on a national basis. Parlia-
in 1648. Population: (1977 est.) 2,011,578.
sions
mentary bodies were also deeply involved in
Rivers
Climate
NATO problems. From such consultations and
NORTH CANADIAN RIVER, one of the principal
Plants
discussions, a strengthened alliance and a re-
rivers of Oklahoma, 843 miles (1,357 km) long
mais
vitalized organization might emerge that could
2 The Pe
It rises in northeastern New Mexico and flows
fulfill most of the hopes and expectations of the
east through the panhandles of Texas and Okh
Western world.
homa and southeast through central Oklahoma
NORTH
CHARLES E. MARTIN*
past Oklahoma City.
one of t
University of Washington
The North Canadian formerly joined the
and thir
Bibliography
Canadian River a few miles east of Eufaulx
River, W
Ball, M. Margaret, NATO and the European Union
Okla., but a dam built below the junction formed
of 503 II
Movement (1959; reprint, Greenwood 1974).
the Eufaula Reservoir, backing up the water
Beer, Francis A., Integration and Disintegration in
of 187 I
NATO (Ohio State Univ. Press 1969).
along the North Canadian and Canadian rivert.
sandy oc
Fedder, Edwin H., NATO: The Dynamics of Alliance in
The North Canadian River is dammed 3 miles
wide At
the Postwar World (Harper 1973).
(5 km) north of Canton in west central Okla
Fox, William T., and Schilling, Warner R., eds., Euro-
to the hi
pean Security and the Atlantic System (Columbia
homa to create Canton Reservoir, which is used
tiins in
Univ. Press 1973).
for flood control and irrigation.
Hahn, Walter F., and Pflatzgraff, Robert L., Jr., eds.,
age syst
Atlantic Community in Crisis: A Redefinition of the
graphic
Transatlantic Relationship (Pergamon 1979).
NORTH CAPE, a promontory of the island
The
Ludz, Peter C., and others, Dilemmas of the Atlantic
Mageröy in northern Norway at latitude 71° 10
Alliance: Two Germanys, Scandinavia, Canada, NATO,
and Spa
20" N and longitude 25° 47' 40" E. It rises
and the EEC (Praeger 1975).
colonize
Richardson, James L., Germany and the Atlantic Al-
an altitude of about 1,007 feet (307 meters)
ever, di
liance (Harvard Univ. Press 1966).
above the Arctic Ocean and is visited by tourit
Royal Institute of International Affairs and Chatham
ships. Although it is often regarded as the
by Virg
House Study Group, Atlantic Alliance: NATO's Role
famland
in the Free World (1952; reprint, Greenwood 1979).
northernmost point of Europe, Knivskjellodden
lowed.
Strausz-Hupe, Robert, and Dougherty, J., Building the
an island 4 miles (6.5 meters) to the west
Atlantic World (1963; reprint, Greenwood 1974).
Western
northwest, lies, at latitude 71° 8" N.
of them
1112
WORLD WAR II IN THE WEST
Major obstacle was the Hürtgen Forest.
mored Division* thrust through the Sa-
The attack, on a narrow front, reached
verne Gap of the Vosges Mountains to
the Roer River, but crossing could not be
liberate Strasbourg (November 23), rous-
attempted until the dams near Schmidt
ing French national morale to a peak.
had been seized to prevent the Germans
The French First Army overran Mul-
from flooding the valley. A major offen-
house. Devers was now on the Rhine from
sive for this purpose was begun (Decem-
Karlsruhe to below Strasbourg, and again
ber 13).
from Mulhouse to the Swiss border; but
1944, November 16-December 15. Lorraine
the deep Colmar pocket in between was
Operations. Patton's Third Army cap-
still firmly held by Wiese's German Nine-
tured Metz (December 13) and battled its
teenth Army.
way across the Seille River.
*
Bitter personal enmity existed between
1944, November 16-December 15. Alsace
Leclerc and de Lattre de Tassigny; hence,
Operations. Devers' group made deep
the 2nd French Armored Division was never
gains; Seventh Army's French 2nd Ar-
under the latter's command.
German Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge), December, 1944-January, 1945
The German Plan. Hitler had prepared a striking force to split the Allies. His
armor would rip through to Antwerp, crippling their supply. He hoped to destroy
all Allied forces north of the line Antwerp-Brussels-Bastogne just as in 1940. Success
depended on three elements: (1) a breakthrough, (2) seizure of Allied fuel supplies
and the key focal points of communication in the area St.-Vith and Bastogne, and
(3) widening of the initial gap to increase the flow of invasion. Hitler's command-
ers, though dubious of success, obeyed orders.
1944, December 16-19. The German Blow.
eral Hasso von Manteuffel) Panzer armies
The operation was launched after a period
-24 divisions, 10 of them armored. The
of fog, rain, and snow blanketed Allied
Seventh Army (General Ernst Branden-
aerial observation and hobbled combat
berger) was to cover the southern flank.
capabilities. The striking force, from
The initial wave-8 Panzer divisions-dis-
north to south, consisted of the Sixth SS
rupted the U.S. VIII Corps. Tactical and
(General Sepp Dietrich) and Fifth (Gen-
strategic surprise was complete. (SHAEF
ARDENNES CAMPAIGN
16 Dec. 1944-16 Jan. 1945
5
10
15
20
25
30
Liége
FIFTEENTH
o
Scale of miles
&
Verviers
Monschau
Huy
R
Z
Namur
Sambre
R
XXXX
Malmedy
XXXX
U.S.
FIRST
FIFTH
Charleroi
HODGES
Stavelot
A
B
E
L
G
I
XXXX
U
M
Br.
SECOND
Dinant
St. Vith
(Part)
Marche .
Prum
M
16 Jan
4
XXXX
Lesse
Rochefort
SIXTH
Houffalize
16 Dec.
R
R.
26 Dec.
St. Hubert
Bastogne
L x M B
E
SEVENTH
Libramont
03
XXXX
F
R
A
N
C
E
U.S.
THIRD
G
PATTON
Mezières
Trier
VEST
THE WAR IN THE WEST, 1944
1113
Division* thrust through the Sa-
intelligence estimates had dismissed all
weight of the German assault to Manteuf-
ap of the Vosges Mountains to
probability of any immediate major Ger-
fel's Fifth Panzer Army, but Hitler, ob-
Strasbourg (November 23), rous-
man offensive capability.) The 106th Di-
stinate and ignorant, insisted the decisive
ich national morale to a peak.
vision, just arrived on the front, and the
blow be struck by his SS pet, Dietrich.
:nch First Army overran Mul-
28th Division, recuperating from severe
By December 22, Patton was attacking
evers was now on the Rhine from
fighting at Schmidt, were shattered. A par-
north toward beleaguered Bastogne on a
e to below Strasbourg, and again
atroop drop in the area Eupen-Monschau,
2-corps front, while Devers' 6th Army
alhouse to the Swiss border; but
and a spearhead force of English-speaking
Group extended its left to cover his ad-
Colmar pocket in between was
German soldiers in American uniforms,
vance. Dietrich's penetration in the Man-
ly held by Wiese's German Nine-
added to panic and confusion behind the
hay-Stavelot area, and Manteuffel's spear-
rmy.
assault zone. But on the north flank, the
heads-Panzer Lehr and 2nd Panzer di-
U.S. V Corps, halting its own offensive
visions-were grinding to a halt with
personal enmity existed between
toward the Roer dams, held firm, as did
empty fuel tanks at Celles, almost in
d de Lattre de Tassigny; hence,
the U.S. 4th Division on the south. Canal-
ench Armored Division was never
sight of the Meuse, to be struck by Amer-
atter's command.
ized between these shoulders, the attack
ican and British counterattacks (Decem-
roared on toward the Meuse. Two U.S.
ber 25-26). Hitler's gamble had failed.
ecember, 1944-January, 1945
armored divisions were rushed in by Brad-
Patton's Third Army punched a hole
ley as immediate reinforcement. Eisen-
through Manteuffel's troops to reach Bas-
ng force to split the Allies. His
hower then committed the SHAEF reserve
togne (December 26), and, with the first
r supply. He hoped to destroy
-the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions
clear weather, Allied air began pounding
astogne, just as in 1940. Success
(recuperating near Reims from their Maas
German supply trains west of St.-Vith.
operation). Truckborne, they arrived (De-
) seizure of Allied fuel supplies
1944, December 26-1945, January 2. The
cember 19)-the 101st (under Brigadier
Battle for Bastogne. Hitler insisted on
ea St.-Vith and Bastogne, and
General Anthony C. McAuliffe) at Bas-
the capture of Bastogne, and a furious
of invasion. Hitler's command-
togne, a check to Fifth Panzer Army's
battle raged for a week while the German
progress, and the 82nd (Major General
tide ebbed elsewhere in the Bulge under
Matthew B. Ridgway) to bolster the
Allied pressure. Attempting to disrupt Al-
SO von Manteuffel) Panzer armies
northern flank. Montgomery began shift-
lied air support, the Luftwaffe made its
isions, 10 of them armored. The
ing 1 British corps to backstop the opera-
last offensive strike (January 1), some 800
Army (General Ernst Branden-
tion along the Meuse. At Bradley's order,
planes attacking airfields in France, Bel-
was to cover the southern flank.
Patton (December 18) halted his Third
gium, and Holland, and destroying 156
al wave-8 Panzer divisions-dis-
Army's advance in the Saar to begin an
Allied planes. The attack was repulsed
ne U.S. VIII Corps. Tactical and
amazing 90° shift in direction to the
with heavy losses to the Germans, and the
surprise was complete. (SHAEF
north, to hit the German southern flank.
Allied air offensive over the Ardennes area
1944, December 20-26. Allied Recovery.
and German rear elements continued.
Eisenhower transferred command of all
1945, January 3-16. Allied Counteroffensive.
U.S. troops north of the bulge to Mont-
On the northern flank of the German pen-
FIFTEENTH
gomery, leaving only Patton's army under
etration, Montgomery unleashed Hodges'
erviers
Monschau
Bradley. Despite a desperate defense of
U.S. First Army. German offensive efforts
St.-Vith by the U.S. 7th Armored Di-
near Bastogne were repulsed, and Pat-
N
vision (Brigadier General R. W. Has-
ton's increasing efforts, supported by XIX
Malmedy
xxxx
brouck), the Sixth Panzer Army forged
Tactical Air Force, shrank the southern
FIFTH
Stavelot
A
slowly ahead (December 19-22), but the
face of the German penetration. Hitler
delay had been fatal to the German plan.
permitted withdrawal of the Sixth Panzer
M
St. Vith
The V Corps was still presenting an im-
Army (January 8; see p. 1122). The Bulge
Prum
M
penetrable front, while the U.S. VII Corps
was eliminated (January 16). Hodges'
XXXX
SIXTH
was hurrying southwest to seal the re-
First Army returned to Bradley's control
mainder of the northern flank. At Bas-
(January 18), but Simpson's Ninth Army
16 Dec.
R
togne, the 101st Airborne, with some other
remained in Montgomery's 21st Army
units-some 18,000 men in all-resisted
Group.
all efforts of the Fifth Panzer Army to
E
COMMENT. Hitler's Ardennes offensive
SEVENTH
B
overrun their perimeter. However, the in-
was a gamble, pure and simple. The blow
vading tide, lapping around Bastogne,
was checked first by the resistance of the
G
progressed northwest toward the Meuse.
U.S. elements on both shoulders, next by
Model, commanding Army Group B,
Hasbrouck's stand at St.-Vith and McAul-
Trier
quite properly desired now to shift the
iffe's epic defense of Bastogne. Hitler's re-
1114
WORLD WAR II IN THE WEST
fusal to shift the weight of the attack to the
men killed, wounded, or missing, 600 tanks
flank making the best progress was stupid.
and assault guns, 1,600 planes, and 6,000
When the German armor was unable to over-
vehicles. Allied losses (mostly American)
run Allied fuel depots to replenish its tanks,
were approximately 7,000 killed, 33,400
the end was inevitable. The net result was a
wounded, 21,000 captured or missing, and
delay of about 6 weeks to Allied operations
730-odd tanks and tank destroyers. Among
in the west, while Hitler had expended the
the Americans were 86 prisoners captured
slim reserves with which he otherwise might
by the 1st SS Panzer Division at Malmédy
have checked the coming Russian spring of-
on December 17th, then lined up and ruth-
fensive. German losses were some 120,000
lessly machine-gunned to death.
The Eastern Front
RUSSIAN WINTER OFFENSIVE
Following a series of probing attacks, the Soviet armies launched a concerted
drive as winter hardened roads and froze the waterways.
1944, January 15-19. Liberation of Lenin-
to penetrate the German right. Novgorod
grad. Two Russian army groups fell on
was taken (January 19). German forces
the German Eighteenth Army, investing
under General Georg Lindemann escaped
Leningrad. General L. A. Govorov's Len-
annihilation only by rapid withdrawal. A
ingrad Front, crossing the frozen Gulf of
third Russian group-General M. M. Po-
Finland, pierced the German left, while
pov's Second Baltic Front-threatened fur-
General Kirill A. Meretskov's Volkhov
ther envelopment and caused the retire-
Front swept over frozen lakes and swamps
ment of General von Kuechler's entire
RUSSIAN CONQUEST
FINIAND
OF EASTERN EUROPE
Leningrad
OCTOBER, 1944-APRIL, 1945
SEPT. 15
DENMARK
SWEDEN
Riga
BALTIC SEA
HAMBURG
Danzig
MAY 7
Stettin
BERLIN
Minsk
R.
APRIL 15
Vislula
Biolystok
Dnieper
1941 RUSSIAN BORDER
GERMANY
WARSAW
Brest
apo
POLAND
UNION OF
Nürnberg
R
PRAGUE
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
CHECHOSIOVACIA
Kiev
Przemysi
Donube
Lwow
S
Vienna
DEC. 15
AUSTRIA
BUDAPEST
Driester
HUNGARY
Odessa
BELGRADE
RUMANIA
BUCHAREST
YUGOSLAVIA
BLACK SEA
0
100
200
BUIGARIA
Scale of Miles
OPERATIONS IN 1918
985
1918, September 28-October 14. Offensive
government took power and proclaimed a
JSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE
in Flanders. British-Belgian troops of
republic (November 9). The Kaiser fled
26 September-11 November 1918
King Albert's army group swept over the
to Holland (November 10).
0
5
10
Ypres Ridge, but then slowed down as
1918, November 7-11. Armistice Negotia-
Scale of miles
swampy country choked all supply, and
Rupprecht's army group fought back
tions. A German delegation, headed by
LUX.
grimly.
a civilian, Matthias Erzberger, negotiated
an armistice with Foch in his railway
1918, October 17-November 11. Advance to
coach headquarters on a siding at Com-
the Sambre and the Scheldt. Because of
piègne. Agreement was finally reached at
American progress in the Meuse-Argonne,
5 A.M., November 11, 1918. The terms,
a German retreat all along the line be-
which were in effect a German surrender,
Z
came necessary. Ludendorff hoped that he
provided that the German Army must im-
could re-establish a new line west of the
mediately evacuate all occupied territory
A
German border and by a determined de-
and Alsace-Lorraine; immediately surren-
of American divs. served
fense through the winter force the Allies
se French corps.
M
der great quantities of war matériel (in-
to grant generous terms. But his hopes
cluding 5,000 guns and 25,000 machine
R
were foiled by the pressure being main-
guns); evacuate German territory west of
tained all along the Allied lines. In a re-
E
the Rhine, and three bridgeheads over the
Metz
newed British assault, Rawlinson's Fourth
Rhine, to be occupied by the Allies; sur-
G
Army broke through German defenses
11 Nov.
render all submarines; intern all other
Moselle
on the Selle River (October 17). Byng's
surface warships as directed by the Allies.
Third Army forced a crossing lower down
1918, November 11. The Armistice. Hos-
26 Sept.
(October 20). The drive threw back
tilities ceased at 11 A.M.; the terms of the
XXX
Boehn's army group with the loss of 20,-
IV
armistice immediately became effective.
000 prisoners. At the same time the Bel-
COMMENT. Comparisons are invidious.
ed 12 Oct.,
XXX
:ked 10 Nov.
VI
gians and British began to move again in
The American Expeditionary Force was the
FR.
Flanders. The German Army began to
vital factor in the final Allied victory; the
crack.
Meuse-Argonne offensive was decisive; 6
; vital artery of supply for the en-
other American divisions played important
rman front. A spectacular drive
The German Collapse
spearhead roles elsewhere on the front dur-
an by the U.S. 1st Division was
/ checked by orders from higher
1918, October 6. Request for an Armistice.
ing the final Allied advances. But the ques-
As the front lines began to crumble, the
tion whether Allied victory could have been
y, to permit the French the honor
g the city and erasing the stain of
new German chancellor, Prince Max of
achieved without the Americans should not
D disaster (see p. 835). Bullard's
Baden, sent a message to President Wil-
be debated. The American role was to add a
Army launched its final attack
son, requesting an armistice on the basis
final increment of numbers and fresh initia-
of Wilson's Fourteen Points (see p. 977).
tive, permitting the much larger, and more
ber 10), driving for Montmédy.
by the armistice ended all hostili-
An exchange of messages concluded (Oc-
experienced, Allied armies to achieve equally
tober 23) with Wilson's insistence that the
spectacular successes in the final weeks of
U.S. (and the Allies) would not negotiate
the war.
tish, French, and
an armistice with the existing military
fensives
dictatorship.
The Italian Front
tember 27-October 17. Storming
1918, October 27. Resignation of Luden-
1918, June 15-22. Austrian Offensive. Ger-
denburg Line. One day after the
dorff. Just before formal dismissal, Lu-
many during the spring transferred her
g of the American offensive,
dendorff resigned to permit the desperate
troops in Italy to the Western Front, in-
rmy group flung itself against the
German government to comply with Wil-
sisting that the Austrians crush Italy sin-
ourg Line. Trading space for time
son's demand. Hindenburg, however, re-
glehanded. The argument had weight,
front, Boehn's army group man-
tained his post as German commander in
since Russia was out of the war. Both
withdraw after a succession of
chief, with General Wilhelm Groener re-
Conrad (now commanding on the Tren-
nd gallant British attacks drove
placing Ludendorff as Quartermaster Gen-
tino front) and Borojevic, on the Piave,
the last of the Hindenburg Line
eral (Chief of Staff).
demanded command of the decisive ef-
(October 5). To Haig's surprise,
1918, October 29-November 10. Revolution
fort. A compromise decision by Archduke
been unable to achieve a com-
in Germany. Inspired by the Commu-
Joseph permitted them to attack simulta-
eakthrough, and the momentum
nists and sparked by a mutiny of the High
neously. Since the mountainous terrain
rive slowed down in the face of
Seas Fleet, disorders, revolts, and mutinies
and lack of lateral communications would
German defense.
flared inside Germany. A new Socialist
prevent mutual support, the available re-
VEST
OPERATIONS IN 1940
1059
ally had some 600,000 men in
II. The Dutch Army theoreti-
German Plans. Following overwhelming terror bombardment, Army Group B
and of General Henri G. Win-
would overrun Holland. Moving more slowly into Belgium to encourage the Allied
h countries had elaborate de--
left-flank armies to rush to the assistance of the Low Countries, Army Group A
tworks, with further arrange-
would then hurl an armored drive through the Ardennes Forest and via the Stenay
Gap into France. Thus splitting the Allied armies (cutting off those which had ad-
vanced into Belgium), Army Group A would continue westward to Calais and roll
Groningen
the northern portion of the Anglo-British forces against the anvil of Army Group B
in the Low Countries. Subsequent, prompt southward exploitation of the gap would
then roll the southern French armies back upon the Maginot Line, where Army
Group C would be waiting.
Allied Plans. The French were still thinking in terms of the Schlieffen Plan
D
S
of 1914, a southwesterly sickle movement through Belgium. The Allied plan pro-
posed, therefore-just as the Germans expected-to meet the expected invasion on
the Dyle Line of Belgium, pivoting the First Army Group about the northern tip of
XXXX
XXXXX
the Maginot Line.
R.
18
B
KUECHLER
1
xxxx
BOCK
BATTLE OF FLANDERS,
Dutch flooding of much of the country-
REICHENAU
MAY IO-JUNE 4
side. By the 13th, German main elements
had begun to force their way into the so-
*****
Invasion of the Low Countries
called Fortress of Holland, joining up with
XXXX
1940, May 10. The German Assault. Fol-
most of the paratroops, who had seized
ael
KLUGE
xxxx
lowing predawn bombardments of all ma-
and held the key bridges over the Rhine
STRAUSS
XXXX
jor Dutch and Belgian airfields, Army
estuary. At the same time, German spear-
12
XXXX
XXXXX
LIST
2
A
Groups A and B crossed the Belgian and
heads met advance elements of the French
XXXX
WEICHS
RUNDSTEDT
Dutch frontiers. Initially the main effort
Seventh Army (Henri Giraud) near Breda,
16
BUSCH
PAN
Rhine
was on the right, by Army Group B, in
and drove them back toward Antwerp.
KLEIST
a
Holland. Paratroop drops in the vicinity
The Queen of the Netherlands and her
STATE
of Rotterdam, The Hague, Moerdijk, and
government escaped by ship to England
XXXXX
C
XXXX
Dortrecht quickly paralyzed the interior
from The Hague. Germany demanded
LEEB
of the Netherlands. Early in the day,
complete surrender, on pain of the de-
WITZLEBEN
glider and parachute units landed on the
struction of all Dutch cities by aerial
top of powerful Fort Eban Emael, north-
bombardment (May 14). As proof of its
Metz
ern anchor of the main Belgian defense
intentions, the Luftwaffe brutally de-
XXXX
line, neutralizing it, while other German
stroyed the entire business section of Rot-
4
XXXX
5
troops crossed the Albert Canal, which
terdam while negotiations were in proc-
REQUIN
BOURRET
should have been defended by Eban
ess. Winkelman surrendered.
AT
Strasbourg
Emael's guns. The violence and success of
1940, May 11-15. Fall of Belgium. Follow-
the initial German attacks, combined with
ing a similar pattern of bombings, the
R.
Colmar
terror bombings of the interior regions of
German Sixth Army (Reichenau) drove
xxxx
both countries, threw their populaces into
southwest. Fort Eban Emael fell to its au-
XXX
DOLLMANN
confusion and panic.
dacious attackers. As the Germans poured
XXXX
3
1940, May 10. Churchill Becomes Britain's
across the Albert Canal, the Belgian Army
GARCHERY
SON
Prime Minister. News of the early Ger-
retired to the Dyle Line, to be reinforced
Basel
man successes aroused great alarm in Paris
(May 12) by elements of the BEF and
and London. Prime Minister Chamber-
the First French Army (Georges Blan-
lain, whose government had been tottering
chard). By the 15th, some 35 Allied di-
g dikes. The troops, however,
because of failures in Norway and general
visions-including most of the BEF-
ess modern and less complete
lack of popular support, resigned to per-
were in the area Namur-Antwerp, with
ous deficiency, however, was
mit lionhearted Winston S. Churchill to
the German Sixth Army probing the Dyle
could remain neutral, neither
lead a coalition British government in the
Line in their front and the Eighteenth
int defensive plans with the
face of the German avalanche.
(Georg von Kuechler), now turning
ort to carry on even informal
1940, May 11-14. Fall of Holland. Pressing
southward from Holland, threatening their
its initial advantage, German Army Group
left flank. At about the same time, these
B pressed steadily forward, despite frantic
Allied units realized that to their right
1060
WORLD WAR II IN THE WEST
L
A
N
Note: Arrows Indicate location
D
S
CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST
of German forces 21 May.
18 May
Situation 21 May 1940 and
N
approximate Allied lines
16 and 18 May
Ostend
Concis
.
Antwerp
o
20
40
60
Bruges
****
Dunkirk
XXXX
Albert
Scale of miles
18
Calais
Allied line
BELG
KUECHLER
21 May
Demer
R.
Country
NETH
Ypres
Brussels
Masstricht
Boutogne
****
****
SMOUP
allay
Wavre
Eber/Emael
Lillee
BEF
REICHENAU
Liege
Maulde
Meuse
XXXX
Namur
SEX
2
Sambre
Maubeuge
Dinant
Abbeville
16 May
XXXX
Amiens
KLUGE
Peronna
XXXX
Montherme
9
STRAUSS
R
****
21 May
Mazieres
2
WEICHS
Moselle
LIST
Sedan
****
XXXX
16
BUSCH
WITZLEBEN
Aisne R.
****
Soissons
2
1005
W
&
XXXX
Oise
Reims
3
R.
Verdun
Metz.
Chateau
Seine
XXXX
R.
Thierry
Chalons
4
Menux
Paris
Mostile
rear the French center was being torn
als hurried their cavalry forward to cross
apart.
the Meuse and delay until both armies
could establish themselves on the river.
Northern France
1940, May 13-15. Across the Meuse. But
1940, May 10-12. Advance through the Ar-
Corap was slow, and Huntziger's cavalry
dennes. The German hammer blow—
was outflanked. Supported by devastating
Rundstedt's Army Group A-moved
dive-bombing attacks against accurate
through the difficult Ardennes simultane-
French artillery, one of Hoth's armored
ously with the assaults on Holland and
divisions forced a river crossing at Haux;
Belgium, but by nature of the terrain and
General Georg-Hans Reinhardt's corps of
road net did not reach the Meuse until
Kleist's Panzer Group was similarly get-
May 12. This calculated delay was suffi-
ting over at Monthermé and General
cient to coax the Allied forces north of the
Heinz Guderian's corps at Sedan (May
Sambre in motion into Belgium. Leading
13). Despite the now frantic efforts of the
the 3 German invading columns was Gen-
French, the bridgeheads were quickly ex-
eral Paul L. E. von Kleist's Panzer Group
panded. The French Ninth Army was
(5 armored and 3 mechanized divisions),
completely shattered, and the Second
to its north General Hermann Hoth's Pan-
Army's left pulverized (May 15). The
zer Corps (2 armored divisions). Never
German armor, spearheaded by Stuka
dreaming that the Germans would make
dive bombers, roared west on a 50-mile
their main effort through the hilly, for-
front, while behind them fast-moving Ger-
ested Ardennes, General André-Georges
man infantry poured through the gap.
Corap's Ninth French Army and General
1940, May 16-21. The Drive to the Chan-
Charles Huntziger's Second had their
nel. All too late, Gamelin ordered up
weakest elements in the Stenay Gap area,
divisions from the French general reserve,
while the Ardennes Forest itself was
and from the armies south of the German
screened only by small French cavalry
drive, into. a new Sixth Army (General
and Belgian chasseur units, which were
Touchon) to plug the gap. General Henri
quickly brushed aside. With first word of
Giraud, succeeding the inefficient Corap,
the German advance, both French gener-
attempted to regroup the Ninth Army in
ST
OPERATIONS IN 1940
1061
the face of the tidal wave, but it was
1940, May 26-28. Hitler's Stop Order. By
AMPAIGN IN THE WEST
Situation 21 May 1940 and
completely routed (May 17), and Giraud
the Führer's command, the armored at-
approximate Allied lines
was captured. Brigadier General Charles
tack from the south was halted peremp-
16 and 18 May
0
20
40
60
A. J. M. de Gaulle's 4th Armored Divi-
torily. This incredible order permitted the
Scale of miles
sion made 3 successive punches into the
hasty organization of perimeter defenses
NETH.
German south flank from Laon (May
around Dunkirk and the equally hasty
Masstricht
17-19), but after limited success (the only
concentration of evacuation craft from the
successful French attacks of the cam-
British Channel ports. The Luftwaffe was
EberyEmael
ege
paign) his gallant troops were turned
given the mission of pulverizing the Dun-
back by dive bombers and counterattacks.
kirk perimeter. But the Germans in the
Gamelin was relieved, General Maxime
air met an intensive, continuous attack by
Weygand taking supreme Allied com-
the RAF Fighter Command which, from
mand (May 19). German armor reached
bases in southern Britain, nullified Ger-
the seacoast west of Abbeville, com-
man operations in a series of spectacular
***
STRAUSS
pletely splitting the Allied forces and
air battles.
****
Mosella
severing communications with the BEF's
1940, May 28-June 4. Evacuation from
WEICHS
****
base port, Cherbourg (May 31). While
Dunkirk. Hitler rescinded his stop order
BUSCH
the French to the south attempted to hold
and the German armor resumed assaults
WITZLEBEN
the line of the Somme and Aisne rivers,
on the Allied right, to be checked by 3 Brit-
100S
the severed northern grouping found itself
ish divisions aligned in deep zonal defense.
****
being pinned against the sea.
A conglomeration of some 850 British ves-
Verdun
Metze
1940, May 21-25. Exploitation in the North.
sels of every shape, size, and propulsion-
The German armor wheeled northward in
most of them manned by civilian volun-
3 prongs, from the seacoast to Arras,
teers-converged on Dunkirk to begin the
while the Fourth (Günther von Kluge),
most amazing exodus in history. In 8 days,
Sixth, and Eighteenth Armies pressed in
their cavalry forward to cross
more than 338,000 men-among them
from the east on the French First Army,
and delay until both armies
112,000 French and Belgian soldiers-
the BEF, and the Belgian Army. Lord
lish themselves on the river.
were lifted. The troops streamed in or-
Gort, on the First Army left, sent a task
3-15. Across the Meuse. But
derly lines over wharves and beaches and
force south behind the French to bolster
slow, and Huntziger's cavalry
through the surf, while overhead Spitfires
the right flank and to counterattack the
ked. Supported by devastating
of the Royal Air Force beat off most of
German armor at Arras, but this effort
ng attacks against accurate
the Luftwaffe's attempts at strafing, and
was repulsed by General Erwin Rommel's
llery, one of Hoth's armored
their comrades along the ever-shrinking
7th Panzer Division (May 21). Guderian's
rced a river crossing at Haux;
armored corps captured Boulogne and iso-
defensive perimeter held back German as-
org-Hans Reinhardt's corps of
lated the British garrison of Calais (May
saults. On the final night (June 4), Gen-
izer Group was similarly get-
22-23). Dunkirk was chosen as substitute
eral Harold Alexander, commanding the
at Monthermé and General
British base. The unbearable pressure of
rear guard, personally toured the beaches
erian's corps at Sedan (May
the German attack forced the Allies off
and the harbor to verify the fact that the
e the now frantic efforts of the
the Escault River line into an ever-shrink-
last living British soldier had been em-
bridgeheads were quickly ex-
ing perimeter, with the full force of the
barked, then himself got into a boat. Next
he French Ninth Army was
German armor knocking against the BEF
morning the Germans overwhelmed the
shattered, and the Second
detachment on the Allied right (May 25).
fragments of the First French Army gal-
t pulverized (May 15). The
Complete and speedy annihilation of the
lantly screening the evacuation. The Bat-
mor, spearheaded by Stuka
penned-in Allies appeared certain.
tle of Flanders had ended.
ers, roared west on a 50-mile
1940, May 25-27. The Belgian Surrender.
COMMENT. Aside from the duplicity
behind them fast-moving Ger-
Meanwhile, on the Allied left, the Belgian
and treachery of the Nazi attacks on Hol-
y poured through the gap.
Army was being pulverized by German
land and Belgium, the actual military opera-
-21. The Drive to the Chan-
attacks. King Leopold, deciding that fur-
tions of the German Army were, with one
00 late, Gamelin ordered up
ther resistance was hopeless, surrendered
exception, clear-cut in ruthless efficiency.
om the French general reserve,
to save further bloodshed, thus exposing
Hitler's strange stop order, arresting the ar-
ie armies south of the German
the left flank of the Franco-British army
mored assault on the boxed-in Allied armies
a new Sixth Army (General
to further assault. There could now be no
in Flanders, cannot be charged against the
0 plug the gap. General Henri
hope of holding any part of Flanders.
German commanders. It appears to have
ceeding the inefficient Corap,
Churchill ordered the Royal Navy to help
been motivated by Goering's plea that the
o regroup the Ninth Army in
evacuate the British troops from Dunkirk.
Luftwaffe be permitted to give the coup de
1062
WORLD WAR II IN THE WEST
grâce and thus have full share in the glory
British and French commanders complicated
of victory. Added, perhaps, was Hitler's fear
the situation. Indecision was the most marked
that miraculously the French might mount a
characteristic of the French high command.
counterattack from the south and wreck his
The over-all handicap was the Allied reli-
plans of conquest.
ance on fortifications per se, which throttled
On the other side of the ledger, the Al-
the spirit of the offensive. Much has been
lied operations, having no strong, centralized
made of the decay of patriotic fiber in
control, either prior to or during the action,
France, sapping the warrior spirit; but the
were disjointed and ineffective. The initial
troops of the First French Army, battling
French troop distribution, with the weight of
without hope in front of Dunkirk while their
forces behind the Maginot Line defenses,
British comrades were being evacuated, cer-
was ridiculous. Friction and distrust between
tainly behaved most gallantly.
THE BATTLE OF FRANCE, JUNE 5-25, 1940
With amazing precision the German armies regrouped for the conquest of
France, in accordance-except for minor changes-with previously prepared plans.
Bock's Army Group B was poised on the line of the Somme extended east to Bourg.
Rundstedt's Army Group A continued east to the Moselle in front of the Maginot
Line, and Leeb's Army Group C stretched from there to the Swiss border. Facing it,
behind the Somme, the Aisne, and the Maginot Line, the bewildered French forces
were regrouping, with Army Group 3 (Besson was now on the left, Billotte having
been killed in an auto accident) extending from the sea east to Rheims, Army Group
4 (Huntziger) continuing on to the Meuse and thence to Montmédy, and Prételat's
Army Group 2 behind the Maginot Line. The best that Weygand could produce-
with half of France's available strength already dissipated and the remainder shaken
-was a defense in depth behind the Somme and Aisne. His concentration was ham-
pered by incessant Luftwaffe bombings, dislocating rail centers and blocking troop
movements on the roads. He had available only 65 divisions, 3 of them armored
units already badly mauled, and 17 others fortress troops or second-line reserve units.
All elements were under strength, all lacked equipment, and the general morale was
very low.
1940, June 5-13. Renewed German Assault.
Fourth Army (Edouard Réquin), and a
Army Group B, spearheaded by Kleist's
series of counterattacks, Guderian's tanks
Panzers, struck from the Somme. Smash-
crunched through at Châlons and roared
ing through the Tenth French Army (Félix
southward. Kleist's armor crossed the
Altmeyer), the Germans reached the Seine
Marne at Château-Thierry at the same
west of Paris (June 9) and the armor
time. The breakthrough was complete.
turned westward to pin the French IX
The French government abandoned Paris
Corps and the British 51st Highland Di-
for Bordeaux, toward which refugees in
vision, one of the few remaining BEF ele-
countless thousands were already pouring
ments still in France, against the sea at
(June 10). Paris was declared an open
St.-Valery-en-Caux. This force surren-
city (June 13) and next day German
dered (June 12). The French Seventh
troops marched in.
Army to the east put up a stiffer fight. But
1940, June 10. Italy Enters the War. Mus-
to restore his flank Weygand ordered Army
solini, deciding now that France could
Group 3 to withdraw to the Seine (June
not win, declared war and ordered an in-
8). Rundstedt's Army Group A launched
vasion of southern France.
its main-effort assault next day against the
1940, June 13-25. The Pursuit. The French
left of the French Group 4, east of Paris.
armies disintegrated, while German col-
His Panzer spearheads, under Guderian,
umns spread west, south, and east. Ger-
were reinforced by Kleist's Panzers of
man armor swept the coastal ports from
Group B, rapidly shifted eastward. Despite
St.-Nazaire north to Cherbourg. Other
valiant resistance in depth by the French
Germans crossed the Loire (June 17) and
D25
D8
1977
it
THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF MILITARY
HISTORY
from 3500 B.C. to the present
R. ERNEST DUPUY and TREVOR N. DUPUY
ondon University
Revised Edition
Javy, Rtd.
ce, George Washington
tes Marine Corps, Rtd.
1 States Air Force Re-
University
h College
rsity of Illinois
1817
ed States Army, Rtd.,
HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS: New York
ineering, United States
Cambridge, Philadelphia, San Francisco, London,
Mexico City, São Paulo, Sydney
Medieval History, Har-
ates Military Academy
10pyught 1970
101
5
Belgium
Introduction
Belgium covers a strip of land just under 200 miles (320 kilome-
ters) long and 100 miles (160 kilometers) wide bordering the
North Sea between France and Holland. With more than 10
million people, Belgium is the second most densely populated
country in the world. It is a divided nation, populated by two
distinct peoples. The Flemish, who speak Dutch (Flemish), in-
habit the northern half of the country and account for 56% of
the population. The French-speaking Walloons live in the other
half. The capital, Brussels, is officially designated a dual-
language area.
Belgium is the world's most heavily industrialized) country
with only 5% of the working population engaged in agriculture
(though they still manage to produce two of Europe's greatest
pâtés and any number of fine sausages). Besides being good
businessmen, the Belgians also work very hard-partly to
make up for what has so long been denied them. In the course of
history, the Belgians have been ruled by the Romans, Vikings,
French, Spanish, Austrians, Dutch, English, and Germans.
Many of Europe's greatest battles have been fought on Belgian
soil-from Waterloo and earlier, to the long-slogging encoun-
ters of World War I. During World War II, this territory
witnessed both the initial Blitzkrieg of Nazi Panzer units and
Hitler's final desperate counterattack against the advancing
Allies in the Ardennes-an offensive that has gone down in his-
tory as the Battle of the Bulge.
The south of the country is a wild wooded area, with mountains
rising to more than 2,000 feet (610 meters). In the Dutch-
speaking north, on the other hand, the land is flat and heavily
cultivated, much as in neighboring Holland. Here stand the
medieval Flemish cities of Ghent and Bruges, with their cele-
brated carillons and canals-not to mention the 50 miles (80
kilometers) of sandy beaches that make up the country's north-
ern coastline. To the northeast lies Antwerp, the country's
main seaport. This city, where the painter Rubens lived, is now
the world's leading diamond-cutting center.
Brussels stands in the very center of the country. A booming,
expanding, and often very expensive city, it is now the capital
of Europe. Here the Common Market (EEC) has its headquar-
ters, as does NATO. The city boasts more ambassadors than
any other in the world-approximately 160. Partly as a result
of this concentration of power and partly because of the Bel-
gians' celebrated love of good food, Brussels has become one of
the most renowned gastronomic cities in the world. Those with-
out expense accounts, beware! Belgian cuisine adds French
flare to Dutch-size portions-which means that you seldom
have to order very much.
Perhaps in order to work off all this good living, the Belgians
are fanatical bicyclists. Several of the great legendary figures
of the Tour de France have been Belgians. And despite its
name, this annual race (the world's greatest and most grueling)
usually has a stage or two running through Belgium.
1112
WORLD WAR II IN THE WEST
Major obstacle was the Hürtgen Forest.
mored Division* thrust through the Sa-
The attack, on a narrow front, reached
verne Gap of the Vosges Mountains to
the Roer River, but crossing could not be
liberate Strasbourg (November 23), rous-
attempted until the dams near Schmidt
ing French national morale to a peak.
had been seized to prevent the Germans
The French First Army overran Mul-
from flooding the valley. A major offen-
house. Devers was now on the Rhine from
sive for this purpose was begun (Decem-
Karlsruhe to below Strasbourg, and again
ber 13).
from Mulhouse to the Swiss border; but
1944, November 16-December 15. Lorraine
the deep Colmar pocket in between was
Operations. Patton's Third Army cap-
still firmly held by Wiese's German Nine-
tured Metz (December 13) and battled its
teenth Army.
way across the Seille River.
* Bitter personal enmity existed between
1944, November 16-December 15. Alsace
Leclerc and de Lattre de Tassigny; hence,
Operations. Devers' group made deep
the 2nd French Armored Division was never
gains; Seventh Army's French 2nd Ar-
under the latter's command.
German Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge), December, 1944-January, 1945
The German Plan. Hitler had prepared a striking force to split the Allies. His
armor would rip through to Antwerp, crippling their supply. He hoped to destroy
all Allied forces north of the line Antwerp-Brussels-Bastogne, just as in 1940. Success
depended on three elements: (1) a breakthrough, (2) seizure of Allied fuel supplies
and the key focal points of communication in the area St.-Vith and Bastogne, and
(3) widening of the initial gap to increase the flow of invasion. Hitler's command-
ers, though dubious of success, obeyed orders.
1944, December 16-19. The German Blow.
eral Hasso von Manteuffel) Panzer armies
The operation was launched after a period
-24 divisions, 10 of them armored. The
of fog, rain, and snow blanketed Allied
Seventh Army (General Ernst Branden-
aerial observation and hobbled combat
berger) was to cover the southern flank.
capabilities. The striking force, from
The initial wave-8 Panzer divisions-dis-
north to south, consisted of the Sixth SS
rupted the U.S. VIII Corps. Tactical and
(General Sepp Dietrich) and Fifth (Gen-
strategic surprise was complete. (SHAEF
ARDENNES CAMPAIGN
16 Dec. 1944-16 Jan. 1945
Liége
FIFTEENTH
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Scale of miles
R
Verviers
Monschau
Huy
Z
&
Namur
R.
XXXX
Sambre
Malmedy
xxxx
U.S.
FIRST
.......
FIFTH
Stavelot
Charleroi
HODGES
A
B
E
L
G
I
U
M
XXXX
S
Br.
SECOND
St. Vith
Dinant
Marche
Prum
(Part)
M
16 Jon.
XXXX
Lease
SIXTH
Rochefort
Houffalize
16 Dec.
R
R.
26 Dec.
St. Hubert
Bastogne
Libramont
XXXX
O 8 W 1
XXXX
E
SEVENTH
03
G
F
R
A
N
C
E
U.S.
THIRD
PATTON
Trier
Mezières
T
THE WAR IN THE WEST, 1944
1113
sion* thrust through the Sa-
intelligence estimates had dismissed all
weight of the German assault to Manteuf-
of the Vosges Mountains to
probability of any immediate major Ger-
fel's Fifth Panzer Army, but Hitler, ob-
isbourg (November 23), rous-
man offensive capability.) The 106th Di-
stinate and ignorant, insisted the decisive
national morale to a peak.
vision, just arrived on the front, and the
blow be struck by his SS pet, Dietrich.
1 First Army overran Mul-
28th Division, recuperating from severe
By December 22, Patton was attacking
rs was now on the Rhine from
fighting at Schmidt, were shattered. A par-
north toward beleaguered Bastogne on a
) below Strasbourg, and again
atroop drop in the area Eupen-Monschau,
2-corps front, while Devers' 6th Army
ouse to the Swiss border; but
and a spearhead force of English-speaking
Group extended its left to cover his ad-
olmar pocket in between was
German soldiers in American uniforms,
vance. Dietrich's penetration in the Man-
held by Wiese's German Nine-
added to panic and confusion behind the
hay-Stavelot area, and Manteuffel's spear-
y.
assault zone. But on the north flank, the
heads-Panzer Lehr and 2nd Panzer di-
U.S. V Corps, halting its own offensive
visions-were grinding to a halt with
sonal enmity existed between
toward the Roer dams, held firm, as did
empty fuel tanks at Celles, almost in
de Lattre de Tassigny; hence,
the U.S. 4th Division on the south. Canal-
sight of the Meuse, to be struck by Amer-
h Armored Division was never
ized between these shoulders, the attack
er's command.
ican and British counterattacks (Decem-
roared on toward the Meuse. Two U.S.
ber 25-26). Hitler's gamble had failed.
ember, 1944-January, 1945
armored divisions were rushed in by Brad-
Patton's Third Army punched a hole
ley as immediate reinforcement. Eisen-
through Manteuffel's troops to reach Bas-
force to split the Allies. His
hower then committed the SHAEF reserve
togne (December 26), and, with the first
-the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions
upply. He hoped to destroy
clear weather, Allied air began pounding
(recuperating near Reims from their Maas
ogne, just as in 1940. Success
German supply trains west of St.-Vith.
operation). Truckborne, they arrived (De-
eizure of Allied fuel supplies
1944, December 26-1945, January 2. The
cember 19)-the 101st (under Brigadier
Battle for Bastogne. Hitler insisted on
St.-Vith and Bastogne, and
General Anthony C. McAuliffe) at Bas-
the capture of Bastogne, and a furious
invasion. Hitler's command-
togne, a check to Fifth Panzer Army's
battle raged for a week while the German
progress, and the 82nd (Major General
tide ebbed elsewhere in the Bulge under
Matthew B. Ridgway) to bolster the
Allied pressure. Attempting to disrupt Al-
von Manteuffel) Panzer armies
northern flank. Montgomery began shift-
lied air support, the Luftwaffe made its
ons, 10 of them armored. The
ing 1 British corps to backstop the opera-
last offensive strike (January 1), some 800
my (General Ernst Branden-
tion along the Meuse. At Bradley's order,
planes attacking airfields in France, Bel-
S to cover the southern flank.
Patton (December 18) halted his Third
gium, and Holland, and destroying 156
wave-8 Panzer divisions-dis-
Army's advance in the Saar to begin an
Allied planes. The attack was repulsed
U.S. VIII Corps. Tactical and
amazing 90° shift in direction to the
with heavy losses to the Germans, and the
rprise was complete. (SHAEF
north, to hit the German southern flank.
Allied air offensive over the Ardennes area
1944, December 20-26. Allied Recovery.
and German rear elements continued.
Eisenhower transferred command of all
1945, January 3-16. Allied Counteroffensive.
U.S. troops north of the bulge to Mont-
On the northern flank of the German pen-
FIFTEENTH
gomery, leaving only Patton's army under
etration, Montgomery unleashed Hodges'
ers
Monschau
Bradley. Despite a desperate defense of
U.S. First Army. German offensive efforts
St.-Vith by the U.S. 7th Armored Di-
near Bastogne were repulsed, and Pat-
N
vision (Brigadier General R. W. Has-
ton's increasing efforts, supported by XIX
Malmedy
xxxx
brouck), the Sixth Panzer Army forged
Tactical Air Force, shrank the southern
FIFTH
velot
A
slowly ahead (December 19-22), but the
face of the German penetration. Hitler
delay had been fatal to the German plan.
permitted withdrawal of the Sixth Panzer
M
The V Corps was still presenting an im-
St. Vith
Army (January 8; see p. 1122). The Bulge
Prum
M
penetrable front, while the U.S. VII Corps
was eliminated (January 16). Hodges'
XXXX
was hurrying southwest to seal the re-
First Army returned to Bradley's control
SIXTH
mainder of the northern flank. At Bas-
(January 18), but Simpson's Ninth Army
16 Dec.
R
togne, the 101st Airborne, with some other
remained in Montgomery's 21st Army
units-some 18,000 men in all-resisted
Group.
all efforts of the Fifth Panzer Army to
E
COMMENT. Hitler's Ardennes offensive
SEVENTH
B
overrun their perimeter. However, the in-
was a gamble, pure and simple. The blow
vading tide, lapping around Bastogne,
was checked first by the resistance of the
G
progressed northwest toward the Meuse.
U.S. elements on both shoulders, next by
Model, commanding Army Group B,
Hasbrouck's stand at St.-Vith and McAul-
Trier
quite properly desired now to shift the
iffe's epic defense of Bastogne. Hitler's re-
D25
D8
1977
wH
THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF MILITARY
HISTORY
from 3500 B.C. to the present
R. ERNEST DUPUY and TREVOR N. DUPUY
11
don University
Revised Edition
vy, Rtd.
; George Washington
S Marine Corps, Rtd.
States Air Force Re-
University
College
ty of Illinois
1817
1 States Army, Rtd.,
HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS: New York
eering, United States
Cambridge, Philadelphia, San Francisco, London,
Mexico City, São Paulo, Sydney
edieval History, Har-
tes Military Academy
OPERATIONS IN 1914
935
urchill and the First Sea Lord,
OPERATIONS IN 1914
and the Dutch border, a narrow corridor
guarded by Liége, one of the strongest
d comparable standards of effi-
S well as numbers. The Russian,
Western Front
fortresses of Europe. A night attack (Au-
gust 5-6) penetrated the ring of 12 out-
th and were to play only minor
THE OPENING BATTLES
lying forts. Heavy fighting followed, in
which German Major General Erich F.
1914, August 3-20. Belgium Overrun. A
Ludendorff distinguished himself, as did
specially trained German Second Army
the Belgian commander, General Gérard
-AUGUST, 1914
task force of about 30,000 men under
M. Leman. German bombardment by
General Otto von Emmich crossed the
42-cm. howitzers (heaviest used to this
German
Belgian frontier between the Ardennes
time) systematically reduced the concrete
High
Home
Seas
Total
Waters
Fleet
BELGIUM
Battle of the Sambre,
Cologne
22-23 Aug.
Calais
Bottle of Mons,
13
NETH
*****
FIRST
(13)
(13)
22-23 Aug.
****
Battle of Le Cateou,
XXXX
SECOND
26 Aug.
BEF
Mons
Namur
5
(4)
(4)
Liege
XXXX
22
(22)
BEF
****
Coblenz
(10)
И
FIFTH
THIRD
R.
Le Cateau
N
41
(32)
(17)
Somme
Amiens
Guise
144
(144)
(80)
Mainz
XXXX
Battle of Guise,
FOURTH
LUX.
XXXX
29 Aug.
FOURTH
30
(30)
(24)
XXXX
Sedan
FIFTH
Bottle of the Ardennes,
XXXX
XXXX
22-25 Aug.
THIRD
Aisne
R.
FIFTH
roximate, and varied considerably during
5
Reims
Army of Lorraine
1g all old battleships (see discussion in
SIXTH
1
2
3
4
disbanded 26 Aug.
M
dy for action, and 15 under construction
Verdun
Seine
R.
Metz
ad 3 more completed, but not yet ready
Marne
LORRAINE
Paris
XXXX
XXXX
SIXTH
THIRD
thinner armor and greater speed. Britain
The French offensive
xxxx
in Lorraine 14-20 Aug.
not yet ready for action. Britain had 1
BEF
Toul
XXXX
Strasbourg
XXXX
FOURTH
XXXX
R
med, light cruisers.
HILLS
R.
NINTH
SECOND
FRANCE
in commission. This figure is approxi-
Marne
n.s
xxxx
2
SEVENTH
Epinal
Rhine
XXXX
FIRST
R.
A
E
E
BATTLES OF THE FRONTIERS
AND GERMAN ADVANCE
TO THE MARNE
XXXX
uld develop from a reconnais-
ALSACE
14 Aug.-5 Sept. 1914
ticularly the German Zeppelin
0
25
50
Belfort
0
:h reconnaissance and bombing
Scale of miles
SWITZERLAND
also used from the outset.
and steel cupolaed defenses. Liége surren-
1914, August 14-25. Battles of the Frontiers.
dered (August 16). The German First
The Germans and the Anglo-French ar-
Army (General Alexander von Kluck)
mies met each other head on in 4 almost
and the Second (General Karl von Bülow)
simultaneous actions:
poured through the Liége corridor and
1914, August 14-22. Battle of Lorraine. An
across the Meuse. Hastily mobilized Bel-
early advance to Mulhouse in Alsace (Au-
gian field forces were brushed aside to the
gust 8) by the French right-wing Army of
north of Tirlemont (August 18-19) and
Alsace (General Paul Pau) was followed
Brussels occupied (August 20). After some
by a full-scale offensive southeast of Metz
skirmishing along the Meuse (August
by the French First (General Auguste Du-
12-16), the Belgians, personally com-
bail) and Second (General Noël de Cas-
manded by King Albert, fell back on the
telnau) armies (August 14-18). After
e
fortress of Antwerp.
planned withdrawals, the German Sixth
936
WORLD WAR I
(Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria) and Sev-
bre left him without support; the BEF
enth (General Josias von Heeringen) ar-
therefore withdrew during the night.
mies turned in violent converging counter-
French was bitter about Lanrezac's unan-
attacks. The French were thrown back to
nounced withdrawal, which he believed
the fortified heights of Nancy, where they
had jeopardized the existence of his own
barely managed to stop the German drive.
BEF.
The French XX Corps, under General
COMMENT. The French offensive had
Ferdinand Foch, played a decisive role in
failed completely-at a cost of some 300,000
holding Nancy.
casualties. But Moltke overestimated the ex-
1914, August 20-25. Battle of the Ardennes.
tent of the German victory. His communica-
The advancing French Third (General
tions with his armies were poor, his infor-
Pierre Ruffey) and Fourth (General Fer-
mation faulty. Believing that the success in
nand de Langle de Cary) armies met
Lorraine was a decisive victory, he ordered
headlong the German Fourth (Duke Al-
his left to continue its offensive against the
brecht of Württemberg) and Fifth (Crown
fortified Nancy heights, hoping thus to ob-
Prince Wilhelm) armies, comprising the
tain a double envelopment of the entire
pivot of the Schlieffen Plan maneuver.
French field forces. The Ardennes and Sam-
After 4 days of furious fighting, the out-
bre battles he also considered decisive, and
numbered French were repulsed with
so he renewed the orders for his right-wing
shocking losses, falling back to reorganize
armies to continue their sicklelike sweep,
west of the Meuse, with their right flank
with the First Army still to swing west of
on the fortress of Verdun.
Paris. He decided to send to the Sixth and
1914, August 22-23. Battle of the Sambre.
Seventh armies reinforcements originally in-
To the north, the German First, Second,
tended for the right-wing armies, to provide
and Third (General Max von Hausen)
more weight to his new offensive in Lorraine.
armies were beginning to sweep west and
Confident that the French armies were on
southwest. In accordance with the con-
the verge of destruction, he also detached 2
tingency provisions of Plan XVII, Joffre
corps from the right to hasten by railroad to
ordered the French Fifth Army (General
the Eastern Front, where the Russians had
Charles Lanrezac) into the Sambre-Meuse
shown unexpected initiative. (Ironically,
angle to meet this unexpected move. The
these 2 corps, whose absence would vitally
German Second and Third armies struck
affect the outcome of the Battle of the
Lanrezac southwest of Namur, defeating
Marne, were still en route at the time the
him and forcing him to retreat. The Bel-
Battle of Tannenberg made their presence
gian defenders of Namur were hammered
unnecessary in the east.) As a result of these
into submission by some of Bülow's troops
and other detachments to contain the Bel-
and siege guns after a brief siege (August
gian Army at Antwerp and to besiege the
20-25).
French fortress of Maubeuge, the 3 German
1914, August 23. Battle of Mons. The
right-wing armies had been bled from a total
British Expeditionary Force (Field Mar-
strength of 16 corps to 11. The already wa-
shal Sir John French), 4 divisions and
tered-down Schlieffen Plan-dependent upon
over 100,000 strong, had promptly and
a right-wing hammer blow-was thus still
efficiently crossed the Channel and con-
further modified from the concept of its
centrated in the vicinity of Le Cateau,
creator.
left of the French Fifth Army. Upon Jof-
Joffre, on the other hand, had kept
fre's request, the BEF moved into Belgium
close touch with his subordinate commanders
in co-operation with Lanrezac's advance
and was well aware of the actual situation.
toward Namur (August 21). Near Mons
He knew that, despite tactical defeats, mo-
the British were struck by the full weight
rale of his troops was still high. He was now
of aggressive von Kluck's First German
also aware of the German plan. Seemingly
Army. Outnumbered, the British fought
oblivious of the disastrous results of his own
back stoutly, their fire discipline taking
Plan XVII, he calmly prepared for a coun-
heavy toll of the close German forma-
terattack. This would be a Schlieffen Plan
tions. Sir John French was prepared to
in reverse, pivoting about Verdun and the
continue the fight next day, but the retreat
Nancy heights, where his First and Second
of Lanrezac's Fifth Army from the Sam-
armies were ordered to hold on at all costs.
OPERATIONS IN 1914
937
m without support; the BEF
While the Third, Fourth, and Fifth armies
for help. Aggressive Kluck, thinking the
withdrew during the night.
and the BEF were to continue their south-
French Fifth Army now to be the left-
S bitter about Lanrezac's unan-
westerly withdrawals, Joffre drew units from
flank unit of the opposing field forces, and
/ithdrawal, which he believed
his embattled right flank and from reserves
unable to communicate with Moltke,
dized the existence of his own
in the interior of France to create 2 new
threw the remnants of the Schlieffen Plan
armies. The Sixth, under General Michel J.
into the discard. He shifted his direction
JT. The French offensive had
Maunoury, was to assemble-first near Ami-
of march to the southeast to roll up the
etely-at a cost of some 300,000
ens, later in and around Paris-west of the
Fifth Army (August 31). This change
it Moltke overestimated the ex-
German right wing, prepared to attack east.
would cause him to pass east of Paris; he
German victory. His communica-
The Ninth, under General Foch, would be
knew nothing of the French concentration
is armies were poor, his infor-
in the fortified area of the capital. By
gathered in close support behind and be-
y. Believing that the success in
tween the Fourth and Fifth armies to pro-
September 2, Kluck's left flank was on the
S a decisive victory, he ordered
Marne at Château-Thierry, his right on
vide weight for a counterattack against the
ontinue its offensive against the
the Oise, near Chantilly.
German main effort. This attack was to be
cy heights, hoping thus to ob-
launched when the 4 Allied left-flank armies
1914, September 1-2. Joffre's Reaction.
ble envelopment of the entire
forces. The Ardennes and Sam-
had fallen back to the general line of the
Aware of the German change in direction
Somme River-Verdun.
through air reconnaissance, Joffre ordered
he also considered decisive, and
the Sixth Army to complete its concentra-
ed the orders for his right-wing
1914, August 25-27. Battle of Le Cateau.
tion in the Paris area. He ordered the
continue their sicklelike sweep,
Marshal French's BEF, hard-pressed by
general retirement to continue until the
rst Army still to swing west of
the German First Army, fought daily
Fifth Army was out of immediate danger
ecided to send to the Sixth and
rear-guard actions. Attempting a stand
of envelopment. Thus he was forced to
ries reinforcements originally in-
(August 27) to relieve his exhausted II
abandon his originally planned counter-
the right-wing armies, to provide
Corps troops, General Horace Smith-Dor-
stroke from the Somme-Verdun line.
1 to his new offensive in Lorraine.
rien became engaged in the biggest battle
Foch's newly forming Ninth Army contin-
hat the French armies were on
the British Army had fought since Water-
ued its concentration between the Fourth
f destruction, he also detached 2
loo. This corps fought off a double en-
and Fifth armies. Joffre was concerned by
the right to hasten by railroad to
velopment by the full strength of Kluck's
British lack of responsiveness to his or-
Front, where the Russians had
army; the survivors successfully disen-
ders, but a visit to Field Marshal French
expected initiative. (Ironically,
gaged when night fell. The price was
by the British War Minister, Field Mar-
ps, whose absence would vitally
high: 7,800 casualties out of 40,000 men
shal Lord Kitchener, soon changed Sir
outcome of the Battle of the
engaged.
John's attitude and he began to co-oper-
re still en route at the time the
1914, August 29. Battle of Guise. Joffre, to
ate.
Гаппепьегд made their presence
relieve German pressure on the BEF,
1914, September 3-4. Kluck's Second Di-
in the east.) As a result of these
ordered the Fifth French Army, itself
lemma. Belatedly Moltke sent a message
detachments to contain the Bel-
pressed hard by the German Second
to Kluck, agreeing to the move east of
at Antwerp and to besiege the
Army, to make a 90-degree shift westward
Paris, but complicating matters by order-
tress of Maubeuge, the 3 German
to attack the left flank of the German
ing Kluck to guard the right flank of the
armies had been bled from a total
First Army. The initial attack got no-
Second Army, which would thus become
16 corps to 11. The already wa-
where, but General Louis Franchet d'Es-
the spearhead of the modified German
Schlieffen Plan-dependent upon
perey, commanding Lanrezac's I Corps,
wheel. But Moltke, whose intelligence had
ng hammer blow-was thus still
smartly moved from reserve to hit and
informed him of the French concentration
odified from the concept of its
halt the pursuing German Second Army,
near Paris, did not realize that his First
thus achieving the first French tactical
Army had been moving at amazing speed
; on the other hand, had kept
success in the campaign. Bülow called on
under Kluck's driving leadership, and that
l with his subordinate commanders
Kluck (August 30) for help.
its advance units were much farther
vell aware of the actual situation.
1914, August 30-September 2. Kluck's First
south than those of the slower-moving
that, despite tactical defeats, To-
Dilemma. The German First Army had
Second Army. And Moltke failed to ex-
troops was still high. He was now
driven the BEF from its front; for the
plain the reason for his order. For Kluck
: of the German plan. Seemingly
time being-as Kluck saw it-the British
to have obeyed the order would have
of the disastrous results of his own
were out of the picture. On the right,
meant halting his army for 2 days, which
I, he calmly prepared for a coun-
some slight clashes had occurred with
he believed would permit the French ei-
This would be a Schlieffen Plan
French troops (actually part of Mau-
ther to escape or to rally. Again being
pivoting about Verdun and the
noury's assembling Sixth Army, but in
unable to communicate directly with his
ights, where his First and Second
Kluck's opinion unimportant scattered
commander, unaware of the situation in
ere ordered to hold on at all costs.
elements). Bülow on the left had called
Paris, and trying to act in accordance
938
WORLD WAR I
with the apparent intention of Moltke's
was ideally situated for this task. Accord-
order, Kluck reasoned that its purpose
ingly, pugnacious Kluck continued south-
was to assure that the French were driven
ward, across the Marne, his right flank
southeast of Paris. His own First Army
wide open, just east of Paris.
BATTLE OF THE MARNE, SEPTEMBER 5-10
Joffre's counterattack order (September 4) directed the Sixth Army to attack
eastward toward Château-Thierry; the BEF was to move on Montmirail, with the
Fifth Army, supported by the Ninth, prepared to conform. The Fourth Army would
hold, prepared to advance, and the Third would strike westward from Verdun.
On the success of this proposed double envelopment of the German right wing, as
Joffre well knew, rested the fate of France. September 6 was to be D day.
Meanwhile Maunoury's Sixth Army, temporarily under the regional command
of General Joseph S. Galliéni, energetic military governor of Paris, had begun to
carry out Joffre's warning orders by an advance from Paris toward the Ourcq
River, where Kluck's right flank lay invitingly open. Only the aggressive initiative
of the German right-flank corps commander, General Hans von Gronau, saved
Kluck's army from surprise envelopment (September 5). As it was, Kluck believed
that the French activity on his right was only a spoiling attack and merely de-
tached one additional corps to help Gronau to repel it, while pressing southward
with the rest of his army in pursuit of the BEF and the French Fifth Army. Not
until this Battle of the Ourcq had raged for 2 days did Kluck realize the French in-
tentions (September 7). By this time most of his army was south of the Márne.
Pulling back north of the river, Kluck rapidly changed his front and turned his en-
tire army westward in savage counterattacks that halted the French and forced
Maunoury to fall back on the defensive (September 7-9). Only the arrival of rein-
forcements rushed from Paris by Galliéni-some in commandeered taxicabs-per-
mitted Maunoury to stem the impetuous German advance.
By this time the action had become general along the entire front west of
Verdun. Kluck's westward shift, undertaken on the assumption that the BEF was
no longer a threat, widened the already existing gap between his army and that
of von Bülow, which was still moving south. Into this gap now moved the BEF,
slowly, since Marshal French underrated the recuperative powers of his troops.
Franchet d'Esperey's Fifth Army (Lanrezac had been relieved) battered at part of
the German Second Army along the Petit Morin.
Farther southeast, Foch's Ninth Army, attacking north at St.-Gond, found itself
confronting the rest of the Second Army while Hausen's Third Army struck its
right. A surprise night bayonet attack by 4 divisions of Hausen's army threw part
of Foch's army into confusion (September 8). Foch's response was to order an im-
mediate renewal of his own assault; the German advance was halted, but Foch's
position was precarious.
At Vitry-le-François, Langle de Cary's Fourth Army battled desperately but
indecisively with the Duke of Württemberg's Fourth Army and part of the Third.
At Revigny in the Argonne Forest, General Maurice Sarrail's Third Army (Ruffey
had been relieved) stopped the Crown Prince's Fifth Army, while at Nancy and
along the Alsace frontier the French First and Second armies-even though attenu-
ated by drafts for Joffre's new formations to the west-clung successfully to the
heights, despite a succession of attacks by the reinforced German Sixth and Seventh
armies. (Schlieffen had warned against any such attacks.)
Moltke, worried by rumor and pessimistic fragmentary reports from his sub-
ordinates, sent a general staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hentsch, to in-
OPERATIONS IN 1914
939
ly situated for this task. Accord-
BATTLE OF THE MARNE
gnacious Kluck continued south-
R.
Reims
Ourca
THE CRITICAL DAY
ross the Marne, his right flank
****
Situation Early 9 September
n, just east of Paris.
XXXX
FIRST
Marne
R.
0
5
10
15
20
Chatesu.
SIXTH
Thierry
Scale of miles
Epernay
MBER 5-10
Lizy
xxxx
sted the Sixth Army to attack
Meaux
Chalons
BEF
nove on Montmirail, with the
ST. GOND
****
Petit
Morin
XXXX
MARSHES
SECOND
FOURTH
form. The Fourth Army would
Crecy
Coulommiers
****
trike westward from Verdun.
XXXX
Grand
Morin
FIFTH
THIRD
of the German right wing, as
****
er 6 was to be D day.
XXXX
FOURTH
Vitry Le Francois
/ under the regional command
NINTH
[
vernor of Paris, had begun to
rom Paris toward the Ourcq
spect the front (September 8). Hentsch's orders were oral; they still remain some-
Only the aggressive initiative
what of a mystery. He arrived at the Second Army's headquarters just as news was
eral Hans von Gronau, saved
received that its right flank was being turned by a vigorous night attack by Franchet
5). As it was, Kluck believed
d'Esperey's Fifth Army. This was probably the turning point of the battle. Bülow-
boiling attack and merely de-
personally defeated-was about to retreat. Kluck's First Army was making headway
:1 it, while pressing southward
in the northwest against Maunoury's left, but the BEF's advance through the gap
1 the French Fifth Army. Not
threatened Kluck's own left and rear.
id Kluck realize the French in-
Hentsch tacitly approved Bülow's planned retreat and, later the same day, in
rmy was south of the Marne.
Moltke's name ordered Kluck also to withdraw (September 9). Moltke, now realiz-
ed his front and turned his en-
ing that his offensive had failed, ordered a general retirement to the line Noyon-
halted the French and, forced
Verdun. Within 5 days the Germans, having disengaged without serious interference
7-9). Only the arrival of rein-
from the exhausted Allies, were organizing their new positions. The Battle of the
commandeered taxicabs-per-
Marne thus ended as a strategic Allied victory and Joffre emerged as savior of
ance.
France. That same day Moltke was relieved, General Erich von Falkenhayn replac-
along the entire front west of
ing him (September 14).
assumption that the BEF was
COMMENT. France's initial offensive plan had failed because it was entirely
up between his army and that
unrealistic in concept and in execution. The German plan-sound and workable-
this gap now moved the BEF,
failed because of the inefficiency of Moltke, who first emasculated the plan, then lost
perative powers of his troops.
all personal touch with his army commanders and with their progress. Joffre, on the
n relieved) battered at part of
other hand, emerged as a strong and capable leader, who kept in close touch with
his subordinates. His reconstruction of a counterattack upon the wreckage of his
north at St.-Gond, found itself
initial plan was masterful, its execution assisted by the marvelous resiliency of the
ausen's Third Army struck its
French Army. The BEF's part was that of a sound professional soldiery. The clash
$ of Hausen's army threw part
of personalities and mutual distrust existing between Sir John French and Lanrezac
S response was to order an im-
prevented better use of the BEF, as did French's excessive caution in the counter-
dvance was halted, but Foch's
attack. Casualties on both sides were enormous: the Allies lost about 250,000 men;
German losses were somewhat greater. In 3 weeks of war, each side had lost more
Army battled desperately but
than half a million men in killed, wounded, and captured. The Battle of the Marne,
1 Army and part of the Third.
tactically indecisive, was a clear-cut strategic victory for the Allies. Had it ended
: Sarrail's Third Army (Ruffey
differently, the history of the 20th century would have been altered fundamentally.
th Army, while at Nancy and
It was the world's most decisive battle since Waterloo.
d armies-even though attenu-
west-clung successfully to the
THE "RACE TO THE SEA,"
armies, seeking to envelop the German
ced German Sixth and Seventh
SEPTEMBER 15-NOVEMBER 24
right, were rebuffed from the hastily pre-
cks.)
pared German field fortifications. Both
,mentary reports from his sub-
1914, September 15-18. First Battle of the
sides now extended their operations north-
olonel Richard Hentsch, to in-
Aisne. Slow in their pursuit, the Allied
ward, attempting each to outflank the
940
WORLD WAR I
other. Both failed, in bitter fighting in
1914, September 22-25. Verdun and St.-
Picardy (September 22-26) and Artois
Mihiel. Farther south, repeated German
(September 27-October 10). Meanwhile,
attacks against Verdun were repulsed
behind the German lines, beleaguered
(September 22-25), but the Germans did
Maubeuge had fallen (September 8) and
seize the strategic St.-Mihiel salient (Sep-
the fortress of Antwerp, systematically
tember 24), to which they would cling
bombarded (October 1-9), surrendered.
until 1918.
The Belgian Army fell back to the west
1914, October 18-November 24. Battles in
along the coast. An extemporized British
Flanders. The final actions of the "Race
naval division, rushed to reinforce the
to the Sea" were the Battle of the Yser
Antwerp garrison, also escaped, but with
(October 18-November 30) and the
loss of 1 of its 3. brigades.
bloody First Battle of Ypres (October 30-
French poilus march single file through a dense field of barbed wire
November 24), in which the BEF was
had cost the Allies nearly 1 million cas-
nearly wiped out in a successful, gallant
ualties. German losses were almost as
defense against a heavily reinforced Ger-
great.
man drive, ordered by Falkenhayn, who
expected to capture the Channel ports.
Eastern Fronts
The British were aided by French troops,
under Foch, rushed north by Joffre.
OPERATIONS IN EAST PRUSSIA
1914, December 14-24. General Allied At-
tack. From Nieuport to Verdun an allied
The Russian Offensive
offensive beat unsuccessfully for 10 red
days against the rapidly growing German
1914, August 17-19. Invasions of East Prus-
system of field fortifications. The era of
sia. The Russian Northwest Army Group
stabilized trench warfare had begun: the
under General Yakov Grigorievich Jilin-
spade, the machine gun, and barbed wire
sky, consisting of General- Pavel K. Ren-
ringing down the curtain on maneuver,
nenkampf's First and General Alexander
from the North Sea to the Swiss border.
Samsonov's Second armies, advanced into
A costly French attempt at breaking
East Prussia. Opposing them was German
through in Champagne-the First Battle
General Max von Prittwitz' Eighth Army,
of Champagne (December 20)-was still
widely disposed from the Baltic south to
in progress as the year ended. By this
Frankenau, and based on the fortress of
time, operations on the Western Front
Königsberg (Kaliningrad). Its mission
OPERATIONS IN 1914
941
ember 22-25. Verdun and St.-
was one of elastic defense and delay in
feared envelopment. Aggressive François
Farther south, repeated German
accordance with the modified Schlieffen
persuaded him to attack. François's own
against Verdun were repulsed
Plan.
corps smashed in the Russian right flank,
per 22-25), but the Germans did
1914, August 17. Battle of Stallupönen.
driving it back for 5 miles. Other German
strategic St.-Mihiel salient (Sep-
The center of Rennenkampf's widely
attacks were not successful, and a drawn
24), to which they would cling
strung advance met General Hermann K.
battle resulted.
8.
von François's I German Corps, was badly
ber 18-November 24. Battles in
mauled by the alert François, and was
The Tannenberg Campaign
The final actions of the "Race
thrown back to the frontier with loss of
1914, August 20. German Change in Com-
ea" were the Battle of the Yser
3,000 men. François then retired on Gum-
mand. Prittwitz, in near panic after his
18-November 30) and the
binnen.
unsuccessful attack against Rennenkampf,
irst Battle of Ypres (October 30-
1914, August 20. Battle of Gumbinnen.
and with Samsonov's army posing a poten-
Slowly the Russians advanced again. Pritt-
tial threat to his line of communications,
witz, aware also of the Russian Second
telephoned Moltke, at Coblenz, to report
Army's advance far to his southern flank,
his decision to withdraw to the Vistula
BATTLE OF TANNENBERG
Situation 20 August
Prittwitz decided to withdraw to the Vistula,
and subsequent operations to 29 August 1914
Konigsberg
0
25
50
***
Insterburg
Scale miles
Gumbinnen
XXX
***
XVII
Danzig
1R
***
Note: Only one COV. div.
remained to oppose First
XX
3R
JR
Army.
XXXX
FIRST
Marienburg
****
EIGHTH
***
Allenstein
MASURIAN
Deutsch
***
Eylay
XX
e field of barbed wire
Tannenberg
XXX
XXX
XXX
the Allies nearly 1 million cas-
****
:
Soldau
***
SECOND
German losses were almost as
***
Thorn
Fronts
and to request reinforcements to be able
ported his actions; Hindenburg approved.
to hold that river line. Moltke at once re-
When they arrived at Marienburg, Eighth
TIONS IN EAST PRUSSIA
lieved Prittwitz of command, appointing
Army Headquarters, next day, they dis-
in his place elderly General Paul von
covered that Lieutenant Colonel Max
ian Offensive
Hindenburg, called from retirement, with
Hoffmann, Prittwitz' capable chief of op-
brilliant General Erich Ludendorff, hero
erations, had already prepared for prac-
ust 17-19. Invasions of East Prus-
of Liége (see p. 935), as his chief of
tically the same movements and disposi-
e Russian Northwest Army Group
staff. Thus was created a team destined
tions that Ludendorff had ordered (Au-
General Yakov Grigorievich Jilin-
for world renown.
gust 20). (The coincidence is especially
sisting of General Pavel K. Ren-
1914, August 22. Ludendorff's Plan. After
interesting as evidence of the uniform
pf's First and General Alexander
studying reports from the east, Ludendorff
thought process of the German Army
v's Second armies, advanced into
telegraphed orders to the individual corps
General Staff in dealing with an unex-
issia. Opposing them was German
commanders, directing a concentration
pected situation.) While one lone cavalry
Max von Prittwitz' Eighth Army,
against Samsonov's Second Army, while
division was delaying fumbling Rennen-
disposed from the Baltic south to
delaying Rennenkampf's First Army far-
kampf, the bulk of the German army was
au, and based on the fortress of
ther east. Joining Hindenburg later that
shifting south, by rail and road, against
erg (Kaliningrad). Its mission
day for the rail trip east, Ludendorff re-
the equally incompetent Samsonov.
I
OPERATIONS IN 1915
947
inch of naval blockade. The German
high command now focused its atten-
OPERATIONS IN 1915
on the one major weapon left to it on
igh seas: the submarine.
The Global Situation
Turkish Fronts, 1914
Turkey's entrance had changed the war's complexion. Russia, already shaken
October 29. Turkish Declaration of
by the reverses of 1914, was now almost completely cut off from Franco-British
r against the Allies. This was pro-
war supplies, upon which she was dependent for a long-continued war. The western
med by the guns of the Turkish fleet
Allies, at the same time, were anxious to regain access to the Ukrainian grain fields.
:luding the erstwhile German Goeben
These considerations prompted a strategic debate in Britain between "Easterners"
Breslau), now commanded by Ger-
and "Westerners." A strident segment of British officialdom, led by capable and
1 Admiral von Souchon, in a bombard-
energetic Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, urged immediate action
it without warning of Odessa, Sevas-
to seize the Dardanelles and to restore the vital Mediterranean-Black Sea supply
1, and Theodosia on the Russian Black
route to Russia through the Turkish Straits. British War Minister Field Marshal
coast. This Turkish alignment with
Horatio Herbert, Lord Kitchener, was equally insistent that a decision be obtained
Central Powers closed the Dardanelles
on the Western Front, and deplored any diminution of strength there for a periph-
he Allies, thus physically separating
eral operation in the east. He was strongly supported in this position by French
sia from them.
military and political opinion. Nevertheless, in early January, after lengthy and
heated debate in the British War Council, an amphibious operation against the
CAUCASUS FRONT
Dardanelles was grudgingly approved.
November-December. Turkish Offen-
In the Central Powers' camp also, strategical opinion was divided. The Hin-
Against the sage advice of General
denburg-Ludendorff team urged an all-out effort against faltering Russia. Falken-
Liman von Sanders, chief of the Ger-
hayn, though reconciled to the fact that the war had become one of attrition, be-
military mission to Turkey, Enver
lieved that it would have to be won in the west; he predicted that tactical victories
a, Turkish war minister, began an in-
in the east would be meaningless because of the space of Russia and her vast man-
n of the Russian Caucasus.
power resources. The Kaiser sided with Hindenburg. Accordingly, the Germans
December 29. Battle of Sarikamish.
adopted a defensive posture in the west, while seeking a decision against Russia.
Turkish advance toward Kars was
d and rebuffed with severe losses by
Western Front
Zeppelin dirigible airships (under German
an General Vorontsov in winter
Navy control) caused relatively minor
S. The struggle here continued as the
1915, January 1-March 30. Allied Offensive
casualties and more anger than panic.
ended.
in Artois and Champagne. This, a con-
Eighteen more such raids occurred during
tinuation of the First Battle of Cham-
the year. The largest of these was a mass
MEDITERRANEAN REGION
pagne (see p. 940), was a major effort by
attack on London (October 13).
Joffre to liberate the extensive and valua-
1915, April 6-15. Battle of the Woëvre.
November-December. British Reac-
ble areas of France held by the Germans.
Repeated French assaults against the north
Britain announced the annexation
A series of attacks against the western
face of the St.-Mihiel salient were re-
yprus (November 5). Declaring a
face of the Noyon salient and in the area
pulsed with heavy losses.
ctorate over Egypt (December 18),
between Reims and Verdun were unsuc-
1915, April 22-May 25. Second Battle of
ritish began moving troops there for
cessful. Limited German counterattacks
Ypres. Allied preparations for another
:fense of the Suez Canal. Meanwhile,
along the La Bassé Canal and near Sois-
co-ordinated offensive were spoiled by a
1 cruisers shelled the Dardanelles
sons stabilized the situation (January 8-
surprise German attack preceded by a
without effect (November 30).
February 5). Renewed Allied assaults
cloud of chlorine gas emitted from some
(March) made little headway. The British
5,000 cylinders. This was the first use of
MESOPOTAMIAN FRONT
made an initial breakthrough in a well-
poison gas in the west. Two German
planned attack at Neuve Chapelle (March
corps drove through 2 terrorized French
:tober 23. British Landings. British
10), but poor management prevented an
divisions and bit deeply into British lines,
Army troops, who had already
adequate follow-up; the Germans quickly
creating a wide gap. The Germans, how-
ushed to Bahrein to protect oil re-
re-established the line (March 13). French
ever, had made no preparations to exploit
$ there, began an invasion of south-
casualties approached 400,000 during this
such a breakthrough and had few reserves
[esopotamia. Local Turkish garri-
period; British and German losses were
available because of their build-up in the
vere driven back; Basra was cap-
also heavy.
east. Local counterattacks by the British
by the British (November 23).
1915, January 19-20. First German Air
Second Army finally stemmed the Ger-
Raids on England. Bombing attacks by
man advance after bitter fighting. German
948
WORLD WAR I
CLAND
NEUTRAL
ZEEBRUGGE
TERRITORY
CHATHAM
Richborough
Ktrom Parry)
Ostand
ANTWERP
o
10
Maruges
20
30
40
50
Miles
Nevport
DOVER
DUNKIRK
Ghents
Folkartons
COLOGNE@
"CALAIS
@BRUSSELS
YPRESO
Boulogns
Armantsking
LEGE
LILLE
@Etaples
Meuse
Coblents
@Lane
MONS
Sambre
NAMUR
Charterol
ARRAS
MASSEUGE
CAMBRAI
Bapaume
M
MAINT
Cateou
Dispps
SL. Quantin
LUXEM-
BURG
Section
A
@Loon
PROVEN
SOISSONS
2
@Senks
SMETZ
Chits on
Medicane
Therry
Marne
Mithiel
CHÂLONS
@Mortiange
PARIS
STRASBOURG@
TOULE
seine
EPINAL
Colmar
THE WESTERN FRONT. 1914-1918:
FURTHEST GERMAN ADVANCE Aug- Sept. 1914
TRENCH LINE. Dec. 1914
GERMAN WITHDRAWAL. Mar. 1917
GERMAN ADVANCE. Mar. July 1918
BELFORT
ARMISTICE LINE. Nov. IL 1918
FRENCH a BELGIAN FORTRESSES
SWITZERLAND
losses were some 35,000 men; the British
000. At the same time, in the Third Battle
lost 60,000, the French about 10,000.
of Artois, the French continued their at-
1915, May-June. Battles of Festubert and
tacks against Vimy Ridge (September 25-
Souchez (Second Battle of Artois). After
October 30) while the British, a few miles
limited gains, the British were stopped
north, smashed at Loos (September 25-
near Festubert (May 9-26). The French
October 14). The minor gains made were
did only slightly better in their efforts to
out of proportion to the casualties suf-
seize the commanding height of Vimy
fered: more than 100,000 French, 60,000
Ridge near Souchez (May 16-June 30).
British, 65,000 German.
The Allies, exhausted by their costly and
1915, December 17. Change in British Com-
unsuccessful assaults during the first half
mand. Blamed for the failure at Loos,
of the year, spent the rest of the summer
Field Marshal French was relieved and
in resting, reorganizing, and reinforcing.
General Sir Douglas Haig was placed in
The Germans, who had also suffered se-
command of the BEF, which now com-
verely, were happy to take advantage of
prised 3 armies.
the lull, and by the end of the summer
COMMENT. Increase of lethal fire
had also reinforced the west with troops
power, both machine gun and field artillery,
from their successful operations in the
had revolutionized combat tactics and had
east. Both sides had come perilously close
given the advantage to the defense, which
to expending their ammunition reserves
was able to bring up reserves to limit a pen-
and were now waiting for munitions pro-
etration before the attackers could move for-
duction to catch up with consumption.
ward sufficient reserves and artillery to ex-
1915, September 25-November 6. Renewed
ploit a breakthrough. This was particularly
Allied Offensives in Artois and Cham-
critical on the Western Front, where a con-
pagne. This was another major co-ordi-
tinuous battle line prevented classical offen-
nated effort planned by Joffre, and was
sive maneuvers. The Germans, recognizing
again unsuccessful. In the Second Battle
the change long before the Allies, had
of Champagne the French lost more than
adopted an elastic defense, in 2 or more
100,000 men and the Germans some 75,-
widely separated lines, highly organized with
OPERATIONS IN 1915
949
entrenchments and barbed wire, heavy in
Luigi Cadorna, was about 875,000, but it
NEUTRAL
machine guns, and supported by artillery
was deficient in artillery, transport, and
TERRITORY
echeloned in depth. Assaulting troops broke
ammunition reserves. The Italian plan was
20
30
so
Miles
through the first line only to be decimated
to hold the Trentino salient into Italy by
COLOGNE@
by the fire from the succeeding lines and
offensive-defensive action, while operating
pounded by artillery beyond the range of
eastward offensively in the Isonzo salient
their own guns.
projecting into Austrian territory. The
Coblenza
Appalling losses had been suffered dur-
immediate objective was Gorizia, but Ital-
ing 1915 on both sides: 612,000 German,
ian military men dreamed of advancing
1,292,000 French, and 279,000 British. The
through Trieste to Vienna.
MAINI
year ended with no appreciable shift in the
Austrian Dispositions. Despite the
M
LUXEM
hostile battle lines scarring the land from
Triple Alliance, Austria had heavily for-
BURG
the North Sea to the Swiss Alps.
tified the entire mountain frontier with
Italy. Austrian Archduke Eugene was in
The Italian Front
over-all command of the Italian front.
1915, May 23. Italy Declares War on Aus-
General Svetozan Borojevic von Bojna,
SMETZ
tria. Adroit Allied diplomacy, offering
with some 100,000 men, held the critical
@Morhange
substantial territorial gains, caused Italy
Isonzo sector.
to abrogate the Triple Alliance and to en-
1915, June 23-July 7. First Battle of the
STRASBOURG@
ter the war. The total strength of the
Isonzo. The Italian Second Army (Gen-
Italian Army, commanded by General
eral Pietro Frugoni) and Third Army
ÉPINAL
Colmon
THE ITALIAN FRONT. 1915-1918
ID
20
30
40
50M
Brixen
AND
Meran
BELFORTE
AND
oct
MOUNTAINS
Copóretto
e same time, in the Third Battle
Bozen
Pontebbo
before
1918.
the French continued their at-
NOV.
olmezzo
nst Vimy Ridge (September 25-
Line
0) while the British, a few miles
Armistisk
ashed at Loos (September 25-
Adige
CAPORETTO
Bellunot
Manlago
4). The minor gains made were
oportion to the casualties suf-
Feitre
-Vittorio
re than 100,000 French, 60,000
Tagliamento
UDINE
TRENT
Pordenone
OGORIZIA
1,000 German.
MONTE
GRAPPA
iber 17. Change in British Com-
Isonzo
Blamed for the failure at Loos,
Bassano
SAlo
Line
rshal French was relieved and
Castelfrance
TREVISO
TRIESTE
Sir Douglas Haig was placed in
BRESCIA
VICENZA
18
of the BEF, which now com-
Loke
LOST AFTER
Gardo
rmies.
PADUA
VENICE
CAPORETTO
VERONA
NT. Increase of lethal fire
(Emanuele Filiberto, Duke of Aosta),
1915, October 18-November 4. Third Isonzo.
machine gun and field artillery,
totaling approximately 200,000 men and
The Italians, reorganized and strength-
ionized combat tactics and had
200 guns, battered in vain against the
ened, and supported now by 1,200 guns,
dvantage to the defense, which
Austrian defenses.
struck once more at Gorizia and were
bring up reserves to limit a pen-
1915, July 18-August 3. Second Isonzo.
again repulsed.
ore the attackers could move for-
Cadorna, bringing up more artillery, tried
1915, November 10-December 2. Fourth
ent reserves and artillery to ex-
again. The Austrians, reinforced by 2 ad-
Isonzo. This was really a continuation
ikthrough. This was particularly
ditional divisions, held firm. The Italians
of the third battle. When the offensive
the Western Front, where a con-
broke off the struggle when their artillery
broke off, no material gain had been
le line prevented classical offen-
ammunition gave out. Italian losses in
made to show for the Italian loss of 117,-
vers. The Germans, recognizing
these two battles amounted to about 60,-
000 men in the 2 battles. The Austrians
long before the Allies, had
000 men; the Austrian casualties totaled
had lost almost 72,000 men.
elastic defense, in 2 or more
rated lines, highly organized with
nearly 45,000.
COMMENT. As in France, the invul-
OPERATIONS IN 1917
967
stroyer and was trying to catch up with his battle cruisers.) Von der Tann, her guns
6:00-9:15 PM
9:30 PM-3:00AM
already out of action, remained in line only to spread the British fire. Both Seydlitz
and Derfflinger broke into flames but remained in action as the German battle cruis-
ers swung past the British battle line at short range. Then German destroyers sped
in toward Jellicoe's battleships to make a torpedo attack and spread a smoke screen.
Jellicoe, wary of torpedoes, saved Scheer by himself turning away. By the time he
had resumed his battle line, the German High Seas Fleet had disappeared westward
into the dusk as Scheer made another 180 degree turn. Amazingly, none of the
German battle cruisers had been sunk in their courageous "death ride."
But the battle was not over. Scheer knew that the British fleet was now between
IV
his fleet and its home ports, and that Jellicoe was steaming to cover the entrances
to those ports. Scheer also knew his fleet could not survive a renewed general battle.
After dark he boldly turned to the southeast, deliberately crashing into the for-
Run to the South.
mation of light cruisers at the tail of Jellicoe's southbound fleet. He finally battered
his way through in a chaotic midnight battle of collisions, sinkings, and gunfire. The
British cruiser Black Prince, suddenly engulfed in the midst of the Germans, was
lumn.
sunk in 4 minutes. The German predreadnought battleship Pommern was cut in two.
By dawn, Scheer was shepherding his cripples toward the Jade anchorage, and
er's "T."
Jellicoe realized that his quarry had escaped.
The British now turned back to their bases. They had lost 3 battle cruisers, 3
cruisers, and 8 destroyers; they had 6,784 casualties. The Germans lost 1 old battle-
ship, 1 battle cruiser, 4 light cruisers, and 5 destroyers; casualties were 3,039.
iring accurately at Beatty's ships
COMMENT. Jutland marked the end of an epoch in naval warfare. It was the
ng and was now being pounded
last great fleet action in which the opponents slugged it out within eyesight of one
e chase to the north continued,
another. A drawn battle tactically, it made no change in the strategic situation, other
:r 6 P.M., Beatty sighted Jellicoe's
than to make the Germans realize that they had no chance of defeating the Grand
allel columns, preceded by Rear
Fleet. Of the commanders engaged, Beatty, Hipper, and Hartog stand out, gifted
ttle cruisers and 2 light cruisers.
with that "Nelsonian touch" which neither Jellicoe nor Scheer (both able profes-
m the Germans, but Beatty, still
sionals) appeared to have. In general, both sides behaved with the utmost gallantry.
t of the Germans, to get himself
SUBSEQUENT NAVAL OPERATIONS, JUNE-DECEMBER
ow also turned behind Beatty.
y around Scheer and block him
The remainder of the year saw one timid sortie of the High Seas Fleet (August
d Hood's squadron to his right
18), which ended as a fiasco, both opponents running home without making contact
1 around the German battle line.
-Scheer deceived by a false airship report, Jellicoe because he feared a submarine
h fleets was within range and a
ambush. Two German light-cruiser raids were made on the British coast (August 19
lerman battle cruisers caught the
and October 26-27), and several auxiliary cruisers slipped through the British block-
ammered out of action. On the
ade to ravage Atlantic commerce. But in the main, German naval effort was now
th all on board by Derfflinger's
concentrated on submarine activities. Tremendous toll was taken of Allied shipping:
rior also went down.
300,000 tons per month by December.
ging arc of the Grand Fleet and
cover of a smoke screen and de-
OPERATIONS IN 1917
ilt and perfectly executed simul-
Global Situation
W minutes his ships were out of
Allied strength had grown during 1916. Toward the end of the year, at another
ad of pursuing, continued south-
Allied conference called by Joffre at Chantilly, there had been general agreement to
Germans and their bases. Then,
continue a policy of joint Anglo-French large-scale operations on the Western Front
back toward the British, appar-
in conjunction with simultaneous Russian and Italian offensives. These would have
nly the entire German fleet was
priority over all operations elsewhere, although new British Prime Minister David
his time it seemed that the Ger-
Lloyd George decided to undertake a major campaign in Palestine as well.
t projectiles.
The western Allies at this time did not realize the extent of Russia's instability.
rn away, while the 4 remaining
The retirement of Joffre (December 31, 1916), who was succeeded by Nivelle, the
erfflinger, most gallantly charged
hero of Verdun, immediately complicated the co-ordination of the Allied operations.
Hipper had transferred to a de-
968
WORLD WAR I
Unity of command was nonexistent. Nivelle, planning a giant joint Anglo-French
offensive, to be carried out with "violence, brutality, and rapidity," clashed with
Haig on their command relationship. The French government supported Nivelle
and the British were divided. British Prime Minister Lloyd George, who distrusted
Haig and admired charming, English-speaking Nivelle, placed the BEF under Ni-
velle's command, to the horror of Haig and of Sir William Robertson, the new Chief
of the Imperial General Staff. Through this bickering, and Nivelle's own imprudent
announcements, secrecy was lost.
Ludendorff, aware of the Allied preparations and particularly fearing for over-
extended German lines in the west, deliberately chose a defensive attitude on both
major fronts while forcing Austria (with German assistance) to take decisive action
against Italy, which he believed could be defeated in 1917. The Kaiser approved
this strategic concept, and also concurred in the inauguration of unrestricted sub-
marine warfare, regardless of American opinion. He virtually granted unlimited
authority to the military high command.
United States Entry
1917, April 6. The U.S. Declares War
against Germany. This followed the sink-
1917, January 31. Germany Proclaims Un-
ing of several American ships and Presi-
restricted Submarine Warfare. To offset
dent Wilson's war message to Congress
growing hostility in the U.S., covert nego-
(April 2). War against Austria-Hungary
tiations were already in process by Ger-
was not declared until 8 months later
man diplomats for a German-Mexican-
(December 7).
Japanese alliance.
1917, April-June. U.S. Preparations. The
1917, February 3. The U.S. Severs Rela-
Army would have to be built. Major Gen-
tions with Germany. This was a protest
eral John J. Pershing was selected to com-
against unrestricted submarine warfare.
mand the American Expeditionary Force
Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, and other Latin
(AEF) and the 1st Division (an amalga-
American nations followed suit, as did
mation of existing Regular Army units)
China (March 14).
was shipped to France (June). Pershing's
1917, March 1. Zimmermann Note. Publi-
plan called for a 1-million-man army
cation of a proposed German defensive
overseas by May, 1918, with long-range
alliance with Mexico in case of war be-
provision for 3 million men in Europe
tween Germany and the U.S., with the
later. A draft law-the Selective Service
proviso "that Mexico is to reconquer the
Act-was passed (May 19) and the nation
lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and
went into high gear. The Navy was ready
Arizona" caused a wave of American fury.
(see p. 975).
Alfred Zimmermann, German Foreign
Secretary, had sent the coded proposition,
The Western Front
which contained the further suggestion
that Mexico urge Japan to join the Cen-
1917, February 23-April 5. German With-
tral Powers, to von Eckhardt, German
drawal. Ludendorff had prepared a
Minister to Mexico (January 19). British
much shorter, highly organized defensive
naval intelligence, intercepting and decod-
zone-the Hindenburg Line, or Siegfried
ing it, gave a copy (February 24) to Wal-
Zone-some 20 miles behind the winding,
ter Hines Page, U.S. ambassador to Brit-
overextended line from Arras to Soissons.
tain. He immediately turned it over to the
Hindenburg approved, and decided to
State Department, which released it to the
withdraw to the new line, which could be
press (March 1). U.S. intelligence sources
held with fewer divisions, thus providing
later verified the authenticity of the note.
a larger and more flexible reserve. Be-
1917, March 13. U.S. Merchantmen Armed.
hind a lightly held outpost line heavily
President Wilson's decision to arm for
sown with machine guns lay 2 successive
self-defense all vessels passing through war
defensive positions, heavily fortified. Be-
zones was announced by the State and
hind these again lay the German reserves
Navy departments.
concentrated and prepared for counterat-
OPERATIONS IN 1917
969
g a giant joint Anglo-French
tack. Each successive defensive line was
attacks. With exceptional gallantry, how-
; and rapidity," clashed with
so spaced in depth that, should one be
ever, the French managed to reach and
government supported Nivelle
taken, the attackers' artillery would have
take the first German line, but were then
Lloyd George, who distrusted
to displace forward before progressing
stopped. Repeated attacks gained little
le, placed the BEF under Ni-
against the next. Between the original line
ground. The whole affair was a colossal
lliam Robertson, the new Chief
and the new zone, the countryside had
failure, costing the French nearly 120,000
, and Nivelle's own imprudent
been devastated; towns and villages were
men in 5 days. German losses, despite
razed, forests leveled, water sources
21,000 captured, were much less. Com-
contaminated, and roads destroyed. The
pared with similar attacks in previous
1 particularly fearing for over-
actual withdrawal, conducted in great se-
years, such losses might not have seemed
e a defensive attitude on both
crecy, began February 23 and was com-
excessive, had Nivelle not promised a
stance) to take decisive action
pleted by April 5.
breakthrough and victory.
n 1917. The Kaiser approved
1917, April 9-15. Battle of Arras. This was
1917, April 29-May 20. Outbreak of Mu-
uguration of unrestricted sub-
the British preliminary to the Nivelle Of-
tiny in French Armies. Widespread mu-
e virtually granted unlimited
fensive. The British First (General H. S.
tiny followed the Nivelle Offensive disas-
Horne) and Third (General Sir Edmund
ter. Political repercussions simultaneously
Allenby) armies, following a heavy bom-
shook the nation. Nivelle was replaced by
il 6. The U.S. Declares War
bardment and gas attack, crashed into the
Pétain (May 15). After a 2-week period
positions of the German Sixth Army
in which the entire Western Front was
Germany. This followed the sink-
:veral American ships and Presi-
(General L. von Falkenhausen). British
nearly denuded of French combat troops,
Ison's war message to Congress
air supremacy was rapidly gained. Cana-
Pétain quelled the mutiny and restored
). War against Austria-Hungary
dian troops stormed and took Vimy Ridge
the situation with a combination of tact,
declared until 8 months later
the first day. The British Fifth Army
firmness, and justice. By amazingly effi-
er 7).
(Hubert Gough), assisting on the south,
cient censorship control, French counter-
I-June. U.S. Preparations. The
made little progress. The British advance
intelligence agencies completely blotted
buld have to be built. Major Gen-
was finally slowed down in succeeding
out all news of the mutiny. When it finally
1 J. Pershing was selected to com-
days of battle. Although this was a Brit-
trickled to Ludendorff, it was too late;
e American Expeditionary Force
ish tactical victory, there was no break-
renewed British attacks to distract his at-
and the 1st Division (an amalga-
through. British casualties were 84,000;
tention had already drawn German re-
German, about 75,000.
serves to the northern front. The full ex-
of existing Regular Army units)
ped to France (June). Pershing's
1917, April 16-20. Nivelle Offensive (Sec-
tent of the mutiny was not known to the
ond Battle of the Aisne, Third Battle of
outside world for more than a decade.
lled for a 1-million-man army
by May, 1918, with long-range
Champagne). The French Reserve Army
1917, June-July. British Offensive in Flan-
1 for 3 million men in Europe
Group (Alfred Micheler), heavily rein-
ders. Haig, after an abortive renewal of
draft law-the Selective Service
forced, assaulted on a 40-mile front be-
the fighting around Arras to relieve Ger-
S passed (May 19) and the nation
tween Soissons and Reims to take the
man pressure on the French, had deter-
0 high gear. The Navy was ready
Chemin des Dames, a series of wooded,
mined to break through between the
rocky ridges paralleling the front. The
North Sea and the Lys River. The Ypres
75).
Sixth (Mangin) and Fifth (Olivier Mazel)
salient was selected, but success could
stern Front
armies were closely supported by the
only be gained after first taking the dom-
Tenth (Denis Duchêne), and backed by
inating Messines Ridge. Plans for an as-
uary 23-April 5. German With-
the First (M. E. Fayolle). French
sault had been begun many months ear-
Ludendorff had prepared a
strength in the attacking armies totaled
lier by competent, methodical General Sir
iorter, highly organized defensive
1,200,000 men and 7,000 guns. The Ger-
Herbert Plumer, Second Army com-
le Hindenburg Line, or Siegfried
man Seventh (Max von Boehn) and
mander.
ome 20 miles behind the winding,
First (Fritz von Below) armies held the
1917, June 7. Battle of Messines. After a
nded line from Arras to Soissons.
sector, fully cognizant of French plans
17-day general bombardment, British
ourg approved, and decided to
as a result of Nivelle's confident public
mines packed with 1 million pounds of
N to the new line, which could be
boasts of victory. Just before the attack,
high explosive tore a wide gap in the
:h fewer divisions, thus providing
German flyers swept the sky of French
German lines on the Ridge. Under cover
and more flexible reserve. Be-
aerial observation and German artil-
of this surprise and of British aerial su-
lightly held outpost line heavily
lery fire destroyed French tanks still
periority, in a carefully planned and or-
th machine guns lay 2 successive
in march column. The French rolling ar-
ganized attack, Plumer's Second Army
e positions, heavily fortified. Be-
tillery barrage moved too fast for the in-
successfully gained the position at cost of
ese again lay the German reserves
fantry, who met preplanned artillery and
17,000 casualties. German losses were 25,-
rated and prepared for counterat-
machine-gun fire, and sectional counter-
000, including 7,500 prisoners. Elbowroom
970
WORLD WAR I
recover from the mutiny, had another
card to play.
1917, November 20-December 3. Battle of
Cambrai. General J. H. G. Byng's Brit-
ish Third Army struck General Georg
von der Marwitz' German Second Army
positions in front of Cambrai in complete
surprise and under most favorable terrain
conditions. At dawn, some 200 tanks fol-
lowed a sudden burst of artillery fire into
the German wire. Behind them moved
wave after wave of infantry. The German
defense collapsed temporarily and the as-
sault bit through the Hindenburg Line
German pursuit planes attacking
for 5 miles on a 6-mile front, except at
Allied observation planes
Flesquières, where German artillery
knocked out tanks and the British infantry
had been gained for the main offensive,
was unable to close in support. Although 2
and the clear-cut victory bolstered British
cavalry divisions were poised to exploit
morale.
the breakthrough, infantry reserves were
1917, July 31-November 10. Third Battle of
weak, and too many tanks had been put
Ypres (Passchendaele). Following an in-
in the first waves. Crown Prince Rupprecht
tensive bombardment, the British Fifth
of Bavaria, commanding the defending
army group, rushed reinforcements to
Army (Gough) assaulted northeast against
Marwitz. A large proportion of the British
the German Fourth Army (Friedrich Sixt
leading tanks became casualties-more
von Armin). The French First Army
from mechanical breakdown than by ar-
(François Anthoine), on the left, was the
tillery fire-and the advance slowed down.
pivot of maneuver; on the right, Plumer's
German counterattacks fell on the salient
Second Army covered the main effort. The
(November 30) and Haig ordered a par-
low ground, sodden with rain, had been
tial withdrawal (December 3). Casualties
churned to a quagmire by a 3-day bom-
on both sides were approximately equal:
bardment. Overhead the Allies had won
about 45,000. The British took 11,000
temporary air superiority. All surprise
prisoners; the Germans, 9,000. Cambrai
had been lost, however, by the long
marked a turning point in Western Front
preparation, and the German defense
tactics on 2 counts: successful assault
in depth was well organized. After some
without preliminary bombardment and
early gains, the attack literally bogged
the first mass use of tanks.
down. Haig now placed Plumer in com-
COMMENT. The most important lesson
mand of the operation. After typical care-
emerging from the entire western campaign
ful planning, a series of limited attacks
of 1917 was the necessity for unity of com-
on narrow fronts began (September 20);
mand. Haig and Nivelle between them in
the British inched forward against deter-
two disjointed offensives had squandered
mined counterattacks. Mustard gas was
more than one-half million men and ex-
used here by the Germans for the first
hausted the resources of two splendid war
time, while German planes flew low to
machines without appreciable effect. In
strafe British infantry with machine guns.
Haig's defense, however, it should be noted
The taking of Passchendaele Ridge and
that his persistent costly attacks in Flanders
Passchendaele village (November 6) con-
and Artois were largely intended to attract
cluded the offensive. The British-held
German attention from the weakness of the
Ypres salient had been deepened for about
French armies farther south; in this he was
5 miles, at great cost-some 300,000 Brit-
successful, and to him must go at least part
ish and 8,528 French casualties. German
of the credit for France's survival through
losses are estimated at 260,000. But Haig,
1917.
still determined to keep pressure on the
As the year ended, acquisitive eyes in
Germans to permit the French armies to
both Britain and France turned to the as yet
OPERATIONS IN 1917
971
from the mutiny, had another
untouched human resources of the United
clouds of gas and smoke shells, disrupted
play.
States.
Italian signal communications. Then the
ember 20-December 3. Battle of
German assault elements loomed through
i. General J. H. G. Byng's Brit-
The Italian Front
mist and rain on the demoralized defend-
rd Army struck General Georg
1917, April. Allied Planning. Cadorna
ers. Cadorna, having learned of the pro-
Marwitz' German Second Army
feared that the Germans would send
jected assault, had ordered defense in
S in front of Cambrai in complete
troops to aid the Austrians in an offensive
depth, but Capello-a capable officer-
and under most favorable terrain
on the Italian front. Because of this, Ni-
was ill and the acting commander of the
ns. At dawn, some 200 tanks fol-
velle sent Foch to meet Cadorna to work
Second Army ignored the instructions.
sudden burst of artillery fire into
out plans for French and British assistance
By-passing strong points which would be
man wire. Behind them moved
in such an event. Franco-British-Italian
mopped up later by reserves, the German
ter wave of infantry. The German
staff officers worked out a program for re-
assault elements streamed through the
collapsed temporarily and the as-
inforcements to be rushed into Italy in
zone, uprooting the Second Army. The
t through the Hindenburg Line
Austrian Tenth Army on the right and
emergency.
iles on a 6-mile front, except at
the Fifth Army on the left supported the
1917, May 12-June 8. Tenth Battle of the
res, where German artillery
main effort. The Italian Third Army with-
Isonzo. Cadorna, despite promises to aid
out tanks and the British infantry
drew in good order along the coast, but
the Allied offensive, did not get started
ble to close in support. Although 2
part of the so-called Carnic Force on the
until after the battles of Arras and the
divisions were poised to exploit
northern Alpine fringe was trapped. Far-
Aisne were over. Once again the Italians
akthrough, infantry reserves were
ther west the Italian Fourth Army hur-
attempted to batter their way through,
nd too many tanks had been put
riedly fell back to conform with the situ-
over mountainous terrain. After a 17-day
'st waves. Crown Prince Rupprecht
ation as the battered Second Army was
battle, gains were small but losses huge:
ria, commanding the defending
driven in succession from defensive lines
some 157,000 Italian casualties against
roup, rushed reinforcements to
along the Tagliamento and Livenza rivers.
about 75,000 Austrians. Following some
A large proportion of the British
By November 12, Cadorna managed to
minor give and take on both Isonzo and
tanks became casualties-more
stabilize his defense from Mt. Pasubia,
Trentino fronts, Cadorna decided to make
echanical breakdown than by ar-
south of Trent, to the Piave and along
a supreme effort with 52 divisions and
re-and the advance slowed down.
that river to the Gulf of Venice. There
5,000 guns.
counterattacks fell on the salient
the Austro-German offensive slowly
ber 30) and Haig ordered a par-
1917, August 18-September 15. Eleventh
ground to a halt, having outdistanced its
Battle of the Isonzo. The Italian Second
drawal (December 3). Casualties
supply. The catastrophe cost the Italians
sides were approximately equal:
Army (General Luigi Capello), heavily
40,000 killed and wounded plus 275,000
5,000. The British took 11,000
reinforced, assaulted north of Gorizia,
prisoners, 2,500 guns, and huge stores
;; the Germans, 9,000. Cambrai
while the Third (Duke of Aosta), to its
of goods and munitions. Austro-German
a turning point in Western Front
south, drove into the rocky hills between
losses were about 20,000. By this time
Gorizia and Trieste. The southern assault
on 2 counts: successful assault
French and British reinforcements, in ac-
preliminary bombardment and
was speedily stopped by the left wing of
cord with the plan prepared earlier in the
mass use of tanks.
Austrian General Borojevic's Fifth Army,
year, were moving in, 11 divisions in all,
but Capello's Second Army on the north
ENT. The most important lesson
under British General Plumer. Cadorna
made a clear-cut advance, capturing the
ToT the entire western campaign
was now removed from command, being
strategically important Bainsizza Plateau.
IS the necessity for unity of com-
replaced by General Armando Diaz.
Outrunning their artillery and supply, the
ig and Nivelle between them in
COMMENT. Caporetto is a prime ex-
Italians were then forced- to stop. The net
nted offensives had squandered
ample of the military principles (or virtues)
result was an incipient collapse of Aus-
one-half million men and ex-
of surprise, objective, mass, and economy of
trian arms. The Austrians asked for Ger-
force. Below had but 35 divisions in all
e resources of two splendid war
man help.
without appreciable effect. In
against the Italian 41, but was far superior
1917, October 24-November 12. Battle of
ense, however, it should be noted
in strength at the point of impact. Had he
Caporetto (Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo).
rsistent costly attacks in Flanders
possessed cavalry and armored cars to ex-
A new Fourteenth Austrian Army (7 of
were largely intended to attract
ploit his success, the battle might have been
its divisions and much of its artillery were
tention from the weakness of the
decisive. As it was, the Italians were badly
German), under German General Otto
nies farther south; in this he was
shaken, but still capable of carrying on the
von Below, was concentrated behind the
and to him must go at least part
war. A direct result of this disaster to Allied
Tolmino-Caporetto-Plezza zone. Using
dit for France's survival through
arms was the Rapallo Conference (Novem-
novel "Hutier tactics" (see p. 972), it
ber which set up a Supreme War Coun-
suddenly crashed against the Italian Sec-
cil, the first attempt to attain over-all Allied
e year ended, acquisitive eyes in
ond Army. Surprise bombardment, with
unity of command.
n and France turned to the as yet
976
WORLD WAR I
OPERATIONS IN 1918
Global Situation
The Allies entered the year in a state of frustration. The rosy promises of early
1917 had been unfulfilled. Except in the Near East, where Allenby's dynamic lead-
ership had culminated in the capture of Jerusalem-with its tremendous psycho-
logical uplift to Christendom-Allied offensives had bogged down in a welter of
cross-purpose and disunity of command. Russia had collapsed. The German U-boat
campaign still threatened the maritime pipeline of supply from America. Finally,
many months would still pass before American armed forces could bolster up lost
Allied man power. Both Britain and France were therefore on the defensive. The
Supreme War Council did no serious planning. Haig (who had been refused rein-
forcement by Lloyd George) and Pétain agreed among themselves on mutual sup-
port should a German offensive be launched. Some attempt at organization of de-
fense in depth was made.
Nor had the Central Powers been successful. They all felt the strangulation
of Allied naval blockade. Austria was at the end of her resources, Turkey and Bul-
garia were wobbling, and the burden of the war fell heavier and heavier on Germany.
Hindenburg and Ludendorff had established a virtual military dictatorship over
Germany, and exercised almost as complete authority over the subservient govern-
ments of Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey.
The American Build-up
Having entered the war without previous preparation, the U.S. was faced with
organizing, equipping, training, transporting, and supplying an expeditionary force
in Europe. The little Regular Army provided the leaven for 2 successive waves of
man power: the National Guard and the draftees produced by the Selective Service
Act (May 19, 1917). From a strength of 200,000 men and 9,000 officers (including
65,000 National Guardsmen then serving on the Mexican border), the Army swelled
to over 4 million men, including 200,000 officers. Some 2 million in all served over-
seas. Based on Pershing's recommendations, a divisional organization of approxi-
mately 28,000-man strength was adopted. It consisted of 2 infantry brigades of two
regiments each, an artillery brigade, an engineer regiment, 3 machine-gun battal-
ions, and trains and supporting services. Forty-two of these divisions, which were
nearly double the strength of their European counterparts, reached France. Though
Pershing understood the need and importance of entrenchments, he eschewed what
he considered to be a defeatist concept of trench warfare. Training was predicated
on the spirit of the offensive-mobile combat-with stress on individual marksman-
ship.
Overseas, the Service of Supply became an empire in itself, manning 9 base
sections. Pershing chose the Lorraine area east of Verdun as the American combat
zone. The pipeline of supply from the United States went to ports in southwestern
France, and movement overland conflicted little with the Allied efforts farther north.
Except for small arms, ordnance needs were filled by America's allies. So too with
airplanes; American production was limited to the Liberty engine.
Overseas transportation, the province of the U.S. Navy, was in part provided
by the German merchant fleet seized in American ports, plus an improvised fleet of
the American merchant marine-much of it built with remarkable celerity, some
British ships, and neutral shipping sequestrated or leased. The combined fleet car-
OPERATIONS IN 1918
977
ried more than a million American soldiers to France without loss of a single vessel
918
-on eastbound voyages. (The remaining million shipped overseas went on Allied
ships, mostly British.)
The Navy, whose personnel waxed to 800,000, was primarily concerned in anti-
submarine and convoy activities, though a division of 5 battleships joined the British
ation. The rosy promises of early
Grand Fleet and 3 other battleships operated in Irish waters against surface raiders.
where Allenby's dynamic lead-
In all, some 79 American destroyers took part in convoy work, and 135 subchasers
n-with its tremendous psycho-
also operated in European waters. An important part of U.S. Navy participation
ad bogged down in a welter of
was in the laying of 56,000 of the 70,000 mines comprising the North Sea mine
1 collapsed. The German U-boat
belt-from Scotland to Norway. Naval air squadrons took part in bombings of Ger-
E supply from America. Finally,
man submarine bases along the Belgian coast. A Marine brigade became part of
med forces could bolster up lost
the AEF.
therefore on the defensive. The
American combat participation in World War I was based on "co-operation,"
aig (who had been refused rein-
as Pershing's directive put it. The U.S. was not technically an Ally. Its expeditionary
nong themselves on mutual sup-
force was to be "a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the
e attempt at organization of de-
identity of which must be preserved." Pershing's directive ran counter to the Allies'
desires. They distrusted the inexperienced Americans' military ability, and they were
They all felt the strangulation
short of man power. From the beginning Pershing was cajoled, coaxed, and finally
her resources, Turkey and Bul-
threatened, in fruitless efforts to have him turn the AEF over in toto as a replace-
heavier and heavier on Germany.
ment reservoir for the French and British armies. War Secretary Newton D. Baker
rtual military dictatorship over
and President Wilson upheld Pershing when Clemenceau and Lloyd George went
ity over the subservient govern-
over his head to Washington with their demands.
The Fourteen Points
In an address to Congress on January 8, 1918, President Wilson laid down his
aration, the U.S. was faced with
"only possible program" for peace. The policy included (1) open covenants, openly
upplying an expeditionary force
arrived at; (2) freedom of the seas in war and peace; (3) removal of trade barriers;
eaven for 2 successive waves of
(4) national armament reductions; (5) impartial adjustment of colonial claims;
roduced by the Selective Service
(6) evacuation of Russian territory and independent solution by Russia of her po-
en and 9,000 officers (including
litical development and national policy; (7) evacuation and restoration of Belgium;
kican border), the Army swelled
(8) evacuation and restoration of all occupied French territory and return of Al-
me 2 million in all served over-
sace-Lorraine; (9) readjustment of Italian frontiers on lines of nationality; (10)
sional organization of approxi-
autonomy for the peoples of Austria-Hungary; (11) evacuation of Rumania, Serbia,
ed of 2 infantry brigades of two
and Montenegro, restoration of occupied territories, and Serbian access to the sea;
egiment, 3 machine-gun battal-
(12) Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire to be assured secure sovereignty, but
of these divisions, which were
other nationalities under Turkish domination to be freed; (13) independence of
rparts, reached France. Though
Poland, to include territories with predominantly Polish population, with free Polish
trenchments, he eschewed what
access to the sea; (14) formation of an association of nations ensuring liberty and
arfare. Training was predicated
territorial integrity of great and small alike.
stress on individual marksman-
Operations on the Western Front
npire in itself, manning 9 base
LUDENDORFF'S OFFENSIVES
erdun as the American combat
S went to ports in southwestern
During the winter of 1917-1918, Ludendorff realized that Germany's only hope
the Allied efforts farther north.
of winning the war lay in a decisive victory in the west in 1918, before the weight
»y America's allies. So too with
of American man power could have a significant effect. With Russia knocked out
berty engine.
of the war, he believed that this could be done. Shifting most German forces from
.S. Navy, was in part provided
the east, he instituted an intensive training program in preparation for an all-out
orts, plus an improvised fleet of
offensive to be launched as early as possible in the spring. The best units were de-
with remarkable celerity, some
veloped into "shock troops," to be spearheads of the planned assaults. His intention
eased. The combined fleet car-
was to smash the Allied armies in a series of hammer blows. Recognizing the diver-
978
WORLD WAR I
gent interests of the French (concerned with protection of Paris) and the British
(interested in maintaining their lines of communications with the Channel ports),
he intended to drive a wedge between the two Allied armies and then destroy the
British in subsequent assaults. Preparations were made with remarkable efficiency.
The Somme Offensive
between Arras and La Fère. The objective
was to break through, dislocate, and roll
1918, March 21. The First Offensive. The
up the British, wheeling to the north and
Germans began their drive at dawn in
splitting them from the French on their
heavy fog. Three German armies-Seven-
right. Following a surprise 5-hour bom-
teenth (Otto von Below), Second (Mar-
bardment by more than 6,000 cannon, the
witz), and Eighteenth (Hutier), from
specially trained German shock elements
north to south-struck the right flank of
rolled through the fog, using "Hutier tac-
the British sector-the Third (Byng) and
tics"-infiltration behind a rolling barrage
Fifth (Gough) armies-on a 60-mile front
and passing of strong points which would
Dunkirk
Calais
GERMAN DRIVES, 1918
Yser
NETH.
o
25
50
Ypres
Boulogne
Scale of miles
Lys
R.
2
Lille
1
Somme Offensive (First Drive), March
Z
2
Lys. Offensive (Second Drive), April
3
Alsne Offensive (Third Drive), May
4
Noyon-Montdidier Offensive (Fourth Drive), June
A
"Cambral
5
Champaigne Marne Offensive (Fifth Drive), July
1
BELGIUM
M
Amiens
4
Cantigny
ARDENNES
LUX.
Somre.
Montdidier
Noyon
3
FOREST
Sedan
R
4
R
Compiegne
5
&
Soissons
5
E
Reim
Verdun
Metz
Epernay
8/18
Chateau
Paris
Thierry
R
Marre
G
St. Miniel
be later mopped up by reserves, accompa-
cerned with protecting Paris than he was
nied by artillery neutralization of battery
with assisting Haig. The British com-
positions and observation posts (see p.
mander hastily appealed to the new Brit-
972). No limits were set to the advance;
ish Chief of Staff, General Sir Henry Wil-
each division pressed as far and as fast as
son, and the War Minister, Lord Milner,
possible, with close-support elements pass-
for the appointment of "Foch or some
ing through and taking up the advance
other French general who will fight" to
whenever a local assault should bog down.
take supreme command.
Gough's Fifth Army, spread thin on a
42-mile front lately taken over from the
1918, March 23-August 7. Artillery Bom-
French, collapsed, exposing the Third
bardment of Paris. A remarkable long-
Army's right and forcing its withdrawal,
range German cannon began a sporadic
but Byng, better organized in depth, held
bombardment of Paris from a position 65
the German Seventeenth and Second ar-
miles away. This amazing achievement of
mies to limited gains. Hutier, continuing
German ordnance technology seriously
on Gough's heels, reached and passed the
hurt morale of Parisians and inflicted 876
Somme. All British reserves were commit-
casualties, but did not significantly affect
ted to plug the gap and some French units
the war. Actually there were 7 "Paris
also reinforced. But Pétain was more con-
Guns," with a caliber of about 9 inches,
OPERATIONS IN 1918
979
:tion of Paris) and the British
the barrels 117 feet long, with a maximum
made, the front-line infantry quickly outran
tions with the Channel ports),
range of 80 miles.
its artillery, which was unable to advance in
:d armies and then destroy the
1918, March 26. Foch Appointed Allied Co-
any significant numbers through the roadless
ordinator. In an emergency meeting of
morass. Thus, when the British were finally
e with remarkable efficiency.
the Supreme War Council at Doullens,
able to move reserves into the gap, the Ger-
Foch was appointed co-ordinator for the
mans lacked sufficient fire power to main-
Arras and La Fère. The objective
Western Front.
tain the momentum of their drive or to deal
oreak through, dislocate, and roll
1918, April 3. Foch to Supreme Command.
adequately with the British fighter planes
British, wheeling to the north and
At Beauvais, the War Council appointed
strafing them.
them from the French on their
Foch commander in chief of the Allied
The Lys Offensive
ollowing a surprise 5-hour bom-
forces in France. Pershing, who had al-
t by more than 6,000 cannon, the
ready (March 27) generously offered his
1918, April 9. Ludendorff's Second Offen-
trained German shock elements
8 available divisions in France to Foch in
sive. Again the Germans struck the Brit-
trough the fog, using "Hutier tac-
the emergency, agreed in principle to the
ish sector, this time in Flanders on a nar-
filtration behind a rolling barrage
appointment.
rower front, threatening the Channel
sing of strong points which would
1918, April 5. End of the Offensive. Mean-
ports. The German Fourth Army (Sixt
while the German drive, after gaining a
von Armin) struck Plumer's Second Army
40-mile-deep salient, lost momentum.
in a Hutier-type attack. (Plumer had re-
1918
NETH.
Paris had been bombarded by long-range
turned from Italy at Haig's request.)
50
artillery (75 miles; March 21-April 6).
Ferdinand von Quast's German Sixth
Foch's shifting of reserves checked the
Army on its left clawed through the posi-
if Drive), March
N
German assault after it reached Mont-
tions of Horne's First Army, demolishing
, Drive), April
didier, and Ludendorff brought it to a
a Portuguese division.
1 Drive), May
halt. Allied losses mounted to about 240,-
1918, April 12. "Backs to the Wall." Haig's
lensive (Fourth Drive), June
000 casualties (163,000 British, 77,000
order forbidding retirement galvanized
Offensive (Fifth Drive), July
French), including 70,000 prisoners and
British resistance. The German drive was
BELGIUM
M
1,100 guns. German casualties were al-
halted (April 17) after a 10-mile advance
LUX.
most as high, most of them in the spe-
which included recapture of Messines
ARDENNES
FOREST
R
cially trained shock divisions. Over Haig's
Ridge. Foch, gathering a reserve force be-
Sedan
protests, Gough was relieved by the Brit-
hind the British, placed only part of it in
ish government; his shattered Fifth Army
the line (April 21), much to Haig's dis-
E
was taken over by General Sir Henry
satisfaction. After a series of further at-
Verdun
Matz
Rawlinson's Fourth Army headquarters.
tacks and counterattacks, Ludendorff
G
COMMENT. The most serious conse-
finally called the operation off. Again, and
St. Mihiel
quence of the offensive, from the German
for the same reasons as before, he had
point of view, had been the institution of an
achieved tactical success but strategical
Allied unified command. Thus, despite its
failure. No breakthrough had been ef-
initial brilliant tactical success, the offensive
fected, and the Channel ports were safe.
vith protecting Paris than he was
sisting Haig. The British com-
was a strategic failure. There were 3 main
The cost had been great-another 100,000
hastily appealed to the new Brit-
reasons for this: (1) Lack of logistical mo-
British casualties-but again German
E of Staff, General Sir Henry Wil-
bility. Once a breakthrough had been made,
losses had been almost as great. Luden-
the War Minister, Lord Milner,
the Germans found themselves advancing
dorff's carefully trained and prepared
shock troops were sadly depleted, the
appointment of "Foch or some
across land devastated by 4 years of war,
:ench general who will fight" to
particularly by their own "scorched earth"
morale of the survivors badly shaken.
measures at the time of the withdrawal to
reme command.
The Aisne Offensive
the Hindenburg Line (see p. 968). They did
ch 23-August 7. Artillery Bom-
not have the means of keeping up a flow of
1918, May 27. Third German Offensive.
it of Paris. A remarkable long-
ammunition, food, and other supplies to their
This time Ludendorff struck along the
erman cannon began a sporadic
troops advancing through a veritable quag-
Chemin des Dames, a diversion against
ment of Paris from a position 65
mire. (2) Lack of strategic mobility. The
the French preparatory to a planned final
ay. This amazing achievement of
same problem prevented them from fully ex-
and decisive blow to be struck against the
ordnance technology seriously
ploiting the gap with fast-moving mobile
British in Flanders. The German First
rale of Parisians and inflicted 876
forces, or even from providing adequate re-
(Bruno von Mudra) and Seventh (Boehn)
s, but did not significantly affect
inforcements and replacements to the break-
armies attacked the French Sixth Army
Actually there were 7 "Paris
through troops. (3) Lack of mobile tactical
(Duchêne) with 17 divisions in the as-
with a caliber of about 9 inches,
fire support. Once the breakthrough was
sault, preceded by tanks. Duchêne's 12
980
WORLD WAR I
divisions (3 of them British) were sur-
Fourth and Fifth German Offensives
prised in shallow defenses along a lightly
held 25-mile front and collapsed. By noon
1918, June 9-13. Noyon-Montdidier
the Germans were crossing the Aisne; by
(Fourth) Offensive. Forewarned by Ger-
evening they were crossing the Vesle, west
man deserters, Foch and Pétain were
of Fismes, and reached the Marne (May
ready. French defenses were organized in
30).
depth. A counterpreparation artillery
1918, May 28. Battle of Cantigny. Mean-
bombardment disrupted the Eighteenth
while, as Pershing was rushing the 2nd
Army's assault. Some gains were made,
(Major General Omar Bundy) and 3rd
but a Franco-American counterattack
(Major General J. T. Dickman) divisions
halted the advance (June 11). The Sev-
to reinforce the French, the first Amer-
enth Army's attack was quickly snubbed
ican offensive of the war took place at
(June 12). By this time, 25 American
Cantigny, 50 miles northwest. The 1st
divisions were in France, 7 of them at the
U.S. Division (Major General Robert Lee
front. French and British leaders were
Bullard) attacked the village, a strongly
making strenuous efforts to incorporate
fortified German observation point, taking
American troops into their respective ar-
all its objectives, and then repulsed a series
mies permanently; Pershing was resisting
this.
of violent German counterattacks (May
28 and 29). While only a local operation,
1918, July 15-19. Champagne-Marne (Fifth)
its success, against veteran troops of Hu-
Offensive. Ludendorff, clinging to his
tier's Eighteenth Army, boosted Allied
plan for an all-out drive against the Brit-
morale.
ish in Flanders, attempted one more pre-
1918, May 30-June 17. Battles of Château-
liminary offensive in Champagne to pinch
Thierry and Belleau Wood. The U.S.
out the strongly fortified Reims area.
2nd and 3rd divisions were flung against
Boehn's Seventh Army would advance up
the nose of the German offensive along
the Marne through Épernay to meet Mu-
the Marne, moving into position through
dra's First Army and Karl von Einem's
the retiring troops of the French Sixth
Third attacking south toward Châlons.
Army. The 3rd Division held the bridges
Foch, already planning a major counterof-
at Château-Thierry against German as-
fensive, was again warned of the blow by
saults, then counterattacked and, with as-
deserters, aerial reconnaissance, and pris-
sistance from rallying French troops,
oners. German shock troops were tripped
drove the Germans back across the Marne
by an Allied artillery counterpreparation
at Jaulgonne. The 2nd Division, taking
(night of July 14-15). East of Reims the
over the sector of the French XXI Corps
attack was halted in a few hours by
between Vaux and Belleau, west of Châ-
Henri Gouraud's French Fourth Army.
teau-Thierry, checked German attacks.
1918, July 15-17. Second Battle of the
Ludendorff called off his offensive (June
Marne. West of Reims, where the de-
4). The 2nd Division then counterat-
fenses were neither so strong nor so deep,
tacked, spearheaded by its Marine bri-
the German Seventh Army penetration
gade. In 6 successive assaults the Ger-
carried to the Marne, some 14 divisions
mans were uprooted from positions at
crossing the river. The stout defense of
Vaux, Bouresches, and Belleau Wood, los-
the U.S. 3rd Division again snubbed the
ing some 9,500 men and more than 1,600
attack there. Then Allied aircraft and ar-
prisoners.
tillery destroyed the German bridges, dis-
COMMENT. The net result of the third
rupting supply and forcing the attack to
German drive had been to make a serious
halt. Ludendorff, admitting defeat, now
dent in the Allied front, a salient some 30
prepared for a general withdrawal from
miles wide and more than 20 miles deep.
the Soissons-Château-Thierry-Reims sali-
Ludendorf determined to exploit this success
ent to reduce the front held by his depleted
by another diversionary drive, prior to his
forces. In 5 months he had lost half a
proposed Flanders stroke. It would be a
million casualties. Allied losses had been
2-pronged affair converging on Compiègne,
somewhat greater, but American troops
the Eighteenth Army attacking southwesterly,
were now arriving at a rate of 300,000 a
the Seventh Army westerly.
month.
OPERATIONS IN 1918
981
nd Fifth German Offensives
THE ALLIED COUNTEROFFENSIVE
The Marne salient no longer existed. In
reward for the victory, Clemenceau pro-
une 9-13. Noyon-Montdidier
The Aisne-Marne Offensive
moted Foch to Marshal of France (Au-
) Offensive. Forewarned by Ger-
eserters, Foch and Pétain were
1918, July 18-August B Allied Aisne-Marne
gust 6).
Offensive. The French Tenth (Mangin),
COMMENT. The entire July operation,
French defenses were organized in
Sixth (Jean M. J. Degoutte), and Fifth
German offensive and Allied counteroffen-
A counterpreparation artillery
(Henri M. Berthelot) armies, from left to
sive, is sometimes called the Second Battle
dment disrupted the Eighteenth
assault. Some gains were made,
right, assaulted the Marne salient. The
of the Marne. Strategically, it was the turn
Franco-American counterattack
Ninth Army (M. A. H. de Mitry) was in
of the tide: the initiative had been wrested
reserve. In a series of smashing attacks,
from the Germans. Ludendorf's gamble to
the advance (June 11). The Sev-
the Germans were rolled back all along
conclude the war successfully had failed.
my's attack was quickly snubbed
the line, despite desperate resistance and
The front had been shortened by 28 miles,
12). By this time, 25 American
skillful handling. The U.S. 1st and 2nd
the important Paris-Châlons railway line re-
S were in France, 7 of them at the
French and British leaders were
divisions spearheaded the Tenth Army's
established, and all menace to Paris ended.
attack-the main effort. The 1st Division
On the Allied side, troops of 4 nations-
strenuous efforts to incorporate
captured 3,800 prisoners and 70 guns
France, Great Britain, the United States,
in troops into their respective ar-
from the 7 German divisions it encoun-
and Italy-had successfully participated in a
rmanently; Pershing was resisting
tered. Its casualties were 1,000 killed and
unified operation. Allied morale soared as
6,000 wounded. The 2nd Division, captur-
German dropped. Ludendorf had lost 30,-
15-19. Champagne-Marne (Fifth)
ing 3,000 prisoners and 75 guns, suffered
000 more prisoners, more than 600 guns,
e. Ludendorff, clinging to his
5,000 casualties in all. Six other American
200 mine throwers, and 3,000 machine guns.
an all-out drive against the Brit-
divisions also took part the 4th, 26th
The Amiens Offensive, August 8-
landers, attempted one more pre-
and 42nd in Major General Hunter Lig-
7 offensive in Champagne to pinch
September 4
gett's I Corps with the French Sixth
strongly fortified Reims area.
Army, and the 3rd, 28th, and 32nd in
1918, August 8-11. First Phase. Haig, in
Seventh Army would advance up
Major General Bullard's III Corps with
conjunction with the French Aisne-Marne
ne through Épernay to meet Mu-
the Ninth Army (which moved into line
offensive, threw Rawlinson's British
rst Army and Karl von Einem's
between the Sixth and Fifth armies). Lu-
Fourth Army and the French First Army
attacking south toward Châlons.
dendorff called off his proposed Flanders
(M. Eugène Debeny, attached by Foch to
ready planning a major counterof-
drive (July 20), concentrating his efforts
Rawlinson's command) against the Ger-
was again warned of the blow by
to stabilize the situation along the Vesle.
man Eighteenth (Hutier) and Second
;, aerial reconnaissance, and pris-
erman shock troops were tripped
Allied artillery counterpreparation
f July 14-15). East of Reims the
was halted in a few hours by
ouraud's French Fourth Army.
y 15-17. Second Battle of the
West of Reims, where the de-
ere neither so strong nor so deep,
man Seventh Army penetration
to the Marne, some 14 divisions
the river. The stout defense of
3rd Division again snubbed the
here. Then Allied aircraft and ar-
estroyed the German bridges, dis-
supply and forcing the attack to
idendorff, admitting defeat, now
[ for a general withdrawal from
sons-Château-Thierry-Reims sali-
duce the front held by his depleted
In 5 months he had lost half a
casualties. Allied losses had been
at greater, but American troops
W arriving at a rate of 300,000 a
The Paris gun
982
WORLD WAR I
(Marwitz) armies. Expecting an Allied
right took up the assault. The British
attack farther north in Flanders, the Ger-
Fourth Army in the center joined in (Au-
mans were caught off guard by a well-
gust 22), followed by the British First
mounted assault secretly prepared. The
Army (Horne) on the far left. Luden-
Canadian and Anzac corps jumped off
dorff ordered a general withd from
without preliminary bombardment, pre-
both the Lys salient in Flanders and the
ceded by tanks, and bit deep through a
Amiens area. His plans were disrupted
dense fog. More than 15,000 prisoners and
when the Anzacs penetrated across the
400 guns were captured. On their right,
Somme (August 30-31), taking Péronne
the French bombarded first, then ad-
and threatening St.-Quentin. The Cana-
vanced. Despite near panic among their
dian corps, shifted to the north flank,
front-line troops, the Germans managed
broke through near Quéant (September
to re-establish a position 10 miles behind
2). The entire German situation deterio-
the former nose of the salient. The French
rated, necessitating retirement to the final
Third Army (Georges Humbert), on the
position-the Hindenburg Line. By this
right of the First, entered the action (Au-
time Haig had expended his reserves and
could not further exploit his victory. Ger-
gust 10), forcing the evacuation of Mont-
man casualties were more than 100,000,
didier. Haig cautiously paused (August
including some 30,000 prisoners. Allied
11) to regroup, despite Foch's wishes to
losses were 22,000 British and 20,000
maintain unremitting pressure on the Ger-
French. Tactically and strategically, the
mans. Both Allied and German air forces
Allies had gained another major victory,
took part in the initial fighting after the
cracking German morale.
fog cleared.
COMMENT. Ludendorf's bitter state-
1918, August 21-September 4. Second Phase.
ment that August 8 had been the "Black
Progressively, the British Third Army on
Day" of the German Army tells the story.
the left and the French armies on the
He said flatly: "The war must be ended!"
St.-Mihiel Offensive, September 12-16
Pershing's insistence on a separate and distinct United States Army operating
on its own assigned front was reluctantly accepted by Foch (July 24). Reduction
of the St.-Mihiel salient was the first mission. The U.S. First Army, with the French
II Colonial Corps attached, took over the sector (August 30). Foch, planning an
all-out Allied offensive, then attempted to change Pershing's plan and divide part
of the American forces between the French Second and Fourth armies. After sharp
disagreement, Foch accepted Pershing's position, but the American agreed to shift
his army and attack with the French in the Argonne Forest immediately upon con-
clusion of the St.-Mihiel operation.
Ludendorff, well aware of the threat, started evacuation of the salient (Sep-
tember 8).
Supported by a conglomerate Allied air force of some 600 planes-American,
French, Italian, and Portuguese-under American Colonel William Mitchell, the
First Army attacked both faces of the salient (September 12). The French corps
held the nose. The assault-both ground and air-was completely successful; the
converging attacks met at Hattonchatel by nightfall on the first day, and the salient
was entirely cleared (September 16) ; more than 15,000 prisoners and some 250 guns
were taken. American casualties numbered 7,000. The strategic importance of the
victory was great; since 1914 the St.-Mihiel salient in German hands had constituted
a standing threat to any Allied movements in Champagne. In addition, the First
Army proved itself to both friend and foe to be a competent entity. This was the
largest American operation since the Civil War. Pershing at once turned to the tre-
mendous job of shifting his entire army some 60 miles, and entering another major
offensive without any rest.
OPERATIONS IN 1918
983
took up the assault. The British
1 Army in the center joined in (Au-
2), followed by the British First
(Horne) on the far left. Luden-
ordered a general withdrawal from
he Lys salient in Flanders and the
S area. His plans were disrupted
the Anzacs penetrated across the
: (August 30-31), taking Péronne
treatening St.-Quentin. The Cana-
orps, shifted to the north flank,
through near Quéant (September
e entire German situation deterio-
necessitating retirement to the final
1-the Hindenburg Line. By this
aig had expended his reserves and
lot further exploit his victory. Ger-
sualties were more than 100,000,
ig some 30,000 prisoners. Allied
were 22,000 British and 20,000
Tactically and strategically, the
Lieutenant Frank Luke, American ace, with his Spad
ad gained another major victory,
} German morale.
FOCH'S FINAL OFFENSIVES
ENT. Ludendorf's bitter state-
August 8 had been the "Black
The Concept
the German Army tells the story.
atly: "The war must be ended!"
Foch planned a double penetration, in 2 major assaults. One of these was to be
a Franco-American drive from the Verdun area toward Mézières, a vital German
supply center and railroad junction. The other was to be a British offensive between
Péronne and Lens, with the railroad junction of Aulnoye as its objective. Seizure
United States Army operating
of these 2 vital railroad junctions would jeopardize the entire German logistical
by Foch (July 24). Reduction
situation on the Western Front. Supplemental assaults would be made in Flanders
S. First Army, with the French
by a combined British Belgian rench army group, and between La Fère and
August 30). Foch, planning an
Péronne by another Franco-British force.
'ershing's plan and divide part
nd Fourth armies. After sharp
The Meuse-Argonne Offensive,
forcements. The American drive lost mo-
the American agreed to shift
September 26-November 11
mentum on the line Apremont-Brieulles
Forest immediately upon con-
1918, September 26-October 3. First Phase.
(October 3), having penetrated the first
Having efficiently shifted by night more
2 German positions.
vacuation of the salient (Sep-
than a million men with tanks and guns
1918, October 4-31. Second Phase. Replac-
over an inadequate road and rail net,
ing a number of his assault divisions by
some 600 planes-American,
Pershing launched the First Army-3
veteran troops from the St.-Mihiel op-
Colonel William Mitchell, the
corps abreast-in attack at 5:25 A.M. On
eration, Pershing renewed the offensive.
ember 12). The French corps
its left the French Fourth Army (H. J. E.
There was no room for maneuver; the
vas completely successful; the
Gouraud) attacked also. The American
First Army battered its way slowly for-
n the first day, and the salient
zone lay astride the Meuse Valley, includ-
ward in a series of costly frontal attacks,
0 prisoners and some 250 guns
ing the Argonne Forest on its left, the
and the actual combat zone was widened.
le strategic importance of the
Aire Valley, and the heights on both sides
to include the east bank of the Meuse,
German hands had constituted
of the Meuse. The German defenses (Gall-
where the Germans had excellent observa-
witz's army group to the east, the Crown
tion from the Heights of the Meuse. The
pagne. In addition, the First
Prince's to the west) consisted of 3 heavily
Argonne Forest was cleared, facilitating
mpetent entity. This was the
fortified lines taking clever advantage of
the advance of the French Fourth Army,
ing at once turned to the tre-
the rugged and heavily wooded terrain.
on the left, to the Aisne River. Pershing
i, and entering another major
Initial rapid advance was finally slowed in
regrouped his forces into a group of 2 ar-
the Argonne Forest and in front of Mont-
mies (October 12). The newly constituted
faucon as the Germans rushed in rein-
Second Army, commanded by Bullard,
984
WORLD WAR I
Sedan
Initial boundary. Later moved east
MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE
to allow French to take Sadan.
26 September-11 November 1918
BELGIUM
0
5
10
Scate of miles
LUX.
Stenay
N
28
A
Several American divs. served
in these French corps.
W
8
R
2
Verdun
XXX
XXX
E
XXX
III
Metz
XXXX
I
FR.
FR.
FOURTH
G
St. Menehould
11 Nov.
FOREST
XXXX
FIRST
U.S.
XXX
FR.
26 Sept.
XXXX
XXX
SECOND
IV
*****
AEF
Formed 12 Oct.,
XXX
attacked 10 Nov.
VI
St. Mihiel
FR.
prepared for an offensive northeast, be-
rail line, vital artery of supply for the en-
tween the Meuse and the Moselle, while
tire German front. A spectacular drive
the First Army, now under Liggett, con-
on Sedan by the U.S. 1st Division was
tinued its slow northward battering-ram
abruptly checked by orders from higher
progression. Clemenceau, exasperated by
authority, to permit the French the honor
the Americans' slow progress, tried un-
of taking the city and erasing the stain of
successfully to have Pershing relieved.
the 1870 disaster (see p. 835). Bullard's
Foch, aware of the nature of the opposi-
Second Army launched its final attack
tion, well knowing that the American of-
(November 10), driving for Montmédy.
fensive-threatening the part of the front
Next day the armistice ended all hostili-
most vital to the Germans-was drawing
ties.
all available German reserves from else-
where for its defense, declined to support
Final British, French, and
Clemenceau. As October ended, the First
Belgian Offensives
Army had punched through most of the
1918, September 27-October 17. Storming
third and final German line.
the Hindenburg Line. One day after the
1918, November 1-11. Final Phase. With
beginning of the American offensive,
rested divisions replacing tired ones, the
Haig's army group flung itself against the
First Army jumped off again, smashing
Hindenburg Line. Trading space for time
through the last German positions north-
on this front, Boehn's army group man-
east and west of Buzancy, thus enabling
aged to withdraw after a succession of
the French Fourth Army to cross the
costly and gallant British attacks drove
Aisne. In the open now, American spear-
through the last of the Hindenburg Line
heads raced up the Meuse Valley, brush-
positions (October 5). To Haig's surprise,
ing aside last-ditch German defensive
he had been unable to achieve a com-
stands, reaching the Meuse before Sedan
plete breakthrough, and the momentum
(November 6) and placing destructive ar-
of his drive slowed down in the face of
tillery fire on the Mézières-Montmédy
skillful German defense.
OPERATIONS IN 1918
985
1918, September 28-October 14. Offensive
government took power and proclaimed a
in Flanders. British-Belgian troops of
republic (November 9). The Kaiser fled
ISE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE
King Albert's army group swept over the
to Holland (November 10).
26 September-11 November 1918
0
5
10
Ypres Ridge, but then slowed down as
1918, November 7-11. Armistice Negotia-
Scale of miles
swampy country choked all supply, and
tions. A German delegation, headed by
Rupprecht's army group fought back
a-civilian, Matthias Erzberger, negotiated
LUX.
grimly.
an armistice with Foch in his railway
1918, October 17-November 11. Advance to
coach headquarters on a siding at Com-
the Sambre and the Scheldt. Because of
piègne. Agreement was finally reached at
American progress in the Meuse-Argonne,
5 A.M., November 11, 1918. The terms,
a German retreat all along the line be-
which were in effect a German surrender,
came necessary. Ludendorff hoped that he
provided that the German Army must im-
could re-establish a new line west of the
mediately evacuate all occupied territory
A
German border and by a determined de-
and Alsace-Lorraine; immediately surren-
al American divs. served
fense through the winter force the Allies
der great quantities of war matériel (in-
10 French corps.
W
to grant generous terms. But his hopes
cluding 5,000 guns and 25,000 machine
were foiled by the pressure being main-
guns); evacuate German territory west of
R
tained all along the Allied lines. In a re-
the Rhine, and three bridgeheads over the
E
Metz
newed British assault, Rawlinson's Fourth
Rhine, to be occupied by the Allies; sur-
G
&
Army broke through German defenses
render all submarines; intern all other
11 Nov.
on the Selle River (October 17). Byng's
surface warships as directed by the Allies.
Third Army forced a crossing lower down
1918, November 11. The Armistice. Hos-
26 Sept.
(October 20). The drive threw back
tilities ceased at 11 A.M.; the terms of the
XXX
Boehn's army group with the loss of 20,-
armistice immediately became effective.
IV
000 prisoners. At the same time the Bel-
COMMENT. Comparisons are invidious.
ed 12 Oct.,
***
gians and British began to move again in
The American Expeditionary Force was the
:ked 10 Nov.
VI
FR.
Flanders. The German Army began to
vital factor in the final Allied victory; the
crack.
Meuse-Argonne offensive was decisive; 6
, vital artery of supply for the en-
other American divisions played important
rman front. A spectacular drive
The German Collapse
spearhead roles elsewhere on the front dur-
an by the U.S. 1st Division was
ing the final Allied advances. But the ques-
1918, October 6. Request for an Armistice.
/ checked by orders from higher
tion whether Allied victory could have been
As the front lines began to crumble, the
y, to permit the French the honor
achieved without the Americans should not
new German chancellor, Prince Max of
g the city and erasing the stain of
be debated. The American role was to add a
0 disaster (see p. 835). Bullard's
Baden, sent a message to President Wil-
final increment of numbers and fresh initia-
Army launched its final attack
son, requesting an armistice on the basis
tive, permitting the much larger, and more
of Wilson's Fourteen Points (see p. 977).
ber 10), driving for Montmédy.
experienced, Allied armies to achieve equally
ty the armistice ended all hostili-
An exchange of messages concluded (Oc-
spectacular successes in the final weeks of
tober 23) with Wilson's insistence that the
the war.
U.S. (and the Allies) would not negotiate
tish, French, and
an armistice with the existing military
The Italian Front
Offensives
dictatorship.
1918, October 27. Resignation of Luden-
tember 27-October 17. Storming
1918, June 15-22. Austrian Offensive. Ger-
dorff. Just before formal dismissal, Lu-
denburg Line. One day after the
many during the spring transferred her
dendorff resigned to permit the desperate
ag of the American offensive,
troops in Italy to the Western Front, in-
German government to comply with Wil-
sisting that the Austrians crush Italy sin-
army group flung itself against the
son's demand. Hindenburg, however, re-
ourg Line. Trading space for time
glehanded. The argument had weight,
tained his post as German commander in
since Russia was out of the war. Both
front, Boehn's army group man-
chief, with General Wilhelm Groener re-
withdraw after a succession of
Conrad (now commanding on the Tren-
placing Ludendorff as Quartermaster Gen-
nd gallant British attacks drove
tino front) and Borojevic, on the Piave,
eral (Chief of Staff).
demanded command of the decisive ef-
the last of the Hindenburg Line
$ (October 5). To Haig's surprise,
1918, October 29-November 10. Revolution
fort. A compromise decision by Archduke
been unable to achieve a com-
in Germany. Inspired by the Commu-
Joseph permitted them to attack simulta-
reakthrough, and the momentum
nists and sparked by a mutiny of the High
neously. Since the mountainous terrain
lrive slowed down in the face of
Seas Fleet, disorders, revolts, and mutinies
and lack of lateral communications would
German defense.
flared inside Germany. A new Socialist
prevent mutual support, the available re-
OPERATIONS IN 1914
935
rchill and the First Sea Lord,
OPERATIONS IN 1914
and the Dutch border, a narrow corridor
1 comparable standards of effi-
guarded by Liége, one of the strongest
well as numbers. The Russian,
Western Front
fortresses of Europe. A night attack (Au-
gust 5-6) penetrated the ring of 12 out-
h and were to play only minor
THE OPENING BATTLES
lying forts. Heavy fighting followed, in
which German Major General Erich F.
1914, August 3-20. Belgium Overrun. A
Ludendorff distinguished himself, as did
specially trained German Second Army
the Belgian commander, General Gérard
-AUGUST, 1914
task force of about 30,000 men under
M. Leman. German bombardment by
General Otto von Emmich crossed the
42-cm. howitzers (heaviest used to this
German
Belgian frontier between the Ardennes
time) systematically reduced the concrete
High
Home
Seas
Total
Waters
Fleet
BELGIUM
Battle of the Sambre,
22-23 Aug.
Colone
Calais
Battle of Mons,
(13)
22-23 Aug.
NETH
*****
13
(13)
FIRST
Y
****
Battle of Le Coleau,
XXXX
SECOND
5
(4)
26 Aug.
BEF
(4)
Mons
Namur
Liege
R
xxxx
22
(22)
(10)
BEF
XXXX
Coblenz
a
FIFTH
THIRD
Le Cateaug
R.
Z
41
(32)
(17)
m e
Amiens
Guise
144
(144)
(80)
Z
Z
XXXX
Mainz
Battle of Guise,
FOURTH
LUX.
29 Aug.
XXXX
30
(30)
(24)°
XXXX
FOURTH
A
Sedan
FIFTH
Bottle of the Ardennes,
XXXX
XXXX
22-25 Aug.
R.
THIRD
roximate, and varied considerably during
FIFTH
5
Reims
Army of Lorraine
ig all old battleships (see discussion in
SIXIS
1
2
3
4
disbanded 26 Aug.
ly for action, and 15 under construction
Seine
R.
Verdun 5
(LORRAINE)
M
Metz
ad 3 more completed, but not yet ready
LORRAINE
Paris
XXXX
XXXX
thinner armor and greater speed. Britain
THIRD
SIXTH
The French offensive
xxxx
not yet ready for action. Britain had 1
in Lorraine 14-20 Aug.
BEF
XXXX
Toul
Strasbourg
XXXX
FOURTH
XXXX
R
rmed, light cruisers.
FIFTH
NINTH
R
SECOND
$ in commission. This figure is approxi-
FRANCE
Marne
n-+
xxxx
Epinal
selle
SEVENTH
Rhine
XXXX
FIRST
BATTLES OF THE FRONTIERS
R.
A
E
E
AND GERMAN ADVANCE
TO THE MARNE
XXXX
uld develop from a reconnais-
S
ALSACE
14 Aug.-5 Sept. 1914
rticularly the German Zeppelin
0
25
50
Belfort
G
th reconnaissance and bombing
Scale of miles
SWITZERLAND
also used from the outset.
and steel cupolaed defenses. Liége surren-
1914, August 14-25. Battles of the Frontiers.
dered (August 16). The German First
The Germans and the Anglo-French ar-
Army (General Alexander von Kluck)
mies met each other head on in 4 almost
and the Second (General Karl von Bülow)
simultaneous actions:
poured through the Liége corridor and
1914, August 14-22. Battle of Lorraine. An
across the Meuse. Hastily mobilized Bel-
early advance to Mulhouse in Alsace (Au-
gian field forces were brushed aside to the
gust 8) by the French right-wing Army of
north of Tirlemont (August 18-19) and
Alsace (General Paul Pau) was followed
Brussels occupied (August 20). After some
by a full-scale offensive southeast of Metz
skirmishing along the Meuse (August
by the French First (General Auguste Du-
12-16), the Belgians, personally com-
bail) and Second (General Noël de Cas-
manded by King Albert, fell back on the
telnau) armies (August 14-18). After
le
fortress of Antwerp.
planned withdrawals, the German Sixth