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White House Conference on Global Change 4/17/90 [OA 6895] [2]
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White House Conference on Global Change 4/17/90 [OA 6895] [2]
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Records of the White House Office of Speechwriting (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Speech Backup Chronological Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
S
S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series:
Speech File Backup Files
Subseries:
Chron Files, 1989-1993
OA/ID Number:
13713
Folder ID Number:
13713-008
Folder Title:
White House Conference on Global Change 4/17/90 [OA 6895] [2]
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26
20
5
1
List of Handouts:
Background paper on IPCC
IPCC Secretariat report to UNGA on IPCC activities
Organization charts of IPCC and RSWG
List of upcoming IPCC meetings
1/20/89 remarks of Secretary Baker at RSWG meeting
5/12/89 statement by the President
Reporting cable and summary report of October 2-6 RSWG meeting
Speech of Assistant Secretary Bernthal on climate change, September 19, 1989
10/17/89
Background Paper on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
In response to the growing international awareness of the
potentially serious consequences of global climate change, the
governing bodies of the United Nations Environment Program
(UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC). The IPCC is designed to serve as the primary
international forum for assessing the state of knowledge about
global climate change and its impacts and considering possible
response strategies.
The first session of the IPCC, which was held in Geneva in
November 1988, was attended by participants from 30 countries as
well as 16 international organizations. At that meeting the
Panel agreed that its main mission was to assess available
scientific and technical information on the nature of climate
change and its potential impacts, and to formulate realistic
response strategies for addressing climate change. To carry out
these tasks the IPCC established three working groups on
science, impacts, and response strategies, chaired,
respectively, by the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and United
States.
The U.S. -chaired response strategies working group (RSWG)
first met in January 1989 in Washington and agreed on a work
plan for developing response options. The RSWG established four
subgroups to consider response options in the fields of: energy
and industry; agriculture and forestry; coastal zone management;
and resource use management. The first two of these subgroups
deal with measures for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, while
the latter two subgroups deal with measures for adapting to the
impacts of climate change. The RSWG is also considering
available mechanisms for implementing response strategies. At a
workshop in Geneva from October 2-6, 1989, the RSWG reviewed
implementation mechanisms in the fields of economic measures;
public information and education; financial measures; technology
development and transfer; and legal measures, including elements
of a framework convention on climate.
The IPCC is scheduled to complete a report, incorporating
the work of all three working groups, by September 1990, prior
to the U.N. General Assembly meeting and the Second World
Climate Conference. President Bush in May 1989 announced U.S.
support for negotiations on a framework convention on climate
following completion of the IPCC report. Support for a
framework convention, based on the work of the IPCC, was also
expressed by the Governing Bodies of the UNEP and the WMO and by
the leaders of the G-7 countries during the July 1989 Paris
summit.
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTERCOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE
(Submitted by Chairman, IPCC)
1. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) has been established jointly by the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP).
2
IPCC has met twice since its' formation, once in
Geneva (9-11 November 1989) at the WMO Headquarters and
once in Nairobi (28-30 June 1989) at the UNEP Headquarters.
Thirty countries were present at the first session and
forty three at the second.
1. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PANEL
1.1 At its first session:
1.1.1 The Panel elected Prof. B. Bolin of Sweden;
Dr. A. Al-Gain of Saudi Arubia and Dr. J.A. Adejokun of
Nigeria as its Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur
respectively. (See annex VI of reference 1 for their
duties and terms of office.)
1.1.2 The Panel agreed that its main task was
(a) to assess the scientific information that is
related to the various components of the climate change
issue, such as increases of major greenhouse gases in the
Earth's stmosphere and modification of the Earth's
radiation balance resulting therefrom, and that needed to
enable the environmental and socio-economic consequences of
climate change to be evaluated, and
(b) to formulate realistic response strategies for the
management of the climate change issue.
1.1.3 To accomplish its task, the Panel sat up three
Working Groups: (i) Working Group I for the assessment of
available scientific information on climate change, (ii)
Working Croup II for the assessment of the environmental
and socio-economic impacts of climate change and (iii)
Working Croup III for formulating response strategies. The
Working Croups are chaired respectively by the UK, the USSR
and the USA. Brazil and Senegal were named as the
Vice-Chairs of Working Group I, Australia and Japan as the
Vice-Chairs of Working Group II, and Canada, China, Maita,
the Netherlands and Zimbabwe as the Vice-Chairs of Working
Group III.
1.1.4 Noting the need for co-ordination among the
Working Groups, the Panel established & Bureau for the
purpose, consisting of the three Officers of the Panel
(vis, the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur)
and the Chairs and Vice-Chairs of the Working Groups.
1.2 At its second session:
1.2.1 The Panel, much concerned sbout the inadequate
participation of the developing countries in its activities
and searching for ways and means to promote such
participation, and after considering a special report
prepared on the subject by its Ad-Hoc Subgroup (see para
4.1(a) below), established a Special Committee on Matters
Related to the Developing Countries. This Committee would
be chaired by France and will consist of 5 members from the
developing countries and 5 from the developed countries
(including France).
1.2.2 With regard to the membership in various Working
Croups, the Panel decided to do away with the concept of
core members. It may be recalled that such members were
named during the first session, the underlying idea being
that responsibility for the tasks had to be assigned in
order to ensure their timely completion. (It may further
be recalled that IPCC is open to all member governments of
WMO and UNEP, as pet the decision made at the first
session.)
2. FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PANEL
2.1 At its first session:
2.1.1 The Panel agreed on the formation of a trust
fund to finance its activities. Such a fund, the joint
WMO/UNEP IPCC Trust Fund, has since been established and is
administered by the Secretary-Ceneral, WMO, as agreed to
between WMO and UNEP
2.1.2 The sources of funding to the Trust Fund are
WMO, UNEP and voluntary contributions by IPCC member
governments and organizations. It should be noted that the
contributions are in cash or in kind or both.
2.1.3 WMO contributes the person-year cost of the
Secretary of IPCC, the cost of housing the IPCC Secretariat
and SF 125,000 per annum. UNEP contributes the person-year
cost of the Programme Officer and SF 125,000 per annum. In
addition, UNEP provides the equivalent of SF 100,000 per
annum in non-convertible currency.
2.2 At its second session:
2.2.1 At the suggestion of the Executive Heads of the
two sponsoring organizations, the Panel set a target of $
1,000,000 for the support of the participation of the
developing countries in its activities between now and the
release of the draft IPCC first assessment report (see para
5.1 below). It decided that the contributions from IPCC
member governments made for this specific purpose would be
separately administered from other contributions.
3 THE ACTIVITIES OF THE WORKING GROUPS
3.1 The terms of reference of the Working Croups can be
found in anner IV of reference 1.
3.1 WORKING GROUP I (SCIENCE)
3.1.1 Working Group I will complete a review of
available scientific assessments of climate warming, with
special emphasis on
(i) recent measurements of greenhouse gases and the
new information on their chemistry and tropospheric
lifetimes,
(11) critical review of available climate data for
detecting trends,
(111) evaluations of existing disagreements in model
calculations of regional scale climate change (for the
mcnsoon region, the Sahel, the Creat Plains of N. America,
the Mediterranean region and Australia; the results of
these evaluations would be used in obtaining and
interpreting model predictions of regional scale climate
change in all other regions of the world subsequenty),
(iv) transient climate change calculations,
(v) new evaluations of sea level rise,
(vi) biosphere-ecosystems feedback processes, and
(vii) future requirements for climate research and
observing systems for monitoring climate change.
3.2 WORKING GROUP II (IMPACTS)
3.2.1 Working Group II (Impacts) will focus its
efforts on (the countries shown in paranthses have lead
responsibility):
(i) agriculture, forestry and land use (India, UK, USSR)
(ii) natural terrestrial ecosystems (Canada, USSR)
' (iii) hydrology and water resources (Algeria, USA, USSR)
(1v) energy, industry, transportation, settlements and
human health (Japan, USSR),
(v) world oceans and coastal sones (USA,USSR)
(vi) the cryosphere including permatrost (Canada, USSR).
3.2.2 The Working Croup set up a Steering Group
composed of the Co-Chairs and contributing organizations
for co-ordination purposes.
3.3 WORKING CROUP III (POLICY)
3.3 1 Working Group III (Folicy) will concentrate in
two broad sreas of tesponse strategies:
- Limitation
- Adaptation
3.3.2 Under the former strategy, two subgroups have
been formed, one on energy and industry (including
- transportation) and the other on agriculture and forestry.
The first will be primarily concerned with carbon dioxide
emissions from industrial activities (the chiorofluoro-
carbons and halons being left to the Montreal process) and
the second with emissions of methane and nitrous oxide and
with emissions and/or uptake of carbon dioxide. The first
will be co-chaired by Japan and China (with Canada acting
as rappor(eur) and the second by the Federal Republic of
Cermany and Zimbabwe.
3.3.3 Under the latter strategy, two more subgroups
have been formed, one on coastal zone management and the
other on resource use and management. The first will be
co-chaired by the Netherlands and New Zealand and the
second by Canada, France and India.
3.3.4 This Working Croup set up & Steering Committee
to co-ordinate and, as initial tasks,
- to develop base emissions scenatios
- to examine implementation mechanisms (legal
instruments, financial measures, public information etc.)
3.3.5 Three base emissions scenarios have since been
developed and correspond to the radiative equivalent of &
doubling of the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide
from its pre-industrial value assumed to occur by the year
(i) 2030, (ii) 2060 and (iii) 2090 and stabilizing
thereafter. Among these, the "2030" scenario can be
thought of as "business-as-usual" scenatio. Another
scenario will be developed which will be radiatively
equivalent to a carbon dioxide concentration of less than
twice the pre-industrial value.
3.3.6 The Working Group will also develop the elements
of a possible framework convention on climate change. To
this end, the views of all governments on. such alements are
being solicited. These views, after collation, will be
discussed at a meating of the Working Croup in October
1989. In the process, the Working Group will identify, and
suggest measures for the possible strengthening of,
existing international legal instruments having a bearing
on climate change.
4. THE FIRST SESSION OF IPCC BUREAU
4.1 The Bureau mat on 6-7 February in Ceneva to review
the work outlines prepared by the Working Groups. In the
course of approving them, the Bureau:
&. reiterated the need to promote participation of
the developing world in the activities of IPCC. It set up
a small Ad-Hoc Subgroup (Brazil, Senegal, Zimbabwe, chaired
by Saudi Arabia) to make recommendations to the second
session of IPCC,
b. instructed the IPCC Secretariat to prepare and
disseminate an IPCC Bulletin, with the widest readership in
mind, as & measure of promoting public awareness of IPCC
activities.
5. IPCC FIRST ASSESSMENT (1990) REPORT
5.1 The target date for completing the first
assassment report of IPCC on the climate change issue is
late August/early September 1990. The report will consist
-
of (i) the reports of the three Working Groups, each
I
approximately 200 pages long, (ii) 20-page summaries of the
these reports written in a fashion understandable to the
non-specialist and the policy-maker and (iii) 20-page
summary integrating the findings and conclusions of IPCC.
Reference:
IPCC-1, Report of the first session of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, WMO TD No. 267,
World Meteorological Organization, P.O. Box 2300, CH 1211
Geneva 2, Switserland, 1988.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE
Chairman, B. Bolin (Sweden)
Vice-Chair, A. Algain (Saudi Arabia)
WORKING GROUP I
WORKING GROUP II
WORKING GROUP III
SCIENCE
IMPACTS
RESPONSE
STRATEGIES
Chairman:
Chairman:
Chairman:
J. Houghton (U.K.)
Y. Izrael (USSR)
F. Bernthal (U.S.)
IPCC WORKING GROUP I
SCIENCE ASSESSMENT
GREENHOUSE GASES AND
TRANSIENT CLIMATE CHANGE
OTHER FORCING AGENCIES
U.S., Sweden, Switz.
U.S.
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE
CLIMATE CHANGE
OF FORCING AGENCIES
AND VARIABILITY
France, U.S.
U.K., U.S., USSR
PROCESSES AND
COMPARISON OF TRANSIENT
MODELLING
OBSERVATIONS/SIMULATIONS
FRG, U.S.
U.K., U.S.
EQUILIBRIUM
SEA LEVEL RISE
CLIMATE CHANGE
U.K., U.S., USSR, Japan
U.K., Netherlands
VALIDATION OF
ECOSYSTEM INTERACTIONS
CLIMATE MODELS
W/ATMOSPHERE & CLIMATE
U.S., U.K., PRC
U.S., India, Brazil, U.K.
RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS
U.S., Canada
IPCC WORKING GROUP II
ASSESSMENT OF
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS
SUB-GROUP A:
AGRICULTURE & FORESTRY
U.K., India, USSR
SUB-GROUP B: NATURAL
TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS
Canada, USSR
SUB-GROUP C:
HYDROLOGY & WATER RESOURCES
U.S., Algeria, USSR
SUB-GROUP D: ENERGY,
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT
Japan, USSR
SUB-GROUP E: WORLD
OCEANS AND CRYOSPHERE
U.S., USSR
SUB-GROUP F:
STEERING COMMITTEE
IPCC
RESPONSE STRATEGIES
WORKING GROUP
STEERING
"Task A":
COMMITTEE
Emissions
"Task B":
Implementation
Scenarios
Mechanisms:
Legal Measures (U.K., Canada, Malta)
Financial Measures (France, Neth.)
Economic Measures (Australia, N.Z.)
Technology Measures (Japan, India)
Public Education Measures (U.S., PRC)
Energy and
Agriculture
Coastal Zone
Resource Use
Industry
and Forestry
Management
Management
Subgroup
Subgroup
Subgroup
Subgroup
(Japan and
(FRG and
(N. Zealand &
(France, India,
China)
Zimbabwe)
Netherlands)
and Canada)
LIST OF IPCC MEETINGS
4/29,
Date
Venue
Meeting/activity
Organization
AUGUST
8
Toronto
Ecosystems subgroups
IPCC WGI/WGII
SEPTEMBER
11-15
Berne
Workshop: Greenhouse Gases
IPCC WGI
Subgroup
18-20
Geneva
Hydrology and Water Resources
IPCC WGII
(postponed
Subgroup
to 26-27
Oct. 1989)
18-20
Toronto
Meeting of Subgroup on
IPCC WGII
Cryosphere and Permafrost
18-21
Tokyo
Subgroup on Energy. Industry.
IPCC WGII
Japan
Transportation, Health and
Humann Settlements
21-22
Paris
Agriculture and Forestry
IPCC WGII/OECD*
(postponed)
Subgroup
25-26
Pangbourne,
Workshop:
Sea level rise
IPCC WGI/Univ. of
UK
Subgroup
East Anglia
28-29
Paris
IPCC Special Committee on
Govt. of France/
Developing Countries
IPCC
28-29
Geneva
Energy and Industry Subgroup
IPCC WGIII
-
Washington
Agricultural Data and Practices:
IPCC WGIII
Subgroup on Agriculture and
Forestry (AFOS)**
-
Helsinki
Workshop on Boreal Forests:
IPCC WGIII
(AFOS)
OCTOBER
2-6
Geneva
Second session
IPCC WGIII
2-6
Moscow
Climate Change and World
IPCC WGII
Fisheries: Subgroup on World
Oceans and Cryosphere
*
OECD - Organization for Economic Co-operation & Development
** AFOS - Agriculture and Forestry Subgroup of WG III
(WCP-478)
- 2 -
18-20
Boston
Workshop: Greenhouse gases
IPCC WGI
(non-CO2)
30-31
Bonn
Workshop on Temperate Forests
IPCC WGIII
(AFOS)
30-1 Nov. Geneva
Resource Use & Management
IPCC WGIII
Subgroup
31-3 Nov. Geneva
Second session
IPCC WGII
NOVEMBER
2-3
Geneva
Agriculture & Forestry Subgroup
IPCC WGIII
23-24
Egham, UK
Paleo-analogue Climate
IPCC WGI/WGII
Forecasting
27-1 Dec. Miami
Coastal Zone Management Subgroup
IPCC WGIII
29-1 Dec.
Bracknell,
Climate Trends Subgroup
IPCC.WGI
UK
DECEMBER
11-14
Washington
Agricultural Emissions Workshop
IPCC WGIII
11-15
Brisbane
Subgroup on Model Predictions
IPCC WGI
and Validation
17-19
Berkeley,
Integrated Energy Analysis, EIS
IPCC WGIII
U.S.
SECTION B: 1990
JANUARY
-
Reading, UK
Workshop: Climate Forcing Agencies
IPCC WGI
-
San Diego,
Workshop: Comparison Transient
IPCC WGI
USA
Simulations
9-12
Brazil
Workshop: Tropical Forests,
Govts. of USA/
WGIII (AFOS)
Brazil/IPCC WGIII
FEBRUARY
5-7
Washington
IPCC third session
Govt. of USA/IPCC
7-8
Washington
IPCC Bureau second session
Govt. of USA/IPCC
26-2 Mar. UK ?
Meeting Lead Authors
IPCC WG I
-
Australia
Coastal Zone Management Subgroup
IPCC WGIII
(WCP-478)
MARCH-APRIL: Geneva (?) IPCC WGIII Subgroup Meetings
IPCC WGIII
- 3 -
MAY
8-10
TBD
Third session,
IPCC WGIII
(tentative)
approval or report of WG
23-25
UK
Second session,
IPCC WGI
approval of report of WG
JUNE
-
Moscow
Third session,
IPCC WGII
approval of report of WG
AUGUST
-
Stockholm
IPCC fourth session,
Govt. Sweden/IPCC
approval of first assessment
report
(WCP-478)
RESPONSE STRATEGIES WORKING GROUP
of the
INTERGCVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
FIRST MEETING
WASHINGTON, D.C.
January 30 - February 1, 1989
Speech I
1/30/89
REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER III
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
RESPONSE STRATEGIES WORKING GROUP
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JANUARY 30, 1989
Thank you Fred Bernthal, Professor Bolin, ladies and
gent.lemen. I am very pleased to have the opportunity to join
you this morning, however briefly, and to welcome you to the
Department of State. You are the first official group that
I've had the pleasure of welcoming to the Department.
I would also like to welcome Bill Reilly, who is here with us
this morning -- President of the World Wildlife Fund and the
Conservation Foundation. Bill has let President Bush talk him
into becoming the nominee for the post of Administrator of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency, and it's my
fervent hope. Bill, that nothing you hear at this conference
this morning will cause you to change your mind.
The truth is, though, as I don't need to tell those of you who
are here, we face some very difficult problems. It is also
true, though, that we now recognize them to be problems, and in
my experience in government that is at least half of the battle
Some months ago President Bush said, "We face the prospect of
being trapped on a boat that we have irreparably damaged -- not
REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT`EXPENSE
by the cataclysm of war, but by the slow neglect of a vessel WF
believed to be impervious to our abuse. "
The establishment of the Intergovernment Panel on Climate
Change and this meeting of the Panel's Response Strategies
Working Group, I think, shows beyond a doubt that this is a
transnational issue. We are all in the same boat. And as I
put it in my testimony to the Senate recently, "The tides and
the winds can spread environmental damages to continents and
hemispheres far removed from the immediate disasters."
PR NO. 11
-2-
So, if I may borrow a phrase from the environmentalists, the
political ecology is now ripe for action. We know that we need
to act, and we also know that we need to act together: That is
what this meeting is all about.
But I would take it even a step further. One of the big
advantages of being Secretary of State is that because I am not
a scientist, I am, therefore, not called upon to assess the
evidence, especially on global climate change. Yet it is also
clear, I think, that we face more than simply a scientific
problem. It is also a diplomatic problem of when and how we
take action. And here, if I might, 1 would like to make four
points.
The first is that we can probably not afford to wait until all
of the uncertainties have been resolved before we do act. Time
will not make the problem go away.
The second is that while scientists refine the state of our
knowledge, we should focus immediately on prudent steps that
are already justified on grounds other than climate change.
These include reducing CFC emissions, greater energy efficiency
and reforestation.
The third is that whatever global solutions to global climate
change are considered, they should be as specific and
cost-effective as, they can possibly be.
The fourth is that those solutions will be most effective if
they transcend the great fault line of our times, the need to
reconcile the transcendent requirements for both-economic
development and a safe environment.
Without in any way downgrading the difficulty of the task, I
would conclude, ladies and gentlemen, by noting that progress
generally results when common interests are joined to a common
understanding. This meeting and others like it will play a
REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE
crucial role in moving us all toward that common understanding
of what we must do to protect and to preserve our environment.
Thank you very much for having me this morning, and Godspeed.
****
FB
RJS
WAN
0
S
N
CP
THE WHITE HOUSE
ENJ
Office of the Press Secretary
(College station, Texas)
EHC
OSP
NTS
For Immediate Rolease
May 12, 1989
SCT
SAT
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
EX
The United States Dalegation to the Stoering Group of the
Response Strategies Working Group on climate change carried
instructions to move the international community forward in
establishing a process for considering how to respond to climate
change. I am pleased to note that the nations meeting in Geneva
have agreed to a workshop this fall looking at the range of
financial, economic, technical and legal issues for responding to
climate change.
The United States looks forward to playing a significant
role in afforts to assess and respond to global climate change.
I expect that these efforts will lead to formal negotiations
on the establishment of a framework convention on global climate.
It is important that this process lead to international
scientific consensus on the serioushess of the issue for the
environment and for the world economy. At the same time, we
should ensure that the interests of developing countries are
taken into account in -this process.
The United States will host a meeting under the auspices of
the Response Strategies Working Group this fall that is intended
to advance our understanding and promote consensus. I look
forward, personally, to reviewing its results.
# # #
UNCLASSIFIED
INCOMING
Department of State
TELEGRAM
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ACTION OES-09
SUBMITTED, ONLY ONE WAS FROM AN LDC AND NONE WERE FROM
CPES. SOME LDCS SAID THEY WERE UNABLE TO PREPARE PAPERS
INFO
LOG-56
ADS-B9
AID-98
INR-07
EUR-00
SS-00
01C-92
DUE TO THE SHORT LEAD TIME, AND FRANCE SAID IT HAD BEEN
CIAE-99 EB-00 DINT-05 DODE-09 H-01
10-19
NSCE-98
HAMPERED BY LANGUAGE DIFFICJLTIES AND THE SUMMER
NSF-#2 NSAE-89 COME-#9 SSO-09 L-03
PM-19
EPA-94
VACATIONS. RSWG CHAIRMAN BERNTHAL EMPHASIZED THAT WHILE
IMRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 DOEE-09 CEQ-81 PRS-01 E-01
THE TOPIC PAPERS ARE TO BE TREATED AS LIVING DOCUMENTS
T-91
/978 W
THE RSWG SHOULD AIM TO COMPLETE THEM IN TIME FOR THE
#55301 1919412 /25 25
FEBRUARY 1990 PLENARY. HE INVITED ALL COUNTRIES TO
o 180928Z OCT 89
SUBMIT ADDITIONAL COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS THROUGH THE END OF
FM USMISSION GENEVA
1989. INTERIM REPORTS CN THESE TOPICS WILL BE REVIEWED
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2319
BY THE RSWG CHAIRMAN, VICE CHAIRMAN, TOPIC COORDINATORS,
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AND SUBGROUP CHAIRMEN AT THE TIME OF THE IPCC PLENARY IN
FEBRUARY 1999. END SUMMARY.
UNCLAS GENEVA 98788
2. REPORT ON SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PARTICIPATION OF LDCS
MR. JEAN RIPERT OFRANCEQ SUMMARIZED THE REPORT OF THE
MEETING SEPTEMBER 28-29 IN PARIS OF THE IPCC SPECIAL
DEPT PLS PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR OSTP/OBROMLEY,
COMMITTEE ON PARTICIPATION OF LDCS, WHICH HE CHAIRED.
CEQ/MDELAND, DPC/DBATES; COMMERCE/JKNAUSS;
NOTING THE NEED FOR IPCC TO STRENGTHEN COMMUNICATION AND
DOE/JEASTON; EPA/WREILLY
DISSEMINATION OF IPCC INFORMATION AND PAPERS TO
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, HE APPEALED FOR ADDITIONAL
E.O. 12356: N/A
RESOURCES TO THE IPCC SECRETARIAT, BOTH FINANCIAL AND IN
TAGS: SENV, EAID, ETRD, KSCE, AORC, IPCC
THE FORM OF SECONDED PERSONNEL. HE ALSO URGED THAT IPCC
SUBJ:. IPCC WRAP UP CABLE
RECONSIDER ITS POLICY OF CONDUCTING WORKING GROUPS IN
ENGLISH ONLY, NOTING THAT USE OF ADDITIONAL UN LANGUAGES
1. SUMMARY: THE SECOND MEETING OF THE RESPONSE
WOULD MAKE IPCC'S WORK ACCESSIBLE TO A FAR WIDER
STRATEGIES WORKING GROUP OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
POTENTIAL AUDIENCE IN LDCS. HE REPORTED THE COMMITTEE'S
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE QIPCCO WAS HELD IN GENEVA
GENERAL SUPPORT FOR PROPOSALS MADE IN THE AL-GAIN REPORT,
OCTOBER 2 TO 6. FORMAT OF THE MEETING WAS A
SUCH AS QUOTE CRASH SEMINARS UNQUOTE AND THE
WORKSHOP TO CONSIDER IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES IN $
ESTABLISHMENT OF FOCAL POINTS AND SOUGHT THE GUIDANCE OF
TOPIC AREAS: EDUCATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION,
THE WORKSHOP ON THE FUTURE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE.
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER, ECONOMIC
THIS TOPIC WILL BE ADDRESSED AT THE FEBRUARY PLENARY.
QMARKETO, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL MEASURES. SUMMARIES
OF THE TOPIC DISCUSSIONS AT PARAS 4 8.
3. ACTIVITIES OF ENERGY INDUSTRY SUBGROUP QEISQ
FORTY-THREE NATIONAL DELEGATIONS AND 29 OBSERVERS
FROM NGOS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ATTENDED,
MEMBERS OF THE EIS GROUP CLARIFIED SOME OF THE DECISIONS
REPRESENTING A SIGNIFICANT BROADENING OF
PARTICIPATION BY LDCS AND THE EASTERN BLOC IN THE
MADE IN THE EIS SUBGROUP MEETING THE PREVIOUS WEEK.
WORK OF RSWG. USSR, POLAND AND GDR SENT
ASSIGNMENTS FOR DRAFTING A FIRST VERSION QANNOTATED
REPRESENTATIVES. THIS BROADER PARTICIPATION HAD THE
OUTLINE FORMATO OF THE EIS REPORT WERE:
PREDICTABLE EFFECT OF FRAGMENTING WHAT AT THE OUTSET
OF THE MEETING HAD APPEARED TO BE A DISCERNIBLE
-- A. INTRODUCTION JAPAN
CONSENSUS ON EACH OF THE FIVE TOPICS. THE WORKSHOP
SERVED A USEFUL PURPOSE IN REVEALING THE RANGE OF
B. ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS OF THE NATIONAL CASE
VIEWPOINTS. IN ADDITION TO THE ISSUES OF A
STUDIES AND SPECIALIZED STUDIES U.S.
CONVENTION, NEW INSTITUTIONS, ADDITIONAL FUNDING AND
975) 8,3 ?6 30
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WORKSHOP REVEALED
NOVEMBERO
ADDITIONAL POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT WHICH WILL REQUIRE
SUSTAINED DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION.
C. DISCUSSION OF OPTIONS - JAPAN Q31 DECEMBERQ
JEAN RIPERT QFRANCEQ REPORTING ON THE SEPTEMBER 28
TO 29 MEETING OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
-- D. ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS UK METHERLANDS Q38
PARTICIPATION OF LDCS, CALLED FOR ADDITIONAL
NOVEMBERG SUPPLEMENTED BY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS US 031
RESOURCES TO STRENGTHEN THE IPCC SECRETARIAT'S
JANUARY.
OUTREACH, AND FOR TRANSLATION OF IPCC
WORKING GROUP MEETINGS INTO ADDITIONAL LANGUAGES BESIDES
E. CONCLUSIONS « AND WETHERLANDS Q38 NOVEMBERO
ENGLISH. THESE SUGGESTIONS RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT
AND WILL BE ADDRESSED AT THE FEBRUARY PLENARY, AS WILL
JAPAN AND US MET TO SET THE TIMING AND PROPOSED VENUE FOR
THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE COMMITTEE.
A MEETING OF THE ENERGY AND INDUSTRY SUBGROUP ON THE
INTEGRATED ANALYSIS TO BE DONE BY SPECIALISTS. THIS IS
CHAIRMAN BERNTHAL ENCOURAGED EACH COUNTRY PARTICIPATING
SET AS 17 19 DECEMBER AT LAWRENCE BERKELEY LABS,
IN IPCC/RSWG TO UNDERTAKE A NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF ITS
CALIFORNIA. THE NATIONAL CASE STUDIES WILL ALSO BE
INDIVIDUAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, TO PROVIDE A
DISCUSSED.
BASELINE FOR PLANNING NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
STRATEGIES. THESE ANALYSES ARE TO BE SHARED WITH THE EIS
4. PUBLIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATION
AND AFOS SUBGROUPS.
THE SYNOPSIS REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON PUBLIC EDUCATION
VIRTUALLY ALL THE TOPIC COORDINATORS EXPRESSED CONCERN AT
AND INFORMATION WAS CONSIDERED IN THE MORNING PLENARY
THE SPARSE RESPONSE FROM LDCS IN SUBMITTING PAPERS. FOR
SESSION ON OCTOBER 3. DELEGATES SUGGESTED MEANS FOR
EXAMPLE, IN ECONOMIC MEASURES, OF THE 7 COUNTRY PAPERS
STRENGTHENING THE CLARITY AND SUBSTANCE OF THE REPORT. A
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
INCOMING
Department of State
TELEGRAM
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DRAFTING GROUP LED BY GARY EVANS QUSQ AND LUO JIBIN QPRCQ
MEASURES, FRANCE, CANADA, THE NETHERLANDS, FRG, AND
PRODUCED A CONSENSUS DOCUMENT REVIEWED BY-RSWG III
INDONESIA INDICATED THEY ALSO SAW THE NEED FOR GOVERNMENT
DELEGATES AND RECEIVING APPROVAL WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT
INTERVENTION, AND THE GDR STRESSED ITS IMPORTANCE FOR
CHANGE IN THE AFTERNOON PLENARY SESSION OCTOBER 5. THE
CPES.
CONSENSUS REPORT EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF AN INFORMED
GLOBAL POPULATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF ACCURATE
MALTA AND.THE METHERLANDS WERE VOCAL ON THE NEED TO
INFORMATION AND EFFECTIVE EDUCATION. THE REPORT PUT A
ELIMINATE PERVERSE SUBSIDIES, WITH INDIA OBSERVING THAT
PRIORITY CN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL MEANS OF
NOT ALL SUBSIDIES ARE PERVERSE.
DEVELOPING INFORMATION AND FORMAL AND INFORMAL
EDUCATIONAL STRATEGIES APPROPRIATE TO DIVERSE AUDIENCES,
REGARDING TAXES, THE WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE STRONGLY
CULTURES, AND COUNTRIES. SPECIFIC SHORT- AND LONG-TERM
ADVOCATED USE, WHILE SWEDEN CAUTIONED THAT THEY
SUGGESTIONS ARE SET FORTH IN THE REPORT.
MUST BE "AREFULLY ANALYZED AND HARMONIZED AMONG NATIONS.
S. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER
OBSERVERS FROM THE IEA AND THE DECD STRESSED THE NEED FOR
COST EFFECTIVE MEASURES AND THE NECESSITY TO PROVIDE FOR
THE PAPER ON TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER CALLED
POSITIVE ECONOMIC GROWTH.
FOR GREATER COOPERATION AMONG ALL NATIONS TO EXCHANGE
TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION. SOME OF THE LDC'S MADE IT
THE LDCS GENERALLY EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF
CLEAR THAT THEY EXPECT PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN RECEIPT
CONSIDERING THEIR SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, E.G., MALAYSIA
OF INFORMATION. HOWEVER, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF BRAZIL
POINTED TO THE NEED TO PROVIDE AN ECONOMIC ALTENATIVE. TO
AND INDIA, NO ONE DISPUTED THE NEED TO PROTECT
DEFORESTATION, AND SENEGAL TO ITS NEED FOR MORE FUNDS TO
INTELLECTUAL OR OTHER PROPERTY RIGHTS. MANY COUNTRIES
ACQUIRE TECHNOLOGY: PERHAPS THE MOST SWEEPING STATEMENT
AGREED WITH THE U.S. POSITION. THE FINAL VERSION OF THE
ON THE LDCS PLIGHT CAME FROM MEXICO, WHICH OPINED THAT
PAPER STATES THE VIEWS CLEARLY.
CLEANING UP THE ENVIRONMENT WILL BE A VERY COSTLY PROCESS
THAT WILL END UP BEING PAID FOR BY THE LDCS.
-- SOME COUNTRIES NOTED THE NEED TO FOCUS ON GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSION LIMITATION TECHNOLOGIES IN THE NEAR TERM
THE WORKSHOP REPORT ON ECONOMIC MEASURES WAS A-BALANCED
WHILE OTHERS STRESSED THE NEED TO ADDRESS ADAPTIVE
PRESENTATION OF THE CONCEPTS AND ISSUES COVERED IN THE
TECHNOLOGIES IN THE NEAR TERM AS WELL.
INITIAL COUNTRY PAPERS AND THE DISCUSSION IN THE
MEETING. THE ONLY NOTABLE EVENT IN THE APPROVAL OF THE
-- MANY LDC'S NOTED THE NEED TO TAILOR TECHNOLOGIES TO
REPORT WAS AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE US DELEGATE ON THE ONE
LDC DOMESTIC TECHNOLOGICAL AND HUMAN RESOURCE
HAND, AND BRAZIL AND INDIA ON THE OTHER HAND, REGARDING
CAPABILITIES AND TO BETTER DEVELOP THOSE CAPABILITIES.
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS. THE FINAL
REPORT REFLECTS THE OPPOSING VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE.
-- IMPEDIMENTS TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND MECHANISMS TO
7. FINANCIAL
OVERCOME THOSE IMPEDIMENTS WERE DISCUSSED AT LENGTH AND
ENUMERATIVE LISTS DEVELOPED. HOWEVER, NO ENDORSEMENTS OF
THE FINANCIAL MEASURES DISCUSSION AND PAPER EMPHASIZED A
ANY PARTICULAR MECHANISMS WERE MADE.
COLLABORATIVE APPROACH BY DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES. IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT DEVELOPED
6. DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC MEASURES
COUNTRIES SHOULD ATTEMPT TO ASSIST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
IN RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND IN MEETING THEIR
THE U.S. DELEGATION IN DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC MEASURES
RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER A FUTURE CLIMATE CONVENTION OR
COVERED THE PRINCIPAL POINTS IN OUR MEASURES PAPER,
PROTOCOL. IT WAS ALSO AGREED. THAT CLIMATE CHANGE SHOULD
STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF USING MARKET MECHANISMS
NOT BE SEPARATED FROM OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL AND DEVELOPMENT
TOGETHER WITH GOVERNMENT ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROBLEMS.
OBJECTIVES, AS WELL AS THE NEED FOR COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
IN SELECTING OPTIONS AND ALLOWING MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY BY
ALL DELEGATIONS AGREED THAT EXISTING INSTITUTIONS SHOULD
COUNTRIES IN SELECTING RESPONSE STRATEGIES. IT POINTED
BUILD CLIMATE CHANGE CONCERNS INTO THEIR PROGRAMS AND BE
OUT THAT INEFFICIENT APPROACHES COULD REDUCE. FINANCIAL
STRENGTHENED IN THEIR ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THESE ISSUES.
RESOURCES NEEDED FOR SOCIAL PURPOSES AND ECONOMIC
AT THIS STAGE OF THE DISCUSSION, THE PLANS OF THE
ASSISTANCE, AND EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR INFORMATION AND
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE OF THE OECD AND THE
EDUCATION PROCESSES IN CONNECTION WITH ECONOMIC
COMMUNIQUE FROM THE SEPTEMBER MEETING OF THE WORLD BANK
MEASURES. THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING DISTORTION TO
DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE IN THIS REGARD WERE MIGHLIGHTED.
THE U.S. MADE IT CLEAR IT HAD NO ADDITIONAL RESOURCES TO
OFFER.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE NECESSITY TO ACCORD EFFECTIVE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, JOINED BY THE METHERLANDS AND THE
PROTECTION AT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS WAS ALSO
NORDIC COUNTRIES, FELT THAT A NEW FINANCIAL MECHANISM WAS
ELABORATED ON.
ALREADY JUSTIFIED. IN A DEPARTURE FROM PAST POSITIONS,
OF THE MEASURES COVERED IN THE SYNOPSIS PAPER; TAXES,
THESE COUNTRIES EMPHASIZED THAT THE NEED WAS PRINCIPALLY
SUBSIDIES, TRADEABLE EMISSIONS PERMITS, AND SANCTIONS,
FOR NEW MECHANISMS TO GENERATE ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL
THE LATTER TWO WERE THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL, WITH A NUMBER
RESOURCES. THEY INDICATED FLEXIBILITY ON HOW THE FUNDS.
OF DELEGATIONS EXPRESSING RESERVATIONS TO ONE OR BOTH.
WOULD BE ALLOCATED. MANY DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED SUPPORT
BRAZIL STRONGLY OPPOSED SANCTIONS; WITH SUPPORT FROM THE
FOR ALLOCATING THESE NEW FUNDS THROUGH A SPECIAL WINDOW
USSR AND AUSTRIA. THE USE OF TRADEABLE EMISSIONS PERMITS
WITHIN THE WORLD BANK SYSTEM WHILE A FEW EXPRESSED A
WAS QUESTIONED SHARPLY BY JAPAN AND BRAZIL, WITH FINLAND,
PREFERENCE FOR USING THE U.N. SPECIALIZED AGENCIES OR A
AUSTRIA, AND SWEDEN ALSO VOICING CONCERN, AT LEAST AT
NEW INSTITUTION. THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES STRESSED THAT
THEIR USE AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL.
ASSISTANCE RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE SHOULD NOT BE
SUBJECT TO THE SAME CONDITIONS AS TRADITIONAL WORLD BANK
ALTHOUGH THEY ACCEPTED THE UTILITY OF SOME MARKET
ASSISTANCE. THE U.S. AND OTHERS POINTED OUT THE NEED FOR
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
INCOMING
Department of State
TELEGRAM
PAGE 83 OF 84 GENEVA 98788 80 OF 05 1918382
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VIEW THAT NO TARGETS SHOULD BE SET FOR THEM IN THE
CONVENTION, ONLY FOR INDUSTRALIZED COUNTRIESQ. ON THAT
SUPPORTIVE ECONOMIC POLICIES AND DIALOGUE AND THAT
POINT, IT WAS ALSO STRESSED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN
CONSIDERATION OF NEW MECHANISMS IS PREMATURE.
APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN BEING MORE AMBITIOUS IN
DEVELOPING A CONVENTION QUICKLY AND OBTAINING A GOOD
THE U.S. SUGGESTED THAT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, WITH THE
INSTRUMENT WITH WIDE ACCEPTANCE.
HELP OF INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES, SHOULD INITIATE STUDIES
TO DEFINE THE SCOPE AND SCALE OF FUTURE RESOURCE
THE REPORT OF THE MEETING CONTAINS A COMPILATION OF
REQUIREMENTS SIMILAR TO THE APPROACH NOW BEING USED TO
POSSIBLE ELEMENTS FOR A FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
ASSESS FINANCIAL.NEEDS ASSOCIATED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION
CHANGE PROPOSED BY VARIOUS PARTICIPANTS. THE REPORT
OF THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL. DONORS WERE ENCOURAGED TO
EXPLICITLY NOTES THAT THE INCLUSION OF ANY PARTICULAR
PROVIDE ASSISTANCE AND TO HELP COMPLETE THESE STUDIES
SUGGESTION DOES NOT IMPLY CONSENSUS WITH RESPECT TO IT,
QUICKLY. THIS DATA WOULD HELP IN ASSESSING THE
OR THE AGREEMENT OF ANY PARTICULAR GOVERNMENT TO INCLUDE
CAPABILITIES OF EXISTING INSTITUTIONS. IT WOULD ALSO BE
IT IN A FRAMEWORK-CONVENTION, IT ALSO NOTES THAT SOME OF.
ESSENTIAL IN ANALYZING THE NEED FOR NEW MECHANISMS.
THE PROPOSED ELEMENTS ARE CONTROVERSIAL, BUT HAVE BEEN
INCLUDED TO STIMULATE DISCUSSION AT THE NATIONAL AND
TROUBLESOME PROPOSALS FOR GENERATING RESOURCES THROUGH
PRIOR OBLIGATION OF FUNDS SUCH AS FROM TAXES ON
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND OTHER LEVIES WERE INCLUDED
INTERNATIONAL LEVELS.
AS OPTIONS TO BE STUDIED. THE FINAL PAPER OUTLINED A
SERIES OF PRIORITY AREAS FOR TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL
DESPITE BROAD CONSENSUS ON CERTAIN BASIC ISSUES, LEGAL
ASSISTANCE INCLUDING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND SUPPORT FOR
MEASURES DRAFTING COMMITTEE WORK AND FINAL DISCUSSION IN
THE DESIGN OF POLICIES AND PROGRAMS.
PLENARY DISCLOSED FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES AMONG DIFFERENT
GROUPS OF COUNTRIES ON KEY ISSUES. SCANDINAVIANS, FRG
8. LEGAL MEASURES: THE WORKSHOP CONSIDERED, ON THE
AND NEW ZEALAND EXPRESSED CLEAR DESIRE FOR EMISSIONS
BASIS OF A SYMOPSIS PREPARED BY THE TOPIC COORDINATORS
CONTROL PROVISIONS IN CONVENTION ITSELF. INDIA, BRAZIL
QUK, CANADA, MALTAQ OF NUMEROUS WRITTEN CONTRIBUTIONS AND
AND MEXICO REPEATEDLY MENTIONED NEED FOR LDCS TO INCREASE
VIEWS EXPRESSED AT THE MEETING, WHICH ELEMENTS SHOULD BE
EMISSIONS OVER SHORT TERM, NEED FOR CLIMATE FUND OR OTHER
INCLUDED IN A FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE;
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND RIGHT TO RECEIVE TECHNOLOGY ON
WHAT OTHER INSTRUMENTS QEG., PROTOCOLSQ MIGHT BE
PREFERENTIAL AND NON COMMERCIAL TERMS. INDIA AND BRAZIL
EMPLOYED; AND THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A
PROPOSED LANGUAGE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION.
DIRECT CONFLICT WITH LANGUAGE PROPOSED BY U.S. AT
CONCLUSION OF MEETING, SEVERAL DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED
THE GENERAL VIEW WAS THAT EXISTING LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND
DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE LACK OF CONSENSUS DURING.FINAL
INSTITUTIONS WITH A BEARING ON CLIMATE SHOULD BE FULLY
DISCUSSION OF LEGAL MEASURES. JAPAN AND UK GENERALLY
UTILIZED AND FURTHER STRENGTHENED QA LIST OF THE
SUPPORTED U.S. POSITIONS AND CANADIAN INTERVENTIONS WERE
U.S. -COMPILED RELEVANT INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS WILL
MODERATE AND HELPFUL.
BE ANNEXED TO THE REPORTQ; BUT, THEY WERE IGNORED AS
INSUFFICIENT TO MEET THE CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE.
NEXT STEPS
THE DISCUSSION THEREFORE CONCENTRATED ON THE CONTENTS OF
A FRAMEWORK CONVENTION.
CHAIRMAN BERNTHAL INVITED COUNTRIES TO MAKE ADDITIONAL
COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT TEXTS BY THE END OF 1989. COMMENTS
BROAD CONSENSUS EMERGED AMONG THE PARTICIPANTS ON THE
SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE IPCC SECRETARIAT, WHICH WILL
NEED FOR A FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND
DISTRIBUTE THEM TO THE TOPIC CCORDINATORS AND THE RSWG
THAT IT SHOULD GENERALLY FOLLOW THE FORMAT OF THE VIENNA
CHAIRMAN. COPIES OF THE TOPIC PAPERS, WITH ANY PROPOSED
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE OZONE LAYER. THE
ADDITIONAL MODIFICATIONS, WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ALL
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION WOULD LAY DOWN GENERAL PRINCIPLES
IPCC MEMBERS BY THE SECRETARIAT BEFORE THE IPCC MEETING
AND OBLIGATIONS, AND PROVIDE FOR A CONTINUING ASSESSMENT
IN FEBRUARY.
OF THE SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS
IMPACTS, AND FOR RESPONSE STRATEGIES.
CHAIRMAN BERNTHAL WILL MEET WITH THE TOPIC COORDINATORS,
VICE CHAIRMEN, AND SUBGROUP CHAIRMEN FOR ADDITIONAL
THERE WAS ALSO BROAD AGREEMENT THAT THE FRAMEWORK
DISCUSSIONS ON THESE TOPICS AT THE IPCC PLENARY, FEBRUARY
CONVENTION SHOULD CONTAIN PROVISION FOR SEPARATE
5-8, 1999, IN THE U.S.
PROTOCOLS TO BE NEGOTIATED TO DEAL WITH SPECIFIC
OBLIGATIONS, EG., ON THE DIFFERENT GREENHOUSE GASES.
IN THE MEANTIME, THE SUBGROUPS, AS THEY MEET, SHOULD
MOST DELEGATIONS WHO SPOKE TO THE ISSUE NOTED THE NEED TO
CONSIDER THE RECOMMENDATIONS THAT HAVE EMERGED FROM THIS
GO BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION EITHER IN TERMS OF
WORKSHOP. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION
STRENGTHENING PROCEDURES FOR FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL
TOPIC PAPERS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE SUBGROUP
ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, STRENGTHENING
CHAIRMEN AT THE FEBRUARY MEETING.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROVISIONS, ENHANCED
INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OR BY INCORPORATING GENERAL
FINALLY, ALL RSWG SUBGROUP REPORTS AND TOPIC PAPERS
GREENHOUSE GAS QGHGQ EMISSION CONTROL OBJECTIVES IN THE
SHOULD BE IN FINAL DRAFT BY APRIL 38, 1999 so THAT THEY
CONVENTION ITSELF. ON THE LATTER POINT, A NUMBER OF
CAN BE INCORPORATED INTO AN OVERALL RSWG REPORT. THE
DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT ONE OR MORE GHG
RSWG MEETING IN LATE SPRING 1999 WILL REVIEW AND APPROVE
PROTOCOLS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE
THE RSWG REPORT, WHICH WILL THEN BE SUBMITTED TO THE IPCC
CONVENTION.
DRAFTING COMMITTEE IN JUNE.
IT WAS RECOMMENDED BY SEVERAL DELEGATIONS THAT EFFORTS BE
ABRAM
MADE TO TRY AND CONCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS ON A CONVENTION BY
THE END OF 1991 THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES GENERALLY TOOK THE
UNCLASSIFIED
INTRODUCTION TO FINAL REPORT
Introduction
As part of the work of the WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IFCC), 163 representatives from 43 governments and 25 observers from
governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations met October
2-6 in Geneva, Switzerland, at the second meeting of the Response Strategies
Working Group or RSWG (IPCC Working Group III), convened as a
multidisciplinary workshop on possible means'of implementing response options
to deal with potential climate change. The meeting was chaired by
Dr. Frederick M. Bernthal, Chairman of RSWG. Participants included a broad
spectrum of experts -- from both developed and developing countries,
representing both market and centrally planned aconomies.
The topics considered included: Legal and Institutional Measures,
including elements of a framework climate convention; Technology Transfer and
Development; Financial Measures (especially assistance to developing
countries); Public Education and Information: and Economic and Market Measures.
Views on Workshop topics
Certain views energed from the group's identification and assessment
of potential implementation mechanisms for climate change response strategies:
Legal and Institutional Measures
-- In addition to strengthening existing legal and institutional
mechanisms to address climate change issues, a framework convention on
climate change 15 timely and necessary. The 1985 Vienna Convention on
the Protection of the Czone Layer should provide a point of departure
for the development of such a convention. At a minimum the convention
should set forth principles of cooperation, provide & legal and
institutional framework for nonitoring and assessing climate change
and for developing and implementing responses, and should aim to
attract the largest number and widest range of signatory countries. A
number of nations suggested that binding commitments and control
measures be included in a framework convention. A number suggested
that the convention or its protocols deal with the special
circumstances of developing countries, and make clear mechanisms for
providing financial assistance. Negotiations on a convention should
begin as soon as possible after the issuance of the IPCC first
assessment report due in September of 1990.
Technology Development and Transfer
-- Sustainable development requires the development of technologies to
address climate change, and should be pursued in a wide range of
public and private sectors and through active international
collaboration. Such development could be promoted by an inventory of
priority areas, public/private partnerships, and the creation of
information-gathering and -sharing systems. Effective alternatives to
-2-
existing technologies must take account of social, environmental and
economic variances among countries and regions. Mechanisms for
implementing technology transfer include the establishment of
incentives for private sector transfer, initiation of pilot programs
in developing countries, and creation of an international
clearinghouse on relevant technologies and new developments. There
should be particular emphasis on the need to identify and enhance the
preconditions for technology transfer, such as financial capacity,
domestic institutional and technical infrastructure, and resolution of
the issues concerning protection of intellectual property.
Financial Measures
-- Industrialized and developing countries share a common
responsibility for addressing climate change. The special needs of
developing countries, including their vulnerability to climate change
impact, and lack of financial resources and technology must be
recognized. Some countries suggested that industrialized countries
should show leadership by initiating domestic actions to limit and
reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases and
providing financial support to developing countries wishing to take
similar actions. Regional and subregional cooperation to limit
emissions was encouraged. The need for cooperation at the
international, regional and subregional level, as well as the need for
assistance in developing adaptation strategies was stressed.
Existing relevant financial institutions should be strengthened and
their mandates expanded to address climate change concerns. A number
of delegations from both developed and developing countries suggested
that parallei action was already justified with respect to creation of
new financial mechanisms and facilities. It was agreed that further
analysis should be conducted on the nature of projects that might be
warranted, the likely magnitude of assistance needs, and the scope and
need for new institutions or mechanisms. Proposals for generating
resources and mechanisms for administering a new fund should be
examined expeditiously to make early decisions possible.
Public Education and Information
-- Public education and information is of paramount importance for
dealing with the climate change issue. There is a particular need
both for effective international coordination and for national
coordination in each country. Mechanisms should be developed to
assure efficient compilation and dissemination of up-to-date
information to all sectors. In addition, it is desirable to draw upon
the expertise of existing international organizations and to assist
developing countries in structuring materials and programs appropriate
to their particular social, economic, and cultural requirements.
- 3 -
Economic and Market Mechanisms
-- Economic and market mechanisms that might achieve stabilization or
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions at minimum cost to society
should be reviewed. These mechanisms may be particularly relevant
domestically and may also have some international applications. They
entail use of adjustment to market forces (or environmentally adjusted
market forces) to take account of environmental impacts. Regulations,
tradeable emission permits, emission charges, subsidies and sanctions
were discussed as possible economic market mechanisms. Some of the
proposed mechanisms would require further careful study. Such
measures must be sensitive to the needs of developing countries. It
may become necessary to use some economic and market mechanisms in
tandem with traditional regulatory approaches. Various potential
applications of economic and market mechanisms were identified.
Report on LDC participation
A report was submitted by Mr. J. Ripert, Chairman of the IPCC Special
Committee on the Participation of the Developing Countries, which held its
first meeting in Paris on the 28 and 29 September 1989. The attention of the
delegates was drawn to the necessity of quick implementation of short term
measures, including crash seminars, establ ishment of national climate
committees, training of experts and establishment of effective means of
communication including communication in regard to IPCC activities.
Results of Workshop
The meeting produced a report of its work, which will be further
refined and developed within the IPCC process. The workshop report will be
used by the four RSWG subgroups in developing recommended response options,
and will itself form the basis for a portion of the IPCC first assessment
report.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the RSWG expects that this
report will serve AS the basis for much more detailed and intensive study of
the many issues here outlined, in a wide variety of national and
international, public and private fora. The IPCC (and RSWG) in its work must
make use of all relevant work of other organizations and individual countries.
All countries have been invited to make additional comments on the
draft texts through the end of this year. The RSWG Chairman, Vice-chairmen,
Sub-group Co-chairmen and Topic Coordinators will neet for further
consultations just prior to the third session of IFCC in February 1990 in the
United States. This session will bring together the members of the IPOC. The
first RSWG report to IPCC, after its review and approval in a meeting to be
held next spring, will be submitted to the IPCC Drafting Committee by mid-June
1990.
July 28, 1989
MEMORANDUM
Re:
20 Suggested Events Involving Reforestation & Trees
The following is a list of ideas for events involving trees. The
suggestions are intended to spur ideas of ways for the President to
take advantage of the public's increasing interest in the environment
and reforestation, and to continue the momentum that has built up
since the successes of our recent environmentally-related events.
One theme of reforestation is that trees symbolically represent the
linking of generations. Thus, events involving the planting of trees
will be especially effective if they involve children and/or older
Americans. Many of the suggestions below reflect this point.
In addition to these suggestions, a list of tree-related dates and
anniversaries can be found at Tab 1.
1.
While he is on vacation in Kennebunkport, the President could
plant a tree on Walker's Point.
More significantly, the President could plant a tree with
Maine's Democratic Senator George Mitchell and his family in a
day trip to a state park. Both the Bushes and the Mitchells
could be joined by selected Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, local
naturalists, etc. We could arrange for there to be seedlings
left over.
The President and Sen. Mitchell would then ask Senators,
particularly those from states having a Senator from each
party, to plant trees in their own states, e.g., Sens. Robb
and Warner in Virginia, Sens. McConnell and Ford in Kentucky,
Sens. Graham and Mack in Florida, etc.
2.
Around Bethel, Maine are located a number of studies
conducted by state authorities involving the effects of acid
rain on maple trees. Bethel is close enough to Kennebunkport
to suggest a short day trip.
3.
The President could inspect the famous poisoned oak in
Austin, Texas in the company of the country's most respected
tree expert. Lady Bird Johnson would be natural for this
event, as with other national events.
(more)
2-2-2
4.
The President could announce the formation of a National
Registry of Historic Trees. The setting could be a tour of
the White House grounds and Lafayette Park to see the historic
trees that were planted by previous Presidents (see Tab 2).
Perhaps Mrs. Bush could conduct this walking tour.
The President should be accompanied by one of the media's
avuncular human interest story journalists, e.g., Charles
Kuralt, Charles Osgood, or Andy Rooney, as well as by noted
writers from the nature magazines, e.g., National Geographic,
Nature, the Smithsonian, etc.
In this connection, we could determine which trees on the
White House grounds were planted by the families of the
previous Presidents. President Bush could then plant a tree
with his own family, thus sending the message that trees are a
link between the generations.
5.
There is bound to be some latter-day Johnnie Appleseed -- the
person in America who has planted the most trees. The
President could henor this person in some suitable way
involving tree planting and reforestation -- perhaps by
awarding a Johnnie Appleseed award and/or visiting one of the
remaining trees planted by the actual Johnnie Appleseed.
6.
A Presidential event could involve the oldest tree in the
world, which is in the White Mountains of California. The
tree, a Bristlecone Pine known as "Methusela," is 4,600 years
old.
7.
The President could visit a Brazilian rainforest in order to
draw attention to the deforestation of tropical forests.
Each year, an area of tropical forest larger than the size of
Tennessee is cleared, with now well-known effects on the
global environment.
Any event should involve nature journalists, as well as Robert
Redford. Redford is currently planning a film based on the
story of Francisco Mendes, the rubber tapper who was murdered
while trying to organize other rubber tappers to fight
deforestation of Brazil's tropical rainforests. (see Tab 3)
Other celebrity activists concerned about deforestation
include Jerry Garcia and Sting.
(more)
3-3-3
8.
The first planting of trees in Alaska was done by the
Russians in 1803 on Unalaska Island in the Aleutians. Some
of the trees are apparently still living. This obviously
suggest an event highlighting Soviet-American cooperation,
particularly in light of the Soviet desire to improve their
reputation on the environment.
9.
Another international reforestation event could involve the
donation of trees from each nation to an International Grove,
featuring a tree from each of the 150-odd nations from around
the world.
10.
In the same vein, perhaps the President could dedicate a
National Grove, using the types of official state trees in an
event involving the governors and state forestry officials
(for a list of official state trees, see Tab 4).
11.
At HUD, Jack Kemp could set up a Task Force on Urban
Esthetics, focusing on the role of trees in urban
beautification. An urban tree is as much as 15 times more
valuable in offsetting pollution and heat than a rural tree.
12.
A Presidential essay contest on the importance of trees could
involve a suitable prize, say, planting a tree with the
President. Each young person entering an essay -- there are
104 million young Americans between ages 5 and 19 -- would
receive a Presidential letter and a seedling. The First Lady
could judge the entries and/or award the prize.
13.
A Presidential art contest, for younger children, would award
a prize for the best tree-related art work. The finalists
could be displayed by the National Endowment for the Arts in a
travelling exhibit.
14.
The National Endowment For the Humanities could sponsor a
scholarly collocation on the culture aspects of trees.
15.
The President could call upon "Punch" Sulzberger of the New
York Times to seek the involvement of the children of the
Fresh Air Fund (a charity much trumpeted by the Times) in
planting trees. Other newspapers with similar programs could
be similarly approached.
16.
The President could meet with the head of the Jewish National
Fund, an organization which has planted a total of 180 million
trees in Israel, largely donated as memorials.
(more)
4-4-4
17.
The President could encourage grandparents (or parents) to
plant a tree to honor the birth or a grandchild. Should the
circumstances arise, the President and Mrs. Bush could so
commemorate their own new grandchild.
The President could give each of his grandchildren (or other
relatives, foreign dignitaries, and the like) a membership in
the National Arbor Day Foundation (Nebraska City, Nebraska),
and give them each a seedling with the membership. The cost is
ten dollars per year.
18.
The President could send a proclamation to, invite to the
White House, or visit the "Tree Musketeers," a troop of girl
scouts in E1 Segundo, CA who have devoted themselves to
promoting and caring for trees through newsletters,
celebrations, tree-plantings, creating stationery, etc.
19.
There are any number of events that could be arranged around
Arbor Day (the last Friday in April -- April 27, 1990) and
the National Arbor Day Foundation (see Tab 5). Among these
are the following:
-
On Arbor Day, the President could visit a city that is
becoming a "Tree City.' There are already 1,000 communities
that are "Tree Cities," having met the criteria of 1) having
an Arbor Day celebration, 2) spending at least $1/year/person
in the community, 3) having a "Tree Board," and, 4) having
tree ordinances.
-
The President could invite John Rosenow, Executive Director
of the National Arbor Day Foundation, to a White House
ceremony or Arbor Day celebration.
I
Honorary Members of the National Arbor Day Foundation include
Stuart Udall, Eddie Albert, Cong. Douglas Bereuter, Dick
Cavett, Lady Bird Johnson, and Ted Turner.
-
Presidential recognition of the statue of JS Morton, founder
of Arbor Day, in Statuary Hall, at the Capitol. Morton once
said, "Other holidays repose upon the past. Arbor Day
proposes for the future."
-
Presidential recognition the J. Stuart Morton Elm, which was
planted on the Capitol grounds in 1932 (100th anniversary of
his birth).
(more)
.10
12.5
4,787
63.1
3,612
2,266
62.7
1,410
JMV
773
1965
7,582
1964
7,341
4,459
2,017
60.5
1,328
826
62.2
2,680
1,616
60.3
774
12.5
60.7
3,333
12.4
58.3
58.8
1,276
748
58.6
2,502
1,437
57.4
776
1963
6,922
4,034
3,144
1,849
1,274
53.0
12.4
1962
6,668
3,723
55.8
2,977
1,744
58.6
1,285
705
54.9
2,406
777
1961
782
12.4
3,645
56.5
2,841
1,697
59.7
1,219
675
55.4
2,388
1,273
53.3
6,448
1960*
56.8
62.2
1,185
655
55.3
2,279
1,175
51.6
776
12.4
6,060
3,445
2,596
1,615
12.4
1959
2,846
52.7
2,432
1,280
52.6
1,087
572
52.6
1,885
994
52.7
767
5,404
768
12.5
1958
53.9
2,180
1,141
52.3
989
541
54.7
1,868
1,032
55.2
5,037
2,714
923
48.6
925
488
52.8
1,717
952
55.4
12.5
1957
4,541
2,363
52.0
1,899
1956
2,122
45.7
1,735
820
47.3
896
415
46.3
2,013
887
43.6
759
4,644
12.7
1955
1,869
44.8
1,642
746
45.4
877
387
44.1
1,656
736
44.4
757
4,175
661
42.3
833
374
44.9
1,770
775
43.8
757
12.7
1954
4,165
1,810
43.5
1,562
766
12.8
1953
3,608
1,646
45.6
1,332
569
42.7
715
369
51.5
1,561
708
45.4
730
12.7
1952
2,995
1,406
47.0
1,126
493
43.8
575
313
54.5
1,294
600
46.3
12.9
1951
1,212
442
36.5
40.7
931
396
42.5
482
231
47.9
728
12.9
2,625
1,069
1950
2,332
901
343
39.0
453
205
45.3
999
353
41.0
727
38.7
879
13.1
1949
802
39.7
286
38.4
366
171
46.9
910
345
37.9
741
13.1
2,019
744
732
300
1948
1,657
673
40.6
636
235
36.9
289
138
37.9
41.0
746
13.2
1947
46.6
500
189
37.7
193
107
55.1
557
287
51.5
747
1,250
582
13.3
1946
617
13.1
13.0
Denotes first year for which figures include Alaska and Hawaii.
2 Covers real property against damage by autos.
540
3 Covers auto fire, theft, collision, and comprehensive.
519
13.1
1
For 1970, includes adjusting expenses.
604
13.5
694
13.8
678
13.8
Series Q 175-186. Percent Distribution of Automobile Ownership, and Financing: 1947 to 1970
668
13.8
658
13.9
[In percent. Excludes Alaska and Hawaii]
648
13.9
635
14.0
Method of financing purchases
Families owning automobiles
All passenger cars 1
New passenger cars 1
Used passenger cars 1
Owning 1
Owning
Installment
Installment
Years
automobile
2 or more
Installment
Total
automobiles
Full
credit
Total
Full
credit
Total
Full
credit
Total
and other
cash 2
and other
cash 2
and other
cash 2
borrowing
borrowing
borrowing
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
28
100
47
53
100
34
66
100
52
48
1970
82
54
1969
79
52
100
47
53
100
34
66
100
51
49
27
50
53
26
100
42
58
100
31
69
100
50
1968
79
1967
25
100
48
52
100
38
62
100
53
47
78
53
54
25
52
100
37
63
100
52
48
1966
79
100
48
53
47
24
100
48
52
100
40
60
100
1965
79
55
1964
78
47
53
100
40
60
100
51
49
55
22
100
58
22
100
45
55
100
38
62
100
49
51
1963
80
62
100
48
50
57
17
100
44
56
100
38
1962
74
1961
76
58
18
48
52
100
39
61
100
52
48
100
62
15
100
38
62
100
33
67
100
41
59
1960
77
61
100
33
66
100
41
57
1959
74
59
15
100
38
1958
70
60
10
100
43
56
100
36
63
100
45
54
13
100
38
60
100
36
63
100
39
58
1957
75
62
36
61
100
34
63
100
38
60
1956
72
61
9
100
60
10
100
38
60
100
39
60
100
37
60
1955
70
100
37
61
100
38
61
100
36
61
1954
66
58
8
5
61
100
40
59
100
37
62
1953
61
55
100
38
33
65
100
35
63
100
41
57
100
1952
60
56
4
44
55
100
52
47
100
39
60
1951
60
56
4
100
1950
59
52
7
100
47
52
100
54
46
100
41
57
100
47
52
33
100
50
49
100
56
43
1949
56
³48
1948
39
100
66
33
100
55
42
54
100
59
1947
100
65
35
100
71
29
100
63
37
1 Refers to purchases during preceding year. Includes cars received as gifts, whether
2 Includes trade-in allowance.
cash or credit purchased. Detail in purchases excludes buyers for whom method of
3
Based on spending units (persons living in the same dwelling and related by blood,
(series Q 151)
financing was not ascertained.
marriage, or adoption) who pooled their income for major items of expense.
717
N 238-258
CONSTRUCTION AND HOUSING
Series N 238-245. Occupied Housing Units and Tenure of Homes: 1890 to 1970
Total population
Tenure of homes
Total
occupied
Number
Occupied
Owner occupied
Renter occupied
housing units
of
Per occupied
units report-
Year 1
(1,000)
persons
housing
ing tenure
(1,000)
unit
(1,000)
Number
Number
(1,000)
Percent
(1,000)
Percent
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
TOTAL
1970 ²
63,450
203,211
3.2
63,450
39,885
62.9
23,565
37.1
1960*
53,024
179,326
3.4
53,024
32,796
61.9
20,227
38.1
1956
3
49,874
(NA)
(NA)
49,874
30,121
60.4
19,753
39.6
1950
42,826
150,697
3.5
42,826
23,560
55.0
19,266
45.0
1945
37,600
140,186
3.7
37,600
20,009
53.2
17,591
46.8
1940
34,855
131,669
3.8
34,855
15,196
43.6
19,659
56.4
1930
29,905
122,775
4.1
29,322
14,002
47.8
15,320
52.2
1920
24,353
105,711
4.3
23,811
10,867
45.6
12,944
54.4
1910
20,256
91,972
4.5
19,782
9,084
45.9
10,698
54.1
1900
15,964
75,995
4.8
15,429
7,205
46.7
8,224
53.3
1890
12,690
62,948
5.0
12,690
6,066
47.8
6,624
52.2
NONFARM
1970
60,351
192,624
3.2
60,351
37,393
62.0
22,957
38.0
1960*
49,458
165,851
3.4
49,458
30,164
61.0
19,294
39.0
1950
37,105
127,649
3.4
37,105
19,802
53.4
17,304
46.6
1945
31,281
(NA)
(NA)
31,281
15,878
50.8
15,403
49.2
1940
27,748
101,453
3.7
27,748
11,413
41.1
16,335
58.9
1930
23,300
92,618
4.0
22,917
10,550
46.0
12,367
54.0
1920
17,600
74,096
4.2
17,229
7,041
40.9
10,188
59.1
1910
14,132
'59,895
4.2
13,672
5,245
38.4
8,427
61.6
1900
10,274
9,780
3,567
36.5
6,213
63.5
1890
7,923
7,923
2,924
36.9
4,999
63.1
FARM
1970 ²
3,095
10,589
3.4
3,095
2,492
80.5
603
19.5
1960*
3,566
13,475
3.8
3,566
2,633
73.8
933
26.2
1950
5,721
23,049
4.0
5,721
3,758
65.7
1,963
34.3
1945
6,319
(NA)
(NA)
6,319
4,131
65.4
2,188
34.6
1940
7,107
30,216
4.3
7,107
3,783
53.2
3,324
46.8
1930
6,605
30,158
4.6
6,405
3,452
53.9
2,953
46.1
1920
6,751
31,614
4.7
6,581
3,826
58:1
2,755
41.9
1910
6,124
32,077
45.2
6,110
3,838
62.8
2,271
37.2
1900
5,690
5,649
3,638
64.4
2,011
35.6
1890
4,767
4,767
3,143
65.9
1,624
34.1
* Denotes first year for which figures include Alaska and Hawaii.
2 Farm-nonfarm breakdown will not add to total; "Total" figures were revised as
NA Not available.
a
result of errors found after the tabulations were completed.
1 Figures for 1956 are for December 31; figures for 1945 are for November 1; figures
3 These figures are not comparable with other years; based on sample surveys.
for decennial years, 1890 to 1970, are for census dates.
4 Estimated; see text.
Series N 246-258. Housing Units Vacancy Rates, by Region: 1940 to 1970
[In percent. Annual averages, except as noted. For composition of regions, see text for series A 172-194]
All housing units vacancy rate
Homeowner vacancy rate
Rental vacancy rate
Year-
Seasonal
United
North
United
North
Year
Total
round
vacancy
States
Northeast
Central
South
West
States
Northeast
Central
South
West
vacancy
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
1970
8.8
6.3
2.5
1.0
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.1
5.3
2.7
5.8
7.2
5.6
1969
9.1
6.5
2.6
1.0
.8
.9
1.2
1.2
5.5
3.0
5.7
7.2
6.1
1968
9.3
6.7
2.6
1.1
.8
1.0
1.4
1.3
5.9
3.7
5.4
7.5
7.1
1967
9.9
7.2
2.7
1.3
.7
1.0
1.7
2.0
6.8
4.8
5.7
8.0
8.9
1966
10.3
7.5
2.8
1.4
.9
1.0
1.8
2.1
7.7
5.3
6.5
8.5
10.9
1965
10.5
7.6
2.9
1.5
1.0
1.2
2.0
1.9
8.3
5.6
7.2
9.0
11.9
1964
10.3
7.3
3.0
1.5
1.1
1.3
1.9
1.8
8.3
5.2
7.9
9.1
11.0
1963
10.3
7.2
3.1
1.5
1.0
1.4
1.9
1.9
8.3
5.1
8.7
9.2
10.2
1962
10.1
7.4
2.7
1.4
1.1
1.2
1.7
1.6
8.1
4.7
9.0
9.9
9.5
1961
10.2
7.6
2.6
1.4
1.1
1.2
1.7
1.3
8.7
4.9
9.3
10:4
10.7
1960*
10.1
7.4
2.7
1.3
1.0
1.2
1.6
1.4
8.1
4.9
8.3
9.5
11.0
1959
10.0
7.0
3.0
1.2
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.4
7.0
3.9
7.1
9.4
8.5
1958
9.9
6.7
3.2
1.2
1.0
1.4
1.0
1.2
6.5
3.8
7.3
7.9
7.5
1957
9.1
6.2
2.9
1.0
.7
.9
.9
1.3
5.6
3.4
5.4
6.7
7.4
1956
8.8
6.2
2.6
1.0
.9
.8
1.0
1.4
6.1
3.1
5.6
8.1
8.7
1950 1
6.9
4.4
2.5
is
1940 1
6.6
4.5
2.0
* Denotes first year for which figures include Alaska and Hawaii.
1 As of April.
646
HOUSING
N 259-272
Series N 259-261. Price Indexes for 1-Family Houses: 1890 to 1947
Owner-occupied
Median
Owner-occupied
Median
Owner-occupied
Owner-occupied
houses, 22 cities
asking
houses, 22 cities
asking
houses, 22 cities
houses, 22 cities
(1929 = 100)
price for
(1929 = 100)
price for
(1929 = 100)
(1929 = 100)
existing
existing
houses,
houses,
Year
Un-
Adjusted
Washing-
Year
Un-
Adjusted
Washing-
Year
Un-
Adjusted
Year
Un-
Adjusted
adjusted
for depre-
ton, D.C.
adjusted
for depre-
ton, D.C.
adjusted
for depre-
adjusted
for depre-
ciation
ciation
ciation
ciation
259
260
261
259
260
261
259
260
259
260
1947
$12,309
1932
78.7
82.0
$6,515
1917
80.1
68.0
1903
64.9
45.5
1946
12,638
1931
87.9
90.4
6,796
1916
78.5
65.8
1902
63.9
42.4
1901
54.2
37.0
1945
10,131
1930
95.7
97.1
7,146
1915
71.7
59.2
1944
8,649
1929
100.0
100.0
7,246
1914
78.1
63.7
1900
64.6
43.5
1943
8,011
1928
102.1
100.7
7,333
1913
75.3
60.5
1899
56.5
37.5
1942
7,573
1927
100.6
97.9
7,682
1912
75.3
59.7
1898
59.1
38.7
1941
6,954
1926
104.5
100.4
7,748
1911
72.5
56.7
1897
55.5
35.9
1896
53.8
34.3
1940
6,558
1925
108.9
103.1
7,809
1910
74.2
57.3
1939
6,416
1924
103.5
96.7
7,720
1909
68.7
52.3
1895
62.1
39.0
1938
6,420
1923
103.3
95.2
7,400
1908
70.3
52.8
1894
68.4
42.4
1937
6,622
1922
101.8
92.5
7,197
1907
77.9
37.7
1893
58.7
35.9
1936
6,145
1921
100.4
90.0
7,019
1906
70.6
51.6
1892
56.3
34.0
1891
55.3
32.9
1935
6,296
1920
102.7
90.8
6,296
1905
59.5
42.9
1934
77.9
78.3
5,972
1919
93.7
81.7
5,626
1904
67.9
48.3
1890
61.3
36.0
1933
75.7
80.0
5,759
1918
85.2
73.3
4,821
Series
N 262-272. Residential Nonfarm Mortgage Debt Outstanding, by Type of Holder: 1890 to 1970
[In millions of dollars]
Debt, excluding real estate bonds
Total
debt,
Institutional
including
real
Non-
Year
estate
Total
institutional
Mutual
Savings
Life
Home
Federal
bonds
Total
Commercial
savings
and loan
insurance
Owners'
National
Other
banks
banks
associations
companies
Loan Corp.
Mortgage
Assn.
1
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
1970
338,198
35,733
302,465
45,640
49,936
138,800
42,737
20,708
4,644
1969
318,984
34,361
284,623
44,573
48,682
129,658
42,083
15,797
3,830
1968
298,587
32,688
265,899
41,433
46,748
120,839
41,784
11,420
3,675
1967
279,970
31,119
248,851
37,642
44,641
112,804
41,480
8,912
3,372
1966
263,952
30,062
233,890
34,876
42,242
106,028
40,522
7,109
3,113
1965
250,120
29,445
220,675
32,387
40,096
102,347
38,400
4,769
2,676
1964
231,142
28,673
202,469
28,933
36,487
94,236
35,761
4,464
2,588
1963
211,229
27,244
183,985
26,476
32,718
84,882
32,674
4,729
2,506
1962
192,295
25,898
166,397
23,482
29,181
74,103
31,122
6,032
2,477
1961
175,895
24,564
151,331
21,225
26,341
65,447
29,899
6,216
2,203
1960
161,636
22,493
139,143
20,362
24,306
57,569
28,744
6,297
1,865
1959
149,522
21,120
128,402
20,320
22,486
51,187
27,249
5,581
1,579
1958
134,535
19,701
114,834
18,591
20,935
44,122
25,921
3,937
1,328
1957
122,947
17,757
105,190
17,147
19,010
38,885
24,992
4,011
1,145
1956 2
113,880
16,707
97,173
17,004
17,703
34,761
23,745
3,085
875
1956 3
112,051
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
17,004
17,703
35,014
23,745
3,047
(NA)
1955
100,670
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
15,888
15,568
30,832
21,213
2,615
(NA)
1954
87,280
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
14,152
13,211
25,670
18,557
2,436
(NA)
1953
77,117
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
12,925
11,334
21,523
16,558
2,463
(NA)
1952
68,878
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
12,188
9,883
18,028
15,045
2,242
(NA)
1952
4
69,561
69,121
10,990
58,131
12,188
9,833
17,590
15,112
2,210
1,198
1951
62,506
62,026
10,604
51,422
11,270
8,595
14,801
13,865
1,818
1,073
1950
54,882
54,362
10,422
43,938
10,431
7,054
13,104
11,035
10
1,328
978
1949
46,456
45,896
10,461
35,435
8,676
5,569
11,117
8,232
231
806
804
1948
41,461
40,861
10,189
30,672
8,066
4,758
9,841
6,754
369
198
686
1947
35,701
35,071
9,689
25,382
6,933
3,937
8,475
5,005
486
4
542
1946
30,139
29,459
8,809
20,650
5,146
3,588
6,843
4,021
636
6
410
1945
25,383
24,643
7,874
16,769
3,395
3,387
5,162
3,632
852
7
334
1944
24,820
24,000
7,348
16,652
3,218
3,476
4,638
3,819
1,091
50
360
1943
24,956
24,056
7,181
16,875
3,256
3,558
4,422
3,835
1,338
60
406
1942
25,647
24,667
7,316
17,351
3,335
3,725
4,449
3,625
1,567
206
444
1941
25,915
24,875
7,462
17,413
3,308
3,884
4,481
3,235
1,777
203
525
1940
24,930
23,810
7,278
16,532
2,997
3,914
4,073
2,887
1,956
178
527
1939
23,940
22,740
7,156
15,584
2,719
3,875
3,748
2,557
2,038
144
503
1938
23,326
22,046
7,105
14,941
2,535
3,830
3,523
2,226
2,169
80
578
1937
23,284
21,924
7,089
14,835
2,415
3,851
3,414
2,163
2,398
594
1936
23,435
21,915
6,967
14,948
2,285
3,897
3,257
2,142
2,763
604
1935
23,891
22,211
6,984
15,227
2,225
3,984
3,301
2,200
2,897
620
1934
24,811
22,811
7,377
15,434
2,183
4,109
3,749
2,370
2,379
644
1933
25,464
23,083
8,356
14,727
2,528
4,293
4,473
2,626
132
675
1932
27,438
24,918
9,208
15,710
2,561
4,554
5,020
2,854
721
1931
29,293
26,673
9,940
16,733
2,769
4,568
5,704
2,948
744
See fbotnotes at end of table.
647
594
Transportation-Land
No. 1012. MOTOR-VEHICLE REGISTRATIONS, 1970 TO 1987, AND VEHICLE-MILES OF TRAVEL, 1986,
No. 1011. MOTOR VEHICLES-SUMMARY: 1970 TO 1987
BY STATE
Unit
1970
1975
1980
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
[In thousands, except as Indicated. Motor vehicle registrations cover publicly, privately, and commercially owned vehicles. For
ITEM
uniformity, figures have been adjusted to a calendar-year basis as registration years in States differ, figures represent net
numbers where possible, excluding re-registrations and nonresident registrations]
PASSENGER CARS
Passenger car production
1,000
6,550
6,717
6,376
5,073
6,781
7,773
8,185
7,829
7,099
Passenger car factory sales
1,000
6,547
6,713
6,400
5,049
6,739
7,621
8,002
7,516
7,085
AUTOMOBILES, TRUCKS, AND BUSES ,
MOTORCY-
1986
1,000
8,405
8,640
8,979
7,982
9,182
10,390
11,042
11,460
10,278
CLES (incl.
Passenger car (new). retail sales 1
Domestic 2
1,000
7,116
7,050
6,581
5,759
6,795
7,952
8,205
8,215
7,081
1987, est.
official) 1987,
Vehicle miles of
Public
3
1,000
700
1,604
1,489
1,776
2,322
1,297
1,325
1,101
est.
travel
Subcompact
2,563
2,461
2,388
Automobiles
road
1,000
1,338
2,336
1,659
1,257
1,110
1,336
1,000
1,956
1,358
1,377
1,825
1,817
STATE
and
Compact 3
1,882
1,888
1,565
(incl. taxis)
Standard 3
5,778
1,641
2,071
2,484
2,464
2,540
2,026
1970
1980
1985
1986
Per
street
Per
Intermediate
3
1,000
2,058
1,957
Total
Per
mile-
Total
mile of
1,000
1,285
1,587
2,398
2,223
2,387
2,439
2,838
3,245
3,197
Total
1,000
Imports
1,000
age
(bil.
Total
popu-
road
lation 2
(1,000
mi.)
TRUCKS
popu-
mi.)
(1,000)
Truck and bus production
1,000
1,734
2,270
1,634
1,912
2,444
3,151
3,468
3,490
3,811
lation 2
Truck and bus factory sales
1,000
1,692
2,272
1,667
1,906
2,414
3,075
3,357
3,393
3,821
1,000
1,746
2,351
2,232
2,248
2,709
3,538
3,984
4,031
4,174
Truck and bus retail sales 5
U.S
108,418
155,796
171,654
176,191
3,766
3,885
180,989
139,041
571
5,148
21
3,879.5
1,838.2
473.8
Light duty (up to 14,000 GVW) 6
1,000
(NA)
2,076
1,964
2,064
2,521
3,261
3,700
61
53
51
55
AL
Med. duty (14,001-26,000 GVW)
6
1,000
(NA)
169
92
46
48
1,966
2,938
3,338
3,457
3,470
2,534
621
56
14
88.0
34.0
386.4
Heavy duty (over 26,000 GVW)
6
1,000
126
106
176
138
141
216
231
214
234
AK
139
262
353
363
371
233
444
10
19
13.6
4.0
294.1
AZ
1,093
1,917
2,235
2,346
2,440
1,698
501
80
24
77.3
22.7
293.7
MOTORCYCLES
AR
1,043
1,574
1,384
1,426
1,459
952
399
20
8
77.1
17.6
228.3
689
811
772
722
631
550
CA
11,901
Motorcycle registrations, new 7
1,000
751
747
838
16,873
18,899
19,760
20,608
15,978
578
684
25
175.1
214.9
1,227.3
Motorcycle (new) retail sales 8
1,010
940
1,070
990
1,185
1,305
1,260
1,045
935
1,000
CO
1,442
2,342
2,759
2,763
2,769
2,016
612
107
32
76.3
26.4
346.0
250
425
550
550
465
395
CT
1,733
2,147
All-terrain vehicles
1,000
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
2,465
2,562
2,658
2,496
777
57
18
19.7
24.1
1,223.4
(NA)
(NA)
275
430
635
683
498
320
1,000
(NA)
DE
312
397
465
480
All-terrain vehicle imports
492
386
599
9
14
5.3
5.8
1,094.3
Motorcycle imports, total 9
1,000
1,091
948
1,120
917
540
441
733
550
318
763
463
Mil. dol
308
713
1,142
1,110
697
523
783
DC
257
268
326
289
295
278
447
3
5
Value 10
1.1
3.3
3,000.0
FL
4,120
7,614
9,865
10,362
10,943
8,752
728
227
19
99.1
87.3
880.9
FOREIGN TRADE
GA
2,584
3,818
4,580
4,841
5,106
3,659
588
125
20
106.6
56.8
532.8
1,000
285
640
617
379
554
616
704
673
633
HI
405
Passenger cars (new), exported 11
570
651
689
735
640
591
16
15
4.0
7.0
1,750.0
2,926
3,134
3,559
4,398
4,691
4,589
ID
488
Passenger cars (new), imported 12
1,000
2,013
2,075
3,116
834
854
857
858
536
537
47
47
71.5
7.8
109.1
Canada
734
595
703
836
1,073
1,145
1,162
927
1,000
693
IL
5,238
7,477
7,727
7,420
7,409
6,084
525
214
18
134.8
74.1
549.7
259
240
335
473
452
378
IN
2,818
Germany, Federal Republic of
1,000
675
370
339
3,826
4,024
4,174
4,325
3,241
586
117
21
91.5
40.8
445.9
1,000
381
696
1,992
1,801
1,871
1,949
2,527
2,619
2,418
IA
1,790
2,329
2,696
2,638
2,623
1,890
667
227
80
112.5
20.4
181.3
Japan
1,000
91
219
186
124
132
159
183
205
222
Trucks (new) exports
1,000
166
295
747
697
785
1,025
1,253
1,351
1,177
KS
1,548
Trucks (new) imports 12
2,007
2,148
2,176
2,203
1,518
613
86
35
132.6
19.8
149.3
142
483
356
430
567
800
976
772
KY
1,763
2,593
2,615
2,685
2,745
1,838
493
43
12
69.6
29.3
421.0
Japan
1,000
27
Mil. dol
3,719
7,483
16,675
20,180
23,394
29,264
36,474
45,302
47,858
LA
Import value, new passenger cars 1
1,742
2,779
3,012
2,890
2,831
1,868
419
48
11
58.2
29.9
513.7
1,985
4,453
4,848
6,541
7,734
8,504
8,729
ME
510
724
840
872
916
694
585
Trucks and buses, new
Mil. dol
381
620
43
36
22.0
10.0
454.5
Mil. dol
10,658
16,015
16,039
17,078
20,776
22,820
21,955
24,812
3,871
MD
1,872
Export value 13
2,803
3,276
3,361
3,451
2,830
624
84
19
27.7
35.2
1,270.8
2,867
4,208
4,876
6,027
6,258
6,695
MA
Passenger cars (new) 13
Mil. dol
822
2,852
3,932
2,575
3,749
3,738
3,841
3,927
3,430
586
114
19
33.8
40.7
1,204.1
Mil. dol
636
2,305
2,977
2,642
2,130
2,479
2,789
2,953
3,375
MI
Trucks and buses (new) 13
4,569
6,488
6,727
6,832
6,939
5,493
597
247
27
117.7
72.0
611.7
10,530
10,740
13,421
14,004
12,744
14,742
MN
Parts and accessories 14
Mil. dol
2,413
5,501
9,106
2,207
3,091
3,385
3,087
3,107
2,400
565
132
31
132.6
33.8
254.9
VEHICLES IN USE AND RETIRED
MS
1,117
1,577
1,746
1,770
1,798
1,374
523
23
9
71.8
19.2
267.4
106.9
109.0
112.0
114.7
117.3
119.8
MO
2,408
3,271
3,558
3,683
3,790
2,741
537
74
15
Cars in use, total
Million
80.4
95.2
104.6
119.4
41.6
348.4
Under 3 years
24.4
25.8
26.8
21.5
20.7
22.0
24.8
27.9
28.1
Million
MT
485
680
652
673
693
468
578
26
32
71.7
7.7
107.4
Million
24.9
27.0
25.5
.29.9
28.8
26.8
23.9
22.7
24.7
NE
974
1,254
1,257
1,281
1,306
871
546
27
17
92.2
12.6
136.7
3-5 years
Million
25.2
22.2
23.5
26.8
27.8
26.5
24.4
18.4
22.0
NV
355
655
709
769
812
581
577
19
19
44.4
8.0
180.2
6-8 years
Million
7.7
13.9
14.6
17.9
18.9
17.4
17.2
18.7
21.4
NH
390
704
974
1,071
1,164
972
920
67
63
14.5
7.9
544.8
9-11 years
Million
4.9
6.6
12.5
15.4
17.0
19.0
21.0
21.5
21.2
NJ
3,586
4,761
4,909
12 years and over
5,267
5,373
4,870
635
118
15
34.0
55.4
1,629.4
7.2
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.6
7.6
NM
Years
5.6
6.0
6.6
637
1,068
1,176
1,320
1,407
894
596
47
31
53.6
13.2
246.3
Average age
Cars retired from use 15
1,000
7,461
5,669
8,405
6,921
6,243
6,675
7,729
8,442
8,103
NY
6,718
8,002
9,042
35.2
37.0
38.1
40.1
42.4
44.8
47.3
9,515
9,996
8,754
491
236
13
110.1
94.7
860.1
Trucks in use, total
Million
17.7
24.8
Million
4.7
6.9
8.8
5.6
5.9
7.2
9.0
11.1
11.9
NC
2,826
4,532
4,450
Under 3 years
8.3
4,739
4,934
3,585
559
61
10
93.6
52.9
565.2
10.7
9.5
8.0
6.3
6.6
ND
428
627
655
648
641
379
564
39
5.6
65.0
3-5 years
Million
4.3
5.8
8.1
26
86.2
6-8 years
3.0
7.4
7.1
7.7
9.2
10.2
8.9
7.4
4.4
OH
Million
5,974
7,771
8,102
8.0
8,159
8,204
6,730
624
303
28
113.3
81.3
717.6
5.7
6.5
6.2
6.2
6.7
OK
1,713
2,583
2,864
2,902
67
20
277.5
9-11 years
Million
1.9
3.2
4.4
7.9
8.5
9.6
10.7
11.5
11.8
2,934
1,893
579
111.0
30.8
12 years and over
Million
3.9
4.4
6.5
OR
1,369
2,081
2,204
8.0
2,264
2,336
1,709
627
82
30
94.6
22.7
240.0
7.8
8.1
8.2
8.1
8.0
PA
Years
7.3
6.9
7.1
5,818
6,926
7,209
2,364
7,477
Average age
7,724
6,267
525
196
16
115.7
77.6
670.7
Trucks retired from use 15
1,000
837
908
1,732
1,459
1,491
1,602
2,100
2,309
RI
488
623
610
632
652
544
552
25
25
6.0
5.4
900.0
SC
1,360
1,996
2,222
2,304
2,369
1,782
520
32
9
63.3
28.3
447.1
TIRES AND BATTERIES SHIPMENTS
SD
426
601
650
664
678
412
210.8
581
34
48
73.5
6.2
84.4
Tires, passenger car, total 16
Million
168.6
167.0
145.9
167.5
182.0
201.6
200.9
202.7
115.9
133.4
156.6
164.7
174.0
187.3
TN
2,050
3,271
3,754
Radials
Million
2.9
61.5
83.5
3,932
4,156
83.9
39.5
129.6
130.5
134.0
144.6
141.5
144.3
151.9
3,298
679
123
25
470.8
Replacement
Million
122.5
106.9
TX
6,693
44.4
10,475
12,444
12,407
12,421
8,495
506
240
14
286.0
148.3
518.5
33.8
36.9
40.8
41.1
40.6
UT
664
Tires, truck and bus, total 16
Million
25.7
27.3
31.1
992
26.0
1,099
1,111
1,125
760
452
46
27
49.9
12.1
242.5
Million
(NA)
8
3.8
10.4
13.4
16.0
19.7
21.1
VT
229
347
398
34.5
418
439
326
Radials
595
20
36
14.0
4.8
342.9
30.3
31.7
32.1
32.4
VA
2,263
3,626
4,253
Replacement
Million
16.7
19.8
24.4
28.1
75.7
4,532
4,718
3,711
629
76
13
65.8
51.7
785.7
Batteries, total 17
Million
46.9
52.9
61.7
64.6
69.0
74.7
74.4
75.7
WA
2,102
3,225
59.9
3,526
3,752
3,906
2,716
599
144
32
80.5
36.0
447.2
59.3
58.7
60.3
WV
801
Replacement automobile batteries
Million
37.9
42.6
50.1
54.2
56.1
1,320
1,143
1,170
1,195
826
435
32
17
35.1
13.2
376.1
WI
2,182
2,941
3,187
3,120
3,121
2,402
500
185
38
108.7
38.4
353.3
2 Includes domestic models produced in Canada and
WY
247
467
500
440
417
237
484
23
47
38.9
5.4
138.8
Mexico. 3 Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, unpublished data. Represents total auto sales data those from
NA Not available.
1 Based on data from U.S. Dept. of Commerce.
Ward's Automotive Reports. Criteria by which each year's car models are grouped into the major size categories vary among foreign
1 Excludes vehicles owned by military services.
2 Based on resident population as of July 1.
collecting data. Data shown here follow Automotive News classifications. in Canada. Beginning 1980, 5 Excludes cars produced motorcoaches in U.S. and by light-duty
Source: U.S. Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics, annual; and Selected Highway Statistics and Charts, annual.
manufacturers imports from foreign are included. manufacturers. Excludes Beginning domestic 1975, includes models imports produced sold by franchised dealers of U.S. manufacturers. loaded Starting vehicle). in
4
1986, includes sales of trucks over 10,000 lbs. GVW by foreign manufacturers. 6 Gross vehicle weight (fully 1984,
excludes New York. Reproduction prohibited without Polk permission.
7 Source: R. L. Polk & Company, Detroit, MI, New Motorcycle Registrations 8 Estimates by States. by Motorcycle 1970-1986 Industry excludes Council Oklahoma; Inc., Costa
Mesa, CA. Includes all-terrain vehicles and scooters. Excludes mopeds/motorized bicycles. 9 Source: Motorcycle vehicles. Industry
Council, Inc., Costa Mesa, CA. Data from U.S. Dept. of Commerce. Excludes mopeds/motorized 11 1970-1975, covers bicycles assembled and all-terrain vehicles only.
vehicles. 14 Includes rubber tires and tubes and used vehicles. 15 For years ending June 30. Represents vehicles failing
Beginning 1980, includes chassis. 12 Includes other countries, not shown separately. 13 Covers assembled and unassembled to
10 Dutiable value for customs purposes prior to 1980 thereafter, c.i.f. value.
re-register.
18 Includes original equipment. Also includes exports, not shown separately. Source: The Rubber Manufacturers
Association, Source: Except Inc., Washington, as noted, Motor D.C., Vehicle AMA Monthly Manufacturers Report. Association of the United States, Inc., Detroit, MI, Motor Vehicle Facts
Tire
17 Source: Battery Council International, Chicago, IL.
and Figures, annual; and World Motor Vehicle Data, annual.
New Trucks-Recreational Vehicles-Motorcycles
597
596
Transportation-Land
No. 1013. MOTOR VEHICLES-REGISTRATIONS FACTORY SALES, AND RETAIL SALES: 1955 TO 1987
No. 1015. NEW TRUCKS-RETAIL SALES, BY WEIGHT CLASS AND TYPE: 1980 TO 1987
to
[Minus sign (-) indicates decrease. For definition of average annual percent change, see Guide to Tabular Presentation. See also
NUMBER (1,000)
PERCENT CHANGE
Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to 1970, series Q 148-155]
WEIGHT CLASS AND TYPE
1983-
1984-
1985-
1986-
1980
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
REGISTRATIONS 1
AVERAGE ANNUAL
1984
1985
1986
1987
FACTORY SALES
PASSENGER CARS
(mil.)
Motor-
(1,000)
RETAIL SALES (1,000)
PERCENT CHANGE 4
cycle
Total
2,232
2,709
3,538
3,984
4,031
4,174
30.6
12.6
1.2
3.5
YEAR
Total
Pas-
registra-
Total
Trucks
Pas-
Trucks
tions
Do-
Im-
Registra-
Retail
cars,
cars,
and
and
Total
Under 6,000 pounds
985
1,314
2,031
2,408
2,541
2,696
54.6
18.6
5.5
6.1
senger
sales
trucks,
senger
(1,000)
trucks,
mestic
ports
tions
5
buses 3
Utility
51
254
370
429
382
383
45.7
15.9
-10.8
.2
cars 2
buses
cars
buses
buses
Pickup, cartype
50
26
26
24
24
15
-1.8
-5.0
-1.5
-35.8
Pickup, conventional
545
445
632
644
582
566
42.0
1.9
-9.7
-2.8
1955
62.7
52.1
10.6
412
9,169
7,920
1,249
7,466
7,408
58
7.2
(NA)
Pickup, compact
254
488
613
696
757
861
25.6
13.4
8.9
13.7
560
679
795
29.4
11.6
8.5
17.2
1960
73.9
61.7
12.2
574
7,869
6,675
1,194
6,641
6,142
499
3.5
-2.3
Domestic
26
433
625
75.3
15.1
1,382
11,057
9,306
8,763
569
4.7
7.0
Import
229
55
53
70
79
66
-4.1
32.9
-11.9
-16.7
1965
90.4
1,752
9,332
Van
79
67
121
115
112
101
80.4
-5.3
-2.2
-9.9
1967
96.9
80.4
16.5
1,953
8,976
7,437
1,539
8,337
7,568
769
3.1
-5.5
Mini van
(x)
(z)
24
103
110
89
1,317.2
335.1
6.6
-19.2
14.1
11.1
9,656
8,625
1,031
4.1
15.8
Station wagon (truck chassis)
(x)
8
62
86
98
108
634.1
38.9
1968
100.9
83.6
17.3
2,089
10,718
8,822
1,896
9,583
8,464
1,118
4.2
-.8
Mini passenger carrier
(x)
8
169
301
460
546
1,923
1,964.8
78.3
52.8
18.8
1969
105.1
86.9
18.2
2,316
10,147
8,224
1970
108.4
89.2
19.2
2,824
8,239
6,547
1,692
8,405
7,119
1,285
3.2
12.3
6,000 to 10,000 pounds
975
1,207
1,224
1,280
1,214
1,175
1.5
4.6
-5.2
-3.2
103
108
101
91
22.2
4.4
-6.4
-9.6
1971
113.0
92.7
20.3
3,344
10,638
8,585
2,053
10,250
8,681
1,568
4.2
22.0
Utility
108
84
118.8
97.1
21.7
3,760
11,271
8,824
2,447
10,950
9,327
1,623
5.1
6.8
Van
172
311
265
261
261
254
-14.8
-1.5
.1
-2.8
1972
2,980
11,439
9,676
1,763
5.8
4.5
Pickup, conventional
546
574
573
628
582
569
-.2
9.7
-7.3
-2.2
1973
125.7
102.0
23.7
4,371
12,637
9,658
1,413
3.4
-22.5
Station wagon (truck chassis)
39
69
86
95
98
91
25.0
9.9
4.1
-7.5
1974
129.9
104.8
25.1
4,966
10,059
7,331
2,727
8,867
7,454
1975
132.9
106.7
26.2
4,964
8,985
6,713
2,272
8,640
7,053
1,587
2.3
-2.6
10,001 pounds and over
271
189
283
295
276
302
49.9
4.2
-6.4
9.6
1976
138.5
110.2
28.4
4,933
11,480
8,500
2,979
10,110
8,611
1,498
4.2
17.0
1977
142.1
112.3
29.8
4,881
12,642
9,201
3,441
11,185
9,109
2,076
2.6
10.6
X Not applicable.
Z Less than 500.
1978
148.4
116.6
31.8
4,868
12,871
9,165
3,706
11,312
9,312
2,000
4.4
1.1
2.4
-5.7
Source: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures, annual.
1979
151.9
118.5
33.4
5,422
11,456
8,419
3,037
10,671
8,341
2,329
1980
155.8
121.6
34.2
5,694
8,067
6,400
1,667
8,979
6,581
2,398
2.6
-15.9
No. 1016. RECREATIONAL VEHICLES-NUMBER AND RETAIL VALUE OF SHIPMENTS: 1970 TO 1987
1981
158.3
123.1
35.2
5,831
7,956
6,255
1,701
8,536
6,209
2,327
1.6
-4.9
-6.5
1982
159.6
123.7
35.9
5,754
6,955
5,049
1,906
7,982
5,759
2,223
.8
1983
163.9
126.2
37.7
5,585
9,153
6,739
2,414
9,182
6,795
2,387
2.7
15.0
NUMBER (1,000)
RETAIL VALUE (mil. dol.)
166.2
128.1
38.1
5,480
10,696
7,621
3,075
10,391
7,952
2,439
1.6
13.2
1984
1985
171.7
131.9
39.8
5,444
11,359
8,002
3,357
11,042
8,204
2,838
3.3
6.3
YEAR
Motor-
40.8
5,262
10,909
7,516
3,393
11,460
8,215
3,245
Travel
Folding
2.6
Truck
Motor-
3.8
Travel
Folding
Truck
1986
176.2
135.4
Total
ized
camping
Total
ized
camping
1987 6
181.0
139.0
41.9
5,148
10,907
7,085
3,821
10,278
7,081
3,197
2.7
-10.3
trailers
homes
campers
trailers
trailers
homes
trailers
campers
NA Not available.
1 Excludes Alaska and Hawaii prior to 1960. Includes publicly owned vehicles. Excludes military services'
1970
380.3
30.3
138.0
116.1
95.9
1,122
318
445
175
183
vehicles.
2 Includes taxis.
3 Includes standard equipment.
4 From immediate prior year.
5 Excludes motorcycles.
1973
528.8
129.0
212.3
97.7
89.8
2,322
1,153
843
160
167
6 Estimate.
1974
295.8
68.9
126.3
55.2
45.4
1,392
624
567
109
92
Source: Registrations-U.S. Federal Highway Administration, Selected Highway Statistics and Charts, annual; sales-Motor
1975
339.6
96.6
150.6
48.1
44.3
2,320
1,251
856
101
112
Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., Detroit, MI, MVMA Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures, annual.
1976
541.1
256.1
189.7
53.3
42.0
4,284
2,923
1,132
117
112
1977
533.9
280.2
167.9
53.9
31.9
5,327
3,876
1,229
123
99
1978
526.3
293.6
159.8
48.2
24.7
5,683
4,329
1,153
116
85
No. 1014. MOTOR VEHICLE OUTPUT AND TRADE IN NATIONAL INCOME ACCOUNTS: 1970 TO 1987
1979
307.7
172.6
90.2
31.1
13.8
3,538
2,682
725
83
48
1980
181.4
99.9
52.0
24.5
5.0
1,952
1,381
485
69
17
(In billions of dollars, except percent. Vehicle output equals final dollar sales value of new vehicles, plus net dollar value of
1981
239.1
135.2
63.8
35.0
5.1
2,775
2,019
631
105
20
used vehicle sales, adjusted for changes in inventories and net balance of vehicle exports and imports]
1982
258.0
152.5
65.5
34.3
5.7
3,505
2,701
666
110
28
1983
358.0
223.7
90.0
37.5
6.8
6,324
5,099
1,067
122
36
1984
CONSTANT (1982) DOLLARS
398.2
257.3
92.4
40.9
7.6
7,610
6,262
1,157
145
46
CURRENT DOLLARS
1985
359.2
233.5
82.9
35.9
6.9
7,029
5,724
1,122
137
46
Vehicle
1986
379.5
249.6
86.0
36.5
7.4
1,213
53
Vehicle output
7,564
6,155
144
Vehicle output
Vehicle
1987
400.2
255.7
92.8
41.6
10.1
8,400
6,826
1,331
167
76
YEAR
Per-
Per-
GNP
Ex-
Im-
GNP
Ex-
Im-
cent
cent
Truck
port
port
Source: Recreation Vehicle Industry Association, Reston, VA, RVs The Family Camping Vehicle, A Year-End Report/1986.
Total
Auto
Truck
port
port
Total
Auto
of
of
value
value
value
value
Data also in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., Detroit, MI, Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures,
GNP
GNP
annual.
1970
1,016
36.8
3.6
28.5
8.3
1.4
4.4
2.416
73.2
3.0
53.1
20.1
3.0
11.8
No. 1017. MOTORCYCLES-TRAVEL, REGISTRATION, AND FUEL CONSUMPTION: 1970 TO 1986
93.6
3.8
69.8
23.8
3.5
14.8
1971
1,103
49,3
4.5
38.9
10.4
1.8
5.9
2,485
1972
1,213
55.0
4.5
41.4
13.6
2.0
6,8
2,609
104.2
4.0
73.9
30.3
4.0
16.0
1973
4.6
46.0
17.1
2.7
7.8
2,744
119.4
4.4
82.0
37.4
5.3
17.2
Number
FUEL CONSUMPTION
1,359
63.1
Average
1974
1,473
57.7
3.9
38.8
18.9
3.7
8.8
2,729
103.7
3.8
65.4
38.3
6.7
17.5
Travel
of
Average
miles per
8.5
14.9
(mil. veh.
registered
travel per
Average
YEAR
1975
8.4
2,695
90.9
3.4
61.8
29.1
vehicle
Total (mil.
gallon
1,598
56.7
3.5
40.3
16.4
5.1
per
1976
1,783
78.3
4.4
55.2
23.1
5.4
11.0
2,827
118.0
4.2
80.1
37.9
8.3
18.2
miles)
vehicles
con-
(1,000)
(miles)
gal.)
vehicle
sumed
1977
1,991
95.1
4.8
64.3
30.8
5.6
13.3
2,959
135.7
4.6
88.7
47.0
8.1
20.3
(gal.)
1978
2,250
105.1
4.7
68.3
36.8
6.5
17.4
3,115
138.6
4.4
87.3
51.3
8.7
23.7
1979
2,508
104.0
4.1
66.9
37.1
8.0
18.6
3,192
128.1
4.0
80.2
47.9
10.0
22.8
1970
2,979
2,824
1,055
59.6
21
50
28.1
23.5
1975
5,629
4,964
1,134
112.6
23
50
1980
2,732
84.4
3.1
60.1
24.3
7.1
20.9
3,187
95.2
3.0
67.1
8.1
3.1
73.3
28.8
23.4
1977
7.6
6,349
4,933
1,287
127.0
26
50
1981
3,053
96.6
3.2
69.4
27.2
7.2
22.6
3,249
102.1
1982
3,166
94.3
3.0
66.5
27.8
5.4
25.5
3,166
94.3
3.0
66.5
25.5
1978
27.8
5.4
7,158
4,868
1,470
143.2
29
50
1979
8,637
5,422
1,593
172.7
32
50
1983
3,406
123.6
3.6
88.6
35,0
6.2
29.5
3,279
119.8
3.7
85.9
33.9
6.0
28.6
1984
51.2
38,9
36.7
1980
6.9
10,214
5,694
1,794
204.3
36
50
3,772
156.3
4.1
105.1
7.3
3,501
146.2
4.2
98.5
47.7
1981
10,690
5,831
1,833
213.8
37
50
41.1
1982
9,910
5,754
1,722
198.2
34
50
1985
4,015
172.8
4.3
116.5
56.3
8.8
45.5
3,619
157.4
4.3
106.5
50.9
7.9
4.1
106.2
47.8
46.2
1983
7.9
8,760
5,585
1,568
175.2
31
50
1986
4,240
175.8
4.1
120.6
55.2
9.3
55,6
3,722
154.0
1987
4,527
175.9
3.9
116.3
59.6
9.9
58.2
3,847
151.4
3.9
45.6
1984
8.2
8,784
5,480
1,603
175.7
32
50
100.6
50,8
1985
9,086
5,444
1,669
181.7
33
50
1986
9,414
5,262
1,789
188.3
36
50
1 For definition of gross national product (GNP), see text, section 14,
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, The National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929-82, and
Source: U.S. Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics Summary to 1985 and Highway Statistics, annual.
Survey of Current Business, July issues.
598
Transportation-Land
Motor-Vehicle Accidents and Fatalities
599
No. 1018. MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS-NUMBER AND DEATHS: 1970 TO 1987
[See also Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to 1970, series Q 208 and Q 224-232]
NO. 1020. FATAL MOTOR-VEHICLE ACCIDENTS-NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS AND FATALITIES, BY TYPE OF
VEHICLE: 1980 TO 1986
ITEM
Unit
1970
1972
1975
1980
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
[Based on data from the Fatal Accident Reporting System]
1987
Motor vehicle accidents 2
Million
Cars
16.0
17.0
Million
16.5
17.9
18.1
23.5
18.3
18.8
19.3
ACCIDENTS
1
Trucks
24.5
17.7
OCCUPANT FATALITIES
22.5
Million
22.8
23.2
3.2
23.5
3.5
25.2
3.8
25.6
(NA)
Motorcycles
27.7
TYPE OF VEHICLE
1,000
5.5
5.8
305
5.8
343
6.3
372
6.1
(NA)
6.1
1980
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1980
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
Motor vehicle deaths within 1 yr.3
1,000
560
550
54.6
530
570
45.9
480
(NA)
Noncollision accidents
56.3
440
1,000
53.2
45.8
15.4
44.4
(NA)
Collision accidents:
15.8
46.2
12.7
45.9
14.7
48.3
12.6
12.2
48,8
Total 2
12.6
45,284
39,092
37,976
39,631
39,195
41,090
41,927
35,646
34,843
36,284
36,043
38,229
With other motor vehicles
12.9
13.9
13.5
With pedestrians
1,000
23.2
23.9
19.5
23.0
19.8
Passenger cars 3
31,550
27,548
26,698
27,745
27,142
28,752
27,449
23,330
22,979
23,621
23,214
24,947
1,000
9.9
19.2
With fixed objects
10.3
20.3
8.4
19.9
9.7
20.5
8.4
20.8
Mini-compact
3,263
3,559
3,753
4,001
3,973
4,346
2,966
3,194
3,278
3,470
3,429
3,647
1,000
3.8
8.2
Deaths within 30 days 4
3.9
8.6
8.4
3.1
3.7
8.3
3.2
8.6
Subcompact
4,875
4,649
4,884
5,275
5,445
6,006
4,158
3,881
4,000
4,346
4,422
4,770
1,000
52.6
3.1
Vehicle occupants
54.6
3.0
44.5
2.7
51.1
3.3
43.9
3.8
Compact
1,118
1,565
1,936
2,670
3,445
4,374
927
1,210
1,499
2,081
2,635
3,312
Pedestrians
1,000
40.6
42.6
41.4
44.3
32.8
43.8
36.8
46.1
31.2
46.4
Intermediate
5,224
5,305
5,352
5,976
6,064
6,555
3,878
3,919
3,985
4,287
4,391
4,763
5
1,000
9.0
30.6
Motorcyclists
9.2
31.9
7.5
31.5
8.1
33.7
7.3
34.5
Full size
7,026
5,691
5,361
5,199
4,906
5,094
4,831
3,651
3,489
3,269
2,974
3,191
Bicyclists
1,000
2.3
6.8
3.0
7.0
3.2
6.8
5.1
6.8
4.5
4.3
6.7
Largest size
10,817
8,343
7,524
7,334
6,452
6,339
6,746
4,779
4,470
4,160
3,612
3,662
Traffic death rates:
6
1,000
.8
1.0
4.6
1.0
4.6
4.6
1.0
.9
.8
4.0
Unknown
5,134
3,863
3,264
2,905
2,699
2,053
3,943
2,696
2,258
2,008
1,751
1,602
Per 100,000 resident population
.8
.9
.9
.9
Per 100,000 registered vehicles
Rate
25.8
Motorcycles
4,879
4,201
4,045
4,378
4,342
4,209
4,961
4,270
4,104
4,431
4,417
4,309
26.2
20.7
22.6
19.0
Per 100 million vehicle miles
Rate
47.3
18.2
44.5
18.7
Moped, mini bike
180
177
158
172
151
250
183
183
161
177
147
257
Rate
32.3
18.4
31.6
19.1
26.6
25.1
19.1
Per 100,000 licensed drivers
4.7
4.3
25.7
24.8
25.4
Light trucks 2
10,841
9,597
9,347
10,255
10,470
11,179
6,566
5,590
5,395
5,773
5,834
6,390
Rate
3.4
3.3
2.8
24.9
47.2
2.6
8,796
7,842
7,698
8,285
5,463
4,873
4,886
46.1
2.6
Motor vehicle accidents 7
34.3
2.5
35.2
2.5
Pickup
8,375
8,526
4,677
4,579
5,090
29.2
27.6
2.4
28.5
27,9
28.9
Van
28.6
2,009
1,722
1,615
1,737
1,807
1,952
1,000
814
712
764
791
879
Injuries
7
Million
22.1
24.9
24.9
1,000
24.1
28.5
29.4
30.9
32.5
Medium trucks
1,076
666
672
680
654
661
285
154
172
153
157
145
Economic loss 8
4,983
5,190
Bil. dol
4,978
5,230
33,3
4,490
33.9
4,665
4,850
5,044
5,300
Heavy trucks 2
4,036
3,754
3,968
4,185
4,217
4,171
976
789
807
920
814
781
23.5
28.7
36.1
57.1
60.2
62.7
5,400
69.0
76.0
Single-unit 4
377
283
323
271
370
305
89
52
60
83
48
42
80.0
NA
Not
85.0
available.
Two-unit 5
3,396
3,072
3,144
3,359
3,411
3,351
812
663
648
758
692
689
the
road.
3
1 Represents occur peak year for deaths from motor vehicle accidents.
Multi-unit
148
129
168
188
182
179
41
25
36
37
31
50
System. days 7 Source: of accident. 5 Insurance Includes Deaths Source: that motor Information U.S. scooters National within and one Highway year motorized of Traffic accident. bicycles Safety Includes Administration, (mopeds). collision 6 unpublished categories Based not 30-day 2 data Covers shown from only separately. Fatal accidents Accident occurring 4 Within Reporting 30 on
Buses
329
288
305
302
304
282
46
35
53
45
55
39
Institute,
New
on
definition
of
traffic
1 Each accident involving multiple types of vehicles is recorded in each category; therefore, the aggregate of all types will
Survey. of representative disability. 8 Wage 1986 cross-section data loss; for legal, economic of States. medical, loss Includes hospital, based all on and motor York, information funeral vehicle NY, Insurance accidents from the on Facts. National and off Estimates Center the road for based and Health all on injuries Statistics, official regardless reports National of from deaths. Health length a
exceed the total number of accidents. 2 Includes other types and unknown, not shown separately. Mini-compact wheel
base less than 95 in.; subcompact, 95 in. to 99 in.; compact, 100 in. to 104 in,; intermediate, 105 in. to 109 in.; full size, 110-114
in.; and largest size greater than 115 in. 4 Gross vehicle weight greater than 26,000 lbs. 5 Tractor-trailer combination.
Source: Except as noted, National Safety Council, Chicago, IL, expenses; Accident Facts, insurance annual. administrative (Copyright.)
costs;
and
property
damage.
Source: U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Fatal Accident Reporting System, annual.
No. 1019. DEATHS FROM MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS, BY STATE: 1970 TO 1986
No. 1021. HIGHWAY MILEAGE, VEHICLE MILES OF TRAVEL, ACCIDENTS, AND FATALITIES, 1975 TO
1986, AND BY TYPE OF HIGHWAY SYSTEM, 1986
[Data based tional curred. differ Classification Includes from table deaths of 1018 Diseases, of nonresidents because for data earlier of are years U.S. based Beginning classified on date 1980, of death, deaths not classified date of according accident. to Data the reflect ninth revision State where of the death Interna- OC-
FATAL
NONFATAL
on Vital Registration System, see Appendix III. For composition according of to regions, the revision see fig. in use I, inside at the front time; cover] see
Vehi-
High-
Daily
text,
section
2.
Data
ACCIDENTS
INJURY
FATALITIES²
cle
vehi-
way
ACCIDENTS
miles
cle
REGION,
YEAR AND TYPE OF SYSTEM
mile-
of
miles
DIVISION,
1970
1972
1980
DIVISION
age
Num-
1975
1985
travel
per-
Num-
Num-
AND STATE
1986
1970
(1,000)
Rate
ber
Rate
Rate
AND
1972
1975
1980
ber
STATE
1986
(bil.)
mile
ber
1985
(1,000)
U.S
54,845
56,528
46,032
53,476
46,159
48,140
S.A
9,796
1975, total
3,838
1,328
948
39,993
3.01
1,861
140
45,500
3.43
Region:
10,600
DE
8,358
9,767
9,389
9,986
1980, total
3,857
1,527
1,082
45,284
2.96
2,008
131
51,091
3.35
158
130
Northeast
129
MD
164
8,850
119
809
160
1982, total
3,866
1,595
1,130
39,092
2.45
1,966
123
43,945
2.76
8,992
7,431
Midwest
8,255
6,797
852
14,629
7,090
DC
686
822
766
140
796
1983, total
3,880
1,653
1,167
37,976
2.30
2,005
121
42,589
2.58
14,670
11,293
South
12,244
9,760
100
21,964
10,115
VA
91
79
96
20,792
18,029
1,251
86
1984, total
1,256
3,892
1,720
1,208
39,631
2.30
2,137
124
44,257
2.57
West
21,014
19,250
WV
1,069
20,189
1,111
10,574
10,902
561
1,021
1,141
1985, total
3,862
1,774
1,259
39,168
2.21
2,219
125
43,795
2.47
9,279
578
11,963
499
N.E
2,095
10,352
NC
583
2,180
10,746
461
1,801
470
1,953
2,026
2,246
288
1,873
SC
1,560
1,588
1,880
1,070
1,553
1,727
ME
1,148
1986, total
3,880
1,838
1,298
41,062
2.23
2,254
123
46,056
2.51
252
837
895
NH
235
264
224
218
GA
943
182
1,825
1,077
172
1,940
155
FL
1,420
VT
192
1,558
198
2,181
1,462
1,604
Urban
702
1,088
4,250
18,740
1.72
1,577
145
20,307
1.87
116
181
2,570
126
2,067
124
2,967
131
2,968
2,925
Rural
3,178
677
90
25,749
117
E.S.C
4,850
750
647
22,322
2.98
3.43
MA
918
105
4,972
1,042
895
KY
3,881
3,995
RI
933
773
1,081
3,664
4,166
761
1,114
143
TN
885
144
865
749
1,525
829
Interstate
44
391
24,411
3,716
.95
144
37
4,251
1.09
CT
140
142
124
155
1,526
448
AL
1,280
1,280
444
M.A
1,297
1,219
1,372
Urban
404
11
231
1,356
57,266
1,908
.83
107
46
2,139
.93
584
449
448
MS
1,087
6,755
1,054
1,005
1,180
Rural
33
160
13,327
1,808
1.13
37
23
2,112
1.32
6,812
NY
5,478
6,009
3,117
4,924
947
3,140
5,210
976
W.S.C
629
796
691
785
2,277
2,717
6,146
1,289
2,121
6,392
NJ
2,183
AR
5,790
7,252
1,099
595
6,197
6,037
Noninterstate
1,352
750
3,836
1,447
1,034
37,346
2,58
2,110
146
41,805
2.89
577
PA
1,130
2,349
986
1,059
LA
607
580
624
2,320
1,194
Urban
2,102
1,136
691
857
3,401
16,832
1.96
1,470
172
18,168
2.12
E.N.C
2,162
1,817
1,968
OK
993
1,261
787
1,011
987
Rural.
792
3,145
590
514
20,514
3.47
640
108
23,637
4.00
9,623
9,514
OH
7,361
8,000
6,602
6,754
TX
748
1,006
3,570
781
725
2,488
2,336
IN
1,652
3,714
1,976
1,609
Mt
3,472
1,581
4,378
3,549
3,825
3,701
3,764
Federal-aid highway system, total
847
1,483
4,795
30,757
2.07
1,498
101
34,794
2.35
1,587
1,578
1,139
3,206
4,071
3,409
3,589
Urban
1.80
IL
1,213
1,045
1,077
MT
340
408
190
880
12,678
14,565
1.66
1,102
125
15,858
2,267
2,216
1,816
1,633
ID
294
339
MI
1,985
1,594
320
233
240
324
Rural
657
603
2,514
16,192
2.69
396
66
18,936
3.14
2,172
2,236
291
1,811
345
1,817
268
273
1,605
WY
1,666
210
196
Interstate
210
44
391
24,411
3,716
.95
144
37
4,251
1.09
WI
1,109
1,148
CO
246
943
145
163
W.N.C
1,009
777
5,006
769
697
746
621
783
Other primary arterial
259
537
5,677
12,584
2.34
512
95
14,579
2.71
5,156
3,932
4,244
NM
568
628
657
588
556
Urban
3,158
33
251
20,891
4,014
1.60
317
126
4,408
1.75
MN
1,028
1,052
3,361
798
AZ
617
561
539
IA
900
782
858
Rural
713
226
286
3,461
8,570
3.00
195
68
10,171
3,56
657
946
904
608
714
UT
983
354
942
1,073
662
354
285
Urban (arterial and collector)
146
398
7,450
8,643
2.18
677
170
9,311
2.34
MO
478
1,479
1,500
446
NV
370
335
370
1,105
278
290
236
Secondary (collector)
398
157
1,083
5,814
3.69
165
105
6,653
4.23
ND
1,239
194
1,005
1,205
Pac
388
7,025
297
274
206
183
SD
184
117
7,138
240
120
WA
6,073
7,892
902
6,943
7,157
312
216
836
804
1,048
763
Non-Federal-aid highway system, total
3,032
355
321
10,305
2.90
756
213
11,262
3.17
NE
238
435
142
OR
786
504
152
739
774
582
Urban
511
208
1,116
4,175
2.01
476
229
2.14
KS
406
259
CA
698
4,449
385
684
311
5,114
605
649
531
5,300
4,414
5,860
Rural
AK
5,294
5,523
2,521
147.
160
6,130
4.16
280
190
6,813
4.63
678
615
500
519
107
64
120
Collector
349
70
553
2,061
2.92
101
143
2,301
3.26
HI
91
124
98
163
164
153
195
Urban
19
19
2,799
309
1.57
20
102
332
1.68
134
124
Rural
330
51
422
1,752
3.45
81
159
1,969
3.88
1 Represents peak year for deaths from motor vehicle accidents.
Source: U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics of the United States, annual; and unpublished data.
Local
2,672
257
263
7,742
3.01
634
247
8,391
3.27
Urban
483
165
932
3,466
2.11
437
266
3,680
2.24
Rural
2,189
92
116
4,276
4.63
197
214
4,711
5.10
1 Rate per 100 million vehicle miles of travel.
2 Represents fatalities occurring within 30 days of accident. Excludes nontraffic
600
Transportation-Land
Motor Vehicle Travel-Fuel Consumption-Gasoline Supply
601
No. 1022. MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY DEFECT RECALLS, BY DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN MANUFACTURERS:
No. 1025. MOTOR VEHICLE TRAVEL, BY TYPE OF VEHICLE; AND SPEED: 1970 TO 1986
1975 TO 1987
in billions of vehicle-miles, except as Indicated. Travel estimates based on automatic traffic recorder data. Oct. Speed 1975 trend all
[Travel data 1970-1975 collected by several State highway agencies, normally during summer months; beginning Monitoring
[Covers manufacturers reporting to U.S. National Highway Traffic Administration under section 151 of National Traffic and Motor
States for have monitored were speeds at locations on several highway systems as part of 55 mile per hour Speed Limit
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended]
Program. See also Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to 1970, series Q 199-207]
MANUFACTURER
Unit
1975
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
AVG. MILES PER VEHICLE
MOTOR VEHICLE SPEED 2
VEHICLE-MILES OF TRAVEL (bil.)
(1,000)
Motor vehicles:
Total recall
Passenger
Avg.
Percent of vehicles
YEAR
vehicles
Vehicles
speed
exceeding-
campaigns 1
Number
217
271
275
167
156
135
140
164
173
174
199
Domestic
Number
190
199
218
129
128
107
110
127
137
139
150
Total
Cars
1
Buses
Trucks
Trucks
recorded
(miles
(1,000)
per
55
60
65
Foreign
Number
27
72
57
38
28
28
30
37
36
35
49
Cars
Buses
hour)
m.p.h.
m.p.h.
m.p.h.
Total vehicles
recalled
1,000
2,109
9,063
8,919
4,863
9,405
1,914
6,114
7,220
5,629
2,880
9,091
Domestic
6,997
7,379
3,090
9.9
200
63.8
87
69
44
1,000
1,829
7,921
3,939
1,401
6,283
4,995
1,731
7,297
1970
1,110
920
4.5
186
10.0
12.0
Vehicles recalled by
1,013
5.7
262
9.2
12.7
10.6
203
57.6
65
29
9
4 leading auto
1974
1,281
1,328
1,040
6.1
282
9.3
13.1
10.9
102
57.6
68
27
7
manufacturers
1,000
1,602
7,670
6,989
3,730
7,247
1,324
3,021
6,148
4,811
1975
11.2
515
58.2
69
32
10
1,382
6,944
1,402
1,084
6.3
312
9.4
13.1
Foreign
1,000
280
1,141
1,922
924
2,026
513
3,024
937
634
1,149
1,793
1976
1,467
1,116
5.8
346
9.5
11.9
11.8
500
58.8
74
35
10
Motor vehicle tires:
1977
5.9
385
9.5
11.6
12.3
468
58.8
74
36
10
1978
1,545
1,154
Recall campaigns 1
Number
31
17
21
16
12.2
506
58.3
72
32
9
22
42
24
25
19
14
16
1979
1,529
1,122
5.9
401
9.1
11.3
Tires recalled
1,000
72
14,686
235
7,070
125
131
95
81
28
164
43
1,527
1,122
6.1
399
8.8
11.5
11.9
667
57.5
66
25
7
1980
1,142
6.2
405
8.9
11.5
11.7
3,048
57.9
68
30
9
1981
1,553
9.1
10.4
11.7
4,895
59.0
73
40
14
1A recall campaign is the notification to the Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Transportation and to owners, purchasers, and
1,595
1,176
5.8
413
1982
dealers, of a motor vehicle safety defect.
1,653
1,207
5.2
441
9.1
8.9
12.0
7,856
59.1
74
41
15
1983
1,720
1,234
4.6
482
9.2
8.0
12.8
8,067
59.3
75
43
16
Source: U.S. National. Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Motor Vehicles Defect Recall Campaigns, annual.
1984
1,774
4.9
500
9.2
8.2
12.7
8,449
59.5
75
44
17
1985
1,270
1,838
1,313
5.1
520
9.3
8.6
13.0
8,549
59.7
76
46
18
No. 1023. LICENSED DRIVERS AND ESTIMATED ARRESTS FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE, BY
1986
AGE: 1975 AND 1986
: Includes recorded motorcycles. on level, straight sections of rural interstate highways during off-peak 3 hours; beginning 1980, based violations. on
2 Represents speed on rural interstate highways. For 1970-1979, based on free flow speed all of
[Total drivers and arrests In thousands. Represents licensed drivers and arrests for those 16 years old and over]
vehicles vehicles on rural interstate highways. Beginning 1976, for year ending Sept. 30. Citations issued for 55 mph
1975
1986
No. 1026. DOMESTIC MOTOR FUEL CONSUMPTION, BY TYPE OF VEHICLE: 1970 TO 1986
Percent
AGE
Arrests per
Arrests per
change in
Drivers
Arrests
100,000
Drivers
Arrests
100,000
rate,
[Comprises purchases for military use. Minus sign (-) indicates decrease. See also Historical Statistics, Colonial Times
all fuels (gas, diesel, or other fuels) used for propulsion of vehicles under State motor fuels laws. to Excludes 1970, series Federal Q
drivers
1975-86
drivers
156-162]
AVERAGE FUEL CONSUMPTION PER
AVERAGE MILEAGE
Total
129,671
946
729
158,494
1,792
1,130
55
FUEL CONSUMPTION
Percent distribution
VEHICLE (gal.)
PER GALLON
100.0
100.0
(x)
100.0
100.0
(x)
(x)
16-17 years old
3.7
1.8
352
2.6
1.5
647
84
18-24 years old
18.9
25.3
979
15.7
28.8
2,075
112
All
12.9
15.0
847
22.0
YEAR
Avg.
25-29 years old
13.0
125
vehi-
Cars 2
Buses 3
Trucks 4
All
All
1,909
annual
1,471
(bil.
(bil.
(bil.
vehi-
Cars 2
Buses 3
Trucks
vehi-
Cars
2
Buses 3
Trucks 4
30-34 years old
10.3
12.2
867
12.2
15.8
70
cles
percent
35-39 years old
8.5
10.6
909
10,9
11.1
1,158
27
(bil.
gal.)
gal.)
gal.)
cles
cles
40-44 years old
7.9
9.8
904
8.5
7.2
968
7
change
gat.)
45-49 years old
8.0
8.9
812
6.9
4.9
805
-1
50-54 years old
7.9
7.3
675
6.3
3.4
609
-10
5.4
67.8
.8
23.6
830
760
2,172
1,257
12.02
13.52
5.54
7.85
55-59 years old
6.8
4.6
490
6.3
2.4
434
-11
1970
92.3
1973
6.2
78.7
1.0
30.7
850
771
2,326
1,321
11.89
13.30
5.86
8.34
60-64 years old
5.7
2.7
347
5.9
1.6
299
-14
110.5
12.05
13.42
5.89
8.70
1974
106.3
-3.8
75.1
1.0
30.1
788
716
2,159
1,224
65 years old and over
9.5
1.8
141
11.9
1.2
118
-16
1975
109.0
2.5
76.4
1.1
31.4
790
716
2,279
1,217
12.18
13.52
5.75
8.99
1976
115.7
6.2
79.7
1.0
34.8
806
723
2,188
1,250
12.12
13.53
5.98
8.95
716
1,984
1,301
12.26
13.80
5.98
9.06
X Not applicable.
1977
119.6
3.4
80.4
1.0
38.1
814
1978
125.1
4.5
81.7
1.0
42.3
816
701
1,957
1,349
12.35
14.04
5.95
9.11
Source: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drunk Driving, Special Report.
1979
122.1
-2.4
77.3
1.0
43.6
776
653
1,891
1,326
12.52
14.41
5.97
9.19
1980
115.0
-5.9
71.9
1.0
41.9
712
591
1,926
1,243
13.29
15.46
5.95
9.54
1.1
42.2
697
576
1,938
1,219
13.57
15.94
5.92
9.59
No. 1024. LICENSED DRIVERS, FATAL MOTOR-VEHICLE ACCIDENTS, AND ALCOHOL INVOLVEMENT,
1981
114.5
-.4
71.0
1982
113.4
-.9
70.1
1.0
42.1
686
566
1,756
1,191
14.07
16.65
5.93
9.80
BY AGE OF DRIVER: 1987
2.4
69.9
.9
45.1
686
553
1,507
1,229
14.24
17.14
5.92
9.77
1983
116.1
1984
118.7
2.3
68.7
.8
49.0
691
536
1,359
1,308
14.49
17.83
5.85
9.83
2.2
69.3
.8
51.0
685
525
1,407
1,302
14.62
18.20
5.84
9.79
1985
121.3
AGE OF DRIVER
1986
125.2
3.2
71.2
is
52.9
690
525
1,500
1,318
14.68
18.32
5.71
9.83
65
ITEM
Unit
Total
16-17
18-21
22-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
years
1 From prior year shown. For 1970, change from 1965. 2 Includes taxicabs. 3 Includes school buses.
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
and
4 Includes combinations.
over
Source of tables 1025 and 1026: U.S. Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics Summary to 1985. and Highway
Statistics, annual.
Licensed drivers (estimated) 1
1,000
161,975
4,202
12,400
11,583
40,738
32,369
21,367
19,339
19,880
Percent distribution
Percent
100.0
2.6
7.7
7,2
25.2
20.0
13.2
11.9
12.3
No. 1027. DOMESTIC MOTOR GASOLINE SUPPLY: 1974 TO 1987
Licensed drivers involved in fatal
accidents
Number
261,434
3,326
8,874
6,513
16,554
9,774
5,472
4,221
5,078
Percent distribution
Percent
2100.0
5.4
14.4
10.6
26.9
15.9
8.9
6.9
8.3
[In 1,000 barrels per day, except as noted]
Drinking drivers involved in fatal
accidents
Number
20,384
798
3,534
2,966
6,889
3,067
1,225
511
SUPPLY 1
767
SUPPLY 1
Percent distribution
Percent
2100.0
3.9
17.3
14.6
33.8
15.0
6.0
3.8
2.5
Net
Stocks
Net
Stocks
Unleaded
Pro-
Unleaded
Pro-
im-
im-
(mil.
YEAR
(mil.
YEAR
duction
1 Source: U.S. Federal Highway Administration, Selected Highway Statistics and Charts, annual.
2 Includes ages unknown and
duction
bbls.)
Total
ports
bbls.)
Total
ports
Per-
less than 16 years old.
Per-
Total
Total
cent
cent
Source: Except as noted, U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, unpublished data from the Fatal Accident
Reporting System.
1974, avg
6,537
(NA)
(NA)
6,360
202
1981, avg
6,588
3,264
49.5
6,405
155
253
218
(NA)
235
1982, avg
6,539
3,409
52.1
6,338
177
235
1975, avg
6,675
(NA)
6,520
182
231
1983, avg
6,622
3,647
55.1
6,340
237
222
1976, avg
6,978
1,508
21.6
6,841
128
243
215
258
1984, avg
6,693
3,987
59.6
6,453
293
1977, avg
7,177
1,976
27.5
7,033
1985, avg
6,831
4,406
64.5
6,419
371
223
1978, avg
7,412
2,521
34.0
7,169
189
238
1986, avg
7,034
4,854
69.0
6,752
293
233
1979, avg
7,034
2,798
39.8
6,852
181
237
1987, avg
7,206
5,470
75.9
6,841
349
226
1980, avg
6,579
3,067
46.6
6,506
139
261
602
Transportation-Land
Cost of Owning Automobile-Passenger Transit Industry
603
No. 1028. HOUSEHOLD VEHICLES: ANNUAL MILEAGE, FUEL CONSUMPTION, AND FUEL EXPENDITURES:
No. 1030. COST OF OWNING AND OPERATING AN AUTOMOBILE: 1975 TO 1987
1985
[See headnote, table 1029]
Unit
1975
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
ITEM
NUMBER OF-
Cents
18.31
20.19
19.57
23.97
27.95
31.92
32.35
33.42
31.32
27.20
29.59
32.64
MILES DRIVEN
GALLONS
EXPENDITURES
Cost per mile 1
CONSUMED
Cost per 10,000
2,959
Dollars
1,831
2,019
1,957
2,397
2,795
3,192
3,235
3,342
3,132
2,720
3,264
HOUSEHOLD AND VEHICLE
miles
CHARACTERISTICS
Vehicles
Variable cost
6,45
5,80
5.65
5.86
7.62
8.17
8.37
8.36
7.86
8.04
6.52
7.20
House-
Cents/mile.
3.89
4.11
5.86
6.27
6.74
6.64
6.19
6.16
4.48
4.80
Vehicles
per
Total
Per-
Gas and oil
Cents/mile.
4.82
4.11
holds
Total
Per-
(millions)
Total
house-
(billion)
Per-
.97
1.03
1.10
1.10
1.12
1.18
1.00
1.04
1.04
1,23
1.37
1.60
(millions)
cent
(billion)
cent
Maintenance
Cents/mile
(bil. dol.)
.72
.63
.68
.63
.65
.67
.80
hold
cent
Cents/mile
.66
.66
.66
.65
.64
Tires
Total
Fixed cost
Dollars
1,186
1,439
1,392
1,811
2,033
2,375
2,398
2,506
2,346
2,441
2,596
2,782
77.7
137.3
1.8
1,353
100.0
83.9
100.0
99.1
100.0
Insurance:
70
76
53
80
80
92
86
87
Metropolitan status:
Fire and theft 2
Dollars
53
80
57
74
Metropolitan
Collision 3
Dollars
141
188
138
168
172
180
153
201
200
198
191
196
59.0
103.0
Central city
1.7
1,029
76.1
25.5
62.6
41.0
74.6
73.8
74.5
Property damage 4
254
243
222
225
213
232
252
Outside central city
1.6
383
28.3
33.6
23.9
28.5
62.0
28.3
646
28.5
Dollars
189
250
229
241
248
Nonmetropolitan
1.8
and liability
47.8
18.7
38.7
46.1
34.3
45.6
1.8
324
23.9
46.0
License and
74
74
90
82
88
54
102
106
115
130
140
Origin of householder: White
68.1
21.3
122.3
25.4
25.2
25.5
registration
Dollars
30
Black
1.8
1,204
89.0
74.3
87.7
773
847
894
942
1,038
1,287
1,356
1,343
1,207
1,253
1,320
1,506
7.2
88.5
11.0
88.5
Depreciation
Dollars
423
490
539
558
528
570
637
601
Hispanic descent: Yes
1.5
112
8.3
3.5
7.4
6.0
8.9
8.8
8.8
Finance charge
Dollars
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
296
No
1.7
58
4.3
74.3
3.6
131.3
4.3
1.8
4.3
1,295
4.3
95.7
80.3
95.7
94.8
95.7
Average fixed cost per
5.57
6.51
6.57
6.87
6.43
6,69
7.11
7.62
Household size: 1 person
Dollars
3.25
3.94
3.81
4.96
15.9
19.0
2 persons
1.2
162
12.0
24.5
10.0
day
41.3
11.9
1.7
11.8
386
12.0
3 persons
28.6
23.5
28.0
data.
2
$50
deductible
1975
and
1977,
and
$100
14.6
29.0
27.8
28.0
1
4 persons
2.0
293
21.7
Beginning
12.9
18.2
26.6
21.7
21.5
NA Not available.
$100 1985, deductible not comparable 1975 and to previous 1977, and $250 deductible 1978 through 1987.
4
Coverage:
5 or more persons
2.1
281
21.7
20.8
9.9
17.8
21.3
2.2
21.0
deductible 1978 through 1987.
3
21.3
230
21.2
Family income 1985:
17.0
14.4
17.1
16.9
17.1
Less than $5,000
$100,000/$300,000. Source: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., Detroit, MI, Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures, annual.
3.7
$5,000-$9,999
4.4
1.2
34
2.5
9.7
2.4
12.5
2.8
1.3
2.8
2.8
$10,000-$14,999
98
7.2
10.7
6.7
15.8
8.0
1.5
7.8
7.9
149
No. 1031. PASSENGER TRANSIT INDUSTRY-SUMMARY: 1970 TO 1987
$15,000-$19,999
11.0
9.7
9.8
15.8
11.7
11.5
$20,000-$24,999
1.6
141
11.6
10.4
9.5
9.0
16,9
10.7
10.5
$25,000-$34,999
1.8
10.6
165
12.2
10.4
[Includes school buses. Covers (a) local motorbus systems, (b) light rail systems, (c) data
Puerto Rico. Comprises all privately and publicly owned organized local passenger transportation heavy agencies rail systems, except (d)
14.7
28.2
12.3
12.2
1.9
12.3
$35,000 or more
289
21.4
19.8
17.8
43.7
21.3
2.2
21.0
21.2
477
35.2
taxicabs coach and sightseeing systems, and and (e) automated guideway, inclined plane, cable car, and aerial tramway systems. vanpools Beginning and 1984, demand
27.9
33.2
33.3
33.6
trolley railroads. urban ferry boats, rural fixed-route non-intercity motorbus systems, received
Number of drivers (fall 1984): 1
24.7
2
29.6
1.2
also include suburban data non-continuous between 1983 and 1984. Based on financial and statistical reports See also
257
19.0
39.1
16.1
73.1
19.1
1.9
19.0
730
19.2
3 or more
53.9
12.5
45.3
32.9
54.0
response by American systems. Public Thus, Transit all Association are from transit systems representing more than 85 percent of the industry.
Type of fuel: Leaded
2.6
53.5
54.0
352
26.0
(x)
21.7
42.0
25.9
Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to 1970, series Q 238-250]
25.7
Unleaded
(x)
25.9
332
24.5
(x)
24.5
92.8
29.2
27.3
Type of vehicle: Automobile
(x)
27.6
1986,
1987,
990
73.2
(x)
57.8
106.6
68.9
69.9
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
Jeep-like vehicle
(x)
70.6
1,059
61.7
73.4
ITEM
Unit
1970
1975
1980
prel.
prel.
78.3
Van
(x)
3.7
73.5
(x)
74.1
39
2.9
(x)
3.1
3.6
Pickup truck
4.7
3.6
(x)
3.6
49
3.6
(x)
3.7
21.2
4.4
4.3
1,036
1,036
4,938
4,973
5,019
5,048
4.4
(x)
199
14.7
14.7
17.5
Operating systems
Number
1,079
947
1,044
1,035
16.9
17.1
Number
1,075
941
1,040
1,030
1,031
1,031
2,604
2,632
2,654
2,672
Number of cylinders: 4
(x)
39,9
Motorbus systems 1
333
576
578
581
599
(NA)
1,435
(NA)
(NA)
144
6
(x)
445
32.9
(x)
19.6
35.6
23.4
23.5
23.7
Publicly owned systems 1
Number
8
(x)
362
26.8
(x)
22.7
61.0
27.0
26.9
27.2
Number
61,428
62,261
71,018
72,098
73,838
73,813
95,603
88,691
91,218
91,115
(x)
536
Passenger vehicles owned 2
62,114
62,093
63,497
57,285
58,000
57,687
Air conditioning: Yes
39.6
41.1
(x)
86.3
49.0
48.1
48.5
(x)
885
Motorbuses
2
Number
49,700
50,811
59,411
60,393
No
65.4
55.2
65.8
65.6
66.2
Number
9,286
9,556
9,641
9,749
9,815
9,891
9,083
9,326
10,386
10,168
Type of transmission:
(x)
51.0
(x)
468
Heavy rail 2
1,829
1,527
1,623
1,519
1,581
34.6
28.7
34.2
33.5
33.8
Other electric 23
Number
2,442
1,894
1,966
1,956
1,909
Automatic
(x)
954
Suburban rail
Number
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
4,075
4,035
4,440
4,656
(x)
Manual
99.0
70.5
63.2
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
17,421
16,422
16,873
17,023
(x)
38.3
75.4
74.7
75.4
Vehicle used on the job: Yes
(x)
29.5
24.6
All other
Number
399
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
No
(x)
20.7
17.3
24.4
24.6
(x)
203
15.0
12.6
15.0
MII. dol
(NA)
3,451
6,510
7,366
8,044
8,526
11,623
12,195
13,147
13,968
(x)
120.0
15.0
15.2
Total revenue
4,575
5,011
5,156
(x)
1,150
85.0
71.3
85.0
84.0
84.8
Passenger revenue
Mil. dol
1,639
1,861
2,557
2,701
3,077
3,172
4,448
68
183
248
344
380
333
780
702
743
771
X Not applicable.
Other operating revenue 4
Mil. dol
(NA)
1,408
3,705
4,321
4,587
5,023
6,395
6,918
7,393
8,041
Operating assistance
Mil. dol
Mil. dol
(NA)
302
1,094
1,095
1,005
827
996
940
912
894
Federal
(NA)
1,106
2,611
3,226
3,582
4,195
5,399
5,978
6,481
7,147
No. 1029. HOUSEHOLD MOTOR VEHICLE TRANSPORTATION, BY VEHICLE MODEL YEAR: 1985
State and local
Mil. dol
Mil. dol
1,996
3,752
6,711
7,623
8,314
8,736
12,957
14,077
15,080
15,997
Total expense
12,381
13,353
13,967
[Preliminary. large trucks, Household and vehicles include all motorized vehicles used for personal transportation, excluding
Mil. dol
(NA)
3,537
6,246
7,024
7,553
7,956
11,574
the Residential buses. The reporting unit for 1985 is all households which owned a vehicle at any time during motorcycles, 1985. Based mopeds, on
Operating expense
Mil. dol
(NA)
1,877
3,248
3,596
3,882
3,931
5,142
5,655
6,106
6,019
Transportation Energy Consumption Survey; subject to sampling variability]
Transportation
Mil. dol
(NA)
814
1,774.
1,946
2,168
2,392
3,062
3,672
3,965
4,310
Maintenance
1,503
1,634
3,370
3,054
3,282
3,638
Mil. dol
(NA)
846
1,224
1,482
Administration
Mil. dol
(NA)
215
464
597
761
780
1,383
1,696
1,727
2,030
House-
VEHICLES (millions)
Reconciling expense
MILES PER GALLON
Capital expenditure, Federal
Mil. dol
(NA)
1,287
2,787
2,946
2,544
3,162
2,876
2,510
3,137
2,476
holds
Model year
2,134
2,129
2,117
2,749
2,791
2,890
2,962
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
with
Model year
Vehicle-miles operated
Million
1,884
1,989
2,094
motor
Total
1973
Aver-
Motorbus
Million
1,409
1,526
1,677
1,685
1,669
1,678
1,845
1,863
1,896
1,927
vehicles
1974
1979
1983
1973
1974
1979
1983
423
385
420
429
408
436
451
476
490
407
(mil.)
and
to
to
and
age
and
to
to
and
Heavy rail
Million
40
32
29
31
31
32
33
33
34
earlier
1978
Other electric 3
Million
68
1982
later
1978
1982
later
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
168
183
186
189
earlier
Suburban rail
Million
Million
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
268
261
299
322
Total
All other
77.7
137.3
26.9
43.3
37.8
28.7
16.1
13.4
13.8
17.9
19.3
Passengers carried 5
Million
7,361
6,988
8,249
7,978
7,755
7,903
8,851
8,659
8,801
8,340
Northeast
5,908
5,675
5,748
15.0
24.8
3.0
Million
5,034
5,084
5,837
5,594
5,324
5,422
5,207
Midwest
8.1
7.6
6.1
19.5
17.0
13.6
34.1
14.0
18.8
20.2
Motorbus 5
Million
1,881
1,673
2,108
2,094
2,115
2,167
2,231
2,290
2,333
2,402
6.4
11.4
9.0
Heavy rail 5
329
303
304
300
South
7.0
27.0
15.6
48.5
12.6
13.2
9.2
17.6
19.1
West
15.0
13.8
10.5
15.8
12.9
13.5
Other electric 3 5
Million
446
231
304
290
316
314
16.1
29.8
8.3
17.4
18.9
Million
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
267
275
303
311
8.9
7.3
113
120
5.1
Family income in 1985:
16.5
14.4
15.0
19.2
Suburban rail
18.3
Million
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
116
116
All other
Less than $5,000
3.7
4.4
1.4
Cents
22.4
26.7
31.0
33.9
39.7
40.2
50.3
52.8
56.9
61.8
$5,000-$9,999
1.7
.7
.6
9.7
14.2
Avg. revenue per passenger
270
276
12.5
12.5
13.7
4.3
17.5
15.6
$10,000-$14,999
4.4
2.4
1.4
10.7
14.6
12.7
16.8
19.9
Employees, number (avg.)
138
160
187
192
194
195
263
275
13.3
1,000
15.8
4.4
Mil. dol
2,236
3,281
3,494
3,731
3,921
5,488
5,843
6,228
6,540
$15,000-$19,999
5.8
3.8
1.8
9.7
15.2
1,274
13.4
$20,000-$24,999
15.8
3.5
13.8
17.5
18.9
Payroll, employee
5.7
3.9
2.6
9.5
15.7
16.9
12.9
3.1
13.4
18.1
20.4
$25,000-$34,999
5.5
4.7
3.4
$35,000 or more
14.7
16.0
28.2
13.3
14.0
4.5
17.9
18.9
1 with combined services including motorbuses, heavy rail cars, light urban rail cars, ferry boats, trolley
9.2
8.5
5.9
19.8
16.2
43.7
13.2
14.0
18.2
19.0
NA Not available. Includes systems Beginning 1984, combined services also include suburban rail includes cars, active vehicles
5.7
11.0
13.7
13.1
17.1
13.9
14.3
17.9
19.4
coaches, vanpools, cable cars, and inclined automated plane guideways, cars. and demand response vehicles. 2 Beginning 1984, 4 Includes other
Survey: Source Consumption of tables Patterns 1028 and of 1029: Household U.S. Vehicles, Energy Information 1985. Administration, Residential Transportation Energy Consumption
only.
3 aerial Includes tramways, light rail, trolley coach, cable car, inclined income. plane, aerial 5 Data tramway, for 1970 and and automated 1975 not guideways. comparable with later years.
revenue,
and
auxiliary
operating Source: revenue, American non-operating Public Transit Association, Washington, DC, Transit Fact Book, annual.
44
Population
Household Characteristics
45
No. 55. INTERRACIAL MARRIED COUPLES: 1970 TO 1987
No. 58. HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, SUBFAMILIES, MARRIED COUPLES, AND UNRELATED INDIVIDUALS:
[In thousands. 1970 data as of April; 1980 and 1987 data as of March. 1970, persons 14 years old and over; 1980 and 1987
1960 TO 1988
persons 15 years old and over. 1980 and 1987 based on Current Population Survey; see headnote, table 49]
[In thousands, except as indicated. As of March. Based on Current Population Survey; includes members of Armed Forces living
off post or with their families on post, but excludes all other members of Armed Forces; see text, section 1 and Appendix III. For
ITEM
1970
1980
1987
ITEM
1970
1980
1987
definition of terms, see text, section 1. Minus sign (-) indicates decrease. See also Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to 1970,
series A 288-319]
Total married couples
44,597
49,714
52,286
Other Interracial married couples
245
484
622
Interracial married couples
310
651
799
Husband Black
8
20
33
PERCENT
All Black-White married couples
65
167
177
Wife Black
4
14
8
CHANGE
Husband Black, wife White
41
122
121
Husband White
139
287
358
TYPE OF UNIT
1960
1970
1975
1980
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Wife Black, husband White
24
45
56
Wife White
94
163
223
1970-
1980-
1980
1988
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970, Marital Status, PC(2)-4C; Current Population Reports,
series P-20, No. 424 and earlier reports.
Households
52,799
63,401
71,120
80,776
85,407
86,789
88,458
89,479
91,061
27.4
12.7
Average size
3.33
3.14
2.94
2.76
2.71
2.69
2.67
2.66
2.64
(x)
(x)
No. 56. UNMARRIED COUPLES, BY SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS, 1970 TO 1987, AND BY MARITAL
Family households
44,905
51,456
55,563
59,550
61,997
62,706
63,558
64,491
65,133
15.7
9.4
Married couple
39,254
44,728
46,951
49,112
50,090
50,350
50,933
51,537
51,809
9.8
5.5
STATUS OF PARTNERS, 1987
Male householder
1,228
1,228
1,485
1,733
2,030
2,228
2,414
2,510
2,715
41.1.
56.7
Female householder 1
4,422
5,500
7,127
8,705
9,878
10,129
10,211
10,445
10,608
58.3
21.9
(In thousands. As of March, except 1970, as of April. An "unmarried couple" is two unrelated adults of the opposite sex sharing
the same household. See headnote, table 58]
Nonfamily households
7,895
11,945
15,557
21,226
23,410
24,082
24,900
24,988
25,929
77.7
22.2
Male householder
2,716
4,063
5,912
8,807
9,752
10,114
10,648
10,652
11,305
116.8
28.4
Female householder
5,179
7,882
9,645
12,419
13,658
13,968
14,252
14,336
14,623
57.6
17.7
MARITAL STATUS OF FEMALE
One person
6,896
10,851
13,939
18,296
19,954
20,602
21,178
21,128
21,884
68.6
19.6
Mar-
PRESENCE OF CHILDREN AND
ried,
Families
45,111
1970
1980
1985
1987
Total
Never
51,586
55,712
59,550
61,997
62,706
63,558
64,491
65,133
15.4
9.4
MARITAL STATUS OF MALE
AGE OF HOUSEHOLDER
Di-
Wid-
hus-
Average size
3.67
3.58
3.42
3.29
3.24
3.23
3.21
3.19
3.17
(x)
(x)
mar-
vorced
owed
band
Married couple
39,329
44,755
ried
46,971
49,112
50,090
50,350
50,933
51,537
51,809
9.7
5.5
ab-
Male householder 1
1,275
1,239
1,499
1,733
2,030
2,228
2,414
2,510
2,715
39.9
56.7
sent
Female householder
1
4,507
5,591
7,242
8,705
9,878
10,129
10,211
10,445
10,608
55.7
21.9
Unrelated subfamilies
207
130
149
360
504
526
505
566
537
176.9
49.2
Married couple
75
27
20
20
53
46
45
37
38
(B)
(B)
Unmarried couples
523
1,589
1,983
2,334
Total, 1987
2,334
1,286
731
171
146
Male reference persons 1
47
11
14
36
63
85
63
77
46
(B)
(B)
No children under 15 yr
327
1,159
1,380
1,614
Never married
1,315
950
269
60
37
Female reference persons
1
85
91
115
304
388
395
397
452
452
234.1
48.7
Some children under 15 yr
1 196
431
603
720
Divorced
762
261
389
46
65
Related subfamilies
1,514
1,150
1,349
1,150
2,198
2,228
2,256
2,286
2,396
-
108.3
Under 25 yr. old
55
411
425
524
Widowed
88
11
24
46
7
Married couple
871
617
576
582
722
719
726
712
765
-5.7
31.4
25-44 yr. old
103
837
1,203
1,414
Married, wife absent
169
63
49
20
38
Father-child
1
115
48
69
54
113
116
131
123
152
(B)
(B)
45-64 yr. old
186
221
239
252
Mother-child
1
528
484
705
512
1,363
1,392
1,399
1,451
1,479
5.8
188.9
65 yr. old and over
178
119
116
143
Married couples
40,200
45,373
47,547
49,714
50,864
51,114
51,704
52,286
52,613
9.6
5.8
1 Children in unmarried-couple households are under 14 years old.
With own household
39,254
44,728
46,951
49,112
50,090
50,350
50,933
51,537
51,809
9:8
5.5
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, vol. II, part 4B, and Current Population Reports, series P-20,
Without own household
946
645
596
602
775
764
771
749
803
-6.7
33.4
Percent without
2.4
1.3
1.2
No. 423 and earlier reports.
_1.4
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.4
1.5
(x)
(x)
Unrelated Individuals
11,092
14,988
19,100
26,426
29,497
30,518
31,506
31,914
33,120
76.3
25.3
No. 57. HOUSEHOLDER AND MARITAL STATUS OF POPULATION, 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER: 1987
Nonfamily householders
7,895
11,945
15,557
21,226
23,410
24,082
24,900
24,988
25,929
77.7
22.2
Secondary individuals
3,198
3,043
3,543
5,200
6,087
6,436
6,606
6,926
7,191
70.9
38.3
[In thousands, except percent. As of March. See headnote, table 51]
Male
1,746
1,631
2,087
3,006
3,531
3,743
3,764
3,947
4,081
84.3
35.8
Female
1,451
1,412
1,456
2,194
2,556
2,693
2,842
2,978
3,110
55.4
41.8
Total,
MALE
FEMALE
- Represents zero:
B
Not shown; base less than 75,000.
X Not applicable.
1 No spouse present.
HOUSEHOLDER AND MARITAL
15 yrs.
STATUS
and
20-24
25-44
45-64
65 yr.
20-24
25-44
45-64
65 yr.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, series P-20, No. 432.
Total'
and
Total'
and
over'
years
years
years
years
years
years
over
over
No. 59. HOUSEHOLDS, BY TYPE-PROJECTIONS: 1989 TO 2000
Total persons
186,688
89,368
9,499
37,671
21,428
11,578
97,320
9,859
38,597
23,472
16,397
[In thousands. As of July. Series A reflects the assumption that the recent moderation in marriage and divorce trends will
Householder
89,479
61,735
2,884
28,861
19,304
10,487
27,744
1,915
10,346
6,774
8,511
1,356
3,365
603
continue but that historical changes spanning the last 25 years must be taken into consideration. Series A assumes a
Single
12,071
5,985
1,224
3,514
734
391
6,086
601
Married, spouse present
51,537
48,573
1,523
22,405
16,371
8,197
2,964
239
1,630
817
260
continuation of past trends in householder proportions but changes in recent years are given more weight. Series B reflects
Married, spouse absent
59
815
506
188
2,638
152
1,535
709
227
assumptions intermediate between series A and C, namely changes in marriage and divorce will slow considerably, but will not
4,206
1,569
Widowed
11,291
1,721
41
363
1,317
9,570
5
362
2,385
6,819
cease during the next 15 years. Series C reflects the assumption that the rapid change in marriage and divorce may have come
Divorced
10,374
3,887
77
2,087
1,331
393
6,487
164
3,455
2,261
603
to an end, and householder proportions will remain constant for the next 15 years]
Not householder
97,209
27,634
6,615
8,809
2,124
1,091
69,575
7,944
28,252
16,698
7,887
Single
37,114
20,801
6,155
5,058
514
135
16,313
4,634
2,622
411
295
FAMILY
NONFAMILY
Married, spouse present
53,035
3,713
277
1,966
960
479
49,322
2,999
24,203
15,566
6,165
Married, spouse absent
1,847
1,021
106
639
183
67
825
156
423
141
62
YEAR AND SERIES
Total
Male
Female
Male
Female
Widowed
1,952
399
59
305
1,553
3
59
239
1,252
Total
Married
11
25
house-
house-
Total
house-
house-
Divorced
3,261
1,699
66
1,121
406
104
1,562
151
944
342
111
couple
holder
holder
holder
holder
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION
1989: Series A
93,622
65,403
51,521
2,616
11,266
28,219
12,403
15,816
Series B
Total persons
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
92,847
66,034
52,554
2,508
10,972
26,814
11,583
15,231
Householder
47.9
69.1
30.4
76.6
90.1
90.6
28.5
19.4
26.8
28.9
51.9
Series C
92,126
66,653
53,562
2,410
10,681
25,473
10,802
14,671
Single
6.5
6.7
12.9
9.3
3.4
3.4
6.3
13.8
8.7
2.6
3.7
1990: Series A
95,243
65,964
51,704
2,723
11,538
29,279
13,008
16,270
Married, spouse present
27.6
54.4
16.0
59.5
76.4
70.8
3.0
2.4
4.2
3.5
1.6
Series B
94,227
66,758
53,012
2,581
11,165
27,469
11,946
15,523
Married, spouse absent
2.3
1.8
.6
2.2
2.4
1.6
2.7
1.5
4.0
3.0
1.4
Series C
93,297
67,535
54,282
2,455
10,798
25,762
10,949
14,814
Widowed
6.0
1.9
-
.1
1.7
11.4
9.8
.1
.9
10.2
41.6
Divorced
5.6
4.3
.8
5.5
6.2
3.4
6.7
1.7
9.0
9.6
3.7
1995: Series A
102,785
68,219
52,178
3,276
12,765
34,565
16,102
18,463
Not householder
52.1
30.9
69.6
23.4
9.9
9.4
71.5
80.6
73.2
71.1
48.1
Series B
100,308
69,787
54,863
2,940
11,984
30,520
13,666
16,854
Single
19.9
23.3
64.8
13.4
2.4
1.2
16.8
47.0
6.8
1.8
1.8
Series C
98,180
71,294
57,410
2,667
11,217
26,887
11,490
15,396
Married, spouse present
28.4
4.2
2.9
5.2
4.5
4.1
50.7
30.4
62.7
66.3
37.6
2000: Series A
Married, spouse absent
1.0
1.1
1.1
1.7
.9
.6
.8
1.6
1.1
.6
.4
110,217
70,024
52,263
3,845
13,916
40,193
19,471
20,722
Widowed
1.0
.4
.1
.1
.3
2.6
1.6
1.0
7.6
Series B
.2
105,933
72,277
56,294
3,282
12,701
33,656
15,452
18,204
Series C
Divorced
1.7
1.9
.7
3.0
1.9
.9
1.6
1.5
2.4
1.5
.7
102,440
74,449
60,080
2,855
11,515
27,991
11,985
16,006
- Represents or rounds to zero.
1 Includes 15-19 year olds.
1 With no spouse present.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, series P-20, No. 423 and earlier reports.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, series P-25, No. 986.
46
Population
Household Characteristics
47
No. 60. WHITE, BLACK AND HISPANIC HOUSEHOLDS, BY TYPE: 1970 TO 1987
-
[As
of
March,
Hispanic
3.42
3.00
3.31
3.77
3.97
3.70
2.98
2.39
2.09
3.11
3.54
3.34
3.63
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
8.08
2.50
4.03
2.96
3.03
2.38
2.53
3.72
3.22
except
as noted. Based on Current Population Survey, except as noted; see headnote, table 58. See also Historical
Statistics, Colonial Times to 1970, series A 292-295 and A 320-334]
CHARACTERISTIC
NUMBER (1,000)
PER HOUSEHOLD
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION
Black
2.91
2.62
2.92
3.20
3.44
3.15
2.56
2.34
1.90
2.79
2.88
3.02
2.61
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
8.19
2.41
3.68
2.68
2.76
2.31
2.44,
3.17
2.70
1970
1975
1980
1985
1987
1970
1975
1980
1985
1987
WHITE
Total
Total
2.66
2.31
2.65
3.08
3.37
3.07
2.37
1.88
1.57
2.62
2.67
2.66
2.70
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.89
1.78
3.27
2.33
2.47
1.56
2.03
2.82
2.39
Family households
56,602
62,945
70,766
75,328
77,284
46,166
100.0
100.0
49,334
100.0
52,243
100.0
54,400
100.0
Married couple
55,676
41,029
81.6
78.4
42,951
73.8
44,751
72.2
45,643
72.0
Male householder¹
46,410
1,038
72.5
1,257
68.2
63.2
Female householder
1,441
60.6
1,816
60.1
2,038
1.8
2.0
Non-
family
house-
holds
100.0
9.0
11.8
9.7
12.9
8.9
2.0
2.4
12.5
17.3
17.8
22.0
24.5
32.4
21.1
84.6
12.3
2.0
8'
.3
(z)
NN
36.6
(x)
7.9
5.6
33.0
22.5
43.9
56.1
Nonfamily households
4,099
5,126
6,052
6,941
2.6
7,227
Male householder.
10,436
7.2
13,612
8.1
18,522
8.6
20,928
9.2
9.4
21,608
3,406
18.4
5,038
21.6
7,499
26.2
27.8
Female householder
8,608
28.0
9,034
7,030
6.0
8,574
8.0
10.6
11,023
11.4
12,320
11.7
12,574
12.4
13.6
BLACK
15.6
16.4
Female
house-
holder
100.0
8.1
12.0
14.0
25.6
15.5
11.5
7.4
6.0
21.7
23.5
36.6
18.2
(x)
43.1
31.2
14.7
6.2
2.7
2.2
20.6
(x)
16.3
17.5
15.3
24.9
36.9
45.5
54.5
Total
Family households
6,223
7,262
8,586
9,480
9,922
4,856
100.0
5,468
100.0
100.0
6,184
100.0
6,778
100.0
Married couple
7,096
78.0
75.3
Male householder 1
3,317
3,343
3,433
72.0
71.5
3,469
71.5
3,742
181
53.3
256
Family households
Married
couple
100.0
3.6
46.0
36.6
37.7
10.0
13.0
23.6
17.4
16.0
11.5
4.9
20.4
24.9
34.9
19.9
(x)
38.1
22.7
23.3
10.3
3.6
1.9
(x)
100.0
(x)
(x)
(x)
(x)
77.7
22.3
3 No spouse present.
Female householder
211
40.0
344
386
2.9
2.9
lonfamily households
1,358
1,915
3.0
2,495
3.6
2,964
3.9
2,967
Male householder
1,367
21.8
1,793
26.4
29.1
2,402
31.3
2,703
29.9
2,826
564
22.0
791
24.7
28.0
Female householder
1,146
28.5
1,244
28.5
1,313
803
9.1
1,002
10.9
1,256
13.3
13.1
1,459
13.2
1,513
12.9
13.8
HISPANIC
14.6
15.4
15.2
Total 2
100.0
4.6
10.4
13.1
24.0
17.1
15.1
10.8
5.1
20.7
24.6
34.9
19.8
(x)
39.6
24.3
21.4
9.5
3.4
2.0
4.5
79.9
3.4
2.9
4.7
7.4
71.8
28.2
Total
amily households
2,303
(NA)
3,684
4,883
5,418
2,004
100.0
(NA)
(NA)
100.0
3,029
100.0
3,939
100.0
Married couple
4,403
1,615
87.0
(NA)
82.2
80.7
81.3
Male householder
(NA)
2,282
2,824
3,118
PERCENT
82
70.1
(NA)
(NA)
61.9
57.8
57.5
No. 62. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS, BY RACE, HISPANIC ORIGIN AND TYPE: 1987
[As of March. Based on Current Population Survey; see headnote, table 58. For composition of regions, see fig. I, Inside front cover]
Hispanic -
100.0
9.7
15,6
14.9
24.0
14.9
10.9
6.5
3.5
138
20.2
6.0
32.9
40.8
15.0
21.6
19.3
20.9
12.8
5.7
4.7
14.4
10.0
6.5
11.5
40.6
Female householder
210
57.5
7.9
59.4
253
307
3.6
(NA)
3.7
4.3
onfamily households
(NA)
610
905
4.7
1,032
299
13.3
(NA)
(NA)
16.6
Male householder
654
18.5
944
19.0
1,015
Female householder
150
13.0
(NA)
365
(NA)
17.8
19.3
509
18.7
521
148
6.5
(NA)
289
(NA)
9.9
10.4
435
9.6
494
6.4
(NA)
7.8
8.9
9.1
NA Not available.
Black
100.0
6.8
11.7
13.9
21.3
16.2
13.1
10.5
6.6
17.8
19.2
53.5
9.5
25.2
24.6
19.7
15.1
8.0
3.8
3.6
22.2
37.7
11.4
10.0
13.8
14.8
45.4
54.6
1 No spouse present.
2 Hispanic persons may be of any race. 1970 data as of April.
sports, Source: series U.S. P-20, Bureau No. of 424 the and Census, earlier Census reports. of Population: 1970, Persons of Spanish Origin, PC(2)-1C; Current Population
Total
100.0
5.8
10.8
12.1
20.9
14.8
14.4
12.6
8.7
21.1
24.6
34.2
20.1
23.6
32.0
18.1
15.6
6.9
2.4
1.4
13.5
57.6
4.7
3.7
12.6
11.6
64.0
36.0
2 Includes male householder, no spouse present.
No. 61. HOUSEHOLDS BY CHARACTERISTIC OF HOUSEHOLDER AND SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD:
8
1970 TO 1987
Non-
family
house-
holds
24,988
2,258
2,957
2,433
3,228
2,213
3,130
4,313
4,456
5,505
6,129
8,084
5,269
21,128
3,084
492
200
66
10
9,138
(x)
1,985
1,390
8,248
5,616
10,972
14,016
S of March. Based on Current Population Survey; see headnote, table 58. See also Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to 1970,
series A 335-349]
Female
house-
holder
10,445
843
1,257
1,460
2,675
1,614
1,196
772
628
2,262
2,458
3,824
1,900
(x)
4,501
3,257
1,532
645
282
228
2,155
(x)
1,831
1,595
2,604
3,854
4,755
5,690
HARACTERISTIC OF HOUSEHOLDER AND
NUMBER (mil.)
SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION
1970
1975
1980
1984
1985
1986
1987
1970
1975
1980
1985
1987
Total
71.1
Married
couple
51,537
1,858
5,170
6,708
12,157
8,947
8,240
5,935
10,504
12,817
17,964
(x)
11,713
12,013
5,330
1,833
1,002
(x)
51,537
(x)
(x)
(x)
(x)
63.4
40,057
11,480
80.8
85.4
86.8
88.5
89.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
a of householder:
100.0
100.0
5-24 years old 2
5-29 years old
4.4
5.8
6.6
5.5
5.4
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS (1,000)
Family households
2,522
10,252
19,645
5.5
6.1
5.2
6.8
0-34 years old
7.8
8.2
9.3
8.1
9.8
6.3
9.6
5.8
9.8
5.6
9.7
9.6
5-44 years old
7.1
11.0
9.3
11.5
2,939
6,695
10.0
11.1
10.4
10.8
10.9
8.8
Total 2
64,491
8,417
15,667
6,097
2,221
10,6
15,476
10,998
9,738
6,937
3,292
13,367
15,844
22,536
12,744
(x)
25,519
13,783
2,165
1,259
2,932
51,537
1,902
3,043
4,758
46,287
18,205
10.0
11.5
12.0
5-54 years old
11.8
11.9
14.0
16.6
17.5
18.0
12.1
12.2
18.7
18.6
12.9
16.7
12.7
17.3
12.5
20.1
12.6
20.9
5-64 years old
13.1
13.2
19.5
18.2
15.7
Hispanic persons may be of any race.
5-74 years old
10.8
11.3
12.5
13.1
14.6
13.1
14,8
12.9
7.7
12.9
8.9
17.1
10.1
15.9
15.5
10.7
15.1
14.4
Hispanic -
5,418
524
845
805
1,300
807
589
354
.192
325
5 years old and over
10.9
11.2
1,097
1,785
2,211
810
1,170
1,048
1,132
695
307
257
781
3,118
543
426
350
625
2,198
3,220
4.8
11.3
12.1
5.4
12.5
6.4
12.5
7.2
12.6
7,3
12.6
7.4
7.7
7.6
7.6
7.9
8.4
8.7
e
rafe
50.0
54.3
58.0
59.4
60.0
61,0
13.4
61.7
16.8
78.9
76.4
22.8
71.8
26.0
69.2
26.8
69.0
27.4
27.7
21.1
23.6
28.2
30.8
to
31.0
Black
9,922
671
56.6
1,159
1,382
2,109
1,604
1,301
1,038
658
1,766
1,905
5,305
945
2,499
2,440
1,951
1,500
797
374
361
2,202
3,742
1,136
990
1,373
1,468
4,505
5,417
*
62.9
70.8
74.4
75.3
76.6
77.3
6.2
7.3
89.5
88.5
8.6
87.6
9.2
86.8
9.5
86.4
9.8
9.9
9.8
10.2
10.6
10.9
anic 3
11.1
(NA)
(NA)
3.7
4.3
4.9
5.2
5.4
(NA)
(NA)
4.6
5.6
6.1
wson
Total
89,479
5,197
9,652
10,850
18,704
13,211
12,868
11,250
7,748
18,873
21,973
30,620
18,014
21,128
28,602
16,159
13,984
6,162
2,176
1,268
12,071
51,537
4,206
3,292
11,291
10,374
57,258
alle
10.9
32,221
13.9
18.3
20.0
20.6
21.2
3.5
21.1
17.1
4.9
7.0
19.6
22.7
7.5
23.7
smale
7,9
23.6
8.3
7.3
8.2
5.5
asons
9.0
11.3
6.9
8.7
12.4
12.7
9.1
12.9
9.2
18.3
12.9
21.8
11.5
25.3
12.7
rsons
26.9
14.0
27,4
14.6
27.7
14.4
Z Less than .05 percent.
10.9
28.6
12.4
28.9
30.6
14.1
31.4
15.1
31.6
rsons
15.5
32.0
16.1
10.0
16.2
17.3
11.1
12.7
17.4
13.6
17.5
17.8
13.6
13.8
18.1
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, series P-20, No. 424 and series P-60, No. 159.
rsons
6.5
14.0
15.8
6.4
15.6
6.1
15.7
6.1
15.7
6.1
15.6
rsons
6.3
3.5
6.2
10.3
3.1
9.0
rsons or more
2.5
7.5
2.4
7.0
2.3
6.9
2.1
3.2
2.2
2.5
5.6
1.8
4.3
1.4
3.1
1.3
2.6
2.4
1.3
1.3
5.0
3.5
2.2
1.5
1.4
\ Not available.
1
Ispanic persons may be of any race. other
Includes
races,
not
shown
separately.
2
1970
and
1975,
persons
14
to
24
years
old.
CHARACTERISTIC
arce: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, series P-20, No. 424 and earlier reports; and unpublished data.
Total
Age of householder:
15-24 years old
25-29 years old
30-34 years old
35-44 years old
45-54 years old
55-64 years old
65-74 years old
75 years old and over
Seven persons or more.
Marital status of householder:
Single (never married)
Married, spouse present
Married, spouse absent
Not applicable.
Region:
Northeast
Midwest
South
Size of household:
One person
Two persons
Three persons
Four persons
Five persons
Six persons
Separated
West
Widowed
Divorced
Tenure:
Owner occupied
Renter occupied
No. 63. HOUSEHOLDS-STATES: 1980 TO 1987
No. 65. LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF PERSONS 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY SELECTED
[1980, as of April 1; thereafter, as of July 1. For definition of household, see text, section 1. For composition of regions, see fig. I,
CHARACTERISTICS: 1987
inside front cover]
[As of March. Based on Current Population Survey which includes members of Armed Forces living off post or with families on
post, but excludes other Armed Forces; see text, section 1 and Appendix III]
NUMBER
PERSONS PER
REGION, DIVISION,
NUMBER
(1,000)
PERSONS PER
HOUSEHOLD
AND STATE
DIVISION AND
(1,000)
HOUSEHOLD
ALL RACES 1
WHITE PERSONS
BLACK PERSONS
STATE
1980
1985
1980
PERCENT LIVING-
PERCENT LIVING-
1987
1987
1980
1985
1987
1980
1987
Percent living-
U.S
80,390
87,489
90,031
2.75
2.64
So. Atl
With
13,160
14,940
15,655
2.59
AGE AND SEX
With
2.73
legion:
DE
Total
With
With
With
other
With
other
207
227
238
2.79
2.64
Alone
Alone
(1,000)
With
other
non-
spouse
rela-
spouse
rela-
Northeast
MD
1,461
17,471
1,587
18,424
1,656
2.82
2.68
Alone
18,768
2.74
2.61
DC
253
248
248
2.40
spouse
rela-
rela-
tives
tives
Midwest
20,859
2.35
21,758
22,153
2.75
South
2.62
VA
1,863
2,076
tives
tives
2,171
2.77
2.63
26,486
29,859
30,899
2.77
2.65
WV
686
West
710
707
2.79
2.63
15,574
17,448
18,211
2.71
2.66
NC
2,043
2,294
2,390
2.78
2.60
Total
186,688
11.3
56.0
27.0
5.7
11.4
58.6
24.4
11.9
36.2
46.1
SC
1,030
! Eng
1,154
1,199
2.93
2.77
GA
15-19 years old
18,186
.5
2.8
93.5
3.2
.5
3.2
92.9
.4
.9
96.4
4,362
4,674
4,791
2.74
2.59
1,872
2,138
2,258
2.84
2.69
13.2
6.3
28.5
51.5
4.5
12.8
73.7
ME
395
432
447
Fl
3,744
4,506
20-24 years old
19,358
6.0
26.0
54.8
2.75
2.57
4,787
2.55
NH
2.46
25-44 years old
76,267
8.5
65.8
18.4
7.3
8.4
68.7
15.7
9.3
44.7
38.5
323
366
391
2.75
17.4
51.6
26.4
VT
2.61
E. So. Cent
45-64 years old
44,901
10.8
75.1
11.4
2.7
10.2
77.8
9.6
178
196
204
2.75
2.58
5,051
5,438
5,580
2.83
2.68
KY
65 years old and over
27,975
30.4
54.0
13.2
2.4
30.4
55.1
12.1
33.0
41.7
22.7
MA
2,033
2,156
2,190
2.72
2.58
1,263
1,344
1,366
2.82
2.65
RI
TN
1,619
1,759
2.77
65-74 years old
17,232
24.1
63.7
10.2
2.0
23.9
65.2
9.0
29.0
47.4
20.7
339
359
369
2.70
1,820
2.61
40.8
39.0
17.1
39.8
31.9
CT
2.57
AL
1,342
1,444
1,483
75 years old and over
10,743
40.5
38.5
17.9
3.1
25.9
1,094
1,165
1,189
2.76
2.62
2.84
2.69
MS
827
890
909
2.97
2.81
Male
89,368
9.2
58.5
25.3
7.0
9.0
60.9
23.4
11.6
40.4
39.3
Id. Atl
13,109
13,749
13,976
2.74
2.61
W. So. Cent
15-19 years old
9,193
.4
1.2
95.6
2.8
.4
1.3
95.3
4
.4
97.4
NY
8,276
6,340
9,481
6,634
9,665
2.80
6,722
2.72
2.70
6.6
18.9
60.1
14.3
6.9
20.8
57.8
4.6
9.3
75.1
NJ
2.58
AR
816
875
895
2,549
2.74
20-24 years old
9,499
2,740
2.61
2,807
2.84
2.68
LA
25-44 years old
37,671
10.3
64.7
15.5
9.5
10.1
67.0
13.8
12.1
47.4
28.3
PA
1,412
1,556
1,566
2.91
2.78
4,220
4,375
4,447
2.74
2.62
OK
1,119
1,252
1,244
2.62
2.55
45-64 years old
21,428
8.9
80.9
6.9
3.4
8.1
82.9
6.1
17.1
61.2
14.3
TX
4,929
65 years old and over
11,578
15.6
74.9
6.9
2.6
14.9
76.0
6.5
22.8
63.9
10.1
No. Cent
5,797
5,960
2.82
2.75
14,654
15,204
15,495
2.78
2.64
65-74 years old
7,608
12.3
79.7
5.6
2.5
11.7
81.1
5.0
20.0
65.9
9.9
OH
3,834
Mt
75 years old and over
3,970
21.8
65.9
9.6
2.7
21.3
66.4
-9.5
28.0
60.1
10.6
3,963
4,035
2.76
2.61
3,986
4,589
IN
4,780
2.79
2.70
1,927
2,011
2,049
2.77
2.63
MT
284
305
303
2.70
IL
2.60
ID
324
354
Female
97,320
13.2
53.7
28.6
4.4
13.6
56.6
25.3
12.2
32.7
51.6
4,045
4,212
4,271
2.76
2.65
357
2.85
2.74
MI
3,195
3,266
WY
3,355
2.84
2.68
166
182
2.72
15-19 years old
8,994
.5
4.5
91.3
3.6
.6
5.1
90.5
.4
1.3
95.6
177
2.78
WI
CO
5.7
45.3
4.5
15.7
72.5
1,652
1,751
1,785
2.77
2.62
1,061
1,222
1,255
2.65
2.56
20-24 years old
9,859
5.5
32,8
49.6
12.0
36.2
NM
441
510
533
25-44 years old
38,597
6.8
66.9
21.2
5.0
6.8
70.5
17.6
7.0
42.4
47.1
2.90
2.77
No. Cent
AZ
957
1,143
1,240
45-64 years old
23,472
12.6
69.8
15.6
2.0
12.2
73.0
12.8
17.6
44.0
35.9
6,205
6,554
6,658
2.68
2.57
2.79
2.68
UT
65 years old and over
16,397
40.9
39.2
17.6
2.3
41.4
40.2
16.1
39.8
26.7
31.1
MN
1,445
449
1,546
505
1,585
518
2.74
3.20
2.60
3.19
IA
NV
304
368
1,053
1,074
397
65-74 years old
9,624
33.5
51.0
13.9
1.6
33.6
52.6
12.2
35.4
34.0
28.6
1,072
2.59
2.68
2.49
2.55
75 years old and over
6,773
51.5
22.4
22.8
3.3
52.1
23.1
21.5
46.7
15.3
34.9
MO
1,793
1,895
1,940
2.67
2.56
Pac
ND
11,587
12,859
13,431
228
2.68
2.65
248
247
2.75
2.62
WA
SD
1,541
1,691
1,761
2.61
2.51
243
260
1 Includes other races not shown separately.
264
2.74
2.59
OR
NE
992
1,044
1,074
2.60
2.48
571
605
608
2.66
2.54
CA
8,630
KS
9,619
10,076
2.68
2.68
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, series P-20, No. 423.
872
926
943
2.62
2.54
AK
131
175
175
2.93
2.89
HI
294
330
345
3.15
3.02
No. 66. LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF YOUNG ADULTS: 1970 TO 1987
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, series P-25, No. 1024.
[1970 and 1980, as of April. Beginning 1985, as of March and based on Current Population Survey, see headnote, table 65]
No. 64. HOUSEHOLDS, 1980 AND 1987, AND PERSONS IN HOUSEHOLDS, 1987, BY TYPE OF
PERSONS 18-24 YEARS OLD
PERSONS 25-34 YEARS OLD
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND SEX
HOUSEHOLD AND PRESENCE OF CHILDREN
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
[As of March. Based on Current Population Survey; see headnote, table 58. Minus sign (-) indicates decrease]
Total (1,000)
22,357
29,122
27,844
27,111
26,462
24,566
36,796
40,857
42,053
42,636
Percent distribution:
HOUSEHOLDS
PERSONS IN
Child of householder 1
47.3
48.4
53.6
52.6
54.3
8.0
8.7
10.6
11.1
11.1
HOUSEHOLDS,
Per-
Family householder or spouse
37.9
28.9
24.3
24.9
23.3
82.8
72.3
67.9
66.6
66.6
Number
Change,
Percent
1987
sons
9.5
8.2
8.5
8.5
4.9
12.0
12.9
13.1
12.6
YPE OF HOUSEHOLD AND PRESENCE OF CHILDREN
(1,000)
Nonfamily householder
4.8
1980-1987
distribution
per
Other
10.0
13.2
13.8
14.0
14.0
4.3
7.0
8.6
9.2
9.7
house-
Num-
Per-
Num-
Percent
1980
hold,
Male (1,000)
10,398
14,278
13,695
13,324
13,029
11,929
18,107
20,184
20,956
21,142
1987
ber
1980
cent
1987
ber
distribu-
1987
Percent distribution:
(1,000)
(1,000)
tion
Child of householder 1
54.3
54.3
59.7
58.8
61.3
9.5
10.5
13.3
14.2
14.5
Family householder or spouse
30.0
21.3
16.4
17.1
15.3
79.3
66.4
60.1
58.2
58.1
Total households
80,776
89,479
16.6
8,703
10.8
100.0
100.0
Nonfamily householder
5.4
11.1
9.6
9.5
9.5
6.5
15.3
16.1
15.7
238,261
100.0
2.66
Other
10.3
13.3
14.3
14.6
14.0
4.8
7.9
10.5
10.9
11.7
nily households
With own children under 18
59,550
64,491
4,941
8.3
73.7
72.1
207,772
87.2
3.22
Without own children under 18
31,022
31,898
876
2.8
38.4
35.6
124,642
52.3
Female (1,000)
11,959
14,844
14,149
13,787
13,433
12,637
18,689
20,673
21,097
21,494
3.91
28,528
larried couple family
32,593
4,065
14.2
35.3
36.4
Percent distribution:
83,130
34.9
2.55
8.0
7.7
49,112
51,537
Child of householder 1
41.3
42.7
47.8
46.7
47.5
6.6
7.0
8.0
With own children under 18
2,425
4.9
60.8
57.6
168,302
70.6
3.27
24,961
24,645
Family householder or spouse
44.7
36.2
32.0
32.4
31.2
86.1
78.1
75.5
74.9
74.9
Without own children under 18
-316
-1.3
30.9
27.5
102,134
42.8
4.14
Nonfamily householder
4.2
8.1
6.9
7.5
7.5
3.5
8.8
9.7
9.6
9.7
lale householder, no spouse present
24,151
26,892
2,741
11.3
29.9
30.1
66,168
27.8
2.46
Other
9.7
13.1
13.3
13.4
13.9
3.9
6.2
6.7
7.5
7.7
With own children under 18
1,733
2,510
777
44.8
2.1
2.8
7,232
3.0
2.88
616
955
Without own children under 18
339
55.0
.8
1.1
2,767
1.2
2.90
1,117
1,554
437
emale householder, no spouse present
39.1
1.4
1.7
1 Includes unmarried college students living in dormitories.
4,465
1.9
2.87
With own children under 18
8,705
10,445
1,740
20.0
10.8
11.7
32,238
13.5
3.09
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 and 1980 Census of Population, PC(2)-4B and Current Population Reports, series P-
5,445
Without own children under 18
6,297
852
15.6
6.7
7.0
19,741
8.3
3.13
20, No. 423 and earlier reports.
3,261
family households
4,147
886
27.2
4.0
4.6
12,497
5.2
3.01
21,226
Living alone
24,988
3,762
17.7
26.3
27.9
30,489
12.8
1.22
18,296
ale householder
21,128
2,832
15.5
22.7
23.6
21,128
8.9
1.00
8,807
Living alone
10,652
1,845
20.9
10.9
11.9
14,303
6.0
1.34
6,966
emale householder
8,246
1,280
18.4
8.6
9.2
8,246
3.5
1.00
Living alone
12,419
14,336
1,917
15.4
15.4
16.0
16,186
6.8
1.13
11,330
12,881
1,551
13.7
14.0
14.4
12,881
5.4
1.00
purce: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, series P-20, No. 424 and earlier reports; and unpublished data.
Order Code IB89010
CRS Issue Brief
Tropical Deforestation:
International Implications
Updated March 22, 1989
by
A
Susan R. Fletcher
Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division
CRS
Congressional Research Service The Library of Congress
CONTENTS
SUMMARY
ISSUE DEFINITION
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Moist Tropical Forests: A Special Concern
Extent of Rain Forests and Rate of Depletion
Causes of Deforestation
Major Impacts of Deforestation
Congressional Responses
Bilateral Aid
Multilateral Aid
Legislative Proposals
International Responses
Tropical Forestry Action Plan
International Tropical Timber Organization
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
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Tropical Deforestation: International Implications
SUMMARY
Tropical forests are being cut down and permanently lost at a rapid pace in
many parts of the world. Most such forests are found in developing countries where
poverty and economic pressures are key factors. Results of deforestation include
significant releases of carbon dioxide, a "greenhouse" gas, with possible consequences
for global climate; rapid loss of thousands of plant and animal species, many of which
may have potential medical or chemical values; flooding of adjacent countries as
watersheds lose their capacity to store water; loss of coastal and riverine fisheries and
resources as soil erosion washes sediment into rivers and the sea; and the failure of
economic development efforts as poor farmers attempt to farm marginal deforested
soils that cannot support sustained agriculture.
Congress has addressed this issue over the past several years primarily in
legislation guiding United States foreign assistance programs. Laws have been passed
guiding the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) and establishing
requirements for environmental protection in U.S. participation in multilateral
development banks (MDBs) such as the World Bank. Congressional concern over
tropical deforestation, especially its contributions to the greenhouse effect and
resulting warming of the climate, grew rapidly during the 100th Congress and has
continued in the 101st. Several comprehensive bills to deal with climate change
contain sections on protection of tropical forests.
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ISSUE DEFINITION
Tropical forests are being cut down at a rapid pace in many areas of the world.
Among the international consequences are: loss of biological diversity and impacts
on global climate change. The major issue for U.S. policymakers is what can be done
to influence other countries to reduce deforestation and to avoid actions that will
contribute to deforestation?
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Protection of tropical forests is largely an international issue for the United
States, since there are almost no tropical forests within U.S. borders. Only in Hawaii
and Puerto Rico are such forests found, and only in Puerto Rico is there direct
Federal jurisdiction.
Moist Tropical Forests: A Special Concern
Loss of forests is a concern around the world. Trees contribute to healthy
functioning of many types of ecosystems and provide important "services" in
agriculture in temperate areas, savannah areas, and at most latitudes. However,
moist tropical forests, known as "rainforests" are of special concern for several
reasons:
1. They occur in extensive systems that stretch uninterruptedly over large
territories; these massive areas of forest are thought to play a key role
in climate patterns, influencing moisture/rainfall cycles far from their
location.
2. They are among the most chemically dynamic of the earth's ecological
types, and their role in atmospheric chemistry, particularly the
greenhouse effect, is thought to be significant.
3. They contain the richest store of biological diversity on earth,
harboring more than half of the species on earth, many of which have
made ingenious adaptations to unique surroundings and thereby offer
clues to possible medical cures and genetic puzzles. Modern medicine
includes many critically important medicines that originated among the
unusually specialized plant and animal species of the rainforest. Many
of these species are found only in very small niches within these
rainforests, and as tracts of any significant size are cut, they can be
permanently lost through extinction.
4. The clearing of tropical moist forests for agricultural development is
frequently uneconomic, since the soils underlying such forests are often
infertile and lateritic (such soils harden and become barren when
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exposed). This unsustainable conversion of the land can have tragic
results for the poverty stricken people who attempt such marginal
agricultural operations.
Extent of Rain Forests and Rate of Depletion
Tropical rainforests are found primarily in a "belt" around the globe on either
side of the equator. In South America there are several countries that contain such
forests, but the vast majority are found in the Amazon Basin, which comprises a
large area of Brazil as well as parts of Ecuador and other countries. In Africa, the
Congo Basin and several West African countries share the bulk of the rainforest. In
Southeast Asia, such forests are found in several large island countries such as
Indonesia and New Guinea, as well as in Malaysia and others. In other countries,
tropical forests were once widespread, but have now been cut back to small
proportions of their previous range. India and countries in Central America, among
others, are in this category.
One reason the Amazon, particularly in Brazil, is of such concern with regard
to deforestation is that it is sustaining the most rapid loss of forest. Brazil contains
by far the largest area under tropical moist forest cover. It contains nearly twice as
much forest area than the second and third largest areas -- Indonesia and Zaire
respectively -- combined.
Precise data on the exact extent of tropical rainforest on the earth do not exist,
nor do data on the rate of deforestation that is occurring. The numbers commonly
used, though often based on the best available information, may differ because of
varying definitions, methods, and purposes. Despite differing estimates, however,
there is wide agreement among scientists and analysts that tropical forests are being
subjected to rapid cutting and burning and are being permanently lost at an
increasingly rapid rate. The following summary uses figures developed from several
sources, primarily the Tropical Forest Action Plan (discussed below).
Of the 4 billion hectares of forest covering the earth (one-third of the earth's
land surface), some 58% is in developing countries, mostly tropical; 42% is in
developed countries and is mainly temperate forests. Thus tropical forests cover an
estimated 2.3 billion hectares. These forests can be divided into two main types:
closed forest in which trees and undergrowth cover the ground, such as in the humid
forests, and open forests with continuous grass cover and intermittent tree cover.
It is estimated that each year some 7.5 million hectares of closed forest and 3.8
million hectares of open forest are cleared in the tropics. The United Nations Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) completed a worldwide forest survey at the end
of the 1970s that established the extent and location of existing forest cover.
However, no systematic plans for a follow-up survey to establish rates of change in
forest cover were made. Most of the data in the FAO survey resulted from reports
by each country on its forest cover, which makes the results uneven and somewhat
unreliable on a worldwide basis.
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Satellite data are now being analyzed on a yearly basis for areas in Brazil, and
baseline studies are underway for areas in Africa, in a small program in the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Results from these analyses indicate
that the forest loss in the Brazilian Amazon from burning and clearing of the land
is much more rapid than had been thought.
Agreement on precise amounts of deforestation in Brazil is difficult to find;
however, there is agreement on the very large magnitude and seriousness of
deforestation there. The Brazilian Space Research Center has been conducting
analyses of remote sensing data over the past several years, as has NASA.
Researchers in these institutions collaborate in efforts to measure deforestation, but
some differences in interpretation do exist between them. This is partly because only
limited field work to provide "ground truth" has been done, and detailed analysis of
Landsat data is only now being completed. Recent information, based on interviews
with officials from Brazil and NASA researchers, is as follows:
Legal Amazonia covers nearly 5 million square kilometers in Brazil. This
area contains both forested and non-forested areas. Within this area,
remote sensing data show some over 204,000 square km. burned in 1987,
according to the Brazilian Space Research Agency. This agency estimates
some 300,000 sq. km. burned in 1988. However, because these figures
reflect burning of both forested and non-forested land, the amount of forest
burned is considerably less. The Brazilian agency estimates that some
80,000 of the 204,000 sq. km. in 1987 was primary forest being cleared for
the first time; NASA researchers estimate it may be 50,000 sq. km of the
total that was first-time burning of a forested area.
Protected areas, designated as parks or reserves, total only some 10,
825,141 hectares (2.47 acres per hectare) or 2.04% of Legal Amazonia.
However, protective status has not been effectively implemented, so even
these figures do not represent areas that are well studied or adequately
protected from human encroachment.
Types and amounts of burning and deforestation vary greatly among the
states of Amazonia. The Brazilian Space Research Agency reports the
following amounts of area burned for the various states in 1987:
Acre
7,274 sq. km.
Amazonas
1,094
Para
19,365
Rondonia
45,452
Mato Grosso
78,718
Goias
38,940
Maranhao
13,765
In the more developed states, more of the burning was on nonforested lands; in
the less developed state of Amazonas, the largest in Brazil, for example, the burning
was probably mostly forest, and was about 1% of the forest area in that state. In
Rondonia, where development is more extensive, of the 45,452 sq. km. burned,
between 6,000 and 8,000 is estimated to be forest. However, this may represent up
to 18% of the forest of that state.
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Rapid deforestation is also occurring in Southeast Asia. In Africa, the humid
closed forests are believed to be under less severe pressure in most countries, but in
some African countries tropical rainforest has already been largely lost.
Causes of Deforestation
The causes of deforestation in the humid tropics are complex, and the amounts
of forest loss attributable to each cause are not precisely known. However, most
observers believe that land clearing for marginal agriculture, often through the use
of slash-and-burn practices, is the most widespread cause of deforestation. In large
areas, conversion to pasture is blamed for tropical deforestation.
Today, in addition to direct clearing for pasture, there is a widespread cycle of
activity found in tropical rainforests that begins with road construction, followed by
an influx of poor peasants who have often been encouraged by government policies
to seek lands for farming. After the trees are felled and when the soils are depleted,
often after only two or three seasons, or when subsistence agriculture fails for other
reasons, peasants move again, and the land is sold or abandoned, then used for cattle
pasture. In this way large areas are converted to grazing lands, despite the
unsuitability of much of the land for grazing and its susceptibility to compaction
under grazing pressure. When large areas are converted from tropical rainforest in
these ways, it may be difficult or impossible for the forest to regenerate; many of the
native species that created the complex cycle of life in the rainforest become extinct.
Considerable attention has been paid to the United States "hamburger
connection" to tropical deforestation. The concern is that beef exported to the U.S.
market is being raised on land cleared from tropical rainforest. Although beef for
export may have been an early incentive for the cattle industry in many countries
in Latin America, currently domestic consumption in those countries accounts for a
large portion of the beef production there. The United States presently imports little
or no beef from countries where tropical deforestation is occurring. The vast
majority of beef imports to the United States are from Australia and New Zealand.
Another cause of forest degradation and loss is commercial logging, often carried
out for export to obtain scarce foreign exchange, under pressure of enormous
international debt loads in many developing countries. The sight of huge logs being
transported along jungle highways is familiar in some severely deforested countries;
however, commercial logging is a minor contributor to the overall problem, compared
to land clearing for other uses. Brazil recently banned the export of round logs in
its new Forest Protection Law; however, some estimate that only 5% of deforestation
of the Amazon is attributable to commercial timber operations.
Major Impacts of Deforestation
Greenhouse effect. Deforestation makes a contribution to the greenhouse
effect and resultant global warming through emissions of carbon dioxide in burning
or decay of forests, and loss of a carbon dioxide "sink" provided by large forests (see
CRS Issue Brief 89005, Global Climate Change). The National Aeronautics and
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Space Administration (NASA) currently is sponsoring research on the chemistry of
carbon dioxide exchanges above the Amazonian forest in an effort to understand the
dynamics of this "sink" and the extent to which forests produce and absorb
greenhouse gasses such as carbon dioxide and nitrogen compounds. The Worldwatch
State of the World 1987 report estimated that the amount of carbon added to the
atmosphere annually from deforestation is between 1.0 and 2.6 billion tons. This is
between 20% and 50% of the amount added by fossil fuels. All but 100 million tons
of this comes from tropical forests, mainly due to burning or decay.
Biological diversity. Tropical moist forests contain the greatest diversity of
life found in any type of ecosystem on earth. They harbor innovative adaptations to
conditions that may prevail in only a small area. Whenever a tract of any significant
size is cut down, species adapted to that specific area can be lost.
These diverse biological components have been the sources of critically important
medicines and chemicals that contribute to daily life in the developed world. Just as
bioengineering is becoming increasingly important, the "raw material" for this science
is being eliminated by the rapid loss of tropical forest habitat. Some half of all
medical prescriptions have their origins in wild organisms. If all pharmaceuticals are
counted, the yearly commercial value of products derived from organisms found in the
wild is over $40 billion.
Scientists are in substantial agreement that the world is experiencing an
unprecedented wave of extinctions as the tropical rainforest habitats are reduced in
size. However, since only a small proportion of the world's species has been
identified or studied, it is not known how many species do indeed exist, or exactly
how many are being lost. Estimates vary widely, but some put the number of species
on earth at 30 million. However, only some one and a half million of them have
been identified or studied. If deforestation rates continue in the Amazon Basin at
rates prevailing in the mid-1980s, some estimates are that 15% of all plant species
will be lost by the turn of the century.
Weather circulation patterns. Possible impacts on regional weather systems
as moisture circulation patterns change over large areas are also being studied by
NASA researchers. Tropical forests recycle enormous amounts of water as the dense
vegetation absorbs rainfall, transpiration occurs, clouds form over the forest, and the
cycle repeats itself. When an area is deforested, this cycle is eliminated, with possible
effects not only in the denuded forest area, but far away as well.
Watershed protection. An important ecological "service" provided by all
forests is watershed protection, in which the trees anchor and shield the soil and
prevent it from being washed away by rainfall or blown by wind. Soil erosion and
increased downstream flooding are two major consequences of deforestation. In some
tropical countries, rivers that once ran clear are mud-filled with silt from previously
forested areas; consequences include the silting up of dams along the river, and
damages to riverine and coastal aquatic life. Spawning areas for economically
important fisheries may be destroyed in some instances. In hilly or mountainous
areas, runoff from rainstorms is greatly increased after deforestation removes the
trees that used to hold soil in place and absorbed water. Recent floods in Bangladesh
and Northern India are dramatic examples of increased flooding due to deforestation
in the nearby Himalayan Mountains and their foothills.
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Sustainable Development. Despite their lush appearance, tropical forests
often grow on some of the world's poorest and most problematic soils. These forests
are tremendously efficient at recycling nutrients through interdependent plant,
animal, and insect species; and few of the necessary nutrients reside in the soils. In
addition, many of these soils are "lateritic" in nature, which means that as they are
deprived of vegetation and exposed to the elements without protective cover, they
become hardened and dry. Rainfall runs off such hardened soil and does not soak
in to nurture regeneration of forest plants. Thus, deforestation in some areas may
cause irreversible degradation of the life-sustaining capacity of the soil.
When economic development efforts involve clearing of tropical forests in such
areas, the farming or cultivation that results may be unsustainable, sometimes with
dire consequences for the farmers, usually poor to begin with, who make the attempt.
Even projects that do not have farming as their objective, such as road construction
through tropical forests, may result in the influx of settlers who attempt to practice
agriculture. Unproductive soils may be only one factor, among a spectrum of
difficulties including poor social support services, lack of markets, health problems,
and lack of nonfarm income opportunities. However, environmental conditions that
involve problem soils and climate can create additional burdens on already poor
colonists.
In many tropical forest areas, indigenous people have developed complex systems
for making productive use of forest plant and insect and animal species. These
people may be displaced by colonists, and both their livelihood and their knowledge
of productive use of forest resources may be eliminated. Scientists and activists are
concerned that valuable knowledge of the practical application of forest resources and
products are being lost as this occurs.
The other problems attendant upon deforestation such as soil erosion, silting of
dams, and increased flooding also put at risk the sustainability of economic
development efforts based on irrigation dams, coastal development, and downstream
settlements. In all of these cases, development will be more sustainable over the long
term if the ecological support services of forests are recognized and built into the
project planning.
Congressional Responses
Congress has passed a number of laws and held numerous hearings on tropical
deforestation and related issues. To date, most such legislation and hearings have
focused on bilateral and multilateral foreign economic development assistance.
Bilateral Aid
U.S. bilateral aid programs are administered primarily through the Agency for
International Development (AID), although a wide array of domestic agencies
contribute to these efforts or may work in other countries on a reimbursable basis.
The basic authorizing legislation for AID programs is the Foreign Assistance Act of
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1961 as amended. This Act has been amended many times, several times to add
environmental protection provisions. Such provisions for AID focus strongly on
tropical forests and biological diversity, and many of the more general directives to
assure that environmental deterioration is avoided apply to protection of forests or
watersheds. In addition to authorizing legislation, in recent years foreign operations
appropriations laws have contained environmental protection requirements for AID
and U.S. agencies engaged in foreign assistance activities.
Most recently, the Foreign Assistance Act was amended in the 99th Congress by
P.L. 99-529, substantially augmenting the environmental protection provisions
applying to U.S. foreign assistance. At present, Section 117 of the Act, Environment
and Natural Resources, notes that the world faces enormous, urgent problems with
respect to natural resources, and that it is "in the economic and security interests of
the United States to provide leadership. and in cooperating extensively with
developing countries in order to achieve environmentally sound development." This
Section directs that special efforts be made to maintain and restore the land and
resources in developing countries, and that environmental impact assessments or
statements be done on all projects that significantly affect the environment and
natural resources of developing countries.
Section 118, titled Tropical Forests, states that "Congress is particularly
concerned about the continuing and accelerating alteration, destruction and loss of
tropical forests in developing countries, which pose a serious threat to development
and the environment." It requires a high priority for recommendations of the United
States Interagency Task Force on Tropical Forests. In providing assistance to
developing countries, the United States is to put a high priority on conservation and
sustainable management of tropical forests. AID is to facilitate exchanges of
information with countries receiving U.S. aid on the importance of long-term
economic and other benefits of forest conservation and on the irreversible losses
associated with forest destruction. Section 118 details a long list of specific measures
to be undertaken in foreign assistance to provide economic alternatives to forest
clearing, and to help developing countries better manage tropical forest resources.
In addition, assistance is to be denied for a list of activities that would destroy
forests.
Section 118 further requires that private voluntary organizations and other
nongovernmental organizations be used whenever feasible. An annual report on
activities under this section is required as part of the foreign assistance annual
report.
Section 119, Endangered Species, provides for protection of biological diversity.
In June 1988, U.S. AID produced a combined report on Progress in Conserving
Tropical Forests and Biological Diversity in Developing Countries, as required by
Sections 118 and 119. This 120-page report provided extensive details on forestry
and biological diversity programs carried out by the agency; it reported 146 forestry
projects or projects with forestry components in 46 developing countries for FY87,
and funding for these activities of $56.2 million. AID's biological diversity activities
in 1987 included obligations of $2.4 million for 21 new activities in 15 countries, with
another $2.5 million obligated for biodiversity in other agency projects.
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This represents a considerable increase in the priority extended to tropical forest
and biological diversity efforts by AID. However, the majority of its forestry efforts
remain on agroforestry, or the use of trees in agriculture, rather than protection of
or productive use of existing forests.
Multilateral Aid
Beginning in 1983, various committees of Congress have held numerous hearings
and investigated the operations of the multilateral development banks (MDBs),
focusing extensively on the World Bank and examining the impacts of MDB projects
on the environment of recipient countries. Much of this interest focused on the
extensive deforestation occurring in Brazil, a majority of it occurring around roads
constructed with MDB loans.
Each year for the past 4 years, the foreign operations appropriations legislation
has contained extensive language directing U.S. participation in the multilateral
development banks (MDBs) such as the World Bank to be based on assurances that
environment received a high priority, including such evidence as hiring additional
trained environmental staff. While some of this legislation specified protection of
tropical forests as a goal, language was often more general, urging that MDB projects
should avoid environmental degradation. In most cases, these more general goals
would be relevant to efforts to protect tropical forests. Most recently, P.L. 100-461,
passed in October 1988, specified a number of environmental concerns, including
promotion of policies that minimize greenhouse gases and promotion of conservation
of biological diversity through existing and new mechanisms.
Legislative Proposals
In the 100th Congress, greatly heightened concern about climate change as a
result of the "greenhouse effect" resulted in a number of comprehensive bills to deal
with greenhouse gases. Some of these bills contained extensive provisions to protect
and study tropical forests because of their contributions to the greenhouse effect.
Other bills, H.R. 3010, the Tropical Forest Protection Act, and S. 1538, the Tropical
Forest and Wetlands Protection Act, focused specifically on forests.
In the 101st Congress, a number of the comprehensive bills directed at climate
change and greenhouse effect issues contain extensive sections or titles on tropical
forest protection. The measures proposed deal with forest resource assessments,
bilateral and multilateral assistance programs to assist countries in preserving
tropical forests, international timber trade-related measures, debt reduction or debt-
for-nature measures, and others. (The provisions of these bills relevant to tropical
forests are listed below under the Legislation section hereafter.) In addition, it is
expected that specific tropical forest protection bills will again be introduced.
CRS-9
IB89010
03-22-89
International Responses
Tropical Forestry Action Plan
In June 1987, the Tropical Forestry Action Plan was released by the four
organizations that produced it: the United Nations Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World
Bank, and the World Resources Institute (WRI). The Plan details the economic
consequences of tropical deforestation and identifies several priority action areas:
improving land use and integrating forestry into various kinds of land uses;
developing appropriate forest-based industries; restoring fuelwood supplies in
developing countries; conservation of tropical forest ecosystems; and building
institutional capacity in developing countries for optimal forest resource management.
Among others, U.S. AID has made use of this plan in assisting aid recipients to
engage in appropriate tropical forest management.
International Tropical Timber Organization
In 1983 the International Tropical Timber Agreement was signed by both timber
producing and consuming nations, and the International Tropical Timber
Organization (ITTO) was established to carry out the agreement (see CRS Report
87-795, Tropical Deforestation: The International Tropical Timber Agreement). The
emphasis of ITTO is on timber production and management of timber resource
production, but it has increasingly adopted the term "sustainable management" and
helping timber producing countries to maintain ecological balance is among its
purposes. In ITTO's June 1988 meeting, three areas of priority action identified for
ITTO activities were: (1) sustainable management of tropical timber resources,
including appropriate harvesting methods; (2) further processing; and (3) market
transparency and trade diversification.
LEGISLATION
H.R. 1078 (Schneider)
Global Warming Prevention Act of 1089. Contains 12 titles dealing with a large
number of energy and natural resources management issues. Title VIII on Forest
and Agricultural Policies deals primarily with domestic forest and agricultural
concerns. Title IX on Development Assistance contains several sections dealing with
tropical forest resource assessment and protection. The relevant sections are on
Bilateral Tropical Forestry and Agroforestry Program; Multilateral programs; Trade
in Wood and Wood Products; and Environmental Conservation and Debt Reduction.
Introduced Feb. 22, 1989; referred to more than one committee.
S. 201 (Gore)
World Environment Policy Act of 1989. Covers a wide range of international
environmental issues, focused strongly, but not exclusively, on protection of the
atmosphere. Of the ten titles of this bill, those which address or are relevant to
tropical deforestation are Title VI - The World Bank and Sustainable Economic
CRS-10
IB89010
03-22-89
Development; Title VIII - Conservation of World Biodiversity; Title IX - Replanting
and Conserving the World's Forests; and Title X - International Cooperation.
Introduced Jan. 25, 1989; referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works.
S. 324 (Wirth)
National Energy Policy Act of 1989. Focused on global climate change, this bill
includes tropical deforestation among the concerns it addresses. Of its 15 titles,
sections particularly relevant to tropical deforestation are in Title XIII - Development
Assistance, including bilateral aid, multilateral assistance, trade and debt related
sections focused on forest protection. Introduced Feb. 2, 1989; referred to Committee
on Energy and Natural Resources.
S. 603 (Boschwitz)
Contains extensive provisions relating to tropical forest protection. Introduced
Mar. 16, 1989; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
Mahar, Dennis. Government policies and deforestation in Brazil's Amazon region.
The World Bank policy and planning staff, Environment Department working
paper no. 7. June 1988. 42 p.
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. The tropical forestry action
plan. June 1987. 32 p.
United States Agency for International Development. Progress in conserving tropical
forests and biological diversity in developing countries. The annual report to
Congress on the implementation of Sections 118 and 119 of the Foreign
Assistance Act, as amended. June 1988. 120 p.
U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Technologies to sustain tropical
forest resources. March 1984.
U.S. Department of Energy. Office of Energy Research, Office of Basic Energy
Sciences. Carbon Dioxide Research Division The prospect of solving the C02
problem through global reforestation. Washington, D.C. February 1988.
DOE/NBB-0082
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Tropical deforestation:
The international tropical timber agreement, by Ross Gorte. [Washington] Sept.
30, 1987. 8 p.
CRS Report 87-795
CRS-11
602
Transportation-Land
Cost of Owning Automobile-Passenger Transit Industry
603
No. 1028. HOUSEHOLD VEHICLES: ANNUAL MILEAGE, FUEL CONSUMPTION, AND FUEL EXPENDITURES:
No. 1030. COST OF OWNING AND OPERATING AN AUTOMOBILE: 1975 TO 1987
1985
ITEM
Unit
1975
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
[See headnote, table 1029]
Cost per mile 1
Cents
18.31
20.19
19.57
23.97
27.95
31.92
32.35
33.42
31.32
27.20
29.59
32.64
NUMBER OF-
MILES DRIVEN
GALLONS
EXPENDITURES
Cost per 10,000
CONSUMED
miles
Dollars
1,831
2,019
1,957
2,397
2,795
3,192
3,235
3,342
3,132
2,720
2,959
3,264
HOUSEHOLD AND VEHICLE
Variable cost
Cents/mile
6.45
5.80
5.65
5.86
7.62
8.17
8.37
8,36
7.86
8.04
6.52
7.20
Vehicles
4.82
4.11
3.89
4.11
5,86
6.27
6.74
6.64
6.19
6.16
4.48
4.80
CHARACTERISTICS
House-
Total
Per-
Total
Per-
Total
Per-
Gas and oil
Cents/mile.
Vehicles
per
Maintenance
Cents/mile
.97
1.03
1.10
1.10
1.12
1.18
1.00
1.04
1.04
1.23
1.37
1.60
holds
(millions)
house-
(billion)
cent
(billion)
cent
(bil. dol.)
cent
Tires
Cents/mile
.66
.66
.66
.65
.64
.72
.63
.68
.63
.65
.67
.80
(millions)
hold
Fixed cost
Dollars
1,186
1,439
1,392
1,811
2,033
2,375
2,398
2,506
2,346
2,441
2,596
2,782
Total
77.7
137.3
1.8
1,353
100.0
83.9
100.0
99.1
100.0
Insurance:
Fire and theft 2
Dollars
53
80
57
74
70
76
53
80
80
92
86
87
Collision 3
Dollars
141
188
138
168
172
180
153
201
200
198
191
196
Metropolitan status:
Metropolitan
59.0
103.0
1.7
1,029
76.1
62.6
74.6
73.8
74.5
Property damage 4
229
241
248
254
243
222
225
213
232
252
25.5
41.0
1.6
383
28.3
23.9
28.5
28.3
28.5
and liability
Dollars
189
250
Central city
Outside central city
33.6
62.0
1.8
646
47.8
38.7
46.1
45.6
46.0
License and
25.4
25.2
25.5
registration
Dollars
30
74
74
90
82
88
54
102
106
115
130
140
Nonmetropolitan
18.7
34.3
1.8
324
23.9
21.3
Origin of householder: White
68.1
122.3
1.8
1,204
89.0
74.3
88.5
87.7
88.5
Depreciation
Dollars
773
847
894
942
1,038
1,287
1,356
1,343
1,207
1,253
1,320
1,506
(NA)
(NA)
296
423
490
539
558
528
570
637
601
Black
7.2
11.0
1.5
112
8.3
7.4
8.9
8.8
8.8
Finance charge
Dollars
(NA)
Hispanic descent Yes
3.5
6.0
1.7
58
4.3
3.6
4.3
4.3
4.3
No
74.3
131.3
1.8
1,295
95.7
80.3
95.7
94.8
95.7
Average fixed cost per
day
Dollars
3.25
3.94
3.81
4.96
5.57
6.51
6.57
6.87
6.43
6.69
7.11
7.62
Household size: 1 person
15.9
19.0
1.2
162
12.0
10.0
11.9
11.8
12.0
24.5
41.3
1.7
386
28.6
23.5
28.0
27.8
28.0
NA Not available.
1
Beginning
1985,
not
comparable
to
previous
data.
2
$50
deductible
1975
and
1977,
and
$100
2 persons
14.6
29.0
2.0
293
21.7
18.2
21.7
21.5
21.7
3 persons
4 persons
12.9
26.6
21.0
21.2
deductible 1978 through 1987.
$100 deductible 1975 and 1977, and $250 deductible 1978 through 1987.
4
Coverage:
2.1
281
20.8
17.8
21.3
5 or more persons
9.9
21.3
2.2
230
17.0
14.4
17.1
16.9
17.1
$100,000/$300,000.
Source: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., Detroit, MI, Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures, annual.
Family income 1985:
2.4
2.8
2.8
2.8
Less than $5,000
3.7
4.4
1.2
34
2.5
$5,000-$9,999
9.7
12.5
1.3
98
7.2
6.7
8.0
7.8
7.9
No. 1031. PASSENGER TRANSIT INDUSTRY-SUMMARY: 1970 TO 1987
$10,000-$14,999
10.7
15.8
1.5
149
11.0
9.8
11.7
11.5
11.6
$15,000-$19,999
9.7
15.8
1.6
141
10.4
9.0
10.7
10.5
10.6
12.2
12.3
[Includes Puerto Rico. Comprises all privately and publicly owned organized local passenger transportation agencies except
12.3
$20,000-$24,999
9.5
16.9
1.8
165
12.2
10.4
taxicabs and sightseeing and school buses. Covers (a) local motorbus systems, (b) light rail systems, (c) heavy rail systems, (d)
$25,000-$34,999
14.7
28.2
1.9
289
21.4
17.8
21.3
21.0
21.2
$35,000 or more
19.8
43.7
2.2
477
35.2
27.9
33.3
33.6
trolley coach systems, and (e) automated guideway, inclined plane, cable car, and aerial tramway systems. Beginning 1984, data
33.2
also include suburban railroads, urban terry boats, rural fixed-route non-intercity motorbus systems, vanpools and demand
Number of drivers (fall 1984): 1
24.7
29.6
1.2
257
19.0
16.1
19.1
19.0
19.2
response systems. Thus, all data are non-continuous between 1983 and 1984. Based on financial and statistical reports received
54.0
by American Public Transit Association from transit systems representing more than 85 percent of the industry. See also
2
39.1
73.1
1.9
730
53.9
45.3
54.0
53.5
Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to 1970, series Q 238-250]
3 or more
12.5
32.9
2.6
352
26.0
21.7
25.9
25.7
25.9
Type of fuel: Leaded
(x)
42.0
(x)
332
24.5
24.5
29.2
27.3
27.6
(x)
990
73.2
57.8
68.9
69.9
70.6
1984
1985
1986,
1987,
Unleaded
(x)
92.8
ITEM
Unit
1970
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
Type of vehicle: Automobile
(x)
106.6
(x)
1,059
78.3
61.7
73.5
73.4
74.1
prel.
prel.
Jeep-like vehicle
(x)
3.7
(x)
39
2.9
3.1
3.6
3.6
3.6
Van
(x)
4.7
(x)
49
3.6
3.7
4.4
4.3
4.4
4,973
5,019
5,048
17.5
16.9
17.1
Operating systems
Number
1,079
947
1,044
1,035
1,036
1,036
4,938
Pickup truck
(x)
21.2
(x)
199
14.7
14.7
Motorbus systems 1
Number
1,075
941
1,040
1,030
1,031
1,031
2,604
2,632
2,654
2,672
576
578
581
599
(NA)
1,435
(NA)
(NA)
Number of cylinders: 4
(x)
39.9
(x)
445
32.9
19.6
23.4
23.5
23.7
Publicly owned systems 1
Number
144
333
6
(x)
35.6
(x)
362
26.8
22.7
27.0
26.9
27.2
Passenger vehicles owned
Number
61,428
62,261
71,018
72,098
73,838
73,813
95,603
88,691
91,218
91,115
48.1
48.5
63,497
57,285
58,000
57,687
8
(x)
61.0
(x)
536
39.6
41.1
49.0
Motorbuses 2
Number
49,700
50,811
59,411
60,393
62,114
62,093
Air conditioning: Yes
(x)
86.3
(x)
885
65.4
55.2
65.8
65.6
66.2
Heavy rail 2
Number
9,286
9,556
9,641
9,749
9,815
9,891
9,083
9,326
10,386
10,168
33.8
1,623
1,519
1,581
No
(x)
51.0
(x)
468
34.6
28.7
34.2
33.5
Other electric 23
Number
2,442
1,894
1,966
1,956
1,909
1,829
1,527
Type of transmission:
Suburban rail
Number
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
4,075
4,035
4,440
4,656
Automatic
(x)
99.0
(x)
954
70.5
63.2
75.4
74.7
75.4
All other
Number
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
17,421
16,422
16,873
17,023
Manual
(x)
38.3
(x)
399
29.5
20.7
24.6
24.4
24.6
17.3
(x)
203
15.0
12.6
15.0
15.0
15.2
Total revenue
MII. dol
(NA)
3,451
6,510
7,366
8,044
8,526
11,623
12,195
13,147
13,968
Vehicle used on the job: Yes
(x)
120.0
(x)
1,150
85,0
71.3
85.0
84.0
84.8
Passenger revenue
Mil. dol
1,639
1,861
2,557
2,701
3,077
3,172
4,448
4,575
5,011
5,156
No
(x)
Other operating revenue 4
Mil. dol
68
183
248
344
380
333
780
702
743
771
Operating assistance
Mil. dol
(NA)
1,408
3,705
4,321
4,587
5,023
6,395
6,918
7,393
8,041
X Not applicable.
Federal
Mil. dol
(NA)
302
1,094
1,095
1,005
827
996
940
912
894
State and local
Mil. dol
(NA)
1,106
2,611
3,226
3,582
4,195
5,399
5,978
6,481
7,147
No. 1029. HOUSEHOLD MOTOR VEHICLE TRANSPORTATION, BY VEHICLE MODEL YEAR: 1985
Total expense
MII. dol
1,996
3,752
6,711
7,623
8,314
8,736
12,957
14,077
15,080
15,997
Operating expense
Mil. dol
(NA)
3,537
6,246
7,024
7,553
7,956
11,574
12,381
13,353
13,967
[Preliminary. Household vehicles include all motorized vehicles used for personal transportation, excluding motorcycles, mopeds,
Transportation
Mil. dol
(NA)
1,877
3,248
3,596
3,882
3,931
5,142
5,655
6,106
6,019
large trucks, and buses. The reporting unit for 1985 is all households which owned a vehicle at any time during 1985. Based on
Maintenance
Mil. dol
(NA)
814
1,774
1,946
2,168
2,392
3,062
3,672
3,965
4,310
the Residential Transportation Energy Consumption Survey; subject to sampling variability]
Administration
Mil. dol
(NA)
846
1,224
1,482
1,503
1,634
3,370
3,054
3,282
3,638
Reconciling expense
Mil. dol
(NA)
215
464
597
761
780
1,383
1,696
1,727
2,030
VEHICLES (millions)
MILES PER GALLON
House-
Capital expenditure, Federal
MII. dol
(NA)
1,287
2,787
2,946
2,544
3,162
2,876
2,510
3,137
2,476
holds
Model year
Model year
Vehicle-miles operated
Million
1,884
1,989
2,094
2,134
2,129
2,117
2,749
2,791
2,890
2,962
with
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
Aver-
Motorbus
Million
1,409
1,526
1,677
1,685
1,669
1,678
1,845
1,863
1,896
1,927
motor
Total
1973
1974
1979
1983
1973
1974
1979
1983
Heavy rail
Million
407
423
385
420
429
408
436
451
476
490
vehicles
and
to
and
age
and
to
to
and
to
Other electric 3
Million
68
40
32
29
31
31
32
33
33
34
(mil.)
earlier
1978
1982
later
earlier
1978
1982
later
Suburban rail
Million
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
168
183
186
189
All other
Million
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
268
261
299
322
Total
77.7
137.3
26.9
43.3
37.8
28.7
16.1
13.4
13.8
17.9
19.3
Passengers carried 5
Million
7,361
6,988
8,249
7,978
7,755
7,903
8,851
8,659
8,801
8,340
Motorbus
5
Million
5,034
5,084
5,837
5,594
5,324
5,422
5,908
5,675
5,748
5,207
Northeast
15.0
24.8
3.0
8.1
7.6
6.1
17.0
13.6
14.0
18.8
20.2
Heavy rail 5
Million
1,881
1,673
2,108
2,094
2,115
2,167
2,231
2,290
2,333
2,402
Midwest
19,5
34.1
6.4
11.4
9.0
7.0
15.6
12.6
13.2
17.6
19.1
303
18.9
Other electric 3 5
Million
446
231
304
290
316
314
329
304
300
South
27.0
48.5
9.2
15.0
13.8
10.5
15.8
12.9
13,5
17.4
Suburban rail
Million
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
267
275
303
311
West
16.1
29.8
8.3
8.9
7.3
5.1
16.5
14.4
15.0
18,3
19.2
All other,
Million
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
116
116
113
120
Family income in 1985;
15.6
Avg. revenue per passenger
Cents
22.4
26.7
31.0
33.9
39.7
40.2
50.3
52.8
56.9
61.8
Less than $5,000
3.7
4.4
1.4
1.7
.7
.6
14.2
12.5
13.7
17.5
13.3
12.7
16.8
19.9
Employees, number (avg.)
1,000
138
160
187
192
194
195
263
270
276
275
$5,000-$9,999.
9.7
12.5
4.3
4.4
2.4
1.4
14.6
Payroll, employee
1,274
3,281
3,494
3,731
3,921
5,488
5,843
6,228
6,540
$10,000-$14,999
10.7
15.8
4.4
5.8
3.8
1.8
15,2
13.4
13.8
17.5
18.9
Mil. dol
2,236
$15,000-$19,999
9.7
15.8
3.5
5.7
3.9
2.6
15.7
12.9
13.4
18.1
20.4
$20,000-$24,999
9.5
16.9
3.1
5.5
4.7
3.4
16.0
13.3
14.0
17.9
18.9
coaches, Not cable available. cars, and inclined plane cars. Beginning 1984, combined services also include suburban rail cars, urban ferry boats,
NA
1
Includes systems with combined services including motorbuses, heavy rail cars, light rail cars, trolley
$25,000-$34,999
14.7
28,2
4.5
9.2
8.5
5.9
16.2
13.2
14.0
18.2
19.0
$35,000 or more
19.8
43.7
5.7
11.0
13.7
13.1
17.1
13.9
14.3
17.9
19.4
vanpools, aerial tramways, automated guideways, and demand response vehicles. 2 Beginning 1984, includes active vehicles
only. 3 Includes light rail, trolley coach, cable car, inclined plane, aerial tramway, and automated not guideways. comparable with
4 Includes other
Source of tables 1028 and 1029: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Residential Transportation Energy Consumption
operating revenue, non-operating revenue, and auxiliary income.
5
Data
for
1970
and
1975
later
years.
Source: American Public Transit Association, Washington, DC, Transit Fact Book, annual.
CLOSE HOLD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 29, 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR THE GLOBAL CHANGE WORKING GROUP
FROM:
D. ALLAN BROMLEY
Chairman
Duan
SUBJECT:
Meeting of the Global Change Working Group
There will be a meeting of the Global Change Working Group on
Tuesday, January 30, 1990 from 2:00 to 3:00 p.m. in the Roosevelt
Room for principals only. Please call Dean Schultheiss at 456-
6722 if you are able to attend.
The issues to be discussed include (1) the guidelines for the
U.S. delegation to the plenary meeting of the IPCC, (2) the
President's speech to the IPCC and suggestions for the text of
his remarks, and (3) the dates for the White House Conference on
Science and Economics Research on the Environment.
Enclosed is a copy of the guidelines to the U.S. IPCC delegation.
The guidelines were prepared by an interagency working group
headed by OES at the State Department and reflect consensus
working level recommendations for U.S. policy. Two points
warrant specific consideration as you review the document:
(1) The first is the structure of negotiations of a climate
convention (see "Preparations for Negotiation of a Climate
Convention" on pages 8-11). The U.S. position has consistently
been that any climate convention, and the negotiation process
leading thereto, would follow the model used in dealing with the
stratospheric ozone problem -- a broad framework convention
calling for research and the exchange of data (the Vienna
Convention), followed by targeted protocols (such as the Montreal
Protocol on CFCs). Alternatives to this approach are (a) the
negotiation of a comprehensive framework convention that itself
contains specific provisions spelling out emissions reductions or
(b) the negotiation of a general framework convention accompanied
by concurrent negotiation of specific protocols.
(2) The second is the future of the IPCC (see "Future of IPCC"
on pages 13 and 14) and whether it should be the forum for
climate convention negotiations or whether those negotiations
will be conducted in another forum (e.g., the U.N. General
Assembly.
Please review the guidelines carefully and be prepared to make
any specific comments at Tuesday's meeting, as it is essential
that the Working Group act at that time. Also please be advised
that both documents are close hold. Please refrain from making
additional copies.
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Guidelines for U.S. Delegation to IPCC Plenary
Background:
The Third Plenary Meeting of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) will take place in Washington from
February 5-7, 1990. While the meeting will focus on the status
of efforts to complete the IPCC's First Assessment Report
(Annotated Provisional Agenda Item 3), a number of additional
include: issues will also form the basis for plenary discussions. These
o
Possible additional tasks that should be
undertaken by the IPCC based on recent
international meetings (e.g., Noordwijk)
(Annotated Provisional Agenda Item 2.1)
O
Resolution(s) of the 44th (1989) session of the
United Nations General Assembly related to IPCC
activities (Annotated Provisional Agenda Item 2.2)
o
Preparations for the Second World Climate
Conference (Annotated Provisional Agenda Item 2.3)
o
Preparations for Negotiation of a Framework
Climate Convention (Note: This item has been
deleted from the Annotated Provisional Agenda,
but we understand that Dr. Bolin will raise it in
his opening remarks at the IPCC Plenary and at
the RSWG Officers' Meeting on February 2)
o
Report of the IPCC Special Committee on the
Participation of the Developing Countries
(Annotated Provisional Agenda Item 4)
o
The IPCC's 1990 Budget, specifically the
shortfall between anticipated expenses and
funding pledged to date (Annotated Provisional
Agenda Item 5)
IPCC activities after completion of the IPCC
First Assessment Report (Annotated Provisional
Agenda Item 6)
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In addition, the President or another high-level
Administration official may address the opening plenary session
and restate the President's proposal to Chairman Gorbachev at
the Malta Summit (that the United States is prepared to host "a
conference next fall to negotiate a framework treaty on global
climate change, after the working groups of the UN-sponsored
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change submit their final
report."
The following provides guidance to the U.S. delegation on
each of the items identified.
Additional IPCC Tasks
The United States successfully steered the Noordwijk
Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate
Change (November 6-7, 1989) to the IPCC as the appropriate
forum for international consideration of issues related to
global climate change. In so doing, the Noordwijk Declaration
mentions a number of issues for further consideration by the
IPCC. These "remands" to the IPCC are likely first to be
discussed at the RSWG officers' meeting on February 2 that will
precede the plenary. At that meeting and in the plenary
itself, the United States should:
1)
Agree that the IPCC should examine estimates of
reductions in global anthropogenic greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions, based on the best scientific
knowledge as to the options for containing
climate change within tolerable limits (see
Noordwikj Declaration, para. 8) ; the United
States should propose that such examination take
place first by Working Groups I and II (in view
of the references to "best scientific knowledge"
on the one hand and "tolerable limits" on the
other) and subsequently by the RSWG (all
subgroups, i.e., EIS, AFOS, CZMS and RUMS) ;
2) Agree that the IPCC should consider the necessity
and efficiency of the introduction of the concept
of CO2 equivalence (see Noordwijk Declaration,
para. 10) and stress that this is a high-priority
task; stress also that CO2 equivalence must be
based on full equivalence, i.e., on the entire
life-cycle of each gas; and propose that this
task be taken up by Working Group I;
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3)
Agree that the IPCC should investigate the
feasibility of achieving targets to limit or
reduce CO2 emissions including for example a 20
percent reduction of CO2 emission levels by the
year 2005 (see Noordwijk Declaration, para. 16)
but propose that CO2 emissions be taken to mean
"net" CO2 emissions and that this investigation
be extended to the feasibility of achieving such
targets with respect to all GHGs; propose that
"feasibility" be taken to include "technological
and socio-economic feasibility and the trade-offs
involved among these;" could agree that the IPCC
investigate the feasibility of stabilizing net
GHG emissions in various timeframes, including
the year 2000; could also agree that the IPCC
investigate several options for short, medium and
long-term targets for limiting or controlling GHG
emissions and the trade-offs involved among such
targets; should propose that these investigations
be undertaken by the RSWG, specifically by the
EIS and the AFOS, in consultation with the CZMS
and the RUMS;
4)
Agree that the IPCC should consider the
feasibility of achieving a world net forest
growth of 12 million hectares a year in the
beginning of the next century as a provisional
aim (see Noordwijk Declaration, para. 21) ; should
propose that such consideration be undertaken by
the RSWG, specifically by the AFOS and the RUMS;
5)
Request that the RSWG develop a workplan for
analysis of target options resulting from further
investigation of quantitative emission targets to
limit or reduce CO2 emissions (and, as will be
proposed by the United States, emissions of all
GHGs) ; the workplan should indicate what analysis
can be included in the IPCC's First Assessment
Report due in 1990 (see Noordwijk Declaration,
para. 15), what analysis can be presented to the
Second World Climate Conference in November 1990
(see Noordwijk Declaration, para. 18), and what
analysis can be presented after the Second World
Climate Conference.
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Resolution(s) of the 44th UNGA Session
Among the resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
at its 44th Session, the resolution concerning "Protection of
the Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of
Mankind" (adopted December 17, 1989) will be directly relevant
to IPCC Plenary discussion. In addition, the resolution
concerning "International Cooperation in the Field of the
Environment" will also be relevant to this discussion. While
both resolutions express support for the IPCC, both also
contain a specific recommendation that the U.N. General
Assembly should take a decision early in its 45th session
"recommending ways and means and modalities for further
pursuing these negotiations (negotiations on a framework
convention on climate), taking into account the work of the
preparatory committee for the conference on environment and
development to be held in 1992
The
U.S.
UNEP
Mission
in
Nairobi has indicated (see Nairobi 01051, 11 JAN 90) that "This
is clearly intended to assert General Assembly (and G-77)
control over the process after the IPCC presents its report in
October.
In addition, the resolution (also adopted at the 44th
Session) concerning the 1992 Conference on Environment and
Development will also be relevant. In that resolution, the
General Assembly, inter alia:
O Decides to convene a United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development of two weeks' duration to
coincide with World Environment Day, 5 June 1992;
o accepts Brazil's offer to host the Conference;
O affirms that protection of the atmosphere by
combating climate change, depletion of the ozone layer
and transboundary air polution is among the
environmental issues of major concern in maintainiing
the quality of the Earth's environment and especially
in achieving environmentally sound and sustainable
development in all countries;
O decides to establish a Preparatory Committee of the
General Assembly open to all States Members of the
United Nations or members of the specialized agencies;
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O decides that the Preparatory Committee shall hold
an organizational session of two weeks' duration in
March 1990 and a final session, both at United Nations
Headquarters, in New York, and three additional
substantive sessions, the first in Nairobi and the
following two in Geneva, the timing and duration of
which shall be determined by the Preparatory Committee
at its organizational session;
o decides that the Preparatory Committee shall: (a)
draft the provisional agenda of the Conference; b)
adopt guidelines to enable States to take a harmonized
approach in their preparations and reporting; c)
prepare draft decisions for the Conference and submit
them the the Conference for consideration and adoption.
While the United States joined in the consensus with
respect to the resolution concerning "Protection of Global
Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, U.S.
Special Adviser to the 44th Session of the U.N. General
Assembly Edward Marks made a statement following its adoption,
which reads in pertinent part:
"We support the proposal in operative paragraph
10 that negotiations on a framework convention on
climate begin as soon as possible after adoption of
the interim report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change. In order to ensure that these
negotiations be conducted in a focused, efficient
manner. We believe that they should take place
independently from the important work to be done by
the Preparatory Committee for the 1992 Conference on
Environment and Development."
As noted by the U.S. UNEP Mission in Nairobi, these
resolutions demonstrate that an effort is underway to shift
control over the process of negotiating a framework climate
convention to the U.N. General Assembly.
Consequently, in IPCC plenary discussions of the U.N.
resolutions adopted at its 44th Session, the United States
should:
1) Reiterate the view expressed by U.S. Special
Adviser Marks that "We believe that negotiations
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-6-
toward a framework convention on climate should take
place independently from the important work to be done
by: the Preparatory Committee for the 1992 Conference
on Environment and Development;"
2) Alternatively, propose that work currently taking
place within the IPCC and preparations being
undertaken by UNEP Executive Director Tolba and WMO
Secretary General Obasi in accordance with UNEP
Governing Council Resolution 15/36 and WMO EC-XLI
Resolution 4 (requesting them to "begin preparations
for negotiations" for a framework climate convention
should constitute the arm of the Preparatory Committee
responsible for initiating and conducting negotiations
toward a framework convention on climate (see also
item 3 on page 10 of these Guidelines).
Preparations for Second World Climate Conference
Under this item, the Annotated Provisional Agenda notes
that, "The Chairman of the International Organizing Committee
and/or the Co-ordinator for SWCC will be invited to inform the
Panel of the preparations for, and the activities planned
during, the Conference." (Note: The Second World Climate
Conference will take place from October 29 to November 9, 1990,
in Geneva.)
WMO EC-XLI Resolution 4 and U.N. Resolution 43/53 provide
that the IPCC's First Assessment Report should be provided "to
the governing bodies of WMO and UNEP, through the Secretary-
General and the Executive Director, not later than September
1990, be ready for its first presentation at the Second World
Climate Conference in November 1990" and that the "Secretary-
General and the Organizing Committee for the Second World
Climate Conference, in consultation with the Chairman of the
IPCC, (should) ensure that this conference provides the first
international forum for discussion of the September 1990 report
of the IPCC." The U.N. Secretary-General is requested "to
report to the General Assembly at its 44th session on the
implementation of the present resolution" (43/53).
Assuming that the IPCC's Fourth Plenary in Sweden in August
1990 adopts the IPCC's First Assessment Report by the close of
the session, the final version of the First Assessment Report
should be ready and printed by the end of September. The
Report can be given to the WMO Secretary-General and the UNEP
Executive Director by the Chairman of the IPCC at the end of
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-7-
September 1990. The WMO Secretary-General and the UNEP
Executive Director can then present it to the WMO President,
acting on behalf of the WMO Executive Council, and the Chairman
of the UNEP Governing Council for the UNEP Governing Council.
The WMO President and the Chairman of the Governing Council can
distribute the First Assessment Report to Members of WMO and
UNEP about two to four weeks before the Second World Climate
Conference begins.
The IPCC's First Assessment Report does not have to be
presented by the U.N. Secretary-General to the General
Assembly. The U.N. Secretary-General can report that the First
Assessement Report has been distributed to WMO and UNEP
Members, but he may wish to submit the report of the results of
the Second World Climate Conference to the General Assembly.
There has been some discussion internationally concerning
the procedures that will be followed in submitting the IPCC's
First Assessment Report to the Second World Climate
Conference. Since the IPCC's First Assessment Report has been
requested by the WMO Executive Council and the UNEP Governing
Council, it should go to these bodies through the
Secretary-General of WMO and the Executive Director of UNEP.
These governing bodies do not meet, however, during the period
between finalization of the First Assessment Report and the
Second World Climate Conference. Therefore, the WMO President
and the Chairman of the UNEP Governing Council should act on
behalf of their governing bodies to receive it and distribute
it before the Second World Climate Conference.
In some international discussions, there have been
suggestions that the IPCC's First Assessment Report should be
made confidential or embargoed against release until the Second
World Climate Conference. Both ideas are impractical since the
final drafts as well as the text agreed at the IPCC's Fourth
Plenary will have had wide prior distribution. In addition,
media interest in the recommendations or conclusions of the
First Assessment Report will be intense, and any effort to
withhold distribution will be very difficult.
However, in keeping with the spirit of WMO EC-XLI
Resolution 4, the IPCC could agree to have no press conferences
or lengthy interviews or intervening meetings with respect to
the First Assessment Report before the Second World Climate
Conference.
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-8-
It is highly desirable that the IPCC's First Assessment
Report be circulated to all U.N. Members for review and
internal discussion prior to the Second World ClimateConference
so that scientists and ministers can discuss it knowledgeably
at the Conference.
At the IPCC Plenary the United State should:
1) Support presentation of the First Assessment
Report by the IPCC Chairman to the WMO
Secretary-General and the UNEP Executive Director as
soon as possible following the Fourth IPCC Plenary in
August 1990;
2) Support presentation of the First Assessment
Report by the WMO Secretary-General and the UNEP
Executive Secretary to the WMO President, acting on
behalf of the WMO Executive Council, and the Chairman
of the UNEP Governing Council, acting on behalf of the
Governing Council, respectively, for distribution to
WMO and UNEP Members as soon as possible thereafter
and prior to the Second World Climate Conference;
3) If proposed at the IPCC Plenary, discourage press
conferences, lengthy interviews or intervening
meetings after submission of the First Assessment
Report and prior to the Second World Climate
Conference; but
4) Oppose any effort to embargo the IPCC's First
Assessment Report or classify it between its
submission and the Second World Climate Conference.
Preparations for Negotiation of a Climate Convention
On November 17, 1989, UNEP Executive Director Tolba and WMO
Secretary General Obasi sent a letter to foreign ministers
outlining their own thoughts on possible elements of a future
convention on climate change and asking for national views on
this issue by January 15. The U.S. response indicated that
substantive exchanges on possible elements of a framework
convention should take place in the IPCC and noted that the
RSWG has already begun an extensive review of this issue and is
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-9-
seeking to develop an international consensus on possible
elements of a convention. The U.S. response further indicated
that U.S. views on this question were delivered to the RSWG
last October and that additional comments were provided in
December 1989.
The U.S. response to the Tolba/Obasi letter also welcomed
the input that will be provided to the RSWG from the UNEP/WMO
Task Group by the RSWG observers Mr. Beetham (of the U.K.) and
Mr. Cordeiro (of Brazil).
At the IPCC plenary, the United States should:
1) Support the effort of IPCC Chairman Dr. Bolin to
have representatives of WMO and UNEP inform the IPCC
of the activities to date of the UNEP/WMO Task Group,
and of their plans for further activity;
2) Encourage that the work of this Task Group be
provided to the RSWG as soon as possible so that the
RSWG, specifically the Topic Coordinators on Legal
Measures, may take it into account in finalizing their
report.
It is our understanding that the Legal Measures Topic
Coordinators (the U.K., Canada and Malta) are preparing another
attempt at a consensus elements paper, drawing on the October
RSWG meeting. They are planning to get comments on the paper
from key countries before the upcoming IPCC Plenary. Given the
lack of consensus with respect to legal measures at the RSWG
October Workshop in Geneva, the United States has informally
encouraged efforts on the part of the Topic Coordinators to
move forward on this issue.
At the RSWG Officers' Meeting, and in the IPCC Plenary, the
United States should:
1) Support the efforts of the RSWG Legal Measures
Topic Coordinators to refine further the Legal
Measures Paper, making sure that the recent U.S.
comments are included;
2) Oppose any effort to take final action on any of
the RSWG October Papers at the IPCC Plenary,
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especially any paper dealing with the issue of a
framework convention, urging instead that final action
be taken at the June RSWG meeting;
3) Seek IPCC agreement to recommend that negotiations
on a framework convention take place under UNEP/WMO
auspices, the first session to be held as soon as
possible after submission of the IPCC's First
Assessment Report;
4) Remain within the bounds of the U.S. legal
measures paper prepared for the Geneva Workshop,
including the U.S. position that it is currently
premature to consider the subject of possible
protocols and other agreed response measures, the
order in which they might be taken up, and whether
there will be linkage between various agreed measures.
In this latter connection, questions may arise with respect
to the additional U.S. comments submitted to the IPCC
Secretariat and the Topic Coordinators of the RSWG October
Legal Measures Paper. In the comments, the United States
proposed to add additional ticks in section 3 (General
Obligations). Specifically, the United States proposed to add
the following:
Development as soon as possible of a protocol
addressing all adequately scientifically understood
greenhouse gases, their sources and sinks (with
appropriate treatment of substances subject to control
under the Montreal Protocol), in a comprehensive
approach to controlling net emissions of greenhouse
gases through national performance targets, leaving to
each country the choice of domestic policy responses
to achieve its net greenhouse gas emissions target;
keep under continuing review the set of greenhouse
gases, their sources and sinks, and revise the set,
according to evolving understanding of the science,
economics, and technological advancement. (This
approach is further elaborated in Appendix )
Should the question arise in the RSWG Officers' Meeting or
in the IPCC Plenary as to whether, in light of the additional
U.S. comments, the United States is now prepared to consider
possible protocols, the United States should:
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-11-
1) Make clear that the call for development as soon
as possible of a protocol in the U.S. additional
comments must be read in the context of the Legal
Measures Paper that grew out of the RSWG October
Workshop;
2) Indicate that, by including its proposed
additional language as an additional tick in the
General Obligations Section of the Legal Measures
Paper, the United States sought to preserve the
comprehensive approach to GHGs as an option for
further consideration by the RSWG and the IPCC; and
3) Reiterate that the United States continues to
believe that it is currently premature to consider the
subject of possible protocols and other agreed
response measures, the order in which they might be
taken up, and whether there will be linkage between
various agreed measures.
LDC Participation
At the IPCC Plenary, the Chairman of the Special Committee
on the Participation of Developing Countries, Mr. Ripert (of
France), will be asked to present the report of the Committee
for consideration by the Panel.
The United States should:
1) Support the broadest possible participation of
developing countries in the work of the IPCC, so as to
make the IPCC truly representative of the world
community of nations and thereby strengthen its First
Assessment Report;
2) Reaffirm U.S. commitment to the two-track (phase)
approach developed in Geneva and endorsed at Noordwijk
on financial measures, i.e., a first stage involving
assessing needs in the developing countries and the
availability and potential of existing assistance
mechanisms on an industry-by-industry basis, followed
by consideration of a new funding mechanism as a
second stage, if warranted;
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-12-
3) Reaffirm U.S. belief that, before a new mechanism
is created, existing institutions and mechanisms,
reoriented if necessary to take account of climate
change, should be utilized as fully as possible, and
that use of existing institutions would make resources
available more rapidly with better integration with
ongoing development programs in each country;
4) Note that, if significant action is required to
prevent or slow potential climate change, developed
countries alone will not be able to accomplish it;
5) Emphasize the need for global action to deal with
potential climate change, particularly in view of
projections of likely increases in GHG emissions on
the part of developing countries in the near future;
and
6) Note, that the United States is committed under
the Montreal Protocol to providing technical
assistance, and indicate that, if significant action
is ultimately required to deal with the potential for
climate change, the United States will likewise
undertake to provide appropriate assistance.
IPCC's 1990 Budget
The IPCC Secretariat projects 1990 expenses totaling SFR
1,363,000 (approximately $909,880 converting SFR to U.S.
dollars at a rate of 1.4980 SFR to the dollar -- New York Times
January 16, 1990, conversion rate). The IPCC Secretariat
further projects receipts in 1990 to total SFR 864,000
(approximately $576,769). Of the receipts anticipated, SFR
538,000 (approximately $359,146) constitute pledges from
members, including $150,000 from the United States.
(FYI: The United States has not yet transferred its
pledged amount, but should be able to do so later this spring,
both from the $100,000 that the Department of State has sought
to collect from U.S. agencies to support the IPCC Trust Fund
and from additional amounts contained in the International
Organizations and Programs (IO and P) portion of the Foreign
Assistance Appropriation. End FYI.)
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The IPCC Secretariat thus anticipates a shortfall of SFR
499,000 (approximately $333,111) in 1990.
Under Revised Provisional Agenda Item 6, the Secretary of
the IPCC will summarize the expenditures for 1989 and present
the budget request for 1990 for the consideration of the
Panel. To date, it would appear that only the United States
and the following countries have made pledges to the IPCC for
1990: Japan, Italy, Finland, FRG and France.
In the plenary discussion under this item, the United
States should:
1) Await indications from other members of the IPCC
who may be willing to pledge amounts to help meet the
1990 budget;
2) If appropriate, point to the rather significant
pledge made by the United States for 1990;
3) Make no further U.S. commitment to help meet the
IPCC's 1990 budget at the plenary, although it is
possible that, the United States may ultimately exceed
its pledge if (for information of U.S. delegation
only): (1) all U.S. agencies who have been asked to
contribute to the IPCC Trust Fund by the Department of
State ultimately do so; (2) the Department of State's
authorization and appropriation for FY 1990 ultimately
include the amount requested for the IPCC; and (3) the
United States receives credit toward its pledge from
providing interpretation for the IPCC plenary and
subsequent meeting of the IPCC Bureau.
Future of IPCC
Under this agenda item (Annotated Provisional Agenda item
6), it is noted that "The delegations may wish to take the
opportunity to express their views on the role and possible
activities of the Panel after it completes its first assessment
report.
In the IPCC Plenary discussion the United States should:
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1) Support continuation of the work of the IPCC after
submission of its First Assessment Report in the fall
of 1990;
2) Provide, by way of example, a number of specific
tasks that should be taken up or continued by the
IPCC's Working Groups; and
3) Support efforts within the IPCC to develop a
specific list of tasks and schedules (workplan) that
the IPCC views as necessary to undertake or continue
after October 1990.
Finally, with regard to the specific mandate of the IPCC
after submission of the First Assessment Report, the United
States should:
1) Note that, eventually, we anticipate that the IPCC
will become the Conference of the Parties; and
2) Urge that the governing bodies of UNEP and WMO be
asked to adopt resolutions at their meetings this
summer specifying the IPCC's mandate after submission
of its First Assessment Report.
IPCC Endorsement of President's Proposal
If appropriate in the view of the U.S. delegation, it may
be useful to seek endorsement by the IPCC of the President's
proposal to host "a conference next fall to negotiate a
framework treaty on global climate change, after the working
groups of the UN-sponsored Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change submit their final report."
Informal reactions solicited to date from foreign
governments indicate, however, that there may be some confusion
with respect to the President's offer. Specifically, some
countries have expressed confusion at whether the United States
plans to host its own conference or simply provide a venue for
the first international negotiating session. They have also
indicated that it is not clear whether New York, and thus the
UNGA, falls within the scope of the proposal.
In addition, at least one country (the FRG) has informally
urged that the United States not seek IPCC endorsement for the
President's proposal at the forthcoming plenary, since to do so
would risk "politicizing" the IPCC.
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At the plenary, the U.S. delegation should make clear in
informal discussions with other delegations that:
1) The President has proposed simply to provide a
venue (and thus support) for the first international
negotiating session; and
2) That while the President's proposal did not
specifically mention a site, we understand that it
contemplated a location in the United States other
than New York, and definitely not the UNGA.
If the President or another high-level Administration
official should make opening remarks on behalf of the United
States at the plenary which reiterate the President's proposal
at the Malta Summit, the U.S. delegation may choose to:
Seek IPCC endorsement of the President's proposal,
which endorsement should be communicated by the IPCC
Chairman to the UNEP and the WMO.
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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:
UNCLASSIFIED
CLASSIFICATION
3M ENVIRONMENTAL
ENGINEERING AND
POLLUTION CONTROL
FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL FORM
PLEASECALL PEGGY
TO:
Poggy Dooley ( phone 202/456-7750)
FAX PHONE NUMBER: 202 / 456 - 6218
COMPANY:
White House STorf
FROM:
Dave Benforado (bhone 612/778-5189)
DATE: 9/15/89
PAGES TO FOLLOW:
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COMMENTS: Please call if you have
any questions. -
3M EE&PC
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09/15/89
16:27
ENV. ENG. 21-2W-05
002
POLLUTION PREVENTION PAYS
David M Benfords
3M
Benforado
Status Report
612/798-5189
APRIL 1989
Creative technical Innovation which eliminates or reduces pollution at source, before cleanup problems occur,
continues to pay off for 3M operations worldwide. Since the Pollution Prevention Pays (3P) Program was begun
in 1975, these first-year only cumulative results have been obtained:
TOTAL WORLDWIDE SAVINGS - $482 MILLION
Pollution Prevented Annually
U.S.
International
Air Pollutants
111,000 tons
112,0007
11,000 tons
Water Pollutents
15,000 tons
15,000T
1,100 tons
Wastewater
1 billion gal.
600 million gel.
Sludge/Solld Waste
388,000 tons
400,0007
12,000 tons
The $482 million savings Include $408 million from U.S. Operations and 574 million from International
Operations. The pollution prevented statistics are total for U.S. Operations and pertial for International
Operations, as not all subsidiaries reported these flgures.
Pollution Prevention Pays Projects
United States
718
International
1,725
TOTAL
2,444
Participating Countries
Argentina
New Zealand
Australia
Philippines
Beiglum
South Africa
Brazil
Spain
Canada
Sweden
France
Switzerland
France (Riker)
Thalland
Germeny
United Kingdom
Italy
United Kingdom (Health Care)
Japan
United States
Mexico
Venezuela
Employees at all 3M locations are encouraged to participate In the 3P Program. Recognition of Individuals
responsible for 3P products is an Intrinsic part of this successful program. The worldwide use of the 3P
concept - ellmination of pollution at the source - Is essential.
4/89
JNB:3P (1.51)
Foreign Policy no. 74, Spring 1989
NOTICE TO
CONTRIBUTORS
CLIMATE CHAOS
Articles offered to FOREIGN POLICY
by David A. Wirth
should be original and should not be sub-
mitted simultaneously to any other publi-
cation.
For the past several years scientists have
All manuscripts should be typewritten,
issued ominous warnings about the future of
double-spaced, with 25 lines per page and
the earth's climate. Predictions of dramatic
margins of at least one inch. Full names of
global change arising from the continued
authors, addresses with zip codes, and tele-
dumping of industrial by-products into the
phone numbers should be given. All man-
atmosphere and forest loss of massive scale can
uscripts must be fully documented to
no longer be ignored. Compelling scientific
facilitate fact checking. Authors must pro-
evidence now strongly suggests that world
vide copies of complete English translations
climate patterns, previously regarded as reli-
for all non-English source materials. A stan-
ably stable, could be thrust into a state of
dard length for FOREIGN POLICY articles
turmoil. Emissions of natural and synthetic
is 4,000-6,000 words. For spelling, punctua-
gases are increasing the heat-trapping capacity
tion, and style, refer to the American Heritage
of the atmosphere through a phenomenon
Dictionary and the Chicago Manual of Style.
known as the greenhouse effect.
Address all correspondence to the Editor,
The projected effects of this worldwide
FOREIGN POLICY, 11 Dupont Circle,
climatic disruption dwarf many of the envi-
NW, Washington, DC 20036. For manu-
ronmental problems of the past and augur
script return, include a postpaid, self-ad-
political, economic, and social disruptions on
dressed envelope.
an enormous scale. Global warming could
The copy deadline for the Fall 1989 issue
have catastrophic consequences for the habita-
is June 1.
bility and productivity of the whole planet.
The accompanying strain and upheaval on the
international scene in turn could have serious
foreign-policy consequences for all countries.
Broad scientific agreement exists on the
FOREIGN POLICY (ISSN 0015-7228) is published
underlying theory of climate change, although
quarterly by the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 11 Dupont Circle, N.W., Washington, D.C.,
the nature and magnitude of future effects
20036, which bears no responsibility for the editorial
from greenhouse warming as predicted by
content; the views expressed in the articles are those of
the individual authors.
computer models remain in debate. Some of
Subscription department: P.O. Box 984, Farming-
these, such as a rise in the sea level, have been
dale, NY 11737. Subscriptions: $23.00, one year;
established with greater certainty than others.
$37.00, two years; $53.00, three years. Outside USA
Nonetheless, the range of consequences is
add $5.00 for surface, $20.00 for air mail, payable in
U.S. funds. Second-class postage paid at Washington,
sufficiently clear and the magnitude of the
DC, and at additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send
resources at stake so enormous that policy
change of address to FOREIGN POLICY magazine,
action is required sooner rather than later.
P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, NY 11737.
National distributor for newsstands and bookstores:
Once a crisis has been reached, it will be too
Eastern News Distributors, 1130 Cleveland Rd., San-
late to act.
dusky, OH 44870.
The international political and legal system
Syndication requests should be addressed to the New
York Times Syndication Sales Corporation, 130 Fifth
remains ill-equipped to offer a solution that
Ave., New York, NY 10011; (212) 645-3000.
will assure the integrity of the earth's climate.
For authorization to photocopy individual articles,
contact the Copyright Clearance Center, 27 Congress
DAVID A. WIRTH is a senior attorney at the Natural
St., Salem, MA 01970, using item-fee code 0015-7228/
Resources Defense Council and former attorney-adviser
89/$.50 + .10.
for Oceans, International Environmental and Scientif-
ic Affairs in the State Department's Office of the Legal
Adviser.
3.
FOREIGN POLICY
Wirth
Although the greenhouse theory of warming
Third World countries is particularly severe,
has been accepted for about a century, policy-
with the destruction of tropical forests in
makers have only recently become aware of its
developing countries like Brazil and Indonesia
significance for the global environment. The
exceeding 27 million acres annually from
international community cannot afford to
activities such as burning, logging, and con-
continue to delay elevating the greenhouse
version to agricultural and pastureland. In-
effect to the top of the foreign-policy agenda.
deed, the release of CO2 into the atmosphere as
Arresting the impending climate instability
a result of deforestation amounts to 2-10
will require a concerted international agenda
billion tons annually.
and a reorientation of energy and develop-
Concentrations of a second important
ment priorities in virtually all countries of the
greenhouse gas, nitrous oxide (N₂O), have also
world. Heading this agenda for action should
been rising, probably because of heavier fossil-
be a global multilateral agreement that sets
fuel use, greater agricultural activity, and
strict, binding standards for national emis-
other ecological disturbances. Average global
sions of greenhouse gases.
Human activities since the Industrial Revo-
atmospheric levels of N2O at the end of 1985
were approximately 300 parts per billion (ppb)
lution have dramatically altered the composi-
and are increasing at an annual rate of .2 per
tion of the global atmosphere. A number of
cent. Both CO2 and N₂O, unlike some conven-
gases, emitted in small but significant
amounts, absorb infrared radiation reflected
tional pollutants, are very stable compounds.
from the surface of the earth. As the concen-
CO₂ remains in the upper atmosphere for
decades after its release and N2O for consider-
trations of these heat-absorbing gases increase,
average global temperatures will rise.
ably more than a century. Consequently, with-
Emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) are the
out major reductions in emissions of these
single largest cause of elevated terrestrial
gases with long atmospheric lifetimes, their
temperatures from the greenhouse effect, ac-
concentrations will continue to grow.
counting for approximately one-half of the
problem. Concentrations of CO2 in the range
The international community can-
of 280 parts per million (ppm), together with
not afford to delay elevating the
water vapor in the atmosphere, established the
greenhouse effect to the top of the
preindustrial equilibrium temperature of the
planet. Since the middle of the 19th century
INCR.
foreign-policy agenda.
atmospheric CO2 levels have increased by
about 25 per cent to approximately 350 ppm
By
and are continuing to rise by approximately .4
fis
of
A group of volatile chemicals known as
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) is believed to be
per cent per year. Elevated CO2 concentra-
tions result primarily from the intensified
4/10
currently responsible for 15-20 per cent of the
global warming trend. These chemicals, un-
burning of fossil fuels-coal, oil, and natural
worth top- another
like CO2, are strictly synthetic and are not
gas-which liberates the chemical in varying
known in nature. They have a number of uses
amounts. Coal burning releases the most CO2,
as refrigerants, propellants, solvents, and ther-
while the combustion of quantities of natural
mal insulators. A related class of bromine-
gas and oil needed to produce the same
containing chemicals called "halons" are
amount of energy results in only about 57 per
found in fire-extinguishing systems. Average
cent and 83 per cent as much CO2, respective-
global atmospheric concentrations of CFC-11
ly.
and CFC-12, two of the most commercially
The world's forests are vast storehouses or
important chlorofluorocarbons, in 1985 were
"sinks" for carbon. Worldwide loss of forest
approximately .22 ppb and .38 ppb, respective-
cover, by releasing this vast stockpile of car-
ly. Atmospheric concentrations of CFC-11 and
bon into the atmosphere as CO2, aggravates
CFC-12 are growing at a rate of more than 7
the greenhouse problem. Deforestation in Serious
4.
S.
FOREIGN POLICY
Wirth
per cent annually as a result of increased
world production in recent years.
of total CO2 emissions. Western Europe emit-
Although their concentrations are small
ted 15 per cent of the total, Japan 5 per cent,
relative to that of CO2, CFCs are up to 10,000
and the People's Republic of China 11 per
times more potent in absorbing infrared radia-
cent. Other developing countries together
tion. After release, CFCs and halons reside in
accounted for only 20 per cent of total indus-
the atmosphere for close to a century, or
trial CO2 emissions.
sometimes more, because of their great chemi-
Emissions of CFCs are even more strongly
cal stability at low altitudes. Consequently, an
skewed. In 1980 the United States produced
immediate 85 per cent reduction in emissions
roughly 28 per cent of the global total of
of CFC-11 and CFC-12, for example, would be
approximately 817,300 tons of CFC-11 and
necessary merely to stabilize their atmospher-
CFC-12. Western Europe produced about 30
ic concentrations. With their long atmospher-
per cent, industrialized Asian countries 12 per
ic lifetimes, CFCs and halons eventually reach
cent, and the East-bloc countries an estimated
the upper atmosphere. There, they are the
14 per cent. The entire developing world
principal culprits in the worldwide loss of the
accounted for just slightly more than 2 per
protective stratospheric ozone layer, which
cent of this amount.
shields life on earth from harmful levels of
ultraviolet solar radiation.
Consequences of Greenbouse Warming
Methane, the principal component of natu-
An international scientific consensus now
ral gas, is another significant climate-modify-
supports the assertion that the accumulation
ing chemical. It has an atmospheric residence
in the atmosphere of CO2, N2O, CFCs, meth-
time of about 11 years. Average global concen-
ane, and low-level ozone could have sweeping
trations of methane were approximately 1,700
and far-reaching effects on the earth's
ppb at the end of 1985 and are increasing by
climate.¹ By as early as the year 2030, the heat-
about 1 per cent per year, the highest rate of
retaining capacity of the atmosphere may have
any naturally occurring greenhouse gas, for
increased by an amount equivalent to dou-
reasons that are not now clear. Animal hus-
bling preindustrial concentrations of CO2. By
bandry and rice cultivation have been identi-
fied as major sources of increased methane
I Much of the scientific information in this article is
emissions. Coal mining and landfills are also
drawn from the following reports: World Meteorologi-
cal Organization and United Nations Environment
significant sources, with large potential for
Programme, Developing Policies for Responding
rapid growth in the future.
to Climatic Change (Summary of workshops beld in
Low-level ozone is another greenhouse gas.
Villach, Austria, 28 September-2 October, 1987, and
Bellagio, Italy, 9-13 November 1987 under the aus-
Although ozone in the stratosphere is benefi-
pices of the Beijer Institute, Stockbolm), 1988; Interna-
cial, this highly unstable chemical is the
tional Council of Scientific Unions, United Nations
leading component of photochemical smog
Environment Programme, and World Meteorological
Organization, Report of the International Confer-
pollution at the earth's surface.
ence on the Assessment of the Role of Carbon
While greenhouse gases are dispersed rela-
Dioxide and of Other Greenhouse Gases in
Climate Variations and Associated Impacts (Re-
tively quickly throughout the global atmos-
port of a conference held under the auspices of the World
phere after release. industrial emissions of
Climate Program at Villach, Austria, 9-15 October
these heat-absorbing chemicals are highly con-
1985), 1986; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
and United Nations Environment Programme, Ef-
centrated in the developed world. In 1985, 23
fects of Changes in Stratospheric Ozone and
per cent of total global CO2 emissions of more
Global Climate (Proceedings of a conference beld at
than 20.5 billion tons of CO2 originated in the
Leesburg, Virginia, 16-20 June 1986); U.S. Environ-
United States-the single largest emitting
mental Protection Agency, Assessing the Risks of
Trace Gases That Can Modify the Stratosphere,
country and the highest per capita contributor
vol. 3: chaps. 6-18, prepared for the Office of Air and
among industrial countries to the greenhouse
Radiation by Jobn S. Hoffman (Washington, D.C.,
problem. The second biggest contribution
1987); and Irving M. Mintzer, A Matter of De-
grees: The Potential for Controlling the Green-
came from the Soviet Union, with 19 per cent
house Effect (Wasbington, D.C.: World Resources
6.
Institute, 1987).
7.
FOREIGN POLICY
Wirth
the middle of the next century, average global
ple. In Bangladesh, a 3-foot rise would inun-
temperatures may have risen by as much as
date 11.5 per cent of the country's land area,
3°F-9°F. The absolute magnitude of these
displace 9 per cent of the 112.3 million people
temperatures, as well as the rapidity of tem-
in this densely populated country, and threat-
perature change, will exceed any previously
en 8 per cent of the annual GNP.
experienced in human history.
The range of uncertainties associated with
The effects of a greenhouse-driven climate
local climatic changes is substantially larger
disruption will be characterized with com-
than for global averages. The dramatic antici-
plete certainty only after significant damage
pated increases in global temperature are
has already occurred. However, among the
virtually certain to cause a wide variety of
most dramatic effects likely to ensue from
modifications in regional climates. In middle
greenhouse warming is an unprecedented rise
latitudes, where the continental United States
in sea level resulting from thermal expansion
lies, summertime temperature increases are
of the oceans and melting of glaciers and polar
expected to exceed the global average by 30-50
ice. Over the past century the average global
per cent. Forests, many of them economically
sea level has increased less than 6 inches. By
productive, could begin to die off as early as
contrast, the sea level will have accelerated
the year 2000 if they prove unable to adjust to
considerably, producing a total increase of up
rapidly shifting climatic zones. Regions of
to 1-7 feet by 2075, depending on the degree of
agricultural productivity could shift at the
global warming that occurs.
expense of the American Midwest, which
The impact of sea-level rise in the United
currently has some of the most fertile soils in
States is likely to be severe. The anticipated
the world. A warming of only 3.6°F could
increase in the elevation of the oceans could
decrease wheat and cereal yields by 3-17 per
permanently inundate low-lying coastal
cent. Computer models predict continental
plains, accelerate the erosion of shorelines and
drying in middle latitudes, which means that
beaches, increase the salinity of drinking-wa-
parched soils, scorching droughts, and massive
ter aquifers and biologically sensitive estuar-
heat waves, like those that devastated crops in
ies, and increase the susceptibility of coastal
the Midwest in summer 1988, could become
properties to storm damage. An increase of 5-
commonplace. Water levels in the Great Lakes
7 feet in sea level would submerge 30-80 per
could drop by a foot, interfering with naviga-
cent of America's coastal wetlands, which are
tion for ocean-going vessels. Extreme tempera-
crucial to the productivity of commercially
tures have been shown to elevate human
important fisheries. Extensive existing coastal
mortality. Some models also project disrup-
development may prevent the widespread
tions in atmospheric and ocean circulation
formation of new wetlands. Even in undevel-
patterns. The impact of these changes is
oped coastal areas, the rapidity of the predict-
highly unpredictable.
ed sea-level rise will mean that existing wet-
Countries with tropical climates could expe-
lands would be lost faster than new ones can
rience especially severe consequences. Semiar-
be created.
id areas like much of sub-Saharan Africa
The increase in elevation of the oceans will
might suffer from even lower rainfall. Many
also seriously affect the approximately 50 per
semiarid areas are already marginal for agri-
cent of the earth's population that inhabits
culture, are highly sensitive to changes in
coastal regions. Entire countries, such as the
climate, and have had severe droughts and
Maldives, could disappear. A rise in sea level
famines for the last several decades. Tropical
of only 3 feet could flood an area of the Nile
humid climates could become hotter and wet-
Delta that constitutes 12-15 per cent of
ter, with an increase in the frequency and
Egypt's arable land, produces a similar por-
severity of tropical storms. Floods, which
tion of the Egyptian annual gross national
between 1968 and 1988 killed more than 80,000
product (GNP), and is home to a comparable
people and affected at least 200 million more,
percentage of the country's 51.4 million peo-
could worsen. Natural disasters such as floods,
8.
9.
FOREIGN POLICY
Wirth
now unusual, could become increasingly com-
unless the warming trend is halted. Even the
mon.
limited goal of a steady-state warmer climate
Indeed, climate disruption caused by the
will require major policy reform. Otherwise,
greenhouse effect may already be evident.
greenhouse-gas concentrations and global tem-
Global temperatures in 1988 were again at or
peratures will continue to increase indefinite-
near the record for the period of instrumental
ly, nullifying any short-term benefits.
data, with temperatures elevated by .7°F rela-
Even if a stable warmer climate were identi-
tive to the average for the 30-year period
fied as a policy goal, the rate of climate change
beginning in 1950. The five warmest years in
resulting from greenhouse gases already in the
this century all occurred during the 1980s.
atmosphere would be faster than ever experi-
Moreover, the rate of global warming for the
enced in human history. This climate alter-
past two decades was higher than any in
ation would undoubtedly result in decades of
recorded history. Whether the planet is al-
destruction resulting from an inability to alter
ready experiencing greenhouse-driven warm-
human behavior, such as agricultural tech-
ing as measured against a background of
niques, fast enough to take advantage of new
natural temperature variability is still a sub-
weather patterns. The transition to warmer
ject for debate. However, because there is a lag
climates is expected to be highly disruptive
on the order of decades between emissions of
and accompanied by an increase in the fre-
greenhouse gases and their effects, the level of
quency, intensity, duration, and geographic
heat-absorbing chemicals already released into
extent of extreme weather events like
the atmosphere has irrevocably committed the
droughts and storms. Moreover, sea-level rise
world to an additional .9°F-2.7°F increase over
would be certain to entail net harm the world
the next 50 years even if the atmosphere's
over. No region or individual country should
composition were stabilized today.
place the health and well-being of its public
The greenhouse effect, if unchecked, is
and environment at stake in what amounts to
likely to cause unpredictable disruptions in
a crapshoot.
the balance of power worldwide, exacerbating
While all countries are likely to be losers in
the risk of war. The projected climate distur-
the global climate gamble, some countries
bance and its accompanying impacts are suffi-
have more at stake than others. The United
ciently dramatic in quality, magnitude, and
States has a particularly large investment in
rapidity that policymakers should give the
the status quo. Its current pre-eminence in
most serious consideration to the security
world affairs ultimately derives from the
implications of the ongoing failure to antici-
strength of the country's economy. The pro-
pate and arrest greenhouse warming. The oil
ductivity of the country's natural resources,
crises of the 1970s were widely perceived as a
such as the incomparably valuable farmland of
national security issue because excessive de-
the Midwest, was an essential prerequisite to
pendence on foreign oil threatened the Ameri-
America's elevation as a dominant superpower
can economy. Prevention of global climate
in the latter half of the 20th century. Impend-
disruption demands the immediate attention
ing climate change means that this productivi-
of U.S. leaders for the same reason. But so far,
ty can no longer be taken for granted. The
the implications of the greenhouse phenome-
greenhouse effect threatens the overall health
non have not played the slightest role in long-
of the American economy and could require a
term strategic planning by the government.
massive diversion of resources to nonproduc-
The odds are strongly stacked against every
tive adaptive activities.
country in the game of climate roulette. Con-
The United States has one of the most
trary to some speculation, it is very unlikely
productive agricultural sectors on earth, pro-
that any region of the world will be a net
ducing nearly 50 per cent of the world's corn
"winner" from climate change. The very
and nearly 60 per cent of its soybeans. The
concept of "winning" implies the existence of
United States is also the world's leading
a stable warmer climate, which will not occur
exporter of wheat and corn. By contrast, the
10.
11.
FOREIGN POLICY
Wirth
USSR is now the planet's largest importer of
Maldives would require the relocation of
wheat and its second largest importer of corn.
nearly 200,000 people. Competition over terri-
Climate models, however, suggest that this
tory and natural resources launched by those
pattern could change dramatically if the Mid-
displaced by sea-level rise could create or
west became 10-20 per cent drier and crop
exacerbate regional strife. Pressure from the
yields were reduced. The drought of 1988
10 million individuals in Bangladesh that
demonstrated that falling crop yields are a
would be uprooted by a 3-foot sea-level rise
very real possibility. U.S. Department of
could heighten regional tensions. Famine
Agriculture forecasts for the 1988-89 market-
created by greenhouse-driven crop failures
ing year project that domestic consumption
could also generate regional clashes that might
and exports of U.S. grain and soybeans will
encourage the major powers to take sides.
exceed production by approximately 4.2 bil-
Such an acceleration in showdowns among the
lion bushels. At the same time, Soviet agricul-
superpowers would destabilize the world po-
tural areas, located considerably farther north,
litical balance in highly unpredictable ways,
could suffer smaller losses in productivity
tempting those countries that already have a
relative to their American counterparts. The
tendency toward global adventurism and plac-
difference between last summer's events and
ing U.S. security interests at risk.
the effects of greenhouse-induced climate
change would be that the latter is permanent
Arresting Climate Change
and worsening, not just an isolated calamity.
The worst effects of a greenhouse-induced
Adapting to future climate change is also
climate cataclysm can be averted. And the
likely to require significant resources in the
sooner action is taken, the more effective it
United States. Fighting the effects of a rising
will be. Conversely, the longer a policy re-
sea level on the heavily developed coasts of the
sponse is delayed, the greater the warming
United States, where about 75 per cent of the
that will have accumulated "in the bank" and
U.S. population will reside by 1990, will be
the more radical the measures that will be
phenomenally expensive. Maintaining threat-
required to prevent further climatic upheaval.
ened shorelines just on the American East
CFCs and halons are by far the easiest
Coast by measures such as diking cities could
component of the greenhouse problem to
cost $10-$100 billion for a 3-foot rise. Seven
eliminate. Motivated by concern over the
out of the 10 most populous cities in the
pivotal role these chemicals play in depleting
United States are located either on the coasts
the stratospheric ozone layer, 45 countries and
or on coastal estuaries that would be severely
1 international organization have signed the
affected by sea-level rise. By contrast, the
Montreal Protocol on Substances That De-
USSR, which has relatively less exposed shore-
plete the Ozone Layer, which took effect at
line and considerably less investment in ex-
the beginning of 1989 after negotiations spon-
pensive coastal infrastructure, would suffer
sored by the United Nations Environment
little damage. Only. 1 of the 10 largest Soviet
Programme. The agreement overcame a seri-
cities-Leningrad- would face significant
ous lapse of concern about this issue by U.S.
problems from an elevation in sea level. More-
and European policymakers in the early 1980s
over, the Soviet Union could benefit greatly
and a complete breakdown of negotiations in
from improved navigability in its polar coastal
1985. Aside from representing a diplomatic
areas as Arctic ice melts.
milestone for international cooperation on
The effects of greenhouse warming will also
environmental problems, the Montreal Proto-
be felt in other parts of the world, potentially
col is also an important precedent for a
fueling turbulent regional conflicts that could
multilateral strategy on the more challenging
upset the existing global balance of power.
issue of greenhouse warming.
Loss of low-lying territory could create refu-
The Montreal Protocol requires an incre-
gee problems of an unprecedented scale. Inun-
mental 50 per cent reduction in the consump-
dation of just the tiny island country of the
tion of five ozone-depleting CFCs by the end
12.
13.
FOREIGN POLICY
Wirth
of this century. Beginning in July 1989 con-
if CFCs and halons are phased out within 5-7
sumption of these substances must be frozen
years, the long atmospheric lifetimes of these
at 1986 levels. A reduction of 20 per cent must
chemicals mean that the environment could
be achieved beginning 4 years later and an
take up to a century to recover. Moreover,
additional 30 per cent beginning in July 1998.
even if production of these dangerous chemi-
The agreement permits each country to imple-
cals were to be eliminated altogether, they
ment these requirements as it chooses through
would continue to seep out of the existing
recycling, destruction, or abandonment of
stock of refrigerators, air conditioners, insula-
unnecessary uses of these chemicals. However,
tion, and other repositories.
the overall strategy is to stimulate the develop-
To stabilize global concentrations of CO2
ment of alternatives to existing CFCs by
gas it will be necessary to cut global emissions
constricting supply. The Montreal Protocol
of CO2 by at least one-half. Burning fossil fuels
contains ground-breaking trade incentives for
releases most of the excess CO2 in the atmo-
broad participation, including a ban on im-
sphere. Because no economical technology for
ports of controlled substances from countries
removing CO2 from waste-gas streams is now
that are not party to the accord. Its provisions
available, cutting back releases of CO2 will
dealing specifically with developing countries
require a lower total energy consumption and
resolve delicate equity issues by allowing
a shift in energy sources toward low- or non-
Third World countries a 10-year grace period
CO2-emitting technologies. Greenhouse im-
to make required reductions.
pacts should be an explicit part of all future
Despite the precedential importance of the
decision-making processes in the energy sec-
Montreal Protocol, the agreement is inade-
tor. Reductions in fossil-fuel use will also help
quate. Because of loopholes and leakages built
to ease other environmental problems associ-
into the document, the actual reductions in
ated with current patterns of energy use, such
emissions of substances controlled by the
as acid rain and local air pollution.
protocol will be only about one-third under
Even with the most optimistic assumptions
even the most optimistic assumptions. Con-
about economic growth, major reductions in
sumption of halons, which are up to 10 times
CO2 emissions from industrialized countries
as destructive of ozone as the strongest CFC, is
can be achieved with energy conservation,
merely leveled off and not reduced. The
efficiency technologies, and renewable energy
agreement explicitly specifies that produc-
sources. For example, the 1,200 kilowatt-hours
tion-as distinct from consumption-of CFCs
per year used by a typical frost-free refrigera-
and halons may actually increase by as much
tor can be reduced to only 500 with a state-of-
as 10 per cent over the 1986 level.
the-art model. Current technology can light an
It is now clear that emissions of CFCs and
office building with an expenditure of only .55
halons must be virtually eliminated because of
watts per square foot, as little as one-fifth of
the overwhelming risks these chemicals pose
today's average. It is now possible to produce
to climate and stratospheric ozone. Soon after
motor vehicles-which currently account for
the Montreal Protocol was signed in Septem-
more than one-fourth of greenhouse gases
ber 1987, a seasonal thinning of 50 per cent of
released in the United States-that have fuel
the ozone layer over Antarctica-the ozone
economies of up to 98 miles per gallon, 2-5
"hole"-was conclusively connected to CFCs.
times as efficient as those now on the road.
New and widely accepted scientific evidence
Efficiency improvements have meant that
documents that average global losses in strato-
the amount of energy used in the United
spheric ozone of about 3 per cent-two to
States today is about the same as in 1973,
three times that previously predicted by com-
despite a 40 per cent increase in GNP during
puter models-have already occurred.² Even
the same period. Application of existing effi-
²U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
ciency technologies could reduce U.S. CO2
1988. "Executive Summary of the Ozone Trends Panel,
emissions by 14-18 per cent by the end of the
century. In California alone, a steady improve-
14.
15.
FOREIGN POLICY
Wirth
ment in efficiency of 3.4 per cent per year has
The fundamentals of the greenhouse phe-
been achieved over the past 12 years with only
nomenon are now well understood and the
mild encouragement from state and local
need for swift policy responses firmly estab-
governments through policy measures to en-
lished. While these responses are being imple-
courage conservation and efficiency. Through
mented, the development and dissemination of
a strategy involving efficiency improvements,
technologies to combat climate disturbance-
national progress could be much faster.
such as CFC-free, energy-efficient refrigera-
Nuclear energy has been proposed in some
tors and low-methane strains of rice-should
quarters as the preferred solution to the prob-
be a high priority. Increased basic research to
lem of greenhouse warming. Although atomic
resolve remaining uncertainties concerning
power is a CO2-free technology, its other risks
the magnitude, rate, and effects of greenhouse
currently make it the least attractive alterna-
warming should also be undertaken.
tive to fossil fuels. Nuclear energy carries the
inherent danger of weapons proliferation. The
The Role of Developing Countries
current generation of nuclear reactors still
An equitable response to the special needs
entails the unacceptable danger of accidents
of developing countries is crucial to removing
and suffers from a critical lack of public
greenhouse threats to the global climate. On
confidence in an increasingly large number of
the one hand, developing countries have
countries. The problem of disposing of waste
caused little of the problem and industrialized
that will remain hazardously radioactive for
countries must bear the bulk of the blame. On
many hundreds of thousands of years has yet
the other hand, as economic development
to be adequately solved. Of the alternative
accelerates, Third World countries may ac-
strategies for reducing CO2 emissions, nuclear
count for the preponderance of greenhouse-
energy is among the most expensive. More-
gas emissions by the middle of the next
over, to reduce CO2 emissions by 50 per cent
century. An international solution that pro-
by the year 2020 solely through the expansion
vides incentives for the participation of devel-
of the nuclear industry would require bring-
oping countries while fairly distributing the
ing a new plant on line somewhere in the
responsibility for implementing solutions is
world at the rate of almost one a day starting
essential to a successful global strategy for
in the mid-1990s-clearly a practical impossi-
combating greenhouse warming.
bility. While the nuclear option may be wor-
The consequences of the greenhouse effect
thy of consideration as part of the public
strongly suggest that it is in the self-interest of
debate on ultimate solutions to the greenhouse
Third World countries to re-examine expedi-
problem, increased reliance on nuclear power
tiously their energy priorities. Developing
at present would be both politically infeasible
countries, with fewer resources to adapt to
and irresponsible when major, cheap reduc-
environmental disturbances, stand to suffer
tions in CO2 emissions are available with
disproportionately from a rapid climate
existing technologies.
change. For example, the productivity of com-
Reversing deforestation and creating new
mon rice varieties falls off dramatically at
forested areas will help to offset current levels
temperatures just a few degrees higher than
of CO2 emissions. New forests, in absorbing
those currently prevailing in many rice-grow-
CO2 from the air during photosynthesis, will
ing areas.
contribute to climate stabilization by serving
Tapping the tremendous potential for con-
as supplementary reservoirs for carbon. Ag-
servation and improved end-use efficiency in
gressive policies to conserve existing forests
the developing world would contribute to a
and create new forested areas will yield other
solution for greenhouse warming while meet-
significant environmental benefits, including
ing much of the Third World's growing
erosion control and the preservation of a rich
energy needs. This strategy also avoids other
diversity of species whose genetic potential is
serious environmental and social problems,
only now becoming accessible to humankind.
such as land degradation, local air pollution,
16.
17.
FOREIGN POLICY
Wirth
at controlling trade in tropical woods and
reduce and halt greenhouse warming. Consid-
compensate exporting countries for lost reve-
erable precedent is now in place for multina-
nues through alternative investments.
tional environmental agreements containing
The Third World debt crisis presents major
strict regulatory standards. In addition to the
opportunities for encouraging better forest
Montreal Protocol, which is an ancillary
management in developing countries. As the
agreement to the 1985 Vienna Convention for
market value of such debt has fallen, a number
the Protection of the Ozone Layer, several
of private banks have sold debt owed to them
other international agreements establish re-
by Third World governments to private con-
quirements for controlling emissions of specif-
servation organizations, which have then for-
ic air pollutants. The Protocol on the Reduc-
given the debt in return for specific promises
tion of Sulphur Emissions or Their Trans-
by the governments concerned, such as a
boundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Percent and
commitment to conserve a particular area and
the Protocol Concerning the Control of Emis-
to support its maintenance with a stream of
sions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboun-
payments in local currency. Such "debt for
dary Fluxes-both auxiliary agreements to
nature" swaps are already in place in Bolivia,
the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Trans-
Costa Rica, and Ecuador, and more are under
boundary Air Pollution-set out precise regu-
negotiation. Governments can adopt policies,
latory limitations on releases of specified
such as tax incentives, that encourage creditor
chemicals. Principles established in the case
banks to sell debt for swaps. Creditor gov-
law of international tribunals and in the 1972
ernments can reduce interest or principal on
Stockholm Declaration adopted by the United
sovereign debt in return for promises of policy
Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
reform in this critical sector.
ment also discouraged countries from acting
Coordinating policies on the international
in ways that could harm the environment in
level to fight greenhouse warming will maxi-
another's territory.
mize environmental and foreign-policy bene-
A multilateral treaty designed to arrest
fits. Unilateral reductions in releases of green-
global climate change should satisfy several
house gases by large emitters such as the
basic requirements. First, it must require
United States and the Soviet Union will go a
reductions in releases of greenhouse gases of a
long way toward arresting global climate
magnitude and speed sufficient to stabilize the
disruption. However, a multilateral consensus
earth's climate. The most important gas to
strategy will further the crucial goals of creat-
control is CO2, for which global reductions of
ing incentives for universal participation and
at least 50 per cent are necessary. Participating
establishing an equitable balancing of respon-
countries should accomplish these reductions
sibility for solving the problem.
by means of environmentally and economical-
Existing international mechanisms are an
ly sound technologies that do not present
important part of such a strategy. A reassess-
unacceptable risks to public health or global
ment of the Montreal Protocol, a process that
security. The creation of new forested areas
is provided for by the document itself, is the
might be encouraged by allowing credits
most expeditious way to eliminate the contri-
against reductions of CO2 emissions that
butions CFCs and halons make to the global
would otherwise be required and by provi-
warming problem. The World Bank's institu-
sions establishing or promoting forestry pro-
tional structure also includes mechanisms for
grams. Because the agreement could be ex-
member countries to redirect priorities in the
pected to cover a large number of emissions
critical energy and forest sectors.
sources, it should mandate strict mechanisms
The remainder of the greenhouse problem
for enforcement through reporting of emis-
could be handled most effectively through a
sions, on-site audits, and internationally con-
multilateral treaty, with standards binding
trolled remote sensing.
under international law that would require
Second, the responsibility for making re-
each country to take prescribed actions to
ductions must be distributed equitably.
20.
21.
FOREIGN POLICY
Among the criteria that could be applied is
ENVIRONMENT
relative national wealth as measured by per
capita GNP. Another test could be per capita
AND SECURITY
emissions of CO2, with the highest reductions
required of those countries with the highest
by Norman Myers
emissions per unit of population. Another
possibility would be to require the imposition
of a fee for carbon emissions, either as a
The world is increasingly interdependent
primary mechanism for achieving reductions
environmentally as well as economically. Pol-
or as a supplementary measure. Any of these
lution, whether air- or waterborne, is readily
formulas would require proportionally greater
transported from one country to another, as is
cutbacks by the wealthiest countries and leave
the case between the United States and Cana-
the poorest countries with the fewest con-
da, between the Soviet Union and its neigh-
straints on CO2 emissions. All countries would
bors, among the countries of Western Europe,
be encouraged to use existing energy supplies
and across the Mediterranean basin. The ef-
more efficiently.
fects of soil erosion on agricultural productivi-
A treaty should also require a commitment
ty are a legitimate cause for international
from the wealthier countries for increased
concern, whether the erosion occurs in India
research into non-CO2 energy supply technol-
or in Indiana. Mass extinction of species
ogies and development assistance to help poor-
affects all countries through agriculture, medi-
er countries meet the requirements imposed
cine, and industry, all of which depend to
on them by the agreement. One mechanism
varying degrees on the genetic resources in-
for generating the necessary capital is to
herent in wild plants and animals. The global
require countries to contribute to a fund in
atmosphere is shared by all as well. Following
proportion to their CO2 emissions. Restricting
the build-up of carbon dioxide and other gases
access to this fund to those countries that
that increase the retention of the sun's radiant
accepted the obligations of the treaty would
energy in the earth's atmosphere-known as
create incentives for broad participation.
the greenhouse effect-all countries will suf-
Considering the importance of the re-
fer the vagaries of changed climate. If the
sources at risk, it would be nothing short of
ozone layer continues to be depleted, exposure
reckless to continue with business as usual. A
to enhanced ultraviolet radiation will pose
failure to respond to the threat of greenhouse
serious health threats to all populations. Simi-
warming would amount to an affirmative
lar observations can be made with regard to
decision to wager the health and well-being of
tropical deforestation and the spread of des-
current and future generations against over-
erts. These two latter problems, like certain
whelming odds.
others, are closely connected to rapid popula-
tion growth in the Third World, a problem
related in turn to pervasive poverty and to
associated issues of massive unemployment,
overburdened cities, and refugees from envi-
ronmental degradation.
Some of these problems affect the United
States directly and immediately. For example,
acid rain from the United States and Canada
destroys animal and plant ecosystems in both
countries, and refugees flee environmental
NORMAN MYERS is an independent scientist and
consultant in environment and development. He has
worked with the World Bank, the U.S. National
Academy of Sciences, and the State Department.
22.
23.
DRAFT
DRAFT
COVER to PAMPHLET FOR INFORMAL SEMINAR 2/3/90
DRAFT COVER LETTER
February 2, 1990
Dear Participant:
Tomorrow morning, Saturday, February 3, 1990, an
"Informal Seminar" will be held to discuss approaches that might
be taken to address potential global climate change. In
:
particular, the Seminar will focus on the two approaches recently
suggested by the United States for consideration by the
IPCC/RSWG:
- a "comprehensive" approach in which all greenhouse
gases, their sources and sinks would be treated
together, leaving to each nation the choice of its
internal policies to achieve its net emissions target
through a mix of policies covering the various gases,
sources and sinks; and
- an "emissions trading" approach in which the total
amount of pollution emitted would be limited or reduced
(just as in traditional regulation), in which emitters
are required to hold allowances for their pollution,
and in which allowances may be transferred among
emitters.
Each of these approaches deserves serious consideration. Each
holds the promise of important advantages in any effort to
address potential global climate change. Each also raises
scientific, technological, economic and environmental questions
which must be explored. We hope that discussion at tomorrow's
Informal Seminar and in meetings to come will advance the
understanding and analysis of these approaches. Although
consideration of specific protocols implementing any such
approaches would be premature before the negotiation of a
framework convention, informed discussion of relevant concepts
DRAFT
2
and ideas can improve our shared understanding and can help
ensure that any eventual negotiations toward an international
agreement incorporate the best thinking on the subject.
Tomorrow's Informal Seminar will be chaired by
, and will beg:- with short presentations by
and
.
Audience
discussion will follow. Attached please find:
- Agenda for the Informal Seminar, February 3, 1990
- Introductory Discussion Paper, with References Suggested
for Further Reading
In addition, photocopies of papers on related topics will be
available to you at the Informal Seminar.
These materials are provided to suggest fruitful areas
of discussion; they do not necessarily represent the official
views of the United States nor of the participants in the
Informal Seminar. Our hope is that through these materials, and
more importantly, through our conversations at the Seminar, we
will be more informed about possible approaches to possible
international agreement on global climate change issues, and more
understanding of each others' experiences and views on these
subjects.
DRAFT
DRAFT
AGENDA for INFORMAL SEMINAR, 2/3/90
DRAFT AGENDA for INFORMAL SEMINAR
February 3, 1990
U.S. Department of State, Room XXXX
10:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon
SCHEDULE
10:00 a.m.
Coffee
10:10 a.m.
Welcome
State Dept.
10:20 a.m.
Brief Presentations
:
Moderator: State Dept.
Remarks:
(one or two speakers; some combination of
representatives from:)
Office of the White House Counsel
CEA
EPA
DOJ
11:00 a.m.
Break
11:10 a.m.
Audience Discussion
Moderator: State Dept.
(Additional U.S. Agencies interested in
participating)
(Other nations)
(NGOs?)
(Congress?)
12:00 noon
Conclusion
DRAFT
DRAFT
PAMPHLET for INFORMAL SEMINAR, 2/3/90
INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSION PAPER:
"COMPREHENSIVE" AND "EMISSIONS TRADING" APPROACHES
TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
SUMMARY
In its submission of a "Concept Paper" to the IPCC/RSWG
on December 29, 1989, the United States proposed consideration of
two approaches to any international agreement on potential global
climate change: 1 a "comprehensive" approach and an "emissions
trading" approach. This paper briefly surveys each approach.
Under a comprehensive, performance-based approach, all
greenhouses gases, sources and sinks would be addressed together.
Each international legal instrument produced -- whether
convention or protocol -- would deal, to the maximum extent
possible, with the entire array of gases, their sources and
:
sinks. This approach employs the concept of a parameter, such as
an "index," to enable comparison of the contributions of
different gases, their sources and sinks, to total global climate
change. It also employs the concept of "net emissions" to
fashion performance targets that would not be limited to any one
gas or source or sink, but would permit attainment of the target
through policies aimed at reducing sources or expanding sinks or
both. Such net emissions performance targets would be set, at
least initially, for each nation, 2 and would leave to each nation
the choice of internal policies desired to attain the target.
Thus, employing the parameter or "index," each nation could
devise a set of policies that would focus on one or more gases of
its choice and thereby reduce its "net emissions,' through
restriction of sources or expansion of sinks or both, to meet the
target. Such an approach would provide maximum flexibility for
developing diverse, innovative, cost-effective measures.
¹The term "potential global climate change" is used in this
paper to refer to possible changes in global and regional climate
that may result from increased concentrations of substances in
the atmosphere that alter the atmosphere's thermal radiation
budget.
2 In appropriate circumstances, targets might be set for
groups of nations, such as regional affiliations.
DRAFT
2
The "emissions trading" approach is conceptually
separate from, but compatible with, the "comprehensive" approach.
Emissions trading, which is one form of transferable allowances,
is simply a tool to implement regulations on pollution or other
uses of scarce resources. In a traditional regulatory scheme,
the government sets the proper total amount of emissions (and its
growth or decline over time), and then requires every emitter to
meet the same standard, or to apply the same control technology.
In emissions trading, the government sets the same total limits
on emissions, but then permits emitters to allocate among
themselves who will emit how much. This allocation is
accomplished through issuing allowances to emitters, which they
may trade among each other. The total amount of allowances is
set equal to the total amount of emissions the government has
chosen. The government supervises trades to ensure accurate
reporting, and may take steps to facilitate trades as well. An
emissions trading system can be designed to meet diverse
circumstances: for example, allowances could be tradeable at
specified ratios, or auctioned, or depositable in a bank for
future withdrawal, or other variations.
The United States has used emissions trading to
implement a variety of environmental protection programs, and has
developed practical experience in the design and functioning of
trading systems. This experience indicates that emissions
trading is a pragmatic tool for protecting the environment at
substantially lower costs to society than traditional regulatory
approaches. An emissions trading approach could be highly
advantageous to nations seeking to regulate their greenhouse gas
emissions: limits on such emissions will be economically and
socially costly, and choosing cost-effective methods that both
achieve environmental goals and encourage diversity and
innovation will be of great importance. Emissions trading
programs could be used domestically by nations under the
"comprehensive" approach just described, or under a system in
which only one greenhouse gas is regulated; and, if desired, a
trading system could be adapted for use among nations.
3
3 The RSWG Economic and Market Measures Paper has discussed
allowing international trades (on a bilateral, regional or
multilateral basis, and possibly conducted by governmental or
private sector actors) as a method for attaining national net
emissions targets, in order to achieve further environmental and
economic benefits from the use of the trading principle.
DRAFT
3
DISCUSSION
A.
"Comprehensive" Approach.
1. Description.
A comprehensive performance-based approach stands in
contrast to a piecemeal pollutant-by-pollutant approach, such as
those that focus on adopting targets for one greenhouse gas,
carbon dioxide (C02), alone. 4 The comprehensive approach would
treat all greenhouse gases collectively: each nation would be
obligated to meet a target for its total combined contribution to
greenhouse gas emissions. The total contribution would be the
sum of the emissions of each greenhouse gas, weighted by the
incremental contribution each different gas makes to total
climate change. The weights assigned to the various gases would
be measured by a parameter, such as an "index," expressing the
comparative contribution of each gas (and, in turn, useful for
estimating the comparative role played by any given source or
sink) 6 Further, the "comprehensive" approach would set a target
for each nation's "net emissions" of greenhouse gases, allowing:
4 For example, the November 1989 Noordwijk Declaration
appeared to urge pollutant-by-pollutant control rules, starting
with CO2. On the other hand, it did suggest (in paragraph 10)
possible development of a method for comparing the effects of
other gases to the effects of CO2, similar to the parameter for
comparing gases discussed here.
⁵The term "greenhouse gases" is used in this paper to refer
to substances that, when present in the atmosphere, act to trap
thermal radiation.
⁶For example, analysts have discussed a "global warming
potential index, and the Noordwijk Declaration referred to "the
concept of CO2 equivalence" in paragraph 10. Such a parameter is
a system for computing the contribution to total atmospheric
warming of any alteration in the emissions of any particular
gréenhouse gas. It assigns a value to each greenhouse gas
describing the contribution of each additional molecule of that
gas to the total warming of the atmosphere. The value depends on
variables such as the molecular composition of the gas and its
attendant capacity for radiative forcing, the lifetime of such
molecules in the atmosphere, the existing atmospheric
concentration of the gas and related gases at the time the
additional molecule reaches the atmosphere, and the discount rate
at which future warming is compared to present warming.
DRAFT
4
compliance to be achieved by reductions in sources⁷ of greenhouse
gases, or expansion of sinks, 8 or both. The targets would be
"performance-based," in the sense that they would obligate
nations to achieve certain net emissions levels by whatever
means, rather than "design standards" that obligate parties to
adopt specified technological applications or undertake specified
response activities. The targets could, for example, consist of
reductions. a cap or a phased-in cap, possibly followed by subsequent
2. United States Experience: the Environmental Advantages
of a Comprehensive Approach
In the United States we have followed a medium-by-
medium and pollutant-by-pollutant approach for the last several
decades. Our environmental laws, such as the Clean Air Act, the
Clean Water Act, the hazardous waste statutes, were each written
to address one kind of pollution. Often, these statutes required
separate regulations for each different type of source of that
kind of pollution: thus, for example, there are separate
regulatory programs for air pollutants from large utility plants,
from smaller industrial plants, and from mobile sources.
Breaking pollution control down into these piecemeal categories
may initially seem logical, but we have learned through
frustrating experience that it has a serious drawback: pollution
or other undesirable residual effects of economic activity
regulated in one category may simply shift to another,
unregulated or less regulated, category. Shifts from one
environmental medium -- air, water, land -- to another have
thwarted attempts to reduce pollution, and these "cross-media"
shifts have played a part in the evolution of new (though still
piecemeal) laws aimed at the new manifestations of pollution.
For example, stringent regulations on water pollution have
induced industry to convert liquid pollutants into sludge, in
turn creating toxic waste disposal problems. Statutes regulating
solid waste pollution were not enacted until several years after
the initial air and water laws were put in place. 9
7 "Sources" of greenhouse gases include anthropogenic,
biogenic and other sources of greenhouse gases emitted into the
atmosphere.
8 "Sinks" of greenhouse gases include anthropogenic, biogenic
and other activities, processes, and phenomena that remove
greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. Examples of sinks are
forests and oceanic plankton.
9 Other examples include [ EPA please suggest items ].
DRAFT
5
Moreover, restrictions on emissions from one kind of
source of a pollutant can result in compliance strategies that,
while adhering to the law, fail to reduce environmental
degradation, and may even make it worse. For example, laws
regulating smokestack air pollution were written to require that
the ambient air quality in the locality of the smokestack not
fall below certain levels. One industry response to this
approach was to build taller smokestacks, so that the pollutant
plumes were fed into higher wind currents and were dispersed more
rapidly from the local area. Pollutants continued to degrade the
environment farther downwind. Later, the laws were amended to
try to prevent such circumvention.
Recognizing the inherent and recurring problems in the
piecemeal approach, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is
now devising a more integrated strategy to address the "cross-
media" and "cross-source" difficulties of our system of
environmental control. Preliminary versions of a unified
environmental statute have been drafted. Dealing with all
environmental impacts in a comprehensive fashion will, we hope,
lead to better reduction in deleterious pollution while avoiding
environmentally troublesome and economically wasteful compliance
strategies that merely shift pollution around.
This experience is particularly apt for the problems of
potential global climate change. Such change is thought to be
the result of numerous pollutants: several different greenhouse
gases, such as carbon dioxide (C02), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide
(N20) chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and tropospheric ozone (03) ;
gases like carbon monoxide (CO) that chemically generate
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere; and other substances (e.g.
soot and aerosol pollutants like sulfur dioxide (S02) ) that may
alter the atmospheric thermal budget in other ways. In turn,
each of these gases is produced by a variety of sources on the
earth's surface. Imposing narrow controls on one greenhouse gas
alone, or on one source of such gases, is likely to be
ineffective and possibly even counterproductive. Limits on CO2
alone, for example, could encourage industry to shift to
production and combustion processes, alternative fuel sources,
and other activities that emit other greenhouse gases, possibly
including CO and CH4. Narrow limits on one source of CO2, such
as coal combustion in utility power plants, could encourage
development of alternative combustion methods (e.g., coal
gasification). The end results of these kinds of shifts might
even be greater contributions to total greenhouse gas emissions
per unit of economic output or per capita. A comprehensive
approach to all greenhouse gases, their sources and sinks would
DRAFT
6
limit total impacts on global climate change, while avoiding
undesirable cross-pollutant and cross-source shifts. 10
3. Additional Considerations in Applying the
"Comprehensive" Approach
There are several additional advantages to applying the
"comprehensive" approach to an international agreement on
potential global climate change.
First, the comprehensive approach would allow each
nation to use that combination of source and sink controls and
other measures that is best adapted to its economic and other
circumstances, achieving greenhouse environmental protection at
significantly lower cost than a pollutant-by-pollutant strategy.
This approach maximizes the opportunity for and encourages the
adoption of diverse, flexible, innovative, and cost-effective
solutions to global climate change. For example, an approach
that mandated specific percentage reductions in each gas -- such
as a 20% reduction in CO2 and a 30% reduction in methane -- would
be more costly than an approach that required a reduction in each
nation's contribution to total warming (as measured by the gas-:
comparison parameter) and permitted each nation to adopt its
least-cost mix of choices achieving the target overall. Some
nations might be able to reduce CO2 emissions much more than 20%
through substitution of non-fossil fuels, but be unable to reduce
methane output (e.g., a nation importing oil and dependent on
rice crops, but endowed with untapped solar power opportunities)
Those nations would meet their net targets by reducing CO2 more
rapidly than methane; reducing each the same amount would prove
much more costly (perhaps in terms of higher taxes, or reduced
10 Although a "comprehensive" approach to greenhouse gases
would avoid shifts within the realm of greenhouse factors, it
still might be said to be focused on the "single medium" of
atmospheric temperature change. The problem of the environmental
"second-best" could then persist even in our "comprehensive"
approach: the adoption of a comprehensive greenhouse gas
agreement might lead to previously undiscovered non-greenhouse
environmental impacts. An extreme analog is the history of
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) : enthusiastically introduced to
replace chemicals that were highly toxic to humans, CFCs later
proved to have serious effects on the stratospheric ozone layer.
Nevertheless, a "comprehensive" approach to greenhouse
gases, sources and sinks is a vast improvement over pollutant-by-
pollutant or source-by-source control of greenhouse factors.
Meanwhile, the IPCC or other appropriate body could be directed
to monitor possible non-greenhouse environmental impacts of any
agreement and to report to the international community at regular
intervals.
DRAFT
7
rice production) and would leave available CO2 reductions
unexploited. Other nations might find themselves in the opposite
situation, able to reduce methane more than CO2 (e.g., a nation
dependent on coal reserves but able to reduce its ruminant animal
husbandry) 11 The economic and social costs of policy responses
to global climate change are likely to be great. It is thus
particularly important in this context to use institutional
strategies that will maximize the incentives and opportunities
for development of new technologies and other innovative
responses that will reduce these costs. A comprehensive approach
employing performance-based standards will contribute
substantially to achieving this goal.
Second, this approach reserves to each nation the
freedom to employ whatever institutional mechanisms it wishes to
use to achieve its target objective. This flexibility takes
account of the widely varying legal and cultural systems present
in different nations, and avoids the obstacles to international
agreement among sovereign states that would be raised by
dictating to each nation how it must institutionally manage its
climate-related policies and industries. A free market economy
would not be required to employ strict command and control
regulations; by the same token, a centrally planned economy would
not be required to employ market measures.
Third, a comprehensive approach would be more
equitable. An approach that set targets first for one gas, or
for certain sources or sinks, and progressed to others only later
would unfairly put the onus of compliance disproportionately upon
those nations whose economies are comparatively more burdened by
the initial measure. For example, an approach that first
mandated 20% reductions in CO2 emissions would place much greater
burdens on those heavily committed to using fossil fuels, and on
those whose economies depend on exports of fossil fuels;
alternatively, an approach that first mandated 20% reductions in
methane emissions would place much greater burdens on those
heavily dependent on rice crops and ruminant animal husbandry.
A comprehensive approach gives nations a more equal obligation to
shoulder the costs of compliance. The comprehensive approach is
consequently likely to avoid some of the obstacles to
international agreement that would be faced by a pollutant-by-
pollutant approach. The latter approach could engender
¹¹A similar analysis applies to approaches mandating
specific changes in sources alone or sinks alone, rather than
combining them in a "net emissions" requirement that leaves the
domestic policy mix to each nation.
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8
opposition from nations who feared that the initial burden would
fall on them; the comprehensive approach would ease such fears. 12
There are, however, important caveats to a comprehen-
sive approach that should be reviewed. First, the calculation of
proper gas-comparison parameter or "index" values will require
effort. Scientific study of this calculation has made progress,
but more needs to be done before consensus values are obtained.
As mentioned above, the parameter values depend on a variety of
complex and sometimes interrelated variables. 13 So far, efforts
to define a parameter have reached somewhat different results.
In addition, if the parameter values are to be useful in
assessing the comparative contributions of different sources and
sinks, there remains the practical problem of assigning values
sensitive enough to yield efficient environmental policy. 14
12
Moreover, a comprehensive approach reduces the ability of
nations to manipulate the design of international regulatory
measures to their own competitive or other economic advantage. A
pollutant-by-pollutant command and control approach is vulnerable
to attempts by nations to "game" the standard-setting agenda in
their favor. For example, a nation reliant on non-fossil fuel
energy sources, and whose chief rival earns its income from
fossil fuel exports, could press for reductions in CO2 emissions
not for their environmental value but to improve its competitive
standing relative to its rival. or a wheat-growing nation could
press for methane emission reductions at the expense of its rice-
growing neighbor. Such attempts would hinder international
agreement on reductions of any particular pollutant. Such
attempts to "game" the design of international regulatory
controls are also likely to distort trade and reduce global
welfare, as well as impede environmental improvement. By leaving
the mix of compliance policies to each nation's discretion SO
long as the overall target is achieved, the comprehensive
approach greatly reduces the potential for such gaming.
13
For example, the atmospheric lifetimes of some important
gases are not yet completely understood. In addition, parameter
values for each gas are usually expressed as constants, whereas
their dependence on such variables as the changing ambient
concentrations of related gases suggests that mapping a
continuous function could be helpful for policy analysis.
14 As sources and sinks are assigned performance values for
their contributions to emissions of gases and thus to total
climate change, those values must be sensitive and flexible
enough to take account of numerous variables, such as diverse and
improving combustion techniques and scrubbing methods, and the
varying regional characteristics of forests. Otherwise, the
(continued )
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9
Finally, the policy ramifications of assigning different
parameter values to different gases -- effectively altering the
costs to different nations of achieving their performance targets
mean that the parameter values obtained must be carefully
derived and highly accurate. The committee conducting this work
should be composed of the best experts, and must produce methods
and conclusions that are legitimate in the eyes of the world.
Second, pursuit of the "comprehensive" approach might
appear to some critics to delay the process of reaching
international agreement on global climate change issues. Some
may believe that the fastest approach is to adopt protocols
quickly for substances we can agree on now, and then proceed to
thornier issues as we go. On the other hand, the comprehensive
approach could in fact proceed more quickly, because (as
discussed above) it raises the probability of broad consensus by
eliminating the divisive inequitable effects of single-pollutant
protocols. In addition, the comprehensive approach may achieve
better overall environmental protection than a single-pollutant
protocol, even if it does take slightly longer to achieve than
the first single-pollutant protocol would take, because it will
prevent cross-pollutant shifts. 15
14
(
continued)
values set will entrench existing practices and discourage
investment in advances that could further reduce net greenhouse
gas emissions. For example, if "coal combustion" were assigned a
constant parameter value regardless of combustion technique,
industry would have no incentive to adopt innovative combustion
techniques that reduce the quantity of greenhouse gases emitted
per BTU (indeed, the incentive could operate in the opposite
direction). A similar analysis would apply to assigning a
parameter value to, say, "trees" generally, whereas different
types of trees, and trees in different settings, remove
greenhouse gases from the atmosphere at different rates.
The source and sink values should also be able to take
account of long-term investments in emissions-affecting policies,
such as sink development, which may have inherently long lead times.
15 Efforts might also be directed to accelerating work on the
scientific issues raised by the comprehensive approach, in order
not to waste time. A different tack would be to consider
including in a framework convention, depending on the status of
development of the first protocol, a requirement that within a
specified period after the convention enters into force the
parties will agree on the scope and timetable for the first
protocol. It may, however, be infeasible to ask parties to bind
themselves to future agreement; and specifying too early a date
might hinder efforts to achieve an intelligent resolution of
difficult issues.
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10
Third, the comprehensive approach requires a decision
on which greenhouse gases to include. (Although the same
question could be faced at several junctures in a pollutant-by-
pollutant approach, the comprehensive approach depends upon an
overall decision earlier in the process. 16, For example, it may
be difficult to decide how to treat chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)
and other greenhouse gases already regulated under the Montreal
Protocol on Substances Depleting the Ozone Layer. Options for
addressing CFCs in a greenhouse gas agreement include:
(a) giving credit for reductions in CFCs that go beyond
the reductions required under the Montreal Protocol;
(b) giving credit for all reductions in CFCs; and
(c) not giving credit for reductions in CFCs.
Each of these options would have different effects on CFC
consumption. 17 Other options might also be suggested. A related
question is the treatment of the existing reservoir of CFCs
trapped in such containers as abandoned refrigerators. Venting
such CFCs could be counted as greenhouse gas emissions, thus
giving incentives to store or recycle such gases safely.
Fourth, the comprehensive approach will also require
decision on what treatment to give past practices, such as
investments in fossil and non-fossil fuel energy sources; energy
conservation; efforts at controlling pollutants that reduce
greenhouse gas emissions; and deforestation. This question must
be faced, of course, under a single-pollutant approach as well.
Fifth, a multi-pollutant agreement may complicate the
task of monitoring compliance, because it covers many more gases
and sinks which must be watched. This concern points to the need
to ensure scientifically credible methods of monitoring emissions
16 Limitations in data and scientific understanding may
preclude inclusion, at least at the outset, of "all" greenhouse
gases, sources and sinks, even in a comprehensive approach. An
ideal comprehensive approach would include all factors
influencing global climate change. If that is infeasible, a
comprehensive approach could begin with the set of major,
scientifically understood gases, their sources and sinks, and
proceed to add other gases as they become understood.
17
For example, option (c), no credit, would provide no
additional incentive to nations producing CFCs to achieve further
reductions. Option (a) would provide such an incentive. Option
(b) would provide such an incentive and recognize the value to
potential global climate change of reductions made in CFCs under
the Montreal Protocol.
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11
climate.
of various 18 sources, changes in sinks, and their effects on global
In this respect, a comprehensive approach reinforces
the need to base response agreements on sound science and data.
(It is also possible that the effects of certain gases, sources
and sinks may not be sufficiently well understood to include them
in an initial agreement limiting net emissions. The ideal of
total comprehensiveness may thus be limited by gaps in knowledge.
As scientific knowledge advances, however, additional gases,
sources and sinks could be included in the basic agreement.)
B.
"Emissions Trading" Approach.
The second approach suggested for consideration is
"emissions trading" in greenhouse gas emissions. This paper
discusses emissions trading systems that nations could choose to
employ in their domestic implementation of environmental
protection goals, such as for curtailing greenhouse gas
emissions. The paper surveys how emissions trading works in
principle, and what experience the United States has had in
employing trading systems for environmental protection.
1. Description.
Emissions trading is one system for employing
transferable allowances to ration the use of scarce resources,
such as land, air, or water. These systems are not methods for
increasing the amount of resource exploitation permitted. They
are simply methods for implementing the same limit on total
resource use that would be imposed under a traditional regulatory
scheme. Under a traditional scheme, every resource user must
reduce its use by the same percentage or to the same uniform
level. For some users, that will be very expensive; for others,
even further reductions would be feasible, but there is no
incentive to achieve further reductions. Under a trading system,
the total target limit (or reduction) is the same, but the
resource users are able to reallocate who uses more and who uses
less -- that is, to trade allowances among the users. They will
do so according to how valuable it is to each user to continue
using the resource. Those users for whom reducing resource use
is very expensive can purchase allowances from those users for
whom reductions are less expensive. Allowance sellers then must
reduce their use of the regulated resource even further, but they
gain the sale price of their allowances. The result is that
those best able to reduce resource use do so the most. Overall,
18 For example, in many nations data on methane emissions
from diverse non-point sources, such as rice fields, landfills
and animal herds, are not well developed.
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12
the aggregate resource use target is achieved at lower total cost
than if all users were required to meet the same target
regardless of differences in their costs.
To put the point more concretely: say that the
government determines to reduce total emissions of a pollutant to
Level X, which works out to an average reduction from present
levels of 20 units per polluter. 19 Initially, the government
instructs each polluter to reduce its emissions to a target level
of 20 units less than current emissions; or, stated in other
words, each polluter is allowed to pollute up to the target
level, 20 units less than its current emissions. Allowances are
distributed to polluters which, in total, add up to Level X. No
pollution may be emitted by each polluter above its target, or,
in other words, unless it is accompanied by an allowance. So
far, this system is identical to the traditional scheme. Some
polluters will find it inexpensive to meet the 20 unit reduction,
and could even reduce further, while others will find it very
costly -- possibly ruinous. Now, we add the simple change that
polluters are permitted to trade the allowances they hold. Then
emitters would find mutual advantages to trading. For example,
one emitter of the pollutant might find it more costly to reduce
its own emissions 20 units than to reduce its own emissions only
10 units and to purchase allowances worth the remaining 10 units
(those it will still be producing above its target level) from
another emitter -- so that the second emitter must reduce its
emissions 30 units (the initial 20 units plus an additional 10
units to account for the allowances it is selling). This
decision is a good choice for the second emitter if it is able to
reduce the extra 10 units at less cost than the price the first
emitter is paying it for the accompanying allowances. The net
result is the same average 20 unit reduction sought by the
government, achieving Level X overall, but at less total cost to
society, because the sum of the price paid for the allowance
trade and the second emitter's reduction expenses is less than
the sum of expenses if each emitter had to reduce 20 units. The
"cost" society saves is resources that can be put to good use on
other activities.
The payment for the allowances could be in cash. For
example, a large emitter might meet its allowance limit by paying
a landowner to plant trees. or the payment could be in-kind;
thus, the second emitter might receive some service from the
first emitter. For example, the first emitter might be a large
farming company which could give the second emitter, a town's
public utility plant, harvested grain in return for the extra 10
units of allowances. Whatever the mode of payment, both sides
19 The analysis is similar for a certain percentage reduction
per polluter, or for a rule limiting each polluter's emissions to
a certain maximum.
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13
would gain, at no loss to society in pollution prevention.
Indeed, the gains from trade in allowances are similar to the
gains from trade when two parties voluntarily exchange other
things of value, such as when two neighbors have different jobs
(e.g., farmer and doctor) and rely on each other's services, or
when nations with different economic strengths trade different
goods with each other. It is less costly to everyone for the
parties to produce goods according to their own strengths and to
trade, than for each party to be self-sufficient in every needed
item.
Trading in emissions allowances has several advantages
over nontransferable emissions limits. As just described, it
enables society to achieve pollution reductions at lower total
cost. Given the likely high cost of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions in most societies, a trading system could be a critical
tool in implementing greenhouse gas emissions limits. In
addition, emissions trading gives incentives for energy
conservation and other forms of fuel efficiency and pollution
prevention, whereas regulations that direct firms to employ a
certain pollution control technology do not. Moreover, emissions
trading encourages innovation in technologies, processes and
social systems that reduce emissions at least cost over the long
term, whereas regulations that direct firms to employ a certain
pollution control technology do not.
There would be no requirement that every regulated
emitter "take part" in the trading system; those who saw no
economic need to engage in trades, or who were philosophically
opposed, could refrain. At the same time, other organizations
who wanted to reduce total pollution further -- such as a
philanthropic foundation or the government -- could purchase
allowances and hold them without emitting pollutants. (The
government could also announce in advance that the value of
allowances would be reduced over time, or that tiers of
allowances would expire in time, or that allowances must be
repurchased periodically.)
Implementation of such a system would require a role
for government, as discussed further below. The government could
monitor emissions, as it would under a traditional regulatory
scheme, and it could monitor the trades themselves, to ensure
accurate accounting. The government could facilitate trading, by
acting as an auctioneer or broker, and by establishing "banks" to
trade in allowances. To avoid unregulated increases in
pollution, the government would not permit pollution without
accompanying allowances. Allowances could expire and be issued
or auctioned annually, in revised total amounts that reflect the
government's desired rate of decline or growth in total
pollution. To avoid forcing new entrants to the market to
purchase their allowances directly from their competitors, the
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14
government could retain some of the allowances for issuance or
auction to new businesses.
2. U.S. Experience with "Emissions Trading" Approaches
Emissions trading is not just a concept; it is a
practical method now operating in the United States in several
different areas of environmental policy. A growing literature
has analyzed these efforts. 20 Trading has been used, for
example, to implement controls on air pollution, water pollution,
use of fuels and hazardous substances, and land development. For
the most part, these efforts have been highly successful, but we
have learned as well from the few trading systems that have not
functioned well. Experience with trading systems has been
sufficiently impressive to encourage the Administration to employ
an emissions trading approach in its ambitious proposal to reduce
acid rain; this proposal is now being debated in Congress.
Examples of U.S. experience with emissions trading and
related systems include:
(a) Emissions trading under the Clean Air Act. Under
the Clean Air Act, each region of the country must attain ambient
air quality standards. Existing, modified, and new sources of
pollution are all regulated to achieve the ambient standards and
to prevent deterioration once standards are attained. Depending
on the type of source and whether the area is "in attainment" or
not, sources must employ a range of pollution controls. The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has implemented the ambient
air quality requirements and the pollution control requirements
through several different emissions trading systems. "Offsets"
allow new or modified sources to be created in nonattainment
areas so long as they obtain corresponding decreases in emissions
from existing sources in the same area. The new source must
still employ the most stringent pollution control technologies.
"Netting" allows a source modification to occur without employing
the most stringent pollution control technology if it obtains a
corresponding decrease in emissions from other parts of the same
plant. "Bubbles" allow existing plants with multiple sources to
reallocate emissions within the plant, so long as total emissions
20see the articles cited in the "References" section at the
end of this paper. Experience with several specific trading
systems is surveyed by Dudek & Palmisano, "Emissions Trading: Why
is this Thoroughbred Hobbled?" 13 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 217 (1988) ;
and Hahn & Hester, "Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and
Practice," 16 Ecol. L. Q. 361 (1989). The discussion of trading
system examples in this section draws from these articles and
other sources.
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15
do not increase. In addition, a banking program lets existing
sources store extra reductions in emissions for future use.
Experience has been different under each of these
programs, but in general, there have been significant cost
savings to industry from the netting and bubble programs. There
have been numerous netting trades, yet fairly few bubble program
trades. There have been a number of offset trades, but it is
difficult to assess the cost savings obtained. No overall
environmental effects have been observed; that is consistent with
the design of the trading programs to permit reallocation of
emissions among and within plants but to maintain the same
aggregate emissions level.
Yet observers believe that these trading programs could
be more successful. First, trading is limited but some non-
transferable emissions reduction duties; for example, new sources
are not permitted to avoid employing the most stringent pollution
control technologies, even if they can find an existing source
willing to reduce its emissions commensurately. This situation
prevents trading that could reduce costs while maintaining
constant total emissions. Second, the combination of technology-
based emissions control rules and emissions trading often adds
costs. Firms that have installed control technology are in
compliance, but they must separately measure actual past and
present emissions if they want to trade. Trading would be
relatively less costly if the law regulated emissions directly,
not technology. Similarly, standards for ambient air quality do
not mesh well with emissions trading, because allowances traded
may subject to confiscation if the region as a whole fails to
meet its ambient quality standard. Third, the variety of trading
systems, and the variety of attendant regulatory oversight, favor
some kinds of trades (chiefly trades internal to a firm, such as
netting) over others.
Moreover, some specific trading programs have not
worked well. For example, the agency operating the Los Angeles
program has authorized additional pollution from new sources
without requiring the sources to obtain emissions allowances.
That kind of waiver or loophole effectively expands the limit on
total pollution; it is as though the overall emissions target set
by the government had been relaxed. The agency's action permits
pollution to rise and simultaneously undercuts the allowance
market (and lowers allowance prices) by making allowances
effectively unnecessary.
(b) Acid rain reduction proposal. The Administration
has proposed, and Congress is now considering, new Clean Air Act
legislation to reduce emissions of pollutants which contribute to
acid precipitation. A key feature of the Administration proposal
is a system of transferable emission allowances. The proposal
sets a permanent cap of 10 million tons per year on emissions of
sulfur dioxide (one of the main precursors of acid precipitation)
from certain fossil fuel-burning electric utilities (the primary
source of SO2 emissions in the U.S.) The proposal requires each
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16
utility to hold an allowance for each ton of SO2 it emits.
Allowances for 10 million tons of emissions per year would be
allocated among the utilities by multiplying each utility's
historic power output levels by an average SO2 emissions rate.
Under this formula, most utilities would not be allocated enough
allowances to cover their emissions at historic levels. To make
up this allowance shortfall, utilities could reduce their
emissions by installing additional pollution control equipment or
taking conservation measures, or could purchase additional
allowances. Utilities that could afford to reduce their
emissions below the average emission rate (i.e. below the number
of allowances they had been allocated) would be able to sell
those "extra" allowances to other utilities.
This system provides flexibility for each utility to choose
the compliance strategy that is most cost-effective for it. Each
utility can adopt the mix of emission reductions and allowance
sales or purchases that best minimizes its own costs. It also
creates a strong financial incentive for all utilities to
minimize their emissions; thus, it encourages energy conservation
and technological innovation, either of which would be
encouraged by a rule requiring utilities to adopt specific
pollutant control mechanisms such as scrubbers. And by
permitting trading, it ensures that the overall environmental
objective -- limiting utility SO2 emissions to 10 million tons
per year -- is achieved at the lowest possible cost to the
economy as a whole.
(c) Lead phasedown. Also under the Clean Air Act,
the EPA issued regulations reducing the allowable lead content of
gasoline. In 1982 EPA instituted limits on lead content and
permitted trading within and among refiners: leaded gasoline
producers and importers could transfer (i.e., buy and sell) lead
content credits freely among themselves through 1986, or could
apply such credits to their own gasoline. But such credits
expired quarterly if unused. In 1985, EPA substantially reduced
the lead content limit further; the content was required to
decline, in phases, from 1.10 grams of lead per gallon (gpg) to
no more than 0.10 gpg by the end of 1985. To provide leaded
gasoline producers and importers with some flexibility in
complying with the new limits, EPA also issued regulations in
1985 permitting producers and importers whose gasoline in 1985
contained less lead per gallon than the applicable standard, to
"bank" lead content credits (i.e., to avoid the expiration of
credits). The "banking" regulations then permitted gasoline
producers and importers to "withdraw" those lead content credits
through the end of 1987 and to apply them to help meet the new,
more stringent lead content standards that took effect in 1985.
The banking and trading system helped the industry as a
whole to comply with the new lead limits, while ensuring that the
total amount of lead content did not exceed the maximum that
otherwise would have been allowed under the lead content
standards in the absence of the banking provisions. Data
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17
indicate that banking and trading were active, and that they
resulted in substantial cost savings (on the order of hundreds of
millions of dollars).
The design of the lead phasedown system facilitated
widespread trading. Firms were not required to apply to the EPA
for permission to enter into trades; they simply reported their
trades to the government, as part of their regularly required
reports of the lead content in their gasoline. Each firm was
simply required to have a net balance of lead content credits
greater than or equal to zero in each quarter. In addition,
because gasoline refiners and importers were accustomed to
trading feedstocks and other commodities with each other, trades
in lead content credits did not require new information networks.
In sum, the lead phasedown was highly successful.
(d) CFCs reduction. In order to implement national
and international requirements that production and use of CFCs be
reduced in the 1990s, the EPA has issued regulations limiting
total U.S. CFC production and requiring a 50% reduction in
production by the end of the decade. The EPA regulations
implement these phased reductions by issuing allowances to each
producer of CFCs. These allowances may be traded among
producers. Analysts expect this system to work well. EPA is
able to monitor emissions of CFCs, and to keep track of allowance :
trades. Producers are aware of potential buyers and sellers and
can trade allowances freely. One important question is whether
EPA will issue initial allowances free of charge, or sell them at
fixed prices or at an auction. Free issuance is administratively
simpler, but selling the allowances -- especially at an auction -
- would provide a natural method for allocating the allowances to
start the program, and would give producers an incentive to
develop CFC substitutes even sooner.
(e) Pinelands development. A somewhat different kind
of allowance system has been used successfully by the State of
New Jersey to regulate development of the Pinelands, a forest
zone the State wishes to protect from excessive development.
Here the allowances are not for emissions of a pollutant, but for
rights to develop certain property. Property in parts of the
Pinelands is slated for preservation, and the owners of that
property may agree to be prohibited from developing their land.
In return, they are issued "transferable development rights"
(TDRs) which they may sell to others wishing to develop land in
the other areas of the Pinelands. Different amounts of TDRs are
issued to each owner, depending on the value to society of
preserving that owner's property. In areas in which development
is permitted, landowners must hold TDRs to develop their
property. Thus, the total amount of development in the Pinelands
is capped, and the regional distribution is partly restricted;
but the precise allocation of development on permissible
properties is left to the market for TDRs. In addition, no
current landowner is entirely deprived of the former market value
DRAFT
18
of his or her land, because those who are barred from developing
their own land receive TDRs to sell to others. Because anyone
may purchase the TDRs, landowners in high-growth areas who wish
to block further development may buy TDRs to retire them. The
government has established a TDR exchange to facilitate trades:
the exchange buys TDRs from willing sellers and sells them to
interested buyers.
(f) Fox River water pollution. Under the Clean Water
Act, sources of water pollution must meet water quality
standards. The State of Wisconsin adopted a pollution discharge
limit system for the Fox River that set the limit for each
source, but also permitted sources to devise new discharge
limits, by mutual agreement, so long as the total discharge did
not rise. In principle, the system implements a market in
transferable emissions allowances. In practice, however, the
system has proved cumbersome. Sources hold five-year permits
from the state, and trades may expire at the close of a permit
cycle, impairing their use for reallocations that involve long-
term investments in capital equipment. No allowances or credits
are actually issued to sources; instead, each agreement between
sources must be submitted for approval to the state agency.
Parties must demonstrate to the state that they "need" to make :
changes in their permits. Review by the agency can be complex
and time-consuming. And there is no broker to help arrange
trades. Thus, transaction costs are high and the market is
sluggish. Agency review of proposed trades is necessitated,
moreover, by the fact that agreements between sources can yield
very low discharges of toxic substances in one local area and
very high discharges of toxics in another, placing too great an
ecological burden on the latter area. Hence the spectrum of
possible trades is limited.
(g) Dillon Reservoir water pollution. In the state of
Colorado, economic growth was adding pollutants to the Dillon
Reservoir, endangering drinking water supplies. Pollutants came
from both point sources (e.g. factory discharge pipes) and
nonpoint sources (e.g. runoff). The government issued annual
discharge allowances to all sources. It then requires that
sources may increase their discharges only if they acquire
allowances from nonpoint sources, at a ratio of 2:1. That is,
for each pound of discharges a source wishes to add, it must
reduce discharges by two pounds from nonpoint sources. Because
control of point sources is about seven times as expensive as
control of nonpoint sources, the 2:1 trading ratio leaves
dischargers considerable room for cost-saving trades. Thus,
trading will both save costs and reduce pollution. Although the
program is just getting under way, observers expect active
trading and significant cost savings.
(h) Other related programs. Transferable allowances
and related systems are also being used in other environmental
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19
protection programs. Some truck and automobile manufacturers are
being permitted to trade internally in different types of
emissions. That is, a manufacturer is instructed to achieve
total or average emissions for its fleet, but permitted
flexibility to allocate those emissions among its vehicles. A
similar program is being developed for trading between different
pollutant gases (nitrogen oxides and particulates) emitted from
truck engines. A trading program for reducing asbestos emissions
has also been discussed.
3. The Fruits of Experience.
U.S. experience with these and other trading systems
has yielded several insights. They are summarized here.
Creating a market. Trading systems work when a
resource -- such as stock in a corporation, or available land for
development, or the ability to emit a substance while keeping the
environment healthy -- is in demand, and when the supply of the
resource is finite. Thus, it is essential for a trading system
to work that there be a limit, or "cap, on the total amount of.
allowances. In an emissions trading system, this cap will be the
total amount of pollution the government wants to allow, and it
may change over time (say, as the government reduces the total
amount of allowed pollution). In addition, it is essential that
the market include participants with diverse interests in holding
the allowances -- that is, some who will want to buy and some who
will want to sell. Thus, emissions allowances should not be
distributed only to the worst polluters; they should also be
distributed to firms that historically have been "clean," and to
firms for whom pollution reduction is inexpensive as well as
firms for whom it is expensive. In the Administration acid rain
bill described above, the system will include a large number of
utility plants, with a wide spectrum of pollution reduction
costs, so that a robust trading market develops.
Preventing evasion. At the same time, trading systems
will fail to achieve their overall environmental protection goals
if pollution is permitted in the absence of allowances, or if the
total amount of pollution is permitted to rise through the
issuance of unrestricted allowances (as in the Los Angeles
bubble). The agency supervising the trading system must maintain
the integrity of the market for allowances, monitor to prevent
cheating, and issue allowances according to the desired overall
limit on pollution.
Facilitating trades. In some systems, such as the lead
phasedown described above, trading occurs easily. In others, the
allowance holders are not sufficiently able to trade with each
other. This may occur because each holder lacks information
DRAFT
20
about other holders and cannot find or communicate with them.
Government can facilitate trades by furnishing such information;
by acting as a broker, arranging buyers and sellers; by acting as
an auctioneer; or by creating a "bank" which buys and sells (or
borrows and lends) allowances. The New Jersey TDR exchange for
Pinelands development is a good example of such a bank.
Monitoring trades. Some monitoring must occur lest
participants in the market overstate their trades or the
allowances they hold. Monitoring trades could be accomplished
through reporting requirements, spot checks, or designated
periods in which trading is conducted. Other markets, such as
securities ("stock") markets, function well in the presence of
careful government monitoring. But requiring trades to be
submitted to regulators for prior approval, or requiring them to
meet special criteria, may tend to discourage effective trading.
Monitoring emissions. In addition, the government
must monitor the emissions of pollutants to be sure that emitters
do not understate their emissions. This task would be necessary
whether or not a trading approach is employed. If monitoring
emissions is infeasible, effective regulation -- whether
implemented through a trading system or not -- is difficult.
More than local significance. A trading system is most
effective when the problem it is applied to has significance
beyond local areas. That is, the resource being preserved (such
as clean air or water) should be of at least regional
significance. For example, trading works well in reducing air
pollution dispersed over a wide area from numerous source points.
The potential greenhouse effect is just such a regional issue.
One problem encountered in some trading programs is
that too many pollution allowances (and hence too much pollution)
could be concentrated in one locality, or "hot spot"; if the
pollution has direct toxic effects, this concentration could
excessively endanger the local population. This type of danger,
and attendant agency review, inhibited trading in the Fox River
program. Even if such concentrations did occur in a trading
system for greenhouse gases (and given the wide variety of gases,
sources and sinks and their wide geographic distributions, such
concentrations seem unlikely), "hot spots" are not generally a
problem for the important greenhouse gases, because those gases
may have global thermal effects but do not usually have local
toxic effects.
Moral issues. Some observers have criticized trading
systems as "immoral licenses to pollute," because trading allows
emitters to pay others for permits to allow their own emissions
to grow. A system without trading, however, involves the same
"license" to pollute within the same total target; trading only
allows emissions to be reallocated within the overall limit.
That is, nontransferable regulatory limits on pollution give
DRAFT
21
polluters the very same "license" to pollute up to the regulated
limit; trading does not change the overall limit. Moreover, if
trading is effective at reducing pollution at less cost, then it
is unclear what moral concern is applicable to the difference
between a trading system and a non-trading system. The central
concern should be which system better achieves desirable
environmental protection at least cost. 21
Some critics have also argued that if a firm is able to
achieve additional pollution reductions beyond regulated
standards, those extra reductions should "benefit society" and
should not be sold to another firm to raise the second firm's
pollution level. First, such criticism is really directed at the
government's initial standard: if less total pollution is
desired, the standard may be tightened, but once the standard is
set, further reductions are not legally obligated. Second, such
criticism fails to note that firms only reduce pollution when
given an incentive to do so (such as threat of punishment or
promise of financial benefit). Trading, appropriately designed
and monitored, provides the incentive -- the market for extra
allowances -- to firms to reduce their emissions beyond the
standard; simply setting a standard does not. It is only in a
trading system (or a similar system of emissions charges) that
the "extra" reduction is induced among firms who find it in their
interest to do SO.
4. Potential Elective Use of Trading Among Nations.
Just as trading is a useful tool for implementing
domestic environmental policies, one or more nations could elect
to participate in trading internationally, to meet global
environmental protection goals. As with domestic trading, such a
system would not be mandatory; only those wishing to participate
need do SO. Such a trading system could provide the mechanism
for international financial and technological assistance to
nations who seek to grow economically, to preserve their forests,
and to avoid the use of technologies that imply greenhouse gas
emissions. An international agency and/or national governments
would monitor the trades and perhaps facilitate them. Indeed,
using trading systems to implement environmental protection is
already a feature of the world economy. "Debt-for-nature" swaps
are perhaps the best-known example. The Montreal Protocol on
Substances Depleting the Ozone Layer contains "industrial
rationalization" provisions allowing limited substance trading
among the parties. And the concept of "trading" in the global
21 It is worth noting in this regard that, in comparison with
a comprehensive approach, a single-pollutant approach is an even
larger "license" because it begins by permitting unrestricted
emissions of the as-yet-unregulated gases, which might increase
even faster as industry shifts to systems producing them.
DRAFT
22
climate context has been discussed in the RSWG as part of the
topic discussion of "Economic (Market) Measures."
CONCLUSION
Addressing the potential problems of global climate
change will require creative policy thinking. Attacking the
causal factors of global climate change one at a time, pollutant-
by-pollutant and source-by-source, could jeopardize sound
environmental protection, squander scarce resources, and impose
inequitable burdens and unreasonably uniform requirements on
nations with diverse needs and capabilities. A "comprehensive"
approach would avoid these problems while addressing the
potentially serious environmental goals of global climate policy.
In addition, nations may choose to implement
environmental policy through various means. Some may choose to
adopt uniform standards, or even dictate which technologies
businesses must employ. Others may choose more flexible systems,
such as transferable allowances. United States experience with:
"emissions trading" and other transferable allowance systems
suggests that they could be quite useful means of implementing
global climate change policy.
DRAFT
23
References
and
Suggestions for Further Reading
Ackerman & Stewart, "Reforming Environmental Law," 37 Stan.
L. Rev. 1333 (1985).
Ackerman & Stewart, "Reforming Environmental Law: The
Democratic Case for Market Incentives," 13 Colum. J. Envtl. L.
171 (1988).
Assarsson [ or Levander ?], "The Importance of Greenhouse
Gases other than Carbon Dioxide and Other Possible Differences
Between Various Fuels," Swedish National Energy Administration
(Heat & Electricity Production Div.) memorandum dated Sept. 14,
1989 presented to delegates of the OECD Group on Energy and
Environment, Oct. 13, 1989.
Dudek, "Marketable Instruments for Managing Global
Atmospheric Problems," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of
the Western Economics Assn., Vancouver, BC, July 7-11, 1987.
Dudek, "Offsetting New CO2 Emissions: A First Rational
Greenhouse Policy Step," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of
the Western Economics Assn., Lake Tahoe, CA, June 18-22, 1989.
Dudek & Palmisano, "Emissions Trading: Why is this
Thoroughbred Hobbled?" 13 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 217 (1988).
Grubb, "Alternative Approaches to International Agreements,"
in The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets, chapter 5 (Energy
& Envtl. Programme, Royal Institute of Int'l Affairs, London,
1989)
Hahn, "An Evaluation of Options for Reducing Hazardous
Waste," 12 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 201 (1988).
Hahn, "Economic Prescription for Environmental Problems: How
the Patient Followed the Doctor's Orders," 3 J. Econ. Persp. 95
(1989).
Hahn, "Marketable Permits: What's All the Fuss About?" 2 J.
Pub. Policy 395 (1982).
Hahn & Hester, "Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and
Practice," 16 Ecol. L. Q. 361 (1989).
DRAFT
24
Hahn & Hester, "Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of
EPA's Emissions Trading Program," 6 Yale J. Regulation 109
(1989).
Hahn & Noll, "Barriers to Implementing Tradable Air
Pollution Permits: Problems of Regulatory Interactions, 1 Yale
J. Regulation 63 (1983).
Hahn & Noll, "Designing a Market for Tradeable Emissions
Permits," in Reform of Environmental Regulation (Magat ed. 1982).
Hahn & Noll, "Implementing Tradeable Emission Permits, in
Reforming Social Regulation: Alternative Public Policy Strategies
(1982)
Heffernan & Lave, "Adjusting to Greenhouse Effects: Exploring
the Economic Costs to Rich and Poor Countries," paper presented
at the Workshop on Energy and Environmental Modeling and Policy
Analysis, MIT Center for Energy Policy Research (July-Aug. 1989).
Jorgenson & Wilcoxen, "Environmental Regulation and U.S.
Economic Growth," paper presented at the Workshop on Energy and.
Environmental Modeling and Policy Analysis, MIT Center for Energy
Policy Research (July-Aug. 1989).
Kaya, "Impact of Carbon Dioxide Emission Control on GNP
Growth: Interpretation of Proposed Scenarios," paper submitted to
IPCC/RSWG, May 8, 1989.
Lashof & Ahuja, "Relative Global Warming Potentials of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions," paper submitted to Nature, as revised
Dec. 6, 1989.
Manne & Richels, "CO2 Emission Limits: An Economic Analysis
for the USA, " paper presented at the Workshop on Energy and
Environmental Modeling and Policy Analysis, MIT Center for Energy
Policy Research (July-Aug. 1989).
Nordhaus, "The Economics of the Greenhouse Effect, paper
presented at the Workshop on Energy and Environmental Modeling
and Policy Analysis, MIT Center for Energy Policy Research (July-
Aug. 1989).
Roberts, "Some Problems of Implementing Marketable Pollution
Rights Schemes: The Case of the Clean Air Act," in Reform of
Environmental Regulation (Magat ed. 1982).
Stavins, "Harnessing Market Forces to Protect the
Environment, 31 Environment 5 (1989).
Stewart, "Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic
Incentives," 13 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 153 (1988).
DRAFT
25
Stewart, "Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal
Control, " 9 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (1985).
Swisher & Masters, "International Carbon Emission Offsets: A
Tradeable Currency for Climate Protection Services, TEchnical
Report No. 309, Civil Engineering Dept., Stanford Univ., Feb. 28,
1989.
Tripp & Dudek, "Institutional Guidelines for Designing
Successful Transferable Rights Programs," 6 Yale J. Regulation
369 (1989)
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Emission Trading
Policy Statement," 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814 (1986).
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Protection of
Stratospheric Ozone," 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566 (1988) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82) (Final Rule) (capping CFC production with
marketable permits) ; 53 Fed. Reg. 30,604 (1988) (Advance Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking) (proposing allocation of permits).
Langer -
Back from the
gengetown walkthru
An @ my disk
Jim found good
stuff @ Lib. of Cong.
Thought your like to
read this article.
- -C2
DRAFT
26
Likely candidates for handouts at seminar:
Dudek & Palmisano, Colum. J. Envtl. L.
Hahn & Hester, Ecol. L. Q.
Stavins, Environment
Stewart, Colum. J. Envtl. L.
:
U.S.NEWS
Enviro-cops on the prowl for polluters
DARRYL HEIKES-USN&WR
With halfhearted backing, a
new corps of E-men probes
the Energy Department and
other environment foulers
t was the FBI that drew the attention
early one morning last June when 70
federal agents swarmed into Rocky
Flats, a federal nuclear-weapons facility
near Denver, and declared the place un-
der criminal investigation. It is always
the FBI that draws attention, it seems.
But marching alongside the G-men were
17 agents from a special force of 48
criminal investigators whose specialty is
bringing polluters to justice-the E-men
of the Environmental Protection Agen-
cy. The unit was set up seven years ago
Chemical reaction. Federal agents train state investigators in environmental busts
as an experiment and has since won the
backing of many environmentalists. But
for the E-men. Agents say tougher regu-
the EPA persuaded their bosses to fund
it has only a few ardent supporters with-
lations have actually spawned large num-
criminal investigators with the necessary
in the EPA.
bers of midnight dumpers, companies
expertise to enforce the tougher laws. The
The E-men may provide the kind of
that cannot afford to dispose of wastes
prosecutors did not want EPA techni-
prosecutorial punch the Bush administra-
properly. In Illinois, for instance, the
cians but street-tough detectives who
tion, busily trying to build its environmen-
manager of an industrial plant was
knew how to collect evidence, follow leads
tal credentials, could use. In its first six
caught dumping a 55-gallon drum of
and make arrests.
years, the force has won 385 indictments
polychlorinated biphenyls, a suspected
State side. The upstart E-men, with
and 279 convictions, with about 100 cases
carcinogen, at a forest preserve. He
their law-and-order approach, made few
still to be tried. Their targets have run the
pleaded guilty. Larger companies are just
friends at the EPA. Not all the agency's
gamut from a Winchester, N.H., leather-
as culpable. Last year, Ocean Spray
leaders were convinced they should be in
tanning company that illegally dumped
Cranberries, Inc., pleaded guilty to spew-
the law-enforcement business. The squad
solvents and greases into the Ashuelot
ing undertreated waste water into the
grew slowly, from an initial 23 investiga-
River to W.R. Grace & Company, which
Nemasket River at Middleboro, Mass.
tors to 48 by 1986. Fifteen more slots are
was charged with making false statements
Most cases begin with tips from troubled
expected under the 1990 federal budget,
about chemical solvents used at its Wo-
employes, which means that the agents
which still would mean just a handful of
burn, Mass., plant and concealing the
nearly always are dealing with crimes
agents in each of the EPA's 10 regions.
illegal dumping of chemicals
that have already been com-
To bridge the gap, the E-men have of-
on nearby grounds. The com-
mitted. There is not enough
fered training to state law-enforcement
pany pleaded guilty to one
WALARDOUS
manpower to put agents un-
and environmental officers as well as to
count and was fined $10,000.
WASTE
dercover, and there is nothing
Drug Enforcement Administration and
Lately, the targets have includ-
simple in proving crimes the
FBI agents. Bush's EPA administrator,
ed the government itself. The
*
agents do learn about. Chemi-
William Reilly, has promised that the
raid on the Department of En-
INVESTIGATIONS
cals do not leave fingerprints;
agency "will get tougher on enforcement,
ergy's Rocky Flats, a joint
illegal substances quickly
which is the cornerstone of EPA's envi-
EPA-FBI fraud investigation
wash away or are absorbed by
ronmental program. We expect to see
focusing on the illegal dump-
soil. When agents do find the
even more activity in the future."
ing and burning of hazardous wastes, was
goods, they often must don oxygen masks
It is not clear whether that means
the E-men's most ambitious effort so far.
and protective "moon suits" to collect
even greater emphasis on enviro-cops'
They have opened similar investigations
samples of deadly substances.
criminal investigations. There are still
into the DOE's uranium-refining center
The deployment of criminal investiga-
plenty of officials around Washington
at Fernald, Ohio, and at its West Valley
tors to environmental cases has bucked a
who think that the best environmental-
nuclear-waste site near Buffalo, N.Y. And
long tradition of punishing polluters with
enforcement work is done through the
more probes of once secretive DOE facili-
hefty civil fines. Congress actually made
EPA's civil inspectors or individual
ties are soon to come. "It's no holds
fouling the environment a crime when it
states. Those arguments raise the stakes
barred now," says Marty Wright, chief of
passed the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act,
of high-profile cases like the Rocky Flats
the EPA's National Enforcement Investi-
but few prosecutors applied the act. Even
investigation. The agents are betting that
gations Center. "There's almost an open-
a wave of tough environmental laws
a new administration, one that has
door policy for us."
passed in the 1970s spurred only "haphaz-
promised a crackdown on environmental
Midnight dumpers. In a nation that pro-
ard" environmental enforcement, accord-
criminals, will back up its tough talk
duces 265 million metric tons of hazard-
ing to Judson Starr, former head of the
with action that could turn attention to
ous wastes a year, wastes that increasing-
Justice Department's environmental en-
the E-men for a change.
ly are lacing rivers, creek beds, woods
forcement unit. That changed in 1982,
and fields, there is no shortage of work
when Starr and colleagues at Justice and
by Stephen J. Hedges
U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 9, 1989
23
SCIENCE
CLIMATOLOGY
New Models Chill Some Predictions of Severely Overheated Earth
By William Booth
knowledge that they do not understand or even
ature rises in half when the researchers change
Washington Post Staff Writer
recognize all the variables that affect their pre-
the way raindrops are represented.
THE WARMING WORLD
dictions, thus compounding policy uncertainties.
Of course, not all the climate modelers agree
he most dire predictions about global
"The things we can say with confidence, the
with the lower estimates. One exception is James
LONG-RANGE TEMPERATURE
T
warming are being toned down by many
policy-makers are not interested in. And the
Hansen of National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
Variation of annual surface temperatures for the world. The shaded line
experts, who now predict that tempera-
things the policy-makers are interested in, we
ministration's Goddard Institute for Space
shows long-term trends. The planet has warmed on average by almost 1
tures and sea levels in the next century will not
don't know with much confidence," said Jerry
Studies in New York. Hansen said he thinks his
degree Fahrenheit.
rise as dramatically as once feared.
Mahiman, director of NOAA's Geophysical Fluid
model and the observed temperature record are
1.0
While climate researchers tend to agree that
Dynamics Laboratory at Princeton University.
still in keeping with a greater future increase in
0.8
our grandchildren will inherit a warmer world,
1989
"Modelers have been thrust into the limelight
temperatures. At the meeting at the National
many scientists are now betting on an average
0.6
way too soon," said Richard Cooper, an econo-
Academy of Sciences, Hansen stated again that
warming of only 3 or 4 degrees Fahrenheit by
mist from Harvard University. They don't have
he thinks warming associated with increased
0.4
the middle of the next century, the low end of a
models today you can build public policy on."
greenhouse gases has already begun and that the
0.2
range that prognosticators once put as high as 9
The frustration was evident at a meeting
Earth will warm by more than 4 degrees on av-
degrees.
°F 0.0
Cooper and Mahlman attended last week at the
erage in the next century.
A rise in sea level, one of the most feared con-
National Academy of Sciences, where an expert
All the modelers stress how uncertain the
-0.2
sequences of global warming, also is expected to
panel was grappling with the policy implications
forecasts are. "People are hedging," Washington
-0.4
be far less drastic than previously thought, large-
of global warming. After a long afternoon, during
said. "You get put into a defensive position, be-
ly because of the surprising observation that the
-0.6
which the invited scientists displayed graphs
cause everyone wants the lower estimates."
polar ice sheets are not melting, but growing in
with past and future temperatures bouncing up
Given all the uncertainities, what is known for
-0.8
size. According to Mark Meier of the Institute of
and down like rubber balls, they were finally
sure? It is agreed that carbon dioxide has in-
-1.0
Arctic and Alpine Research at the University of
begged to put aside the carefully hedged fore-
creased over the last 100 years. Since 1958,
1860
1880
1900
1920
1940
1960
1980
2000
Colorado, the consensus now is that sea level will
casts and simply make a "best guess." While the
when accurate surveys were begun, carbon di-
rise by about a foot in the next century, rather
SOURCE: United Kingdom Meteorological Office
ranges of guesses varied, the favorite seemed to
oxide has increased from 316 parts per million
than the three feet that had been suggested in
be a 4-degree increase by the middle of the next
Photocopy-Preservation
parts of air to 353 parts per million today, an 11
CREENHOUSE GAS
previous studies.
century, when concentrations of carbon dioxide
percent increase. This accumulation is attributed
But even if the revised forecast is correct,
Carbon dioxide concentrations monitored at Mauna Loa, Hawaii.
gas-which contributes to the "greenhouse ef-
primarily to the burning of fossil fuels, of which
there would be major effects, the scientists
The gas traps heat close to the Earth's surface.
fect"-are expected to double.
the United States is the largest user.
warn. A one-foot rise in sea level would inundate
CARBON DIOXIDE (PARTS PER MILLION)
One reason many researchers are shying away
The basic phenomena of the greenhouse effect
some shorelines, moving the water's edge inland
355
from the worst-case scenarios so popular a year
are also agreed upon. It has been operating for
by hundreds or thousands of feet. And a global
350
ago has to do with climate record itself. While
millions of years and is one reason Earth is as
345
warming of only a few degrees might upset com-
researchers argue that the oldest records are
warm as it is. In the last few months, the green-
340
munities of plants and animals that have devel-
highly suspect, in general they agree that tem-
house effect was actually measured for the first
335
oped over millennia. Weather patterns also could
peratures have risen over the past 100 years by
time by University of Chicago researchers who
330
change, meaning more frequent droughts and
about 1 degree. But there are tremendous ar-
325
used satellites to measure the radiation coming
severe storms.
320
guments over whether or not this increase is due
into the atmosphere and bouncing back out to
315
Yet along with the new forecasts are indica-
to an accumulation of greenhouse gases such as
space.
310
tions that not all changes will be bad. Some re-
carbon dioxide and methane, which trap heat
So it is almost universally agreed that Earth
searchers have begun to stress that a warmer,
close to Earth. Instead it may be the result of
probably will warm as carbon dioxide and other
1958 '60 '62 '64 '66 '68'70 '72 '74 '76 '78 '80 '82 '84 '86 '88
wetter world might be welcome in some regions.
some other climatic cycle unrelated to human
greenhouse gases accumulate. How much it
SOURCE: Charles Keeling, Scripps Institution of Oceanography
"It is an interesting point that people ought to
activity. But whatever its cause, the tempera-
warms is the question. Richard Lindzen, one of
think about more. By and large, there are pos-
ture record is more consistent with a rise of 4
the most outspoken critics of current projec-
THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT
itive effects. More wheat in the Ukraine. Thin-
degrees, rather than 9 degrees, by the middle of
tions, conceded at last week's meeting that tem-
Sunlight (mostly short waves)
ner ice in Arctic. Better winters in Moscow. But
the next century.
peratures probably will rise, but not by much.
penetrates Earth's
Heat (long waves)
at the same time, you're building up a bigger
"The new runs do favor the lower estimate,"
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology pro-
atmosphere and is
radiates up from
time bomb that is becoming harder and harder to
said Warren Washington of the National Center
fessor said he thinks that the planet will respond
absorbed at surface
the surface but is
dismantle," said John Perry, staff director of the
and stored
for Atmospheric Research, who is another top
to the buildup of greenhouse gases by producing
largely absorbed
Board of Atmospheric Sciences and Climate at
as heat.
climate modeler.
"negative feedbacks," such as high, dry clouds,
by greenhouse
the National Research Council.
Two of the most recent climate simulations,
that will lift warmed air from the ground toward
gas molecules,
Perry points to a recent study by the climate
heating the
done by the National Center for Atmospheric
the upper atmosphere where its heat will radiate
office of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
atmosphere.
Research in Boulder, Colo., and the Geophysical
into space, counteracting a warming trend.
ministration (NOAA) that concluded that a
Fluid Dynamics Lab in Princeton, suggest slight-
But researchers tend to think that while Han-
slightly warmer, wetter world would increase
ly lower temperature increases, according to the
sen's projections may be too hot, Lindzen's are
food production, enhance forest growth and en-
scientists who run them.
definitely too cold.
large water supplies. An obvious drawback was
Both models showed uneven warming in the
Researchers say it may take another decade
that billions of dollars would have to be spent
Northern and Southern hemispheres. In one run,
or more to settle the issues. At present, the
protecting coastal areas from rising seas.
the region around the Southern Ocean that sur-
most common response by government officials
The great uncertainty in predicting global
rounds Antarctica did not warm at all. The model
and scientists has been a call for more research
warming and its effects is making life difficult for
showed it cooling, thanks to improved simula-
and a push to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide
government policy-makers. The computer mod-
tions of how the ocean currents circulate and
by increasing energy efficiency-a painless rem-
els upon which all forecasts are based are gen-
mix. Another world-class model, run by the Unit-
edy that would provide benefits regardless of.
erated by a small group of scientists who ac-
ed Kingdom Meteorological Office, cuts temper-
future temperatures.
ATMOSPHERE
All the News
That's Fit to Print
VOL.CXXXIX
No. 48,083
Copyright © 1989 The New York Times
Skeptics Are Challenging
Dire 'Greenhouse' Views
By WILLIAM K. STEVENS
As governments try to come to
theory is valid in general, there
grips with what is widely depicted
are too many uncertainties about
as a potentially catastrophic
its future effects.
warming of the Earth's surface,
Both of the other factions
dissenting scientists are challeng
those who believe global warming
ing what they see as unneces
to be a clear and definite threat
sarily gloomy predictions.
and those who say there is likely
The skeptics contend that fore-
to be no significant warming
casts of global warming are
appear to be in a minority. Au-
flawed and overstated and that
thorities on weather and climate
the future might even hold no sig-
can be found in all three groups.
nificant warming at all. Some say
Much of the dissenters' criti-
that if the warming is modest, as
cism is aimed at computerized
they believe likely, it could bring
mathematical models of the
world climate on which fore
Split Forecast
casts of global warming are
largely based. The critics also cite
Dissent on Global Warming
data on past climatic trends, and
A special report.
they say the theory of greenhouse
warming has not yet been fully
explored.
benefits like longer growing sea-
"It's not that we have a bad
sons in temperate zones, more
theory," said Reid A. Bryson of
rain in dry areas and an enrich-
the University of Wisconsin, a
ment of crops and plant life.
leading climate theorist. "It's
In any case, they argue, it would
that we have an incomplete
be a mistake to take drastic and
theory with a lot of bad science
costly steps to limit emissions of
Pr.
being done."
carbon dioxide and other gases
on
that trap the sun's heat in the
Forecast and Its Basis
earth's atmosphere until more is
Most of the dissenters' asser-
known about the problem. These
tions are being challenged in turn
"greenhouse" gases are building
by scientists who adhere to the
B
up as a result of human activity,
better-known view of global
especially the burning of fossil
warming. This view holds that in-
I
fuels.
creasing concentrations of green-
Most Have No Firm Position
house gases are likely to cause
the average temperature of the
Exactly how many scientists
air at the Earth's surface to in-
H
are involved in serious climatic
crease by three to eight degrees
research is unclear, but experts in
Fahrenheit some time in the next
I₁
the field say it includes fewer than
century, from the current global
300 climatologists, meteorolo-
average level of 57 degrees. That
gists, geophysicists and people in
amount of increase is generally
related fields. Many of them, per-
accepted by a number of national
haps the majority, have not taken
and international scientific
W.
a firm position in the debate; they
ing
say that while the greenhouse
Continued on Page B12, Column 3
Pre:
to
said
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THE NEW YORK TIMES NATIONAL WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1989
Skeptics Challenge Forecasts of Global Warming
Continued From Page AI
A Diversity of Views
groups that have sought consensi
the Issue, including various panels of
Although many scientists have predicted dire consequences from global warming, skeptics
the National Academy of Sciences,
contend that such views are flawed and overstated.
The forecast is based largely on what
the forecustors see as the Inherent
scientific logic of the greenhouse
theory and on the computerized simu-
lations of the future atmosphere. The
forecasters expect the warming to
rulse sea levels, through the expansion
of warming water and the melting of
Ice around the world; to change the cll-
mate of the globe, and to disrupt weath-
er, human society and balances among
plants and animals.
Both the dissenters and those who
call for action have been pressing their
arguments In Washington as the Bush
Administration grapples with pres-
sures to reduce the burning of fossil
luels like coal and oll, which are the
main source of human-produced at-
mospheric carbon dioxide.
Current forecasts of global warming
"are so Inaccurate and fraught with
uncertainty as to be useless to policy-
makers,' Richard S. Lindzen of the
Massachusetts of Institute of Tech-
nology and Jerome Namias of the
Scripps Institution Oceanography in La
James E. Hansen
Jolla, Callf., wrote In a letter to Presi-
Goddard Institute for Space Studies'
dent Bush In late September. The two
authorities on meteorology are both
Helped propel the issue to the forefront last year by
members of the National Academy of
testifying before Congress that global warming was under way.
Sciences.
Their warning was one of several
cautionary pleas now coming forth in
the aftermath of months of speeches,
Robert D. Cess
writings and testimony to Congress by
State University of
scientists and environmentalists who
New York Stony
urge prompt countermeasures. Some
Bropk.
Important officials in the Administra-
tion, Including John H. Sununu, the
"Common physical
White House chief of staff, have also
sense tells us some-
urged caution until further research Is
thing is going to be
performed.
The New
York
Times/Rick
Prindman
happening" to the
Richard S. Lindzen
world's climate be-
Arguments and Evidence
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
cause of the green-
Current forecasts of global warming
house effect, he
Computer Models'
"are so inaccurate and fraught with
says, but argues
Accuracy Debated
uncertainty as to be useless to policy
that current models
makers."
cannot be used to
predict global
Some of the dissenters, Including Dr.
The New York Times/Michael Shavel
Lindzen, say the scientific uncertainty
warming.
could be reduced through a decade or
less of Intensive research, perhaps In
model experts say they could "also,
through complex set of feedback
have not done well at matching the cll-
three to five years. They counsel
slightly. There is evidence of the same
against drastic action to cut fossil-fuel
mechanisms, Increase the warming.
matic trends on the scale of a century.
pattern in China and Australia, Mr.
emissions until then.
Clouds are poorly simulated In all the
In the last century, according to some
Karl said. He said the reasons are un-
studies of temperature records, the
"The expense is patently obvlous,"
models, most climatologists agree. A
clear, although Increasing cloudiness
average global temperature has risen
said one of the most outspoken skep-
team at the United Kingdom Metcoro-
appears to have contributed to It in this
tics, Patrick Michaels, a professor of
logical Office In England reported In
by about one degree. Simulations by
country.
some models show that It should have
environmental sciences at the Univer-
September that by representing clouds
"If nature is declaring hor green-
risen by about twice that much.
sity of Virginia and a former president
more realistically, its model had ro.
house with relative rise In the night-
of the American Meteorological Soci-
duced the projection of expected
To the dissenters, this gap casts
time rather than the daytime,' sold Dr.
ety. "If the policy is going to be that ex-
warming from about nine degrees to
doubt on the models' crodibility. To
Michaels, "then the severity of the
some environmental scientists It shows
pensive, the science should be much
about five. The British model has usu.
problem is drastically reduced." In
the opposite. "We should be flabber-
less murky than is now,' he said.
ally produced the highest estimates.
fact, he said, warmer nights In temper-
gasted that the models can come that
Other scientists have long acknowl-
The findings have been cited by the
ata regions would lengthen growing
close, given the uncertainties, said Dr.
edged the uncertainties of global
skeptics as evidence that they are
seasons.
M
Oppenhelmer of the Environmental
warming predictions, but argue that
probably right in their contention that
This could especially benefit north-
Defense Fund, a research and ad-
they will not be eliminated in time for
the warming has been overstated. But
em regions, in the Northern Heml-
John F. B. Mitchell, the chief scientist
vocacy organization. The dispute on
effective action to be taken.
sphere, some acientists believe, and
on the Brittish project, said the result
this point is muddled by the variations
"My feeling. is that the uncertainty
southern regions In the Southern. Some
will always remain," said Syukuro
In temperature profiles for past dec-
did not mean that the group was cut-
say, In fact, that countries like the
ades that emerge from different stud-
Manabe of the National Oceanic and
ting its forecast In half.
Soviet Union and Canada might well
So Tittle is known about the charac-
ics. Some studies suggest little or no
Atmospheric Administra Geo:
benefit from even a high degree of
physical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory
teristics of clouds; he said,
warming over the last century, depend-
warming.
at Princeton University, a leading
this latest simulation cannot be taken
ing on the data and methods used. and
this has occasioned argument.
climatologist. Dr. Manabe's laboratory
as realistic. Rather, he sald, the result
Russians Predict Benefits
runs one of the major mathematical
essentially illustrates our uncertain-
Two Soviet scientists, M. I. Budyko
models of the global climate on which
ty" and underscores a serious lack of
Positive Views
and S. Sedunov, have said In a paper
attempts to forecast future warming
data on how clouds behave. Without
that Increased rainfall over all the con-
are mostly based. "We have to make
better data, he sald, "we cah go on
Some See Benefits
tinents,:along with the "fertilizer" ef-
decisions based on uncertain Informa-
doing numerical experiments un we're
feet on plants of carbon dioxide, "will
tion," he said. "I don't think we have
blue In the face and we won't reduce
any other choice."
In Warmer Earth
considerably enhance" plant produc-
the uncertainties."
tivity, Increase harvests, make large
In view of the uncertainty, some
Oceans' Moderating Effects
barron territories suitable for agricul-
scientists favor taking actions that
Few scientists believe greenhouse
ture and permit the expansion of crops
would bring major benefits In their
The models have only recontly begun
warming can now be detected amid the
in other regions.
own right, like Increasing energy effi-
to reflect the enormous capacity of the
oceans to absorb heat, a factor that
normal swings of climate. But If It can,
But Dr. Woodwell of the Woods Hole
clency and pressing the development of
scientists believe will slow down global
says Dr. Michaels, the evidence might
ulternative power sources.
Institute argues that global warming
warming substantially. Scientists
be emerging from data collected by a
would produce even more atmospheric
The Theory's Backers
studying model at the National Con-
team headed by Thomas Karl, a cli-
carbon dioxide by speeding the decay
mate-change analyst at the Govern-
Among those who oppose dissenters
tor for Atmospheric Research In Boul-
of organic matter and accelerating the
like Dr. Bryson, Dr. Lindzen, Dr.
der, Colo., recently completed a simu-
ment's climatic duta center at Ashe-
respiration of plants. This new source
ville, N.C.
Namins and Dr. Michaels are, for OX-
lation that Included the ocean's Influ-
of carbon dioxide, he believes, would
ample, James E. Hanson of the God-
ence. It resulted warming of nearly
Studies there found that since the
more than offset the amount absorbed
dard Institute for Space Studies In New
three degrees when carbon dioxide In
mid-1950's, nighttime temperatures In
by plants In photosynthosis. It could
York City; Michael Oppenholmer, a
the atmosphere doubled, as against
much of the United States have risen In
easily exceed the amount from fossil-
senior scientist with the the Environ-
about seven degrees In an earller
fall, summer and winter, while day.
fuel burning, he says, and cause the
mental Defense Fund; Goorge M.
model
run.
time temperatures have dropped
planet to warm up even more.
Woodwell, director of the Woods Hole
This was also seen by some dissent-
Research Center, and Stephen H.
ers and Government officials as a one-
Schnelder of the National Center for
half reduction In the models' warming
Atmospheric Research.
estimates, but Warren Washington, one
Dr. Hansen helped propel the Issue of
of the chiefs of the Boulder experiment,
global warming to the forefront last
sald that was a misinterpretation. The
year when, at the height of the 1988
modeling exercise was not fully played
heat wave and drought, he testified be-
out because of lack of computer access,
fore Congress that global warming
and the simulation was carried only 30
caused by Increasing concentrations of
years Into the future, he sald. If It had
greenhouse gases was already under
continued to the point where full effects
way.
were felt, he sald, the warming would
The climate models that draw much
have been substantially larger.
of the dissenters' criticism are mathe-
matical equations. that simulate the
physical workings of the atmosphere.
Models and Measurements
Scientists can Insert any set of condi-
tions they like given concentration
of greenhouse gases, for instance
Both Sides Claim
and a computer calculates how the cll-
mate would change, including changes
Support in Data
In the average global temperatu
Global warming theorists maintain
To some scientists who $00 them-
that a relatively small increase in the
selves as neither dissenters nor back-
temperature can have major conse-
ors of specific warming predictions,
quences, For example, they point out,
the uncertainties are perplexing and
the average temperature since the end
frustrating.
of the last Ice age has increased by nine
"Common physical sense tells us
degrees.
something is going to be happening' to
But the computer models "are seri-
the world's climate because of the
ously exaggerating the warming by at
greenhouse effect, said Robert D. Cess,
least two to threefold," said Hugh W.
a professor of atmospheric sciences at
Ellsaesser, a meteorologist at Law.
the State University of New York at
rence Livermore Laboratory In Call-
Stony Brook, who heads an Interna-
fornia who retired in 1086. He has been
tional group that assesses the models.
working on the question of global
But he sold the group's conclusion,
warming since 1972.
soon to be published, is that "we don't
know what those models are doing." lie
said the models "as presently formu-
Complicating Factors
lated" cannot be used to predict future
global warming, and that "whether
Clouds and Oceans
they can ever be used for that purpose
is
problematical."
Poorly Understood
Dr. Hansen defends the models,
pointing out that even as they have be-
come more sophisticated, their conclu-
All the models, sold Dr. Lindzen, con-
sions about global warming have gon.
tain flaws that "could easily reduce the
erally remained within the range pro-
predictions for warming to well under
dicted In the 1970's. Somo defenders of
the models say they doubt that another
Photocopy-Preservation
a degree" centigrade, or 1.8 dogrees
Fahrenhelt. Not least among the flaws,
decade of refinements would substan-
he and others say, is that the models
tially alter the range.
fall to properly reflect the climatic ef-
Defenders also say the models have
fects of water vapor and clouds, which
validated themselves by successfully
can each overwhelm the effect of the
simulating the waxing and waning of
greenhouse gases.
Ice ages, present-day varia-
Skeptics say that clouds might well
lions and the workings of the almos-
reduce the warming by reflecting:sun-
pheres of Venus and Mars.
light back Into space, but some.of, the
But the critics say that the models