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Korean War Veterans Memorial 5/1/90 [OA 6890]
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26
20
5
5
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADDRESS TO THE KOREAN WAR VETERANS
ADVISORY BOARD
DATE:
MAY 1, 1990
TIME:
8:10 P.M.
LOCATION:
THE OMNI SHOREHAM HOTEL
THROUGH:
DAVID F. DEMAREST, JR.,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
COMMUNICATIONS
DAVID Q. BATES, JR.,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
SECRETARY TO THE CABINET
FROM:
DOUG WEAD, SPECIAL ASSISTANT
TO THE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF PUBLIC LIAISON
MIKE DUNCAN, ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PUBLIC
LIAISON
I. PURPOSE:
To honor 47 Members of Congress who are veterans of the
Korean War.
II. BACKGROUND:
On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th
Parallel into South Korea as an attempt to unite North and
South Korea once again -- under Communist rule.
As the world looked towards America to assume the leadership
and responsibility to restore peace in Korea, the first
American troops, stationed in Japan, were ordered to Korea
on July 1, 1950. 403 American soldiers dug foxholes on
three hillsides along the main road between Suwon and Osan
in the early morning of July 5th. Unassured hopes that the
mere presence of American troops would put an end to the
conflict were left unfounded. Our unprepared soldiers were
defeated by the Communist forces as they proceeded their
bloody march south.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
The aggression of the North Korean Communist forces upon the
American troops was the spark leading America once again
into war. The war would last for three years and involve
over one million Americans sent to Korea. The American
peoples living in the States did not clearly understand our
objectives, and it was labeled "a dirty and unpopular war,"
with no end in sight. However, none of these factors
detracted from the sacrifice and determination of those
fighting the battles.
The annual gala dinner is a salute to those involved
directly or indirectly with the Korean War. The dinner is
typically hosted and attended by various celebrities as well
as those directly involved.
III. PARTICIPANTS:
The President
See attached list of the participants in the Photo
Opportunity prior to your address.
IV. PRESS PLAN:
Open Press.
V.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:
See Advance Office scenario.
VI. REMARKS:
To be provided by Speech writers.
APR 25 '90 13:56 STILWELL ASSOCIATES
P.1
General R. G. Stilwell (Ret.)
2000 1 5th STREET NORTH
SUITE 450
ARLINGTON, VA 22201
(703) 558-7527
25 April 1990
FAX
456-6218
To:
Ms. Mary Kate Grant
White House Staff
From: General R.G. Stilwell, USA Ret.
Chairman, Korean War Veterans
Memorial Advisory Board
Subj: Material re: KWM
Here is the material I promised:
1)
American Legion Magazine article (June issue)
2)
Brochure, 14 June 1989 ceremony
(Note words describing statues; or, alternatively,
"of those who fought the war on foot.")
3)
Visual of the column of statues
4)
James A. Van Fleet, aged 98, Commander, Eighth Army
Matt Ridgway, aged 95, UN Commander (1 May 1951)
General R.G. Stilwell, USA Ret.
APR 25 '90 13:57 STILWELL ASSOCIATES
P.2
Overall, they performed in the best tradition of our Armed
Forces. Yet, when the guns fell silent by virtue of military
armistice, the opposing sides were virtually at the start line of
the conflict. A stalemate, with no winners? Was MacArthur
right?
No! Wars are waged for objectives defined by our elected
leaders. The overriding political objective set by President
Truman - and maintained by President Eisenhower - were to restore
the territorial integrity of the Republic of Korea and to ensure
the freedom of its people (now numbering 40 million). A
collateral objective was to stop, once and for all, the advance
of communism by force of arms. Thanks to the collective courage
and sacrifices of those 1 1/2 million Americans, South Koreans
and other allies arrayed alongside them, these national
objectives were attained in full.
There were even greater consequences. In early 1950, a
milestone national security document, had articulated a sound
concept for frustrating Moscow's quest for world domination.
However, the major investments required to implement the concept
were given scant attention; indeed, in the existing domestic
environment, they had no support in the Congress or the public.
The Korean experience soon changed attitudes, driving home the
lesson that a day of war costs more than a year of prevention.
APR 25 '90 13:57 STILWELL ASSOCIATES
P.3
Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the war, we set about
building the powerful, balanced military capabilities and the
global system of alliances that we know today. American resolve
has been the glue of that collective security framework while our
Armed Forces, notably including substantial forward deployments,
have provided the muscle. Dividends from that steady course are
now being reaped in Eastern Europe.
East Asia, given its potential and its dangers, became
central to this strategic posture. Visible American military
power and security guarantees provided the shield, behind which
infusion of American aid coupled with Asian work ethic to spark
the sustained, dynamic growth which will shortly usher in the
Century of the Pacific. The Republic of Korea is the most
spectacular example of the remarkable, region-wide successes
achieved by this combination. That nation is already a major
player in world affairs, confident of its destiny. Yet our work
there is not done for the still divided Korean peninsula is the
vortex of Northeast Asia; the Armistice Agreement remains our
responsibility; and, pending North Korean renunciation of its
aggressive designs, American forces on the ground - and in harm's
way - perform an unique, non-transferable role.
Time and distance improve perspectives. It is now
indisputable that the Korean intervention was a pivotal event in
post-World War II history; and that the policies and initiatives
APR 25 '90 13:58 STILWELL ASSOCIATES
P.4
that followed were of immense benefit to the United States, its
allies and its friends. The American men and women who crossed
the Pacific to defend a people they had never met in a land they
had never known cannot take credit for all that has transpired
these past forty years. But their collective heroism and
fortitude, from the stout defense of the Pusan perimeter onward,
was the indispensable achievement, without which nothing. They
can stand tall in pride. They won - big! And every American has
reason to applaud and support the Congressionally-mandated
national Korean War Veterans Memorial to be created in their
honor.
-30-
APR 25 '90 13:58 STILWELL ASSOCIATES
P.5
PRESIDENT BUSH UNVEILS
WINNING DESIGN OF KOREAN
WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL
WASHINGTON-President George Bush unveiled the winning design
of the Korean War Veterans Memorial in the Nation's capital on June 14,
1989, during Flag Day ceremonies in the White House Rose Garden.
The design, a striking combination of architecture, statuary, and land-
scape, is the concept of four members of the Penn State University
faculty. The main feature is a column of thirty-eight larger than life
statues representing a combat formation; of Army, Marine, Navy and Air
Force elements moving forward on an undefined mission.
Visitors will walk through the column to a plaza where the American Rag
flies. Muraled walls will tell the story of the Korean War, pay special
tribute to the fallen, and recognize the contributions of other participat-
ing nations.
General Richard G. Stilwell (US Army, Retired), Chairman of the Korean
War Veterans Memorial Advisory Board, is shown here briefing Presi-
dent Bush on the Memorial design. General Andrew J. Goodpastor
(USA, Retired), Chairman of the American Battle Monuments Commis-
sion is behind the President. At the right is General Raymond G. Davis
(USMC, Retired). Vice Chairman of the Advisory Board and Chairman of
the Design Committee.
9'd
APR 25 '90 13:59 STILWELL ASSOCIATES
John Gibbons
1
500
Bob Hansen
Lead Advance
Grant/Dooley
343-2541
April 26, 1990
Draft two
A:Korea
Gen. .558-7527
BRIEF REMARKS: KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL
FUNDRAISING DINNER
OMNI SHOREHAM HOTEL
MAY 1, 1990
on-stage Derwinski Stilwell intro
TIME? 8:00 PM
Goodpaster
((Acknowledgements))
Nearly 40 years ago, addressing the American people in the
Report
at
midst of the Korean War, President Truman said, "In the simplest
Radio Ameri Konoa can
terms, what we are doing 18 Korea is this: We are trying to
People The on v on 5. Fartur Policy East
prevent a third World War." The allied men and women who fought in the
&
in Korea -- and who continue to guard the 38th boundary parallel of Rep. of Korea 4/4/51 4/11
fulfilled that mission and helped ensure peace in the world.
558-7531 Stilwel
It was in April Mav of 1951, only two weeks after President Truman
addressed the Nation, that the Communists launched their Spring
Offensive to drive us from the peninsula. And it was that same
+
May
month that our two leaders, General Jim Van Fleet, commanding the
XXX
Forces
Gen. Stilue!
Eighth Army and General Matt Ridgeway commanding the U.N. Army
558-7527
repelled the offensive and drove the Chinese back to the north.
Although they could not join us tonight, General Van Fleet and
bean Byrne
General Ridgeway ages 98 and 95, respectively deserve our
3/19/92
X2150 office
respect and gratitude. 11
Tensions heightened during this month of May, 39 years ago,
as the first major struggle of the nuclear age evolved into a war
ben. Stilwe
of battlefield stratogem and a war of international politics.
97
558 7527
But it was a war in which we turned the tide against communism
for the first time, in a victory sometimes ignored by history.
2
We are here tonight to remember our veterans' remote battles
and their combined talents in what is often called "The Forgotten
Gen
Stiluel
Victory. "
Once this memorial is built, no American will ever
forget the test of freedom our brave sons and daughters fought as
they sought to stop aggression. America must remember that
struggle -- from the Pusan perimeter to the landing at Inchon to
Gen.Stilwel'
the recapture and brave defense of Seoul. And it is never too
late for America to express her gratitude to all those who served
under our flag in Korea -- those who made it home, and those who
didn't. III
Looking back at the Korean conflict, our policy of strength
based on the principles of freedom laid the foundation for the
Gen.
Stilwell
march of democracy we're seeing today around the world. And that
men who tought the war
march is reflected in the memorial itself, with 38 foot soldiers on foot
from all services moving down a path toward the U.S. flag -- the
strongest symbol of freedom known throughout the world.
It's those men and women honored by this memorial who joined
ben stilue
Korean forces under the U.N banner
the South Korean and U.N. forces to help save this small nation
from communism. Men like the Members of Congress here tonight:
Senators Warren Rudman, John Chaffee, and John Glenn, Congressmen
Andy Jacobs, Charlie Rangel, Stan Parris, and John Conyers to
name only a few who served in the Armed Forces during the Korean
War. Because of these brave soldiers and so many others, South
Korea is now on its way to becoming one of the world's economic
powers, with a freely-elected democratic government and secure
borders.
3
And so, my fellow veterans, thank you for the opportunity to
join you in saluting these Members of Congress -- these old
soldiers who have not just "faded away," but who have continued
to serve their country in elected office. Let me in closing
share with you a line from Tennyson, in which Ulysses looks back
Ulysses
with his soldiers on the battles they fought as young men and
A.L.T. Poen
tells them that they remained " strong in will to strive, to
seek, to find and not to yield. "
Immortaing. of The
We honor tonight the heroic hearts and strong will of our
Lang.
Korean War Veterans, and we look forward to the day when the
X
cornerstone of this great memorial is laid. God bless you and
God bless America. Thank you.
# # #
Grant/Dooley
KorAmb Park
April 27, 1990
Draft four-B
A:Korea
BRIEF REMARKS: KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL
FUNDRAISING DINNER
OMNI SHOREHAM HOTEL
MAY 1, 1990
7:45 P.M.
((Acknowledgements))
Thank you, Secretary Derwinski.
General Stilwell. Thank all of you. for aski having be me here. 11
IT great to here,
In the Spring of 1951, almost 40 years ago, President Truman
addressed the American people in the midst of the Korean War,
saying, "In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is
this: We are trying to prevent a third World War." The allied
men and women who fought in Korea -- and who continue to guard
the boundary of the Republic of Korea -- fulfilled that mission
and helped ensure peace in the world.
Korea, the first major struggle of the nuclear age, evolved
into a war of battlefield stratagem and a war of international
politics. But it was a war in which we turned the tide against
communism for the first time, in a victory sometimes ignored by
history.
A year before President Truman spoke, tensions in the Korean
peninsula had heightened, breaking out into a bitter conflict on
25
June 24, 1950, when North Korea launched a surprise attack on the
fledgling republic in the South. President Truman quickly made
the decision to commit American troops, under the leadership of
General Douglas MacArthur, to stop the Communist aggression.
The world watched as fighting continued throughout 1950, and
then, from late April through this month of May in 1951, the
2
Communists began their Spring Offensive to drive us from the
peninsula. But it was our two leaders, General Jim Van Fleet,
commanding the Eighth Army and General Matt Ridgway commanding
the U.N. Forces, who repelled the offensive and drove Communist
troops back to the north. Although they could not join us
tonight, General Van Fleet and General Ridgway -- ages 98 and 95,
respectively -- deserve our respect and gratitude. 11
We are here tonight to remember our veterans' remote battles
and their combined talents in what is often called "The Forgotten
Victory." Once this memorial is constructed, no American will
ever forget the test of freedom our brave sons and daughters
faced as they sought to stop aggression. America must remember
that struggle -- from the Pusan perimeter to the landing at
Inchon to the recapture and brave defense of Seoul. And it is
never too late for America to express her gratitude to all those
who served under our flag in Korea -- those who made it home, and
those who didn't. III
Looking back at the Korean conflict, our defense of freedom
laid the foundation for the march of democracy we're seeing today
around the world. And that march is reflected in the memorial
itself, with 38 soldiers from all services moving down a path
toward the U.S. flag -- the strongest symbol of freedom known
throughout the world.
It's those men and women honored by this memorial who joined
with South Korean troops under the U.N. banner to help save a
proud nation from communism. Men like the Members of Congress
3
here tonight: Senators Warren Rudman, John Chafee, and John
Glenn, Congressmen Andy Jacobs, Charlie Rangel, Stan Parris, and
John Conyers to name only a few who served in the Armed Forces
during the Korean War. Because of these brave soldiers and so
many others, South Korea is now on its way to becoming one of the
world's economic powers, with a freely-elected democratic
government and secure borders.
And so, my fellow veterans, thank you for the opportunity to
join you in saluting these Members of Congress -- these old
soldiers who have not just "faded away," but who have continued
to serve their country in elected office. In closing, let me
share with you a line from Tennyson, in which Ulysses looks back
with his soldiers on the battles they fought as young men and
tells them, "Though much has been taken, much abides."
We honor tonight the heroic hearts and strong will of our
Korean War Veterans, who have given so much that others might
have freedom. God bless you all and the cause you've served.
Thank you.
# # #
Chris - what do you Think of this? MK
Grant/Dooley
April 27, 1990
Draft four
A:Korea
BRIEF REMARKS: KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL
FUNDRAISING DINNER
OMNI SHOREHAM HOTEL
MAY 1, 1990
7:45 P.M.
((Acknowledgements))
Almost 40 years ago, addressing the American people in the
midst of the Korean War, President Truman said, "In the simplest
terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to
prevent a third World War." The allied men and women who fought
in Korea -- and who continue to guard the boundary of the
Republic of Korea ---- fulfilled that mission and helped ensure
peace in the world.
wifere Presedent
in the Koren penensula had
It was about a year earlier that tensions heightened until
breaking out
date. when
they soon broke
into a bitter conflict, begun by a North
anneled
a
Korean surprise attack on the fledgling republic in the South.
President Truman quickly made the decision to commit American
troops to stop the Communist aggression, under the leadership of
General Douglas MacArthur.
Then, in this month of May 1951, the Communists launched
their Spring Offensive to drive us from the peninsula. It was
our two leaders, General Jim Van Fleet, commanding the Eighth
Army and General Matt Ridgway commanding the U.N. Forces, who
repelled the offensive and drove Communist troops back to the
north. Although they could not join us tonight, General Van
2
Fleet and General Ridgway -- ages 98 and 95, respectively --
deserve our respect and gratitude. 11
Korea, the first major struggle of the nuclear age, soon
evolved into a war of battlefield stratagem and a war of
international politics. But it was a war in which we turned the
tide against communism for the first time, in a victory sometimes
ignored by history.
We are here tonight to remember our veterans' remote battles
and their combined talents in what is often called "The Forgotten
Victory." Once this memorial is constructed, no American will
ever forget the test of freedom our brave sons and daughters
faced as they sought to stop aggression. America must remember
that struggle -- from the Pusan perimeter to the landing at
Inchon to the recapture and brave defense of Seoul. And it is
never too late for America to express her gratitude to all those
who served under our flag in Korea -- those who made it home, and
those who didn't.
Looking back at the Korean conflict, our defense of freedom
laid the foundation for the march of democracy we're seeing today
around the world. And that march is reflected in the memorial
itself, with 38 soldiers from all services moving down a path
toward the U.S. flag -- the strongest symbol of freedom known
throughout the world.
It's those men and women honored by this memorial who joined
with South Korean troops under the U.N. banner to help save a
proud nation from communism. Men like the Members of Congress
VOLUME 23
Pumps to Russell
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
AMERICANA
INTERNATIONAL EDITION
COMPLETE IN THIRTY VOLUMES
FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1829
GROLIER INCORPORATED
International Headquarters: Danbury, Connecticut 06816
RIDEAU CANAL-RIDLEY
519
used controversy because
CANAL, ri-dō', a 126-mile (203-km)
RIDGWAY, rij'wã, Matthew Bunker (1895-
EAU way extending southwestward from Ottawa
),
riving energy, and habit
U.S. army officer. He was born at Fort Monroe,
governmental red tape.
Firway Kingston in al Ontario, Canada. It consists of a
Va., on March 3, 1895. He graduated from the
twice passed him over for
watercourses connected by short
U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1917 and
ptain, but after a congres
and locks. The natural waterways in-
completed advanced courses at Fort Benning In-
y promoted him to rear
the Rideau River at Ottawa, the Upper
fantry School in 1930 and at the Army War Col-
e admiral in 1958, and to
Lake, and the Cataraqui River, which
lege in 1937. Between the two world wars he
i. He received a congressi
into Lake Ontario at Kingston. Along
served in staff positions in the United States and
959 and won the Enrico
route are 47 locks, each 134 feet (41 meters)
had overseas assignments in China, Nicaragua,
for his contributions to the
33 feet (10 meters) wide, and 5 feet (1.5
the Panama Canal Zone, and the Philippines.
clear energy.
deep.
Appointed commander of the reactivated 82d
also an outspoken critic
The
canal was built by the British govern-
Infantry Division in 1942, Ridgway supervised its
tional system, calling for
in 1826-1832, under the direction of Lt.
conversion into the 82d Airborne Division, and
S. His works include Educa
John By, to provide a military route that
he planned and executed its July 1943 airborne
59) and American Education
be secure from United States attack. It is
invasion of Sicily. In June 1944 he led his divi-
(1963).
used chiefly by pleasure boats.
sion in its D-Day airborne assault on Normandy.
Later that year he took command of the 18th
INRIKISHA.
ERS TO THE SEA, a tragedy in one act by
Airborne Corps, which fought in France, Belgium,
Irish dramatist John Millington Synge, first
Holland, and Germany and played a key role in
ement or question having
ced in 1904. The work, widely regarded as
stemming the German offensive in the Battle of
meaning, put forth as a
Snest one-act play in English, is remarkable
the Bulge in 1944-1945. After serving in com-
here are two types of
exquisite lyrical tone and its moving and
mand posts in the Philippines and the Mediter-
re problems generally expres
assionate depiction of the human spirit in
ranean he was senior U.S. Army representative
or allegorical language
ace of tragedy.
on the military staff committee of the United
genuity and careful thinking
The play is set in a fisherman's cottage in the
Nations from 1946 to 1948.
d conundrums, which are
Islands of Ireland. Maurya, an old woman,
Assigned to Korea in late 1950, Ridgway took
cts are based on punning
lost her husband and four of her six sons to
command of the U.S. 8th Army and UN ground
on or the answer. The Hum
Her fifth son, Michael, is missing. She
forces and helped to turn back a Chinese offen-
rhyme is a simple example
Bartley, her remaining son, not to go to the
sive. In April 1951, following President Harry S.
estion "What is black and
horse fair on the mainland to sell horses:
Truman's removal of Gen. Douglas MacArthur
is a popular children's
was a hundred horses, or a thousand
from command, Ridgway was appointed to suc-
er-a newspaper-depends
you had itself, what is the price of a
ceed him as supreme commander of UN forces in
"red."
and horses against a son, where there is one
Korea and as Allied commander in Japan, with
cially enigmas, are of very
mly?" While she is pleading, her daughters
the rank of full general. In 1952 he succeeded
re found in most cultures.
from the priest a bundle of clothes, which
Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower as supreme Allied
tous, used by oracles and
identify as those of Michael, now known to
commander in Europe, and in August 1953 he
messages from the gods.
ad. Bartley goes, and the sea swallows him
was appointed chief of staff of the U.S. Army.
sguised important truths
Then, utterly bereft, Maurya finds a strength,
Following his retirement from active military
wise for all to know, enig
clease from her terrible pain. She has lost all
service in June 1955, he served until 1960 as
ags and ambassadors for
men, and she can lose no more. "They're all
chairman of the board of trustees of the Mellon
now, and there isn't anything more the sea
Institute of Industrial Research. His memoirs,
ar in the Bible, such as
do to me.
Soldier, were published in 1956.
at his nuptial feast (Judges
n. In classical mythology
DGEFIELD, a town in Connecticut, in Fairfield
RIDING. See HORSEMANSHIP AND RIDING.
nple is the riddle of the Sp
9 miles (14 km) south of Danbury. A
S (see SPHINX). Aristotle
dential community, it has some light industry.
RIDLEY, rid'lē, Nicholas (c. 1500-1555), En-
nalyzing them as metaphor
Purchased from the Indians in 1708 and in-
d to natural phenomena.
glish prelate, religious reformer, and martyr, who
exporated in 1709, Ridgefield was settled by 25
was a leader of the Protestant party during the
riddles figured significantly
from Norwalk and Milford, who chose their
reign of Edward VI. Ridley was born at Unthank
ritings, such as the Anglo-
sites by lottery. The Battle of Ridgefield
Hall, in Northumberland, about 1500, and edu-
Shakespeare, Macbeth's do
fought here on April 27, 1777, when militia
gmatically by the Third App
cated at Pembroke Hall, Cambridge. He sup-
neighborhood farmers led by Gen. Benedict
hall never vanquish'd be
ported Henry VIII in his quarrel with the pope,
attempted to halt retreating British troops
od to high Dunsinane Hill/
and in 1537 was made chaplain to Thomas Cran-
had raided Danbury. A round shot fired
mer, archbishop of Canterbury, and in 1538 vicar
the battle is embedded in a wall of Keeler
of Herne, in Kent.
found their way from literature
Government is by a board of selectmen.
ms. In music, the plot of
Although Ridley gradually came to favor a
ulation: 20,120.
indot turns on the solution
more radical reform of doctrine, he was made
d by the heroine. The Eng
chaplain to Henry VIII and canon of Canterbury
GEWOOD, a village in New Jersey, in Bergen
vard Elgar presented a series
and Westminster. In 1547, following the acces-
25 miles (40 km) northwest of New York
his Enigma Variations (189
sion of Edward VI, Ridley was appointed bishop
Ridgewood is primarily a residential com-
it to puzzle the listener by
of Rochester. In the following years he furthered
many of whose residents commute to
ugh various devices, to ide
the spread of Anglican doctrines, served on the
York City.
om a particular variation
commission to reform English canon law, and
The site was first settled by the Dutch about
fine arts, the appeal of
probably assisted Cranmer in drawing up the
During the American Revolution, American
such metaphysical paintings
First Book of Common Prayer. In 1550 he was
British forces repeatedly camped here, and
made bishop of London.
o's Enigma of an Autumn
March and April 1780 fighting took place in
In 1553, after Edward's death, Ridley was
5, particularly conundrums,
locality. The settlement was sparsely popu-
sent to the Tower by Queen Mary, whose acces-
until the railroad came in 1848. In 1853 a
f children's play. However
sion he had opposed. In the spring of 1554,
a of riddles is illustrated
estate development began, called Godwin-
along with Cranmer and Hugh Latimer, he was
ston Churchill, who charac
after Abraham Godwin, a Revolutionary
sent to Oxford, examined by an ecclesiastical com-
nion as "a riddle wrapped
The community was renamed Ridgewood
mission, and pronounced a heretic. He and
and incorporated in 1894. Government
Latimer were burned at the stake in Oxford on
enigma."
council and manager. Population: 25,208.
Oct. 16, 1555.
1240
THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953
OPERATIONS, 1950
1241
agreed upon a prisoner of war exchange.
lery and small-arms duel along the entire
referral of the problem to the U.N., which undertook the establishment of an inde-
Involved were 241 Israelis and 8,031
cease-fire line between Kuneitra and
pendent Korean government following free nationwide elections. The U.S.S.R. re-
Egyptians. Following the exchange (com-
Damascus.
fused to co-operate. In the southern zone, the Republic of Korea was established
pleted November 22) the talks broke
1974, March 18. Arabs End Oil Embargo of
(August 15, 1947), with Seoul its capital. Declaring the action illegal, the U.S.S.R.
down because of inability of the two sides
the U.S. Libya and Algeria refused to
set up a puppet government-the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, its capital
to agree on a disengagement formula
vote with the majority of 7 Arab oil-
at Pyongyang-and organized a North Korean Army (NKA). Allegedly, Soviet
(November 29).
producing nations (see p. 1284).
1973, December 21-22. First Meeting of
1974, April-May. Intensified Palestine Guer-
troops evacuated the north (December, 1948). U.S. troops completed evacuation
Geneva Peace Conference. Representa-
rilla Attacks. Palestine guerrillas, at-
of the south (June, 1949) a small American military advisory group remained to
tives of Egypt, Israel, the U.S. and the
tempting to place pressure on Israel, un-
organize a Republic of Korea (ROK) Army. More than a year of continuous bick-
U.S.S.R. agreed that Egyptian-Israeli dis-
dertook a number of suicide raids across
ering-Communist propaganda, raids, sabotage, terrorism, and guerrilla action-
cussion of separation of forces should
the border from Lebanon into Israel.
harassed the south without breaking down the ROK government.
continue in Geneva (December 26).
Most notable were attacks on Qiryat She-
1974, January 18. sraeli-Egyptian Disen-
mona (April 11) and Maalot (May 15).
THE OPPOSING FORCES
gagement Agreement. This followed a
Israeli aircraft bombed Palestine guerrilla
week of intensive "shuttle diplomacy" by
bases and camps in Lebanon in retalia-
Communist North Korea now had a well-trained and Russian-equipped army:
Secretary of State Kissinger, flying back
tion. Losses of life among the civilian
and forth between Egypt and Israel
130,000 men in 10 divisions with a brigade of Russian T-34 medium tanks and sup-
population on both sides further in-
(January 11-17). Israeli troops were to
flamed Arab-Israeli hostilities.
porting troops. Its hard core was composed of some 25,000 veterans of the Chinese
withdraw within 40 days from their
1974, April 18. Egypt Abandons Reliance on
Communist campaign in Manchuria (see p. 1306). The air force consisted of some
bridgehead to a line 15 to 20 kilometers
Soviet Military Equipment. Announcing
180 Russian Yak planes of World War II type. There were more than 100,000
east of the Canal. The Egyptians would
that the U.S.S.R. had failed for 6 months
trained reserves.
remain on the East Bank. in a zone 8 to
to honor Egyptian resupply requests, and
The ROK Army-little more than a national police force-consisted of about
10 kilometers deep. A buffer zone be-
that Soviet terms for renewed supply of
100,000 men in 8 divisions with little supporting artillery. It lacked medium and
tween the two forces, 5 to 8 kilometers
arms to Egypt were "unacceptable" and
heavy artillery, tanks, combat aircraft, and reserves.
wide, would be patrolled by UNEF. This
an "instrument of policy leverage," Presi-
left the Israelis in control of the Gidi
Naval strength on both sides was negligible.
dent Sadat ended 18 years of Egyptian
and Mitla passes. The Israeli withdrawal
reliance upon Soviet arms deliveries.
began on January 24 and was completed
OPERATIONS, 1950
gade, and supporting troops, under Mar-
1974, May 31. Israeli-Syrian Disengagement
March 4.
shal Choe Yong Gun-crossed the border
Agreement. After 32 days of shuttle di-
plomacy by Kissinger between Israel and
1950, June 25. Invasion. North Korcan
in 4 columns, driving on Seoul. Surprise
1974, February 28. The U.S. and Egypt Re-
sume Diplomatic Relations. These had
Syria, Israel gave up all of the territory
forces-7 infantry divisions, the tank bri-
was complete. The power punch, accom-
been broken since June 6, 1967 (see p.
captured from Syria in the October 1973
1231).
war, plus two small strips taken in 1967,
UNITED NATIONS DEFENSIVE
SEA
OF
1974, February-May. Syrian-Israeli "War of
including the town of Kuneitra. Military
June-September 1950
Attrition." Apparently as a tactic to
forces were to be limited in zones on
0
50
100
Scale of miles
JAPAN
place pressure on Israel to make terri-
either side of the new cease-fire line, and
torial concessions on the Golan Heights,
a narrow buffer zone was to be patrolled
Kosong
Syrian forces initiated a protracted artil-
25 June
by units of the UNEF.
38°
38°
Kaesonge
25 June
THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953
Seoul
Inchan
Samchok
BACKGROUND
Initial contact by U.S. forces 4 July
Osan
26-29 June
Korea, annexed by Japan following the Russo-Japanese War (see p. 920), was
promised its freedom by the Allies at the Cairo Conference (December 1, 1943). The
YELLOW
Taejon
Yongdok
18.21
decision was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Proclamation (July 26, 1945). When Japan
July
Pohang
surrendered in World War II (see p. 1198), a hurried Allied agreement (August 15,
Kunsan
14 Sept.
Taegu
****
1945) established the 38th degree of latitude as an arbitrary dividing line, north of
EIGHTH
SEA
which the U.S.S.R. would accept surrender of Japanese forces in Korea; those Japa-
nese south of the line would surrender to U.S. troops. Following the surrender,
Pusan
which took place with little friction, the U.S.S.R. held the 38th parallel to be a
Mekpol
political boundary; along it the Iron Curtain dropped.
Two years of unsuccessful attempts to reach agreement were followed by U.S.
1242
THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953
OPERATIONS, 1950
1243
panied by radio broadcasts asserting it to
in the remainder of his division as fast as
tank regiments, continued a series of un-
the Marine brigade for duty elsewhere
be "national defense" against an alleged
the units came up, General Dean partly
co-ordinated assaults all around the per-
(see below).
ROK "invasion," broke through the scat-
snubbed the NKA advance down the pen-
imeter. A 3-division attack on the north
1950, September 15-25. The Inchon Land-
tered resistance of elements of the four
insula, trading terrain for time, while the
(September 3) necessitated committing
ing. At dawn, the U.S. x Corps, Major
ROK divisions in the area. Its objective
1st Cavalry and 25th divisions were being
the entire U.N. reserve (the 24th Divi-
General Edward M. Almond command-
was to seize the capital and the entire
rushed from Japan. A 5-day action at
sion) north of Kyongju. Arrival of the
ing, began landing over the difficult and
South Korean peninsula, thus presenting
Taejon (July 16-20) ended when the
U.K. 27th Infantry Brigade (September
treacherous beaches at Inchon, on the
the free world with a fait accompli.
NKA assaulted the 24th Division from 3
14) compensated for the withdrawal of
west coast, more than 150 miles north of
1950, June 25-30. United Nations and
directions. Dean, personally commanding
United States Reactions. The Security
his rear guard while the remainder of
Council, in emergency session (the
the division withdrew, was captured. His
UNITED NATIONS OFFENSIVE
September-November 1950
U.S.S.R., boycotting the Council, had no
battered troops were relieved by the 1st
50
100
representative present to veto the action),
Cavalry Division (July 22), while the
Scale miles
called for immediate end to hostilities and
25th Division on its right, together with
withdrawal of the NKA, asking member
reorganized ROK divisions, slowed the
MANCHURIA
Hyesanjin
nations to assist. President Harry S Tru-
NKA advance in the center and on the
24 Nov
man (June 27) ordered General MacAr-
north.
Chosan
thur, commanding U.S. forces in the Far
1950, July 7. MacArthur Named Com-
East, to support and cover ROK defense
26 Oct.
Choshin
mander in Chief United Nations Com-
Res
with air and sea forces. MacArthur ef-
mand. President Truman made the ap-
Sinuiju
fected naval blockade of the North Korean
SEA
OF
pointment in response to a Security
Hungnam
coast and furnished air support. Recon-
Council request that a unified command
noitering the front in person (June 28),
be established under a U.S. officer.
(Wonsan
***
JAPAN
as Seoul fell, he reported the ROK Army
1950, August 5-September 15. The Pusan
Pyongyang
X
X Corps had been
to be incapable of stopping the invasion
Perimeter. Lieutenant General Walton H.
Kosong
withdrawn from Seoul
7 Oct.; disembarked
even with U.S. air support. Truman au-
Walker, commanding what had now be-
14 Oct.
at Wonsan 26 Oct.
****
thorized use of U.S. ground troops (June
come U.S. Eighth Army, stabilized his de-
EIGHTH
38°
30).
fense on a thinly held line extending along
38°
Kaesonge
MacArthur's Resources. Aside from
the Naktong River some 90 miles north
the vessels of the U.S. Seventh Fleet and
Seoul
from Tsushima Strait, thence east for 60
***
Samchok
the Far East Air Force (8½ combat
more miles to the Sea of Japan. The area
Inchon
15 Sept.
Suwan
(Osan*
groups), U.S. ground forces-mostly in
embraced the southeast edge of the Ko-
YELLOW
Japan-consisted of 4 understrength divi-
rean peninsula, including Pusan, the one
26 Sept.
sions organized in 2 skeleton army corps.
available port. On the north, 5 ROK di-
Yongdok
Infantry and artillery units were each at
visions, re-equipped but still shaken, at-
26 Sept.
two-thirds strength in personnel and can-
tempted to contain the invaders, while
Pohang
Kunsan
non, and short of antitank weapons. Corps
the western flank, where the weight of in-
SEA
15 Sept.
Taegu
IIII
troops, such as medium tanks, artillery,
cessant NKA attacks fell, was held by
EIGHTH
and other supporting arms, did not exist.
U.S. troops, now including 2 additional
1950, June 30. U.S. Forces Begin Move to
infantry regiments and a Marine brigade.
Pusan
Korea. The 24th Division (Major Gen-
The Seventh Fleet protected both sea
Mokpo
eral William F. Dean) began movement
flanks and harassed NKA movements
piecemeal by sea and air into Korea; 2
along the coast, while the Far East Air
more divisions were to follow.
Force (augmented by an Australian
1950, July 5. Task Force Smith. One un-
group), together with carrier-based naval
the battlefront, and west of Seoul. Stra-
Perimeter. Simultaneously the Eighth
derstrength battalion (2 infantry compa-
air, hammered at NKA lines of commu-
tegic surprise was complete, although a
Army broke out, the 1st Cavalry Division
nies) with 1 battery of artillery, under
nication and furnished much-needed close
2-day preliminary bombardment had
leading. Choe's NKA, its supplies cut off,
Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith,
support. Thanks to the advantage of in-
warned the few NKA detachments in and
and menaced from front and rear, disin-
joined the ROK Army near Osan (July
terior lines, Walker was able to shift a
about Seoul. The 1st Marine Division
tegrated. The 1st Cavalry and 7th In-
4). Next morning an NKA division, with
mobile reserve from point to point within
swept through slight opposition, securing
fantry divisions met just as Seoul itself
30 tanks, attacked. The ROK troops fled.
the perimeter as the NKA attacks nibbled
Kimpo airport (September 17). The 7th
was liberated.
Task Force Smith, completely surrounded,
at his front. Several penetrations of the
Infantry Division, following the Marines
1950, September 26. Liberation of Seoul.
held out for 7 hours. Then, ammunition
Naktong River line and a 20-mile NKA
ashore, turned south, cutting the railroad
More than 125,000 prisoners were taken,
exhausted, the survivors cut their way
advance in the north (August 26) were
and highway supplying the NKA in the
together with most of its matériel, as the
out, abandoning all matériel.
checked. Choe's forces, now estimated at
south, and Seoul was surrounded.
NKA scattered into the roadless, rugged
1950, July 6-21. Dean's Delay. Throwing
14 infantry divisions supported by several
1950, September 15-25. Breakout from the
countryside.
1244
THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953
OPERATIONS, 1950
1245
COMMENT. The Inchon landing was
Australian, Philippine, Netherland and
to right. The total combat strength of the
Eighth Army, its right flank refused, had
one of the great strategic strokes of history,
Thai battalions
entire command was about 200,000 men,
completely extricated itself, and the Com-
in conception, execution, and results. Mac-
1950, October 15! Wake Island Conference.
with perhaps 150,000 more in support
munist drive was beginning to lose mo-
Arthur's genius had transformed into a stun-
President Truman and General MacAr-
functions in the rear. In addition to the
mentum; but the central and east-coast
ning victory a desperate defense seemingly
thur conferred at Wake Island on the
ROK corps, some 21,000 more Korean
area being wide open (see below), a
doomed to disaster. The Communist grab at
course of the war. This later became an
troops were attached to or integrated in
stronger defensive position was essential.
South Korea, which if successful might have
issue in the Senate investigation that fol-
U.S. units.
Walker accordingly withdrew to the gen-
meant the eventual absorption of all the
lowed the relief of General MacArthur
MacArthur had believed that Commu-
eral line of the 38th parallel, slightly north
Asian mainland, had been thwarted, the
(see p. 1271).
nist China was bluffing; that she would
of Seoul and some 130 miles below the
North Korean Army crushed. MacArthur's
1950, October 16-26. Shift of U.S. X Corps
not enter the conflict unless Manchuria
November 24 situation. There, as the year
decision was taken while his Eighth Army
to the East Coast. Embarked at Inchon,
itself were invaded. He had expressed this
ended, the Eighth Army awaited a new
was still clawing to maintain a toehold at
the corps was moved around to the east
opinion to Truman at Wake Island (see
Communist offensive.
Pusan. On August 12 his staff was ordered
coast to Wonsan (October 19), which had
above). The U.S. Central Intelligence
1950, November 27-December 9. X Corps
to prepare the operation, one month to ac-
already been captured by the ROK I
Agency was of the same opinion. Yet
Withdrawal. In the eastern zone, an ad-
complish what ordinarily would take several.
Corps. A 7-day delay in landing was nec-
now Red Chinese troops were in Korea.
His dynamic insistence overcame the doubts
ditional 120,000 Chinese troops, advanc-
essary to sweep the harbor clear of latest-
MacArthur considered that to suspend his
ing on both sides of the Chosin reservoir,
of the U.S. JCS (technically the Inchon
type Soviet mines, sown under the direc-
advance would be a violation of his direc-
isolated the 1st Marine Division and drove
area was most disadvantageous for an am-
tion of Soviet experts with the NKA.
tive: "to destroy the North Korean armed
in elements of the 3rd and 7th divisions.
phibious operation) and he was provided
1950, October-November. Threats from
forces." Aerial reconnaissance north of the
The ROK troops on the coastal flank were
with the bulk of the 1 division of Marines
Communist China. Peking had threat-
Yalu being still prohibited, he decided the
hurriedly withdrawn on Almond's order
he demanded. (One of its brigades, already
ened intervention should the 38th parallel
only remaining course was to clarify the
without much molestation. MacArthur or-
there, came from his own Pusan perimeter.)
be crossed by U.N. troops, and heavy con-
situation by a bold advance. The decision
dered evacuation of the entire force, since
The 7th Infantry Division was the last of his
centrations of Chinese Communist (Chi-
was specifically approved by the JCS.
the Communist drive, directed on the
occupation troops in Japan, its ranks filled
Com) troops were reported north of the
Meanwhile X Corps had thrust north,
ports of Hungnam and Wonsan, threat-
by more than 5,000 ROK soldiers hurried to
Yalu, in Manchuria. Since aerial recon-
widely distributed over an immense front;
ened its piecemeal destruction. Navy
Japan to train with it. Success depended on
naissance beyond the Yalu was prohibited,
the ROK Capital Division had reached
transports were rushed to both ports.
(a) the ability of the U.S. Navy to provide
MacArthur knew neither the full strength
Chongjin on the coast; the U.S. 7th Divi-
Defensive perimeters were established,
sufficient water transport, (b) the ability of
nor the dispositions of these troops, nor-
sion was on the Yalu at Hyesanjin.
manned by elements of the 3rd and 7th
Walker's hard-pressed Eighth Army to hold
until his forward ROK divisions were am-
1950, November 24. Eighth Army Advance.
divisions, while the 1st Marine Division,
the Pusan perimeter until the stroke fell,
bushed by them and a U.S. regiment at
MacArthur's "reconnaissance in force" be-
under Major General Oliver Smith, con-
and (c) perfect timing of the assault (a
Unsan was severely mauled (November
gan.
solidated south of the Chosin reservoir in
30-foot tide variance permitted use of the
1)-was he aware that ChiComs in con-
1950, November 25-26. Communist Coun-
subzero weather. Surrounded by 8 Com-
beaches for only 6 of each 24 hours.)
siderable numbers were already south of
teroffensive. After advancing for 24 hours
munist divisions, General Smith, announc-
1950, October 1-November 24. Advance to
the Yalu. Walker, confronted by the pres-
against practically no opposition, the
ing to his troops that they were not re-
the Yalu. As directed by both the U.N.
ence of this new element in the situation,
Eighth Army was suddenly struck a mas-
treating, but "attacking in another direc-
and President Truman, MacArthur pushed
recalled his leading Eighth Army units
sive blow, the main effort being directed
tion," moved southeast on Hungnam, sup-
north across the 38th parallel. ROK troops
and consolidated temporarily along the
against the U.N. force's right flank. Some
plied by the Far East Air Force. When a
crossed the line (October 1); Eighth
Chongchon River.
180,000 Chinese troops, in 18 divisions,
Communist blow destroyed the 1 bridge
Army followed (October 9), leaving 2 di-
MacArthur's Plans and Problems.
shattered and ripped through the ROK II
across a gorge otherwise impassable for
visions in the southern area to secure com-
His intention was to advance up the entire
Corps, hit the U.S. 2nd Division on the
the division's trucks and tanks, bridging
munication lines to Pusan and mop up
front of the peninsula, x Corps on the
right flank of IX Corps, and threatened
material was flown in by air and the
roving remnants of the NKA. A serious
east coast, Eighth Army on the west, and
envelopment of the entire Eighth Army.
Marine southward "advance" continued.
military handicap was the injunction that
make a sweeping envelopment. X Corps
The 2nd Division, attempting to refuse
Thirteen days of running fight ended (De-
under no circumstances were U.N. air-
would turn west on reaching the Yalu and
its right flank, fell into an ambush at
cember 9) when a relief column of 3rd
craft to fly north of the Yalu River.
drive all enemy forces south of the border
Kunu-ri as the ChiCom envelopment
Division troops met the Marine vanguard
Pyongyang, North Korean capital, was
into the arms of Eighth Army. Since the
trapped its columns while passing through
outside the Hungnam perimeter.
rugged, desolate central massif precluded
overrun (October 20) by a combined air-
a defile in march order. Some 4,000 men
1950, December 5-15. x Corps Evacuation.
mutual support, these forces acted inde-
borne (187th Regimental Combat Team)
and most of the divisional artillery were
Despite continued Communist attacks on
pendently, their control and co-ordination
landing and overland advance. The ROK
lost while trying to fight their way out.
the perimeters of both ports, evacuation
directed by MacArthur in Tokyo. Almond's
6th Division reached the Yalu at Chosan,
Walker threw in his reserves, the U.S. 1st
by air and by sea went smoothly. Air
X Corps now consisted of the U.S. 1st
and other ROK units fanned out behind
Cavalry Division and the Turkish and
Force and Navy carrier-plane support, to-
Marine and 3rd and 7th Divisions and the
it. By this time, other U.N. token forces
27th Commonwealth brigades. They staved
gether with naval gunfire, facilitated the
ROK I Corps (3rd and Capital Di-
had joined Eighth Army and were inte-
off the envelopment, the Turks in partic-
final embarkation. In all, 105,000 ROK
visions). The Eighth. Army, 9 divisions
grated in existing U.S. divisional ele-
ular taking heavy lossès, and the Eighth
and U.S. troops were lifted by the Navy,
strong, was grouped in 3 army corps: the
Army managed to disengage in compara-
ments: a Turkish brigade, and Canadian,
together with 98,000 civilian refugees.
U.S. I and IX and the ROK II, from left
tively good order. By December 5, the
Some 350,000 tons of cargo and 17,500
1246
THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953
OPERATIONS, 1951
1247
vehicles were also carried. The Far East
the assault at its source, but the JCS had no
1951, January 25-February 10. U.N. Coun-
ualties on the enemy, and secondarily to
Air Force evacuated 3,600 troops, 200 ve-
intention of giving such authority. Finally,
teroffensive. Ridgway launched a series
relieve Seoul and eliminate a large Com-
hicles, and 1,300 tons of cargo. On arrival
the actual local security measures taken just
of limited-objective attacks, slowly driving
munist supply base now built up at Chun-
at Pusan, the x Corps came under Eighth
before and during the Eighth Army's move
north. A Communist counterattack near
chon. The main effort, in the center, forced
Army control as a strategical reserve.
were inadequate under the circumstances.
Chipyong and Wonju (February 11-18)
the Communists back. The Han River was
1950, December 23-26. Death of Walker;
For this both MacArthur and Walker must
checked the advance in the center, but on
crossed east of Seoul.
Arrival of Ridgway. Walker, killed in an
share blame.
the west U.N. troops reached the outskirts
1951, March 14. Reoccupation of Seoul.
automobile accident, was replaced by
The most important lesson from this
of Seoul.
Patrols of the I Corps found it aban-
Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridg-
defeat was the necessity that U.N. troops Te-
1951, March 7-31. Operation "Ripper."
doned. Chinese resistance then stiffened,
way. MacArthur gave Ridgway command
learn the rudiments of fire and movement on
This was designed primarily to inflict cas-
but an airborne drop by a reinforced regi-
of all ground operations in Korea, retain-
foot. Roadbound, they had found themselves
ing over-all ground, air, and sea com-
too dependent upon supporting tanks, artil-
mand.
lery, or aircraft. The Chinese troops, on the
SEA OF
COMMENT. The U.N. forces in Korea
other hand, lightly equipped, utilized fluidity,
Pyonggang
Iron, Triangle
Kansong
had suffered a serious defeat, though disaster
surprise, and concealment in the rugged Te-
Chorwon Kumwha
22 April
JAPAN
was averted through skillful troop leading
gions to compensate for their inferiority in
31 Mar.
Hwachone
38°
and stubborn-in some cases phenomenal-
fire power. They moved and attacked by
38'
Kaosong*
22 May
*Pochan
Chunchen
resistance. MacArthur's critics were quick to
night; lay camouflaged in daylight. Their at-
Munsan
Fab.
Kangnung
blame his simultaneous advance in 2 inde-
tacks all followed the same pattern: infiltra-
Uljongbu
*Hongchon
Seoul
.
25 Jon.
pendent zones on 1 front, and the inadequate
tion, encirclement, and ambush. Frontal as-
THE
Soksa
Kimpo
Inchon
Samchok
security measures which had permitted the
saults were in effect holding attacks in small
Chipyong
*Wonju
stunning surprise. His supporters, in rebuttal,
force, but the penetrations were deep. Each
YELLOW
engagement was initially one of small units.
11
Chechon
pointed to the nature of the terrain, which
Pyongtack
rendered close ground liaison and mutual
It was a platoon commander's war. At по
Chungju
support between Eighth Army and X Corps
time was the U.N. able to employ its fire-
impossible. They also blamed the artificial
power superiority in full force.
ground rules set up by the U.N. and the
JCS prior to the Communist assault pro-
SEA
hibiting aerial reconnaissance north of the
OPERATIONS, 1951
Yalu. To add to MacArthur's problems, he
had been denied his immediate request that
1951, January 1-15. Second Communist In-
he be now permitted to bomb the Yalu
vasion. Long prepared and expected, the
Taegu
bridges and also the important North Korean
Communist assault crossed the 38th par-
entry port of Rachin, only 35 miles from
allel at daybreak, its. main effort in the
Vladivostok, through which Soviet war ma-
western zone. Some 400,000 Chinese
tériel had long flowed freely to the NKA.
troops, with an additional 100,000 of the
Pusan
Bombing of the southern ends of the Yalu
reconstituted NKA, pushed the 200,000-
U.N. COUNTEROFFENSIVE
January-April 1951
bridges was finally permitted; this was an
man Eighth Army back almost to Seoul.
COMMUNIST SPRING
RKOJE 1.
extremely hazardous and practically futile
Then (January 3) a heavy penetration
OFFENSIVE
operation, since to approach them U.N. air-
farther east, in the Chungpyong reservoir
22 April-22 May 1951
craft had to fly parallel to the river, exposed
area, overran the ROK divisions on both
0
25
50
75
Scale miles
to antiaircraft fire from Manchuria and to
flanks of the U.S. 2nd Division, which ex-
the assaults of Communist attack planes.
tricated itself only after serious fighting
Communist traffic over the bridges was little
and the commitment of Ridgway's reserve
ment (187th Regimental Combat Team)
eral MacArthur from his dual command
interrupted.
-the 3rd and 7th divisions.
at Munsan, 25 miles north of Seoul (March
of U.N. forces and of U.S. forces in the
It would appear that MacArthur's
1951, January 4. Evacuation of Seoul. This
23), forced a general Communist retire-
Far East. Ridgway was appointed in his
original decision to advance-a decision con-
was the third time the capital had changed
ment. The Eighth Army was back roughly
place, and Lieutenant General James A.
curred in by the JCS-was proper. But the
hands. Stubborn resistance of ground
along the old 38th-parallel front (March
Van Fleet was hurried from the U.S. to
method may be criticized. The JCS must
troops, plus the Far East Air Force's close
31). MacArthur and Ridgway decided on
command the Eighth Army.
take much blame for permitting the advance
support and interdiction of the now ex-
further advance, toward the "Iron Trian-
COMMENT. The President was exercis-
while prohibiting the prior air reconnaissance
posed Communist lines of communica-
gle"-Chorwan-Kumhwa-Pyonggang, the
ing his legal prerogative as Commander in
that was essential. There is no doubt that
tions, slowly checked the momentum of
major assembly and supply area, as well
Chief. MacArthur was not in sympathy with
MacArthur expected that, should the Chinese
the drive. The U.N. position stabilized
as communications center, for the Chi-
the policy of limiting the war to the Korean
Communist threat materialize, he would im-
some 50 miles south of the 38th parallel,
nese.
peninsula and had not attempted to conceal
mediately be given full authority to extend
from Pyongtaek on the west coast to Sam-
1951, April 11. MacArthur Relieved.
his dissatisfaction with the restrictions placed
his air operations over the border and choke
chok on the east (January 15).
President Truman summarily ousted Gen-
on his operations. MacArthur had stated that
1248
THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953
OPERATIONS, 1951
1249
"in war there is no substitute for victory" in
the Chungpyong reservoir. The U.S. 24th
tended, supplies expended and communica-
It was decided to do nothing to risk World
a letter (March 20) to Representative Jo-
Division on the left and the 1st Marine
tions under continuous aerial attack.
War III.
seph W. Martin, Jr. (R., Mass.), which
Division on the right promptly refused
1951, May 22-31. U.N. Offensive. Preceded
1951, June 1-15. Consolidation of U.N. Po-
Martin promptly made public. MacArthur
their respective flanks, but the penetration
by limited attacks on the far left, anchor-
sition. With the rainy season on, Van
was advocating neither the use of the atom
compromised Van Fleet's general position
ing the U.N. position on the Imjim River,
Fleet decided to establish a defensive belt
bomb nor a land invasion of China. He did
and he began withdrawal of his left-the
north of Munsan, the entire U.N. front
across Korea, from which springboard he
want to destroy, by conventional air attack,
I and IX Corps. The Chinese main effort
moved north. The ROK Capital and 2nd
could keep the enemy off balance by a
bases in Manchuria which were being used
developed against the I Corps, north of
Divisions, on the extreme right, flashed
succession of JCS-approved limited-objec-
as springboards for invasion of Korea. He
Seoul. Hasty withdrawal by the ROK 1st
up the east coast with little opposition,
tive moves. Some gains were made at the
did urge the use of Chinese Nationalist
Division exposed the flank of the U.K.
reaching Kansong. Advance was slower in
base of the "Iron Triangle"-thus deny-
troops in Korea, and also the "unleashing"
29th Brigade on its right and a battalion
the center, but was accelerating by month's
ing its use to the enemy-and on the
of Chiang Kai-shek on the Chinese main-
of the Gloucestershire Regiment was cut
end. Van Fleet was now ordered to halt.
southern rim of the "Punchbowl," a forti-
land. He believed that the Soviet Union
off. After a heroic defense of their hill
Despite his plea for approval of "hot pur-
fied hill-circle northwest of Sohwa. Mean-
could not afford to risk war by coming to
position, the survivors attacked north, to
suit" against an enemy on the verge of
while the Communists were themselves
the aid of Red China, but that if it did make
the momentary confusion of their assail-
collapse, the JCS refused either increased
organizing in depth to the north.
such a mistake there could be no better time
ants. Some 40 men escaped; the remainder
means or permission for another drive
1951, June 23. Soviet Cease-Fire Proposal.
for the U.S. to face a showdown with the
were killed or captured. As usual, the
northward. The U.S. government was con-
This was made in the U.N. by Soviet
Kremlin. Without consulting Washington, he
Communist assault finally lost momentum
cerned by Soviet threats and by conse-
Ambassador Malik. It confirmed that the
had called on the ChiCom commander in
and came to a pause (April 30). They
quent alarm elsewhere in the Free World.
Chinese had been badly hurt in the pre-
Korea to surrender (March 25) and hinted
broke contact, retiring in general beyond
that air and naval attacks against Commu-
U.N. artillery range. Communist losses in
nist China would be the probable conse-
this phase were at least 70,000 men, while
U.N. COUNTEROFFENSIVE
SEA OF
22 May-8 July 1951
quence if the conflict continued.
Eighth Army casualties were about 7,000.
Armistice Line & Neutral
STALEMATE
Zone, 28 July 1953
To Truman such opinion and actions
8 July 1951
1951, May 14-20. Second Phase of Commu-
ARMISTICE LINE
were anathema. MacArthur was defying Pres-
28 July 1953
nist Offensive. Shifting the weight of
0
10
20
30
JAPAN
idential authority and debating national pol-
their attack to the east, more than 20 di-
Scale of miles
Pyonggang
Kumsong
icy. The United States-listening to an anx-
8 July 1951
Kansong
ious Free World opinion frightened by Soviet
visions, with NKA divisions on their right
Punchi
and left, struck the right elements of X
Kumhwa
'Bowl's
31 May 1951
possession of the atomic bomb-had deliber-
Corps-the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions.
Chorwon
Sohwa
15 June 1951
ately given up the idea of liberating all of
The U.S. 2d Division, next on the left,
Korea and was seeking merely to restore the
&
stood firm, but the ROK III Corps, far-
Hwachon
Yonchon
status quo in South Korea. So MacArthur
Hwachon
31 May 1951
Res.
Inje
ther east, went to pieces under heavy as-
Yangyang
had to go. The brusqueness of the ousting-
38°
38°
Kaesong
the general learned it first through a news
sault. The ROK I Corps, on the extreme
Panmunion
Sorim
broadcast-offended many people. MacAr-
right, refused its flank against the Com-
Chunchon
23 May 1951
thur returned to the U.S. to receive a hero's
munist surge through this wide corridor.
Munsan
Tokchong
I
Kapyong
xx:
welcome and an invitation to address the
The U.S. 2nd Division (with French and
Congress in joint session, which he did. A
Netherlands battalions attached) and the
23 May 1951
Uijongbu
1
XXX
Senate investigation later (May-June 1951)
1st Marine Division, on the west side,
I
Chungpyong
Hongchon
Res
Hongchon
aired all the policy issues; the results of the
promptly counterattacked. Van Fleet had
XXX
Soksa
Seoul
investigation were inconclusive; in general,
expected the blow in this area and had
Kimpo
IX
&
however, U.S. policy became tougher subse-
already shifted his reserves-the U.S. 3rd
#IN
Yongdungpo
Division and 187th Regimental Combat
Inchon
Chipyong
quently.
1951, April 12-21. Continued U.N. Ad-
Team. Their combined efforts snubbed
Anyang
the Communist offensive (May 20). At-
Wonju
vance. Aware of Communist prepara-
Suwon
tions for a counteroffensive to blunt the
tacks on the west flank, north of Seoul,
threat to their "Iron Triangle," General
and in the center, down the Pukhon River,
Van Fleet continued forward movement,
had been repulsed.
vious 6 months' fighting. Estimated enemy
tors and to delay progress while playing
losses totaled 200,000 men, together with
for time to recuperate from their mauling.
prepared to fall back, if necessary, to pre-
COMMENT. As usual, initial Commu-
much matériel. Also, U.N. air attacks had
They used the negotiations as a sounding
viously prepared defensive positions. There
nist contact was by small units, attempting
foiled every attempt to install Communist
board for propaganda against the U.N. al-
he would contain the enemy by his heavy
to infiltrate and terrorize. There were few
air bases south of the Yalu. Delegations
lies and the U.S. in particular. Meanwhile,
fire power and then counterattack.
tanks. The attacks, vigorous at night, ceased
from both sides met at Kaesong.
clashes between patrols and outposts con-
1951, April 22-May 1. Communist Spring
with daylight when U.N. artillery and tacti-
1951, July-August. Negotiations. The Com-
tinued all along the firing line as both
Offensive-First Phase. The attack came
cal aircraft fire power could intervene. Com-
munists, taking advantage of the location
sides improved their positions. The Eighth
on a moonlit night; the first assault broke
munist losses in this 7-day phase were es-
of Kaesong just inside their lines, seized
Army improved its hold both on the Iron
through the ROK 6th Division, west of
timated at 90,000. They were now overex-
every opportunity to insult U.N. negotia-
Triangle and the Punchbowl. The negotia-
1250
THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953
SUMMARY
1251
tions broke down completely (late Au-
brought prompt Communist requests for
ball in the U.S. presidential election. The American people, tired of the struggle,
gust).
resumption of armistice discussions.
elected Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had promised to bring about an honorable
1951, August-November. Resumption of
1951, November 12. Discussions Begin at
conclusion.
U.N. Limited Attacks. Van Fleet's troops
Panmunjon. This was a village between
cleared the Iron Triangle and the Punch-
the lines in No Man's Land. General
bowl, driving the Chinese back from the
OPERATIONS, 1953
At the same time he released from his
Ridgway (November 12) ordered offensive
own prison camps 27,000 North Korean
Hwachon reservoir and the Chorwan-
operations stopped, and Eighth Army went
1953, March 28. Communist Move for Peace.
POW's unwilling to be repatriated.
Seoul railway line. These successes
on a highly active defense.
Unexpectedly, but apparently in tune with
1953, June 10-31. Chinese Communist Of-
internal unrest in the Communist world
fensive. Massive attacks, mostly against
OPERATIONS, 1952
following Stalin's death (March 5), Pre-
ROK troops, were begun, obviously to
mier Kim Il Sung of North Korea and
bring about U.S. pressure on Syngman
While negotiations dragged out interminably at Panmunjon, minor actions
General P'eng Teh-huai, heading the Chi-
Rhee. When he released the prisoners, the
flared continually all along the front. General Ridgway, ordered to NATO com-
Com "volunteers," informed General
Communists, accusing the U.N. of bad
mand (see p. 1224), was replaced (May) by General Mark W. Clark. The Com-
Clark of their agreement to his previously
faith, again broke off negotiations and
munists continued building up their strength. By the year's end an estimated 800,-
ignored proposal for mutual exchange of
launched still another offensive (June 25),
000 Communist ground troops-three-fourths of them Chinese-were in Korea,
sick and wounded POW's. They also
against the ROK sector. Some slight gains
while heavy shipments of Soviet artillery were brought in, including excellent anti-
urged resumption of the Panmunjon con-
were made, but quick shifts of U.S. rein-
ferences. Unquestionably, indications of
forcements and the ChiComs' usual ina-
aircraft guns, radar-controlled. However, U.N. command of the air was never seri-
extensive U.S. plans to renew offensive
bility to exploit their penetrations brought
ously threatened, and the Communists were forced to continue their practice of
operations, and possibly to extend the war,
the attack to a halt, with loss of some
taking shelter during daylight hours in concealed, deep-dug bunkers and other un-
were major factors in the Communist
70,000 troops.
derground installations.
gambit.
1953, April. Operation "Little Switch."
1953, July 10. Resumption of Negotiations.
Prisoners of War. Communist wranglings at the Panmunjon conferences cen-
tered on the disposition of prisoners of war. About 92,000 U.N. troops had fallen
This was an exchange of 5,800 Commu-
Following U.N. assurance to the Commu-
nists that no further ROK intransigence
into Communist hands: some 10,000 Americans, 80,000 Koreans, and 2,500 from
nists for 471 ROK's, 149 Americans, and
would occur, the negotiators hammered
other U.N. forces. Statistical computation is impossible; no one will ever know how
64 other U.N. personnel.
out a final armistice.
many prisoners died of mistreatment or starvation. Communist boasts in 1951 put
1953, May-June. South Korean Intransi-
gence. South Korea's President Syngman
1953, July 27. Armistice Signed. The de
their POW bag at 65,000, but at Panmunjon they admitted holding only 11,500.
Rhee flatly refused to become a party to
facto boundary was the existing battle line.
Consensus of reports by returned POW's indicated that about two-thirds of U.S.
any agreement which left Korea divided.
Exchange of prisoners who desired re-
prisoners died or were killed in the prison camps. No neutral or Red Cross inspec-
After Communist attacks against his
patriation followed: 77,000 Communists,
tions were ever permitted.
troops (see below), he demanded resump-
against 12,700 U.N. men-of whom 3,597
Some 171,000 Communist prisoners fell into U.N. hands, more than 20,000 of
tion of the military offensive (June 18).
were Americans and 945 Britons.
them Chinese. About 80,000 of them were assembled on the island of Koje, just off
SUMMARY
Pusan, where they were held under rather haphazard control, due to U.S. anxiety
about our own captives in Communist hands, as well as humanitarian, if misguided,
The Korean War cost the U.N. 118,515 men killed and 264,591 wounded;
efforts to improve their conditions.
At Panmunjon, Communist negotiators insisted on total repatriation of all
92,987 were captured. (A great majority of these died of mistreatment or starva-
POW's, but at least 50,000 prisoners in U.N. hands were violently opposed to re-
tion.) The Communist armies suffered at least 1,600,000 battle casualties, 60 per
cent of them Chinese. An additional estimated 400,000 Communists were nonbattle
turning home. The U.N. command had no intention of forcing these unfortunates
casualties. U. S. casualties were 33,629 killed and 103,284 wounded (see Statistical
back into Communist hands. A deliberate build-up of hard-core Communists at
Koje-organizers planted to become POW's-produced an organized revolt (May
Summary). Of 10,218 Americans who fell into Communist hands, only 3,746 re-
turned; the remainder (except 21 men who refused repatriation) either were mur-
7) when U.S. Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, naive camp commander, was
dered or died. In all, 357 U.N. soldiers refused repatriation. South Korea's toll-
captured through a ruse and held as hostage inside his own prison compound. His
successor, U.S. Brigadier General Charles F. Colson, unwitting that he was abetting
which can only be estimated-came to 70,000 killed, 150,000 wounded, and 80,000
a Communist propaganda coup, bartered for Dodd's release by promising in effect
captured. Approximately 3 million South Korean civilians died from causes directly
attributable to the war.
that alleged abuses in treatment of Communist POW's (abuses which did not exist
in fact) would be "corrected." General Clark ordered U.S. Brigadier General Hay-
This war was significant on several counts. It was the first major struggle of
don Boatner to clear up the situation. Boatner, combining military firmness with
the nuclear age. While no nuclear weapons were employed, the threat of the atom
knowledge of the Chinese Communist mentality, swept the Communist hard-core
bomb hung heavy over all concerned and throttled exploitation of success.
recalcitrants into a separate compound and restored order.
It was a war between two differing ideologies, a war of stratagem and deceit
All this while, a dreary succession of attacks and counterattacks-in reality
in which roadbound superior fire power was canceled out by lighter-armed fluidity
tests of will power-cost both sides great losses in flesh and blood. In October, the
over desolate, trackless wastes. All ethical standards of western civilization were
negotiations at Panmunjon again broke off, while the war became a political foot-
scorned by the Communists.
1252
THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953
THE UNITED NATIONS
1253
STATISTICAL SUMMARY: U.S. FORCES IN THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953
from Manchuria and Siberia in similar fashion, the war would have been over in
Total U.S.
Maximum
Total
Killed
short order.
Prisoner
Forces
Deployed
Combat
and Died
or
Nonbattle
Brainwashing. Not until the U.N. POW's returned home was the full extent
Worldwide
Strength
Casualties
of
Wounds
Wounded
Missing
Deaths
of the Communist ideological warfare realized. Through brutality-physical and
Total
5,764,143
C. 440,000
(Apr-Jul '53)
147,131
33,629
103,284
10,218
20,617
psychological torture (some 60 per cent of American and British POW's died from
Army
2,834,000
276,581
(July '53)
113,610
27,704
77,596
8,310
9,429
torture or neglect)-many men unraveled. About 15 per cent of Americans in cap-
Navy
1,177,000
84,124
(Feb '53)
2,243
458
1,576
209
4,043
tivity actively collaborated with the enemy; only about 5 per cent of the total resisted
Marines
424,000
36,966
(Apr '53)
28,627
4,267
23,744
616
1,261
Air Force
1,285,000
categorically all Communist indoctrination and all efforts to use them for propa-
46,388
(Dec '52)
2,651
1,200
368
1,083
5,884
ganda purposes. Consensus in the U.S. and Britain was that their soldiers had been
mentally unprepared for such treatment.
U.N. Participation. Fourteen U.N. member nations besides the U.S. took part
in this, the first war in which the U.N. had engaged. Britain and Turkey each con-
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING
tributed a brigade (each about two-thirds of a division). In addition, the U.K. fur-
THE UNITED NATIONS
nished 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers, and 8 destroyers, with Marine and supporting
units. Canada sent 1 brigade of infantry, 1 artillery group, 1 armored battalion;
The U.N. Charter, formally ratified by 29 nations, came into force (October 24,
Australia, 2 infantry battalions, 1 each air fighter and transport squadrons, 1 aircraft
1945; the U.N. was later located in New York), composed of a General Assembly
carrier, 2 destroyers, 1 frigate; Thailand, 1 regimental combat team; France, 1 in-
and an elected Security Council of 12, whose 5 permanent members were China,
fantry battalion, 1 gunboat; Greece, 1 infantry battalion, 1 air transport squadron;
France, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and the U.S. Disarmament activities of the
New Zealand, 1 artillery group, 2 frigates; Netherlands, 1 infantry battalion, 1 de-
U.N. are treated separately below: Important highlights of its other activities during
stroyer; Colombia, 1 infantry battalion, 1 frigate; Belgium and Ethiopia, 1 infantry
the period were:
battalion each; Luxembourg, 1 infantry company; Union of South Africa, 1 fighter
squadron. All these elements, though merely token forces, bore themselves well and
1946, April 18. End of League of Nations.
sassinated by Jewish terrorists (see p.
sustained heavy casualties. In addition, from Denmark, India, Italy, Norway, and
The League voted itself out of existence,
1226).
transferring assets and responsibilities to
Sweden came hospital or field-ambulance noncombat units.
1948, October 25. Soviet Veto on Berlin.
the U.N.
This blocked settlement by the Security
Air Warfare. The conflict reaffirmed the critical importance of air power as
1946, December 19. Greek Frontiers. A
Council of the Berlin Blockade (see p.
an essential ingredient of successful combat; it also was a reminder that air power
commission was established to investigate
1263).
alone can neither assure adequate ground reconnaissance nor bring about final de-
violations of the Greek frontiers with Al-
1948, December 11. Conciliation Commis-
cision in land warfare. The immediate superiority achieved by the U.N. in the air
bania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria (see p.
sion for Palestine Established.
necessitated bringing in Soviet Mig-15's-then the latest U.S.S.R. jet fighters, quite
1271). A special commission was later es-
1948, December 12. Korea. The General
superior to America's F-84 and surpassing in some respects the F-86. Migs, first
tablished to observe the northern frontier
Assembly appointed a commission to aid
seen in Korea in late 1950, increased in number during 1951, but the training and
of Greece (October 21, 1947).
unification of Korea (see p. 1241).
competence of U.N. pilots-mostly American-compensated for any inferiority in
1947, May 15. Palestine. A special commis-
1949, January 7. Israeli-Arab Armistice.
matériel. While U.N. pilots were never permitted to hound the Migs across the Yalu
sion was established to investigate the
(See P. 1227.) Supervision arrangements
in "hot pursuit," they were able to neutralize all Communist efforts to establish bases
problem of Palestine (see p. 1276). This
were made by the Security Council.
south of the river. In air-to-air combat, 1,108. Communist planes were destroyed,
led to a plan for establishment of separate
1949, January 28. Indonesia. The Security
independent Jewish and Arabic states, ap-
Council renewed efforts to halt hostilities
including 838 Mig-15's; probably destroyed were another 177 and severely damaged
proved by the General Assembly (Novem-
and settle the Indonesian question; the
were an additional 1,027 planes, against a total U.N. loss of 114 aircraft. As the
ber 29, 1947).
Good Offices Commission (see above) was
war drew to a close, U.S. F-86 jets were downing Mig-15's at the rate of 13 con-
1947, August 26. Indonesia. A Good Offices
reconstituted as the U.N. Commission for
firmed Communist losses to each F-86 shot down. U.N. plane losses to Communist
Commission was appointed to seek peace-
Indonesia.
antiaircraft fire-while giving magnificent close support to ground troops-were
ful settlement of the war in Indonesia
1950, January 3-August 15. Soviet Boycott.
1,213.
(see p. 1303).
The U.S.S.R. boycotted all U.N. bodies
The Helicopter. The potential of this new means of mobile transportation
1948, January 20. Jammu and Kashmir.
on which Nationalist China was repre-
was clearly demonstrated. It was excellent for reconnaissance, evacuation, and res-
Attempt was initiated to settle the India-
sented.
cue work.
Pakistan dispute by a U.N. mediation
1950, June 27. Korean War. The Security
The Navy's Role. American command of the sea was one of the principal
commission (see p. 1287).
Council voted 7-1 (Russia absent) to as-
handicaps to Communist success. Without this, the U.N. campaign in aid of South
1948, April 23. Palestine Truce Commission.
sist South Korea in repelling North Ko-
Korea would have been impossible. The U.S. Seventh Fleet gave valuable gunfire
This was established, after outbreak of
rean aggression (see p. 1241).
Arab-Israeli war (see p. 1224), under the
1950, September 14. U.N. Denounces North
support along the coast and carried out amphibious operations, while naval and
leadership of Count Folke Bernadotte of
Korean Aggression. This was in a report
Marine air units participated in Air Force interdiction and close support to ground
Sweden. An international Palestine U.N.
by the Commission on Korea to the Gen-
units. The Navy's blockade of the peninsula prevented any attempts to supply the
Mediation and Observer Group was later
eral Assembly.
Communist forces by water. Had it been possible to interdict ground-supply channels
created under Bernadotte's command
1951, February 1. Communist China Named
(May 14). Soon after, Bernadotte was as-
Aggressor in Korea. This was by General
Stilwell approves
Grant/Dooley
April 24, 1990
Draft one
A:Korea
BRIEF REMARKS: KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL
FUNDRAISING DINNER
OMNI SHOREHAM HOTEL
MAY 1, 1990
TIME?
((Acknowledgements))
Nearly 40 years ago, addressing the American people in the
midst of the Korean War, President Truman said, "In the simplest
terms, what we are doing is Korea is this: We are trying to
prevent a third World War." The allied men and women who fought
fulfilled
in Korea and who continue to guard the 38th parallel
did
that mission
prevent that next war, holding the line against communism and
helped
ensuring peace in the world.
It was in May of 1951, only two weeks after President Truman
addressed the Nation, that the Communists launched their Spring
Offensive to drive us from the peninsula. And it was that same
James
month that our two leaders, General Van Fleet, commanding the
Eighth Army and General Matt Ridgeway commanding the U.N. Army -
are
ages 98 and 95, respectively both still with us and
or respect Snatitude.
deserving of a salute repelled the offensive and drove the
arethrogh
General Van Fleet General Ridgeway,
Chinese back to the north.
Tensions heightened during this month
of May, 39 years ago, as the first major struggle of the nuclear
age evolved into a war of battlefield strategem and a war of
international politics. But it was a war in which we turned the
tide against communism for the first time, in a victory sometimes
ignored by history.
2
We are here tonight to remember our veterans' remote battles
and their combined talents in what is often called "The Forgotten
Victory.' Once this memorial is built, no American will ever
forget the test of freedom our brave sons and daughters fought
that
as they sought to stop aggression. America must remember her
struggle from the Pusan perimeter to the landing at Inchon to
Stoic
the recapture and stout defense of Seoul. And it is never too
late for America to express her gratitude to all those who served
under our flag in Korea -- those who made it home, and those who
didn't, make it back. III
at the Koreon conflice, our polices as
Looking back, the policy we maintained in the Korean
the principles of freedom 44 lacd she foundation
conflict paved the way for the march of democracy we're seeing
today from Manila to Managua to Moscow And that march is
reflected in the memorial itself, with 38 foot soldiers from all
services moving down a path toward the U.S. flag -- the strongest
symbol of freedom known throughout the world.
honored
It's those men and women symbolized by this memorial -and
the Members of Congress here tonight who also served in that war
joined uses 5. Korean and ON forces do help
who saved the South-Koreans from communist forces. Men like
the member of this small mation
Senators Warren Rudman, John Glenn, Congressmen Andy Jacobs,
Charlie Rangel, Stan Parris, and John Conyers to name only a few
being honored tonight who served in the Armed Forces during the
brave soldiers and somoni others,
Korean War. It's because of these fighters that South Korea is
now on its way to becoming one of the world's economic powers,
with a freely-elected democratic government and secure borders.
3
And so, my fellow veterans, thank you for the opportunity to
join you in saluting these Members of Congress -- these old
soldiers who have not just faded away, but who have continued to
serve their country in elected office. Let me in closing share
with you a for lines from Tennyson Ulysses in which he looks Ulysess
back with his soldiers on the battles they fought as young men:
and tells thema that they removed 11
That which we are, we are one equal temper of heroic
hearts, made weak by time and fate, but strong in will to strive,
to seek, to find and not to yield."
We honor tonight the heroic hearts and strong will of our
Korean War Veterans, and we look forward to the day when
cornerstone of this great memorial is laid. God bless you and
God bless America. Thank you.
# # #
dents
Harry S. Truman, 1951
Apr. II [78]
tained in the next following message. (See
that the United Nations was prepared to discuss
good neighbors, with not a single
conditions of settlement in Korea.
attached Statement by the President.)
t.
3. A statement by General MacArthur, published
ffer a toast to all the American
NOTE: On April II the White House released the
in the New York Times of March 24, 1951, point-
and to the heads of all those
text of an order from Secretary of Defense George C.
ing out the weaknesses of Red China "even under
Marshall to Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway inform-
inhibitions which now restrict activity of the United
Republics, and those of you who
ing him that the President was appointing him to
Nations forces and the corresponding military ad-
d here tonight.
succeed Gen. Douglas MacArthur. He also notified
vantages which accrue to Red China." The state-
General Ridgway that Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet
ment also contained two paragraphs which are
resident proposed the toast at a dinner
would take his place as commander of the 8th
noted in Item 108 [2] below.
Hotel in Washington on the evening
Army in Korea.
4. A message, dated March 24, 1951, from the
ay of the Fourth Meeting of Consulta-
On the same day the White House also made
Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur inform-
sters of Foreign Affairs of American
public the following:
ing him that the President had directed that his
Manuel Tello, Acting Foreign Minister
I. A message, dated December 6, 1950, from the
attention be called to the memorandum of December
elivered the principal address of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur. The
6, 1950 (I above), and further informing him that
message transmitted the text of a Presidential
"in view of the information given you 20 March
om Document 145, the Final Act of
memorandum, dated December 5, directing that no
1951 (2 above) any further statements by you
eeting, are published in the Depart-
speech, press release, or other public statement
must be coordinated as prescribed in the order of
Bulletin (vol. 24, p. 606).
concerning foreign or military policy should be re-
6 December."
leased until cleared by the State Department or the
5. A letter to Representative Joseph W. Martin,
Department of Defense, and further directing that
Jr., House Minority Leader, dated March 20, 1951,
advance copies of speeches or press releases be sub-
which Representative Martin published in the Con-
mitted to the White House.
gressional Record of April 5 (vol. 97, p. 3380), and
Relieving General
2. A message, dated March 20, 1951, from the
which spoke of "meeting force with maximum
Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, inform-
counter force" in the Korean conflict.
1951
ing him that the President was about to announce
acArthur's place in history as
atest commanders is fully estab-
Nation owes him a debt of grat-
78 Radio Report to the American People on Korea and on
distinguished and exceptional
U.S. Policy in the Far East. April II, 1951
he has rendered his country in
[ Broadcast from the White House at 10:30 p.m. ]
responsibility. For that reason
My fellow Americans:
gaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp
egret at the necessity for the
compelled to take in his case.
I want to talk to you plainly tonight about
out freedom all over the world. If they
what we are doing in Korea and about our
were to succeed, the United States would be
y the President to General
policy in the Far East.
numbered among their principal victims.
In the simplest terms, what we are doing
It must be clear to everyone that the United
ret that it becomes my duty
in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a
States cannot-and will not-sit idly by and
d Commander in Chief of the
third world war.
await foreign conquest. The only question
military forces to replace you
I think most people in this country recog-
is: What is the best time to meet the threat
Commander, Allied Powers;
nized that fact last June. And they warmly
and how is the best way to meet it?
Chief, United Nations Com-
supported the decision of the Government
The best time to meet the threat is in the
nder in Chief, Far East; and
General, U.S. Army, Far East.
to help the Republic of Korea against the
beginning. It is easier to put out a fire in
Communist aggressors. Now, many per-
the beginning when it is small than after it
n over your commands, ef-
sons, even some who applauded our decision
has become a roaring blaze. And the best
, to Lt. Gen. Matthew B.
are authorized to have is-
to defend Korea, have forgotten the basic
way to meet the threat of aggression is for
reason for our action.
the peace-loving nations to act together. If
as are necessary to complete
It is right for us to be in Korea now. It
they don't act together, they are likely to be
such place as you select.
was right last June. It is right today.
picked off, one by one.
or your replacement will be
I want to remind you why this is true.
If they had followed the right policies in
currently with the delivery
The Communists in the Kremlin are en-
the 1930's-if the free countries had acted
regoing order, and are con-
223
[78] Apr. II
Public Papers of the Presidents
together to crush the aggression of the dicta-
last May, I month before South Korea was
tors, and if they had acted in the beginning
invaded. The report shows in great detail
when the aggression was small-there prob-
-how this invasion was part of a carefully
ably would have been no World War II.
prepared plot. Here, in part, is what the
If history has taught us anything, it is
Communist officer, who had been trained in
that aggression anywhere in the world is a
Moscow, told his men: "Our forces," he
threat to the peace everywhere in the world.
said, "are scheduled to attack South Korean
When that aggression is supported by the
forces about the middle of June.
The
cruel and selfish rulers of a powerful nation
coming attack on South Korea marks the
who are bent on conquest, it becomes a clear
first step toward the liberation of Asia."
and present danger to the security and inde-
Notice that he used the word "liberation."
pendence of every free nation.
This is Communist doubletalk meaning
This is a lesson that most people in this
"conquest."
country have learned thoroughly. This is
I have another secret intelligence report
the basic reason why we joined in creating
here. This one tells what another Com-
the United Nations. And, since the end of
munist officer in the Far East told his men
World War II, we have been putting that
several months before the invasion of Korea.
lesson into practice-we have been working
Here is what he said: "In order to success-
with other free nations to check the aggres-
fully undertake the long-awaited world revo-
sive designs of the Soviet Union before they
lution, we must first unify Asia.
Java,
can result in a third world war.
Indochina, Malaya, India, Tibet, Thailand,
That is what we did in Greece, when that
Philippines, and Japan are our ultimate tar-
nation was threatened by the aggression of
gets.
The United States is the only
international communism.
obstacle on our road for the liberation of all
The attack against Greece could have led
the countries in southeast Asia. In other
to general war. But this country came to the
words, we must unify the people of Asia and
aid of Greece. The United Nations sup-
crush the United States." Again, "libera-
ported Greek resistance. With our help, the
tion" in "commie" language means conquest.
determination and efforts of the Greek
That is what the Communist leaders are
people defeated the attack on the spot.
telling their people, and that is what they
Another big Communist threat to peace
have been trying to do.
was the Berlin blockade. That too could
They want to control all Asia from the
have led to war. But again it was settled
Kremlin.
because free men would not back down in
This plan of conquest is in flat contradic-
an emergency.
tion to what we believe. We believe that
The aggression against Korea is the bold-
Korea belong to the Koreans, we believe that
est and most dangerous move the Com-
India belongs to the Indians, we believe that
munists have yet made.
all the nations of Asia should be free to work
The attack on Korea was part of a greater
out their affairs in their own way. This is
plan for conquering all of Asia.
the basis of peace in the Far East, and it is
I would like to read to you from a secret
the basis of peace everywhere else.
intelligence report which came to us after
The whole Communist imperialism is
the attack on Korea. It is a report of a
back of the attack on peace in the Far East.
speech a Communist army officer in North
It was the Soviet Union that trained and
Korea gave to a group of spies and saboteurs
equipped the North Koreans for aggression.
224
Harry S. Truman, 1951
Apr.
II
[78]
before South Korea was
The Chinese Communists massed 44 well-
cause. They are proving to all the world
ort shows in great detail
trained and well-equipped divisions on the
that the principle of collective security will
Korean frontier. These were the troops they
work. We are proud of all these forces for
was part of a carefully
ere, in part, is what the
threw into battle when the North Korean
the magnificent job they have done against
who had been trained in
Communists were beaten.
heavy odds. We pray that their efforts may
men: "Our forces," he
The question we have had to face is
succeed, for upon their success may hinge
d to attack South Korean
whether the Communist plan of conquest
the peace of the world.
The
can be stopped without a general war. Our
The Communist side must now choose
niddle of June.
South Korea marks the
Government and other countries associated
its course of action. The Communist rulers
e liberation of Asia."
with us in the United Nations believe that
may press the attack against us. They may
sed the word "liberation."
the best chance of stopping it without a gen-
take further action which will spread the
nist doubletalk meaning
eral war is to meet the attack in Korea and
conflict. They have that choice, and with it
defeat it there.
the awful responsibility for what may fol-
secret intelligence report
That is what we have been doing. It is
low. The Communists also have the choice
tells what another Com-
a difficult and bitter task.
of a peaceful settlement which could lead to
the Far East told his men
But so far it has been successful.
a general relaxation of the tensions in the
fore the invasion of Korea.
So far, we have prevented world war III.
Far East. The decision is theirs, because the
said: "In order to success-
So far, by fighting a limited war in Korea,
forces of the United Nations will strive to
e long-awaited world revo-
we have prevented aggression from suc-
limit the conflict if possible.
Java,
ceeding, and bringing on a general war.
We do not want to see the conflict in
irst unify Asia.
a, India, Tibet, Thailand,
And the ability of the whole free world to
Korea extended. We are trying to prevent
resist Communist aggression has been greatly
a world war-not to start one. And the best
[apan are our ultimate tar-
United States is the only
improved.
way to do that is to make it plain that we
We have taught the enemy a lesson. He
and the other free countries will continue
ad for the liberation of all
southeast Asia. In other
has found that aggression is not cheap or
to resist the attack.
nify the people of Asia and
easy. Moreover, men all over the world
But you may ask why can't we take other
I States." Again, "libera-
who want to remain free have been given
steps to punish the aggressor. Why don't
'language means conquest.
new courage and new hope. They know
we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why
the Communist leaders are
now that the champions of freedom can
don't we assist the Chinese Nationalist troops
stand up and fight, and that they will stand
to land on the mainland of China?
ole, and that is what they
up and fight.
If we were to do these things we would
to do.
control all Asia from the
Our resolute stand in Korea is helping
be running a very grave risk of starting a
the forces of freedom now fighting in Indo-
general war. If that were to happen, we
china and other countries in that part of the
would have brought about the exact situation
onquest is in flat contradic-
believe. We believe that
world. It has already slowed down the
we are trying to prevent.
timetable of conquest.
If we were to do these things, we would
the Koreans, we believe that
the Indians, we believe that
In Korea itself there are signs that the
become entangled in a vast conflict on the
enemy is building up his ground forces for
continent of Asia and our task would become
Asia should be free to work
in their own way. This is
a new mass offensive. We also know that
immeasurably more difficult all over the
e in the Far East, and it is
there have been large increases in the
world.
everywhere else.
enemy's available air forces.
What would suit the ambitions of the
If a new attack comes, I feel confident it
Kremlin better than for our military forces
Communist imperialism is
will be turned back. The United Nations
to be committed to a full-scale war with
:k on peace in the Far East.
fighting forces are tough and able and
Red China?
et Union that trained and
orth Koreans for aggression.
well equipped. They are fighting for a just
It may well be that, in spite of our best
225
[78] Apr. II
Public Papers of the Presidents
efforts, the Communists may spread the war.
The door is always open.
But it would be wrong--tragically wrong-
Then we may achieve a settlement in
for us to take the initiative in extending the
Korea which will not compromise the prin-
war.
ciples and purposes of the United Nations.
The dangers are great. Make no mistake
I have thought long and hard about this
about it. Behind the North Koreans and
question of extending the war in Asia. I
Chinese Communists in the front lines stand
have discussed it many times with the ablest
additional millions of Chinese soldiers.
military advisers in the country. I believe
And behind the Chinese stand the tanks, the
with all my heart that the course we are
planes, the submarines, the soldiers, and the
following is the best course.
scheming rulers of the Soviet Union.
I believe that we must try to limit the war
Our aim is to avoid the spread of the
to Korea for these vital reasons: to make
conflict.
sure that the precious lives of our fighting
The course we have been following is the
men are not wasted; to see that the security
one best calculated to avoid an all-out war.
of our country and the free world is not need-
It is the course consistent with our obligation
lessly jeopardized; and to prevent a third
to do all we can to maintain international
world war.
peace and security. Our experience in
A number of events have made it evident
Greece and Berlin shows that it is the most
that General MacArthur did not agree with
effective course of action we can follow.
that policy. I have therefore considered it
First of all, it is clear that our efforts in
essential to relieve General MacArthur so
Korea can blunt the will of the Chinese
that there would be no doubt or confusion
Communists to continue the struggle. The
as to the real purpose and aim of our policy.
United Nations forces have put up a tremen-
It was with the deepest personal regret
dous fight in Korea and have inflicted very
that I found myself compelled to take this
heavy casualties on the enemy. Our forces
action. General MacArthur is one of our
are stronger now than they have been before.
greatest military commanders. But the
These are plain facts which may discourage
cause of world peace is much more impor-
the Chinese Communists from continuing
tant than any individual.
their attack.
The change in commands in the Far East
Second, the free world as a whole is grow-
means no change whatever in the policy of
ing in military strength every day. In the
the United States. We will carry on the
United States, in Western Europe, and
fight in Korea with vigor and determination
throughout the world, free men are alert
in an effort to bring the war to a speedy and
to the Soviet threat and are building their
successful conclusion. The new com-
defenses. This may discourage the Com-
mander, Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, has
munist rulers from continuing the war in
already demonstrated that he has the great
Korea-and from undertaking new acts of
qualities of military leadership needed for
aggression elsewhere.
this task.
If the Communist authorities realize that
We are ready, at any time, to negotiate
they cannot defeat us in Korea, if they realize
for a restoration of peace in the area. But
it would be foolhardy to widen the hostilities
we will not engage in appeasement. We
beyond Korea, then they may recognize the
are only interested in real peace.
folly of continuing their aggression. A
Real peace can be achieved through a set-
peaceful settlement may then be possible.
tlement based on the following factors:
226
Harry S. Truman, 1951
Apr. 14 [80]
S open.
One: The fighting must stop.
attack and to restore peace.
achieve a settlement in
Two: Concrete steps must be taken to
In the hard fighting in Korea, we are prov-
not compromise the prin-
insure that the fighting will not break out
ing that collective action among nations is
: of the United Nations.
not only a high principle but a workable
long and hard about this
again.
Three: There must be an end to the
means of resisting aggression. Defeat of ag-
ling the war in Asia. I
aggression.
gression in Korea may be the turning point
hany times with the ablest
A settlement founded upon these elements
in the world's search for a practical way of
n the country. I believe
would open the way for the unification of
achieving peace and security.
: that the course we are
Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign
The struggle of the United Nations in
st course.
forces.
Korea is a struggle for peace.
must try to limit the war
In the meantime, I want to be clear about
Free nations have united their strength in
e vital reasons: to make
our military objective. We are fighting to
an effort to prevent a third world war.
ious lives of our fighting
resist an outrageous aggression in Korea.
That war can come if the Communist
d; to see that the security
We are trying to keep the Korean conflict
rulers want it to come. But this Nation
the free world is not need-
from spreading to other areas. But at the
and its allies will not be responsible for its
; and to prevent a third
same time we must conduct our military ac-
coming.
tivities so as to insure the security of our
We do not want to widen the conflict. We
ents have made it evident
forces. This is essential if they are to con-
will use every effort to prevent that dis-
Arthur did not agree with
tinue the fight until the enemy abandons its
aster. And in so doing, we know that we
ve therefore considered it
ruthless attempt to destroy the Republic of
are following the great principles of peace,
e General MacArthur so
Korea.
freedom, and justice.
be no doubt or confusion
That is our military objective-to repel
ose and aim of our policy.
e deepest personal regret
elf compelled to take this
79
Statement by the President on the Invitation to General MacArthur
MacArthur is one of our
To Address a Joint Session of Congress. April 13, 1951
commanders. But the
ace is much more impor-
I AM happy to learn from Speaker Rayburn
Houses. I regard it as fitting that Congress
vidual.
that Congress is planning to invite General
bestow this honor on one of our great mili-
commands in the Far East
MacArthur to address the Members of both
tary men.
whatever in the policy of
We will carry on the
h vigor and determination
80 Address at the Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner.
g the war to a speedy and
ision. The new com-
April 14, I95I
Matthew Ridgway, has
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice President, Mr.
important than that, it is a meeting of Amer-
ited that he has the great
Speaker, fellow Americans:
icans. It is a meeting of Americans who
try leadership needed for
It gives a man a feeling of great humility,
put the welfare of their country first.
and a feeling of great inadequacy, when he
This is a time when all Americans should
at any time, to negotiate
hears the wonderful statements which have
put their country first. This is no time for
of peace in the area. But
been made here tonight about his responsi-
business as usual-or for politics as usual.
age in appeasement. We
bilities and his ability. I hope I can fulfill
There are some people, I am sorry to say,
I in real peace.
the things that are necessary to meet those
who are playing petty politics, right now,
be achieved through a set-
responsibilities.
with the future of the country and the peace
the following factors:
This is a meeting of Democrats. More
of the world at stake. These people seem
227
W909 ®
75
Wm. Shakespeare
Immortal
john Milton
Poems of the
8
English Language
John Keats
AN ANTHOLOGY EDITED BY
OSCAR WILLIAMS
447 BRITISH AND AMERICAN
T.S. Eliot
MASTERPIECES BY 150 POETS
LPU WASHINGTON SQUARE PRESS
W. B. Yeats
G.M. Hopkins
374
IMMORTAL POEMS of the ENGLISH LANGUAGE
ALFRED, LORD TENNYSON
375
Ask Me No More
Flower in the Crannied Wall
Ask me no more: the moon may draw the sea;
Flower in the crannied wall,
The cloud may stoop from heaven and take shape,
I pluck you out of the crannies,
With fold to fold, of mountain or of cape;
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
But o too fond, when have I answer'd thee?
Little flower-but if I could understand
Ask me no more.
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.
Ask me no more: what answer should I give?
I love not hollow cheek or faded eye:
Yet o my friend, I will not have thee die!
As Thro' the Land at Eve We Went
Ask me no more, lest I should bid thee live;
Ask me no more.
As thro' the land at eve we went,
Ask me no more: thy fate and mine are seal'd:
And pluck'd the ripen'd ears,
We fell out, my wife and I,
I strove against the stream and all in vain:
o we fell out I know not why,
Let the great river take me to the main:
No more, dear love, for at a touch I yield;
And kiss'd again with tears!
Ask me no more.
And blessings on the falling out
That all the more endears,
When we fall out with those we love
And kiss again with tears!
All in All
For when we came where lies the child
We lost in other years,
In Love, if Love be Love, if Love be ours,
There above the little grave,
Faith and unfaith can ne'er be equal powers:
o there above the little grave,
Unfaith in aught is want of faith in all.
We kiss'd again with tears.
It is the little rift within the lute,
That by and by will make the music mute,
Ulysses
And ever widening slowly silence all.
à little profits that an idle king,
The little rift within the lover's lute,
Or little pitted speck in garner'd fruit,
By this still hearth, among these barren crags,
Matched with an aged wife, I mete and dole
That rotting inward slowly moulders all.
Unequal laws unto a savage race,
It is not worth the keeping: let it go:
That hoard, and sleep, and feed, and know not me.
But shall it? answer, darling, answer, no.
leannot rest from travel; I will drink
And trust me not at all or all in all.
Life to the lees. All times I have enjoyed
From Merlin and Vision
Creatly, have suffered greatly, both with those
376
IMMORTAL POEMS of the ENGLISH LANGUAGE
ALFRED, LORD TENNYSON
377
That loved me, and alone; on shore, and when
Through scudding drifts the rainy Hyades
Souls that have toiled, and wrought, and thought with me-
Vexed the dim sea. I am become a name;
That ever with a frolic welcome took
For always roaming with a hungry heart
The thunder and the sunshine, and opposed
Much have I seen and known-cities of men
Free hearts, free foreheads-you and I are old;
And manners, climates, councils, governments,
Old age hath yet his honour and his toil.
Myself not least, but honoured of them all-
Death closes all; but something ere the end,
And drunk delight of battle with my peers,
Some work of noble note, may yet be done,
Far on the ringing plains of windy Troy.
Not unbecoming men that strove with gods.
I am a part of all that I have met;
The lights begin to twinkle from the rocks;
Yet all experience is an arch wherethrough
The long day wanes; the slow moon climbs; the deep
Gleams that untraveled world whose margin fades
Moans round with many voices. Come, my friends,
Forever and forever when I move.
Tis not too late to seek a newer world.
How dull it is to pause, to make an end,
Push off, and sitting well in order smite
To rust unburnished, not to shine in usel
The sounding furrows; for my purpose holds
As though to breathe were lifel Life piled on life
To sail beyond the sunset, and the baths
Were all too little, and of one to me
Of all the western stars, until I die.
Little remains; but every hour is saved
may be that the gulfs will wash us down;
From that eternal silence, something more,
may be we shall touch the Happy Isles,
A bringer of new things; and vile it were
And see the great Achilles, whom we knew.
For some three suns to store and hoard myself,
Though much is taken, much abides; and though
And this grey spirit yearning in desire
are not now that strength which in old days
To follow knowledge like a sinking star,
Moved earth and heaven, that which we are, we are-
Beyond the utmost bound of human thought.
One equal temper of heroic hearts,
This is my son, mine own Telemachus,
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will
To whom I leave the scepter and the isle-
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.
Well-loved of me, discerning to fulfill
This labour, by slow prudence to make mild
Choric Song of the Lotos-Eaters
A rugged people, and through soft degrees
There is sweet music here that softer falls
Subdue them to the useful and the good.
Most blameless is he, centered in the sphere
Than petals from blown roses on the grass,
Or night-dews on still waters between walls
Of common duties, decent not to fail
Of shadowy granite, in a gleaming pass;
In offices of tenderness, and pay
Music that gentlier on the spirit lies,
Meet adoration to my household gods,
Than tired eyelids upon tired eyes;
When I am gone. He works his work, I mine.
Music that brings sweet sleep down from the blissful skies.
There lies the port; the vessel puffs her sail;
Here are cool mosses deep,
There gloom the dark, broad seas. My mariners,
And through the moss the ivies creep,
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 8, 1990
Dear General Stilwell:
On behalf of the President, I wish to acknowledge and thank you
for your letter inviting him to attend the fundraising dinner for
the Korean War Veterans Memorial next May.
The President is pleased to accept. This has been entered on his
schedule for May 1, and nearer the date, Mr. John G. Keller, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Advance, will
contact you concerning the President's involvement.
The President's acceptance of this invitation should not be
announced to anyone until official notification is given by the
White House Press Office, and any public announcement of this
event must be coordinated with Mr. Jay Allison who may be reached
at 202/456-2100.
You should be aware that certain physical facility requirements
exist for any Presidential appearance. The costs associated with
these requirements are generally the responsibility of the host
and are summarized on the attached list.
If you wish to alter the current plans for this event in any way,
such as changing any part of the format, the location, or the
participants, please direct your request for the proposed change
to the Office of Presidential Appointments and Scheduling.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
Hagin
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Appointments and Scheduling
General R. G. Stilwell, USA Ret.
Chairman
Korean War Veterans Memorial
Advisory Board
U.S. Department of Interior
16th & c Streets, N.W.
Room 7023
Washington, D.C. 20240
JWH/Ihw
incoming to HelenDonaldson
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 8, 1990
Dear Dick:
I am pleased to accept your invitation to serve
as Honorary Chairman of the Korean War Veterans
Advisory Board.
I believe in your goals, and I am proud to give
my enthusiastic support to your organization's
initiatives. Thank you for extending this
opportunity to me. I know that my staff has
been in touch with you recently concerning my
attendance at the dinner your membership is
hosting on May 1st. I look forward to joining
you for this special occasion.
With appreciation and best wishes,
Sincerely,
ag Brah
General Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Ret.
Chairman, Korean War Veterans
Memorial Advisory Board
Department of the Interior
Room 7023
18th and c Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20240
106283
D. RUDMAN
OFFICES:
NEW HAMPSHIRE
HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
COMMITTEES:
202-224-3324
APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
United States Senate
125 NORTH MAIN STREET
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
603-225-7115
BUDGET
CONCORD, NH 03301
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS,
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
NORRIS COTTON FEDERAL BUILDING
VICE-CHAIRMAN
January 12, 1990
603-666-7591
MANCHESTER, NH 03103
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE FEDERAL BUILDING
603-431-5900
PORTSMOUTH, NH 03801
157 MAIN STREET
603-752-2604
BERLIN, NH 03570
The Honorable John Sununu
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear John:
Could we expedite consideration of this "contingent"
acceptance?
wan Warren B. Rudman
Sincerely
United States Senator
Enclosure
V.
/ B. RUDMAN
OFFICES:
NEW HAMPSHIRE
HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
COMMITTEES:
202-224-3324
APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
United States Senate
125 NORTH MAIN STREET
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
603-225-7115
BUDGET
CONCORD, NH 03301
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
NORRIS COTTON FEDERAL BUILDING
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS,
VICE-CHAIRMAN
January 12, 1990
603-666-7591
MANCHESTER, NH 03103
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE FEDERAL BUILDING
603-431-5900
PORTSMOUTH, NH 03801
157 MAIN STREET
603-752-2604
BERLIN, NH 03570
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
Those of us in the Congress who are Korean War veterans will
be honored at a major affair to be held at the Shoreham on 1 May
1990. The Speaker and Senator Mitchell agreed to co-chair the
Honorary Dinner Committee which will include minority leaders of
both Chambers and Chairmen of several key committees. As was true
of the ceremony you hosted in the Rose Garden on Flag Day, the
event will be another milestone toward realization of the national
Korean War veterans memorial.
You have been invited by Dick Stilwell, Chairman of the Board
appointed by your predecessor, to be honorary chair of this event
and, the demands of your high office permitting, to attend in
company with Mrs. Bush. Your presence would be most meaningful to
my fellow veterans and me. I therefore hope you will circle that
date on your calendar, even though it may be too early to make a
firm commitment about attendance.
It is pivotal to the success of the dinner that the invita-
tional letters make reference to prospective Presidential atten-
dance. I propose, for your approval, the following wording:
"The President and First Lady have marked this date on their
schedules and plan to attend, the exigent demands of State
permitting
"
Respectfully,
Warren wain B. Rudman
United States Senator
KOREAN WAR VETERANS
ASSOCIATION, INC.
Blaine P. Friedlander
Counsel
2341 Dale Drive
Falls Church, VA 22043
(703) 560-4716
mally call call Karhy December Super IT
Bobbic Then collinknow Let Frinolarocal what's Bobbie up.
The Hon. Bobbie Kilberg
Director, Public Liaison
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500
Via FAX 456-6281
Dear Bobbie:
When last we spoke you were seeking a Senator's seat in the
Virginia General Assembly. One could now state that you have
reached a higher level, and I wish to offer my congratulations.
Enclosed you will note a copy of a press release the Korean War
Veterans Association endorsing the actions of President Bush in
Panama. Most of our members served in a similar capacity in Korea
and we are pleased and impressed with the current events.
Somewhere in the White House there is an invitation from our
President, Dick Adams, to your President, George Bush, to
participate in our convention on July 27, 1990, in Northern
Virginia. It would appear that President Bush would be most
warmly received, and the KWVA would like to make a presentation
that would express our appreciation for his handling of the
matters in Panama.
It would be most appreciated if you would kindly meet with several
of us to discuss this matter at your earliest convenience.
With every best wish for the holiday season and New Year,
Blaine P. Friedlander
December 21, 1989
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:
Dick Adams, President
Korean War Veterans Association
P.O. Box 127, Caruthers, CA 936
[0] (209) 268-1869
[H] (209) 864-3196
[FAX] (209) 864-8208
Caruthers, CA. Dec. 21. Dick Adams, President of the
Korean War Veterans Association, said today that the Korean War
Veteran salutes George Bush, President of the United States for
his prompt and proper actions in Panama yesterday and called upon
all citizens to write their Senators and Representative to
immediately ratify the Presidential action.
According to Adams, President Bush's action follows the
in the tradition of President Harry S. Truman, who provided
military support for Korea after the North Korean invasion of
South Korea on June 25, 1950.
"The military movement in Panama is a police action,
just as it was in Korea, nearly forty years ago. It is a sign we
are still a great nation, willing to fight for the freedom of
another country. The combat veteran is in Panama for the same
reasons we were sent to Korea," Adams said.
--2--
Adams, was 17 years old when he was sent to Korea as a
member of a Tank company attached to the 25th Infantry Division,
one of the first units sent to Korea. He celebrated his 18th
Birthday on the Pusan Perimeter and participated in the drive
north after the Inchon landing. Adams was wounded twice. He left
Korea as a First Sergeant.
Adams says that those who eschew force should remember
the restraint of our government during the recent past when
the Panamanian leadership deliberately taunted the United States
and acted in a provocative manner.
"The Korean War Veterans Association at its Midwinter
Meeting on February 10, 1990, will look at an appropriate
ceremony to acknowlege the continued strong leadership of the
United States for good and continued world peace," Adams said.
--30--
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WITH SERVICE IN KOREA DURING THE WAR
Benjamin M. Campbell
R - California
Air Force
John J. Conyers, Jr.
D - Michigan
Army
William E. Frenzel
R - Minnesota
Navy
Robert Garcia
D - New York
Army
Andrew Jacobs, Jr.
D - Indiana
Marine Corps
Alfred A. McCandless
R - California
Marine Corps
Guy V. Molinari
R - New York
Marine Corps
Stanford E. Parris
R - Virginia
Air Force
Charles B. Rangel
D - New York
Army
Richard T. Schulze
R - Pennsylvania
Army
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WHO SERVED
IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES, BUT NOT IN KOREA, DURING THE KOREAN WAR
William R. Archer
R - Texas
Air Force
Herbert H. Bateman
R - Virginia
Air Force
Michael Bilirakis
R - Florida
Air Force
Thomas J. Bliley, Jr.
R - Virginia
Navy
Herbert L. Callahan
R - Alabama
Navy
William L. Clay
D - Missouri
Army
William F. Clinger, Jr.
R - Pennsylvania
Navy
Robert L. Coughlin, Jr.
R - Pennsylvania
Marine Corps
William E. Dannemeyer
R - California
Army
Eligio de la Garza
D - Texas
Army
Robert K. Dornan
R - California
Air Force
Melton D. Hancock
R - Missouri
Air Force
James V. Hansen
R - Utah
Navy
Norman F. Lent, Jr.
R - New York
Navy
Thomas F. Lewis
R - Florida
Air Force
Thomas J. Manton
D - New York
Marine Corps
Norman Y. Mineta
D - California
Army
G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery
D - Mississippi
National Guard
John P. Murtha
D - Pennsylvania
Marine Corps
George E. Sangmeister
D - Illinois
Army
Gerald B.H. Soloman
R - New York
Marine Corps
Floyd D. Spence
R - South Carolina
Navy
Esteban E. Torres
D - California
Army
Bill C. Young
R - Flórida
National Guard
LEADING PROPONENTS OF KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL
LEGISLATION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
Mary Rose Oakar
D - Ohio
Stan Parris
R - Virginia
James J. Florio
D - New Jersey
SENATORS WITH SERVICE IN KOREA DURING THE WAR
John H. Chafee
R - - Rhode Island
Marine Corps
John Glenn
D - - Ohio
Marine Corps
Warren B. Rudman
R - - New Hampshire
Army
John W. Warner
R - - Virginia
Marine Corps
SENATORS WHO SERVED IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES,
BUT NOT IN KOREA, DURING THE KOREAN WAR
Wendell Ford
D - Kentucky
Air National Guard
Edward M. Kennedy
D - - Massachusetts
Army
Terry Sanford
D - North Carolina
Army National Guard
Paul M. Simon
D - Illinois
Army
Strom Thurmond
R - South Carolina
Army Reserve
Arlen Specter
R - Pennsylvania
Air Force
Senator William Armstrong (R - Colorado) is the major proponent of
authorizing legislation for the Korean War Veterans Memorial.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 29, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID Q. BATES
FROM:
BARRY R. MCBEE
SUBJECT:
(1) Korean War Veterans Memorial Dinner
(2) Indian Museum Dedication
(1) Secretary Derwinski is very supportive of this organization
and its efforts and of General Stilwell personally. He
encourages the President at a minimum at agree to serve as
honorary chairman and, if at all possible, to try and drop by the
dinner. He notes that Korean War veterans are moving into
leadership positions of many of the veterans organizations.
(2) Tom Weimer noted that by late January, the proposed date for
the dedication ceremony, Interior will probably be close to
finalizing its position on the recommendations of the Senate
committee that studied the federal government's oversight of
Indians and the Bureau of Indian Affairs; hearings on this issue
are anticipated to begin in mid to late February. One sensitive
issue that could be the focus of attention in connection with the
dedication is the question of museums' disposition of Indian
bones. Extensive discussions on this issue have gone on over the
last few months, with a possible compromise of bones that can be
identified being returned to tribes for proper burial; bones that
cannot be identified can be retained by museums as archaeological
materials. Interior and BIA personnel have been involved in
these discussions. I will arrange for a briefing closer to the
event (if it is approved).
KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
11 December 1989
Board Members
STILWELL, Richard G.
The President
General, USA (Retired)
Chairman
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
DAVIS, Raymond G. (MOH)
General, USMC (Retired)
Vice Chairman and
My dear Mr. President,
Chairman, Design
McKEVITT, James D. "Mike"
With the unveiling of the design for the
Attorney at Law
Chairman, Promotion
Congressionally-mandated Korean War Veterans Memorial
WEBER, William E.
last Flag Day, you paid high honor to all who served in
Colonel, USA (Retired)
that conflict. Your participation gave enormous boost
Chairman, Veterans Liaison
to a noble project. Public awareness - and support -
BORCHERDT, Edward R., Jr.
has been heightened, the design concept has been
President, Borcherdt and Co.
endorsed by all cognizant national commissions and the
CHERRY, Fred V.
architectural engineering phase has begun. Actual
Colonel, USAF (Retired)
construction could initiate in early 1991, if the
CURCIO, John B.
requisite $9 million has been raised. (We currently
CEO, (Retired)
Mack Trucks, Inc.
have $4.5 million.)
DEHNE, Thomas G.
Assistant National Adjutant
In the enabling legislation, Congress determined
Disabled American Veterans
the national interest would best be served if these
McCARTHY, Rosemary T.
funds came from the American people. To achieve our
Colonel, USA (Retired)
goal, Sir, we will be holding our first official "fund
McSWEENY, William F.
raising" event on May 1, 1990.
President, Occidental
International Corporation
The function will honor all serving Members of
RODRIGUEZ, Carlos
Administrator of Benefits
Congress who are veterans of the Korean War (to include
Eastern Paralyzed Veterans
10 Senators and 34 Members of the House). Our good
Association
friend, Bob Hope, has already agreed to play a major
General Counsel
role in the evening's activities.
HOFFMAN, Martin R.
Former Secretary of the Army
We would be most honored if:
Management Advisor
THOMPSON, Gerald J.
As a combat veteran yourself, you would serve as
RADM, SC, USN (Retired)
the Chairman of this special evening, joining
Partner, Coopers & Lybrand
members of the leadership of both Chambers who
Executive Director
will serve as the Dinner Committee.
HANSEN, Robert L.
And, of course, we hope you and Mrs. Bush will
put it on your schedules to attend what promises
to be a wonderful event for a most worthy
cause.
U.S. Department of the Interior, 18th & C Streets, N.W. Room 7023
Washington, DC 20240, (202) 343-2561
FAX (202) 343-4473
The President
December 11, 1989
Page Two
Your distinguished presence would pay further tribute to the
brave Americans who, at staggering cost, helped rescue a fledgling
nation from communist bondage and achieve a major geopolitical
victory.
Thank you most sincerely for your consideration of this
request.
Most respectfully,
Dick
General R.G. Stilwell, USA Ret.
Chairman, Korean War Veterans
Memorial Advisory Board
Enclosures: As noted
RGS/j
G.V. "SONNY" MONTGOMERY
DISTRICT OFFICES:
3D DISTRICT, MISSISSIPPI
FEDERAL BUILDING
HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
MERIDIAN, MS 39301
DC 20516
(601)693-6681
(202) 5031
Congress of the United States
GOLDEN TRIANGLE AIRPORT
COMMITTEES:
COLUMBUS, MS 39701
VETERANS' AFFAIRS
(601)327-2766
CHAIRMAN
house of Representatives
ARMED SERVICES
FEDERAL BUILDING
LAUREL, MS 39440
Mashington, DC 20515
(601)649-1231
FMicium ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT:
ANDRE CLEMANDOT
January 4, 1990
FDM
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
H/S
Dear Mr. President:
You and Barbara have received an letter of invitation
from GEN Dick Stilwell to attend a Gala Dinner on May 1 to
honor current Members of Congress who served during the Korean
War. The dinner also will serve as the kick-off fund raising
for the Korean War Veterans Memorial, which has been authorized
by the Congress. You will remember you participated in the
ceremonies in the Rose Garden unveiling the design of the
Memorial last Flag Day.
I certainly hope your schedule will allow you and Barbara
to be present for this important event. It will certainly
mean a lot to those who served during the Korean War.
Sincerely,
GILLESPIE V. MONTGOMERY
bony morgony
270
Member of Congress
GVM:ac
and Mrs. Bush Ye
attend the may 1 Dola
fundraising efforts to honor
Dinna. to, kich - off the
for memorial. the Koredn War Vetewns
"In The simplest terms, what we acedomg
in a third Korea world M this war. We " are trying to predent
HST speech to Nation
April 14, 1951
P. 120 Bally Pulpit
"America was not built m fear, America was
unbeatable determination to do the job at hand."
built on comage on imagination and an
HST special message Congres
Jan 8 1947 p.47
"We are not now that strength which in old days
moved earth and heaven, that which we all, weare -
One One equal temper of heroic hearts,
To by time and fate, but strong in will
strive, to find and X yield "
won SHAN monal
Wysses by Alfred Lord Polms Tennyso
343-
This month ?
1566-1524 558-7596
Who will be there
anecdotes
Richard
anyone else >
to to
7808 Jan
Battles appropriate
"Forgotten was"
won
Stilwell approves
Grant/Dooley
April 24, 1990
Draft one
A:Korea
BRIEF REMARKS: KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL
FUNDRAISING DINNER
OMNI SHOREHAM HOTEL
MAY 1, 1990
TIME?
((Acknowledgements))
Nearly 40 years ago, addressing the American people in the
midst of the Korean War, President Truman said, "In the simplest
terms, what we are doing is Korea is this: We are trying to
prevent a third World War." The allied men and women who fought
in Korea -- and who continue to guard the 38th parallel -- did
prevent that next war, holding the line against communism and
ensuring peace in the world.
It was in May of 1951, only two weeks after President Truman
addressed the Nation, that the Communists launched their Spring
Offensive to drive us from the peninsula. And it was that same
month that our two leaders, General Van Fleet, commanding the
Eighth Army and General Matt Ridgeway commanding the U.N. Army -
- ages 98 and 95, respectively -- both still with us and
deserving of a salute -- repelled the offensive and drove the
Chinese back to the north. Tensions heightened during this month
of May, 39 years ago, as the first major struggle of the nuclear
age evolved into a war of battlefield strategem and a war of
international politics. But it was a war in which we turned the
tide against communism for the first time, in a victory sometimes
ignored by history.
2
We are here tonight to remember our veterans' remote battles
and their combined talents in what is often called "The Forgotten
Victory." Once this memorial is built, no American will
"forget" the test of freedom our brave sons and daughters fought
as they sought to stop aggression. America must remember her
struggle -- from the Pusan perimeter to the landing at Inchon to
the recapture and stout defense of Seoul. And it is never too
late for America to express her gratitude to all those who served
under our flag in Korea -- those who made it home, and those
didn't make it back. 111
Looking back, the policy we maintained in the Korean
conflict paved the way for the march of democracy we're seeing
today from Manila to Managua to Moscow. And that march is
reflected in the memorial itself, with 38 foot soldiers from all
services moving down a path toward the U.S. flag --- the strongest
symbol of freedom known throughout the world.
It's those men and women symbolized by this memorial -- and
the Members of Congress here tonight who also served in that war
-- who saved the South Koreans from communist forces. Men like
Senators Warren Rudman, John Glenn, Congressmen Andy Jacobs,
Charlie Rangel, Stan Parris, and John Conyers to name only a few
being honored tonight who served in the Armed Forces during the
Korean War. It's because of these fighters that South Korea is
now on its way to becoming one of the world's economic powers,
with a freely-elected democratic government and secure borders.
3
And so, my fellow veterans, thank you for the opportunity to
join you in saluting these Members of Congress -- these old
soldiers who have not just faded away, but who have continued to
serve their country in elected office. Let me in closing share
with you a few lines from Tennyson's Ulysses, in which he looks
back with his soldiers on the battles they fought as young men:
"
That which we are, we are -- one equal temper of heroic
hearts, made weak by time and fate, but strong in will to strive,
to seek, to find and not to yield."
We honor tonight the heroic hearts and strong will of our
Korean War Veterans, and we look forward to the day when
cornerstone of this great memorial is laid. God bless you and
God bless America. Thank you.
# # #
Grant/Dooley
April 24, 1990
Draft one
A:Korea
BRIEF REMARKS: KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL
FUNDRAISING DINNER
OMNI SHOREHAM HOTEL
MAY 1, 1990
TIME?
((Acknowledgements))
Nearly 40 years ago, addressing the American people in the
midst of the Korean War, President Truman said, "In the simplest
terms, what we are doing is Korea is this: We are trying to
prevent a third World War. II The allied men and women who fought
in Korea -- and who continue to guard the 38th parallel -- did
prevent that next war, holding the line against communism and
ensuring peace in the world.
It was in May of 1951, only two weeks after President Truman
addressed the Nation, that the Communists launched their Spring
Offensive into the south. And it was that same month that the
U.N. forces repelled the enemy back to the north. As tensions
heightened during this month of May 39 years ago, the first major
struggle of the nuclear age evolved more clearly into a war of
complex strategy as well as a war of differing ideology.
We are here tonight to remember our veterans' remote battles
and their combined victory in what is often called "The Forgotten
War. " Once this memorial is built, no American will "forget" the
test of freedom our brave sons and daughters fought as they
sought to stop aggression. America must remember her struggle
-- from the port of Pusan to the landing at Inchon to the
retaking of Seoul. And it is never too late for America to
express her gratitude to all those who served under our flag in
Korea -- those who came home, and those whom we buried. III
Looking back, the policy we maintained in the Korean
conflict paved the way for the march of democracy we're seeing
today from Manila to Managua to Moscow. And that march is
reflected in the memorial itself, with 38 members of an infantry
platoon moving down a path toward the U.S. flag -- the strongest
symbol of freedom known throughout the world.
It's those men and women symbolized by this memorial -- and
the Members of Congress here tonight who also served in that war
-- who saved the South Koreans from communist forces. Men like
Senators John Glenn, John Chaffee, Warren Rudman, John Warner,
and Congressmen Guy Molinari, John Conyers and Bill Frenzel to
name only a few being honored tonight who served in the Armed
Forces during the Korean War. It's because of these fighters
that South Korea is now on its way to becoming one of the world's
economic powers, with a freely-elected democratic government and
secure borders.
And so, my fellow veterans, thank you for the opportunity to
join you in saluting these Members of Congress -- these old
soldiers who have not just faded away. Let me in closing
share with you a few lines from Tennyson's Ulysses, in which he
looks back with his soldiers on the battles they fought as young
men:
"
That which we are, we are -- one equal temper of heroic
hearts, made weak by time and fate, but strong in will to strive,
to seek, to find and not to yield."
We honor tonight the heroic hearts and strong will of our
Korean War Veterans, and we look forward to the day when
cornerstone of this great memorial is laid. God bless you and
God bless America. Thank you.
# # #
Pete Watson : NSC
N Kor size Karea
live amo in
starting to push back
to 38th parallel -
stood up to Comm +
mohed them back
for 1st time
mannificent Victory =
forgotten was
turning of the tide
Insantten victory (stilwell)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ROUTING SLIP
Blaine Friedlander
Blessey
Dooley
Current 3/1951 History
Martin
Simon trip to NK01-8/15
Wallace
Wood
After reviewing the attached document, Please
initial and file.
lamn never really moved forward
since that time
KOREAN WAR VETERANS
ASSOCIATION, INC.
Blaine P. Friedlander
Counsel
2341 Dale Drive
Falls Church, VA 22043
(703) 560-4716
FAX (702) 237-6780
To Peggy Dooley
White House
456-6218
copy of Article in Current History
March 1951
pages 136-144
Ten pages including Cover
PO1 100
10:33
tion of a 1
Did Kim 1 Sung,
phrted by tl
or Stalin plan
for whateve
the Korean War?
At least
Communism
by North 1
NORTH KOREA JUMPS THE GUN
matter of hi
reason to
Korean inv
By WILBUR W. HITCHCOCK
advantages
drive into
Former Member United States Military Government in Korea
sminificate
people the
"THE attack upon Korea makes it plain
Manners carefully weighed the influence of
minch" feer
beyond all doubt that Communism has
the factor that, having thrown the switch in
by the Unit
passed beyond the use of subversion to con-
Korea, the Russians were very likely to throw
quer independent nations and will now use
other switches.
WHAT
armed invasion and war So the President of
Whether other switches will be thrown
the United States stated at nood, June 27,
1. By the
linges not only upon the operational decisions
by the foie
1950. He was announcing the commitmention
of the West, however, but also upon whatever
Powers that
American armed forces against those of North
may be the Communist rhission in Korea. For
Korea 70 hours after the Intter Had stormed
pence was
Communist strategists will measure each West-
would attac
across the thirty-cighth parallel Mr. Tru-
cirn move by its effect on the accomplishment
man's remarks have been misinterpreted by no
monist street
of their mission. In turn, we can neither RM-
Large segm
one. The President, whi avoiding directness,
ticipate possible enemy reaction to our plans
be corivince
fully intended to imply that the invasion was
nor achieve our own objectives without first
were not W
that of the Moscow-direted international con-
determining and considering the purpose of
of sherificin
spiracy known as Communism, that the North
the North Korean attack. Accordingly most
Koreans were but dangerous stoges of the
aufung and
vital to the strategy of the West must be the
Kremlin and dhat the tral aggressor was the
procession
detection of the Communist mission in the
leaders atc
Soviet Union. Moreover, his interpretation of
Korean whr.
extreme sac
the events unfolding in Korea was neither
Marx Lenin and Stalin teach and have at
startling nor new. Mr. Truman mercly made
less the pco
ways tatight in Conmunist classics that the
official the opinion that had gelled into lits
support site
Communists fear encirclement by the capitalist
present form throughout the free world with
for example
world. No expedient means for bastening the
a national
the first electrifying reports of the attack the
fall of capitalism is therefore to be denied the
the outhreal
Soviet Union, no longer feeling restrained
Soviet strategist, war with the West is indive
data from 1
from the use of armed force, had finally
table and whenever the Sdviet Union feels the
the use of a
thrown the switch!
time ripe she will defend" herself by taking
true that è
This int rpretation of the conflict has had
whatever action, military or otherwise, is
Russia's fave
a profound influence upon the planners of the
deemed necessary. Despite public pronounce
that much
West. Should we give military assistance to
Hients to the contrary by Soviet representative
the South Koreans? Having committed air
And the ma
abroad these doctrines and taught fervently in
and sea forces, should we introduce ground
schools, factories and public assemblies and
aware of thi
forces? Should the enemy be repulsed beyond
have never been denied behind the Iron
which Sovie
his original border, the thirty-eighth parallel?
Curtain.
whelming th
Should he be pursued to the south bank of
Is it any wonder then, that during the first
it was decid
the Yalu River? Should the Commonists
few days of the conflict serious consideration
bon with th
from China be attacked in their own terri-
was given the thought that the Soviet Union
people would
tory? Should Nationalet Chinese forces be
ntended the North Morean invasion to be a
the rearmin
utilized? Each of these questions and many
prelude to all-out war with the West, either
public opini
more, word answered in the light of what the
as a main thrust or as a feint for a main thrus
point at wh
Soviet Union's next move was milkt likely to
elsewhere? This conclusion, that the Com-
great enoug
be. At each step of decision-making, our
munist mission in Korea involved the initia-
PO2 100
88:01
5
137
Marshally
of
the
Greco-Turkish
-
apparent aid,
Plan, the North Atlantic Pact and the Schu-
man Plan were official expression of this shift
in opinion; American are over the loss of
China to the Communists, an unofficial in.
pression. One more false move by interna-
tional Communism might so incense the
masses of the West that their governments/
would be encouraged to take steps that would
make each day of peace a, day favoring the
West. The Kremlin knew this well; the North
North Korea Jumps the Can
Koreans attacked anyhow
Even had the United Nations not approved
intervention in South Korea's behalf even had
the United States not intervened in the first
place, the Korean invasion would have so
that
aroused
of a World War III, was further sup-
ported by the huge price paid by Communism
for whatever Was to be gained by the attack.
At least four major advantages held by
Communism before the conflict were sacrificed
by North Korean aggression. This is not a
matter of hindsight Soviet planners had every
reason to suspect in advance that a North
Korean invasion would cost what it did in
advantages lost Forfeited by the Communist
into South Korea were a favorable re-
-Fate ratio, the neutrality of certain
the element of surprise and the im-
Optation of Red Chinese delegates
Nations.
MUNISM LOST
Extended Page
UN
influence of
he switch in
kely to throw
2.
138
Current History, March, 1951
expected fter the shock of the initial blow
The Red Air Force did not attempt to cripple
recognition of
had won off never again will the Soviet
the industrial potential of the free world's
consider each
Union he at its disposal the element of com-
arsenal, the United States. Both objectives
The reconna
plete surprise, so essential in an aggressive war
could have been more casily achieved in June,
because the CC
This could not have been unforescon by Soviet
1950, than at any later time. Neither can the
excessive. It
strategists
invasion be explained as a diversionary feint
Within a wee
4. The Soviet Union has advocated and
enabling Russia better to initiate all-out war,
United Nation
still desires the recognition of Communist
for the latter could have been prosecuted
yet in Korea.
Chinese delegates by the United Nations. In
more effectively were the slumbering opponent
naissance woul
the spring of 1950, she had all but achieved
not prematurely alerted by a feint. Further-
North Koream
that goal The Communis government at
more, regardles of this donsideration, having
tion, THE Sovie
Peiping was in almost complete control of the
diverted the world's attention to Korea, Rus-
to he be inf
Chinese mainland and Had indicated a desire
lia took in fact no steps tantamount to all-out
naissan has
to carry in business-as-lisual with other na-
war.
further United
tions. Mest deliberately the Peiping govern
WHAT WAS RUSSIA'S AIM?
the Security
ment had avoided antagonizing other nations
status at a
by internal or external extreines of arbitrari-
We must look further, then, for Soviet pur-
well have and
ness, once control of the mainland was
poses. Russia must have had in mind a goal
tions for in no
acquired, he Peiping government had earned
more immediate and more local than the in-
3 reconnaissan
for itself several non Communis advocates
volvement of her resources in World War 111.
gate however,
including the United Kinddom India Her
Our commentators have offered many sugges-
Council until
chief opponent, the Nationalist Chinese gov-
tions. The invasion, for example, was merely
connaissance
ernment, had lost favor even with he strongest
a reconpaissance-im-forcd to determine the
tically alters
of capitalist states, the United States And
strength of South Korea and to learn the
hardly be cons
the United States had gone on record that
capabilities and intentions of the West. Or
information it
though she would not Note for Red China's
the invasion had the limited goal of mettly
enemy's reacti
admission to the United Nations, she would
bringing South Korea within the Soviet realm.
connaissance i
not veto such admission either In general
Or the invasion was but a feint to conceal 1
or à main thru
Community China seemed to be behaving her
more significant but limited (i.e., not involving
if one Intends
self, and it would appear that the seating
all-out war) attack elsewhere. Or the invasion
does not away
of the Red delegates was hum a matter of time
was but a crowbar with which to pry conces
be will behave
The Korean war however, changed all this
sions from the West. Or the invasion was but
The acquisit
Immediately strong storms of protest aroin
a scheme to exhibit the United States and her
goal, has mucl
from every quarter over offen considering ID
allies as imperialists and aggressors. Or the
ing together W
placement of the National it delegates. So
invasion was 1 clever device to wear down by
would give Ru
unlikely did it become that the Communists
attrition the military and economic potential
of the Sca of
would be seated that on December 14 while
of the West without so affecting that of the
cupying power
Communitt China held two additional bar-
Soviet Union
contrary to th
gaining points, her advancing armies in Korea
Each suggestion however, either has been
to remain disa
and the Visit of her representatives to the
nullified by succeeding events or has been
sitate the con
United Nations by invitation, the matter of
reached by its proponents without full CON
basts in Japar
seating her delegates was excluded from her
sideration of the factors involved. Most fail
complete Japa
terms for prace settlement
only because they do not compensate for the
damaging pro
Thus in the spring be 950 it would have
loss of the four major advantages mentioned
Japanese peac
seemed to Russia's advantage to provoke the
above. For whatever objective the Soviet
poned or cond
West no further, to make no more false
Union Had in instigating the North Korean
soon complain
moves, until her strength was such that victory
thrust, it must have been a goal which she
homeland a и
in an all-out war would be certain But the
considered reasonably attainable and for which
Kerop, it Iwon
Korean attack is not indicative that Soviet
shellwas willing to trable these advantages, is,
Russian bear
strength had reached that point for the all-
the favorable rearming-tate rhtio, the new
Wistern imp
out war never came. THE Red Army, for ex
trality of certain peoples the element of sur
equipment mi
ample,
did
not
launch
a
invasion
of
Europe
prise and the immignent United Nations
invaders and t
PO3 100
58:01
92-60-0861
North Korea jumps the Gun
139
t to cripple
recognition of Red Chinese delegates. Let us
happened in the case of the Chinese "libera-
ree world's
consider each suggested objective in detail.
tion." South Korea per se, however, being
objectives
The reconnaissance-in-force theory collapses
completely agricultural and offering but three
ed in June
because the cost of such an action would be
major seaports, was hardly worth the loss of
her can the
excessive. It has other defects, however.
the four great advantages mentioned above,
quary feint
Within a week after the invasion although
and it might even be questioned that the In-
all-out wat,
United Nations forces in quantity were not
crease in Japanese-Western friction just die-
prosecuted
Tee in Korea, the mission of such R recon-
scribed would really be worth St.
g opponent
naissance would have been accomplished. Yet
Regardless of the calculated value to Russia
t. Further.
North Koreans continued the fight. In addi-
of gaining South Korea, however, and each
ion, having
don, the Soviet Union, having Had disclosed
analyst will calculate the value slightly differ-
Corca, Rus-
the information sought by the recon-
ently, the fact remains that if this were the
it to all-out
nce, had sufficient time to prevent
Soviet objective the Soviet Union did not do
United Nations action by her veto in
certain things which would have helped the
Council. In fact, to better her
invaders accomplish this mission. First, the
Did
peace-loving nation," she might
Soviet Union did not return to the United
Russie
Soviet pur-
well ha
proved the United Nations resolu-
Nations until it was too late to veto United
want
nind a goal
tiohs
no way would have this hindered
Nations intervention. Her contention that she
The
han the in.
a reconnaissance mission. The Russian dele-,
remained away because Red China had not
Id War III.
gate, however, did not appear in the Security
been seated was patently a fraud for she did
any sugges
Council until a month lateri Further, a re-
return in August though that condition was
was merely
connaissance which by its own action dras-
still unsatisfied. Secondly, Chinese troops were
ermine the
tically alters the enemy's dispositions can
not committed until North Korea was all but
, learn the
hardly be considered a reconnaissance, for the
lost rather than at a time when much fewer
West. Or
information it seeks would be out-dated by the
Chinese forces would have sufficed to drive the
1 of merely
enemy's reaction to the investigation. The re+
United Nations from the Pusan beach-head.
oviet realth.
connaissance in this case approaches a feint
Had the acquisition of South Korea been the
0 conceals
or a main thrust, to be treated below. In short,
immediate target of the Soviet Union, even
of involving
Jone intends to capture a sleeping tiger, one
presuming that the had no grounds for an-
the invasion
does not awaken him first to determine how
ticipating United Nations intervention, it
pry concer-
he will behave should he wake up!
stretches Soviet naiveté too far to assume that
ion was but
The acquisition of South Korea, as a limited
she would not have taken preparatory meas-
ates and her
goal, has much to say for itself. Such a hold+
ures for this eventuality.
DIS. Or the
mg together with Sakhalin Island in the north
ar down by
That the invasion could have been a feint
would give Russia almost complete domination
for a more significant but limited attack else-
iic potential
that of the
of the Sea of Japan, forcing the Western OC+
where is disproved by the same reasoning that
cupying powers in Japan to rearm that nation
it, could not have been a feint for & major
contrary to their plea that the Japanese were
war-provoking attack Only one Communist
er has been
to ternain disarmed. At least, it would neces-
invasion followed the Korean attack, the in-
'T has been
sitate the consolidation of Western military
vasion of Tibet, and this is hardly more sig-
ut full con
bases in Japan contrary to the trend toward
nificant than the presumed feint. Even if the
1. Most fail
complete Japanese sovereignty. This makes for
forces of the West were not tied down in
isate for the
damaging propaganda against the West: the
Korea, under no circumstances could it have
S mentioned
Japancse peace treaty would have to be post+
been supposed by Seviet planners that the
the Soviet
poned or conditioned and the Japanese should
West would, or could, defend Tibet.
orth Korean
soon complain against attempts to make their
More feasible is the possibility that the feint
I which she
homeland a Western outpost. With this back-
was intended to reduce the defenses of For-
nd for which
drop, it would perhaps be easier for the
mosa by sucking Nationalist Chinese troops
antages, i.egg
Russian bear to "liberate the Japanese from
into Korea and that the United States nsval
o, the new
Western imperialism: Western attns and
blockade of Formosa unexpectedly prevented
ment of sur-
equipment might soon find their way to the
the main attack Once again we can question
ted Nations
invaders and their supporters in Japan even as
that the delaure of Formosa was worth the loss
Pot 100
1990-04-25 10:37
-
potential, wh
in realm. It
forces of the
involved in
hape some si
gained by M
licens of Rus
special com]
states pur se.
This attri
satisfy our
(undamental
ing away o
States amy
ing, as ail
But di
potential of
divisions we
In return for
and the ITEM
of our troof
her allies ha
of the inten
conversion o:
mobilization
danning and
lense and the
arrangements
are gains in
relatively slip
at riet detagains;
out Korean
the icene an
in several you
situration pc
maintain our
#4 expendit
away process
The attrit
themers an
the war. If
don theory h
tion is true
planners in
tremendous
hims that au
benying ex
materiel and
the man
Mine. The $
that the Sc
1990-04-25
10:38
The crowbar theory must fail for lack of
suitable essions demanded.
It is doubtful that the securing her an oppor
tunity to label the West as imperialist and
aggressive would compensate for the loss of
the four major advantages. This suggested
objective of the Korcan war, however, can be
rejected or 1 more obvious reason: one does
not purchase a standard edition at a cost of
X if one can obtain the deluxe edition Rt &
cost of less than X. American air and sea
forces had been committed to heir "imper-
ialist destiny' in Korea several hours before
the Security Council passed its second resolu-
tion, which direct authorized and chcour-
aged such action Soviet Russia could have
vetoed that resolution. Had the Soviets vetood
America would have been branded aggressive
not only by Russia and her friends, but also
by innuendo, by the United Nations (i.e. the
deluxe edition.) Had the Soviets vetoed,
America and her Allios would have had to
restraint if, indeed,
or the United States
all (i.e., the lower
operate under extreme
her allies offered support
continued operations at
A WAR OF ITRITION?
Most popular of the explanations offered,
however is perhaps that which describes the
Korean conflict as a elever means of wearing
down our economic and military resources
without SO affecting Soviet potentialities This
attrition theory, however, is a contradiction
in terms. It would have us believe that Stalin
is able to expend his resources in a manner
which will not expend his resources For let
us not lose sight of the fact that whatever
military or economic potentialities are avail-
able for disposition by the Kremlin, be they
Russian or satellite, they are military or eco-
nomic potentialities available to the Kremlin
The use of such forces to wear away at the
potential of the West cannot be justified on
the grounds that Soviet potential is not
affected If, for example, the manpower of
North Korea and of Communist China can
be commanded by Moscow, and the attrition
theory presumes this to be so, then any attri-
tion is a direct loss to Moscow for whatever
manpower is expended in Korea cannot be
utilized at some later date in another place.
The same is true a economic and industrial
cost
KIDA
of the four major advantage es held by the Com-
munists prior to the Korean invasion This
theory, holvever presumes that Red forces
were massed for the attac prior to the Kowan
feint. An amphibious asscult is the most diffi-
cult opera on in the bo book Even under m-
timum conditions д successful amphibious
attack demands the mazimaim of fire-power
and Yet, the Chinese Reds, hypo-
thetically phised for assaults across the alwan
Strait, preparing for another assault into Thbet,
and located ominously near the French Indo-
Chinese border, took five months to enter the
Korean conflict in force was established
that the United States Seventh Fleet would
thwart all attempts orm The
fact that so many Chinese tropps were massed
elsewhere at th borde of Tibet and of
French Inch China indicates that an invasion
of Formosa was either not imminent or of
)
We must conclude, then that be Chinese
Communist were not prepared to strike at
Formosa and that this docild hot have been
the operation for which Korean attack was
intended to be a feint. The theory must
be rejected, therefore, on he grounds that no
significant attack was attemp elsewhere and
that the fe feint must have more chronological
proximity to the main thease than is now pas-
sible if the main attack has not yet been
initiated, $ might be the case in French
If the Korean strike were to be means of
prying con essions from the West such doi
sired conce lons should have been riade pub-
lic by now. Communists mad demands;
but the methods of the Communits are hardly
appropriate to these demands. The Soviet
Union has insisted on did withdrawal of for-
eign troops from Korea and the United Na
tions recognition of Red OF China Communist
China, in her December demands or a peace-
ful settlement, has sought but a reversion to
the pre-war status and: withdrawal of
United Nations troops From Korea, with-
drawal of American troops form brmosa and
cessation b Western powers of all "armed
expansion" and war pregaration The only
terms for ttlement offered PM Communists,
then, have either been shade more difficult
to attain be because of or would have been inn-
necessary to seek out for, the Morean assanit.
low priority
Indo-China
100
1990-04-25 10:41
141
cause the West to make more adequate pre-
parations for war. It must therefore be re-
Thus each of the "explanations" for Soviet
conduct in Korea are refuted We cannot
infer that the Kremlin, without considering
carefully every factor, ordered the invasion
erroneously. We cannot assume that Soviet
planners are inept or uninformed. We must
give the enemy the benefit of the doubt in
regard to the soundness of his plans. It is a
fundamental maxim of military intelligence
that, irrefutable evidence to the contrary lack-
ing, the enemy in mentally capable and plans
his mandeuvres in a logical fashion Another
maxim, that what appears logical to you is
not necessarily logical to the enemy, might
attenuate application of the first, but without
a precise knowledge of the nature and extent
of the intelligence upon which the enemy
bases his strategies, our examination of his
actions must of necessity be restricted by what
appears to be reasonable and logical and by
what information it would seem reasonable
to suppose is in the enemy's possession. On
these grounds each suggestion concerning
Russia's immediate objective in the Kerean
war has failed to withstand analysis On these
grounds we can state that none of the sug-
gestions would have been accepted by Soviet
planners as goals to be reached feasibly or
profitably by a North Korean attack.
Accordingly, we are led to either of two
conclusions. The first is merely that we have
not yet fathomed Russia's real purpose for
the Korean war This follows logically from
the premise that the Spviets had such a pur-
pose. The conclusion is negative however, and
not very useful since it clarifies litile if any-
thing Furthermore, the conclusion is quest
tionable inasmuch as It presumes a highly
improbable, though not impossible Soviet
feat: that, her ultimate goal, world domina-
tion, well known, Russia was able to instigate
and maintain a war for six months without
revealing her immediate objectives.
Better suited to our purpose is & second
conclusion which may be honestly accepted
until a better explanation of the Korean con-
flict becomes apparent. This alternate con-
clusion has greater utility than has the first
it circumscribes the first conclusion by ex-
North Korea jumps the Gun
jected
pential, wherever located in the Commun-
realm. It is quite true that the military
forces of the Soviet Union are not yet directly
in the shooting, and there is per-
hape some slight diplomatic advantage to be
guined by Moscow from that fact. Yet mil-
time of Russians in slave-labor camps testify
adequately that the Georgian Stalin has no
special compunction about expending Rus-
attrition theory, however, fails to
afily our requirements for even a more
amental reason. Is there actually a wear-
way of our resources? Seven United
Army divisions, at the moment of writ-
ffering a bad mauling in Korea.
visions is hardly the total military
the United States. Eighty-nine
ere mobilized in World War 11.
In Intern for our serious setbacks in Korea
the magnificent though bitter sacrifices
of our troops there, the United States and
ber allies have been awakened to the realities
of the international political order The rc-
conversion of industry to war production, the
mobilization and training of fighting men, the
planning and implementation of civilian dd-
fenste and the accumulation of mutual defense
arangements have all been stepped up These
gains in our favor. Compared with the
Entively slight losses in Korea they stand out
as net gains, no matter how tragically bitter
our Korean losses are to the participants on
the scerie and their families at home Perhaps
in several years, when we have reached the
sturation point in preparedness and need only
maintain our defenses at that level by replac-
Ing expenditures, we can speak of a wearing
away process. But not yet.
The attrition theory premises that Soviet
schemers anticipated Western involvement in
the war If this assumption is false, the attri-
lion theory has no foundation. If this assump-
is true, we can not suppose that the
Manners in the Kremlin would overlook the
tremendous stimulus to our rearmament prog.
rams that such involvement, with its accom-
panying expenditures of personnel and
materiel and with the concomitant excitation
of the man on the street, would inevitably
bring. The attrition theory asks us to believe
that the Soviet Union would deliberately
ams per sc.
This
division
100
142
Current History, March, 1951
plaining our failure to isolate immediate
lages of the army that holds the initiative
Security
Soviet Mari aims, and clarifies certain
while it compounds the usual confusion of a
based on
apparent inconsistencia in the Soviet execu-
disorganized defended. True, the floods would
the Sime
slow all operations but the more poorly
The firs
tion of the campaign
The alternate concesion startling as it
equipped and greatly outhumbered South
Pyongya
may be, simply that + Soviet Union had
Korean forces hould be over-run in but a few
Comint
and mayfatill have no war objective, that the
days, at worst in a few weeks. Kim's South
Berlin 1
Korean counterpart President Syngmann
Koreans
Soviet Union in fact did not initiate the war,
that the Soviet Union ET from throwing the
Rhee, had just received a beating at the polls
Eay
switch, was just as surp rised as was the West-
Although not removed from office himself, do
only
ern world when the North Koreaus threw the
many of his cohorts had been replaced by in
Council
Chinese
switch!
dependents that no one knew what the com
plexion of the new legislature was likely to be
coedings
A SURPRISE FOR STALIN
In addition, Kim's industrial and ever-hungry
newspap
North had always looked with envy oh the
Lines; Su
We have become so accustomed to crediting
Stalin for everything occurring within his
agricultural South which this year promised
complete
a burriper, and (for the first time since World
the con
domain that invariabl I've accept Moscow
War 11) a surplus, rice crop. Within a month
along W
domination of all Communist activity as an
did the
unquestioned rule of thumb. That at least
and a half this crop would be harvested. II
one Tito was able to break the rule should
Kim arrived in the South after the harvest
Report
rebuff R
give us reason to hesitate before adhering to
the crop would be frightened into the ineti-
table black markets, Too early an arrival
For tl
this premise so blindly
might interfere with its cultivation.
propaga
This conclusion denies only that Moscow
indeed
planned North Korean invasion to dom-
Stalin may have loaded the gun, but it Was
of the
mence Tune 25, 1950. does not deny that
Kim II Sung who seized upon it and pulled
adidator
the Soviets equipped, trained and indoctri
the trigger! With complete disregard for
first We
nated the North Korean warride It does not
Stalin's chips in the bigger game, Kim took
professio
deny that the Soviets may have contemplated
advantage of a favorable set of local circum
less obv
a similar invasion at some later date either
stances Koreans are but neophytes in the
border
by itself or in conjunction with other opera-
game of politics, either domestic or interna-
had bee
tions. In fact what exidence there is as to
tional South Koreani have demonstrated that
Soviet intentions indicatos that the "Ilbera-
impulsiveness frequently outweighs their PO-
For
tion" of South Korea has long been the
litical expediency. Politicians in the North
Nance
ultimate dal toward which All North Koreah
need not be unaffected by the same trait.
officers
equipment, training and indoctrination has
This conclusion Iclerifies the Soviet failure
they we
been directed. From 1985 to 1950 the Soviets
to return to the Security Council and veto Its
defense
had ample opportunity to impress the North
resolutions. The Soviet delegates had not
retuons
Korean with this objective There can be no
strayed away; they were still in New York and
and all
doubt that the North Korean warrier fully
could have re-entered the Security Council
saving
understood his destiny and anxiously awaited
deliberations at any moment they desired: But
variety
the signal to spring into action to de-unite his
the Soviet Government too had been caught
the con
off balance by the attack and was trying to
the
homeland
It is reasonable to suppose that even Kim
piece the news together to invent its account
Il Sung, North Korean Premier grew tired
of the attack and to regain control of the
with
of foreign (Soviet) domination and impatient
situation. The Soviet delegates had not been
warned and had received no instructions
the
ice
about the long overdue signal from Moscow.
would
In June clarric Fremier Minis opportunity He
from their government.
of
the
had recently received much modern equip
This conclusion explains why, contrary to its
ment from Russia 'his was evidenced by the
usual practice, the free world was able to mt
being
more swiftly than the Communist world is
no office
surprise of American intelligence officers upon
its appearance in action The rainy scason was
reporting the event. The first word from be
would
starting, season which adds to the advan-
hind the Iron Curtain came hours after the
The
100
10:43
North Korea jumps the Can
149
Security Council had passed its first resolution
could do at least this well but also could thor-
based on reports of diplomatic agents and of
oughly document such an incident with photo-
the Sunday edition of The New York Times.
graphs, and with sworn statements of loyal
The first Communist comment came from
South Korean soldiers (Southern Communists
Prongyang, the North Korean capital, via the
deliberately planted in the Southern anny-
Communist) New China News Agency and
and there were many so planted) and civilians
Berlin. It was only to the effect that the South
who had been truly enlightened at last by
Koreans had attacked first. Not until the next
their heart-breaking observations of Rightist
day did the Soviet Union comment and then
perfidy. Further, such a "truth" could have
enly that the first resolution of the Security
been dispatched instantly to every corner of
ancil was illegal since the Soviet and Red
the world. The wires of Tass were open. But
setle delegates were absent from the pro-
nothing of this sort was even attempted! In
ngst On the day in which every other
fact, the apparent bungling of Communist
in the nation carried banner head-
propaganda efforts would lead one to suspect
ay, June 25, the Sunday otker,
not only that the attack was Korean-made but
out-scooped, said nothing about
even that Kim II Sung delayed considerably
the
Not until the following day,
before bothering his brothers in the Kremlin
long with the tardy comment from Moscow,
with a report.
did the Daily Worker proclaim indecisively,
The conclusion explains also Chinese Com-
Report fighting in Korea; North said to
munist tardiness in arriving at the scene. of
ebuff Rightist aggression."
hattle They could have been used to great
For the masters of the coup etat and the
advantage in the carlier stages of the war.
propaganda lie, these attempts seem feeble
They were not prepared, however, for a
indeed. To fabricate a more plausible account
Korean expedition.
of the battle than the weak and patently
It clarifies the stupidity of the atrocities
édiculous assertion that the other party shot
committed by North Korean troops not only
first would have been child's play for the
against their military for but also against the
professionals. The clay from which to mold a
civilian population of the South. Over and
obvious fabridation was readily available:
above the attack itself, the atrocities consti-
horder incidents at the thirty-eighth parallel
tuted the worst publicity for the milk and
had been common for years.
honey of Communism Were Mescow in the
For example, à South Korean reconnais-
driver's seat, she would never have permitted
fance force might have captured several key
such activities if there were any danger, and
officers of the North Korean general staff as
there was, that reports would soon reach the
they were making an inspection of the border's
outside world. Chinese Communists have be-
defenses Local Northern commanders im
haved more properly.
petuously took matters into their own hands
WHAT OF KIM IL SUNG?
and attempted to rescue the captives. Face-
saving of either the Oriental or Western
The conclusion indicates why full advantage
variety would have demanded this action of
was not taken of Soviet chairmanship of the
the commanders, responsible for the safety of
Security Council in August Had the invasion
the staff officers while the latter were in their
been held off by the instigators until the end
sones. The Southern forces repulsed the local
of July, Chairman Malik, who very capably
Northern rescue teams and before Pyongyang
blocked all positive action by that body for a
regained control over her field commanders
month, could have used his temporary role
the conflict had spread. However, nothing
even more effectively.
would satisfy Pyongyang now but the return
Finally, the conclusion shedu light on the
of the officers unharmed-which demand,
unusuatrilence of Kim Il Sung, about whose
being impossible for the South to meet since
welfare we might well wonder In October
no officers had been captured in the first place,
he was reported Reeing to Manchuria after
would justify the extension of the war
conceding that the North Korean cause was
The professional propagandist not only
lost. The picture, however, has been altered.
100
1990-04-25 10:45
troops to 9
the
drive
11
M
DC,
UNCS
not
revoke
cant that
when all other reports from
this estimate.
the Coan
ide of the battleground were
A new frame of reference, using this cor
RAN
being
ed via Pelping this report
clusion as a working hypothesis, must
should
m Moscow tiscens significant
erected for the planners of the West. T.
that nb acco at of Kind's location or of his
the Korean invasion was not a part of Mos
activities was included the the report. It seems
cow's grand strategy does not mean, of
significant that there has been no glorious,
course, that Sourct strategy has not been ad-
well-photographed meeting Hitler-Mussolini
listed meanwhife to accord with events. It
style, with Brother greeting and thanking
does mean that since June 25, 1950, Soviet
Brother Lai Piao, the Chinese commander.
strategy in Asia has been at best a salvage
to beside
Though braggadocio is to be expected of
operation for the purpose of extricating inter-
gration of
resuscitated has-beens Kim for all practical
national Communism from what was at the
West of an c
purposes, has disappeared If presently it is
time, and may still be a bad situation not of
Russia which
revealed that Kim has succumed to jungle rot,
its choosing.
t-German
the meaning will be clear his wild excursion
By no means should this new hypothesis
Only France
to the South has brought more grief than joy
excuse any relaxation in our defense prepars-
to Moscow?
tions We merely need not be quite as fearful
29 an equal I
Thus, the conclusion that the North Koreap
munity, alla
as we have been in the past over what Russia's
newed Germ
regime began the independently of the
"next" move will be. Confident that the inter-
rulers in the Kremlin has great utility With
the unity of 1
national picture is ndt as hopeless as unas-
A weak F
out introducing new uncertainties, it clarifies
similated war news would indicate, we can
inid threat n
many issues inexplicable by its contradiction,
proceed with a little more determination.
Germany ag:
Perhaps MacArthur should have been permis-
and with C
Since the usd of the year Kim reported to have made
ted to strike on the opposite shores of the
two public pronouncements: a INEW stating on Number
Moreover, a
1, ostensibly proscidast from Pyengyers and a special order
Yalu Perhaps the threat to bomb Manchurian
celebrating the recepture of Seoul ON MOUNT 5. There is no
ands in the
indication that Kim made either contribution Fur
industry might have deterred the Chinese Reds
ICN in her I'C
ther, Radio Prongrang heing moditored segulary, it is
that we lexth of these metages indirectly by way of Mdscow
without complicating the battle Perhaps get-
Russia and t
By nn means does Kim's ration this the date
upset the conclusion resched above that North Korea stracked
ting a bit tougher in our dealings with the
on neighbor
without A signal flord Motor mean simply that the
Soviet Union will not provoke Russian inter-
Soriets, recognizion this we failed to
the Mobean
b keep Gen
affair in its true light. bate chal to put
his
name
vention land World War III
to limited use or programds purposes
gent France
Precisely what new operational decisions
inhererit in
* Radio Protegying a an Perform that Kim Chek
should be drawn from this hypothesis is left
states of We
the North Karean visa premier died January 30 of & Heart
attack. Significantly Be Held the additional position of come
to the professional planners, who have before
forces unreso
manding general of the North Korean May and according to
them daily intelligence reports
the Associated Press had been impridered the most
region as a W
influential North Khican Communist Kim Il Surie
We may yet dedicate a monument to the
Pyongyang exhibited some confusion MODER Bir death. It had
defense of
reported carlier that he had been Builed Will Kim
ambunctious Kim III Sung who, by his
both condit
11 Sung be right or had the bud 1000 successfully to
Kim Chek?-
blundering, awakened the West to its peril.
power and
restoration 0
France hold
of western
many, the Y
the
The American imperialists have not invaded Korea with the sole aim of
consequently
swall wing Korea Llont their ultimate ambition being to conquer entire Asia and
cannot stark
the rest of the world. There one this great wat the Korean people are now waging
France fe
for the liberation of their fatherland has already become di banner of the liberation
population
movement of all the oppressed peoples throughout the world
Decu endow
North Korean Premier Kim It Sung, Net Year's Day, 1951
Argest shat
100
10:47
natl anthem
alvy Powell -
Inaug.
PRES
disines
Rumunoki -
Stilmell remarks
pres.
Rosemary sing Unoney
Bob Hope 10 min.
mil. Diot of Wash - pageant
Bob & Rooemary
Nonel or lenate
on artive duty
Deminotai MC
intro?
or stiluell
Honor Guard
US Army Bund
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KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Department of the Interior, Main Building
18th & C Streets, NW Room 7023
Washington, D.C. 20240
202-343-2561
FAX 202-343-3459
(PLEASE NOTE THIS IS A NEW FAX NUMBER)
DATE: 4/24/90
TIME:
FIRM/ORGANIZATION TO: Peggy Dealy
SEND
whate House
ADDRESS:
456-6218
FAX #:
FROM:
FIRH/ORGANIZATION:
Number of Pages to follow: 12
2
COMMENTS: Please califyou med more
info !
they
KWVMAB FAX Number: (202) 343-3459
d.
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THE KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL
IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL
Hill twenty
Commu 4/24/90
or
MEMBERS OF THE 101st CONGRESS
WHO SERVED IN THE ARMED FORCES DURING THE KOREAN WAR
SENATE
John H. Chafee reception only
R-Rhode Island
Marine Corps
Wendell Ford
D-Kentucky
Air National Guard
John Glenn 0:30 arrival
D-Ohio
Marine Corps
Edward M. Kennedy
D-Massachusetts
Army
Warren B. Rudman
R-New Hampshire
Army
Terry Sanford
D-North Carolina
Army National Guard
Paul M. Simon
D-Illinois
Army
Arlen Specter
R-Pennsylvania
Air Force
Strom Thurmond Reception
R-South Carolina
Army Reserve
John W. Warner
R-Virginia
Marine Corps
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
William R. Archer
R-Texas
Air Force
Herbert H. Bateman
R-Virginia
Air Force
Michael Bilirakis
R-Florida
Air Force
Ben Blaz
R-Guam
Marine Corps
Thomas J. Bliley, Jr.
R-Virginia
Navy
Herbert L. Callahan
R-Alabama
Navy
Benjamin N. Campbell
D-Colorado
Air Force
William L. Clay
D-Missouri
Army
William F. Clinger, Jr.
R-Pennsylvania
Navy
Howard Coble
R-North Carolina
Coast Guard
John J. Conyers, Jr.
D-Michigan
Anny
R. Lawrence Coughlin, Jr.
R-Pennsylvania
Marine Corps
William E. Dannemeyer
R-California
Army
Eligio de la Garza
D-Texas
Army
Robert K. Dornan
R-California
Air Force
William E. Frenzel
R-Minnesota
Navy
Robert Garcia
D New York
Army
Melton D. Hancock
R-Missouri
Air Force
James V. Hansen
R-Utah
Navy
Andrew Jacobs, Jr.
D-Indiana
Marine Corps
Ed Jenkins
D-Georgia
Coast Guard
Norman F. Lent, Jr.
R-New York
Navy
Thomas F. Lewis
R-Florida
Air Force
Thomas J. Manton
D-New York
Marine Corps
Alfred A. McCandless
R-California
Marine Corps
Norman Y. Mineta
D-California
Army
Guy V. Molinari
R-New York
Marine Corps
G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery
D-Mississippi
National Guard
John P. Murtha
D-Pennsylvania
Marine Corps
Stanford E. Parris
R-Virginia
Air Force
Charles B. Rangel
D-New York
Army
George E. Sangmeister
D-Illinois
Army
Richard T. Schulze
R-Pennsylvania
Army
Gerald B. H. Solomon
R-New York
Marine Corps
Floyd D. Spence
R-South Carolina
Navy
Esteban E. Torres
D-California
Army
C.W. "Bill" Young
R-Florida
National Guard
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page 5
"Those who Served"
on mac disk
and
THEIR COLLEAGUES
whose untiring advocacy insured that such
service would be remembered for all time:
Senator William L. Armstrong
Representative Mary Rose Oakar
Governor Jim Florio
SENT BY:KOREAN WAR VET MEM ADV; 9-24-90 4: 35PM ;
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KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, MAIN BUILDING
18TH AND C STREETS, NW ROOM 7023
WASHINGTON, DC 20240
202-343-2561
FAX 202-343-3459
RLH SUMMARY OF MAY 1st GALA DINNER TABLES SOLD
(list should ultimately be alphabetized)
(33 TABLES AS OF 4-24-90)
Korean War Veterans Association
Disabled American Veterans
Paralyzed Veterans of America
Military Order of the Purple Heart
Eastern Paralyzed Veterans of America
KOREAN EMBASSY
SAMSUNG (6 tables)
AMOCO
GOODYEAR
LITTON
GENERAL MOTORS
MARTIN MARIETTA (Subsidiary)
GLOBAL INC. (1 table)
BOEING
HUGHES AIRCRAFT
GE
MCGAHN, FRISS & MILLER
DR. NAM
POHANG STEEL
ALLIED SIGNAL
ERIN COMMUNICATIONS (2 tables)
TRUMP
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
ZACHARY FISHER
WILLIAM BUSH
READER'S DIGEST
ARNOLD PORTER
Individual seats from:
(346 SEATS)
The American Legion (5 seats)
Bethlehem Steel (2 seats)
Sun Company, Inc (2 seats)
Bank of America (2 seats)
GENERAL R G. STILWELL (2 seats)
WILLIAM F. MCSWEENY (2 seats)
MIKE MCKEVITT (2 seats)
ORACLE (ROPKO) (2 seats)
SID HAWKES (2 seats)
AMERICAN GOLD STAR MOTHERS (2 seats)
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS (2 seats)
NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING (2 seats)
ASSOCIATIONS OF THE ARMY (1 seat)
Air Force Association (1 seat)
NYNEX (1 seat)
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (3 SEATS)
SOFT DRINK ASSOICATION (7 SEATS)
stat
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THE NATIONAL MEMORIAL TO VETERANS OF THE KOREAN WAR
On July 27, 1953, a military armistice ended three years of vicious combat on the war-
torn Korean peninsula. The cost in human an material treasure had been enormous - but
communist aggression had been halted, the territorial Integrity of the Republic of Korea
restored, the rights of 40 million people preserved and Northeast Asia stabilized. All this
had been made possible by a multi-national command, marshalled under the United
Nations banner, to which the Republic of Korea and the United States contributed the
major forces and suffered the major losses.
In 1986, Congress provided the long sought authorization to express our nation's
enduring gratitude to the American service men and women whose fortitude and suffering
had been all but forgotten. Signed into law by President Reagan, the legislation called for
establishment of a Memorial to honor members of the United States Armed Forces who
served in the Korean War, particularly those who were killed in action, are stilled listed as
missing In action, or were held as prisoners of war.
The winning design, chosen form among 543 submissions, was developed by the team
of Veronica Burns-Lucas, John Lucas, Don Leon and Eliza Pennypacker Oberholtzer from
State College, Pennsylvania, It was unveiled by President Bush in a Rose Garden
ceremony on Flag day 1989. His eloquent words reflect the nation's pride and gratitude
for the heros of the Korean War, "America could not be the land of the free, were It not
the home of the brave."
Powerful in concept, the design radiates a message that is at once inspirational in content
and timeless in meaning. The main feature is a column of 38 larger-than-Ilfe statues
representing a combat formation of Army, Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force elements
going forward on an undefined mission. Muralled walls will tell the story of the Korean
War, pay special tribute to the fallen and recognize the contributions of other participating
nations.
With the preliminary approval of the cognizant Federal Commissions in hand, the
architectural firm of Cooper-Lecky has been engaged to provide architectural-engineering
design and the sculptor selection process is in train.
The estimated cost is $10.5 million, all of which must be in hand by October, 1991 - the
five year limitation imposed by the Commemorative Works Act. To date, $5.5 million,
representing over 100,000 contributions, has- been deposited in an escrow account
secured by the Government and reserved exclusively for constructions costs. Promotion
is thus heavily dependent on pro-bono/in-kind support
Dedication of the Memorial on or before the 40th Anniversary of the Armistice will
conclude the final campaign of the geo-political victory that was the Korean War.
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MENU
CHANGE
Appetizer
Copy
Filet of Smoked Trout with
Lemon Capers, Red Onions, Lettuce Leaves
and Dijon Mayonnalse
Fetzer Chardonnay
Entree
Grilled Filet Mignon
Grilled Filet of Salmon
crisp Snow Peas with Water Chestnuts
California Carrots with Grand Marnier
Anna Potatoes
Fetzer Cabernet
Salad
Hearts of Palm, Bibb Lettuce, Pimentos
Lemon Vinalgrette
Whole Wheat and Pumpernickel Rolls
with Sweet Butter Curls
Dessert
White Chocolate Mousse Cake
Raspberry Coulis
Coffee
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page 9, program- jmoc
A SALUTE TO THOSE WHO SERVED
GALA DINNER
New copy
1 May 1990
The Omni Shoreham Hotel
Master of Ceremonies
Edward J. Derwinski,
7
Secretary for Veterans Affairs
of
RECEPTION, The Blue Room
PRESENTATION OF COLORS
Armed Forces Color Guard of the United States
THE NATIONAL ANTHEM
Sergeant Alvy Powell
INVOCATION
James D. Ford, Chaplain, U.S. House of Representative
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
DINNER
HISTORICAL REVIEW
THE KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL
REMARKS PRESENTATION
General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret)
"THOSE WHO SERVED" Presentation
ENTERTAINMENT
Rosemary Clooney
Bob Hope
senght in 11 "
THE HILLS OF VALOR"
The Military District of Washington
BENEDICTION
Archbishop Joseph T. Ryan
The
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page 10
BIOGRAPHIES
BOB HOPE
Hailed as the only performer who has triumphed in all of the five major entertainment
media: vaudeville, stage, radio, motion picture and television, Bob Hope occupies a
unique niche in American life and an extraordinary status among comedians. He is as
much a symbol of American patriotism as Yankee Doodle, and is recognized
Internationally as a tireless humanitarian devoted to the complex art of "lifting the American
spirit."
Since 1941 Hope has travelled more than a million miles to entertain more than ten million
military troops. He has appeared at almost every American military base in the world,
including eight trips to Korea, and has received more than a thousand awards and
citations for his humanitarian and professional efforts.
Hope has entertained and been honored by ten presidents. He has been made Honorary
Commander of the British Empire by order of Queen Elizabeth, and is one of only three
Americans to receive France's highest award. Hope has contributed zealous doses of
his time and talent to charities throughout the world, and was timelessly recognized by
President Kennedy as "America's most prized ambassador of goodwill throughout the
world."
Rosemary Clooney
Whether Rosemary Clooney sings alone or in concert, the quality of her performances
reveals an artist who is at the peak of her creative powers. The distinctive, smooth sound
which garnered Clooney awards and gold records in earlier years is today strengthened
by her triumphant victory over past personal trauma and a return to her real joy in singing
and making music.
Over the years, Clooney has earned tremendous affection and respect internationally.
The success of her recent album "Rosemary Clooney Sings the Music of Rodgers, Hart
and Hammerstein" and an overwhelming response to recent appearances across the
nation confirm her timeless appeal. As Frank Sinatra put it, "Rosemary Clooney has that
great talent which exudes warmth and feeling in every song she sings. She is a symbol
of good, modern American music."
A cause close to Rosemary's heart is the Betty Clooney Foundation for Persons with Brain
Injury, named after her sister who died of a brain aneurism in 1976. This year marks the
"Fifth Annual Singer's Salute to the Songwriter," a gala concert held to benefit the
Foundation and the Betty Clooney Center of Long Beach, California. A unique post-
rehabilitation facility, the Betty Clooney Center offers affordable community-based
vocational and recreational services for survivors of brain injury.
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THE HILLS OF VALOR"
presented by
THE MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
Tonight's presentation "The Hills of Valor" will be a tribute to the valor and sacrifices of
over one million Americans and their United Nations comrades-in-arms.
The production is presented by the Military District of Washington and will be performed
by elements of the United States Army Chorus, The 3rd United States Infantry (The Old
Guard) and members of honor guard units from the United States Marine Corps, Navy,
Air Force and Coast Guard.
The United States Army Band was organized in 1922 by General of the Armles, General
John J. Pershing. The band's duties are extensive. It is the official band for most
diplomatic and state functions in the nation's capital and performs musical honors for the
arrival in Washington of foreign heads of state, diplomats, and high ranking military
officials.
The 3rd Infantry (The Old Guard), on active duty since 1784, is The United States Army's
elite ceremonial unit. The marching platoons, color guards, firing parties, honor guards
and casket teams add distinction and pride to The Presidential Ceremonies, Guarding the
Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and conducting funerals for our fallen comrades who are
laid to rest at Arlington National Cemetery.
Written by: Mr. Mark Murray
Arranged by: Sargent Major James C. Kessier
Produced and
Directed by: Captain Michael A. Greer
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All New Copy
Tributes
WITH DEEP GRATITUDE
ABIGAIL VAN BUREN (Dear Abby)
Trusted and beloved friend and counselor of so much of America over the years. For her
abiding concern for those who served and sacrificed for the cause of freedom; for her
extrordinary efforts to ensure that the long forgotten Korean veterans will be remembered
for all time; for her unparalleied success in promoting the Memorial and marshalling her
devoted readership to its support.
THE KOREAN WAR VETERANS ASSOCIATION
Few of numbers, strong of spirit. For the singled minded concentraton of rank and file
on achieving recognition of a victory heretofore ignored by history and coalescing those
who made it so; and for Its many Initiatives in furtherance of our noble project, notably
Including Kathleen Wyosnick's heartwarming letter.
DONALDIB CHUNG, MD.
Native of North Korea, soldier for the South, American cardiologist with a very big heart.
For his remarkable creativity and "Can do" spirit; and for his unflagging dedication of self
and resources to further our common goal of memorializing those who secured freedom
for a nation and Its people.
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tributes con't
EU BELIL
Korean vet, patriot, publicist. For his long standing and articulate advocacy of a national
memorial; for his outstanding effectiveness in placing our public service announcements
in national papers and magazines; and for a host of related activities to enhance public
awareness via the mass media.
LEE KUN HEE
out
Distinguished steward of the Republic of Korea's premier corporation. For his
envolvement in the memorial project; and for the magnificent generosity that has made
this evening possible.
and to those many thousands, the length and breadth of grassroots America, whose
support and encouragement will one day make the Memorial a reality.
Their treming
We are indebted to mr. her Kena Hee, distinquished Chairman, SamSang
Group, whose great generosity has made then wining possible
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page 13 - dinner patrons Benefactors
Copy
MEMORIAL BENEFACTORS
Contributions to the memorial in excess of $ 10,000 are listed below, starting with the
largest contributor and continuing in descending order:
Hyundal Motor America and Its USA Distributors
Veterans of Foreign Wars
Disabled American Veterans
Korean War Veterans Association
Paralyzed Veterans of America
Veterans of Foreign War, Ladies Auxilllary
AFL-CIO & Affiliates
The American Legion
Ford Motor Company
Pohang Steel America, Inc.
RAKKASANS
Military Order of the Purple Heart
13th Bomb Squadron Association Korea (Grim Reapers)
IBM
Anheuser-Busch, Inc
Chrysler Corporation Fund
E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co.
Philip Morris
United States Automobile Association
Martin Marietta
?
California Korea Bank
Daewoo International (America) Corp.
Daelim America, Inc.
Doosan America Corp.
Golden Bell USA Co., Inc.
Goldstar America International
Haital Trading USA
Hanll Trading USA
Hyosung (America), Inc.
Kolon California Corp.
Kumho USA, Inc.
Pohang Steel America, Inc.
?
Sammi America Corp.
Ssanyong (USA) Inc.
Sunkyong America Inc.
Waikiki Resort Hotel
Marilyn Vandever
Hahn Kook Center (USA) Inc.
Donald K. (B) Chung, MD
?
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American Legion Post 284/Virginla
Association of Ranger Infantry Co.
Adolph Coors, Inc.
Americares Foundation Inc.
Katherine T. Lemnitzer
United Technologies
KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
558-7808
11 December 1989
Board Jan Members
STILWELL, Richard G.
The President
General, USA (Retired)
Chairman
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
DAVIS, Raymond G. (MOH)
General, USMC (Retired)
Vice Chairman and
My dear Mr. President,
Chairman, Design
McKEVITT, James D. 'Mike'
Attorney at Law
With the unveiling of the design for the
Chairman, Promotion
Congressionally-mandated Korean War Veterans Memorial
WEBER, William E.
last Flag Day, you paid high honor to all who served in
Colonel, USA (Retired)
that conflict. Your participation gave enormous boost
Chairman, Veterans Liaison
to a noble project. Public awareness - and support -
BORCHERDT, Edward R., Jr.
has been heightened, the design concept has been
President, Borcherdt and Co.
endorsed by all cognizant national commissions and the
CHERRY, Fred V.
Colonel, USAF (Retired)
architectural engineering phase has begun. Actual
construction could initiate in early 1991, if the
CURCIO, John B.
CEO, (Retired)
requisite $9 million has been raised. (We currently
Mack Trucks, Inc.
have $4.5 million.)
DEHNE, Thomas G.
Assistant National Adjutant
In the enabling legislation, Congress determined
Disabled American Veterans
the national interest would best be served if these
McCARTHY, Rosemary T.
funds came from the American people. To achieve our
Colonel, USA (Retired)
goal, Sir, we will be holding our first official "fund
McSWEENY, William F.
raising" event on May 1, 1990.
President, Occidental
International Corporation
The function will honor all serving Members of
RODRIGUEZ, Carlos
Administrator of Benefits
Congress who are veterans of the Korean War (to include
Eastern Paralyzed Veterans
Association
10 Senators and 34 Members of the House). Our good
friend, Bob Hope, has already agreed to play a major
General Counsel
role in the evening's activities.
HOFFMAN, Martin R.
Former Secretary of the Army
We would be most honored if:
Management Advisor
THOMPSON, Gerald J.
As a combat veteran yourself, you would serve as
RADM, SC, USN (Retired)
the Chairman of this special evening, joining
Partner, Coopers & Lybrand
members of the leadership of both Chambers who
Executive Director
will serve as the Dinner Committee.
HANSEN, Robert L.
And, of course, we hope you and Mrs. Bush will
put it on your schedules to attend what promises
to be a wonderful event for a most worthy
cause.
U.S. Department of the Interior, 18th & C Streets, N.W. Room 7023
Washington, DC 20240, (202) 343-2561
FAX (202) 343-4473
Appx 700-800
50/50 M/F
Vets + Corp exec
Bob hope
Rosenary Cluney
Dear Abbey(
himed Columns 700,000
46 Emen 10 Senators
10/ Congues
36 Reps
In uniform 50-53
25-30 Committed
The President
December 11, 1989
Page Two
Your distinguished presence would pay further tribute to the
brave Americans who, at staggering cost, helped rescue a fledgling
victory. nation from communist bondage and achieve a major geopolitical
Thank you most sincerely for your consideration of this
request.
Most respectfully,
Dick
General R.G. Stilwell, USA Ret.
Chairman, Korean War Veterans
Memorial Advisory Board
Enclosures: As noted
RGS/j
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WITH SERVICE IN KOREA DURING THE WAR
Benjamin M. Campbell
R - California
Air Force
John J. Conyers, Jr.
D - Michigan
Army
William E. Frenzel
R - Minnesota
Navy
Robert Garcia
D - New York
Army
Andrew Jacobs, Jr.
D - Indiana
Marine Corps
Alfred A. McCandless
R - California
Marine Corps
Guy V. Molinari
R - New York
Marine Corps
Stanford E. Parris
R - Virginia
Air Force
Charles B. Rangel
D - New York
Army
Richard T. Schulze
R - Pennsylvania
Army
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WHO SERVED
IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES, BUT NOT IN KOREA, DURING THE KOREAN WAR
William R. Archer
R - Texas
Air Force
Herbert H. Bateman
R - Virginia
Air Force
Michael Bilirakis
R - Florida
Air Force
Thomas J. Bliley, Jr.
R - Virginia
Navy
Herbert L. Callahan
R - Alabama
Navy
William L. Clay
D - Missouri
Army
William F. Clinger, Jr.
R - Pennsylvania
Navy
Robert L. Coughlin, Jr.
R - Pennsylvania
Marine Corps
William E. Dannemeyer
R - California
Army
Eligio de la Garza
D - Texas
Army
Robert K. Dornan
R - California
Air Force
Melton D. Hancock
R - Missouri
Air Force
James V. Hansen
R - Utah
Navy
Norman F. Lent, Jr.
R - New York
Navy
Thomas F. Lewis
R - Florida
Air Force
Thomas J. Manton
D - New York
Marine Corps
Norman Y. Mineta
D - California
Army
G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery
D - Mississippi
National Guard
John P. Murtha
D - Pennsylvania
Marine Corps
George E. Sangmeister
D - Illinois
Army
Gerald B.H. Soloman
R - New York
Marine Corps
Floyd D. Spence
R - South Carolina
Navy
Esteban E. Torres
D - California
Army
Bill C. Young
R - Florida
National Guard
LEADING PROPONENTS OF KOREAN WAR VETERANS MEMORIAL
LEGISLATION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
Mary Rose Oakar
D - Ohio
Stan Parris
R - Virginia
James J. Florio
D - New Jersey
SENATORS WITH SERVICE IN KOREA DURING THE WAR
John H. Chafee
R - Rhode Island
Marine Corps
John Glenn
D - Ohio
Marine Corps
Warren B. Rudman
R - New Hampshire
Army
John W. Warner
R - Virginia
Marine Corps
SENATORS WHO SERVED IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES,
BUT NOT IN KOREA, DURING THE KOREAN WAR
Wendell Ford
D - Kentucky
Air National Guard
Edward M. Kennedy
D - Massachusetts
Army
Terry Sanford
D - North Carolina
Army National Guard
Paul M. Simon
D - Illinois
Army
Strom Thurmond
R - South Carolina
Army Reserve
Arlen Specter
R - Pennsylvania
Air Force
Senator William Armstrong (R - Colorado) is the major proponent of
authorizing legislation for the Korean War Veterans Memorial.
KOREAN WAR VETERANS
ASSOCIATION, INC.
Blaine P. Friedlander
Counsel
2341 Dale Drive
Falls Church, VA 22043
(703) 560-4716
mally coll Kathy December IT
The Hon. Bobbie Kilberg
Then withinknow Bobbie up.
Director, Public Liaison
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500
Via FAX 456-6281
Dear Bobbie:
When last we spoke you were seeking a Senator's seat in the
Virginia General Assembly. One could now state that you have
reached a higher level, and I wish to offer my congratulations.
Enclosed you will note a copy of a press release the Korean War
Veterans Association endorsing the actions of President Bush in
Panama. Most of our members served in a similar capacity in Korea
and we are pleased and impressed with the current events.
Somewhere in the White House there is an invitation from our
[
President, Dick Adams, to your President, George Bush, to
participate in our convention on July 27, 1990, in Northern
Virginia. It would appear that President Bush would be most
warmly received, and the KWVA would like to make a presentation
that would express our appreciation for his handling of the
matters in Panama.
It would be most appreciated if you would kindly meet with several
of us to discuss this matter at your earliest convenience.
With every best wish for the holiday season and New Year,
Blaine P. Friedlander
December 21, 1989
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:
Dick Adams, President
Korean War Veterans Association
P.O. Box 127, Caruthers, CA 936
[0] (209) 268-1869
[H] (209) 864-3196
[FAX] (209) 864-8208
Caruthers, CA. Dec. 21. Dick Adams, President of the
Korean War Veterans Association, said today that the Korean War
Veteran salutes George Bush, President of the United States for
his prompt and proper actions in Panama yesterday and called upon
all citizens to write their Senators and Representative to
immediately ratify the Presidential action.
According to Adams, President Bush's action follows the
in the tradition of President Harry S. Truman, who provided
military support for Korea after the North Korean invasion of
South Korea on June 25, 1950.
"The military movement in Panama is a police action,
just as it was in Korea, nearly forty years ago. It is a sign we
are still a great nation, willing to fight for the freedom of
another country. The combat veteran is in Panama for the same
reasons we were sent to Korea, Adams said.
--2--
Adams, was 17 years old when he was sent to Korea as a
member of a Tank company attached to the 25th Infantry Division,
one of the first units sent to Korea. He celebrated his 18th
Birthday on the Pusan Perimeter and participated in the drive
north after the Inchon landing. Adams was wounded twice. He left
Korea as a First Sergeant.
Adams says that those who eschew force should remember
the restraint of our government during the recent past when
the Panamanian leadership deliberately taunted the United States
and acted in a provocative manner.
"The Korean War Veterans Association at its Midwinter
Meeting on February 10, 1990, will look at an appropriate
ceremony to acknowlege the continued strong leadership of the
United States for good and continued world peace," Adams said.
--30--
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 8, 1990
Dear General Stilwell:
On behalf of the President, I wish to acknowledge and thank you
for your letter inviting him to attend the fundraising dinner for
the Korean War Veterans Memorial next May.
The President is pleased to accept. This has been entered on his
schedule for May 1, and nearer the date, Mr. John G. Keller, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Advance, will
contact you concerning the President's involvement.
The President's acceptance of this invitation should not be
announced to anyone until official notification is given by the
White House Press Office, and any public announcement of this
event must be coordinated with Mr. Jay Allison who may be reached
at 202/456-2100.
You should be aware that certain physical facility requirements
exist for any Presidential appearance. The costs associated with
these requirements are generally the responsibility of the host
and are summarized on the attached list.
If you wish to alter the current plans for this event in any way,
such as changing any part of the format, the location, or the
participants, please direct your request for the proposed change
to the Office of Presidential Appointments and Scheduling.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
JOSEPH W. HAGIN II
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Appointments and Scheduling
General R. G. Stilwell, USA Ret.
Chairman
Korean War Veterans Memorial
Advisory Board
U.S. Department of Interior
16th & c Streets, N.W.
Room 7023
Washington, D.C. 20240
JWH/Ihw
incoming to HelenDonaldson
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 8, 1990
Dear Dick:
I am pleased to accept your invitation to serve
as Honorary Chairman of the Korean War Veterans
Advisory Board.
I believe in your goals, and I am proud to give
my enthusiastic support to your organization's
initiatives. Thank you for extending this
opportunity to me. I know that my staff has
been in touch with you recently concerning my
attendance at the dinner your membership is
hosting on May 1st. I look forward to joining
you for this special occasion.
With appreciation and best wishes,
Sincerely,
ay Brah
General Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Ret.
Chairman, Korean War Veterans
Memorial Advisory Board
Department of the Interior
Room 7023
18th and c Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20240
06-83
U. RUDMAN
NEW HAMPSHIRE
OFFICES:
HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
COMMITTEES:
202-224-3324
APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
United States Senate
125 NORTH MAIN STREET
603-225-7115
BUDGET
CONCORD, NH 03301
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS,
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
NORRIS COTTON FEDERAL BUILDING
VICE-CHAIRMAN
January 12, 1990
603-686-7591
MANCHESTER, NH 03103
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE FEDERAL BUILDING
603-431-5900
PORTSMOUTH, NH 03801
157 MAIN STREET
603-752-2604
BERLIN, NH 03570
The Honorable John Sununu
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear John:
Could we expedite consideration of this "contingent"
acceptance?
wan Warren B. Rudman
Sincerely
United States Senator
Enclosure
B. RUDMAN
NEW HAMPSHIRE
OFFICES:
HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
COMMITTEES:
202-224-3324
APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
United States Senate
125 NORTH MAIN STREET
603-225-7115
BUDGET
CONCORD, NH 03301
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS,
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
NORRIS COTTON FEDERAL BUILDING
VICE-CHAIRMAN
January 12, 1990
603-666-7591
MANCHESTER, NH 03103
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE FEDERAL BUILDING
603-431-5900
PORTSMOUTH, NH 03801
157 MAIN STREET
603-752-2604
BERLIN, NH 03570
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
Those of us in the Congress who are Korean War veterans will
be honored at a major affair to be held at the Shoreham on 1 May
1990. The Speaker and Senator Mitchell agreed to co-chair the
Honorary Dinner Committee which will include minority leaders of
both Chambers and Chairmen of several key committees. As was true
of the ceremony you hosted in the Rose Garden on Flag Day, the
event will be another milestone toward realization of the national
Korean War veterans memorial.
You have been invited by Dick Stilwell, Chairman of the Board
appointed by your predecessor, to be honorary chair of this event
and, the demands of your high office permitting, to attend in
company with Mrs. Bush. Your presence would be most meaningful to
my fellow veterans and me. I therefore hope you will circle that
date on your calendar, even though it may be too early to make a
firm commitment about attendance.
It is pivotal to the success of the dinner that the invita-
tional letters make reference to prospective Presidential atten-
dance. I propose, for your approval, the following wording:
"The President and First Lady have marked this date on their
schedules and plan to attend, the exigent demands of State
permitting
"
Respectfully,
Warren wain B. Rudman
United States Senator
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 29, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID Q. BATES
FROM:
BARRY R. MCBEE
SUBJECT:
(1) Korean War Veterans Memorial Dinner
(2) Indian Museum Dedication
(1) Secretary Derwinski is very supportive of this organization
and its efforts and of General Stilwell personally. He
encourages the President at a minimum at agree to serve as
honorary chairman and, if at all possible, to try and drop by the
dinner. He notes that Korean War veterans are moving into
leadership positions of many of the veterans organizations.
(2) Tom Weimer noted that by late January, the proposed date for
the dedication ceremony, Interior will probably be close to
finalizing its position on the recommendations of the Senate
committee that studied the federal government's oversight of
Indians and the Bureau of Indian Affairs; hearings on this issue
are anticipated to begin in mid to late February. One sensitive
issue that could be the focus of attention in connection with the
dedication is the question of museums' disposition of Indian
bones. Extensive discussions on this issue have gone on over the
last few months, with a possible compromise of bones that can be
identified being returned to tribes for proper burial; bones that
cannot be identified can be retained by museums as archaeological
materials. Interior and BIA personnel have been involved in
these discussions. I will arrange for a briefing closer to the
event (if it is approved).
100000
G.V. "SONNY" MONTGOMERY
DISTRICT OFFICES:
OFFICE
QUILCING
30 DISTRICT, MISSISSIPPI
FEDERAL BUILDING
20515
MERIDIAN, MS 39301
(601)693-8681
Congress of the United States
GOLDEN TRIANGLE AIRPORT
COMMITTEES:
COLUMBUS, MS 39701
VETERANS' CHAIRMAN AFFAIRS
(601) 327-2766
house of Representatives
ARMED SERVICES
FEDERAL BUILDING
Washington, DC 20515
LAUREL MS 39440
(601) 649-1231
Fraceure ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT:
ANDRE CLEMANDOT
January 4, 1990
FDM
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
H/S
Dear Mr. President:
You and Barbara have received an letter of invitation
from GEN Dick Stilwell to attend a Gala Dinner on May 1 to
honor current Members of Congress who served during the Korean
War. The dinner also will serve as the kick-off fund raising
for the Korean War Veterans Memorial, which has been authorized
by the Congress. You will remember you participated in the
ceremonies in the Rose Garden unveiling the design of the
Memorial last Flag Day.
I certainly hope your schedule will allow you and Barbara
to be present for this important event. It will certainly
mean a lot to those who served during the Korean War.
Sincerely,
GILLESPIE V. MONTGOMERY
Jony morting
270
Member of Congress
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