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Asia Society 11/12/91 [OA 8317][1]
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26
21
7
5
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 8, 1991
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THROUGH:
DAVID DEMAREST
FROM:
TONY SNOW
SUBJECT:
ASIA SOCIETY DINNER
I. SUMMARY
On Tuesday, November 12, at 7:35 p.m., at the Waldorf- 20
Astoria in New York City, you will deliver remarks (14 minutes,
on prompter) to an audience of approximately 800 people at the
Asia Society's 1991-92 Annual Dinner. The audience will consist
primarily of business leaders, scholars, and diplomats. You will
be introduced by Asia Society Chairman and former Deputy
Secretary of State John Whitehead.
II. DISCUSSION
Your remarks highlight the future of U.S.-Asia relations and
assert our continued commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. In
particular, you offer reassurances regarding matters of trade,
security and democracy.
Snow/Nix
Asia
Draft One Two
November I, 1991
8
oopy
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: THE ASIA SOCIETY
WALDORF-ASTORIA HOTEL
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1991
7:30 P.M.
35
[INTRODUCTORY ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- Chairman John Whitehead and
wife, Nancy; President Robert Oxnam; and Vice Chairman Peter
Aaron]
As you know, I have just returned from a trip to Rome and
the Hague. There, I worked and other Western leaders worked to
build a post Cold-War world characterized by mutual security,
democracy, individual liberty, free enterprise, and unfettered
international trade. I want to talk about those same topics
tonight, but with the accent on Asia.
But first, for audiences here and in Asia, I think it's
important to discuss once again why we will not travel to the
region later this month. As President, I must serve the entire
nation in the domestic and foreign arenas. Sometimes those
obligations clash. Congress could not complete its work on
schedule this year, forcing me to remain in Washington
indefinitely -- and also forcing us to postpone our important
trip to the Asia Pacific region.
Make no mistake, however: I will not turn my back on my
responsibility to do the nation's business here and abroad, and
2
in times of economic pain, I certainly will not give up an
opportunity to work with our allies to create new markets, new
jobs and new opportunities for American workers. I will not
surrender a chance to help our agricultural industries, our
manufacturing industries and our service industries by building
greater bonds of trade and commerce.
And I certainly will not permit us to retreat into a kind of
Fortress America, which will doom us to irrelevance and poverty.
I remain deeply committed to building closer ties with our the
Asia Pacific region. Although much of our Nation's heritage
comes from Europe, our future points equally toward Asia.
Asia has transformed itself in the space of a generation
into the most rapidly growing region on the face of the earth.
Asia-Pacific nations enjoyed staggering real economic growth in
the decade of the Eighties: The Australian economy grew 41
percent; Japan's grew nearly 52 percent; Malaysia almost 60
percent; Hong Kong, 89 percent; Singapore, 93 percent; Taiwan,
116 percent and South Korea, 150 percent.
The Asia-Pacific region has become, our largest and fastest
growing trade partner. We conduct more than 300 billion dollars
worth of two-way trade annually. Together, we generate nearly
half the world's GNP. American firms have invested more than 61
billion dollars in the region, and that figure will grow. Asians
have invested more than 95 billion dollars in the United States.
In everything from automobiles to microchips, from baseball to
ties of mutual interest
Australian rules football, our grow closer each day.
A
T
4
between America and Indochina, we soon will place an ambassador
in Vientiane.
The government of South Korea has moved quietly to build
better ties with its neighbor to the North, while boldly
challenging the North to abandon its nuclear weapons program,
which threatens regional peace.
We welcome bilateral efforts among the Japanese, Soviets,
Chinese and Koreans to reduce the tensions caused by North
Korea's unsafeguarded nuclear program, and we will continue our
own efforts. But we also will deter aggression by maintaining a
significant military presence in the South.
We have worked closely with Japan in the area of foreign
aid: we are the world's two foremost providers of such aid. We
also cooperate on matters of development assistance,
environmental protection, trade, arms control, refugees and
regional peace.
The Japanese have joined us in trying to lead the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe toward free enterprise. They have
supported more than 50,000 U.S. military forces in Japan with 3
billion dollars in annual host nation contributions. Japan
contributed nearly 13 billion dollars to the multinational forces
for the Gulf War, 10 billion dollars of which went to the United
States. This required new taxes, but Japan chose the right
course in supporting the coalition against aggression.
Australia casts a shadow far larger than its population and
size would suggest. It always has served as a trustworthy ally
3
A few years ago, it was a cliche to refer to the 20th
Century as the American Century and the 21st as the Pacific
Century. I don't have a crystal ball, but I'm willing to bet
that the 21st Century will take a somewhat different form. I
predict that America will remain the world's greatest economic,
political, military and moral power. But at the same time the
nations of the Asia Pacific region, having risen with our help,
will join us as equal partners in building democracy and freedom.
We'd be here forever if I tried to tick off our interests
and activities, country-by-country. So instead I will address
the three central issues in our relationships with the nations of
the region: security, democracy, and trade.
In the area of security, Asia's variety has spawned a
diverse set of political and strategic alliances. Our custom-
made agreements provide a strong foundation for future security.
Let me give you a few examples. The ASEAN Nations, Japan,
Australia and the U.N. Security Council's permanent members
forged a Cambodian peace process that promises free elections in
a nation previously rent by tyranny and genocide.
This promise of peace opens the final chapter of the
Indochina conflict. We envision normal relations with Vietnam as
soon as we resolve our concerns about Cambodia and the problem of
POW/MIAs. Today, I am happy to announce that we will upgrade our
relations with Laos. In an apt sign of the healing process
between America and Indochina, we soon will place an ambassador
in Vientiane.
5
and defender of democracy, and it increasingly serves as an
indispensable link to Asia and the Pacific.
We can help ensure future peace in the region and defend our
interests through a range of military arrangements. Bilateral
alliances, access agreements and Five-Power defense arrangements
give us the flexibility we need.
While we must adjust our force structure in the region to
reflect post Cold War realities, we must not ignore the important
tensions that remain: in Korea; in Burma, where socialist
check
despotism holds sway, despite the heroic efforts of freedom
fighters like Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi; in China and other
communist regimes that resist the worldwide movement toward
political pluralism -- and that sometimes lend comfort, support
and even dangerous weapons to our adversaries.
Fortunately, the key to future stability in the region lies
not with arms, but with ballots. Democracy has swept across
Asia, just as it has liberated other previously enslaved parts of
our world. I have mentioned some of the exceptions: Burma,
China, North Korea, Vietnam. Many, many others have accepted
democracy's call.
The United States will support democracy wherever it can,
understanding that nations adopt political freedom in their own
ways, in manners consistent with their histories and cultures.
After decades of uncertainty, the future seems full of hope, and
even the intransigent few seem likely to join the rest of the
world in building a commonwealth of freedom.
6
This brings us to the third focal point, and a crucial
ingredient in a stable, free society: economic prosperity.
No nation can ignore the incredible vitality of this region
or afford to. The United States will remain engaged with the
Asia Pacific because we must -- and because we want to. Yes, we
disagree on important trade issues, but the key players in the
region have committed themselves to the cause of free and fair
trade because our fates have become inextricably linked.
Contrary to the opinions of some in this country, free trade
requires efforts by all parties involved. The Asia Pacific
N
Economic Cooperation Group encourages growth and trade. The
Uruguay Round of GATT talks remains the single most important
vehicle for advancing the cause of free trade and fending off the
scourge of protectionism. We call upon Japan to work with us in
breaking down old barriers to trade and opening up markets in
manufacturing, services and agriculture -- for all our benefit.
Too often, trade disputes bring out the worst in people.
Japan-bashing has become a minor sport in the United States, and
some in Japan have become equally scornful of the United States.
Both our nations must reject those who would rather seek
n
scapegoats that pursue lasting prosperity.
The fact is that Japan, which nearly half a century ago
became a focal point of American hatred, has become one of our
closest and most treasured allies. We continue working with our
Japanese allies to open agricultural, financial and manufacturing
markets, and in creating opportunities for businesses of both
7
nations. I especially look forward to spending time with my old
friend, Prime Minister Miyazawa -- significantly, a man steeped
in Western and Eastern culture, and superbly equipped to build
bridges of culture and trade between our two great Nations.
Our Structural Impediments Initiative talks have helped
lower barriers to trade and investment, but we need to give those
talks new life and advance the cause of liberalization.
The United States can no more afford to close its doors to
the Asia Pacific Region than Asian nations can afford to close
their doors to us. Our regions have become the most powerful
engines for economic growth on earth. Together, we can build an
even more prosperous and spectacular future -- but only if we set
aside petty pride and take up the tough, rewarding task of
promoting worldwide economic liberty. We seek no trade blocs; we
oppose new trade barriers. We seek a vibrant international
economic system that unites markets on every continent.
We in the United States also must take a hard look at
ourselves and pursue measures to improve our own economy. We
levy an unacceptably high effective tax rate on capital gains.
We subject our own entrepreneurs to incredible pressure. Our
allies want us to unchain our innovators -- and so do I.
We run an enormous and growing budget deficit, which seems
to serve no greater purpose than to inflame political divisions
within our own country. We must take purposeful action to reduce
that deficit, while nourishing the seeds of economic growth.
8
We must modernize our banking industry; strengthen the
competitiveness of our industrial base. We must work with our
allies to build a stable and sound monetary regime.
And perhaps most important of all, we must build human
capital. We have an obligation to prepare future generations for
life in the 21st Century. The integrated global economy will
demand more of us than it ever has before, and our schools must
meet that challenge.
We have seen in recent years that technological change can
do much more than make our lives more comfortable. It can sweep
away the debris of totalitarianism, and forge the foundation for
lasting liberty. We live in an age of liberation technology, and
no technology does more for the cause of freedom than the means
of mass communications. We may carp about what we see on the
evening news, but information media have done more to destroy
despotism than weapons ever could. No nation can import high-
tech conveniences but shut off information and ideas. No wall is
high enough and no government sufficiently despotic to shut off
what some call a revolution of electrons.
As we compete with our allies in this area, we must remember
that information feeds intellect, and the better our children's
educational preparation, the freer this world will become.
Let me close today by summarizing our general approach to
relations with Asia. Our administration sees six keys to
promoting lasting peace in the Asia-Pacific region:
9
Progressive trade liberalization / Security cooperation /
A shared commitment to democracy and human rights / Educational
and scientific innovation / Respect for the environment / And an
appreciation of our distinct cultural heritages.
Americans have always looked to the horizons for their
destiny, even from our earliest days. We have grown great
because we have welcomed people from every continent and country,
and we have tried to make use of their distinct talents, while
constructing a common culture.
As children, many of us traced our fingers along a globe, to
distant lands our ancestors called home. We felt special then,
feeling part of two worlds -- one, of an old and important
culture; the other, the American life of freedom and opportunity.
Today, our Asian population is growing more rapidly than any
other, and immigrants from every Asian island and country have
enriched all our lives. Our Administration is proud to have more
Asian-Americans than any previous administration, and two women
of Asian descent serve in top administration positions: Elaine
check
Chao, as director of the Peace Corps, and Pat Saiki, the
administrator of the Small Business Administration.
America's genius lies in its openness, its tolerance, and
its diversity. Today, we celebrate that diversity, and celebrate
the prospect that in years to come, we will develop with our
Asian friends even greater ties of trade and culture. We will
teach them, and they shall teach us. And together, we will fight
10
to build a world united in its determination to help men and
women make the most of themselves.
I look forward to traveling soon to Asia, to advance these
important principles, and to create work opportunities for tens
of thousands of American workers and businesses. The notion that
we can separate domestic and foreign policy rests upon the
stubborn fantasy that we can live as an isolated island
surrounded by a changing and developing world. In that way lies
national suicide and international chaos.
We tried isolationism once, and we ended up fighting two
bloody world wars.
We tried economic isolationism -- protectionism -- and we
helped set off a worldwide depression. As President, I will
continue building ties with our allies, because those ties mean
peace at home and jobs for American men and women.
I want to thank the Asia Society for its vital contributions
to the cause of peace, prosperity and understanding. I look
forward to your help as I seek to build closer bonds of affection
and interest with the peoples of the vast, marvelous, varied
Asia-Pacific region.
Thank you. May God bless our Asian-Pacific friends and the
United States of America.
#
#
#
#
NOV- 7-91 FRI 14:25 0
P.01
91 NOV 7 P Pl: 34
OFFICE OF FINANCE & TRADE INFORMATION
U.S. Department of Commerce
International Trade Administration
Room 2815
Washington, D.C. 20230
TEL NO. (202) 377-5145
FAX NO. (202) 377-4614
Number of Pages (Including Cover Page)
7
Recipients Name MIcheLLE NIX
Department/Firm WhiteHouse Speech Writing Office
Phone 202/456-7750
Fax 202/456-6218
Comments
Sender Vera Hartman
Date 11/7/91
Senders Phone No 202/377-4211
Have A Nice Day
FRI
P.02
-11- -
Table 2
U.S. Total Exports to Individual Countries, 1984-90
(Domestic and Foreign Merchandise, F.B.B.: Millions of Dollars)
1989/1990 Change
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
$
%
WORLD 1/
223,999
218,828
227,159
254,122
322,426
363,812
393,893
30,082
8.3%
SPECIAL CATEGORY 6/
4,975
5,446
4,364
5,422
5,339
NA
NA
UNDOCUMENTED EXPORTS TO CANADA
5,253
6,036
10,179
6,429
10,648
15,959
NA
MISCELLANEOUS 71
1,226
(116)
(231)
1,333
208
394
241
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 8/
141,274
140,126
151,693
165,429
206,915
234,669
256,885
22,216
9.5%
Cenada
51,777
53,287
55,512
59,814
71,622
78,809
83,866
5,057
6.4%
Japan
23,575
22,631
26,882
28,249
37,725
44,494
48,585
4,091
9.2%
Australia 8/
4,793
5,441
5,551
5,495
6,973
8,331
8,535
204
2.4%
New Zealand 8/
708
727
881
819
940
1,117
1,133
16
1.4%
South Africa
2,265
1,205
1,158
1,281
1,688
1,659
1,732
73
4.4%
Western Europe
58,156
56,836
61,710
69,772
87,967
100,259
113,034
12,775
12.7%
European Community (EC-12) 8/
50,635
49,067
53,222
60,629
75,864
86,424
98,086
11,661
13.5%
Belgfum/Luxembourg
5,301
4,918
5,399
6,189
7,410
8,522
10,448
1,926
22.6%
Denmark
605
706
758
893
969
1,051
1,311
261
24.8%
France 8/
6,037
6,096
7,216
7,943
9,970
11,579
13,652
2,073
17.9%
Germany
9,221
9,123
10,628
11,802
14,457
16,956
18,752
1,796
10.6%
Greece
456
498
430
402
655
697
765
67
9.7%
Ireland
1,354
1,342
1,434
1,810
2,183
2,483
2,539
56
2.3%
Italy 8/
4,375
4,625
4,838
5,530
6,775
7,215
7,987
772
10.7%
Netherlands
7,554
7,269
7,847
8,217
10,117
11,364
13,016
1,652
14.5%
Portugal
961
695
638
581
749
925
922
(2)
-0.3%
Spain
2,561
2,524
2,615
3,148
4,215
4,796
5,208
413
8.6%
United Kingdom
12,210
11,273
11,418
14,114
18,364
20,837
23,484
2,647
12.7%
Non-EC Europe 8/
7,522
7,769
8,488
9,143
12,102
13,834
14,948
1,114
8.1%
Austria
375
441
464
549
746
873
873
1
0.1%
Cyprus
74
45
54
65
116
109
129
21
19.2%
Finland
350
438
381
514
761
969
1,126
157
16.2%
Gibraltar
4
13
32
4
6
2
32
30
...
Iceland
51
38
60
84
97
179
232
53
29.7%
Malta
23
26
24
97
101
48
45
(2)
-5.2%
Norwey 8/
859
666
937
842
929
1,037
1,281
244
23.5%
Sweden
1,542
1,925
1,871
1,894
2,700
3,138
3,404
265
8.4%
Switzerland 8/
2,562
2,288
2,976
3,151
4,196
4,911
4,944
33
0.7%
Turkey
1,249
1,295
1,160
1,482
1,850
2,003
2,253
250
12.5%
Yugoslavia
432
595
528
461
530
499
566
67
13.4%
Other Non-EC Europe 8/
NA
NA
NA
NA
70
67
63
(4)
-5.5%
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2/ 8/
74,418
71,671
70,637
81,691
106,722
117,766
127,448
9,682
8.2%
Western Hemisphere 3/
29,683
31,019
31,077
34,979
43,859
49,080
54,077
4,997
10.2%
Mexico
11,992
13,635
12,392
14,582
20,628
24,982
28,375
3,393
13.6%
South America
11,050
11,022
11,950
13,036
15,112
14,479
15,612
1,133
7.8%
Argentina
900
721
944
1,090
1,054
1,039
1,179
140
13.5%
Bolivia
106
120
112
140
148
145
139
(6)
-4.4%
Brazil
2,640
3,140
3,885
4,040
4,266
4,804
5,062
258
5.4%
Chile
805
682
823
796
1,066
1,414
1,672
258
18.2%
Colombia
1,450
1,468
1,319
1,412
1,754
1,924
2,038
114
5.9%
Ecundor
655
591
601
621
681
643
680
38
5.8%
Falkland Islands
0
0
S
6
0
1
0
(0)
-64.6%
French Gufana
72
114
25
124
283
270
271
1
0.3%
Guyane
51
43
47
60
67
78
76
(2)
-2.8%
Paraguay
64
99
171
183
194
167
307
140
83.4%
Peru
751
496
693
814
795
695
778
83
12.0%
Suriname
100
86
84
72
93
140
157
17
12.3%
Uruguay
80
64
100
92
99
134
145
11
8.2%
Venezuela
3,377
3,399
3,141
3,586
4,612
3,025
3,107
82
2.7%
FRI
"
- 12
Toble 2--Continued
U.S. Total Exports to Individual Countries, 1984-90
(Domestic and Foreign Merchandise, F.8.9.; Millions of Dollars)
1984
1985
1986
1989/1990 Change
1987
1988
1989
1990
$
%
Caribbean Basin Initiative Ctry
6,528
6,199
6,595
7,185
7,937
Bahamas
9,419
9,973
555
554
5.9%
786
761
Afr
782
740
772
Barbados
801
241
29
3.8%
173
147
All
132
160
180
Belize
162
53
(18)
-10.1%
56
59
An:
72
103
101
106
Cayman Islands
5
5.1%
78
75
Bci
83
127
104
204
Costs Rica
185
423
(19)
-9.1%
422
Bo
483
582
696
882
992
Dominican Republic
110
12.4%
646
742
Br
921
1,142
1,359
El Salvador
1,645
1,658
13
0.8%
426
445
Bu
518
390
483
520
556
Guatemala
36
6.9%
377
405
Bui
400
480
590
662
759
Guyana
97
14.7%
51
43
Car
47
60
67
78
76
Haiti
(2)
-2.8%
419
Cel
396
387
459
475
472
478
Honduras
6
1.2%
322
Ch
308
363
418
476
515
563
Jamaica
48
9.4%
Col
495
404
457
601
762
1,006
944
Leeward & Windward Islands
(62)
-6.2%
Col
209
199
225
238
297
372
390
Netherlands Antilles
18
4.9%
648
Dj
427
398
507
528
539
744
Niceragua
205
38.1%
112
Eg'
42
3
3
6
2
68
Panama
66
757
Eq
675
711
742
637
723
867
Suriname
143
19.8%
Etl
100
86
84
72
93
140
157
Trinidad & Tobago
17
12.3%
Fr
601
504
532
361
326
563
430
Turks & Cafcos Islands
(133)
-23.7%
Gol
16
12
15
15
33
46
39
(7)
-14.2%
Go
Gh
Other Western Hemisphere
264
292
272
309
341
417
349
(68)
-16.3%
Gu
Bermuda
225
258
236
261
281
354
255
(99)
-28.0%
IV
French West Indies
38
28
34
44
57
59
88
29
49.0%
Xe
Greenland
2
6
2
3
4
4
6
2
40.5%
Le
St. Pierre & Miquelon
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
158.2%
Li
Li
East Asia NICs
17,723
16,918
18,290
23,547
34,816
38,429
40,741
2,312
6.0%
Ma
Hong Kong
3,062
2,786
3,030
3,983
5,687
6,291
6,840
549
8.7%
Ma
Korea, South
5,983
5,956
6,355
8,099
11,232
13,459
14,399
940
7.0%
Ha
Singapore
3,675
3,476
3,380
4,053
5,768
7,344
8,019
675
9.2%
Mo
Taiwan
5,003
4,700
5,524
7,413
12,129
11,335
11,482
148
1.3%
Mo
Mo
Other Asia 41
9,074
7,611
7,809
8,447
11,174
12,719
14,918
2,199
17.3%
Mo
Afghanistan
7
3
8
8
6
5
4
(1)
-10.9%
No
Bangladesh
303
219
165
193
258
282
181
(100)
-35.5%
Ni
Brunel
34
51
202
93
74
63
143
80
126.3%
NI
Burms
16
10
16
8
11
5
20
15
324.7%
RW
India
1,570
1,642
1,536
1,463
2,500
2,458
2,486
29
1.2%
$c
Indonesia
1,216
795
946
767
1,059
1,247
1,897
650
52.1%
Sc
Macao
2
1
3
5
7
11
8
(3)
-29.9%
si
Malaysia
1,856
1,539
1,730
1,897
2,141
2,870
3,425
554
19.3%
So
Nepal
4
7
8
56
64
9
10
1
9.2%
St
Pakistan
1,092
1,042
830
733
1,090
1,134
1,143
9
0.8%
Su
Philippines
1,766
1,379
1,363
1,599
1,878
2,202
2,472
270
12.2%
Sw
South Asia NEC
3
2
1
4
1
3
1
(2)
-64.2%
To
Sri Lanka
92
73
66
77
122
143
137
(6)
-4.1%
To
Thailand
1,113
849
936
1,544
1,962
2,288
2,991
703
30.7%
Tu
Us
Middle East
11,133
9,709
8,415
9,502
10,814
11,126
11,198
72
0.7%
Vc
Bahrain
145
107
194
205
280
489
We
718
230
47.0%
Iran
162
74
34
54
81
55
Za
166
111
201.9%
Iraq
664
427
527
683
1,157
2:
1,169
732
(437)
-37.4%
Isreel (incl Gaza)
2,194
2,580
2,239
3,130
Zi
3,244
2,828
3,201
373
13.2%
Jordan
299
377
332
365
368
380
309
(71)
-18.7%
Kuwait
635
551
657
505
Oth
683
853
401
(453)
-53.0%
Lebanon
286
141
106
97
123
94
At
98
4
4.8%
Neutral Zone 8/
NA
NA
NA
NA
0
5
#:
1
(4)
-80.4%
Oman
168
160
160
171
129
No
170
163
(7)
-4.2%
Qatar
84
64
62
76
98
P;
100
115
14
14.3%
Saudi Arabia
5,564
4,474
3,449
3,373
Sc
3,776
3,574
4,035
461
12.9%
Syria
104
106
59
93
Tr
84
91
150
59
64.6%
United Arab Emirates
695
596
493
619
705
We
1,238
998
(240)
-19.4%
Yemen Arab Republic
131
51
101
131
Or
86
80
111
31
38.5%
7-91
FRI
14:27
32
U.S BILATERAL TRADE BITH SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1982-84
(Doasstic and Foreign Herchandise Exports, FAS; General Imports, CIFI Millions of Dollars)
U.S. EXPORTS
U.S. IMPORTS
TRADE BALANCE 11
1982
1983
1984
1982
1983
1984
1982
1983
1984
WORLD
212,275
200,538
217,898
254,884
269,878
341,177
(42,609)
(69,340)
(123,289)
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
122,679
122,974
135,884
146,998
157,895
208,557
(24,323)
(34,921)
(72,673)
Canada
33,720
38,244
46,524
46,792
52,546
66,911
(13,072)
(14,302)
(20,387)
Japan
20,966
21,894
23,575
39,932
43,559
60,371
(10,966)
(21,665)
(36,796)
Australia
4,535
3,954
4,793
2,552
2,422
2,899
1,983
1,532
1,894
New Zealand
897
620
706
870
828
880
27
(208)
(172)
South Africa
2,368
2,129
2,265
2,048
2,099
2,577
320
30
(312)
Western Europe
60,189
56,132
58,019
54,806
56,442
74,921
5,382
(310)
(16,902)
European Community
47,932
44,311
46,976
42,509
45,879
60,266
5,423
(1,568)
(13,290)
Belgius/Luxeebourg
5,229
5,049
5,301
2,502
2,510
3,287
2,727
2,539
2,014
Deneark
732
649
605
956
1,126
1,518
(224)
(477)
(913)
France
7,110
5,961
6,037
5,815
6,308
8,316
1,295
(347)
(2,479)
Germany, West
9,291
8,737
9,084
12,503
13,229
17,810
(3,212)
(4,492)
(8,726)
Greece
721
503
456
260
256
383
461
247
73
Ireland
983
1,115
1,354
592
582
674
401
533
480
Italy
4,616
3,908
4,375
5,656
3,819
8,504
(1,040)
(1,911)
(4,129)
Retherlands
8,604
7,767
7,554
2,652
3,149
4,329
5,952
4,618
3,225
United Kingdom
10,645
10,621
12,210
13,541
12,900
15,044
(2,896)
(2,279)
(2,834)
Mon-EC Europe
12,256
11,821
11,043
12,297
10,563
14,655
(41)
1,258
(3,612)
Austria
371
371
375
515
468
760
(144)
(97)
(385)
Finland
489
413
350
447
544
857
42
(131)
(507)
Norway
950
813
859
2,047
1,432
2,004
(1,097)
(619)
(1,145)
Portugal
838
1,212
961
308
308
519
530
904
442
Spain
3,589
2,915
2,561
1,639
1,689
2,627
1,950
1,226
(66)
Sweden
1,639
1,581
1,542
2,092
2,549
3,426
(403)
(968)
(1,884)
Switzerland
2,707
2,960
2,362
2,394
2,552
3,199
313
408
(637)
Yugaslavia
494
572
432
391
424
$27
103
148
(95)
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 21
82,538
72,186
74,418
104,089
107,867
126,730
(21,551)
(35,681)
(52,312)
Western Hemisphere $/
33,591
25,725
29,683
39,559
43,525
50,020
(5,768)
(17,800)
(20,337)
Mexico
11,817
9,082
11,992
15,770
17,019
18,267
(3,933)
(7,937)
(6,275)
South America
15,256
10,519
11,051
15,407
17,093
22,461
(151)
(6,574)
(11,810)
Argentina
1,298
965
900
1,222
939
1,041
72
26
(141)
Brazil
3,423
2,557
2,640
4,643
5,381
8,273
(1,220)
(2,824)
(5,633)
Bolivia
99
102
106
113
172
159
(14)
(70)
(53)
Chile
925
729
805
729
1,053
871
196
(324)
1561
Colombia
1,903
1,514
1,450
083
1,058
1,253
1,020
456
197
Ecuador
928
597
655
1,227
1,520
1,803
(399)
(923)
(1,148)
Paraguay
78
36
64
41
34
44
37
2
20
Peru
1,117
900
751
1,150
1,204
1,402
(33)
(304)
(651)
Uruguay
190
86
80
265
390
576
(75)
(304)
(496)
Venezuala
5,206
2,811
3,377
4,957
5,173
6,820
249
12,362)
(3,443)
Caribboan Basin
6,498
6,032
6,526
8,529
9,557
9,491
(2,031)
(3,505)
(2,963)
Bahaoas
590
452
555
1,086
1,74&
1,218
(496)
(1,294)
(663)
Barbados
155
195
242
109
205
256
46
(10)
(14)
Belize
64
36
53
38
29
48
26
7
5
Cayean Islands
73
67
78
16
10
6
57
57
72
Casta Rice
330
382
423
421
453
544
1911
(71)
(121)
Dominican Republic
664
632
646
669
855
1,067
(S)
(223)
(421)
El Salvador
292
365
426
333
362
406
(41)
3.
20
Guatemala
390
316
377
364
404
479
24
(68)
(102)
Guyana
5&
36
51
79
76
98
(23)
(40)
(37)
Haill
299
366
419
326
351
394
(27)
15
25
Honduras
275
299
322
426
435
450
(151)
(136)
(129)
Jacaice
468
452
495
323
307
415
143
145
80
Netherlands Antilles
660
553
648
2,186
2,367
2,112
(1,526)
(1,814)
Micaragua
(1,464)
110
132
112
98
109
69
20
23
43
Panasa
839
748
757
289
S78
365
550
$70
392
Suriname
128
117
100
68
69
112
60
48
(12)
Trinidad 1 Tobago
894
728
601
1,667
1,357
1,411
(773)
(629)
(810)
Turbe 1 falens Islands
D
P.05
7-91
-
FRI
14:27 0
33
U.S BILATERAL TRADE WITH SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1982-84 (cont.)
(Domestic and Fareign Merchandise Exports, FAS, General teports, CIF: Millions of Dollars)
U.S. EXPORTS
U.S. IMPORTS
TRADE BALANCE 1/
1982
1983
1984
1982
1983
1984
1982
1983
1984
East Asian NICs
15,563
16,915
17,722
23,767
29,561
39,135
(8,204)
(12,646)
(21,413)
Hong Kong
2,453
2,564
3,062
5,895
6,825
8,099
(3,442)
(4,261)
(5,837)
Singapore
3,214
3,759
3,674
2,274
2,969
4,121
940
790
(447)
South Korea
5,529
5,925
5,983
6,011
7,657
10,027
(482)
(1,732)
(4,044)
Taiwan
4,367
4,667
5,003
9,587
12,110
16,088
(5,220)
(7,443)
(11,085)
Other Asia 4/
9,397
9,012
9,076
11,840
14,187
16,60%
(2,443)
(5,175)
(7,525)
India
1,598
1,828
1,570
1,522
2,334
2,737
76
(506)
(1,167)
Indonesia
2,025
1,466
1,216
4,509
5,657
5,867
(2,484)
(4,191)
(4,651)
Malaysia
1,736
1,684
1,856
1,959
2,205
2,825
(223)
(521)
(969)
Pakistan
700
812
1,092
181
183
268
519
629
824
Philippines
1,854
1,807
1,766
1,956
2,159
2,622
(102)
(352)
(856)
Thailand
915
1,063
1,112
956
1,035
1,426
(41)
28
(314)
Middle East
15,950
13,796
11,133
12,437
7,492
8,555
3,513
6,304
2,578
Iran
122
190
162
612
1,167
730
(490)
(977)
(568)
Iraq
846
$12
664
42
61
129
804
451
535
Israel
2,271
2,017
2,194
1,208
1,300
1,809
1,063
717
385
Saudi Arabia
9,026
7,903
5,564
7,860
3,840
4,009
1,166
4,063
1,555
United Arab Emirates
1,101
864
695
2,139
342
1,278
(1,038)
322
(583)
Africa
7,769
6,487
6,562
16,486
13,102
12,419
(8,717)
(6,615)
(5,857)
Algerin
909
594
520
2,792
3,815
3,371
(1,883)
(3,221)
(3,251)
Angola
158
91
103
724
748
1,053
(566)
(857)
(950)
Congo
69
16
12
676
859
1,054
(607)
(843)
(1,042)
Egypt
2,875
2,813
2,704
569
325
182
2,306
2,488
2,522
Ivory Coast
96
62
64
326
371
499
(230)
(310)
(435)
Kenya
98
69
74
77
TO
69
21
(1)
5
Moroeco
396
440
526
51
34
39
345
406
487
Nigeria
1,295
864
577
2,274
3,883
2,606
(5,979)
(3,019)
(2,029)
CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES 5/
6,557
5,080
7,216
3,671
3,955
5,738
2,886
1,133
1,478
China
2,912
2,173
3,004
2,502
2,477
3,381
410
(304)
(377)
USSR
2,587
2,003
3284
247
374
600
2,340
1,629
2,684
Eastern Europe
1,017
898
904
915
1,100
1,752
102
(212)
(848)
Bulgaria
106
66
44
31
30
31
75
36
13
Czechoslovakie
84
59
58
68
68
96
16
(9)
(38)
Sereany, East
223
139
137
59
64
167
164
75
1301
Hungary
68
110
98
145
172
242
(77)
(62)
(154)
Poland
295
324
318
229
209
244
66
115
74
Roeanta
224
186
249
380
553
969
(156)
(367)
(720)
NOTEs Export data include special category or silitary type goods for world, country, and regional
aggregations. Because of rounding, country and regional aggregations in this table may differ
slightly from values in other published sources. Adjustments to the export and import
values for Spain, Portugal, and USSR (and the associated regional aggregations) have been made
for 1982-1993 to agree with the 1984 Cansus definitions of these countries.
1/ Parentheses indicate negative entries.
2/ Excluding Cuba, Laos, and Cambodia or Kampuchea.
31 Excluding Cuba.
4/ Excluding Laos and Cambodia or Kampuches.
S/ Including Cuba, Laos, and Casbodia or Kaspuches.
1
R I
1
4
:
2
0
06
GDP at Constant Prices
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
99bp X
Colculated from Indexes
1.9
1.6
2.4
4.7
3.7
2.9
3.5
4.3
3.2
World
001
4.9
4.0
4.2
3.7
-
4.7
3.6
4.2
3.3
1.1
1.4
-.2
2.6
4.7
3.5
2.8
3.3
4.4
3.2
2.3 Industrial Countries
110
4.7
5.3
2.5
-.2
1,9
-2.5
3.6
6.6
3.5
2.8
3.4
4.4
2.5
1.0
United States
111
4.9
6.2
3.6
4.6
3.9
1.5
3.7
-3.2
3.2
6.3
4.8
3.3
4.0
4.4
3.0
.9
Canada*
156
4.0
.9
3.5
3.6
2.3
3.7
-.1
.6
7.4
4.8
2.4
4.3
3.5
4.5
1.2
Australia
193
Japan*
158
4.2
4.8
5.0
5.6
3.5
3.4
3.4
2.8
4.3
5.1
2.7
4.3
6.3
4.7
5.7
.1
:-2,7
-.3
2.6
1.1
4.9
.4
2.9
5.0
1.2
2.5
.5
-1.3
1.3
New Zealand
196
14.6
4.5
.1
4.7
2.9
-.3
1.1
2.0
1.4
2.5
1.2
2.0
3.9
4.0
4.6
Austria
122
5.8
.3
2.8
1,7
X3.7
-.9
.8
.3
2.3
.6
2.0
2.6
4.5
4.0
Bolgium
124
6.5
1.6
1.5
3.5
-.4
-.9
3.0
2.5
4.4
4.3
3.6
-.6
-.2
1.3
Denmark
128
1
,I
2.2
7.3
5.3
1.6
3.6
3.0
3.1
3.3
2.1
4.0
5.4
5.2
I
Finland
172
4.2
3.2
3.3
3.2
1.6
1.2
2.5
.7
1.3
1.9
2.5
2.2
3.8
3.7
2.8
France
132
5.5
2.6
3.4
4.0
1.0
.1
-1.1
1.9
3.1
1.8
2.2
1.5
3.7
3.8
4.5
Germany
134
6.4
3,4
6.7
3.7
1.7
.1
.4
.4
2.7
3.1
1.4
-.5
4.1
2.8
Greoce
174
176
2.8
11.6
5.9
5.0
I-4.2
4.1
1.5
-4.7
3.5
3.0
7.5
9.1
-1.2
-3.2
.1
Iceland*
1.4
8.2
7.2
3.1
3.1
3.3
12.3
-.3
4.4
2.5
-.4
4.4
3.9
5.9
Ireland
178
6.3
3.7
3.7
6.0
14.2
.6
.2
1.0
2.7
2.6
2.9
3.1
4.1
3.0
2.0
Italy
136
2.5
2.6
4.6
4.0
2.9
.5
1.5
2.4
5.7
3.9
3.4
Luxembourg
137
5.2
2.4
2.0
2.5
1.0
-,7
-1.5
1.7
2.9
2.9
1.5
.9
2.2
4.3
Nothorlands
138
6.8
3.6
4.5
-12.4
I-7.2
.9
.3
3.9
3.8
18.1
4.2
2.0
-.5
4
1,8
Nerway
142
6.9
5.6
3.4
6.2
4.8
.3
3.2
-.3
-1.6
3.3
4.3
Portugal
182
3.0
3.3
1.8
.2
1.5
-.2
1.2
1.8
1.8
2.3
13.3
5.6
5.2
4.8
3.7
Spain
184
1.1
-1.6
1.8
3.8
11.7
-1.0
1.1
2.8
4.0
2.2
2.2
2.5
2.9
2.0
.5
Sweden
144
-.8
2.4
.6
2.4
4.4
1.4
-.9
1.0
1.8
3,7
2.9
2.0
2.9
3.5
2.6
Switzerland
146
3.7
1.0
3.9
2.3
-1.9
-1.1
1.3
3.7
1.8
4.1
4.0
4.6
3.9
1.9
.7
United Kingdom
112
5.6
5.4
4.1
5.0
4.5
2.0
1.0
1.8
4.5
4.3
3.3
4.0
3.6
3.2
Developing Countries
200
4.7
3.5
-.2
2.1
5.4
-1.3
8
-1.4
.8
4.5
2.3
1.3
6.6
3.6
Africa
605
4.3
5.7
2.8
5.0
110.9
5.8
10.8
-2.0
4
2.5
-3.2
Benin
638
16.5
2.3
18.3
12.1
14.0
8.7
-2.3
24.0
20.0
8.1
8.0
10.2
9.0
13.5
Botswana
616
1.7
4.4
2.2
-1.2
1.6
13.1
Burkina Faso
748
7.9
12.4
-1.1
12.0
7.9
10.9
-.4
3.1
-.1
11.7
3.8
4.1
3.7
1.5
3.9
Burundi
618
1.9
5,7
10.4
11.2
14.2
17.1
7.6
6.8
7.5
8.1
Cameroon
622
-1.5
-7.4
-5.0
26.0
-2.7
-5.6
Chad
628
6.6
-7.2
5.5
-9.1
I-3.4
-4.5
7.7
-7.2
-.2
5.7
5.4
Gambia, The
648
3.5
2.3
8.5
-3.2
-
-1.8
-7.2
.7
2.6
5.1
5.2
4.8
6.2
Ghana
652
7.0
9.4
10.8
3.7
5.6
3.8
2.9
.5
1.8
4.3
7.2
5.9
6.0
4.6
Kenya
664
4.0
-.8
4.0
4.4
-4.7
I-4.4
2.3
-2.1
-.6
-
-2.2
Liberia
668
-4.0
3.4
-2.6
9.8
.8
-8.6
-1.8
.8
12.2
2.3
Madagascar
674
6.2
4,3
8.3
3.3
-.4
-5.2
2.8
3.5
4.4
4.5
1.1
2.2
3.3
4.1
4.8
Malawl
676
116.7
6.6
3.8
3.5
-10.1
5.9
15.5
.4
4.8
6.9
9.7
110.2
6.8
4.2
6,6
Mauritius
684
7.0
6.5
3.4
4.5
13.4
-2.8
9.6
-.6
4.3
6.3
8.4
-2.6
10.4
2.2
Morocco
686
10.9
8.1
-7.3
2.5
5.3
I-8.4
-.3
-5.4
-5.1
9.4
3.1
-.5
9.9
5.3
Nigoria
694
1.8
5.2
9.8
9.4
-3.6
2.5
I4.1
6.0
-4.2
4.4
5.5
-.5
.5
-5.7
-.1
Rwanda
714
-2.7
-3.9
10.1
-5.0
-5.2
20.6
2.6
-4.6
3.8
4.6
Sonogal
722
7.9
16.7
15.0
-3.1
-6.6
-1.5
-1.7
8.0
10.3
.8
5.0
4.2
Soychelles
718
3.0
1.4
.3
7.4
3.0
6.2
11.6
+1.4
1.4
I-2.7
-2.4
5.5
1
Sierra Leone
724
1.5
-
2.9
13.2
10.2
2.2
-.4
-1.8
5.2
-1.2
-
2.1
4.1
2.1
-9
South Africa
199
9.9
14.5
-4.4
6.9
.4
-1.2
3.1
2.0
9.1
Swaziland
734
16.6
2.8
2.9
1.2
.8
-1.1
1.3
-.4
2.5
-2
.4
3.9
4.1
Tanzania
738
-.5
5.6
110.1
5.4
1.9
-3.5
-3.8
.7
1.3
3.1
3.4
1.5
Togo
742
8.2
4.9
6.2
7.2
9.4
16.5
-.5
4.7
5.7
5.7
-1.4
5.5
1.5
3.5
7.3
Tunisla
744
.7
1.6
-5.5
-11.0
-3.4
13.9
5.7
7.4
-8.5
2.0
.3
6.4
7.2
6.6
Uganda
746
-5,2
.8
-5.3
.3
2.4
2.9
-3.0
1.3
2.7
2.5
2.7
2.6
2.2
.6
Zaire
636
4.3
-4.8
.6
-3.0
3.0
6.2
-2.3
-2.0
-.4
1.6
.6
-.2
Zambia
754
-.8
-5.7
-2.5
2.8
11.4
12.6
3.2
1.6
-1.8
6.0
2.9
-1.3
3.5
Zimbabwe
698
2.3
7.7
9.2
3.8
5.9
6.0
5.5
7.8
7.5
6.6
6.4
7.3
8.3
6.9
Asia
505
12.3
1.3
6.5
4.6
1.3
6.8
.8
3.6
4.2
3.7
4.7
4.0
2.6
Bangladesh
513
10.0
5.3
8.0
7.0
3.7
10.2
17.8
3.3
Bhutan
514
-3.0
7.8
12.3
7.0
6.4
4.9
8.3
9.8
13.5
13.1
7.9
10.3
China, People's Rep.
924
1.8
-3.5
1.8
12.0
-1.7
6.0
-1.1
-4.0
8.4
-5.1
8.3
-6.1
.8
12.5
FIJI
819
1.5
8.2
6.6
-4.8
16.5
6.3
3.7
7.4
3.7
6.2
4.8
4.5
9.4
5.0
India
534
6.9
8.8
7.8
6.3
9.9
7.9
2.2
14.2
7.0
2.5
5.9
4.1
6.5
7.4
Indonesia
536
13.2
110.9
9.7
7.4
-2.0
6.7
7.3
11.8
9.4
6.9
12.4
12.0
11.5
6.2
9.0
Korea
542
11.6
7.8
6.7
9.3
7.4
6.9
5.9
6.3
7.8
-1.0
1.0
5.4
-.1
18.6
Malaysia
548
17.9
-5.4
19.3
27.2
13.6
8.7
8.9
8.7
9.2
Maldives
556
6.1
6.0
X6.5
5.2
7.9
6.4
5.6
4.4
5.6
3.2
-1.1
-4.0
-11.4
7.4
Myanmar
518
4.4
3.0
4.4
2.4
-2.3
8.3
3.8
-3.0
9.7
6.1
4.3
3.9
7.8
2.3
2.0
Nepal
558
4.6
3.8
8.0
4.8
8.7
I6.9
6.5
6.8
5.1
7.6
5.5
6.5
7.6
5.0
5.3
Pakistan
564
-1.6
I-4,3
8.6
1.8
-2.3
11.1
8
13.4
-1.0
3.6
4.8
2.6
3.1
1.4
Papua New Guinea
853
8.0
6.1
5.5
6.3
15.2
3.2
3.6
1.9
-7.6
-7.4
3.4
4.8
6.3
5.9
2.1
Philippinos
566
17.5
7.8
8.6
9.3
9.7
9.6
6.9
8.2
8.3
-1.7
2.0
9.4
11.1
9.2
8.3
Singapore
576
6.7
-1.1
3.9
8.3
2.6
-2.2
-5.1
Solomon Islands
813
4.4
3.8
7.4
6.1
5.7
5.5
-15.7
15.0
5.1
5.0
4.3
1.5
2.7
2.3
6.2
Sri Lanka
524
9,4
9.9
10.4
5.3
4.8
6.3
4.1
7.3
7.1
3.5
4.9
9.5
13.2
12.0
10.0
Thailand
578
8
4.8
1.9
1.9
15.8
14.0
14.8
5.8
44.1
5.6
Tonga
866
1991
International Financial Statistics Yearbook
161
7-91
FRI
1
:
2
% Change over the Previous year
GDP at Constant Prices
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
99bp X
Calculated from Indexes
5.8
7.6
1.9
4.8
.8
2.7
2.4
.9
4.4
1.7
4.4
2.8
1.1
Europe
170
£18.0
15.8
7.6
9.9
5.9
3.1
6.3
5.3
8.8
14.7
3.8
7.0
8.5
7.2
5.7
Cyprus
423
3.6
7.6
4.4
2.7
1.2
2.9
2.8
.7
2.7
-.3
1.5
4.0
4.6
Hungary
944
17.0
12.2
11.2
10.5
7.0
3.3
2.3
-.6
.9
2.6
4.0
4.2
8.7
Malta
181
4.0
6.1
5.9
--1
2.4
.8
-.5
-5.8
Romania*
968
7.7
7.0
-2.9
2.6
-1.1
4.1
4.6
3.3
6.0
5.1
8.1
7.4
3.4
Turkey*
186
3.9
8.0
6.9
7.0
2.3
1.4
.5
-1.0
2.0
.5
3.6
-1.0
-2.0
Yugosiavia
188
14.3
3.6
-4.6
6.2
.3
2.2
-2.5
3.7
2.4
2.7
-2.6
.3
.9
Middle East
405
23.7
14.7
8.1
-1.1
16.6
-5.5
-7.7
7.5
5.3
-2.7
7
-.9
6.7
Bahrain
419
6.4
6.0
12.1
9.1
16.4
6.2
5.3
5.8
Egypt
469
18.3
7.6
-21.1
-9.3
-13.9
7.9
14.4
10.3
3.3
4.2
-8.4
-1.1
-4.8
Iran, I.R. of
429
3.7
-21.4
13.6
24.0
13.2
4.5
1.1
2.8
2.3
3.8
13.7
5.9
2.7
1.6
5.1
Israel
436
21.2
16.4
14.8
4.5
17.6
9.8
5.6
2.5
1.4
14.1
9.2
3.5
1.2
-5.7
-5.6
Jordan
439
6.6
-2.4
7.2
13.7
-20.4
-18.9
-11.8
7.9
5.2
-4.3
8.5
-4.0
3.5
Kuwait
443
16.0
17.7
17.7
4.6
5.7
17.0
11.5
16.0
16.7
13.8
3.3
-3.7
6.1
1.1
Oman
449
15.1
6.0
6.7
10.1
7.9
1.6
-10.7
-.1
-2.2
-4.0
5.6
-1.4
7.6
.2
Saudi Arabia
456
8.9
-1.4
17.9
3.6
12.0
9.5
2.1
1.4
-4.1
6.1
-4.5
1.6
11.3
Syrlan Arab Rep
463
15.0
17.4
-2.3
24.9
26.4
2.8
-8.3
-2.7
4.5
-2.4
-21.2
3.5
-.2
10.6
United Arab Emirates
466
11.0
5.1
8.3
6.5
15.7
5.8
5.3
6.6
3.4
4.5
9.4
4.3
Yemen Arab Rep.
473
6.1
4.0
4.5
6.7
5.7
-,3
-1.6
-2.7
3.4
3.3
3.6
3.7
7
.2
Western Hemisphere
205
9.5
7.7
7.2
4.1
2.6
2.1
4.9
7.7
8.4
8.8
7.6
6.2
Antigua and Barbuda
311
-.2
-3.3
7.3
1.5
-6.7
-5.0
2.9
2.5
-4.4
5.6
12.5
-2.7
-4.4
4.3
3.7
4.9
7.9
Argentina
213
4.4
-1.9
-5.0
.4
3.6
1.0
4.7
Barbados
316
6.1
4.2
13.4
.2
-1.4
1.0
-4.4
-6.6
-.3
-2
-2.9
2.1
2.7
2.5
Bolivia
218
9.7
2.9
5.0
6.8
91
-4.4
.6
-3.4
5.3
7.9
7.5
3.6
-.1
3.2
Brazil
223
3.5
9.9
8.2
8.3
7.8
5.5
-14.1
-7
6.4
2.5
5.6
5.7
7.4
10.0
Chile
228
4.7
4.2
8.5
5.4
4.1
2.3
.9
1.6
3.4
3.1
5.8
5.4
3.7
3.6
4.2
Colombia
233
5.5
8.9
6.3
4.9
.8
-2.3
-7.3
2.9
8.0
.7
5.5
4.8
3.4
5.7
3.8
Costa Rica
238
6.7
5.0
2.1
4.5
6.1
4.1
1.6
4.6
.3
-2.6
3.2
7.9
.7
4.1
-5.1
Dominican Republic
243
9.2
6.5
6.6
5.3
4.9
3.9
1.2
-2.8
4.2
4.3
3.1
-6.0
11.2
.2
Ecuador
248
4.0
6.1
6.4
-1.7
-8.7
-8.3
-5.6
.8
2.3
2.0
.6
2.7
1.6
1.1
3.4
El Salvador
253
9.0
5.7
8.1
2.4
1.2
2.1
5.3
1.2
5.1
5.4
5.5
6.0
Grenada
328
7.4
7.8
5.0
4.7
3.7
7
-3.5
-2.6
.5
-.6
.1
3.5
3.9
4.0
3.5
Guatemala
258
2.9
1-4.8
-1.7
-11.7
1.6
-.3
-10.4
-9.3
2.1
1.0
.2
6
-3.0
-4.8
-6.2
Guyans
336
6.4
.5
4.9
7.6
7.3
-2.9
-3.4
.8
.3
.2
1.0
.1
1.2
7
-.1
Haiti
263
10.5
10.4
8.3
6.3
1.3
1.5
-2.0
-.2
2.8
3.5
2.8
5.2
5.2
2.8
-1
Honduras
268
-6.3
-2.4
.7
-1.8
-5.7
2.6
1.2
2.3
-.9
-4.6
1.7
6.2
1.5
4.6
Jamaica
343
4.2
3.4
8.3
9.2
8.3
7.9
-.6
-5.3
3.7
2.7
-3.7
Mexico
273
5.2
8.4
-7.8
-26.4
4.5
5.4
-.8
4.6
-1.6
-4.1
-1.0
-7
1.7
1.1
9.8
Nicaragua
278
4.5
15.1
4.2
5.5
.4
-.4
4.7
3.4
2.3
-15.6
-.9
3.4
Panama
283
17.0
10.9
11.4
11.4
11.4
8.7
-1.0
-3.0
3.1
4.0
-
4.3
6.2
6.2
3.3
-3
Paraguay
288
-1.7
14.3
4.9
5.2
-.2
-12.7
5.8
2.2
9.2
8.3
-8.3
-11.9
-4,3
Poru
293
1.2
3.0
4.1
5.0
6.0
5.8
2.1
St. Lucia
362
10.3
2.8
10.0
4.6
4.2
6.2
8.1
6.1
4.9
.8
St. Vincent
364
16.5
11.3
-1.9
84.2
-8.6
7.1
-4.2
-3.9
-1.9
2.0
.8
-6.2
8.2
3.9
Suriname
366
6.4
9.1
10.0
3.6
10.4
4.5
4.0
I-9.2
-6.2
-5.6
-12.9
7.3
-3.4
-.2
1.2
5.3
Trinidad and Tobago
369
4.0
6.2
6.0
1.9
-9.4
-5.9
-1.5
.3
7.5
5.9
,5
1.5
8.8
Uruguay
298
6.7
2.1
1.3
-2.0
-.3
.7
-5.6
I-1.4
1.4
6.3
4.5
6.2
-7.8
5.7
Venezuola
299
Memorandum Items
12.6
7.4
-4.1
4.5
1.6
.5
-1.5
1.1
1.7
2.4
-1.1
.4
2.5
2.2
3.9
4.9
6.2
Oil Exporting Countries
999
5.2
5.5
2.5
1.7
2.0
5.4
4.9
4.7
5.3
4.1
3.5
Non-Oil Developing Countries
201
1985-100
Indexes
77.3
80.4
83.7
86.8
88.5
89.9
89.9
92.1
96.4
100.0
102.9
106.5
111.1
114.6
World
001
78.9
81.7
85.1
87.9
88.9
90.1
89.9
92.2
96.6
72.6
100.0
102.8
106.2
110.9
114.4
117.0
Industrial Countries
110
76.5
79.7
83.6
87.5
89.2
90.1
91.7
95.8
87.1
100.0
103.3
107.5
111.4
115.0
90.2
Developing Countries
200
90.0
91.9
96.8
95.5
96.3
94.9
95.7
100.0
56.0
102.3
103.6
110.5
114.4
Africa
605
60.3
65.9
68.4
72.4
76.7
80.9
87.2
93.8
100.0
76.6
106.4
114.1
123.6
132.2
Asia
505
82.4
84.0
88.0
88.7
91.1
93.3
94.2
87.4
98.3
100.0
104.4
107.3
108.5
90.6
Europe
170
86.4
91.7
92.0
94.1
80.0
91.7
95.0
97.4
100.0
97.4
97.7
98.6
83.2
Middle East
405
86.9
92.7
98.1
97.7
96.2
93.6
96.8
100.0
103.6
107.4
108.2
108.5
Western Hemisphore
205
7-91
FRI
14:30
Table 25
U.S. Merchandise Trade with the East Asian NIC's, 1980-87
(Domestic and foreign exports, P.a.s.; General imports, c.i.f.)
(Millions of dollars)
EXPORTS
Hanufactured Products
Agri-
High
Auto-
Total
cultural
Total
Tech, 1/
motive
1980
14,741
3,468
9,948
4,514
216
1981
15,059
3,738
9,789
4,315
174
1982
15,563
3,289
10,537
4,532
169
1983
16,914
3,664
11,241
5,709
187
1984
17,723
3,672
12,050
6,384
175
1985
16,918
3,160
11,673
6,262
158
1986
18,290
3,007
13,038
6,606
221
1987
23,547
3,743
17,020
8,365
419
IMPORTS
Manufactured Products
Agri-
High
Auto-
Textiles,
Total
cultural
Total
Tech.
motive
Apparel
1980
18,805
355
18,143
4,685
184
4,833
1981
22,057
356
21,293
5,486
205
5,634
1982
23,767
361
22,981
5,876
340
5,970
1983
29,561
404
28,713
8,191
$08
6,927
1984
39,135
446
38,058
11,191
700
9,291
1985
41,880
449
40,487
11,134
837
9,777
1986
49,106
435
47,816
13,638
1,713
10,691
1987
61,283
460
59,768
17,676
3,309
12,261
BALANCE
Manufactured Products
Agri-
High
Auto-
Total
cultural
Total
Tech,
motive
1980
-4,064
3,113
-8,195
-171
32
1981
-6,998
3,382
-11,503
-1,171
-31
1982
-8,204
2,928
-12,444
-1,344
-171
1983
-12,647
3,260
-17,472
-2,482
-321
1984
-21,412
3,225
-26,008
-4,807
-525
1985
-24,962
2,710
-28,814
-4,872
-679
1986
-30,816
2,572
-34,779
-7,022
-1,492
1987
37,735
3,283
-42,748
-9,311
-2,890
1/
Based on U.S. Department of Commerce DOC-3 definition:
excludes special category exports.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
NOV- 7-91 FRI 14:30
P.09
Table 24
U.S. Merchandise Trade with Mexico. 1980-87
(Domestic and Foreign exports, f.a.s.; General imports, c.i.f.)
(Millions of dollars)
EXPORTS
Manufactured Products
Agri-
High
Auto-
Total
cultural
Total
Tech. 1/
motive
1980
15,145
2,503
11,668
3,016
1,527
1981
17,789
2,438
14,421
3,858
2,050
1982
11,817
1,159
9,189
2,440
1,254
1983
9,082
1,945
6,496
2,229
835
1984
11,992
2,039
9,082
2,965
1,496
1985
13,635
1,692
10,846
3,308
2,030
1986
12,392
1,098
10,424
3,267
1,907
1987
14,582
1,212
12,245
3,826
2,212
IMPORTS
Manufactured Products
Agri-
High
Auto-
Textiles,
Total
cultural
Total
Tech.
motive
Apparel
1980
12,774
1,099
4,321
1,545
354
307
1981
14,013
1,143
5,259
1,776
490
313
1982
15,770
1,172
5,331
1,786
705
222
1983
17,019
1,269
6,328
2,186
1,322
251
1984
18,267
1,297
8,246
2,736
1,902
344
1985
19,392
1,456
9,163
2,895
2,840
370
1986
17,558
2,044
10,625
3,295
3,308
483
1987
20,520
1,899
13,861
4,153
4,723
603
BALANCE
Manufactured Products
Agri-
High
Auto-
Total
cultural
Total
Tech.
motive
1980
2,371
1,404
7,347
1,471
1,173
1981
3,776
1,295
9,162
2,082
1,560
1982
-3,953
-13
3,858
654
549
1983
-7,937
676
169
43
-487
1984
-6,275
742
836
229
-406
1985
-5,757
236
1,683
413
-810
1986
-5,166
-946
-201
-28
-1,401
1987
-5,938
-687
-1,616
-327
-2,511
Note: Manufactured products include SITC 5-9.
1/ Based on U.S. Department of Commerce DOC-3 definition; excludes
special category exports.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
Snow/Nix
Asia
Draft Two
November 8, 1991
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: THE ASIA SOCIETY
WALDORF-ASTORIA HOTEL
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1991
7:35 P.M.
[INTRODUCTORY ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- Chairman John Whitehead and
wife, Nancy; President Robert Oxnam; and Vice Chairman Peter
Aaron]
As you know, I have just returned from a trip to Rome and
the Hague. There, I worked and other Western leaders worked to
build a post Cold-War world characterized by mutual security,
democracy, individual liberty, free enterprise, and unfettered
international trade. I want to talk about those same topics
tonight, but with the accent on Asia.
But first, for audiences here and in Asia, I think it's
important to discuss once again why we will not travel to the
region later this month. As President, I must serve the entire
nation in the domestic and foreign arenas. Sometimes those
obligations clash. Congress could not complete its work on
schedule this year, forcing me to remain in Washington
indefinitely -- and also forcing us to postpone our important
trip to the Asia Pacific region.
Make no mistake, however: I will not turn my back on my
responsibility to do the nation's business here and abroad, and
2
in times of economic pain, I certainly will not give up an
opportunity to work with our allies to create new markets, new
jobs and new opportunities for American workers. I will not
surrender a chance to help our agricultural industries, our
manufacturing industries and our service industries by building
greater bonds of trade and commerce.
And I certainly will not permit us to retreat into a kind of
Fortress America, which will doom us to irrelevance and poverty.
I remain deeply committed to building closer ties with the Asia
Pacific region. Although much of our Nation's heritage comes
from Europe, our future points equally toward Asia.
Asia has transformed itself in the space of a generation
into the most rapidly growing region on the face of the earth.
Asia-Pacific nations enjoyed staggering real economic growth in
the decade of the Eighties: The Australian economy grew 41
percent; Japan's grew nearly 52 percent; Malaysia almost 60
percent; Hong Kong, 89 percent; Singapore, 93 percent; Taiwan,
116 percent and South Korea, 150 percent.
The Asia-Pacific region has become our largest and fastest
growing trade partner. We conduct more than 300 billion dollars
worth of two-way trade annually. Together, we generate nearly
half the world's GNP. American firms have invested more than 61
billion dollars in the region, and that figure will grow. Asians
have invested more than 95 billion dollars in the United States.
In everything from automobiles to microchips, from baseball to
3
Australian rules football, our ties of mutual interest grow
closer each day.
A few years ago, it was a cliche to refer to the 20th
Century as the American Century and the 21st as the Pacific
Century. I don't have a crystal ball, but I'm willing to bet
that the 21st Century will take a somewhat different form. I
predict that America will remain the world's greatest economic,
political, military and moral power. But at the same time the
nations of the Asia Pacific region, having risen with our help,
will join us as equal partners in building democracy and freedom.
We'd be here forever if I tried to tick off our interests
and activities, country-by-country. So instead I will address
the three central issues in our relationships with the nations of
the region: security, democracy, and trade.
In the area of security, Asia's variety has spawned a
diverse set of political and strategic alliances. Our custom-
made agreements provide a strong foundation for future security.
Let me give you a few examples. The ASEAN Nations, Japan,
Australia and the U.N. Security Council's permanent members
forged a Cambodian peace process that promises free elections in
a nation previously rent by tyranny and genocide.
This promise of peace opens the final chapter of the
Indochina conflict. We envision normal relations with Vietnam as
soon as we resolve our concerns about Cambodia and the problem of
POW/MIAs. Today, I am happy to announce that we will upgrade our
relations with Laos. In an apt sign of the healing process
4
between America and Indochina, we soon will place an ambassador
in Vientiane.
The government of South Korea has moved quietly to build
better ties with its neighbor to the North, while boldly
challenging the North to abandon its nuclear weapons program,
which threatens regional peace.
We welcome bilateral efforts among the Japanese, Soviets,
Chinese and Koreans to reduce the tensions caused by North
Korea's unsafeguarded nuclear program, and we will continue our
own efforts. But we also will deter aggression by maintaining a
significant military presence in the South.
We have worked closely with Japan in the area of foreign
aid: we are the world's two foremost providers of such aid. We
also cooperate on matters of development assistance,
environmental protection, trade, arms control, refugees and
regional peace.
The Japanese have joined us in trying to lead the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe toward free enterprise. They have
supported more than 50,000 U.S. military forces in Japan with 3
billion dollars in annual host nation contributions. Japan
contributed nearly 13 billion dollars to the multinational forces
for the Gulf War, 10 billion dollars of which went to the United
States. This required new taxes, but Japan chose the right
course in supporting the coalition against aggression.
Australia casts a shadow far larger than its population and
size would suggest. It always has served as a trustworthy ally
5
and defender of democracy, and it increasingly serves as an
indispensable link to Asia and the Pacific.
We can help ensure future peace in the region and defend our
interests through a range of military arrangements. Bilateral
alliances, access agreements and Five-Power defense arrangements
give us the flexibility we need.
While we must adjust our force structure in the region to
reflect post Cold-War realities, we must not ignore the important
tensions that remain: in Korea; in Burma, where socialist
despotism holds sway, despite the heroic efforts of freedom
fighters like Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi; in China and other
communist regimes that resist the worldwide movement toward
political pluralism -- and that sometimes lend comfort, support
and even dangerous weapons to our adversaries.
Fortunately, the key to future stability in the region lies
not with arms, but with ballots. Democracy has swept across
Asia, just as it has liberated other previously enslaved parts of
our world. I have mentioned some of the exceptions: Burma,
China, North Korea, Vietnam. Many, many others have accepted
democracy's call.
The United States will support democracy wherever it can,
understanding that nations adopt political freedom in their own
ways, in manners consistent with their histories and cultures.
After decades of uncertainty, the future seems full of hope, and
even the intransigent few seem likely to join the rest of the
world in building a commonwealth of freedom.
6
This brings us to the third focal point, and a crucial
ingredient in a stable, free society: economic prosperity.
No nation can ignore the incredible vitality of this region
-- or afford to. The United States will remain engaged with the
Asia-Pacific because we must -- and because we want to. Yes, we
disagree on important trade issues, but the key players in the
region have committed themselves to the cause of free and fair
trade because our fates have become inextricably linked.
Contrary to the opinions of some in this country, free trade
requires efforts by all parties involved. The Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation Group encourages growth and trade. The
Uruguay Round of GATT talks remains the single most important
vehicle for advancing the cause of free trade and fending off the
scourge of protectionism. We call upon Japan to work with us in
breaking down old barriers to trade and opening up markets in
manufacturing, services and agriculture -- for all our benefit.
Too often, trade disputes bring out the worst in people.
Japan-bashing has become a minor sport in the United States, and
some in Japan have become. equally scornful of the United States.
Both our nations must reject those who would rather seek
scapegoats than pursue lasting prosperity.
The fact is that Japan, which nearly half a century ago
became a focal point of American hatred, has become one of our
closest and most treasured allies. We continue working with our
Japanese allies to open agricultural, financial and manufacturing
markets, and in creating opportunities for businesses of both
7
nations. I especially look forward to spending time with my old
friend, Prime Minister Miyazawa -- significantly, a man steeped
in Western and Eastern culture, and superbly equipped to build
bridges of culture and trade between our two great Nations.
Our Structural Impediments Initiative talks have helped
lower barriers to trade and investment, but we need to give those
talks new life and advance the cause of liberalization.
The United States can no more afford to close its doors to
the Asia-Pacific Region than Asian nations can afford to close
their doors to us. Our regions have become the most powerful
engines for economic growth on earth. Together, we can build an
even more prosperous and spectacular future -- but only if we set
aside petty pride and take up the tough, rewarding task of
promoting worldwide economic liberty. We seek no trade blocs; we
oppose new trade barriers. We seek a vibrant international
economic system that unites markets on every continent.
We in the United States also must take a hard look at
ourselves and pursue measures to improve our own economy. We
levy an unacceptably high effective tax rate on capital gains.
We subject our own entrepreneurs to incredible pressure. Our
allies want us to unchain our innovators -- and so do I.
We run an enormous and growing budget deficit, which seems
to serve no greater purpose than to inflame political divisions
within our own country. We must take purposeful action to reduce
that deficit, while nourishing the seeds of economic growth.
8
We must modernize our banking industry; strengthen the
competitiveness of our industrial base. We must work with our
allies to build a stable and sound monetary regime.
And perhaps most important of all, we must build human
capital. We have an obligation to prepare future generations for
life in the 21st Century. The integrated global economy will
demand more of us than it ever has before, and our schools must
meet that challenge.
We have seen in recent years that technological change can
do much more than make our lives more comfortable. It can sweep
away the debris of totalitarianism, and forge the foundation for
lasting liberty. We live in an age of liberation technology, and
no technology does more for the cause of freedom than the means
of mass communications. We may carp about what we see on the
evening news, but information media have done more to destroy
despotism than weapons ever could. No nation can import high-
tech conveniences but shut off information and ideas. No wall is
high enough and no government sufficiently despotic to shut off
what some call a revolution of electrons.
As we compete with our allies in this area, we must remember
that information feeds intellect, and the better our children's
educational preparation, the freer this world will become.
Let me close today by summarizing our general approach to
relations with Asia. Our administration sees six keys to
promoting lasting peace in the Asia-Pacific region:
9
Progressive trade liberalization / Security cooperation /
A shared commitment to democracy and human rights / Educational
and scientific innovation / Respect for the environment / And an
appreciation of our distinct cultural heritages.
Americans have always looked to the horizons for their
destiny, even from our earliest days. We have grown great
because we have welcomed people from every continent and country,
and we have tried to make use of their distinct talents, while
constructing a common culture.
As children, many of us traced our fingers along a globe, to
distant lands our ancestors called home. We felt special then,
feeling part of two worlds -- one, of an old and important
culture; the other, the American life of freedom and opportunity.
Today, our Asian population is growing more rapidly than any
other, and immigrants from every Asian island and country have
enriched all our lives. Our Administration is proud to have more
Asian-Americans than any previous administration, and two women
of Asian descent serve in top administration positions: Elaine
Chao, as director of the Peace Corps, and Pat Saiki, the
administrator of the Small Business Administration.
America's genius lies in its openness, its tolerance, and
its diversity. Today, we celebrate that diversity, and celebrate
the prospect that in years to come, we will develop with our
Asian friends even greater ties of trade and culture. We will
teach them, and they shall teach us. And together, we will fight
10
to build a world united in its determination to help men and
women make the most of themselves.
I look forward to traveling soon to Asia, to advance these
important principles, and to create work opportunities for tens
of thousands of American workers and businesses. The notion that
we can separate domestic and foreign policy rests upon the
stubborn fantasy that we can live as an isolated island
surrounded by a changing and developing world. In that way lies
national suicide and international chaos.
We tried isolationism once, and we ended up fighting two
bloody world wars.
We tried economic isolationism -- protectionism -- and we
helped set off a worldwide depression. As President, I will
continue building ties with our allies, because those ties mean
peace at home and jobs for American men and women.
I want to thank the Asia Society for its vital contributions
to the cause of peace, prosperity and understanding. I look
forward to your help as I seek to build closer bonds of affection
and interest with the peoples of the vast, marvelous, varied
Asia-Pacific region.
Thank you. May God bless our Asian-Pacific friends and the
United States of America.
#
#
#
#
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11:04 No. 006 P.02
World Development Report 1990
Table 3.7 Poverty, economic growth, and recession
Observed
Simulated
Annual growth
Length
reduction
reduction
of mean income
of period
in poverty
in poverty
or expenditure
Country and period
(years)
(percentage points)*
(percentage points)b
(percent)
Long-run growth
Indonesia (1970-87)
17
41
35
3.4
Thailand (1962-86)
24
33
30
2.7
Pakistan (1962-84)
22
31
26
2.2
Brazil (1960-80)
20
29
34
5.1
Malaysia (1973-87)
14
23
19
4.0
Singapore (1972-82)
10
21
19
6.4
Costa Rica (1971-86)
15
21
22
3.5
Colombia (1971-88)
17
16
8
1.1
India (1972-83)
11
11
10
1.0
Sri Lanka (1963-82)
19
10
8
0.9
Morocco (1970-84)
14
9
1
0.2
Short-run recession
Costa Rica (1983-86)
3
12
13
10.9
Indonesia (1984-87)
3
11
9
5.0
India (1977-83)
6
7
2
0.8
Malaysia (1984-87)
3
1
-1
-0.7
Pakistan (1979-84)
5
1
4
1.2
Colombia (1978-88)
10
-1
-1
-1.2
Côte d'Ivoire (1985-86)
1
-1
-5
-5.4
China (1985-88)c
3
-4
5
6.7
Brazil (1981-87)
6
-5
1
0.9
Venezuela (1982-87)
5
-5
-6
-4.5
Thailand (1981-86)
5
-6
0
0.0
Costa Rica (1977-83)
6
-7
-8
-3.4
Yugoslavia (1978-87)
9
-7
-12
-2.9
Poland (1978-87)
9
-14
-17
-1.2
a. Absolute change in the headcount index on the basis of the definition of absolute poverty in the specific country.
b. The simulation assumes that the inequality of income remains unchanged.
c. Rural only.
of growth as well as its rate is thus an important
average percentage increase in income in all coun-
determinant of changes in poverty.
tries except Brazil and Costa Rica, where inequality
As the lower part of Table 3.7 shows, in the 1980s
worsened. In Brazil the poor nevertheless enjoyed
the link between growth and poverty reduction is
a substantial increase in income; in Costa Rica they
still there, but it is weaker than before. By and
suffered a loss. In general, therefore, the poorest
large, economic growth reduces poverty and eco-
of the poor participated fully in economic growth.
nomic decline increases it. Fluctuations in inequal-
No simple pattern emerged during the 1980s. In
ity, however, were larger in the 1980s. In Malaysia,
about half the countries the very poor suffered
for example, poverty decreased even though mean
more, or advanced less, than the average citizen.
income also declined. This suggests that external
In Colombia, for example, mean income for the
shocks or important policy changes can alter the
entire population fell by 11 percent between 1978
incidence of poverty by way of changes in the in-
and 1988, whereas for the poorest tenth it fell by
equality of income, whereas in more stable periods
more than 20 percent. In contrast, the poorest
economic growth is the dominant influence on
households in other countries did much better
poverty.
than the rest of the population. In Malaysia aver-
Would the conclusion that growth reduces pov-
age incomes fell by 2 percent between 1984 and
erty change if attention were shifted from the poor
1987, but the mean incomes of the poorest actually
to the very poor? The country-specific poverty
increased by 9 percent.
lines used in this analysis define 20 to 50 percent of
These conclusions shed some light on the differ-
the population as poor. If we turn to the poorest
ing experience of the countries identified in Table
tenth of the population, we find that in periods of
3.5. Economic growth was clearly important-in
stable growth this group enjoyed a larger-than-
the two countries that experienced the fastest re-
48
I.D.
APRE/ASIA
TEL 202-647-3517
Nov 08,91
11:04 No. 006 P.03
A weakness in this assessment is the lack of reli-
suggest that progress in reducing poverty has
able data for Sub-Saharan Africa. The discussion
probably been slowest in that region. Even assum-
of diverging trends in Chapter 1 and the evidence
ing that the distribution of income did not worsen
of stagnant consumption per capita in Figure 3.1
between 1965 and 1985, the number of Africans in
Table 3.2 Changes in selected indicators of poverty
Average
Number
income
Headcount
of poor
shortfall
Length
A index
(millions)
(percent)
of period
First
Last
First
Last
First
Last
Country and period
(years)
year
year
year
year
year
year
Brazil (1960-80)4,b
20
50
21
36.1
25.4
46
41
Colombia (1971-88)*
17
41
25
8.9
7.5
41
38
Costa Rica (1971-86)*
15
45
24
0.8
0.6
40
44
India (1972-83)
11
54
43
311.4
315.0
31
28
Indonesia (1970-87)
17
58
17
67.9
30.0
37
17
Malaysia (1973-87)"
14
37
15
4.1
2.2
40
24
Morocco (1970-84)
14
43
34
6.6
7.4
46
36
Pakistan (1962-84)
22
54
23
26.5
21.3
39
26
Singapore (1972-82)
10
31
10
0.7
0.2
37
33
Sri Lanka (1963-82)*
19
37
27
3.9
4.1
35
29
Thailand (1962-86)*,b
24
59
26
16.7
13.6
35
Note: This table uses country-specific poverty lines. Official or commonly used poverty lines have been used when available. In other cases the
poverty line has been set at 30 percent of mean income or expenditure. The range of poverty lines, expressed in terms of expenditure per
household member and in PPP dollars, is approximately $300-$700 a year in 1985 except for Costa Rica ($960), Malaysia ($1,420), and Singapore
($860). Unless otherwise indicated, the table is based on expenditure per household member. The headcount index is the percentage of the
population below the poverty line. The average income shortfall is the mean distance of consumption or income of the poor below the poverty
line, as a proportion of the poverty line.
a. Measures for this entry use Income rather than expenditure.
b. Measures for this entry are by household rather than by household member.
Box 3.1 Development in a Javanese village
The story of Balearjo, an East Javanese village of almost
shoes were commonplace. Most villagers had radios,
4,000 people, shows what declining poverty means for
and some even had television sets. More than 90 per-
individuals. The village is about eight kilometers from
cent of the houses were made of colorfully painted
the town of Gondanglegi and is connected to the out-
brick and stucco, with partial cement floors. Furnish-
side world by bumpy but passable dirt roads. Although
ings were more extensive and included chairs and ta-
Balearjo is still somewhat poorer than its neighbors,
bles bought from stores. Literacy had improved dra-
research conducted in 1953 and 1985 shows that the
matically thanks to two primary schools, one financed
lives of Its inhabitants improved greatly in the inter-
by the village and the other by the central government.
vening years, Rice yields increased dramatically, from 2
Travel outside the village was common, and knowl-
tons to 6 tons of paddy per hectare for the wet season
edge of national events, provided through hourly radio
crop, and the wage for a day's work increased from 2
broadcasts, was widespread. In 1953 villagers relied on
kilograms of rice in 1953 to nearly 4 kilograms in 1985.
homemade kerosene lamps that provided little illumi-
In 1953 the village would have been considered poor
nation, but by 1982 electric power lines had reached
by most definitions. Rice was available for only four
Balearjo, and by 1985 many households had electric
months; the diet for the rest of the year consisted of
light.
corn and, when that ran out, cassava. Clothes were
Such burdensome activities as rice pounding and
worn until they were in tatters, and few people had
shoulder transport had disappeared, relieving women
shoes. A typical house was made of thatch and bam-
of some of their most exhausting tasks. Higher incomes
boo, with an earthen floor. Furnishings were sparse
had led to demands for new products and services and
and uncomfortable. Few villagers could read, and few
hence to more productive work, such as construction,
had traveled any distance from the village. A daily pa-
trade, and small manufacturing. Growing specializa-
per brought from a nearby town supplied the only out-
tion was also evident: houses in 1953 were constructed
side news.
by the owners with the help of neighbors, but by 1985
By 1985 things had changed. Rice was available
most of the work was done (and done better) by full-
throughout the year. Clothing was much better, and
time carpenters.
41
I.D.
APRE/ASIA
TEL 202-647-3517
Nov
08,91
11:04 No 006 P.04
Saharan Africa) but that less progress had been
countries that have done much worse than re-
made up to 1985 in extending health care to the
gional averages indicate. In Pakistan the net enroll-
poor. Further expansion in coverage will mainly
ment ratio has hardly improved in the past twenty
benefit the poor.
years-it was only 43 percent in 1985-and an esti-
Regional averages mask the tremendous
mated 36 percent of the population lacks access to
achievements that some countries have made in
health care.
providing social services to their populations. Co-
Recently, concern has centered on the effect of
lombia, where mortality for children under 5 fell
the recession of the early 1980s on the provision of
from 135 per thousand in 1965 to 42 per thousand
social services to the poor. In Sub-Saharan Africa
by 1985, and Costa Rica, where 95 percent of the
and Latin America, the two regions worst affected
population has access to primary health care, show
by recession, roughly half the countries for which
what can be done. Even in regions with poor over-
information is available experienced substantial
all performance, some countries have managed to
declines in real per capita spending on education
make great strides. Botswana, for example, has
and health. The social indicators for the early
achieved universal primary enrollment, and its un-
1980s, however, tell a somewhat less gloomy story,
der 5 mortality rate fell from 165 to 70 per thousand
at least in Latin America.
during the past two decades. The sheer scale of the
Figure 3.2 shows that progress in under 5 mor-
improvements in these countries suggests that the
tality and primary school enrollment rates contin-
poor must have participated in the overall
ued into the 1980s in most of the developing
progress. At the other end of the spectrum are
world. Progress was least in the region with the
Table 3.3 Changes in poverty in the 1980s
Average
Number
income
Headcount
of poor
shortfall
Length
index
(millions)
(percent)
of period
First
Last
First
Last
First
Last
Country and period
(years)
year
year
year
year
year
year
Brazil (1981-87)*
6
19
24
23.1
33.2
China (1985-88)*.b
3
10
14
79.2
101.3
25
24
Colombia (1978-88)*
10
24
25
6.0
7.5
36
38
Costa Rica (1977-83)*
6
29
36
0.6
0.9
44
39
Costa Rica (1983-86)a
3
36
24
0.9
0.6
39
44
Côte d'Ivoire (1985-86)
1
30
31
3.1
3.3
33
26
India (1977-83)
6
50
43
324.9
315.0
29
28
Indonesia (1984-87)
3
28
17
45.4
30.0
24
17
Malaysia (1984-87)*
3
15
14
2.3
2.2
26
24
Pakistan (1979-84)
5
21
20
17.1
18.7
19
19
Poland (1978-87)*
9
9
23
3.3
8.6
Thailand (1981-86)
5
20
26
9.5
13.6
27
35
Venezuela (1982-87)*
5
12
16
1.9
3.0
26
31
Yugoslavia (1978-87)
9
17
25
3.8
5.7
Note: See note to Table 3.2 for definitions. The range of poverty lines, expressed in terms of expenditure per household member and in PPP
dollars, is approximately $300-$700 a year in 1985 except for Costa Rica ($960) and Malaysia ($1,420).
a. Measures for this entry use income rather than expenditure.
b. Rural only.
c. Measures for this entry are by household rather than by household member.
Table 3.4 Have social services reached the poor in developing countries?
Latin
Sub-
Europe, Middle
America
All
Saharan
East
South
East, and
and the
developing
Indicator (1985)
Africa
Asia
Asia
North Africa
Caribbean
countries
Percentage of nonpoor in population
53
79
49
75
81
67
Primary net enrollment rate (percent)
56
96
74
88
92
84
Percentage of children immunized
47
73
43
63
65
58
43
Asia Society Acknowledgements
ON STAGE WITH POTUS AND FLOTUS:
Chairman John Whitehead and wife, Nancy
President Robert Oxnam [OX-num]
Vice Chairman Peter Aaron [AIR-un]
(Other Vice Chairman Ward Woods will not be there)
AMONG THE 800-900 AUDIENCE MEMBERS WILL BE:
Ambassadors from approximately 30 Asia-Pacific countries
PER ADVANCE AND PER ASIA SOCIETY -- NO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS OR
CABINET MEMBERS ATTENDING AT THIS POINT (11/8/91, 5:30 p.m.)
SECOND PROOF
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Copies
Chardor
Paal
OCT 25 1991
Patters
FINAL
James A. Baker, III
FYI
PROOF
Don
AMERICA IN ASIA:
EMERGING ARCHITECTURE FOR
A PACIFIC COMMUNITY
I
n Asia as in Europe we are in the midst of the first
transformation of the international system this century that is
not the direct result of global conflagration. This rare moment
presents us with new possibilities for reshaping international
relationships in Asia to meet the challenges of the post-Cold
War world.
President Bush's trip to East Asia marks a point in time
when disparate historical lines are intersecting: the commem-
oration of the fiftieth anniversary of the attack on Pearl
Harbor; the end of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation; and the
prospect of laying to rest the Vietnam War eΓa. The end of
1991 should see the closing off of several tragic, defining
episodes of the American experience in Asia and open a new
chapter of U.S. engagement in the region as we approach the
21st century.
I have presented elsewhere the administration's ideas about
the new post-Cold War architecture of the Euro-Atlantic
community.¹ But America's destiny lies no less across the
Pacific than the Atlantic. We have fought three major wars
over the past half-century in the Asia-Pacific theater. U.S.
economic involvement and defense commitments in the region
have been-and remain-defining realities. We also have large
and growing interests in the human and material development
of the region, as well as in its security. Our success in forging
a new international system will require sustained engagement
in this diverse and dynamic part of the world, just as it does in
Europe and the Americas.
The global trends that are reshaping Europe and the Soviet
Union have also been at work in the Asia-Pacific region: the
'See James A. Baker. III, "A New Europe, A New Adanticism: Architecture for a New
Era," speech to the Berlin Press Club, Dec. 12, 1989; and "The Euro-Atlantic Architecture:
From West to East," speech to the Aspen Institute. Berlin, Germany, June 18, 1991.
James A. Baker, III is Secretary of State.
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2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
bankruptcy of communism as an economic and political sys-
tem; a movement toward democracy and market-oriented
economics; global economic integration of markets for trade,
capital and information; and the emerging recognition that
transnational challenges in such areas as narcotics, the envi-
ronment and migration are important components of a com-
prehensive approach to security. At the same time the dark
countertrends that President Bush pointed to in his September
1991 speech to the U.N. General Assembly are also evident in
Asia: the reemergence of ethnic rivalries, nationalist aspira-
tions and territorial or political disputes which were sup-
pressed during the Cold War years.
II
These global factors for change are playing themselves out
in Asia amid the region's particular historical, cultural and
political circumstances. In contrast to central and eastern
Europe and the U.S.S.R., where change has been driven by the
failure of a system of political economy, much of the ferment
in Asia is a product of the region's unique and dramatic
economic success. Barely twenty years ago East Asia was
engulfed in war and great-power confrontation, burdened
with poverty and challenged by insurgent communist move-
ments. Our trade with the region in the early 1970s was less
than that with Latin America.
But the subsequent two decades brought unrivaled prog-
ress. Throughout the 1980s East Asia led the world in the
innovations of a new economic age. Japan emerged as an
economic superpower. New industrial economies of South
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore achieved rapid
high-technology growth. China opened economically. And the
Philippines, Korea and Taiwan each took strides toward
democracy. As a result the combined economies of East Asia
are now roughly equal in size to that of the United States.
International political developments have also contributed
to a more positive environment. These include the Sino-Soviet
rapprochement, the opening of Soviet relations with the
Republic of Korea, the admission to the United Nations of
both Korean states, the birth of a democratic Mongolia and a
political resolution of the Cambodia conflict based on a U.N.
settlement plan. The latter. if realized. will bring a new era of
peace to Indochina.
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AMERICA IN ASIA 3
For all the region's progress, however, some legacies of the
past could impede a promising future. The heavily armed
standoff on the Korean peninsula is still one of the world's
most dangerous flashpoints, a confrontation now intensified
by the ominous threat of nuclear proliferation. In Burma the
tyranny of a brutal military dictatorship endures, despite the
clear expression of popular will in the elections of 1990 for
civilian democratic government. China, along with the other
residual communist regimes in Asia, continues to resist dem-
ocratic political reform. And despite President Gorbachev's
historic visit to Tokyo last April, the dispute over Japan's
Northern Territories remains an impediment to a major
improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations.
These Asian realities-the elements of a promising future
and the difficult remnants of times past-now shape the
challenges before us. The successes of our policies and those of
our friends in the region mean that many of our partners have
also become robust economic competitors. Allies such as Ja-
pan, South Korea and Australia have become important
political and economic players in the emerging international
system.
Given the challenges and opportunities we now face in Asia,
a viable architecture for a stable and prosperous Pacific com-
munity needs to be founded on three pillars. First, we need a
framework for economic integration that will support an open
global trading system in order to sustain the region's economic
dynamism and avoid regional economic fragmentation. Sec-
ond, we must foster the trend toward democratization so as to
deepen the shared values that will reinforce a sense of com-
munity, enhance economic vitality and minimize prospects for
dictatorial adventures. Third, we need to define a renewed
defense structure for the Asia-Pacific theater that reflects the
region's diverse security concerns and mitigates intra-regional
fears and suspicions-a prerequisite for maintaining the sta-
bility required for continuing economic and political progress.
III
In formulating American policy toward the Asia-Pacific
region, we should recognize our historical and continuing
interests. Since 1784, when the merchant ship Empress of China
sailed for Canton from New York, the United States has
consistently pursued an open door approach to the Asia-
Pacific region. Our interest has resided in maintaining com-
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4 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
mercial access and preventing the rise of any single hegemonic
power or coalition hostile to the United States and its allies and
friends. In today's world a shared focus and the development
of an active partnership among the nations of the Pacific Rim
are essential to the success of the emerging global system.
The Asia-Pacific region is now America's largest trading
partner. America's trans-Pacific commerce is now more than
$300 billion in annual two-way trade-nearly one-third larger
than that across the Atlantic. The United States exports more
to Thailand than to the Soviet Union, more to Indonesia than
to central and eastern Europe and more to Singapore than to
Spain or Italy. Moreover, U.S. firms have invested more than
$61 billion in the region, with over $95 billion of Asian
investments in the United States.
Our closest bond to Asia is the growing number of Asian-
Americans, some seven million strong, who are America's
fastest growing group of immigrants. There are more Laotians
today in the United States than in the Laotian capital of
Vientiane; more Filipinos in California than in Cebu. These
people, along with hundreds of thousands of other Asian-
Americans-Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Cambodians,
Koreans, Thai and Samoans among them-enrich our society,
strengthen our engagement with the region and give us a
growing mutuality of interests in an emerging Asia-Pacific
community.
What has fostered stability and secured economic dynamism
in East Asia for the past four decades is a loose network of
bilateral alliances with the United States at its core. Our
military presence, our commitment, our reassurance has con-
stituted the balancing wheel of an informal, yet highly effec-
tive, security structure that emerged after World War II and
endured throughout the Cold War years.
To visualize the architecture of U.S. engagement in the
region, imagine a fan spread wide, with its base in North
America and radiating west across the Pacific. The central
support is the U.S.-Japan alliance, the key connection for the
security structure and the new Pacific partnership we are
seeking. To the north, one spoke represents our alliance with
the Republic of Korea. To the south, others extend to our
treaty allies-the Association of Southeast Asian (ASEAN) coun-
tries of the Philippines and Thailand. Further south a spoke
extends to Australia-an important, staunch economic, polit-
ical and security partner. Connecting these spokes is the fabric
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AMERICA IN ASIA
5
of shared economic interests now given form by the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process. Within this
construct, new political and economic relationships offer ad-
ditional support for a system of cooperative action by groups
of Pacific nations to address both residual problems and
emerging challenges.
This system has been successful precisely because its flexi-
bility has respected the vast geographic expanse, political and
cultural diversity, as well as the geopolitical realities of East
Asia and the Pacific. Unlike Europe there has been no single
threat commonly perceived throughout the region. Instead,
there is a multiplicity of security concerns that differ from
country to country and within the subregions of this vast area.
Today the overlay of U.S.-Soviet competition has been
removed from Asia, so the enduring diversity of regional
interests and security concerns stand out with even greater
clarity. What was a secondary aspect of our Cold War-era
security presence is becoming the primary rationale for our
defense engagement in the region: to provide geopolitical
balance, to be an honest broker, to reassure against uncer-
tainty.
Our forward-deployed military presence and bilateral de-
fense ties to Japan, South Korea, the allies within ASEAN and
Australia are widely accepted as the foundation of Asia's
security structure. Yet in the post-Cold War world, the en-
hanced capabilities of our allies and friends-and new security
challenges-require adjustments in our force structure, de-
fense activities and in the means of sustaining regional stabil-
ity.
Asian security increasingly is derived from a flexible, ad hoc
set of political and defense interactions. Multilateral ap-
proaches to security are slowly emerging. As we have seen in
the Cambodian peace process, the combined efforts of the
ASEAN countries, Japan, Australia and the U.N. Security Coun-
cil's Permanent Five have tailor-made a conflict-resolution
process. A semiofficial forum on the contested islands of the
South China Sea, hosted recently by Indonesia, also reflects
such an ad hoc, multilateral approach. Guaranteeing stability
on the Korean peninsula may increasingly assume a multilat-
eral form-a solution suited to the character of the problem.
At this stage of a new era we should be attentive to the
possibilities for such multilateral action without locking our-
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6 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
selves in to an overly structured approach. In the Asia-Pacific
community, form should follow function.
IV
While Asian security concerns have a diverse, decentralized
character, burgeoning intra- and trans-Pacific trade and in-
vestment provide areas of broad common interest. Commerce
offers the most natural approach to fostering greater regional
cohesion. This is why the United States and 11 other Pacific
basin economies came together two years ago to initiate the
APEC process. We see APEC as an important mechanism for
sustaining market-oriented growth, for advancing global and
regional trade liberalization and for meeting the new chal-
lenges of interdependence. The APEC agenda is expansive. It
includes, for example, assessment of regional needs in tele-
communications, human resource development, energy, trade
and investment, marine resources and tourism, among others.
APEC is as much the hallmark of American engagement in
the region as are U.S. security ties. Indeed, one could draw a
21st-century Pacific analogy from a nineteenth-century expe-
rience: the development of the American continent. As the
pattern of expansion and influence in the American West was
determined by the location of telegraph lines and railroads, so
the infrastructural links we are building across the Pacific in
areas such as telecommunications and transportation will
shape the economic and political character of the region and
our ties to it.
With the anticipated addition to APEC'S membership of
China, Hong Kong and Taiwan at November's third ministe-
rial meeting in Seoul, APEC'S potential as a major trans-Pacific
forum is becoming a reality. The efforts of APEC'S ten working
groups are laying a solid foundation of economic cooperation
on a broad range of issues.² APEC is ready to emerge as a key
forum that can forge the greater sense of Asia-Pacific commu-
nity needed to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War
world.
Let me also leave no doubt about what APEC is not: it is not
a regional economic bloc. To the contrary, it is a product
'APEC's ten working groups are: trade promotion, expansion of investment and technol-
ogy transfers, human resource development, regional energy cooperation, marine resource
conservation, telecommunications, transportation, data, tourism and fisheries. In addition
APEC has begun regional trade liberalization discussions.
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AMERICA IN ASIA
7
of-and catalyst for-economic integration and trade liberal-
ization. These developments will not cut off the Asia-Pacific
community from the rest of the globe. In fact, by stressing the
gains that have been made from open multilateral policies, and
by enhancing economic efficiency, APEC should help the Pacific
region contribute to a more open trading system. APEC'S
outlook is inclusive, not exclusive. APEC'S members include a
number of the great trading nations and offer excellent
investment opportunities. The intent of the APEC participants
is to overcome barriers and inefficiencies within the region
while working for a more open global system.
Similarly, the emerging North American Free Trade Area
will support both APEC and the global, multilateral systems for
trade and financial flows. Unlike a customs union, NAFTA will
not establish common barriers to those outside. Rather it will
lower barriers among its participants-a governmental re-
sponse to the accelerating economic integration already taking
place among neighbors. Heightened integration and efficiency
will increase the productivity of the U.S., Mexican and Cana-
dian economies. Growth will bring expanding markets for
Asian traders and investors, thus strengthening, not weaken-
ing, trans-Pacific economic links. Indeed, I believe Mexico
views the NAFTA as a vehicle for better integrating its formerly
autarkic economy into the global system; more efficient pat-
terns of trade and investment with the United States and
Canada will strengthen Mexico's ties with a competitive world
economy, not weaken them. This view is supported by Mexi-
co's recent membership in the Pacific Economic Cooperation
Council (PECC) and its interest in participating in both APEC
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment.
Of course the logic of regional integration is more widely
applicable. Indeed, Thailand's proposal for an ASEAN free
trade area is a welcome initiative that could strengthen ASEAN
and, by stimulating ASEAN growth, also reinforce U.S.-ASEAN
economic relations.
The economic future of the United States depends on
strong ties with all the regions of the world. As a nation
generating some 24 percent of the world's GNP, we cannot
operate effectively or efficiently through any other strategy.
This is why the United States has demonstrated an unwavering
commitment to advancing the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) through the Uruguay Round. It is also why
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8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
we are seeking to complement that effort through a network of
initiatives designed to reduce market barriers and support a
more open, competitive and growth-oriented system. The
NAFTA, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the U.S.-
European Community declaration, our trade enhancement
initiative for the emerging central and east European democ-
racies, our agreements with ASEAN and APEC each reflect our
customized attempts to reach out to all major markets, not to
exclude any of them.
Each initiative is tailored to meet special circumstances and
to maintain momentum for liberalization by pressing forward
simultaneously on a large number of fronts. Our logic is that
gains from increasing trade and investment are not calculated
according to any zero-sum formula-instead, greater compe-
tition leads to efficiencies and growth that benefit the system as
a whole. This is a logic that will profit the dynamic economies
of Asia, especially if they join with us to reduce barriers that
threaten political support for a liberalized global trading
system.
The natural partner of market-oriented economics is polit-
ical pluralism. The public accountability that is the hallmark of
democratic political systems is also the best check against
tyranny and aggression. As the history of the past two centu-
ries demonstrates, democratic nations rarely engage in armed
conflict against each other. Not long ago some argued that
democratic politics were unsuited to Asian cultures and tradi-
tions. Yet the political developments of the past decade in the
Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan demonstrate that eco-
nomic growth naturally tends to promote democratization.
Perhaps most remarkably, the powerful appeal of the dem-
ocratic ideal is evident in Mongolia's rejection of its Leninist
past and its turn to political pluralism and economic reform.
Once the oldest communist government in Asia, Mongolia is
the first Asian communist state to purposefully undertake the
challenge of a democratic transition.
In sharp contrast, the democratic ideal has been brutally
thwarted in Burma. The socialist military regime, by suppress-
ing the results of its own 1990 election, has betrayed the
people in their quest for representative government. This
denial of the expressed will of the Burmese people will leave
Burma mired in isolation and stagnation until the military
leadership reverses its repressive policies and transfers author-
ity to the elected civilian leaders of the country. The awarding
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AMERICA IN ASIA
9
of this year's Nobel Peace Prize to Aung San Suu Kyi will give
the Burmese people hope that the world is not ignoring their
plight.
China, Vietnam and Laos have embarked on a course of
market-oriented economic reform while retaining a Leninist
monopoly of political power. But economic reform can be
sustained only when it is accompanied by political reform. The
tragic violence at Tiananmen Square in 1989 was a reflection
of the social and political pressures generated by a decade of
rapid economic expansion unaccompanied by concurrent po-
litical transformation.
Democratic reform in China and Vietnam, as well as in
North Korea, would have a major impact on the character of
international relations in Asia. As generational change unfolds
in all three of what might be called "Confucian-Leninist"
societies, the interplay between economic expansion and the
striving for political reform can only become more pro-
nounced.
V
Our ability to help realize the economic and security archi-
tecture of the Asia-Pacific community we envisage will rest in
no small measure on the successful management of a number
of critical relationships with our allies, friends and regional
groups. Our ties with Japan, South Korea, ASEAN and Australia
are the stabilizing and strengthening spokes in the fan.
U.S.-Japan Relations
The keystone of our engagement in East Asia and the Pacific
is our relationship with Japan. Nothing is more basic to the
prosperity and security of the region, and indeed to the
effectiveness of the post-Cold War system, than a harmonious
and productive U.S.-Japan relationship.
But U.S.-Japan relations have changed profoundly over the
past decade. Our dealings have become more equal, and their
form and substance must now be adjusted to reflect this reality
if we are tn address the sources of tension. I see four basic,
interrelated elements as necessary to accomplish this adjust-
ment.
First, the foundation of our relationship-the U.S.-Japan
security alliance-must be strengthened. We have been
pleased with our growing security cooperation with Japan.
Japan is continuing to progress toward fulfilling our agreed-
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10 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
upon division of defense roles and missions. Japan's ability to
secure its air and sea lanes out to 1,000 miles from its shores,
the growing interoperability and joint training of our forces-
along with generous host nation support, which will increase to
73 percent of the non-salary costs for our forward-deployed
forces-are a major contribution to the stability of the region.
One area which requires greater cooperation, however, is the
goal of a more balanced two-way flow of defense-related
technology, as codified by our 1983 Memorandum of Under-
standing.
Second, we must work to reduce the economic tensions in
our increasingly interdependent relationship. The $140 billion
in annual two-way trade, the investment and the burgeoning
network of private sector linkages between the world's two
largest and most technologically advanced economies under-
score the importance of this aspect of our relations.
A solid, balanced economic foundation, with open markets
on both sides, is needed if we are to sustain and advance our
partnership-one now of truly global dimensions. This re-
quires greater market-opening efforts by Japan, a more com-
petitive U.S. economy and an intensification of the detailed
economic dialogue we have begun in the Structural Impedi-
ments Initiative. Removing the impediments to external ad-
justment and building more balanced economic ties-thus
creating fair opportunities for traders and investors-are
essential to the new harmony we seek.
The SII talks could assume a particularly important role in
this process of economic adjustment. Two nations, recognizing
the extensive interconnection of their respective economies,
have agreed to analyze and pursue microeconomic adjust-
ments in order to harmonize an economic relationship vital to
each other and to global economic growth. This makes the SII
a microeconomic complement to the Group of Seven leading
industrialized nations (G-7), which is designed to improve the
coordination of macroeconomic policies among highly inter-
dependent economies.
For its part, the United States is enhancing its competitive-
ness, as is evident in an 87 percent increase in its exports to
Japan since 1987. This export expansion reflects, in part,
Japan's removal of structural barriers to market access for
goods, services and investment. But many aspects of the
Japanese economy are still constricted by exclusionary busi-
ness practices, to the detriment of new players in the market-
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AMERICA IN ASIA
11
place-both foreign and Japanese-and of the Japanese con-
sumer. And at home we still have much work to do-from
further reducing the cost of capital to American business to
encouraging more aggressive marketing of U.S. products
abroad-if we are to carry out our part of the SII equation.
Third, we must fulfill the promise of the global partnership
called for by the president at the Palm Springs summit last
year. As democracies and market-oriented economies that
together generate nearly 40 percent of the world's GNP, the
United States and Japan have the potential to marshal unri-
valed resources in support of a better future-if our foreign
policies are effectively coordinated. On issues from the Uru-
guay Round to reform in central and eastern Europe, from
preserving the environment to Third World debt relief, we
must engage together globally.
For the international system to work, leading powers must
lead. This is the lesson we learned from our own reluctance to
play an active role in world affairs in the period between the
two world wars. This is why today we seek to build a global
partnership with Japan-with Tokyo assuming a greater lead-
ership role in a system from which it derives significant
benefits. Our broadly convergent interests have already led us
to pursue similar policies on many issues. We are committed to
developing better consultative mechanisms in order to give
greater synergy to our foreign policies.
Finally, we must deepen our understanding of each other's
culture. Japanese youth must be introduced to more about
American life and values. Fast-food, rock and rap music and
Hollywood style are one image we project in the modern
world, but America has much else to offer. Similarly, more
Americans must gain knowledge of, and appreciation for,
Japan's rich history and traditions-in particular, they should
learn the Japanese language. The recently created Abe Fund
offers one important opportunity to expand a host of ex-
changes and interactions-intellectual, scientific, cultural and
people-to-people-needed to deepen our mutual appreciation
and ability to work together.
U.S.-Korean Relations
Another pillar of our engagement in the Pacific is our
alliance with the Republic of Korea. South Korea's economic
and political achievements rival those of Japan. Economically
the R.O.K. has converted itself from a poor agricultural society
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12 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
devastated by the war into the world's thirteenth largest
economy. Its industry is now on the cutting edge of high-tech
growth. Within a generation South Korea's per-capita income
has trebled. And its success in building democratic institutions
and the accomplishments of Nordpolitik in forging new inter-
national relationships underscore the significance of our firm
support for the R.O.K. over the past four decades.
South Korea's dynamism helps us meet the challenge of
transforming what has been primarily a military alliance into a
more equal political, defense and economic partnership. This
is the logic of the U.S. force restructuring now under way, of
Seoul's increased support of our defense presence there, of
our economic dialogue and enhanced political consultations.
South Korea's success is all the more remarkable as it has
been achieved in the face of unrelenting military and political
confrontation with North Korea. Indeed the very real danger
of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula is now the
number one threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific community.
North Korea's repeated failure to meet its international
obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty-
requiring it to implement full-scope International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards inspection of its nuclear facilities—
has raised serious questions about its intentions. Widespread
suspicions about a nuclear weapons program cannot enhance
North Korea's security. President Bush's recent initiative in
withdrawing worldwide U.S. tactical nuclear weapons renders
Pyongyang's preconditions for fulfilling its NPT obligations
more specious than ever.
Yet, as important as the NPT regime is, we have seen in the
case of Iraq that even IAEA safeguards cannot ensure that a
maverick regime will not seek to acquire a nuclear weapons
capability. The only firm assurance against nuclear prolifera-
tion in Korea is a credible agreement by both Seoul and
Pyongyang to abstain from the production or acquisition of
any weapons-grade nuclear material on the Korean peninsula.
The key to reducing tensions on the peninsula-and ulti-
mately to the reunification of Korea-is an active North-South
dialogue. The Koreans themselves must traverse the road to
peace and reunification. President Roh Tae Woo's initiatives to
advance the free flow of trade, people and communications
between North and South are important steps in this direction.
For real progress to occur, a climate of trust and confidence
must he established. The recent admission of both Koreas tn
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AMERICA IN ASIA
13
the United Nations and the ongoing prime ministerial talks are
hopeful signs that the last glacier of the Cold War in Asia is at
last beginning to melt. For our part, we are prepared to
enhance our dealings with Pyongyang as the Democratic
People's Republic meets its responsibilities as a global citizen.
There is potential for European-style confidence-building
measures and, ultimately, Conventional-Forces-in-Europe-
type arms reduction on the Korean peninsula. As in Europe,
large and heavily armed ground forces confront each other
across a clearly demarcated demilitarized zone. Korea is a
place in East Asia where arms control initiatives seem partic-
ularly timely.
The process of reconciliation and, eventually, reunification
on the Korean peninsula need to be based on Korean initia-
tives; yet the four major powers-the United States, Soviet
Union, China and Japan-have important interests that inter-
sect there. As the North-South dialogue progresses, we will
formula
explore the possibilities for a forum for the two Koreas and the
four major powers in Northeast Asia that will support the
dialogue, help in the easing of tensions, facilitate discussion of
common security concerns and possibly guarantee outcomes
negotiated between the two Koreas.
U.S.-Southeast Asian Relations
Our relations with the countries of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations are at the core of our engagement in
this dynamic subregion. Over the last fifteen years, we have
built an impressive structure of economic, political and secur-
ity cooperation with our ASEAN colleagues. Indeed, just fifteen
years ago many feared that countries such as Thailand, Ma-
laysia and Indonesia would become "dominoes" in a commu-
nist assault on Southeast Asia. Today the talented, industrious
people and market-oriented economies of the ASEAN states are
setting global standards for development.
ASEAN today is America's fifth largest trading partner, rival-
ing U.S. commerce with Germany; and America is ASEAN'S
largest export market. ASEAN was a leader in launching the
Uruguay Round of the GATT, and we look to ASEAN for support
in successfully completing the current negotiations. We have
worked hard to keep ASEAN at the core of our efforts at
regional economic integration, and we will continue to do so.
In the political realm a decade of cooperative efforts with
ASEAN has led to the successful conclusion of a comprehensive
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14 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
agreement to end the conflict in Cambodia. In the wake of the
Paris Conference we look to the building-under U.N. auspic-
es-of a just and durable peace in Cambodia. This should
make possible a new era in Southeast Asia, including the
integration of Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos into the main-
stream of the region.
The culmination of the Cambodian peace process-free and
fair elections, the installation of a legitimate government in
Phnom Penh, along with substantial resolution of our POW/MIA
concerns-will finally provide a durable basis for the United
States to normalize relations with Vietnam, Cambodia and
Laos.
Two of ASEAN'S members, the Philippines and Thailand, are
also bilateral treaty allies. Today there is much uncertainty
about the future of our military presence in the Philippines. I
want to emphasize two points in. this regard: our overriding
concern is to sustain good relations with a democratic and
economically resurgent Philippines. And second, regardless of
the future of our military presence at Subic Bay, our security
engagement in Southeast Asia will remain undiminished, even
if realized through other arrangements.
We are exploring ways to enhance defense cooperation with
our friends throughout the subregion in order to sustain an
adequate security presence on a more diversified basis. The
base-access agreement reached earlier this year with Singapore
is a reflection of our commitment to sustaining a defense
capability in Southeast Asia-as well as of the region's wide-
spread desire for an active U.S. security presence.
U.S. Australian Relations
Australia is the southernmost spoke in the fan I described
earlier, serving as the southern anchor for our links across the
Pacific. Moreover, Australia is a bridge between Southeast Asia
and the South Pacific island states. Canberra's activism in both
global and regional affairs-from efforts to rid the world of
chemical weapons to elimination of agricultural subsidies via
the Cairns group in the GATT-demonstrates its importance as
an ally. In its contributions to the Cambodian peace process,
and in its role of honest broker and catalyst for development in
the South Pacific, Australia plays a vital part in regional affairs.
In addition, Canberra has been an important bridge to New
Zealand, as we have sought to encourage policy changes in
Wellington that will make possible a reactivation of the ANZUS
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AMERICA IN ASIA 15
alliance. President Bush's nuclear disarmament initiative has
created a favorable context that we hope will elicit a positive
response from New Zealand.
China
The tragic violence at Tiananmen Square in the summer of
1989 shattered the bipartisan consensus in the United States—
carefully constructed over two decades by five administra-
tions-for engagement with China. Rebuilding that consensus
is in our national interest, but it is proving to be a daunting
task.
Looking back over more than 150 years of American con-
tacts with China-since the time of the first missionaries and
traders-our views of China have oscillated between extremes
of fascination and confrontation. Indeed the influence of the
missionary experience in China-evident in the work of nov-
elists, scholars and diplomats-has shaped our romantic per-
ception of this land and its people. We have admired China's
exotic culture and its hard-working and long-suffering people.
When the Chinese seemed to adopt our principles-either
religious or secular-we enthusiastically welcomed them into
the fold. But when periodic upheavals led to disappointment
and frequently bloodshed, Americans felt the anger of rejec-
tion-of a conversion that failed.
Even in recent years, no foreign event seemed to capture the
American public's interest and excitement more than the
effort in the 1980s to reform China's Soviet-style economy and
to open up the country to the modern world. And then,
overnight, our hopes for a new, democratic China turned to
revulsion at the sight of tanks crushing unarmed students. The
subsequent advance of political reform in the Soviet Union has
made China's setback all the more poignant.
We cannot forget those who were halted by a backlash of
fear, but we will not help the eventual success of their cause by
again turning our backs on China. The pendulum of U.S.
relations with China must stop its sharp swings. China is home
for almost a quarter of mankind. We cannot simply wish away
their problems.
That is why President Bush has pursued a policy of engage-
ment toward the People's Republic. We can eventually solve
our problems with China only if we maintain the ability to
make our case to the Chinese. Our agenda is open for all,
Chinese and American, to see. We want to protect human
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16 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
rights and advance liberty. We want to counter the threat of
nuclear and missile proliferation. We want free and fair trade
that benefits both countries and the region.
Our ideals and values must be an essential part of our
engagement with China. We will fight against political repres-
sion and religious persecution. Yet political liberty is not easily
or long separated from economic freedom. As President Bush
pointed out at Yale University in June, no nation has yet
discovered a way to import the world's goods and services
while stopping foreign ideas at the border. It is in our interest
that the next generation in China be engaged by the Informa-
tion Age, not isolated from global trends shaping the future.
That is why we believe it is important to maintain China's
most-favored-nation trading status. MFN has been a critical
catalyst in the growth of our bilateral ties and in the overall
expansion of China's foreign trade during the 1980s to more
than $100 billion annually. MFN has also facilitated develop-
ment of a large market-oriented sector-in Guangdong prov-
ince it now exceeds the state sector. This engagement has led
to the integration of China's coastal provinces with Hong
Kong, Taiwan and the global economy.
Of course, if China is to become fully drawn into the world
economic system it must further deregulate its economy, adopt
the transparency needed to enter the GATT and protect foreign
intellectual property rights. Resolving these issues-and addi-
tional ones on our bilateral economic agenda, such as market
access and the export of prison-labor products-can only be
pursued through a policy of active engagement.
Finally, China's international role spans a growing range of
global and regional issues affecting our interests: from con-
cerns about missile and nuclear proliferation, to cooperation
in the gulf crisis, to resolving regional conflicts. This under-
scores the need for sustained engagement with China on issues
of common concern. Our recent experiences in working with
Beijing on the Cambodian peace process and in reducing
tensions on the Korean peninsula suggest that our engage-
ment can produce results.
In sum we need to recognize that China is in a time of
transition. An anachronistic regime has alienated us by lashing
out, by seeking to repress an irrepressible spirit. A return to
hostile confrontation will not help the people of China nor
serve our national interests. The only sensible course is to
move ahead with our agenda, secure improvements where
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17
possible and create the context for managing the change that
will come some day.
The U.S.S.R. in Asia
Any discussions of the future of the Asia-Pacific region
would be incomplete without mention of the Soviet Union and
Russia, which have interests in Asia as well as in Europe.
Increasingly we see the Russian Republic taking a more active
role in the Asia-Pacific region. And despite the turmoil in the
U.S.S.R, Moscow has been playing an increasingly positive role
in the region. Soviet cooperation on Cambodia and in the
Persian Gulf, as well as the normalization of relations with
South Korea, illustrate the potential for new forms of cooper-
ation on Asian issues between Washington and Moscow.
Yet Soviet forces in the Far East still remain large, and
market reforms that are the prerequisite for participation in
the Asian economic miracle have yet to be implemented in the
Soviet Union. No nation that spends 20 percent or more of its
GNP on the military can expect to compete economically in the
dynamic Asian region.
We welcome the growing interest in forging new economic
ties between Soviet Asia and the nations of the Pacific Rim.
The opening of Vladivostok, the establishment of a free trade
zone at Nakhodka and resolution of the Northern Territories
issue are important steps that can pave the way for greater
participation in the Asia-Pacific community. As Soviet market
reforms take shape, the potential for economic exchange with
the market-oriented economies of the Pacific Rim will un-
doubtedly grow. In this regard I am pleased to welcome Soviet
membership in the semi-official Pacific Economic Cooperation
Council.
VI
President Bush's trip to East Asia and the Pacific highlights
our hopes for the future of this promising region. Sustaining
American engagement in East Asia and the Pacific is vital to
U.S. interests-not just in the region, but to the international
system we are trying to forge. Our defense commitments
remain at the core of the Asia-Pacific security structure, but
they will evolve to reflect new circumstances and partnerships
based on the enhanced capabilities of our allies and friends.
Supporting democratic trends and helping to shape a frame-
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18 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
work for economic integration are key policy goals which will
enhance the sense of Asian-Pacific community.
Yet we cannot fully enter the future while still burdened by
legacies of the Cold War eΓa, particularly the military confron-
tation on the Korean peninsula and the dispute over the
Northern Territories. Moving from the Korean armistice to a
stable peace and advancing Soviet-Japanese bilateral ties to
make possible a peace treaty would be major steps in tran-
scending those legacies. Only when true peace comes to
Cambodia, when all the states of Indochina have normal
relations with the rest of the world, when Korea is unified on
terms acceptable to all Koreans and when the Northern
Territories are returned to Japan can we finally turn a new
page in the history of the Asia-Pacific region.
For the next millennium to be one of the Pacific, a strong
sense of community must emerge based on shared prosperity
and common values. The agenda and architecture I have
discussed here hold the promise of building that sense of
community. By accommodating Asia's diversity in security,
uniting around shared principles and interests, and forging
the economic ties that bind the region, our vision can be
realized and a new trans-Pacific partnership achieved.
ASIA SOCIETY CONTACTS
NSC Doug Paal x5746
Trade -- DOC
Christina Lucyk 377-5527 (China) ; Kevin Boyd (speechwriter for
Dr. Dustenberger 377-5853; Ed Leslie (Japan) 377-2425; Peter
Cashman, 377-5853
Asia Society (212) 288-6400 Heather Steliga Chen, Janet Gilman
Census Bureau, Vern Jarvis 514-2648 re immigration stats
Services of Mead Data Central, Inc.
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1ST STORY of Level 2 printed in FULL format.
Copyright 1991 American Demographics, Inc.
American Demographics
October, 1991
SECTION: Pg. 26
LENGTH: 3090 words
HEADLINE: We're All Minorities Now
BYLINE: by Martha Farnsworth Riche; Martha Farnsworth Riche is director of
policy studies at the Population Reference Bureau in Washington, D.C.
BODY:
* Racial and ethnic diversity increases the differences between urban, rural,
rich, and poor Americans. Children are most likely to be nonwhite or Hispanic,
but the aging of diversity will have profound effects on consumer markets in the
1990s. Businesses can respond by using consumer information to unite diverse
niches into profitable markets.
The United States is undergoing a new demographic transition: it is becoming
a multicultural society. During the 1990s, it will shift from a society
dominated by whites and rooted in Western culture to a world society
characterized by three large racial and ethnic minorities. All three minorities
will grow both in size and share, while the still-significant white majority
will continue its relative decline.
Whites represent eight in ten Americans, the 1990 census found, down from
nine in ten as recently as 1960. Subtract white Hispanics, and you discover
that only about three out of four Americans are non-Hispanic whites.
During the 1980s, the U.S. received 6 million legal immigrants, up from 4.2
million during the 1970s and 3.2 million during the 1960s. Few immigrants now
are of European origin. Immigrants also tend to have more children than the
non-Hispanic white population, as do Hispanics and blacks. Together, these two
factors are boosting the share of minorities in the population.
These trends are also creating diversity within the minority population.
According to the Census Bureau, the 1990 census missed 1 in 20 blacks and
Hispanics. Nevertheless, it gives an accurate picture of the rapid growth in
their numbers. In 1990, 12 percent of Americans identified themselves as black,
9 percent as Hispanic origin (some of whom are also black), 8 percent as Asian
or Pacific Islander, 1 percent Native Americans, and 4 percent "other.' The
first three groups will continue to grow faster than the white population. AS
each group grows, diversity within them will grow too.
These trends signal a transition to a multicultural society. If you count
men and women as separate groups, all Americans are now members of at least one
minority group. Without fully realizing it, we have left the time when the
nonwhite, non-Western part of our population could be expected to assimilate to
the dominant majority. In the future, the white Western majority will have to
do some assimilation of its own.
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Government will find that as minority groups grow in size relative to one
another, and as the minority population gains on the dwindling majority, no
single group will command the power to dictate solutions. The debate over
almost any public issue is likely to become more confrontational. Reaching a
consensus will require more cooperation than it has in the past.
The new demographic transition may be particularly difficult for business
because it parallels an equally momentous economic transition. As the economy
moves away from manufacturing and phys-ical skills and toward services and
knowledge skills, a real danger emerges. The economic transition is increasing
inequality in both incomes and opportunities. This inequality happens within
and across racial and ethnic groups, and it has the potential to polarize both
consumers and employees.
DIVERSITY DIFFERENCES
Immigration will add more Americans in the 1990s than it did in the 1980s, due
to legislation enacted in 1990. The Immigration and Naturalization Service
projects that legal immigration will exceed 700,000 per year starting in 1992.
That compares with 600,000 immigrants per year as recently as the late 1980s.
Illegal immigration will push the total even higher.
The 1990 law will also increase diversity among immigrants -- notably at the
upper end of the income scale. It allows people who have no family here to
immigrate if they have highly prized work skills, or if they are ready to make a
significant business investment. The law nearly tripled the number of visas (to
140,000 a year) for engineers and scientists, multinational executives and
managers, and other people with skills in demand. This includes 10,000 visas a
year for investor immigrants who will put at least $ 1 million into the economy
and create ten jobs. (The entrance fee drops to $ 500,000 in rural areas and
areas of high unemployment.)
Immigrants tend to join their peers, and their peers tend to live in large
coastal cities. California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey
are expected to get three of every four new immigrants, who will be joining
already-large minority populations in those states. In California, non-Hispanic
whites will become a minority within the next two decades.
Central cities are still the front line for processing immigrants into
society, and native-born minorities and older immigrants are also moving into
suburban areas. Asians are most likely to integrate into white suburbs.
Suburban blacks are still relatively segregated, according to research by
Richard D. Alba and John R. Logan of the State University of New York at Albany.
Hispanics fall somewhere in between.
These locational patterns ensure that multiculturalism will evolve unevenly
across the country. As a result, many states and cities will become
increasingly unlike the rest of the country.
Multiculturalism is not monolithic, either. The difference among Hispanic
subgroups has been well documented; Cuban Americans are an economic and
political dynasty in Miami, but no similar clout exists for Puerto Ricans in New
York or Chicanos in Texas and California. One-quarter of the Hispanic
population in 1990 was the product of immigration during the 1980s, if you
include the children of immigrants. And 43 percent of Hispanics are
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immigrants from the 1970s and 1980s, according to Jeffrey Passel and Barry
Edmonston of the Washington, D.C.-based Urban Institute.
Differences are even more pronounced in the fast-growing Asian American
population. Passel and Edmonston report that 43 percent of the Asian American
population in 1990 came from immigration during the 1980s, and 70 percent from
immigration during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1970, the Asian American
population was dominated by the Japanese. In 1980, the top group was the
Chinese. Thanks to new immigration, the 1990 census found the Filipino American
population had grown almost as large as the Chinese American population, and
both grew far beyond Americans of Japanese origin. Both the Asian Indian and
the Korean populations now rival the Japanese population in size.
Different patterns of childbearing also play a role in creating a more
diverse society. Fertility rates are still higher for minority groups than they
are for non-Hispanic whites. In 1988, Hispanic women had the highest rate, with
96 children per 1,000 women aged 15 to 44. Black women had a rate of 87 per
1,000, compared with 63 per 1,000 for white women. As a result, two-thirds of
minority families had children in 1990, compared with fewer than half on
non-Hispanic white families.
Hispanic and nonwhite women will still have higher fertility rates in the
1990s, primarily because they come from younger populations, according to
Juanita Tamayo Lott, president of a Washington, D.C. consulting firm. But these
rates should diminish as these populations age. Nonwhite and Hispanic fertility
rates should resemble white rates by the mid-21st century, she says.
The trend is clear. If current conditions continue, the United States will
become a nation with no racial or ethnic majority during the 21st century. This
may happen as early as 2060, according to demographer Leon Bouvier of the Center
for Immigration Studies.
THE AGING OF DIVERSITY
The engine driving the diversity trend is the relative youth of minority
populations. In 1988, non-Hispanic whites were older than any minority group,
with a median age of 31.4 years. Hispanics were the youngest, with a median age
of 24 years. Blacks were second youngest, at 25.6, while "other" races (mainly
Asians) had a median age of 27.
The median age is increasing for all racial and ethnic groups, but Hispanics
and blacks will remain younger than non-Hispanic whites. According to Census
Bureau projections, non-Hispanic whites will have a median age of 41.4 years in
2010. That's ten years older than the median age for blacks is 2010 (31.4
years) and 12 years older than for Hispanics (29.3). "Other" races will have a
median age of 35.6.
As a result, different age groups are becoming multicultural at different
rates. In 2000, 72 percent of Americans will be non-Hispanic white, according
to Decision Demographics, a Washington, D.C. consulting firm. But fewer than
two in three children will be non-Hispanic white. Non-Hispanic whites will
account for 63 percent of children under age 8, 65 percent of children aged 8 to
13, and 66 percent of children aged 14 to 17. In contrast, nearly 80 percent of
Americans aged 45 or older will be non-Hispanic white. Multicultural milestones
show up first in the youngest ages.
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These differences in the composition of age groups combine with differences
in life expectancy to make the elderly population disproportionately white.
However, with the notable exception of black men, the gap in life expectancy
between whites and nonwhites has been narrowing. All these trends will
eventually increase the multicultural character of the older population.
Multiculturalism is seeping into every aspect of American society, including
language. The battle to make English the official language of the United States
seems to have fizzled out, as Spanish-speaking Americans make it clear that they
intend to retain their native language. As a result, many English-speaking
Americans are discovering with a shock that they cannot communicate when
visiting certain sections of California, Florida, or Texas. Bilingual signs and
forms are becoming commonplace in many parts of the country.
Next spring, the Census Bureau will release the first data on "linguistically
isolated" households. These are households in which no member aged 5 or older
reported speaking English "very well." The numbers of such households did not
merit a separate tabulation in previous censuses. But the 1990 census found 23
million households that spoke a language other than English at home. It also
found 10 million households that had a less-than-adequate command of English.
These numbers will be considerably larger in the 1990 count, thanks to
immigration, according to Census Bureau demographer Paul Siegel.
Other factors are influencing the evolution of racial and ethnic identities.
More and more Americans are of mixed parent-age, and they are demanding to be
recognized as multiracial.
Communications technologies are also changing the way people identify with
their ethnic roots. For example, African films are gaining a significant
audience here, particularly among African Americans. VCRs, fax machines, and
other new technologies create important opportunities for cultural exchange in
both directions. At the same time, it reduces the impetus for immigrants to
assimilate into the "mainstream."
More than ever, the way for minorities to gain broader opportunities in
American society is to get a college education. But relative to whites, college
enrollment rates actually declined for blacks and Hispanics during the 1980s.
As educational attainment becomes increasingly important to individual
success, differences in educational attainment will produce sharply different
socioeconomic profiles for different racial and ethnic groups. This trend could
create a population polarized by both race and economic opportunity. Whites and
Asians could increasingly dominate high-income high-status occupations, leaving
blacks and Hispanics with low-income low-status occupations.
Even if employment discrimination suddenly ceased to exist, the lower
educational attainment of minorities would keep many of them from entering newly
opened doors. Poorly educated young black men are already shut out of the
broader society; nearly one in four of those aged 20 to 29 is behind bars or on
probation or parole.
As America participates increasingly in the world economy, business leaders
could use a multicultural work force as a powerful competitive edge. But the
opportunities will not be distributed equally among different racial and ethnic
groups. The challenge is to maximize our comparative advantage in the world
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economy while still offering upward mobility to all Americans.
Asian/
Pacific
American
other
white
black
Hispanic
Islander
Indian
races
0 to 9
74.8%
15.0%
12.6%
3.3%
1.1%
5.9%
10 to 19
75.1
15.1
11.6
3.3
1.1
5.9
20 to 29
77.3
13.1
11.5
3.3
0.8
5.5
30 to 39
79.9
12.0
8.9
3.3
0.8
4.0
40 to 49
82.9
10.4
7.1
3.1
0.7
2.9
50 to 59
84.4
10.1
6.4
2.6
0.6
2.3
60 to 69
87.4
8.8
4.8
1.9
0.5
1.5
70 to 79
89.3
7.9
3.5
1.4
0.4
0.9
80 or older
90.4
7.5
3.2
1.0
0.3
0.8
All ages
80.3
12.1
9.0
2.9
0.8
3.9
Note: Hispanics may be of any race: therefore, the percentages do not total to
100.
Source: 1990 census data
HOW BUSINESS CAN RESPOND
"The typical consumer-citizen of California in the late 1990s may be a
38-year-old professional who does Zen meditation. At home, she listens to
Celtic folk music because her grandparents were Scottish. But she spends her
vacations in northern Mexico to study Tarahumara culture, after picking up a
taste for ranchero music," says Paul Saffo, who follows technology for the
Institute for the Future in Menlo Park, California.
In a multicultural society, businesses thrive by finding common ground across
racial and ethnic groups. Businesses that try to target each group separately
will be stunted by prohibitive marketing costs. Others will meet this challenge
by helping multicultural consumers mix and match their lifestyles.
Multicultural consumers will take discrete cultural pieces and mix them into
custom-tailored wholes.
Another common need is information and entertainment that explains the world
to multicultural consumers from their point of view. Last year, a widely
publicized journalism study faulted young Americans for their ignorance of
important news figures and news events. But given their increasingly
multicultural nature, it's no surprise that today's youth had little interest or
knowledge in what was going on in Eastern Europe, but were up-to-the-minute on
developments in South Africa. * Consumer information and entertainment
businesses are going to have to reposition both their content and their
advertising to appeal to today's multicultural youth as they become tomorrow's
multicultural adults.
* See. "What's News with You," American Demographics, November 1990, page 2.
Education is a major common need. The educational establishment has not
adequately responded to the multicultural challenge, and that creates an
opportunity for business.
Communications technology is building a new common ground for an increasingly
multicultural population. We saw this during recent events in China and in
Eastern Europe. We are going to see more of it as technological evolution lets
our most recent arrivals keep close contact with their roots instead of
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7
1991 American Demographics, Inc., October, 1991
cutting them off.
These developments create new opportunities for consumer businesses that can
unlock culture from its origin and allow others to share in it. One example is
the Japanese adoption of the Wild West, as Tokyo executives import log cabins
from Montana and vacation on American dude ranches. As the world's first
multicultural society, the United States is uniquely positioned to both
understand and profit from the emerging global culture.
All this means that consumers are becoming simultaneously part of a global
culture and a local community. It also means that these ties are based on
common interests. Moreover, technology increasingly allows Americans to switch
readily and frequently from one viewpoint to another. The marketer's new
challenge is to find not only the right person with the right message but also
to find them at the right moment.
Some of those moments will be global moments, as everyone in the world
watches a soccer match, or a war. Some will be culturally specific moments, as
Muslims or other groups share a moment that is invisible to everyone else. Some
will be purely and simply local. But in every case, the common ground will be
interests, concerns, and lifestyles.
Without necessarily realizing it, businesses have been preparing to meet this
challenge by building detailed consumer information systems. Combined with
attitude and behavior research, these systems can efficiently unite niches into
markets. The systems' geographic specificity will extend marketing efficiency
by allowing marketers to pay attention to the geographic variations in
diversity.
For example, a Nissan television campaign featured a multicultural design
team engineering cars "for the human race." The tag line made sense nationally,
because it was broadly targeted image advertising. More directly targeted
messages have to identify their audiences more closely. An ad that takes a
multicultural society as a given is right for Los Angeles, but it might strike a
strange note in rural Indiana.
Retailers can use locally based information systems to efficiently target
specific demographic and market segments. Mark London is president and CEO of
Equity Properties in Chicago, a firm that remodels and re-leases shopping
centers whose trade areas have changed significantly. He recently analyzed an
anchor store that was doing badly in a repositioned Miami mall. The store
managers hadn't understood two crucial concepts. First, upscale Hispanic women
don't have the same fashion preferences as other upscale women. Second, they
don't have the same preferences as other Hispanic women. When the store learned
to feature upscale Hispanic fashions, sales rebounded.
On every dollar bill is the phrase E pluribus unum, "from diversity comes
unity." If this fundamental American belief can survive, our country will become
a microcosm of an increasingly interdependent world. America can still offer
hope to other countries, and to all of its citizens. But it can only work if we
meet the multicultural challenge.
GRAPHIC: Photo, no caption, JON REIS (PHOTOP ROBERT ACETO (HAND COLORING)
LEXISNEXIS'LEXIS NEXIS
Snow/Nix
Asia
Draft Three
November 11, 1991
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: THE ASIA SOCIETY
WALDORF-ASTORIA HOTEL
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1991
7:35 P.M.
Thank you very much, John [Whitehead]. John has served this
country with great distinction over the years, and it's great to
join him -- and his wife Nancy -- this evening. It's also a
pleasure to see Asia Society President Robert Oxnam, and vice
Chairman, Peter Aaron. To you, and to the distinguished men and
women in this audience, greetings --- and my thanks for this
opportunity to speak with you on topics of great concern to us
Called Callina
all.
5:08
As you know, I have just returned from Rome and the Hague.
worked
There, I worked and other Western leaders to build a post Cold-
War world characterized by mutual security, democracy, individual
liberty, free enterprise, and unfettered international trade. I
want to talk about those topics tonight, with the accent on Asia.
But first, for audiences here and in Asia, I think it's
important to discuss once again why I will not travel to the
region later this month. As President, I must serve the entire
nation in the domestic and foreign arenas. Sometimes those
obligations clash. When we planned our trip, Congress had
planned to adjourn early in this month. Now the members say they
2
will wrap up by November 22, but who knows? We will reschedule
the trip, but I will not leave while Congress is wrapping up a
session: It can commit too much mischief in times like that.
Frankly, I don't mind telling you that I just don't feel
comfortable leaving Congress home alone. //
Make no mistake, however: I will not turn my back on my
responsibility to do the nation's business here and abroad, and
in times of economic pain, I certainly will not give up an
opportunity to work with our allies to create new markets, new
jobs and new opportunities for American workers -- in
agriculture, in manufacturing and in service industries.
And I certainly will not permit us to retreat into a kind of
Fortress America, which will doom us to irrelevance and poverty.
The notion that we can separate domestic and foreign policy rests
upon the stubborn fantasy that we can live as an isolated island
surrounded by a changing and developing world. We tried
isolationism, and we ended up fighting two bloody world wars.
We tried economic isolationism -- protectionism -- and we
helped set off a worldwide depression. I remain deeply committed
to building closer ties with the Asia Pacific region. Although
much of our Nation's heritage comes from Europe, our future
points equally toward Asia.
Asia has transformed itself in the space of a generation
into the most rapidly growing region on the face of the earth.
Asia-Pacific nations enjoyed staggering real economic growth in
the decade of the Eighties: The Australian economy grew 41
3
percent; Japan's grew nearly 52 percent; Malaysia almost 60
percent; Hong Kong, 89 percent; Singapore, 93 percent; Taiwan,
116 percent and South Korea, 150 percent.
The Asia-Pacific region has become our largest and fastest
growing trade partner. We conduct more than 300 billion dollars
worth of two-way trade annually. Together, we generate nearly
half the world's GNP. American firms have invested more than 61
billion dollars in the region, and that figure will grow. Asians
have invested more than 95 billion dollars in the United States.
In everything from automobiles to microchips, from baseball to
Australian rules football, we grow closer each day.
A few years ago, it was fashionable to refer to the 20th
Century as the American Century and the 21st as the Pacific
Century, as if we were engaged in some long-term competition with
our Asian allies. I don't see it that way. The United States
will remain large and powerful, but in years to come, we will
deepen our partnership with our Asian friends in building
democracy and freedom.
We'd be here forever if I tried to tick off our interests
and activities, country-by-country. So instead I will address
the three central issues in our relationships with the nations of
the region: security, democracy, and trade.
In the area of security, Asia's variety has spawned a
diverse pattern of political and strategic cooperation. Our
custom-made agreements and relationships provide a strong
foundation for future security.
4
Let me give you a few examples of how we seek to build the
peace. The ASEAN Nations, Japan, Australia and the U.N. Security
Council's permanent members recently forged a Cambodian peace
process that promises free elections in a nation previously rent
by tyranny and genocide. Just yesterday, for the first time in
16 years, we sent an accredited diplomat to Cambodia, to
participate in the peacemaking arrangements.
The conflict in Indochina has preoccupied this nation for
years. Finally, we have entered into a period of healing and
constructive cooperation. We will work step-by-step to resolve
the painful issues left by that war. We envision normal
relations with Vietnam as the logical conclusion of a step-by-
step process that begins by resolving the problems in Cambodia
and by addressing thoroughly, openly and conclusively the status
of American POW-MIAs.
Today, I am happy to announce that we will upgrade our
relations with Laos, and that, we soon will place an ambassador
in Vientiane.
The Republic of Korea has moved to build better ties with
North Korea while boldly challenging the North to abandon its
menacing nuclear weapons program, which threatens regional peace.
We welcome recently organized efforts involving us, the
Japanese, Soviets, Chinese and Koreans to bring North Korea's
nuclear program under international supervision. Meanwhile, we
will maintain our conventional military presence in the South as
long as the people want or need us.
5
In laying the foundation for peace through our global
partnership, we have worked closely with Japan in the area of
foreign aid: we are the world's two foremost providers of such
aid. We also cooperate on development assistance, environmental
protection, trade, arms control, refugees and regional peace.
The Japanese have joined us in trying to lead the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe toward free enterprise. They support
more than 50,000 U.S. military forces in Japan with 3 billion
dollars in annual host nation contributions. Japan contributed
nearly 13 billion dollars to the multinational forces for the
Gulf War, 10 billion dollars of which went to the United States.
This required new taxes -- a very tough thing for any politician
to ask of working people -- but Japan deserves praise for
choosing the right course.
To the South, Australia casts a shadow far larger than its
population and size would suggest. It takes justifiable pride in
its long tradition of defending democracy, and its economic,
political and cultural presence helps unite the Asia-Pacific
region with the rest of the world.
We can help ensure future peace in the region and defend our
interests through a range of military arrangements. Bilateral
alliances, access agreements and Five-Power defense arrangements
give us the flexibility we need.
While we must adjust our force structure to reflect post-
Cold-War realities, we also must protect our interests and
allies. In this light, we cannot afford to ignore the important
6
sources of instability: in North Korea; in Burma, where socialist
despotism holds sway, despite the heroic efforts of freedom
fighters like Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi; in China and other
states that resist the worldwide movement toward political
pluralism -- and that sometimes support our adversaries, even by
contributing to the proliferation of dangerous weapons.
Fortunately, the key to future stability in the region lies
not with arms, but with ballots. Democracy has swept across Asia
-- with some notable exceptions, such as Burma, China, North
Korea, and Vietnam. Yet we remain engaged in the region, and
especially in China. If we retreat from the challenge of
building democracy, we will have failed many who have worked
hard, even died, for the cause.
The United States will support democracy wherever it can,
understanding that nations adopt political freedom in their own
ways, in manners consistent with their histories and cultures.
After decades of uncertainty, the future seems full of hope, and
even the intransigent few seem likely to join the rest of the
world in building a commonwealth of freedom.
This brings us to the third focal point, and a crucial
ingredient in a stable, free society: economic prosperity.
No nation can ignore the incredible vitality of this region
--- or afford to. Yes, we disagree on some important trade
issues, but we also recognize a more important fact: Our fates
and values have become linked forever.
7
Contrary to the opinions of American protectionists, free
trade requires efforts by all parties involved. Too often, trade
disputes bring out the worst in people. Japan-bashing has become
a minor sport in the United States, and some in Japan have become
equally scornful of the United States. Both our nations must
reject those who would rather seek scapegoats than tackle their
own problems. We've made a good start: The Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation Group encourages growth and trade. The Uruguay Round
of GATT talks remains the single most important vehicle for
advancing the cause of free trade and fending off the scourge of
protectionism. We call upon Japan and Korea to work with us in
breaking down old barriers to trade and opening up markets in
manufacturing, services and agriculture. Our Structural
Impediments Initiative talks have helped lower barriers to trade
and investment, but we need to give those talks new life and
create a better climate in Japan for U.S. businesses.
The fact is that Japan, which nearly half a century ago
became a focal point of American hatred, has become one of our
closest and most treasured allies. I enjoyed a warm and
constructive relationship working with Prime Minister Kaifu, and
I look forward to spending time with my old friend, Prime
Minister Miyazawa -- significantly, a man steeped in Western and
Eastern culture, and superbly equipped to build bridges of
culture and trade between our two great Nations.
Together, we can build an even more prosperous and
spectacular future -- but only if we take up the tough, rewarding
8
task of promoting worldwide economic liberty: no trade blocs; no
new trade barriers. We seek a vibrant international economic
system that unites markets on every continent.
We in the United States also must strengthen our economy.
We levy an unacceptably high effective tax rate on capital gains.
Germany levies no capital gains tax. The complicated Japanese
tax averages about 1 percent. This puts our own entrepreneurs
and venture capitalitsts at a huge and shameful disadvantage.
We run an enormous and growing budget deficit, which seems
to serve no greater purpose than to inflame political divisions
within our own country. We must take purposeful action to reduce
that deficit, while nourishing economic growth.
To compete internationally we must modernize our banking
industry and make our industrial base more competitive. We must
work with our allies to build a stable and sound monetary regime.
Perhaps most important, we must build human capital. We
have an obligation to prepare future generations for life in the
21st Century. The integrated global economy will demand more of
us than ever before, and our schools must meet that challenge.
Technological change can do much more than make our lives
more comfortable. It can sweep away totalitarianism and forge
the foundation for lasting liberty. We live in an age of
liberation technology, and no technology does more for the cause
of freedom than the means of mass communications. No wall is
high enough and no government sufficiently despotic to shut off
what some call a revolution of electrons. As we compete with our
9
allies in this area, we must remember that information feeds
intellect, and good information fosters freedom.
Let me close by summarizing our general approach to
relations with Asia. Our administration sees six keys to
promoting lasting peace in the Asia-Pacific region:
Progressive trade liberalization / Security cooperation /
A shared commitment to democracy and human rights / Educational
and scientific innovation / Respect for the environment / And an
appreciation of our distinct cultural heritages.
Americans have always looked to the horizons for their
destiny, even from our earliest days. We have grown great
because we have welcomed people from every continent and country,
and we have tried to make use of their distinct talents, while
constructing a common culture.
Today, we celebrate that diversity, and celebrate the
prospect that in years to come, we will develop with our Asian
friends even greater ties of trade and culture.
I look forward to traveling soon to Asia, to advance these
important principles, and to expand market opportunities for tens
of thousands of American workers and businesses. As President, I
will continue building ties with our allies, because those ties
mean peace at home and jobs for American men and women.
I want to thank the Asia Society for its vital contributions
to the cause of peace, prosperity and understanding. I look
forward to your help as I seek to build closer bonds of affection
10
and interest with the peoples of the vast, marvelous, varied
Asia-Pacific region.
Thank you. May God bless our Asian-Pacific friends and the
United States of America.
#
#
#
#
United States
Information
Agency
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
Washington, D.C. 20547
USIA
November 6, 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert A. Snow
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Communications and Director of
Speechwriting
FROM:
David I. Hitchcock DIH
Director
Office of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs
SUBJECT:
Public Affairs Background for the
President's Visit to East Asia
Greta Morris and I appreciated the opportunity to meet with you
and members of your staff last Monday to discuss the
President's upcoming visit to East Asia. As promised during
that meeting, I am enclosing the following background material
which may be useful to you and your colleagues in preparing the
President's public remarks:
1. A memo on the Public Affairs Aspects of the President's
Visit to East Asia which was originally sent to Richard Solomon
on September 20. The memo lists themes to be addressed in
public fora and program suggestions for the visits to Japan,
Korea and Australia.
2. A memorandum prepared by the Counselor for Public Affairs
of our embassy in Tokyo discussing public affairs issues for
the President's visit (especially the comments on page one).
3. Telegrams from our embassies in Seoul and Canberra
outlining public affairs themes and activities for the visit.
These cables and the Tokyo memo formed the basis of the
September 20 paper (item number 1) and provide additional
background.
4. A cable from our embassy in Singapore with themes and a
notional schedule for the President's visit.
5. A list of previous speakers, including Bob Hawke and Brian
Mulroney, in the Singapore Lecture Series which the President
is scheduled to address.
UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
RML 11/01/04
- 2 -
6. A cable from Manila suggesting that the President's remarks
at Pearl Harbor mention the attack on U.S. forces (including
Filipinos) in the Philippines which occurred the same day as
the attack on Pearl Harbor.
7. Some "local color" suggestions for the President's remarks
in Japan, including a Haiku by Japan's most famous, 17th
century poet, Basho.
8. A cable on East Asian perceptions of the U.S. as seen by
PAOs at our October regional conference in Singapore.
If you have questions on any of the enclosed material, or need
additional information, please do not hesitate to call me
(619-4829) or East Asia Policy Officer Greta Morris. We
welcome the opportunity to assist you on this important visit.
Despite the postponement of the President's trip we are sending
you these papers now, since they should eventually be useful to
your staff.
In addition here are two excellent opinion cables just in from
Seoul and Tokyo which may also be of interest to you.
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT