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Asia Research n.d. [OA 7566] [2]
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SECOND PROOF
Jusen &
JOBNAME: UPDATE PAGE: 1 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Thu Oct 24 13:36:31 1991
Copies
Charder
7bs1/303/team3/foreignaf/3184/baker
Paal
OCT 25 1991
Patiers.
FINAL
James A. Baker, III
FMI
PROOF
Dan
AMERICA IN ASIA:
EMERGING ARCHITECTURE FOR
A PACIFIC COMMUNITY
I
n Asia as in Europe we are in the midst of the first
transformation of the international system this century that is
not the direct result of global conflagration. This rare moment
presents us with new possibilities for reshaping international
relationships in Asia to meet the challenges of the post-Cold
War world.
President Bush's trip to East Asia marks a point in time
when disparate historical lines are intersecting: the commem-
oration of the fiftieth anniversary of the attack on Pearl
Harbor; the end of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation; and the
prospect of laying to rest the Vietnam War era. The end of
1991 should see the closing off of several tragic, defining
episodes of the American experience in Asia and open a new
chapter of U.S. engagement in the region as we approach the
21st century.
I have presented elsewhere the administration's ideas about
the new post-Cold War architecture of the Euro-Atlantic
community.¹ But America's destiny lies no less across the
Pacific than the Atlantic. We have fought three major wars
over the past half-century in the Asia-Pacific theater. U.S.
economic involvement and defense commitments in the region
have been-and remain-defining realities. We also have large
and growing interests in the human and material development
of the region, as well as in its security. Our success in forging
a new international system will require sustained engagement
in this diverse and dynamic part of the world, just as it does in
Europe and the Americas.
The global trends that are reshaping Europe and the Soviet
Union have also been at work in the Asia-Pacific region: the
'See James A. Baker. III, "A New Europe, A New Atlanticism: Architecture for 2 New
Era," speech to the Berlin Press Club, Dec. 12, 1989; and "The Euro-Atlantic Architecture:
From West to East," speech to the Aspen Institute. Berlin, Germany, June 18, 1991.
James A. Baker, III is Secretary of State.
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2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
bankruptcy of communism as an economic and political sys-
tem; a movement toward democracy and market-oriented
economics; global economic integration of markets for trade,
capital and information; and the emerging recognition that
transnational challenges in such areas as narcotics, the envi-
ronment and migration are important components of a com-
prehensive approach to security. At the same time the dark
countertrends that President Bush pointed to in his September
1991 speech to the U.N. General Assembly are also evident in
Asia: the reemergence of ethnic rivalries, nationalist aspira-
tions and territorial or political disputes which were sup-
pressed during the Cold War years.
II
These global factors for change are playing themselves out
in Asia amid the region's particular historical, cultural and
political circumstances. In contrast to central and eastern
Europe and the U.S.S.R., where change has been driven by the
failure of a system of political economy, much of the ferment
in Asia is a product of the region's unique and dramatic
economic success. Barely twenty years ago East Asia was
engulfed in war and great-power confrontation, burdened
with poverty and challenged by insurgent communist move-
ments. Our trade with the region in the early 1970s was less
than that with Latin America.
But the subsequent two decades brought unrivaled prog-
ress. Throughout the 1980s East Asia led the world in the
innovations of a new economic age. Japan emerged as an
economic superpower. New industrial economies of South
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore achieved rapid
high-technology growth. China opened economically. And the
Philippines, Korea and Taiwan each took strides toward
democracy. As a result the combined economies of East Asia
are now roughly equal in size to that of the United States.
International political developments have also contributed
to a more positive environment. These include the Sino-Soviet
rapprochement, the opening of Soviet relations with the
Republic of Korea, the admission to the United Nations of
both Korean states, the birth of a democratic Mongolia and a
political resolution of the Cambodia conflict based on a U.N.
settlement plan. The latter. if realized. will bring a new era of
peace to Indochina.
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AMERICA IN ASIA
3
For all the region's progress, however, some legacies of the
past could impede a promising future. The heavily armed
standoff on the Korean peninsula is still one of the world's
most dangerous flashpoints, a confrontation now intensified
by the ominous threat of nuclear proliferation. In Burma the
tyranny of a brutal military dictatorship endures, despite the
clear expression of popular will in the elections of 1990 for
civilian democratic government. China, along with the other
residual communist regimes in Asia, continues to resist dem-
ocratic political reform. And despite President Gorbachev's
historic visit to Tokyo last April, the dispute over Japan's
Northern Territories remains an impediment to a major
improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations.
These Asian realities-the elements of a promising future
and the difficult remnants of times past-now shape the
challenges before us. The successes of our policies and those of
our friends in the region mean that many of our partners have
also become robust economic competitors. Allies such as Ja-
pan, South Korea and Australia have become important
political and economic players in the emerging international
system.
Given the challenges and opportunities we now face in Asia,
a viable architecture for a stable and prosperous Pacific com-
munity needs to be founded on three pillars. First, we need a
framework for economic integration that will support an open
global trading system in order to sustain the region's economic
dynamism and avoid regional economic fragmentation. Sec-
ond, we must foster the trend toward democratization so as to
deepen the shared values that will reinforce a sense of com-
munity, enhance economic vitality and minimize prospects for
dictatorial adventures. Third, we need to define a renewed
defense structure for the Asia-Pacific theater that reflects the
region's diverse security concerns and mitigates intra-regional
fears and suspicions-a prerequisite for maintaining the sta-
bility required for continuing economic and political progress.
III
In formulating American policy toward the Asia-Pacific
region, we should recognize our historical and continuing
interests. Since 1784, when the merchant ship Empress of China
sailed for Canton from New York, the United States has
consistently pursued an open door approach to the Asia-
Pacific region. Our interest has resided in maintaining com-
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4 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
mercial access and preventing the rise of any single hegemonic
power or coalition hostile to the United States and its allies and
friends. In today's world a shared focus and the development
of an active partnership among the nations of the Pacific Rim
are essential to the success of the emerging global system.
The Asia-Pacific region is now America's largest trading
partner. America's trans-Pacific commerce is now more than
$300 billion in annual two-way trade-nearly one-third larger
than that across the Atlantic. The United States exports more
to Thailand than to the Soviet Union. more to Indonesia than
to central and eastern Europe and more to Singapore than to
Spain or Italy. Moreover, U.S. firms have invested more than
$61 billion in the region, with over $95 billion of Asian
investments in the United States.
Our closest bond to Asia is the growing number of Asian-
Americans, some seven million strong, who are America's
fastest growing group of immigrants. There are more Laotians
today in the United States than in the Laotian capital of
Vientiane; more Filipinos in California than in Cebu. These
people, along with hundreds of thousands of other Asian-
Americans-Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Cambodians,
Koreans, Thai and Samoans among them-enrich our society,
strengthen our engagement with the region and give us a
growing mutuality of interests in an emerging Asia-Pacific
community.
What has fostered stability and secured economic dynamism
in East Asia for the past four decades is a loose network of
bilateral alliances with the United States at its core. Our
military presence, our commitment, our reassurance has con-
stituted the balancing wheel of an informal, yet highly effec-
tive, security structure that emerged after World War II and
endured throughout the Cold War years.
To visualize the architecture of U.S. engagement in the
region, imagine a fan spread wide, with its base in North
America and radiating west across the Pacific. The central
support is the U.S.-Japan alliance, the key connection for the
security structure and the new Pacific partnership we are
seeking. To the north, one spoke represents our alliance with
the Republic of Korea. To the south, others extend to our
treaty allies-the Association of Southeast Asian (ASEAN) coun-
tries of the Philippines and Thailand. Further south a spoke
extends to Australia-an important, staunch economic, polit-
ical and security partner. Connecting these spokes is the fabric
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AMERICA IN ASIA
5
of shared economic interests now given form by the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process. Within this
construct, new political and economic relationships offer ad-
ditional support for a system of cooperative action by groups
of Pacific nations to address both residual problems and
emerging challenges.
This system has been successful precisely because its flexi-
bility has respected the vast geographic expanse, political and
cultural diversity, as well as the geopolitical realities of East
Asia and the Pacific. Unlike Europe there has been no single
threat commonly perceived throughout the region. Instead,
there is a multiplicity of security concerns that differ from
country to country and within the subregions of this vast area.
Today the overlay of U.S.-Soviet competition has been
removed from Asia, so the enduring diversity of regional
interests and security concerns stand out with even greater
clarity. What was a secondary aspect of our Cold War-era
security presence is becoming the primary rationale for our
defense engagement in the region: to provide geopolitical
balance, to be an honest broker, to reassure against uncer-
tainty.
Our forward-deployed military presence and bilateral de-
fense ties to Japan, South Korea, the allies within ASEAN and
Australia are widely accepted as the foundation of Asia's
security structure. Yet in the post-Cold War world, the en-
hanced capabilities of our allies and friends-and new security
challenges-require adjustments in our force structure, de-
fense activities and in the means of sustaining regional stabil-
ity.
Asian security increasingly is derived from a flexible, ad hoc
set of political and defense interactions. Multilateral ap-
proaches to security are slowly emerging. As we have seen in
the Cambodian peace process, the combined efforts of the
ASEAN countries, Japan, Australia and the U.N. Security Coun-
cil's Permanent Five have tailor-made a conflict-resolution
process. A semiofficial forum on the contested islands of the
South China Sea, hosted recently by Indonesia, also reflects
such an ad hoc, multilateral approach. Guaranteeing stability
on the Korean peninsula may increasingly assume a multilat-
eral form-a solution suited to the character of the problem.
At this stage of a new era we should be attentive to the
possibilities for such multilateral action without locking our-
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6 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
selves in to an overly structured approach. In the Asia-Pacific
community, form should follow function.
IV
While Asian security concerns have a diverse, decentralized
character, burgeoning intra- and trans-Pacific trade and in-
vestment provide areas of broad common interest. Commerce
offers the most natural approach to fostering greater regional
cohesion. This is why the United States and 11 other Pacific
basin economies came together two years ago to initiate the
APEC process. We see APEC as an important mechanism for
sustaining market-oriented growth, for advancing global and
regional trade liberalization and for meeting the new chal-
lenges of interdependence. The APEC agenda is expansive. It
includes, for example, assessment of regional needs in tele-
communications, human resource development, energy, trade
and investment, marine resources and tourism, among others.
APEC is as much the hallmark of American engagement in
the region as are U.S. security ties. Indeed, one could draw a
21st-century Pacific analogy from a nineteenth-century expe-
rience: the development of the American continent. As the
pattern of expansion and influence in the American West was
determined by the location of telegraph lines and railroads, so
the infrastructural links we are building across the Pacific in
areas such as telecommunications and transportation will
shape the economic and political character of the region and
our ties to it.
With the anticipated addition to APEC'S membership of
China, Hong Kong and Taiwan at November's third ministe-
rial meeting in Seoul, APEC'S potential as a major trans-Pacific
forum is becoming a reality. The efforts of APEC'S ten working
groups are laying a solid foundation of economic cooperation
on a broad range of issues.² APEC is ready to emerge as a key
forum that can forge the greater sense of Asia-Pacific commu-
nity needed to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War
world.
Let me also leave no doubt about what APEC is not: it is not
a regional economic bloc. To the contrary, it is a product
"APEC's ten working groups are: trade promotion. expansion of investment and technol-
ogy transfers, human resource development, regional energy cooperation. marine resource
conservation, telecommunications. transportation. data. tourism and fisheries. In addition
APEC has begun regional trade liberalization discussions.
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AMERICA IN ASIA
7
of-and catalyst for-economic integration and trade liberal-
ization. These developments will not cut off the Asia-Pacific
community from the rest of the globe. In fact, by stressing the
gains that have been made from open multilateral policies, and
by enhancing economic efficiency, APEC should help the Pacific
region contribute to a more open trading system. APEC'S
outlook is inclusive, not exclusive. APEC'S members include a
number of the great trading nations and offer excellent
investment opportunities. The intent of the APEC participants
is to overcome barriers and inefficiencies within the region
while working for a more open global system.
Similarly, the emerging North American Free Trade Area
will support both APEC and the global, multilateral systems for
trade and financial flows. Unlike a customs union, NAFTA will
not establish common barriers to those outside. Rather it will
lower barriers among its participants-a governmental re-
sponse to the accelerating economic integration already taking
place among neighbors. Heightened integration and efficiency
will increase the productivity of the U.S., Mexican and Cana-
dian economies. Growth will bring expanding markets for
Asian traders and investors, thus strengthening, not weaken-
ing, trans-Pacific economic links. Indeed, I believe Mexico
views the NAFTA as a vehicle for better integrating its formerly
autarkic economy into the global system; more efficient pat-
terns of trade and investment with the United States and
Canada will strengthen Mexico's ties with a competitive world
economy, not weaken them. This view is supported by Mexi-
co's recent membership in the Pacific Economic Cooperation
Council (PECC) and its interest in participating in both APEC
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment.
Of course the logic of regional integration is more widely
applicable. Indeed, Thailand's proposal for an ASEAN free
trade area is a welcome initiative that could strengthen ASEAN
and, by stimulating ASEAN growth, also reinforce U.S.-ASEAN
economic relations.
The economic future of the United States depends on
strong ties with all the regions of the world. As a nation
generating some 24 percent of the world's GNP, we cannot
operate effectively or efficiently through any other strategy.
This is why the United States has demonstrated an unwavering
commitment to advancing the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) through the Uruguay Round. It is also why
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8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
we are seeking to complement that effort through a network of
initiatives designed to reduce market barriers and support a
more open, competitive and growth-oriented system. The
NAFTA, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the U.S.-
European Community declaration, our trade enhancement
initiative for the emerging central and east European democ-
racies, our agreements with ASEAN and APEC each reflect our
customized attempts to reach out to all major markets, not to
exclude any of them.
Each initiative is tailored to meet special circumstances and
to maintain momentum for liberalization by pressing forward
simultaneously on a large number of fronts. Our logic is that
gains from increasing trade and investment are not calculated
according to any zero-sum formula-instead, greater compe-
tition leads to efficiencies and growth that benefit the system as
a whole. This is a logic that will profit the dynamic economies
of Asia, especially if they join with us to reduce barriers that
threaten political support for a liberalized global trading
system.
The natural partner of market-oriented economics is polit-
ical pluralism. The public accountability that is the hallmark of
democratic political systems is also the best check against
tyranny and aggression. As the history of the past two centu-
ries demonstrates, democratic nations rarely engage in armed
conflict against each other. Not long ago some argued that
democratic politics were unsuited to Asian cultures and tradi-
tions. Yet the political developments of the past decade in the
Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan demonstrate that eco-
nomic growth naturally tends to promote democratization.
Perhaps most remarkably, the powerful appeal of the dem-
ocratic ideal is evident in Mongolia's rejection of its Leninist
past and its turn to political pluralism and economic reform.
Once the oldest communist government in Asia, Mongolia is
the first Asian communist state to purposefully undertake the
challenge of a democratic transition.
In sharp contrast, the democratic ideal has been brutally
thwarted in Burma. The socialist military regime, by suppress-
ing the results of its own 1990 election, has betrayed the
people in their quest for representative government. This
denial of the expressed will of the Burmese people will leave
Burma mired in isolation and stagnation until the military
leadership reverses its repressive policies and transfers author-
ity to the elected civilian leaders of the country. The awarding
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AMERICA IN ASIA
9
of this year's Nobel Peace Prize to Aung San Suu Kyi will give
the Burmese people hope that the world is not ignoring their
plight.
China, Vietnam and Laos have embarked on a course of
market-oriented economic reform while retaining a Leninist
monopoly of political power. But economic reform can be
sustained only when it is accompanied by political reform. The
tragic violence at Tiananmen Square in 1989 was a reflection
of the social and political pressures generated by a decade of
rapid economic expansion unaccompanied by concurrent po-
litical transformation.
Democratic reform in China and Vietnam, as well as in
North Korea, would have a major impact on the character of
international relations in Asia. As generational change unfolds
in all three of what might be called "Confucian-Leninist"
societies, the interplay between economic expansion and the
striving for political reform can only become more pro-
nounced.
V
Our ability to help realize the economic and security archi-
tecture of the Asia-Pacific community we envisage will rest in
no small measure on the successful management of a number
of critical relationships with our allies, friends and regional
groups. Our ties with Japan, South Korea, ASEAN and Australia
are the stabilizing and strengthening spokes in the fan.
U.S.-Japan Relations
The keystone of our engagement in East Asia and the Pacific
is our relationship with Japan. Nothing is more basic to the
prosperity and security of the region, and indeed to the
effectiveness of the post-Cold War system, than a harmonious
and productive U.S.-Japan relationship.
But U.S.-Japan relations have changed profoundly over the
past decade. Our dealings have become more equal, and their
form and substance must now be adjusted to reflect this reality
if we are in address the sources nf tension. I see four basic,
interrelated elements as necessary to accomplish this adjust-
ment.
First, the foundation of our relationship-the U.S.-Japan
security alliance-must be strengthened. We have been
pleased with our growing security cooperation with Japan.
Japan is continuing to progress toward fulfilling our agreed-
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10 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
upon division of defense roles and missions. Japan's ability to
secure its air and sea lanes out to 1,000 miles from its shores,
the growing interoperability and joint training of our forces-
along with generous host nation support, which will increase to
73 percent of the non-salary costs for our forward-deployed
forces-are a major contribution to the stability of the region.
One area which requires greater cooperation, however, is the
goal of a more balanced two-way flow of defense-related
technology, as codified by our 1983 Memorandum of Under-
standing.
Second, we must work to reduce the economic tensions in
our increasingly interdependent relationship. The $140 billion
in annual two-way trade, the investment and the burgeoning
network of private sector linkages between the world's two
largest and most technologically advanced economies under-
score the importance of this aspect of our relations.
A solid, balanced economic foundation, with open markets
on both sides. is needed if we are to sustain and advance our
partnership-one now of truly global dimensions. This re-
quires greater market-opening efforts by Japan, a more com-
petitive U.S. economy and an intensification of the detailed
economic dialogue we have begun in the Structural Impedi-
ments Initiative. Removing the impediments to external ad-
justment and building more balanced economic ties-thus
creating fair opportunities for traders and investors-are
essential to the new harmony we seek.
The SII talks could assume a particularly important role in
this process of economic adjustment. Two nations, recognizing
the extensive interconnection of their respective economies,
have agreed to analyze and pursue microeconomic adjust-
ments in order to harmonize an economic relationship vital to
each other and to global economic growth. This makes the SII
a microeconomic complement to the Group of Seven leading
industrialized nations (G-7), which is designed to improve the
coordination of macroeconomic policies among highly inter-
dependent economies.
For its part, the United States is enhancing its competitive-
ness, as is evident in an 87 percent increase in its exports to
Japan since 1987. This export expansion reflects, in part,
Japan's removal of structural barriers to market access for
goods, services and investment. But many aspects of the
Japanese economy are still constricted by exclusionary busi-
ness practices, to the detriment of new players in the market-
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AMERICA IN ASIA
11
place-both foreign and Japanese-and of the Japanese con-
sumer. And at home we still have much work to do-from
further reducing the cost of capital to American business to
encouraging more aggressive marketing of U.S. products
abroad-if we are to carry out our part of the SII equation.
Third, we must fulfill the promise of the global partnership
called for by the president at the Palm Springs summit last
year. As democracies and market-oriented economies that
together generate nearly 40 percent of the world's GNP, the
United States and Japan have the potential to marshal unri-
valed resources in support of a better future-if our foreign
policies are effectively coordinated. On issues from the Uru-
guay Round to reform in central and eastern Europe, from
preserving the environment to Third World debt relief, we
must engage together globally.
For the international system to work, leading powers must
lead. This is the lesson we learned from our own reluctance to
play an active role in world affairs in the period between the
two world wars. This is why today we seek to build a global
partnership with Japan-with Tokyo assuming a greater lead-
ership role in a system from which it derives significant
benefits. Our broadly convergent interests have already led us
to pursue similar policies on many issues. We are committed to
developing better consultative mechanisms in order to give
greater synergy to our foreign policies.
Finally, we must deepen our understanding of each other's
culture. Japanese youth must be introduced to more about
American life and values. Fast-food, rock and rap music and
Hollywood style are one image we project in the modern
world, but America has much else to offer. Similarly, more
Americans must gain knowledge of, and appreciation for,
Japan's rich history and traditions-in particular, they should
learn the Japanese language. The recently created Abe Fund
offers one important opportunity to expand a host of ex-
changes and interactions-intellectual, scientific, cultural and
people-to-people-needed to deepen our mutual appreciation
and ability to work together.
U.S.-Korean Relations
Another pillar of our engagement in the Pacific is our
alliance with the Republic of Korea. South Korea's economic
and political achievements rival those of Japan. Economically
the R.O.K. has converted itself from a poor agricultural society
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12 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1990
devastated by the war into the world's thirteenth largest
Chandbork Formstical
economy. Its industry is now on the cutting edge of high-tech
growth. Within a generation South Korea's per-capita income
has trebled. And its success in building democratic institutions
and the accomplishments of Nordpolitik in forging new inter-
national relationships underscore the significance of our firm
support for the R.O.K. over the past four decades.
South Korea's dynamism helps us meet the challenge of
transforming what has been primarily a military alliance into a
more equal political, defense and economic partnership. This
is the logic of the U.S. force restructuring now under way, of
Seoul's increased support of our defense presence there, of
our economic dialogue and enhanced political consultations.
South Korea's success is all the more remarkable as it has
been achieved in the face of unrelenting military and political
confrontation with North Korea. Indeed the very real danger
of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula is now the
number one threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific community.
North Korea's repeated failure to meet its international
obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty-
requiring it to implement full-scope International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards inspection of its nuclear facilities—
has raised serious questions about its intentions. Widespread
suspicions about a nuclear weapons program cannot enhance
North Korea's security. President Bush's recent initiative in
withdrawing worldwide U.S. tactical nuclear weapons renders
Pyongyang's preconditions for fulfilling its NPT obligations
more specious than ever.
Yet, as important as the NPT regime is, we have seen in the
case of Iraq that even IAEA safeguards cannot ensure that a
maverick regime will not seek to acquire a nuclear weapons
capability. The only firm assurance against nuclear prolifera-
tion in Korea is a credible agreement by both Seoul and
Pyongyang to abstain from the production or acquisition of
any weapons-grade nuclear material on the Korean peninsula.
The key to reducing tensions on the peninsula-and ulti-
mately to the reunification of Korea-is an active North-South
dialogue. The Koreans themselves must traverse the road to
peace and reunification. President Roh Tae Woo's initiatives to
advance the free flow of trade, people and communications
between North and South are important steps in this direction.
For real progress to occur, a climate of trust and confidence
must he estahlished. The recent admission nf both Koreas to
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AMERICA IN ASIA
13
the United Nations and the ongoing prime ministerial talks are
hopeful signs that the last glacier of the Cold War in Asia is at
last beginning to melt. For our part, we are prepared to
enhance our dealings with Pyongyang as the Democratic
People's Republic meets its responsibilities as a global citizen.
There is potential for European-style confidence-building
measures and, ultimately, Conventional-Forces-in-Europe-
type arms reduction on the Korean peninsula. As in Europe,
large and heavily armed ground forces confront each other
across a clearly demarcated demilitarized zone. Korea is a
place in East Asia where arms control initiatives seem partic-
ularly timely.
The process of reconciliation and, eventually, reunification
on the Korean peninsula need to be based on Korean initia-
tives; yet the four major powers-the United States, Soviet
Union, China and Japan-have important interests that inter-
sect there. As the North-South dialogue progresses, we will
formula
explore the possibilities for aforum for the two Koreas and the
four major powers in Northeast Asia that will support the
dialogue, help in the easing of tensions, facilitate discussion of
common security concerns and possibly guarantee outcomes
negotiated between the two Koreas.
U.S.Southeast Asian Relations
Our relations with the countries of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations are at the core of our engagement in
this dynamic subregion. Over the last fifteen years, we have
built an impressive structure of economic, political and secur-
ity cooperation with our ASEAN colleagues. Indeed, just fifteen
years ago many feared that countries such as Thailand, Ma-
laysia and Indonesia would become "dominoes" in a commu-
nist assault on Southeast Asia. Today the talented, industrious
people and market-oriented economies of the ASEAN states are
setting global standards for development.
ASEAN today is America's fifth largest trading partner, rival-
ing U.S. commerce with Germany; and America is ASEAN'S
largest export market. ASEAN was a leader in launching the
Uruguay Round of the GATT, and we look to ASEAN for support
in successfully completing the current negotiations. We have
worked hard to keep ASEAN at the core of our efforts at
regional economic integration, and we will continue to do so.
In the political realm a decade of cooperative efforts with
ASEAN has led to the successful conclusion of a comprehensive
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14 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
agreement to end the conflict in Cambodia. In the wake of the
Paris Conference we look to the building-under U.N. auspic-
es-of a just and durable peace in Cambodia. This should
make possible a new era in Southeast Asia, including the
integration of Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos into the main-
stream of the region.
The culmination of the Cambodian peace process-free and
fair elections, the installation of a legitimate government in
Phnom Penh, along with substantial resolution of our POW/MIA
concerns-will finally provide a durable basis for the United
States to normalize relations with Vietnam, Cambodia and
Laos.
Two of ASEAN'S members, the Philippines and Thailand, are
also bilateral treaty allies. Today there is much uncertainty
about the future of our military presence in the Philippines. I
want to emphasize two points in. this regard: our overriding
concern is to sustain good relations with a democratic and
economically resurgent Philippines. And second, regardless of
the future of our military presence at Subic Bay, our security
engagement in Southeast Asia will remain undiminished, even
if realized through other arrangements.
We are exploring ways to enhance defense cooperation with
our friends throughout the subregion in order to sustain an
adequate security presence on a more diversified basis. The
base-access agreement reached earlier this year with Singapore
is a reflection of our commitment to sustaining a defense
capability in Southeast Asia-as well as of the region's wide-
spread desire for an active U.S. security presence.
U.S. Australian Relations
Australia is the southernmost spoke in the fan I described
earlier, serving as the southern anchor for our links across the
Pacific. Moreover, Australia is a bridge between Southeast Asia
and the South Pacific island states. Canberra's activism in both
global and regional affairs-from efforts to rid the world of
chemical weapons to elimination of agricultural subsidies via
the Cairns group in the GATT-demonstrates its importance as
an ally. In its contributions to the Cambodian peace process,
and in its role of honest broker and catalyst for development in
the South Pacific, Australia plays a vital part in regional affairs.
In addition, Canberra has been an important bridge to New
Zealand, as we have sought to encourage policy changes in
Wellington that will make possible a reactivation of the ANZUS
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AMERICA IN ASIA
15
alliance. President Bush's nuclear disarmament initiative has
created a favorable context that we hope will elicit a positive
response from New Zealand.
China
The tragic violence at Tiananmen Square in the summer of
1989 shattered the bipartisan consensus in the United States-
carefully constructed over two decades by five administra-
tions-for engagement with China. Rebuilding that consensus
is in our national interest, but it is proving to be a daunting
task.
Looking back over more than 150 years of American con-
tacts with China-since the time of the first missionaries and
traders-our views of China have oscillated between extremes
of fascination and confrontation. Indeed the influence of the
missionary experience in China-evident in the work of nov-
elists, scholars and diplomats-has shaped our romantic per-
ception of this land and its people. We have admired China's
exotic culture and its hard-working and long-suffering people.
When the Chinese seemed to adopt our principles-either
religious or secular-we enthusiastically welcomed them into
the fold. But when periodic upheavals led to disappointment
and frequently bloodshed, Americans felt the anger of rejec-
tion-of a conversion that failed.
Even in recent years, no foreign event seemed to capture the
American public's interest and excitement more than the
effort in the 1980s to reform China's Soviet-style economy and
to open up the country to the modern world. And then,
overnight, our hopes for a new, democratic China turned to
revulsion at the sight of tanks crushing unarmed students. The
subsequent advance of political reform in the Soviet Union has
made China's setback all the more poignant.
We cannot forget those who were halted by a backlash of
fear, but we will not help the eventual success of their cause by
again turning our backs on China. The pendulum of U.S.
relations with China must stop its sharp swings. China is home
for almost a quarter of mankind. We cannot simply wish away
their problems.
That is why President Bush has pursued a policy of engage-
ment toward the People's Republic. We can eventually solve
our problems with China only if we maintain the ability to
make our case to the Chinese. Our agenda is open for all,
Chinese and American, to see. We want to protect human
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16 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
rights and advance liberty. We want to counter the threat of
nuclear and missile proliferation. We want free and fair trade
that benefits both countries and the region.
Our ideals and values must be an essential part of our
engagement with China. We will fight against political repres-
sion and religious persecution. Yet political liberty is not easily
or long separated from economic freedom. As President Bush
pointed out at Yale University in June, no nation has yet
discovered a way to import the world's goods and services
while stopping foreign ideas at the border. It is in our interest
that the next generation in China be engaged by the Informa-
tion Age, not isolated from global trends shaping the future.
That is why we believe it is important to maintain China's
most-favored-nation trading status. MFN has been a critical
catalyst in the growth of our bilateral ties and in the overall
expansion of China's foreign trade during the 1980s to more
than $100 billion annually. MFN has also facilitated develop-
ment of a large market-oriented sector-in Guangdong prov-
ince it now exceeds the state sector. This engagement has led
to the integration of China's coastal provinces with Hong
Kong, Taiwan and the global economy.
Of course, if China is to become fully drawn into the world
economic system it must further deregulate its economy, adopt
the transparency needed to enter the GATT and protect foreign
intellectual property rights. Resolving these issues-and addi-
tional ones on our bilateral economic agenda, such as market
access and the export of prison-labor products-can only be
pursued through a policy of active engagement.
Finally, China's international role spans a growing range of
global and regional issues affecting our interests: from con-
cerns about missile and nuclear proliferation, to cooperation
in the gulf crisis, to resolving regional conflicts. This under-
scores the need for sustained engagement with China on issues
of common concern. Our recent experiences in working with
Beijing on the Cambodian peace process and in reducing
tensions on the Korean peninsula suggest that our engage-
ment can produce results.
In sum we need to recognize that China is in a time of
transition. An anachronistic regime has alienated us by lashing
out, by seeking to repress an irrepressible spirit. A return to
hostile confrontation will not help the people of China nor
serve our national interests. The only sensible course is to
move ahead with our agenda, secure improvements where
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AMERICA IN ASIA
17
possible and create the context for managing the change that
will come some day.
The U.S.S.R. in Asia
Any discussions of the future of the Asia-Pacific region
would be incomplete without mention of the Soviet Union and
Russia, which have interests in Asia as well as in Europe.
Increasingly we see the Russian Republic taking a more active
role in the Asia-Pacific region. And despite the turmoil in the
U.S.S.R, Moscow has been playing an increasingly positive role
in the region. Soviet cooperation on Cambodia and in the
Persian Gulf, as well as the normalization of relations with
South Korea, illustrate the potential for new forms of cooper-
ation on Asian issues between Washington and Moscow.
Yet Soviet forces in the Far East still remain large, and
market reforms that are the prerequisite for participation in
the Asian economic miracle have yet to be implemented in the
Soviet Union. No nation that spends 20 percent or more of its
GNP on the military can expect to compete economically in the
dynamic Asian region.
We welcome the growing interest in forging new economic
ties between Soviet Asia and the nations of the Pacific Rim.
The opening of Vladivostok, the establishment of a free trade
zone at Nakhodka and resolution of the Northern Territories
issue are important steps that can pave the way for greater
participation in the Asia-Pacific community. As Soviet market
reforms take shape, the potential for economic exchange with
the market-oriented economies of the Pacific Rim will un-
doubtedly grow. In this regard I am pleased to welcome Soviet
membership in the semi-official Pacific Economic Cooperation
Council.
VI
President Bush's trip to East Asia and the Pacific highlights
our hopes for the future of this promising region. Sustaining
American engagement in East Asia and the Pacific is vital to
U.S. interests-not just in the region, but to the international
system we are trying to forge. Our defense commitments
remain at the core of the Asia-Pacific security structure, but
they will evolve to reflect new circumstances and partnerships
based on the enhanced capabilities of our allies and friends.
Supporting democratic trends and helping to shape a frame-
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18 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
work for economic integration are key policy goals which will
enhance the sense of Asian-Pacific community.
Yet we cannot fully enter the future while still burdened by
legacies of the Cold War era, particularly the military confron-
tation on the Korean peninsula and the dispute over the
Northern Territories. Moving from the Korean armistice to a
stable peace and advancing Soviet-Japanese bilateral ties to
make possible a peace treaty would be major steps in tran-
scending those legacies. Only when true peace comes to
Cambodia, when all the states of Indochina have normal
relations with the rest of the world, when Korea is unified on
terms acceptable to all Koreans and when the Northern
Territories are returned to Japan can we finally turn a new
page in the history of the Asia-Pacific region.
For the next millennium to be one of the Pacific, a strong
sense of community must emerge based on shared prosperity
and common values. The agenda and architecture I have
discussed here hold the promise of building that sense of
community. By accommodating Asia's diversity in security,
uniting around shared principles and interests, and forging
the economic ties that bind the region, our vision can be
realized and a new trans-Pacific partnership achieved.
Robert A. Scalapino
roals which will
THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA:
ill burdened by
ilitary confron-
FUTURE PROSPECTS
spute over the
n armistice to a
bilateral ties to
Th
steps in tran-
he Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ushered in a new era
eace comes to
of U.S. involvement in Asia. In the past lay hearty merchant-
have normal
voyagers, missionaries and assorted diplomats. Only in the
a is unified on
Philippines, however, had Americans become deeply involved
the Northern
in an Asian society, and even there colonial governance was in
illy turn a new
the hands of a relative few. For the average American, Asia
signified exotica-a distant region wholly foreign and to many,
acific, a strong
slightly ominous.
red prosperity
In the years since 1941, however, massive American military
lecture I have
involvement was to be followed by diverse efforts at political
that sense of
tutelage, extensive cultural exchange and a level of economic
ty in security,
and financial intercourse that was eventually to make the
i, and forging
Pacific-Asian region more critical to the American economy
vision can be
than Europe.
hieved.
Millions of Americans acquired a personal knowledge of
certain parts of Asia. In addition a growing Asian population
in the United States has begun to influence American society
in a variety of ways as the century draws to a close. Thus, just
as victory in war extended the United States further into the
Pacific, so that victory bound America to Asia in ways that
could not possibly have been foreseen on that fateful day of
December 7, 1941.
II
To understand where the United States stands today and
what future prospects exist for U.S. relations with Asia, one
must first comprehend the enormous changes that are taking
place throughout this vast region.
First, note the geopolitical transformation. At the close of
World War II the Eurasian heartland was strong, its periph-
eries weak. Although deeply wounded by that war, the Soviet
Union had the strength and will to build a buffer-state system
to the West and, in alliance with the newly victorious commu-
Robert A. Scalapino is Robson Research Professor of Government
Emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley.
20 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
nists in China, to project communist power to the edges of the
Asian mainland. Western Europe and the peripheral regions
of Asia, including Japan, on the other hand, were weak, either
crippled by the war or emerging from lengthy colonialism.
Only substantial American military and economic assistance
provided the key peripheral societies with an opportunity for
renewal.
Today the situation is precisely reversed. The Eurasian
heartland is in the throes of crisis, with the Soviet Union in the
process of dismemberment and China-especially interior
China-facing a host of complex problems that affect its
cohesion and power. For the present at least, China has only a
limited capacity for external involvements. The other Leninist
states remaining on the Asian continent are in similar or worse
condition. But the Eurasian peripheries are generally strong,
with western Europe demonstrating a new dynamism and the
market economies of East Asia led by Japan providing models
for the developing world. The implications of this great
transformation of power and authority in Eurasia for Ameri-
can attitudes and policy have yet to be fully grasped.
Second, to an unprecedented extent, economics has taken
command of international relations. This was not always true.
At the close of the Second World War, politics was generally
paramount, especially in Asia, with revolutionary leaders seek-
ing to build or rebuild nations by mobilizing their people
through ideological appeals. They gave lip service to develop-
ment, but their priorities were political. Today, however, even
Leninist states are forced to concentrate on economic reform
in an effort to compete with others.
Leaders everywhere are coming to the realization that the
economic health of their society is critical not only to internal
stability but to external influence. Moreover the rapid growth
of economic interdependence has linked domestic and foreign
policy together more closely than at any time in history. A
nation's domestic policies, in both the economic and political
realms, directly impact other countries, and hence are a matter
of legitimate concern to a much greater extent than in the past.
This is the basic rationale for the U.S.-Japanese Structural
Impediments Initiative (SII), in which each side proposes
internal changes to make economic relations more harmoni-
ous.
Issues of interdependence are becoming increasingly com-
plex. Throughout Asia, for example, natural economic terri-
THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA
21
the edges of the
tories (NETS) are being formed, often cutting across political
ripheral regions
lines. Sometimes they are the result of governmental promo-
vere weak, either
tion; sometimes they evolve largely because of private sector
thy colonialism.
initiatives; often a combination is involved. In any case, they
nomic assistance
are becoming significant in both political and economic terms.
opportunity for
One NET encompasses the Guangdong province of southern
China, Hong Kong and Taiwan; another that is emerging
The Eurasian
includes China's Shantung province and South Korea. It is
iet Union in the
likely that within a few years a Sakhalin-Kuriles-northern
secially interior
Japan NET will emerge, and in the Sea of Japan closer ties are
that affect its
forming between the Siberian ports of Vladivostok and Na-
China has only a
khodka and regions such as Niigata in west Japan. In South-
e other Leninist
east Asia discussions are under way toward establishing a NET
similar or worse
to include Singapore, Johore (Malaysia) and Batam island
enerally strong,
(Indonesia). The relationship between NETS and the political
amism and the
entities called nation-states, along with the massive financial
oviding models
transactions that flow across borders daily and the more
of this great
formal large-scale economic regions now being formed, forces
asia for Ameri-
one to evaluate the growing limitations upon national sover-
asped.
eignty and its implications for an international order as this
nics has taken
decade advances.
ot always true.
Naturally the ascendancy of economics has colored domestic
was generally
politics in Asian countries as elsewhere. If one defines ideology
y leaders seek-
as a universally applicable theory-a set of cosmic ideas and
their people
values that provide a comprehensive guide to thought and
ce to develop-
action-it has declined in the face of the pragmatic impulses
however, even
stemming from economic primacy. This has posed an acute
nomic reform
problem for all political systems. Asia's remaining socialist
leaders are downplaying-or completely jettisoning-
ation that the
Marxism-Leninism in favor of resorting to nationalist appeals
ily to internal
in an effort to bolster faith in a system in trouble. Considering
rapid growth
the original Marxist appeal to the brotherhood of the global
C and foreign
proletariat, it is a supreme irony that the remaining Leninists
in history. A
now concentrate on nationalist appeals while economics is
and political
driving the democratic societies-sometimes reluctantly-to
: are a matter
internationalism.
in in the past.
But in politically open Asian societies, as in the Western
se Structural
democracies, enduring political values are also in jeopardy.
de proposes
Can liberalism encompass responsibilities as well as rights? Can
ore harmoni-
it preserve both the community and individual interests in an
age when materialism and hedonism seem to reign supreme?
asingly com-
In any case, whatever its political form, a government today
nomic terri-
must depend upon performance, not faith, to sustain its
22 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
legitimacy. Despite efforts at intensive indoctrination in certain
socialist societies, increasingly the average citizen is asking the
government, "What have you done for me?" often adding the
word "lately."
Political leaders, and not just old Marxists, have turned to
the nationalist appeal as a substitute of sorts for a more
comprehensive ideological faith. Imbedded in Asian national-
ism are certain traditional feelings that can be revitalized,
including antiforeign sentiments. When the contemporary
conservative Chinese leaders warn citizens against foreign
forces that would subvert Chinese socialism by infiltrating the
society using the technique of "peaceful evolution," they hope
to strike a responsive chord among a people that have period-
ically struck out against those external forces that earlier
penetrated China in one form or another. When North
Korean leaders speak of socialism under juche (self-reliance),
with "iron-clad unity around one leader, one party, one
nation," they are making a traditional appeal to people that
have lived in a country once known as "the hermit kingdom."
Nationalism, however, is also a natural reaction in demo-
cratic societies when external economic forces seem to repre-
sent the new threat. In an incredibly short space of time,
societies coming from different traditions, at different stages
of development and pursuing different economic strategies
have been thrust together economically. Friction is inevitable,
and with only rudimentary instruments of economic conflict-
resolution, a political response based on themes such as a
"foreign threat" or "foreign pressure" may find a receptive
audience. Recent public opinion polls in South Korea, for
example, show that the principal reason for the growth of
anti-Americanism there comes not from the political left, but
from those in agriculture and business who believe that the
United States applies undue pressure to obtain a swifter
movement away from Seoul's neo-mercantilist policies.
Despite its resurgence, however, nationalism faces strongly
competitive forces. On the one hand, there are growing
pressures from below due to the rise of problems connected
with the advanced stages of industrialization and the renewed
vitality of ethnic and religious cleavages; on the other hand,
pressures from above are steadily mounting in the form of
internationalist imperatives due to economic interdependence
and security needs. The complex interaction among localism,
THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA
23
ation in certain
nationalism and internationalism will be one of the great
en is asking the
dramas of the coming decades.
ten adding the
Among the separatist forces, ethnicity and religion are
formidable agents, especially in southern Asia. Populations in
have turned to
northeast Asia, Japan, the two Koreas, Mongolia and Taiwan
CS for a more
are remarkably homogeneous. Even China has a minority
Asian national-
population of only some eight percent, although the minorities
be revitalized,
occupy more than half of this massive nation's land area,
contemporary
primarily in the sparsely populated border regions. Beijing is
gainst foreign
understandably nervous about the rising nationalist senti-
infiltrating the
ments in the central Asian republics that were a part of the old
on," they hope
Soviet Union and the substitution of Genghis Khan for Lenin
t have period-
as a national hero in Mongolia. Despite their best (and worst)
S that earlier
efforts, the Chinese will never be able to homogenize the
When North
Tibetans, Mongols, Kazhaks and Uighurs that inhabit their
self-reliance),
land, and thus ethnicity will remain a permanent factor in
e party, one
Chinese politics, but given the disparity of numbers, not one
o people that
that is regime-threatening.
it kingdom."
Southeast Asia has long lived with ethnic diversity, and it
ion in demo-
remains a vital force in the politics of the region, providing
em to repre-
linkage between domestic and foreign policies. The major
ace of time,
division is that between Malay and Chinese, although Indian
ferent stages
and aboriginal elements exist along with numerous ethnic
subdivisions. While the Chinese represent a small proportion
nic strategies
is inevitable,
of the population (except in Singapore and Malaysia), they
mic conflict-
play a major role in finance, commerce and industry. Hence
recurrent tensions have an economic as well as a social base. In
es such as a
South Asia, meanwhile, religion is an enduring source of
I a receptive
conflict, primarily with regard to Hindu-Islamic divisions, but
1 Korea, for
also within Hinduism itself.
e growth of
Meanwhile political institutions throughout Asia are gener-
tical left, but
ally weak, and the premium upon leadership remains high.
eve that the
The old political structure in many societies has been de-
in a swifter
stroyed or badly damaged, but broadly acceptable new insti-
licies.
tutions are not yet in place. Three basic political systems now
ces strongly
coexist: Leninism, authoritarian-pluralism and parliamentary
are growing
democracy. The authoritarian-pluralist system is one charac-
S connected
terized by restrictive politics, with choice and freedom con-
the renewed
strained, but with a civil society existing apart from the state in
other hand,
some degree, manifested in the capacity of religious, educa-
the form of
tional and familial institutions to operate with a degree of
dependence
autonomy. The economy, moreover, is one where the market
ng localism,
plays a crucial role although with extensive state involvement.
24 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
At this point the political spectrum in Asia appears to be
widening. The surviving socialist states are fighting desper-
ately to batten down the political hatches even as they exper-
iment with more open economic policies. Political tightening is
being pursued in the name of stability, a term that is endlessly
invoked in China, North Korea and Vietnam. Events in
eastern Europe and the old Soviet Union are being held up to
the citizenry as negative lessons. The breakdown of order, it is
asserted, will seriously retard economic development and
hence the opportunity for a better life. Thus while they search
desperately for the proper combination of economic policies to
reform socialism, the key leaders of these societies attempt to
keep Leninist politics more or less intact.
In the Asian Leninist states, remnants of the first generation
revolutionaries still cling to power, in contrast to Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union prior to the recent revolutions,
where the revolutionary flame had been supplanted by routine
bureaucracy and greyness. In this atmosphere leaders came to
realize that they presided over essentially backward societies,
and the necessity of reform began to gain recognition within
the elite. Their response was to attempt reform not revolution,
their appeal to "make socialism work better." At a certain
point, however, the elite lost control of the process. To be sure,
it was vitally important that their populations had always lived
within the orbit of Western culture and were increasingly
influenced by the dynamic developments in western Europe.
These factors suggest the need for caution in projecting
political developments in Europe automatically to Asia.
If the immediate situation is characterized by a stretching of
the political spectrum, there are good reasons to believe that in
the not distant future, that spectrum will narrow. On the one
side, the few remaining traditional monarchies will either be
reformed or disappear. On the other side, Leninism in its
traditional form is doomed, with the only issue being that of
timing of demise and means of exit. An open economy and a
closed polity cannot long coexist. As the socialist states turn
outward, seeking capital, technology and markets from the
dynamic economies around them, as NETS involving a portion
of their state evolve, and as political power is assumed by
younger generations-who are more technocratically inclined,
better educated and have a greater knowledge of the world-
the old political order cannot possibly be sustained.
THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA
25
sia appears to be
fighting desper-
Development bears with it three forces that have powerful
political implications: diversity, inclusiveness and porousness.
en as they exper-
The developmental process, especially in its early stages,
tical tightening is
generally accentuates class and regional differences, thereby
1 that is endlessly
rendering highly centralized controls increasingly inefficient
nam. Events in
and politically unacceptable. As education spreads and liveli-
being held up to
hood improves, moreover, demands emerge for more genuine
wn of order, it is
inclusiveness in the political process, especially from a growing
evelopment and
middle class.
vhile they search
Finally, economic policies and the communications-
nomic policies to
information revolution combine to remove the instrument of
ieties attempt to
isolation from the hands of the state, once an excellent
technique for preserving mass faith. The society becomes
first generation
more porous, thus susceptible to a variety of external influ-
rast to Eastern
ences; witness the emergence of a cosmopolitan culture among
ent revolutions,
a growing number of youth in Shanghai, Beijing and Ho Chi
inted by routine
Minh City. Note also the increased access to outside informa-
leaders came to
tion from radio, television, tourists and visiting relatives. Even
ward societies,
in remote North Korea, information about the external world,
ognition within
however partial and distorted, is filtering in to the populace.
not revolution,
This can only increase with the new economic measures now
" At a certain
under way. With information comes the ability to make com-
ess. To be sure,
parisons, which leads to demands that cannot be met by
ad always lived
exhortations to keep the faith.
e increasingly
Thus, on balance, development in Asia as elsewhere serves
estern Europe.
the cause of political pluralism. In assessing this fact, however,
in projecting
one must avoid two errors. No political process is completely
to Asia.
linear; there will be zigs and zags, retrenchments and retreats
a stretching of
as well as advances. Further, neither the world at large nor
believe that in
Asia in particular are destined to have a total convergence of
V. On the one
political systems. Differences of tradition, scale, geographic
will either be
position and stage of development preclude identity, now or in
eninism in its
the foreseeable future. It is possible-indeed probable-that
being that of
most if not all of the remaining Leninist states of Asia will
onomy and a
evolve toward some form of authoritarian-pluralism rather
st states turn
than liberal democracy in the near term. In fact that was the
trend in China in the mid-1980s, after economic reform had
ets from the
ing a portion
been under way for a few years.
Nonetheless if the political extremes are eliminated, a nar-
assumed by
ally inclined,
rower spectrum will permit much more meaningful dialogue
the world-
across ideological-political boundaries and, together with the
ed.
ever more complex economic network connecting societies,
reduce the risks of military conflict.
26 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Security issues and the security structure are also rapidly
changing in the Pacific-Asian region. Here as in Europe the
Cold War no longer serves to delineate the lines and define the
critical issues. For the indefinite future Russia will be weak-
not necessarily in terms of its military arsenal (although that
will continue to be reduced) but in terms of its capacity (or will)
to use its military resources outside the boundaries of the old
Soviet Union, and perhaps even within those boundaries.
Moreover, under current conditions, the United States and
Russia have a growing community of interests, both with
respect to the global scene and with regard to the regional
order in Asia. China is fully preoccupied with its domestic
problems. Japan, an economic superpower, is only beginning
to apply that power for political purposes and is content at
present with a purely defensive military strategy.
In sum the risk of a major power conflict in Asia is at its
lowest point in this century. Violence will be domestic or
subregional, allowing others to determine whether or not they
choose to intervene directly or indirectly. The implications of
these developments for the United States are far-reaching.
Given present trends it is not surprising that a process of
Asianization is expanding ever more rapidly-a growing net-
work of ties among and between Asian states at every level. At
the same time alliances of the earlier type are disappearing or
undergoing significant alterations. The exclusiveness of past
ties and the dominant pattern of patron-client relations is
giving way to a trend toward partnerships, with greater
flexibility and independence on the part of both parties in the
relationship. And in current bilateral relations, whether they
be those of alignment or otherwise, a combination of cooper-
ation and competition prevails, with some element of tension.
Hence continuous negotiations are necessary at the bilateral
level; in addition, it is important to place such relations in a
broader multilateral context.
For the foreseeable future it will be necessary for the major
Pacific-Asian states to operate simultaneously at the bilateral,
regional and global levels, in both the economic and political-
security fields. The inevitable contradictions involved in this
situation will have to be managed with as much skill as
possible-a challenge especially for the United States, given its
important global position at present and its past proclivity for
unilateralism.
THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA
27
re also rapidly
III
in Europe the
It is against this background that the future alternatives for
and define the
U.S. policy in Asia should be explored. First, however, there is
will be weak-
merit in examining America's post-1945 Asian policies to see if
(although that
there are lessons to be learned from the past.
pacity (or will)
One lesson stands out graphically: do not mislead your
ries of the old
opponent. The two wars that the United States fought in Asia
e boundaries.
in the past forty years-Korea and Vietnam-were both prod-
ed States and
ucts of communist miscalculation in some measure, and for
ts, both with
this America bears considerable responsibility. The signals
the regional
sent to the Korean communists and their Soviet and Chinese
I its domestic
mentors were that South Korea was outside the perimeter of
nly beginning
American security commitments. The communists had little
is content at
reason to believe that the United States would intervene on
South Korea's behalf. Thus, tragedy ensued.
Asia is at its
domestic or
In Vietnam also, Hanoi could scarcely have imagined that a
massive American commitment would ultimately be made,
:r or not they
aplications of
given the initial responses of the Eisenhower administration to
-reaching.
signs that the North did not intend to abide by the terms of the
a process of
1954 Geneva agreement. To be sure, one can and in some
growing net-
instances should keep strategic options open, but to allow the
very level. At
aggressor to believe that it can move with impunity can have
appearing or
deadly consequences. It is not altogether clear that the United
'ness of past
States had learned that lesson by the time of the gulf crisis.
relations is
The Iraq conflict proved once again that if war comes, Amer-
with greater
icans support most strongly those wars in which U.S. troops
arties in the
are used with full force, win an overwhelming military victory,
hether they
and leave as quickly as possible.
1 of cooper-
A second, more complex lesson is that, henceforth, the
: of tension.
United States must subordinate unilateralism to bilateral and
he bilateral
multilateral approaches, whether the issue is strategic or
elations in a
political. Nothing is more difficult for Americans. The Gulf
War illustrated these new complexities. When the gulf crisis
r the major
began, it was imperative for the United States to work through
he bilateral,
the United Nations, and most specifically with the permanent
id political-
members of the Security Council. Indeed it was this necessity
Ived in this
that precluded a march to Baghdad. Moreover, while the
ch skill as
United States is largely disengaged militarily as a major occu-
es, given its
pying force, it is still politically involved in the region, having
roclivity for
inherited the twin burdens of dealing with Saddam Hussein
and of seeking to construct a broader Arab-Israeli peace.
28 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Whatever the outcome, the effort to combine American
leadership and international consensus is a result of realizing
that a new era is at hand. No country including the United
States has the capacity or desire to create a new global order
single-handedly. The costs of going it alone-political as well
as economic-are now too formidable despite the difficulties of
reaching multilateral agreements. Often in the past the United
States has sallied forth on behalf of the American way. It has
become increasingly clear, however, that such values as human
rights can be most successfully defended abroad when it is not
just an American cause, but an international one.
In this connection, moreover, another lesson should be
considered seriously. It is proper to champion democracy and
seek to support it abroad, since with all of its defects democ-
racy allows people the greatest opportunities, material and
cultural. Yet it should also be recognized that within most if
not all nondemocratic societies diverse political forces exist,
some seeking to forestall change, others seeking to accelerate
it. The concept that one promotes democracy-or greater
political openness-by limiting contacts with such societies to a
minimum is naïve. The proper question to ask is how can a
process of change be most effectively accelerated in a given
authoritarian state? The answer may vary but rarely if ever will
it be to impose isolation to the maximum possible extent.
Perhaps the most powerful political lesson is the close
correlation between the American citizens' level of economic
and political satisfaction at home, and their willingness to
support an active international role. When there are strong
domestic concerns, it is nearly impossible to muster public
enthusiasm for a foreign aid program, apart from short-range
humanitarian measures. If crime and drugs are rampant in
one's own neighborhood, concern about security centers on
the home front. There has been a growing gap in opinion polls
between American decision-makers and average citizens on
the willingness to make security and economic commitments to
others. Even the former group is now shaken by diverse
manifestations of social disorder, the decline in primary and
secondary educational standards, the rising fiscal deficit, the
low savings rate, the poor investment record in civilian re-
search and development and the resulting loss of competitive-
ness. The lesson is clear: either these problems will be tackled
with a seriousness not yet in sight, or the commitment to
THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA
29
ombine American
internationalism will rapidly decline at all levels of American
result of realizing
luding the United
society.
To put this matter differently, when one asks from whence
new global order
comes the threat, the proper answer is that in major part the
e-political as well
threat is within our own society. It is here that the battle for
e the difficulties of
internal cohesion, international competitiveness and, hence,
e past the United
genuine strength and influence will be won or lost.
erican way. It has
Yet there is another threat: the inability of leaders and
7 values as human
citizens to devise and activate a range of institutions above the
oad when it is not
nation-state level that can effectively handle the multitude of
I one.
economic, political and strategic issues that confront the world
esson should be
today.
n democracy and
How the United States and other key countries balance the
S defects democ-
conflicting demands of their localities, their nation, their
es, material and
region and their world will determine how well they cope with
at within most if
the greatest revolutionary age in the history of mankind.
ical forces exist,
Living with complexity is difficult and there are no simple
ing to accelerate
answers. It is precisely because of this fact that leadership
acy-or greater
remains supremely important even in advanced industrial
ich societies to a
states where political institutions are relatively strong. The
sk is how can a
central task of leaders today, irrespective of the particular
ated in a given
qualities that diverse societies demand, is to simplify intricate
arely if ever will
problems for their citizens without undue distortion, fathom-
ible extent.
ing correctly and in time the implications of the oncoming
on is the close
tides of global change for their nation. Despite the difficulties
el of economic
in keeping up with events, leaders cannot afford to be merely
willingness to
reactive; the premium is to understand the basic meaning of
the massive transformations that the world faces, and pursue
ere are strong
muster public
innovative policies to move into the future at the optimal time.
m short-range
Herein lies the supreme test of the leader-but beyond this,
the test of the citizenry at large.
re rampant in
ity centers on
IV
1 opinion polls
ge citizens on
What lies ahead for the United States in Asia? In an age like
mmitments to
this it would be foolish to posit a certain outcome for many of
en by diverse
the issues that confront America. It is only possible to sketch a
primary and
broad road map, allowing for detours and impasses, starting
al deficit, the
with the supremely important issue of economic relations. The
United States cannot restrict itself to a single level of economic
n civilian re-
interaction with other nations. At the bilateral level the United
f competitive-
vill be tackled
States will be involved in continuous negotiations with its key
trading partners, notably Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the
mmitment to
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China
30 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
using a variety of mechanisms to advance dialogue from the SII
to the trade action discussions. Efforts will be focused on
resolving disputes before they reach the highly emotional
political level. As in the case of U.S.-Japanese economic
relations, however, the issues will go beyond tariff and sector-
specific issues to a discussion of general administrative and
structural barriers to an open trading and investment system.
Inevitably this will reach into highly sensitive areas, evoking
the charge of interference in a country's internal affairs. But
that is the price to be paid for interdependence.
Another aspect to the new economic order is emerging. The
United States will find restraints on imports increasingly
controversial because of the damage caused to other parts of
its own economic system and the risks of retaliation. Increas-
ingly industry-specific protectionism will be challenged by
American companies hurt by such action even as it is sup-
ported by those companies assisted. Increasingly restraints will
have to be justified less on traditional grounds of security or
unfairness and more on the grounds that it is a temporary
measure to enable an industry to become competitive. But the
premium will be upon the efforts for, and the logic of,
competitiveness.
Unquestionably the level of frustration in important sectors
of American society will remain high, and many U.S. griev-
ances are justified. The major differences relating to the
timing of development and economic strategies between the
United States and its key Asian trading partners will not
suddenly disappear. Thus the temptation to move to more
comprehensive protectionist measures will continue to be
strong, especially if economic regionalism in Europe and Asia
proves to be exclusivist. Indeed, in political terms, the present
system of restraints and retaliatory measures serves as a shield
against more extensive protectionism.
The capacity of the United States to play a key role in
preserving and developing more open global markets hinges
upon action on the home front. Macroeconomic policies re-
quire extensive revision. The massive investment in military
research and development can and must be redirected to
commercial purposes. The private sector must engage in rapid
technological innovations and restructuring. In the past Japan
borrowed much from America, including earlier methods of
quality control; it is now appropriate that America borrow
some (not all) techniques from Japan and others.
THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA 31
iew
Meanwhile it will be critical to encase bilateral economic
1
relations in a regional and global context. In the first instance,
this requires that Washington try to develop the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation forum into something more than a
ilarjolin
debating and discussion society. APEC is the one organization
that should eventually encompass all Pacific-Asian societies
mers of the 1991 Essay Competi-
lobert Marjolin. A former adviser
and take the lead in inaugurating policies, combining assist-
be OEEC), Vice President of the
ance for latecomers with a more open system of economic
European Community.
intercourse across national boundaries.
Economy: 5", Oxford University
Subregional groups will undoubtedly emerge, formally or
otherwise. The nonwhite East Asian Economic Group pro-
posed by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir harkens back to
the old Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and it is out of
step with the times. Any group that seeks to represent East
IZE $5,000
Asia alone, omitting Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico
r European Policy Studies, Brussels
and above all, the United States, not only adds fuel to protec-
uropean Investment Bank
- The Deutsche Mark Also?"
tionist fires in the United States, but fails to take into account
the degree to which the American economy, and particularly
2,000
that of western America, is becoming integrated into Asia. It
may be meaningful to have quasi-formal North Pacific, South
nternational Affairs, London
rope into a Wider Europe"
Pacific and ASEAN groups (joined eventually by Indochina) as
stepping-stones to APEC, but not in competition with it.
bridge
In any case for the United States the critical challenge will be
ement When There Are Failures
ilemmas in Eastern Europe"
to operate regionally on two fronts, North America and
ger
Pacific-Asia, to facilitate maximum openness and cooperation.
Los Angeles
! the Optimal Timing
For the time being these fronts are moving at a different pace,
on in Eastern Europe."
but that could change. Already extensive Asian investment is
taking place in Canada and Mexico as well as in the United
.1 Economics, Washington
upital Account"
States. Proposals to extend the North American Free Trade
Area to the more advanced portions of Asia are now being
E
heard, even before the NAFTA has come into being. Whatever
President of the European Com-
the barriers, the process of economic integration is irrevers-
`yohten, former Vice Minister of
ible, and future policies must be planned and executed with
Brookings Institution, Washing-
this fact in mind.
ction & Development, Professor
nnant-Rea, Editor, The Econo-
Finally, it is of great importance to make the General
ard O'Brien, Chief Economist,
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade work. Otherwise regional
ew
trade blocs are likely to be inevitable, and that could produce
) N
the type of economic damage America has not known since the
ns, June 1st 1992) write to The
1930s.
ress Bank Ltd., 60 Buckingham
32 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
V
On the political front one worrisome fact emerges. For the
first time in the twentieth century, U.S. relations with Japan
and China are troubled simultaneously, albeit for largely
different reasons. Previously America had good relations with
one while it confronted the other. To be sure the U.S.-Japan
relationship is fundamentally sound and supremely impor-
tant. In both societies, however, public opinion has been
moving in a negative direction. Especially in the United States,
negative sentiment toward Japan has risen rapidly, principally
due to a perception that Japan pursues self-interested, selfish
policies without regard to the interests of others. And in Japan
resentment has been growing against what is perceived to be
slander and unfair policies on the part of the United States to
compensate for shortcomings in American industry and soci-
ety.
In the years ahead a new foundation for U.S.-Japan rela-
tions must be laid. The time when the Soviet threat served to
underwrite the relationship, whatever the immediate storms, is
ending. Such a foundation will require resolute domestic
actions on the part of both countries. If interdependence is to
be made viable, greater economic compatibility must be
achieved; objections by either party that this would require
impermissible cultural changes or economic measures unpop-
ular with the electorate cannot be accepted. Cultures do
change, and never more rapidly than in this era. It is the
responsibility of leaders to make their electorate understand
why certain measures are imperative.
Beyond this, however, the U.S.-Japan relationship must be
broadened to encompass new or expanded fields: cooperation
in the monumental environmental tasks that lie ahead; joint
research in such fields as biotechnology and space; cooper-
ation in advancing programs relating to peacekeeping in
concert with the larger international community; interaction
in dealing with regions of tension, particularly in East Asia;
and much more broadly gauged cultural relations that bring
the younger generations into sustained contact with each
other.
Japan is no longer a follower in many lines of basic research;
it is a pioneer. The challenge is to seize upon this fact and to
build a new relationship based upon it. This can best be
accomplished in the fields that are on the horizon, the areas
THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA
33
that will determine how well we live in the 21st century. The
ct emerges. For the
two countries that together make up nearly 40 percent of the
elations with Japan
global gross national product can lead together in these
albeit for largely
endeavors, and in leading, reduce the friction that has dogged
good relations with
our bilateral relations in the recent decades.
ure the U.S.-Japan
What of China? Economic issues between Washington and
supremely impor-
Beijing are rising and Chinese sales of strategic weapons to
opinion has been
sensitive areas are of great concern, but political issues remain
1 the United States,
central. It is appropriate to continue to criticize the violations
apidly, principally
of human rights occurring in this society, and to point out that
-interested, selfish
China is involved in a tremendous waste of much needed
ers. And in Japan
manpower by treating its intellectuals in a shoddy fashion,
is perceived to be
both in material and political terms. In the United States alone
e United States to
some 50,000 Chinese students and intellectuals reside, unwill-
industry and soci-
ing to go home-not merely because of political uncertainties,
but because only rarely do they get the type of respect and
U.S.-Japan rela-
remuneration that they feel they deserve, verbal assurances of
t threat served to
their importance to the contrary.
mediate storms, is
At the same time Americans should also recognize that
esolute domestic
China is in a transitional phase, with leadership changes-and
dependence is to
quite possibly policy changes-lying ahead. The two principal
tibility must be
objectives of the moment, economic diversification and politi-
is would require
cal tightening, are basically incompatible, and the tension
between them can only grow with time. Meanwhile, decentral-
neasures unpop-
ed. Cultures do
ization is an irreversible process, made more complex by the
is era. It is the
growth of the NETS previously described.
Thus the United States must not treat China as a monolithic
rate understand
society, frozen in its current posture indefinitely. It is entirely
appropriate for Washington to act in a pluralistic fashion, with
ionship must be
private activities and official policies pursuing different em-
Ids: cooperation
phases, and with maximum contact maintained at different
lie ahead; joint
levels.
space; cooper-
No doubt some Chinese leaders will continue to accuse the
eacekeeping in
United States of being the leader in the effort to subvert
nity; interaction
Chinese socialism by "peaceful evolution." But in fact the
!y in East Asia;
external sources of stimulation for China's people are numer-
ions that bring
ous, many of them coming from the market economies and
tact with each
open societies of East Asia. One important influence is Taiwan,
which combines a dynamic economy that now reaches deeply
basic research;
into coastal China as well as Southeast Asia with an unfolding
this fact and to
democracy-fragile and facing problems but still indicating to
is can best be
the Chinese people that there are Chinese alternatives to
izon, the areas
Leninism.
34 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
China is a society that will undergo many travails in its long
march toward development. Weaknesses and strengths in all
areas, including the military realm, are likely to be interwoven.
The greatest probabilities for the decade ahead are for some
form of authoritarian-pluralism on the home front and a
continued effort to create a loose buffer system by building
upon the recent improvements in its relations with Russia and
the East Asian states. Although it can no longer play the
pivotal role in a U.S.-China-Soviet triangle, China intends to
be a regional power. American policy must take its cues from
those facts.
At some point it is likely that the United States will establish
diplomatic relations with Vietnam and North Korea (Cambo-
dia represents a special case where recognition of a consoli-
dated government will come soon if present trends hold). Both
of these governments cling to hard-line political policies at
present while they wrestle with adverse international trends
and serious economic problems at home. Prediction in each
case is hazardous.
Vietnam is the more porous, with economic changes already
under way. The legitimacy of the present government is low,
the differences between north and south are pronounced, and
a generational change in political leadership is at hand. Hanoi
is almost desperate for Washington to lift its embargo, hope-
fully followed by recognition. Hence Vietnam is en route to
meeting most American conditions. Meanwhile diverse pres-
sures have mounted within the United States for a change of
policy. Those who expect great economic returns are likely to
be disappointed; except for a very few fields such as off-shore
oil and tourism, Vietnam is not an investor's bonanza.
The North Korean situation is even more cloudy. The
political system is essentially Stalinist, with extensive nationalist
trimmings. There are scant indications of any serious chal-
lenges to the regime, at least from the grass-roots level. A
transition in governance is under way from Kim Il Sung to his
son, but the father's charisma cannot be transferred. After his
father is gone, Kim Jong Il must depend upon performance to
earn his own legitimacy. Without major economic changes,
substantial improvements are impossible-hence the current
quest for normalized relations with Japan, the expansion of
barter trade with the South and other signs that Pyongyang
may seek to take a leaf from Beijing's book.
THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA 35
ravails in its long
Projections for North Korea's future range from a political
d strengths in all
collapse, which could have serious repercussions for the
to be interwoven.
South's stability, to a military regime controlled by technocrats
ead are for some
operating within an authoritarian-pluralist structure. The var-
me front and a
iables are too numerous to make a firm prediction. It can only
tem by building
be asserted with some confidence that the status quo cannot
with Russia and
hold much longer.
longer play the
In this situation it behooves the United States to raise the
China intends to
level of official dialogue with North Korea, allow the expan-
tke its cues from
sion of private scholarly and cultural contacts, and work
toward military as well as political measures that will reduce
tes will establish
tension. These activities should and will be undertaken while
Korea (Cambo-
America's basic commitments to the Republic of Korea are
on of a consoli-
maintained and extensive consultation is carried out. Ameri-
nds hold). Both
ca's stake in peace and development on the Korean peninsula
tical policies at
remains high and demands a flexibility and innovation in
national trends
American policies that has not yet appeared.
diction in each
As this century draws to a close, the profound changes in the
nature of alliances and the character of interstate relations will
hanges already
continue. The old, exclusive patron-client relations of the past
ernment is low,
are fading away. Those alliances that continue will be at once
onounced, and
more conditional and permit greater independence of action
at hand. Hanoi
for both parties. In most cases, moreover, they will be encased
mbargo, hope-
in various multilateral agreements and arrangements.
is en route to
Much speculation surrounds key bilateral relations. The
: diverse pres-
likelihood, however, is that no relationship between two major
or a change of
Pacific-Asian nations will be threatening to others in the
ns are likely to
foreseeable future. Sino-Russian relations will be normal, but
:h as off-shore
scarcely intimate, with severe limits due to geography, eco-
nanza.
nomics and politics. Both sides need a reduction of tension;
cloudy. The
hence, both will seek "normalcy" and expand economic and
ive nationalist
cultural contacts. Fundamentally, however, Russia will look
serious chal-
west, and China will look east.
roots level. A
Relations between Russia and Japan will gradually shift
Il Sung to his
from confrontation to accommodation as the Russian military
red. After his
threat recedes, but the economic foundation of this relation-
erformance to
ship will remain limited for the foreseeable future due to
mic changes,
conditions in Russia, despite Japanese cooperation with other
: the current
industrial nations in helping the Russians chart a new eco-
expansion of
nomic course. Moreover cultural as well as political ties can
it Pyongyang
only be slowly advanced. Mutual suspicions will die hard, as in
the case of Korean-Japanese relations.
36 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Sino-Japanese relations will have a strong economic footing,
but the thesis advanced by some observers that the intimate
relationship sought by various Japanese and Chinese through-
out the twentieth century is now in the offing is fanciful. The
political and economic systems of these two nations are at great
variance, and will remain so despite a process of continuous
change in China. Moreover their cultures are radically differ-
ent, notwithstanding their shared Confucian heritage. Both
are destined to eye each other warily, given their mutual
interest in playing a significant regional role. Here, as else-
where, a strong quotient of competition will coexist with
cooperation.
Given the likely power relationships in East Asia, U.S. policy
can proceed with minimal concern about new hostile coali-
tions; Washington can fit its policies to the specific needs of
each situation, building above the bilateral level whenever
possible.
Meanwhile the situation in the Asian subcontinent is under-
going profound changes. On the one hand the Russian factor
in Indian foreign policy has been substantially reduced by
ongoing events. The Soviet-Indian alignment has ceased to
have meaning. At the same time new political forces are
emerging that, while weak and uncertain, appear dedicated to
abandoning India's neo-mercantilist, quasi-socialist policies
and casting their lot with market economics. On the other
hand the U.S. need to protect Pakistan against Russian power
has essentially disappeared, and with the Afghanistan civil war
in a holding pattern, the threat of large-scale violence in this
region has significantly diminished.
Under these circumstances the time has come for a funda-
mental reappraisal of American policies toward India. Such a
reassessment will happen, assuming present trends are not
disrupted. For the first time in history there is a genuine
prospect of a constructive American-Indian relationship, but
one that does not ignore American interests in other South
Asian states and the vital issue of nuclear proliferation.
The process of Asianization will accelerate, but a continued
U.S. presence in the region will be desired by virtually all Asian
governments. To be sure, the current leaders of the People's
Republic of China are telling both Russia and Japan that there
must be closer cooperation to block a hegemonic America-
ironically at the same time as certain prominent Americans are
suggesting to Beijing that the United States and China must
THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA
37
nomic footing,
work together to prevent Japan from emerging as a dominant
at the intimate
power. Most states seek some kind of card to play in efforts to
inese through-
bolster their position vis-à-vis others. But it is indicative of the
S fanciful. The
times that even the North Koreans whisper into American ears
ons are at great
that since the Russians are talking to the South about military
of continuous
relations, it might be wise for the United States to improve its
adically differ-
relations with the North.
heritage. Both
In truth it is widely recognized that for the near term the
their mutual
United States is necessary to play the role of buffer, balancer
Here, as else-
and stabilizer in a Pacific-Asia rife with unresolved bilateral
coexist with
and multilateral problems. The real issue is whether the
American people can be persuaded that such is their mission
ia, U.S. policy
in the post-Cold War era. Fundamentally this is related to the
hostile coali-
degree of cooperation and burden-sharing in every field that
cific needs of
can be expected from America's Pacific-Asian neighbors, the
vel whenever
instruments and institutions that can be utilized to bring about
greater equity and responsibility on the part of medium and
ent is under-
small as well as large states and, above all, a more successful
lussian factor
resolution of America's domestic problems.
reduced by
as ceased to
VI
I forces are
In no area have bolder global measures been announced by
dedicated to
the U.S. government than in the security realm. With the
alist policies
Russian response indicating a willingness to advance still
)n the other
further, the United States appears to be on the threshold of
issian power
startling breakthroughs in the critical field of strategic weap-
stan civil war
onry-breakthroughs that could change the entire history of
lence in this
the 21st century.
As yet, however, new ideas relating to American security
or a funda-
policies in Asia have not been forthcoming from Washington.
dia. Such a
On the contrary, the present line is that the United States
ids are not
should pursue the same course, except at the reduced level
a genuine
necessitated by budgetary cuts. America has managed to look
onship, but
as if it were being driven out of Subic Bay against its will, and
ther South
deplored the Philippine Senate vote as a tragedy for the
ation.
Filipinos. Perhaps such a view has some merit, but it is an
1 continued
example of old thinking in a new era. It should have been
Ily all Asian
realized long ago that by remaining as a large military pres-
he People's
ence in a nation where the United States had once been the
1 that there
colonial power, Americans were certain to make themselves
America-
the focus of domestic politics, thereby perpetuating old atti-
ericans are
tudes and policies deleterious to both American and Filipino
China must
interests.
38 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
At the end of this century the United States will have
departed from most if not all fixed bases on foreign soil. The
emphasis will be upon staging areas and bases kept in readi-
ness by those states aligned with the United States strategically,
with a small number of American technicians in residence in
some places. The premium will be upon lift capacity and rapid
deployment, keeping in mind the contingencies most likely to
occur. Moreover, with its primary military forces mobile, the
reliance will be upon air and sea power; there is virtually no
chance that large American ground forces will be sent into
combat in Asia again.
This new strategy will be put in place for both political and
economic reasons. The political costs of foreign bases are not
limited to the Philippines. Those costs will rise in South Korea
and even in Japan as the perception of the end of the Cold
War sinks in fully. Moreover the American people will rightly
expect Asian states to bear the primary responsibility for their
own defense, even in those cases where such defense is critical
to an overall regional balance of power and, thus, to American
national interests. The premises of the Guam Declaration of
1969 will come into play ever more prominently.
Does this mean that the United States will cease to be a
meaningful part of an Asian-Pacific security structure? Not if
Washington makes timely adjustments suitable to the situation
at home and abroad. The argument currently being advanced
to Asians and Americans, however, that the United States must
maintain its present strategic policies in East Asia because of
the Middle East security requirements has only the barest
chance of being accepted by either constituency. Future secur-
ity policies must take into account a new world: the extraor-
dinary changes in the global and regional environment, the
greatly altered nature of real and perceived threats, the
revolution in military technology and the need for revised
American priorities. Security policies must take on a stronger
multilateral component, with issues like nuclear proliferation
and strategic weapons sales placed on the international
agenda. At the same time America must make progress
through unilateral and bilateral actions in adjusting its vast
arsenals to these new realities, exercising that degree of
caution dictated by the uncertainties surrounding the old
Soviet Union.
Experience dictates that the United States must conceive of
security structures suited to specific situations, whereby con-
THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA 39
tates will have
centric arcs are constructed, arcs rather than circles so that
reign soil. The
contacts can flow among levels when necessary. In the case of
kept in readi-
the Korean peninsula, for example, the first arc is naturally
es strategically,
composed of North and South Korea, the parties immediately
in residence in
concerned; beyond them, the four major states long involved
acity and rapid
with the Korean problem; as an outer arc, international
S most likely to
bodies, both economic and political, that may provide services.
ces mobile, the
A similar structure was used in making progress in Cambo-
is virtually no
dia: the first arc being the four Khmer factions; the second
II be sent into
composed of China and Vietnam, states whose concurrence
with any formula was critical; beyond them, the ASEAN mem-
h political and
bers and the United Nations and in this case, more specifically,
1 bases are not
the five permanent members.
7 South Korea
VII
d of the Cold
ple will rightly
The future of Asia and of American relations with Asia are
bility for their
promising. The risks of a major power conflict are small. Most
ense is critical
subregional tensions have eased and, with very few exceptions,
;, to American
the costs of armed struggle, even between smaller states, are
Declaration of
such as to make that option highly undesirable to the leaders
concerned. Meanwhile the new priorities are on economic
cease to be a
development. Hence pragmatism is ascendant, ideology at a
acture? Not if
lower premium.
) the situation
Nationalism, to be sure, is a force with which to reckon. It
eing advanced
takes many forms, including that of xenophobia, as fearful
ed States must
elites seek to bind their people to existing political dogma. It is
ia because of
also a prominent factor in nations afraid of external economic
ly the barest
inroads, including the United States. But the broad course is
Future secur-
toward greater economic contacts of all types across ideologi-
the extraor-
cal-political boundaries, and a growth in political inclusiveness
ronment, the
and openness, various problems notwithstanding. Meanwhile
threats, the
the leaps taking place in science and technology make possible
1 for revised
a pace of development impossible to envisage only a few
on a stronger
decades ago-if the proper policies are instituted.
proliferation
America's future policies in Asia must be based on these
international
realities. There is a middle path between withdrawal and the
ke progress
status quo, and the United States must take it. To withdraw
sting its vast
precipitously under current circumstances would be irrespon-
.t degree of
sible and would seriously damage U.S. national interests.
ling the old
America cannot withdraw since it is a part of the Pacific-Asian
region in every sense. To hew to the old policies, however, is
t conceive of
impossible in light of the tremendous changes under way.
hereby con-
Despite the natural attention recently given to Europe and the
40 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S.S.R., it is time for America to cease merely reacting and to
start innovating in its policies in Asia, a region that constitutes
half the globe and may well determine the fate of the United
States in the 21st century.
Richard Holbrooke
ly reacting and to
n that constitutes
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES:
ate of the United
ENDING THE UNEQUAL PARTNERSHIP
A
nniversaries sometimes impose their own almost arbi-
trary logic on events. Nowhere has this been more apparent
than in the massive attention being paid in the United States to
the fiftieth anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Har-
bor. The television programs, articles and ceremonies-with
the president himself presiding over one of them-have
caused alarm among many Japanese, who fear that memories
of that infamous day and the world war that followed will fuel
anti-Japanese sentiment.
The anniversary itself will quickly pass. But serious strains
between Japan and the United States will remain long after
December 7, 1991, and they are likely to increase. What has
been called America's most important single foreign relation-
ship, one central to regional peace and global prosperity, has
lately turned unhealthy and even nasty. While far from a
breaking point, the U.S.-Japanese relationship is increasingly
filled with friction, resentment and mutual recrimination.
For two decades nearly every study of this bilateral relation-
ship has concluded that, as the two greatest economic powers
in the world, Japan and the United States have a special
responsibility to work together to address the planet's most
pressing problems, with each nation taking the lead in speci-
fied areas. In pursuit of this goal President George Bush and
former Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu talked frequently of a
"global partnership" to deal with the world's problems, and the
two governments have created numerous task forces and
commissions to address these issues.
The effort to reduce some of the specific difficulties has
made progress. The trade deficit between the two nations is
decreasing. American exports to Japan have doubled in the
last five years-in fact, American exports to Japan are almost
as large as those to the United Kingdom, Germany and France
Richard Holbrooke, former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, is a managing director of Lehman Brothers. The views
in this article are the author's alone.
42 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
combined. And Japan has already taken major steps toward
accepting its responsibility to do more to help the rest of the
world. Over the last three years, for example, the Japanese
have been the biggest donor of aid to the Third World,
supplying an impressive 22 percent of all funds flowing to
developing countries in 1989 (although they have been criti-
cized for making loans instead of grants, and imposing stiffer
repayment terms than other nations).
Nonetheless there is a general sense among many outside
observers that the overall relationship is drifting slowly down-
ward-its tone increasingly acrimonious and its original post-
war rationale now largely irrelevant. Both sides have entered a
period filled with false expectations and misunderstandings.
Even as the interdependence between the two nations in-
creases, each society is showing greater impatience and less
sympathy for the other. The leaders of both nations continue
to employ old rhetoric to explain what binds the two nations
together. Yet to continue such outdated rhetoric in the face of
the dramatic changes sweeping the world is to ignore the effect
those changes are having on U.S.-Japanese relations.
In the fiftieth year after Pearl Harbor, two unexpected
events have accelerated the pace at which U.S.-Japanese rela-
tions and Japan's role in the world are changing. One is the
end of the Cold War, the other the aftermath of the Gulf War.
The time has come to factor both old history and these new
realities into the equation and see what they mean for the
future.
II
American displeasure with Japan has been well docu-
mented, and now for the first time the Japanese are beginning
openly to show their own frustration and anger with the
United States. Most Americans feel they have a right to make
special demands of Japan because of history. And, indeed,
history will judge America's postwar policies toward Japan as
perhaps the most remarkable and far-sighted ever conducted
by a victorious nation toward a defeated foe. For their part,
Japanese acknowledge the generosity of America's postwar
policies, but they generally feel that the United States no
longer has the right to make seemingly endless demands based
on obligations from that past. While Americans often say that
the Japanese are ungrateful or that they still owe the United
States something, Japanese are more likely to say that Amer-
THE UNEQUAL PARTNERSHIP 43
ajor steps toward
icans should stop blaming Japan for America's own failures.
elp the rest of the
For years Japanese made such observations only in private, but
ple, the Japanese
their irritation and self-confidence have now increased to the
he Third World,
extent that their complaints can finally be heard in the United
funds flowing to
States.
y have been criti-
Attention has long been focused primarily on the American
d imposing stiffer
trade imbalance with Japan and charges that Japan plays by
unfair rules in trade and business. But is this the fundamental
ng many outside
factor? If identical trade problems existed with Germany or
ting slowly down-
Britain, for example, would they create such animosity?
its original post-
Would the purchase of Rockefeller Center or Columbia Pic-
es have entered a
tures by a Dutch or Italian company have generated the
sunderstandings.
continuing public attention triggered by Japanese purchase of
two nations in-
these two American trophies? Does a manufacturing plant in
atience and less
Tennessee owned by a European company attract the same
nations continue
attention as one owned by a Japanese company? Do the
the two nations
difficulties Americans have dealing with the regulations of
ric in the face of
European nations provoke the same anger as difficulties with
ignore the effect
Japan? In all cases the answer is clearly no.
lations.
What, then, lies at the heart of the American obsession with
WO unexpected
Japan? In a certain sense it is a reflection of America's fear that
-Japanese rela-
it may have lost its own way. Japan seems to be better at the
ring. One is the
very things on which Americans once prided themselves:
of the Gulf War.
quality products, hard work, sacrifice, strong family structure,
and these new
a sense of national unity and patriotism. In another sense,
mean for the
there may still be an underlying racism, not always conscious,
in the attitudes of some Americans toward Japanese. Finally,
there is resentment that Japan is not sufficiently grateful to the
United States for its generosity and protection since World
en well docu-
War II. Perhaps fifty years is not such a long time after all.
are beginning
Postwar U.S.-Japanese relations were never immune to
nger with the
friction or misunderstandings. In the first forty years after
right to make
World War II, there indeed were many difficult problems, but
And, indeed,
each was surmounted through the efforts of public officials on
ward Japan as
both sides of the Pacific committed to preserving good rela-
ver conducted
tions. Leaders in Washington and Tokyo recognized that close
For their part,
ties between the United States and Japan were of immense
rica's postwar
importance not only to both nations but to global peace,
ted States no
stability and growth.
emands based
Mike Mansfield, the former American ambassador who
often say that
presided over the last decade of this productive era, was not
ve the United
the only person to believe that the relationship with Japan was
ty that Amer-
"the most important bilateral relationship the United States
44 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
has." His view was shared by a large number of foreign policy
experts and even reflected in public opinion polls, which
showed that the American public increasingly understood the
importance of Japan. In 1982, for example, Japan was per-
ceived by Americans as more "important to U.S. interests"
than any other country, and these results continued in subse-
quent surveys. But importance did not equate automatically
with affection. The same series of polls showed a drop in
Japan's score (on a scale of 1 to 100) from 61 in 1986 to 52 in
1990, in response to a question that tested the "feelings" of
Americans toward a number of countries. (No other country,
except China in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square, showed
any comparable decline.) Seventy-one percent of those polled
believed Japan was guilty of unfair trade practices, compared
to 40 percent who said the same for the European Commu-
nity. And most revealing, when asked if Japan's economic
power constituted a "critical threat" to the vital interests of the
United States, 60 percent of those questioned said yes------
number far higher than that for any other "possible threat" to
the United States mentioned by the poll's respondents.¹
In the late 1970s, a period aptly described by the late Prime
Minister Masayoshi Ohiro as one of unparalleled "productive
partnership," I believed that greater communication and in-
teraction between the two nations would increase understand-
ing and that greater understanding, in turn, would strengthen
the relationship. I now believe this theory was wrong. Greater
communication did in fact take place at almost every level of
society; businessmen, scholars and students on both sides of
the Pacific established close counterpart relations to an un-
precedented degree. Americans became familiar for the first
time with many elements of Japan's impressive culture and
society, from sashimi to ikebana. But this hugely increased
interaction did not bring with it a greater sense of common
destiny, shared values and closer friendship. Even many
Americans who admired Japan's postwar achievements came
to fear that the United States could never compete with Japan
on a level playing field because of what Business Week, in a
recent scathing cover story, called Japan's "collusive network"
'Polls conducted by the Gallup Organization at four-year intervals for the Chicago Council
on Foreign Relations, 1974-91. I am indebted to William Watts of Potomac Associates for his
invaluable assistance in locating and analyzing polling data concerning U.S.-Japanese rela-
tions.
THE UNEQUAL PARTNERSHIP 45
f foreign policy
of "politicians, bureaucrats, big business, and sometimes even
n polls, which
gangsters."2 As former Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peter-
understood the
son wrote recently: "There is a strong streak of genuine
Japan was per-
admiration-indeed envy-for Japan's hard work, managerial
U.S. interests"
and product achievements.
Yet, on the other hand, there
inued in subse-
is a growing fear of Japan and a suspicion that these better
e automatically
products have arrived in our markets on the backs of a closed
wed a drop in
market and an unfair business system in Japan."3
7 1986 to 52 in
By the late 1980s many Americans harbored a fear that,
e "feelings" of
despite the high quality of its products, Japan was in some
other country,
insidious manner destroying or threatening the American way
quare, showed
of life. This new alarmism in the United States was matched by
of those polled
a growing public candor in Japan about its frustrations with
ces, compared
the United States. For the first time Japanese gave public voice
bean Commu-
to their feelings that the United States treated Japan unfairly.
an's economic
Shintaro Ishihara received international attention (even that
nterests of the
ultimate tribute, a Playboy interview) after writing The Japan
d said yes-a
That Can Say No, a powerful nationalistic tract stating, among
ible threat" to
other things, that "racial prejudice was behind the trade
ndents.¹
friction between our two countries," and constituted "the root
the late Prime
cause of Japan-bashing."⁴ Ishihara did not mention the deep
d "productive
roots of racism in his own country, a problem that Japanese
cation and in-
rarely admit exists. Some Japanese tried to minimize Ishihara's
e understand-
impact in the United States by suggesting that his was a lonely
ld strengthen
voice. But in the introduction to the American edition of
rong. Greater
Ishihara's book, Japan expert Ezra Vogel observed that, al-
every level of
though "Japan's political leaders are more pragmatic and
both sides of
more cautious than Ishihara," his book should be read "as a
ns to an un-
reflection of deep currents of popular Japanese thinking about
for the first
the United States."5
culture and
Ishihara's outspoken views were sometimes echoed, more
ely increased
discreetly, by senior Japanese officials charged with maintain-
of common
ing good relations with the United States. "Why, of all coun-
Even many
tries in the world, is Japan [America's] favorite target?" asks
ements came
Ryohei Murata, Japanese ambassador to the United States.
e with Japan
Because, he says, "the average American feels that Japanese
is Week, in a
ive network"
"Business Week, Aug. 26, 1991, page 34.
SPeter G. Peterson, "The 1990s: Decade of Reckoning or a Decade of a New Partnership?"
A Paper for the Commission on U.S.-Japan Relations for the Twenty First Century, March 7,
he Chicago Council
1991, PP. 6-7.
C Associates for his
4Ishihara, The Japan That Can Say No, (English language edition) New York: Simon &
J.S.-Japanese rela-
Schuster, 1991.
51bid., page 9.
46 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
are somehow 'different' from Americans." At the same time,
Murata notes that Japan has begun to "view both reasonable
and unreasonable requests as U.S. pressure and reacts defen-
sively and antagonistically."6
III
For decades one could divide U.S.-Japanese relations into
"high" policy and "low" policy. The former concerned polit-
ical and strategic issues relating to regional stability and
the containment of Soviet adventurism in the Pacific. Low
policy, by contrast, consisted of a broad range of bilateral
issues primarily related to trade and business practices on
which the two nations were in constant contact and increasing
conflict.
While not entirely passive on high policy issues, Japan
generally followed policies designed to keep Washington con-
tent. Tokyo kept a certain distance from the United States in
the 1960s, in part because of the widespread opposition within
Japan to American policy in Vietnam (some Japanese leaders
even stated at the time that their nation pursued a policy of
"equidistance" between the United States and the Soviet
Union). But once the war was over and both nations had
opened relations with mainland China, an era of unprece-
dented cooperation began. Washington realized that, in the
aftermath of the disaster in Vietnam, close ties with Japan
were essential for America's strategic and political interests.
(This was true despite the attention paid by the American
public and certain senior officials to the new and exciting
relationship with China during the 1970s.) The cooperation
between the United States and Japan during the late 1970s
and most of the 1980s was an important ingredient in the
reversal of the perception that America was retreating from
the Pacific after Vietnam. The strategic relationship became
increasingly close, including considerable, if unpublicized,
cooperation between the defense forces of the two nations in
such areas as joint naval operations.
Low policy involved the interaction of the internal politics of
the two nations and thus was usually more complicated than
high policy. While high policy problems were generally re-
"See Hiroshi Kitamura, Ryohei Murata and Hisahiko Okazaki, Between Friends: Japanese
Diplomats Look at Japan-U.S. Relations, New York: Weatherhill, 1985, PP. 111-118.
THE UNEQUAL PARTNERSHIP 47
It the same time,
solved by a handful of professional diplomats, low policy issues
both reasonable
were usually the bailiwick of trade-oriented departments and
and reacts defen-
agencies that were responsive to domestic pressures.
Both sides knew that no matter how serious trade differ-
ences were, they could not be allowed to jeopardize the
strategic relationship. Throughout the last generation both
se relations into
governments successfully managed to keep tensions over low
concerned polit-
policy from destroying cooperation on high policy. If a trade
al stability and
negotiation appeared to be headed for collapse, the leaders of
he Pacific. Low
both nations would often step in (usually through trusted
nge of bilateral
intermediaries) to make a deal that could be justified on
ess practices on
grounds that the only beneficiary from any crisis in Japanese-
t and increasing
American relations would be the Soviet Union. This potent
Cold War argument won the political or bureaucratic debate
y issues, Japan
every time, although it annoyed many who thought it was
Vashington con-
invoked excessively and without proof.
United States in
This ritual at times resembled kabuki theater, but it was
pposition within
crucial in resolving many tense trade problems, from Japa-
apanese leaders
nese automobile exports to American access to the Japanese
telecommunications market. But by the mid-1980s, it was
ued a policy of
and the Soviet
clear that this case-by-case approach to trade problems had
run its course. The much-heralded Structural Impediments
th nations had
Initiative of 1989-90 was the result: an effort to create a
ra of unprece-
broader system that would solve the commercial problems
ed that, in the
between the two nations through a structural approach. Both
ties with Japan
governments considered it a breakthrough. On both sides of
litical interests.
the Pacific, however, there was serious public criticism of SII,
the American
and it fueled the developing anger between the two nations,
V and exciting
especially among ordinary people. Karel van Wolferen artic-
e cooperation
ulated the view of many hostile and skeptical Western observ-
the late 1970s
ers when he called SII a fraud and "the most recent instance
redient in the
of American wishful thinking." On the Japanese side, Ishi-
etreating from
hara again said what others felt but rarely voiced in public:
onship became
SII, he wrote, was "further evidence of an unequal relation-
unpublicized,
ship" in which the United States "presented Japan with more
two nations in
than two hundred items for discussion, including some
farfetched suggestions that utterly ignored distinctive fea-
rnal politics of
tures of Japanese society, especially certain cultural aspects,"
nplicated than
while Japan offered a few "limited" proposals that were
generally re-
ignored by the Americans.⁸
seen Friends: Japanese
"Karel van Wolferen, "The Japan Problem Revisited," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1990, P. 45.
111-118.
⁸Ishihara, op. cit., PP. 120, 128-9.
48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
IV
American military involvement in East Asia and the Pacific
has a far longer and deeper history than it does in Europe.
American military forces have been in Japan and the western
Pacific continuously since the end of World War II. They have
been present in the Philippines since the beginning of the
century and operated intermittently in China over many
decades prior to 1949. Thus any discussion, however specula-
tive, of the possibility of the departure of American troops
from the western Pacific may cause concern, even fear, among
some people, both in Asia and the United States, who have
come to assume that there will always be American military
forces in East Asia.
For the present, of course, the United States still has
important obligations in East Asia. Northeast Asia, a perennial
cockpit of great power rivalry and conflict, is today more
peaceful and stable with American troops in Japan and South
Korea than at any time since the beginning of the century, and
those troops should not leave Japan or South Korea as long as
North Korea remains a threat to peace and as long as Japan's
Northern Islands, seized by the Soviet Union at the end of
World War II, remain in Soviet hands. Their presence is an
important factor encouraging a peaceful outcome to both
problems.
But in the long run, the removal of permanent American
military facilities and troops from East Asia is probably inevi-
table, as recent events in the Philippines suggest; when the
reasons for their deployment disappear, force withdrawal
could be healthy for both Asians and Americans alike, pro-
vided it is handled correctly. When the new post-Cold War
Pacific emerges, the American Seventh Fleet, with access to
ports of call in the western Pacific, should be sufficient to
defend U.S. national security interests and make the necessary
contribution to regional stability.
In the United States the commitment to defend Japan's
home islands has been widely supported since 1950 when Mao
Zedong's takeover of China and the outbreak of the Korean
War alerted Americans to the communist threat in Asia. In
Japan the security ties and the American troop presence had
often come under heavy pressure, especially in 1960 when
student demonstrators snake-danced through the streets of
Tokyo and forced the cancellation of a planned trip to Japan
THE UNEQUAL PARTNERSHIP 49
by President Eisenhower. As late as 1981, Tokyo, fearful of
and the Pacific
serious domestic repercussions, still resisted the use of the
does in Europe.
word "alliance" in any official statement describing its relation-
and the western
ship with the United States.⁹ In recent years this problem
15 II. They have
subsided, and the once-controversial word is now used rou-
ginning of the
tinely. A strong U.S.-Japan relationship came to be recognized
na over many
as the key to stability in the entire Pacific region-a bulwark
wever specula-
against Soviet adventurism, a symbol of the American commit-
nerican troops
ment to the security of the region and one of America's
en fear, among
greatest policy successes since the end of World War II.
ites, who have
The continuity of this commitment was made strikingly clear
erican military
last September, when the huge American aircraft carrier
Independence, with 5,300 personnel, steamed into its new home-
tates still has
port 25 miles south of Tokyo (replacing the aged Midway), as
ia, a perennial
though the world had not changed in twenty years. Objecting
; today more
to the deployment, Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder (D-
an and South
Colo.) foreshadowed a debate. "Why do we have to spend all
century, and
these dollars," she asked, "to defend a rich country that is an
rea as long as
economic competitor?" But in this case the answer was readily
ng as Japan's
available: since Japan absorbs most of the "in-country" costs
t the end of
for the large American base at Yokusuka, where 18,000
resence is an
American military personnel and dependents are stationed, it
ome to both
is cheaper to homeport the Independence in Japan than in the
United States. Responding to constant American pressure
it American
since 1975, Japan now contributes over $3 billion a year to
bably inevi-
support the American military presence in Japan, far more
t; when the
than any other American ally has ever contributed to the costs
withdrawal
of stationing American troops on its soil.
alike, pro-
Even as communism collapsed in eastern Europe, the resi-
t-Cold War
due of the Cold War that remained in East Asia prevented
h access to
comparable progress. Yet the disintegration of communism
ufficient to
inside the Soviet Union in August 1991 greatly increased the
e necessary
possibility of eradicating such legacies. Both Russian Republic
President Boris Yeltsin and spokesmen for the "former Soviet
nd Japan's
Union" hinted last September that the question of the North-
when Mao
ern Islands could soon be resolved on terms that would satisfy
he Korean
Tokyo. North Korea remains a Cold War anachronism and a
n Asia. In
danger to regional stability, but it is now almost completely
sence had
960 when
9A storm of protest arose when the word "alliance" first appeared in a joint statement
streets of
during Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki's May 1981 visit to the United States. See John K.
) to Japan
Emmerson and Harrison M. Holland, The Eagle and the Rising Sun: America and Japan in the
Twentieth Century, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1988, P. 180.
50 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
isolated. It seems increasingly unlikely that when Kim Il Sung,
the world's longest-lasting dictator, finally passes from the
scene, his shadowy son will be able to maintain absolute power.
The admission of both Koreas to the United Nations last
September-delayed for decades and to the end opposed by
North Korea-was surely an omen that sooner or later this last
bastion of Stalinism would crumble. And further to the south
another protracted tragedy, the Cambodian problem, moved
closer to resolution, however imperfect, under U.N. auspices.
Thus it is finally possible to envision East Asia in the
approaching future free from the Cold War environment that
dominated the region and helped shape the U.S.-Japanese
relationship for forty years. But what will then remain of the
old strategic relationship? What will be the rationale, if any, for
the continued presence of American troops in Japan and, for
that matter, in South Korea?
By decade's end, if not sooner, there may be no American
troops in Japan or, in fact, anywhere on foreign soil in the
western Pacific or East Asia (with the exception of American
deployments on Guam and some other small Pacific islands
that have a special relationship to the United States). The
departure of American troops from Japan-where they have
successively symbolized wartime victory, the Occupation and
the American commitment to defend their homeland-would
affect deeply the psychology of the relationship, removing a
sense of dependency and obligation that has existed since
1945. The common strategic objective of keeping the Soviet
Union at bay, which helped contain trade disputes, would no
longer exist. At the same time, ironically, major irritants
caused by the troops and exploited by politicians for a gener-
ation would no longer exist either: Japanese could no longer
complain about American behavior or special privileges on the
bases, and American politicians would no longer be able to
demand trade concessions in return for Japan's "free ride" on
defense. Both the positive and negative aspects of the Amer-
ican troop presence would disappear-and the relationship
between the two nations would change, gradually but pro-
foundly.
V
Nothing could have been less helpful to U.S.-Japanese
relations than Operation Desert Storm. Most Japanese did not
see their vital interests threatened by Saddam Hussein's take-
THE UNEQUAL PARTNERSHIP
51
en Kim Il Sung,
over of Kuwait and were sharply divided about the wisdom of
passes from the
absolute power.
supporting the coalition. But listening to prescient warnings
from Ambassador Michael Armacost that its actions would
ed Nations last
end opposed by
have a profound effect on future relations with the United
or later this last
States, the Japanese government contributed an impressive
er to the south
$13 billion to the gulf effort, far more than any other nation
roblem, moved
outside the gulf. Had Japan not given such a vast sum, the
U.N. auspices.
American reaction undoubtedly would have been worse, but it
st Asia in the
was bad enough: Americans felt that Japan's support of the
vironment that
coalition was slow, grudging and inadequate, especially since
U.S.-Japanese
three-fourths of Japan's oil comes from the Middle East.
1 remain of the
Japan's political style requires that major changes in its foreign
nale, if any, for
policy be worked out through a methodical, consensus-
Japan and, for
building ritual that Westerners often find frustrating and
confusing. The rapid American timetable for assembling the
no American
Desert Shield coalition did not fit that process. American
ign soil in the
public support for Japan dropped during and after the war
1 of American
and has yet to recover.
Pacific islands
The Gulf War gave further impetus to Japan's quiet re-
1 States). The
evaluation of its foreign policy. Most Japanese felt that their
ere they have
vast monetary contribution was not appreciated by the United
cupation and
States. For Japan one of the main lessons was that it should not
eland-would
allow itself to be placed in a position where the United States
, removing a
could drag it into a foreign policy adventure without adequate
existed since
prior consultation.
ng the Soviet
Quiet evidence that Japan intends to accelerate the process,
tes, would no
already under way, of developing its own foreign policy came
ajor irritants
in the fall of 1991. Predictably it received little notice in the
for a gener-
United States. When the U.N. General Assembly convened,
Id no longer
Tokyo made a concerted effort to gain a seat on the Security
ileges on the
Council because, according to foreign ministry spokesmen, it
:r be able to
felt that it needed to have a stronger voice in international
free ride" on
affairs. 10 In Tokyo the government devised a new plan to deal
of the Amer-
with future crises, which would allow up to 2,000 troops from
relationship
Japan's Self Defense Forces to participate in a future U.N.
lly but pro-
peacekeeping force-after any fighting had stopped and only
if the government approved the specific mission. More specif-
ically Japan put the word out that it would be willing to send
S.-Japanese
¹⁰Despite pro forma American support, Japan's long-standing hope for a permanent
nese did not
Security Council seat, which it surely deserves, seems doomed unless there is broad-ranging
ssein's take-
reform of the Security Council and the creation of a class of permanent members without veto
power.
52 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
troops to Cambodia as part of a U.N. force-a small step for
international peacekeeping, perhaps, but a giant step for
Japan, which has not sent troops abroad, under any flag, since
1945.
More incremental steps of this sort from Japanese foreign
ministry officials, once regarded as custodians of a passive
foreign policy, can be expected. They will certainly create
apprehension in some nations that fear Japan's ambitions or
cannot forgive the past. China, for one, has already indicated
concern. But Japan's eventual involvement in such activities
outside its home borders, once unthinkable, is now inevitable.
(Already Malaysia has proposed a regional economic bloc that
would exclude all non-Asian nations and be dominated by
Japan; while Tokyo will probably keep its distance-under
American pressure-the proposal itself marks another mile-
stone in Japan's new regional acceptability.) One probable
consequence of such activity will be a further gradual distanc-
ing of Japan's foreign policy from that of the United States—
even were the United States to dominate the United Nations
again in a crisis, as it did during the summer of 1990.
VI
Accepting a more assertive and independent Japan will
prove difficult for many Americans, who have come to regard
Japan as a junior partner on most important foreign policy
issues. This attitude was most evident during the 1970s and
1980s, when the United States embarked on a particularly
shortsighted effort to get the Japanese to increase their own
defense spending.¹¹ Behind this effort lay the fact that, be-
cause Japan spent less than one percent of its GNP on defense
compared to over five percent for the United States, Japan was
able to devote more of its resources to nonmilitary spending,
creating resentment in the United States over the "free ride"
Japan was getting from the American security umbrella. From
Congress and four successive administrations came pressure
on Tokyo to break through the one percent barrier and take
up more of the burden of defending the northeast Pacific
against the Soviet Far Eastern fleet, which had, in fact, peaked
"The first manifestation of this policy came much earlier, when, during a visit to Japan in
1953, Vice President Nixon urged the Japanese to begin rearming. This bewildered his hosts,
who were comfortable with the famous Article 9 of the constitution renouncing war as an
instrument of national policy and prohibiting the development of all offensive weapons.
THE UNEQUAL PARTNERSHIP 53
-a small step for
giant step for
in strength by the mid-1980s.¹² This effort was a particular
favorite of members of Congress looking for ways to reduce
er any flag, since
America's own defense expenditures or criticize Japan. Little
thought was given to the long-term consequences: its poten-
ipanese foreign
ns of a passive
tially destabilizing effect on Japan's East Asian neighbors,
whose memories of World War II were more vivid and
certainly create
i's ambitions or
stronger than those in the United States; and the possibility
that Japanese military capability might, over time, lead to a
ready indicated
more aggressive foreign policy from Tokyo that might even
such activities
eventually be at odds with America's.
now inevitable.
Washington was on sounder ground when it embarked on
nomic bloc that
several policies designed to encourage Japan to make a larger
dominated by
contribution to the international financial institutions and
stance-under
foreign assistance agencies. These policies were not only
another mile-
correct; they should have been pursued earlier and more
One probable
vigorously, in lieu of efforts to increase the defense budget. At
adual distanc-
least a decade ago, before it was too late, Washington should
nited States—
have offered Tokyo a "grand bargain"-that it would continue
nited Nations
=
1990.
to provide the security umbrella for Japan and not ask Tokyo
to increase its defense budget, in exchange for a quantum leap
by Japan in foreign assistance levels, support of international
financial institutions and contributions to such international
nt Japan will
problems as refugees, famine relief and environmental disas-
me to regard
ters. A provocative version of this idea was contained in
oreign policy
he 1970s and
Peterson's proposal for a new relationship in which "Japan
would be senior partner on economic issues and the United
I particularly
se their own
States the senior partner on political and military ones," with
fact that, be-
both countries committing themselves to substantial transfor-
P on defense
mation of their own societies: "Japan becoming more open;
the United States putting its economic house in order."¹³
es, Japan was
When it was timely, such an arrangement was discussed
ry spending,
neither with the Congress, whose approval would have been
e "free ride"
brella. From
essential and difficult to obtain, nor the Japanese government.
Today, regrettably, the time for such a division of responsibil-
me pressure
ity between the United States and Japan has faded: with the
ier and take
passing of the threat from Moscow, Japanese seniority on
east Pacific
economic issues, with American primacy in political and secur-
fact, peaked
ity issues, would not be a particularly good bargain for the
United States.
a visit to Japan in
vildered his hosts,
incing war as an
"From 1977-81 I participated in these efforts. The policy was misguided and carried out
sive weapons.
with far too much enthusiasm.
"Peterson, op. cit., pp. 8 and 12.
54 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
VII
Despite their vast cultural and stylistic differences, Japan
and the United States are linked by an extraordinary series of
events stretching back to the arrival of Commodore Perry's
black ships in Tokyo Bay in 1853. 14 The two nations were
destined to a stormy and often unpredictable relationship,
with the exception of the U.S.-Israeli relationship probably the
most unusual American bilateral tie in the world. But until
now it has always been an association between two unequal
partners, one clearly inferior to the other. In that form it has
run its course and no longer serves the interests of either
nation.
What does this mean for the future? Are U.S.-Japanese
relations doomed to deteriorate still further? Or are they
essentially cyclical in nature, destined to improve if Japan's
economy slows down and America catches up? Is this, perhaps,
less of a crisis than meets the eye? Will the relationship simply
go on much as it has been before, enduring out of mutual need
and ever-deepening economic interdependence, despite
chronic complaining that resembles the bickering of an un-
happily married couple for whom divorce is nonetheless
impossible?
There are no easy answers, yet on these questions much will
depend. The extraordinary size, scope and importance of the
relationship will not only continue; it should increase-but not
on the old basis. Clearly Americans and Japanese alike should
seek to accelerate the day when Japan is completely freed from
the dependency relationship that has existed in one form or
another since 1945. So long as the United States expects
constant repayment for past generosity and for its open
markets, a relationship based on dependency, resentment and
false expectations will continue. The best basis for post-Cold
War relations with Japan is a mature relationship of equals.
The two most powerful economies in the world, while com-
petitors, must learn to interact with each other in a manner
that sets aside ideas of junior and senior partnerships. Natural
concepts in the early postwar and Cold War eras, such notions
"The Russians arrived at Nagasaki only six weeks after Perry reached Tokyo Bay. Later
Perry made a remarkable forecast: "Eastward and southward will [our] great rival in the
future aggrandizement stretch forth her power, and thus the Saxon and the Cossack will
meet. Will it be in friendship? I fear not! The antagonistic exponents of freedom and
absolutism must thus meet at last."
THE UNEQUAL PARTNERSHIP
55
defied realities of domestic politics in both countries and were
erences, Japan
made obsolescent by events in the communist world and by the
dinary series of
Gulf War.
The current mood is one of unfulfilled hopes and disap-
nodore Perry's
) nations were
pointments. High rhetoric about a special "global partnership"
e relationship,
only adds to false expectations and increases the sense, on each
side, that the other has failed to live up to its obligations. In the
ip probably the
orld. But until
days of the Occupation and the Cold War, the relationship
worked to the mutual benefit of both nations. But what the
n two unequal
United States did for Japan during the Cold War it did out of
at form it has
a belief that it was also in the American national interest, that
rests of either
it was essential for strategic reasons. The extraordinary gen-
erosity of the United States in giving Japan, and other nations,
U.S.-Japanese
access to the vast American market without full reciprocity has
Or are they
to come to an end, not as an act of neo-protectionism, but as a
ove if Japan's
simple political and economic fact reflecting the recent
this, perhaps,
changes in the world, the limitations on American resources
onship simply
and the tremendous economic competition America faces
mutual need
from abroad.
ence, despite
The United States gains nothing by dwelling on alleged
ng of an un-
Japanese ingratitude. One cannot hold an entire people hos-
; nonetheless
tage to repayment of a debt without eventually provoking
resentment that outweighs any obligations imposed by the
ons much will
past. It is time to accept Japan as a full member of the world's
rtance of the
leadership, not just in the economic arena but across the
ease-but not
board. This likely will be more difficult for Europeans than for
: alike should
Americans, given their far greater lack of understanding and
ly freed from
communication with Japan.
one form or
Japan gains nothing by showing open or thinly veiled
tates expects
contempt for America's internal problems and inefficiency.
for its open
Every indicator shows that Japan has earned the right to
entment and
participate in international affairs as an equal of any other
or post-Cold
nation on earth. But Japan would be well advised to proceed
ip of equals.
cautiously in the brave new era that lies ahead. The future may
while com-
not be as bright as the last twenty years for Japan, as other
in a manner
parts of the world catch up. Furthermore as the twentieth
iips. Natural
century nears its end, Japan is undergoing some important
such notions
internal changes of its own, including the rapid growth in the
number of its elderly and the increasing demand for leisure
Tokyo Bay. Later
time among its youth that could significantly reduce its com-
great rival in the
parative advantages in international commerce.
1 the Cossack will
of freedom and
Japanese are always quick to remind the rest of the world
how resource-poor and vulnerable they are. This vulnerability
56 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
may tempt Japan to seek primacy or domination in areas that
contain vital natural resources or important trading partner-
ships. This would be a natural policy to follow, especially if it
is true, as many experts have concluded, that Japanese have
great difficulty dealing with other people or nations as equals.
According to this widely accepted theory, the Japanese either
accept inferior status or seek superiority in all relationships,
and true equality is virtually impossible.¹⁵ It would be a
tragedy if Japan were to attempt, in a nonmilitary form, to
control certain resources or regions of the world. It may be
true that the United States once had such dominance in many
parts of the world, notably Latin America, but those days are
over, not only for the United States but for every other nation.
In the modern world, any nation that seeks to dominate any
region of the world through either political or economic
pressure risks massive economic retaliation from other major
trading nations. Shooting wars may be out of the question
between the major powers, but trade wars, stimulated by
powerful domestic interests, are still possible-and both the
United States and Japan run risks in this regard. This is why
even Americans with impeccable pro-Japan credentials, who
often have been embarrassed by statements by their own
countrymen, feel a shiver of concern as they listen to some of
the recent rhetoric coming from Tokyo.
Economic and political necessity makes it imperative that
discourse between the two nations not reach the breaking
point. In this regard, the selection of Kiichi Miyazawa, the
senior Japanese political figure most at ease in dealing with
Americans, as prime minister is welcome news. Miyazawa has
broader knowledge of the United States than any other senior
politician and is well-liked by his many American friends.
Although it is reasonable to assume that he will continue to
develop a more independent Japanese foreign policy,
Miyazawa can be counted on to use his substantial diplomatic
and personal skills to contain tensions with Washington. But
Washington must be careful not to expect from Miyazawa
special favors; he has long been suspect in Japan precisely
because of his ease and fluency with Americans, and he will
have to protect himself from any charges that he is subservient
to the United States.
As the Japanese gradually embark on a more assertive
"This theory is best laid out in Chie Nakane's Japanese Society (English language version),
Rutland, Vermont: C.E. Tuttle, 1984.
THE UNEQUAL PARTNERSHIP 57
tion in areas that
foreign policy, they must remember two unpleasant and rarely
trading partner-
voiced truths: they remain generally unpopular overseas, and
w, especially if it
the United States is still Japan's best friend, and perhaps at
it Japanese have
times its only friend.
ations as equals.
If the comparative economic strength of the two nations
Japanese either
continues to move in Japan's direction, and Japan continues to
all relationships,
diversify its overseas markets and sources of supply, Japan's
It would be a
relative importance to the United States may increase as
hilitary form, to
Washington's relative importance to Tokyo decreases. 16 None-
orld. It may be
theless the United States will remain the most important
inance in many
nation in the world to Japan, and Japan will remain among the
t those days are
most important nations to the United States, if not always the
:ry other nation.
0 dominate any
most important.
al or economic
Perhaps it is time for a statute of limitations on invoking the
om other major
past in the current debate: while no one should have to repeat
of the question
history because they have forgotten it, there is also a risk of
stimulated by
being trapped by half-accurate myths presented as history.
-and both the
This has happened in many other parts of the world (Ireland,
rd. This is why
Cyprus and Lebanon leap to mind), always with unfortunate
redentials, who
results. Let us hope that it does not happen between the
by their own
United States and Japan.
Each side will have to change certain attitudes deeply
sten to some of
engraved into their national subconscious in the half century
imperative that
since December 7, 1941. The United States will need to accept
1 the breaking
a Japan that carries out an independent foreign policy and no
Miyazawa, the
longer automatically follows the American lead on interna-
n dealing with
tional issues. Japan will need to recognize the necessity of true
Miyazawa has
equality of market access between the two nations and avoid
ny other senior
the temptation to seek complete domination of the East Asian
erican friends.
region. Japan will also have to learn how to treat other nations
ill continue to
as equals. Both nations will need to move beyond a period of
reign policy,
history that was immensely successful, helped preserve the
tial diplomatic
peace and brought prosperity to a region covering one-third
ashington. But
of the globe-but a period that is rapidly coming to an end.
om Miyazawa
apan precisely
is, and he will
is subservient
nore assertive
sh language version),
16Last year for the first time Japan's exports to East Asia were greater than those to the
United States.
Yoichi Funabashi
JAPAN AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER
A
crisis almost always reveals the reality, and the
Persian Gulf crisis revealed the real Japan. In the moment of
truth, an economic superpower found itself merely an auto-
matic teller machine-one that needed a kick before dispens-
ing the cash. The notion that economic power inevitably
translates into geopolitical influence turned out to be a mate-
rialist illusion. At least many Japanese now seem to subscribe
to that view.
In Japan the crisis over the gulf was a manifestation of the
failure of Japanese leadership. In 1989 Japan's ruling Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) lost control of the Diet's upper house,
the House of Councillors. Thus when the gulf crisis erupted,
Japan was governed by its politically weakest leadership of the
postwar era, and it had great difficulty in forming a coalition
with the opposition-the Democratic Socialist Party and the
Komeito-to support its response. The public was polarized.
Japan had not witnessed such a divergence of views on an issue
of this magnitude for thirty years past. Slow and cumbersome
decision-making was the result, which only benefited Japan's
powerful bureaucracies and served the status quo. In the end
crisis. the government proved totally unfit to respond quickly in a
Japan nevertheless managed to be part of the international
coalition effort by making a $13 billion contribution. But it
could not make even the most modest contribution of man-
power, falling short of Korea's dispatch of 150 medics and the
Philippines' 190 doctors and nurses. Certainly many Japanese
are pleased that the national consensus finally solidified
against sending troops abroad. Many feel that Japan did what
it could and that the Japanese themselves, as well as foreigners,
should not expect too much of Japan. Moreover the $13
billion, made possible only by a tax increase, was not negligible.
Yoichi Funabashi is a diplomatic correspondent and columnist for the
Tokyo daily Asahi Shimbun. This article was adapted from the forthcoming
Japan's International Agenda, sponsored by the Japan Center for Interna-
tional Exchange.
hi Funabashi
JAPAN AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 59
It was more than Japan's annual foreign aid program, its
ORLD ORDER
Official Development Assistance (ODA), which ranks first in the
world.
The Gulf War was a unique phenomenon. The war itself
crystallized and magnified issues that Japan should have
: reality, and the
addressed long ago. For Japan the crisis was, in a way, a day of
In the moment of
reckoning. It broke out precisely when the gap was most
f merely an auto-
pronounced between Japan's underdeveloped political capac-
k before dispens-
ity and its seemingly uncontrollable economic expansion. The
power inevitably
outcome was shocking, rudely awakening Japan to its inability
out to be a mate-
to cope with a crisis affecting its vital interests. The lesson was
seem to subscribe
that the international environment in the 1990s will no longer
allow Japan to follow the same one-dimensional economic
nifestation of the
strategy it has single-mindedly pursued for the past forty
n's ruling Liberal
years.
et's upper house,
II
ulf crisis erupted,
In the postwar era Japan's image of itself as a small,
leadership of the
strategically naked and economically fragile island nation
rming a coalition
gradually changed as it became a respected member of the
ist Party and the
world community. Japan's inclusion in 1975 as a founding
ic was polarized.
member of the Group of Seven (G-7) leading industrialized
views on an issue
nations helped transform the Japanese public's perception of
and cumbersome
its own country. A decade later Japan's self-image as an
benefited Japan's
economic power was supplanted by the image of Japan as an
quo. In the end
economic superpower, as Japan suddenly found itself the
ond quickly in a
world's largest creditor nation. And now with the end of the
Cold War and the advent of a more polycentric world, the
the international
perception of Japan as a global power should become even
tribution. But it
more widespread.
ibution of man-
Ironically, as Japan's international power has advanced, the
) medics and the
underpinnings of its political and economic systems have been
many Japanese
called into question. Japan's rapidly aging population, unique
finally solidified
lifelong employment system, homogeneous social fabric, "plu-
Japan did what
tocratic collusion" among leading industries, speculative "bub-
ell as foreigners,
bles and bursts" in financial markets, and complacency have all
reover the $13
been pinpointed as vulnerabilities or signs of decline. But it is
as not negligible.
still too early to deliver such a verdict. Japan has a proven
capacity to adapt to new international environments, as hap-
1 columnist for the
pened with the Meiji Restoration and the post-World War II
reconstruction.
m the forthcoming
Center for Interna-
Japan's strategic premises are nonetheless basically condi-
tioned by a historical sense of vulnerability and are the legacies
60 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
of traumatic defeat and a determination to be reborn. These
legacies are many, yet the following stand out: adaptation and
"catch-up," concentration on economic gains, following the
lead of the United States and absence of regional strategy.
Throughout its modern history Japan has felt isolated in
world affairs. This heightened sense of Japan as "latecomer"
or "odd man out" on the world scene contributed to its familiar
foreign policy behavior: inward-looking exceptionalism (ultra-
nationalism in prewar days and "one country pacifism" in the
postwar era) coupled with desperate efforts to catch up to
those ahead of it (rectification of unequal treaties in the Meiji
period and "GNP-ism" after World War II).
Confined by this mindset, Japan has seldom tried to present
itself as a rule-maker in the world community. The rules were
already there. Japan simply tried to adapt to them and, if
possible, excel at playing the game. When faced with difficulty,
however, it tended simply to ignore or reject those rules
altogether. But the world order is a given, and Japan a reactor
par excellence. In the words of one Japanese political scientist,
"The world is nothing but a 'framework' or the setting which
can change only mysteriously."¹
Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda's (1976-78) "equidistance
diplomacy" in large part reflected this psychological block
against defining Japanese priorities in foreign policy. Japan's
apparent obsession with its status in the world also testifies to
its lack of will in defining its own self-image and world role.
Postwar "economism" or "GNP-ism" was a strategy used to
eschew political involvement. Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki's
(1980-82) characterization of Japan as the "10 percent nation"
(ichiwari kokka)-a nation occupying 10 percent of world GNP-
and his call for Japan to make a greater international contri-
bution also revealed how the nation perceives its status and
even the world itself in quantitative terms, while conspicuously
avoiding a qualitative definition.
Recently Japan's former vice minister for foreign affairs,
Takakazu Kuriyama, has argued for a new Japanese diplo-
matic posture with the phrase "foreign policy of a major power
with an unassuming posture." But this thrust for a new foreign
policy posture is still expressed by attitudinal concepts rather
than strategic ones. Shintaro Ishihara's much publicized book,
'Kyogoku Jun'ichi, Gendai minishusei to seijigaku, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969, P. 170.
JAPAN AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 61
be reborn. These
The Japan That Can Say No, merely worsened the situation for,
ut: adaptation and
as the book's title indicated, it was a rejection, not a projection,
tins, following the
of a national psyche.
egional strategy.
Today Japan's increased weight and stake in the world has
as felt isolated in
in turn increased the world's stake and interest in Japanese
an as "latecomer"
strategy and policy. But the gap between Japan's foreign policy
outed to its familiar
projection and the expectations placed on Japan by other
eptionalism (ultra-
countries has widened to a precarious abyss. The call for Japan
"Y pacifism" in the
to bear a full share of the burden to sustain the world system
ts to catch up to
has intensified. For Japan the essential question is now this:
eaties in the Meiji
For what purpose should Japan assume a larger share of the
burden? Japan must now define its objectives and world role
m tried to present
more clearly than at any time in the past forty years. It can no
y. The rules were
longer merely respond to the international environment and
to them and, if
measure itself quantitatively. Such a task will severely chal-
ed with difficulty,
lenge Japan's long-standing strategic premises and policy
eject those rules
foundations. But Japan is now a key pillar of the global order
d Japan a reactor
itself, no longer merely an actor within it, and Japanese policy
political scientist,
must reflect that change.
the setting which
III
'8) "equidistance
The Japanese people almost unanimously supported the
chological block
nation's postwar mercantilist strategy and enthusiastically com-
n policy. Japan's
pelled it for four decades. Japan's postwar determination,
d also testifies to
symbolized by the "Peace Constitution," was so overwhelming
that nearly all the nation's energy and resources were mobi-
and world role.
lized exclusively for economic reconstruction and expansion.
strategy used to
Military and security issues were constantly placed on the back
Zenko Suzuki's
burner, and certain other noneconomic policy goals, such as
I percent nation"
international peacekeeping and human rights, were never
t of world GNP-
vigorously pursued.
rnational contri-
But this postwar strategy of economic expansion became
es its status and
increasingly untenable by the mid-1980s. First, the scale of the
le conspicuously
Japanese economy and its overseas penetration caused politi-
cal repercussions that forced Japan to respond politically as
foreign affairs,
well. The voluntary restrictions on automobile exports to the
Japanese diplo-
United States throughout the 1980s was one such example.
f a major power
Second, Japan's creditor status compelled it to endorse many
or a new foreign
international programs with strategic implications-Latin
concepts rather
American debt relief, east European recovery, Middle East
publicized book,
peacekeeping-changing the nature of its economic diplo-
macy. At the same time, louder criticism of Japan's "checkbook
Shoten. 1969, P. 170.
diplomacy" was also likely to be heard. Finally, Japan increas-
62 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ingly acquired and developed militarily relevant technology,
transforming the nation's strategic significance. Japan's long-
standing nonmilitary strategy was based on its status as "have-
not" in terms of indigenous military resources. But that
premise has been shaken. Japan now clearly belongs to the
club of "haves" possessing a key military resource: technology.
Japan's postwar economic miracle required U.S. protection.
The U.S.-Japanese alliance provided both national security
and an economic market for Japanese products. For many
Japanese the lesson became clear: Japan prospered while
following the lead of the world's most liberal economic power.
A strategy of following was thus born, came to be cherished
and eventually developed into a kind of axiom.
That strategy changed somewhat under Prime Minister
Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-87), when Japan began to seek a
higher profile and broader role in world politics. Nakasone's
commitment to the Western alliance, based on the assumption
that global security was "indivisible," reflected Japan's search
for a leadership role. His "high yen" strategy helped lay the
groundwork for the G-7's 1985 "Plaza accord" and inaugu-
rated Japan's new role as a world banker. At the G-7's Venice
summit in 1987 Nakasone changed policy to provide for fiscal
expansion and paved the way for Japan's new task as an
"absorber" country, a market power. Yet the Japanese leader-
ship's habit of viewing the world through the prism of U.S.-
Japanese relations still limited the scope of its foreign policy.
Overdependence on its bilateral relationship with the
United States undermined Japan's creative diplomacy by clos-
ing off avenues to other foreign policy initiatives. Accustomed
to the deep-rooted hierarchical relationships in Japanese soci-
ety, Japanese leaders found it difficult to execute an effective
foreign policy based on equality. The leadership developed a
psychology of dependency-a tendency to view America as a
big brother-and failed to assert a distinctively Japanese
foreign policy, in effect inviting foreign pressure, or gaiatsu.
This new word, coined solely to denote this phenomenon,
indicates the degree to which foreign pressure has affected
Japanese political culture.
Gaiatsu, however, causes problems. Foreign pressure does
not help generate healthy policy debates or create a sound
political milieu for Japan to promote foreign policy initiatives.
It shifts the focus of debate away from what Japan should do
in its own best interests and toward what other countries want
) Europe
JAPAN AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 63
well connected
it to do. For this reason it often arouses nationalistic sentiments
and infuses issues with emotion. It also provides a "cover" for
certain Japanese to pursue their own policy agendas (e.g.,
sending Self-Defense Forces abroad) under the guise of policy
coordination, particularly with the United States. Gaiatsu pol-
itics thus undermines U.S.-Japanese relations, because it tends
to perpetuate a patron-protégé relationship and a love-hate
cycle between the two nations.
Japan's postwar strategy was also affected by the bankruptcy
of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Its failure
created profound political and psychological inhibitions for
Japan. Whenever Japan tried to assert itself and assume a
regional leadership role, Asian leaders recalled its culpability
in the Second World War and repeatedly warned of its "new
ambition" and aspiration toward becoming a "military giant"
once again. Japan was handicapped by the lack of an institu-
tional economic and military framework for cooperation in the
Asian-Pacific region, such as NATO and the EC in Europe, which
helped West Germany overcome the constraints on its regional
policies. The Japanese government's attempt to send Self-
Defense Forces abroad during the Gulf War was one such
example. It was met with suspicion and opposition from other
Asian nations that feared possible consequences of Japanese
power projection.
Since regionalism was so tainted, Japan became one of the
few countries in the modern world with truly global interests.²
ed traveler will tell you the best way
Regionalism was seen as both bad politics and bad economics.
ope is with a native. And since
It implied political domination by an ambitious hegemon as
cated right in the heart of it, you
ne is in a better position to take you
well as by an economic bloc that would destroy the free-trading
e have 88 European destinations,
system. Unlike its prewar concentration on Asian markets,
n all U.S. airlines combined.
Japan was encouraged to devote itself to engaging the U.S.-led
here's always an experienced
global economic framework. It thus diversified its export
nearby to help with almost any-
markets but came to develop a special link to the United States.
last-minute travel plans, advice on
client for dinner, even to tell you
While Japan still heavily concentrated its ODA on Asian neigh-
S to Rome. Combine that with
bors, who received more than 60 percent of all aid, it never
aralleled on-board service and
developed a comprehensive regional policy.
d why, at Lufthansa, we offer you
Renewed interest in a regional strategy has emerged in
<perience anywhere in the world.
recent years. Global economic developments have forced Ja-
pan to entertain "new thinking" about the Asian-Pacific eco-
ansa
nomic framework. An aggressive bilateral U.S. trade policy has
Robert A. Scalapino, "Perspectives on Modern Japanese Foreign Policy," The Foreign
nt in the mileage programs of United. Delta.
See your Travel Agent for details.
Policy of Modern Japan, University of California Press, 1977, p. 399.
64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
strained the multilateral trading system that Japan has taken
for granted and within which Japan has prospered. European
Community integration, the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade
Agreement and now the prospect of a North American Free
Trade Agreement that also includes Mexico have caused
Japan to reconsider its previous regional restraint. European
integration, for example, can be viewed as a classic "challenge-
response" case. EC integration was in part driven by the
challenge from the dynamic economies of Japan and its
Asian-Pacific neighbors. But European integration has in turn
challenged Japan. A unified Germany as the nucleus of the EC,
coupled with the specter of eastern Europe as the new frontier
of an even more colossal Europe, have only served to sharpen
that sense of challenge.
World political developments also lead Japan to take stock of
its regional strategy. The sudden recession of the shared
perception of a Soviet threat-the glue of the U.S.-Japanese
mutual security mechanism-the prospect of U.S. military
disengagement and the need to incorporate the People's
Republic of China and the Soviet Union as responsible re-
gional players add momentum in Japan toward broader Asian-
Pacific cooperation. In the multipolar world after the Cold
War an effective regional framework could provide each
country with a sort of safety net. But questions arise: How
viable is Asian-Pacific regionalism, politically and economi-
cally? Can Japan assume a leadership role there? And, more
generally, what is Japan's role in the already existent system?
Some influential business leaders, such as Yotaro Kobayashi,
argue for Japan's "re-Asianization." It is only natural, Koba-
yashi proposes, that Japan should find its "home" in Asia, in
the same way that Mikhail Gorbachev has said Russia should
find its in Europe. Kobayashi has suggested that Japan explore
the possibility of playing a role as regional "co-chairman" with
China.³ Although he stresses the importance of U.S. partici-
pation in Asian regionalism, other political and business lead-
ers urge stronger Asian ties regardless of the United States.
These voices could fan the embers of anti-Western, and
particularly anti-American, feeling among Japanese. Japan's
historical modernization process has been pendulous, vacillat-
ing first toward the West, then back to the more familiar East.
'Yotaro Kobayashi, "Japan's Need for Re-Asianization," Foresight, April 1991.
JAPAN AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 65
that Japan has taken
prospered. European
And today Japan's soul-searching for the proper self-image
nadian Free Trade
and regional and global roles is still haunted by its past swings.
North American Free
IV
Mexico have caused
I restraint. European
Japan's international agenda for the 1990s must respond to
S a classic "challenge-
a variety of new issues and challenges. Japan must establish a
new image of itself in the world, one that expresses its
part driven by the
cherished values and self-enlightened interests. This need not
S of Japan and its
be a radical process, but rather a conscious effort on the part
tegration has in turn
of the nation to develop itself incrementally. Japan's unortho-
he nucleus of the EC,
dox power portfolio ("economic giant" and "military dwarf")
e as the new frontier
should not be viewed as an unstable and transitional phenom-
ly served to sharpen
enon; its deep-rooted pacifism should not be treated as mere
escapism, although its more eccentric elements have some-
ipan to take stock of
times been refered to as "Kamikaze pacifists." On the contrary
ion of the shared
this very portfolio presents Japan with the opportunity to
the U.S.-Japanese
define its own power and role in the radically changing world
t of U.S. military
ahead. Emergence of a more internationalist and actively
rate the People's
engaged Japanese pacifism could play a constructive role in
as responsible re-
making Japan a global civilian power.
trd broader Asian-
For the first time in its modern history, Japan in the 1990s
Id after the Cold
will be substantially free of security threats from the north,
ild provide each
whether explicit or implicit, ideological or military. Although
stions arise: How
the post-Cold War world will surely see its share of small-scale
!ly and economi-
regional conflicts, and even wars, the Asian-Pacific area may
here? And, more
have a better chance to maintain peace than in the turbulent
existent system?
days of the 1940s (the Pacific War), the 1950s (the Korean
otaro Kobayashi,
War) or the 1960s (the Vietnam War).
y natural, Koba-
The widespread perception that the Gulf War actually
ome" in Asia, in
underscored the supremacy of military power should not alter
d Russia should
Japan's strategy of acting as a global civilian power. Japan
It Japan explore
should still search for various avenues to enhance its political
chairman" with
power through economic strength, not military might. Such a
of U.S. partici-
strategy could again stimulate the perception of the changing
d business lead-
nature of power in the world and the recognition and accept-
United States.
ance of Japan as a new power. Global interdependence and a
-Western, and
higher priority for economic statecraft benefit Japan. They
anese. Japan's
better suit its pacifistic strategy and enhance the levers avail-
lulous, vacillat-
able to the nation through financial and economic resources.
: familiar East.
Japan should take full advantage of such global developments
to pursue a broader set of policy goals aimed at promoting a
pril 1991.
world order more compatible to Japan's own self-image and
interests.
66 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Japan should therefore pursue two sometimes contradictory
strategies: active engagement for world peace and military
self-restraint. Its one-dimensional economic strategy must be
replaced by a more multifaceted, values-oriented policy. It is
time for the world's banker to design and contribute to an
international order based on something more than mere
economic growth. Japan should give higher priority to four
values as foreign policy goals: to act as a model for, and lend
assistance to, poorer countries in their own efforts for economic
and democratic development; international peacekeeping;
promotion of human rights; and environmental protection.
In particular a human rights policy has been problematic for
Japan. For various reasons Japan has been reluctant to place
human rights on its foreign policy agenda. Japan's foreign-
policy makers have not usually come under heavy pressure
from the nation's grass-roots movements. The dependence of
Japan's economy on a conservative and feudalistic Saudi
Arabia, as well as Japan's sensitive relationships with China
and the Republic of Korea, force it to think twice before
speaking out on human rights. Moreover Japan's sense of guilt
after World War II, especially toward China and Korea, puts
a psychological brake on criticizing human rights violations
and exerting diplomatic pressure. A vigorous human rights
policy is regarded as the luxury of countries such as the United
States and France, who were able to claim a kind of moral
superiority because of their victory in the war.
Such constraints will not easily disappear. But Japan has
begun exploring ways to set certain political conditions on its
economic aid policy. Tokyo has now placed four criteria-level
of military expenditure; potential for atomic, biological and
chemical weapons; arms trade and democratization-on fu-
ture aid to developing countries. Although the effectiveness of
this new approach remains to be seen, it clearly reflects the
stronger yearnings of the Japanese public.
An extremely delicate case concerns Japan's relationship
with China, as demonstrated by Japan's tortured diplomacy
following the Tiananmen Square incident. Although Japan
should be mindful of its strategic relationship with China, it
must still effectively convey Japan's aspirations for human
rights to Chinese authorities as well as the Chinese people.
Otherwise the Sino-Japanese relationship may come to be
viewed at home as well as abroad as a collusion between
apparatchiks of both ruling parties and the single-minded
JAPAN AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 67
nes contradictory
ace and military
pursuit of Japanese economic interests. Such an appearance
would not only undermine the value of the Sino-Japanese
strategy must be
nted policy. It is
relationship but also hinder any broader attempts by Japan to
contribute to an
pursue a more vigorous policy on human rights.
Protection of human rights will also be more crucial to
ore than mere
priority to four
peacekeeping efforts among nations in the 1990s as the world
el for, and lend
faces more ethnic and nationalistic conflicts. Ensuring that the
rts for economic
rights of minorities are respected and internationally moni-
tored is the most effective way to reduce the likelihood of
peacekeeping;
tal protection.
conflict. But Japan also has minority groups, although rela-
problematic for
tively small. Japan's human rights diplomacy first and fore-
most should be directed at its own minorities, particularly its
uctant to place
600,000-strong Korean community, in order to enhance their
ipan's foreign-
political and economic status.
eavy pressure
dependence of
Japan's expression of values in foreign policy must be
idalistic Saudi
matched by more strenuous efforts to make its own political
system more democratic, and its economic structure more
ps with China
twice before
open and liberal, so that Japan may serve as an example to
developing nations and make its institutions and practices
S sense of guilt
more compatible with like-minded democracies.
d Korea, puts
ghts violations
V
human rights
as the United
As part of a new foreign policy Japan also needs to initiate a
tind of moral
fuller global partnership with the United States. The U.S.-
Japanese "global partnership"-a new look designed at the
ut Japan has
spring 1990 meeting between President George Bush and
ditions on its
Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu-proved to be a non-starter only
riteria-level
several months later. Yet the concept should not be aban-
ological and
doned. Rather it must be further defined and developed as
tion-on fu-
Japanese foreign policy matures.
ectiveness of
Japan should not believe, however, that this means equal
reflects the
standing with the United States. The United States will be the
sole superpower in the 1990s. Its superior military resources
relationship
and logistics will probably make it the only country in the
d diplomacy
world capable of being a kind of "lender of last resort" in
bugh Japan
providing a security blanket in military crises. The relationship
between the two countries can best be characterized as mutu-
th China, it
for human
ally supportive. Yet it is not necessary or desirable that Japan
try to gain equal footing in sharing leadership. Japan's rela-
ese people.
tionship with the United States, as well as its world role, is
tome to be
on between
better defined as "supportive leadership." Its leadership role
gle-minded
should not be primary, but auxiliary, to U.S. global posture
and commitment.
68 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The Gulf War may have marked the return of an American
unipolar system, but it also demonstrated the need for the
United States to exert its leadership as part of a coalition. The
Gulf War was but one example of the types of threats the
world will confront in the future. Even a confident United
States will not always be able to cope with a diversity of threats
alone. The United States will be, at least for the foreseeable
future, subject to financial limitations. It will also have to pay
more attention to a wider range of issues that now qualify as
security matters-its economy, the environment, human rights
and drugs. These issues will pose problems for the traditional
pattern of U.S. hegemonic leadership, because they require
collective leadership and policy coordination. Finally, as Wash-
ington gradually disengages militarily from Europe and the
Asian-Pacific region, it will likely face isolationist sentiments at
home or, at least, milder domestic pressures to turn inward.
Japan's supportive leadership, therefore, should not be
viewed as simply following the United States, neither should it
be regarded as financial underwriting for U.S. military actions.
It should instead be seen as providing collective goods indis-
pensable in an age of collective leadership. Japan's major task
will be to stimulate U.S. interest in the open global trading
system. It must also manage the dollar so that the United
States will be able to overcome its twin deficits while maintain-
ing non-inflationary economic growth. Japan has an "absorb-
er" function as well, principally regarding neighboring Asian-
Pacific countries, in reducing the U.S. external trade
imbalance and lessening the U.S. burden.
The U.S.-Japanese security alliance should continue to be
the underpinning of a dynamic bilateral relationship and an
anchor of future Asian-Pacific security. Japan's alliance with
the United States is the third alliance Japan has forged in its
modern history. But unlike the Anglo-Japanese alliance in the
early part of the century and the Axis alliance with Germany
and Italy prior to World War II, the U.S.-Japanese alliance is
not a mere invention of realpolitik. It is a far more pervasive
engagement and a symbol of friendship and stability between
two societies. It can continue to function as such and help
stabilize the Asian-Pacific framework.
At the same time Japan's excessive reliance on its bilateral
relationship with the United States should be balanced by
strengthening its multilateral (the United Nations, GATT),
trilateral (G-7, OECD) and regional diplomacies (APEC). As more
JAPAN AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 69
urn of an American
constraints are placed on U.S. leadership and as the need for
d the need for the
policy coordination grows, both the United States and Japan
[ of a coalition. The
will need to search for wider options and alternatives to their
vpes of threats the
previous relationship. Japan's contribution to this task is the
1 confident United
essence of supportive leadership.
diversity of threats
for the foreseeable
VI
ill also have to pay
hat now qualify as
Japan must not delude itself that its identity can be devel-
ent, human rights
oped in purely regional terms, its economy sustained in an
for the traditional
Asian bloc and its political ambitions fulfilled in Asian-Pacific
ause they require
integration alone. Yet Japan must have a regional strategy.
Finally, as Wash-
Such a strategy must not be confined to Asia, particularly East
1 Europe and the
Asia, but widened to the Asian-Pacific rim, which includes the
onist sentiments at
United States. Its objective must be to keep the region open,
$ to turn inward.
peaceful and democratic. Regionalism for this purpose can be
:, should not be
called "Pacific globalism."
neither should it
In the coming years Japan's strategy of Pacific globalism
5. military actions.
should consist of three pillars:
ctive goods indis-
-to promote regional economic growth and development
apan's major task
as well as the liberalization and multilateralization of trade
'n global trading
and investment in the region;
that the United
-to enhance regional peacekeeping and peace-building
S while maintain-
mechanisms and measures by stimulating U.S. commit-
I has an "absorb-
ment and engagement; and
ighboring Asian-
-to incorporate the region's rapidly changing socialist
external trade
countries-the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam and North
Korea-as responsible players.
I continue to be
As for regional economic liberalization, Japan can sustain
tionship and an
and reinvigorate U.S. global trading interests and posture by
n's alliance with
infusing Pacific globalism into the aging globalism set in place
as forged in its
by the Atlantic Charter. Japan could accomplish this by pro-
e alliance in the
moting stronger interest in the Uruguay Round of the General
: with Germany
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and in the Asian-
anese alliance is
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). In doing so Japan can
more pervasive
play a constructive role in deterring European and North
tability between
American regionalism from becoming exclusivist and create a
such and help
more favorable milieu for Soviet and Chinese regional inte-
gration. Such a policy would also help mitigate inward-
on its bilateral
looking, nationalistic thrusts in Asian countries and calls for
e balanced by
their own restrictive regional grouping. A U.S. presence and
ations, GATT),
contribution is essential to the formation of any Asian-Pacific
APEC). As more
arrangement, and Japan should thus resist Malaysian Prime
70 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Minister Mahathir's call for an East Asian Economic Grouping,
because of its exclusivity.
While APEC is currently an embryonic organization, it could
gradually be transformed into a policy coordinating body.
Future annual meetings could be held at the head-of-state
level and timed to precede the G-7's annual summits. Japan,
with the United States and Canada, could then represent
APEC'S interests at these summits. When APEC matures it may
even be worthwhile exploring the possibility that its chief
attend G-7 summits, in a fashion similar to EC representation.
One way Japan could enhance APEC is by liberalizing its own
trade and economic systems and maintaining vigorous domes-
tic demand. A part of this effort should be to engage in a
multilateral Structural Impediments Initiative with the United
States and western Europe, preferably within the framework
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment. Japanese leadership for more open economic systems
must first be rooted in its own market liberalization. SII talks
target politically sensitive sectors of the Japanese economy,
such as banking, securities, distribution, transportation and
construction industries, which have more or less remained
untouched by the liberalization processes of the past three
decades. SII implementation will help lay the groundwork for
harmonization of Japan's economic and social system by grad-
ually breaking up the collusion of vested interests. By setting
an example in transforming its own noncompetitive struc-
tures, Japan could urge other trading partners to do the same.
Japan could also set in motion a new process of coordination
between the micro and macroeconomic policies of nations
within the G-7. Moreover it should cooperate with the United
States and western Europe to manage a more stable currency
relationship among the dollar, yen and European Currency
Unit. It will be crucial for all three parties to intensify their
efforts to promote future cooperation not only for economic
reasons, but for political and strategic reasons as well.
In the realm of security Japan is likely to continue to be
constrained from playing a leading role even in the 1990s. U.S.
leadership will still be required to stabilize the region, and U.S.
bilateral alliances with certain nations, particularly Japan and
Australia, will remain necessary to anchor the regional security
framework. Japan's role will be as a support. But that role
should be pursued in the name of broader regional security,
rather than Japan's security alone.
Studies
USS
JAPAN AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 71
While the United States and a reinvigorated United Nations
are indispensable to fostering a better security climate, Asian-
ollowing areas:
ciates and commission researchers
Pacific countries themselves must discuss security matters
ity
more directly with one another. The problem for Japan's
ian Security
regional security may lie with Japan itself. Japan's reluctance
Asian Security
to face up to its past colonization of Korea, invasion of China,
of Indo-China
domination over Southeast Asia and guilt for war crimes-and
curity
its feeble effort to educate its people about this history-
institutions and Conflict Management
:curity Perceptions in ex-Communist
generate deep suspicion and mistrust all over Asia. This
reluctance also creates complacent and self-indulgent views of
e invited to apply for the Institute's
Japan's history among Japanese themselves. Japan's new na-
tionalistic thrusts, though still amorphous, may gather mo-
losed 6 study and a chapter outline.
reference to be forwarded
mentum and run a dangerous course if not soon checked and
relevant field and have full
redressed. This perception that Japan has not come to terms
: to:
with its own past puts a fundamental obstacle before its pursuit
$11 7NQ, United Kingdom
of an effective regional policy.
Japan must also pursue an effective peace structure for
y 1992. Selections will be made
will commence on 1 October 1992.
Northeast Asia. Such a structure, however, should not copy
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Asia's
security environment and political configuration are too dif-
ferent from Europe's. In Asia, particularly in Northeast Asia,
U.S. PORTAL Service
* OWNERSHIP. MANAGEMENT. AND CERCULATION
(Required by 39 U.S.C. MRS)
it is more realistic to build multilayer security regimes. Confi-
REIGN AFFAIRS. IS Publication No: 00157120
dence-building measures should be introduced on the Korean
-d Annually: $
*tember. December, February, April. June (5)
Peninsula under the auspices of an Asian "two plus four":
nce: $32.00
: sa of E. publication (Street, City. County. State and ZIP Code) (No
North and South Korea along with the United States, the
60d Street, New Yerk. NY M0021
stars or general business offices of de publisher (Not printer): -
Soviet Union, China and Japan.
1. treases New of Yerk. publisher, aditor. and managing aditor: Publisher:
021: NY 10021: Editor: William G. Hyland, SS E Daniel
It is also advisable that concerned parties-the United
Managing Editor: Peter Gross, . E 68th Street, New - Yet,
States, Canada, the Soviet Union, Japan, China and the
" sporation, and its name and address - be canced and also
lock. addresses of meckholders - or helding I I
be not owned by # corporation. the names and addresses percent - of
Koreas-begin to undertake a reduction of military capabili-
*** as that of each individual - be give , the
as given. well , owned by . partnership or other unincerporated
ties in the region. Northern territory areas could eventually be
69th organization, its - and address - be meand. publics. Comet
Street, New York, NY 10021.
demilitarized and a free economic zone introduced that incor-
ads. cages, and other security holders owning - bolding I percess .
montgages, or other accepties: Name.
TT fanction. organizations authorized to and . special rates (DMM Section
porates Soviet maritime provinces and a free port at Vladivos-
- tax and scaprofe - of this organization and the
DOB purposes have not changed during preceding 12 months a
tok. The U.S. naval nuclear presence could be reduced,
Average no. copies
each - during
Actual as. copies of
proportionate to a reduction of the Soviet land and nuclear
proceding 12 meachs
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scarest to Sing date
Ram)
arsenals and Soviet logistical capabilities. The United States-
126,982
ADOB:
134,780
carriers,
Japan Security Treaty, however, should be maintained as an
miss
16,330
13,373
96,688
106,128
anchor of regional stability.
Expensed
113,818
With regard to China, Japan and the United States should
THE .
119,981
encourage China, as a regional power, to participate in Asian-
WD, of
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Pacific economic expansion. But both the United States and
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3,661
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126.982
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join in opposing the "human rights imperialism of the United
by - there - atted and complete.
David Kelings,
Publiching Director
72 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
States." Japan also has a deep-rooted cultural and psycholog-
ical affinity toward China that may take political shape,
spurred by mounting frustration over "Japan-bashing" in the
United States. But Japan should refrain from trying to estab-
lish an exclusive "special relationship" with Beijing.
Finally, Japan's relationship with the Soviet Union (or the
Russian republic) may be normalizing. This is due to a possible
settlement of the still unresolved Northern Territories issue. If
such a settlement finally comes to pass, economic development
in Siberia and the Soviet Far East could gain momentum with
an infusion of Japanese capital and technology. Yet it is more
advisable for Japan to explore ways to multilaterize develop-
ment of the region.
VII
Japan's own political constraints affect its pursuit of a
dynamic foreign policy. It took the gulf crisis to bring many of
these shortcomings into stark relief. Tokyo lacked initiative
and policy innovation, global institutions through which it
could effectively pursue its policies, the acceptance of its
leadership by its neighbors, and recognition of the contribu-
tion it could make to responsibility-sharing stemming from its
unique power portfolio.
Japan must thus examine its own political and decision-
making structures to try to overcome these constraints. Japa-
nese societal and behavioral patterns and attitudes clash with
the need for sometimes quick and dynamic formulation and
implementation of foreign policy. The structural weaknesses
of its leadership-highly personalized political allegiances
among factions and parties, and the predominance of pork-
barrel politics-characterize Japanese political culture and
limit the projection of its foreign policy. These shortcomings
may also be destabilizing factors in world financial markets.
The inability of Japan's leadership to cope with the unrealis-
tically high prices of land and stocks, for instance, has already
caused a dangerous bubble-and burst-in Japanese financial
markets, putting a grave strain on Japan's macroeconomic
policies.
Japan's consumers, particularly its urban dwellers, increas-
ingly find a gap between Japan's economic wealth and the
quality of their standard of living, which sharpens their
political awareness. But in addressing this gap Japan's bureau-
crats and politicians have become a part of the problem rather
JAPAN AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 73
al and psycholog-
than problem-solvers. The bureaucracy and its symbiotic "pol-
political shape,
icy tribes" in the ruling LDP have formed "iron triangles" with
n-bashing" in the
protected industries to resist fundamental economic and social
n trying to estab-
reforms.
Beijing.
The immobility of Japan's decision-making process is well
et Union (or the
exemplified by ubiquitous gaiatsu politics, which helps main-
due to a possible
tain the existing political order by blaming foreigners (often
erritories issue. If
Washington) for uncomfortable accommodations. Future for-
nic development
eign policy success is thus essentially a function of overcoming
momentum with
the immobility of the Japanese system. This immobility is the
y. Yet it is more
product of institutional and cultural factors that include a
aterize develop-
bottom-to-top, consensus-oriented decision-making process,
the supremacy of "domesticists" over the internationalists, and
the need for domestic political institutions to achieve parity in
burden-sharing.
S pursuit of a
Japan cannot ultimately develop an effective international
) bring many of
role without a significant measure of domestic political change.
'acked initiative
Japan still has only one political party capable of ruling. The
rough which it
opposition does not have the psychology and policy positions
ceptance of its
required of a governing party. The quasi-coalition among the
of the contribu-
LDP, Democratic Socialist Party and Komeito in the gulf crisis
nming from its
was a telling example of political immaturity. A viable two or
multiparty system is yet to evolve.
and decision-
Yet the initiative for change must come from politicians, not
astraints. Japa-
from bureaucrats. The politicians must press for long-overdue
ides clash with
political and electoral reform in order to assure better repre-
rmulation and
sentation of the "silent majority" of its big-city constituents-a
ral weaknesses
huge bloc of voters with a keener sense of Japan's enlightened
al allegiances
self-interests. The politicians must start lively and constructive
lance of pork-
debates to enhance the development of meaningful policy
I culture and
proposals not dependent on the bureaucracy. They may have
shortcomings
a better chance to do so in the coming years, now that the
ncial markets.
ideological overtones of the security issue-so characteristic of
1 the unrealis-
Diet debates in the Cold War era-are fading.
e, has already
Japan will see a generational change in the leadership of all
nese financial
its major political parties in the next decade. More interna-
acroeconomic
tionally minded, confident and self-assertive leaders will ap-
pear among the top echelons. At the same time new political
llers, increas-
forces-women, the elderly, consumer and environmental
alth and the
groups as well as local governments-will increasingly gain
arpens their
momentum. Some of these political forces will push Japan
ban's bureau-
toward a more active foreign policy-for example, strong
oblem rather
overtures toward the Pacific Soviet Union by certain prefec-
74 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
tures on the Sea of Japan, pressures to open agricultural
markets from Japanese consumer groups. But others may
counter with emphasis on domestic issues involving "quality of
life."
Japan may have to wait for this new generation of leaders,
political parties and social forces in order to persuade its public
that "quality of life" is increasingly linked to the stability and
welfare of global security and economic systems-systems to
which its voice and commitment contribute. But the national
debate already appears to be starting. The painful lessons of
the gulf crisis have helped to stimulate public interest and
demands for the political reforms necessary for Japan to
realize fully its new international role. A world power, after all,
is a power with a commitment to others. Japan's path to
power-as a global civilian power-must start with the com-
mitment to reform from within and, increasingly, that seems
destined to be the will of the public.