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Speech Backup Alphabetical Files
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This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
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Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
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Speechwriting, White House Office of
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Speech File Backup Files
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Arms Control, 1990
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2
7
ROLE OF ARMS CONTROL AND THE SNF MODERNIZATION
ISSUE
While Arms control can not dominate our acquisition decisions, it must be considered.
Understanding how the equipment fits into the larger security picture and how it could be
affected in future negotiations allows us to work smart in arms control and to accomplish
both our short and longer national security goals.
VISION AND ROAD TO THE FUTURE: What we want to accomplish through Arms
Control and SNF Modernization should be guided by our vision of our future national
security posture. With the rapid changes in the Soviet/WP countries it is imperative that we
examine now our potential paths and not take a wait and see attitude before acting.
POLITICAL IN NATURE: We must not forget that politics will drive both the arms
control and SNF modernization process. This is true for our government and that of our
allies.
UNDERSTAND OUR ALLIES: The reality that our allies can accept or reject some or all
of our SNF modernization plans must be considered now. We do not want a repeat of the
1977 rejection of the enhanced radiation round for Lance after it was developed. We have
the opportunity to learn the sensitivities of our allies from the work that went into the
NATO Comprehensive concept and our work in CFE. These understandings and the
sensitivities can provide the basis for their acceptance of the SNF modernization program.
MEET THE NATO COMMANDERS MISSION: As we heard from Gen Galvin's remarks
this morning, he is in the unique position to know what is required militarily and how this
should be accomplished politically. Though it is not his role to develop systems his
knowledge of the political and military environment should impact accordingly on the
acquisition process and vision for the role of SNF arms control.
AVOID THE THIRD ZERO: In all scenarios, we must work hard to insure we are not
pushed to a "third zero" for ground to ground systems. We will not have a creditable
deterrence with just dual capable aircraft and/or sea launched systems. As we observed
with our INF systems, deterrence is enhanced with the visible presence and operational
capabilities of ground based systems.
AVOID LETTING THE SOVIETS CAPTURE OUR TECHNOLOGY: The Soviets over
the years have worked hard to capture or impede our high technology systems. In INF they
worked hard to eliminate the PII: a system whose accuracy has yet to be equaled in any of
our other missile systems. The technology in SDI was a major factor in bringing the Soviets
back to the negotiating table. Though there will be reductions in SNF we must protect those
high tech systems such as the ATACMS and MLRS critical to our future military posture.
AVOID NAVAL ARMS CONTROL: The Soviets will raise Naval Air and Sea based issues
in SNF arms control. We must persevere and resist negotiating. Sea power is critical to our
ability to project power, sustain forces in Europe and provide reinforcements in time of
crisis. While some suggest that we should at least talk about naval arms control in a CSBM
forum, this would be a real slippery slope that once we begin, would be difficult to halt or
walk away from. Now, we have the moral high ground on this issue and we must not lose it.
SNF IS ONLY ONE OF THE WHOLE: SNF arms control must be considered in the
context of negotiations that have been completed (INF) or those now under way (START or
CFE). The agreed methods of verification and compliance from these other treaties will be
folded into any SNF agreement. It is the totality of the politics associated with these other
treaties that will frame the political course that can be taken in an SNF treaty.
DEBATE NOW: As we are doing today, at this conference, we need further debate on this
issue -- the issue of political acceptability of SNF modernization and SNF arms control.
Doing so will allow us to think through the environment that will exist after SNF and choose
the course that will guide our negotiations.
UNDERSTAND THE CHANGES COMING IN THE FUTURE
POLITICAL: After CFE I, it will not be business as usual. We must broaden our vision
and understand both the military and political impacts that will result from this event. If
we have lower force levels with measures that increase stability, as is our goal, we will find
that the fear of the threat will no longer dominate our defense requirements. In this
environment, it is crucial that we articulate a vision that insures the necessary role of the
military in the broader text of our security interests, and that this vision sustain needed
support for the military in this new environment.
MILITARY: The military will have to rapidly adjust to this change and work to articulate
its new requirements. Failing to do SO quickly will result in diminished military.
NEED FOR POLITICAL FLEXIBILITY: In a changing environment, politicians do not
like to be faced with "either" "or" solutions. They need room to maneuver and so it will be
with the SNF modernization issue. Some technical options will provide more flexibility than
others. Providing this flexibility will better insure that SNF modernization is accomplished.
DEVELOP "WIN-WIN" POSITIONS: We must make acquisition and arms control
decisions that place us in a win-win position where we have the needed systems of strength
prior to and after a treaty. We can not lose more than the Soviets and where possible
should be in a position to reduce the Soviets more than us, as we did in INF. Here we not
only eliminated the Soviet INF nuclear weapons but captured the their chemical and
conventional capability. We have this opportunity in SNF and should take advantage of
this.
CONCEPT VS TECH AND FORCES MIXES: In emerging technologies possible force mix
options are important. However, the need for a concept that provides the framework for
integrating these into the military strengthening is what will result in the needed
contribution to the long term security of Europe.
TIME TABLE SET BY MANY: The time schedule for SNF arms control negotiations is
not under our sole control. How fast SNF occurs will be determined by many factors.
Experience has shown that both related and un-related internal and external factors will
drive the negotiations. More important than the timetable is our ability to stay on the
charted azimuth to achieve our goals for the future.
CONCLUSION: SNF arms control will not be easy. We must set our goal, of reducing the
Soviet capability to the maximum while increasing overall stability. To do this we will need
SNF modernization programs that minimize the political impact and maximize the military
capability. It is clear that there will be tradeoffs in both areas if we want to accomplish our
goals.
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
(Contact Joe Duggan, 202-647-4153)
WARSAW PACT MUST ACCEPT COMBAT AIRCRAFT LIMITS,
BUSH ARMS CONTROL ADVISER SAYS
Aug. 17 (Thursday) - President Bush's special advisor on arms control today
challenged the Warsaw Pact to remove a major stumbling block to a treaty reducing
conventional forces in Europe. Ambassador Edward L. Rowny called on the Warsaw
Pact to accept NATO's proposed limits on all aircraft with combat capability and drop
its position that "defensive" aircraft be excluded from cuts.
Addressing the national convention of the American Council for Polish Culture in
Philadelphia, Rowny said that NATO and Warsaw Pact negotiators in Vienna are "close
to agreement on ceilings of tanks, artillery pieces, armored troop carriers and
helicopters. But we're far apart when it comes to how to define and count combat
aircraft.
"The fact is, modern jet fighters are highly versatile. Strap-on pods and rapid
retrofit kits can transform an air defense interceptor into a ground attack fighter in a
matter of hours. Variations of the same jet fighter are often observed on the same
airfield, some configured for ground attack and some for air-to-air combat.
Multi-capable combat aircraft are the rule rather than the exception in virtually all of
today's modern air forces.
"By the Warsaw Pact's self-serving definition, only the East has exempt 'defensive'
aircraft while NATO has none. The Eastern Bloc seeks to include all NATO aircraft in
the treaty-limited category while excluding as many as half of their own planes. This is
strongly reminiscent of the traditional Soviet approach to arms control: 'What's mine is
mine; what's yours is negotiable!'
"NATO's aircraft proposal makes sense and is a position that will lead to greater
stability. It is simple it embraces the notion that any aircraft with combat capability
is considered a combat aircraft. It is verifiable -- it locks in given types of aircraft and
counts all variants the same. It is more than skin deep it moves beyond simply
assigned missions and addresses an aircraft's inherent capability for offensive action.
"NATO's proposal makes the aircraft issue easy to solve. If the Soviets and their
Eastern counterparts are truly serious about achieving a good conventional arms
reduction treaty, they will recognize the NATO proposal on aircraft for what it is: a
logical means of strengthening security in Europe.
"President Bush has challenged NATO and Warsaw Pact negotiators to complete a
CFE treaty within one year. Before the CFE talks went into recess last month, NATO
presented its framework agreement two months ahead of schedule. When the talks
reconvene in September, we are hoping the Warsaw Pact will join us to work
constructively and with a sense of urgency. The President has pushed to the top of his
agenda the core security problem of Europe -- the conventional imbalance. If the
Soviets truly exhibit 'new thinking,' we can change the military map of Europe."
The T Backgrounder
Herîtage Foundation
No.
The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002 (202)546-4400
725
September 1, 1989
A U.S. AGENDA FOR THE
CONVENTIONAL FORCES REDUCTION TALKS
Next week, after a brief summer recess, the United States and its North
Atlantic allies resume negotiating in Vienna with the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact
to reduce conventional (non-nuclear) military forces in Europe. Known as
the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations, the talks will
begin again on September 7.
These talks potentially are the most important in which the two sides are
engaged. They aim to produce a treaty setting equal ceilings on the number
of tanks, artillery, armored troop carriers, aircraft, helicopters, and perhaps
manpower that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw
Pact can deploy in Europe.
Because the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies now enjoy
tremendous advantages over NATO in conventional forces, reductions to
equal levels would improve dramatically the security of America's West
European allies if they continue to field modern forces of their own. Under
terms already agreed to, the emerging CFE accord would require the Warsaw
Pact to dismantle over 30,000 tanks, 25,000 armored troop carriers, and
between 20,000 and 30,000 artillery pieces; by contrast, the West would have
to make relatively minor reductions.
Optimistic Timetable. In addition to its potential to improve NATO
security, CFE could serve U.S. interests by allowing the U.S. to withdraw
from Europe significant numbers of forces without damaging Alliance
security. CFE also could weaken the Soviet Union's hold over Eastern
Europe by requiring the withdrawal of between 250,000 and 325,000 of the
roughly 600,000 Soviet troops now stationed there. George Bush said in June
that he wants to complete a CFE agreement within six months to a year. His
timetable, however, may be optimistic. The two sides have yet to agree on
Note: Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an
attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
such basic issues as how much equipment each side now deploys in Europe,
what types of aircraft to count, and precisely how to define regional "zones"
where special limits would be placed on military forces. Other key issues,
including how to verify a CFE agreement, have not yet seriously been
addressed.
Remarkably swift progress nevertheless has been made since CFE talks
opened this March 9. Moscow has agreed to the Western proposal to reduce
each side's forces to somewhat below NATO's current levels; this means
much greater cuts for the Warsaw Pact than for NATO. Both sides too are in
accord on the precise number of tanks and armored troop carriers to be
permitted under treaty limits. Further, Moscow now has accepted NATO's
basic framework for a treaty, including the proposal for setting separate limits
that would reduce Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe.
Challenges for NATO. Even if successful, of course, CFE will not resolve
all of NATO's political or military dilemmas and could create new ones.
Example: NATO's force cuts would not be very great, which means that the
West would have to continue expensive military modernization programs at a
time when a CFE accord would be signalling relaxed East-West tensions.
How NATO responds to such challenges will determine CFE's ultimate
success. On balance, though, a verifiable CFE accord along the lines
proposed by NATO should serve U.S. interests and improve NATO's
security. As the second round of CFE talks opens, Bush should:
Put CFE at the top of the U.S.-Soviet agenda, publicly making it a
litmus test for Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Among all the items on the
U.S.-Soviet agenda, including strategic arms reductions talks (START), CFE
is the best test of Gorbachev's sincerity and reliability as a negotiating
partner.
Require the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare options for cuts of
up to 75,000 of the 305,000 U.S. air and ground forces now based in Europe,
in the event a CFE treaty is signed and implemented.
Hold firm against Soviet attempts to exclude most Soviet warplanes
in Europe from the CFE negotiations.
Accept only an accord that allows the U.S. to continue storing
equipment in Germany and elsewhere to support rapid U.S. reinforcement
of the Alliance.
Design and insist upon an effective CFE verification and monitoring
plan.
Propose a five-year CFE treaty limit. This would encourage NATO
to assess regularly Soviet compliance with a CFE treaty and the overall affect
CFE on Alliance security.
Not permit Moscow to tie conclusion of a CFE accord to the opening
of arms control talks on naval forces or short-range nuclear forces (SNF).
2
Gorbachev must reduce his conventional military threat to Europe before the
U.S. or its allies consider arms control measures that could jeopardize NATO
security.
Warn the allies against premature military cutbacks in anticipation
of CFE.
Continue to exercise strong NATO leadership on CFE, even if this
annoys some allies. Britain and France, for instance, remain bitter over
Bush's push to include aircraft in negotiations; they maintain aircraft cuts
should have been saved for possible CFE follow-up talks. But with sixteen
NATO nations involved in CFE talks, U.S. leadership and initiative are
essential to keep negotiations moving forward.
Create a NATO High Level Group to evaluate the Alliance's military
requirements in the event of a CFE accord; encourage allies to take the lead
in planning for post-CFE European defense.
Require the Joint Chiefs of Staff to begin a thorough evaluation of
U.S. global strategy in the event of a CFE accord. The Joint Chiefs should
plan for a shift in the U.S. role in NATO defense away from providing large
numbers of ground forces and toward providing primarily naval nuclear
forces.
WHAT IS CFE?
Sitting around Vienna's CFE negotiating table are the sixteen members of
the NATO alliance and seven members of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. The
objective of the negotiations is to limit conventional forces in Europe,
including tanks, artillery, armored troop carriers, aircraft, helicopters, and
some troops. 1
Toward Equal Limits. CFE is an ambitious undertaking. Its geographic
scope stretches from the Atlantic shores of Western Europe to the Ural
Mountains, 1,500 miles into Soviet territory. The negotiations are guided by
the principle of "asymmetric reductions" to equal levels and capabilities.
This means that the Warsaw Pact, which has more weapons than NATO, will
be required to dismantle more weapons than NATO to come down to equal
limits that are below NATO's current levels. This negotiating principleopens
the way for an agreement.that-will-cut-mainly Soviet forces, which comprise
1 Helpful studies on conventional arms control include: Robert D. Blackwill, "Conceptual Problems of
Conventional Arms Control, International Security, Spring 1988; Stephen J. Flanagan and Andrew Hamilton,
"Arms Control and Stability in Europe: Reductions are Not Enough," Survival, September/October, 1988;
General John R. Galvin, "Some Thoughts On Conventional Arms Control, Survival, March/April 1989; and
Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thomson, eds, Conventional Arms Control and the Security of Europe (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1988).
3
NATO and Warsaw Pact CFE Proposals Compared
Overall Limits
Sufficiency
Stationing
Limits
Limits
Tanks
NATO:
20,000
12,000
3,200
Warsaw Pact:
20,000
14,000
4,500
Artillery
NATO:
16,500
9,900
1,700
Warsaw Pact:
24,000
17,000
4,000
Armored
NATO:
28,000
16,800
6,000
Carriers
Warsaw Pact:
28,000
18,000
7,500
Aircraft
NATO:
5,700
no limit
no limit
Warsaw Pact:
1,500
1,200
350
Helicopters
NATO:
1,900
no limit
no limit
Warsaw Pact:
1,700
1,200
600
Manpower
NATO:
no limit
no limit
275,000*
Warsaw Pact:
1,350,000
920,000
350,000
*U.S. and Soviet forces only. NATO proposal from Western CFE Delegations' Paper, March
6, 1989. and U.S. Department of Defense, Conventional Arms Control Update, (Army Staff,
unpublished briefing).; Warsaw Pact proposal from The Arms Control Reporter, July 1989, p.
407.B.195.
the bulk of the Warsaw Pact's military inventory. If CFE succeeds along the
lines now being negotiated, it will entail destroying over 100,000 pieces of
major military equipment now in the inventories of the two sides.
Agreement: The Basic Outlines of a CFE Accord
NATO came into the negotiations with a position paper outlining an
agreement incorporating four types of armaments limitations. 2 By the end of
June, Moscow had accepted this basic framework in principle, although the
Soviets presented their own numbers and other details for each type-of
limitation, some of which conflict with NATO's. 3 The four types of limits
that both sides have agreed to include in an accord are:
1) Overall limits. These are restrictions on the total amount of equipment
- tanks, artillery pieces, armored troop carriers, aircraft, and helicopters -
that either side could deploy in Europe. The limits are different for each
type of weapon, and each side would have to come down to equal levels set
somewhat below NATO's current levels for each type of equipment. Moscow
agrees with NATO's limits for two key types of equipment: tanks to be
limited to 20,000 and armored troop carriers to 28,000. Using NATO's
2 Western CFE Delegations' Paper, released March 6, 1989 in Vienna.
3 See Text of Eastern CFE Proposal, tabled March 9, 1989, JCS Information Service Center; Address of WTO
States to NATO States, TASS, June 11, 1989 (NATO official translation).
4
figures on the existing East-West military balance, the 20,000 tank limit
would mean that Moscow would have to dismantle 31,500 of its 51,500 tanks
in Europe; NATO would have to dismantle 2,224 of its 22,224 tanks.
2) Sufficiency limits. These are restrictions on the percentage of either
side's allotted military equipment that could be fielded by any one country.
NATO proposed sufficiency limits primarily to restrict the portion of Soviet
forces within the Warsaw Pact's overall allotment, but the same restrictions
would apply to U.S. or West German or any other country's share of NATO's
overall equipment limits. Gorbachev surprised NATO in late May by
accepting the principle of sufficiency limits, although Moscow's proposed
limits differ somewhat from NATO's. 4 NATO would limit any one country to
30 percent of the total of both side's combined equipment holdings;
Moscow's limits vary at somewhat higher levels averaging about 35 percent.
Sufficiency limits would affect mainly the Soviet Union, which now has 54
percent of the tanks, 48 percent of the armored troop carriers and 57 percent
of the artillery now deployed by both sides from the Atlantic to the Urals. 5
3) Stationed forces limits. These are limits on the amount of equipment
that the countries of either side could deploy in Europe outside their own
territory. NATO proposed stationed forces limits primarily to curtail the
number of Soviet forces that could be deployed in Eastern Europe. These
limits also would apply to NATO equipment (including American, British,
and French equipment stationed in Germany) that could be deployed in
Europe on foreign territory. Example: Under NATO's proposal only 3,200 of
either side's overall limit of 20,000 tanks could be "stationed" tanks; thus
Moscow, the only Warsaw Pact country with troops deployed outside its own
territory, could deploy no more than 3,200 tanks in Eastern Europe, roughly
7,600 fewer than it stations there today. Similarly, the sum total of NATO
tanks deployed on foreign territory within Europe (primarily American,
British, and French tanks stationed in Germany) also could not exceed 3,200.
4) Zone limitations. These are restrictions on the numbers of forces that
could be deployed by either side in specific geographic regions, or zones,
carved out of the treaty area from the Atlantic to the Urals. Zone limitations
are designed to force each side to spread out its forces geographically so that
they can not be concentrated in any one area for an attack. Example:
NATO's proposal carves out three progressively smaller zones within the
Atlantic-to-the-Urals region. In the zone that includes on the Warsaw Pact
side Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland, the Warsaw Pact could
station only 8,000 of its 20,000 tanks and 4,500 of its 16,500 artillery pieces.
4 Michael Gordon, "Moscow Supports U.S. on Troop Cuts," The New York Times May 25, 1989, p. 9.
5 Phillip A. Karber, testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, April 6, 1989 (BDM Corporation
reprint), p. 9.
5
Differences in NATO Versus Warsaw Pact Force Estimates
NATO Estimates
Warsaw Pact Estimates
Troops
NATO: 2.2 million
NATO: 2.9 million
Warsaw Pact: 3.1 million
Warsaw Pact: 3.2 million
Aircraft
NATO: 6,700
NATO: 5,450
Warsaw Pact: 13,500
Warsaw Pact: 5,355
Helicopters
NATO: 2,200
NATO: 5,270
Warsaw Pact: 3,500
Warsaw Pact: 2,785
Tanks
NATO: 22,224
NATO: 30,690
Warsaw Pact: 51,500
Warsaw Pact: 59,470
Artillery
NATO: 17,328
NATO: 57,060
Warsaw Pact: 43,400
Warsaw Pact: 71,560
Armored Troop Carriers
NATO: 28,800
NATO: 46,900
Warsaw Pact: 53,500
Warsaw Pact: 70,330
Figures based on latest NATO estimates according to Defense Department Sources. See
also Conventional Forces: The Facts, NATO Document, November 25, 1988; Warsaw Treaty
Organization and North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Correlation of Forces in Europe, Moscow:
Novosti Publishing, 1989.
NATO would be subject to identical limits in an area encompassing Belgium,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany.
NEGOTIATING HURDLES
1) How should the balance be measured?
Before the CFE talks began, NATO and the Warsaw Pact each presented
their own data on the equipment and troops deployed by the two sides in
Europe. The data revealed numerous discrepancies in the two side's public
portrayal of the military balance (see Table above.). In some cases, such as
helicopters, the Soviet count inexplicably inflated NATO's holdings. In some
cases, part of the difference can be explained. Example: Moscow's figures
count NATO's Bradley infantry fighting vehicles in the tank balance while
excluding its own infantry fighting vehicles; NATO counts only heavy tanks
like its own M-1 Abrams and Soviet T-80 in the tank category. To date
NATO negotiators have found their Soviet counterparts generally unwilling
or unable to provide an adequate explanation of how they arrived at their
figures. 6 But even after such differences are taken into account, say NATO
negotiators, most of Moscow's figures do not add up. Both studies are
expected to produce revised and updated figures this fall.
6 This and other observations based on author's interviews with Defense Department, State Department, and
National Security Council officials involved with the CFE negotiations.
6
2) At what levels should equipment limits be set?
The two sides disagree over what levels to set for overall limits, sufficiency
limits and stationing limits for most categories of equipment. Examples:
NATO calls for overall artillery limits of 16,500, while the Warsaw Pact
proposes 24,000; NATO calls for stationing limits of 3,200 tanks while the
Warsaw Pact wants 4,500. Generally, Moscow seeks somewhat higher limits
than NATO, particularly for limits that would restrict Soviet forces deployed
in Eastern Europe.
3) Which aircraft should be included in negotiations?
NATO initially resisted Moscow's calls for limits on aircraft and helicopters
on the grounds that negotiations first should focus on ground equipment
capable of seizing and holding NATO territory. Bush changed the American
position at the May NATO summit, proposing to include aircraft and
helicopters in the negotiations; NATO agreed on July 13.
The two sides remain far apart on the issue of which aircraft to include in
negotiations. Moscow wants to include only "strike" aircraft, which it defines
as aircraft equipped to attack targets on the ground. It seeks to exclude
"defensive interceptors" used to shoot down other aircraft in air-to-air
combat. But since most NATO aircraft, such as the F-16 Fighting Falcon, are
used for air-to-ground and air-to-air combat, virtually all NATO aircraft
would be subject to restrictions under Moscow's proposal. But roughly 9,000
Soviet aircraft (by NATO's count) would be excluded under the Soviet
proposal, including combat-capable training aircraft and modern fighters like
the MiG-31 Foxhound.
NATO proposes counting all interceptors and attack aircraft equally as
"combat aircraft" and subjecting them to limitations. NATO points to the
inherent unfairness of a Soviet proposal that excludes by definition 9,000 of
its own combat aircraft, each capable of shooting down NATO aircraft no
matter whether they are designated "defensive" or "strike" by Moscow.
Further, the Soviet distinction between "defensive interceptors" and "strike"
aircraft does not hold up under scrutiny, since even 8 interceptors could be
outfitted to attack ground targets during wartime.
7 See Michael Gordon, "Arms Pact on Fast Track," The New York Times, May 30, 1989; Theresa Hitchens,
"NATO Rushes New Troop Cut Plan to Vienna Two Months Early," Defense News, July 17, 1989, p. 42.
8 See Peter Adams, "Arms Control Agreement May Hinge on Definition of Air Defense Aircraft," Defense.
News, August 7, 1989; Edward L. Warner 3d and David A. Ochmanek, "Arms Talks: The Plane Truth," The
New York Times, June 1, 1989, p. 23.
7
4) What kind of manpower limits should CFE include?
NATO has not agreed to the Warsaw Pact's proposal to place an overall
cap on manpower. Alliance leaders are concerned that Moscow could use
manpower limits to restrict West European reinforcement and reserve troops
critical to manning NATO's defensive line in the event of a Warsaw Pact
attack. As a result of a Bush initiative at the May NATO summit, NATO has
agreed to bring manpower into the negotiations. NATO proposes a limit of
275,000 on U.S. troops and Soviet troops stationed on foreign territory in
Europe. 9 But Moscow insists that this limit, which it would set at 325,000,
should be imposed not just on U.S. and Soviet troops, but on the total of all
troops from either alliance stationed in Europe outside their own territory.
Because NATO relies on an international force of over 400,000 American,
British, French, and other allied troops in West Germany as its front line of
defense, it has rejected these limits.
5) How should stored equipment be counted?
Both sides agree that all military equipment in Europe, whether stored or
deployed with active forces, would be included in overall equipment limits
set under a CFE agreement. The two sides disagree, however, about whether
stored equipment would be further restricted by "stationing limits" on the
amount of equipment that countries can deploy outside their own territory in
Europe and "zone limits" that put regional ceilings on equipment
deployments between the Atlantic and the Urals. The Warsaw Pact says
those ceilings should apply to active and stored equipment; NATO says they
should apply only to equipment with active forces.
The issue is important because Moscow's formula would force the U.S. to
withdraw most of its'stored equipment from West Germany. U.S. equipment
stored or "prepositioned" in Germany is crucial to NATO strategy because it
permits the U.S. to reinforce the Alliance 10 rapidly simply by flying in troops to
match up with equipment already there.
Remote Storage. NATO's CFE proposal is designed not only to permit the
U.S. to keep its stored equipment in West Germany, but also to encourage
the Warsaw Pact to put large amounts of its own equipment in storage.
9 See "Bush Proposes Cutback in U.S. Troops in Europe," The Washington Post, May 30, 1989, p. 1.
10The U.S. is supposed to store enough equipment in West Germany to outfit the six U.S. divisions (these
stores actually may only be about 2/3 full) that the U.S. plans to fly to Germany to reinforce NATO quickly at
the first sign that war is imminent. Without this stored equipment in Germany, the U.S. would have to ship the
equipment for these divisions to Europe, making rapid U.S. reinforcement of NATO all but impossible.
Moscow has no need to store large amounts of equipment near the front in Europe because it quickly can
reinforce its front-line forces with equipment sent via rail from the Soviet Union.
8
NATO's zone proposal calls for both sides to keep about 20 percent of its
equipment either in storage or in regions far from the central front in
Germany. For NATO, this remote region would include Iceland; for the
Warsaw Pact, it could be the Soviet Transcaucasus military district on the
Caspian Sea. NATO wants Moscow to put equipment in storage because it
would be easier to count and monitor than equipment kept with active
divisions. Moscow has resisted this proposal. Compromises may be possible
by which some equipment kept 11 with active units would be kept in designated
areas and closely monitored.
6) Should a CFE agreement be tied to negotiations on naval forces and
short-range nuclear forces?
Official Soviet pronouncements on CFE consistently tie successful
conclusion of a CFE treaty to the opening of negotiations to limit naval
forces and short-range nuclear forces (SNF), such as the U.S. Lance
missile.
12
Moscow long has sought ways through arms control to limit
superior U.S. naval forces and to force the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear
weapons from Europe. The U.S. and its NATO allies consistently have
rejected naval force limitations because the U.S. has global naval obligations
and because NATO relies so heavily on the U.S. navy for reinforcement
during wartime. Although West Germany has been at odds with the other
major allies on whether to open SNF negotiations, NATO agreed at its May
summit that it would not enter into these negotiations until Moscow has
begun conventional force reductions through CFE. 13
7) How will a CFE treaty be verified?
Adequate verification will be the key to ensuring improved Western
security under a CFE treaty. Neither side has yet proposed a full verification
plan, although NATO is expected to have one ready when negotiations
reopen on September 7. NATO's proposal is likely to include measures for
observing and counting deployed forces through such means as aircraft
overflights, satellite reconnaissance, and direct "on site" inspection by teams
of observers.
11See R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Weighs New NATO Arms Storage Plan," The Washington Post, July 29, 1989, p. 9;
Peter Adams, "NATO Hopes Stored Materiel Overcomes Geographic Liability," Defense News, July 3, 1989, p.
3.
12See address by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Schevardnadze in Vienna, March 6, 1989, TASS press
release. See also, R. Jeffrey Smith, "Soviet Advisor Hints at Potential Mobile Missile Deal," The Washington
Post, July 24, 1989, p. A18.
13See NATO's Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament, adopted by NATO heads of state,
Brussels, May 29 and 30, 1989, p. 11. West Germany, alone among the major NATO allies, favors immediate
SNF negotiations but agreed to the U.S. position at the May 29-30 NATO summit contingent upon U.S.
agreement to seek a CFE accord within "six to twelve months." Comprehensive Concept, p. 11. If an accord is
not reached in that time, Germany is likely to break ranks with NATO again on this issue.
9
American officials indicate that the most important part to an effective
verification and monitoring plan will be a Soviet willingness to give a full
prior accounting, detailed to the level of individual combat units, of the
location and status of all its equipment and forces in the Atlantic to the Urals
region. Moscow would be required to update this regularly by reporting any
changes in the location or status of those troops, including their level of
readiness, removal of equipment from storage, troop movements, or weapon
modernization.
With this information and with sufficient surprise on-site inspection
procedures in place, NATO could spot check any military unit anywhere in
the reductions area and know the status and makeup of the forces that were
supposed to be stationed there. Any variations between what is found in an
area and what should be there would trigger more inspections that
presumably would reveal further violations of the agreement.
So far, Moscow has not provided a precise and detailed accounting of how
and where its forces are deployed. Nor is it certain that Moscow will open its
territory to virtually unlimited on-site inspection. Both will be necessary
components of an effective CFE verification plan.
HOW CFE COULD BENEFIT THE WEST
A CFE accord could end NATO's decades-old disadvantage of military
inferiority in the European theater and could establish parity. NATO thus
would be more secure militarily than it is now if it modernizes and maintains
the conventional forces allowed it by an agreement. In addition to
evening-up the odds for NATO, CFE would end what has been NATO's
nightmare over the past decade: the threat of a surprise attack. CFE could 14
trim Soviet forces enough to make a surprise attack extremely difficult
CFE also would benefit the West by forcing the withdrawal of between
250,000 and 325,000 Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. This would
political
encourage forces for democracy by reducing Moscow's ability to intimidate
East European governments and by making it difficult for the Soviets to
intervene militarily in Eastern Europe without violating the treaty.
European Concerns. For America, CFE would be an opportunity at last to
withdraw substantial forces from Western Europe. This would occur under
military conditions significantly less threatening than they now are and would
make it easier for America's European allies to compensate for the reduced
number of U.S. troops. Under the West's CFE proposal at least 30,0000 U.S.
forces would be withdrawn from Europe; within the Bush Administration and
14See Karber, op. cit.
10
in Congress cuts of up to 75,000 are being advocated whether required by
treaty or not. 15 This prospect understandably is viewed with concern by many
Europeans.
For Gorbachev, CFE likely is consistent with his plans to field a somewhat
smaller but better organized and more modern military force. He also may
hope to create a climate of relations with the West more conducive to gaining
Western financial and technological help to resuscitate the faltering Soviet
economy. Over the longer term he may hope to set in motion events that
would lead to a complete U.S. military disengagement 16 from Europe and the
withdrawal of U.S. nuclear forces from the continent.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To ensure that a CFE accord serves American and Western rather than
Soviet objectives, Washington faces immediate and longer-term challenges.
First, the U.S. will have to work with its allies to negotiate a verifiable treaty
that brings genuine parity to the East-West conventional military
confrontation in Europe. If a CFE treaty is achieved, the U.S. will face the
longer-term task of reducing its military presence in Europe while
maintaining NATO's political cohesiveness and military effectiveness. Bush
should begin working now toward these immediate and longer-term goals.
The Immediate Agenda: A Sound Treaty
In the short-term, Bush's objective is to ensure a sound and verifiable CFE
treaty. To achieve this he should:
Put CFE at the top of the U.S.-Soviet agenda; make it a key litmus
test for Gorbachev.
If Gorbachev is serious about reducing the military threat to NATO, CFE
is his opportunity to prove it. Unlike strategic arms reductions or most other
nuclear arms negotiations, CFE cuts to the heart of NATO's security
problem by reducing the basic tools of warfare - tanks, artillery, and
armored troop carriers - with which Moscow would invade the West. It
therefore is the best test of Gorbachev's sincerity and reliability as a
negotiating partner.
Insist on including all aircraft in CFE negotiations.
The West initially did not want to include aircraft in the CFE negotiations
and agreed to do so only at Moscow's insistence. Moscow cannot now
15"Budget, Troop Cuts May Revamp Military," Chicago Tribune, June 23, 1989, p. 1.
16See Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Yasuhiro Nakasone, and Henry A. Kissinger, "East-West Relations," Foreign
Affairs, summer 1989, and Christopher Coker, "CFE: The Soviet's Hidden Agenda," European Security Analyst,
July 1989, Institute for European Defense and Strategic Studies.
11
reasonably expect to exclude over 9,000 of its own warplanes from the
negotiations on the grounds that they are "defensive interceptors," when they
clearly can be used for offensive as well as defensive purposes.
Negotiate a proposal that permits the U.S. to keep stored or
"prepositioned" equipment in West Germany.
Currently equipment for up to six American divisions is "prepositioned" in
West Germany. Without this, the U.S. would not be able to reinforce NATO
quickly during a crisis.
Propose a five-year CFE treaty limit.
Even though the CFE treaty is expected to contain provisions designed to
deter Moscow from threatening NATO in ways not restricted by a CFE
accord (example: by building up conventional forces east of the Ural
Mountains where they would not be limited by a CFE treaty), these
provisions will not guarantee NATO security. The reason: If Moscow cheats
on a CFE accord, it may be difficult politically for NATO to withdraw from
the agreement. But if a CFE treaty must be renewed every five years, NATO
will be forced to assess periodically Soviet compliance with the letter and
spirit of the accord.
Design and insist upon an effective CFE verification and monitoring
plan.
This plan would have to include at a minimum provisions for: 1) a full prior
accounting by both sides of the precise status and stationing of all
CFE-limited equipment or troops; 2) notification of exercises, troop
movements, changes in force composition or stationing, and weapons
modernization; 3) on-site inspection procedures sufficient to detect patterns
of violation; and 4) storage and permanent monitoring of a fixed percentage
of CFE-limited equipment.
Not permit Moscow to tie conclusion of a CFE accord to the opening
of naval or short-range nuclear (SNF) arms control talks.
Moscow still is threatening to hold a CFE deal hostage to the opening of
talks on naval forces and short-range nuclear forces. Because NATO relies
much more heavily than Moscow on naval power to reinforce and support
Western Europe and globally, naval arms control is not in U.S. or NATO
interests. SNF negotiations should not begin until after a CFE accord has
been signed and reductions are underway. NATO cannot risk further nuclear
disarmament until Moscow reduces its overwhelming conventional military
advantage through CFE or unilaterally.
12
Warn the allies against premature military cutbacks in anticipation
of CFE.
Many of the same conditions that may make CFE possible, including
economic and political upheaval in the Soviet Union, also make this a
potentially dangerous and unstable period for Europe. NATO cannot afford
to relax its defenses at this time, particularly since Moscow continues to
increase production of such key conventional military equipment as tanks and
artillery, despite assertions to the contrary by Soviet leaders. Meanwhile
NATO allies, who spend proportionally only half of what Americans spend
on defense, already have begun scaling back conventional military spending
and key programs. 17
Continue to lead on CFE within the Alliance.
To safeguard U.S. and Alliance interests, the U.S. must keep negotiations
moving forward even at risk of alienating close allies. Bush demonstrated his
ability to do this when he rallied the Alliance behind him to overcome
French procedural objections at the opening of negotiations in March, and
again when he gained Alliance support in the face of French and British
objections for his proposal to include aircraft in the negotiations. France in
particular has shown signs of dragging its heels on CFE, and French officials
make it clear that CFE is as worrisome to them as it is promising because it is
likely to bring U.S. troop withdrawals and, consequently, necessitate a greater
French role in NATO defense. 18 If France or other allies put unreasonable
obstacles before a CFE accord, Bush as a last resort should let it be known
that the U.S. will pursue some troop withdrawals regardless, either
unilaterally or through a separate U.S.-Soviet deal.
Longer-term Agenda: Prepare for NATO Defense After CFE
Even if the two sides reach a CFE agreement, NATO and the U.S. will face
important military choices and opportunities. To prepare for these Bush
should:
17See Senator John McCain, "Hard Steel Belies Gorbachev's Soft Words," Defense News, July 24, 1989, p. 35.
See also Jacques Isnard, "France Details Defence Budget Cuts," Jane's Defence Weekly, June 3, 1989, p. 1035;
Theresa Hitchens, "Deficit-wary Belgians Trim Defense Budget," Defense News, July 31, 1989, p. 6; Theresa
Hitchens, "W. German Defense Budget: More is Really Less," Defense News, July 31, 1989, p. 4. Only Britain
among major allies is increasing its defense spending substantially.
18Author's discussions in Paris and Washington with French Defense and Foreign Ministry officials.
13
Require the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare options for cuts of
up to 75,000 U.S. troops in Europe in the event of a CFE treaty.
A verifiable CFE treaty along the lines proposed by the West would
improve NATO's military position, allowing the U.S. to reduce the cost of its
NATO commitment by withdrawing some troops from Europe. Under
NATO's present proposal the U.S. would have to withdraw 30,000 of its
305,000 ground and air force now in Europe. This would save 19 the U.S.
roughly $2 billion a year if these troops are fully demobilized.
Cuts of up to
75,000 U.S. troops from Europe after CFE would save the U.S. roughly $5
billion annually. Cuts of this size would be likely to require compensating
measures by European allies, such as moving more European troops to the
front. But given that Americans pay proportionally double what most
European allies pay for defense, it is fair that the U.S. expect the lion's share
of savings from CFE.
While NATO's negotiating position need not change, the U.S. should put
its allies on notice that it will withdraw up to 75,000 troops, or about 1 2/3
divisions and supporting units after a CFE accord is signed and fully
implemented. Bush should provide details of the cuts and a timetable for
withdrawals as soon as a treaty is signed so allies will have the opportunity to
adjust their defense plans accordingly.
Create a NATO High Level Group to evaluate the Alliance's
post-CFE military requirements and how they will be met.
A High Level Group is NATO's most senior defense decision-making
forum and is responsible directly to NATO foreign ministers. CFE will
change Europe's military landscape: Soviet forces will be smaller but likely
more modern and better organized; the U.S. presence will be reduced,
perhaps substantially; NATO's defensive line will be thinned out somewhat,
and eventually NATO's short-range nuclear forces are liable to be reduced.
A NATO High Level Group should begin planning for these changes and the
possibility of greater force cuts through follow-on CFE talks.
Issues for the Group to discuss include questions about the viability of
NATO's strategy of "forward defense" after CFE cuts and possible further
U.S. troop cuts. "Forward defense" requires NATO to defend a line as close
as possible to the East-West German border. NATO also will have to
consider such issues as what kind of European-based nuclear force will be
needed in the event of CFE.
Further, Europeans will have to face some politically difficult military
issues. West Germany, for example, may have to consider erecting barrier
defenses along the border with East Germany, an option long rejected
9Congressional Budget Office Staff Working Paper, "The Budgetary Effects of The President's Conventional
Arms Proposal," June 1989.
14
because it would symbolize Germany's division. France might consider
reintegrating its forces into NATO's military command and taking up
positions along NATO's central front in Germany, questions not thought
about seriously in Paris since France quit NATO's military command in 1966.
Require the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to begin a thorough evaluation
of U.S. global strategy in the event of a CFE accord.
When the Pentagon took a look at U.S. long-term strategic priorities last
year, it recognized a need to focus defense efforts increasingly on a "wider
range of contingencies" than the defense of Europe, particularly since West
Europeans are capable of doing more for their own defense than they now
20
are.
The Joint Chiefs should plan for a shift in the U.S. role in NATO
defense away from providing large numbers of ground forces deployed in
Europe and toward providing primarily naval and air forces, reserve
manpower and, of course, nuclear forces. In this context, the withdrawal of
75,000 U.S. troops from Europe would be the first step in a realignment of
America's military strategy. Even after this realignment is complete, the U.S.
should remain an active member of NATO and its integrated military
command, and should continue to station some ground forces permanently in
Europe along with air, naval and nuclear forces as a sign of its commitment to
the defense of Western Europe. This realignment is necessary if the U.S. is
to continue dealing effectively with challenges from Moscow and regional
powers outside the NATO region, particularly in the Pacific.
CONCLUSION
The emerging CFE accord has tremendous potential to improve the
security of America's West European allies and to advance such U.S.
interests as cutting back its ground forces in Europe and triggering the retreat
of hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. Tough
negotiating, however, lies ahead.
It will be up to Bush to ensure that key negotiating issues are resolved to
NATO's satisfaction, including verification, rules for counting aircraft, and
ensuring that CFE does not prohibit the U.S. from storing critical
"prepositioned" equipment in Europe. Bush also will have to hold the line
with sometimes difficult allies, encouraging them to keep up their defense
efforts while negotiating, and continuing to take a strong stand against
opening talks on short-range nuclear forces until after CFE is signed and
reductions have begun.
20Discriminate Deterrence: Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Fred C. Ikle and Albert
Wohlstetter, co-chairman, January 1988, p. 2.
15
Making NATO More Secure. If NATO and the Warsaw Pact reach an
equitable and verifiable CFE accord, the U.S. can reduce the military cost of
its NATO commitment by withdrawing up to 75,000 ground and air force
troops from Europe and turning over to the West Europeans greater
responsibility for their own defense. Even with some U.S. withdrawals, the
drastic reductions that CFE would require in Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces
will make NATO dramatically more secure if the allies plan well and field a
modern force after a CFE agreement.
If NATO plans well for the future, a CFE treaty could be the historical
turning point in the West's quest to make Europe "whole and free," and
immune to threats from the East. If, on the other hand, Europeans are lulled
into a false complacency by CFE and allow their defenses to wither, a CFE
accord ultimately will work to Moscow's advantage, no matter how skillfully
Western negotiators do their job in Vienna.
Jay P. Kosminsky
Policy Analyst
Heritage Interns James Kostohryz and Benjamin Kaminetzky assisted in the research for this study.
All Heritage Foundation papers are now available electronically to subscribers of the "NEXIS" on-line data
retrieval service. The Heritage Foundation's Reports (HFRPTS) can be found in the OMNI, CURRNT, NWLTRS,
and GVT group files of the NEXIS library and in the GOVT and OMNI group files of the GOVNWS library.
16
ARM S Conspor
DRAFT
Themes on Resumption of Nuclear and Space Talks
On June 19, the United States and the Soviet Union resumed the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms in Geneva. Ambassador
Richard Burt, the chief negotiator for the Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks, heads the U.S. delegation. Ambassador Henry
Cooper is the chief negotiator for the Defense and Space Talks.
--
Our objective in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)
and the Defense and Space Talks is to conclude verifiable
agreements that will improve our security while enhancing
stability and reducing the risk of war.
In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, our emphasis will be
on creating a more stable nuclear balance and strengthening
deterrence by reducing and constraining those strategic
nuclear forces which pose the greatest threat to our
security and stability.
We will pursue complementary goals in the Defense and Space
Talks, seeking an agreement on a cooperative transition to a
more stable nuclear balance that relies increasingly on
defenses.
Our proposals in the Strategic Arms Talks are for deep
reductions in strategic nuclear forces aimed at creating
disigned
a
more stable nuclear balance. The reductions we propose
are
would strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentives for
either side to launch a first strike, even in a crisis. We
are not seeking reductions for their own sake
The objectives of our START proposals are:
To reduce force vulnerability by reducing the
incentives to strike first, and by providing for
survivable retaliatory systems;
To curb specific threats to stability, including
currently deployed and emerging threats;
To foster predictability and lower the
uncertainties about the future strategic threats
that each side will face;
O
To verify effectively that the other side is
complying with the agreement.
We have already made significant progress toward a START
treaty: a 400 page joint draft treaty text reflects broad
areas of agreement between the sides. We intend to proceed
in this new round of talks on the basis of this document,
and will look for ways to reinforce our emphasis on
survivability and stability.
DRAFT
DRAFT
Verification is one of the most complex issues in the
negotiations, and one of the most critical to our security.
As part of our overall negotiating effort as the talks
resume in Geneva, the United States will also propose that
the two sides make a special effort to agree on, and begin
implementing as soon as possible, certain verification and
stability measures drawn from proposals that both sides have
already advanced in START or other contexts.
These measures will enhance verification of a START Treaty
and contribute to strategic stability. Early implementation
of them will speed resolution of outstanding issues, and
give added momentum to the efforts of our two countries to
conclude a START agreement.
Our approach to START and to our strategic force
modernization program are complementary and mutually
reinforcing. Maintaining credible and effective nuclear
deterrent forces is essential both to our security and to
our ability to negotiate sound and stabilizing agreements.
Both aim to ensure a more stable nuclear balance by reducing
the nature and scope of the threat to U.S. forces,
decreasing the vulnerability of our forces to the threat
that remains, and lowering the uncertainties in the
evolution of forces between the sides.
A successful START Treaty will not diminish our need to rely
on modernized, effective strategic forces for continued
deterrence. Indeed, our security would be reduced rather
than enhanced if we do not modernize our forces while the
Soviets continue to modernize theirs. We must continue to
pursue both our force modernization programs and arms
control, and not make the mistake of treating one as a
substitute for the other.
We will continue to insist that all the rights accorded by a
START agreement and the limits imposed by it will apply
equally to both sides.
In the Defense and Space negotiations, as in START, our
fundamental objective is to reduce the risk of war by
enhancing stability and predictability. We believe that
advances in technology offer new promise for developing
effective defenses to strengthen deterrence.
We will pursue discussions in the Defense and Space Talks
about moving cooperatively toward a more stable strategic
balance with increased reliance on strategic defenses,
should they prove feasible, and to preserve our options to
deploy advanced defenses when they are ready.
DRAFT
DRAFT
U.S. negotiators have worked toward a joint draft text of a
Defense and Space treaty building on the principles outlined
at the December 1987 Washington Summit. Last year, the U.S.
presented draft protocol provisions on predictability or
confidence-building measures in the field of strategic
ballistic missile defense.
Because stabilizing strategic arms reductions are in the
interests of both countries, we will not agree to allow the
completion of a START agreement to be held hostage to
completion of a Defense and Space agreement.
The previous administration left an excellent foundation
upon which to build. President Bush was part of that effort
when he was Vice-President. There will naturally be
considerable continuity in our approach to these
negotiations, but we reserve the right to make changes and
introduce new ideas in the course of the talks.
DRAFT
DRAFT
0 and A's
Q. You state that the U.S. reserves the right to introduce new
ideas in the draft START Treaty. Can you provide any specifics
as to what new ideas you might be considering?
A. -- I DO NOT HAVE ANY SPECIFICS AT THIS TIME: AS WE HAVE SAID,
THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION LEFT AN EXCELLENT FOUNDATION UPON
WHICH TO BUILD IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL, AND WE EXPECT THERE
WILL BE A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF CONTINUITY IN THIS
ADMINISTRATION. HOWEVER, AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE ALSO BEEN
REVIEWING U.S. STRATEGY IN THIS AREA AM WE WILL PRESENT PROPOSALS
ARISING FROM THE REVIEW TO THE SOVIETS AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME
NS,
Q. Can you tell us which elements of the Reagan Administration's
START position you are prepared to reaffirm?
A. -- AGAIN, THIS ENTIRE AREA HAS BEEN UNDER REVIEW IN
PREPARATION FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS. WE WILL HAVE
DETAILS AS THE TALKS PROGRESS.
Q. If the arms control review in this area is not yet completed,
how can you return to the Nuclear and Space talks?
A. -- MAJOR PORTIONS OF THE REVIEW ARE COMPLETE, WHILE OTHERS
ARE NEARING COMPLETION. OUR REVIEW OF MAJOR STRATEGIC ISSUES
WILL BE COMPLETED BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS ON THOSE ISSUES RESUME.
Q. Discussions of the U.S. START position seem to put less
emphasis on the concept of deep reductions. Is that a change in
the U.S. position?
A. THE U.S. GOAL HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF
NUCLEAR WAR, WITH REDUCTIONS IN THE NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF THE U.S.
AND THE SOVIET UNION A WAY OF REACHING THAT GOAL. THAT POSITION
HAS NOT CHANGED. WE SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD
RESULT IN GREATER STRATEGIC STABILITY, THUS REDUCING THE RISK OF
NUCLEAR WAR, NOT MERELY REDUCTIONS FOR THEIR OWN SAKE.
Q. Will the U.S. be introducing new ideas in the Defense and
Space Talks as well?
A. -- AS WITH START, WE EXPECT A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF
CONTINUITY IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS, BUT WE RESERVE THE
RIGHT TO MAKE CHANGES AND PRESENT NEW IDEAS HERE AS WELL. THE
PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED THAT OUR GOALS FOR SDI AND OUR APPROACH IN
THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS ARE SOUND AND REMAIN UNCHANGED.
DRAFT
SENT BY:Xerox Felecopier 7020 ; 6-15-89 4:48PM
2025471346-2023955221
DRAFT
Q. Will the START and Defense and Space talks be merged?
A. -- OUR NST NEGOTIATING STRUCTURE WILL NOT BE CHANGED. BOTH
SETS OF TALKS WILL BE RESUMING ON JUNE 19.
Q. Do full-scale negotiations actually begin on June 197
A. -- THE JUNE 19 SESSION WILL BE PRIMARILY AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MEETING. THE FIRST PLENARY SESSION OF ROUND XI WILL TAKE PLACE
ON JUNE 21.
Q. What are the major issues that remain to be resolved in START?
A. =- MAJOR ISSUES REMAINING TO BE RESOLVED INCLUDE:
o MOBILE ICBMs. [ THE U.S. CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT
MOBILE ICBMs SHOULD BE BANNED, UNLESS EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION
PROVISIONS CAN BE FOUND FOR LIMITATIONS ON THEM, IN WHICH CASE WE
WOULD CONSIDER ALLOWING A SMALL NUMBER OF MOBILE ICBMs. 11 or
((THE U.S. CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT LIMITATIONS ON MOBILE ICBMs
MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS. "
THERE HAVE BEEN INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS ON THIS ISSUE. WE HAVE
PROPOSED A VERIFICATION REGIME, AND THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE
PROPOSALS. WE HAVE SOME ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND, BUT THERE IS
NO AGREEMENT AS YET.
O ICBM WARHEAD SUBLIMIT. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT AGREED
TO A SUBLIMIT OF 3,000-3,300 ON THE NUMBER OF ICBM WARHEADS,
WHICH THE U.S. HAS PROPOSED TO ENSURE THAT A START AGREEMENT WILL
ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY THROUGH DEEP REDUCTIONS IN THESE
DESTABILIZING WEAPONS SYSTEMS.
o SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. AT THE WASHINGTON
SUMMIT THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF LIMITING DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE,
NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMs OUTSIDE THE 6000 WARHEAD AND 1600 STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLE LIMITS, AND TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
AND EFFECTIVE METHODS OF VERIFICATION OF SUCH LIMITS. DESPITE
OUR EXTENSIVE EFFORTS, THE U.S. HAS NOT YET FOUND WAYS TO
EFFECTIVELY VERIFY LIMITS ON NUCLEAR ARMED SLCMs. IN THE ABSENCE
OF A WORKABLE PLAN FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION, THE U.S. HAS
PROPOSED THAT THE SIDES SHOULD MAKE NON-BINDING DECLARATIONS OF
PLANNED NUCLEAR SLCM NUMBERS.
o AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. SINCE THE WASHINGTON
SUMMIT, IMPORTANT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON THIS ISSUE. THE
SIDES HAVE AGREED ON THE NEED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CATEGORIES
OF HEAVY BOMBERS WITH DIFFERENT ARMAMENTS, FOR THE RIGHT TO
CONVERT BOMBERS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER, AND FOR SOME OF THE
DRAFT
SEN
BY:Xerox
DRAFT
COUNTING RULES FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND THEIR ARMAMENTS. HOWEVER,
IMPORTANT ISSUES STILL NEED TO BE RESOLVED, INCLUDING THE NUMBER
OF WARHEADS TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR
NUCLEAR ALCMs, HOW TO TREAT HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR
CONVENTIONAL ARMS ONLY, HOW TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND
CONVENTIONAL ALCMs, AND THE RANGE THRESHOLD ABOVE WHICH
NUCLEAR-ARMED ALCMs WOULD BE SUBJECT TO START LIMITS.
SOVIET LINKAGE OF START TO ABM. THE U.S. BELIEVES
THAT START AND DEFENSE AND SPACE TREATIES MUST EACH STAND ON
THEIR OWN MERITS. THE CURRENT SOVIET POSITION, WHICH WOULD ALLOW
EITHER SIDE TO SUSPEND IMPLEMENTATION OF START REDUCTIONS IF THEY
CLAIMED THE OTHER SIDE HAD VIOLATED THE ABM TREATY, IS NOT
ACCEPTABLE. SUCH LINKAGE WOULD UNDERMINE THE CONFIDENCE NEEDED
TO UNDERTAKE FAR-REACHING START REDUCTIONS.
Q. Can a START agreement be achieved before the next summit?
?
A.
WHILE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARD AN
AGREEMENT, THE ISSUES WHICH REMAIN ARE COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT. WE
RETURN TO GENEVA READY TO TACKLE THESE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. IF
THE SOVIETS ARE SIMILARLY PREPARED, FURTHER PROGRESS CAN BE
ACHIEVED. HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT NEGOTIATING AGAINST ANY DEADLINE.
Q. Where do we stand in the Defense and Space Talks?
A. -- U.S. NEGOTIATORS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO WORK TOWARD A JOINT
DRAFT TEXT OF A DEFENSE AND SPACE AGREEMENT, BUILDING ON THE
UNDERSTANDING OUTLINED AT THE DECEMBER 1987 WASHINGTON SUMMIT.
WHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE REFUSED TO PREPARE SUCH A TEXT, PROGRESS
HAS BEEN MADE ON DRAFT PROTOCOL PROVISIONS ON PREDICTABILITY, OR
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING, MEASURES IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC BALLISTIC
MISSILE DEFENSES.
-- IMPORTANT AREAS OF DIFFERENCE REMAIN:
o NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY. WHILE THE U.S.
COULD ACCEPT A LIMITED COMMITMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM
TREATY IN ORDER TO DEPLY SDI, IT INSISTS THAT NORMAL,
INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED WITHDRAWAL RIGHTS - BASED ON SUPREME
NATIONAL INTERESTS AND MATERIAL BREACH - BE INCLUDED IN THE D&S
TREATY. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, WANT AN UNCONDITIONAL COMMITMENT
NOT TO WITHDRAW, WHICH NO SOVEREIGN NATION COULD ACCEPT.
Q
ABM TREATY RESTRICTIONS ON RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND
TESTING. THE SOVIET UNION SEEKS GREATER RESTRICTIONS THAN THOSE
AGREED TO IN THE ABM TREATY, IN AN EFFORT TO LIMIT THE U.S. SDI
PROGRAM. THE U.S. SEEKS RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING
RIGHTS PROVIDED IN THE ABM TREATY.
DRAFT
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DRAFT
O THE REGIME THAT WOULD FOLLOW THE END OF THE
NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. THE SOVIET UNION SEEKS CONTINUATION OF AN
UNSPECIFIED RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY
FOLLOWING THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. THE U.S. AGREES THAT THE
ABM TREATY WOULD REMAIN IN EFFECT AFTER THE NON-WITHDRAWAL
PERIOD, EXCEPT THAT EITHER SIDE COULD ELECT TO DEPLOY STRATEGIC
DEFENSES BEYOND THOSE PERMITTED IN THE TREATY.
O THE PURPOSE OF PREDICTABILITY MEASURES. THE SOVIET
UNION HAS PROPOSED A SET OF UNWORKABLE MEASURES THAT SEEK TO
ENHANCE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY, THE U.S.
HAS PROPOSED A SET OF FAR-REACHING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
TO ENHANCE PREDICTABILITY ABOUT THE SIDES' FUTURE ACTIVITIES IN
THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE.
Q. Does SDI remain a stumbling block?
A. -- THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID WE WILL VIGOROUSLY PURSUE SDI. THE
SOVIETS SHOULD UNDERSTAND -- PARTICULARLY SINCE PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY HAVE THEIR OWN COMPARABLE
PROGRAM IN THIS VITAL AREA OUR INSISTENCE ON INVESTIGATING
FULLY THE FEASIBILITY OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES.
[[Q.. What is the U.S. position on the broad interpretation of
the ABM Treaty?
A. -- IT HAS NOT CHANGED. IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS, WE
SEEK TO PRESERVE OUR RIGHTS UNDER THE ABM TREATY TO DEVELOP AND
TEST ADVANCED ABM SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS. ]]
Q. What must the Soviet Union do to resolve the Krasnoyarsk
violation? Why is the U.S. even negotiating if it will not sign
any agreement until the Krasnoyarsk violation is corrected?
A. -- WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT ANY SATISFACTORY
SOLUTION OF THE KRASNOYARSK VIOLATION MUST REESTABLISH THE LEAD
TIME ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. THAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE LARGE
PHASE ARRAY RADAR PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY, AND MUST
VERIFIABLY REMOVE ALL TREATY-PROHIBITED RADAR CAPABILITY. WE
BELIEVE THAT THESE CRITERIA CAN ONLY BE MET BY DISMANTLEMENT OF
THE RADAR AND DESTRUCTION OF THE TRANSMITTER AND RECEIVER
BUILDINGS, INCLUDING THEIR FOUNDATIONS, BUT WE WILL CONSIDER
OTHER SOVIET PROPOSALS THAT WILL MEET OUR CRITERIA.
-- THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AT THE
NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS, SEEKING PROGRESS ON ALL THE OUTSTANDING
ISSUES, so THAT WE WILL BE PREPARED TO MOVE FORWARD QUICKLY AS
SOON AS THE KRASNOYARSK PROBLEM IS CORRECTED. HOWEVER, AS WE
HAVE SAID, NO FURTHER STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS CAN BE
CONCLUDED UNTIL THE SOVIETS CORRECT THE KRASNOYARSK VIOLATION.
THE SOVIET UNION IS WELL AWARE OF OUR POSITION ON THIS MATTER.
DRAFT
PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR RELEASE AT 3:45 PM EDT
MONDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1989
Prerequisites and Principles for Arms Control
Address by
The Honorable James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State
The Commonwealth Club
San Francisco, California
Monday, October 23, 1989
For further information contact:
- 2 -
Ladies and Gentlemen:
As you know, this speech was supposed to be given last week. A
terrible tragedy intervened, and naturally I thought at first that I
should cancel it.
In view of the suffering, it didn't seem right to come here and
speak to you about arms control. But you requested that I fulfill
this commitment and that is a telling sign of your character. It is
the truly American character of facing up to disaster, taking its
measure, and then getting on with the work. It is the truly Bay
Area character of looking to the future.
Your deeds, beyond the power of any words to convey, are the
most eloquent testimony to your resilience, a resilience I might
add, that is capturing the imagination of the whole country. You
are working hand-in-hand with one another to turn crisis into
opportunity, to turn pain into progress, and to turn a world tossed
upside-down right-side up. My heartfelt condolences go out to the
families of the victims. And my prayers are with you.
Now I would like to begin my discussion with you today by
talking about another October crisis, a crisis from twenty-seven
years ago: the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. For it is a crisis
that seems so far, far away --- so remote from the tragedy you are
now overcoming so well.
The contrast in relations between Moscow and Washington in
October 1962 and in October 1989 could not be greater. In October
1962, WE faced a blustering Soviet Union; its leader talked of
burying us. Today, we face a sobered Soviet Union; its leader talks
of restructuring his society.
In October 1962, the Soviet economy was growing and ready to
feed an unrelenting arms buildup. Today, the Soviet economy is
virtually bankrupt.
In October 1962, the Soviet space program raised fears we would
lose the race to the moon. Today, the Soviet Union is racing to
avoid being left behind as much of the world moves from the
Industrial Age into a new century.
And twenty-seven years ago this month, we stood -- as you all no
doubt recall -- eyeball-to-eyeball on the brink of war. Today, by
contrast, superpower relations are as promising as we have ever
found them since the Second World War. Looking back, the Cuban
missile crisis posed the clearest possibility for nuclear war in the
post-war era. Looking forward, we face the clearest opportunity to
reduce the risk of war since the dawn of the nuclear age.
The President has described our purpose as moving beyond the
peace of armed camps to the peace of shared optimism. Last week, I
described our strategy for achieving this goal through a prudent
search for points of mutual advantage. Today, I want to talk in
more detail about one of those points: arms control.
- 3 -
Arms control can lend a strong hand in building an enduring
peace, but arms control does not proceed in a political vacuum. Let
me be clear: We compete militarily because we differ politically.
Political disputes are fuel for the fire of arms competitions. Only
by resolving political differences can we dampen the arms
competition associated with them. To follow Clausewitz, if war is
the continuation of politics by violent, military means, arms
control is the search for a stable, predictable strategic
relationship by peaceful, political means.
That is why our times are now SO full of promise. Over the last
forty years, arms control played only a limited role in shaping the
U.S.-Soviet security relationship because our political differences
were simply too wide to allow enduring and substantial progress.
Western strength and Western unity sustained deterrence throughout
this period when we all lived in the shadow of opposed values and
conflicting purpose. Now perestroika in Soviet domestic and foreign
policy could, in part, lift the shadow. The political prerequisite
for enduring and strategically significant arms control may finally
be materializing. Surely the President was right when he wrote
President Gorbachev in June, "We bear enormous -- and mutual ---
responsibility to take advantage of the promise of these
extraordinary times to improve international security."
The President and I have both said that we want perestroika to
succeed. It would be folly indeed to miss this opportunity. Soviet
"new thinking" in foreign and defense policy promises possibilities
that would have been unthinkable a decade ago, such as deep,
stabilizing cuts in strategic forces and parity in reduced
conventional arms in Europe. Yet perestroika's success is far from
assured.
Any uncertainty about the fate of reform in the Soviet Union,
however, is all the more reason, not less, for us to seize the
present opportunity. For the works of our labor -- a diminished
Soviet threat and effectively verifiable agreements -- can endure
even if perestroika does not. If the Soviets have already destroyed
weapons, it will be difficult, costly, and time-consuming for any
future Kremlin leadership to reverse the process and to assert
military superiority. And with agreements in place, any attempt to
break out of treaties will serve as one indicator of an outbreak of
old thinking.
We can take advantage of the new political climate to
consolidate deterrence at lower levels of risk. Through sound and
verifiable agreements, we can shape and institutionalize a more
stable, predictable strategic relationship. The changing political
relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States should
be reflected in changing Soviet force structures and strategic
concepts. In this way, we can help to codify political progress in
military reality and by doing so, underpin that progress and
strengthen it.
- 4 -
Strategy and the Changing Strategic Environment
Before outlining the tenets of this Administration's arms
control policy, I would like to say a few more words about the
broader strategic environment in which arms control must operate.
Politically, the Soviet Union is in the midst of this revolution
of perestroika, glasnost, and democratization. The new thinkers
understand that Stalin's system must change fundamentally if the
Soviet Union is ---- as Mr. Gorbachev has said -- to enter the
Twenty-First Century in the manner worthy of a Great Power. To this
end, the Soviet leadership has done much and promised even more for
political, economic, and legal reform. While his reforms need to be
extended, codified, institutionalized, and made habitual, the
political face of Soviet power is being changed already.
The prospects for reform are just as great, in some cases
perhaps even greater, in Poland, Hungary, East Germany,
Czechoslovakia and the other countries of Eastern Europe. While the
trends should not be overstated, the political foundations of a
Europe divided by force since 1945 are crumbling away. We can move
toward the President's vision of a Europe whole and free.
These great political changes are set in a time of vast
technological change. Our military tools are being reshaped by
emerging technologies that could offer greater security. Advances
in sensor technology, data processing capabilities, and
precision-guided munitions present novel ways to strengthen
deterrence.
We need to be careful, however, also to see the darker side of
changing technological realities. More nations are acquiring the
capacity to make chemical weapons and to manufacture missiles. With
many of these regimes locked in continuing regional conflicts, the
explosive escalation potential of their disputes is obvious.
I would add, too, that these technological changes are taking
place in a time of changing defense economics. Everyone has noted
the Soviet Union's compelling need to convert some of its vast
expenditures for the military into domestic reconstruction. The era
of rapidly rising defense budgets is over in the West, too. From
the new technologies, we are going to have to pick very carefully
those weapons that strengthen deterrence most cost-effectively.
What do these political, economic, and technological changes add
up to? Strategically, the world we've planned for since the Cuban
missile crisis is increasingly distinct from the world we actually
face. Threats to our interests are changing politically and
multiplying technologically. Our capabilities are being improved
technologically but constrained economically.
Our fundamental values and interests will endure. But as our
strategic environment is transformed, we need to look anew at some
of our guiding concepts and approaches. Many long-held assumptions
- 5 -
may need to be rethought. Strategy aligns ends and means. As both
shift, strategy may have to shift, too.
For example, we need to think about the future of both European
security relations and the central superpower strategic
relationship. Today's historic political transformations in Eastern
Europe -- if suitably institutionalized -- make such reassessments
doubly important. In light of the growing threat to our global
interests and power projection forces posed by the proliferation of
new technologies, we also need to reconsider our strategy for Third
World conflicts. Over the longer term, we need to consider if
strategic defense options, deep reductions in nuclear and
conventional weapons, increasingly powerful conventional munitions,
and shifts in Soviet strategy will alter our requirements for
deterrence.
To cope with this changing environment, defense programs and
arms control must work together. This is a prerequisite for a
coherent, integrated strategy that reduces the risk of war by
deterring agression while promoting American values. Both defense
programs and arms control can serve the common goals of enhancing
stability, ensuring predictability, and bolstering deterrence. As
our strategy may change in response to an evolving strategic
environment, so, too, our defense programs and arms control
positions would also change. Together, security will be enhanced.
Clearly, neither defense programs nor arms control can do the
job alone. To maintain the integrity of the Triad, we will need to
rely upon the deployment of mobile missiles as a key component of
our nuclear modernization program. But START can play a key role.
It can reduce the Soviet threat to our forces and thereby make
survivability through mobility more feasible. Without START to
constrain the Soviet threat, the job of ensuring reliable deterrence
would be less predictable and affordable. Without the START
negotiations, the domestic consensus needed to support essential
modernization programs --- not only mobile ICBMs but also B-2,
Trident, and SDI -- would be difficult to sustain. Likewise,
without our strategic modernization program, the benefits of a START
agreement would be sharply reduced. Thus, our force modernization
and arms control efforts reinforce one another.
In September, I announced the President's decision to allow
mobile land-based missiles in START. Permitting mobile missiles
only makes sense if the United States is willing to deploy them.
For this reason, this decision is contingent on Congressional
funding of our mobile missile program. Congress needs now to
support START, not undercut it, by funding this program. As Senator
Nunn said recently, "Unless we in the Congress can manage to put our
ICBM modernization program back on track the START negotiations
face a very bleak and a very long future indeed."
Another prerequisite for a successful strategy -- for defense
programs and arms control that work together -- is the need for
unity as a nation and as an Alliance. This follows from a simple
truism: united we stand, divided we fall. We should not tempt the
- 6 -
Soviets with exploitable differences between the Administration and
Congress, or between the United States and its allies. That does
not exempt us, of course, from the need for informed debate. It is
imperative that we maintain open and honest discussions about
strategy and arms control matters within the strategic community and
with the public at large. As we deter possible aggression, we must
-- as the noted military historian Michael Howard has put it --
reassure our peoples that their defense dollars are efficiently and
effectively supporting the cause of peace. An open, frank debate is
the surest formula for unity. But such a debate must begin and seek
to reach some resolution before treaties are signed if we are to
bring home treaties in the national interest.
The Goal of Arms Control and the Path To It
As a contribution to such a debate, I would like to move now
from the prerequisites of arms control to the basic goal of our arms
control policy and the principles for achieving it.
The main goal of arms control is to reduce the risk of war --
any war, nuclear or conventional. We hope to prevent war by working
toward a stable, predictable strategic relationship. Stability
requires military forces and policies such that no one can gain by
striking first even in the worst crisis. Beginning a war,
especially a nuclear war, must never become a Soviet option -- even
a least-worst option, as a noted strategist once put it.
Predictability requires that sufficient openness and transparency
prevails to prevent misperception, miscalculation, and an
inadvertent war -- a war no one wanted but no one could stop. The
more open and transparent Soviet military affairs, the greater trust
and confidence we can have in Soviet intentions.
Four principles guide our search for a stable, predictable
strategic relationship. First, we seek reductions in first-strike,
surprise attack capabilities. We seek stability through proposals
to reduce those capabilities most suited for offensive,
blitzkrieg-style actions and preemptive first-strikes. In CFE,
we've concentrated on eliminating Soviet advantages in those weapons
most suited to seizing and holding territory: tanks, artillery, and
armored personnel carriers. In START, we've focused on reducing the
most destabilizing weapons, especially vulnerable, silo-based heavy
ICBMs, such as Soviet SS-18s. These weapons are suited principally
for preemptive first-strikes and not for retaliatory missions. In
Wyoming, we proposed banning short-time-of-flight sea-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) tests, seeking in this way to reduce the
capability for a Soviet decapitating first-strike. Our START
proposals emphasize the relative merits of slow-flying weapons --
first-strike. such as cruise missiles and bombers which are not suitable for a
Our SDI program also supports our emphasis on stability.
Effective strategic defenses can contribute to survivable,
cost-effective barriers to a successful first-strike. That's why we
look favorably on the decision made by the Soviets in Wyoming to
de-link the Defense and Space Talks from START. This Soviet
- 7 -
decision to no longer hold START hostage to resolution of Defense
and Space issues removes a key obstacle to a START Treaty while
enabling us to proceed with our SDI plans. We remain committed to
preserving our right to conduct SDI activities consistent with the
ABM Treaty. And we will use the Defense and Space talks to explore
a cooperative and stable transition to a greater reliance on
stability-enhancing, cost-effective strategic defenses.
Our second principle -- predictability through openness --
expands the traditional focus of arms control on capabilities.
Every war has its own unique causes, but surely Thucydides made an
important general point when he wrote, "What made war inevitable was
the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in
Sparta." Arms control has mainly focused on the first part of this
equation: constraining or reducing destabilizing military
capabilities. Now in expanding the agenda, we are working to deal
with the other aspect of Thucydides' equation: fears of aggressive
intent. We are pushing to make Soviet military activities more open
and transparent. The more we know and understand, the more we can
be assured that our fears are not results of misperception or
miscalculation. Greater openness is the surest path to greater
predictability and a lower risk of war, especially inadvertent war.
The President's Open Skies initiative is a clear example of this
new focus in arms control. Openness about military forces and
activities is at the heart of the talks on confidence and security
building measures (CSBMs) among all the states of Europe. In those
negotiations, we are proposing an all-European military data
exchange about our forces and weapons programs. In keeping with the
spirit of openness we found at the Wyoming Ministerial, we signed an
agreement on notification of strategic exercises and invited the
Soviets to visit our SDI facilities. The chemical weapons data
exchange will help us move toward a verifiable global ban. Defense
Minister Yazov's visit earlier this month is just one of a series of
exchanges that provide face-to-face opportunities to understand the
Soviet military. And we've pushed the Soviets to publish a real
defense budget that reveals the inputs into and outputs from their
defense production process.
Openness in military affairs is just part of our overall
emphasis in our dealings with the Soviets on creating open,
pluralistic institutions. On his recent visit, Soviet Defense
Minister Yazov talked of the increasing influence of Supreme Soviet
committees over the Soviet defense complex. We hope that Soviet
military power may increasingly be exposed to the salutary effects
of detailed and searching public debate.
Greater openness combined with force reductions will support
political change as well. In CFE, our proposals will reduce the
potential not only for a Soviet blitzkrieg but for Soviet
intimidation of Western Europe. The Soviet Army we face as a
potential army of aggression is to East Europeans an army of
occupation. The weight of the Soviet military presence in Eastern
Europe will be reduced. Freed from the cold shadow of Soviet
military domination, political pluralism and free markets should
flourish more easily in Eastern Europe.
- 8 -
A more predictable strategic relationship should also be less
expensive. Arms control can, as the President wrote Mr. Gorbachev,
"introduce predictability into military planning so that we can slow
the pace of military competition." A slower competition could be a
cheaper and safer competition. But our desire to save money must
not come into conflict with the necessity for security.
The third principle of our policy is a broadened arms control
agenda, far wider than its traditional East-West nuclear focus. We
are broadening our agenda with the Soviets, both in terms of dealing
with pressing, global arms control problems, like chemical and
missile proliferation, as well as focusing on regional conflicts.
In an increasingly intertwined world, a stable, predictable
U.S. -Soviet strategic relationship depends in part on regional
stability and vice versa. Earlier, I noted that advanced
technologies were proliferating to the Third World. Advanced
fighters have gone to Libya, Syria, and North Korea. Over twenty
states possess the capability to produce chemical weapons. And
nuclear proliferation, notably North Korea's reactor program,
remains dangerous. Arms control should increasingly focus on such
problems.
The President's United Nations initiative can lead us toward a
verifiable global ban on chemical weapons. The President's proposal
represents a realistic road map for progress. As a step toward a
multilateral ban, we will move bilaterally with the Soviets to
reduce chemical weapons to 20% of the current U.S. levels. We will
further slash stocks to just 2% of their current levels within eight
years after the multilateral convention goes into effect. This total
cut of 98% is a substantial acceleration of previous destruction
plans. Then, we will move to zero within two years of adherence to
the ban by all chemical weapons-capable states.
We realize it may be difficult to persuade problem states such
as Libya to join. But we are creating an environment where everyone
will have incentives to join and costs to pay for remaining an
outlaw. Export controls on precursor chemicals will be
strengthened, building on progress made at the recent Canberra
Conference. The President has also ordered a study on sanctions to
deter and punish chemical weapons use and other violations of a
convention. States must know that they will pay a price for their
inhumanity.
Our fourth principle is institutionalization of a safer world.
The President aims to reduce the risk of war permanently, not
temporarily. We want to see Soviet defensive military operations
made habitual. We want to see the new thinking concretely built in
to the Soviet force structure. We want to see weapons destroyed,
not merely removed. And we want agreements that can endure.
Effective verification can ensure that the treaties we sign are
doing their job to institutionalize a safer world. Because of the
primacy of effective verification in this Administration's approach
to arms control, our negotiators have already proposed data
- 9 -
exchanges and trial verification measures that would be implemented
even before the agreements themselves are concluded. Such measures
in START and in chemical weapons will help us build confidence and
gain practical experience that will facilitate the conclusion of
sound, verifiable agreements.
Neither have we stood still in pressing the Soviets to comply
fully with agreements already signed. In September, President
Gorbachev informed the President that the Krasnoyarsk radar would
finally be destroyed. We welcome Moscow's step to come into
compliance with the ABM Treaty.
A Realistic Path to Risk-Reduction
These four principles of a more stable, open, broader and less
reversible strategic relationship offer a realistic path to a
lasting reduction of risk. It is a path best travelled by steady
steps that build on one another, rather than grand leaps that are
often as not unrealistic or undone. In START, in CFE, in all our
negotiations -- we have made fair, responsible proposals designed to
find enduring points of mutual advantage. The Soviets have said yes
to much of what we have proposed. Now, we have rolled up our shirt
sleeves and set to work together to put principle into practice.
We should be clear about the task ahead. We are not on the
verge of a Perpetual Peace in which war is no longer possible. We
cannot dis-invent nuclear weapons nor the need for continued
deterrence. Nor can we completely eliminate Soviet-American
rivalry. But that rivalry does not require that we stand on the
brink of Armageddon as we did twenty-seven years ago this month.
Peace need no longer hang solely on Winston Churchill's "process of
sublime irony where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and
survival the twin brother of annihilation."
Deterrence need not rest only on a delicate, technical balance
of terror disturbed by periodic crises. Opportunity invites us,
instead, to move beyond containment, beyond the Cold War, to a new
strategic relationship based on a sound political footing.
A new relationship in which the capabilities and incentives to
attack first are minimized and the possibilities of strategic
defenses are pursued. A new relationship in which Soviet military
power is open to the naked eye, not just satellites in the sky. A
new relationship in which all the peoples of Europe are free of
military intimidation. A new relationship in which effectively
verifiable treaties lock-in a lower risk of war. And a new
relationship in which arms control aids our people in turning the
seeds of war into the fruits of peace.
This is the strategic relationship we seek.
Thank you.
Nation
Photo Copy Preservation
chairman Sam Nunn, who strongly sup-
Better Late
AIR FORCE
ports the Bush proposal: "I can see a re-
gime on both sides where we have single-
warhead missiles in silos. There is no
Than Never
reason to go first [with a nuclear attack] in
that situation."
Bush springs a proposal
Getting MIRVS onto the Administra-
tion's agenda, however, has not been easy.
to ban MIRVed missiles
National Security Adviser Brent Scow-
croft has persistently championed a ban
By JAY PETERZELL
on mobile MIRVS, but Secretary of De-
fense Dick Cheney fiercely opposed it,
E
ver since George
largely because he saw the rail-based MX
Bush moved into
as the best way to reduce the vulnerability
the White House, he
of the U.S. missiles. Cheney blocked the
has wanted to put his
Scowcroft proposal from being presented
own stamp on the stra-
to the Soviets on at least three occasions,
tegic-arms-reduction
officials say. The first was last September,
process that Ronald
prior to a meeting between Shevardnadze
Reagan presided over
and Secretary of State James Baker in
with such dramatic
Wyoming. At the Malta summit last De-
flair. Last month the
cember, the plan made it as far as a brief-
President finally found
ing book prepared for Bush; a line had to
a way. In a secret let-
be drawn through the proposal on the
ter to Soviet President
President's copy. The ban was blocked
Mikhail Gorbachev, he
again when Baker visited Moscow in Feb-
proposed nothing less
ruary. Finally, Cheney relented when he
than the complete
realized that Congress was no longer like-
elimination of the
ly to give him the $6 billion needed to put
most dangerous weap-
the MX's on rails. "The driving force,"
ons in U.S. and Soviet
says one White House official, "is a reflec-
arsenals: land-based
Launch and
tion of political realities."
missiles topped with
re-entry:
Cheney is not the only one to raise
multiple warheads, or
MX missile and
questions about Bush's proposal. Even
MIRVS. As a first step,
the trails of
Bush suggested, the
warheads falling
some experts who like the idea of banning
to their targets
MIRVS have reservations. Among them:
two superpowers
Why delay the nearly completed START
should agree to ban
treaty to take up a new issue? Bush waited
land-based mobile missiles with MIRVS.
A complete ban on MIRVED missiles
too long to get his ducks in a row, say
Not surprisingly, Gorbachev had prob-
would give both nations a chance to re-
some critics, apparently including the So-
lems with the proposal. In a letter hand de-
verse what many defense experts consider
viets; MIRVS would be better addressed in
livered to Bush during Soviet Foreign Min-
a classic case of shortsightedness: the Nix-
a later round of negotiations. But Nunn
ister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to
on Administration's decision to deploy
and other advocates reply that the time
Washington, Gorbachev replied that any
MIRVS in the first place during the 1970s,
for the U.S. to trade away the rail-based
MIRV ban should not be limited to land-
which prompted the Soviets to follow suit
MX is now, before it is deployed. "I have
based weapons, where the Soviets have a
rapidly. Multiple warheads seemed an in-
never seen the military very willing to give
heavy numerical advantage, but should
expensive way to expand the U.S. nuclear
up things that have just been built," says
also include those aboard submarines,
force. But what strategists overlooked was
Nunn. "If a ban does not come in START I,
where the U.S. has the edge.
the fact that the large number of war-
it's going to be at least ten times more
Resolving that larger disagreement
heads packed onto a small number of mis-
difficult.'
will probably keep arms-control negotia-
siles make them a tempting target for a
The best reason for banning mobile
tors busy for years to come. But for now
first strike. In a surprise attack, an aggres-
MIRVS is as a first step toward eliminating
U.S. officials say Bush's first step-a ban
sor could knock out as many as ten or
all land-based multiple-warhead missiles.
on mobile land-based MIRVS-has be-
more warheads by hitting a single silo.
But what if the U.S. and Soviets never take
come an active issue ofthe Strategic Arms
Says Senate Armed Services Committee
that second step? With most U.S. MIRVS on
Reduction Talks. A treaty outline is being
submarines and most Soviet MIRVS on
rushed to completion in time for the May
30 summit in Washington. If Bush's pro-
NOSNHOR CANTHING
land, each side will be trying to limit weap-
ons the other deems essential; a stalemate
posal makes it into the START agreement,
could easily be reached. The two sides
the U.S. will scrap its plan for moving 50
would then be left in a more dangerous sit-
MX missiles, with ten warheads apiece,
uation than now, with land-based MIRVS
from silos onto railroad cars, while the So-
sitting in vulnerable silos.
viets will demobilize 20 of their new, mo-
Perhaps the greatest danger today is to
bile SS-24s, each of which also packs a
assume that anything is beyond negotia-
ten-warhead punch. But will the Soviets,
tion. At least the Bush Administration is
who have recently taken a tougher line on
thinking seriously about a nuclear future
START, trade a mobile weapon they al-
that is more stable than the hair-trigger
ready have for one that is still a gleam in
past.
-With reporting by Michael Duffy/
Uncle Sam's eye?
Scowcroft wants a ban
Washington
TIME, APRIL 23, 1990
25
cerns, such as Conyers
existing statutes bar government officials from
accepting bribes, trafficking in classified infor
ple who were
mation or attempting to defraud the federal
biguities, but it has crean
government.
military to work with contractors,
Can
Referring to the federal investigation into
said: "It is in the best interest of the country to
contract fraud at the Pentagon, called Operation
communicate on what their needs are.
sma
drd
U.S., Soviets Discuss Surveillance Flights
an
searc
an enemy
SKIES, From Page 1
detected, the
be, according to the administra-
The details of Open Skies now
ed positively to the plan at the
explosive
tion official who briefed
being negotiated include the pos-
ates as it
September meeting in Wyoming
reporters.
sible use of a C-130 aircraft and a
between Secretary of State James
ble top
"After that net assessment, the
set of rules governing the flights.
Baker and Soviet Foreign Minis-
president said to go forward with
Under Open Skies, a plane would
ter Eduard Shevardnadze
the maximum open regime but
fly to a port of entry in the Soviet
Open Skies, first proposed in
that decision was not applauded
Union and present a flight plan.
ten
1955 by U.S. President Dwight
in all the nooks and crannies of
After 24 hours, during which the
Eisenhower but rejected then by
flight
the intelligence community he
aircraft is inspected by the Sovi-
from the
the Soviet Politburo, was resur-
said.
ets; the U.S. inspectors would be
rected by U.S. President George
scends slowly
Jeffrey Tracey, supervisor for
free to fly.
Bush on May 12 in a speech at
parachute. A
electro-optical systems at Intera
College Station, Texas
Technologies Ltd., Ottawa, which
The only prohibition is on hav-
ed when its S
The scheme is an agreement of
ing signal intelligence equipment
tank. Conferee
is working on sensors for Open
the nations involved to open their
Skies, said possible sensors in-
aboard that can be used to eaves-
for SADARM tc
airspace to unarmed aerial sur-
clude Synthetic Aperture Radar
drop on electronic communica
a request of $1
veillance over their territory with-
tion below.
Terminally
for day and night flights with a
such as the Aut
out restrictions unless air safety
resolution of about 20 feet, and
rules conflict.
Administration officials say
Guided Munitic
infrared imaging for night scan-
that while Open Skies will be one
The State Department, Arms
ative program,
ning at resolutions down to 1.6
more means of verifying arms
Control and Disarmament Agen-
aircraft, artille
feet.
control treaties along with satel-
cy and various intelligence agen-
and are equi
Although restricted to daytime
lites, it is cheaper than satellite
cies conducted an assessment
cated gui
use, cameras would provide the
technology A full complement of
during the summer to determine
system
best resolution down to less than
sensors could cost about $15 mil-
its ts
just how open Open Skies should
a foot, Tracey said.
lion for one aircraft
he
Photo Copy Preservation
ESDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1990
The Arms Control Sideshow
not SO much good or bad as irrelevant.
thoughts on what is surely a key issue for
By GREGORY A. FOSSEDAL
Technology. for example, is driving weap-
the future.
onry toward accuracy, speed, mobility and
Mr. Reagan's "perfect defense," Mr.
This probably is not the most propitious
defense. All of these developments tend to
Adelman writes, is unattainable, though fa-
time for a book severely critical of arms
undermine arms control, especially verifi-
vors a serious program of investigation "If
control. The U.S. and the Soviet Union are
cation. But they also make it less rational
the research succeeds." (Succeeds In
getting along as never before, with peace
to continue to stockpile large hoards of big,
what?) But Mr. Reagan never said defense
and democracy seemingly busting out ev-
destructive nuclear weapons.
had to be perfect. In fact, he stressed re-
erywhere. And yet, before arms control en-
Now there is something to these trends,
peatedly that imperfect defenses have
thusiasts gush about their critical role in
though not as much as Mr. Adelman
helped render all sorts of weapons obso-
the unfolding of all this glasnostroikade-
tente, it's worth recalling: All these re-
makes. (One reason we can't count on
lete, from the crossbow to the gas mask. If
forms have preceded, rather than followed,
them, for instance, is precisely the exis-
that is the goal; then U.S. research into
some great U.S.-Soviet pact on nuclear
tence of arms control-after all, U.S. nego-
strategic defenses had already "suc-
ceeded" by the time Mr. Reagan took of-
weapons. If communists can praise democ-
tiators could choose to outlaw the very
fice. The only question was political and
racy and tear down walls without agreeing
strategic in nature: Should we build these
with us (at least yet) on arms control,
Bookshelf
imperfect defenses?
maybe arms control was a bit oversold to
What we ended up with Star Wars re
begin with.
search simply was a way to avoid making
That's certainly what Kenneth L. Adel-
"The Great Universal Embrace"
explicit political choices to please every
man thinks, and in "The Great Universal
one. Opponents of defense could be tol
Embrace" (Simon & Schuster, 366 pages.
By Kenneth L. Adelman
that nothing really was being done-just
$19.95) he makes some good arguments for
research program. Proponents could t
just that point of view. Having negotiated
pacified by being told this research pro
the one minor arms pact that was signed
kinds of weapons Mr. Adelman is talking
gram was robust and that Star Wars would
in the 1980s (involving certain types of
about, as they did in a 1972 treaty that out-
"never be traded away." In the end, all
weapons in Europe) and having served as
laws any substantial defense.) The result,
the promises were kept, and the defense
director of the U.S. Arms Control and Dis-
of course, is that Mr. Adelman can spend
idea died not through arms control, but
armament Agency for five years, Mr.
much of the book dodging tough ques-
from the simple illogic of spending billions
Adelman certainly brings unique creden-
tions-should we sign a major strategic
of dollars yet never constructing any-
tials to the task. Few others SO critical of
arms agreement? If so, under what terms?
thing.
arms control have had SO much practice in
What should we have done about Soviet vi-
Evidently, Ken Adelman went along
the field.
olations of the '1972 anti-strategic-defense
with this diversion both as an arms control
And despite what Churchill once called
treaty? Instead, he focuses on minutiae.
official and (now) as a strategic pundit. He
"the burden of expertise," Mr. Adelman
Thus, a large portion of the book dis-
has managed to write an entire book on
writes in a simple, often lively, prose re-
cusses the Jimmy Carter strategic arms
arms control without taking any firm posi-
markably uncluttered by jargonization and
treaty-SALT II in arms control argot-
tion on the deployment of strategic de-
acronymizing. Whenever Mr. Adelman
that Ronald Reagan, after many years, de-
fenses. It's as if someone wrote's book on
does grapple with the issue at hand, the re-
cided to scrap. Yet as Mr. Adelman ad-
U.S. poverty from- 1960 to 1980 and made
sult is a straightforward, sometimes in-
mits, this was, in the end, mainly a "sym-
only passing reference to the Great Soci-
sightful mix of historical reporting and po-
bolic issue."
ety. Still, what Mr./Adelman does do is add
litical analysis. Too often, though, one gets
The big issue of the decade, both critics
much useful and interesting Information to
the impression that Mr. Adelman is avoid-
and. proponents generally would admit,
a critical episode in defense history. And
ing a thorny question or a tough debate.
was Star Wars: Ronald Reagan's proposal
that is not something one can say for many
For example, one of the main theses of
for a defensive shield that would make nu-
books on arms control.
the book is Mr. Adelman's pet notion that
clear weapons "impotent and obsolete."
arms control is happening anyway, without
Here again Mr. Adelman dodges both his
Mr. Fossedal is a research fellow at
treaties. Thus the drive for agreements is
own role and responsibility, and offers few
Hoover Institution.
won
BW
How
bown
to
Reduce
Military all 16.00 homorad
form
Spending
-11) 01 bol 2nw I down fllow THAT
By Lawrence J. Korb
ble for Mr. Cheney to present a coher-
should
ent strategy to justify his reductions.
research andedevelopment.in these
Thus, his effort last spring toicancel
WASHINGTON
areas, howeveryas:a hedge againstia
the V-22 Osprey tilt rotor aircraft/and
breakdownof the talks
or some time now, there
the F-14D fighter was easily:defeated
Cheney's cuts
F
has been no mistaking
aseThe vresearch wand development
by a Congress more worried about
the direction in U.S.
would consist of testing the 13 B-2
jobs than about a coherent and effi-
are easily
military
spending.
bombers already paid for, providing
cient military strategy.
Since 1985, the budget
modest funding for the Midgetman,
Fortunately, the outlines of the
obtainable.
for the Defense Depart-
designing a hew smaller ballistic mis-
post-containment era are already
ment has fallen by about 15 percent,
sile submarine and continuing S.D.I.
clear, We know enough about pur
after inflation. Last week, the De-
as a research program. Such a strat-
military needs for the next decade to
fense Secretary, Dick Cheney, bowed
egy could reduce projected defense
structure spending so, that we gain
the most expensive and thorough
to the inevitable and agreed to recom-
spending by about $100 billion over
greater security fortless money, The
modernization in history, there is no
mend cutting the fiscal 1991 budget
the next five years.
outlines of this new era are contained
need to rush Into expensive programs
by an additional 3 percent to 5 per-
Progress at the talks on conven-
in the proposals put forth at the
tional forces should allow the Admin-
like the advanced tactical fighter at
cent and to reduce military spending
strategic arms reduction talks and
$100 million a plane, the Amraam
by about $180 billion over the next
istration to begin drastic reductions
the negotiations on: conventional
missile at $500,000 each, the LHX heli-
five years.
insured.
in forces defending Europe. Now, the
forces in Europe.
copter at $35 million a copy, Burke
Also clear is the cause of the de-
U.S. is committed to having 10 divi-
At Start, both sides have agreed to
class destroyers at $1 billion each and
cline: Gramm-Rudman-Gorbachev
sions, 100 tactical squadrons and a
reduce the number of strategic nu-
Sea Wolf submarines at $1.5 billion
The huge Federal budget deficits, the
Marine brigade in Europe within '10
clear warheads to 6,000. Pending the
days of a Warsaw Pact mobilization.
each: These programs could easily be
perception of fraud, waste and mis-
completion of these talks, the U.S.
management in the Pentagon and Mi-
" the negotiations are concluded
kept in research and development,
should defer deployment of such sys-
pending the outcome of the talks on
khail Gorbachev's replacement of the
along lines already agreed to the U.S.
tems as the rail-mobile MX missile,
conyentional forces.
Brezhnev Doctrine with the Sinatra
would have minimum of three to
Doctrine of national self-determina-
the single-warhead Midgetman
Together, these steps could save at
four months to respond to a Soviet
ICBM, the B-2 bomber, additional Tri-
least the $180 billion that Secretary
tion'have combined to destroy the de-
buildup. This extra warning time
dent submarines and the Strategic
Cheney hopes to save by 1994. But
fense consensus.
would allow the Pentagon to cut its
active divisions and tactical air
nothing will happen unless the Ad-
Not so clear is what type of strat-
ministration takes a tough stand.
egy and force structure will or should
forces iff while eliminating the
Indeed, early Indications point to a
emerge from this abridged military
amphibious lift for a Marine brigade.
budget. Initially, the Pentagon tried
Moreover the more benign Interna-
scramble by the military services to
Nuclear and
protect their own bureaucratic inter-
to keep alive all the major programs
tional environment should allow the
ests at the expense of the national in-
by stretching out production sched-
conventional
Navy to reduce the tempo of its over-
ules. But this approach, which greatly
seas deployments and return to a
terest, For example, the Air Force is
increases unit costs, has been harshly
traditional force of carrier battle
reported to have proposed saving the
arms talks
Stealth bomber and the Amraam
criticized.
groups from now groms
USN
"Reductions of these land, air and
missile by stretching out production
To his credit, Mr. Cheney accepted
may
while cutting out purchases of the
the, new fiscal situation and did at-
provide an
sea forces would save relatively little
highly effective F-16 fighter.
11:20
tempt to kill some major weapons
In the short run. But by the middle of
outline for
Neither the nation nor the Penta-
systems. But the failure of the Bush
NUT
the 1990's, the savings would add up
gon can afford to stumble along
Administration to produce a national
tocabout billion a year in today's
security policy has made it Impossi-
a leaner
trying to sustain a $400 billion mili-
ADVAN
However during this transi-
tary on a $300 billion and declining
period, the Pentagon could save
budget. Secretary Cheney has taken a
Lawrence J. Korb directs the Brook-
military.
about billion year slowing
bold and logical first step. He needs to
ings Institution's Center for Public
down modernization of land;'sea and
follow this by Imposing a coherent
Policy Education.
air forces in betreing
strategic vision and complementary
Since the services completed
force structure on the Pentagon.
Photo Copy Preservation
THE WASHINGTON POST
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1990 A27:
Stephen S. Rosenfeld
Charles Krauthammer
Half Measures
Declare Victory
In Moscow last summer I heard Mikhail
Gorbachev's dilemma described by admirers
culture, pumping in consumer imports, re-
in the following terms. He could proceed by
forming prices and moving rapidly to market
ways. On the political side, he has been slow
In Vienna
bold-sounding but mild reforms and for sure
fall ever deeper into the abyss, or he could
to shift his base out of an unredeemable
summon up courage and attempt to leap over
party accustomed to top-down governance,
the abyss. It was asserted that he was doing
YT.GESON
into the mass of bottom-up popular social
And then go to the opera.
the latter, but increasingly it is evident that
of the economy and by continued maintenance
he understands apparently only dirily, that the
movements and organizations taking shape
he has been doing the former, taking what
problem is not that the Communist Party needs
all across Soviet society.
What on Earth are we doing still at the conventional
of heavy controls on democratic development.
arms talks in Vienna? Negotiations continue over how
leading-edge poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko
That Gorbachev retains the power of initiative
to be made mean and lean but that it needs to
To this point, writes S. Frederick Starr in
many Soviet and American troops may remain in
wickedly terms, in a new poem of that name,
tends to conceal that he is short on the power
be allowed to die the natural death it is due.
The Wall Street Journal, Gorbachev has sided
"Half Measures":
of follow-through. Our gee-whiz reaction to
All of Eastern Europe is also moving into
with the new forces "only in order to blud-
Europe-in his State of the Union address, the presi-
Half measures can kill when on the
newly permitted Soviet criticism of the leader-
dent proposed yet another number, 195,000 each-at a
an open relationship with the Western mar-
geon Communist Party hard-liners. He has
brink of precipices,
ship deflects attention from the merits of much
time when Europe has made it abundantly clear that it
ket economy. This is happening even as
not accepted them for what they are: the very
of the criticism, especially, in my view, criti-
wants Soviet troop level of zero.
chafing in terror at the bit,
Gorbachev remains mired in rudimentary
core of the emerging new order."
cism from his left.
The CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) talks in
we strain and sweat and foam
definitional questions of whether private
"Now, however, this tactic will only pro-
because we cannot
Meanwhile, Eastern Europe has come along
property and untrammeled entrepreneurship
long the transition to a civil society, and
Vienna have been superseded by events. When they
utterly to alter the standards by which Soviet-
began there was a Warsaw Pact. There were satellite
jump just halfway across.
have valid role.
hence expand the social void that has opened
bloc progress must be measured. Gorbachev
:But is it accurate to call what Gorbachev
The task of leadership in the Soviet
governments in Eastern Europe. It made sense to
In these circumstances, to applaud Gorba-
took an immense-loss-cutting-step in decid-
has been doing "half measures," especially in
chev for striking out on new paths is to
Union is to move swiftly and decisively along
negotiate a reduction of the Soviet troop advantage.
light of his stroke this week in opening the
ing to modernize relations with East Europe by
down to level of equality with ours.
patronize the man and to conveya misleading
the more radical path that the party is now
letting the region go its own way. But the way it
way to a multiparty system? Can he really be
impression of how he is doing.
1
debating and to which large parts of the
But now everything has changed. There is no
has gone in moving to democracy and the free
expected to do more than he is doing? Is it not
In foreign policy, to be sure, he's doing fine.
public are now committed.
Warsaw Pact. By summer there may be no East
market highlights the pinched and inadequate
the course of prudence as well as fairness for
He has had a hand free enough and a mind
We are uncomfortable urging the bold Mik-
Germany. Next year there may not even be a
quality of Gorbachev's own reforms at home.
open enough to cast the Soviet Union as a
hail Gorbachev to be bolder yet. It seems
U.S.S.R. The president's new proposal seems to be
Westerners to cheer him on?
All of Eastern Europe is moving, over the
The fact is that, five years into the Gorba-
peace seeker, and thereby helhas won de-
ungracious, and anyway what do we know? But
a response to the revolution of '89, but because it
span of a few months, toward a real, working
served international acclaim and the opportu-
cannot shake the American obsession with arms
chev era, Soviet society is barely holding on.
we have our own obligation to tell it like it is.
multiparty system, something that in the Soviet
The successes of glasnost and democratization
nity to start shifting spending priorities.
And we should not underestimate the extent
control, it is in fact a step backward.
Union, even after this week's proceedings, is
in opening up public dialogue and public partici-
But at home he has avoided the strong
to which this man and others in his country,
Once again, arms control proves not just irrele-
only now becoming more than a glint in Gorba-
pation have been offset by the manifest failures
moves urged by some of his more "radical"
aware of the deficit in their domestic experi-
vant but counterproductive. Why, after all, are we
chev's eye. The region understands clearly, as
economic advisers, like decollectivizing agri-
ence, listen to the outside world.
legitimizing the presence of 195,000 Soviet troops
in the "Central Zone" of Eastern Europe? The
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
people of that zone-Poland, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, Hungary-are quite clear as to how
Photo copy Preservation
many Soviet troops they want. Czechoslovakia and
How Gorbachev Did It
Hungary have officially asked the Soviets for a
troop level of zero. Lech Walesa just three weeks
ago demanded the same for Poland. (Gen.
MOSCOW-Playing politics in a way that
When Gorbachev's foes looked out the win-
Wojciech Jaruzelski disagrees, but he is yester-
would have impressed the late mayor Richard
take public positions that are unacceptable to
dows of the Hotel Moscow Monday morning just
But even protecting the geographic integri-
day's man.) And in East Germany, even the
Daley of Chicago, Mikhail Gorbachev used
rank-and-file voters.
before he convened the Central Committee ple-
ty of the Soviet Union may really be secondary
Communists have now called for German reunifi-
every trick from "spontaneous demonstra-
Gorbachev's tactical brilliance is seen in his
num, they saw 200,000 demonstrators in Revolu-
to Gorbachev's objective of ending the party's
cation-and a reunified Germany, whether neutral
tion" to a "no-secrecy" edict in pressing the
tion Square rallying for-not against-Gorba-
conclusion long ago that contested elections are
leading role. Some Soviet insiders believe
or NATO, cannot be home to Soviet troops.
Communist power elite to place the interests
chev. That sent a signal: Gorbachev has the
critical in cutting down Communist Party power.
Gorbachev targeted the constitutionally pro-
Yet here comes the United States saying that it is
of country over party for the first time since
street. Indeed, he broke a 70-year ban on anti-
Of all methods available for ending its "leading
tected Communist bureaucracy even before be
quite prepared to see 195,000 Soviet troops in
the Bolshevik revolution.
party political rallies to prove he not only has the
role," this is the likeliest to succeed without a
became party boss, He is now succeeding in a
countries where they are not wanted.
President Garbachev's victory, the first step in
street but knows how to use his foot soldiers.
bloody showdown. By stimulating factions, blocs
move few thought attainable or even desirable
This legitimation of the Soviet presence undermines
a long march, was no smoke-and-mirrors magic
He then publicly warned that all speeches at
and eventually competing parties, multiple candi-
when he came to power in 1985.
the brave East European democrats who demand and
trick. twas the culmination of months of meticu-
the closed session of the Central Commit-
dacies and contested, free elections define plural-
That marks him as a formidable political
immediate Soviet evacuation. They are desperate to,.
lous planning growing out of his gradual aware-
tee would be published. That put his enemies in
ism. Once the Soviet Union set down this path, a
leader. It could be that he actually means what
get rid of their Soviet occupiers now while the going is,,
ness that the greedy, selfish Communist appara-
a bind. If the showdown between political plural-
multiple-party system was inevitable.
he has said about separation of powers, limited
good, ie, while Gorbachev is in control They fear that
tus he heads has had its hand on the throat of the
ism and Communist dictatorship was to be
The party has already lost its supremacy in the
Soviet Union and has been strangling it.
government, an independent judiciary and oth-
if they wait, some calamity might intervene and cost
conducted in public view, the contest was over
"republics". of the Baltics and Azerbajjan. In
them their historic opportunity for independence.
0!
Whether the defeat of his enemies now opens
er tools of democracy taken for granted in the
before it started. Because Gorbachev's glasnost
Eastern Europe, starting with Poland, Commu-
the way to real perestroika (restructuring) of a
West. Whether that proves true or not, it is
CFE delays the process. We and the Soviets are?
has spotlighted one terrible evil after another in
nist rule imposed after World War II has been
beyond argument he is a skilled political me-
now engaged in months of arduous negotiation about
dying economy is not yet known. What is known
the party's murderous past, everyone in the
overtumed. While Gorbachev accepted this col-
in the first flush of Gorbachev's triumph over
chanic who has dismantled the machine built
verification procedures, counting rules and similar.
Soviet Union now knows the record.
lapse of external empire west of his Polish
by Lenin and Stalin that has presided over so
niceties. This week's breakthrough is a Western
power-clutching Brezhnevites is the political
By opening up the choice of new Communist
border, closer to home he has used force to block
much terror and oppression here and around
agreement to accept separate limits for combat planes
skill of the man who says he will end the
leaders to contested elections and multiple can-
dissolution of his internal empire-but not to
dictatorship of the Communist Party.
the world.
and "air defense interceptors,' a category of plane)
didates, Gorbachev has forced his enemies to
protect Communist Party power.
that until last Monday we said did not exist.
© 1990, Creatore Syndicate, Inc.
This is all quite surreal. If, as the East Europeans
Henry Kissinger
demand and as eventually must happen, the Soviets
leave Eastern Europe completely, who needs all these
negotiated categories and compromises? Zero is zero.
Delay Is the Most Dangerous Course
The CFE process is simply prolonging the Soviet stay in
Eastern Europe at a time when every other force,
natural and political, is demanding their departure.
The collapse of Soviet political and military
Bush's 195,000 proposal has a second effect just as
United States and is compatible with some rea-
power in Central Europe coincides with a de-
(f) Military forces in the rest of Western
sonable process of German unification.
But the West does neither Gorbachev nor
pernicious. It perpetuates the CFE symmetry between
clining fear in the Western democracies of the
Europe would be brought into some agreed
Establishment of such a system is primarily a
itself a favor by pretending that the structural
the level of American and Soviet troops. The symmetry
military threat. Therefore the existing arrange-
alignment with limitations on Soviet deploy-
changes Gorbachev's policies have evoked can
is false morally and mischievous politically. The Soviet
political and not a technical arms control issue.
ments are becoming unsustainable,
ments between Moscow and the Soviet Union's
There are in fact only three possible political
be calibrated by arcane analysis of his domestic
troops are occupiers. American trons are them ...
western frontier
The conventional solution
Delay IS the Most Dangerous Course
The CFE process is simply prolonging the Soviet stay in
Eastern Europe at a time when every other force,
natural and political, is demanding their departure.
The collapse of Soviet political and military
power in Central Europe coincides with a de-
United States and is compatible with some rea-
(f) Military forces in the rest of Western
Bush's 195,000 proposal has a second effect just as
clining fear in the Western democracies of the
sonable process of German unification.
Europe would be brought into some agreed
But the West does neither Gorbachev nor
pernicious. It perpetuates the CFE symmetry between
military threat. Therefore the existing arrange-
Establishment of such a system is primarily a
political and not a technical arms control issue.
alignment with limitations on Soviet deploy-
itself a favor by pretending that the structural
the level of American and Soviet troops. The symmetry
ments are becoming unsustainable,
ments between Moscow and the Soviet Union's
changes Gorbachev's policies have evoked can
is false morally and mischievous politically. The Soviet
The conventional solution is to accelerate
There are in fact only three possible political
western frontier.
be calibrated by arcane analysis of his domestic
troops are occupiers. American troops are there by
arms control negotiations. But the upheavals in
outcomes: (a) that Germany remain divided along
the existing military demarcation lines, (b) that
Obviously such a scheme is highly illustrative,
position. One way or another, the process now
invitation of freely elected governments.
Central and Eastern Europe have overthrown
permitting numerous permutations. Nor would it
underway will proceed on many fronts. In an
Politically the symmetry is just as noxious. The
Germany be unified as a neutral state with a
not only Communist regimes but also some of
election year for both Germanys, the drive for
status similar to Austria or Finland, (c) that
need to be implemented immediately. A five-year
Soviet presence in East Europe is headed to zero.
the premises of traditional arms control theory.
transitional period during which some Soviet
unification will surely develop its own momen-
Therefore, as long as we keep proposing equal troop
Germany be unified within NATO.
When the current stage of conventional arms
The permanent division of Germany would
forces remain in Central Europe seems entirely
tum. Various parliaments will be reducing
levels for the United States and the U.S.S.R., we
negotiations began, the military and political
reasonable. But the basic objectives need to be
NATO defense budgets, and different national
imply that the Soviet evacuation of Europe should be
demarcation lines were identical. And because
produce a chronic European crisis by tempting
outside powers either to exploit or to stimulate
established soon,
4
leaders will push individual arms control propos-
accompanied by an American evacuation.
the present stage of the negotiations is confined
intra-German conflict. The Soviet Union would
In my view, the scheme outlined here would
als, not least East European leaders seeking to
This is a bad idea. First, because our allies want an.
to thinning out U.S. and Soviet forces it does
meet everybody's political and security concerns
get rid of Soviet troops. In these circumstances
surely be sucked back into Central Europe to
American presence. Some, like the British, are quite
not depend SO critically on the location of the
maintain the division of Germany, whatever Mik-
to some extent. Such an outcome would bring
waiting on events is an invitation to chaos and to
fearful that we may indeed be packing our bags. As in
dividing lines. When that negotiation is complet-
hail Gorbachev's intentions or professions.
about a coincidence between the political and
the unilateral dismantling of institutions that
Asia, the presence of American troops is almost
ed in the next few months, attention will have to
The concept of a unified and neutral Germany
military demarcation lines, An agreed, managed
have brought us this far.
universally felt by the locals to be not a threat but
turn to the design of comprehensive European
has a surface plausibility but grave underlying
process of German unification would ease an
It may be that no security system will be able
kind of insurance against instability.
(1)
security system. Then the fact must be faced:
problems-even, and perhaps especially-for the
to contain the process now underway. In time
Second, a mutual Soviet and American evacuation
the military and political dividing lines in Europe
Soviet Union. After a few years Germany might
Germany may become neutral either by its own
of Europe is not a truly symmetrical act. Russia is 92
are no longer congruent. The military dividing
repeat its historic mistake of attempting to
choice or in response to Soviet offer. Improba-
Eurasian land power. Evacuation means pulling back
line runs through Germany; the political one is
achieve its own independent security, an enter-
"A dividing line
ble as it now seems, a German initiative cannot
few hundred miles behind the Polish border. For the
located at the Soviet-Polish frontier.
prise which twice in this century produced global
through the center of
be ruled out if German disillusionment with
Soviets to return to Europe in a crisis means crashing
A dividing line through the center of Germa-
catastrophe. An Austrian-type neutral solution for
Western lack of support for its national aspira-
through a few toll booths at the Polish frontier. For
ny cannot continue to be appropriate after the
Germany would create a single block from the
tions continues to grow. And sooner or later the
the United States to return means crossing the
two German states have held elections later this
French-German frontier to the Polish- Soviet bor-
Germany cannot
Soviet Union may play its "German card"-to
Atlantic, a 3,000-mile wide submarine lair.
year. Two democratic German states drawing
der of states with similar international status and
continue to be
exchange unification for neutrality-reckless as
It is true that Americans might at some point
ever closer together and governed by parties
therefore propelled toward joint diplomacy. Sure-
it would be for Soviet security in the long run.
decide to leave Europe regardless. Fine. By all
professing comparable ideologies cannot possi-
ly there is no better formula for eventual German
bly belong to two opposing alliance systems for
appropriate after the
Whether Germany would accept it would depend
means, let us have a debate at home and with our
begemony over Central Europe or a long-term
German Russian conflict.
not so much on exhortations as on the strength
allies about the appropriate level, if any, of Ameri-
any length of time.
of its ties with the West. I believe nevertheless
can troops in a post-Communist Europe. But that
In future arms control negotiations the United
Ideally, a new security system for Europe
two German states have
that over time such a formula would be accept-
level should be determined by Western needs, not
States will have to walk a fine line. It must not
should possess the following elements:
held elections later this
ed, especially if Germany could maintain its
by arbitrary numbers chosen to produce CFE sym-
legitimize a larger Soviet military presence in
(a) The countries of Eastern Europe-with the
membership in the European Community.
metry and State of the Union applause.
Central Europe than the Soviet Union could
exception of the German Democratic Republic-
would be given a status similar to Austria or
year.
Painful as I would find such a development
What to do? Declare that the CFE negotiations in
maintain on its OWN. At the same time it must
myself, the United States would have no reason
Vienna have succeeded grandly. That we and the
not encourage the impression that a complete
Finland, They would be politically neutral and
Soviet withdrawal from Central Europe will have
agree to a regime of limited armaments specified
to panic. Instead it should offer to preserve
Soviets are now agreed in principle to reduce our
otherwise festering crisis, The Soviet Union
NATO for whatever core group of the Atlantic
forces to a ceiling of 195,000 on either side. That
to be matched by a complete American with-
by treaty and guaranteed internationally.
would acquire a glacis of some 800 miles, a zone
Alliance wishes it. In my view, that offer would
we believe further reductions might be in order and
drawal from Europe. Its geographic proximity
(b) Germany would begin the process of unifi-
of limited armaments between the Rhine and the
be accepted with alacrity by Western Europe as
should immediately be negotiated bilaterally be-
enables the Soviet Union to be a major military
cation with a confederation whose first interna-
Elbe, à significant reduction of U.S. forces, a
tween the concerned countries.
factor in Central Europe from its national territo-
tional task would be to negotiate a peace treaty
a hedge against German revanchism or re-
acknowledging its present external frontiers.
demilitarized area on the territory of the present
newed Soviet aggressiveness.
Such a declaration would allow events to follow"
Copy Preservation
ry, while an American withdrawal across the
(c). Germany would remain in NATO if
German Democratic Republic and a neutral belt
In short NATO is needed for the internal
nature. The Warsaw Pact countries would then"?
Atlantic would destroy the possibility of balance
it
of power on the continent.
wished, but the territory of the present German
in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Western
West European balance and as a guarantee of
proceed to ask the Soviets to reduce their troops to
Democratic Republic would be demilitarized and
Europe would gain the same glacis in reverse,
European security. To be sure, the American
zero. And we could then conduct a conversation.
A new European security system should do the
all German military forces limited by agreement.
beginning with zone of limited armaments in the
deployments in Europe and the overall strength
with ourselves and our allies as to how many
following things: reassure the Soviet Union with
western part of the Soviet Union, 3
Americans should remain on the continent.
respect to its historic nightmare of invasion from
(d) U.S. and other foreign forces on German
Many thoughtful policy makers shrink from
of NATO should take account of the declining
military threat. But abolishing NATO cannot be
We don't need a CFE treaty or formal signing
the West, ease Western Europe's fear of Soviet
soil would be dramatically reduced (perhaps
down to one division of U.S. ground forces and
tackling the German issue because, while recog-
a quid pro quo for the ailments of the Warsaw
ceremony, however useful a photo opportunity it
invasion, protect the countries of Eastern Europe
no more than half of current U.S. air forces).
nizing its complexity, they fear that tackling it
Pact. What NATO must do is to redefine the
offers a president. We should declare victory at
against Soviet aggression and German resur-
head-on might overthrow Gorbachev. I believe.
Vienna, shake hands with the Soviets, compliment
gence and reflect the reality-demonstrated by
(e) Nuclear weapons and foreign forces on
that procrastination would produce the most
threat it is supposed to deal with, the strategy
them on their vision and forthrightness and wish
two world wars in this century-that a balance
West German soil would be pulled back from
dangerous consequences. Gorbachev surely de-
appropriate to it and the organization that
them well in their negotiations with their Warsaw
on the continent requires the participation of the
the current East German border to an agreed
line east of the Rhine.
serves great respect for his willingness to con-
reflects the changed roles of Europe and the
United States.
Pact friends. Then we all go to the opera.
front the crisis of his society.
Never will an arms control negotiation have
©1990, Los Angeles Time Syndicate
ended more successfully.
Richard Cohen
Lying to Your Diary
In an effort to show that he was merely follow-
ing orders, former national security adviser John
wonderfully rich account of his era, including-
Poindexter has demanded portions of Ronald Rea-
most famously- sexual mores.
sit at day's end (early afternoon in Reagan's case)
Pepys used code, a standard device to dis-
and write "Dear diary" without fearing the dread-
Candor like Pepys's is now almost totally con-
gan's White House diary. His request raises legal
courage curious wives or children, but he wrote
ed subpoena. For that reason, the diary has be-
fined to the novel. It is only in fiction that public
issues about which, for the moment, confess ab-
without fear of subpoena. With that assurance,
come another version of the memo-a cautious,
people act like real people. The incredible intru-
solutely no interest. Instead, want to discuss dia-
he even recorded visits to prostitutes. Almost
rarely candid account of what happened.
sion of the press coupled with the demands of ni
ries themselves even though, like resolutions, I've
never been able to keep one for long.
no diary of has since contained
It's hard to imagine Reagan writing a diary of
the law ensure that no one of any importance is
such an admission-not because men no longer
any literary importance. But it's harder still to
going to be anything other than a hypocrite.
But there are people who do. Where they get
the time, will never know, but every day, or
pay for sex, but because no one would admit-
imagine him or any high government official
The public figure who lies to the press will like- on
even to his diary-doing so.
confiding to a diary what he actually thinks.
maybe less frequently, they record their thoughts
Would he, for instance, tell his diary that he and
ly also lie to his diary, where, after subpoena or no !!
and activities. Many of them do this while in
The reason is that the diary has become pub-
lic property. In legal or ethical sense, that's
Poindexter discussed an allegedly illegal opera-
posthumous publication, he will be revealed as
pretty close to perfect.
00
state of literary schizophrenia-writing a private,
okay. Poindexter asserts that Reagan's diaries
tion? Would he tell his diary what he actually
intimate account of their lives while simulta-
thought of some subordinate, when there is
Of course, honesty would be the best policy.
neously hoping (praving?) for publication
might prove that he was following-not initiat-
even the slightest chance of publication? We
But public men are only men, with all the usual
KEN ADELMAN
|oviet President Mikhail Gor-
getry in a valiant stab at verifiability.
S
bachev, that bestower of op-
Arms control exit signal
The unpleasantries of Mr. Bush
portunities galore, last week
asking for two new land-based mis-
handed President Bush a
sile systems - the MX on rail and
doozie. Mr. Gorbachev's walking
the Midgetman in order to bolster
back previously agreed-upon arms
plod along an arms-control path
meets the eye.
The whole world is changing, with
his negotiating leverage, when both
control measures hands Mr. Bush
which has gone virtually nowhere
Especially now, when the whole
one former ally after another nego-
systems are expensive and neither is
the opportunity of refocusing U.S.-
for 25 years. A path which made
world is changing, when the Soviet
tiating for the complete removal of
needed.
Sovtet relations.
more sense in the '70s and '80s than
Union desperately needs to decen-
Soviet troops from their territory.
The unpleasantries of signing a
This is long overdue. It is mind-
in the '90s. A steep and thorny path
tralize - both politically, given that
And the whole world is changing
conventional arms accord which le-
less for the Bush administration to
leading to more problems than solu-
Lithuanias are popping up here,
with the ecological devastation
gitimizes 195,000 Soviet troops re-
tions.
there and everywhere, and economi-
wrought by communist regimes -
maining on station across Eastern
When all is said and done, more is
cally, given that Mr. Gorbachev's
the grime belt stretching from East
Europe, after the United States ada-
Ken Adelman is a nationally syn-
said about arms control than ever
economy is plummeting further and
Germany to the Urals of the Soviet
mantly refused to legitimize any So-
dicated columnist.
done by it. There is less there than
faster.
Union in critical need of cleanup.
viet occupation forces there for the
So the whole world is changing.
past 40 years. And doing so now,
What's the Bush administration
when everyone knows they are ille-
pushing for? Why, a way to count
gitimate.
ALCMs (air-launched cruise mis-
And the additional unpleasant-
IT'S YOUR TURN
TO DEAL WITH HIM!
OK... OK
siles) and to declare SLCMs (sea-
ries of an anticipated accord
QUIET
launched cruise missiles).
prompting the United States and the
ENOUGH! I'VE HAD
DOWN...
Huh?
TIME FOR
Soviet Union to sell more sophisti-
Future historians will look back
BEDDY
cated equipment to less sophisti-
BYES
and wonder. Some may. call to mind
cated nations.
what Henry James said about James
The ultimate sin of any arms ac-
Madison's performance as secretary
cord is to make the world more dan-
of state: "He ignored the heart of
gerous. As Florence Nightingale
every issue to fret the extremities."
grasped: At a minimum, hospitals
But none, no historian, could con-
should not spread disease.
WAAAAA
sider these the critical issues of our
Yet a formal arms pact would lead
day.
to a glut of highly sophisticated
How can the administration dive
tanks, rifles, machine guns, anti-
for the capillaries? Why?
tank weapons, anti-aircraft weap-
Political necessity may be a major
ons, armored personnel carriers and
factor - presidents adore treaty
more.
signing ceremonies - and force of
Being cash-starved and equip-
Photo Copy Preservation
habit another.
ment-rich, the Soviet Union will un-
Regardless, Mr. Gorbachev just
doubtedly step up its sale of arms
handed Mr. Bush an opportunity to
abroad, in anticipation of an arms
leave this cul de sac, and to do so with
accord.
EAHEM
the grace Mr. Bush finds congenial.
The New York Times reporter
DADDY'S JUST
THE USA WILL CUT
Since Mr. Gorbachev clearly does
Robert Pear quotes experts as say-
SAHHAAHAHA...
GOING TO GET
ICBMs BY 41%
not, or cannot, keep deals he made
ing that "improvements in Soviet-
ANICE LITTLE
SLBMsBY 20%
just last month, since he clearly
American relations have had the
BOOK TO READ..
INCREASE SLCMs
BY 46% AND HBs
nixed any chance for an arms pact
paradoxical effect of increasing
(B52s) BY137%
being ready for signing at next
other countries' appetites for mis-
FOR A NETGAIN
month's summit, Mr. Bush should
siles, tanks, warplanes and artillery."
OF 02%
say, "Fine. So let's move on to other
THEUSSR WILL CUT
Handing this type equipment to
ICBMs(55-19)
issues, bigger issues, more impor-
Third World loonies and Moscow
BY 52%
tant issues."
remains friendly with Syria, Libya,
SLBMs BY
Thus grabbing this opportunity
Iraq, North Korea - is the worst
44%
with both hands, Mr. Bush would
possible outcome. Old rivalries with
INCREASE
STRATEGIC
SLCMs BY
ARMS
avoid:
new weaponry is deadly. I'd rather
300%AND
The unpleasantries (to state
have the stuff remain in Soviet
TREATY
HBs By
things gingerly) of each side actu-
hands.
FOR
ally possessing more strategic arms
With arms control shoved aside
LOSS OF 30%
after a START treaty than before.
seen rightly as an accouterment of
PRECIPITATING
STARTII
The unpleasantries of having an
the Cold War - Messrs. Bush and
accord which simply cannot be de-
Gorbachev can lift their eyes to see,
cently verified, of having one that
and help determine, the shape of
nonetheless may cost billions of dol-
things to come in the unsketched but
lars of the latest intelligence gad-
promising world ahead.
A14
Tl
REVIEW & OUTLOOK
2/28/90
Pebbles Progress
The de
bert has
Sometimes the best stories are the
cite enormous progress Technically,
lapse of
ones that don't make page one. A good
it looks/very good.'
junk era
example is the enormous progress be
Those results explain why Mr.
for quite
ing made on strategic defense, in par-
Bush has proposed to nearly triple
ters as V
ticular on a concept known as Bril-
Pebbles' funding next year to $329
way it (
liant Pebbles.
million. The Pentagon will sensibly
what m
"The technology is at hand to de-
continue to pursue other technolo-
all inter
ploy such a system," said SDI's direc-
The
gies-just this month it tested a
that mo
tor, Lt. Gen. George Monahan, the
ground-based interceptor for the first
sulting
other day. Defense Secretary Dick
time. But if Pebbles works out, Gen.
ple eff
Cheney took a trip to the Pebbles'
Monahan says, SDI's first phase could
and tha
home Livermore National Labora-
begin deployment by mid-decade at a
tions, W.
tory in California last fall, and was
cost of $55 billion, That's $14 billion
gate the
impressed enough to urge a similar
less than he estimated only a year
Drex
trip for George Bush. The President
ago. When was the last time a govern-
that junk
visited this month and hailed Brilliant
ment program's cost actually de-
were less
Pebbles. "If the technology I've seen
clined?
greedy ba
today proves feasible-and I'm told it
of the 197
SDI's real obstacle has always
looks very promising," Mr. Bush said,
stock prio
been more political than technical, of
tio for the
"no war planner could be confident of
course. Members of Congress are al-
than 17; b
the consequences of a ballistic-missile
ready massing to rob SDI's budget so
cline to 6.8
attack."
they can save useless bases in their
terest rates
The beauty of Brilliant Pebbles is
own districts. Which is why we re
Young CO!
its simplicity, employing the classic
couldn't ea
delighted to see Mr. Bush making the
military strategem of dispersal. The
ties borro:
case for SDI even in a world of lower
idea is to send into Earth orbit 4,600
The only a
tensions: Even after a START accord,
because of
interceptors each small enough to
the Soviets will retain 10,000 nuclear
enterprise
hold in your hands. In peacetime,
warheads. They are modernizing their
other wor
they'd serve as highly useful sensors
SS-18s and plan a follow-on to the mo-
for tracking and perhaps surveillance.
Reregula
bile SS-24. As for any START-II the
But in the event of a ballistic-missile
At the
fewer the weapons the greater the
ance sheet
launch, they'd be activated on a signal
threat if one side cheats SDI is insur-
tion, which
from Earth, then use their powerful
ance against cheating
sets. Infla
propulsion system to head for the
SDI can also defend against the 15
inventories
Photo Copy
nearest missile and destroy it with the
easily, and
force of impact.
other nations the CIA says could have
went from
It sounds fantastic, but then SO did
ballistic missiles in 10 years. Only last
share in 1
the Manhattan Project and Apollo.
week, the U.S. expressed its concern
worth, ex
The concept has become possible be
about the sale of a French nuclear re-
prices ma
actor to Pakistan. Maybe a few vision-
the likes 0
cause of the astounding progress in
aries think a world of proliferated
T. Boone I
miniaturizing computer components.
weapons can be protected by diplo-
fees for t
Lowell Wood, a Livermore physicist,
says the size required for scientific
mats, but serious people don t. Since
Without
computing has plunged by a factor of
the Pebbles would have a global
wouldn't
Investme
nearly 1,000 in 10 years. The large
reach, they could also protect U.S. al-
ury Secre
"smart rock interceptors imagined
lies from such launches, or protect the
Milken I
10 years ago can now be smarter peb-
Soviets for that matter. "In the 1990s,
made the
bles costing less than $1.4 million
strategic defense makes much more
bring it
apiece.
sense than ever before, in my view,
higher ec
major pl
The Pebbles program has also re-
Mr. Bush said this month.
eral insu
ceived a boost from independent sci-
SDI's falling costs are approaching
large ju
entists: A study by JASON, a group of
those of other strategic options, such
physicists that regularly advises the
as the Midgetman missile. For $40 bil-
Pentagon, concluded that "there does
lion or more, Midgetman will buy a
not appear to be any obvious techno-
couple of hundred mobile missiles-
logical show stopper." While prob-
that it. For not much more SDI
lems remain, including how well the
buys peacetime sensors ("brilliant
Most
Pebbles could survive an attack
eyes plus some protection against a
tion scen
aimed at them, JASON said the pro-
variety of missile threats. It also buys
a first-
gram deserves continuing support
valuable experience in space, which
teachers
A second study, by the influential
will become as strategically impor-
age of t
Defense Science Board, also gave
tant as the seas became in the 16th
and pra
otherw!
Pebbles qualified support. 'JASON
and 17th centuries.
ing lic
and DSB really gave it a good techni
SDI has had to climb a wall of Es
educa
cal scrub, says one Pentagon official
tablishment scorn/but the progress SO
and
who's familiar with both studies.
far has borne out the faith George
ch'
Both don say it's done yet, but they
Bush places in American sch ence
the
U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee
William L. Armstrong, Chairman
March 26, 1990
Scorecard On Arms Control
It's 1990. Will the last decade of the 20th Century be marked by a new era in US-Soviet
relations and the signing of major arms control agreements? The US can hardly close its eyes to
recent events in Eastern Europe. And it appears that the recent superpower summit at sea (December
2-3, 1989) set out the overall agenda for reaching three major arms control agreements by 1990 or
1991: one on strategic offensive arms, one on chemical weapons, and one on conventional forces
in Europe.
But what are the nuts and bolts of these agreements? What's under discussion? What are the
outstanding issues and what are the prospects for successful conclusion by the designated dates?
That's what this paper addresses. This paper is a scorecard on arms control.
The following ongoing negotiations are addressed:
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START);
Defense and Space (D&S);
Chemical Weapons (CW);
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE); and
Nuclear Testing Talks (NTT).
Also analyzed are implementation of the recently concluded Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Agreement, possible future negotiations on Short-Range Nuclear-Forces (SNF), and
Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT), as well as new approaches to arms limitations in the forms of a
plutonium production ban and open skies.
Clearly, the changing political and military landscape in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
can bring about rapid changes in any or all arms control negotiations. In one respect, recent events
in Eastern Europe have already contributed to putting arms control in the fast lane. The uncertainty
of the present situation, however, calls for caution on the US' part, especially where arms control
agreements are concerned.
While reading this paper, keep in mind that the goal of arms control is to decrease the likelihood
of war by reducing the incentive to use weapons in a crisis or to orchestrate a surprise attack, so
enhancing stability. The desirable goals of cost savings and arms reduction must be secondary to
this search for strategic stability.
PREPARED, PUBLISHED, AND MAILED AT TAXPAYER EXPENSE.
Table of Contents
Ongoing Negotiations
2
Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START)
2
Goals And Provisions
2
History
2
Current Status
4
Outstanding Issues
4
1. How To Deal with Mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)?
4
2. What to do About Soviet SS-18s?
5
3. Air-Launched Cruise Missiles
6
4. Verification
6
5. Depressed Trajectory Missile Ban
8
6. Sea-Lauched Cruise Missiles
8
Prospects For The Future
9
Analysis
9
Defense And Space Talks
10
Goals And General Provisions
10
History
10
Current Status
10
Outstanding Issues
11
1. US and Soviet Interpretation of Testing
11
2. Negotiations on Permitted and Prohibited Testing
11
3. Predictability
11
Prospects For A Future Agreement
12
Analysis
12
Chemical Weapons Talks
13
Goals And Provisions
13
History
13
Current Status
14
Outstanding Issues
16
Analysis
16
Prospects For A Future Treaty
17
Conventional Forces In Europe Talks: CFE*
18
Goals And General Provisions
18
History
18
Current Status
19
Subregion Proposals: Soviet Union-Warsaw Pact
22
The Soviet-Warsaw Pact Alternative Proposal
23
The US-Nato Subregion Proposal
24
Outstanding Issues
25
1. How to deal with Soviet air defense interceptors?
25
2. Details of verification
25
3. Defining other treaty limited items
25
4. Zonal limitations
25
5. How to resolve the production issue
26
6. What to do about stored equipment
26
7. How to implement requried reductions
26
Analysis
26
Prospects For A Future Agreement
27
Nuclear Testing Talks
28
Goals And Overall Provisions
28
History
28
Current Status
29
Outstanding Issues
29
Analysis
30
Prospects For Future
30
Recently Concluded Agreements
31
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Implementation
31
The Agreement
31
History
31
Current Status
31
Analysis
31
Possible Future Negotiations/Treaties
33
Short-Range Nuclear Force (SNF) Negotiations
33
What The Treaty Might Look Like
33
History
33
Prospects For A Future Agreement
34
Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT)
34
What A Treaty Might Look Like
34
History
34
Current Status
34
Analysis
35
Prospects For A Future Agreement
36
New Approaches To Arms Limitations
37
Plutonium Production Ban
37
What The Agreement Would Look Like
37
Current Status
37
Analysis: A Plutonium Ban: Good Deal Or Bad?
37
Prospects For A Future Agreement
38
Open Skies
38
Idea Behind The Concept
38
History
38
Current Status
39
Analysis
39
Conclusion
40
Ongoing Negotiations
Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START)
Goals And Provisions
The Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks seek to
U.S. and Soviet Strategic Offensive Forces
cut the strategic nuclear
The annual Department of Defense assessment, Soviet Military Power, suggests the Soviet forces
have become less threatening in the past year but still present a major challenge. Serious U.S.
arsenals of the US and
concerns continue, however, over the imbalance of strategic nuclear weapons.
USSR in half. The
weapons to be limited
Soviet
1,250
include long-range
SS-25
nuclear
forces:
SS-24
1,000
US
Soviet
Intercontinental Ballistic
MX
SS-19
SS-N-23+
SS-N-28+
Missiles (ICBMs),
750
SS-18
SS-N-18
Minuteman
US
Submarine Launched
III
SS-N-17
Soviet
500
SS-17
TRIDENT
US
Ballistic
Missiles
Blackjack++
SS-13
1(C-4)+
SS-N-8
B-18
Minuteman
F8-111
(SLBMs) and strategic
Backfre++
250
II
SS-11
SS-N-6
B-52H
bombers, as well as
POSEIDON
Bear++
(C-3)
SS-N-5
B-52G
associated nuclear
US
USSR
us
USSR
US
USSR
ICBMs
SLBMs
Aircraft
warheads.
Intercontinental
Submarine-launched
bellistic missiles
ballistic missles
+ Includes SLBMs poentially carried on Trident, Typhoon and Delta-IV submarines on sea trials.
++ Includes Backfires assigned to Soviet Naval Aviation and other training aircraft.
Source: Department of Defense
History
The START and Defense and Space negotiations are a part of the Nuclear and Space Talk (NST)
forum. The reason for such a structure is to emphasize the relationship between offensive and
defensive forces. More specifically, the US believes that offensive reductions, combined with
strategic defenses, can create a more stable environment in a world of controlled arms. Both the
START and D&S negotiations began in March 1985.
The first watershed in the START negotiations came in 1986 in Reykjavik, Iceland when
Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to 50% reductions in strategic nuclear weapons,
with an overall warhead limit of 6,000. During the 1987 Washington Summit, the US and USSR
agreed to a sublimit of 4,900 warheads on land- and submarine-based ballistic missiles and 1,100
warheads on heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles. At the 1988 Moscow Summit, Reagan
and Gorbachev agreed to a draft treaty that added limits on heavy bombers, cruise missiles, and
Soviet heavy missiles.
2
Soviet/US Strategic Modernization
1960-1982
SALT and
SALT #
ABM Treaty
BEAR
BACKFIRE
SS-9 M1
55-9 M2 55-9 M2
SS MI
55-N-6 M1
M2
M1
M2
MI
M2
M3
55-6
$5-7
S5-N-5
SS-8
SS-9 MJ
S5-9 M4
55-17 M1
55-19 M1
55- 55-18 M2
SS- 55-18 M3
SS-17 M2
SS-19 M2
S5-16
16
S5-17 M3
55-18 M4 M4
55-79 M3
SS-N-17
BISON
HOTEL III
GOLF .
TYPHOON
HOTEL a
GOLF #
DELTA .
YANKEE I
YANKER If
DELTA I
DELTA M
B-52
ATLAS E
TITAN
ATLAS f
A2
MM 1A
TITAN .
MM 1
A3
MM M
RI-111
AAK-12 A MM ass
0
S
SNARX
ATLAS D
MM
ETHAN
GEORGE
LAPAVETTE
ALLEN
WASHINGTON
OHIO
1960
1972
1979
1982
As Reagan left office, the START numerical limits were as follows:
an overall limit of 6,000 nuclear warheads on 1,600 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles
(SNDVs);
a sublimit of 4,900 warheads on land- and submarine-based ballistic missiles, of which
only 1,540 warheads could be on Soviet SS-18s; and
a limit of 1,100 warheads on heavy bombers and Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs).
[Joint Draft Text of a Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms]
President Bush has adopted these numerical limits, but has shifted the US' negotiating stance
on two important issues; namely mobile missiles and verification. The Bush Administration is also
toying with changing long-held US positions regarding Air-Launched Cruise Missiles and limits on
Soviet SS-18s.
3
Current Status
Over the last few months, the START negotiations have experienced several changes on
particular issues. First, the Soviets proposed that limits on Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs)
be referred to a separate treaty, (possibly in the context of a naval arms accord); while the US
proposed that a verification regime for trial inspections of each side's armaments be conducted prior
to signing START. The US is considering the Soviet proposal; the Soviets have agreed in principle
to the US proposal.
Second, during his visit to Washington in September 1989, Eduard Shevardnadze presented
President Bush with a letter from Mikhail Gorbachev revealing a new Soviet position regarding
START and the ABM Treaty. Since the beginning of the START negotiations, the Soviets refused
to sign a START agreement unless the US restricted its space-based missile research and tests and
vowed not to deploy space-based weapons. [Washington Times, 5/18/89, p. A4] But Gorbachev's
letter to the President claimed that such linkage was a thing of the past. However, the Soviets
continued to demand the US abide by a "narrow" interpretation of the ABM Treaty. If either side
pursued activities that violated the "narrow" interpretation, the other could abrogate START.
[Washington Post, 9/24/89, p. A35]
Some newspapers were quick to praise the Soviets for their "concessions," claiming that a
major obstacle to concluding a START agreement had been lifted. Experts in and out of government,
however, saw right through the Soviet proposal. Some Congressional leaders saw the Soviet
proposal as "extremely cunning" - allowing the Soviets to get a START Treaty while at the same
time maintaining "veto power" over testing or deployment of SDI. [Los Angeles Times, 9/26/89,
p. 10] Even arms control enthusiasts, like Spurgeon Keeny, Director of the Arms Control
Association admitted that, "It [the Soviet position] is not a fundamental change." [Washington Post,
9/24/89, p. A35] And Les Aspin (D-Wis), House Armed Services Committee Chairman, cautioned
against praising the Soviets for a shift in position. According to Aspin, Moscow has changed the
"form of what they are asking, but not the substance of opposition to SDI." [Washington Post,
9/25/89, p. A1]
Finally, during the Malta summit, Bush proposed that Secretary of State James Baker and
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze meet in early 1990, to discuss and resolve three
outstanding START issues Air-Launched Cruise Missiles, nondeployed or stored missiles, and
encryption of missile test data. [Washington Post, 12/3/89; p. 38] The Secretary of State is scheduled
to visit the Soviet Union on February 5 - 6, 1990. President Bush is confident that a START
agreement could be signed in June 1990, at the Washington Summit or sometime soon thereafter.
Such a schedule may be overly optimistic, given the number and extent of outstanding START
issues.
Outstanding Issues
1. How To Deal with Mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)?
Mobile ICBMs are a double-edged sword: their mobility enhances land-based ICBM
survivability but also complicates verification.
4
Originally, the Reagan Administration supported a mobile missile ban for verification reasons.
A mobile missile ban is easier to verify than an agreement allowing some mobile missiles, since
detection of just one missile could prove Soviet noncompliance. Without a ban the US would be
uncertain whether a particular missile spotted was legal or not. The enormous land mass of the
Soviet Union gives them a huge hiding place for illegal missiles, making the need for a ban even
more critical. [Washington Post, 4/7/89, p. A1]
Later, the US did moderate its position on mobile missiles, but only contingent upon
establishing an effective verification regime and strict limits on mobile ICBM warheads.
[Washington Post, 6/13/89, p. A22] When Reagan left office, the question of mobile missiles was
left unresolved even though the Soviets agreed to a general outline for strict verification as proposed
by the US at the Moscow summit. This plan called for confining mobile missiles to designated
deployment areas, allowing them outside those areas only for specific reasons, such as maintenance.
[Washington Times, 8/7/89, p. A8]
The Bush Administration has diverged from the Reagan Administration's position, recently
dropping the mobile missile ban, but only if Congress funds the two mobile missiles requested by
the President: the rail-mobile MX and the Small ICBM. Since Congress did agree to authorize funds
for the two missiles, the work for negotiators will now turn to defining the numbers of permitted
mobile missiles and how to verify them - a whole new can of worms.
2. What to do About Soviet SS-18s?
The SS-18 is a heavy, highly accurate Soviet missile that was first deployed in 1974, and has
been modernized four times. The Soviet SS-18 Mod V can carry 16,000 pounds of throwweight
with up to ten warheads on each missile. The US has no comparable ICBM system. The closest
match is the MX missile that also carries ten warheads. But the MX can only carry 7,000 pounds
of throwweight. This means that the Soviets can place heavier warheads on the missiles for greater
overall explosive power or they could fit more warheads on such a heavy missile.
US attempts to limit the Soviet's large throwweight capability in SALT I and II were
unsuccessful. But, at the Moscow Summit, the USSR agreed to a limit of 1,540 warheads on 154
SS-18 missiles, a formula that would indirectly limit the throwweight capability of the Soviet Union.
However, the US position also prohibited production, flight testing, or modernization of the SS-18
or similar missiles. This was the US' way to prevent the Soviets from further upgrading the SS-18
or producing new heavy missiles. The Soviet position, however, would allow modernization of the
SS-18, but no development, testing, or deployment of new missiles. [Washington Post, 6/13/89, p.
A22] But the Soviet position contains a loophole. The Soviets could build a new missile with
properties similar to the SS-18 and still try to pass it as a "modernized" SS-18. And they have done
just that.
Over the last several years, the Soviets have increased the SS-18s' throwweight by 25%, while
also adding new fuel and a new booster. The Soviets claim this is merely a "modernized" SS-18.
Originally, US intelligence sources designated it a new missile, given the new fuel, booster, and
throwweight capability. But now it appears the Administration has backed down and will designate
this missile as a "modernized" SS-18. The result: even if the US negotiating position on the SS-18
is accepted, the Soviet's heavy missile capability will be reduced only by 25%, not 50%.
[Washington Post, 10/27/89, p. A19]
5
And, the MOD V variant of the SS-18 is more accurate and more lethal than the MOD IV,
which could target every US ICBM silo and command facility with two warheads each, while still
having 1,000 warheads left over. [Air Force Magazine, 11/89, p. 8]
Fortunately, the Bush Administration is working on other alternatives than a 1,540 warhead/154
missile limit. These alternatives include:
an SS-18 ban;
decreasing the number of allowable SS-18s from 1,540 warheads on 154 missiles to some
lower, yet undefined level; and
a heavy missile flight test ban.
[Christian Science Monitor, 5/15/89, p. 19; New York Times, 6/16/89, p. 6]
While the most stabilizing agreement would be one that bans SS-18s, most observers believe
the Soviets will reject such a ban since the original US START position accepted Soviet deployment
of a particular number of SS-18s.
3. Air-Launched Cruise Missiles
Under the Reagan Administration, different types of bombers were designated as carrying a
specific number of cruise missiles, even if the bomber could carry more. The Bush Administration,
however, has been offered an alternative recently from within its own ranks. The new approach,
proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would change the counting rules to reflect the number of
cruise missiles fitted into each bomber, which will often be less than the maximum. [New York
Times, 6/16/89, p. 6] And in the summer of 1989, the Soviets proposed that bombers be counted as
carrying the actual number of missiles installed in a given period. [Washington Post, 8/9/89, p.
A17] The US and Soviets appear to be getting closer to resolving this ALCM issue.
But other long-standing areas of difference between the US and USSR on ALCMs remain. One
is the range threshold above which ALCMs would be subject to START limits. The US defines
ALCMs as any Air-Launch Cruise Missile with a range in excess of 1,500 kilometers, while the
Soveits set ALCMs range in excess of 600 kilometers. A second problem involves how to treat
heavy bombers that are equipped with only conventional arms given the verification difficulties of
distinguishing whether a bomber is carrying nuclear or conventional warheads. [Fiscal Year 1990
Arms Control Impact Statements, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 3/89, p. 6]
4. Verification
The Bush Administration's new approach to verification relies on resolving verification issues
before negotiating limits on specific weapons systems. This verification scheme involves both
general and more specific provisions dealing with mobile missiles. In the general category, the
following schemes are under consideration:
banning interference with electronic telemetry transmitted from missiles during flight tests;
mutual inspection of reentry vehicles or missile warheads; and
comprehensive exchange of data on US/Soviet strategic nuclear systems.
[Washington Post, 6/20/89, p. A26]
6
With regards to mobile missiles, the Bush Administration has detailed a variety of monitoring
methods, such as:
on-site inspection of Soviet SS-24 missile production facilities;
placing an electronic device on Soviet missiles in the field and ones coming out of
production facilities (a process known as "tagging," and used in the INF Treaty to ensure
that banned SS-20s were not being inserted into permitted SS-25 silos) to determine
whether the missile was moved from a deployment or a production site;
an elaborate exchange of nuclear weapons data;
direct inspections of missile nosecones;
a ban on encryption of data from missile flight tests; and
banning flight testing of depressed trajectory missiles - those missiles that can best launch
a sudden attack.
[Washington Post, 6/22/89, p. A30; 7/11/89, p. A1; Los Angeles
Times, 6/21/89, p. 14; Washington Times, 6/19/89, p. A6]
During his trip to the US in September 1989, Eduard Shevardnadze presented President Bush
with a letter from General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev detailing several arms control positions.
One included agreement "in principle" to trial verification inspections. But the Soviets also
expanded the bounds of the proposal to cover bombers and naval vessels, a position the US is
unlikely to accept for fear of compromising sensitive national security information. [Washington
Post, 9/22/89, p. A32]
These verification schemes, however, are full of potential negotiating snags, such as:
how to account for mobile missiles that have been produced but not deployed;
how to monitor missile factories;
the size of the designated deployment site (the Soviets want larger regions than does the
US);
the conditions under which missiles can be moved in and out of the designated sites; and
how to carry out aerial observation: i.e., whether each nation could use its own planes or
use a common pool of planes assembled into a unique international air force under United
Nations auspices.
[Washington Times, 8/7/89, p. A8]
Indeed, a recent Washington Post article outlined how little progress has been made in
implementing Bush's proposals for trial arms inspections because both the US and USSR have
proposed completely different schemes and priorities. [10/24/89, p. A20]
7
5. Depressed Trajectory Missile Ban
Recently, the US decided to add a provision prohibiting either side from developing depressed
trajectory ballistic missiles (those missiles that come in at extremely low altitudes and have short
flight times). Specifics still have to be worked out, but the idea is that the US and Soviets would
agree to set standards for the flight arc of the missile, below which testing would not be allowed.
In addition, a minimum limit would be agreed to regarding ballistic missile flight times. [Defense
News, 7/31/89, pp. 1, 24] Other details, like verification, have yet to be addressed.
This proposal is unique - for the first time an arms control agreement would ban a missile
that has yet to be developed. Only time will tell if the details on this proposal can be worked out
to each side's satisfaction.
6. Sea-Lauched Cruise Missiles
Originally, the Soviets proposed a ceiling of 400 nuclear and 600 non-nuclear SLCMs for each
nation, to be verified by comprehensive monitoring of ports and warships. [Christian Science
Monitor, 6/19/89, p. 2] The Reagan Administration refused to negotiate limits on SLCMs because
of verification difficulties, and the Bush Administration has done likewise thus far for the same
reasons. The US position is that each superpower merely declare the number of SLCMs it plans to
deploy. [Fiscal Year 1990 Arms Control Impact Statements, 101 st Congress, 1st Session, 3/89; New
York Times, 6/16/89, p. 6; 12/19/89, p. 18]
Verification difficulties revolve around three issues:
distinguishing conventional SLCM warheads from nuclear warheads is almost impossible
since SLCMs can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads;
verifying the numbers of nuclear SLCMs deployed on a submarine is complex because a
submarine would carry both nuclear and conventional SLCMs; and
detecting covert deployment is next to impossible because SLCMs are very small and can
be easily hidden;
The Soviets, however, have been claiming that the problems of verification and
distinguishability can be overcome, and to prove it they recently invited a team of American
scientists, Congressmen, and the press on board a Soviet missile cruiser to test a method for
determining the type of warhead on a cruise missile. [Washington Post, 7/6/89, p. A19; 7/7/89, p.
A22] While the test monitored successfully the presence of uranium in a missile silo confirming
the existence of a nuclear warhead, John Spratt, a member of the House Armed Services Committee
who was present during the test warned that, "I do not believe we should leave here with the
impression or conclusion that this tough nut - cruise missile verification - has been cracked."
[Washington Post, 7/7/89, p. A22] Even an American physicist with the Natural Resource Defense
Council, admitted that, "it remains possible for either side to hide weapons or to shield them against
detection," from the type of devices used in the test. [Soviet Nuclear Test, AP Wire Service, 7/6/89]
Such a verification backdrop set the stage for a shift in Soviet policy on SLCMs. The Soviets
used the meeting between Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Jackson
Hole, Wyoming, to call for a joint study on verification measures required to monitor compliance
8
with limits on nuclear-armed SLCMs. Further, the Soviets offered to exclude SLCMs from the
START formula while proposing that these weapons be handled in a "side agreement." [Washington
Post, 9/24/89, p. A36] The US has not yet responded to the Soviet proposal, mainly-because of
fears that the Soviets will use the "side agreement" as an opening to expand the agreement to include
conventional SLCMs and other naval limits.
Prospects For The Future
President Bush has stated on several occasions that a START agreement could be reached by
1990. The most recent reiteration came during the Malta Summit. To meet this schedule, Secretary
of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will meet in the new year to hammer
out current disagreements. As the list of outstanding issues shows, Baker and Shevardnadze have
their work cut out for them.
While Bush clearly feels domestic as well as international political pressures to "respond" to
the changes in Eastern Europe, pushing for a START agreement by the next superpower summit in
Washington in June 1990, may not have been wise. Such optimism gains a momentum all its own.
The US could be pushed into making last minute concessions so it is not seen as obstructing the
arms control process. Such artificial deadlines set the stage for previous agreements - SALT I,
SALT II; and the INF Treaty - leading to US concessions on important issues while preventing it
from extracting similar concessions from the Soviets.
The bottom line - if a START Agreement is ready for signing in 1990, the US must be sure
that the agreement enhances strategic stability, is verifiable, and in no way is tied to limits on the
US SDI program.
Analysis
Several criticisms have been leveled against the START formula and the verification schemes
envisioned.
First, some claim that the START formula places too many warheads on too few launchers.
This is a cause for concern especially if the US decides to deploy 21 Trident submarines.
Deployment of 21 Trident submarines, each carrying 244 warheads, would demand reduction of
more flexible bombers and mobile ICBMs to stay within START's numerical limits for warheads
and missile launchers. For instance, the land-based leg of the nuclear deterrent would shrink from
carrying 2,000 warheads to only 868. [Defense News, 6/5/89, p. 38] This is hardly a stabilizing
situation, since the US bases nuclear deterrence on dividing nuclear assets amongst its land, sea and
air-breathing systems, each one with its own strengths and weaknesses.
With 21 Trident submarines, however, four-fifths of the US' warheads would be deployed by
only 21 potential targets. While some might argue that placing a larger number of warheads on the
more survivable submarine platform would be stabilizing, one should never place all one's eggs in
a single basket. Further, US confidence in future submarine survivability has been shaken by the
Walker spy case, a formidable Soviet Anti-Submarine Warfare capability, and potential problems
in US submarine command, control, and communications.
9
Another problem lies in the START verification scheme. As Edward L. Rowny, retired Army
lieutenant general and special adviser to the President and the secretary of state for arms control
matters has stated, "Simply having the right to on-site inspection does not mean inspections will
automatically yield relevant information." [Hartford Courant, 8/31/89, p. C17]
Finally, there is the recent US reversal on the mobile missile issue. While perhaps a tactic to
strongarm Congress into funding the President's defense budget priorities, allowing mobile ICBMs
will complicate verification of Soviet compliance with any START agreement.
Defense And Space Talks
Goals And General Provisions
Strategic defense systems are the topic of the Defense and Space Talks (D&S). These talks
provide a forum for exploring ways to transition from a deterrence based on offensive forces to one
emphasizing defensive systems. The US' goal: to conclude a treaty with provisions that eventually
allows for deployment of ballistic missile defenses. [Fiscal Year 1990 Arms Control Impact
Statements, 101 Congress, 1st Session, 3/89, p. 8]
History
The Defense and Space (D&S) Talks comprise the second set of negotiations under the Nuclear
and Space Talk (NST) forum. Negotiations began in March 1985. Superpower summit discussions
provided the foundation upon which the US drafted a preliminary D&S Treaty, which was presented
to the Soviets on January 22, 1988. Four months later, the Soviets came forward with their own
draft agreement. However, the Soviets have refused to develop a Joint Draft Treaty.
Current Status
Recently, the Soviets dropped a demand that both sides cannot withdraw from the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for a period of ten years. While the time span of the non-withdrawal
period was one contentious issue for negotiators, both sides did agree that after a certain period of
adherence to the treaty, each would be free to deploy defensive systems. Now, the Soviets are
demanding each side abide by the ABM Treaty "as signed," which they interpret as restricting testing
and development (as well as deployment) of space weapons.
The question of what tests are and are not permissible under the ABM Treaty has long been a
sticking point in negotiations. The Soviets even conditioned the conclusion of START to resolution
of this issue. But now, in another departure from the past, the Soviets have broken this linkage and
replaced it with another, more restrictive link between START and the ABM Treaty. The Soviets
proposed that either side be allowed to abrogate the START Treaty if the other violates the ABM
Treaty. The Soviets claim that development and testing of space-based weapons would violate the
ABM Treaty. [Wall Street Journal, 9/25/89, p. A11] The Soviets recently renewed a proposal to
limit the type of experiments that could be conducted under the SDI program, and the US quickly
10
rejected it. The current US counter-proposal would allow space tests under two conditions: 1) that
prior notification is given; and 2) that tests do not constitute deployment.
Outstanding Issues
The Soviet shift in negotiating positions places even greater restrictions on the US SDI testing,
program and at the same time, attempts to prevent the deployment of US strategic defenses. Let's
look at the outstanding negotiating issues in light of the new Soviet defense and space arms control
proposal.
1. US and Soviet Interpretation of Testing
The US believes the ABM Treaty allows research, development, and testing in the following
cases:
development and testing of devices that are neither ABM system components or substitutes
for such components;
development and testing at agreed test ranges based on physical principles existing in 1972;
and
development and testing based on other physical principles than those existing in 1972.
[Ambassador Paul Nitze, ABM Treaty-Permitted
Activities, National Defense, V. 71, 4/87]
The Soviets object, claiming that Article V of the ABM Treaty bans these activities.
With regards to space-based weapons, the US interprets the ABM Treaty as allowing for
carrying out testing of space-based components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor
missiles, but only using designated ABM test satellites. The US would also like to limit the number
of designated test satellites in orbit at one time to about 15, to demonstrate that such testing does
not represent deployment of space-based weapons. The Soviets strongly oppose this position,
claiming that such action would be a violation of Articles I and V of the ABM Treaty.
2. Negotiations on Permitted and Prohibited Testing
The Soviets have repeatedly called for negotiations to cover, and for negotiators to come up
with, a list of activities permitted by the ABM Treaty. [Washington Post, 9/27/89, p. A44] The US
refuses to accept this Soviet demand, and understandably so when the implications are considered.
First, the Soviets will demand that only those tests they claim are permissible be on the list. Second,
permissible tests will be defined as ones allowed by a "narrow" interpretation [read Soviet
interpretation] of the ABM Treaty. The Soviet plan appears to be an effort to expand the list beyond
what was agreed to in the 1972 ABM Treaty to further restrict US testing for the SDI program.
3. Predictability
In an attempt to create greater understanding and knowledge about each's defense programs,
the D&S negotiations involve a number of "predictability" measures, such as annual exchanges of
programmatic data on planned strategic defense activities and reciprocal visits to associated research
facilities. The area of disagreement: the US predictability package is voluntary, while the Soviet
11
package is compulsory. However, the US has not been discouraged from trying to open channels
for understanding each other's defensive efforts. In line with this approach, Soviet representatives
recently visited the neutral particle beam center at Los Alamos National Laboratory and the large
ALPHA chemical laser at the San Juan Capistrano TRW facility in California. [Defense News,
12/18/89, p. 10]
Prospects For A Future Agreement
The outlook for concluding a D&S Agreement in the near future is not promising, especially
given the extent of the remaining issues. Further, the Soviets have done everything in their power
thus far to limit US SDI testing and chances for deployment. And the fact that the Soviets recently
admitted that their Krasnoyarsk radar is a "clear" violation of the ABM Treaty does not mean a
changed Soviet Union. For instance, the Soviet admission was coupled to its long-held demand
that Soviet inspectors be allowed to inspect the US radars in Greenland and England. [Washington
Post, 10/24/89, p. A22]
The Soviets have continuously said these radars violate the ABM Treaty, which is completely
false for several reasons. First, the radars were deployed long before the ABM Treaty went into
effect. Second, if the Soviets were so concerned about these radars during the ABM Treaty
negotiations, they would have objected to them at that time, and insisted on specific treaty language
regarding these radars.
At the same time, the Soviets are using their admission as a desire to strengthen and reinforce
the terms of the ABM Treaty. But other Soviet activities indicate renewed Soviet efforts to
undermine the ABM Treaty. First, the Soviets have boosted the radar power of their anti-missile
system, increasing the likelihood that they can provide a nation-wide defense. Article I of the ABM
Treaty prohibits the deployment of nation-wide defenses, or a base for such a defense. Second, the
Soviets have supposedly moved some SA-12B surface-to-air missiles to East Germany, although
the ABM Treaty explicitly forbids either nation from moving ABM-capable missiles outside their
own territory. [Washington Times, 10/2/89, p. 6]
Actions speak louder than words. The Soviets have changed little - their tactics may have
changed but their strategy of using the Defense and Space negotiations to stifle progress in the US
SDI program have not. The US should not reward the Soviets for breaking an international
agreement by giving in to Soviet demands for strengthening the ABM Treaty. On the contrary, the
failure of the ABM Treaty to limit deployment of strategic defenses indicates that a more desirable
treaty would be one allowing mutual deployments of strategic defenses.
Analysis
The idea of transitioning from a deterrent based on offensive forces to one increasingly
dependent upon defensive forces makes sense. Strategic defenses can enhance the survivability of
offensive nuclear forces, making it less likely that an enemy would launch an attack. As a bonus,
command, control, and communications can be protected by deployment of a strategic defense
system. And, defenses become even more important to the US if a START Treaty is signed. Why?
Because these defenses can provide a safeguard against possible Soviet cheating, such as building
prohibited offensive systems. It would make little sense for the Soviets to spend precious money
12
on covertly producing a large amount of weapons that would convey little strategic advantage in
the face of a deployed US strategic defense system.
Turning to specifics, the Soviet ploy of "delinking" completion of START to resolution of the
ABM Treaty interpretation issue was cunning indeed. The Soviets can now push forward on
completing a START Agreement while continuously holding the threat of abrogation over the US'
head. In essence, the Soviets merely replaced one linkage proposal with another, more lethal one:
that a START Agreement can be signed but only if the US agrees never to deploy space-based
strategic defenses. [Los Angeles Times, 9/26/89, p. 1]
If the US accepts the Soviet "re-linkage," any space-based testing would be met with the Soviets
blaming the US for breaking two treaties, not just one. It would be difficult enough for the US to
muster the political courage to conduct such activities, regardless of their legality, let alone doing
so in the knowledge that the Soviets would abrogate a START Treaty. [Defense News, 10/2/89, p.
23] It appears that the Soviet proposal is targeted at keeping the US SDI program a research and
development forever program while the Soviets continue to upgrade their own strategic defense
system. [See Wall Street Journal, 10/6/89, p. A12 for a review of recent upgrades to the Soviet
ABM System]
Chemical Weapons Talks
Goals And Provisions
The Chemical Weapons (CW)
negotiations involve 40 nations
attempting to conclude a global
Chemical agents and their effects
treaty banning production,
Type and Name
Form
Smell
Parts of body affected
possession, transfer, development,
Nerve agents
and use of chemical agents.
Tabun GA
Liquid or vapor
Fruit
Sarin GB
Liquid or vapor
Almost none
Usually fatal
VX
Liquid
History
Blister agents
Distilled Mustard
Liquid or vapor
Garlic
Damages exposed skin surfaces
Nitrogen mustard
Liquid or vapor
Fish or soap
Can be lethal in large doses
In 1984 the US proposed a
Choking agents
Phosgene
Colorless gas
New-mown hay
Lethal
draft treaty banning the
development, production, use,
Incapacitating agents
CN
Visible vapor
Apple blossom
CS
transfer, and stockpiling of
Visible vapor
Pepper
BZ
Vapor
-
chemical weapons, which remains
Toxin agents
the basis for negotiations today.
Butolin X, A
Powder or liquid
-
Usually lethal
Saxitoxin TZ
Powder or liquid
-
Three years later, the negotiators
Enterotoxin B
Powder or liquid
-
agreed to a draft treaty with the
following provisions:
a prohibition on the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer,
and use of chemical weapons;
that existing chemical weapons and production facilities be declared, placed under
international surveillance, and destroyed within a ten-year period; and
13
identification of certain activities of the civil chemical industry to be monitored to ensure
chemical weapons are destroyed (e.g., that dual-capable chemicals be used only for
"peaceful purposes").
[Ambassador Tessa Solesby, Head of the UK Delegation to the Committee on
Disarmament in Geneva, Nato Review, V. 36, 12/88, p. 8]
Current Status
During their meeting in September 1989, Secretary Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze agreed to a US/USSR exchange of poison gas stockpile data, (to include total volume,
weaponry, storage sites, and production and destruction facilities) by the end of the year.
[Washington Post, 9/27/89, p. A44] The two sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
to verify their chemical weapons arsenals, with two phases. Phase I involves the exchange of general
data on chemical weapons capabilities as well as conducting visits to relevant CW facilities. Phase
II involves the exchange of detailed data, with on-site inspections being performed to verify the
accuracy of the data. [US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Memorandum of Understanding
between the government of the United States of America and the government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons," 9/23/89; p. 1] Phase I data was to be exchanged by December
31, 1989, [although no reports have confirmed whether the exchange took place on the designated
date] and visits to related facilities are to be conducted no later than June 30, 1990. The US and
USSR have begun bilateral talks to hammer out verification provisions. The idea: that the
superpowers can set an example by allowing inspections of CW production and storage sites prior
to completion of the Treaty, exchanging data on stockpile size, and agreeing to procedures for highly
intrusive suspect site inspections. [New York Times, 7/18/89, p. 1; Washington Post, 8/3/89, p. A5;
Washington Times, 7/31/89, p. A10]
Other ideas for verification have come from a group of countries volunteering to conduct trial
inspections of their chemical plants as an experiment for verifying that routinely produced
commercial chemicals are not being used to chemical warfare agents. The countries include:
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, East Germany, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US, USSR, and West Germany. [Lois Ember, Chemical and Engineering
News, Vol. 67, 3/89, p. 24]
The most recent development that will undoubtedly affect the CW negotiations stems from
President Bush's recent United Nations speech, where he proposed that:
in the first eight years of a chemical weapons treaty, the US will destroy 98% of its chemical
weapons stockpile if the Soviets do likewise;
the US will destroy all chemical weapons within ten years when all nations capable of
producing chemical weapons sign a treaty; and
the US will begin eliminating more than 80% of its stockpile if the Soviets cut their chemical
weapons to an equal level.
[President Bush Addresses United Nations General
Assembly, New York, New York, 9/25/89, p. 5]
14
Halting Chemical Weapons Production
President Bush's call for a ban on the use and production of deadly chemical weapons would mean:
The Soviet Union would have to destroy some 50,000 tons of chemical agents and the United States
some 30,000 tons.
US chemical weapons would be cut to 20 percent of current levels if the Soviet Union does the same.
US chemical weapons would be cut by 98 percent after those nations holding chemical weapons
make the same pledge by signing a special convention agreement.
All chemical weapons would be eliminated once a multilateral treaty was signed.
Nations confirmed to have chemical weapons: United States, Soviet Union, Iraq, France.
Nations seeking chemical weapons: Iran, South Korea.
Nations reported to have chemical weapons: Egypt, Syria, Libya, Israel, Ethiopia, Burma, Thailand,
China, North Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan.
The Soviets welcomed President Bush's proposal but took it one step further by suggesting
that production of the most advanced chemical weapons be banned. The Soviet proposal is merely
aimed at putting political pressure on the Bush Administration's plans to replace badly deteriorating
chemical weapons with more advanced yet more safely storable binary chemical weapons. The
Soviets reacted similarly in 1985 when Congress first authorized $155 million to begin replacing
outdated US chemical weapons stockpiles, breaking a sixteen year self-imposed moratorium on
production. [Stanford Journal of International Law, V. 25, Spring 1989, p. 650]
The Binary Bomb
Binary chemical weapons include two
ingredients that are nonlethal when separate.
Once combined in the bomb (a 155-mm howitzer
shell, right) the chemicals become lethal weapons.
For Use:
1. Base is unscrewed and two canisters with
chemical ingredients are loaded in the shell. The
coffee-can-size containers usually hold the agents
in liquid form.
2. Force of firing ruptures canisters. Some
binaries have rotation devices that mix the two
chemicals thoroughly.
Body
3. Burster opens shell on contact with target.
The now-lethal agent is released, usually in aerosol
form (a cloud of fine particles).
1
gos
Fuse
pocket
The Unitary
bomb
This would contain
the lethal agent,
usually in compressed
liquid form. On
contact, the agent is
released as an aerosol
or in tiny droplets.
Liqudfied gas
Casing
15
Further, while the US and USSR have joined together to speed up the CW talks, the Soviets
have refused to accept any immediate stockpile reduction until the US decides to forgo its binary
weapons program. During the Malta Summit, Bush agreed to abandon production of binary
chemical weapons. At the same time, Bush proposed that the two sides sign a bi-lateral agreement
on CW destruction. [Defense News, 12/11/89, p.4]
Outstanding Issues
Outlawing the development, transfer, production, and use of chemical weapons is a complex
process, and many outstanding obstacles to concluding an agreement exist. These include:
the problem that chemical weapons can be clandestinely produced by civilian chemical
industries;
clandestinely produced weapons can be stockpiled and hidden in small areas;
how to deal with the dual use characteristics of chemicals, since chemicals used in
weaponry have legitimate uses in industry and for health purposes (e.g., thiodiglycol, a
chemical of ball-point pen ink, creates mustard gas when mixed with hydrochloric acid;
phosphorus oxychloride is an ingredient of pesticides, hydraulic fluid, and the nerve gas
Tabun. [Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, Spring 1989, p. 656];
how to allow for on-site inspections so that sensitive military facilities and propriety
information of chemical industries is not compromised;
how to prevent the spread of chemical weapons amongst those countries that refuse to sign
the Treaty; and
the fact that the US and USSR differ on their assessments of the Soviet chemical weapons
stockpile: the US suspects the Soviets have produced and stored 300,000 tons of chemical
weapons. The Soviets claim they only have 50,000 tons. [Washington Times, 11/8/89, p.
A7] While US estimates may be a bit exaggerated, the uncertainty of just how large the
Soviet stockpile is shows the complex verification problems involved in these negotiations.
Analysis
Lewis-Dunn, former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, outlines
some of these difficult issues in a recent article:
"Many technical analysts believe that a legitimate civilian
facility could be switched to production of super-toxic chemical
agents and back in twelve hours or, at most, days, without too much
difficulty and without a high risk of detection.
"Nor can necessary prompt and unfettered access to a plant be
assumed.
"Chemical weapons plants can be hidden within the larger
industrial fabric." [Survival, V. 31, 5/6/89, p. 215]
16
Even before the formal opening of negotiations, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that the Soviets
would reduce unilaterally some conventional forces in Eastern Europe. According to Gorbachev,
tanks would be reduced by 10,000, artillery systems by 8,500, combat aircraft by 800, and certain
assault river crossing and landing formations would also be withdrawn. [General John Galvin,
"Some Thoughts on Conventional Arms Control," Survival, V. 31, 3-4/89, p. 99] These reductions
set the political stage for the formal opening of negotiations.
Current Status
The current treaty under consideration is based on the revised CFE package introduced by
NATO on July 13, 1989. The draft treaty proposes limiting the numbers of weapons and manpower
in general, with more specific limitations on the numbers and types of forces permitted in certain
geographical regions. The package includes five types of limits. [All of the data below is from:
CFE: Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, 1989]
1. Overall Numerical Limits: sets a cap on the overall total of NATO and Warsaw Pact
conventional forces. [Note the numerical differences regarding artillery, manpower, combat aircraft
and attack helicopters.]
NATO
WARSAW PACT
PROPOSAL
PROPOSAL
Main Battle Tanks
40,000
40,000
Artillery
33,000
48,000
Armored Troop Carriers
56,000
56,000
Combat Aircraft *
11,400
3,000
Combat Helicopters
3,800
3,400
Manpower
NATO proposal addresses U.S. and Soviet manpower
2,700,000
only, with U.S. and Soviet ground and air stationed
manpower levels in Europe to be limited to 275,000 each.
*NATO's proposed ceiling refers to total NATO and Warsaw Pact holdings of permanently
land-based, combat-capable aircraft. The Warsaw Pact proposal includes bombers, fighter bombers,
and attack aircraft.
19
2. Equal Limits in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. NATO and the Warsaw Pact have
set out limits of weapons systems within the Atlantic to the Urals zone.
NATO
WARSAW PACT
PROPOSAL
PROPOSAL
Main Battle Tanks
20,000
20,000
Artillery
16,500
24,000
Armored Troop Carriers
28,000
28,000
Combat Aircraft *
5,700
1,500
4,700**
Combat Helicopters
1,900
1,700
1,900**
Manpower
NATO proposal addresses U.S. and Soviet manpower
1,350,000
only, with U.S. and Soviet ground and air stationed
manpower levels in Europe to be limited to 275,000 each.
*NATO's proposed ceiling refers to total NATO and Warsaw Pact holdings of permanently land-based,
combat-capable aircraft. The Warsaw Pact proposal includes bombers, fighter bombers, and attack aircraft.
**updated figures from Jane's Defense Weekly, 1/13/90, p.73
3. Sufficiency limits: The two sides agree in principle that no one country should have more
than a specific percentage (NATO proposes 30%; Warsaw Pact proposes 35-40%) of the overall
limits.
NATO
WARSAW PACT
PROPOSAL
PROPOSAL
Main Battle Tanks
12,000
14,000
Artillery
10,000
17,000
Armored Troop Carriers
16,800
18,000
Combat Aircraft
NATO has proposed a ceiling of 3,420 for holdings by individual members
of NATO and the Warsaw Pact of permanently land-based, combat-
capable aircraft. This figure reflects a broader definition of combat aircraft
than that used by the Warsaw Pact which has proposed a ceiling of 1,200
for "strike" aircraft only.
Combat Helicopters
1,140
1,350
Manpower
NATO proposal addresses U.S. and Soviet manpower
920,000
only, with U.S. and Soviet ground and air stationed
manpower levels in Europe to be limited to 275,000 each.
*NATO's ceiling would limit permanently land-based, combat-capable aircraft. The Warsaw Pact
definition of combat aircraft includes bombers, fighter bombers, and attack aircraft.
20
4. Stationed forces limits: The US and Soviet Union also agree in principle to limit the number
of forces they can station on "foreign territory."
NATO
WARSAW PACT
PROPOSAL
PROPOSAL
Main Battle Tanks
3,200
4,500
(active units only)
(in active units and stored)
Artillery
1,700
4.000
(active units only)
(in active units and stored)
Armored Troop Carriers
6,000
7,500
(active units only)
(in active units and stored)
Combat Aircraft
N/A*
350
("strike" aircraft only)
Combat Helicopters
N/A*
600
Manpower
275,000
350.000
(U.S. and Soviet ground/air forces only)
5. Subregions: Each side has also agreed, in principle, to geographical sublimits - the
larger the zone, the more forces allowed; the smaller the zone, the less forces allowed. The
sub-region proposal is meant to prevent redeployment of forces withdrawn from one area to another.
21
Subregion Proposals: Soviet Union-Warsaw Pact
The Soviet-Warsaw Pact has made two subregion proposals; one in May 1989 which divided
Europe into three zones (Central, Forward, and Rear) and one in June 1989 which divided Europe
into four zones (North, Center, South, and Rear).
:
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Rear Zone
In May, the Warsaw Pact proposed the following regional sub-ceilings for three geographic sub-regions:
Categories
Central Zone
Forward Zone
Rear Zone
(includes Central Zone)
Tanks
8,700
16,000
4,000
Artillery
7,600
16,500
7,500
Armored Troop Carriers
14,500
20,500
7,500
Aircraft
420
1,100
400
Helicopters
800
1,300
400
Manpower
570,000
1,000,000
350,000
22
The Soviet-Warsaw Pact Alternative Proposal
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Center Zone
North Zone
South Zone
Rear Zone
On June 29, the Warsaw Pact tabled an alternative regional approach with sub-ceilings:
Categories
North
Center
South
Rear
Tanks
200
13,300
5,200
1,300
Artillery
1,000
11,500
8,500
3,000
Armored Troop Carriers
150
20,750
5,750
1,350
Aircraft
30
1,120
290
60
Helicopters
30
1,250
360
60
Manpower
20,000
910,000
270,000
150,000
[CFE: Negotiation on Conventional Armed forces in Europe, US Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, 1989]
23
The US-Nato Subregion Proposal
NATO has defined not only the regions but also the maximum number of forces allowed in
each of four zones as follows:
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Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
On March 9, NATO proposed the following interlocking regional sub-ceilings for four geographic sub-regions to prevent
redeployment of forces withdrawn from one part of the area of application to another:
Categories
Zone 1
Zone 2 a
Zone 3 a
Zone 4 a
(includes Zones 2, 3 & 4)
(includes Zones 3 & 4)
(includes Zone 4)
Tanks
20,000
11,300
10,300
8,000
Artillery
16,500
'9,000
7,600
4,500
Armored Troop Carriers
28,000 b
20,000
18,000
11,000
Combat Aircraft
5,700 C
N/A di
N/A d
N/A d
Combat Helicopters
1,900 c
N/A d
N/A d
N/A di
Manpower
- e
- e
- e
- 8
a
Active units only
-
Of which no more than 12,000 would be Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles
:
Land-based combat aircraft/helicopters
1
Due to the extreme mobility and speed of aircraft and helicopters. NATO has not proposed regional sub-ceilings or ceilings of stationed equipment
e
NATO proposed a stationed overall manpower limit of 275,000 each for the U.S. and USSR
[CFE: Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, US Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, 1989]
24
Most recent developments include proposals from both sides involving verification measures.
The two sides appear to agree on the need to exchange information on numbers and locations of
forces and weapons systems, but the two sides disagree on details regarding on-site and suspect-site
inspection procedures. [Wall Street Journal, 9/22/89, p. A10; Washington Times, 9/22/89, p. A8;
Washington Post, 9/22/89, p. A33]
Finally, in a departure from the past, the Soviets recently agreed to limit their "front-line"
fighters, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare aircraft. While this announcement may bring the
two sides closer than before on the aircraft issue, this issue, as well as many others, are far from
being resolved.
Outstanding Issues
The important outstanding issues include:
1. How to deal with Soviet air defense interceptors?
The Soviets have recently proposed that there be a separate ceiling on interceptor aircraft. This
is a far cry from their original position, stated by Soviet arms control Ambassador Oleg Grinevsky,
that interceptors be excluded from limits because, "they have no ground attack capability and are
not part of the surprise attack potential." [Defense News, 10/2/89, p. 16] But the West has yet to
see just what these separate ceilings are, which interceptors would be included and whether any
would be excluded from the separate ceiling. And, the Soviet aircraft proposal excludes land-based
naval air forces, combat-capable trainers, and Backfire bombers, for a total of some 6,000 aircraft.
Clearly, the US cannot allow the Soviets to retain these systems without maintaining comparable
forces.
2. Details of verification
Verifying conventional forces may be more difficult than verifying nuclear forces, since
conventional arms are smaller, larger in number, more mobile, and easily camouflaged. And while
the sides agree on basic principles, such as data exchange, the procedures for implementing on-site
and suspect-site inspections are open to debate. [Thomas J. Marshall, "New Openings for
Conventional Arms Control," Parameters, V. 19, 6/89, p. 82] To make matters worse, NATO allies
disagree amongst themselves over verification measures regarding notification requirements of arms
and troop movements and whether to allow constant monitoring of arms production and key
weapons transfer points. [Washington Post, 9/8/89, p. A30]
3. Defining other treaty limited items
So far, the two sides have failed to find common ground in defining every type of weapon
system to be limited. For instance, the problem of distinguishing light from main battle tanks will
be the focus of the upcoming new round of negotiations that began on January 12. [Defense News,
1/1/90, p. 3]
4. Zonal limitations
The two sides have different ideas on not only the number of zones but also regarding the
numbers of forces allowed in each zone.
25
5. How to resolve the production issue
For instance, no greater than a particular number of tanks is allowed in any particular region.
How would this impact on tanks rolling off the production line in these regions?
6. What to do about stored equipment
NATO wants to exclude stored equipment from CFE's limits to compensate for its geographical
distance from Western Europe to protect its reinforcement capability. The stored equipment,
according to NATO's proposal, could be disassembled, with some of the components stored at
different locations. [Defense News, 7/3/89, p. 3] Thus far, the Soviets want to include stored
equipment. To resolve this issue, the West proposed that the Soviets store equipment in Poland, but
Poland flatly refused.
7. How to implement required reductions
Of course, both sides would prefer getting rid of older systems and leaving newer systems
intact. However, NATO has already experienced differences over which nations should give up its
older forces to be replaced by more modern ones. For instance, Turkey has objected to allowing
Greece to have more modern weapons. And, in general, the question of what forces and how many
forces should be reduced raises issues of how to restructure NATO's military forces.
Analysis
First things first. Let's examine the Soviet unilateral proposal which many arms control
enthusiasts immediately applauded. To date, the Soviets have begun moving out some of their
armaments and personnel from Eastern Europe. However, these arms and troops are only being
redeployed to other areas. So, the unilateral reduction hailed as a significant Soviet move toward
"genuine" arms control is really a ruse. For instance, the 69th Motorized Rifle Regiment has been
reassigned to a new command. And other equipment and units, critical to military readiness, will
remain in Eastern Europe: infantry fighting vehicles and communications, maintenance and medical
troops. [New York Times, 8/9/89, p. 10; Washington Post, 8/9/89, p. A14; US News and World
Report, 11/6/89, p. 54] Finally, the 5,000 tanks to be withdrawn from Eastern Europe were merely
redeployed outside the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone to bases and storage behind the Ural Mountains.
[Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, No. 118, 10/26/89, p. 1]
And recently, the Soviets pledged to reduce their tank production by 50% over the next five
years. But according to Les Aspin, while the number of Soviet tanks may decline, the remaining
force is becoming more "formidable" with the addition of three layers of reactive -explosive
boxes that deflect most anti-tank missiles. [National Journal, 10/14/89, p. 2533] US Secretary of
Defense Dick Cheney accurately described the cosmetic changes taking place when he stated that,
"The net result [of these reductions] is likely to be a leaner and meaner Soviet military establishment,
one that is every bit as capable as their current forces, if somewhat restructured and with a slightly
different set of priorities." [Washington Times, 9/14/89, p. A5]
And while East Germany began dismantling its old T-55A tanks for conversion into other
vehicles, Soviet tank production has hit an all-time high. [Reuter Wire News, from: Current News,
6/16/89, p. 2] For instance, T-80 tank production for last year totaled 3,500, while tank production
for the first quarter of this year totaled 4,200. [Washington Times, 5/8/89, p. 1] Although there are
26
some reports that Soviet tank production has recently tapered off, many military officials state that
even if tank production stopped today, the Soviets have produced enough new T-80 tanks to replace
some 10,000 old T-55 and T-62 tanks, leaving them with a more modern and more powerful military
force.
Further, the potential for concluding a destabilizing agreement exists if the US concedes on
several of the important outstanding issues, such as the interceptor question, the geographical zones
and numbers of forces allowed in each zone, and verification measures. For obvious reasons, the
US cannot give in to an agreement that allows the Soviets to maintain their air defense interceptor
capability, that establishes a zonal limit which the Soviets can exploit to jeopardize Western security,
and that creates verification uncertainties.
Prospects For A Future Agreement
During the NATO Summit in May 1989, President Bush stated enthusiastically that a CFE
agreement could be signed within a year. And Bush was just as optimistic at the Malta meeting
proposing signing of a CFE Agreement by Fall, 1990. Here we go again, setting internal deadlines
that can only be harmful to the prospects of achieving an equitable, stabilizing CFE agreement. And
even if the outstanding issues described above are resolved in short order, there are a list of other
potential obstacles to reaching an agreement within a year. These include:
French and British troops
The Soviets have already said that the more than 100,000 French and British troops
stationed in West Germany could complicate the manpower reductions Bush has
proposed. The Soviets claim these troops should also be included in the overall troop
level for the West. But the manpower limits proposed by the US are aimed at reducing
the military presence of the US and the Soviet Union in Western Europe and Eastern
Europe respectively.
What to do about French and British aircraft
Neither country wants its dual capable aircraft limited by CFE on the same grounds as
above: they provide the independent nuclear capability for France and Britain, and are
not under the NATO alliance's control. Such a Soviet demand would be unacceptable.
What to do about the Soviet Backfire bomber
During the SALT II negotiations, the Soviets argued that Backfire was a modernized
medium-range bomber and should be excluded from the Treaty's limits. As a
medium-range bomber, however, the Backfire should be captured by a CFE Agreement.
The US has supposedly raised the Backfire bomber issue with the Soviets in the
negotiations, but has been unsuccessful in convincing the Soviets that it should be limited
by a CFE agreement.
The relationship between a CFE agreement and short-range nuclear force negotiations.
The Soviets can be expected to continue pushing for short-range nuclear force
negotiations [see section on SNF Negotiations], to place greater pressure on already
strained relations within the NATO alliance.
27
The Soviet insistence that naval force reductions be negotiated or else "no drastic
reductions of the armed forces and armaments in the world will be possible."
The Soviets realize that limiting US naval forces would strangle the US from vital sea
lanes. The US capability to reinforce NATO via sea lift could be jeopardized. [New
York Times, 7/25/89, p. A5; 7/31/89, p. A15; Washington Post, 6/1/89, p. A33; Baltimore
Sun, 7/26/89, p. 14] The US cannot give in to such a Soviet demand.
While this lengthy list of negotiating problems and outstanding issues makes completion of a
CFE Agreement by next year highly unlikely, there is no telling how quickly these issues could be
resolved given the political push to complete a treaty by 1990.
Perhaps the most important consideration for concluding a CFE agreement is the impact of
reductions on NATO's strategy and ability to defined against attack. NATO has already embarked
upon an analysis of what a post-CFE environment would look like, and the types of forces necessary
to maintain deterrence. Talk of further reductions - a CFE-II agreement that would entail more
extensive limits on manpower - have already surfaced.
Before the West leaps into a CFE I agreement, however, it would be prudent to have a Western
consensus about how NATO can and will deal with a post-CFE environment and a commitment
regarding force structure and modernizations. From a purely US stance, the desire for a quick
agreement, as well as supposed cost savings from bringing troops home from Europe, must take a
back seat to the more important issues of force requirements and strategy.
Nuclear Testing Talks
Goals And Overall Provisions
The goal of the Nuclear Testing Talks (NTT) is to create acceptable verification procedures for
two treaties: the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
(PNET).
History
In 1974, the US and USSR signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which restricts underground
nuclear tests to a 150 kiloton limit (150,000 tons of TNT). In 1976, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Treaty, which restricts underground nuclear tests for peaceful purposes also to a 150 kiloton level,
was signed. But these treaties are still awaiting ratification until more accurate verification measures
are hammered out. The concern is that past verification measures could be off by a factor of two,
meaning that a Soviet test estimated by the US to be 150 kilotons could actually be as low as 75
28
kilotons or as high as 300 kilotons. [Comparative Strategy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1989, p. 216] Much
progress has been made recently in establishing more stringent verification measures, thus
increasing the likelihood of ratification by easing concerns over data errors.
Current Status
The negotiations have revolved around finding verification measures for two types of
underground tests: those conducted in vertical holes and those conducted in horizontal tunnels.
During their meeting in September 1989 at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, the US and USSR agreed to:
on-site inspections of tests in vertical holes whose explosions would exceed 35 kilotons;
monitoring of at least two blasts a year for five years; one blast a year thereafter; and
monitoring by either seismic sensors or electronic cables when a detonation is anticipated
to exceed 50 kilotons.
This final provision is important because it was a product of the 1988 Joint Verification
Experiment (JVE) when the US and USSR monitored each other's nuclear tests. Both sides,
however, used different methods to verify the tests. The Soviets claimed that traditional seismic
methods could provide effective verification, while the US favored on-site test measurements. The
Soviet method involves placing seismic devices hundreds of miles from the test site to measure the
shock wave from a nuclear explosion as it moves through the earth. The US' method, called
CORRTEX, relies on a cable inserted into the ground only a short distance away from the test site.
The strength of a nuclear blast would be measured by how quickly the cable is crushed. [New York
Times, 8/9/89, p. 11] Until recently, each side believed its scheme was superior to the other's and
neither was willing to accept the other's method.
At the end of the last round of nuclear testing negotiations, the Soviets accepted the US' demand
for CORRTEX monitoring, so long as the US agreed to the Soviet demand for seismic monitoring.
[New York Times, 8/9/89, p. 11] The negotiations began again on October 2, 1989 when the US
agreed to the Soviet proposal that each use its preferred method of verification. [Philadelphia
Inquirer, 10/3/89, p. 9]
Outstanding Issues
Unlike the other negotiations, only a few outstanding issues remain regarding the TTBT and
PNET. One involves inspection procedures for tests in horizontal tunnels, the details of which have
not been reported. [Washington Post, 9/27/89, p. A44] But a second issue could stall negotiations
at any time. When President Bush assumed office, he pledged to go further in the NTT talks -
that once an agreement was ratified, even more restrictive testing provisions, with the goal of
eventually ending nuclear testing altogether, could be negotiated. [Fiscal Year 1990 Arms Control
Impact Statement, 3/89, p. 13] The Soviets could demand that the US begin negotiations on a
comprehensive test ban before signing the agreed verification protocols for the NTT. In fact, the
Soviets recently renewed a call for such a testing moratorium. [Washington Post, 9/27/89, p. A44]
However, with both sides claiming that an agreement would be ready for signature during the
superpower summit in summer 1990, the Soviets will probably wait until the treaties are ratified
before proposing further testing limits.
29
Analysis
There are several reasons why continued nuclear testing below the TTBT's limits is vital to
US national security:
Testing enhances deterrence by ensuring that our forces will work;
Underground tests provide the US with information regarding nuclear weapons effects and
their impact on military systems;
Testing allows the US to improve the safety and security of nuclear systems; and
Testing protects against technological surprises from the enemy.
Prospects For Future
Observers both in and out of government remain confident, especially given President Bush's
comments, that the verification protocols to the TTBT and PNET agreements could be signed by
Gorbachev and Bush at their upcoming Washington summit in 1990. This means the Treaty could
make it to the Senate floor by the summer or fall of next year. When a Treaty does reach the Senate
floor, the following issues must be addressed:
that the verification measures will prevent both sides from exceeding the threshold limit;
and
that the treaty threshold is high enough for US to continue its necessary nuclear testing
program.
30
Recently Concluded Agreements
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
Implementation
The Agreement
Under the terms of the INF Treaty, a whole class of nuclear weapons (those with ranges between
300 and 3,400 miles) were eliminated.
History
On December 8, 1987, the US and USSR signed the INF Treaty after six years of negotiations.
The Treaty was ratified by the US Senate and entered into force on June 1, 1988. [US Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, Office of Public Affairs, 1988; For more information on the INF Treaty's
provisions, see "The INF Treaty At A Glance," Republican Policy Committee, 12/14/87]
Current Status
As of December 23, 1989, nearly three quarters of the US and USSR INF missiles had been
destroyed. All of the shorter range INF missiles have been eliminated, including 239 Soviet SS-23s
and 718 SS-12s plus 169 US Pershing IAs.
The longer range systems that have been demolished include, for the Soviets, 80 nondeployed
cruise missiles, 327 SS-20 missiles (out of a total 654), 100 SS-4s (out of a total 150) and all six
SS-5s. The US has. eliminated 50 of its 234 Pershing II and more than 170 of the 443
ground-launched cruise missile inventory. [Washington Post, 12/23/89, p.A5]
During the 18 months since the Treaty's been in effect, the superpowers have conducted
extensive inspections: 117 by the Soviets and 282 by the Americans.
Analysis
The question of whether the Soviets are abiding by the INF Treaty was addressed in the
December 2, 1988 President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements.
This report outlined five possible Soviet violations of the INF Treaty since December 1987,
including:
31
detected movement of SS-20 missiles on launchers;
failure to declare Treaty limited items and their locations in the initial update to the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU);
unnotified movements of SS-20 training launchers;
the removal of short-range missiles from an elimination facility; and
the presence of declared Treaty limited items at non-declared locations;
[The President's Unclassified Report on Soviet Noncompliance
with Arms Control Agreements, 12/2/88, pp. 12-15]
According to the Report, the Soviets have either ceased their noncompliant behavior or they
have stated their intent to resolve the issue- - but only after repeated urging by the US in the Special
Verification Commission (SVC) and through diplomatic channels.
But the potential for the Soviets violating the INF Treaty remains. Most recently, an American
and a Soviet company are planning on jointly developing a commercial space rocket that would use
a booster similar to the mobile SS-20 missile banned by the Treaty. The Soviets are planning on
using facilities that formerly produced SS-20s to build the launch vehicle, thus making it more
difficult for the US to monitor if the Soviets were building illegal SS-20 missiles. And START
verification could also be complicated. The Soviets could produce a covert force of SS-25s and
disguise them as commercial space launchers since the two would be virtually indistinguishable.
[Washington Times, 9/13/89, p. A3; Wall Street Journal, 8/7/89, p. A18] Yet another potential
problem is accurately monitoring whether destroyed missiles remain destroyed and/or are being
used for seemingly innocuous purposes.
For instance, US observers found examples of "inadvertent" Soviet violations of the INF
Treaty. Soviet SS-23 missile launchers, that were destroyed by sawing off the ends, were found
welded back together. The Soviets said they were merely preparing the launchers to haul lumber,
and subsequently agreed to cut the ends off. [Wall Street Journal, 11/9/89, p. A12] These situations
highlight the need to constantly monitor, question, and scrutinize Soviet actions to preserve the
integrity of the INF Treaty.
32
Possible Future Negotiations/Treaties
Short-Range Nuclear Force (SNF) Negotiations
What The Treaty Might Look Like
Short-range nuclear forces have ranges up to 300 miles, and thus are not covered by the
Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF Treaty). Ideas for SNF arms control treaties range
from reducing to completely eliminating these forces.
History
A long-time Soviet goal is to de-nuclearize NATO. Over the last two decades, the Soviets have
continuously called for eliminating nuclear forces in Europe. After the INF Treaty was signed, the
Soviets stepped up their calls for a nuclear free Europe. The most effective one came some five
months after General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev announced unilateral reductions in Soviet
conventional forces, when he offered to transfer 500 short-range nuclear warheads from Eastern
Europe to the Soviet
homeland. [Washington
Post, 5/12/89, p. A1]
Warsaw Pact: Frog-7 Battlefield Support Missile
The Soviet's timing
was perfect: the issue of
short-range nuclear force
Surface-to-surface unguided tactical missile.
Range: 43.5 miles. Length: 29.9 feet. Diameter: 21.7 inches.
modernization and
negotiations was threatening
NATO: Lance Battlefield Support Missile
to tear the NATO Alliance
apart during the impending
Mobile surface-to-surface tactical guided missile.
NATO meeting of ministers;
Range: 80.8 miles. Length: 20.1 feet. Diameter: 22 Inches
and
Gorbachev's
announcement lent further
fuel to the fire. West
Germany, Belgium, and Denmark opposed modernization and supported early SNF negotiations,
while the US and Great Britain supported modernization and opposed early negotiations.
33
Prospects For A Future Agreement
The issue was resolved during the NATO Summit, when the Alliance agreed that SNF
negotiations cannot be started until a conventional force agreement is signed and reductions
implemented. While the SNF issue appears resolved, the Soviets continually resurface their demand
for early SNF negotiations in the CFE negotiations, as well as in public. On July 7, 1989, Mikhail
Gorbachev renewed calls for talks to eliminate short-range nuclear forces in Europe. [Washington
Post, 7/7/89, p. 22; For a more thorough analysis of the SNF issue, see "NATO Nuclear
Modernization: The Tension Between Military Need, Alliance Politics, and Arms Control,"
Republican Policy Committee, 4/26/89]
President Bush rejected Gorbachev's call for SNF negotiations, yet further pressure for SNF
talks by the Soviets, combined with Allied desire for such talks, could prove unsettling in the future.
Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT)
What A Treaty Might Look Like
Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASATs) are deployed in space with the mission of destroying the
enemy's satellites and protecting one's own satellites. A variety of proposals for controlling ASATs
exist, ranging from limiting high altitude ASATs to eliminating ASATs altogether.
History
From 1978 until 1979, there were three rounds of ASAT negotiations. During the talks, the US
proposed negotiating a comprehensive ASAT ban and a testing moratorium while negotiations were
being conducted. The Soviets were unenthusiastic about the US proposal, probably because they
were in the process of conducting tests on their own ASAT system at the time. The Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan was the straw that broke the camel's back. ASAT negotiations never reopened after
their December 1979 recess.
After extensive analyses and much consideration, the Reagan Administration decided to forgo
negotiations on Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASATs), claiming that a treaty would harm US national
security and would be unverifiable. President Reagan then pursued an ASAT program that
successfully destroyed an aging satellite in 1985. The Miniature Homing Vehicle program, however,
was abandoned when Congress banned further weapons tests in 1987.
Current Status
There are some in Congress who favor ASAT negotiations, and a treaty limiting ASAT
capabilities, and even banning ASATs. The types of limits could include:
banning ASATs capable of attacking high orbiting communications and missile warning
satellites;
34
confidence building measures, where each side would inform the other on its ASAT
research projects;
a ban on high altitude ASATs; or
a complete ASAT ban.
[Washington Times, 5/11/89, p. A5; Senator Tom Harkin, "Star Wars:
A Trojan Horse for ASATs," Arms Control Today, 3/89]
Analysis
Those who support ASAT arms control make the following arguments:
The US would benefit from ASAT arms control;
The US is becoming more and more dependent upon satellites, and ASAT limits would
protect these satellites against Soviet attack;
The Soviets have shown a willingness to negotiate on ASATs. They even recently invited
US press and Congressmen to observe their laser facility in Sary Shagan. Those observers
found that the radars' output, at only 20 kilowatts, was far too weak to kill a satellite. A
satellite killer would need at least 1,000 times more power than the one examined at Sary
Shagan. [Los Angeles Times, 7/13/89, p. 11] Since the assessment of a US need for an
ASAT was based on an exaggerated threat that does not really exist, the US should forgo
the ASAT program; and
Another indication of Soviet interest in ASAT arms control is reflected by its unilateral
moratorium on ASAT testing. If this doesn't show Soviet desire for an ASAT arms control
agreement, what does?
Each of these arguments can be countered by the facts:
FACT:
While the US may be becoming more dependent upon satellites, arms
control is not the answer.
In fact, ASAT arms control will make US satellites more vulnerable, since it would allow the
Soviets to maintain residual ASAT capabilities, through its ABM system and the knowledge gained
by years of experience with its own ASAT system, while denying the US any such capability. The
Soviets would thus be capable of blinding the US during a war, denying it critical information on
troop locations, enemy targets, damage assessment - information essential to successful
prosecution of war.
FACT:
Of course the Soviets are willing to negotiate on ASATs - they are the
only nation in the world with an operational ASAT capability to date.
Any ban would leave the Soviets with the working knowledge and the capability to deploy
systems rapidly. And while the Soviets have not tested their ASAT capability in space for some
time, they have still conducted laboratory tests using the SL-11 ASAT booster with other payloads,
35
thereby ensuring system reliability without having to test in space. [Soviet Military Power, US
Department of Defense, 4/88, p. 65]
FACT:
Yes, the Soviets did open up their laser facility at Sary Shagan to US observers.
And yes, these observers did say the laser had minimal ASAT capability. But, the observers
were intentionally shown an old facility. In fact, according to intelligence community analyses, the
Sary Shagan complex "contains other laser facilities which are much more advanced and which do
present significant threats
Roughly a half-dozen major research and development facilities are
involved with Soviet laser weapon research and development." [Department of Defense Press
Release, 7/26/89] And, the Soviets are also suspected of having another ASAT facility at Dushanbe,
near the Afghanistan border, which was not made available for US inspection. [National Journal,
8/5/89, p. 1993]
FACT:
The arguments used to support an ASAT Treaty overlook a very important
point: that the Soviets could easily cheat if an ASAT ban were negotiated.
The Soviets could easily circumvent any Treaty banning, or even partially limiting ASATs
because ASATs are small and can be easily developed covertly. Thus, any cheating could very well
escape US detection. [Defense Daily, 4/12/89, p. 61 and 3/16/89; Washington Times, 5/11/89, p.
A5]
A quote from Edward Rowny, arms control adviser to President Bush says it all, "The Defense
Department recently told Congress that our lack of a capability comparable to the Soviet ASAT, is
one of the most serious US military deficiencies. We are unable to deter a Soviet ASAT attack by
the threat of retaliating in kind. This critical deficiency means that the US is unable to protect its
terrestrial forces Doubters should take note: The case for a US anti-satellite capability
encompasses more than just deterrence theory; it is essential for protecting the men and women of
our armed forces." [Los Angeles Times, 7/18/89, p. 8]
Prospects For A Future Agreement
A treaty banning or even limiting ASATs is not high on the US arms control agenda. So it is
unlikely we will see an ASAT agreement any time in the near future. Perhaps the most we should
ask for regarding ASAT arms control is that the two sides begin developing certain
confidence-building measures in the Defense and Space Negotiations forum, similar to those now
being considered for the ABM Treaty.
36
New Approaches To Arms Limitations
Plutonium Production Ban
What The Agreement Would Look Like
In May 1989, the International Plutonium Control Act was introduced. The House bill, H.R.
2403 and the Senate companion bill, S. 1047, would block US plutonium and uranium production
if the Soviet Union shuts down its plutonium and uranium plants.
Current Status
On April 7, 1989 the Soviet Union promised to stop producing weapons grade uranium in 1989
and to shut down two (out of at least 13) plutonium producing reactors by 1990. [Washington Post,
4/8/89, p. A1] Three months later the Soviets pledged to shut down all five old plutonium producing
reactors at the Kyshtam Industrial Complex by 1991. [Washington Post, 7/9/89, p. A1] But even
after the Soviets shut down these reactors, they will retain a substantial capability to produce new
materials and to recycle materials from retired weapons. [Washington Post, 4/8/89, p. A14]
In contrast, the US shut off all production of uranium in 1964 and ceased plutonium production
in August of 1988 when the last of four key reactors at Savannah River, South Carolina, was turned
off. Thus the US has no plutonium production plants open today. And although it is scheduled to
restore the Savannah River plant's production in early 1990, to produce both tritium and eventually,
plutonium, safety issues will probably push that date far into the future. [Washington Post, 5/19/89,
p. A21]
Analysis: A Plutonium Ban: Good Deal Or Bad?
The Bush Administration has stated clearly that a plutonium ban would not be in the US'
interest, since:
once such facilities are shut down, it will be difficult to restart them on a moment's notice
if the US finds the Soviets are cheating;
the US would be removing the capability to produce nuclear weapons at a time when the
world still relies on keeping peace through deterrence by maintaining a nuclear weapons
capability;
verification of a Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) cutoff would be difficult, given the
expansive Soviet SNM program. The fact that the Soviet program does not separate
military and civilian facilities means it could quickly start up a military program using
civilian facilities. However, since the US does separate its military from its civilian
facilities, it would not have the same capability for quickly restarting a program; and
37
a ban on SNM would not remove the threat from Soviet nuclear missiles. Only a START
Agreement can do that. Instead, a plutonium ban would remove the US' ability to respond
to future world environments and threats.
[Statement by Kathleen Bailey, Assistant Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
on the International Plutonium Control Act, Before the Defense Nuclear Facilities Panel, House
Armed Services Committee, 6/6/89, pp. 3-6; Statement of Brigadier General Robert Linhard, USAF,
Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy, (J-5), Before the House of Representatives, Committee on
Armed Services, Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities Panel on HR 2403, "International
Plutonium Control Act," 6/6/89, pp. 1-6]
Prospects For A Future Agreement
The plutonium control act has a long way to go before a formal negotiating forum is established
and an agreement is signed. While politically attractive, the concept itself could do much to harm
US national security. The fact that there are no negotiations on this issue should tell us something
- that a plutonium/tritium ban is considered a non-starter arms control issue.
Open Skies
Idea Behind The Concept
The open skies concept seeks to use aerial observation to gain important intelligence
information about another side's armament, exercises, and the like.
History
In 1955, President Eisenhower called for an open skies agreement, where both superpowers
would allow unimpeded surveillance of their territory. Eisenhower's proposal was proposed long
before today's age of sophisticated surveillance satellites that observe Soviet military activities from
space. But the progress of technology and the apparent Soviet policy of "openness" breathed new
life into the open skies proposal.
On May 12, 1989, during a commencement speech before the graduating class of Texas A&M
University, President Bush echoed Eisenhower's call for open skies, but on a grander scale. Bush's
concept would include allies from both East and West, to provide greater scrutiny of each's activities,
and, "would show the world the meaning of the concept of openness." This proposal was couched
in terms of giving the Soviets the opportunity to prove their commitment to the openness, or glasnost
we hear so much of today. [Text of Remarks Prepared for Delivery by President George Bush,
Texas A&M University Commencement, 5/12/89, p. 137]
38
Current Status
There has been much talk, both in and out of government, about relying on open skies to verify
the CFE agreement. On January 6, 1990, a Canadian aircraft flew over Hungary in a first trial run
of the open skies measure. This success will be followed by a two week conference on Open Skies
in Ottowa beginning on February 12, 1990. The conference will provide a forum for hammering
out the details of an Open Skies agreement between the 23 nations of NTO and the Warsaw Pact.
Analysis
If an open skies agreement allowed unimpeded fly-overs to occur any time, any place, it would
be a plus for verification. Such inspections could help not only confirm a Soviet willingness to
openness, but also would be a significant verification asset for future arms control agreements
because:
aircraft can hover over a "problem" area for long periods of time. They can also fly around
or below clouds to observe movement from different angles. The result: more precise data
on the nature and type of movement occurring in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe can
be obtained; and
aircraft observation could assist in verifying difficult treaty terms, such as weapons
destruction, withdrawals, or even troop movements, all of which are nearly impossible to
monitor today.
Information gained through overflights would serve very well the purposes of early warning
of an impending attack. It would also serve to improve US understanding of Soviet technology and
developments, but could not, on its own, provide reliable verification of arms control treaties.
[Washington Times, 7/18/89, p. 5] However, when combined with other intelligence assets for
verification (satellite observation and on-site inspections) Open Skies can help increase confidence
in monitoring compliance with treaties.
39
Conclusion
With the rapid pace of change in Eastern Europe, it is fatuous to attempt a summing up at this
time. This paper reviews the history of recent negotiations; it tells you where we've been and what
- under the old order - remained as outstanding issues. Many of what appeared to be the real
tough nuts to crack may prove less difficult in light of political changes in Europe.
But, arms control agreements have consequences for future weapons development and strategic
planning that are often unforeseen at the time of their signing. The SALT agreements, for example,
led us to the era of huge multiple warhead missiles that have become a destabilizing first strike
target. Thus any rush to either "reward" the Soviets for apparent progress toward democracy or to
cash in on the "peace dividend" should be checked by hard thinking about the impact on future
requirements for U.S. security. These issues will be the topic of a future Policy Committee paper.
Staff contact: Yvonne Bartoli, 224-2946
40
THE WHITE HOUS
Room 122 OEOB
Chriss Winston
Office of the Press
:
7 copies
PRESS BRIEFING
BY
MARLIN FITZWATER
May 1, 1990
The Briefing Room
11:41 A.M. EDT
INDEX
SUBJECT
PAGE
ANNOUNCEMENTS
President's Amended Tax Information
1-2
Travel to Oklahoma
2-3
Index of Leading Indicators
.3
Statement on COCOM
3-16
FOREIGN
Hostages/Israel
15, 18-19
Lithuania
16-19
Canada/St. Regis Reservation Hostilities
18
Gorbachev-Bush Summit
20-21
12:41 P.M. EDT
#196-05/02
cocom
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
PRESS BRIEFING
BY
MARLIN FITZWATER
May 2, 1990
The Briefing Room
11:41 A.M. EDT
MR. FITZWATER: Since we went ahead and handed this out,
let me do this first and take care of it. Then we've got some other
things to do. First of all, the attorneys for President Bush
discovered on April 19th that there was deferred compensation which
had not been reported and, therefore, the President is today filing
an amended tax return, which you have in your possession.
I would ask you to turn to the second page of this --
this one here that's got the language here. And this is a
description of why we're filing the amended return. This says, in
effect, that as an employee of the Zapata Corporation, which he left
in 1962, he received deferred compensation which he would begin
receiving when he reached age 65. He reached age 65 on June 12 and
elected to take that compensation in terms of a life insurance policy
which, indeed, had cash value. A 1099 was not transmitted to the
President in association with that and, therefore, it was not
discovered.
Nevertheless, it does have cash value which has to be
reported. And if you will look at this page, which is essentially
all there is to it, you'll notice that the first number is $26,250,
which is line number one, which is the total value of the
compensation of that life insurance policy. It's the page here that
has the President's signature at the bottom. It says Amended U.S.
Individual Income Tax Return. I assume it's page one, very front.
Number one, first thing you're looking at. You can't miss it.
The $26,250 under column B. You see column B? All
right, then the next line, line three, is $26,250. The next line
says minus $525. In recalculating his total deductions, which is the
second page of your package -- simply a recalculation page of his
deductions based upon the new income, he lost $525 in deductions.
Therefore, that becomes income which has to be added on to the
$26,250. Thus, the total amended income is $26,775, as shown on line
five.
Q
How did he lose that $525?
MR. FITZWATER: The $525 is lost deduction by virtue of
the additional income. And the calculation for that is on the second
page, if you want to go through it -- third page, I'm sorry. But
it's just a mathematical calculation and it relates to basically --
you see on line 23 --
Q
I don't understand this.
MR. FITZWATER: Well, let me explain this to you in that
case. For the benefit of Terry Hunt, look at line 23 on page three.
It has "multiply the amount of Form 1040, line 32 by two percent.'
Well, when you change the amount of his income, line 32 changes, and
when you remultiply the two percent it comes out to be $525 different
MORE
#196-05/02
- 2 -
than it did the first time. Are you with me? All right.
Q Marlin, does he have to pay a penalty for late --
MR. FITZWATER: Let me come to that, my man. That's a
very good question. (Laughter.)
Line seven is $26,000 -- so the new tax on this is
$7,497. Thus, the President is today sending the IRS $7,497 in
additional taxes for this income. In addition to that, he is sending
$40.77 which is the interest on this unpaid tax for an accrued amount
of time of approximately 15 days. All of which goes to show that --
Q
He should have filed an extension in the first
place. (Laughter.)
MR. FITZWATER: And there's no penalty involved because
it was a reasonable - what's the term here -- a reasonable --
Q
There was no fraud involved.
MR. FITZWATER: No penalty involved due to reasonable
cause.
Q
No penalty involved for not reporting it the first
time, but what about not withholding the money? He's beyond the
limit of how much you're allowed to under-withhold by going here. He
was just under that with his previous --
MR. FITZWATER: I don't know. Lawyers say no reasonable
cause and no penalty. But he does pay the interest.
All right. Any questions on this?
Q
No.
Q
Is he outraged by this terrible screw-up?
(Laughter.)
Q
Did he fire anybody?
Q Will there be an investigation?
MR. FITZWATER: The President wants to do what's right
and pay that tax. So his total tax is now $108,000 -- more than my
annual salary by a sizable amount.
Q That's what it amounts to now --$108,000?
MR. FITZWATER: The total amount now of his taxes would
be $108,879.
Moving on quickly. Friday, we travel to Oklahoma --
Stillwater, Oklahoma -- to address the Oklahoma State University
commencement at 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon. Then on to Tulsa for a
GOP fundraising reception at 6:00 p.m. And at 6:30 p.m. he will
address the Oklahoma Foundation for Excellence dinner. This is a
group of business leaders in Oklahoma who have established a
foundation to award teaching excellence. They give three $5,000
teacher awards, one $5,000 administrator award, and they honor some
100 students from across the state.
Q
Due to the lateness of the hour, we'll we have an
advance text on these speeches?
MR. FITZWATER: We will try to have an advance text on
all speeches, yes.
Q
Marlin, do you know the theme of --
MORE
#196-05/02
- 3 -
MR. FITZWATER: We'll have a statement today.
Pardon?
Q
Do you know the theme of the main address?
MR. FITZWATER: The main address -- the commencement
address will be on foreign policy, but I don't have any specifics.
Q Broken any new ground or any new wind or anything --
MR. FITZWATER: I can't say for sure yet; I have not seen
it. Every speech all speeches are newsworthy and important. This
one certainly will be in that category.
The Index of Leading Indicators rose .9 percent in March,
rebounding from a one percent decline in the previous month.
Positive contributions were made by contracts and orders for plant
and equipment, the change in sensitive materials prices, new orders
for consumer goods, stock prices, vendor performance, and weekly
claims for unemployment insurance. The leading indicators show the
economy continues to grow and offers the promise of moderate
performance in the months ahead.
Q
Why is everybody worried about the economy if it's
so great?
MR. FITZWATER: I'm not. The economy is doing very well.
Q
Man on the street is worried.
MR. FITZWATER: The economy is still producing jobs. The
unemployment rate is the lowest in 15 years. Inflation is low,
running at around five percent.
Q
Nine percent.
MR. FITZWATER: That's only at a monthly basis.
Q
Do you think it is progressing, you say?
MR. FITZWATER: The economy is stable.
Q But not static. (Laughter.)
MR. FITZWATER: Let me announce also the presidential
decision on COCOM. I'd like to read you a statement simply because I
just put this together from notes, and we're having it typed up now
and have this for you soon after the briefing. And we do have a fact
sheet that will give you more detail as well. Is the fact sheet
ready to go, do you know? Why don't we go ahead and hand out the
fact sheet and they can look at that as they listen to me talk.
The President is recommending to the Coordinating
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, COCOM, that significant
changes be made in the list of technologies subject to export
control. For over 40 years, COCOM controls have helped the allies
protect our technological achievements from being exported to our
adversaries.
The President initiated a comprehensive study of the
these controls in January to reflect the changes in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union, as well as other military priorities that have
emerged in the last year or more. The President has concluded that a
complete overhaul of the control list is warranted. Therefore, the
United States will recommend to COCOM the development by the end of
1990 a new core list of goods and technologies that is far shorter
and less restrictive than the present list.
The President's proposals will continue to protect our
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advanced technology from being exported to the Soviet Union and other
adversaries. In effect, our proposals will build higher fences
around fewer goods by focusing on those items that are most sensitive
in terms of our national security. We will be able to pinpoint a
streamlined list of exports that can make a major contribution to
Soviet power while changing the restrictions on items such as
personal computers, which are readily available throughout the world
anyway.
We will propose that of the 120 categories on COCOM's
industrial list, 30 will be eliminated completely and the scope of
another 13 will be reduced substantially. These changes reflect
specific analysis by the Department of Defense that identifies
technology of crucial importance to weapons production in the Soviet
Union and other countries. They have the unanimous support of all
security agencies.
Careful study indicates that most of the goods and
technologies that we currently control to Eastern Europe and Soviet
destinations are of low strategic value and should be decontrolled.
These categories include computers, telecommunications equipment and
machine tools. More specifically, they include off-the-shelf
personal computers and some mainframe computers for use in banking,
airline reservations, et cetera.
We are proposing greater access for Eastern Europe to
modern fiber optics equipment and some microwave telecommunications
systems. Access to this technology is dependent on adoption of
safeguards against diversion such as identification of authorized
uses and verification inspections.
The United States will begin consultations immediately
with our allies on these changes. We think it is crucial to be able
to provide maximum protection to our highly sensitive technologies,
while at the same time giving the Eastern Europeans access to
technologies desperately needed to improve their infrastructure and
modernize their industrial plants.
End of announcement.
Q
Are you saying they're building higher fences
against technology going to the Soviet Union, but not to Eastern
Europe?
MR. FITZWATER: Basically, the effect of this is that we
reduce the number of products that are being reviewed for export
license and, in doing so, pinpoint a smaller amount that are the most
strategically important to us and to the Soviet Union. And
therefore, will get the most comprehensive review and the most
control.
Q Marlin, what's the time frame on this? The fact
sheet seems to say that some of it would be proposed to be done by
the end of 1990 and other things that are immediate.
MR. FITZWATER: Well, these are all all of these
issues have to be resolved by COCOM, so that we're in consultations
now with the COCOM members. And it's impossible to give a specific
date on it, but it's presumably as soon as they would adopt these
changes, if they do. Actually, the allies have been urging these
kinds of restrictions -- I mean, these kinds of changes for some
time. So they are, I think, receptive to our proposals.
Q What's the method for tightening the controls over
some of the remaining high-tech --
MR. FITZWATER: Well, you have -- what this COCOM does is
sets up a licensing process. In 1989, we had 1,782 licenses; which
is to say a document that describes a product that would go to one of
the countries on the list, how it's to be used, what its strategic
sensitivities are, whether or not it can go, or whether or not it's
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rejected. And that process would remain the same. But in reducing
the list, it means basically there's a smaller number of products
that would have to receive licenses and, therefore, be subject to
review. The other side of that is the Defense Department feels they
can give it a much better review by concentrating on a few
strategically important items.
Q
So they'll study these things more closely and
there's less likelihood of something slipping through, is that you're
point?
MR. FITZWATER: That's right. Exactly. Last year, we
had $2.6 billion worth of license. And the list of products was
enormous.
Q
Is there a feeling -- if I could follow up -- that
some of these sensitive things have been slipping through because the
licensing process has been a little slipshod?
MR. FITZWATER: Well, I don't think we would say that,
but we would say that there has been some danger of that by virtue of
the amount of time that we've had to spend on such things as personal
computers, which have been on the list, which for the most part now
are available in any Radio Shack in the world. And it's just been
needless expense and effort wasted on them.
Q
Tell me if I'm wrong, but I think in the past COCOM
has not differentiated from the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact
countries. Has that changed now given the fact that the nature of so
many of these governments have changed?
MR. FITZWATER: Well, yes. COCOM, under our proposals
would differentiate.
Q
You would?
MR. FITZWATER: Because a major focus of this is to allow
increased technology to go to the Eastern European countries. And
there would be a difference between some that would be allowed to go
to Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and not to the Soviet Union.
Q
Is that on this list you announced today there's
a differentiation? In other words, are the 30 completely lifted for
anybody and the 13 can go to the Eastern Europe, but not the Soviet
Union. Is that the way that works?
MR. FITZWATER: No. We had a list of 120. And we are
proposing to reduce it by 30 and change 13. But the total list -- if
you reduced 120 by 30, you're left with 90, right? So you still have
90. Now, the decision on which would go to the Soviet Union and
which would go to one country or another is made on a
product-by-product basis. So there's no way you can give a number to
that in terms of the categories.
Q What's the 13 then?
MR. FITZWATER: Thirteen are, again, kinds of product
categories in which we are changing the criteria for judging their
strategic sensitivity. But there again you can't make a distinction
by country in advance because you have to judge the product, how it's
going to be used and so forth.
Q Well, in effect, then will there be two lists; one
list for the Soviet Union and one list for Eastern Europe?
MR. FITZWATER: No, in effect, there's a list for every
country. You identify a list of countries.
Q
So each country will have a list of things that
require licensing?
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MR. FITZWATER: That's my understanding. Is that not
right, Roman?
MR. POPADIUK: There's one list for all countries,
Marlin.
Q Well, then how do you differentiate?
MR. FITZWATER: How do you differentiate then?
MR. POPADIUK: If you look at the fact sheet, item B.
MR. FITZWATER: Item B of the fact sheet, Roman refers me
to.
Q Telecommunications?
MR. POPADIUK: For example, on telecommunications
there's a differentiation between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
on fiber optics.
MR. FITZWATER: So you're saying you do it by product and
not by --
Q
By product category, or is it product?
MR. POPADIUK: By product category, as I understand it.
MR. FITZWATER: But then you have to have a list. I
mean, if you have a product category that says these computers can go
to Hungary but they can't go to the Soviet Union.
MR. POPADIUK: I don't have the details yet, Marlin.
MR. FITZWATER: That's as close as I can come. Maybe
Clyde Farnsworth can clear this up for me and make sure he knows how
this works.
Q Is it true that they were in the -- the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe were lumped together in the -- are still lumped
together? In terms of the restrictions?
MR. POPADIUK: I don't think I understand what the
question is. What do you mean by lumped together?
Q
Was there differentiation between East Europe and
the Soviet Union until now?
Q That's right before. Exactly.
MR. POPADIUK: Not that I -- no. Not that I --.
Q No, what? I'm lost here.
MR. FITZWATER: Well, I'm not sure we have a good enough
understanding of this because if you get a license application -- I
guess we should have a Commerce Department expert over here. Do we
have a Commerce Department person here who understands this process
or wants to talk? If you don't want to talk, don't raise your hand.
But in any case, you get a license application of a country that
wants to buy a product. And you can make a judgment on that basis.
Now, beyond that, I don't know whether there are rules or not. I'll
ask Commerce if they've got either some paper they want to bring over
or if they want to send a delegate to explain this.
Q
But bascially, what you're saying is there's
differentiation, but we don't really or you don't really know the
mechanism?
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Q
Awwww.
Q
Mr. COCOM, step right up.
Q
I mean, basically what you're saying is that will be
differentiation but you don't know how to explain the mechanism.
MR. FITZWATER: That's my knowledge at the moment.
Q
It must not be a big story then.
MR. FITZWATER: You want to add to that?
MR. BARTH: There would be one list for all
destinations. There would be favorable treatment which could be done
through faster license processing for different parameters under
which there would be controls that are tighter or looser, depending
on the destination.
MR. FITZWATER: Identify yourself.
MR: BARTH: Richard Barth, National Security Council
staff. There would be one control list to all the prescribed
destinations including Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. But
there would be favorable treatment accorded to some of those
destinations, that is as COCOM partners agree to them. Favorable
treatment could include faster processing time, slightly different
control parameters that would allow more easy shipment by the
national governments rather than referring the licenses to COCOM.
Q
Well, do we understand correctly that part of what
this proposal would be, would be to eliminate from this master list
of products some products that are now on it? Is that part of what
the deal is here?
MR. BARTH: That's correct.
Q
It's not simply expanding the number of countries
getting favorable treatment, it is the removal from the list of
restricted products?
MR. BARTH: That's the most important factor -- is
removal from the list the requirement for licensing period.
Q
Can you tell us in layman's terms, or even in terms
not quite as technical as the ones that are being used here, for
example, on computers, what categories of computers was now being
permitted and which would still be forbidden on personal computers?
It seems to me that computers as fast as the IBM AT, for example,
were not on the list.
MR. BARTH: They were decontroled last July.
Q
They decontroled that stuff? So what is this up to
now?
MR. BARTH: The next generation 386-base computers would
now be decontroled.
Q
Speak layman for those of us who don't know what 386
is.
MR. BARTH: The lastest generation of IBM personal
computers would be decontroled.
Q
Are there items that you'll be able to sell in
Poland that you will not be able to sell in the Soviet Union? And
was that the case -- is that the case now? I mean, before the
review, were there items that could be sold in Eastern Europe but not
in the Soviet Union?
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MR. BARTH: The current policies don't differentiate
formally. There may be licenses that would be grated more readily
for Poland because of less of a risk of diversion to military uses
that we would not allow to be shipped to the Soviet Union under
current procedures. Under the new procedures, there would be even
fewer strictures on those shipments to Poland for good end users, we
call them, as opposed to Soviet destinations.
Q
If I can follow that, already there is consideration
that some East European countries will not pass on high-tech items to
the Soviets. Already, there is that consideration.
MR. BARTH: There is no formal arrangement to do SO.
But the end use and the destination and the end use of the equipment
is evaluated. A shipment to Poland to a machine tool plant, for
example, would probably receive more favorable treatment even right
now than it would to the Soviet Union in a similar type of situation.
Q Already, we assume they're not going to pass that
on?
MR. BARTH: The U.S. threat analyses of the situation
lead us to conclude that that's the case.
Q
You don't have a guarantee of it? You wouldn't
demand some kind of --
MR. BARTH: Seeking further guarantees is part of our
current proposal.
Q Right. What form would that take? Marlin's opening
statement said there was a safeguard against the diversion of these
technologies. How -- verification procedures. Is doing this
conditional on effectively getting assurances?
MR. BARTH: The U.S. has proposed a list of various
types of safeguards that we've not yet agreed with our COCOM partners
too. However, includes things such as on-site verification of the
use of the equipment. It includes government-to-government
assurances that the equipment won't be diverted to military end uses,
and similar categories.
Q
This fact sheet lists clear delineation for Eastern
Europe where it comes to telecommunications equipment. I mean,
that's what it says in the fact sheet. But are there similar
breakdowns in the computer and machine tool fields as well?
MR. BARTH: There is a greater level of detail that
we're now negotiating with our allies on in those areas, also.
Q But you just left out of the fact sheet? In other
words, is there some there is a breakdown for the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe for computers and for machines?
MR. BARTH: No, I'm sorry, I didn't understand the
question earlier. The only separation between treatment for Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union that we are currently seeking in our
proposal in any level of detail is in telecommunications.
Q
Can you tell me, what possesses us to believe now
more than in the past that Poland -- whatever other Eastern European
country that we might sell to wouldn't transfer goods to the Soviet
Union? -- a little bit more?
MR. BARTH: We have received inquiries from certain
Eastern European governments which have included offers of safeguards
already.
Q
Can you name any countries?
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MR. BARTH: Not right now.
Q
What other countries beside the Soviet Union are on
what you might call this enemy's list which get the most stringent
restrictions?
MR. BARTH: The proscribed list includes all the current
members of the Warsaw Pact and the Peoples Republic of China.
Q
Wait a minute. What about Cuba? What about Korea?
MR. BARTH: There are various reasons for various types
of controls that I'd rather not get into now. But there are foreign
policy reasons for -- Vietnam, for example, Cuba and other
destinations. We have other controls other than the types that we're
talking about decontrolling here today.
Q
But wait a minute. Is there not a complete list of
countries that --
MR. BARTH: of the list of proscribed destinations, there
are subsets that we have controls on for various reasons -- Libya,
Iraq for one set of reasons -- antiterrorism reasons. We have
controls to South African destinations for other reasons. The
principal purpose for the dual use controls that we're talking about
with our COCOM partners now are to the Warsaw Pact and the Peoples
Republic of China.
Q
But telecommunications are only being restricted now
to Eastern Europe, or are these other countries --
MR. BARTH: No. There are additional controls even in
telecommunications to some of those other countries. It's a very
complex matrix.
Q
So they stay on?
MR. BARTH: They would stay on, depending on the
negotiations and --
Q
The only modification is to Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union.
Q
The COCOM list stays the same -- the other --
MR. BARTH: COCOM lists are only to the Warsaw Pact and
PRC.
Q
This proposal only applies to COCOM, so the rest of
it is not --
MR. BARTH: Precisely.
Q
Is COCOM at all concerned with protecting technology
or the could I ask one more question?
MR. FITZWATER: Thank you very much. He was good. Yes.
Appreciate it. Thank you.
Q
When and where are those -- are going to begin and
how long will it take? Is it already beginning?
MR. FITZWATER: Yes, they're already begun in terms of
COCOM executives.
Do you know the exact location? I don't have that. The
COCOM part is essential to the NATO countries.
Q
Do you have any estimate of what this will mean in
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terms of increased sales to American businesses?
MR. FITZWATER: Don't have amount to increase; I said it
was $2.6 billion last year. But there's no way to judge whether it
could be increased or how much --
Q
How will a united Germany --
MR. FITZWATER: -- $2.6 billion in product value --
sales.
Q
Sales or estimated --
MR. FITZWATER: No, no. This is sales in 1989.
Q
That would permit it under the COCOM restrictions?
MR. FITZWATER: Let me do it one more time. In 1989 we
approved 1,782 licenses for sales valued at $2.6 billion.
Q
Is there any way of saying how much of that would
now be decontrolled -- how much of those 1,782 licenses under this
new proposal would not have to go through this procedure?
MR. FITZWATER: I don't have a list of how many licenses
were in each category, no. Although the personal computer is
obviously a large category. But I don't have a specific breakdown.
Q
Marlin, clearly if you're knocking 30 off the
control list entirely, this liberalizes our trade status with the
Soviets. Is the President concerned that last week he announced he
wouldn't impose sanctions on Lithuania, and today he announces steps
that are clearly going to help import more technology from the West.
MR. FITZWATER: We think this helps us have a more
realistic approach to trade with the Soviet Union, yes. It's
absolutely right.
Q
But isn't it a curious timing when -- considering
economic sanctions against the Soviets?
MR. FITZWATER: You can't time every one of these events
one against another. The fact is, the timing relates to the status
of events in Eastern Europe, the changes that we see in the Soviet
Union, the changes in the allied attitude towards sales, the changes
in our assessment that's done by the Defense Department and others.
So the timing is dictated by the process itself and by its impact.
Q
Marlin, the Western Europeans, for quite a number of
months now, have been pressing for faster and wider decontrol of
COCOM restrictions.
MR. FITZWATER: Right.
Q
Now, by doing this today, we're proposing
elimination of 30 out of 120 categories, so that's 25 percent.
Aren't they still asking for far looser restrictions than even this
U.S. proposal, and do you anticipate several weeks or several months
of serious negotiations with honored NATO partners before we come up
with a united stand? or do you feel you're very close now?
MR. FITZWATER: We think we're pretty close, but you're
right -- there are some of the COCOM partners who would like to have
even a more liberalized approach than this represents. So there will
be a period of consideration and negotiation, yes.
Q
Marlin, as far as the telecommunications equipment
goes, what is the differentiation between the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe? What would you sell to Eastern Europe that you
couldn't sell to the Soviet Union?
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MR. FITZWATER: It's in the fact sheet. Modern fiber
optics equipment to a transmission level of 156 megabytes and some
microwave telecommunication systems.
Q
And that wouldn't go to the Soviet Union?
MR. FITZWATER: I'm saying we have proposed relaxation of
controls, for example in some cellular communication systems and
satellite ground stations to all destinations. But for Eastern
Europe, greater access -- I don't know that you can say absolutely
none, but basically that's the thought, yes, is of greater access to
Eastern Europe than to the Soviet Union.
Q
What I'm trying to understand is, is why you would
do that. What the reason is for --
MR. FITZWATER: Because we think those are essential to
Eastern Europe helping to build up their industry and their plant
base. They need fiber optics equipment for communications, they need
certain machine tools to help build their assembly lines and so
forth.
Q
Wouldn't the Soviet Union as well?
MR. FITZWATER: Yes, but we don't think that the Soviet
Union is in a category that's ready to receive some of these because
of differences in possible strategic uses. That's the whole point of
this system.
Q
In other words, that there's a difference in the
technological advancement of --
MR. FITZWATER: No, there's a difference in the national
security risk to the United States in the loss of this technology --
that Eastern Europe is different than the Soviet Union in some of
these cases in terms of what their military purposes are and what the
Soviet Union's military purposes are; in terms of how they might use
the equipment and so forth; in terms of kinds of protections they're
willing to put on it.
Q Marlin, a technical question. Does this require
Senate approval? That's question one. And question two, on the
trade treaty that's being talked about, would that require Senate
approval?
MR. FITZWATER: The trade treaty, of course, ultimately
requires a change in Jackson-Vanik and would require a Senate review
at some point, yes. No, this, I don't believe, does.
Do you know, Roman? I don't believe it does.
Q
A trade treaty would require ratification.
MR. FITZWATER: I'm not sure directly, but it might
indirectly as it goes through the process. In other words, first you
have to have the trade treaty, and then you have the immigration law,
the trade treaty, then you have to waive Jackson-Vanik, and then you
can grant most-favored nation status. There is a congressional
review in that process. I'm not sure exactly what step it is, but it
is in there. That's why you will recall yesterday they passed a
resolution saying that they would be reluctant to approve it, because
they have that authority.
Q Marlin, is the aim here to protect the technology or
to protect the end use?
MR. FITZWATER: The aim of COCOM is to protect the
technology.
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Q
So that even the diversion of one or two units --
MR. FITZWATER: Well, both -- it depends on how you -- is
to protect the technology and protect it from being used in weapon
systems that could someday be a threat to Western interests.
Q
My point is whether we're trying to keep from being
copied or keep the Soviets from being able to install a big -- a
series of big IBM mainframes in a weapon system.
MR. FITZWATER: Well, both. They're part of the same
process.
Q
Is that a bottom line, or are you ready to go
further in negotiations with --
MR. FITZWATER: You can never say what a bottom line is.
This is what our proposal is, and we'll negotiate.
Q
Marlin, can you provide a list of the 120 and the 30
categories broken out?
MR. FITZWATER: I tell you, I don't have a breakout. I
don't really -- there is an index to the commodity control list which
I'll try and get for you. If you'll see me later, I'll see what I
can do. But there is such a list available.
Q
Could you comment on reports that the Defense
Department has been very upset by this and internally hasn't really
fully gone along with it.
MR. FITZWATER: Yes. The Defense Department did the
basic analysis. They are supportive of this. There is unanimous
recommendation to the President by all the security agencies. There
are some individual conservatives who are not happy with this, and
they have tried to portray the defense establishment as being not
supportive, but that's not the case.
Q
How long have the current controls been in effect?
MR. FITZWATER: The current controls? Forty years.
Q
Marlin, what type of a reaction do you expect from
the Senate on basically proposing a liberalized trade with the Soviet
Union, particularly since yesterday they -- slow down on this?
MR. FITZWATER: I'm sure it'll be mixed. There's always
been broad support for increased trade, but there are always those
who are concerned about any trade with Eastern countries. So it'll
be mixed.
Q
Do you expect it to come up tomorrow in the
President's discussions with the Prime Minister of Lithuania?
MR. FITZWATER: I don't know whether she'll want to get
into that or not. She is an economist, SO she might.
Q
Marlin, in January you announced that you were going
to take steps to liberalize the restrictions in these three priority
areas. Is this just a formalization of a proposal that you were
drafting at that point, or does this go beyond what you were thinking
of in January and at the February COCOM meeting?
MR. FITZWATER: It goes beyond what we were thinking of
in January.
Q
Because of the 30 items being dropped from the list
altogether, or --
MR. FITZWATER: Yes, we were just starting the review
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back then, and it was clear at that point we wanted to make changes.
But there was no -- we didn't have the analysis that allowed us to
identify individual categories and exactly how far we wanted to go.
Q
Marlin, on the top of Page 2 there is a reference to
the China green line, and that provision mentions that you already
freely license a great deal of technologies to the Peoples Republic
that you don't allow to go elsewhere. Nonetheless, would the main
impact of these proposals result in greater access for the Peoples
Republic of China?
MR. FITZWATER: No. It won't change --
Q
There won't be anything more than they can't get
now?
MR. FITZWATER: Only in the cases where there are
categories that are completely eliminated. In other words, if 30
categories are eliminated, those are categories that would have had
some review and they might not have received, but now they receive no
review at all, so there's no question they won't get it.
But as a general rule, no. As a general rule, there's no
change.
Q
Is there any concern on the part of the
administration that, at a time when you're still attempting to make
your concerns known to the Chinese government about the
liberalization policies and their crackdown on democracy that you're
in effect providing them with greater access to high technology?
MR. FITZWATER: No.
Q
I just want to make clear here -- are we talking
primarily about streamlining a process in getting rid of some red
tape -- that is, a lot of these things will not have to go through
the licensing procedure, or are we truly opening the door to new
equipment in --
MR. FITZWATER: It's not quite that black and white.
First of all, you're opening the door in some cases, because you're
eliminating a lot of categories of things where people couldn't get
products before, or where there were long delays in getting them
because of the license review.
Q
That's what I was trying to decide.
MR. FITZWATER: There's some of each. Some of each.
Q
So there's really a mix. Some stuff you're just
getting it faster, and some stuff you --
MR. FITZWATER: Yes, some personal computers, for
example, if you applied for them through COCOM and you had to go
through the review process would take quite a while, where in fact
they could probably god down to the corner drugstore and buy them.
So there was not much value in doing it.
I mean, the timetable is going to be different for every
category of product. Remember, the product list is by category of
equipment and technology, not by country.
Q
Are you going to tell us the 30? Is that
information going to be made available to us?
MR. FITZWATER: I don't have a list of the 30. I don't
know whether we will or not. I can show you the whole list if you
want to stop by my office later, but I don't think I can identify the
30.
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Q
Isn't that central to understanding --
MR. FITZWATER: They're all in these categories that I've
given you here. If you understand the difference between 156
megabytes and 130 begabytes, then it's meaningful. If you don't
understand that difference, then just say small computers of 150
megabytes and you're still ahead of the game.
Q
Marlin, you're trimming the list, obviously. But
you also called for a complete overhaul. Is that a further step, or
is that something else, or just a euphemism?
MR. FITZWATER: We consider it a complete overhaul to
make this kind of drastic change more drastic than anything in 40
years.
Q The second point, if I may.
Q
Did the overhaul come out of the President's visits
to Poland and Hungary last year, or did it predate that?
MR. FITZWATER: He asked for this review in January of
this year. But the COCOM partners have been pressing for change for
sometime, a year or more.
Q
You said that you were going to build higher fences
around certain items. What are those?
MR. FITZWATER: The strategically sensitive things -- big
computers, for example, that can be used in defense systems. That's
the most readily understandable one.
Q Anything else?
MR. FITZWATER: There are many others, yes. But that's
-- no, I don't have a list.
Q
What are the new fences? I mean, all you say is
you're going to watch them more closely, right?
MR. FITZWATER: Controls that say they can't have them.
Q
Marlin, has Senator Nunn expressed any point of view
on these changes?
Q Senator Nunn.
MR. FITZWATER: I don't know his position, Virginia.
Q
Who is involved in the review that began --
MR. FITZWATER: State, Defense, Commerce, Energy, Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Intelligence agencies.
Q
The report in a newspaper today that this would work
out with COCOM nations in Paris in June you can't confirm that?
MR. FITZWATER: That's probably right. I just don't know
the venue.
Q
Marlin, two things. First off, you mentioned
computer hardware here, but computer software has also been on the
COCOM list. Are you proposing to make changes on software as well,
do you know?
MR. FITZWATER: I'd have to see the list. I don't have
that to be able to tell you that. I think we probably -- I just
don't know. I'll have to check that.
Q
The other thing is, on this machine tools --
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MR. FITZWATER: I think it's a safe bet the answer is
yes, but still we had better check.
Q
On the machine tools thing, you've got a number here
of plus or minus two or three microns, which sounds pretty small.
MR. FITZWATER: The micron question is a tough one. I've
been wrestling with that one all morning long.
Q
Can you put that in some sort of context? I mean,
there was this case a couple years ago where the Japanese sold some
machine tools to the Soviets that we were upset about with Toshiba.
Can you make some comparison between the accuracy in the machine
tools involved in that case and what we're now saying would be okay?
MR. FITZWATER: Yes, that does require a comparison of
the 2.3 microchron versus the 4.6 microchron. Now, as you know there
are certain tendencies in that --
Q Seriously. I mean --
MR. FITZWATER: Let me give you the layman's answer to
your question. The layman's answer to your question is that the
Toshiba-like tools would not be covered by this, would not -- that's
the real answer.
Q
Do I understand you to say you are going to release
the list of the changes that you're proposing?
MR. FITZWATER: We're not going to release it, but if
you'll come see me later I'll give you a good feel for what's on the
list.
Q
Marlin, why not release the specific list?
MR. FITZWATER: Well, I don't know. Why? Because I'm
told not to do it, and why, I don't have the slightest idea.
Q
The Israeli government said it's not ready at all to
free some Shiite prisoners. Do you think it's helpful?
MR. FITZWATER: I'm sorry, what was your question? I was
still pondering the infamous list, which is probably published in the
Federal Register notice and available to all of America, but
nevertheless, my security agents have told me don't release this upon
threat of death, life, penalty, et cetera.
Now that I overcome that foolishness, Pascal, give me
your question.
Q The government of Israel says it's not ready at all
to free some Shiite prisoners. Do you think it's an -- position?
MR. FITZWATER: We don't have any comment on Israel's
position.
Q
Two quick points. Are all 40 of these items that
you've targeted for elimination in those three priority sectors?
MR. FITZWATER: Going to do a Crosstalk on this?
Q
How many microns in a --
MR. FITZWATER: We delete 43 of the
Q Just two quick points. Are all 40 of these items
that you targeted for partial elimination in those three priority
sectors?
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MR. FITZWATER: Got to do a cross-talk on this? We
delete 43 of the existing entries. That's 37 percent of the entries
making up the industrial list. of these, 30 could be dropped
completely without qualification. In 13 cases, a careful review
indicates that some portion of the goods and technologies covered by
the item need to be kept under control on strategic grounds under
other entries or consolidated new entries already under negotiation.
These residual subitems cover relatively small volumes of trade,
however, and the deletion of the original entries will contribute to
the intended streamlining of the control list. I read that as
"most."
Q
So most of them would fall under computers,
telecommunications, or machine tools? But you don't if all?
Q
What will the President say to the Lithuanian Prime
Minister when she comes tomorrow about the fact that today we've
relaxed restrictions and it will now be easier for the Soviets to get
somewhat --
MR. FITZWATER: If she's interested in the COCOM process,
he'll simply explain the changes and why we made them.
Q
You will clearly take some flak for this, Marlin,
though. People who are thinking you ought to get tough on this --.
MR. FITZWATER: Life is full of flak, Pat. (Laughter.)
Q
In practical, Marlin, isn't it a fact that your
option is really -- the only available option is to loosen some
because if you don't, you face a total break-up of COCOM by Western
Europe, and they'd be selling that stuff unilaterally to the Soviets
in Eastern Europe by themselves anyway?
MR. FITZWATER: There are a lot of good reasons. The
first, of course, is the one we stated which is the strategic review
that shows changes necessary to reflect the realities of the threat
and the realities of developing countries. The second is -- you're
right -- the COCOM partners have been asking for this for a long
time. If your system is not facing reality, it's like any other
system that's based on unreal circumstances; sooner or later it's get
violated or circumvented. And thirdly, that we do need a system of
controls on some kinds of equipments. We do still have high
technology, military threats being developed, and we need to focus on
them. And the fact of life is, laptop computers are not going to be
a threat to national security.
So you're right, there are a number of reasons, all of
which why these changes are timely and appropriate.
Q
In terms of time, give me an understanding. We've
got talks to go on with COCOM partners and agreements to be made over
these things. At what point would you anticipate the more relaxed
sales beginnning because --
MR. FITZWATER: By the end of 1990.
Q Marlin, do you -- Landsbergis said today that he was
willing to suspend some of the laws backing up the declaration of
independence, but not the declaration itself -- that that was sacred.
Is that a helpful position? And in tomorrow's meeting, will the
President encourage suspension of the declaration?
MR. FITZWATER: Well, we aren't going to be trying to
dictate a course of action. We have urged dialogue and discussion.
And it does appear that there's some movement in that direction, and
that's a good course. But we aren't going to comment on any specific
comments or any proposals that they may have surfaced in the last day
or SO.
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Q
Marlin, it's my understanding the President can
unilaterally suspend the Jackson-Vanik whenever he feels the Soviets
have met the provisions for it, and that the resolution passed last
night by the Senate was one that urged the President not to do SO
until the Soviets lifted their economic embargo to Lithuania. Is the
President at all sympathetic with the spirit of the resolution that
was passed by the Senate last night?
MR. FITZWATER: Well, he certainly is very concerned
about what's happening in Lithuania and the Soviet Union. We are
watching that matter very carefully. He does share some sense of
concern about how the trade treaty would relate to the situation in
Lithuania. He reviewed that matter from that perspective in the last
few weeks as we went through the consulation period with the allies
just last weekend, I guess.
So, yes, it is a matter of concern and it is a matter
that he has considered. And at the moment, we are progressing with
the trade talks, but it's still an open question. We're still
progressing through the situation in Lithuania. We're still hoping
for peaceful resolution. It's not a matter that's been settled.
Q
What was Kissinger doing here Monday night? What
were Foley and Nunn doing here today?
MR. FITZWATER: Kissinger was here as a part of a
Chase-Manhattan Bank delegation that was in the White House for a
briefing by -- I don't know who -- senior staff, I guess. The
President did do a drop-by. And he did stick around, along with Lord
Carrington, for a private meeting in the residence with the President
just to talk about the situation in Eastern Europe and other European
developments.
Who else did you ask about?
Q
Nunn and Foley.
MR. FITZWATER: Nunn was here for breakfast with Vice
President Quayle. They have breakfast occasionally to talk about
military matters. And that was this morning. Foley was here to --
he had breakfast with the Governor. And I don't know -- I think he
met with the President, but I don't know about breakfast. David
Frost was in for a while, and I saw him then, but I didn't see Foley
for breakfast. But in any case, the Governor and I think the
President very briefly. And he was here to talke about the
legislative agenda.
Q
Why was David Frost here?
MR. FITZWATER: And David Frost -- just because he's a
friend of the President's.
Q
Marlin, on the matter of the trade agreement with
the Soviets, you said it's still an open question. Is it possible
that the President will refuse to sign an agreement at the summit
because of circumstances in Lithuania?
MR. FITZWATER: No. I simply point out that we're
negotiating a treaty and we're moving forward in that direction. But
nothing's been finalized yet, but we are proceeding down that course.
Q
If the treaty is ready, as appears likely, for the
summit on May 30, does the President have any problem about signing a
treaty --
MR. FITZWATER: Well, that's a hypothetical and I won't
speculate. I simply wanted to counter the hypothetical speculation
in Nick's question.
Q
I just wanted to know what the "it's an open
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- 18 -
question" meant.
MR. FITZWATER: I said we're proceeding down that course,
but as I say, the matter is not resolved. We're still searching for
a peaceful solution in Lithuania. We're progressing on the trade
agreement. But we understand the sensitivities and the relationships
involved, and we understand that Congress is concerned about this,
and we certainly take all those things into account.
Q But are you linking the final say and signing of the
trade treaty at the summit with the situation in Lithuania?
MR. FITZWATER: No.
Q
You seem to be doing that right now for the first
time.
MR. FITZWATER: No, not linking it.
Q
Is it true, as alleged today on Capitol Hill, that
the office of then Vice President Bush interceded on behalf of Hector
Bereto for a $500,000 HUD grant to study a Hispanic trade center?
MR. FITZWATER: I don't know. I've never heard of Hector
Bereto in my life.
Q
Are you aware of that charge being leveled at the
then Vice President?
MR. FITZWATER: No.
Q
Is this something you could ask about?
MR. FITZWATER: Sure.
Q
Marlin, Canadian authorities yesterday publicly
asked the Bush administration to intervene in Indian hostilities that
are taking place up in the St. Regis Reservation. It's on the
Canadian-New York border. Is the President aware of their request
and does he plan to do anything about it?
MR. FITZWATER: We have no intention to intervene. It's
a matter that needs to be resolved locally.
Q
Marlin, when the Islamic Revolutionary Dawn said
they would release Reed, they said he would bring a message. We're
told we're led to believe that Polhill's message was nothing new.
Do we have any indication yet from Wiesbaden that Reed has something
more portentous?
MR. FITZWATER: I'm not aware of anything.
Q If he has a message, will the President have him to
the White House, as he had Polhill?
MR. FITZWATER: I'm sure if he wants to come into see the
President, a meeting would be arranged. He certainly has every right
to do that.
Q
Is there anything new on --
MR. FITZWATER: But he hasn't come back to the United
States; has not indicated to us what his preferences are. So we'll
just have to wait and see.
Q
Shortly after Polhill was released, you gave
indication that things were -- I think your words were "things were
bubbling a bit" towards another hostage coming out, which eventually
was Reed. The Tehran Times has said that the ball's in our court,
but Khameni today gave a speech in which he said Iran is still
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- 19 -
working to free the hostages. Other than the public sources, is
there any reason to believe that anything else is going to happen
now, or are you just waiting to see?
MR. FITZWATER: We don't have any other indications of a
release, no.
Q
Marlin, if the President is so concerned about
Lithuania, why is he, at this particular time, making these positive
steps on trade with the Soviet Union when he could just lay low or
hold this out as a pressure to get them to step back across the line
--
MR. FITZWATER: Because we think it's the right thing to
do for all the reasons I laid out earlier.
Q
Why's he sending -- he's sending them positive
signals.
MR. FITZWATER: Well, it's the right thing to do for all
the reasons we laid out earlier. You can't link everything in the
world.
Q
Did the President and Foley discuss budget
negotiations?
MR. FITZWATER: I don't know what they talked about.
We've got a lot of budget items on the Hill. The Panama-Nicaragua --
Q
Romantic items?
MR. FITZWATER: Romantic items, yes. That's what they --
they probably talked about Darman's romance. (Laughter.)
Q
Reed, in Wiesbaden, was asked if he had any messages
for the --
MR. FITZWATER: Darman as a romantic figure gives a whole
new kind of -- (laughter) -- cast to public service. That's kind of
the way I've always thought of Darman -- as a romantic figure.
(Laughter.)
Q
Reed, when he met a bunch of reporters --
Q
It's almost impossible to fantasize. Red, white and
blue shorts. (Laughter.)
MR. FITZWATER: That's right. Helen does remember those
things.
I'm sorry, Steve, go ahead. We're having a little too
much fun up here. Go ahead.
Q
Reed, in Wiesbaden this morning, said to reporters
who were gathered there that -- he was asked if he had a message for
the other families, and he talked about being angry and embarrassed,
and said, yes, he probably did at one time have a message. But the
State Department talked to him, and he decided now he doesn't have a
message because the process seems to be working. Was he shushed up?
MR. FITZWATER: No. But I think you have to understand
that when someone comes out of captivity for three and a half years
they certainly have every right to be angry and frustrated and so
forth. They've also been cut off from information, from the process,
from a lot of different things. Mr. Reed is free to say whatever he
wants. I'm sure he was reflecting briefings he's received about the
status of events, but he is free to say anything he likes.
Q
Any reaction to the Republican lawmakers refusal to
put the President's budget up for a vote? And has it indeed been
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#196-05/02
- 20 -
passed by the times?
MR. FITZWATER: Let's see. We had -- I better check with
legislative affairs on the exact status, but we had a vote last
night. We are still working with the leadership and the members of
the committee on the budget. I don't have any progress to report at
this point, but we're working, try to get together.
Q
Republicans, lawmakers saying that the President's
budget has been overtaken by events.
MR. FITZWATER: Well, that's kind of like life is full of
flak. We've been through this before. We'll continue to talk. It's
still the basis for all of our discussions and negotiations.
Q
Have we learned anything from Polhill and from Reed?
Has the President learned anything new in his meeting?
MR. FITZWATER: Well, you've put the adjective new on
there, which is -- I'm not sure -- but the President certainly found
it a very usefule discussion in terms of learning about how the
captivity took place and how he was held there and the conditions and
so forth. I don't think we learned anything new in terms of policy
or how to approach the problem. But the President was very
interested in his recollections and his recounting of the hardships
involved. And hopefully it was helpful to him to be able to tell the
President of his country exactly what happened. I think both sides
found it a very useful discussion.
Q
Have we learned anything significant about the
status of the other remaining hostages from Polhill and Reed?
MR. FITZWATER: I don't believe SO. There again, what
does significant mean? We've learned some things about other
hostages by virtue of his descriptions of where he was and that sort
of thing, but nothing that's going to change the situation.
For example, when he was put on the phone with Mr. Reed,
he had never met Mr. Reed either before or after his captivity. On
the other hand, he was with Steen and Turner. But from a policy
standpoint or the standpoint of affecting the outcome of the
situation, I don't have anything to report.
Q
Marlin, do you expect people to announce the details
of the summit by the end of this week?
MR. FITZWATER: You mean logistical details? I would --
well, I don't know. Probably not until next week actually. I think
we're getting closer and in fact it's going to be almost entirely in
Washington. That seems clear.
Q
What do you mean by that?
MR. FITZWATER: Well, we've said the main meetings would
be here in Washington, but there might be a private day at the end.
And that's still the case, but we don't have anything ready to
announce at this time. Nor do I have arrival times, that sort of
thing.
Q
Where are the meetings?
Q
Are the Soviet guys, advance -- are they here in the
White House or what?
MR. FITZWATER: I haven't seen any. I don't think
they're here in the White House, but we are getting close to getting
our two teams together, their protocol team and our protocol team. I
don't know the schedule.
Are they here now? I don't know whether they are today,
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- 21 -
they weren't yesterday when I was in touch with them. I don't know.
Q
Will the meetings be in the White House?
MR. FITZWATER: They were last time. I'm sure there will
be some in the White House, although most will probably be over in
the State Department.
Q
Your statement that it will be entirely in
Washington with a private day at the end. Does that rule out any
unilateral Gorbachev travel?
MR. FITZWATER: No, I can't rule any travel out, no. We
don't have his specific plans. As I recall when Gorbachev came here
for the Washington summit last time, there were things he did
personally that he didn't tell us about until the day he got here.
And there were things he did he never told us about.
Q
But you would moving around the country is more
than
Q Like what?
MR. FITZWATER: Like Connecticut Avenue.
Q
Moving around the country outside of Washington on
his own is certainly more than --
MR. FITZWATER: Not aware of any.
Q
What do you know about this? I mean, it's the end
of the month and we seem to be --
MR. FITZWATER: I told you everything we know that we can
say.
Q
Marlin, what's your guidance on a NATO summit to
brief the allied leaders after this?
MR. FITZWATER: Possibility. No date, no time, no place,
but it's a possibility.
Q
Strong possibility?
MR. FITZWATER: Strong possibility.
Q
Are you signaling that the private day is going to
be Camp David rather than anything beyond?
MR. FITZWATER: I'm not sending any signal, but we'll
announce it as soon as we can.
Q
Press conference, Marlin?
MR. FITZWATER: Press conference sometime. We'll tell
you, you'll be here.
Q
Today?
MR. FITZWATER: Not today.
THE PRESS: Thank you.
END
12:41 P.M. EDT
#196-05/02
A12 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL FRIDAY. FEBRUARY 23, 1990
POLITICS & POLICY
Prodded by Quayle and Cheney, Bush Becomes
helped introduce the argument that SDI
would be needed to guard against attacks
from the Third World as well as from the
Fervent Supporter of Strategic Defense Initiative
Soviets.
Then, after Mr. Cheney became defense
secretary, the vice president began what
By GERALD F. SEIB
says Frank Gaffney, head of the Center for
officials describe as a persistent personal
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Security Policy. "I think what he's trying
edge that he never fully embraced Mr.
campaign to increase the new defense
WASHINGTON - To many who have
to do Is avoid responsibility for the free-fall
Reagan's original, costly concept of SDI as
chief's enthustasm for SDI. Mr. Cheney al-
watched him over the years, It's an un-
the defense budget is going to take in the
an impenetrable "Astrodome" shield in
ways was an SDI advocate. But adminis-
likely development: George Bush is post-
next few. months."
which a combination of space-based sen-
tration officials say his advocacy for the
tioning himself as a champion of the Stra-
Indeed, congressional Republicans warn
sors and lasers would insulate the U.S.
program turned up a notch when, partly as
tegic Defense Initiative.
the White House that It will take an even
from even an all-out Soviet nuclear as-
a result of the peppering he was receiving
And for that turn of events, SDI sup-
more vigorous defense of SDI than Mr.
sault.
from Mr. Quayle, he flew to California
porters owe particular thanks to Vice Pres-
Bush is mounting to prevent the program
But Mr. Bush began getting more en-
Sept. 21 to visit for the first time the Law-
Ident Dan Quayle
from being slashed in the attack that will
and Defense Secre-
thused one day in 1988, when physicist Ed-
rence Livermore Laboratory, site of much
certainly be mounted on Capitol Hill.
tary Dick Cheney.
Predictably, though, White House aldes
ward Teller walked into an NSC meeting
of the cutting-edge research on SDI tech-
Mr. Quayle has been
Insist that Mr. Bush genuinely believes his
carrying a model illustrating a new ap-
nology.
the key behind-the-
recent assertion that "in the 1990s, strate-
proach called "Brilliant Pebbles." Bril-
Mr. Cheney seemed to return from the
scenes player in the
gic defense makes much more sense than
liant Pebbles is a cheaper SDI plan in
trip with deeper enthusiasm for SDI and
evolution of the
ever before." And whatever his true feel-
which thousands of small rockets built with
the Brilliant Pebbles approach, adminis-
Bush administra-
Ings, Mr. Bush has begun making a public
existing technology would constantly orbit
tration officials say. He began openly lob-
tion's surprisingly
case that the end of the Cold War will pro-
the earth.
bying members of Congress to make the
robust advocacy of
duce an International environment In
Upon detection of an enemy attack,
same trip. telling lawmakers at one recent
SDI, and has helped
which the importance of SDI grows rather
they would be dispatched to crash into in
hearing that "phenomenal progress" has
fuel Mr. Cheney's
than declines.
been made in SDI research.
recent gung-ho sup-
Mr. Bush maintains that SDI is needed
coming missiles. (As technology advances
Still, SDI spending was chopped by Con-
port of the program
in part because the threat of surprise mis-
allow the rockets to be shrunk in size, scl-
gress in last year's budget deliberations.
as well.
sile attacks by Third World nations and
entists recently have begun referring to
So last November Mr. Quayle convened a
Dan Quayle
SDI supporters
terrorists is increasing as more nations ac-
the concept as "Smart Bullets" rather
meeting of about 20 sympathetic law-
have long been skeptical of Mr. Bush. They
quire ballistic missiles. And his aides as-
than Brilliant Pebbles. Advocates assert
makers in the vice president's office in
strongly suspect he Is only lukewarm in his
sert that strategic defense makes more
that Brilliant Pebbles would cut the cost
the Executive Office Building to develop
support of the space-based missile defense
sense as the size of the offensive U.S. nu-
of SDI to $55 billion from $69 billion.
more effective arguments for SDI spend-
program. and maintain he wavered in his
clear deterrent declines under U.S. Soviet
Brilliant Pebbles began turning SDI Into
ing. As a result, House Republican leader
defense of It in his presidential cam-
arms deals.
paign.
a program Mr. Bush could more fully sup-
Robert Michel and Republican Whip Newt
That public posture has emerged from a
Gingrich sent the president a letter urging
But now Mr. Bush wants an Increase of
port, aides say. That inclination was rein-
series of private twists and turns that have
him to mention SDI in his State of the Un-
roughly $1 billion, or some 25%, in SDI
fostered Mr. Bush's
forced when Mr. Bush picked Mr. Quayle,
ion address. And the idea of having Mr.
funding-at a time when the perception of
current thinking on
an unabashed SDI and Brilliant Pebbles
Bush himself travel to Livermore began to
a Soviet threat is fading fast and other
SDI, officials say.
backer, to be his vice president.
circulate around the White House.
Pentagon programs are being cut back. He
The evolution began,
Mr. Quayle: lobbled hard to Insert a
By December, the administration was
made a well-publicized visit to the nation's
they say, with a Na-
statement supporting SDI into Mr. Bush's
still wavering on how much money to re-
top SDI lab. And he delivered a major de-
tional Security Coun-
first address to Congress a year ago this
quest for SDI this year. Mr. Quayle pushed
fense speech in which he declared that the
cil meeting back
month, administration aides say. Because
hard internally for robust funding, oppos-
program is needed more than ever.
when Mr. Bush was
he had long warned of the danger of ballis-
ing some officials who argued that such a
Indeed, Mr. Bush's administration has
vice president. The
big request wasn't wise because Congress
begun talking of beginning deployment of
tic missile proliferation, Mr. Quayle also
process was pushed
would never approve it anyway. In the
SDI by the late 1990s-a timetable as ambl-
along by Mr.
tious as any discussed under President
Quayle's persistent
Reagan, who created SDI.
lobbying for the lat-
Skeptics still doubt that Mr. Bush really
est SDI concept, and
is deeply committed to SDI. They suspect
It was galvanized by
Dick Cheney
he Is mostly posturing, in an effort to en-
a little-noticed Sep-
sure that conservatives who champion SDI
tember trip by Mr. Cheney to the labora-
won't blame him when Congress slices up
tory conducting the most important SDI re-
end, the Bush budget called for a big $1 bil-
stood before television cameras at the Li-
the program's budget later this year.
search.
lion SDI spending boost, and the president
vermore Laboratory. "Even as we work to
"I don't think he's been converted,"
Privately, Mr. Bush's advisers acknowl-
plugged SDI In his State of the Union
reduce arsenals and reduce tensions, we
speech.
understand the continuing crucial role of
Earlier this month, Mr. Bush himself
strategic defense." he declared.
ARES
CONTROL AGENCY
TEL: 202-647-6721
Nov 8,89 10:58 No.017 P.01
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
To. DAN MCGROARTY
ROOM 118
FAX: 456-7005
FROM : Joe DUGGAN
647-4153
ARMS CONTROL AGENCY
TEL: 202-647-6721
Nov 8,89 10:58 No. 017 P.02
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
(Contact Joe Duggan, 202-647-4153)
Rapid Accord on Conventional Arms Cuts
Would Help European Stability, Bush Advisor Says
IRVING, Texas, Nov. 9 (Thursday) - President Bush's special advisor on arms
control, Edward L. Rowny, today said he is "hopeful about the Vienna conventional
forces talks. The remaining differences between East and West are narrowing and each
side is motivated to achieve an agreement. More than anything else, progress on
conventional arms reduction promises to make European security more stable. It
provides an important opportunity for advancing the President's vision of a 'whole and
free' Europe.
"While good progress is being made in the CFE talks, it must be sustained and
pursued with a sense of urgency, Rowny said in a speech at the University of Dallas.
Rowny said: "...it has long been true that the division and heavy militarization of
Europe is a threat to peace and stability the world over. A conventional war in Europe
would have grave potential of escalating beyond Europe's borders into a global conflict
involving the US and the USSR. Though the likelihood for war is today low, I believe
that all-out nuclear war between the superpowers is more likely to result from the
flames of a conventional warfare tinderbox than from a 'bolt out of the blue.'
"We must not discount the inherent destructiveness of conventional forces -- the
weapons my Soviet counterparts have called 'useable forces.' The destructive power of
the modern conventional weapons deployed in Europe today is far greater than that of
the conventional weapons that wreaked such devastation half a century ago. With a
heavy imbalance of conventional forces which favors the Warsaw Pact, Europe today is
the world's most militarized continent. Soviet modernization of its forces continues
apace. While the USSR is reducing its force of older model T-64 tanks, it continues to
produce newer T-72s and T-80s at a rate far in excess of US tank production.
"Because of these factors President Bush has led the Western alliance in
intensifying efforts for an historic agreement for deep conventional forces cuts to equal
levels. With the proper understanding and effort, we can meet the President's goal of a
treaty within one year.
"A combination of events on the world scene makes this a time for hope- and for
hard work to bring those hopes to fruition. The President has a balanced,
common-sense approach toward advancing both world peace and world freedom. By
stressing the need to tackle the causes of tension and not simply its symptoms, he is
pursuing a broad agenda which goes beyond arms control. Nevertheless, he is not
neglecting arms control and is emphasizing the reduction of the risk of war through an
early agreement on conventional forces. This has the greatest potential for realizing
the goal of a more stable and free Europe. President Bush also is moving forward with
negotiations for a START treaty and remains committed to our strategic defense
program. Our aim is the reduction of strategic forces to levels which are not only lower
but more stabilizing, with deterrence no longer based solely on mutual terror.
"The culmination of this common-sense approach could, by the century's end, make
for a more stable world, one in which the nations of Eastern Europe can complete a
peaceful transition to freedom."
ARMS CONTROL AGENCY
TEL: 202-647-6721
Nov 8,89 10:58 No. 017 P.03
Promoting Peace and Freedom:
A Time for Hope and Hard Work
An Address by Ambassador Edward L. Rowny
Special Advisor to the President
and Secretary of State for Arms Control Matters
University of Dallas
Irving, Texas . November 9, 1989
The last decade of the 20th Century presents us with extraordinary opportunities
to advance America's goals of a world more peaceful and more free. The election and
inaugural speech of George Bush signalled to the world that the United States would
continue to move forward toward these aims.
President Bush and Secretary Baker are taking a broad, integrated approach to
improving East-West relations. As the Bush Administration diplomacy already has
demonstrated, politics does not proceed in a social or economic vacuum. And
Secretary Baker observed recently that arms control does not proceed in a political
vacuum.
The Bush Administration recognized the success of President Reagan's four-point
approach to U.S.-Soviet relations. Clear gains have been made in advancing human
rights, mediating regional conflicts, improving bilateral exchanges, and furthering
arms reductions. Having been involved in superpower arms control now for nearly
two decades, I can attest that the success of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
Treaty would not have been possible without U.S. persistence in addressing the
causes, and not just the symptoms, of U.S.-Soviet tensions. Recognizing this, the
President and Secretary Baker has made the U.S.-Soviet agenda broader still,
initiating talks on transnational issues such as environmental protection, drug
trafficking, and terrorism.
President Bush has made it clear that United States leadership in the NATO
alliance is as strong as ever. His demonstration of leadership comes at a propitious
time -- indeed, at a truly amazing moment of rapid expansion of freedom and
democracy in Eastern Europe. In Poland and in Hungary, tangible progress toward
the President's vision of a Europe "whole and free" is taking place every day.
Global Ramifications of European Security
So much focus on Europe at this time should not be mistaken for "Eurocentrism"
which neglects Asia and the other continents. To the contrary, it has long been true
that the division and heavy militarization of Europe is a threat to peace and stability
the world over. A conventional war in Europe would have grave potential of
escalating beyond Europe's borders into a global conflict involving the US and the
USSR. Though the likelihood for war is today low, I believe that all-out nuclear war
between the superpowers is more likely to result from the flames of a conventional
warfare tinderbox than from a "bolt out of the blue."
The popular imagination tends to regard nuclear war as the sole apocalyptic
threat. As a soldier who has fought in three wars, my perspective is that all war is
hell.
Chemical warfare raises a frightening specter. After Europe's experience with
poison gas in World War I. the civilized nations agreed to bar the use of chemical
weapons. However, over the past decade it has become apparent that the taboo
against chemical warfare is not as strong as one would expect. Poison
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gases have been used in the Iran-Iraq war, and by communist forces against freedom
fighters in Afghanistan and Laos. Chemical weapons could become a cheap and
widely available "poor man's atomic bomb."
Chemical weapons pose such a danger that President Bush has redoubled United
States efforts for an effectively verifiable treaty to ban these weapons. Progress in
bilateral efforts between the U.S. and the Soviet Union will help spur the effort for a
global accord. At present the USSR possesses, according to its own admission, the
world's largest CW stockpile.
President Bush has offered to reduce U.S. stocks of chemical munitions if the
Soviets would also reduce theirs. At their September meeting in Wyoming, Secretary
Baker and Minister Shevardnadze took a forward step in this matter by agreeing to a
bilateral data exchange and verification of that data to begin next month.
While working to complete a global CW treaty, the U.S. has proposed to the
Soviet Union that the two countries agree to the destruction of a major portion of
their respective CW stockpiles down to equal and lower levels, with mutually agreed
verification provisions.
Following the Wyoming meeting, in a September 25 speech to the United Nations
General Assembly, President Bush reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to a multilateral
treaty that would completely eliminate chemical weapons in 10 years, provided that
all states with CW capability become party to the treaty. The U.S. would destroy
more than 98 percent of its current CW stockpile within eight years after entry into
force of a multilateral CW treaty, provided the Soviet Union also is a party The
remaining 2 percent would be destroyed in the following two years after all
CW-capable countries become parties to the treaty.
Although the prospect of possible use of chemical or nuclear weapons is horrible,
let us not discount the inherent destructiveness of conventional forces the weapons
my Soviet counterparts have called "useable forces." Conventional weapons can
cause devastating results. This has been demonstrated during the 1980s in Iran,
Iraq, and Afghanistan, and most convincingly in the Middle East during the 1970s.
And as for Europe, the destructive power of the modern conventional weapons
deployed on the continent today is far greater than that of the conventional weapons
that wreaked such devastation half a century ago.
Europe today, with a heavy imbalance of conventional forces which favors the
Warsaw Pact, is the world's most militarized continent. Even when the announced
unilateral Soviet force reductions are carried out fully, Warsaw Pact tanks, armored
troop carriers and artillery pieces will still outnumber NATO's by more than 2 to 1.
Moreover, Soviet modernization of these forces continues apace. While the USSR
is reducing its force of older model T-64 tanks, it continues to produce newer T-72s
and T-80s at a rate far in excess of US tank production. Soviet artillery has been
modernized, and front-line units now feature self-propelled, nuclear-capable guns.
While the Soviets are reducing somewhat their capability to conduct a surprise attack
against the West, they will still possess effective forward-deployed forces capable of
sustained offensive operations. What some would characterize as "merely" a
conventional war in Europe would take a catastrophic toll in civilian lives and
property.
Because of these factors President Bush has led the Western alliance in
intensifying efforts for an historic agreement to reduce Conventional Forces in
Europe (CFE). He has set as a goal the accomplishment of a treaty within one year.
Our NATO allies and the Warsaw Pact have adopted this goal and made significant
strides since the talks opened in Vienna earlier this year. NATO's aims are to:
ARMS- CONTROL AGENCY
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Nov 8,89 10:58 No. 017 P.05
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**
Eliminate the capability for surprise attack and large scale offensive action.
**
Remove the major source of military instability on the European continent:
the threat posed by excessively large
forces of the Warsaw Pact, especially forward deployed Soviet forces.
**
Concentrate on reducing those weapons that are best suited for surprise
attack and offensive operations: especially tanks, artillery, and armored
troop carriers. The Warsaw Pact has indicated willingness to make deep,
asymmetrical cuts in these systems. All the reduced weapons would be
destroyed. This would mean, for example, destroying more than 30,000
Warsaw Pact tanks.
**
Limit US and Soviet troops based on foreign soil in Europe to 275,000 each
-- a cut of 30,000 from current US levels and 325,000 from Soviet levels. All
withdrawn troops would be demobilized.
In September, NATO tabled its proposals in Vienna on information exchange,
stabilizing measures, verification, and non-circumvention The Warsaw Pact
responded with its own measures last month. While good progress is being made it
must be sustained and pursued with a sense of urgency.
I am hopeful about the CFE talks because the remaining differences between
East and West are narrowing and each side is motivated to achieve an agreement.
More than anything else, progress on conventional arms reduction promises to make
European security more stable. It provides an important opportunity for advancing
the President's vision of a "whole and free" Europe.
START's Goal Is Stability
In the Geneva talks on US and Soviet long-range, or strategic arms, important
progress has been made. But we remain divided on such key strategic issues as
sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles, strategic bombers, and verification.
The forces. outcome on these issues will affect the nature and composition of our strategic
While the negotiations have been in progress, the Soviet Union has continued to
modernize its strategic forces. For example, the Soviets have continued to make
improvements in the accuracy and yield of their SS-18 heavy missiles. They also
have fielded two mobile ICBMs. Because of these improvements, it is imperative that
we adhere to the principle that remaining forces after a START agreement be more --
and not less stabilizing than current forces.
One of the most complex issues in the START negotiations is verification. We
made a quantum leap in verification with the INF Treaty's provisions for baseline
and short notice on-site inspections, and for portal monitoring of missile facilities.
But verification of START. compared to INF, is considerably more difficult. INF
provided for the complete elimination of an entire category of weapons all of them
land-based and banned their production, deployment, and testing. START will
permit the retention of many strategic weapons, based in the air and at sea as well as
on land. Verifying reduction of these weapons will be far more difficult than
monitoring the implementation of the "global zero" INF treaty.
Accordingly, President Bush's first major initiative in START was to put
verification on the front burner. He proposed that we and the Soviets work out
certain verification and stability measures and implement them as soon as possible,
even before a START treaty enters into force. The President is striving to ensure
that any treaty he signs will be effectively verifiable.
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In START it is important to stress that our objective is not the abolition of all
nuclear weapons, nor making deep reductions for their own sake. Our goal is an
increase of stability at lower levels of armament. It is possible, if we are not careful,
to cut weapons and yet end up with a more dangerous situation if the resulting
effectiveness of forces are improperly structured. In time of crisis, a relative
advantage on one side or the perceived vulnerability of the other's retaliatory forces
could put a premium on striking first. This is why one of the key criteria for
resolving the remaining issues in START is whether it promotes stability.
The START talks do not proceed in a vacuum. Strategic modernization of U.S.
forces is essential to the credibility of the forces which would remain under a START
agreement. President Bush made his understanding of this clear when he prepared
his Defense budget. It is vital, he said, that we move forward with the rail-mobile
MX and road-mobile "Midgetman" ICBMs; with the revolutionary B-2 Stealth
bomber; with the Trident D-5 submarine-launched missile; and with the Strategic
Defense Initiative.
SDI: Technology Meets "New Thinking"
The Strategic Defense Initiative exemplifies progress in technology and in
American "new thinking" about how best to deter the use of the awesome arsenal of
long-range Soviet nuclear weapons. Today, the threat of retaliation stands as our
sole means of deterring a nuclear attack.
This situation dates to the early 1970s when our political and scientific leaders
had little confidence that effective strategic defenses could be developed in the near
term. We entered into an agreement with the Soviets the ABM Treaty of 1972 -- to
forbid either country from deploying a capability for nationwide territorial defense.
Then we dismantled our partial strategic defense system. Our policymakers of that
time believed that a strategic defense system was not practical. Moreover, they
predicated the ABM Treaty on the belief that both sides would make reductions in
strategic offensive weapons. That promise went unfulfilled.
Today, the new technological potential for effective, stabilizing strategic defenses
unimagined by many of the policymakers of 1972--looks bright. As Secretary
Cheney said recently: "Thero are many compelling reasons why we need SDI, and
there are no technical reasons why we could not have it."
For example, there is a very promising new concept for space-based missile
interceptors called Brilliant Pebbles. Preliminary reading of independent studies
now being reviewed in Washington indicate that a few thousand relatively
inexpensive, very small interceptors based in space may be capable of taking on even
the Soviet SS-18 heavy ICBM force and significantly limit its effectiveness.
Knowledge of this would severely complicate a Soviet planner's calculations and
thereby act as a powerful deterrent against an ICBM attack. Just as important these
"Brilliant Pebbles" also could serve as a shield against unauthorized, accidental, or
terrorist missiles aimed at the US or our friends.
This is why President Bush is committed to moving forward with SDI. This, too,
is why we are assiduously seeking in Geneva to gain Soviet agreement to a stable,
transition from deterrence based solely on offensive weapons to deterrence based on a
balance of offensive weapons and defensive measures.
It is simple, perennial common sense to balance defensive and offensive systems.
Such a balance is both feasible and affordable. Security never has been soundly
based on swords without shields any more than it has been based on shields without
swords. History will not forgive us, I believe, if we fail to pursue the benefits of
defenses against ballistic missiles.
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Unfortunately, there is a morass of misinformation and misunderstanding about
strategic defense and very little public awareness of the Administration's aims for
SDI. Let me outline them:
President Bush has promised to deploy SDI "when it is ready." The SDI
program is structured to allow the President to make an informed
deployment decision before the end of this term.
The US and Soviets have not one, but two Nuclear and Space negotiations
under way in Geneva the Defense and Space Talks and START. If the
Soviets would agree to our Defense and Space proposals, we would be in a
promising position to effect a stable transition from deterrence based on
strategic offenses alone to deterrence based on strategic offenses and
defenses.
*
We are convinced that effective defenses, should they prove feasible, can be
introduced at a measured pace and in a cooperative way to maintain
stability during a transition to greater reliance on defenses.
Despite these reasonable and achievable aims, SDI has been under attack, and
this has undercut its funding and slowed its momentum. It has been delayed, but it
has not been killed or crippled. The next several years hold the bright promise of a
time when we will move from the deterrent "triad" of land, air and sea based
offensive strategic forces to a more stable "tetrad" which adds strategic defenses to
the deterrent force.
Bringing Hopes to Fruition
A combination of events on the world scene makes this a time for hope -- and for
hard work to bring those hopes to fruition. The President has a balanced,
common-sense approach toward advancing both world peace and world freedom. By
stressing the need to tackle the causes of tension and not simply its symptoms, he is
pursuing a broad agenda which goes beyond arms control. Nevertheless, he is not
neglecting arms control and is emphasizing the reduction of the risk of war through
an early agreement on conventional forces. This has the greatest potential for
realizing the goal of a more stable and free Europe. President Bush also is moving
forward with negotiations for a START treaty and remains committed to our strategic
defense program. Our aim is the reduction of strategic forces to levels which are not
only lower but more stabilizing, with deterrence no longer based solely on mutual
terror.
The culmination of this common-sense approach could. by the century's end,
make for a more stable world, one in which the nations of Eastern Europe can
complete a peaceful transition to freedom.
REMARKS OF DEFENSE SECRETARY DICK CHENEY
AT THE SDI SYMPOSIUM
OF THE AMERICAN DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS ASSOCIATION
WASHINGTON HILTON HOTEL
MONDAY, MARCH 19, 1990
STX
SEC. CHENEY: Thank you very much for the kind introduction and
the warm welcome. I talk about 1990 -- of course, it has been a
full year now since I became Secretary of Defense. As a matter of
fact, just a year ago this week. Somehow it seems longer.
(Laughter.) But the nice thing about 1990 is I don't have to run
for Congress this year, so no election campaign. So I -- there are
some pleasant aspects to being Secretary, as well.
Well, let me this morning -- I know you're focused, of course,
the conference is focused on the Strategic Defense Initiative, and
that is a subject near and dear to my heart. And I do want to focus
my remarks specifically on that. Another anniversary that occurs
this week, of course, is the 7th anniversary of the day that
President Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983.
I am here this morning to tell you that those seven years, I think
have been very well used. President Bush and I want to keep moving
forward as fast as we possibly can, and we are committed to
deploying strategic forces when they are ready -- excuse me,
strategic defenses when they are ready.
In other words, the President and I are "bullish" about SDI.
We are convinced that the program is on track. We are also
convinced, as the President has said, that in the 1990s, strategic
defense makes much more sense than ever before. Unfortunately, not
everyone agrees. Critics of the program seem to think that the
events of the past year have done away with the need for strategic
defense. Some of the skeptics are members of Congress. As a
result, we stand at a crossroads. We want to move forward. Dur
critics want to cut back. The issue between us is almost entirely
political.
Almost everyone now will concede that defense against ballistic
missiles is possible within a very few years. Independent review
boards tell us that a first phase strategic defense system with
Brilliant Pebbles should be well within reach. Of course, there's
still some development work to be done. That is the purpose of the
SDI program. But I am convinced that the issue is how we can meet
the President's timetable for decision and deployment, not whether
we can meet that timetable. At least, that is the technical issue.
CHENEY-03/19/90
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.STX The political issue is much more troublesome. Without funds, we
can't do much of anything, no matter how close we may be.
Therefore, it is time, I think, to get back to basics. We have to
take another look at the threshhold question: Why do we need SDI at
all?
I plan to answer that this morning by talking about three
different subjects. First is the role of strategic defense as
a deterrent to nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. Second, I want
to talk about the emerging third world threats. Together, these two
make up the negative side of the argument, what bad things SDI can
prevent. Finally, I'd like to spend a couple of moments discussing
how SDI fits with our view of the world in the 21st Century. This
argument is very different from the negative ones. Instead of the
ills we want to prevent, it is about how SDI can help us achieve the
positive relationships that we all want to develop.
Our relationship with the Soviet Union clearly has taken a turn
for the better. That fact is indisputable. It is also one of the
main reasons the President's strategic programs are under attack.
Our critics say that the enemy has disappeared, and with that, SO
have the reasons for strategic modernization and SDI. We have
clearly been impressed with President Gorbachev's determination to
bring about reforms in Soviet foreign and domestic policy. In
Eastern Europe, the changes have been nothing short of
revolutionary. There is a real possibility that former satellites
will soon be governed by democratically elected non-communist
regimes. Witness the events yesterday in the German Democratic
Republic. The new governments may well ask the Soviet Union to
bring their troops home where they belong. As a result of these
changes, the threat of a sudden Soviet invasion of Western Europe
clearly has receded. Because of this receded threat and the
likelihood of conventional and nuclear arms control agreements, the
President submitted a reduced defense budget to Congress in January.
I want to underline that point: The President's budget is $22
billion below what the same program would cost that Congress itself
approved just last November.
During the 12 months now that I'v been Secretary of Defense,
we've reduced the five-year defense program by $231 billion. By
March of -- by 1995, defense spending will be down to the lowest
share of GNP since before World War II. These are real cuts, they
are big, and they relate directly and rationally to the reduced
threat.
But these cuts are as far as we can responsibly go. For one
thing, there is great uncertainty about the future course of reform at
inside the Soviet Union. Mr. Gorbachev faces massive problems
home, and while we very much want perestroika to succeed, its
success is far from assured. In addition, we must never forget that
the Soviets retain enormous military capabilities, and those
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.STX
capabilities are getting stronger in the one arena that is most
dangerous to the United States --- strategic nuclear weapons.
At the same time as the Soviets have begun to reduce the
conventional threat, to cut back on defense spending, they are
pursuing a major strategic modernization program. That program will
significantly improve their nuclear capabilities. Specifically, the
Soviets are building two different kinds of mobile ICBMs, the rail
mobile SS-24 and the road mobile SS-25. They are upgrading their
SS-18s; thatt one, of course, is the huge multiple warhead system in
fixed silos. Its construction and basing mode make it most suitable
for a preemptive first strike. In fact, last year alone the Soviet
Union produced 140 new ICBMs; we produced 12. That was in 1989, the
year our critics say that the threat went away.
The Soviets are also improving their submarines and cruise
missiles, and they've upgraded their anti-ballistic missile system
around Moscow. And despite all their protestations about what we
[
are doing, the Soviets have a longstanding program of their own for
developing advanced missile defenses.
One interesting issue is how all of this relates to strategic
arms reduction. START will reduce the total number of nuclear
weapons on both sides. It deserves to be pursued wholeheartedly, as
the President is doing. However, limiting the totals will not
prevent either side from replacing older systems with modern ones.
Based on their recent activity, we expect the Soviets to have a
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completely modernized force under START, so.it 50 would be
irresponsible not to seek modern forces for the United States as
well.
Let me point out, however, that there is an important
difference in our two countries' strategic programs. The Soviets
continue to upgrade their first strike ICBMs, the SS-18. In
contrast, we are not looking for a first-strike capability, and
never have. Our emphasis is on systems that survive a first strike,
if necessary, and respond flexibly.
That is also why we believe it's crucial to move forward
rapidly with strategic defenses. Strategic defense can make a
unique contribution to deterrence, even apart from the moral reasons
for building defenses. It will make no difference to a Brilliant
Pebble whether a ballistic missile is launched from a mobile or a
fixed site, on land or at sea. It will work against any ballistic
missile. The Pebble's sensors will acquire the missile during
launch. Its computers will track and predict the flight path, the
Pebble will collide with the missile, and the missle will be
destroyed, together with its warheads. If some missiles are missed,
ground-based interceptors then will pick up the remaining warheads
and kill them. That is the basic architecture of our strategic
defense system.
The critics like to say that this kind of a defense is not
perfectly air-tight. They are right. In an all-out first strike,
come of the warheads would get through. But let's not make the best
the enemy of the good. When it comes to deterrence, a limited
defense is enough to give your opponent second and third thoughts.
The important point is that a significant number of missiles and
warheads would be destroyed; moreover, the Soviets could never know
in advance which ones would be.
Under those conditions, it would be impossible for them to plan
a first strike. at all. If you don't know which missiles will get
through, you can't know what a strike will achieve. You also can't
be sure what will be left to hit you back afterwards. In other
words, even an imperfect space-based defense will make preparations
for a first strike extremely difficult and complex.
Some of the critics suggest that the advantages we'll gain from
SDI can easily be defeated by Soviet countermeasures. We are well
aware of the countermeasures that have been discussed by the
critics, and we acknowledge that they must be addressed. However,
our opinion so far is that countermeasures will not be easy or cheap
to deploy, and that they can be answered. The countermeasures would
cost far more than the original defensive deployments. In addition,
we believe we can respond to the countermeasures more cheaply than
the Soviets' next round of offensive responses. At each stage of
escalation, upgrading the defense hope that should the be Soviet cheaper Union would avoid
the this offense. kind of losing Therefore, competition we to move to a greater mutual reliance
on strategic defense.
SDI, we assumed Moscow would spare tens no expense of to
counter When a we First began Phase deployment. We thought about
thousands of warheads,
CHENEY-03/19/90
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STX
hundreds of thousands of decoys and extremely high spending. Given
the state of the Soviet economy, we no longer believe that's likely
to happen. In addition, the START agreement would limit certain
countermeasures, such as decoys, by reducing the number of missiles
and warheads under the treaty. Of course, even though effective
Soviet countermeasures seem unlikely, we do not rule them out
absolutely, as if they could never be developed under any
conditions. We are not foresaking research into even more advanced
defensive technologies.
Some of the critics would like to skip Phase One entirely and
keep funding more advanced research. That is another example of
rejecting a system we can build in favor of the ones still in the
laboratory or mind's eye. It is a favorite tactic of people who
oppose all kinds of defense spending. In this case, it would mean
not meeting today's threat because of a fear about some future
threat that may never materialize. The remarkable thing is that
this fear comes from the same people who say we have no reason to
worry about the threat in any case.
We do still have a good reason to be worried about Soviet
strategic capabilities. To answer that concern, we need a balanced
offensive and defensive response. A strategic defense system is a
crucial element that will help protect us against a first strike for
decades to come.
I want to turn more briefly now to threats from countries other
than the Soviet Union. Some faulty press coverage has been saying
that the Third World has replaced the Soviet Union as a
justification for SDI. That is not true. The Soviet Union will
remain the only country that can threaten our very survival for the
foreseeable future. However, threats to our interests from other
nations are likely to grow, and SDI is an effective counter to them.
This past week there's been a public discussion about the
Libyan chemical weapons. A growing number of hostile powers are
gaining chemical, biological, and even nuclear capabilities. Many
of these countries also have acquired, or may soon acquire,
ballistic missiles able to deliver those weapons. Second-class
powers will become first-class threats.
At least 15 developing countries will produce or own their own
ballistic missiles by the year 2000. More may buy them as they do
now. Also by 2000, at least six developing countries will have
intermediate-range missiles, not merely short-range ones. Some of
the countries now developing missiles are ones that may already have
nuclear weapons or advanced nuclear weapons programs. By the end of
the decade, that list, too, could grow longer.
Most of these missiles could not reach the continental United
States; however, that should not leave us feeling safe. The United
STX is a global power with global interests and global
States Our allies could certainly be threatened. So
responsibilities. overseas bases and our forward-deployed troops. adversary. Any of
could these our could easily be in range of a missile fired by an
Who us is willing to bet that a missile will never be
That among threshold has already been crossed. In 1986, Guard Libya
used? fired two Soviet-made SCUD missiles at one of our Coast
stations on an off-shore Italian island.
CHENEY-03/19/90
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.STX
The Libyan missiles fell short of their targets. In addition, of
course, Iran and Iraq used hundreds of missiles during their recent
war.
Fortunately, Brilliant Pebbles will be able to give worldwide
protection against all but the shortest range missiles, and against
shorter range missiles our defenses can provide valuable information
to local defense units. Those are both major bonuses from a system
that already promises to deliver very much.
So far, I have given a broad range of negative reasons for
supporting SDI, things we want to guard against. I've talked about
threats and how SDI can meet them. Now I'd like to shift gears.
The Soviet Union has entered into a more productive
relationship with the United States in recent years. One of the
hallmarks of that relationship has been the Soviet decision to
reduce and redeploy their conventional forces into a defensive
posture. They have even joined with us in working on a conventional
force reduction agreement that would put teeth into the decision.
The Soviets also seem likely to agree to a START treaty that would
reduce both of our strategic offensive nuclear forces. What they
have been unwilling to do 50 far is to let our mutual interest in
strategic reductions turn into a mutual shift to a more defensive
posture.
But what works for conventional forces makes sense in the
strategic arena as well. Both of our countries have delegations at
the ongoing Defense and Space Talks in Geneva. It would make a
great deal of sense to use those talks for negotiating a cooperative
transition to a more balanced deterrent, one based on a mixture of
offense and defense. At a time when we may be changing the basis of
our relationship it seems incongruous for a deterrent to rely solely
on our ability to destroy each other.
Of course, we cannot hold up SDI to wait for these stalled
talks to make progress. However, we look forward to the day when
both sides might increase their reliance on defense. In my view
that clearly would produce a safer and more stable world. However,
we can have greater stability only if Congress cooperates. We can
move ahead with strategic defenses or continue relying solely on
offense. A balanced mixture would make for a better world. The
choice should be clear. The question is whether or not Congress
will make it.
Thank you. (Applause.)
I don't want to interfere with anybody's lunch, but I've been
told that I could take a few questions from the audience if anybody
has any questions they want to raise. I apologize for not making
that clear earlier so you could spend time thinking up questions.
Yes, sir?
Mr. Secretary -- (off mike) --- how the world had changed
and your Q program (next year should change ?). Will there be some
attempt to (this year ?) deal with that issue -- (off mike) --
political nature of -- (off mike) --
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.STX
SEC. CHENEY: Do you want to repeat the tail end of your
question?
Q
Will you be able to address that incongruence at the very
beginning -- (inaudible) --- you recognize the world has changed --
SEC. CHENEY: Yes. Well, let me talk about that for a minute
because the -- in the course of the debate, submitting the budget
and all of the follow-on stories, that get covered and some of the
discussions on the Hill, I think there has been a memory lapse, if
you will, collectively on the part of some of my former colleagues
-- I almost said former friends -- in Congress. (Laughter.)
We went through an exercise last year where I had to cut $65
billion out of the five-year defense program, and to do that, I
tried, among other things, to cancel the V-22 Osprey, to shut down
the F-14D new production line, close a few bases, et cetera. The
resistance to making those kinds of changes wasn't in the Pentagon,
it wasn't in the Executive Branch; it was right up there on Capitol
Hill.
This year what we've gone forward with are proposals to
terminate about 20 programs, including the M1 tank, the Apache
helicopter, the F-15E aircraft, et cetera. We're going to take two
divisions out of the United States Army in 1991. We're taking down
eight submarines. There's a long list of programs that we want to
do away with. We've got 120 bases on the list for closure in the
United States, another dozen overseas, and there will be a lot more
overseas once we've completed a conventional force reduction
agreement.
And again, the resistance we keep running into is right up
there on Capitol Hill with those folks who say they want to cut the
defense budget, but, of course, they don't want me to close any
bases, shut down any production lines, or do anything that might
have an impact on somebody's base back home in their district.
I think it's crucial for us, if we're going to go through this
period of shrinking our defense capabilities, if we're going to use
as justification for that the changing circumstances in the Soviet
Union and in Eastern Europe, that there be some linkage, some
rationale in terms of those programs that are cut with respect to
the reduced threat, and that's exactly what we've provided. The
President's budget does, indeed, do that.
The reason you stop producing M1 tanks is because we've got
enough with some 7,900 in the inventory, and if, in fact, the Warsaw
Pact is going to continue to fall apart, as it would appear to be
doing, if the Soviets are going to withdraw from Eastern Europe --
they've now signed agreements to get out of both Hungary and
Czechoslovakia by the middle of '91 --- and we expect further
reductions through the CFE talks, then the things that ought to
change are those forces and those systems that are specifically
dedicated to dealing with that major land war in Europe.
CHENEY-03/19/90
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.STX
That's why you take two divisions out of the Army, more over the
long time; that's why you shut down the M-1 production line, the
Apache helicopter and those other systems.
What has not changed, where there has been no diminution
whatsoever of the Soviet threat, where Soviet capabilities remain
absolutely unchanged except for the fact that they continue to get
better, is in the strategic area. Now, it makes no sense at all on
the one hand to argue that we have to respond to the changing threat
out there, make changes in our own posture, but then run over and
say, "therefore, take down your strategic systems or give up on
SDI." That is, it seems to me, is the height of illogic, and it's
vital that we continue to make that point and we'll do it just as
often as we can.
The President has in fact submitted, for the first time in
about 15 years, from the Executive branch, a defense budget that
calls for real declines in defense spending. It will take us down
by 1995 if all of the good news continues, if we continue to see --
(adjusts the micropohone) - now I understand what that guy was
doing up here -- (laughter) -- if we continue to see the kinds of
changes that have occurred over the last couple of years, then
there's no question but what it should be safe for us to make those
reductions.
But it's going to be, I think, vital for us to remember that
when we get through that period of time, we still are going to
retain the requirement for significant military capability. And
that includes not only in the conventional arena but in the
strategic area as well.
Q
Secretary Cheney, other earlier speakers today -
(inaudible) -- (applause). Some of the earlier speakers today,
including (name inaudible), suggested that the service bureaucracies
are more interested in maintaining current programs, and really
haven't been able to consider the possibility of cutbacks. Other
speakers have (neglected?) the fact that - decried the fact that
there haven't been any real government studies on this
offense-defense integration. What sort of leadership do you think
your office will assert to get their house in order within DOD
before you go up to the Hill, since you don't have offense and
defense (contingency data to report in terms of dollars?)?
SEC. CHENEY: Well, if there have been no studies of
offense-defense integration, it's the only thing we haven't studied.
We crank out huge volumes of studies and reports in the department,
but it's possible we missed one. With respect to the services, I
think you will find within the department that there are a variety
of opinions about not only SDI but a lot of our other programs as
well. And I can
CHENEY-03/19/90
7-1
.STX
find in an organization that size people within the building who
have got a variety of opinions on any given subject. My experience
has been that individuals and officers as well as the civilians
associated with the services come in and argue very hard for those
programs they're responsible for. They believe in them. That's
what they're expected to do.
It's my job as secretary in working with my staff to have to
make some of those choices. And I think it would be fair to say
that opinion is going to be mixed on most of the major systems of
the day, especially when you're faced with shrinking budgets, and
we're having to make some of these difficult choices.
So, I don't find it surprising that you won't get unanimity.
What should be very clear though is what the policy of this
administration is, and that is aggressive support for the Strategic
Defense Initiative. We think it's extremely important. It's one
of the President's priorities. It's one of my priorities. And I
know a good number of people in the services who aggressively
support those programs in all services.
Yes, sir?
Q
(Off mike question regarding attitudes in Europe towards
SDI.)
SEC. CHENEY: Well, I'd -- we'll be happy to take a look at any
thoughts and ideas for studies. I don't mean to be flippant in my
answers, but we have tried and will continue to try to educate
people about SDI. This is an opportunity for me, a forum, because
of press coverage hopefully that we're able to generate, to
reiterate again the importance that we place on this program.
The President also I think has been very actively involved in
it, his recent tour of the lab out at Livermore and his speech.
Just last fall, General Monahan accompanied me to a meeting of all
the NATO Defense Ministers where he made an excellant presentation
of the status of the program. So, we're doing everything we can to
educate as many people as possible.
My most immediate problem though isn't the Europeans. My most
immediate problem is up there on Capitol Hill and getting adequate
support from Congress so that we continue the kind of program that
will ultimately make it possible for us to achieve our objective.
I'll take one more question. Yes, sir?
Frank, how are you?
Q
I appreciate the chance to ask a question. In connection
with your reference to --- (inaudible) -- Capitol Hill support of
this program, I would argue that one of the most damaging things
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STX
that has happened this week is a public statement by the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency. You have been engaged in a more or
less public debate with him about defining the particulars that this
program -- the defense program of the country implicitly is less
important now than it used to be because under -- he has been quoted
as saying, "Under no foreseeable set of circumstances can the Soviet
threat reemerge."
Your speech today obviously doesn't reflect the conversion to
his point of view. One of the things that we've been very anxious
to encourage people to do is to get a second opinion on this.
SEC. CHENEY: (Laughs.) Well, I'm glad you asked, Frank.
(Laughter.)
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The fact of the matter is, I think Bill and I --- Bill Webster
and I have a difference of opinion, and that Bill has an obligation
as the Director of Central Intelligence, I think, to voice his
views. And he's done that, and I certainly wouldn't want to
discourage that. My job as Secretary of Defense is -- I think calls
for me to err on the conservative side before I declare that the
Soviets no longer constitute, nor will they in the future constitute
a significant military threat to the United States and our allies.
I - Bill will have to speak for himself. He does that very
well. My own views I think are well known, and that is that from
the standpoint of what we see developing in the Soviet Union we're
obviously encouraged, but there are all the things you can tick off
that lead me at this point to say we have to be very cautious.
And those points of caution are that that transition in Eastern
Europe is far from complete. It may turn out to be much easier to
topple the old regimes than it is to build new ones in their place.
It's great to have the Berlin Wall down, but there's still 15, 16
Soviet divisions in East Germany. It's nice that we're making
progress on strategic arms talks, but even after we complete that
treaty the Soviets are going to retain robust nuclear capability.
And they'll have that capability long after Mr. Gorbachev is gone
from the scene, completed his term of office, and his successor is
on board. They are not about to give it up. It's the only thing
that makes them a superpower. It's the only reason a lot of people
care very much about what does happen inside the Soviet Union --
it's because, of course, they sit on top of all those nuclear
weapons.
Now, I cannot in good conscience look at that situation and
contemplate the Lithuanian independence movement and the ethnic
unrest in Azerbaijan and Soviet talk by Soviet citizens -- not mine,
Soviet citizens - speculating about the prospects of civil war and
economic collapse inside the Soviet Union, and not be concerned that
we may indeed at some point down the road be faced with a government
in the Soviet Union that is possessed of enormous military
capability and is not nearly as benign towards the West as has been
Mr. Gorbachev.
And under those circumstances I think it would be irresponsible
for me as Secretary of Defense to run out and focus only on the good
news and not continually remind people that we've come a long way;
we're about the reap one of the great victories, if you will, in the
postwar period -- certainly the most significant - but in this
century as a result of our successful cold war strategy. And now is
not the time for us to throw it all over when if we proceed
cautiously and carefully -- we can save a lot of money out of the
defense budget, but we ought to do it over time and we ought to
continue to focus not just on Soviet intentions, but on Soviet
capabilities which remain enormous.
Thank you all very much. (Applause.)
.ETX
END
Duggan
to
Ninl
A successful strategy for securing funds to keep the SDI
program on track requires rapid mobilization of all the
relevant public liaison constituencies, but it also requires
7151
much more. It calls for a total communications strategy, with
the President, Vice President, General Scowcroft, Mr.
Fitzwater, Secretary Baker and Secretary Cheney all singing
loudly and clearly from the same songsheet. The message
needs to be projected powerfully through national TV, radio
and print media, through local news and opinion media
(especially in targetted congressmen's districts) and through
constituent activist organizations and their own media
organs.
George Bush, the former ambassador and combat pilot, has
the qualities and the experience to be a greater communicator
than Reagan at the level of defense and foreign policy detail.
Reagan's vision for SDI was profoundly correct, but now it is
up to Bush to bring to fruition a successful program worthy of
that vision. The "in-basket" president has a job to do: to
exercise the political leadership to give us the missile
defenses he has promised. Opposition to SDI no longer has
any technological basis; it is based solely on partisan and
ideological politics.
Bush pledged in 1988 his support for SDI and his
commitment to deploy it "when it is ready." He elaborated
that he would keep SDI research and testing on track SO that
he could make a well-informed deployment decision before the
end of his first term.
On taking office, in the context of other defense cuts, Bush
trimmed $1 billion, or more than 15 percent, from Reagan's
FY 1990 request for SDI. This would leave SDI with the bare
minimum needed to conduct the tests on which to base a
sound deployment decision.
Democrats in Congress are about to give the President less
than $4 billion for SDI -- far less than the bare minimum
needed to bring about the deployment decision. They want to
kill SDI, of course. But they also smell an opportunity to
cripple George Bush politically. This is their chance to
discredit the President with his own pro-defense
constituencies. If Bush allows SDI to be killed though it is
within his leadership capability to preserve it and move it
forward, disaffected pro-defense constituencies may decide
they have better things to do than work for George Bush's
re-election in 1992.
The President needs to give another "read my lips" speech on
the defense legislation. In other words, a speech that
combines a fighting, inspiring political spirit with
sophisticated, detailed policy arguments.
Here are some of the points he should make:
--Since its beginning in 1983, SDI research has been highly
successful. Each year has added confidence to the prospect of
deploying effective, affordable space and ground based
defenses against ballistic missiles. This too will make
deterrence more stable by having it based on a mix of
defensive systems as well as the offensive retaliatory systems
which now are the only basis for strategic deterrence.
--The core of domestic opposition to SDI has hardened even as
they have had to abandon their "it won't work" arguments.
Their arguments shift as circumstances change. Until last
week, when the Soviets dropped their demand that limits on
SDI be expressly linked to a START agreement, our domestic
opponents' favorite argument was that we needed to kill SDI
because it was blocking a START agreement. Now the same
people are saying that SDI should be killed because it no
longer has any value as a START bargaining chip!
--The American people are only dimly aware of the Soviet
strategic defense program, which is about 10 times costlier
than ours and has been going at a robust pace at least since
the early 1970s.
--By openly launching the SDI program, the U.S. put its cards
on the table. We say we want ballistic missile defenses and
that we want to introduce them without a destabilizing shock
to the strategic balance, i.e., a sudden U.S. breakout from the
ABM Treaty. The Soviets on the other hand are far ahead of
us toward acquiring capability to break out of the ABM
Treaty, but with false piety they insist that the ABM Treaty
is sacrosanct. They refuse to discuss our proposals for
amending it.
REVISED
Statement of
John G. Tower
before the Committee on Armed Services
of the
United States Senate
January 25, 1989
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
It is both a professional honor and a personal pleasure to appear before this
committee and so many of my old colleagues as President Bush's nominee to be
Secretary of Defense.
The fundamental concerns of this Committee also have been my concerns
throughout my tenure in public service. The responsibility to safeguard the security
and freedom of our nation is the most important obligation shared by the President
and Congress. Only through a sound national security and defense policy can the
safety of this nation be truly assured.
Under the leadership of former President Reagan and then-Vice President Bush,
and with the bipartisan support of Congress, we can point with pride to a renewed
commitment to the national defense -- one that actually began with congressional
initiatives in 1980. Our national confidence and defense capability, which had
languished during the 1970's, have been restored and revitalized.
The fruits of this renewed commitment to a strong defense can be seen in many
places, but nowhere more clearly than in our armed forces. Great strides have been
made toward modernizing our forces; more importantly, the quality and morale of
our men and women in uniform is higher than ever.
EMBARGOED UNTIL RELEASED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
2.
The results of our efforts can also be seen in the changes in the international
environment that have occurred over the past eight years. Soviet troops are coming
out of Afghanistan; Cubans are coming out of Angola. The long conflict between
Iran and Iraq shows promise of an end, and the sea lanes in the Persian Gulf remain
open. Today, United States forces are not engaged in active combat anywhere in
the world.
In the area of arms reductions, the strategy of negotiating from strength --
criticized early on as unrealistic -- has borne unprecedented success with an
agreement to eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles and much
progress toward reducing strategic nuclear arms.
In my view, the common commitment to a revitalized defense established over
the last eight years was, and remains, a prerequisite to the success of U.S. policy.
Now the nation faces a new challenge: to preserve and enhance what has already
been achieved in the face of ever more sophisticated threats while, at the same
time, living within demanding fiscal constraints. I believe we can meet this
challenge. But it will require creative and cooperative approaches by the Executive
branch and the Congress. The success such a partnership can bring cannot be
overestimated.
Defense Resources
A fundamental challenge to this partnership will be to build a bipartisan
consensus to meet our national security requirements and commitments in the face
of constrained resources. I believe this can be done, but it will require that some
3.
hard choices be made. It will require that the President and the Congress devise a
common strategy and work together to put into place mechanisms which permit us
to do more, for less.
The role Congress must play in this process is vital. Enhancing the predictability
of the budget will be a key to achieving greater efficiencies and savings. Biennial
budgeting, increased multiyear procurement, and more economic production rates
are all promising areas that should be supported. I intend to work closely with you
to develop those legislative tools required to stabilize the defense budgeting
process.
While Congress must give us the necessary budgetary stability to
achieve planning goals, the Executive branch must demonstrate leadership
in putting its house in order. Within the Department, our approach to this
challenge should involve two major elements. The first is the initiation of a review
of our national security strategy to instill purpose and discipline into every force
structure decision that is made. The second is to build upon important reforms
already initiated which are designed to streamline and make more efficient
defense management and acquisition.
National Security Strategy
Under the direction of President Bush, we must review and either affirm or revise
our national security objectives. With this clear focus, we will better define the
necessary strategy to achieve those objectives. The Department will then assess the
appropriate roles and missions and the forces and weapons required to meet our
objectives and carry out our strategy. Through such a thorough review, we will
better establish what we seek to achieve in the 1990's.
We will review operations and organization, and the systems and technologies,
in an effort to exploit enduring U.S. strengths. All elements of our forces will be
subject to review. In this way we can help bring existing force structure and
planned procurements into line with our national objectives and strategies.
Prioritizing weapons decisions along these lines will require that difficult choices
be made. There is no room in the future of the defense budget for costly mistakes.
To aid in this process, we will continue to develop promising planning concepts such
as Competitive Strategies, which can be used to evaluate current defense plans and
help provide a guide for maximizing the leverage gained from each taxpayer dollar
spent.
Defense Management and Acquisition
The second major element of our approach within the Department will be an
immediate focus on the reforms necessary in defense management, and
particularly in defense acquisition. Our first steps in this area should be full
implementation not just of the letter but of the spirit of the Packard Commission,
building upon existing reforms made possible by the strong and able leadership of
Secretary Carlucci. Our efforts will be directed at continuing to reform the
acquisition process, focusing both on personnel and procedures.
At the senior level, I will recommend to the President a team of tough, aggressive
and accountable decisionmakers, who will operate within a streamlined
bureaucracy. At the managerial level, I intend to instill within the Pentagon the
principles which guided the Packard Commission: find the right people and train
them well; give them the authority as well as the responsibility to do their jobs;
provide them with short and clear lines of communication and with adequate
staffs; and hold them accountable for the results. We will work to make acquisition
a profession in order to provide the best industrial managers for DoD.
This same high standard of accountability will extend to the private sector as well.
If confirmed, my policy towards those who break their trust with the men and
women of our armed forces and with the taxpayers of this nation will be a simple
one: zero tolerance.
We will also continue to reform acquisition procedures to ensure efficient use of
U.S. tax dollars. This requires conducting a comprehensive review of both what the
Department is procuring and how goods and services are being procured. We
should continue to move toward the competitive contracting style practiced in the
private sector one based on quality and past performance, not simply price. We
will make tradeoffs between cost and performance early on, and our decisions will
be guided by operational testing and prototype programs that clearly define
whether developing systems meet essential performance objectives. We will also
continue to seek ways to buy off-the-shelf wherever possible in order to reap the
benefits of past investments and current economies of scale.
In addition, we shall also draw upon private sector and Department expertise to
look at ways to streamline Defense Department regulations as well as federal
procurement statutes. I intend to call upon Congress to aid in the implementation
of these and related reforms.
Continued Strong Defense
We must face squarely the necessity of achieving economies wherever possible.
Yet our actions must be guided by one fundamental principle: our strategy must be
founded on a careful, deliberate assessment of our interests and the nature and
magnitude of the threat posed by our adversaries. While we strive to maximize the
value of each dollar spent on defense, our defense strategy must not be determined
by a complacency brought on by our foreign policy successes or by a retrenchment
mentality fostered by budget constraints.
In this complex and changing world, the most solemn obligations of this nation's
leadership remain: to provide for America's security; to protect its vital interests
abroad; and to foster a climate of peace and stability in which freedom and
democracy can flourish and prosper, free from intimidation and fear.
Fulfilling these obligations requires active engagement in the world that
surrounds us. We assume this role beyond our shores because we are a great nation,
representing a way of life and a system of government to which so many nations
look as a model, and because it is in our national interest to do so. But we can
continue in this role only as long as we remain strong.
The New Challenges Abroad
Recent policy successes have enhanced our security and provide a clear lesson in
the art of the possible. However, in the area of national security and defense, we
can never afford to rest on our laurels. We must remain vigilant lest the peace and
prosperity we currently enjoy lead us to a dangerous complacency and misjudgment
about what is required to maintain that peace. We cannot take our defense
capability for granted; nor can we afford to do only simple maintenance. We need
to be mindful of the fact that the challenge to our national security has not yet
diminished, though it is changing -- its nature is more subtle and, in some ways, far
more complex. The nation must be prepared to meet new challenges which could
threaten our achievements and undermine the potential for future progress.
The Soviet Union
The changing and complex nature of the threat is apparent when we look at the
Soviet Union. We are now confronted with a dynamic new Soviet leadership which
acknowledges openly that past ways of doing business must be altered to prevent
technological obsolescence and internal economic stagnation. This has prompted
some to project major alterations in military doctrine, policies and force posture.
However, while we welcome the significant internal reforms implemented and
external promises made thus far, and harbor hope of genuine change that will
result in more benign Soviet policies internationally, this does not alter the fact that
in terms of political philosophy and offensive capability, the Soviet Union remains
our greatest adversary. We welcome the first step General Secretary Gorbachev has
taken in announcing the withdrawal of certain offensive troops and forces from
Eastern Europe. However, we must proceed with caution because great
asymmetries in NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities will remain even after such cuts
are carried out.
The U.S. must have a long-term strategy that is consistent and reliable. We must
be sufficiently flexible to seize the initiative and explore positive shifts in Soviet
policy that may strengthen U.S. security. But until there is concrete evidence that
these shifts have occurred and, in fact, are enduring, we cannot afford to decrease
our vigilance. While the rhetoric has indeed changed, the economic and production
resources as well as the military forces and policies that support Soviet interests and
clients, have not changed commensurately. Moreover, we must remain mindful
that the policies of the current Soviet leadership can be read as having a marked
strategic cast to them -- they are designed to place the Soviet Union in a more
competitive position globally.
Facing this new, more sophisticated challenge, we must continue to maintain
our strength -- both nuclear and conventional, including the prospects of strategic
defenses -- to deter Soviet aggression anywhere in the world that our interests
demand. This, along with the vitality of our alliances, is essential to meeting our
global responsibilities. Our goal must remain to convince the Soviet Union that
military aggression does not pay, and that a build-up of military forces beyond
levels necessary for legitimate national defense will not provide them unilateral
advantage.
At the same time, I strongly support complementing our collective
determination to provide for our own defense with constructive dialogue with the
Soviet Union. The success of the INF negotiations has demonstrated clearly that
peace through strength works.
I am confident that, with similar resolve, positive results can be obtained in
addressing the conventional asymmetries in Europe in the new negotiations on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CAFE Talks). Similarly, progress is possible in
negotiations regarding strategic arms, chemical weapons, ballistic missile
proliferation, and nuclear testing. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that
the prospects for success in these areas will be small if we are unwilling to maintain
our own strength.
Regional Threats
The changing and complex threat we face is not limited to the long-standing
challenge posed by the Soviet Union. Regional low intensity conflicts continue to
pose a variety of real threats to U.S. interests -- threats ranging from subversion and
terrorism to the direct use of military force.
To one degree or another, continued instabilities also can be expected both
close to home -- as in Central America -- and farther away -- as in the Middle East,
where our deep commitment to the security of Israel, the integrity of moderate
Arab states, and our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf region demand a
continued role. Each potentially threatens our interests or those of our friends and
allies. Regional instabilities are likely to be exacerbated in the future by the spread
of new military technologies including ballistic missiles and chemical weapons. To
this must be added the continuing threat of international terrorism. We must take
care to have the means necessary to address these threats.
Meeting the Threat
Taken together, these challenges require not only that the United States
maintain a strong defensive capability, but that our alliance relationships remain
healthy and unified. These alliances are a central feature of our ability to protect
our own interests throughout the globe.
NATO
Our alliance relationships also are evolving. The post-war period, as we knew it
for decades, has ended. We now see a prosperous and self-confident Europe
moving toward unprecedented economic integration. Our challenge in this area is
to enhance the unity of NATO, proceed with the needed modernization of our
conventional and nuclear forces, and ensure an equitable sharing of the burden of
maintaining our common defense.
There are some who question the necessity of the enormous U.S. commitment to
the defense of Western Europe, suggesting, at best, that we are altruistic--and at
worst, that we are permitting ourselves to be exploited. Neither assessment is
accurate. We devote a large share of our resources to NATO because its strength,
cohesion, and unity are essential to the security of the United States. The repeated
and unsuccessful Soviet efforts to drive a wedge between the United States and
NATO during the INF deployments testify to the strength of Alliance unity. We must
nurture and build upon that strength.
Nonetheless, in the near future, a constellation of factors is likely to combine to
test that unity. Positive and innovative approaches are called for if we are to avoid
serious stresses and strains within the Alliance. To deal with the challenges of the
1990's, the United States and its European allies must continue to review their
respective roles, risks and responsibilities.
Creative policies must also be applied to NATO as we look towards European
economic integration in 1992. The emergence of a true European common market
will mark a major advance for freer world trade. To ensure that this evolution not
be accompanied by protectionism in the defense trade, which could impair
economies of scale, as well as force rationalization and standardization, we must
further expand cooperative programs such as those sponsored by Senator Nunn.
In addition, we must work to ensure that Europe's economic "coming of age"
also sees expanded efforts in defense, by encouraging our European partners to
measure their contributions to the common defense against their great and
growing economic capacity.
The Pacific Rim
United States' alliances and friendships in Asia are also a key element of this
nation's continued security. The powerful economic transformation of Asia has
fostered a strong interdependence with the United States, cementing long-standing
security relationships in the region. Our military presence in South Korea and in the
Philippines enhances regional stability which, in turn, is essential to continued
economic development and democratization.
Cooperation with Japan will be crucial to our security interests in the Pacific
region. While significant sentiment holds that Japan is not contributing all that it
could towards our common defense, there are indicators that Japan understands
and is responding to these concerns. In the past decade, Japan has increased its
defense spending and its development assistance to other nations in the Pacific and
beyond. We should encourage Japan to do more in this regard. I am confident this
key security partnership will remain a sturdy one.
The Pacific region will surely witness rapid economic and political development
in the years ahead. Maintaining the peace that permits continued development will
be of prime importance.
Conclusion
I do not underestimate the difficulty of the task ahead. I can only repeat to you
what President Bush so candidly told the American people about our national
agenda at his inauguration, "We have more will than wallet; but will is what we
need. We will make the hard choices, looking at what we have and perhaps
allocating it differently, making our decisions based on honest need and prudent
safety." In defense, the essential ingredient for success will be for the executive and
legislative branches of government to work in concert, not competition, to ensure
that America remains strong, at peace, and fiscally sound.
This statement appeared on the Op-Ed Page of The New York Times on November 3, 1989
The Future of U.S. Strategic Forces
To evaluate the major issues of U.S. strategic force modernization, strategic defense and START, the
International Security Council convened a panel of twenty distinguished national security specialists on
the theme "The Future of U.S. Strategic Forces" on October 5-6, 1989 in Washington, D.C. The conferees,
while expressing a diversity of views, nonetheless produced a summary of recommendations which we
present in the public interest.
T
he Soviet Union continues to assign the highest
move from research to deployment.
priority to the modernization and expansion of
Assigning higher priority and a greater sense of
its strategic nuclear capabilities, both offensive
urgency to strategic offensive force modernization is
and defensive. Massive investments, which have ac-
essential. Strategic offensive force modernization
tually increased during the Gorbachev regime, have
alone, however, cannot restore stability to the U.S.-
made these forces far more formidable than a dec-
Soviet strategic balance or prevent the Soviets from
ade ago. Yet, the Soviet threat to the U.S. deterrent
widening their strategic superiority. What is now
force is increasingly being defined in terms of assumed
required is a firm commitment to unfettered
development and the earliest deployment of
Soviet intentions rather than actual Soviet capabilities
strategic defenses against ballistic missiles.
and programs.
Neither the public nor most of Congress seems to
U.S. security will be better served by the deployment
realize that Soviet military spending under Gorbachev
of SDI defenses than by continued adherence to the
has continued to increase annually while comparable
ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty, in disallowing defense of
U.S. defense budgets have been reduced for five con-
the United States or its deterrent forces in the hope
secutive years. This combination is producing a widen-
that the Soviet Union would thereby voluntarily reduce
ing gap similar to that of the 1970s when the military
its offensive threat, was ill-conceived. The ABM Treaty
balance shifted heavily in favor of the Soviets and U.S.
now stands in the way of U.S. development and
deterrent forces became seriously vulnerable to new
deployment of the kind of defense that would
Soviet capabilities.
redress the strategic imbalance and reduce missile
The failure of U.S. strategic force modernization to
threats to the United States. Continued adherence
keep pace with Soviet modernization means that in
to the treaty is not in our national interest, and
most respects the United States is worse off in the
President Bush should declare this to be so.
strategic balance today than it was in 1981.
This is due not only to the determined Soviet effort
to undercut American deterrent forces, but also on the
T
he strategic arms reduction agreement, as it is
currently being formulated, will not improve the
part of the United States, to the lack of decisive national
current strategic imbalance. In many ways it will
direction and proper priorities, the adverse effects of
worsen it and add to the risks. In our view, START is
arms control, inadequate budgets, and restraints im-
an important additional reason to proceed with
posed by Congress.
deployment of a ballistic missile defense. A defense
Because of these factors, U.S. strategic forces today
against ballistic missiles would lessen the vulnera-
do not possess the range of capabilities required by
bility of a reduced U.S. force to continuing moderni-
the threat and by official U.S. deterrence doctrine.
zation of Soviet strategic forces, to unexpectedly
Ironically, while the United States has proceeded in
rapid changes in the threat, and to Soviet cheating,
circumvention of the agreement, and preparations
recent years in a proper direction in the evolution of its
for rapid breakout from START.
strategic nuclear doctrine, concepts, and objectives, it
has not translated these standards into capabilities or
Our first priority, with or without a START agreement,
into deployment programs that command strong sup-
should be to begin deployment of whatever strategic
port. Current programs which might improve the situa-
defense systems we can deploy as soon as possible,
tion are under threat of further delay and dilution.
with the clear intention of proceeding with a well-defined
Decisions on U.S. force modernization are being
program to deploy a comprehensive strategic defense
driven more by the federal budget environment than
capability. Initial deployment of an ABM Treaty-
by a clear understanding of the Soviet threat and
compliant, ground-based system, however, should
the requirements of effective deterrence. Lacking
not jeopardize timely deployment of a far more
purposeful national direction, both the military
effective layered system of space- and ground-
services and Congress will tax strategic force
based defenses, so long as such deployment is
modernization to pay for other programs. And
seen as the first step toward a layered defense.
inadequate funding of offensive force moderniza-
tion will lead both the services and Congress to kill
The administration should proceed with the deploy-
SDI to pay for those programs.
ment of effective defenses while it attempts to negotiate
a satisfactory ballistic missile defense deployment
T
he Secretary of Defense must maintain firm
agreement to accompany a START agreement. If such a
control
over
deployment agreement is
strategic policy
not reached in two years,
and programs. If strategic
or by the time that START
modernization were left
reductions are begun, the
to the military services,
United States must con-
it would continue to
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
tinue ABM deployment
receive inadequate and
818 Connecticut Avenue, NW
free of agreed limitations.
parochial attention. In
Washington, DC 20006
This is essential to the
particular, if left to the
(202) 828-0802
implementation of a
services, SDI would never
START agreement.