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Japan [OA 6902]
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Records of the White House Office of Speechwriting (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Carol Aarhus Alpha Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
S; 1999-0582-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series:
Aarhus, Carol, Files
Subseries:
Alpha File, 1990-1992
OA/ID Number:
13864
Folder ID Number:
13864-004
Folder Title:
Japan
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
19
2
5
5
policy
Fall 1991
Number 58
$4.50
Conservatism's Growing Pains
Edwin J. Feulner Jr.
Why Communism Failed
Adam Meyerson
Is Japan Our Enemy?
Seth Cropsey
Reclaiming the Culture
Heather S. Richardson
Canada's Patient Patients
Edmund F. Haislmaier
Food Fight on Capitol Hill
Robert Rector
The Loneliness of the Black Conservative
Clarence Thomas
13
0 74470 65831 3
UNCLE SAMURAI
America's Military Alliance with Japan
SETH CROPSEY
T
here were no aftershocks of alarm in Tokyo when
leaders, meanwhile, should hold fast to the American
Iraq invaded Kuwait a year ago. The Japanese, who rely
military umbrella by contributing to its technological and
on Middle Eastern imports for two-thirds of their energy,
financial support as actively and greatly as possible.
figured that oil is oil, and that it would find its way to
market whether or not Kuwait was a sovereign nation.
The Scorch of the Rising Sun
The land of the rising sun lay low.
The Asian solar system has a binary star for its center.
Bush administration requests for Japan's assistance in
China, the primary sun, has the greatest mass. It and the
transporting troops to the Persian Gulf aboard chartered
smaller Japanese star revolve around one another, affect-
airplanes elicited no response from Prime Minister
ing with their combined gravitational force the move-
Toshiki Kaifu's anxious cabinet, and polite refusals from
ment and rotation of all the lesser Asian planets.
both Japan Airlines and All-Nippon Air. By early Septem-
Beginning with the last quarter of the 19th century,
ber, however, the issue could not be avoided. U.S.
Japan's pull has been so strong that it is impossible to
Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady arrived in
discuss Asian security relationships without noting how
Tokyo to ask Kaifu to provide frontline countries in the
the Japanese have altered everyone else's paths. This is
Gulf and the U.S.-led coalition with $4 billion in assis-
especially true in Asia where, owing perhaps to the
tance. Japan began to realize that the nations arrayed
unusual antiquity of its recorded events or the deep
against Saddam Hussein were watching its response to
animosity between its peoples, history is remembered in
the growing crisis very carefully.
detail and called upon routinely as a lesson for the future.
Eventually, Japan contributed $14 billion to Opera-
For its neighbors, Japan's obvious historical fact is its
tion Desert Storm, and after the war was over, it sent
aggression.
four naval vessels to the Persian Gulf to help clear mines.
Closer to Japan than any other neighbor, Korea was
Meanwhile, Japan's Asian neighbors shifted about un-
the first Asian country to encounter an aggressively hos-
comfortably at the thought of Japanese involvement
tile Japan. Intending to pass through and invade China,
once again in significant events beyond its borders. The
Hideyoshi Toyotomi, a 16th-century warlord attacked
political debate that occurred in Japan over what its role
Korea in 1592 and again five years later.
should be as a contributing member of the responsible
As the 19th century drew to a close, Japan resumed
international community continues today. As the
its active interest in Korea. Japanese policy successfully
preeminent Pacific power, as Japan's largest trading
edged out Chinese claims, and then by warfare in 1905,
partner, and as its effective military protector, there is
Russian control over the Korean Peninsula. When Japan
no nation with a keener interest in the outcome of that
decided soon after to bypass formalities and govern
debate than the United States.
Korea directly, the subjugated people rose up. Japanese
The United States and Japan have a common interest
forces put their villages to the torch and killed 12,000
in maintaining the current military partnership. From it
Koreans in a year.
Japan derives the principal source of its security, the
Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and moved quickly to
umbrella of U.S. military force deployed the western
erase Koreans' sense of their nationhood. Newspapers
Pacific. The United States, meanwhile, gets a base in
were banned, schools closed, history rewritten, and
Japan for protecting American influence in a region of
Japanese treaties substituted for Korean ones. Occasional
the world whose importance will increase with time.
demonstrations against Japanese rule, such as the peace-
America's superior, and Japan's subordinate, role in this
ful one that took place when the old Emperor Kojong
security partnership are essential to the regional and
global peace that both nations seek. As such, U.S. policy-
SETH CROPSEY, director of The Heritage Foundation's Asian
makers should resist isolationist and budget-driven pres-
Studies Center, was deputy undersecretary of the Navy from 1984
sures to diminish American influence in Asia. Japan's
to 1989.
24
Policy Review
died in 1919, were answered with club, bullet, and hand-
cuff. In Seoul, 6,000 demonstrators were killed, 15,000
wounded, and 50,000 arrested.
For the next three-and-a-half decades until the end of
World War II, Japan ruled Korea with increasing severity,
enforcing worship of the Japanese Shinto religion, en-
ding primary school instruction in the Korean language,
and forcibly assigning nearly 5.5 million laborers to help
support Japan's war effort.
"Bestial Machinery"
In late summer 1931 Japan overwhelmed Manchuria,
a province of China in which elements of the Japanese
army had been stationed since defeating the Russians in
1905. Initiating their military campaign with a manufac-
tured provocation, Japanese soldiers attacked Chinese
troops in the city of Mukden. Japan's forces in China,
known as the Kwantung Army, then conquered all of
Manchuria and several thousand square miles of neigh-
boring inner Mongolia before the year was out.
A skirmish between Chinese and Japanese forces near
Beijing in July 1937 led immediately to general warfare.
By August the fighting had reached Shanghai. In Decem-
ber the Kwantung Army advanced up the Yangtze river
valley and captured Nanjing, the Chinese capital.
Japanese military commanders were determined to
discourage military and civilian opponents alike from
any thought of resistance. They turned Nanjing into a
charnel house, killing 200,000 civilians and prisoners of
war in the first six weeks of occupation. Japanese military
authorities failed to discipline their forces who looted
and burned what could not be raped or slaughtered.
Nazi Germany's ambassador to China cabled home
describing the Japanese army as "bestial machinery."
The sharp gears of this violent instrument were
engaged again as Japan turned it upon the Philippines.
Japanese aircraft operating from bases on Formosa
struck at American military targets on Luzon within
hours of the Imperial Navy's attack on Pearl Harbor.
Library of Congress
After General MacArthur was forced to leave Corregidor
in early March 1942, Japanese occupation closed upon
Japan has been a bulwark against Soviet
the Philippines like a fist. The conquerors" policy was
aggression in the Pacific.
direct: exploit the land for resources to aid Japan's
overall war effort.
treatment. The collective effect of this memory
The Japanese military unleashed its characteristic
forecloses any possibility in the immediate future that
ruthlessness. A special unit of the Imperial Army's
Japan could peacefully assume a significant military posi-
military police known as the Kempei Tai was responsible
tion in Asia.
for upholding law and order in the immediate vicinity
of its bases. Individual accounts of those who survived
Asian Powderkeg
the Kempei Tai tell of the random shooting (and burial
Japan's enormous national wealth, unsurpassed
alive) of children, incineration of live victims' sexual
manufacturing capability, technological prowess, and
organs, beatings with baseball bats, the burning of
personal industriousness would likely produce, if har-
prisoners lashed to a rotating spit, and other forms of
nessed, an exceptionally well-organized military armed
torture that are unprintable.
to the hilt with the most advanced equipment. Yet
When Manila fell in March 1945 the Japanese naval
Japanese rearmament would cause such upheaval
defense commander, Rear Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi, gave
throughout the rest of Asia that it is almost certainly not
orders for retreat that resulted in the beheading, rape,
in Japan's own interests.
and shooting of numerous Filipinos who had thus far
Were Japan seriously to embark upon a major plan to
survived.
rebuild their national defenses today, other Asian
Japan's armed forces stalked across Asia duplicating
countries that have already been occupied in ambitious
this record. Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaya-there is
armament programs for the last decade would redouble
hardly a country in the region that escaped the harsh
their efforts. A hot market in weapons would be trans-
Fall 1991
25
Ships of the World
Japan's neighbors shifted uncomfortably as Japan sent four ships to the Persian Gulf
to clear mines after Operation Desert Storm.
formed into a furnace. The apprehension caused by a
missiles (ICBMs) and aircraft carriers, which are deemed
remilitarizing Japan would be further sharpened by the
offensive. Under this striet interpretation Japan has not,
Bush administration's continuing reductions in
until this past spring, deployed any armed forces outside
American military strength, especially its intention an-
its borders. It has forsworn the right of collective defense,
nounced in 1990 to decrease troop levels in Asia from
i.e., coming to the aid of allies under attack, and has
135,000 to 120,000 by 1993. Asia would become a pow-
steadfastly refused to export weapons-to anyone.
derkeg as Koreans, Chinese, and other Asians fear a
Japan's defense budget of $30 billion is comparable
resurgence of Japan as the region's preeminent military
to those of Britain, France, and Germany, but small
power.
relative to its GNP and its global economic importance
Tempting as the prospect of a Japan wholly respon-
and interests. It is also deliberately unassuming. Reject-
sible for its own defense is to those in the United States
ing even the slightest appearance of military ostentation,
who would slash the Defense Department or spend its
the Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) does not speak
budget on domestic priorities, it is not an option so long
of its component parts as an army, navy, and air force,
as a stable Asia that can go on creating wealth while it
choosing instead to call them the ground, maritime, and
moves toward democracy remains, as it should, the U.S.'s
air self defense forces (GSDF, MSDF, ASDF). Together
overall policy goal for the region. Nor would rearmament
they number about 249,000 active-duty troops, a little
be practical for the Japanese.
larger than the total active and reserve strength of the
Because Japan also remembers. Since its absolute
United States' smallest military service, the Marine
defeat at the end of World War II, Japan has eschewed
Corps.
arms as passionately as it once embraced them. Article
With 156,000 men, the GSDF is the largest component
Nine of Japan's constitution, enacted in November 1946,
of Japan's military. It fields one armored and 12 infantry
"forever renounce[s] war as a sovereign right of the
divisions, and would constitute the nation's final defense
nation and the threat or use of force as a means of
against a successful invasion of Japanese soil. The MSDF
settling international disputes."
and ASDF divide the other 93,000 troops equally in
Successive Japanese governments have interpreted
carrying out their defensive missions. Roughly one-third
the article to allow national possession of only those
of the ASDF's 365 combat aircraft are committed to the
weapons that are minimally necessary for self-defense.
support of ground troops, with the balance assigned to
Excluded are such weapons as intercontinental ballistic
defending Japanese airspace. The MSDF is built around
26
Policy Review
a core of surface warships and submarines. Its principal
self-effort that would have destabilized all of Asia, the
mission is to defend the sea-lanes through which Japan's
United States has gained power and influence in the
vital commercial shipping passes up to 1,000 miles from
western Pacific while deterring war with the Soviets, and
the mainland.
the world has been a safer place. The relationship has
Beyond the 1,000-mile boundary, the U.S. Seventh
been mutually-and universally-beneficial.
Fleet, which is homeported in Yokosuka, Japan, along
with its premier capital ship, the aircraft carrier USS
Still a Bear Not to Cross
Independence, assumes responsibility for patrolling the
It is extremely important to remember that while the
vast waters of the North Pacific and keeping open the
climate between the United States and the Soviet Union
sea lines of communication that link Japan with much
is more temperate now than ever, Soviet capabilities in
of the rest of the world.
the Far East have kept expanding as though this sea-
change had taken place in an undiscovered ocean. Both
Japan's Strategic Value
the intentions and capabilities of a potential opponent
Japan has benefited richly from the United States'
must be weighed when trying to peer into the future.
defensive umbrella since the end of World War II.
Intentions can change over a night or two. Capabilities
Released from the burden of acquiring a military com-
take years to develop. Since President Gorbachev as-
mensurate with their dependence on the seas for delivery
sumed power the Soviets have continued to modernize
of raw materials and export of finished goods, the
their forces in their Far Eastern theater.
Japanese have stood out among the free nations in the
Although the Defense Department expects overall
relative puniness of their defense budgets. It was, for
reductions in the number of Soviet tanks deployed in
example, only in 1987 that Japan reversed a decision
the Far Eastern theater, modern and more powerful
made 11 years earlier by Prime Minister Takeo Miki's
models such as the T-80, T-72, and upgraded T-72 will
cabinet to keep defense spending below 1 percent of
replace many of the older ones. As a result, firepower
gross national product. In terms of GNP, this is by far
will be retained. The same is true for tactical air forces.
the smallest of the 20 top defense budgets in the world.
As older planes are withdrawn, new models such as the
The yen saved may have contributed to the Japanese
Su-24 Fencer-E and MIG-29 Fulcrum will preserve com-
economy's position as the second largest in the world.
bat capabilities. The addition of some newer aircraft, like
But the use of Japan as an American base roughly 200
the Su-27 Flanker will provide Soviet commanders with
miles off the eastern coast of the Soviet Union has been
a long-range escort role that will actually increase the
of incalculable strategic value to the United States
threat to Japan and the U.S. forces based there.
throughout the Cold War, and is certain to remain so
Similarly, the fighting capability of Soviet Pacific Fleet
unless some great event divides the two nations.
surface forces is expected to grow significantly
Since 1905, when the Russians were defeated in their
throughout the 1990s. The Defense Department es-
war with Japan, Moscow has been unable to turn its
timates that surface-to-surface missile capacity aboard
complete attention to Europe, serene in the knowledge
Soviet warships will increase by 100 percent, surface-to-air
that its easternmost Asian approaches were secure. Over
the years, Kremlin rulers may also have recalled that the
Japanese troops who landed at Vladivostok in December
1917 were the first of many sent by foreign powers to
Japanese rearmament would
crush the Bolshevik Revolution. Japan did not act out of
a fear of Communism; the chance to seize territory at
cause such upheaval
fire-sale prices was simply irresistible.
As tensions grew with China in the 1950s, Soviet
throughout the rest of Asia
anxiety heightened. By the 1980s the very low-technology
threat of mainland China's People's Liberation Army
that it is almost certainly not
(PLA) had tied up as many as 50 Soviet divisions at a
time in Asia.
in Japan's own interests.
Qualitatively superior to that of the PLA, the U.S.
presence in Japan has had a similar effect on Moscow.
To keep the Soviets from concentrating their attention
on Europe and to hold before them the daunting
missiles by 50 percent, and the number of ships with
prospect of a two-front war, the United States could not
long-range anti-submarine warfare weapons by 40 per-
have asked for a more favorable position than that
cent. With the addition of the ability to project power
offered by the main Japanese islands. They sit con-
ashore to this swelling armada, the Soviet Pacific Fleet is
veniently across the Sea of Japan from Vladivostok,
predicted to increase its capacity to transport amphibious
which is the eastern terminus of the Trans-Siberian
troops from the current level of 50 percent of the naval
Railway, the Soviets' chief warm water port, and the
infantry (marines) assigned to the fleet, to 80 percent
logistical center of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern theater
by the year 2000.
of military operations. The presence of major U.S. armed
Still, there have been cutbacks in the Soviets' Asia-
forces at the USSR's back door speaks to the Kremlin in
based ground forces. Symbolic ones were announced in
a clear and powerful language that needs no translation.
April 1991 when President Gorbachev visited Tokyo and
Japan's security thus has been assured without the
declared his intention to reduce the military division
Fall 1991
27
based on the contested Kurile Islands by one-third. The
Japanese nationals employed on U.S. bases grew by 176
rest of the 325,000 troops in the Far Eastern theater,
percent. Japan's level of support is today far greater than
according to Soviet figures, who are focused on Japan
that of any other nation that is host to U.S. armed forces.
and U.S. forces in Asia, remain where they were.
By 1995 Japan has promised to pay 73 percent of the
The real reductions in the Soviets' Asian forces have
total cost of the U.S. military presence on Japanese soil,
come from their army divisions facing China from which,
minus the salaries of U.S. armed forces personnel and
since 1988, nearly 120,000 troops have been withdrawn.
civilian Defense Department employees.
Leaving aside speculation about what opportunities Beij-
Japan has also increased active defense cooperation
ing thinks the Soviet withdrawal may have unearthed for
with the United States. In 1983 at the request of the
them, practical-minded Japanese are wise to note, as one
Reagan administration, Prime Minister Yasuhiro
defense expert did this past June, that "If the Soviets say
Nakasone's government reexamined Japan's Three Prin-
their Far Eastern forces are not focused on the Chinese,
ciples on Arms Export, which, since their declaration in
then there are only the Japanese and the U.S. left."
1967, had effectively prevented the sale abroad of any
Signs that Moscow's interest in Japan and the Far East
equipment remotely connected with military technology.
is not restricted to the old regime were plain last spring.
Nakasone waived the rules exclusively for the United
Mikhail Gorbachev's rival, Russian Republic President
States, allowing transfer of military technologies for naval
Boris Yeltsin, and no friend of the Soviet Imperium,
and selected surface-to-air missile application.
effectively claimed the Kurile Islands as Russian territory.
Other gauges record similar progress. Among all na-
On the eve of Gorbachev's historic trip to Japan, Yeltsin
tions, Japan is second only to Turkey in the amount by
warned him not to cut any deal with the Japanese without
which its government increased total defense spending
first obtaining the Russian Republic's approval.
during the 1970s and '80s. From 1971 to 1989 Japan's
Japanese defense officials are appropriately wary. In
defense budget grew by 165 percent (the United States
their 1991 annual White Paper, Japan's Defense Agency
by comparison increased its defense spending during the
called the situation in the Soviet Union "still unpre-
same period by 20.5 percent).
dictable and untransparent." Their skepticism is justified
both by the Soviets' continued arms buildup in the Far
Undesired Guest
East, and by their response to the Conventional Forces
Kokusai-koken is shorthand for Japan's still-to-be-
in Europe (CFE) agreement Moscow signed with
defined contribution to the emerging world order. The
Washington last November. Required to decrease force
Gulf War helped concentrate the attention of Japanese
levels in Europe, the Soviets simply transported an enor-
leaders on the question. American policy-makers should
mous quantity of weapons east of the Ural mountains.
anticipate and debate the issue seeking to guide its
Those weapons can be shipped further east.
resolution.
For the United States the first principle is to maintain
Providing for Common Defense
American influence in the western Pacific and Asia. The
In fact, Japan's appreciation of the Soviet threat has
forward-based units of the American military are essen-
long been sound. It is reflected not only by the efforts
tial for U.S. leverage, and the bases Japan provides and
mentioned above at self-defense, and the gradually ac-
helps to provision are still central to America's military
presence in the region. So long as Moscow retains power-
ful armed forces capable of seriously threatening vital
U.S. interests around the world, American sailors,
Japan's defense budget of $30
marines, soldiers, and pilots should remain in Japan as
a strategic reminder to Kremlin leaders of their vul-
billion is comparable to those
nerability to a second front. Moreover, the Soviets are
still modernizing their military capabilities in the Far
of Britain, France, and
East. U.S. forces in Japan offer the strongest bulwark in
the region against that éxpanding threat.
Germany, but small relative to
The second reason for preserving the U.S. defense
relationship with Tokyo is economic. Japan is the heart
GNP.
of the Asian market that holds the fastest-growing and
most dynamic economies in the world, and to which the
center of international trade is shifting from the North
Atlantic. As America's commerce with Asia grows, so does
celerating percentage of GNP Japanese leaders have
its interest in Asian stability. U.S. forces based in Japan
devoted to the military budget, but by Tokyo's record of
assure that stability, first by protecting Japan, and second,
growing financial support over the years for U.S. troops
by saving Tokyo the military exertions that would agitate
based in Japan, and by several other important but
other nations in the region. The rotating presence of
generally unknown facts.
the Yokosuka-based Seventh Fleet throughout Asia offers
Between 1985 and 1989, and under steady diplomatic
genuine hope for that quarter of the world's continued
pressure, Japanese payments for facilities and equipment
prosperity and its eventual progress toward democracy.
on U.S. bases rose by 45 percent. During the same period
The foundation on which U.S. military presence in
Tokyo's annual payments for items such as water,
Japan rests is sound. Both nations benefit greatly. The
electricity, construction, and a part of the salaries of
fact that Japan now recognizes the need to increase its
28
Policy Review
participation in shaping international events dovetails
with American popular opinion that Japan should as-
sume an even greater share of responsibility for its own
defense. It should not be regarded as the first step in a
reverse march of history.
Today, Japanese energies are absorbed commercially.
Japan's military occupies a place in society much like the
presence at a rich banquet of an unimportant and vague-
ly undesired guest. Recruiting is difficult. This year one-
fifth of the National Defense Academy's graduating class
turned down commissions, largely to accept more lucra-
tive offers in business. Prestige is low; it was only after
Noburu Takeshita became prime minister in November
1987 that military officers were once again allowed to
wear their uniforms in the chief of government's office.
And, the military's voice within the government carries
little weight. In fact they are répresented by the Finance
Ministry, and have no direct control over budget
decisions.
In short, while the chance, of a relapse into the war-
rior-dominated society that precipitated Japan's behavior
Newsphotos
in the decades before and during World War II cannot
be dismissed, signs of it are scant. Kokusai-koken should
be welcomed by the United States as an opportunity to
encourage Tokyo to expand its contribution to our
mutual security.
Getting Japan to See It That Way
Aircraft carrier USS Enterprise off Okinawa. Japanese
That will require persuasion. In a recent poll of
bases are central to America's military presence in Asia.
Japanese corporate leaders, 75 percent believed that the
Gulf War forced Japan to consider the extent of its
much, and perhaps more, from the U.S. ability to protect
cooperation with the United Nations. Only 35 percent
international order. For the United States, though, with
thought that the issue raised had been the nature of the
Soviet aggressiveness in remission, Moscow is more likely
U.S.-Japan relationship. Japanese politicians and intel-
to pose a regional than a global threat. The emphasis
lectuals have reacted similarly. Those who favor a more
on Japan's strategic value has shifted from the
active role in the world have focused on measures such
geographic to a mixture of technological and economic.
as mediating Third World disputes, using foreign aid as
Japan's technology with military application, its in-
a more effective lever to advance peace, and stepping up
dustrial prowess, and its wealth will become the chief
participation in internationally sanctioned peace-keep-
benefits to the United States of our mutual security
ing operations.
relationship.
These initiatives can be useful, but they are bound to
That shift alters slightly the balance of the security
have a marginal effect on immediate dangers to peace:
relationship between the two nations, giving a United
rulers such as Saddam Hussein or North Korea's Kim Il
States relieved of having to cope with the Soviets' most
Sung. Nor can such economic or diplomatic measures
troublesome aggressiveness a slight edge over a Japan
protect Japan from the fallout of more distant interna-
that must still face the localized reality of Moscow's
tional explosions: a possible cataclysmic splintering of
well-armed forces. As much as Washington would like to
the Soviet Union, major civil unrest in China, atomic
draw upon Tokyo's know-how and wealth, Japan has a
exchanges in the sub-continent or the Middle East, or
more urgent requirement for America's defensive
nuclear blackmail as powerful weapons and the means
umbrella.
to deliver them proliferate.
U.S. policy-makers should remember that fact as
As a great commercial power, Japan has to prevent
debate over the future of the U.S.-Japan security
the turmoil in marketplaces and unavoidable disruption
relationship takes shape. The leverage it offers should
in seagoing commerce that such upheavals would cause.
not be wielded to threaten Japan with termination of
Japan's clearest foreign policy interest is in continued
U.S. defensive protection, but rather to build upon and
international stability. The most dependable guarantor
strengthen the framework of the relationship that al-
of that equilibrium is U.S. willingness to lead other
ready exists between the two nations.
nations in coalition efforts like Desert Storm or, if neces-
sary, to act by itself. And that fact links the former basis
Greater Burden-Sharing
of the U.S.-Japan security relationship with its future.
One part of that structure that has already been
Where the foundation of the relationship was once
improved almost as much as possible is Japan's direct
the common need to guard against potential Soviet
financial support for U.S. forces based on its soil. Here
aggression, Japan in the future stands to gain just as
and there a significant U.S. expense can still be identified
Fall 1991
29
UPI/Bettmann
Fifty years after Pearl Harbor, the United States and Japan are close friends with common defense interests.
that the Japanese could reasonably be expected to pay.
Seventh Fleet aircraft carrier battle groups. Because it is
One such example is the 5.3 million barrels of ship fuel
likelier to produce results ,quickly, the Bush administra-
the Seventh Fleet burned last year and which cost
tion should step up its efforts quietly to persuade
American taxpayers roughly $200 million.
Japanese politicians to pass legislation that would allow
The Japanese should divide that bill equally with the
the SDF to conduct joint operations with the United
United States. But the list of military expenses Tokyo
States.
does not share with the United States is finite, and close
A far more profitable area for cooperation, however,
to exhaustion. It cannot be lengthened without changing
and one in which there are tremendous possibilities for
fundamentally the idea of burden-sharing, and that
growth is technology. The Japanese government's 1983
would have a negative effect. For the foreseeable future,
decision to allow the export of military technology to the
the current of Japanese pacifism will run strong, not
United States creates the potential for increased
dictating the country's foreign and defense policies, but
availability of leading-edge technologies, significantly
certainly influencing them. Any agreement Japan could
reduced production costs, and substantial decreases in
make to recompense the United States for defense costs
the long intervals the-Pentagon routinely experiences
beyond those that clearly apply to Japan would inevitably
between the completion of research and development
foul and probably diminish the defense relationship
for weapons systems and their actual production.
between the two nations.
There are today three committees, staffed by
A small yet fertile and untilled field that offers more
American and Japanese officials, that are working to
opportunities for Japan to increase its level of support is
reach agreements on the transfer of advanced Japanese
in operations alongside the U.S. military. To note a
military technologies to the United States, and another
couple of examples, Japanese naval supply ships could
two that would move selected U.S. technologies in the
help reprovision U.S. naval vessels, and Japanese com-
opposite direction. Gaining access to Japanese excel-
mand-and-control aircraft could work together with
lence in technology that greatly improves a missile's
30
Policy Review
ability to locate and destroy its target, in certain areas of
the human building blocks of a massive technological
magnetic field research, and for ceramics used to
project like SDI, abound in Japanese society. Their
strengthen and lighten internal combustion engines are
talents have already been indicated by the award of
the U.S. objectives in these discussions. In their dealings
contracts let by the U.S. Defense Department's Strategic
with Japanese officials, the Defense Department should
Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) to Japanese cor-
elevate the importance of reaching timely agreements
porations in areas such as superconductivity and mag-
that produce meaningful, tangible results.
netic field technology. And, of course, Japan has the
wealth to shoulder a large portion of this burden.
SDI Cooperation
Persuading-Japan that it has the interest to do so
The United States should expand considerably the
should be the object of the Bush administration. Easing
scope of this effort so that the éntire spectrum of Japan's
that task is the suitability of SDI, a defensive weapon, to
applicable manufacturing industry is brought to bear in
Japan's constitutional limitations, its experienced aver-
support of the armed forces that protect both nations.
sion to nuclear attack, and its nearly total vulnerability
Japanese commercial successes in micro-processing,
to the ballistic missile-borne weapons of mass destruction
electro-optics, and advanced steel technologies, to name
a few, can and should be harnessed to serve the interests
of both nations by improving. the combat capabilities of
the U.S. military.
SDI cooperation is suitable
More to the point, the United States should con-
solidate in one office of the Department of Defense
for Japan's constitutional
responsibility for all government efforts to identify and
then negotiate with Japan to obtain technologies that
limitations and its
could substantially improve U.S. combat capabilities.
Right now that effort is diffuse. In the Defense Depart-
vulnerability to nuclear attack.
ment, for example, officials of the Defense Security
Assistance Agency, the Defense Technology Security Ad-
ministration, and in the undersecretary for Acquisition's
office are all involved. At the Departments of State and
Commerce efforts are also underway to draw upon
that will before long find their way into more and more
Japan's technological skills. The issue is important today
hands.
and will surely grow enough in the future to deserve the
Complicating the task of convincing the Japanese will
concentrated energies of the arm of government respon-
be their urge to turn to the checkbook when threatened.
sible for defense.
Tokyo's recent discussions with the North Koreans over
Finally, and most important, Japan's industry and
possible reparations from World War II are a good
wealth should become a primary engine in the effort to
example. They come at a time when Pyongyang is
build an effective space-based defense against ballistic
probably trying to complete plans for the production of
missiles. Then-Prime Minister Nakasone laid the
nuclear weapons. A fundamental issue in the U.S.-Japan
groundwork for such cooperation with his 1986 agree-
security relationship's future is not whether Japan will
ment to participate in SDI research. Fleshing it out to
remilitarize, but whether it chooses to become an active,
produce real, practical results should be accomplished
influential participant in shaping world events. Can this
as soon as feasible.
powerful ally resist the temptation to employ the wealth
Japan's ability to play a major role in the development
that is the source of its power to solicit neutral nations
and production of SDI is plain. The research laboratories
and placate hostile ones? The United States must agree
of the nation's great manufacturing corporations labor
upon the means, and then persuade Japan to employ
smoothly and efficiently alongside the production
them in demonstrating its confidence that working
facilities they support. Both respond speedily to decisions
together with friends is the straightest path to mutual
taken by the central government in Tokyo. Engineers,
security.
Fall 1991
31