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3
INTERNATIONAL
message to the Czechs and East Germans:
ecker's removal. A senior West German
cial. "If that begins to shift, you can as-
Moscow wanted the refugee problem re-
diplomat said the East German leader
sume the fix is in."
solved before Gorbachev arrived in East
could be gone from office "in a matter of
It was doubtful, however, whether a suc-
Berlin-and, Shevardnadze stressed, the
weeks" through the combined pressure of
cessor would be any improvement. Mos-
Soviets wanted it resolved "with or without
Moscow, Bonn and the East German pub-
cow would clearly prefer a committed
the GDR's approval." Knowing the Czechs
lic. That is probably premature. Next
reformer such as Hans Modrow, the
had no choice but to abide by Moscow's
spring, however, the regime will hold a
hugely popular Dresden party chief who
wishes, the Honecker government gave the
critical Communist Party congress. "Up
openly advocates the overhaul of East
emigration its sullen blessing.
until now, every public and private
Germany's political and economic institu-
Some Western analysts speculated that
signal has been that there won't be any
tions. It was more likely, though,
Gorbachev might lobby privately for Hon-
changes in authority," said one U.S. offi-
that any successor would be drawn from
How Kissinger Sees It
As East-bloc unity disinte-
ropeans, but everybody has
grates, the future of the two
to recognize that we have a
Germanys gains new impor-
special mission in the East.
tance. Former secretary of
Where have they proved their
state Henry Kissinger met
special vocation in Eastern
with NEWSWEEK editors last
Europe other than in the mili-
week to discuss "the German
tary field? To speak of a
question.' Excerpts:
German special historical re-
lationship: in Poland is absurd.
W
e are watching a political
West German industrial-
process in Europe in
ists want to use Eastern Eu-
which the Soviets are losing
rope for low-cost manufactur-
political control in Eastern
ing of German technology.
Europe, while NATO's mili-
They're putting a lot of money
tary position progressively
into some of these countries.
weakens in Western Europe. I
What happens when the Sovi-
consider what's going on now
ets wake up and find that they
to be the lull before some
have lost Eastern Europe eco-
DPA-PHOTOREPORTERS
storm. The problem in East-
nomically to the Germans,
ern Europe is a disintegration
and that East Germany is
A disintegrating empire: Calling for reform in East Germany
of the concepts of the satellite
blowing up. Is it likely they
empire. The communist par-
will acquiesce to losing their
ties, to the extent that they
Eastern European empire to
Events in the East will pro-
saw Pact? Should we try to get
become national parties and
the Germans? can't conceive
duce a situation where the
them out? Or should we en-
participate in the electoral
that. The internal disintegra-
United States has to take a
courage them to stay?
process, must adopt an atti-
tion could have reached a
position. The only question is
It must be in the Soviet in-
tude independent of Moscow
point where they will accept
whether we do it ad hoc, react-
terest not to be the permanent
because it's the only way they
it, but I wouldn't want to base
ing to each crisis as it devel-
policeman of Eastern Europe,
can legitimize themselves. In
American policy on that prop-
ops. Or whether we say that
thereby jeopardizing a relax-
Poland and Hungary the com-
osition. What if the Soviets de-
we're in a new period, howev-
ation with the West. We have
munist parties may believe
cide to demonstrate their
er we got there. That new
to find a way to give the Sovi-
that by calling themselves so-
power in Central Europe, per-
period requires the follow-
ets assurances of security
cial democrats they will save
haps in Berlin?
ing concepts: the bipolar ap-
within their 1941 borders,
national communism. But
We have to come up with a
proach will no longer work.
and convince them that it is
this can't work in East Ger-
political concept for the
Therefore, we have to see how
in their interest to get out
many, because there you can-
future of Europe, or we will
to manage trends in a manner
of physical control of East-
not be a national communist;
be endlessly whipsawed be-
that does not leave us at the
ern Europe-which, however,
as a nationalist you have to be
tween accelerating unilateral
end with a Europe less stable
can be turned into a zone to
for unification.
disarmament in NATO and
than the one we've known be-
make military attack against
The basic dilemma of the
the political disintegration of
fore. You already see in the
them impossible. We need a
West Germans is that they're
Central Europe. The art of
Balkans that all the old quar-
concept for Germany, for the
emotionally cut loose from
foreign policy is to under-
rels are coming up again. You
evolution of Eastern Europe
some of their Western moor-
stand trends and to manage
can visualize the German-
and for defense in a new politi-
ings. It is a standard phrase of
them. I would have preferred
Slav problems will be there
cal environment. We've got-
West German politics now
a more orthodox evolution.
again. You'll be back to tradi-
ten ourselves obsessed in the
that Germany has a special
I would have preferred to
tional European politics with-
West. We were SO militarized
vocation in the East. They
maintain the present mili-
out a concept and without the
in our thinking that we're
keep saying: we're good allies,
tary structures and a gradual
forces to handle them. What
now militarized in our diplo-
we're reliable members of
easing of tensions within
do we do if one of these coun-
macy-on both sides. And we
NATO, we are dedicated Eu-
them. But a trend exists.
tries decides to leave the War-
have to get away from that.
NEWSWEEK: OCTOBER 16, 1989 45
INTERNATIONAL
the ranks of East Germany's Stalinists,
understand why people are unsatisfied."
ment official, "who knows where Gorba-
men such as 52-year-old Egon Krenz, who
With the closing of the Czech border,
chev's visit could lead? Will he urge them
emerged as heir apparent while Honecker
East Germany exposed itself as a country
to liberalize? Will he urge Honecker to
was reported close to death following
that can no longer compete for its citizens'
leave office? Will the population respond
gallbladder surgery over the summer.
allegiance. Instead, said Dorothee Wilms,
so overwhelmingly that it risks another
Currently the head of the security police,
West German minister for intra-German
Tiananmen Square?" After admitting its
Krenz is favored by party hard-liners who
relations, "The GDR [is] more than ever
political illegitimacy, East Germany can
are seeking to hold back the tide of reform.
a state built on walls." East Germans'
either reform, repress or explode.
"These are old men, immobile, petrified,
increasingly panicky claustrophobia is
HARRY ANDERSON with MICHAEL MEYER
unable to cope with changing times,"
threatening to get out of hand. "In those
and KAREN BRESLAU in East Berlin,
MARGARET GARRARD WARNER in Washington
said one official in Bonn. "They do not
circumstances," said a U.S. State Depart-
and bureau reports
Behind the Masks of Eastern Europe
20 years socialism was de-
prived of the moral side. All
was apathy and depression, a
In Eastern Europe last
hopelessness prevailed. But
week, NEWSWEEK Executive
over the last year we can see
Editor Stephen Smith and
remarkable change. First, a
Bonn bureau chief Michael
new generation has grown up
Meyer spoke with leading poli-
that did not go through the
ticians and activists about the
trauma of 1968. Second, de-
pace of change in their coun-
velopments in Hungary and
tries. Excerpts:
Poland are stimulating our
society. Third, the current
Mieczyslaw Rakowski, Polish
policy of our leadership is
Communist Party chief: The polit-
growing sterile. The leader-
ical situation is not stable. A
ship is tired and growing old.
new balance is emerging. The
It's becoming petrified.
Communist Party is seeking
A dictatorship in crisis typi-
an identity, as is Solidar-
cally makes contradictory
ity. As for reforms, there are
moves. I can imagine a situa-
no barriers, theoretically. In
tion that one day my play will
practice, you have to ask how
BISSON-SYGMA
SHEPARD SHERBEL-SABA
'The challenge is to change people's mind-set': Rakowski, Pozsgay
open in Prague, and the next
much people are willing to see
day I'll be in prison. This may
a decline in their living stand-
seem implausible, but at the
ards. In my opinion, Polish so-
moment of crisis, when power
ciety is not prepared to make
Europe. There is no political
Dictatorial socialism will dis-
is shaken, anything can hap-
sacrifices of this kind. You
or even geographical unity.
appear. We must create a con-
pen. For 20 years the commu-
have this horrible contradic-
What you call the East bloc is
stitutional state ruled by
nists exploited the future.
tion: you need radical moves
an artificial linkage, a hybrid
law. The goal should be a par-
Now come the results of this
but you have the resistance of
imposed after Yalta. The cri-
liamentary government free-
very dangerous policy. With-
the people.
sis of Europe lies in its di-
ly elected from among com-
in eight to 10 years, [we] will
The real challenge is
vision. Protracted problems
peting parties. If defeated, the
be like Poland-$40 billion in
to change people's mind-set.
here will lead to protracted
party will transfer power as in
debt and no basic foodstuffs.
Poles would like to work in
problems in Western Europe
any democracy. Hungary is
We keep telling the regime
socialism but live in capital-
as well. We have an unprece-
not an oligarchy: we should be
that it is not necessary to wait
ism. We like the demands on
dented opportunity for creat-
able to change our leaders at
until the bitter end before
us to be low. Most Poles are
ing a united Europe. It's not a
any time.
starting a social dialogue. A
attached to the peaceful life.
matter of money. We want ac-
lot of suffering could be
The greatest barrier to re-
cess to Western technology, to
Milos Jakes, Czechoslovak Com-
prevented.
form lies in people's psycholo-
economic innovation and for-
munist Party leader: Restructur-
But do not forget, in a totali-
gy, what I call the "awareness
eign investment. We want en-
ing] certainly does not mean
tarian system we can observe
barrier." Changing this is not
trepreneurs who can teach us
edging away from the ideals of
an interesting phenomenon.
a matter of a year or five
management skills as well.
socialism
We keep a close
People in power will speak out
years; it will take a genera-
We have seen no sign that
eye on those developments [in
only when the time is ripe.
tion. As it is, the system has
Moscow wants to pull us back.
Hungary and Poland], which
Our leaders all wear a uni-
demoralized people. I may be
To the contrary, Gorbachev's
in many respects give us con-
form mask and declare iden-
wrong, but after the first radi-
perestroika is a wind at our
cern, and draw the necessary
tical phrases. Perhaps at a
cal steps, and the subsequent
back. Hungary has reached a
lessons-forexample, that the
moment of history, the masks
social reaction, the new gov-
point where there is no go-
party as the leading force in
will fall, and it is only at that
ernment will retreat.
ing back.
society must not lose control
moment that we know who is
The Hungary of the future
over the situation.
who. It is possible then that
Imre Pozsgay, Hungarian Politbu-
will be similar to West Euro-
we may be surprised to find
ro member and a leading reformer:
pean social democracies. The
Vaclav Havel, Czechoslovak play-
that the masks concealed an
A crisis prevails in Eastern
party state will cease to exist.
wright and political activist: For
intelligent face.
46 NEWSWEEK OCTOBER 16, 1989
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL TUESDAY, APRIL 14, 1987
NATO Edges Toward
the Moment of Truth
By IRVING KRISTOL
The trouble with cleverness in foreign
Board of Contributors
policy is that one is likely to end up being
too clever by half. This is the situation in
which America's European allies now find
Politicians who are loath to advocate the withdrawal of
themselves.
For many years now, they have been pi-
U.S. troops from Europe for reasons of policy are beginning
ously and disingenuously stressing the im-
portance of arms-control negotiations as
to look with favor on the idea for budgetary reasons.
one alternative to an expensive and politi-
cally unpopular buildup of the North Atlan-
Soviet aggression-even if it is nonnuclear
ous reasons-is that any such nuclear ex-
tic Treaty Organization's conventional mil-
aggression that is involved. This commit-
change would primarily involve the two su-
ment was made at a time when the nations
perpowers, with the missiles flying over
itary forces. They have even felt free to
of Western Europe were economically and
West European heads, as it were. But with
criticize the U.S. for dragging its feet on
this issue. Now, however, they are dis-
militarily weak. It was also made at a
or without American troops in Europe, this
time when the U.S. had a clear nuclear su-
is an unlikely scenario, since neither the
mayed at the public revelation that the al-
ternative was always a false one. The
periority over the Soviet Union. This is no
Soviet Union nor the U.S. is really inter-
price of a successful arms-control agree-
longer the case, to put it mildly, and many
ested in committing national suicide in a
ment is larger military budgets, not
analysts have been saying-some candidly,
conflict over Western Europe, dearly. as
some sotto voce-that NATO should begin
they may cherish that portion of the
smaller ones.
to recognize that the American "nuclear
globe.
Shifting the Focus
umbrella" is more fictitious than real.
This does not mean that the U.S. will
As the prospect of an agreement be-
On the surface, their arguments seem
simply "decouple" itself from Western Eu-
tween the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on inter-
to have had little effect. The State Depart-
rope. It cannot and should not. Since the
mediate-range nuclear missiles grows
ment and the Pentagon are resolutely dedi-
costs of a West European conventional de-
brighter, Western European nations have
cated to the status quo. U.S. politicians are
fense will be high-nuclear weapons are
been nervously shifting the focus to the So-
fearful of disrupting an alliance that has
attractive precisely because they are SO
viet's short-range missiles. They have also
"kept the peace" in Europe for more than
relatively cheap-the U.S. should be (and
indicated clearly that if an agreement on
four decades. And public-opinion polls
surely will be) ready to help, with sophisti-
this matter is negotiated-which is by no
show widespread and habitual public ac-
cated weaponry, with its Navy and Air
means out of the question-then the focus
ceptance of NATO. True, these polls never
Force, even with some troops where neces-
will shift to a negotiated reduction of So-
ask, "Are you in favor of the U.S. engaging
sary and feasible. But Europe will have to
viet conventional superiority.
in mutual nuclear annihilation with the So-
become more self-reliant if "containment"
But they know beforehand that this is a
viet Union in order to preserve the integ-
of the Soviets is to be successft.
nonstarter. The negotiations on conven-
Political Will
rity of Western Europe?" This question is
tional forces have been going on for 15
never raised in public discourse, lest the
This possibility tends to be dismissed
years now in Geneva, and there has not
answer be disconcerting.
much too casually. Yes, the Soviets now
even been agreement on an agenda. The
Beneath this surface of seemingly solid
have 27,000 tanks vs. NATO's 14,000. But
Soviets are not simply going to negotiate
commitment, however, a subtle and impor-
the nations of Western Europe know how to
away their superiority vis-a-vis NATO on
tant change is taking place. Politicians
build tanks-very good ones, actually-and
this level. They see themselves as a world
who are loath publicly to advocate the
have the resources to do so. They also
power, not a middling power, which is
withdrawal of American troops from Eu-
have the human resources to man them.
what America's NATO allies are resigned
rope-the supposed guarantor of that nu-
Especially with American assistance, they
to being. The Soviets' conception of an
clear umbrella-for reasons of foreign pol-
should be able to close much of this gap, if
ideal military "balance" is one in which
icy are beginning to look with favor on
not all of it. And what is true for tanks is
their conventional forces are equal to those
the idea for budgetary reasons. More and
no less true for airplanes. The key question
of Western Europe plus those of the U.S. If
more one hears invidious comments about
is: Do they have the political will to move
this ideal is to be frustrated, it will not be
the level of European military expendi-
in this direction?
by negotiation but by a very substantial in-
tures as compared with that of the U.S.
The State Department and the Pentagon
crease in NATO's conventional military
And more and more one hears rough calcu-
are convinced that they do not-that the
power-substantial enough so that the So-
lations of how much the deficit would be
political will for such self-reliance is non-
viets would be hard put to match the pace.
reduced if NATO were more 'European,"
existent. This is why they prohibit, in ef-
Any such buildup, however, is what our
fect, any speculation about the future of
NATO partners wish so desperately, for in-
less American. This is not the most sensi-
NATO. Nevertheless, that future is now an
ternal political reasons, to avoid.
ble reason for rethinking NATO, but wel-
open question. It will be up to the Euro-
So a rift is developing within NATO on
fare-state politics within the U.S. are not
peans to prove the State Department and
arms control, and ironically it is now West-
all that different from welfare-state poli-
the Pentagon wrong.
ern Europe that is trying to repudiate its
tics in Britain or West Germany.
What it comes down to is that the very
Mr. Kristol is the John M. Olin profes-
past rhetoric. It is indeed a surprise that
the rift should be developing on this issue,
idea of NATO is now edging into incoher-
sor of social thought at the NYU Graduate
School of Business and a senior fellow of
in this way-as a result of Soviet accom-
ence, and the status quo is becoming more
modation rather than Soviet intimidation.
and more anachronistic. The defense of
the American Enterprise Institute.
But it ought not surprise anyone that there
Western Europe at the conventional level
is a rift. The present structure of NATO is
will be, in the future, primarily a Euro-
such that rifts are bound to emerge, and to
pean responsibility. The British and
become ever more serious with each pass-
French nuclear forces will have to become
ing year.
the nuclear deterrent for all of Western
The keystone of NATO is the American
Europe. It will be a deterrent against So-
commitment to defend Western Europe,
viet nuclear aggression-as it already has
with nuclear weapons if necessary, against
been in fact, as distinct from theory.
It is preposterous to believe, as official
NATO theory prescribes, that the govern-
ments of Western Europe would ever re-
sort to a first-use of nuclear weapons
against conventional Soviet aggression,
therewith ensuring their own annihilation.
The European dream-unstated, for obvi-
lation
TIME/MARCH 5, 1990
The playwright-President's stirring remarks brought down the House-and the Senate. Some lawmakers were moved to tears
The Revolution
Has Just Begun
In 59 days that shook the world, dissident playwright
"
Twice in this century the world has
been threatened by a catastrophe.
Vaclav Havel was swept out of political detention into the
Twice this catastrophe was born in
Europe, and twice you Americans, along
presidency of Czechoslovakia. Last week Havel delivered to
with others, were called upon to save Eu-
a joint meeting of Congress an extraordinary speech about
rope, the whole world and yourselves.
In the meantime, the U.S. became the
democratic ideals, the rebirth of the human spirit and
most powerful nation on earth, and it un-
derstood the responsibility that flowed
America's role in the post-cold war era.
from this. But something else was happen-
14
There are two plywood circles showing
where gun turrets were taken out to save
The health of nations-II
weight when hauling the 9,600-lb. Little
Boy atom bomb. Back in the bomb bay
work is going on to reconstruct the single
hook used to suspend and release the
bomb. A normal double hook for bombs
Whose lunch are
was abandoned by the mission planners,
who feared, if one malfunctioned, the
armed bomb might dangle in the rack like
we consuming?
hell on a tether. You remember the day 44
years ago on a college campus when the
A nation-especially a nation in a leadership role-is only as strong as its
news came of the Enola Gay's successful
economy. America has been a world leader since World War II because it could
drop and the public dawning of the nuclear
afford to be. But even as sweeping changes in Eastern Europe and elsewhere
age, how you sat up most of the summer
make the world a different place, the American economy is changing as well,
night talking and wondering.
and not necessarily for the better. These changes raise the question of whether
The Garber Facility is named for a di-
America can remain at center stage as the daily drama of history continues
to unfold.
minutive 90-year-old man who still goes to
work every day as historian emeritus of the
The worldwide political landscape, once so clearly divided by figurative
curtains and literal walls, is a blurry place today, and nobody has issued new
Smithsonian Institution and has done
road maps. At the same time, the nation faces a daunting array of economic
more than any other person to preserve the
problems: An intractable budget deficit, an equally stubborn trade deficit, a
record of the nation's great venture into
tendency to consume rather than to save and invest, and a growing reliance
flight. Paul E. Garber was born just as the
on foreign money to finance our debt. These domestic woes carry over into
Wright brothers began to inquire about fly-
today's international marketplace; American companies are hard-pressed to
ing machines. When Garber was five, his
compete, and cries are raised that "they"-our international competitors-are
uncle gave him a kite, and his fascination
eating our lunch.
with the sky was fixed for a long lifetime.
But it shouldn't matter who sits down to dine if the meal is large enough
to feed everybody. The real challenge for America is to keep the economy
growing-not only for the sake of our international commitments, but also
A
t nine, Garber read in the evening Star
to raise the living standards of our population. And that means shifting the
about an airplane demonstration. He
emphasis from consumption to investment. Today's investments, after all,
mooched 50c from his father and hopped
provide the means for tomorrow's higher standard of living in an increasingly
the Washington trolley to Arlington Na-
competitive world.
tional Cemetery. When he stepped down,
The key to economic expansion remains the translation of savings into new
he heard a strange sound, looked up and
plants and equipment, research and development, and a better-trained, more
saw Orville Wright steer his Military Flyer
sophisticated work force. People are crucial-people working better and
above him with Lieut. Frank Lahm, one of
smarter, not necessarily harder.
the first military pilots, at his side. Garber
But America has a long-standing penchant for saving less than its foreign
competitors. Japan and West Germany, to name just two, have a tradition of
ran up the hill to Fort Myer, where Presi-
saving and investing at high levels, and this tradition is continuing into the
dent William Howard Taft was witnessing
present. Just one measure of this phenomenon, admittedly an imperfect one: In
the birth of American air power. Years lat-
1988, Americans saved 4.4 percent of their disposable household income; the
er, Garber, by then a friend of the Wright
Japanese saved 15.2 percent and the West Germans 12.6 percent.
brothers, acquired both their original plane
As if a low savings rate weren't bad enough, the federal deficit makes it
and the Military Flyer for the Smithsonian.
worse. A lot of what Americans do save goes to finance Uncle Sam's massive
Garber learned to fly one of the legend-
debt. Foreign money is another prime way we finance our excessive consump-
ary Curtiss Jennys just after World War I.
tion, including the government's.
In the final analysis, the budget deficit has to fall sharply if America is to
But he got so wrapped up in the evolution
remain a world leader. But in the fiscal year ended last September 30, the
of the planes and preserving them that he
deficit was $152 billion, a mere $3 billion less than in fiscal '88, and this after a
never pursued a flying career. In all likeli-
great deal of highly publicized number-juggling. America's accumulated debt at
hood, he is the only man alive who has lived
that point was some $3 trillion.
the entire span of aviation history at the
We continue to believe that some fat remains in the budget and there's
very center, friend of most of the pioneers,
room to cut waste. But such economies may not be enough. If they aren't, it's
keeper of flight's most complete diary.
past time for Congress to bite the bullet and raise more revenue. Smoke and
Garber put the bite on Jimmy Doolit-
mirrors simply can't do the job.
tle, Amelia Earhart, Wiley Post and How-
We also continue to believe that any new tax should be levied on consump-
tion, not earnings. In addition to being an incentive to save rather than spend,
ard Hughes for famous planes they flew to
such a tax wouldn't be collected on goods made to be sold abroad, and
records in what is often called the golden
therefore wouldn't harm America's competitiveness in world markets. But it
years of aviation, when new planes were
would be collected on goods consumed in the U.S.-treating American and
designed and built every few weeks. When
foreign products equally and tempering consumption generally.
Garber's friend Charles Lindbergh took
Foreign nations didn't create America's budget deficit. While they are
off for Paris in 1927, Garber heard the
helping finance it, they can't cure it, either. That's a job we have to tackle
news on a homemade radio in his Chevy.
ourselves. Nobody is eating our lunch. We're the only ones who can make our
He stopped at roadside and scribbled a ca-
pie bigger, or cut ourselves a thicker slice of steak.
Next: The high price of leadership.
ble asking for the plane. "Lindbergh hasn't
gotten there yet," stammered the Smithso-
nian's Assistant Secretary Charles Greely
Abbot when asked to send the wire. "He's
a great aviator in a very good plane," re-
sponded Garber. "I think he will make it."
Mobil®
Lindbergh did. So did Garber's plea. The
Spirit of St. Louis is one of the most popular
exhibits in all of aviation history.
1990 Mobil Corporation
way to democracy and independence.
viet Union and the other countries the So-
This, I am convinced, is a historically
viet Union subjugated in its time, a legacy
ASHE
irreversible process and, as a result, Eu-
of countless dead, an infinite spectrum of
rope will begin again to seek its own iden-
human suffering, profound economic de-
tity without being compelled to be a divid-
cline and, above all, enormous human hu-
ed armory any longer. Perhaps this will
miliation. It has brought us horrors that
create the hope that sooner or later, your
fortunately you have not known.
boys will no longer have to stand on guard
It has given us something positive, a
for freedom in Europe or come to our res-
special capacity to look from time to time
cue, because Europe will at last be able to
somewhat further than someone who has
stand guard over itself.
not undergone this bitter experience. A
But that is still not the most important
person who cannot move and lead a some-
thing. The main thing is, it seems to me,
what normal life because he is pinned un-
that these revolutionary changes will en-
der a boulder has more time to think about
able us to escape from the rather antiquat-
his hopes than someone who is not
ed straitjacket of this bipolar view of the
trapped that way.
world and to enter at last into an era of
What I'm trying to say is this: we must
multipolarity in which all of us, large and
all learn many things from you, from how
small, former slaves and former masters,
to educate our offspring, how to elect our
will be able to create what your great Pres-
representatives, all the way to how to orga-
ident Lincoln called "the family of men."
nize our economic life so that it will lead to
prosperity and not to poverty. But it
THE PATH OF PLURALISM
doesn't have to be merely assistance from
How can the U.S. help us today? My reply
the well educated, powerful and wealthy to
is as paradoxical as the whole of my life has
someone who has nothing and therefore
been. You can help us most of all if you
has nothing to offer in return.
help the Soviet Union on its irreversible
We too can offer something to you: our
but immensely complicated road to de-
experience and the knowledge that has
mocracy. It is far more complicated than
come from it. The specific experience I'm
the road open to its former European sat-
talking about has given me one certainty:
ellites. You yourselves know best how to
consciousness precedes being, and not the
support as rapidly as possible the nonvio-
other way around, as the Marxists claim.
lent evolution of this enormous multina-
For this reason, the salvation of this hu-
tional body politic toward democracy and
man world lies nowhere else than in the
autonomy for all its people. Therefore, it is
human heart, in the human power to re-
not fitting for me to offer you any advice.
flect, in human meekness and in human
I can only say that the sooner, the more
responsibility.
quickly and the more peacefully the Soviet
Union begins to move along the road to-
A NEW WAY OF THINKING
ward genuine political pluralism, respect
Without a global revolution in the sphere
for the rights of the nations to their own in-
of human consciousness, nothing will
tegrity and to a working-that is, a mar-
change for the better in the sphere of our
ket-economy, the better it will be not just
being as humans, and the catastrophe to-
for Czechs and Slovaks but for the whole
ward which this world is headed-be it
world.
ecological, social, demographic or a gener-
And the sooner you yourselves will be
al breakdown of civilization-will be un-
ing as well. The Soviet Union appeared,
able to reduce the burden of the military
avoidable. If we are no longer threatened
grew and transformed the enormous sacri-
budget borne by the American people. To
by world war or by the danger that the ab-
fices of its people suffering under totalitar-
put it metaphorically, the millions you give
surd mountains of accumulated nuclear
ian rule into a strength that, after World
to the East today will soon return to you in
weapons might blow up the world, this
War II, made it the second most powerful
the form of billions in savings. American
does not mean that we have definitely
nation in the world.
soldiers shouldn't have to be separated
won. We are still incapable of understand-
from their mothers just because Europe is
ing that the only genuine backbone of all
CREATING THE FAMILY OF MEN
incapable of being a guarantor of world
our actions, if they are to be moral, is re-
All of this taught us to see the world in bi-
peace, which it ought to be in order to
sponsibility. Responsibility to something
polar terms as two enormous forces-one
make some amends, at least, for having
higher than my family, my country, my
a defender of freedom, the other a source
given the world two world wars.
company, my success-responsibility to
of nightmares. Europe became the point
the order of being where all our actions
of friction between these two powers, and
THE LEGACY OF OPPRESSION
are indelibly recorded and where and only
thus it turned into a single enormous arse-
As long as people are people, democracy,
where they will be properly judged.
nal divided into two parts. In this process,
in the full sense of the word, will always be
I think that you Americans should un-
one half of the arsenal became part of that
no more than an ideal. In this sense, you
derstand this way of thinking. When
nightmarish power, while the other, the
too are merely approaching democracy.
Thomas Jefferson wrote that "govern-
free part, bordering on the ocean and hav-
But you have one great advantage: you
ments are instituted among men, deriving
ing no wish to be driven into it, was com-
have been approaching democracy unin-
their just powers from the consent of the
pelled, together with you, to build a com-
terruptedly for more than 200 years, and
governed," it was a simple and important
plicated security system to which we
your journey toward the horizon has never
act of the human spirit. What gave mean-
probably owe the fact that we still exist.
been disrupted by a totalitarian system.
ing to that act, however, was the fact that
The totalitarian system in the Soviet
The communist type of totalitarian sys-
the author backed it up with his
Union and in most of its satellites is break-
tem has left both our nations, Czechs and
life. It was not just his words, it was
ing down, and our nations are looking for a
Slovaks, as it has all the nations of the So-
his deeds as well.
"
TIME, MARCH 5, 1990
15
Nation
Ripples in the American Lake
Can the U.S. reap a peace dividend in the Pacific?
While the U.S. bases are often picketed by
NO
leftists, polls show that a majority of Filipi-
BANAN
nos want them to stay. They provide 68,000
Filipino jobs and inject $507 million annu-
NA
BASES
SABWATAN
ally into the economy.
TUNAY
Clark is clearly more expendable than
NUSP
Subic. The Air Force increasingly operates
its long-range bombers and advanced fight-
ers out of Guam. Singapore's Prime Minister
SP
Lee Kuan Yew has offered to accept some
air units from Clark in his country. Subic's fa-
cilities, on the other hand, cannot readily be
replaced. They include extensive machine
shops that maintain the U.S. fleet with low-
cost labor unavailable at alternative sites in
Singapore or Japan.
But what are the bases protecting? At a
media conference in Manila last week, So-
viet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadi
Gerasimov asked, "Suppose the bases go
tomorrow-where's the threat?" The Sovi-
ets, he insisted, "will not fill the vacuum."
Base-less protest: Manila demonstrators at U.S. embassy want Yanks to go home
American planners are not so sure of that.
Subic is strategically situated across the
By ED MAGNUSON
Both sides in the bases dispute may be
China Sea from Cam Ranh Bay, the for-
just huffing, seeking an edge in the immi-
mer U.S. naval base in Viet Nam, which
E
ver since U.S. forces destroyed the
nent bargaining. At the Pentagon, a Navy
now berths about 20 Soviet warships.
Japanese Navy in World War II, the
captain insisted that Philippine officials
And while Mikhail Gorbachev has
Pacific Ocean has been, in military
"have cried wolf one time too often" over
promised to remove 120,000 troops from
terms, an American lake. From naval bases
Subic and that the U.S. might pull out.
Soviet Asia and Mongolia, that would still
in the Aleutian Islands and southward to Su-
Aquino, who was saved from a military
leave 600,000 along the Soviet border with
bic Bay in the Philippines, 107 U.S. warships
coup last December when U.S. jet fighters
China. At least 10,000 troops are based in
and 51 submarines project commanding sea-
from Clark kept rebel air power grounded,
the northern territories just off Japan that
power. Ashore, mostly in South Korea, Ja-
caught a lot of domestic heat over her de-
were seized by the Soviets in 1945. The So-
pan and Okinawa, 120,000 American troops
pendence on the U.S. She may have used
are poised to deter aggression along the Pa-
Cheney's visit to show some distance.
cific's western rim. Now, with the Soviet
threat waning under the U.S.S.R.'s econom-
SOUTH KOREA
ic and ideological decay, is that U.S. military
Air Force 11,600
Army
31,600
presence still necessary?
As he ended a two-week tour of the Pa-
U.S.S.R.
cific last week, Defense Secretary Dick
U.S. FORCES
Cheney concluded that the governments of
Sovetskaya
Japan and South Korea still appreciate
IN THE PACIFIC
Gavan
their U.S. protectors, despite anti-Ameri-
Petropavlovsk
Vladivostok
can sentiment among some political fac-
JAPAN
4
tions. Yet Cheney caught a slap from Phil-
Air Force 16,500
Navy
8,300
CHINA
ippine President Corazon Aquino. The
Marines 23,700
Army
2,000
SOUTH
Yokosuka
U.S. Congress had recently cut $96 million
KOREA
Sasebo
JAPAN
from a $481 million military and economic
PACIFIC
aid package that Aquino apparently con-
Okinawa
OCEAN
sidered a precondition for negotiations on
renewing U.S. leases to operate the huge
Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base.
PHILIPPINES
Air Force
9,200
Cam
Subic
Miffed, she canceled plans to meet Cheney.
Navy
5,500
Ranh
Bay
Clark
GUAM
The Defense Secretary took the snub
Marines
2,000
Bay
PHILIPPINES
Air Force
4,200
Army
600
VIET NAM
Navy
4,000
gracefully but declared that the U.S. will re-
Guam
main in the bases, whose leases expire next
year, "only as long as the Philippine people
U.S. bases
wish it to stay-and only if the terms nego-
Soviet bases
tiated are acceptable to both parties."
TIME Map by Paul J. Pugliese
16
THE WASHINGTON POST
Vaclav Havel
Our Freedom
D
ear fellow citizens:
For the past 40 years on this day you
have heard my predecessors utter different
variations on the same theme, about how
our country is prospering, how many more
billion tons of steel we have produced, how.
happy we all are, how much we trust our
government and what beautiful prospects
lie ahead of us. I do not think you. me
into this office so that I, of all people, should
also lie to you.
Our country is not prospering. The great
creative and spiritual potential of our nation
is not being used to its full potential. Whole
sectors of industry are producing things in
which no one is interested, while the things
we need are in short supply.
The state, which calls itself a state of the
working people, is humiliating and exploit-
ing the workers. Our outdated economy is
squandering energy, of which we are in
short supply. Acountry which could once be
proud of the standard of education of its
people spends so little on education that
today it occupies 72nd place in the world.
We have laid waste to our soil and the
rivers and the forests that our forefathers
bequeathed to us, and we have the worst
environment in the whole of Europe today.
Adults in our country die earlier than in
We cannot lay all the blame on those who ruled
most other European countries.
us before, not only because this would not be true
A
llow me to tell you about a little
but also because it could detract from the
personal experience of mine. Flying to
Bratislava recently, I found time to look out
responsibility each of us now faces-the
of the window. What I saw was the Slovnaft
[oil refinery] complex and the Petrzalka
responsibility to act on our own initiative, freely,
suburb immediately beyond it. That view
was enough for me to understand that our
sensibly and quickly."
statesmen and politicians had not even
looked, or did not even want to look, out of
the windows of their planes. None of the
wear itself down, along with all the cogs in
generation to the next in order for each of
it.
statistics available to me would have en-
us to discover them within us when the
abled me to understand more quickly or
time was right, and to put them into prac-
more easily the situation we have gotten
W
hen I talk about a decayed moral
tice.
ourselves into,
environment, I do not mean merely
Of course, for our freedom today we also
But not even all of that is the most
those gentlemen who eat ecologically pure
had to pay a price. Many of our people died
vegetables and do not look out of their
in prison in the '50e, many were executed,
important thing. The worst thing is that we
airplane windows. I mean all of us, because
thousands of human lives were destroyed,
are living in a decayed moral environment.
all of us have become accustomed to the
hundreds of thousands of talented people
We have become morally ill, because we
totalitarian system, accepted it as an inal-
were driven abroad. Those who defended
have become accustomed to saying one
terable fact and thereby kept it running. In
the honor of our nations in the war were
thing and thinking, another. We have
other words, all of us are responsible, each
persecuted, as were those who resisted
learned not to believe in anything, not to
to a different degree, for keeping the totali-
totalitarian government, and those who
have consideration for one another and only
tarian machine running. None of us is mere-
simply managed to remain true to their own
to look after ourselves. Notions such as
ly a victim of it, because all of us helped to
principles and think freely. None of those
love, friendship, compassion, humility and
create it together.
who paid the price in one way or another for
forgiveness have lost their depth and di-
Why do I mention this? It would be very
our freedom today should be forgotten.
mension, and for many of us they represent
unwise to see the sad legacy of the past 40
Independent courts should justly assess the
merely some kind of psychological idiosyn-
years as something alien to us, handed
appropriate guilt of those responsible, so
crasy, or appear to be some kind of stray
down to us by some distant relatives. On
that the whole truth about our recent past
relic from times past, something rather
the contrary, we must accept this legacy as
comes out into the open.
something which we have brought upon
The previous regime
ourselves. If we can accept this, then we
N
either should we forget that other
will understand that it is up to all of us to do
nations paid an even higher price for
made talented people
something about it. We cannot lay all the
their freedom today, and thus they also paid
blame on those who ruled us before, not
indirectly for us too. The rivers of blood
who were capable of
only because this would not be true but also
which flowed in Hungary, Poland, Germany
because it could detract from the responsi-
and recently also in such a horrific way in
making an enterprising
bility each of us now faces-the responsibil
Romania, as well as the sea of blood shed by
ity to act on our own initiative, freely
the nations of the Soviet Union, should not
living in their own
sensibly and quickly.
bè forgotten, primarily because all human
Throughout the world, people are sur-
suffering affects every human being. But
country into cogs in
prised that the acquiescent, humiliated,
more than that, they must not be forgotten
skeptical Czechoslovak people who appar-
because it was these great sacrifices which
some kind of
ently no longer believed in anything sudden-
weaved the tragic backdrop for today's
ly managed to find the enormous strength
freedom or gradual liberation of the nations
monstrous, smelly
in the space of a few weeks to shake off the
of the Soviet bloc, and the backdrop of our
totalitarian system in a completely decent
newly charged freedom too.
machine whose purpose
and peaceful way. We ourselves are also
Without the changes in the Soviet Union,
surprised at this, and we ask where the
Poland, Hungary and the GDR, the develop-
no one can understand.
young people, in particular, who have never
ments in our country could hardly have
known any other system, find the source of
happened, and if they had happened, they
comical in the era of computers and-space
their aspirations for truth, freedom of
surely would not have had such a wonderful
rockets, Few of us managed to cry out that
thought, political imagination, civic courage
peaceful character. The fact that we had
the powerful should not be all-powerful, and
and civic foresight. How is it that their
favorable international conditions, of
that the special farms which produce eco-
parents, the generation which was consid-
course, does not mean that anyone was
logically sound and high-quality foodstuffs
ered lost, also joined in with them? How is it
helping us directly in those weeks. For
for them should send their produce to the
even possible that so many people immedi-
centuries; in fact, both our nations have
schools, children's hostels and hospitals,
ately grasped what had to be done, without
risen up by themselves, without-relying on
since our agriculture is not yet able to offer
needing anyone else's advice or instruc-
any help from more powerful states or big
tions?
this to everyone.
powers.
The previous regime, armed with its
I think that this hopeful aspect of our
This, it seems to me, is the great moral
situation today has two main reasons.
arrogant and intolerant ideology, denigrat-
stake of the present moment. It contains
Above all, man is never merely a product of
ed man into a production force and nature
the hope that in the future we will no longer
the world around him, he is always capable
into a production tool: In this way it at-
have to suffer the complex of those who are
of striving for something higher, no matter
tacked their very essence and the relation-
permanently indebted to someone else,
how systematically this ability is ground
ship between them. It made talented people
Now it is up to us alone whether this hope
down by the world around him. Second, the
who were capable of managing their own
comes to fruition, and whether our civic,
humanistic and democratic traditions—
affairs and making an enterprising living in
national and political self-confidence re-
which are often spoken about in such a
their own country into cogs in some kind of
awakens in a historically new way.
hollow way-nonetheless lay dormant
monstrous, ramshackle, smelly machine
somewhere in the subconscious of our na.
The writer is president of Caechoslovakia.
whom ПО was can 11
Hone
national
minor-
This is excertive from his New Year's Day
im
Photo Copy Preservation
NAL FRIDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1989
Outfoxed Again
By ANGELO CODEVILLA
self-criticism or of policy innovation.
dismantle those few steps the U.S. has
If, as Soviet Foreign Minister Edouard
Then in 1983 came the discovery of a
taken in recent years away from the stra-
Shevardnadze has promised at U.S. insis-
sixth "Pechora class" radar near the Si-
tegic-conception behind the ABM treaty:
tence, the Soviet Union actually dismantles
berian city Krasnoyarsk-2,000 miles away
the SDI antimissile program, the highly
the huge ABM radar near Krasnoyarsk; it
from the border it faced. This was a viola-
accurate Trident, II submarine-launched
will have eliminated the most undeniable
tion. Ironically, given its orientation to the
missile that is designed to threaten Soviet
violation of the U.S.-Soviet ABM treaty of
Bering Straits, one of the less likely places
silos, and the programs for basing U.S.
1972. But U.S. officials, by focusing on
from which missiles might come, the Kras-
missiles on roads and rails instead of in
Krasnoyarsk, have succeeded only in
noyarsk radar was probably the least mili-
vulnerable silos.
averting America's eyes from the much
tarily significant of the six, and obviously
Clearly, the real problem is not Kras-
more important whole of which Kras-
much less significant than the six taken as
noyarsk, nor Soviet compliance or non-
noyarsk was just a part.
a whole. But the U.S. government chose to
compliance with the language of arms con-
They have ignored hugely threatening
make a big deal about it, and it alone. And
trol: treaties, but the determination of
events because those events happened to
while the U.S. government was giving the
American policy makers to behave accord-
occur very much within the letter of the
impression that Krasnoyarsk was the prob-
ing to their own vision of the ABM treaty,
ABM treaty. They have cried wolf.
lem, U.S. intelligence discovered three
hesitating to build even the things that
The primary long-term objective of the
more Pechora-class radars, at Mukachevo,
they concede that the U.S., like the Soviet
Americans who ne-
Union, has the right
gotiated the ABM
to build; while the
treaty between 1969
Anti-Ballistic Missilo Radar
Soviet Union has
and 1972 was to
eliminate the five,
in the Soviet Union
built everything it
could under the
later six, "Hen
treaty, and then
House" radars then
some.
(as now) on the pe-
If Krasnoyarsk
riphery of the Soviet
disappears, the loss
Union, all more ca-
Olenegorsk
pable than our best
Skrunda
Kamchatka
to the Soviet ABM
Peninsula
system will be mar-
ABM radars, and to
Baranovichi
ginal. By no stretch
keep others from be-
Mukachevo
Pechora
of the imagination
ing built. The So-
will the Soviet Union
viets said "nyet," SO
Moscow
be as defenseless
the U.S. agreed to
against ballistic mis-
language allowing
siles as the U.S. is.
the Soviets to build
Krasnoyarsk
In no way will the
whatever radars
Lyaki
Mishelevka
development and
they wanted, so long
production of Soviet
as they were on the
Sary
anti-missile devices
periphery of the
Shagan
be slowed. On the
country, and ori-
contrary, American
ented outward.
reactions to the dis-
But putting battle
mantling of Kras-
management radars
noyarsk are sure to
on the periphery
raise the marginal
does not necessarily
effectiveness of ev-
degrade their per-
ery piece of Soviet
formance. The large
ABM equipment.
phased array radars in the planned Ameri-
Baranovichi, and Skrunda in the vital
The principal reaction, a renewed U.S.
can ABM system of the late 1960s were to
northwest missile corridor. These nine ra-
commitment to the ABM treaty, is a guar-
be on the periphery (Boston, North Da-
dars, plus the six old Hen House radars,
antee that the U.S. will build nothing to in-
kota, Montana, etc.) The ABM treaty's lan-
provide double, and usually triple, cover-
terfere with a disarming first strike by So-
guage on big radars was a placebo to as-
age of all approaches to the Soviet Union
viet missiles.
sure the U.S. Senate that these devices had
through the most capable radars available
Soviet First Strike
been limited. In fact, the U.S. negotiators
to mankind. The only radar gap on the
had simply translated their hopes that the
map of the Soviet Union faces such missile
For example, the acceptance of the
Soviets might limit themselves into a con
powers as the Central African Republic.
START treaty by the U.S. would mean that
viction that they would.
This network is backed up by the newly
the distribution of U.S. strategic forces
modernized Moscow ABM Complex. This is
would shrink from about 2,000 "aim
Screening the Buildup
specifically allowed by the ABM treaty. Its
points" to perhaps 400, and that the ratio
Instead, the treaty language served to
SH-11 high-altitude interceptors fired from
of Soviet counterforce warheads to Ameri-
screen the coming Soviet buildup. The Hen
underground launchers already incorpo-
can targets would rise from the present 3.5
House network was modernized. Then, dur-
ing the 1970s and early '80s, the U.S. no
rate SDI technology stolen from the U.S.
to 1 to perhaps as many as 10 to 1. That
They cover much of European Russia. The
means, far fewer American warheads
ticed that, first at Pechora, then at Lyaki,
Mishelevka, Olenegorsk, and Sary Shagan,
Soviets also are producing the SA 12 mo-
might be expected to survive a Soviet first
bile ABM, allowed by the ABM treaty be
strike. That, in turn, means that the Soviet
the Soviets were building radars hundreds
of times more powerful than our best ABM
cause it is dual-purpose: Finally, the Soviet
ABM system would have a much much
radars. (See map., Absent the ABM
Union is producing a host of other rapidly
easier job to do, and a much increased
treaty, the U.S. government would have
deployable ABM components and squirrel-
chance of doing successfully.
ing them away who knows where. The
The Soviets are selling the Krasnoyarsk
been obliged to note that a massive anti-
ABM treaty says nothing about produc-
radar at a very good price. The cost to
missile system was being built. But all five
tion.
them might be even lower if-and this is
of these new Pechora class" radars were
likely-they relocate the radar to northern
allowed by the ABM treaty To denounce
As the Soviets no doubt foresaw, some
Kamchatka. There it would fully comply
them, U.S. officials would have had to de
in Washington are taking the prospective
with the ABM treaty while making even
nounce their own previous judgment. As a
demise of Krasnoyarsk to mean that the
timelier transmission of data to local ABM
consequence, they also would have obliged
Soviet Union is rededicating itself to the
sites in the interior
themselves to devise a new and more
purposes of the ABM treaty The adminis-
somber American approach. But the U.S.
tration is moving toward signing a new
Mr. Codevilla is a research fellow at
government proved incapable either of
START treaty, while Congress rushes to
Stanford University's Hoover Institution.
Photo Copy Preservation
THE WASHINGTON POST
Quebec Separatist Movement Enjoys Resurgence
Canadians See Amicable Divorce of French-Speaking Province from Nation as Possible
By Lewis H. Diuguid
business class in Montreal has been
Trudeau's efforts to resolve the Que-
Fotheringham that "Meech Lake is
Washington Post Foreign Service
cast as radical with its rear-guard
bec issue constitutionally culminated
idead."
campaign to kecp English on the
in June 1988 with a meeting of the
New Brunswick and Manitoba
OTTAWA-Quebec separatism,
city's street signs.
federation's 10 premiers at. Meech
provinces have failed to ratify the
the issue that Canada has never quite
Among the English-speaking na-
Lake on the Ontario-Quebec border.
1988 accord and another provincial
resolved, is heating up anew.
tional majority, a perception is
In what was described as a historic
An election in the French-speak-
spreading that if Quebec did sepa-
leader has indicated he may seek a
accord, they provided assurances for
rollback. Bourassa has made clear
ing province last month confirmed
rate; it would be an amicable divorce,
the maintenance of Quebec's "dis-
that this would be unacceptable.
the persistence of a 40 percent mi-
with the province's economic rela-
tinctiveness.
nority wishing to pull out of the fed-
tionship to the federation enduring.
All 10 premiers agreed, and went
The stage is set for a failure to
eration, and by most interpretations
As Allan Fotheringham of Mac-
home to seek ratification within two
meet the June deadline for ratifica-
a majority for separation soon may
lean's weekly news magazine wrote
years. But while Conservative Prime
tion of the accords, and a threatened
be found.
"If Quebec walked out, you wouldn't
Minister Brian Mulroney said last
pullout of Quebec ministers from the
need a passport to make it to Mon-
Most English-speaking politicians
week, "We simply cannot afford not
federal cabinet. Then, the question
treal's restaurants. The Edmonton
to carry through to a successful con-
would be how Quebec's premier-
have railed against separation, but
Oilers will still be playing the
clusion the process initiated by
and electorate-will respond to an
they no longer are unanimous in
Canadiens for the Stanley Cup."
Meech Lake," most politicians and
issue that keeps coming back unre-
their willingness to compromise to
Ex-prime minister Pierre Elliott
journalists consulted agreed with
solved.
keep the thorny Quebecois in the
federation.
Canada officially became a bilin-
gual country 30 years ago, a move
that was intended to disarm the Que-
bec separatists. It did not. Premier
Rene Levesque agitated for 10 years
until, in a 1980 referendum, the
province said no to his formula for
sovereignty.
Power shifted from Levesque's
Parti Quebecois to the province's
Liberal Party, which narrowly won
the election there last month. But
while Liberal Premier Robert Bou-
rassa avowedly is a federalist, he has
indicated that he will follow the elec-
torate rather than lead it on the sep-
aratist question.
Labor leader Gerard Docquier has
made this prediction about his native
province: "I have always said it will
not be the Parti Quebecois" that pulls
Quebec out of Canada, "it will be the
Liberals."
Photo Copy Preservation
His point, and that of other com-
mentators, is that the separatist
movement now embraces an upbeat
French-speaking entrepreneurial
class. The image of bomb-throwing
Parti Quebecois socialists has
blurred. The once dominant English
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL MONDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1989
A15
Yugoslav Tremors Along Balkans' Political Fault Line
LJUBLJANA, Yugoslavia-Twohistoric
that instead of being fought with guns it is
concepts are emerging out of the ruins of
gary. Thus the story here is less appealing
Another scenario is therefore more
being waged through bureaucratic means.
communist Eastern Europe. One, "Central
to journalists. Nevertheless, several dis-
likely: half-baked reform, continued infla-
Late last month, Serbia fired a powerful
Europe," the media is now beating to
tinct patterns are emerging, each with far-
tion and sporadic rioting in the poorer,
salvo at Slovenia, instructing all Serbian
death. The other, "the Balkans, the me-
reaching implications not just for Yugosla-
southern regions, as the two northern re-
organizations to sever links with the rival
dia has yet to discover.
via, but for Europe as well.
publics-Slovenia and Croatia-are drawn
republic. The move-nudging the country
In the optimistic scenario, the Inflation:
Central Europe suggests a place where
further into the West German-fueled, Cen-
ever closer to the long-predicted disinte-
may soon force even Serbia to embark on
reason prevails. as national tensions are
tral European prosperity sphere.
gration of the Yugoslav federation-I
dramatic economic reform that must inevi-
eased by democracy and bourgeois pros-
lowed the introduction of emergency meas-
tably lead to political pluralism and the de-
Because Journalists and other Western
perity. The Balkans, on the other hand, is
ures in Slovenia to head off a rally in
mise of Mr. Milosevic's one-man rule. Such
visitors tend to visit only Belgrade, the out-
II Third World caldron where ethnic groups
Ljubljana on Dec. 1. The rally was being
circumstances would permit Slovenia, and
side world has yet to grasp the degree to
exist In psychological Isolation from each
organized by Serbs in an apparent effort to
which Slovenians and Croats view the fed-
other, subverting attempts at political and
neighboring Croatla to a lesser extent, to
bring down Slovenia's relatively liberal
eral capital as merely the capital of a
economic reform.
leadership. The Serbs have been claiming
hated, retrograde local republic. Sloven-
Yugoslavia, a multinational state as
that Slovenia is supporting ethnic Alban-
AUSTRIA
Miles
ians, especially, whose identity was sub-
tride the borders of Rome and Byzantium
lans in Kosovo-which is true to the extent
400
merged during hundreds of years of unin-
and Catholicism and Orthodoxy. is on this
that Slovenia has been dissociating itself
terrupted Hapsburg rule, are undergoing a
fault line as well.
from Mr. Milosevic's attempt to extend
IJul/ljane
ROMANIA
national renaissance. Mr. Smole, who is
In the north, Slovenia is going the way
Serbian dominance over the region.
the leading reformer within the republic's
of Hungary. Economic reform here started
political establishment, declared: 'We
Anti-communist opposition groups in
Slovenia responded to Serbia's action last
joined Yugoslavia not to be Yugoslavs, but
Belgrade
Europe
week by forming an umbrella organization,
because at the time It was the best way to
SERBIA
defend the Interests of the Slovenian na-
the Democratic Opposition of Slovenia,
By Robert D. Kaplan
which is demanding that "all state organs
BULGARIA
tion."
KOSOVO
in Slovenia break off ties with state organs
Whether the Slovenians-who make up
in Serbia." They issued a statement on
8% of the Yugoslav population yet account
years ago. Slovenian communists have
Dec. 8 declaring, "Slovenia should respond
ALBANIA
for a quarter of the nation's gross national
dropped the hammer and sickle from their
to pressures mounting against It after the
ITALY
product and a third of its exports to the
banner, are considering changing the party
ban of the rally In Ljubljana."
West-will in future years feel it is in their
Serbla's rebellious ethnic-Albanian
Interests to remain part of Yugoslavia is of
name, and concede they may lose republic-
wide elections slated for March. "Just be-
province of Kosovo in the south evokes the
pivotal Importance to Europe.
West Bank, with the streets patrolled by
act as a motor dragging the whole of Yugo-
cause Serbia doesn't want a multiparty
slavia over many years into a Central Eu-
A Yugoslavia propelled forward by Slo-
system doesn't mean we have to wait,'
armed troops. Besides national tensions,
ropean-like prosperity.
venian reformist values will help the
Joze Smole, the head of the Slovene Social-
Kosovo and other poor regions of Yugosla-
chances of successful liberalization not
ist Alliance, told me.
via may soon be plagued not only with na-
But cutting Inflation means closing un-
only in Bulgaria but eventually in Romania
In the central heartland of Yugoslavia,
tional tensions but also with bread riots,
productive, state-supported factories and
and Albania too. The Balkans would then
Serbia is drifting more in the direction of
as 50% monthly inflation tears apart the
thus putting many people out of work in a
exist purely in a geographical sense. How-
Romania, A personality cult has formed
social fabric.
country where there is no social safety net.
ever, were Yugoslavia to continue to fis-
around the republic's president, Slobodan
It is extremely doubtful that the current
This complex, asymmetrical situation is
sure, as it is now clearly doing, the whole
Milosevic, who has pulled half-a-million
like the Soviet Union In miniature. Because
federal prime minister, Ante Markovic, de-
of southeast Europe could become politi
people late the streets-not by delivering
much of the discoutent is being released
spite his reformist reputation, can muster
cally and economically dislodged from the
upinals of lism Ind By
the courage and the political closs to take
rest of the Continent. And the Balkans
and
HP
other,
11/11/11
Excerpts From Speech
By the Czech President
Special to The New York Times
PRAGUE, Jan. 1 - Following are excerpts from President Vaclav Havel
New Year's Day address, as translated by The New York Times:
e
d
The Truth, Unvarnished
best Government, the best Parlia-
ment and the best President cannot
For 40 years you have heard on this
do much by themselves. Freedom
day from the mouths of my predeces-
and democracy, after all, mean joint
sors, in a number of variations, the
participation and shared responsibil-
same thing: how our country is flour-
ity. If we realize this, then all the hor-
ishing, how many more millions of
rors that the new Czechoslovak
tons of steel we have produced, how
democracy inherited cease to be SO
we are all happy, how we believe in
horrific. If we realize this, then hope
our Government and what beautiful
will return to our hearts.
prospects are opening ahead of us. I
assume you have not named me to
this office SO that I, too, should lie to
Everywhere in the world, people
you.
were surprised how these malleable.
Our country is not flourishing. The
humiliated, cynical citizens of
great creative and spiritual potential
Czechoslovakia, who seemingly be-
of our nations is not being applied
lieved in nothing, found the tremen-
meaningfully. Entire branches of in-
dous strength within a few weeks to
dustry are producing things for which
cast off the totalitarian system, in an
there is no demand whilewe are short
entirely peaceful and dignified man-
of things we need.
ner. We ourselves are surprised at it.
The state, which calls itself a state
And we ask: Where did young peo-
of workers, is humiliating and ex-
ple who had never known another sys-
ploiting them instead. Our outmoded
tem get their longing for truth, their
economy wastes energy, which we
love of freedom, their political imagi-
have in short supply. The country,
nation, their civic courage and civic
which could once be proud of the
responsibility? How did their parents,
education of its people, is spending SO
precisely the generation thought to
little on education that today, in that
have been lost, join them? How is it
respect, we rank 72d in the world. We
possible that so many people immedi-
have spoiled our land, rivers and for-
ately understood what to do and that
ests, inherited from our ancestors,
none of them needed any advice or in-
and we have, today, the worst envi-
structions?
ronment in the whole of Europe,
Adults die here earlier than in the
Recalling Ruined Lives
majority of European countries
Naturally we too had to pay for our
present-day freedom. Many of our
Learning to Belleve Again
citizens died in prison in the 1950's.
The worst of it is that we live in a
Many were executed. Thousands of
spoiled moral environment We have
human lives were destroyed. Hun-
become morally ill because we are
dreds of thousands of talented people
used to saying one thing and thinking
were driven abroad.
Those who
another. We have learned not to be-
fought against totalitarianism during
lieve in anything, not to care about
the war were also persecuted.
No-
each other, to worry only about our-
body who paid in one way or another
selves. The concepts of love, friend-
for our freedom could be forgotten.
ship, mercy, humility or forgiveness
Independent courts should justly
have lost their depths and dimension,
evaluate the possible guilt of those re-
and for many of us they represent
sponsible, SO that the full truth about
only some sort of psychological curi-
our recent past should be exposed.
osity or they appear as long-lost wan-
But we should also not forget that
derers from faraway times, some-
other nations paid an even harsher
what ludicrous in the era of comput-
price for their present freedom, and
ers and space ships
paid indirectly for ours as well. All
human suffering concerns each
Cogs No Longer
human being.
Without changes in
the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary
The previous regime, armed with a
and the German Democratic Repub-
proud and intolerant ideology, re-
lic, what happened here could hardly
duced people into the means of pro-
have taken place, and certainly not in
duction, and nature into its tools. So it
such a calm and peaceful way.
attacked their very essence, and their
Now it depends only on us whether
mutual relations. Out of talented
this hope will be fulfilled, whether our
and responsible people, ingeniously
civic, national and political self-re-
husbanding their land, it made cogs
spect will be revived. Only a man or
of some sort of great, monstrous,
nation with self-respect, in the best
Copy
thudding, smelly machine, with an
sense of the word, is capable of listen-
unclear purpose. All it can do is,
ing to the voices of others, while ac-
slowly but irresistibly, wear itself out,
cepting them as equals, of forgiving
with all its cogs.
Photo
enemies and of expiating sins,
If I speak about a spoiled moral at-
mosphere I don't refer only to our
Prosperity, Humanely
masters
I'm speaking about all of
us. For all of us have grown used to
Perhaps you are asking what kind
the totalitarian system and accepted
of republic I am dreaming about. I
it as an immutable fact, and thereby
will answer you: a republic that is in-
actually helped keep it going. None of
dependent, free, democratic, a repub-
us are only its victims; we are all also
lic with economic prosperity and also
responsible for it.
social justice, a humane republic that
It would be very unwise to think of
serves man and that for that reason
the sad heritage of the last 40 years
also has the hope that man will serve
only as something foreign, something
it
inherited from a distant relative. On
the contrary, we must accept this
The People Hold Sway
heritage as something we have in-
My most important predecessor
flicted on ourselves. If we accept it in
started his first speech by quoting
such a way, we shall come to under-
from Comenius. Permit me to end my
stand it is up to all of us to do some-
own first speech by my own para-
thing about it.
phrase. Your Government, my peo-
Let us make no mistake: even the
ple, has returned to you.
THE WASHINGTON POST
Henry Kissinger
Superpowers and the New Europe
Don expect stability and peace to just happen.
The past year has seen an astonishing evolution in
growing temptations to reduce NATO's conventional mili-
East-West relations. The Soviet Union is losing control of
tary establishment unilaterally. Not only is opposition to
the political agenda in Eastern Europe at the same
moment that the United States is losing control of its
modernization of short-range nuclear weapons in West
security agenda in Western Europe. But Western rhetoric
Germany becoming insurmountable, the entire nuclear
deployment on German soil is being challenged. The
is stuck in familiar categories relating either to the arcane
denuclearization of Germany would threaten the political
catechism of strategic arms control or a diplomacy geared
to "helping" Gorbachev.
contract under which American forces have been deployed
in Europe for four decades. Finally, a START agreement
Because it is peripheral to the emerging central danger,
will weaken the rationale for initiating nuclear war, further
major progress toward a START agreement is probable
reducing the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent:
by the time of next spring's summit. "Helping" Gorbachev
contributes to peace only if the Soviet leader is prepared
Trends in both German-states compound these divisive
to help in building a more stable international system. And
tendencies. Any West German government is bound to
in that case we in the West are not helping him but
seek for the people of East Germany the same privileges
ourselves.
already accorded the populations of Poland and Hungary.
Any analysis based on mutual interest must start from
The result is increasing West German-activism all over
the recognition that the fulcrum of international tensions
Eastern Europe. West German political figures are fond of
has returned to its historical place of origin at the center of
repeating Germany's alleged historic mission in Eastern
Europe. A new design for Europe should end both Soviet
Europe-an amazing proposition for which history offers
political domination of Eastern Europe and potential super-
power military confrontation in the center of Europe.
During the next decade U.S. and Soviet ground forces
should be progressively withdrawn from Central Europe in
an orderly negotiated fashion, with Soviet offensive capa-
bilities, especially tank forces, returned deep into Russia.
The most startling changes have occurred in Eastern
Europe. After monopolizing education, propaganda and
bureaucracy for four decades, the Polish Communist Party
was able to win only one contested seat in the first nearly
BYT.GIBSON
free election since World War II. The Communist Party in
Hungary is likely to split into two groups at the next party
no evidence and which is likely to inspire premonition in
congress; polls indicate that its popular support hovers
Eastern Europe. Unless it keeps its foreign policy well
around 40 percent. Though Czechoslovakia has not per-
within a European framework and its security policy
mitted free elections, its Communist Party is surely no
closely tied to NATO, West Germany could repeat the
historic German flaw of self-isolation and become the
more popular.
target of Western suspicions and Soviet attempts to stem
As a result, Moscow is on the verge of losing its grip on
the centrifugal tendencies in its empire.
the political evolution of Eastern Europe. Historically,
Communist parties have justified themselves as the advance
forces of history destined to lead-and if necessary com-
Both East and West are being challenged to a new-vision of
pel-the majority on the high road to Communist ortho-
Europe's future. The West must define for itself three
doxy. Therefore, Communist parties toying with democracy
concepts: for defense in an era of declining budgets and
face a philosophical dilemma: if they become true democrats
increasing opposition to U.S. nuclear deployment in Central
they cease to be true Communists. If they remain Commu-
Europe; for arms control policies that promote greater
nist, they will act to undermine the new democratic system,
freedom for the people of Eastern Europe; and for devising
for example shifting to Solidarity the blame for the austerity
political obstacles to Soviet pressure on Western Europe
required to overcome the economic mess the Communists
and Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, in part to replace
left behind. But whatever their motive, the leaders of the
the military obstacles in the process of being eroded.
Communist parties of Eastern Europe face an overwhelm-
The Soviet Union faces an even more profound chal-
ing new fact: having lost the capacity to compel by terror,
lenge. Its massive troop presence in Europe is both a drain
they must turn to public opinion, appealing to nationalism
on economic resources and presents Moscow with a
and challenging Moscow.
Hobson's choice between the humiliation of acquiescing in
At least for the time being-and so long as membership
fundamental political change while its troops are present
in the Warsaw Pact is not challenged-the Communist
or repression with unforeseeable consequences. The test
monolith is weakening with Moscow's acquiescence. Prop-
for stability is whether for the first time in history Europe
ping up Communist rule in Eastern Europe by military
can live in equilibrium, with a Russian empire, with neither
means apparently seems too risky to a Soviet leadership
side fearing invasion by the other. If Gorbachev will work
reluctant to hazard the carefully crafted new image. Mos-
toward that goal, he deserves generous support. If he does
cow may be hoping that in the end calculations of the
not, his rule will have been an interesting psychological
mutual national interest buttressed by geographic propin-
episode on the way to adventurism or repression or both.
quity can substitute at least to some extent for ideological
Assuming he opts for the first course, a new security
conformity.
system could have the following components: Soviet
The jury is still out as to whether this strategy will work
ground forces in Europe would return to national territory;
Copy
in Hungary or Poland. But it cannot work in East
Soviet offensive capabilities-especlally tank forces-in
Germany. There the Communist Party is in no position to
the area west of Moscow would be limited under interna-
mobilize national feelings because these feelings
tional inspection. In return, the United States should be
counter to the very existence of the East German state.
prepared to withdraw in stages throughout the 90s most
Photo
West Germany by definition, and increasingly by its
of its ground forces from: the European continent. Both
policies, keeps the hope for reunification alive. East
nuclear superpowers could be allowed to maintain agreed
Germany faces the dilemma that opposition to reform will
air forces and material storages in Europe to make clear
turn it into an anachronism while liberalization will under-
that an attack would involve an unacceptable risk of war.
mine its reason for being,
Such military redeployments would inevitably project the
Disintegrative tendencies exist inside the Soviet Union
future of Germany to the forefront of European politics
as well. Gorbachev undoubtedly launched glasnost and
because East Germany will face new internal pressures,
perestroika in the belief that reduced repression from;
especially once Soviet ground forces are removed. The
Moscow would enlist support for his reforms. But the
German issue can in any case no longer be avoided. If
non-Russian nationalities-especially those acquired as
Western cohesion is to be maintained, Germany's allies
the result of the Hitler-Stalin pact-march to their own
must come forward with plausible program, that meets
Germany's aspirations without destabilizing Central Europe.
West Germany's contribution to such a program should
An empire assembled over a
be to accept the present frontiers of Germany as final and
abandon the current ambiguous official rhetoric, which
period of 400 years by force
renounces force only in changing frontiers. This is the
precondition for negotiations on an appropriate system of
will not disintegrate
free elections for East Germany, perhaps at first on the
Polish model. The almost certain outcome of such a
passively.
process would be a step-by-step melding of the domestic
structure of the two Germanys. At that point a plausible
guarantee that the change would not extend the frontiers
drummers. So strong is public feeling that even local
of NATO to the East is essential-perhaps by creating
Communist parties have felt obliged to challenge Moscow.
over time a confederation of the two states with East
Economic decentralization-essential for perestroika-
Germany becoming essentially demilitarized.
liberates pressures for autonomy if not outright indepen-
I envisage a three-stage process. The first stage would
dence within the framework of glasnost.
be the reduction of forces outlined in President Bush's
Too many Western leaders seem to think that these
proposal of last May. The principle of total Soviet with-
trends need little response beyond judicious doses of
drawal of ground forces should be established in this stage,
economic assistance. I strongly favor greatly increased aid
for example by the complete withdrawal from at least one
to Poland and Hungary. But this is no substitute for a
European country such as Hungary.
concept for the future of Europe. An empire assembled
The next stage would establish four security zones:
over a period of 400 years by force will not disintegrate
from the Atlantic to the Rhine; from the Rhine to the
passively. And the Western alliance is bound to be shaken
eastern frontier of West Germany; from that frontier to
by the very events it is celebrating.
the Soviet-Polish frontier; from the Soviet-Polish frontier
to the area of Moscow. The forces west of the Rhine and
For 40 years the Atlantic Alliance has been held together
between the Polish-Soviet frontier and Moscow would be
by the fear of Soviet military aggression. Its response has
roughly equal, as would be the forces on both sides of the
been to build up integrated conventional forces augmented
dividing lines in the central sectors.
by European-based nuclear weapons and backed by an
The final stage-toward the latter part of the decade
intimate reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent Now each
-would X free elections 111 hast Germany, uner
Photo Copy Preservation
AL FRIDAY, MARCH 2, 1990
Czechoslovakia's Free-Market Minister
By JOHN H. FUND
first became exposed to Western economic
for an ambitious and dramatic push to-
Vaclav Klaus, Czechoslovakia's new
thought during post-graduate studies in It-
ward'a free market. Within days of taking
free-market finance minister, kicked off
aly and at Cornell University in the U.S.
office, he drastically devalued the Czech
his whirlwind 24-hour, visit to New York
during the late 1960s. Just before the 1968
crown from eight to the dollar to 38, and
last week by speaking to a group of Wall
Prague Spring, he was hired by a section
proposed his country quit the communist
Street executives and others about how his
of the Ministry of Economics that criti-
trading bloc, Comecon.
country needed to adopt "a market econ-
cized non-Marxist economics. Mr. Klaus
Mr. Klaus sums up his overall policy as
omy without any adjectives
became converted to classical liberal
one of "demonopolization." He aims to use
Afterward, Alice Tepper Marlin, direc-
thinking: "By letting me see Western text-
very restrictive monetary and fiscal poli-
tor of the leftish Council of Economic Pri-
books, the government in a way paid for
cies to squeeze state monopolies, while en-
orities, approached him with a gift: her
its own undermining."
couraging competition from foreign com-
group's guidebook on "Shopping for a Bet-
Even after the Soviet invasion, Mr.
panies to help make Czech firms efficient
ter World," a sort of moral report card
Klaus took délight in writing anti-statist es-
players in the world market.
on U.S. corporations and the products they
says for a Czech Encyclopedia of Econom-
Monday, President Havel announced a
make. After leafing through it, his reaction
ics. His dismissal of John Kenneth Gal-
package of sweeping new laws that will al-
was polite but firm: "If this is another ef-
braith as a "social critic" rather than an
low state companies to sell-shares to their
fort to make a third way between capital-
economist drew rebukes, He was fired in.
workers, permit citizens to start their own
ism and communism, we have tried this.
1970 after being cited as the leading
companies of whatever size, and allow for-
We wanted to create a New Man, with only
"counter-revolutionary" in the Ministry
eign investors to own as much as 100% of a
unselfish thoughts. I am afraid it is not
For most of the next 19 years, Mr.
Czech firm. Next week, Mr. Klaus will
possible." Ms. Marlin, somewhat taken
Klaus worked in obscure positions in the
present an austere budget cutting state
aback by an Eastern European with such
subsidies by at least 15%.
views, retreated.
Although he is satisfied with the pace of
Admirer of Milton Friedman
Refreshingly, Czecho-
reform for now, Mr. Klaus acknowledges
that his colleagues have some disagree-
Mr. Klaus, a slim, graying 48-year-old
slovakia is not asking for
ments with his radicalism. Mr. Komarek,
with a dry sense of humor, Is one of three
ministers in charge of the Czech economy.
Western foreign aid. Mr.
the first deputy prime minister, appeared
to fire a shot across Mr. Klaus's bow last
They are easily the most outspoken free
Klaus believes such assis
month when he warned that "if a market
marketeers in post-communist Eastern Eu-
tance would bring both in-
economy were to start immediately, eco-
rope. An admirer of Nobel Prize-winning
nomic agony" and chaos would result.
economists Milton Friedman and F.A.
Hayek, Mr. Klaus says fundamental com-
flation and timidity in pol-
Mr. Klaus may be forced to edge a little
toward the "reform trap." He says It is
promises with a market economy will only
icy formulation.
best not to slash consumer subsidies fur-
delay solutions to his country's stagnant
ther until a "legitimate" government is in-
economy. He says the market is not divisi-
stalled after the June 8 elections. Jan Ur-
ble; the only real issue is the proper se-
Czech central bank. However, he is quick
ban, the secretary general of Civic Forum,
quence of reforms needed to dismantle the
to note that the image of total control that
wonders if the government is tossing away
statist economy.
the communist government displayed to
a real opportunity for radical measures, at
Mr. Klaus is especially leery of what he
the West had little to do with reality. In
a time when people are most prepared to
calls the "reform trap," in which cautious
fact but not in name, Mr. Klaus became
sacrifice:
and partial reforms prove worse than none
the adviser to the bank's chairman Last
Mr. Klaus also says he has been criti-
at all. He fears that Hungary and, to a
year, he was rehired by the Ministry of
cized by some in the West for not moving
lesser extent, Poland are in danger of fall-
Economics and once again began to criti-
faster to privatize Czech companies. He
ing into exactly that trap.
cize the regime publicly. Mr. Klaus says
says that in the absence of firm rules for
Mr. Klaus and his colleagues-Valtr Ko-
that there were many Western misconcep-
such sales It would be folly to unload state
marek, first deputy prime minister and
tions about his country over the past year.
companies now. He refuses to play Santa
Vladimir Dlouhy, the planning minister-
"We weren't an outpost of Stalinism," he
Klaus to communist managers by letting
know that Czechoslovakia faces some hard
says. "The communists had lost effective
them sell their firms at fire-sale prices to
times in the short run. Machinery and
control; new thinking was everywhere.
the first Western buyer, often in exchange
equipment exports to the Soviet Union
Even the economy was moving away from
for a golden parachute.
(70% of all Czech ex-
the bureaucrats. The party only had the
ports) will fall by at
A Big Hit
power to break up demonstrations.
least a fourth in the
Then on Nov. 17, the pace of change
Still, Mr. Klaus and his colleagues were
next few years. Most
suddenly lurched into overdrive. On that
a big hit in both Washington and on Wall
of the lost exports
night, after a police beating of student
Street last week. Robert Hormats, vice
are unsalable else-
demonstrators, opposition to the regime
chairman of Goldman Sachs International,
where. Moscow will
swelled into a mass movement. Mr. Klaus
says the Czech team is very Impressive.
also deliver only
remembers walking home from the train,
They mean to tackle underlying economic
70% of promised oil
station about 11 that night, unaware of the
problems head-or and solve them.' Many
shipments in the
brutality. Outside his home, he met his 20
Wall Streeters asked for assurances that
first three months of
year-old student son, who was white with
the Czechs would be in office after the
this year.
fright from what he had seen. The son
June elections. No guarantees were given,
Still, Czechoslo-
challenged the father to do more than en-
but with Vaclav Havel likely to baw to de-
vakia's long-term
gage in academic criticism. "We children
mands that he seek a full term as presi-
economic prospects
did our job tonight, and now it is the re-
dent, the Civic Forum team looks like a
are the brightest of
Vaclav Klaus
sponsibility of the parents to do some-
winner at the polls.
any Eastern European country outside of
thing,' he told his father. Similar conver
Leaving his meeting with the Wall
rapidly vanishing East Germany. Czechs
sations took place all over Prague.
Street executives, Mr. Klaus banters with
have to remind visitors that in 1939 their
Two days later, Civic Forum was
a crowd of admirers in pin-stripes. A
country ranked 10th in the world in per-ca-
formed out of a loose. collection of dissi-
Chase Manhattan official tells him that her
pita income, ahead of Austria and Bel-
dents, actors, academics and workers. Mr
bank is'about to send a mission to Prague.
gium.
Klaus became a key political adviser to
Oh, would you like to buy a bank?" Mr.
And refreshingly, unlike every other
Vaclav Havel. The two men had met dur-
Klaus asks, his eyes twinkling. "Sure,
Eastern European country, Czechoslovakia
ing the Prague Spring when they served to
what's your price?" the executive coolly
is not asking for Western foreign aid.
gether on the board of a literary magazine
replies "Well, the Austrians are also com-
"That is the last thing on our agenda,"
and had kept in close touch When, the rev.)
ing in a few days so you may have to com-
says Mr. Klaus, who believes such assis-
olution succeeded, Mr. Klaus was pres
pete, Mr Klaus says. We are reformers,
tance would bring both inflation and timid-
sured into taking the highly visible job of
but we are not naive reformers."
ity in policy formulation.
finance minister. He had hoped for a qui-
Mr. Klaus has never been timid in his
eter post as head of the central bank.
Mr. Fund is a Journal editorial
opposition to the communist regime. He
Instead, he has become the point man
writer
The Oder Neisse Imbroglio
Political judgments often boll down
There is indeed a nationalist fringe in
to this: You:are right, but you lose.
German politics in the form of the Re
Chancellor, Kohl seems to be
publikaner party. Virulently patriotic,
relearning this lesson in the midst of
xenophobic and anti free market, the
the current German election cam
Republikans prey on the kinds of re
paign. While there seems to be gen-
sentment found in any democratic
eral agreement in the West that a
electorate. After World War II, for
united Germany will be democratic,
ample, the Soviet "liberators" helped
prosperous and firmly bound to NATO
themselves to allarge chunk of Polish
and the European Community, the
territory in the east, while the country
head of West Germany is catching
was compensated from the histori
heat for his position on the border be-
cally German regions of Silesia; Po-
tween East Germany and Poland.
merania and East Prussia to the west
His position is that before the mat-
and north: The subsequent population
ter can be finally settled, Germany
movement caused no little suffering
must be reunited: There Is a certain
among the defeated Germans a histo-
logic to the notion that until he has
rian might say this was rough justice
some authority over East Germany he
for the Nazishorrors, but some per
can't decide-its border questions. In
centage of German voters might take
fact, both West and East Germany
a different view.
have signed various treaties recogniz-
The Republikaners have recently
ing the present border at the Oder and
done well in local elections and are
Neisse rivers, but Poland and certain
now running at about 5% in the polls.
West German and other Western poll-
Unhappily, 5% is the percentage
ticians are demanding resolutions
that would entitle them to representa-
corresponding to a peace treaty.
tion in Parliament under the German
Pressure has been applied by Po-
electoral system. Mr Kohl knows that
land's prime minister, Tadeusz Ma-
if the Republikaners do well his
zowiecki, West Germany's opposition
party does. poorly. And if the Free
Social Democrats and Free Democrat
Democrats fail to mount the
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich
threshold, his present coalition would
Genscher, part of Mr. Kohl's Chris-
collapse and he would have to choose
tian Democrat-led coalition: The chan-
between the unwanted support of the
cellor told his cabinet this week that
Republikaners and a grand coalition
he would not oppose a joint resolution
with the Social Democrats:
forswearing territorial demands on
Mr. Kohl's position on the Eastern
Poland by the Bundestag and the Par
territor esprepresents a careful. tacti-
liament to be elected in East Ger
cal decision to avoid handing the Re
many this month. He stopped short of
publikaners a volatile issue Surely
offering a provisional treaty, however
keeping the Republikaners out of Par
and later rejected suggestions about
liament is worth.a temporary delay In
taking up the issue of war repara
dotting the is and crossing the on:
tions. The political barrage against
the Oder-Neisse Line. One can, of
Photo Copy Preservation
him continued, with France's foreign
course, disagree with the chancellor
minister, Roland Dumas; demanding
tactical judgment, but his motives
immediate clarity about the borders.
ought to be respected by politicians
tempted to play to anti-German re-
The way to understand Mr. Kohl's
sentments in their own electorates
position is to sit back from the tran-
Mr. Kohl is not trying to fan the
scendent Issue to the more immediate
flames of German chauvinism, but to
context of West German politics.
contain them:
Asides
Return of the Gipper
March 18 elections wants the origina-
tor of the "evil: empire" speech to
Ronald Reagan even now remains
speak in East Berlin on their behalf
a figure of controversy and obloquy in
We know that some disagree with us
some American quarters, but they
on this, but future historians will have
love him in East Germany. Yes, a
rich material for deciding: Who won
party coalition running there in the
Eastern Europe?
Richard Cohen
No Double Standard for Germany
The polls tell us that most Americans
Of course, no one can ignore what
to see the revival of German language
support German reunification. The fig.
happened the last time Germany was
newspapers In Polish areas with signifi-
ures are foverwhelming 67 percent
unified. It produced Adolf Hitler, World
cant numbers of ethnic Germans. To the
and a German reading those figures
War II and the Holocaust. A visitor to
Poles and others, these might seemina
might take both comfort and pride in
Germany, especially one whose relatives
tionalistic demands-as they might well
(them. Not 80 fast, Helmut The Cold War
perished in the Holocaust, cannot help
be-aut they are no different from what
may be over, but in certain neighbor
staring at people on the street Sand
other countries would ask71
hoods World War II is still being fought
wondering about them: have they
The problem for Germany
that
Journalists are warned not to put too
changed? do that on every visit, and in
ordinary manifestations of nationalism
much faith in polls. They capture public
my imagination, put them in uniform.
will be viewed as a return to the past.
opinion at particular moment and no
There: that's how they would look in
The German lunatic fringe will be ex-
more accurately predict the future than
military or: SS garb, There: that is
aggerated and the occasional victory at
does Nancy Reagan's astrologer. At this
Germany and nothing has changed.
the polls of a neo-Nar will be trumpet-
particular moment, Germany-both East
But a lot has changed. For almost half
ed 8 harbinger of things to come,
and West-is looking pretty good Indeed,
a century, West Germany has been
But other countries, including our own,
East Germans are streaming over the
democracy-an integral part of the dem-
have their lunatics, David Duke, the
border and being met by only the most
ocratic West, It has made reparations to
former Klansman, seat in the
understanding and charitable of (former)
Holocaust victims. West Germany-as
Louisiana legislature, but that did not
countrymen. Who cannot be moved?
opposed to East Germany-has never
signal the return of Jim Crow.
And Americans have been, According
ducked its responsibility for that enory
When such things happen in Ger-
to:s New York Times/ CBS News poll
mous crime, and indeed, it has taught its
many, Its high rating here
only 16 percent of those polled feared
young the truth of the Nazi period.
will surely plummet, and some people
Germany would once again try to domi-
contrast that effort with the experience of
will warn of the "old Germany, But it
nate the world. Americans are SO favor-
a young Mississippi woman I know. Not
is 8 "new Germany" they will, be
ably disposed to the prospect of German
until she saw the film "Mississippi Burn-
seeing It will be a nation acting much
reunification that even the World War II
ing did she realize what had happened in
like any other-having its parades,
generation has little apprehension.
the civil rights era in her own state:
saluting its flag and electing its occa-
Among persons 65 and older, 64 percent
No young West German could be 80
sional extremist, Moreover, it will be
were untroubled by reunification.
ignorant: But along with that education
a nation where patriotism had been
Let me make a prediction: It's only a
effort has come some resentment. A
repressed. As a result, it may surface
matter of time. until those favorable
college student I spoke with in Bonn said
very suddenly and rambunctiously. It
figures nosedive. That's because it's
her classmates had just about had it with
would only help the worst elements in
only a matter of time until Germany,
their national "guilt trip." They wanted,
Germany to apply a double standard
both East and West, becomes, well,
instead, to celebrate German accom-
to the entire nation.
Germany. I refer to a chauvinistic ren-
plishments and revive a patriotism that
Germany justifiably still remains on
aissance, an explosion of nationalism
has long been dormant,
parole, But if a united Germany is ever
that is bound to make both the United
Others in Germany are feeling patriotic
to take its place among nations it has to
States and Europe anxious. When that
or, if you will, nationalistic. When it
be allowed to act much like any other
happens whole lot of people are
comes to Poland, for instance Germans
nation, To treat it differently, to feeda
point
to
want them dead cared OF in
German
IFPA
dna
Defense Nuclear Agency
PROGRESS REPORT FOR
THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY
May 1 - June 30, 1989
Contract Number: DNA 001-87-C-0033
Policy Considerations Affecting
Nuclear Forces Modernization
United
The
Federal
Nethariands
Xingdom
Beigname
Republic
of
Germany
France
Italy
Submitted By:
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
675 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139
1612 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
1 May - 30 June 1989
Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
Table of Contents
Executive Summary
i
Implications for DNA and
Acquisition Policy
vi
Federal Republic of Germany
1
West German Perspectives of the
NATO Summit's Comprehensive Concept and its
Handling of the SNF Issue
1
The Future of SNF
5
The Vienna CFE Talks
6
Bundeswehr Restructuring and Personnel Issues
8
United Kingdom
13
British Perspectives on the NATO Summit
13
British SNF Modernization
14
The Bush CFE Proposal and U.S./British Relations
15
Defense White Paper: Major Procurement Themes
16
Labour Policy Review: Kinnock's Move to "Multilateralism"
22
SLD Defense Policy Statement
25
France
27
French Defense Council Decisions on Nuclear Weapons Procurements
27
The SNF Controversy and Hadès
28
French Views of the Current CFE Proposals
30
Defense Austerity and the 1992 Budget Guidance
35
The European Elections and the National Service Debate
39
The Netherlands
43
Fall of the Lubbers Government and Dutch SNF Perspectives
Leading to the NATO Summit
43
The Dutch "Shift Concept" Reflected in Summit Communiqué
44
Impact of the Government's Fall on Procurement
47
Prospects for the Next Dutch Government:
The European Elections in the Netherlands
51
Belgium
53
The NATO Summit and Arms Control Priorities
53
Procurement Issues and Defense Industrial Trends
55
European Elections and Belgian Coaltion Politics
60
Italy
62
Italy's Governmental Crisis and the NATO SNF Debate
62
Italian Views of the NATO Compromise
63
Implications for Italian Defense Reorganization
65
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
1 May - 30 June 1989
Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING NUCLEAR
FORCES MODERNIZATION
Executive Summary
Federal Republic of Germany
The SNF debate continues to be controversial in the Federal Republic of Germany, not-
withstanding the NATO Summit's compromise formula on Lance modernization and SNF
negotiations. Even if the present government coalition is returned to power in the 1990
election, it is increasingly doubtful that the Germans will take a decision on FOTL in the
1992 timeframe. Moreover, there is also the prospect that the West German government
will support opposition calls for an SNF negotiation that aims at an early reduction in the
number of nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missile launchers, down from their present
total of 88 to a number above zero, irrespective of progress achieved in the CFE negotiations.
The emergence of West German "sovereignty" as an issue in Alliance politics threatens to
become more important in the future, and, together with the growing importance of
environmental issues throughout all of Western Europe, may jeopardize Alliance decision-
making on future weapons modernization decisions, including TASM. In the Federal
Republic, support for a "Third Zero" option is widespread, although for many it is considered
only with regard to land-based surface-to-surface missiles and nuclear-capable artillery
deployments, and not dual-capable aircraft platforms.
West German criticisms of the Bush CFE proposals focused on the inclusion of troop ceilings
and aircraft platforms, although in the FRG there is widespread popular support for the
President's initiatives and the opposition parties are in favor of an agreement at the CFE that
includes both categories. Military opposition to the Bush proposals is based primarily on
fears that the inclusion of aircraft, for example, will dilute the focus of the talks, which, in
the military's view, must be the reduction of the Warsaw Pact's invasion capabilities. On
the question of troop reductions, some in West Germany fear that this will become a license
for the large-scale withdrawal from Western Europe of American conventional forces.
In the context of a prospective CFE regime, the West Germans are restructuring their ground
forces to emphasize highly mobile units based, in large measure, on the utilization of reserve
forces. For the West Germans, the prospective post-CFE force structures of the NATO allies
and the Warsaw Pact nations will imply a change in the scale of projected conflict
probabilities, in stark contrast to current planning assumptions that are based on expectations
i
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Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
of attack by large-scale and massed armored Soviet forces. In a CFE regime, West German
military analysts feel that the incentive for surprise attack may be increased and in this
circumstance nuclear weapons deployments will remain critical to war deterrence in Europe.
Britain
British perspectives on SNF continue to be shaped by Mrs. Thatcher's views of the
relationship between British strategic-nuclear forces and their contingencies for use, and
NATO's requirement for Selective Employment options in the context of Flexible Response.
It appears as if the Prime Minister is seeking to maintain distance between a forward battle
contingency in the FRG and the prospective destruction of British territory, in line with her
so-called "firebreak" thesis.
British concerns that West Germany may not be prepared in 1992 to come to a decision on
Lance modernization have helped to solidify a U.K. decision to sign an MOU with the United
States on TASM cooperation. A final decision by the British Government on which
technological option (related to TASM) to choose will be governed by assessments of the
best offset arrangements and cost/effectiveness issues pertaining to the incorporation of
British "front-end" and other technologies.
As is true elsewhere in Western Europe, however, TASM modernization will likely face
criticism in Britain, although the Government's decision to replace the aging British
stockpile of WE-177 free-fall bombs is likely to stand. Its major challenge may come from
budget austerity requirements which could sacrifice tactical nuclear aircraft programs to
stave off budget cuts to either Trident or conventional force modernizations. However,
because of the early decision on TASM cooperation with the United States, such a budget
contingency is not likely to occur.
The newly released Defense White Paper provides for little change in British procurement
priorities. NATO commitments, apart from the Trident program, account for the largest
single line items, and amount to 39% of the total spending in the procurement area.
France
On June 2 the French Defense Council agreed to a series of austerity measures designed to
stretch out and scale down major weapons procurements. While no major nuclear equipment
programs were shelved, there continues to be speculation that the S-4 mobile IRBM program
will be scrapped, in favor of the deployment of a ground-based variant of the M-5 SLBM,
to keep up-to-date the 18 launchers deployed on the Albion Plateau. There is also speculation
that the Hadès "prestrategic" nuclear weapons program will be reduced, or even cancelled,
if the President can be persuaded that its cancellation will not push the West Germans to
ii
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Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
foreclose a NATO option to modernize Lance, which, in turn, may be linked-from the
French perspective-to the willingness of the United States to sustain its troop commitment
to Western Europe.
In contrast, in conventional weapons procurement, the Defense Council decisions mean
delays in some programs like the PAH helicopter project and the construction of the Charles
de Gaulle nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, although it still is not clear whether the Socialist
government will, ultimately, decide to cancel the carrier modernization program altogether.
Over the next year, on the basis of cost-effectiveness studies, major force structure reor-
ganization decisions will be taken by the French. In this respect, it is widely speculated that
French ground forces may be reorganized to emphasize highly mobile structures and reduced
personnel ceilings.
The French Government hastens to point out that these austerity measures are in no way
related to Western CFE proposals and should not be taken as an impetus to rush toward an
agreement. At the CFE talks, the French continue to be opposed to the inclusion of aircraft
platforms, even in a second round of the negotiations, and, reject any notion that French
offe
forces are to be included in "NATO" cuts, preferring to categorize their capabilities as reserve
forces distinct from, but integral to, forces located in the "central zone," or the areas of the
Federal Republic and the Low Countries.
There is likely to be much political debate over the Government's austerity measures, and,
in particular, its decision to retain, for the moment at least, French "tactical" nuclear weapons
in the French inventory. There has never been great support in France for such systems, and
renewed debate in Parliament and the press over Hadès, for example, could erode the
widely-vaunted French defense consensus, which is much more fragile than is readily
understood in the United States.
French perspectives on defense issues, particularly nuclear weapons deployments in France,
and NATO Europe more generally, are diverse and much more complex than is widely
believed. As elsewhere in Western Europe, they are being subjected to influence as a result
of changed threat perceptions of the Soviet Union and an evolving conception of policy
priorities and French national interests. Thus, in the conceptualization of French interests,
arms control and environmental issues, for example, have emerged as central concerns in
the shaping of policy initiatives, as has the requirement to help to manage change in the
relationships between and among their Eastern neighbors and West European partners.
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
1 May - 30 June 1989
Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
The Netherlands
The fall of the Dutch center-right government on May 2, triggered largely by Liberal Party
in-fighting (and the growing dissatisfaction of the Liberals' over their junior status within
the coalition), raises the distinct possibility of a center-left Christian Democratic/Labor
coalition coming to power after the September elections. In terms of future defense planning,
such a coalition might lead, for example, to a greater willingness on the part of the Christian
Democrats to accept lower levels of defense spending and to press NATO toward early SNF
negotiations, in exchange for a more moderate Labor defense policy across the board
(including on SNF issues).
The ongoing Dutch role in helping to fashion a NATO compromise on SNF can be seen in
the degree to which the Summit communique incorporated major aspects of the SNF strategy
outlined by Foreign Minister van den Broek, which included: a call for unilateral Soviet
reductions to the NATO level; an opening of SNF negotiations after an agreement has been
reached on conventional force cuts in CFE; steps to ensure that such negotiations do not lead
to a "Third Zero"; and support for the updating of NATO SNF systems "where necessary".
The fall of the Lubbers Government has had the immediate impact of delaying major
procurement programs formulated by the Dutch defense ministry. Key programs now on
hold include the modernization of the Leopard I tank; selection of an attack helicopter for
the Dutch army; replacements for peacetime attrition in F-16s; the purchase of additional
Patriot air defense systems; and the purchase of the Crotale SAM system.
The outcome of the European Parliament elections in Holland suggests that a CDA/PvdA
successor to the fallen CDA/VVD coalition is, while probable, not inevitable. The Dutch
Labor party (PvdA) did not perform as well as had been expected, while the centrist CDA
turned in a strong showing with the Dutch electorate. Should these trends persist, and if
Labor Party centrists fail to gain adequate support among the rank and file for a more
moderate defense policy, Lubbers and the Christian Democrats may choose to govern once
again with a suitably chastened Liberal Party (which, nevertheless, continues to slide in the
polls).
Belgium
The center-left Martens government welcomed the formula for possible SNF negotiation
and modernization reached at the NATO Summit, although both major party blocs in the
current coalition - - the Christians and the Socialists - - would prefer to begin SNF talks in
the nearer term (even parallel to the CFE negotiations).
iv
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Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
While still opposing (for the moment) a "Third Zero" option, the Government also continues
to reject any "updating" of existing SNF assets that might significantly extend their range.
In this context, support in Belgium is weak for the deployment of air-launched stand-off
systems (such as TASM), which many on the center-left of the political spectrum believe
may violate the "spirit" - if not the letter - of the INF Treaty.
The Belgian Socialists - particularly the Flemish wing - still voice support for an ultimate
"Third Zero", and argue (with the center-left in West Germany) that such an option was not
foreclosed by the NATO Summit. In this formulation, negotiations toward a "partial
reduction" of NATO SNF are viewed primarily as an intermediate step toward the final
objective.
With the decision to procure the French Carapace ECM system for the Belgian F-16 fleet,
the Ministry of Defense has announced the last major systems procurement for 1989-90.
Although an American candidate was rejected in this competition (primarily due to the lack
of a sufficiently attractive offset package for Belgian industry), future areas of potential sales
opportunity include budgeted plans for the modernization of Belgium's Leopard I tanks and
field artillery, together with the acquisition of modern anti-tank, air-to-air, air-to-surface,
and surface-to-air missile systems.
Results from the elections to the European Parliament suggest shifting public support for the
parties in Belgium's governing coalition. Prime Minister Martens' Christian Socialists
faired well, while their strongest rivals in the coalition - the Flemish Socialists - faired
poorly. Also of note was a fall in support for the Flemish nationalist Volksunie party (now
in the government), support which shifted primarily toward the more extreme Vlaams Blok.
Belgian Greens also polled extremely well, while the Liberals in both language communities
continued their slide in popularity.
Italy
Italian defense perspectives emphasize internal security threats and "out of area" contingen-
cies, specifically Italy's interests in the Mediterranean basin and concern over the export of
Middle Eastern terrorism. On this basis, future Italian defense planning will revolve around
a defense model, called the Zanone Plan, that emphasizes power projection capabilities and
highly mobile ground forces structures.
However, the funding that is necessary to support the new Italian defense model is unlikely
to be forthcoming, and if anything, over the next several years, in line with the (former)
Government's priority to bring into balance Italy's deficit spending, Italian defense ap-
propriations are likely to be reduced. Already, a supplemental spending bill that authorizes
funds for major international collaborative programs, including Patriot procurement, EFA
V
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1 May - 30 June 1989
Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
funding and the NATO Frigate program, has been delayed in Parliament and is not likely to
be submitted for a vote in the near future.
On the SNF controversy in NATO, the Italians are generally supportive of the official West
German governmental position, including Bonn's attempts to tie SNF negotiations to the
CFE talks. In contrast to the official German governmental position, however, the (former)
five-party Italian governmental coalition is more skeptical of the deployment in Italy of
strike-tasked aircraft, and, on this basis, hopes that a CFE negotiation will preclude the
necessity for the redeployment of the American 401st F-16 squadron to Italy. This explains,
in part, the widespread Italian support for President Bush's CFE proposals.
The formation of a new Italian government is proving to be somewhat more difficult than
had been expected, largely because of the personality clash between the Socialist leader,
Bettino Craxi, and Christian Democratic leader Ciriaco De Mita. Craxi apparently favors a
partnership with either his friend in the Christian Democratic Party, Arnaldo Forlani, or the
CD Foreign Minister, Giulio Andreotti. In either case, Italian government policy on national
security issues is unlikely to change.
Implications for DNA and Acquisition Policy
General Political Observations
Political considerations will affect policy decision-making in NATO to a far greater extent
in the future than was the case in the past. Particularly with regard to nuclear modernization
issues, political considerations have become as important as military requirements in
delineating the parameters for Alliance deployment and modernization of SNF. In NATO,
this can already be seen in the context of the national debates over Lance and nuclear-artillery
modernization. In future, it will be apparent especially in the context of the CFE talks and
the broad European desire for early SNF negotiations. Clearly, European political objectives
and policy perceptions may impose upon U.S. and NATO planners real constraints in terms
of SNF and force deployment contingencies.
Environmental issues, too, will have a greater role in shaping European defense policy
options, from restraints on low-level flying to limitations on troop maneuvers in protected
areas. Together with a greater West German sensitivity to sovereignty issues, environmental
politics will have implications for NATO planning, including, possibly, TASM deployment,
depending on how the issue is presented by the United States and Allied leadership.
Few West German political analysts think that TASM modernization will be any less difficult
to achieve than Lance modernization. Already members of the "left" have raised opposition
to TASM on the basis that its deployment would be a circumvention of the INF Treaty, an
vi
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Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
argument that is shared by many left-of-center politicians in other NATO countries (includ-
ing those examined in this Report).
SNF
The NATO agreement on SNF, set forth in the joint communiqué document issued at the
Summit, represents a fragile consensus among national views on the SNF issue that continue
to diverge. Significant, however, is the widespread support throughout each of the countries
reviewed in this report for the U.S. CFE proposals set forth by the President at the Summit.
It is necessary for the United States to maintain the perception now held in Western Europe
that it has seized the initiative at CFE. This perception will help to stall pressure for
negotiations on SNF before a CFE agreement is finalized.
In many respects, the prospects for a positive decision on Lance modernization are decreas-
ing, and even if the current government coalition in the FRG is returned to power in the 1990
election, its support for FOTL is questionable, given widespread public opposition to
ground-based short-range nuclear weapons deployments on West German soil.
It may be that the easiest route toward a more stable NATO consensus on nuclear weapons
deployments lies in TASM and enhancements to DCA survivability. Because TASM could
be deployed with the air forces of a number of NATO European countries, it would not single
out West Germany as the only deployment country. By the same token, the range of a TASM
stand-off system would make possible attacks launched against targets deeper in Warsaw
Pact territory (perhaps even in the western Soviet Union), thus obviating West German fears
of deploying a system capable of being targeted only against sites in East Germany.
Yet, TASM modernization is not without potential pitfalls. A number of leading West
European officials and party leaders in most of the countries reviewed in this study argue
that an extended-range (400 km or over) TASM would violate the spirit of the INF Treaty.
Others oppose TASM because they reject the necessity of modernized SNF for NATO, based
on widespread opposition to "nuclear warfighting" concepts. In Western Europe, today,
there is a strong, popular and analytical attachment to "massive retaliation" as the favored
deterrence strategy for NATO. So, too, a growing number of West Europeans endorse a
"minimal deterrence" concept based on a low nuclear threshold in NATO. This conception
is driving West European arms control perspectives, as well, and provides a basis for
rationalizing defense budget cuts, especially in ground forces structures.
Recent announcements concerning the defense budgets of many of the countries reviewed
in this Report suggest a continuing trend of reduced growth rates throughout NATO Europe,
despite a renewed commitment to 3% real growth per year. For reasons ranging from the
fall of government coalitions to the reordering of budgetary priorities to emphasize spending
vii
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Federal Republic of Germany
In the second quarter of 1989, West German defense debate focused on the Alliance controversy
over short-range nuclear forces (SNF), the NATO Summit and the U.S. and Soviet arms control
proposals presented at the CFE talks. During this period the Federal Republic hosted state visits
by President Bush and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. In June, the new budget
figures for the Bundeswehr were released and discussion of Bundeswehr planning attracted
considerable attention from FRG defense analysts, both in and out of government.
West German Perspectives of the NATO Summit's
Comprehensive Concept and Its Handling of the SNF Issue
While West German government offi-
West German officials, although pleased with the
cials expressed relief over the results of
unified picture presented by the NATO summit
the NATO Summit's SNF compromise,
agreement, are critical of the Comprehensive
they have been highly critical, in private
Concept. accusing it of lacking a "vision" of the
conversations, of the Comprehensive
future of East-West relations. Given the huge
Concept's perceived lack of visionary
economic power of the FRG relative to its size,
initiative. This is based on a view that
West German leaders are making increasingly
the future role of the Alliance lies more
clear their desire to be treated as a full partner in
in the political, and not strictly the
the Alliance and with the United States; these
military, realm, as a manager of East-
desires are manifested in more vocal demands for
West relations and, in particular, of the
full sovereignty on issues which attract public
arms control process, which increasingly
attention, namely SNF modernization, low-level
is identified as the most important agen-
flying, and NATO-maneuvers.
da item in the evolving East-West
relationship. In this context, and to a
considerable extent, West German policy officials, particularly those in the Foreign Ministry,
feel that the U.S. insistence on Alliance support for "updating as necessary" SNF deployments
has resulted in an inflexibility that detracts from the Comprehensive Concept's capacity to help
fashion a creative Alliance policy relating to the future of East-West relations. Many West
German politicians argue that NATO needs an agenda for East-West relations in which options
and consequences are drawn from a systematic assessment of the changes taking place in Eastern
Europe and the USSR. From this perspective, if NATO cannot adapt itself to such a role. its
institutional framework may be less and less relevant to emerging European interests and policy
objectives.
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Clearly, the role of the Federal Republic in the Alliance is under review across the spectrum of
political opinion in West Germany. Only the most radical political spokesmen today advocate
West Germany's withdrawal from NATO altogether, but this is less a reflection of a convergence
of opinion between the Alliance's supporters and its opponents, than an indication of a growing
sense that the Federal Republic has a leadership role to play in the Alliance. Based in part on
a more narrow assessment of West German national interests arising from the FRG's solid
economic performance in recent years, as well as from a sense that U.S. and West German
interests may not necessarily coincide in all areas, support for an expanded West German role
in the Alliance is a manifestation of the increasing importance of the "sovereignty" issue in West
German politics. Paradoxically, however, it is also part of the more amorphous, less well-
defined, sentiment in support of greater European unity and the need to put forward regional
perspectives on global economic and security issues. The European impetus is reflected in the
West German insistence on greater decision authority in the Alliance, to be sure. But it is also
manifested in the FRG's expressed desire for closer European collaboration in the defense area
on a bilateral and multinational basis (i.e., the Franco-German Brigade), including collaborative
projects under the auspices of the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) for weapons
acquisition (i.e., NATO Frigate) and R & D cooperation (i.e., MSAM). The emergence of a
new assertiveness on the part of the West Germans with respect to Alliance issues was reflected
dramatically in President Richard von Weiszäcker's remarks on the occasion of the fortieth
anniversary of the Federal Republic. In this speech, von Weiszäcker stated that West Germany
was no longer prepared to be treated as anything less than a full partner in the Alliance.
Furthermore, he noted that, while Europe may be leading the path toward change in a new
strategic situation on the Continent, the Federal German Republic is capable of playing a greater
role in Europe.
If von Weiszäcker's remarks are taken to heart, we must assume that in the future West German
perspectives on security issues may not always correspond to, and may sometimes even conflict
with, those of the United States. For NATO this may mean greater difficulty in the future with
regard to decision-making on issues that directly affect West German perceptions of Germany's
national interests. This is likely to be the case with respect to Alliance decisions on issues that
are seen as infringing on West Germany's sovereignty, such as low-level flying and NATO
exercises. Of higher visibility and, ultimately, of potentially greater significance to Alliance
cohesion will be the West German position on the continuing SNF debate, which by no stretch
of the imagination has been resolved as a result of the NATO Summit's compromise formula.
In fact, at the heart of West German criticisms of the Comprehensive Concept document is the
SNF issue, and British and American insistence on an explicit statement excluding the "Third
Zero" option. The West German position entering the pre-Summit negotiations had been laid
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out by Chancellor Kohl in his speech to the Bundestag on April 27, 1989 (see IFPA's DNA
Quarterly Report for January-April). In this speech, Kohl announced that any West German
decision on proceeding with a follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL) would not be made until 1992, and
would be dependent upon an evaluation, at that time, of "political and security policy develop-
ments, especially considering the results of all arms control negotiations." Specifically, Kohl
tied the decision to the achievement of three goals. First, there would have to be "increased
security at a lower level of nuclear and conventional forces as a whole." Second, the Alliance
would have to judge whether "binding agreements" with the Warsaw Pact had been concluded,
"eliminating the capability for surprise attacks and offensives designed to conquer territory."
Third, the Alliance would seek evidence of agreement creating "a greater degree of mutual trust,
based on increased transparency and calculability of military procedure." Additionally, Kohl
put forth the West German demand for "speedy" negotiations to reduce NATO and Warsaw
Pact deployments of SNF in Europe.
Holding to these positions against what was perceived in West Germany to be extreme pressure
from the United States and the United Kingdom to agree to modernization without arms control,
the coalition was able to make the argument domestically that it had fought up to the last minute
to ensure that the Allies took account of West German interests. The compromise reached in
Brussels, which delayed the FOTL modernization decision until 1992, tied the start of negotia-
tions on SNF to the conclusion and implementation of the first stage of CFE reductions, and
confirmed that the Alliance seeks only a partial draw-down of its SNF assets. In the Federal
Republic, in the immediate aftermath of the NATO Summit, the SNF compromise was portrayed
as a great victory. However, in recent IFPA discussions with West German officials, it became
clear that, from their perspective, the Alliance debate over SNF and Lance modernization was
far from over, and few defense analysts in the FRG were optimistic over the prospects for
deployment in West Germany of FOTL.
Even as Kohl, in his presentation on June 1 of the Government's view of the NATO Summit,
sounded an optimistic tone with regard to SNF, and in particular the Lance modernization
decision, he proceeded to say that, in this context, the phrase "for the foreseeable future," can
mean "only a relatively limited period of time," suggesting that the Alliance might eventually
decide that the conditions have been reached which make any or all of the SNF basing modes
obsolete. From Kohl's perspective, then, the NATO compromise formula fails to rule out the
possibility of significant change in Alliance deployments of short-range nuclear forces. In the
future, as the nature of the threat changes either as a result of unilateral Soviet initiatives or
because of a negotiated arms reduction regime, land-based SNF, in particular, could be
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configured differently than they are at present. For deterrence purposes, however, many West
German policy officials and defense analysts agree that the political utility of SNF deployments
will be critical even under a CFE regime that is characterized by conventional parity. From this
perspective, and under the circumstance of a CFE regime, ground-based nuclear surface-to-sur-
face missile launchers could, perhaps, be reduced to below the current NATO inventory of 88
(Lance) launchers, but not necessarily to zero, as is favored by some members of the government
coalition (principally members of the Free Democratic Party) and endorsed by the opposition
Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Greens.
On the specific issue of what the NATO Summit compromise means for the modernization and
future deployment of nuclear-capable surface-to-surface and other SNF systems, notably nuclear
artillery and aircraft platforms, differences of interpretation among the government coalition
partners, and between the government and opposition parties, have begun to be aired publicly.
For example, CSU Bundestag member Ortwin Lowack assesses the compromise to mean
Alliance agreement to end the drift toward a "Third Zero" option in short-range forces. On this
basis, he recently stated that by the NATO formula the "Third Zero" was "off the table."
Reflecting this view also is the NATO Secretary General and former West German Defense
Minister Manfred Wörner, who declared that the wording of the agreement, which accepted
only a partial reduction of SNF, meant exactly that: "partial means partial-and not complete."
However, in Bundestag debate, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP)
called upon the Federal Republic to shape the disarmament process so that there can be no
"compulsion for modernization" in the case of short-range nuclear forces, and that negotiation
of the "Third Zero" option should not be unilaterally ruled out by the NATO allies. It was widely
reported in the Federal Republic and other NATO capitals that Genscher had threatened to bring
down the government coalition over the SNF issue if negotiations on short-range nuclear forces
were not somehow sanctioned by the Alliance. Although the Summit wording leaves ample
room for interpretation, Genscher did come away from the meeting with an Alliance commit-
ment to drop the modernization issue until 1992, stating: "we have an agreement to negotiate
without an agreement to modernize." Having put off the modernization issue until 1992,
Genscher went even further in his efforts to discourage the potential for a positive decision at
that time. With regard to the language used at the Summit, Genscher commented that an
agreement to negotiate a modemization decision is not a decision to modernize. It remains to
be seen whether the FDP's relatively poor showing (5.6%) in the June European Parliamentary
elections will strengthen or diminish Genscher's objective of pushing for early SNF negotiations
and thereby obviating, according to his view, the requirement for FOTL. Nevertheless, one
thing is clear: while the European election results for the CDU were not extraordinary, attracting
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only 37.8% of the vote, they were not so disastrous as to prompt a Party decision to oust Kohl
from the CDU leadership. (It had been widely speculated in the Federal Republic that if the
CDU failed to attract 35% to 40% of the popular vote in the Parliamentary election, the CDU
might turn to a more charismatic personality than the personally unpopular Kohl).
However, despite the continuity of Kohl's leadership in the CDU, the prospects for a positive
FOTL decision are diminishing steadily in the Federal Republic. The opposition Social
Democrats and Greens, both parties of which held their respective voter support in the June
elections-37.3% for the SPD and 8.4% for the Greens-are opposed to SNF deployments on
West German soil, at least in the SSM and nuclear artillery categories, and both support
immediate calls for the start of negotiations on SNF reductions toward a "Third Zero" in parallel
with the CFE talks in Vienna. There is some division in the SPD on air-launched SNF systems,
but in general most party officials oppose TASM deployment, with some "centrist" defense
analysts supportive of DCA in the context of deterrence coupling and assuming no significant
reduction in Soviet SNF capabilities.)
The Future of SNF
Particularly since the signing of the INF Treaty,
Although the NATO summit agreement
West German and American differences over
included approval of only a partial reduc-
the roles of nuclear weapons in Alliance
tion of short-range nuclear forces, and
strategy have become more pronounced. In line
then only after implementation of a CFE
with general European thinking on this issue,
negotiated reduction, modernization op-
the West Germans, apart from some military
ponents still call for a Third Zero option.
officers and defense analysts, emphasize the
Chancellor Kohl himself envisages a time
political function of nuclear weapons in NATO
in the future in which NATO SNF could be
strategy and reject any conceptualization of
reduced below current NATO levels.
SNF as "warfighting" capabilities, as was clear-
ly evident in their reaction to Wintex. In this respect, the West Germans, like their European
counterparts, are more comfortable with the strategic logic of "massive retaliation" and are
highly critical of NATO's Selective Employment options for the "substrategic" use of nuclear
weapons. This perspective engenders criticism of SNF deployments, in particular because of
their disproportionate destructive potential relative to German territory (East and West) and the
lack of a "shared" risk that they bestow upon the other NATO allies, who do not themselves
host deployments of short-range nuclear weapons. In the Federal Republic, this has contributed
to a convergence of opinion across the political spectrum against Lance modernization and
nuclear-artillery deployments on West German soil. It is also reflected in the widespread support
for early SNF negotiations. Thus, the Chancellor's speech of April 27, calling for "early" or
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"speedy" negotiations, was a product of pressure from both the political "right" and "left" which
he could not leave unanswered, even if this set him into direct conflict with the United States.
Moreover, from the West German perspective, it is difficult to rationalize NATO's call for
modernization of SNF and, at the same time, support for the goal of deep cuts in conventional
forces in Europe. The rationale for short-range nuclear force deployments is widely seen in the
Federal Republic as compensation for Warsaw Pact conventional superiority. Thus, the logical
nexus between a CFE regime and SNF deployments would be a force mix based on lower levels
of short-range nuclear capabilities. It seems that in much the same way as NATO tied cruise
and Pershing II missile deployments to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 IRBMs, the West
Germans are seeking to tie Alliance SNF options to specific cuts in Soviet Warsaw Pact
conventional forces. Clearly, in the Federal Republic, it will be extraordinarily difficult to build
support for any SNF modernization, including FOTL and also TASM, in an era of perceived
progress on conventional force reductions.
There is little reason to believe that the opposition which coalesced around FOTL would leave
TASM untouched, especially given the extreme West German sensitivity regarding aircraft in
the current environment. Already opposition to TASM has been broached among the public at
large, based largely on the argument that the deployment of such systems would constitute a
circumvention of the INF treaty. It is conceivable that an attempt on the part of the Alliance to
introduce TASM as a routine technical improvement, after substantial consultation with the
FRG in advance, might lessen opposition, but it is impossible to predict that even this approach
would meet with success. Even those who are not opposed in principle to TASM question its
survivability, including the ability of its platform to penetrate enemy air defenses and to escape
aircraft interdiction on the ground, a concern that certainly diminishes its perceived credibility
as a deterrent asset. Broader popular opposition to TASM is also possible in the context of West
German concerns over FRG sovereignty. Calls for TASM deployment could help to coalesce
the divergent antinuclear and environmental groups opposed, in the context of the sovereignty
issue, to the large concentration of "foreign" troops on West German soil. Whatever the validity
of these observations, it is becoming increasingly apparent that TASM modernization may be
politically difficult to accomplish in an environment that now provides for the prospect of an
SNF negotiation and a CFE regime which includes aircraft platforms.
The Vienna CFE Talks
Because the future of negotiations on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces in Europe is
now clearly tied to the achievement of progress in the conventional force talks, West German
attention is more clearly focused on Vienna. Although the intent of President Bush's surprise
proposals for the CFE talks may have been to suggest to the Bonn leadership that substantial
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progress could be made toward an agreement
Some West German military analysts were
and its implementation-and thus toward SNF
critical of Bush's proposal to include
negotiations,-they also opened for discussion
aircraft in the CFE talks, and suggest that
the new issue areas of aircraft, helicopters, and
NATO concentrate in the first phase of the
troop reductions. Based on previous ex-
negotiations on the more significant prob-
perience in the MBFR, this expansion of the
lem of ground forces.
CFE mandate is widely expected in West Ger-
many to slow down progress at the talks substantially, making it unlikely that Bush's six-month-
to-one-year deadline can be met. Nevertheless, Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher
were obviously relieved that President Bush had found in the CFE a means of mitigating the
NATO dispute over "early" negotiations on SNF and of wresting the arms control initiative
from Gorbachev, even if only temporarily.
In early assessments of the Bush proposals, West German defense analysts were critical of two
aspects: the inclusion of troop reductions and aircraft platforms (although on the aircraft issue
the political leadership is divided, with public opinion and the opposition parties strongly
supportive of this element of the President's CFE initiative). Thus, while members of the CSU
and some CDU politicians oppose the inclusion of aircraft platforms in the CFE, even in a second
round negotiation, on the basis that this will dilute the primary focus of the talks (which should
be directed toward the Warsaw Pact's ground force invasion capabilities), the leadership of their
coalition partner, the FDP, endorsed the Bush initiative, arguing that combat aircraft represent
an area of Western superiority which must be considered in a CFE force reduction regime, if
the West is to be perceived as serious about its arms control efforts. With regard to the platforms
for inclusion, the West German Defense Ministry believes that the CFE proposals should be
confined to land-based aircraft (but including land-based West German naval air assets-i.e.,
Tornado, which Foreign Minister Genscher is said to have already conceded to the Soviet
Union). However, notwithstanding the inclusion, for planning purposes, of their land-based
Tornado assets, defense planners in Bonn continue to insist that the Alliance must not allow the
CFE negotiations to affect NATO's structural combat capability. Thus, one West German
working proposal is to include only land-based aircraft and the West German Tornados, in the
second phase of the negotiations, while first focusing on combat helicopters. In this way, the
Defense Ministry may hope to diffuse the DCA issue. In other words, the Germans are
considering a proposal that aims at finding a common Alliance position on aircraft by emphasiz-
ing cuts in combat helicopters (together with personnel) in the first phase, and accepting, in
principle, negotiations on fixed-wing aircraft at a later time.
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Bundeswehr Restructuring and Personnel Issues
In the context of the manpower issue, the
Bush and Soviet CFE proposals have ob-
Arms control agreements, demographic pres-
vious implications for future Bundeswehr
sures, and budgetary restrictions will all play
planning, and the force structure options
a part in shaping future Bundeswehr force
being discussed at the Defense Ministry are
structure; the Bundeswehr of the future will
said to be taking into account possible arms
rely ever more heavily upon reserve units.
control outcomes. While it is anticipated
that West German ground forces will continue to emphasize the Brigade/Division/Corps
structure that is currently the basis of West German defense planning, there are likely to be
changes (restructuring) in the active strength-reserve forces ratio in some units. There also is
likely to be created a new "Ready Reserve" that will be structured to fill short-falls in personnel
created in active force units which are not manned at optimal levels. Clearly, from the West
German perspective, one of the implications of a CFE agreement will be to put a premium on
highly ready, limited, force structures, with a greater reliance on reserve force structures.
FRG PROCUREMENT PLANS
Agreement between FRG and France on 3 Joint Projects
»MBB and Aerospatiale to develop fibre optic guided missile for aircraft and helicop-
ters; to be named Polypheme, and having an IOC of 1999
New fire control system
Optical equipment for third-generation anti-tank missile
FRG will purchase five Signaal multi-beam acquisition radar for targeting (SMART)
for its Type 123 frigates
MBB joins GeneralElectric (USA), Aeritalia, Ferranti (UK), and Electronique Serge
Dassault to bid for NATO Battlefield Information Collecting and Exploitation System
(BICES)
CAE (Canada) selected to develop testbed simulator providing low-level flight training
for Tornado; CAE also selected to upgrade seven existing simulators
FRG relents on demand that German company be granted contract for maintenance
of aircraft for multi-service electric warfare group; decision now left to NATO Manage-
ment and Supply Agency (NMSA)
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Together with the establishment of cooperative Confidence and Stability Building Measures
(CSBMs), the resultant CFE force structures imply a change in the scale of projected conflict
in stark contrast to current West German planning assumptions that are based on expectations
of attack by large-scale, massed, Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces. In a CFE regime where inspections
and rapid challenges are the norm-and limited forces structures the result-many West German
military analysts feel that the incentive for surprise attack may be increased and not diminished
in the European theater.
Moreover, in the context of the discussions at the CFE talks, and against the background of
prospective defense budget cuts, West German defense planners are engaged in a detailed study
of future Bundeswehr structures and personnel ceilings. It is interesting to note that in a briefing
received by IFPA personnel from members of the Planning Staff (of the Defense Ministry), the
West Germans, in their working numbers, (in the aircraft category), appear to include all NATO
personnel, including naval forces manpower. The accompanying table reflects the planning
assumptions of the West Germans related to their assessment of the Western and Eastern CFE
proposals. With the content of the Bush proposals and the U.S. agreement to include troop
ceilings in the CFE discussions, the West Germans are grappling with means to maintain an
active force component end-strength of 450,000 up to the end of the century. Already facing
domestic opposition to his policies on SNF, Chancellor Kohl announced that the Coalition had
decided to postpone for three years the planned extension of military service from 15 to 18
months. The extension for conscript personnel had been a highly contentious issue in West
German political circles and Kohl was under a great deal of pressure, even within his own party,
to postpone the military-supported initiative. (See Table II for survey results of recent West
Table II
POLL RESULTS
In your opinion, who is performing the more important service for Society on the whole: a young
man who performs military service as a soldier in the Bundeswehr, or someone who per-
forms civilian service, in a nursing home or old peoples home, for example?
1981
1988
Person Entering Bundeswehr
24
19
Person Performing Civil Service
23
36
Same
46
40
Undecided
7
5
9
West German View of theEffects of the
Warsaw Pact CFE Proposal (23 May 89)
NATO
Warsaw Pact
Category
Upper Limit
Current Level
Reduction
Current Level
Reduction
Percentage
Percentage
Personnel
1.35 mil.
2.93¹ mil.
1.58 mil.
54%
4.07¹ mil.
2.72 mil.
67%
Combat Aircraft
1,500
4,740
3,240
68%
8,208
6,708
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80%
10
Combat Helicopters
1,700
2,627
927
35%
3,664
1,964
53%
Tanks
20,000
22,809
2,809
12%
50,000
30,000
60%
24,000
17,739
2)
2)
Artillery
42,715
18,715
44%
APCs
28,000
28,610
610
2%
55,800
27,800
50%
1 May 30 June 1989
1) Includes land, air, and naval forces; for the Warsaw Pact, also includes special troops.
2) Estimated at 6.261, theoretical reduction of 36%.
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German attitudes on Bundeswehr service and public attitudes toward the military in general.)
The effect of this decision will be a drawdown in the country's active force strength unless
collateral measures are taken, including a tightening of permissible exemptions from service, a
lowering of medical entry standards, and the collateral use of men who participate in local "fire
brigades" to fill out undermanned units. According to members of the Defense Planning Staff,
the West Germans have some breathing space on this issue, probably until the end of the century,
because there are still enough reservists to fill in active units that could be mobilized in a wartime
contingency. By West German calculations, there is also a pool of approximately 300,000, men
who have received military deferments, but who would still be eligible for mobilization if called.
Nevertheless, the Bundeswehr structure for the year 2000 is based on projections of a reduced
active force strength and a greater reliance on reserve force structures, as was discussed above
in the context of West German thinking about a post-CFE environment in Europe. Also as noted
above, West German thinking with regard to future force planning hinges substantially on the
assumptions being made about the CFE and the prospective SNF negotiations. There is, from
the West German perspective, no doubt that under the current CFE proposals, the large scale
Soviet offensive capability will be reduced dramatically if the current Western proposals are
implemented. At the same time, there is likely to be a political perception of a reduction in the
Soviet threat even if Moscow's ability to implement an attack against Western Europe will
remain. Under these conditions, the West German military, as well as members of the Defense
Ministry's civilian bureaucracy, question their ability to fashion, together with NATO, a force
posture that will meet the defense and deterrence needs of the twenty-first century.
In late June, this was placed further into question as a result of the agreement reached by Defense
Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg and Finance Minister Theodor Waigel on the level of defense
spending planned for the 1990 national budget. Stoltenberg's initial request for DM 55.3 billion,
($28.43 billion) which would have represented a 4.7% increase over last year's expenditures,
was cut to DM 54.47 billion, ($28.00 billion), or an annual increase over FY89 funding of
approximately 2.2%. Stoltenberg has characterized the agreement with Waigel as a "tolerable
and satisfactory compromise for the Bundeswehr," despite the fact that the proposed increase
does not out-pace inflation and does not meet the 3% level approved by NATO defense ministers
(including Stoltenberg) in Brussels in late May. Strong FDP resistance to substantial increases
is said to have led to agreement on the lower figure. The full cabinet is expected to meet to pass
the FY90 budget on July 5, 1989.
According to the new spending figures, approximately DM 400 million ($210.5 million) will
be programmed for incentives to enhance the attractiveness of military service, in order to
increase the number of soldiers deciding to remain in the Bundeswehr after the mandatory
15-month term. Among other items, these incentives will also include modernization of
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barracks and increased emphasis on practical training. Equipment procurements will have to
be reduced in this austere budget environment, with reductions in credits anticipated for the
West German contribution to EFA and other air defense modernization programs. The West
German Navy faces similar cutbacks. In an appearance before the Bundestag's Defense
Committee in May, Inspector General, Admiral Mann (the FRG equivalent of the U.S. Chief of
Naval Operations) described the cuts he is prepared to make in naval forces to meet financial
constraints. These include decisions to close one half of the Navy's bases located on the Baltic
and North Seas, including those in Flensburg and Cuxhaven. In addition, according to Admiral
Mann, by the year 2000, only 80 of the current 188 ships will remain in service, while the number
of men serving in the fleet will fall from the current 38,700 to approximately 20,000 in the year
2005 to meet the projected budget austerity measures.
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United Kingdom
British Perspectives on the NATO
Summit
British governmental perspectives on SNF are
Most significant among defense-related
driven by Mrs. Thatcher's desire to maintain
developments in the United Kingdom
distance between Britain's strategic options and
during May and June was the Thatcher
NATO's selective employment policies.
Government's insistence on a near-term
system-specific decision for a successor
to the Lance missile and its continued opposition to East-West negotiations on short-range
nuclear forces (SNF), a position that Prime Minister Thatcher pressed vigorously in the weeks
leading to the NATO Summit. At the Summit itself, Mrs. Thatcher remained unalterably
opposed to a "Third Zero" on short-range nuclear systems. Thus, in the agreement that emerged
from the Summit, Britain was widely perceived to have made significant concessions in the
interests of Alliance unity; yet, Mrs. Thatcher continued to assert, to an increasingly skeptical
British public, that Britain had secured its most important objectives in the final NATO
communique by staving off a negative SNF modernization decision and ensuring that the "Third
Zero" was not a near-term Alliance option.
The Prime Minister's "hardline" on the SNF issue can be seen, in part, as a response to her
perception that the Bush Administration might become so concerned with the achievement of
a NATO-wide consensus that major British interests-specifically, the maintenance of an
up-to-date short-range nuclear forces element of the NATO force posture-would be pushed
aside. It can also be assessed in the context of British fears of West Germany's drift toward
"neutralism", and Mrs. Thatcher's concerns over what she has called the "mindless" rush toward
arms control. On the surface, the British Government's strategy was successful, with the
Alliance decision to push off but not foreclose, until 1992, a decision on the "introduction and
deployment" of a Lance successor. However, in fact, Foreign Office analyses of the Summit's
compromise formula are less optimistic about the future prospects for a Lance modernization,
and, in this context, Foreign Office experts were relieved that the Summit Formula for endorsing
SNF negotiations at least precludes, according to their understanding, the "Third Zero" option.
This latter point was particularly important to Mrs. Thatcher, who, during the course of the
Summit wrangling on the language of the Communiqué, forced the NATO heads of state to
agree that the "Third Zero" is not an option for NATO under present conditions. Even through
the condition that CFE implementation must be "underway" prior to the initiation of SNF
negotiations was a weaker formulation than Thatcher would have preferred, the Prime Minister
stated clearly that her understanding of the clause was that "not a single missile can be taken
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out until the whole conventional agreement has been implemented." Mrs. Thatcher's views on
the SNF issue are clearly shaped by her perspectives of the relationship between British strategic
nuclear forces and NATO short-range "tactical" nuclear capabilities. In line with her "firebreak"
analysis (which reportedly sought to establish a barrier between NATO's selective employment
options and the requirement for use of British strategic nuclear forces), Mrs. Thatcher apparently
is seeking to maintain distance between a forward battle contingency in the FRG and the
prospective destruction of British territory. Mrs. Thatcher's critics have been quick to point out
her efforts to separate Britain from its European NATO allies on the SNF issue, and, in
Parliamentary debate after the NATO summit, both opposition Labour Party members and
"centrist" Social and Liberal Democrats criticized the Government's "hard-line" stance on the
Lance modernization and SNF negotiations issues.
British SNF Modernization
In the context of British concerns that
the West Germans may not, in 1992, be
British concerns that West Germany may not be
in a position to go ahead with a modern-
prepared to come to a decision on FOTL have led
ization decision on Lance, and holding
to their signing of an MOU on TASM with the
United States.
to a view of deterrence that emphasizes
NATO's escalatory options, the British
government is continuing its own SNF force modernization program, based on the procurement
of a long-range stand-off strategic missile capacity. In this regard, in early May, Defense
Minister George Younger announced that Britain's range of choices for a new generation
nuclear-tipped tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM), to be deployed on the Tornado GR-1,
would not be based on collaboration with the French utilizing their air-to-ground medium-range
missile (ASMP) technology base. Younger pointed out that the French system was "not suitable
for [British] needs either in timing or range." Though no mention of a specific selection choice
was made in the Statement on the Defense Estimates (the annual White Paper), which was
released in June, the British government has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the
United States on collaboration for the development and procurement of TASM to replace the
U.K.'s ageing stockpile of WE-177 free-fall bombs. According to British MOD officials,
Britain favors two U.S.-developed systems that are in competition for selection as the British
choice for TASM: the Boeing-developed Short-Range Attack Missile "T" (SRAM-T), a tactical
variant of the SRAM-2; and Martin-Marietta's Supersonic Low Altitude Target (SLAT) system.
A British decision between these two systems will hinge on a number of considerations, primary
among which will be the offset arrangements for British industry and the cost/effectiveness
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related to the incorporation of a British "front end" (i.e., warhead technologies) and adaptations
to the Tornado airframe..
As is the case elsewhere in Western Europe, TASM modernization is not without its critics in
Britain, and has the potential, therefore, for attracting widespread public opposition, as did
British acceptance of cruise missile deployments in the late 1970s. Against criticisms that
TASM deployment would be a circumvention of the INF Treaty, the British government has
defended its decision to move ahead on TASM on the grounds that the Soviet Union has not
curtailed its continuing modernization of Warsaw Pact SNF capabilities. More to the point, the
Thatcher Government has countered that: (1) as an air-based system, TASM does not fall within
Treaty constraints, which apply only to land-based INF systems; and (2) the range of a British
TASM would, in any case, be under the 500 km limit established by the INF Treaty. However,
arguments such as these are not convincing to diehard opponents of SNF and, as a procurement
decision appears to be imminent, popular and political opposition to a British government
decision is likely to increase for several reasons. First, as will be more closely examined below,
the Thatcher government is wary of President Bush's proposal to include combat aircraft in CFE
negotiations, and has already announced that its DCA are exempt from consideration in the
negotiations. Yet, in Britain, the inclusion of aircraft in the CFE talks is a popular initiative,
and the Government's interest in TASM may be seen to fly in the face of NATO negotiations
policy. Secondly, British involvement in TASM development is likely to be opposed as well
because of its perceived contribution to NATO's nuclear "warfighting" options and, in par-
ticular, its ability to target aimpoints located on Soviet territory. In addition, the potential
expense associated with modernization of aircraft systems, the survivability of which is in
question in light of Soviet preemptive strike assets and the evolution of Soviet air defense
capabilities, could attract opposition from those who do not necessarily oppose the TASM
system concept. In a budget constrained environment, tactical nuclear weapons programs may
not receive the support that conventional weapons procurements, especially naval systems,
might, and-given that the Trident is a "sacred cow"-budget cuts in the tactical nuclear area
may be easier to effect than would cuts in the British Army of the Rhine, whose forward
deployment in West Germany provides tangible evidence of Britain's European interests.
The Bush CFE Proposal and U.S.-British Relations
Across the British political spectrum, President Bush's proposals for the CFE talks-known as
the "Conventional Parity Initiative"-were well received. Martin O'Neill, Labour's shadow
Defense Minister, characterized the Bush initiative as "the first really constructive attempt by
the Bush Administration to address the challenges which Gorbachev has placed before the
Alliance." Former Labour Defense Minister John Gilbert welcomed the linkage Bush had
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1 May - 30 June 1989
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established to "very drastic Soviet conven-
Bush's CFE proposals were welcomed across
tional cuts," and Paddy Ashdown, leader of
the British political spectrum, although the
the centrist "Democrats," hailed the Bush
proposed inclusion of DCA in the talks is con-
proposals as "an historic moment which
troversial and opposed by some in the Conser-
must not be wasted."
vative government.
Perhaps the coolest reaction to the Bush
proposals came from the Prime Minister herself, who voiced concern over both timing and
content. While crediting the Bush proposals as having "transformed" the Summit, Mrs.
Thatcher stressed the need for NATO to retain adequate levels of dual-capable aircraft in its
force structure, an objective that she feared might be compromised by the President's call to
include combat aircraft in the CFE mandate. The Prime Minister also called for a clause in any
potential CFE agreement requiring the destruction, and not merely the removal, of weaponry,
for aircraft moved simply beyond the Ural Mountains, she noted, would still be only three hours'
flying time from Western Europe. So, too, Thatcher characterized as "very optimistic" the Bush
challenge to complete CFE negotiations within six months to a year.
Mrs. Thatcher's concerns over the scope of President Bush's proposals did not cloud the
atmosphere at the London meeting between the President and the Prime Minister in early June.
U.S. attempts to soothe British fears over a growing Washington-Bonn relationship, at the
expense of British interests, were met with repeated affirmations by Thatcher of the enduring
importance of the "special relationship." So strong were the Prime Minister's statements on the
importance of the U.S./U.K. relationship that they were widely interpreted in Britain as a
decision by the Conservative Party government to place loyalty to the United States ahead of
considerations of further European integration. In fact, Thatcher had said in formal remarks
that "[f]or us, loyalty to the United States is paramount because we share so many of the same
basic beliefs." Coming as it did less than two weeks before the European Parliament (EP)
elections, however, this statement was held by British commentators to underscore Thatcher's
opposition to significantly increased European integration. This interpretation contributed to
the Conservatives' poor performance in the EP elections, and set off a round of opposition
criticism of Thatcher's handling of the British-U.S. relationship.
Defense White Paper: Major Procurement Themes
Early May also saw the release of the British Government's annual Statement on the Defence
Estimates. This year's White Paper again defied long-standing calls, from both the Labour
ranks as well as from voices within the Conservative party itself, for a full-scale review of
commitments and capabilities by the Thatcher Government. Instead, the 1989-90 White Paper
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The defense White Paper provides for
proposed a continuation of the large majority of all
little change in British procurement
British equipment programs and force commitments,
priorities. NATO commitments,
cutting back in small increments where savings
apart from Trident, account for the
needed to be made.
largest single line items.
Overall British defense spending for 1989-90 was
announced in the White Paper to be $33.84 billion (at
an exchange rate of $1.68 = £1.00). This represents an increase of $1.6 billion over the previous
(1988-89) fiscal year, and an additional $294 million over 89-90 spending as projected in last
year's White Paper-which, while significant, is not nearly sufficient to compensate for inflation
in defense costs over the past twelve months. (Retail inflation in Britain currently stands at
7.9%, which alone would require an increase of $2.65 billion to stay even with last year's
projected expenditures.) Thus, the overall British defense budget for 1989-90 represents in real
terms a cut of 0.7%. Specifically, this has forced a cut of approximately $168 million on the
Royal Navy, while providing for small increases in Army and Air Force spending. Moreover,
in the area of manpower, Britain will increase spending on personnel by $504 million-but this
increase will go toward a total force level that will fall by 3,000 troops, to a level of 324,000.
Even given increased personnel expenditure, however, Britain's retention rates are falling, and
a number of combat units are operating under strength.
The White Paper sets forth an equipment procurement budget for 1989-90 of $13.9 billion,
which represents 41% of overall British defense spending (as shown in Figure 1) and an increase
of only $28.56 million over last year (when equipment procurement stood at 38% of total British
defense spending). These resources are to be allocated among the Services, General Support,
and Research areas. The breakdown of this allocation is seen in Figure 2. Significant major
projects in these major areas of equipment procurement include:
Royal Navy
two nuclear-powered fleet (attack) submarines
four conventional submarines
eight frigates (including four Duke-class Type 23 frigates, for the ASW mission, at a value
of $840 million)
British Army of the Rhine (BAOR)
a sixth and seventh regiment of Challenger
replacement of Rapier with the advanced Rapier-C
16 additional Lynx helicopters
17
Figure 1
The Divisions of the Defence Budget by Principal Heading 1989-1990
1
Works and Miscellaneous
stores and services
Forces Pensions
19%
6%
Civillan Pay
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The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
12%
18
Equipment 2
41%
Forces Pay and Allowances
23%
1 May . 30 June 1989
Notes
1 Percentage of equipment expenditure based on the last five years. The total adds up to 101% because of roundings.
2 Of which 75% to UK, 15% to collaborative procurement and 10% to overseas procurement.
Figure 2
The Main Divisions of the
Procurement Program 1989-1990
Air Equipment
Development
$1.08b
Production
$4.03b
7%
Production
26.1%
$2.31b
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The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
Land Equipment
15%
Research
Development
3.3%
4.7%
$719m
19
$502.3m
6.6%
Development¹
$1.01b
7.7%
General Support
25.5%
Production
Production
4.1%
$1.09b
$3.94b
Development
$631.7m
Sea Equipment
1 May - 30 June 1989
Note:
1) Including the cost of some HQ staff who are responsible for both research and development.
Figure 3
Estimated Costs of Defense
Commitments for 1989-1990
(in billions of dollars)
RAF Germany
(incl reinforcement
Central Front
forces)
6.741
1.741
Berlin
4.903
98
BAOR
(incl reinforcement
forces)
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The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
Maritime
4.015
3.174
20
Eastern
Atlantic
.84
Channel
Home Base
3.393
Other
1.274
Nuclear Strategic Force
1.795
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Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
An Analysis of Defence Resources
by Major Programs 1989-1990
Figure 4
5.7
Nuclear Strategic
0.6
Force
1.3
Naval General
11.9
Purpose Combat
122
Forces
7.0
17.0
European Theater
31.4
Ground Forces
14.2
0.9
Other Army
4.4
Combat Forces
3.5
17.4
Air Force General
19.0
Purpose Forces
5.3
2.2
Reserve and
Auxiliary
0.9
Formations
1.8
11.7
Research and
0.3
Development
14.0
6.7
18.1
Training
7.5
Equipment Support
5.2
and Associated
2.6
Facilities in the UK
21.0
War and Contingency
2.5
Stocks
18.8
Other Support
10.5
Functions
24.4
Expenditure as a percentage of the defence budget 1989-90
Service manpower as a percentage of estimated total average strengths
Civilian manpower as a percentage of estimated total average strengths
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Royal Air Force (RAF)
6 additional mobile radars for the UK air defense ground environment
15 additional Tornado ADV (air defense variant)
26 additional Tornado GR1 (strike version)
In addition, progress continues on the Trident nuclear deterrent force, which is to begin
replacement of the existing Polaris force in the mid 1990s. Two of the boats are currently under
construction, with the third (of a total of four) expected to be ordered by the British government
later this year.
In short, there are no surprises in the White Paper-especially in the absence of a complete
review of British defense commitments and capabilities. The cost of supporting British defense
commitments is illustrated in Figure 3. Clearly, the lion's share of Britain's defense commitment
has been, and continues to be, its contribution to NATO Central Front forces, which comprise
fully 39% of overall British expenditure on defense commitments (and is almost exactly twice
that spent on the defense of Britain's home territory). When these defense commitments are
divided further into major programmatic areas of British defense spending, as represented in
Figure 4, the preponderance of the NATO-European commitment becomes even more obvious.
British ground forces dedicated to the NATO central front take up fully 31.4% of overall service
manpower, and 17% of the entire British defense budget. The allocation of effort in British
defense spending illustrated in Figure 4 may be expected to guide the U.K.'s procurement
priorities for as long as the Thatcher Government continues in office.
Labour Policy Review: Kinnock's Move to "Multilateralism"
For its own part, the opposition Labour party, guided by its leader Neil Kinnock, completed in
mid-May its year-long review of Labour policies. Of primary importance in this effort was
Kinnock's determination to move the Labour party away from its long-held policy of com-
prehensive, unilateral nuclear disarmament in the event a Labour government assumed office.
Kinnock, á member of Britain's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) since his college
days, argued forcefully for the "unilateralist" position during the 1987 general elections, which
resulted in a crushing defeat for Labour and an unprecedented third consecutive victory for the
Conservative government of Prime Minister Thatcher. In the wake of this electoral disaster,
and with the Labour party wrenched between its "hard-left" elements and what remained of its
once-predominant centrist wing, Kinnock launched a full-scale review of Labour policies.
Central to this effort was his insistence that in order to present a credible alternative to the
Conservative government, Labour would have to move away from its "unilateralist" stance and
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toward a position that has become labelled "multilateralism." Instead of a unilateral elimination
of all British nuclear forces (as well as the closure of all nuclear bases on British soil), a
"multilateralist" Labour government would instead seek a denuclearized Britain through enter-
ing British forces into talks on strategic forces, presumably the START talks. While "multi-
lateralism" did not (and does not) represent a fundamental shift away from the primary
conviction of the Labour party that Britain should become denuclearized, the prospect of
adopting the new policy became the primary point of debate as the new Labour policy document
moved toward public release.
Ultimately, one week after its stunning success in the Welsh by-election in May, Labour's
governing board-the National Executive Council (NEC)-approved, by a 17 to 8 vote, the
new "multilateralist" policy. Major themes of the policy as adopted include:
All nuclear bases in Britain will be reduced, and eventually removed, under a Labour
government. While this represents a willingness to work out arrangements with NATO as
Britain moves toward denuclearization, it still is représentative of Labour's rejection of a
nuclear element to NATO's force posture.
A policy of "no first use" to be adopted with respect to Britain's nuclear capability.
Placing all of the U.K.'s nuclear weapons in East-West negotiations, with the intention of
eliminating them. Thus, instead of giving up "something for nothing"-the major criticism
of Labour's defense policy in the last election-Labour would now adopt a "something for
something" approach to scaling down British nuclear forces.
Within this framework, however, other Labour perspectives on defense and security issues were
made clear. Of note are the following:
Labour continues to oppose the modernization of NATO's SNF forces, and holds the view
that no convincing case has been made for NATO to take this step.
Labour indicates its agreement with the West German perspective that SNF weapons, "far
from constituting a deterrent to conventional war, actually make conventional war much
more likely by lowering the threshold of nuclear response and blurring the difference
between the use of conventional and nuclear weapons."
Continued rejection of NATO's doctrine of Flexible Response. Labour holds the view that
the first use of nuclear weapons would lead to uncontrolable escalation up to and including
and exchange of central strategic forces.
Support for a third zero. The Labour party believes that "the third zero should be made a
firm objective."
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Support for the objective of "elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000"-an
objective first enunciated by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev.
Unilateral abandonment of further testing of British nuclear devices.
Cancellation of the fourth British Trident submarine. (The third is slated to be ordered later
in 1989.)
The combination of what has been characterized as a "sweeping change" in Labour's policies—
particularly defense-and the party's dramatic successes in recent parliamentary by-elections,
has led to increasing speculation among analysts of the British scene that Labour may once again
be regarded by the British electorate as a credible governing alternative. In what appears to
be a two-track approach of his own devising, Kinnock has now sought to ensure the complete
adoption of the "new" defense policy by isolating the hard "left" of the party-which has
opposed the move to multilateralism-while suggesting through public comments a new
"pragmatic" approach by Labour to the possession of nuclear weapons. Examples of the
isolation tactic include, in addition to the vote approving the policy shift, the defeat of two
"left-sponsored" amendments to the policy document which would have adopted a "no use"
policy on British nuclear weapons, together with a repudiation of the U.S. strategic nuclear
"umbrella". With respect to public statements on nuclear weapons, Kinnock went so far as to
say in a speech to the Welsh Labour Party (of which he is a member) that he would never say
yes or no "if asked whether I would push the button." Such statements seemed intended to
increase in public perception the credibility of Kinnock's claim that the "multilaterialist" policy
represents a significant departure from Labour's 1987 defense platform.
However, Kinnock still must overcome a number of obstacles within the party before he can
claim to have completely brought about the change in policy. Before the new policy was even
unveiled, a member of the Labour "shadow cabinet"-Bryan Gould, responsible for trade and
industry-criticized the new policy, noting that "we have no intention of keeping a nuclear
deterrent either to use or to deter." The "hard left" of the party, meeting as the "Socialist
Conference," condemned Kinnock and his allies in the policy review as "new men with old
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ideas," and characterized the new "multilateral" policy as "a shambles." Many of the hard-left
trade union leaders-notably Ron Todd, head of the Transport and General Workers' Union
(TGWU) and a member of the defense policy review committee-have already indicated that
they will direct the weight of their block votes against the multilateralist position. In addition
to the TGWU, this list includes the Manufacturing, Science, and Finance Union. Supporters of
the new policy have included the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE), a major force
in the trade block votes. In fact, the change in defense policy has opened a breach in Labour's
trade union support, with potentially far-reaching consequences for the internal cohesion of the
party.
SLD Defense Policy Statement
During the same time, but with much less fanfare, the centrist opposition "Democrats" (or Social
and Liberal Democrats) presented their own policy statement on defense. During mid-May,
final drafting sessions were held on the SLD's policy document, entitled After the Cold War, in
which the party affirmed its acceptance of a nuclear element to deterrence (and criticized the
Labour party's failure to do the same). Even so, however, support is also expressed for the
deployment of Trident with fewer warheads, to be followed by a stage-by-stage negotiated
reduction of the British national deterrent force. The Democrats also express in their document
a clear opposition to the modernization of NATO SNF systems, and support the idea of a "nuclear
free zone" in Europe.
The document represented something of a departure from the Democrats 1987 election platform,
under which the party supported the cancellation of Trident. Response to its publication was
mixed, even within the party, which is itself the result of a merger between the old British Liberal
party and elements of the Social Democratic Party. For example, Meg Beresford-chairperson
of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and a member of the Democrats' defense
policy review committee-criticized the final document as "illogical and inconsistent." Beres-
ford, a member of the old Liberal party, represents a large antinuclear sector of the newly-merged
party, drawn from what was once the strongly antinuclear Liberals. At the same time, the party's
* The Labour Party is goverened in its convention through votes from both constituencies (the parliamentary
districts) and block votes from the British trade unions that have membership in the party. The trade union block
votes are a significant makeweight on a wide variety of party policy decisions, and have been a contributing
factor to the popular perception of the Labour party as controlled by the unions-a perception Thatcher has used
to her advantage on numerous occasions. Realizing this, Kinnock is presently attempting to change the structure
of the party's internal government, with the specific objective of reducing the impact of the trade union block
votes on party policy decisions.
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defense spokesman, Menzies Campbell, declared that the document represented a consensus on
the need to maintain a "minimum deterrent" under British control. There seems little doubt that
the defense policy statement will prove a source of contention when the Democrats hold their
annual conference in September-a meeting which will likely determine whether or not the
party will continue to remain both politically and financially viable.
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France
Over the last two months the French defense debate was focused on the NATO SNF controversy
and the NATO Summit meeting; the Conventional Forces Talks, including the Warsaw Pact
and Bush proposals; the Defense Council's military budget decisions; and the European
Parliamentary election debate, which in France turned largely on the issue of 'national service'.
Publication of Richard Ullman's article (in Foreign Policy) alleging closer U.S.-French nuclear
collaboration than generally was publicly known to exist, also prompted brief attention in French
defense policymaking circles. In general, however, the furor that might have been expected
never erupted in France-in part because of the timing of the article's publication, which
coincided with the NATO Summit meeting, and in part because of the Government's swift and
practiced response that admitted limited cooperation with the U.S., but denied that this in any
way affected negatively French independence in strategic nuclear technologies and policy. In
contrast, the outcome of the NATO Summit and President Bush's CFE proposals attracted much
commentary and debate in France, and, as with the French Defense Council's revisions to the
1987 guidance on force procurements, are influencing official and public perceptions of the
future requirements of the French deterrence posture.
French Defense Council Decisions on Nuclear Weapons Procurements
By far, the most immediate issue to affect the future
While no major nuclear equipment
composition of French military forces and their
programs were shelved, key
preferred deployment contingencies was the June 2
programs have been stretched out
decision of the Defense Council, headed by French
or delayed-including the Mirage
President François Mitterrand, to stretch out and
2000N and the M-5 SLBM-and the
scale down a number of major weapons programs in
S-4 IRBM SRM is likely to be
a series of austerity measures. While no major
scrapped and Hadès deployments
nuclear equipment programs were shelved, there con-
are uncertain.
tinues to be speculation that the S-4 IRBM and the
Hadès short-range nuclear missile will, ultimately, be
scrapped, if cost analyses of these programs demonstrate that monies can still be saved from
their cancellation. At the same time, several other nuclear programs were delayed or cutback,
including the Mirage 2000N program which will be reduced to three squadrons (down from
five) making for a reduction to 45 from 75 aircraft capable of carrying the ASMP air-to-ground
nuclear missile. In addition, the M-5 SLBM modemization program will be stretched out and
is not expected to be operational until the turn of the century. The M-5 is widely expected to
be tapped as the candidate system, in a ground-based version, for replacement of the older S-3
IRBMS, 18 of which are deployed on the Albion Plateau in the South of France. The prospective
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selection of the M-5 is largely for reasons of cost effectiveness; also significant is President
Mitterrand's own opposition to mobile, ground-based nuclear weapons (the S-4 program), and
the expectation that French Greens and other groups (such as members of the Communist (PCFs)
and Radical (MRG) Parties) will oppose the program and undermine the much discussed French
national defense consensus (which is already eroding), This decision is expected to be taken
this fall by the Defense Council which will also, probably, formally cancel the S-4 program.
Support for the S-4 program has never been forthcoming among members of the Socialist Party.
The program was originated by the conservative government of Jacques Chirac during the
"cohabitation" period of 1986-1988, and his defeat during last year's Presidential election
virtually signalled the end of the expensive mobile missile program.
With regard to the Hadès program, controversy has erupted between the offices of the Defense
and Prime Ministers, with the Finance Minister siding with Michel Rocard (Prime Minister) in
his effort to cancel the program, and President Mitterrand having to mediate between the two
on the issue. According to a discussion with Prime Minister Rocard's chief defense advisor,
Marisol Touraine, and with Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Jean-Pierre Chevènement's technical-
military counsellor, both the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister are staunchly committed
to opposite positions on the Hadès program, with Chevènement apparently prepared to resign
if Rocard persists is pushing for deep cuts in Hadès deployments or the cancellation, altogether,
of the program. Hubert Vedrine, President Mitterrand's chief security advisor, is also reportedly
skeptical of the Hadès program, but, like the French President, is apparently willing to consider
systems' deployment at a considerably reduced level. Vedrine sees this primarily as a means
to help push the West Germans into acceptance of a Lance modernization decision and systems
deployment in the early 1990's, provided a CFE agreement does not radically alter the deterrence
requirements for longer-range, ground-based SNF-and assuming that a SNF negotiation has
not obviated the requirement for a ground-based surface-to-surface system altogether.
The SNF Controversy and Hadès
Chevènement's position on the Hadès is derived from a conception of deterrence coupling with
the United States that considers the American strategic relationship crucial to West European
security, admitting implicitly that French nuclear forces by themselves may not credibly form
the basis of a broader West European deterrence posture. Perhaps, more importantly,
Chevènement's position on Hadès stems from an apprehension that a West German refusal to
deploy a follow-on system to Lance on West German territory would contribute to debate in
France over French nuclear systems and, thus, help to fracture the widely vaunted French defense
consensus. In this context it is important to note that neither Chevènement nor Rocard-nor
the French President, for that matter-appear to be interested in the military-operational
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contribution of SNF to NATO and French defense postures. In France, with the possible
exception of a few French defense analysts and a handful of military personnel, the value of
short-range nuclear force deployments lies not in their potential "warfighting" roles but in their
perceived contribution to deterrence and crisis stability. In French strategic thinking, SNF are
considered "prestrategic" systems whose use in a European contingency would be closely tied
to the employment of French (and other Western) strategic nuclear assets. Such a political
conceptualization of nuclear weapons, then, appears to provide the basis for the French defense
consensus, and has allowed even opponents of nuclear weapons deployments (for example,
members of the French Communist Party) to endorse the French deterrence posture. If pressed,
however, most French policy officials and defense analysts, not to mention public opinion,
would support only minimal strategic nuclear weapons deployments-and, indeed, successive
French governments since the Gaullist period, with the brief exception of the "cohabitation"
government of Jacques Chirac as Prime Minister and François Mitterrand as President (1986-
1988), have sought to down-play the role of shorter-range nuclear weapons.
Clearly, the President's Defense Council decision to retain, for the moment, the Hadès program
must be seen in the context of the NATO Summit's compromise formula on SNF modernization
and against fears that the Federal Republic of Germany is abandoning its linchpin role in the
Atlantic Alliance. The French preoccupation with the perceived neutralist drift of West
Germany has already prompted the current government to strengthen bilateral defense coopera-
tion with the FRG through the creation of a joint brigade (for potential employment in a reserve
role in a European contingency) and the implementation of exercises designed to bring French
conventional forces into a "forward defense" role in a European contingency. The contribution
of French short-range nuclear weapons in a European scenario is still problematic, with the
employment of 'tactical nuclear' weapons inextricably tied, in French strategic thinking, to the
protection of French national territory, and under the direct command authority of the French
President.
While refusing to be drawn into the pre-Summit controversy between Britain and the United
States, on the one hand, and West Germany, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Spain and Norway, on
the other hand, the French President has consistently said that whereas he opposes a "Third
Zero" option at the moment, he does endorse a delay in pushing for a NATO modernization
decision (on Lance) until 1992, as the West Germans wish. French interests in the NATO SNF
debate relate directly to French security conceptions, which are based on the perceived
requirement for the continued deployment in the European theater of American conventional
and "substrategic" systems (the NATO lexicon for SNF), both of which are viewed as essential
for deterrence coupling purposes and for the credibility of French nuclear force deployments
29
Institute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis
1 May . 30 June 1989
Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
themselves. Thus, the official French governmental position is not to oppose SNF negotiations,
as such, but to ensure that the "Third Zero" is not an option for NATO in the near future, so
long as Soviet SNF deployments outnumber those of NATO and before the CFE produces deep
cuts in Soviet-Warsaw Pact offensive nonnuclear capabilities. For the French President, and
for most French defense analysts, negotiations to reduce conventional forces deployed in the
central region of Europe continues to be the priority objective of East-West arms control
discussions.
French Views of the Current CFE Proposals
At the CFE, and in response to President Bush's arms
control proposal that was articulated at the time of the
The French government opposes
NATO Summit, the French have voiced several con-
President Bush's CFE proposals to
cerns. The first, and foremost, relates to the concep-
include aircraft platforms in the
tualization of French forces in the context of proposed
negotiations.
reductions for NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. France
rejects any notion that its forces are to be included in "NATO cuts," and prefers to categorize
French forces as European reserve capabilities-distinct from, but integral to, forces located in
the "central zone" or roughly the areas of the Federal Republic, plus the Low Countries. (The
Germans had long sought to resist this French conceptualization of a separation between their
forces and those of the Federal Republic; but, for the sake of the unity of the Western proposal,
the West Germans conceded to placing France in a concentric, if separate, zone from the FRG).
At the heart of the French CFE position is their perception of the autonomy of French defense
forces and probably, more importantly, their fear that through the "backdoor" French nuclear
forces might be compromised. This is partly the reason for the French insistence that aircraft
platforms be kept out of the CFE discussions.
The proposed inclusion of fixed and rotary-wing aircraft in the conventional forces talks may
also be seen as the basis of French objections to the Bush arms control proposals. According
to a number of French defense analysts, the real reason for the French opposition to the inclusion
of conventional aircraft platforms in the CFE is far more complex than just an apprehension
about the prospect of compromising French na-
The much-vaunted French consensus on
tional nuclear assets. Allegedly, it relates to
fears that inclusion of aircraft in the CFE will
nuclear forces is more fragile than it
occasion debate in France over the role of French
appears. In fact, it extends primarily to
French strategic systems; support for
tactical nuclear forces themselves, and perhaps
tactical nuclear systems is tenous.
contribute to a fracturing of the much discussed,
but little understood, French defense consensus.
30
Table I
Opinion Poll: European Views on Defense *
France
Great Britain
Italy
FRG
In taking account of the International and
economic situation, do you think the country
should:
Increase military spending.
**(9) 5
(17) 9
(8) 6
(4) 2
Maintain the present level.
(45) 43
(49) 54
(22) 19
(39) 36
Reduce military spending.
(35) 46
(27) 31
(62) 70
No opinion.
(11) 6
(7) 7
(7) 5
(1) 2
Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
Institute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis
(57) 61
The U.K. and France have their own nuclear
weapons. Personally, would you prefer to see
these countries:
31
Continue the enhancement of the
nuclear weapons.
10
4
1
2
Leave things as they are.
33
37
7
23
Reduce the importance of nuclear
weapons.
28
27.
20
28
Renounce nuclear weapons.
24
26
69
46
No opinion.
6
6
3
0
To ensure their defense the majority of Western
European countries are linked to the United
States through NATO. Do you believe that Western
Europe should:
Maintain their military relations with
the United States within NATO.
(26) 27
(41) 43
(19) 29
(54) 56
Build a common European defense, independent
from the United States within NATO,
(35) 37
(23) 23
(38) 42
(19) 26
Assume the entire responsibility for its own
1 May. 30 June 1989
defense.
(20) 21
(26) 23
(31) 27
(25) 17
No opinion.
(20) 15
(10) 11
(12) 1
(2) 1
This poll was conducted in 1989 by the OPTEN Institute, in cooperation with the U.K.'s ICM, Italy's ASM, and West Germany's Marplan. The survey was based on 1054 French
respondents, 1406 British, 1860 Italian, and 1801 West German. Respondents were all 18 or older.
.. Numbers in parentheses represent results from the 1987 poll.
Opinion Poll: European Views on Defense (continued)
France
Great-Britain
Italy
FRG
If there were a common European defense,
Independent from the U.S. and NATO, which of the
three possibilities In your opinion, would be
the major desirable?
Use the existing nuclear weapons of Great Britain
and France as a foundation for a European nuclear
defense, but without the participation of the
other countries in their development or in
determining how they are to be employed.
(8) 11
(13) 18
(3) 1
(12) 30
Build a common European nuclear defense capability
with all countries that would like to participate
in the development and use of nuclear weapons.
(35) 36
(35) 30
(14) 11
(14) 21
Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
Institute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis
Build a common European defense withoutnuclear
weapons and reinforce conventional weapons.
(25) 33
(35) 37
(70) 67
(29) 46
No opinion.
(31) 21
(17) 16
(13) 20
(46) 4
32
If the military threat of the USSR diminishes,
do you believe that Western European countries must:
Reduce their defense effort in the same
proportions.
34
43
59
66
Maintain a precautionary defense effort at
the same level that now exists.
54
48
31
33
No opinion.
12
9
9
1
Do you believe that the leader of the USSR,
Mikhall Gorbachev, truly believes In arms control?
Yes
41
(31) 74
65
(31) 76
No
36
(57) 12
18
(68) 23
No opinion
23
(12) 15
17
(1) 1
Do you feel that the U.S. President, George Bush,
truly believes In arms control?
1 May 30 June 1989
Yes
29
(35) 38
36
(3) 55
No
38
(52) 27
27
(69) 42
No opinion
33
(13) 35
37
(1) 3
Institute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis
1 May - 30 June 1989
Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
In speaking with numerous French government officials and defense analysts, it is clear that the
much-vaunted French defense consensus is more fragile than we in the United States understand.
While there is great support for the French deployment of strategic submarine forces in the
context of the East-West deterrence calculus, there is less and less support for the deployment
of shorter-range nuclear weapons systems. This results from a diminished threat perception of
the Soviet Union, but also because of a general abhorrence of "nuclear warfighting" concepts-
and, at the same time, a renewed interest in environmental concerns. Several recent public
opinion polls confirm the tenuous state of the French defense consensus. When asked, for
example, if they thought France should continue to develop its nuclear armament systems, only
10% of Frenchmen responded favorably, while 33% favored the status quo (no modernization,
but deployment of existing capabilities ); 28% thought that less importance should be placed on
French nuclear weapons development; and, 24% said that they thought that France should
renounce, altogether, its nuclear capability. These results parallel those of a televised national
survey (on French channel AN 2 on May 31, 1989) that found, in response to a question on
French deterrent forces, a majority (52%) still favored the deployment of strategic nuclear
weapons at present levels, but a growing minority (34%) favored renunciation of all French
nuclear weapons. (Fourteen percent of those polled had no opinion.) More surprising, perhaps,
were the French responses to the question (published in L' Express, on June 9, 1989) of whether
France should use its nuclear weapons to defend French territory. Fully 56% of the respondents
stated that, in case of the entry of Soviet troops in France, the Government should "negotiate"
and offer no armed resistance. (The accompanying Table I highlights French (and related
European) responses to the L' Express poll.) In light of these trends in the public perception of
the acceptability of nuclear force deployments in France, and against a diminished perception
of a Soviet threat- 41% of the French sincerely believe that Mikhail Gorbachev wants to lower
the level of armaments in Europe, as opposed to 29% who believe that President Bush is sincere
in this objective- and a growing desire to have the French government spend less money on
defense and more on education and health care, the French may seek to use the arms control
negotiations at Vienna to achieve defense economies in programs that are too costly. Indeed,
in the French view, it is this motivation that drives the American CFE proposal. French security
analysts have observed that the Bush proposal to include aircraft, albeit in a second round
negotiation, may be the result of a considered American decision to withdraw several aircraft
wings from Europe for budgetary or political reasons, such as the Italian opposition to the siting
of the U.S. 401st F-16 squadron on Italian soil. At any rate, French interests at the CFE are
clearly related to future force structure planning, the legitimacy of which could be placed in
question if NATO's capacity to effect a credible forward defense is eroded by the arms reduction
regime agreed to at the CFE.
33
Institute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis
1 May 30 June 1989
Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
Table II: French Views of the CFE Proposals' Limitations
NATO
WARSAW PACT
Current Total1
Proposed Limits
Proposed Limits
Unilateral
Current Total1
Reductions
United States Troops
317,000
275,000
Soviet Troops
(2)
240,000
600,000³
Number of those troops sta-
tioned in East Germany, Hun-
gary, and
Czechoslovakia
50,000
Tanks
16,364
20,000
20,000
10,000 (4)
59,470
Other armored vehicles
40,814
28,000
28,000
70,330
Artillery pieces (5)
14,458
16,500
24,000
8,500
71,560
Aircraft
4,077
3,400 (6)
1,500
800
7,876
Attack Helicopters
2,519
2,140 (6)
2,785
1. The totals indicated here are those that each alliance announced last fail for its own forces. Part of the differences can be attributed to how the
categories are defined: thus, the Warsaw Pact credits NATO with 7130 attack aircraft and 5270 helicopters: however, the West recognizes only
4077 and 2519. repectively. The numbers indicated for NATO include the French forces.
2. The Soviet Union has not yet announced limits that would be imposed on its own troops outside its frontiers in Europe: the total of Warsaw Pact
forces from the Atlantic to the Urais would be limited to 1,350,000 men.
3. This number is obtained from the Bush communiqué, but has not been confirmed by Moscow, which has announced the total of its overall
strength west of the Urais (i.e. including the European part of the Soviet Union): to be 2,458,000 men.
4. These will be retired from the Soviet Anny west of the Urais by 1991. included in this number are 5000 tanks which must be removed from
East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. These numbers should be added to the unilateral reductions announced by Soviet allies.
5. NATO considers all artillery pieces larger than 100mm as "heavy" artillery. The Warsaw Pact includes in this category all cannons greater than
75mm and mortars larger than 50mm.
6. These limits have been established as part of the 15% reduction announced by President Bush of the numbers of planes and helicopters
recognized by NATO.
Source: Le Monde, May 31, 1989.
34
Institute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis
1 May - 30 June 1989
Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
As elsewhere in Western Europe, there are differences in perception among French policy
officials and defense analysts regarding the American CFE proposal. (See Table II) While it
appears that officials in the Defense Ministry and some in the Foreign Ministry are adamantly
opposed to the inclusion of aircraft and the proposed reduction of American troops, the office
of the Prime Minister and the President's advisors appear more willing to accept the U.S.
propositions. However, they caution that there are, restrictions on their support, enjoining that
troop and aircraft reductions should only be considered after reductions are implemented in the
three categories of tanks, artillery and armored vehicles. Both the Prime Minister's defense
advisor and members of the Defense Ministry are leery of negotiations on combat helicopters,
given that this is one area in which they believe that the West has a real advantage; but more
than this, such capabilities are projected to form the backbone of future Western force postures
under a CFE regime that inevitably will place a premium on highly mobile, and ready force
structures. This analysis notwithstanding, it appears that the French military has not yet begun
a systematic assessment of what the various CFE proposals might mean for French forces,
although this is doubtless a priority, especially in the context of preliminary studies for the
preparation of the new "Programme Loi" (the French five year budget guidance plan) for the
years 1992-1997. The question that the French are struggling to deal with is how, within the
context of the CFE proposal, the reductions are going to be carried out. The French still appear
to be resisting the Western position on the proportion of reductions within the Atlantic Alliance
countries. The French also make clear that the budgetary measures that were announced by the
Defense Council in early June are separate from the CFE, and should not be construed as part
of French arms control obligations. To do so, the French fear, will be to give the West an impetus
for a CFE agreement before the Allies have worked out how the reductions should be
apportioned
Defense Austerity and the 1992 Budget Guidance
In preparing for development of the 1992-97
The revision of France's "Programme Loi"
"Programme Loi", the Prime Minister's office
has lowered equipment procurement fund-
is sponsoring a series of cost analysis studies
ing. Given that no nuclear programs are to
designed to examine the criteria by which
be cancelled, this has resulted in the stretch-
French procurement decisions are being
ing out of major French conventional
made. The stated purpose of these studies is
programs, including the Rafale aircraft, the
to identify which programs are experiencing
PAH-2 helicopter, and the Charles de Gaulle
cost overruns and why; to evaluate the ration-
carrier.
ale for specific weapons procurements; and,
to make policy recommendations to avoid bad acquisition decisions. Reminiscent of the U.S.
35
Institute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis
1 May . 30 June 1989
Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
Defense Department's quantitative studies methodology emphasized during Robert
McNamara's tenure as Secretary, the current French Defense Minister is opposed to this
approach to defense decision-making. For example, with regard to the highly costly Rafale
aircraft program, Chevènement's view is that it is a politically important program which, even
if too expensive, cannot at this late date be cancelled. Likewise, the Hadès program is regarded
by Chevènement and his staff to be important politically (to shore up West German resolve in
the defense area); even though September 1989 is said to be the cross-over point (after which
it would no longer make any sense to cancel the program), he is pressing for a systems
deployment decision this July at the next Defense Council meeting. (At that time, it is expected
that Mitterrand will support a reduced deployment decision of Hadès launchers, stretched out
to the 1995-96 timeframe-incidentally, the same time-frame during which NATO Lance
systems would become obsolete.)
The Rocard-Chevènement controversy dates back to their long association in the Socialist party
and reflects their respective perceptions, which differ, on the future role of France in Europe.
Rocard is much more European-oriented than is Chevènement, who is a French nationalist.
Rocard began his political career in the Algerian independence movement; Chevènement
opposed Algerian independence on the basis of its implications for the French colonial empire.
Thus, whereas Rocard is seeking to support the American CFE proposals in the hope of
negotiating a successful European arms control regime, Chevènement is concerned about the
effects that the proposed cuts would have upon the French national defense posture. While he
is "leftist" on domestic economic issues, Chevènement is of the Gaullist school in foreign and
national security policy. However, he is isolated in the Socialist Party, which is further to the
"left" on arms control and defense issues than even the more "centrist" positions of Rocard and
Mitterrand. Thus, in arbitrating the defense budget controversy between the Defense and Prime
Ministers' positions, the President had to consider his Socialist Party constituency and the weight
of public opinion-which, as noted above, is turning away from support for higher defense
spending and the modernization of systems to emphasize highly sophisticated and costly
weapons technologies.
As a result, in a revision of the spending levels for the next two years in the 1987-1991
"Programme Loi" (an exercise that had been widely anticipated by French defense experts given
the rate of inflation over the last three years and the rising costs of weapons procurements), the
French President opted to lower equipment procurement funding, in line with the suggestions
of Finance Minister Pierre Bergovoy. Together with the Prime Minister, Bergovoy had sought
to reduce defense spending by several percentage points (in relation to the Produit Interier Brut
Marchand (PIBM), which corresponds to all the gross values of the domestic commercial
36
Institute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis
1 May - 30 June 1989
Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
product (GDP), including the Value Added Tax). Thus, for 1990, the French government
lowered its acquisition and equipment budgets to FFr 103.1 billion ($15.6 billion in 1990's
figures), down from the "Programme Loi's" provision of FFr 100.1 billion (or $15.19 billion)
in 1986 francs. In 1991, equipment funding is projected to be FFr 107.2 billion ($15.48 billion),
down from FFr 106.2 billion (or $15.33 billion) in 1986 francs. Using the projected franc value
for 1990, as compared to the "Programme Loi's". original reliance on the value of the 1986
Franc, the Socialist's revised spending plan for military equipment in the year 1990 will amount
to a less than 3% increase in credits (as compared to the 5% that was originally projected and
the 6% that Chevènement said was necessary to sustain all current procurement acquisitions).
For 1991, credits will rise to 3.9%. Over the following two-year period, 1992 and 1993,
equipment credits are expected to reach a real annual growth rate of 4%, resulting, over the
four-year period, in a projected savings of approximately FFr 40-45 billion ($6.04-7.0 billion).
In announcing the proposed cuts, Mitterrand stated that they would not, however, affect France's
ability to carry out the four primary defense missions of nuclear deterrence, territorial defense,
European defense, and out-of-area force projection.
Yet, in practical terms, this means that without the outright cancellation of any currently planned
nuclear forces programs (as noted above), major conventional weapons programs will have to
be delayed or stretched out. The accompanying Table III portrays the major equipment
programs that form French procurement priorities, to date. The most vulnerable program in this
regard is the controversial Charles de Gaulle, the Navy's nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
project. By the President's decision the program will be delayed, with its entry into service
pushed back to 1998 from 1996. Similarly the new carrier's battle group will also be affected,
with the Atlantique, a maritime surveillance aircraft program, targeted for reductions. Three
(instead of five) will now be purchased in the first year. The construction program for
surveillance frigates will be maintained; but the plans for development of a "light" frigate will
be delayed by one year. Likewise the fifth, sixth and seventh Améthyste-class nuclear attack
submarines will be delayed, on average, for eight months; and Air Force orders of the Mirage
2000 will be reduced from 33 per year to 28. For now, the main battle tank program, Leclerc,
is being continued, but on a reduced basis order of 1050 (down from 1400).
It is still possible that this program may be cancelled if cost overruns continue and, more
importantly, if the Army is restructured to take account of possible CFE outcomes. As was
reported in IFPA's DNA Quarterly Report for the months of January through April, 1989, the
Defense Ministry is studying proposals for the reorganization of French conventional ground
forces. Under the direction of Jean-François Delpech of the Center for the Study of Relations
between Technologies and Strategies (CREST), the MOD-sponsored study is reported to be
37
Table III:
Major French Equipment Procurements Affected by Austerity Measures
Nuclear Deterrence
Central-European Defense
Out-of-Area
New
S4 Missile
Rafale
Franco-German
Leclerc Tank
Hadès
Charles de
Naval Aviation
Generation
Attack
Prestrategic
Gaulle Nuclear
Group
SNLE-NG
Helicopter
Missile
Aircraft Carrier
Ballistic
(PAH-2)
Submarine
Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
Institute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis
(Rafale?)
Cost of Program:
Cost of Program:
Cost of Program:
Cost of Program:
Cost of Program:
Cost of Program:
Cost of Program:
$12.07 billion
$5.28 billion
$22.02 billion
Cost of Program:
$6.79 billion
$2.26 billion
$3.02 billion
$3.02 billion
38
$9.05 billion
Number planned:
Number planned:
Number systems:
Number planned:
Number planned:
Number planned:
Number Planned:
6
18 with spares
336, of which 86
Number systems:
1050
40-45
2
4 wings?
are for naval
427, of which
Projected year of
Projected year of
aviation
215 are for
First deliverles:
First deliverles:
Year of Service
Year of Delivery:
deployment:
deployment:
France
1991, (110 per
1992
entry: 1996
2002
1994
??
First year for
year)
deployment:
First deliverles:
Delayed: 1995-6
Delayed: 1998
Delayed: ?
Delayed: 1995?
Contractors:
1996
1997
Delayed: ?
Aérospatiale
Contractors:
Contractors:
Contractors:
(principal)
Delayed:
Delayed: 2000
Contractors:
Aérospatiale
Direction des
DCN of Cher-
End of 1996
GIAT (principal),
(principal), CEA,
Constructions
bourg
Contractors:
Sagem, Creusot-
Sagem
Navales Brest
(principal),
Contractors:
Aérospatlate
Loire
(principal), CEA,
Creusot-Loire,
Dassault (prin-
and MBB (prin-
Framatome,
Alsthom, CEA
cipal). Snecma,
cipals),
Thomson,
Thomson,
Turboméca,
Creusot-Loire
+ M4 and M45
Matra, and
MTU, Thomson
missiles:
others
approximately
1 May 30 June 1989
$9.05 billion
+M5 missiles
(after the year
2000):
$12.07 billion
Institute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis
1 May - 30 June 1989
Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
considering a reduction in the number of French Army Corps from three to two, with the
elimination of the General Staff Corps headquartered in Metz. The operational structure of the
French Army differs from the delineation of French territorial districts and has been in effect
since 1984. The First Army Corps in Metz is composed, principally, of two armored divisions,
one infantry division, and one division recruited from the infantry school in Montpellier, with
a total strength of 33,000 men. The Second Army Corps is essentially composed of three
armored divisions stationed across the Rhine and has, in total, 42,000 men. The Third Army
Corps, headquartered in Lille since 1984, is composed of 30,000 men forming one armored
division, one infantry division, and a division recruited from the tank school in Saumur. The
proposed elimination of the Metz Army Corps will place into question current operational
doctrine and will force a fundamental reassessment of the roles and missions of French
conventional ground forces, especially in a CFE environment.
The European Elections and the National Service Debate
Defense budget issues were insinuated
In the European Parliament elections, the com-
into the campaign for the European Par-
bined French right (RPR and UDF) captured
liamentary elections when former French
26% of the French vote, compared to the
President Valery Giscard d'Estaing (who
Socialists' 22%. Remarkably, the French
is running for the presidency of the
Greens gained 10.6% of the vote. A significant
European Parliament, and headed the list
issue during the EP campaign in France was the
of the unified right, composed of the Rally
subject of national service, with former Presi-
for the Republican (RPR) and Union of
dent Giscard d'Estaing calling for an end to
the Democratic Center (UDC) Parties)
conscription and the creation of a professional
went on national television (May 29,
army.
1989) and proclaimed his support for the
end of conscription and the creation of a
professional army. Giscard, whose center-right coalition captured 29% of the vote for a gain
of 26 of France's 81 seats in the European Parliament, based his recommendation for a
professional army on the assumption that if the CFE negotiations are successful the French
conventional force structure will be profoundly affected, placing a premium on highly-trained
but smaller force structures. Moreover, according to the former French President, "a profes-
sional army would contribute to the objective of European defense unity and would facilitate,
more easily, cooperation between France and its European partners in areas such as language
training and development of a familiarity with their armament and strategic concepts." The
former President also expressed the hope that by moving away from the conscript system the
social injustice created by "middle and upper class" youth exemptions would be rectified, and
39
Institute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis
1 May - 30 June 1989
Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
the Armed Forces would have the luxury of accepting only the most qualified volunteers. Within
France, public opinion, by and large, appears to be opposed to the creation of a professional
army and, thus far, only the right-wing National Front Party, which won 12% of the French
European Parliamentary vote, has endorsed the concept in its program platform. According to
the ideas of National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, the French concept of a professional army
should encompass service by both males and females and be based on a voluntary period of
service of six to nine months. The leadership of the political center in France-which includes
Giscard, but is not limited to him-is in disagreement over whether France alone should proceed
on this basis. Raymond Barre, for example, has stated that this, "is a complex idea which needs
great thought." Pierre Méhaignerie, president of "centrist" Democratic Socialist Grouping,
greeted the proposition with caution, stating that the idea should be discussed with France's
European partners.
Beyond the expense that would be associated with the creation of a professional army force,
French opponents of the Giscard concept fear that declining demographic trends especially
evident in the years between 1992 and 2002, as depicted in the accompanying graphic, would
create a situation in which available slots would outnumber the high quality volunteers. More
than this, however, conscription is viewed by most French defense analysts and policy officials
as providing the basis of French national support for French defense policies. Thus, in a coalition
of the "right" (the Rally For the Republic Party) and the "left" (the ruling Socialist, the
Communists, and the leader of the Greens Antoine Waechter) proponents of the national service
concept opposed the creation of a French professional army, although each of the "leftist" parties
tied their respective opposition to several conditions. For the Socialists, opposition is strong,
with the possible exception of former Defense Minister Charles Hernu, who bases his support
on the complexity of emerging weapons technologies and the requirements of a common
European defense. The French Communist Party opposes the professional army concept but
proposes a limit of six months on conscripted military service, while the French Greens favor
national service if a conscriptee has the option of choosing between military or civil service.
The most hostile opposition to the Giscard proposal came from Jacques Chirac's RPR, stating
that a "professional army could lead to an authoritarian state," and, that, "national service forms
the basis of French national defense and democracy."
The furor created by the Giscard proposals did not affect his prospects (as noted above), nor
those of the "center-right" in the European Parliamentary elections. Giscard's unified list of
RPR and UDF candidates won 26 of France's 81 Parliamentary seats, while the ruling Socialist
Party attracted only 24% of the vote or 22 seats. The "Centrist" list under the immensely popular
Simone Veil, a former President of the European Parliament, won only 8% of the votes for 7
40
Institute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis
1 May - 30 June 1989
Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
Anticipated National Service Manpower Resources for the Next 20 Years,
(x1000)
450
400
1
350
2
300
Personnel Strength
3
4
250
200
150
5
100
50
0
1986
1967
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1993
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
6
Key:
1) average births, 1966-1985 (source: National Institute of Statistics and Economics Studies); 2) real average manpower resources at census time B 396,500; 3) anticipated
manpower resources through draft (working back from current data) average - 275,000; 4) useful manpower resources per birth year; 5) useful manpower resources per
birth year; 6) birth year class (actual birth year 20 years earlier)
Source: Défense Nationale, March 1989, p. 24.
seats; while Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front Party emerged with 12% of the vote or 10 seats.
The French Communist Party attracted 8% of voter support, making for 7 seats, while the big
winner, the Greens won 11% of the vote for 9 Parliamentary seats. Even as voter turnout (at
50%) in France was the second lowest in the history of the Fifth Republic (surpassed only by
the low turnout during the referendum on New Caledonia last year), the clear winners in this
election were the Greens and Prime Minister Rocard. Rocard's aspirations for leadership of the
Socialist Party (after Mitterrand exits the French political scene) is unlikely to be challenged by
former Prime Minister Laurent Fabius, as the Socialist Party's showing in the election under
Fabius' leadership is widely regarded as a political failure, and probably the end of his hopes to
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lead the French Socialist party. What these results mean for French defense policy may be
profoundly important, although caution must be exercised in analyzing these election results
since they do not affect significantly French national interests and hence they may not reflect
precisely future French voting patterns. Election of the Greens indicates, further, a loosening
of the French defense consensus and the virtually unchallenged position of nuclear power in
French defense and energy policies. Clearly, the Chernobyl disaster, coupled with a diminished
threat perception of the Soviet Union, has raised public sensitivity to the possibility of opposing
established policy on French nuclear issues. In coming months the fragility of the French
defense consensus is likely to be further tested in the context of the French Parliamentary debates
on national planning and defense spending.
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The Netherlands
Fall of the Lubbers Government and
Dutch SNF Perspectives leading to the NATO Summit
The centrally important event in the
The fall of the Dutch Government on May 2 was not
Dutch defense debate during the
related to defense issues, but rather disagreements
second quarter of 1989 was the un-
within the coalition and, specifically, within the
expected fall of the Christian
Liberal party-raising the prospect of a center-left
Democratic-Liberal (CDA-VVD)
coalition after the September elections.
government on May 2. Prime Min-
ister Ruud Lubbers' government,
which had been the longest-lived postwar coalition (outlasting by five years the 26-month
average life of postwar Dutch governments), ultimately fell not over issues directly related to
defense and security, but rather over questions relating to the funding of the government's
environmental plans. The smaller partner in the coalition, the People's Party for Freedom and
Democracy (VVD, or Liberal party), perceived the issue-mistakenly, it would appear-as one
upon which it might effectively reassert its own identity and agenda within the governing
coalition, while simultaneously resolving internal party leadership questions. In any event, the
Liberal's hardline stand on the environment issue had the effect of bringing about the
government's resignation in the midst of NATO consultations on the contentious subject of SNF
modernization leading up to the May summit of NATO heads of government.
As a result, Dutch influence in bringing about a NATO compromise on SNF was perhaps not
felt to the degree it might have been in the leadup to the summit. During this period, Dutch
officials continued to oppose calls for immediate negotiations on SNF, emanating chiefly from
the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium. So high was the importance attached to this
issue that Prime Minister Lubbers kept a scheduled meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl on
the afternoon of May 3rd, even though it was only the preceding morning that he had submitted
the Cabinet's resignation to the Dutch head of state, Queen Beatrix. Later reports of the
Lubbers/Kohl meeting indicated that the two had discussed "party issues" in advance of elections
to the European Parliament (both are the leaders of Christian Democratic parties in their
respective countries). However, it seems unlikely that Lubbers and Kohl would have avoided
the single most important defense policy topic on the agenda during their meeting.
The Dutch position on SNF was underscored later in May- and closer to the summit
meeting-by Hans van den Broek, the Dutch Foreign Minister and a member of Lubbers' CDA
party. Van den Broek, in a speech at The Hague during the visit of Polish Foreign Minister
Tadeusz Olechowski, welcomed Gorbachev's announcement in early May of a unilateral Soviet
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withdrawal of 500 Soviet SNF warheads from Warsaw Pact countries. Van den Broek took
note, however, of Moscow's continuing numerical advantage in SNF, and characterized
Gorbachev's withdrawal offer as a "modest step" against this background. The Dutch Foreign
Minister indicated that the policy of the Netherlands vis-a-vis Moscow would be "to continue
to urge the Soviet Union to bring down unilaterally its 14-fold preponderance in SNF missile
systems to the current NATO level." Until progress was made along these lines, van den Broek
averred, "no realistic basis [will exist] for negotiations on mutual reductions to equal ceilings
in land-based missiles."
Finally, in the week before the NATO summit, Frits Bolkestein-the Liberal party Defense
Minister in the CDA/VVD coalition, who will now continue in that position during the caretaker
period leading up to the September general election-became the first Western defense minister
to visit Hungary. This meeting had been arranged before the fall of the government and, while
it was carried out in his official capacity as defense minister in the caretaker government,
Bolkestein did not hesitate to utilize the forum provided by his visit to promote the prospects
of his own party, both in the European elections of early June and the September Dutch general
elections. Even so, Bolkestein's visit to Budapest was significant, at least in so far as it
represented the lessening of political tensions between East and West immediately before the
NATO summit. Bolkestein, whose party is strongly Atlanticist, has been seen, since his
accession to the post of Defense Minister, as sympathetic to U.S. policies and perspectives, and
has publicly voiced skepticism regarding the motivations behind Gorbachev's unilateral force
reduction offers. During his trip to Hungary, Bolkestein did not directly challenge Gorbachev's
intentions. The purpose of his trip, noted Bolkestein, was "the awakening of reciprocal trust.
We are talking about small steps within the room for maneuver that the two countries are
offered within their own alliances."
The Dutch "Shift Concept" Reflected in the Summit Communiqué
If the fall of the Dutch government limited the ability of Dutch officials to effect a compromise
between contending perspectives on SNF
modernization and arms control before the
Dutch perspectives on SNF were largely
summit convened, the same cannot be said for
reflected in the final language of the NATO
the outcome of the meeting. The Communiqué
Summit Communiqué. This perspective in-
issued by the assembled heads of government
cluded support for modernized, longer-
is clearly marked by the presence of major
range SNF at lower levels, together with an
elements of the Dutch position defined and
opening to SNF modernization after an
articulated in the months leading up to the May
agreement reducing conventional force
meeting. Primary elements in this position, as
asymmetries.
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noted in previous IFPA updates, have been the following:
Support for a "phased approach" to SNF modernization, with options at each step for
updating SNF systems, for reducing unilaterally shorter-range assets, for restructuring the
NATO stockpile toward longer-range systems, and (if certain conditions are met) for
pursuing SNF negotiations.
First phase would include allied agreement in principle to keep NATO's nuclear assets "up
to date where necessary", coupled with unilateral cuts in NATO nuclear artillery.
At the same time, NATO would call on Soviet Union to reduce unilaterally its own SNF
forces to the NATO level, at which point NATO would consider SNF negotiations.
With this option in mind, priority should be given to the formation of a special NATO
working group to consider the specific mechanics of SNF arms control.
Deeper, negotiated cuts in SNF forces would be tied to progress at the CFE talks, but would
in no case go to zero. In this phase, SNF negotiations might be directly linked to
second-phase CFE talks.
Primary Dutch objective throughout all phases is to "shift" the orientation of NATO's SNF
away from shorter-range capabilities and toward longer-range (400-450 km) systems, while
reducing overall inventory.
Each of these points is reflected, to a greater or lesser extent, in the final Communiqué issued
by the NATO heads of government. The "phased approach," an essential component in the
Dutch "shift" concept (to move the NATO SNF stockpile in the direction of fewer, longer-range
systems) is not mentioned directly; however, the recent steps taken by NATO (since the
Montebello agreement) to reduce unilaterally its SNF arsenal is once again noted by the
Communiqué. Special emphasis is placed on the fact that NATO's SNF stockpile "has been
reduced by over one-third to its lowest level in 20 years." Moreover, the Communiqué notes,
"Updating where necessary of (NATO's) substrategic systems would result in further reduc-
tions"--a clear and concise statement of acceptance of the Dutch "shift" concept.
In line with the long-standing Dutch position, the Summit Communiqué also calls upon the
Soviet Union "to reduce unilaterally its short-range missile systems to the current levels within
the integrated military structure"-nearly a word-for-word restatement of van den Broek's
response to Gorbachev's 500-warhead cut (noted above). While such unilateral cuts were not
established as a pre-condition for NATO participation in SNF reduction negotiations, the
Communiqué did establish the condition that implementation of a phase I CFE agreement must
be "underway" before the Alliance would consider it appropriate to enter into such negotiations.
Such a position is a reflection of the Dutch position that SNF talks should await the outcome of
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the CFE negotiations. Furthermore, Holland's insistence that SNF not be reduced to zero in
any circumstance-a position also held by the United States and Great Britain-was also
reflected in the Communique's language. In what was widely reported to be the single most
important phrase in clinching a consensus position [and agreement between the U.S. and West
German delegations], the following language-thought to have been suggested by van den
Broek, who chaired the Foreign Minister's meeting-was suggested:
Once implementation of such an agreement [the CFE talks] is underway, the United States,
in consultation with the allies concerned, is prepared to enter into negotiations to achieve a
partial reduction of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile forces of shorter range
to equal and verifiable levels. (Emphasis in original)
The key phrase in this language referred to "partial" reductions, which seemed to satisfy the
Dutch, U.S., and U.K. requirement that a "Third Zero" be clearly ruled out. (Although, as
discussed in the sections of this report dealing with the Federal Republic and Belgium,
perceptions that a "Third Zero" opption had been foreclosed are not universally shared.)
As for the potential "updating" of existing SNF assets, there has been greater discussion in the
Netherlands following the NATO Summit-as there has been in other countries examined in
this Report-of nuclear-tipped stand-off systems, and most particularly a tactical air-to-surface
missile (TASM) option, which many believe would be less controversial to deploy than new
ground-based systems. Yet, the emergence of broader support for TASM by leading Dutch
defense planners could result in friction between the partners in a future center-left governing
coalition in Holland-which, as discussed below, is a possible, and perhaps probable, successor
to the fallen center-right coalition. At least two points of division between CDA and Dutch
Labor (PvdA) leaders may be anticipated on the TASM issue. First, while CDA leaders
reaffirmed after the INF Treaty their commitment to a continuing nuclear role for Holland's
F-16s, and have openly endorsed-as have Liberal and D'66 party leaders-the deployment by
NATO of air-launched stand-off weapons, PvdA leaders have continued to press in the recent
past for a substantial reduction (if not elimination) of the nuclear tasks performed by Dutch
forces, including that assigned to the F-16s. PvdA spokesmen have remained, studiously
noncommittal during the current SNF debate on the question of stand-off systems, be they air-
or sea-launched. Secondly, and more importantly, Labor spokesmen-similar to their counter-
parts in other NATO European countries-have become increasingly critical of TASM-like
systems (with ranges nearing, and possibly exceeding, the 500-kilometer threshold) as violating
the "spirit" of the INF Treaty, even though the accord deals solely with the elimination of
ground-based missile systems. It remains to be seen whether or not Labor's desire to enter the
next coalition-together with Labor leader Wim Kok's rather pragmatic approach to defense
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policy (compared to that of his predecessors)-will be strong enough to move the PvdA closer
to the CDA position on TASM and SNF in general.
Impact of the Government's Fall on Procurement
For the moment, the fall of the Government
The fall of the Government has resulted in
in May has had a direct and immediate
delays in a number of major procurement
impact on Dutch defense procurement
programs. Though Prime Minister Lubbers
plans. A number of key procurement
has appealed for movement on key programs
projects, detailed in earlier IFPA quarterly
such as the Leopard I tank modernization, it is
updates, have now been deferred until a
unlikely that decisions on major procurement
new government is assembled-a process
projects will be made before a new government
that could take some weeks (and perhaps
is assembled.
months) following the general elections on
6 September. Significant procurement
projects and decisions that have been put off include:
Modernization plans for the Dutch Army's 468 Leopard I tanks
A system decision on an attack helicopter to fill the Army's requirement for 50 platforms
(a decision was to have been forthcoming in November, but is now not expected until early
1990)
A decision on whether or not to purchase replacements for peacetime attrition losses of F-16s
The purchase of four Patriot air defense systems
The acquisition of the FIST Verdac fire control system for the Army
A decision on Dutch participation in the NATO Helicopter for the Nineties (NH-90) project
in order to provide an ASW helicopter for the Dutch Navy
The previously-announced decision to procure 14 Crotale SAM systems to provide air
defense for seven Dutch air bases
The Defense Committee of the Dutch parliament informed Lubbers' caretaker government on
May 11 that it would suspend consideration of major defense procurement projects until after
the forthcoming elections. Prime Minister Lubbers is reported to have replied in a letter to the
Committee that the delay of parliamentary review of these projects could result in contractual
difficulties, the need to reopen negotiations with contractors, and increased costs. This is
particularly the case with respect to three major procurement decisions which are at a crucial
decision stage, and for which specific funding requests had previously been submitted:
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The Leopard I modernization ($560 million)
The Crotale SAM system ($132 million)
The purchase of the Thomson-CSF ATILA field artillery command and control system ($79
million)
A significant result of the government's fall with respect to defense procurement was the
announcement by State Secretary for Defense Jan van Houwelingen of his intention to leave
office following the September elections. Van Houwelingen, a member of the CDA, has held
the number two slot at the Dutch Ministry of Defense for eight years. In this capacity, he has
championed greater European defense cooperation, and was largely responsible for the
revitalization of the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) as a major focus of defense
equipment collaboration among the major NATO European defense industrial countries,
including France. Van Houwelingen has frequently expressed a preference for European
collaborative projects over similar projects involving the participation of U.S. firms. This has
particularly been the case of late with respect to two major recent or on-the-horizon procurement
decisions, namely, (1) a forthcoming decision on which attack helicopter system to choose for
the Army's air support requirement, and (2) the recent choice of Crotale air defense systems for
air base defense over the U.S.-produced pedestal-mounted Stinger and the U.S./West German
ADATS system.
In a recent interview, van Houwelingen has expressed the view that a decision on an attack
helicopter system may be forthcoming by September-although, as noted above, most observes
point to January as a more likely target date. Van Houwelingen's preference is for the European
Light Attack Helicopter (LAH), also referred to as the Tonal. Under discussion for two years
between the Dutch, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain, there is as yet no agreement among
the partners on performance requirements for the LAH. As a result, some reports suggest
that-despite van Houwelingen's optimism-the Dutch will abandon participation in the LAH
sometime in July, unless two conditions are agreed to by the other partners: (1) the LAH must
be capable of carrying the TRIGAT antiarmor missile; and (2) a firm timetable must be agreed
to for production. The Hague is concerned that the four partners in the LAH are behind the
game in the procurement of modern attack helicopters. Simultaneously, reports suggest that the
major Dutch aerospace firm, Fokker-the industry representative of the Netherlands in the LAH
project-is now pressuring The Hague to drop plans for participation in LAH in favor of the
procurement of Italy's A-129 Mangusta. Fokker's motivation is reputedly a hoped-for sale of
its new F-100 commercial transport planes to the Italian national airline. It is thought, therefore,
that the way to this order could be smoothed by the Dutch Army's purchase of Italian helicopters.
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Whether or not this option materializes is yet to be seen. Other key contenders for the Dutch
attack helicopter requirement is the "Euro-Apache" now being offered by McDonnell Douglas
to the Dutch and other Allied countries, and the French-West German future helicopter project
currently known as PAH/HAC. For his part, van Houwelingen has said that he is "not exactly
sure what the Euro-Apache is." He continues to express the conviction that the LAH project
will move ahead following what he anticipates will be the U.K.'s decision to continue with the
program. In any event, notes van Houwelingen, "the helicopter is only the platform. What
really matters are the weapons systems"-a reflection of the Dutch insistence on TRIGAT
capability with whatever platform is selected.
Late in May, the possibility that Holland might ultimately choose the French-West German
PAH/HAC option was enhanced by developments in another helicopter arena, the NH-90. The
Netherlands, currently holding a five percent stake in the utility helicopter program (and
planning, as noted above, to utilize the NH-90 in an ASW role with the Royal Navy), was
approached by the Federal Republic with the request that Holland double its financial commit-
ment to the program (to ten percent). In last September's Defense White Paper, the Dutch
government had earmarked $287 million for its share of the NH-90 development costs; accepting
the West German offer would raise this stake to $574 million. The motivation for the German
offer was simply a financial one. Recognizing the Hague's increasing doubts over the LAH
program (see above), and given Bonn's continuing inability to commit resources to the NH-90
project sufficient to support its own 25% stake in the program, the German government offered
Holland participation in the PAH program-with no entrance costs-in return for taking over
an additional 5% stake in the NH-90. In addition to participation in the Franco-German project,
the Netherlands would be loaned a number of West German Bo-105 antitank helicopters until
the PAH's come into service. Given Dutch concern that, by waiting for the LAH, it is getting
behind the game in deployment of a modern attack helicopter, this option will probably receive
considerable support within the Dutch MOD. However, the greatly increased outlays (relative-
ly) required to accept the West German offer would require review by the Dutch parliament-
which seems unlikely to happen before a new government is formed. At the moment, no time
limit has been set on the West German offer.
In another significant area of procurement, reports during the quarter suggested that Dutch Air
Force officials are now formulating requirements for a planned mid-life update (MLU) of
Holland's F-16 fleet. The Netherlands, as the single largest European purchaser of the F-16,
will have a proportionately larger degree of influence over the MLU program, which it is hoped
will be adopted jointly by all European F-16 fleets (in Belgium, Denmark, and Norway in
addition to the Netherlands). Air Commodore Cees Barendregt, now the Deputy Chief of Plans
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for the Royal Netherlands Air Force (and soon to take command of the Dutch Tactical Air
Command), has recently stated this objective clearly: "We hope to be able to agree on a joint
MLU-suite, based on common core avionics and standard software, with optional loose ends to
facilitate individual extras."
Key elements of the MLU proposal, which is to be submitted to the four European F-16 countries
by General Dynamics at the end of this year, are expected to include radar, computer memory,
processing and database interface capabilities similar to Block 50 F-16 C/D aircraft (the
European countries fly the F-16 A/B). Other elements anticipated are a digital terrain navigation
system, and database technologies making possible the integration of threat intelligence data
with electronic warfare capabilities.
Owing to the Dutch focus on the effectiveness of ground operations (noted in previous IFPA
reports on the Netherlands), F-16s are expected (and their pilots are trained) to fulfill two
missions-both air superiority/air space control (air-to-air) and ground support (air-to-ground).
Because of the need to keep these missions in balance, Dutch planners have shied away from
the procurement of systems that in their view would impose intensive training requirements on
one mission only. Thus, even though Dutch F-16s continue to deploy laser-guided bombs that
require remote laser designators (say, from other 2ATAF aircraft or ground-based designators),
plans for updating these systems to the Maverick self-guided missile have been dropped on the
argument that training requirements for the new system would orient Air Force operations too
far toward the air-to-ground role. Instead, future acquisition plans include the possible purchase
of a future Modular Stand-Off Weapon (MSOW) and/or the U.S. Direct Airfield Attack
Combined munition.
Procurement practices generally in the Netherlands have been subject to increased scrutiny
during the second quarter of 1989. With the fall of the government, and the coming campaign
for the September general election, it may be that defense procurement will receive even wider
attention in Holland. Recommendations for improving Dutch procurement processes-which
had been developed with the assistance of an external consulting firm-were accepted by the
Netherlands Defense Council and submitted to Parliament during the quarter. These recom-
mendations included specific proposals for improving the process in five major areas, including
clarification of objectives; increased collaboration between the Ministries of Defense and
Economic Affairs; clearer definition of accountability, responsibility, tasks, and authority in the
procurement process; better coordination of operational requirements and procurement; and the
control of managerial information. One specific recommendation of note to emerge from this
review is the development of a joint task force between the Dutch Economic Affairs and Defense
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Ministries in order to develop a future strategy for Dutch defense industries, particularly with
respect to the coming single European market of 1992.
Prospects for the Next Dutch Government:
The European Elections in the Netherlands
Whether these recommendations are
Though observers have widely predicted a center-
put into effect, however, hinges-as
left successor to the recently-fallen center-right
indeed, the prospects of each of the
Dutch government, the European Parliament elec-
procurement programs noted above
tions suggested that the Dutch Labor party's sup-
do-on the outcome of the September
port is slipping, The centrist CDA did well,
general elections. To the extent that
suggesting that it will continue to exert considerable
the recent European elections are any
control over Dutch defense policy.
indication of how the Dutch elec-
torate will shape its next government,
it may be said that the Dutch Liberal party was ill-advised in bringing down the government by
standing firm against the CDA's environmental policies, if it had any intention of remaining in
the governing coalition. For the Liberal party fared poorly in the European election, losing two
of its four seats in the Dutch delegation to the European Parliament (EP), while Lubbers' CDA
gained two seats, making the CDA the largest single party in the Dutch EP delegation.
Moreover, the CDA gained 34.6% of the total Dutch vote, which matched its best-ever electoral
performance recorded in the last national election (of 1986). At the same time, the opposition
Dutch Labor party (PvdA), unlike a number of other socialist parties across Western Europe
(but similar to the Belgian Socialists), fared poorly in the Dutch European poll. The PvdA
actually lost one of its seats in the Dutch delegation of 25, falling from nine to eight members
with a vote of only 30.7%-compared to its vote of 33.3% in the last Dutch general election.
The poor showing of the Dutch Labor party has increased the possibility that a government
formed after the September election will incorporate three parties-the CDA, the PvdA, and the
smaller Democrats '66 party-in a center-left coalition. For a number of reasons (including
questions over internal party leadership and significant hostility within the party rank and file
toward the treatment received at the hands of the CDA, and specifically from Prime Minister
Lubbers), the right-of-center Liberal party seems unlikely to have a role in the next government.
Yet predictions immediately after the government's fall that a CDA-PvdA coalition would come
about from the September election now seem to have been clouded by Labor's poor showing
in June. A number of emerging factors, not least among them being the greatly increased
importance of environmental issues on the Dutch domestic agenda, as well as Lubbers' own
personal preference for a more center-left approach (so long as the economy is sound and a
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moderate security policy is pursued), point in the direction of a CDA-PvdA coalition succeeding
the center-right CDA-VVD government. Unless the Labor party can improve its showing over
the June elections, however, the degree of any leftward shift would likely be moderated by the
presence of the more centrist D'66 party within the coalition.*
What can be said about the next Dutch government with respect to defense policy is that it will
face strong pressure to reduce public spending on defense. Within the Dutch electorate, there
is a general sentiment that the years of austerity imposed in order to balance the Dutch budget
deficit did not fall equally on defense spending. As noted in previous IFPA reports on the
Netherlands, increases in defense spending have not even approached NATO's agreed goal
(recently reaffirmed at the Brussels summit) of three percent per year real growth in defense
spending. Yet even so, the PvdA has long held that Dutch defense spending should be frozen,
if not reduced, in order to restore cuts imposed in social welfare programs during the CDA/VVD
austerity programs. Democrats '66 have proposed a freeze in the Dutch defense budget for the
early 1990s, with "built-in flexibility" to increase (or decrease) defense expenditures as
developments in the European arena warrant. For its own part, the CDA lead the governing
coalition that authored a proposed 2% per year increase in defense spending beginning in 1991;
it is doubtful, however, that this plan will be observed by the next government, regardless of its
composition.
Recognizing the need to make its defense policies more palatable to the electorate, the Dutch
Labor party has moved steadily away from the strongly antinuclear posture that had come to
characterize its security perspectives in recent years. Marjanne Sint, the party chair, has stated
that pragmatism is called for if the PvdA is to be viewed as a credible coalition partner; this
sentiment has also been reflected in the public statements of Wim Kok, the party's parliamentary
leader, who has never really embraced the extreme antinuclear sentiments articulated by past
Labor leaders. A prospective coalition agreement between the CDA and PvdA, therefore, might
extend to the PvdA's more explicit acceptance of a continuing nuclear element to the NATO
force posture (carried out in part by Dutch forces), so long as the CDA agrees to press in NATO
for early negotiations on SNF and accepts lower levels of defense spending at home.
* It is important to note that while in most of the other countries covered in this update the success of socialist and
Green parties can be attributed to rejectionist sentiments and low voter turnout, the Dutch case is somewhat
different. Because the fall of the government preceded the European Parliament poll, the June vote was widely
seen as a "primary" of sorts in the leadup to the September general elections. The predictive value of the Dutch
European results were limited, however, by the surprisingly low turnout-which, at 47.2%, represented the
lowest turnout of Dutch voters for a European Parliament election since they began.
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BELGIUM
Belgium's center-left government
The NATO Summit and Arms Control Priorities
welcomed the NATO Summit
In Belgium, as in other countries examined in this
communiqué as supporting its own
Report, debates over security policy during the past
position, which favors near-term
two months have revolved primarily around the proper
SNF negotiations "as soon as pos-
focus to be adopted in NATO's "comprehensive con-
sible", while deferring any decision
cept"-or, in French, concept global-of arms control
on Lance until 1992. While reject-
and disarmament, the final draft of which was being
ing, for the moment, a "Third Zero"
readied for approval at the NATO Summit on May
option, the current Belgian coalition
29-30. Indeed, ever since the October 1988 NPG
opposes any significant increase in
meeting at Scheveningen, the current center-left Mar-
the range of existing SNF assets.
tens Government (known locally as Martens VIII) has
taken a particularly active-if nonetheless skeptical-
role in the discussion of short-range nuclear force (SNF) modernization requirements, arguing
(with the Germans) against any near-term decision by NATO to deploy a follow-on to Lance
(FOTL), and pressing instead for East-West negotiations on SNF "as soon as possible"
(preferably running parallel to the CFE talks in Vienna). Not surprisingly, therefore, in the
weeks immediately preceding the NATO Summit, Belgian officials involved in the NATO
policy process continued to stress the "arms control plank" of the draft comprehensive concept,
together with the need for Allied agreement on a common approach to potential SNF negotia-
tions prior to any serious discussion of possible upgrades to NATO's existing SNF assets. On
the specific question of FOTL, moreover, the Martens Government (in the days leading up to
the Summit) held fast to its position-first publicly articulated by the Prime Minister in a speech
before Parliament on April 11-that no decision was required before 1991-92, and that even
then such a decision should be sensitive to possible reductions in the threat achieved via the
CFE talks. Perhaps, in a bid to guard against any compromise on this issue, the Chairman of
the Flemish Socialist Party (SP)-which remains the most stridently antinuclear political
grouping in Belgium-warned on May 23 that the Socialist bloc (or at least the larger Flemish
wing) might well pull out of the governing coalition, if Belgium (for the sake of Alliance
solidarity) were to agree at the Summit to an SNF modernization program.
Given these views on arms control and SNF, Belgian reactions to the NATO Summit-which
endorsed President Bush's proposals for deeper and broader force reductions at CFE, deferred
any FOTL decision until 1992, promised only to update SNF "where necessary," and secured
U.S. support for SNF negotiations once implementation of a CFE agreement is "underway"-
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have been quite favorable across party lines. In a speech before the Belgian Parliament on June
9, Prime Minister Martens, speaking on behalf of the five-party coalition, praised the Allied
decision to include combat aircraft, helicopters and troops in the CFE negotiations as an
"important gesture toward the Soviet position", which would make early agreement on conven-
tional force reductions-and, by extension, the opening of SNF talks in the near-term future-far
more likely. Recalling Belgium's opposition (for the moment) to a "Third Zero" option and her
willingness to maintain-without significantly improving-NATO's tactical nuclear forces "at
whatever level may be necessary", Martens went on to describe the final concept global, as it
appeared in the Summit Joint Communiqué, as "an honorable compromise to which Belgium
could fully subscribe a compromise set within a dynamic approach to relations with the East."
Forty years after the Treaty of Washington, Martens concluded, the Alliance faced two major
trends-namely, progress toward European integration and the turn toward reform in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe-and the NATO Summit, in his estimation, would facilitate both.
This is not to suggest, of course, that the debate over SNF policy and arms control priorities has
come to an end in Belgium. For now, the Flemish Socialists-who pushed the governing
coalition to oppose SNF modernization-seem prepared to adopt a "wait and see" attitude, even
though they would prefer immediate SNF negotiations without any linkage to the state of
progress at the CFE talks. As do many in Western Europe, they perceive the object of their
greatest opposition-that is, the FOTL option-to be, in any event, "dead in the water", and are
more willing, as a consequence, to give the negotiators at Vienna a chance to produce concrete
results before pressing an alternative approach on the SNF front. If there are few signs of an
impending CFE agreement within six months to a year, however, the Belgian Socialists
(especially from Flanders) will no doubt revive their campaign for SNF negotiations "as soon
as possible", an appeal that almost certainly would be endorsed by other left-of-center parties
in NATO Europe. Echoing statements made in the FRG, moreover, Socialist spokesmen in
Belgium made clear, once the full text of the Summit Communiqué was released, that a "Third
Zero" for SNF forces definitely remained, in their view, a live option. While they may be willing
to approve ambiguous Summit language endorsing East-West negotiations toward only a
"partial reduction" of SNF (once implementation of CFE cuts are in progress), Socialist critics
of NATO's nuclear policy still consider such reductions as merely a necessary phase in the
complete elimination of SNF systems from the European theater.
Yet another possible complication that could dampen Belgian support for future Alliance
initiatives is the Martens Government's stated opposition to any upgrades of SNF forces that
might significantly increase their range, "thereby undermining", in the words of Martens'
statement before Parliament on April 11, "the spirit of the INF Treaty". As discussed at length
54
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June
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in the last IFPA Report, the Belgian admonition that NATO avoid extended-range SNF can be
traced primarily to the Socialists' concerns that deployment of such systems would reverse what
they view as a generally positive trend toward reduced ranges brought about by the elimination
of theater nuclear systems with ranges of 500 kilometers or more. What is more, it has become
clear in recent debates in the Belgian Parliament that SNF systems with ranges much beyond
400 kilometers would indeed be considered excessive by most of the Socialist bloc and (in fact)
by many from the more centrist Christian parties. What this means in practical terms is that the
NATO plan to deploy 400-plus kilometer air-launched SNF (such as TASM) is likely to trigger
rather strong opposition from powerful elements within Belgium's governing coalition. This
is true despite the widespread preference among most NATO allies (including the FRG) to shift
from shorter to longer-range SNF. If the Belgian Socialists-and again, the Flemish activists,
in particular-have their way, efforts to phase-in TASM-like systems as routine modernizations
of NATO's air-delivered nuclear assets will proceed (if at all) with difficulty. Should the view
that TASM and similar range systems contravene the spirit-if not the letter-of the INF Treaty
begin to gather broader support in NATO Europe (and the signs are that this is occurring on the
center-left of the political spectrum), then post-Summit assumptions that deferral of FOTL could
be compensated for, to some extent at least, by deployment of supposedly less controversial
stand-off systems (both air and sea-launched) may need to be revised.
Procurement Issues and Defense Industrial Trends
On the military equipment front, Belgian
The selection of the Carapace ECM system-
MOD and General Staff officials took ad-
largely due to the offset package offered to
ditional steps in the May/June period to set
Belgian industry-represents the last major
in place the 1989-92 Mid-Term Procure-
Belgian purchase for 1989-90. Future
ment Plan approved by the Martens
prospects for U.S.-Belgian defense cooperation
Government on March 24, announcing in
will be chiefly in Air Force and Army
mid-May the selection of the Carapace
programs (Leopard Iupgrades, artillery mod-
electronic countermeasures (ECM) sys-
ernization, third-generation anti-tank
tem-produced by the French firm
weapons, and air-to-air/air-to-surface mis-
Electronique Serge Dassault-to update
siles).
the Belgian F-16 fleet. With a total pro-
gram value reaching some $220.4 million,
the ECM buy stands as the last major hardware purchase scheduled for the 1989-90 timeframe
(the Army's VHF choice having been made earlier in the year). Significantly, this will be the
first time, according to a Belgian MOD press release, that equipment built by a non-American
company would be integrated with the F-16.
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Principal Belgian Procurement Programs for the Mid-Term
1989-1992
(in millions of dollars)
General Staff
1989
1990
1991
1992
TOTAL
BEMILCOM
43.9
43.9
BEMILDAT
11.6
6.3
17.9
COMPUTERS
14.5
8.5
2.5
1.6
27.1
AWACS MODERNIZATION
24.6
24.6
GAS MASKS
24.6
24.6
Army
BRIGADES REORGANIZATON
1.1
2.3
37.7
41.1
3RD GENERATION ANTITANK
15.6
15.6
LEOPARD MODERNIZATION
45.0
6.6
87.7
139.3
VHF RADIO
244.9
2.1
13.8
260.8
ARTILLERY MODERNIZATION
2.3
15.8
25.9
44.0
VEHICLES
3.2
32.9
202
238.1
Air Force
F-16 ECM
175.6
21.0
23.8
220.4
MIRAGE UPDATE
35.9
53.8
89.7
AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES
52.8
35.9
96.9
185.6
AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES
30.8
30.8
C-130 MODERNIZATION
35.9
25.4
61.3
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES
83.6
83.6
Navy
FRIGATE CONSOLIDATION
17.9
12.8
30.7
MINESWEEPERS
0.64
72.5
73.0
Medical
STERILIZERS
9.4
9.4
MED. UNIT
2.8
2.8
Logistics
NATO
73.0
84.5
89.6
91.2
338.3
OTHER
9.8
56.4
25.7
2.2
94.1
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Perhaps more important from the perspective of U.S. defense industry, this decision represents
a significant set-back for Litton Applied Technology's TWS (Tail Warning System) 95B project,
which Litton had hoped would open the door-beginning in Belgium-to broader export sales
in the NATO European market. The selection of Carapace, moreover, simply underscores the
difficulty American firms will continue to have in generating new sales in the increasingly
competitive European market, unless they are prepared to offer much more attractive offset
packages, including additional production opportunities for local industry. For Belgium-
where the relatively small aerospace sector is finding it increasingly difficult to compete with
the larger European firms (especially in the wake of the current rash of mergers)-access to
advantageous offset terms for Belgian industry was almost certainly the single most decisive
factor in choosing between competing ECM systems. The French entry won, no doubt, not
merely because it met the technical requirements of the Belgian Air Force (as did Litton's TWS),
but because Electronique Serge Dassault was prepared to guarantee that a minimum of 80
percent of the contract value would be returned to the Belgian marketplace in the form of direct
subcontracts, co-production schemes and indirect offsets (involving products unrelated to the
specific deal).
The importance of revitalizing Belgium's defense industrial base-and the entrée to the Belgian
market that this process could provide to foreign firms-was reaffirmed by Minister of National
Defense Guy Coëme in a speech in early June to a group of defense industry executives. Coëme
noted the need for Belgian industry-together with the three regional governments of Flanders,
Wallonia and Brussels-to make a far greater effort to help finance military procurement
programs (and to get involved early on in program planning), if they are to remain competitive
in the European single market that will emerge in 1992. Joint funding from industry and the
regions, Coëme implied, was perhaps the only way to avoid stagnation in the Belgian defense
industrial sector after 1992, and one sure avenue toward an improved financial footing for
Belgian industry (and, by extension, for the regions themselves) was to encourage greater foreign
investment. As noted above, this objective weighed heavily in Belgium's recent selection of
prime contractors for the Army's combat helicopter and the Air Force's F-16 ECM suites. It
seems to have been a key factor as well in the decision in June by Fabrique Nationale (FN) to
sell a controlling interest (51 percent) of its aeronautics division-FN Moteurs-to the French
engine manufacturer SNECMA, keeping a 42 percent interest for itself and providing the
regional government of Wallonia (which agreed to pour some $26 million into FN Moteurs)
with a 7 percent share. The deal, which netted the FN Group approximately $45 million, permits
FN to pay off its debts and finance a costly restructuring program, while still retaining a major
minority interest in a far more competitive FN Moteurs (which will keep its separate identity
and its production base near Liege).
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Belgian Procurement
Funds by Service for the Mid-Term
1989-1992
(in millions of current dollars)
308.9
1989
264.3
18.54
30.0
1990
141.5
12.8
96.5
1991
168.7
303.5
96.9
1992
72.5
738.9
Total
1989-1992
671.4
103.84
Army
Air Force
i Navy
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Division of Belgian Procurement
Funds for the Mid-Term
1989-1992
(in percentages)
Air Force
32%
General Staff
7%
Army
35%
Logistics
21%
Medical
Navy
1%
5%
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The implications of the above for U.S. defense companies, then, seem rather obvious. If they
are prepared to invest in Belgian firms-or, failing that, establish new subsidiaries within
Belgium-as part of a broader strategy to improve their European production base in preparation
for 1992, they stand a far better chance of winning Belgian contracts. If they are unwilling or
unable to do so, American firms will continue to be edged out by European competitors and
others (e.g., the Japanese) who seek to improve their market position in the post-1992 environ-
ment.
As for specific contract opportunities over the mid-term (1989-92), hardware needs of the Army
and Air Force-as the accompanying charts graphically illustrate-will provide the most
lucrative projects for .industrial participation. Looking beyond the VHF and ECM accounts,
major equipment programs over the next four years will include (for the Air Force) the purchase
of modern air-to-air, air-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, and (for the Army) an upgrade
of the Leopard I tanks, artillery modernization, and acquisition of a third-generation anti-tank
weapon (likely to be the joint European TRIGAT system).
The European Elections and Belgian Coalition Politics
Beyond the election of national delegates to
Results from the European Parliament vote
the European Parliament, the European elec-
suggest shifting levels of support for the par-
tions in mid-June hold significance in Bel-
ties in Belgium's Chrístian/Socialist/Flemish
gium for what they imply about the likely
nationalist governing coalition, bringing into
stability of the current coalition and the rela-
question the continued stability of the Bel-
tive strength of Belgium's various political
gian government. Prime Minister Martens'
parties, both in and out of government. In-
CVP party gained strength, while the
deed, given the delicate political balance that
Flemish Socialists and Flemish nationalists
prevails in Belgium, even slight shifts in
political popularity can open rifts among
(Volksunie) lost support. Additionally, Bel-
coalition partners, and a preliminary assess-
gian Green parties gained remarkable sup-
ment of the election results suggests that this
port.
may very well be happening. To be specific,
the Flemish Nationalist Volksunie party-which has been slipping in the polls since the
September 1988 local elections-lost a significant portion of its vote (and a seat in the European
Parliament) to the more extreme, far-right, ultra-nationalist Vlaams Blok, a turn of events which
many feel will strengthen the Volksunie's pre-existing doubts about remaining in the coalition.
Given the importance of the Volksunie to the constitutional reform process (devolving greater
powers to the regions), neither of the larger coalition groupings-the Christians and the
Socialists-would look forward to the Volksunie's departure from government any time soon,
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at least not until the close of the current Parliament in January 1992. Yet, should the Volksunie's
fortunes continue to slide, its leadership may very well opt out of the governing coalition.
Among the five parties now in power, the main winner in the European elections was Prime
Minister Martens' Flemish Christian Socialists (the CVP), which gained a seat in Strasbourg,
while the principal losers were the Flemish Socialists, who lost a seat. Martens' former coalition
partners-the more conservative Liberal parties of Flanders and Wallonia-also lost support
(and one seat in the European Parliament). Together with their failure to lead the voting in the
Brussels regional elections (held parallel to the European elections), the Liberals did little to
improve their standing among the Belgian electorate (or, in consequence, their chances of joining
another coaltion in the near-term, should the current government fall). By far the true victors
in the Belgian European elections were the two Green parties, the Walloon Ecolo and the Flemish
Agalev. In French-speaking Wallonia, the Green turnout was particularly strong, giving Ecolo
15 percent of the Walloon vote (just a notch less than that for the Francophone Liberals) and
the same level of representation at Strasbourg (two seats) as that for the venerable Walloon
Christian Socialists (PSC). Belgium's Green presence in the European Parliament will probably
be bolstered still further by the sole remaining Volksunie delegate, who is expected to align with
the Green faction.
What this means for defense is difficult to tell with precision. The annual summer negotiations
among the governing parties over the national budget is about to begin, and the CVP's
comparatively stronger showing may help to hold off Flemish Socialist pressures to reduce
further Belgian defense spending-pressures which a number of informed observers thought
might well increase in the wake of post-Summit arms control euphoria and NATO's more
agressive efforts to achieve a CFE agreement at Vienna. On the other hand, CVP leaders-who
must contend with a vocal anti-defense/antinuclear minority within the party-have never been
particularly eager to expend scarce political capital protecting military expenditures. Given the
Green Party proclivities of the Volksunie on such matters, the Christians' only real ally (among
its coalition partners) in the coming budget battle will be the French-speaking Socialists (the
PS) of Wallonia, where most of Belgium's defense industries are located. Together, the CVP
and the PS will likely sustain the Government's current commitment to a $2.7 billion Mid-Term
Procurement Program, but efforts to maintain annual defense spending at the $2.66 billion
level-thought by Belgian Chief of Staff Charlier to be the absolute minimum allowable-could
easily falter.
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Italy
Over the last three months, Italian strategic and political analysts were focused on; President
Bush's visit to Rome and the subsequent NATO Summit meeting; the outcome of the European
Parliamentary elections; and, the continuing search for a rationalization of the roles, missions
and structures of the Italian armed forces. All of these issues were, however, overshadowed by
the fall, on May 19, of the forty-eighth Italian post-World War II government, occasioned by
the resignation of Christian Democratic Prime Minister Ciriaco De Mita.
Italy's Governmental Crisis and the NATO SNF Debate
At the heart of Italy's current political crisis is a struggle for power between, on the one hand,
Socialist Party leader Bettino Craxi and his
Christian Democratic friend and ally Arnal-
Italian defense perspectives are focused on
do Forlani, the former Prime Minister who
internal security and "out-of-area" threats.
aspires to leadership of the Christian
Democratic Party (CDI), and, on the other hand, the De Mita faction which has relied on
centralization of the government bureaucracy to sustain control over dissident party factions.
This rivalry helped to shape the Italian election campaign for the European Parliament which,
ultimately, resulted in a victory for the "left", as the Italian Communist and Greens Parties made
significant inroads in cutting the popular majority of the five-party coalition government.
Even as voter turnout was low, in fact the lowest in post-war Italian history, and the campaign
centered less around European questions - although in a related referendum Italian voters
overwhelmingly approved a motion that Europe should be governed by a single government
responsible to Parliament-the June Parliamentary election results revealed several interesting
insights into Italian political, and hence strategic, perspectives. The first, and most obvious, is
the apparent rejuvenation of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) under its new dynamic leader,
Achille Occhetto. With his Europeanist outlook (that was described in depth in IFPA's DNA
Quarterly Report for January-April 1989) and his Party's innovative approach to domestic
economic issues, the new Italian Communist Party leader may succeed in attracting a greater
share of the Italian electorate in a national election, and, thus, disrupt the plans of Socialist Party
(PSI) leader Bettino Craxi to form and head a new "union of the left." Such a "union"
presumably would take on many of the positions of the International Socialist Movement,
including in the defense arena where both Parties have been supportive of West German NATO
positions, in particular their insistence on starting SNF negotiations before implementation of
a CFE agreement. In this context, both the Socialist Craxi and PCI leader Occhetto have
supported a "Third Zero" option, pertaining to Lance (nuclear surface-to-surface) missiles and
nuclear-capable artillery deployments. Their respective positions on NATO deployments of
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dual-capable aircraft are less clear, although both men are said to oppose the Italian acceptance
of the redeployment of the U.S. 401st air wing, primarily because of its collateral nuclear-strike
tasking. This sensitivity of Italian officials (and public opinion, to nuclear deployments on
Italian soil) threatens to emerge as a major political issue in regard to TASM, especially if the
U.S. F-16s are, in fact, redeployed to Italy. Reinforcing this view is the apparent growing
sympathy of Italian voters for the environmentalist cause which was manifested in the gains
made by the Italian Greens whose 6% of the vote translates into five seats in the European
Parliament. Together with the growth of antinuclear sentiments, the concern over environmental
issues reflects the emergence in Italy, as well as in Western Europe, of a "leftist" trend which
may have a significant impact on the future conceptualization of national and European
defense/deterrence requirements.
However, the extent to which the results of the European Parliamentary elections will influence
the nearterm shaping of Italian defense policy is unclear. At the moment, Italian perspectives
on defense and deterrence issues are preoccupied with a growing concern over the global
proliferation of ballistic missile and chemical warfare technologies and, for the most part, a
diminished perception of a threat posed by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact forces. As has
been noted consistently in previous IFPA Quarterly Reports for DNA, Italian threat perceptions
have changed over the years since World War П, to emphasize internal security and "out of
area" threats, specifically from Libya to the South and terrorism from the Middle East. For at
least a decade the Italians have emphasized the Libyan threat in the context of their Mediter-
ranean obligations in NATO and in the course of Alliance debates over force dispositions and
burdensharing. In their current defense plans, Italian forces are structured primarily for use in
Mediterranean scenarios, although they maintain a capability for employment in the North
against a Soviet/Warsaw Pact contingency. It is in this context that Italian public opinion has
become embroiled in the NATO SNF debate and the attendant discussion of Western CFE
proposals.
Italian Views of the NATO Compromise
Apart from sympathizing with the dilemma of the West Germans in the Alliance, and indeed,
supporting their position in the NATO controversy on Lance modernization and SNF negotia-
tions, the last five-party Italian government coalition, under the lead of the long-serving,
Christian Democratic Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, has been outspoken on the need to
reconsider the deployment of all of NATO's frontline forces, nuclear as well as conventional,
in the context of both the conventional force talks (CFE) and the prospective negotiation of an
agreement to limit short-range nuclear forces in Europe. The Italian position on the relationship
between the CFE talks and the proposed negotiation of short-range nuclear forces is based on
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a perception that NATO has more to gain by bringing Soviet short-range nuclear weapons into
talks which may result in their disproportionate dismantling (because of the larger inventory of
Soviet SNF systems, as compared with that of the Alliance). But more than this, from the Italian
perspective, the defense rationale for the deployment of SNF systems will inevitably be
diminished as the conventional force talks produce agreement on the reduction of armored and
artillery force deployments in Europe. Thus, the five-party government coalition partners have
been united in their support for an early SNF negotiation, tied to progress at the CFE, but not
necessarily to implementation of an agreement. At the same time, the Italians have also been
more or less united in the view that a Lance modemization decision need not be made by the
Alliance this year. In part, in support of the West Germans, the Italians have stated that a
modernization decision on Lance could be pushed off until the early 1990's, at which time many
Italian defense analysts anticipate that there will be negotiated a framework agreement at the
CFE which would facilitate, from a military-operational perspective, a draw-down in Alliance
SNF deployments.
While there is widespread support in Italy for SNF negotiations, there are divergent views of
whether or not to support the "Third Zero" option. Among Italian public opinion, support for
the "Third Zero" is strong; but
among defense experts and
The Italian position on SNF negotiations does not tie
policymakers in the Foreign and
future negotiations to implementation of a CFE
Defense Ministries and at NATO,
agreement, although it does foresee some progress
this is widely regarded as a
at CFE as a necessary precursor to talks.
dangerous option for the strategic
stability of Europe. There is among
Italian defense experts strong support for the concept of minimal deterrence based upon the
extension of a U.S. strategic-nuclear guarantee to Western Europe, manifested in the forward
deployment of American forces in the Central Region of NATO. In this context SNF may have
a coupling role, especially in the aftermath of the INF Treaty; but deployments of nuclear
artillery and large numbers of SSM systems (i.e. the 88 Lance launchers) are widely regarded
as unnecessary. On the precise question of a preferred NATO SNF force posture under a
minimal deterrence concept, the Italians are divided as to whether NATO Europe should support
deployments of ground-based nuclear weapons capabilities at all. Ever since the INF deploy-
ment controversy and debate in Italy, the question of nuclear-capable systems located on Italian
soil has been controversial and sparks opposition, especially in those areas where these systems
are to be sited. For many Italian defense analysts, the current NATO controversy over SNF
should be regarded as the "tip of the iceberg." The real Alliance confrontation is said to be
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coming over military doctrine and the defense posture attendant with NATO's forward defense
concepts.
For many Italians, the differences in perspective between NATO's front-line states (of West
Germany and Italy) and what were termed by the Italians as the "second-line" allies (of France,
Britain and the United States) go to the core of the Alliance's nuclear "warfighting" posture.
From the Italian perspective, the present NATO strategy of forward defense and early use of
short-range nuclear weapons, if conventional forces cannot hold their assigned wartime posi-
tions, creates a distinction between "front" and "second-line" states, with Italy and the Federal
Republic of Germany facing prospective destruction and widespread radioactive contamination.
For the Italians who deploy six batteries of nuclear Lance missiles (in the northeast, near the
town of Portogruaro), with the objective of stopping a Warsaw Pact invasion down the Po valley,
their use in a European contingency would ensure the destruction of Italian territory and
population from Trieste to Udine. Increasingly, as with the deployment of nuclear-capable
artillery launchers, the deployment on Italian soil of any short-range nuclear weapons is disputed
except, perhaps by the Italian Army's leadership, and is likely to engender heated public and
policy debates that could have the effect of eroding Italian support for NATO as the preeminent
institutional framework for defense cooperation in Europe. Already many Italian defense and
policy analysts and officials have jumped on the "European" bandwagon, preferring to explore
the future prospects for defense collaboration either under West European Union (WEU)
auspices or in the context of the European Communities, which currently have no formal
defense-related responsibilities.
Italian opposition to land-based short-range nuclear weapons deployments on Italian soil is also
seen in the growing opposition to the planned redeployment of the U.S. 401 st F-16 wing. Apart
from regional concerns which are not incidental and which focus on a range of environmental
issues - from noise abatements to low-flight training - there is growing political opposition
to the move on the basis of anti-nuclear sentiment, but also in the context of diminished threat
perceptions of the Soviet Union and against the prospects of a CFE agreement. By and large,
Italians are hopeful that a CFE framework agreement can be negotiated by 1991, especially in
light of President Bush's recent proposals which included aircraft and troop reductions, both of
which the Italians have long supported for inclusion in the CFE.
Implications for Italian Defense Reorganization
In line with projected changes in the European security environment as a result of a diminished
Italian threat perception of the Soviet Union, and a possible CFE outcome that may affect
fundamentally Alliance force deployments and military structures in Western Europe, the Italian
military is working on a major reorganization of Italy's defense forces. This effort is being
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undertaken in the context of reduced defense spending and against the assumption that austerity
measures will be necessary well into the 1990's if the Italian economy is to meet the
government's objective of stabilizing the national debt before 1992, and the implementation of
the European Single Integrated Market structure. Within the new Italian defense model: the
territorial defense structure will be streamlined, with a progressive reduction of the number of
conscripts and a revision in the numbers of personnel assigned to logistics; while redundant or
unnecessary facilities will be closed or made available for civilian use. Additionally, both in
the administrative area and logistics services, automated systems and new organizational
structures will be put into operation, and, the length of military service will be reduced to take
account of political opposition to current conscription periods.
On the equipment side, the Zanone Plan, as the defense model is now termed, provides for major
equipment procurements between the years of 1989 and 2000, related specifically to air defense
of Italian territory; to sea-based air defense assets, including systems for the protection of
land-based as well as naval assets; mobility enhancements; and, infrastructure modernizations
for the Italian ground forces. This Plan does not, however, include funding for major interna-
tional procurement programs like Patriot, the European Fighter Aircraft, or the NATO Frigate
program, which, when taken together, would "break through current budgetary ceilings" and
thus, have to be authorized under a separate Parliamentarily-approved funding package. (In this
context it is important to
note that the Zanone Plan
Defense reorganization necessitated by the Italian
is a draft law that also has
government's austerity measures into the 1990s will include:
not yet been submitted to
streamlining of the territorial defense structure, reduction in
the Italian Parliament for
the number of conscripts and revision of the number of
approval.)
personnel assigned to logistics, and closure of unnecessary
The emphasis of the
facilities. The current defense plan includes funding for in-
Zanone Plan on Italian
frastructure and mobility enhancements and air-defense as-
defense interests in the
sets, but not for major international procurement programs
Mediterranean and "out-
like Patriot or the NATO Frigate. Funding to meet these
of-area" contingencies
demands would have to be authorized by Parliament under a
reinforces, in the new
separate supplementary procurement package.
Italian defense model, the
role of the Italian Navy
which, until now, has been relegated a "poor third cousin" to the Air Force and the Army in
budgetary allocations. For example, the 1988 Italian defense budget assigns 42.5% of its funds
to the Army, 35.7% to the Air Force, and only 21.8% to the Navy. Moreover, of the 3.189
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intervention for limited peacekeep-
ing and international security
Italy at a Glance
operations, "will be the most prob-
Population:
56.8 million
able ones in the next years."
Area:
30.2 million hectares
Yet, funding for the proposed
Work force (average 1988): 24 million
Italian defense reorganization is
Unemployed (average 1988): 2.9 million
not likely to be available in the next
Dollar exchange rate
ten years. While Italy's Defense
(average 1988):
one dollar =1,302 lire
Minister, Valerio Zanone, has re-
Inflation (consumer
price index average 1988):
5.0%
quested budget authority for 30 tril-
GDP 1988:
L1,073,100 billion
lion Lire ($21 billion) over the next
ten years for the modernization of
GDP growth 1988:
4.0%
Italian armed forces, a large portion
Money supply
M2 growth 1988:
7.7%
of it will be allocated to administra-
Public sector borrowing
tive and service costs. Of the ap-
requirement 1988:
L124,651 billion
propriations
to
"heavy
Public debt at
technologies" there will be a large
year end 1988:
L 1,035,500 billion
deficit if each of the Services' mod-
Public debt/GDP:
96.5%
ernization requirements are to be
Trade 1988:
met. In his budget request, Zanone
Imports
L180,059 billion
Exports
L167,196 billion
proposes to allocate three trillion
Merchandise trade deficit
L12,863 billion
Lire ($2 billion) per year to the
Head of State:
President Francesco
Services, making for an allotment
Cossiga
of one trillion Lire ($705 million)
Prime minister:
Ciriaco De Mita
for each of the armed forces. This
(ChristianDemocrat)
is in addition to the 30,000 billion
Government:
Five-party coalition
comprised of:
Christian Democrats (DC),
Lire ($20,9 billion) that the govern-
(until May 19, 1989)
Socialists (PSI),
ment requested Parliament to
Social Democrats (PSDI),
Republican (PRI) and
authorize for additional procure-
Liberals (PLI)
ment funding over the next ten
Parliamentary composition
years.
This supplemental
(three main parties):
Christian Democrats 34.3%
Communists (PCI) 26.6%
authorization is supposed to cover
Socialists 14.3%
Italian participation in major inter-
national programs, notably the European Fighter Aircraft, Patriot, and the NATO Frigate
program. Thus far, however, the funding bill has not been acted upon by the Parliament which,
together with the governing coalition, had decided that it was of a lower priority than implemen-
tation of proposed cuts in government spending. Without authorization of the supplemental
68
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
1 May - 30 June 1989
Progress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency
funding bill, Italian defense spending over the first three years of the requested budget
authorization would amount to just 0.1% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and would
permit Italian defense to reach in 1992 (the year in which the national budget is to be stabilized
according to coalition government policy), an overall defense expenditure percentage of almost
2.4% of the GDP, which compares favorably with the present spending level of 2.1% of the
Italian GDP (in 1988). Even so, the budget request will barely be enough to preserve the status
quo of the armed services and to authorize investments already made. To meet the objectives
of the new defense model, Italy would have to have available at least a budget of 35 billion Lire
($24.7 million) on an annual basis, according to analyses of the new Ministry of Defense think
tank headed by General Carlo Jean.
69
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"ocrText": "Originally Processed With FOIA(s):\nFOIA Number:\nS\nFOIA\nMARKER\nThis is not a textual record. This is used as an\nadministrative marker by the George Bush Presidential\nLibrary Staff.\nRecord Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records\nCollection/Office of Origin: Speechwriting, White House Office of\nSeries:\nDavis, Mark, Files\nSubseries:\nSubject File, 1989-1991\nOA/ID Number:\n13870\nFolder ID Number:\n13870-009\nFolder Title:\nForeign Policy-Europe, ca. 1989-90 [2]\nStack:\nRow:\nSection:\nShelf:\nPosition:\nG\n19\n2\n6\n3\nINTERNATIONAL\nmessage to the Czechs and East Germans:\necker's removal. A senior West German\ncial. \"If that begins to shift, you can as-\nMoscow wanted the refugee problem re-\ndiplomat said the East German leader\nsume the fix is in.\"\nsolved before Gorbachev arrived in East\ncould be gone from office \"in a matter of\nIt was doubtful, however, whether a suc-\nBerlin-and, Shevardnadze stressed, the\nweeks\" through the combined pressure of\ncessor would be any improvement. Mos-\nSoviets wanted it resolved \"with or without\nMoscow, Bonn and the East German pub-\ncow would clearly prefer a committed\nthe GDR's approval.\" Knowing the Czechs\nlic. That is probably premature. Next\nreformer such as Hans Modrow, the\nhad no choice but to abide by Moscow's\nspring, however, the regime will hold a\nhugely popular Dresden party chief who\nwishes, the Honecker government gave the\ncritical Communist Party congress. \"Up\nopenly advocates the overhaul of East\nemigration its sullen blessing.\nuntil now, every public and private\nGermany's political and economic institu-\nSome Western analysts speculated that\nsignal has been that there won't be any\ntions. It was more likely, though,\nGorbachev might lobby privately for Hon-\nchanges in authority,\" said one U.S. offi-\nthat any successor would be drawn from\nHow Kissinger Sees It\nAs East-bloc unity disinte-\nropeans, but everybody has\ngrates, the future of the two\nto recognize that we have a\nGermanys gains new impor-\nspecial mission in the East.\ntance. Former secretary of\nWhere have they proved their\nstate Henry Kissinger met\nspecial vocation in Eastern\nwith NEWSWEEK editors last\nEurope other than in the mili-\nweek to discuss \"the German\ntary field? To speak of a\nquestion.' Excerpts:\nGerman special historical re-\nlationship: in Poland is absurd.\nW\ne are watching a political\nWest German industrial-\nprocess in Europe in\nists want to use Eastern Eu-\nwhich the Soviets are losing\nrope for low-cost manufactur-\npolitical control in Eastern\ning of German technology.\nEurope, while NATO's mili-\nThey're putting a lot of money\ntary position progressively\ninto some of these countries.\nweakens in Western Europe. I\nWhat happens when the Sovi-\nconsider what's going on now\nets wake up and find that they\nto be the lull before some\nhave lost Eastern Europe eco-\nDPA-PHOTOREPORTERS\nstorm. The problem in East-\nnomically to the Germans,\nern Europe is a disintegration\nand that East Germany is\nA disintegrating empire: Calling for reform in East Germany\nof the concepts of the satellite\nblowing up. Is it likely they\nempire. The communist par-\nwill acquiesce to losing their\nties, to the extent that they\nEastern European empire to\nEvents in the East will pro-\nsaw Pact? Should we try to get\nbecome national parties and\nthe Germans? can't conceive\nduce a situation where the\nthem out? Or should we en-\nparticipate in the electoral\nthat. The internal disintegra-\nUnited States has to take a\ncourage them to stay?\nprocess, must adopt an atti-\ntion could have reached a\nposition. The only question is\nIt must be in the Soviet in-\ntude independent of Moscow\npoint where they will accept\nwhether we do it ad hoc, react-\nterest not to be the permanent\nbecause it's the only way they\nit, but I wouldn't want to base\ning to each crisis as it devel-\npoliceman of Eastern Europe,\ncan legitimize themselves. In\nAmerican policy on that prop-\nops. Or whether we say that\nthereby jeopardizing a relax-\nPoland and Hungary the com-\nosition. What if the Soviets de-\nwe're in a new period, howev-\nation with the West. We have\nmunist parties may believe\ncide to demonstrate their\ner we got there. That new\nto find a way to give the Sovi-\nthat by calling themselves so-\npower in Central Europe, per-\nperiod requires the follow-\nets assurances of security\ncial democrats they will save\nhaps in Berlin?\ning concepts: the bipolar ap-\nwithin their 1941 borders,\nnational communism. But\nWe have to come up with a\nproach will no longer work.\nand convince them that it is\nthis can't work in East Ger-\npolitical concept for the\nTherefore, we have to see how\nin their interest to get out\nmany, because there you can-\nfuture of Europe, or we will\nto manage trends in a manner\nof physical control of East-\nnot be a national communist;\nbe endlessly whipsawed be-\nthat does not leave us at the\nern Europe-which, however,\nas a nationalist you have to be\ntween accelerating unilateral\nend with a Europe less stable\ncan be turned into a zone to\nfor unification.\ndisarmament in NATO and\nthan the one we've known be-\nmake military attack against\nThe basic dilemma of the\nthe political disintegration of\nfore. You already see in the\nthem impossible. We need a\nWest Germans is that they're\nCentral Europe. The art of\nBalkans that all the old quar-\nconcept for Germany, for the\nemotionally cut loose from\nforeign policy is to under-\nrels are coming up again. You\nevolution of Eastern Europe\nsome of their Western moor-\nstand trends and to manage\ncan visualize the German-\nand for defense in a new politi-\nings. It is a standard phrase of\nthem. I would have preferred\nSlav problems will be there\ncal environment. We've got-\nWest German politics now\na more orthodox evolution.\nagain. You'll be back to tradi-\nten ourselves obsessed in the\nthat Germany has a special\nI would have preferred to\ntional European politics with-\nWest. We were SO militarized\nvocation in the East. They\nmaintain the present mili-\nout a concept and without the\nin our thinking that we're\nkeep saying: we're good allies,\ntary structures and a gradual\nforces to handle them. What\nnow militarized in our diplo-\nwe're reliable members of\neasing of tensions within\ndo we do if one of these coun-\nmacy-on both sides. And we\nNATO, we are dedicated Eu-\nthem. But a trend exists.\ntries decides to leave the War-\nhave to get away from that.\nNEWSWEEK: OCTOBER 16, 1989 45\nINTERNATIONAL\nthe ranks of East Germany's Stalinists,\nunderstand why people are unsatisfied.\"\nment official, \"who knows where Gorba-\nmen such as 52-year-old Egon Krenz, who\nWith the closing of the Czech border,\nchev's visit could lead? Will he urge them\nemerged as heir apparent while Honecker\nEast Germany exposed itself as a country\nto liberalize? Will he urge Honecker to\nwas reported close to death following\nthat can no longer compete for its citizens'\nleave office? Will the population respond\ngallbladder surgery over the summer.\nallegiance. Instead, said Dorothee Wilms,\nso overwhelmingly that it risks another\nCurrently the head of the security police,\nWest German minister for intra-German\nTiananmen Square?\" After admitting its\nKrenz is favored by party hard-liners who\nrelations, \"The GDR [is] more than ever\npolitical illegitimacy, East Germany can\nare seeking to hold back the tide of reform.\na state built on walls.\" East Germans'\neither reform, repress or explode.\n\"These are old men, immobile, petrified,\nincreasingly panicky claustrophobia is\nHARRY ANDERSON with MICHAEL MEYER\nunable to cope with changing times,\"\nthreatening to get out of hand. \"In those\nand KAREN BRESLAU in East Berlin,\nMARGARET GARRARD WARNER in Washington\nsaid one official in Bonn. \"They do not\ncircumstances,\" said a U.S. State Depart-\nand bureau reports\nBehind the Masks of Eastern Europe\n20 years socialism was de-\nprived of the moral side. All\nwas apathy and depression, a\nIn Eastern Europe last\nhopelessness prevailed. But\nweek, NEWSWEEK Executive\nover the last year we can see\nEditor Stephen Smith and\nremarkable change. First, a\nBonn bureau chief Michael\nnew generation has grown up\nMeyer spoke with leading poli-\nthat did not go through the\nticians and activists about the\ntrauma of 1968. Second, de-\npace of change in their coun-\nvelopments in Hungary and\ntries. Excerpts:\nPoland are stimulating our\nsociety. Third, the current\nMieczyslaw Rakowski, Polish\npolicy of our leadership is\nCommunist Party chief: The polit-\ngrowing sterile. The leader-\nical situation is not stable. A\nship is tired and growing old.\nnew balance is emerging. The\nIt's becoming petrified.\nCommunist Party is seeking\nA dictatorship in crisis typi-\nan identity, as is Solidar-\ncally makes contradictory\nity. As for reforms, there are\nmoves. I can imagine a situa-\nno barriers, theoretically. In\ntion that one day my play will\npractice, you have to ask how\nBISSON-SYGMA\nSHEPARD SHERBEL-SABA\n'The challenge is to change people's mind-set': Rakowski, Pozsgay\nopen in Prague, and the next\nmuch people are willing to see\nday I'll be in prison. This may\na decline in their living stand-\nseem implausible, but at the\nards. In my opinion, Polish so-\nmoment of crisis, when power\nciety is not prepared to make\nEurope. There is no political\nDictatorial socialism will dis-\nis shaken, anything can hap-\nsacrifices of this kind. You\nor even geographical unity.\nappear. We must create a con-\npen. For 20 years the commu-\nhave this horrible contradic-\nWhat you call the East bloc is\nstitutional state ruled by\nnists exploited the future.\ntion: you need radical moves\nan artificial linkage, a hybrid\nlaw. The goal should be a par-\nNow come the results of this\nbut you have the resistance of\nimposed after Yalta. The cri-\nliamentary government free-\nvery dangerous policy. With-\nthe people.\nsis of Europe lies in its di-\nly elected from among com-\nin eight to 10 years, [we] will\nThe real challenge is\nvision. Protracted problems\npeting parties. If defeated, the\nbe like Poland-$40 billion in\nto change people's mind-set.\nhere will lead to protracted\nparty will transfer power as in\ndebt and no basic foodstuffs.\nPoles would like to work in\nproblems in Western Europe\nany democracy. Hungary is\nWe keep telling the regime\nsocialism but live in capital-\nas well. We have an unprece-\nnot an oligarchy: we should be\nthat it is not necessary to wait\nism. We like the demands on\ndented opportunity for creat-\nable to change our leaders at\nuntil the bitter end before\nus to be low. Most Poles are\ning a united Europe. It's not a\nany time.\nstarting a social dialogue. A\nattached to the peaceful life.\nmatter of money. We want ac-\nlot of suffering could be\nThe greatest barrier to re-\ncess to Western technology, to\nMilos Jakes, Czechoslovak Com-\nprevented.\nform lies in people's psycholo-\neconomic innovation and for-\nmunist Party leader: Restructur-\nBut do not forget, in a totali-\ngy, what I call the \"awareness\neign investment. We want en-\ning] certainly does not mean\ntarian system we can observe\nbarrier.\" Changing this is not\ntrepreneurs who can teach us\nedging away from the ideals of\nan interesting phenomenon.\na matter of a year or five\nmanagement skills as well.\nsocialism\nWe keep a close\nPeople in power will speak out\nyears; it will take a genera-\nWe have seen no sign that\neye on those developments [in\nonly when the time is ripe.\ntion. As it is, the system has\nMoscow wants to pull us back.\nHungary and Poland], which\nOur leaders all wear a uni-\ndemoralized people. I may be\nTo the contrary, Gorbachev's\nin many respects give us con-\nform mask and declare iden-\nwrong, but after the first radi-\nperestroika is a wind at our\ncern, and draw the necessary\ntical phrases. Perhaps at a\ncal steps, and the subsequent\nback. Hungary has reached a\nlessons-forexample, that the\nmoment of history, the masks\nsocial reaction, the new gov-\npoint where there is no go-\nparty as the leading force in\nwill fall, and it is only at that\nernment will retreat.\ning back.\nsociety must not lose control\nmoment that we know who is\nThe Hungary of the future\nover the situation.\nwho. It is possible then that\nImre Pozsgay, Hungarian Politbu-\nwill be similar to West Euro-\nwe may be surprised to find\nro member and a leading reformer:\npean social democracies. The\nVaclav Havel, Czechoslovak play-\nthat the masks concealed an\nA crisis prevails in Eastern\nparty state will cease to exist.\nwright and political activist: For\nintelligent face.\n46 NEWSWEEK OCTOBER 16, 1989\nTHE WALL STREET JOURNAL TUESDAY, APRIL 14, 1987\nNATO Edges Toward\nthe Moment of Truth\nBy IRVING KRISTOL\nThe trouble with cleverness in foreign\nBoard of Contributors\npolicy is that one is likely to end up being\ntoo clever by half. This is the situation in\nwhich America's European allies now find\nPoliticians who are loath to advocate the withdrawal of\nthemselves.\nFor many years now, they have been pi-\nU.S. troops from Europe for reasons of policy are beginning\nously and disingenuously stressing the im-\nportance of arms-control negotiations as\nto look with favor on the idea for budgetary reasons.\none alternative to an expensive and politi-\ncally unpopular buildup of the North Atlan-\nSoviet aggression-even if it is nonnuclear\nous reasons-is that any such nuclear ex-\ntic Treaty Organization's conventional mil-\naggression that is involved. This commit-\nchange would primarily involve the two su-\nment was made at a time when the nations\nperpowers, with the missiles flying over\nitary forces. They have even felt free to\nof Western Europe were economically and\nWest European heads, as it were. But with\ncriticize the U.S. for dragging its feet on\nthis issue. Now, however, they are dis-\nmilitarily weak. It was also made at a\nor without American troops in Europe, this\ntime when the U.S. had a clear nuclear su-\nis an unlikely scenario, since neither the\nmayed at the public revelation that the al-\nternative was always a false one. The\nperiority over the Soviet Union. This is no\nSoviet Union nor the U.S. is really inter-\nprice of a successful arms-control agree-\nlonger the case, to put it mildly, and many\nested in committing national suicide in a\nment is larger military budgets, not\nanalysts have been saying-some candidly,\nconflict over Western Europe, dearly. as\nsome sotto voce-that NATO should begin\nthey may cherish that portion of the\nsmaller ones.\nto recognize that the American \"nuclear\nglobe.\nShifting the Focus\numbrella\" is more fictitious than real.\nThis does not mean that the U.S. will\nAs the prospect of an agreement be-\nOn the surface, their arguments seem\nsimply \"decouple\" itself from Western Eu-\ntween the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on inter-\nto have had little effect. The State Depart-\nrope. It cannot and should not. Since the\nmediate-range nuclear missiles grows\nment and the Pentagon are resolutely dedi-\ncosts of a West European conventional de-\nbrighter, Western European nations have\ncated to the status quo. U.S. politicians are\nfense will be high-nuclear weapons are\nbeen nervously shifting the focus to the So-\nfearful of disrupting an alliance that has\nattractive precisely because they are SO\nviet's short-range missiles. They have also\n\"kept the peace\" in Europe for more than\nrelatively cheap-the U.S. should be (and\nindicated clearly that if an agreement on\nfour decades. And public-opinion polls\nsurely will be) ready to help, with sophisti-\nthis matter is negotiated-which is by no\nshow widespread and habitual public ac-\ncated weaponry, with its Navy and Air\nmeans out of the question-then the focus\nceptance of NATO. True, these polls never\nForce, even with some troops where neces-\nwill shift to a negotiated reduction of So-\nask, \"Are you in favor of the U.S. engaging\nsary and feasible. But Europe will have to\nviet conventional superiority.\nin mutual nuclear annihilation with the So-\nbecome more self-reliant if \"containment\"\nBut they know beforehand that this is a\nviet Union in order to preserve the integ-\nof the Soviets is to be successft.\nnonstarter. The negotiations on conven-\nPolitical Will\nrity of Western Europe?\" This question is\ntional forces have been going on for 15\nnever raised in public discourse, lest the\nThis possibility tends to be dismissed\nyears now in Geneva, and there has not\nanswer be disconcerting.\nmuch too casually. Yes, the Soviets now\neven been agreement on an agenda. The\nBeneath this surface of seemingly solid\nhave 27,000 tanks vs. NATO's 14,000. But\nSoviets are not simply going to negotiate\ncommitment, however, a subtle and impor-\nthe nations of Western Europe know how to\naway their superiority vis-a-vis NATO on\ntant change is taking place. Politicians\nbuild tanks-very good ones, actually-and\nthis level. They see themselves as a world\nwho are loath publicly to advocate the\nhave the resources to do so. They also\npower, not a middling power, which is\nwithdrawal of American troops from Eu-\nhave the human resources to man them.\nwhat America's NATO allies are resigned\nrope-the supposed guarantor of that nu-\nEspecially with American assistance, they\nto being. The Soviets' conception of an\nclear umbrella-for reasons of foreign pol-\nshould be able to close much of this gap, if\nideal military \"balance\" is one in which\nicy are beginning to look with favor on\nnot all of it. And what is true for tanks is\ntheir conventional forces are equal to those\nthe idea for budgetary reasons. More and\nno less true for airplanes. The key question\nof Western Europe plus those of the U.S. If\nmore one hears invidious comments about\nis: Do they have the political will to move\nthis ideal is to be frustrated, it will not be\nthe level of European military expendi-\nin this direction?\nby negotiation but by a very substantial in-\ntures as compared with that of the U.S.\nThe State Department and the Pentagon\ncrease in NATO's conventional military\nAnd more and more one hears rough calcu-\nare convinced that they do not-that the\npower-substantial enough so that the So-\nlations of how much the deficit would be\npolitical will for such self-reliance is non-\nviets would be hard put to match the pace.\nreduced if NATO were more 'European,\"\nexistent. This is why they prohibit, in ef-\nAny such buildup, however, is what our\nfect, any speculation about the future of\nNATO partners wish so desperately, for in-\nless American. This is not the most sensi-\nNATO. Nevertheless, that future is now an\nternal political reasons, to avoid.\nble reason for rethinking NATO, but wel-\nopen question. It will be up to the Euro-\nSo a rift is developing within NATO on\nfare-state politics within the U.S. are not\npeans to prove the State Department and\narms control, and ironically it is now West-\nall that different from welfare-state poli-\nthe Pentagon wrong.\nern Europe that is trying to repudiate its\ntics in Britain or West Germany.\nWhat it comes down to is that the very\nMr. Kristol is the John M. Olin profes-\npast rhetoric. It is indeed a surprise that\nthe rift should be developing on this issue,\nidea of NATO is now edging into incoher-\nsor of social thought at the NYU Graduate\nSchool of Business and a senior fellow of\nin this way-as a result of Soviet accom-\nence, and the status quo is becoming more\nmodation rather than Soviet intimidation.\nand more anachronistic. The defense of\nthe American Enterprise Institute.\nBut it ought not surprise anyone that there\nWestern Europe at the conventional level\nis a rift. The present structure of NATO is\nwill be, in the future, primarily a Euro-\nsuch that rifts are bound to emerge, and to\npean responsibility. The British and\nbecome ever more serious with each pass-\nFrench nuclear forces will have to become\ning year.\nthe nuclear deterrent for all of Western\nThe keystone of NATO is the American\nEurope. It will be a deterrent against So-\ncommitment to defend Western Europe,\nviet nuclear aggression-as it already has\nwith nuclear weapons if necessary, against\nbeen in fact, as distinct from theory.\nIt is preposterous to believe, as official\nNATO theory prescribes, that the govern-\nments of Western Europe would ever re-\nsort to a first-use of nuclear weapons\nagainst conventional Soviet aggression,\ntherewith ensuring their own annihilation.\nThe European dream-unstated, for obvi-\nlation\nTIME/MARCH 5, 1990\nThe playwright-President's stirring remarks brought down the House-and the Senate. Some lawmakers were moved to tears\nThe Revolution\nHas Just Begun\nIn 59 days that shook the world, dissident playwright\n\"\nTwice in this century the world has\nbeen threatened by a catastrophe.\nVaclav Havel was swept out of political detention into the\nTwice this catastrophe was born in\nEurope, and twice you Americans, along\npresidency of Czechoslovakia. Last week Havel delivered to\nwith others, were called upon to save Eu-\na joint meeting of Congress an extraordinary speech about\nrope, the whole world and yourselves.\nIn the meantime, the U.S. became the\ndemocratic ideals, the rebirth of the human spirit and\nmost powerful nation on earth, and it un-\nderstood the responsibility that flowed\nAmerica's role in the post-cold war era.\nfrom this. But something else was happen-\n14\nThere are two plywood circles showing\nwhere gun turrets were taken out to save\nThe health of nations-II\nweight when hauling the 9,600-lb. Little\nBoy atom bomb. Back in the bomb bay\nwork is going on to reconstruct the single\nhook used to suspend and release the\nbomb. A normal double hook for bombs\nWhose lunch are\nwas abandoned by the mission planners,\nwho feared, if one malfunctioned, the\narmed bomb might dangle in the rack like\nwe consuming?\nhell on a tether. You remember the day 44\nyears ago on a college campus when the\nA nation-especially a nation in a leadership role-is only as strong as its\nnews came of the Enola Gay's successful\neconomy. America has been a world leader since World War II because it could\ndrop and the public dawning of the nuclear\nafford to be. But even as sweeping changes in Eastern Europe and elsewhere\nage, how you sat up most of the summer\nmake the world a different place, the American economy is changing as well,\nnight talking and wondering.\nand not necessarily for the better. These changes raise the question of whether\nThe Garber Facility is named for a di-\nAmerica can remain at center stage as the daily drama of history continues\nto unfold.\nminutive 90-year-old man who still goes to\nwork every day as historian emeritus of the\nThe worldwide political landscape, once so clearly divided by figurative\ncurtains and literal walls, is a blurry place today, and nobody has issued new\nSmithsonian Institution and has done\nroad maps. At the same time, the nation faces a daunting array of economic\nmore than any other person to preserve the\nproblems: An intractable budget deficit, an equally stubborn trade deficit, a\nrecord of the nation's great venture into\ntendency to consume rather than to save and invest, and a growing reliance\nflight. Paul E. Garber was born just as the\non foreign money to finance our debt. These domestic woes carry over into\nWright brothers began to inquire about fly-\ntoday's international marketplace; American companies are hard-pressed to\ning machines. When Garber was five, his\ncompete, and cries are raised that \"they\"-our international competitors-are\nuncle gave him a kite, and his fascination\neating our lunch.\nwith the sky was fixed for a long lifetime.\nBut it shouldn't matter who sits down to dine if the meal is large enough\nto feed everybody. The real challenge for America is to keep the economy\ngrowing-not only for the sake of our international commitments, but also\nA\nt nine, Garber read in the evening Star\nto raise the living standards of our population. And that means shifting the\nabout an airplane demonstration. He\nemphasis from consumption to investment. Today's investments, after all,\nmooched 50c from his father and hopped\nprovide the means for tomorrow's higher standard of living in an increasingly\nthe Washington trolley to Arlington Na-\ncompetitive world.\ntional Cemetery. When he stepped down,\nThe key to economic expansion remains the translation of savings into new\nhe heard a strange sound, looked up and\nplants and equipment, research and development, and a better-trained, more\nsaw Orville Wright steer his Military Flyer\nsophisticated work force. People are crucial-people working better and\nabove him with Lieut. Frank Lahm, one of\nsmarter, not necessarily harder.\nthe first military pilots, at his side. Garber\nBut America has a long-standing penchant for saving less than its foreign\ncompetitors. Japan and West Germany, to name just two, have a tradition of\nran up the hill to Fort Myer, where Presi-\nsaving and investing at high levels, and this tradition is continuing into the\ndent William Howard Taft was witnessing\npresent. Just one measure of this phenomenon, admittedly an imperfect one: In\nthe birth of American air power. Years lat-\n1988, Americans saved 4.4 percent of their disposable household income; the\ner, Garber, by then a friend of the Wright\nJapanese saved 15.2 percent and the West Germans 12.6 percent.\nbrothers, acquired both their original plane\nAs if a low savings rate weren't bad enough, the federal deficit makes it\nand the Military Flyer for the Smithsonian.\nworse. A lot of what Americans do save goes to finance Uncle Sam's massive\nGarber learned to fly one of the legend-\ndebt. Foreign money is another prime way we finance our excessive consump-\nary Curtiss Jennys just after World War I.\ntion, including the government's.\nIn the final analysis, the budget deficit has to fall sharply if America is to\nBut he got so wrapped up in the evolution\nremain a world leader. But in the fiscal year ended last September 30, the\nof the planes and preserving them that he\ndeficit was $152 billion, a mere $3 billion less than in fiscal '88, and this after a\nnever pursued a flying career. In all likeli-\ngreat deal of highly publicized number-juggling. America's accumulated debt at\nhood, he is the only man alive who has lived\nthat point was some $3 trillion.\nthe entire span of aviation history at the\nWe continue to believe that some fat remains in the budget and there's\nvery center, friend of most of the pioneers,\nroom to cut waste. But such economies may not be enough. If they aren't, it's\nkeeper of flight's most complete diary.\npast time for Congress to bite the bullet and raise more revenue. Smoke and\nGarber put the bite on Jimmy Doolit-\nmirrors simply can't do the job.\ntle, Amelia Earhart, Wiley Post and How-\nWe also continue to believe that any new tax should be levied on consump-\ntion, not earnings. In addition to being an incentive to save rather than spend,\nard Hughes for famous planes they flew to\nsuch a tax wouldn't be collected on goods made to be sold abroad, and\nrecords in what is often called the golden\ntherefore wouldn't harm America's competitiveness in world markets. But it\nyears of aviation, when new planes were\nwould be collected on goods consumed in the U.S.-treating American and\ndesigned and built every few weeks. When\nforeign products equally and tempering consumption generally.\nGarber's friend Charles Lindbergh took\nForeign nations didn't create America's budget deficit. While they are\noff for Paris in 1927, Garber heard the\nhelping finance it, they can't cure it, either. That's a job we have to tackle\nnews on a homemade radio in his Chevy.\nourselves. Nobody is eating our lunch. We're the only ones who can make our\nHe stopped at roadside and scribbled a ca-\npie bigger, or cut ourselves a thicker slice of steak.\nNext: The high price of leadership.\nble asking for the plane. \"Lindbergh hasn't\ngotten there yet,\" stammered the Smithso-\nnian's Assistant Secretary Charles Greely\nAbbot when asked to send the wire. \"He's\na great aviator in a very good plane,\" re-\nsponded Garber. \"I think he will make it.\"\nMobil®\nLindbergh did. So did Garber's plea. The\nSpirit of St. Louis is one of the most popular\nexhibits in all of aviation history.\n1990 Mobil Corporation\nway to democracy and independence.\nviet Union and the other countries the So-\nThis, I am convinced, is a historically\nviet Union subjugated in its time, a legacy\nASHE\nirreversible process and, as a result, Eu-\nof countless dead, an infinite spectrum of\nrope will begin again to seek its own iden-\nhuman suffering, profound economic de-\ntity without being compelled to be a divid-\ncline and, above all, enormous human hu-\ned armory any longer. Perhaps this will\nmiliation. It has brought us horrors that\ncreate the hope that sooner or later, your\nfortunately you have not known.\nboys will no longer have to stand on guard\nIt has given us something positive, a\nfor freedom in Europe or come to our res-\nspecial capacity to look from time to time\ncue, because Europe will at last be able to\nsomewhat further than someone who has\nstand guard over itself.\nnot undergone this bitter experience. A\nBut that is still not the most important\nperson who cannot move and lead a some-\nthing. The main thing is, it seems to me,\nwhat normal life because he is pinned un-\nthat these revolutionary changes will en-\nder a boulder has more time to think about\nable us to escape from the rather antiquat-\nhis hopes than someone who is not\ned straitjacket of this bipolar view of the\ntrapped that way.\nworld and to enter at last into an era of\nWhat I'm trying to say is this: we must\nmultipolarity in which all of us, large and\nall learn many things from you, from how\nsmall, former slaves and former masters,\nto educate our offspring, how to elect our\nwill be able to create what your great Pres-\nrepresentatives, all the way to how to orga-\nident Lincoln called \"the family of men.\"\nnize our economic life so that it will lead to\nprosperity and not to poverty. But it\nTHE PATH OF PLURALISM\ndoesn't have to be merely assistance from\nHow can the U.S. help us today? My reply\nthe well educated, powerful and wealthy to\nis as paradoxical as the whole of my life has\nsomeone who has nothing and therefore\nbeen. You can help us most of all if you\nhas nothing to offer in return.\nhelp the Soviet Union on its irreversible\nWe too can offer something to you: our\nbut immensely complicated road to de-\nexperience and the knowledge that has\nmocracy. It is far more complicated than\ncome from it. The specific experience I'm\nthe road open to its former European sat-\ntalking about has given me one certainty:\nellites. You yourselves know best how to\nconsciousness precedes being, and not the\nsupport as rapidly as possible the nonvio-\nother way around, as the Marxists claim.\nlent evolution of this enormous multina-\nFor this reason, the salvation of this hu-\ntional body politic toward democracy and\nman world lies nowhere else than in the\nautonomy for all its people. Therefore, it is\nhuman heart, in the human power to re-\nnot fitting for me to offer you any advice.\nflect, in human meekness and in human\nI can only say that the sooner, the more\nresponsibility.\nquickly and the more peacefully the Soviet\nUnion begins to move along the road to-\nA NEW WAY OF THINKING\nward genuine political pluralism, respect\nWithout a global revolution in the sphere\nfor the rights of the nations to their own in-\nof human consciousness, nothing will\ntegrity and to a working-that is, a mar-\nchange for the better in the sphere of our\nket-economy, the better it will be not just\nbeing as humans, and the catastrophe to-\nfor Czechs and Slovaks but for the whole\nward which this world is headed-be it\nworld.\necological, social, demographic or a gener-\nAnd the sooner you yourselves will be\nal breakdown of civilization-will be un-\ning as well. The Soviet Union appeared,\nable to reduce the burden of the military\navoidable. If we are no longer threatened\ngrew and transformed the enormous sacri-\nbudget borne by the American people. To\nby world war or by the danger that the ab-\nfices of its people suffering under totalitar-\nput it metaphorically, the millions you give\nsurd mountains of accumulated nuclear\nian rule into a strength that, after World\nto the East today will soon return to you in\nweapons might blow up the world, this\nWar II, made it the second most powerful\nthe form of billions in savings. American\ndoes not mean that we have definitely\nnation in the world.\nsoldiers shouldn't have to be separated\nwon. We are still incapable of understand-\nfrom their mothers just because Europe is\ning that the only genuine backbone of all\nCREATING THE FAMILY OF MEN\nincapable of being a guarantor of world\nour actions, if they are to be moral, is re-\nAll of this taught us to see the world in bi-\npeace, which it ought to be in order to\nsponsibility. Responsibility to something\npolar terms as two enormous forces-one\nmake some amends, at least, for having\nhigher than my family, my country, my\na defender of freedom, the other a source\ngiven the world two world wars.\ncompany, my success-responsibility to\nof nightmares. Europe became the point\nthe order of being where all our actions\nof friction between these two powers, and\nTHE LEGACY OF OPPRESSION\nare indelibly recorded and where and only\nthus it turned into a single enormous arse-\nAs long as people are people, democracy,\nwhere they will be properly judged.\nnal divided into two parts. In this process,\nin the full sense of the word, will always be\nI think that you Americans should un-\none half of the arsenal became part of that\nno more than an ideal. In this sense, you\nderstand this way of thinking. When\nnightmarish power, while the other, the\ntoo are merely approaching democracy.\nThomas Jefferson wrote that \"govern-\nfree part, bordering on the ocean and hav-\nBut you have one great advantage: you\nments are instituted among men, deriving\ning no wish to be driven into it, was com-\nhave been approaching democracy unin-\ntheir just powers from the consent of the\npelled, together with you, to build a com-\nterruptedly for more than 200 years, and\ngoverned,\" it was a simple and important\nplicated security system to which we\nyour journey toward the horizon has never\nact of the human spirit. What gave mean-\nprobably owe the fact that we still exist.\nbeen disrupted by a totalitarian system.\ning to that act, however, was the fact that\nThe totalitarian system in the Soviet\nThe communist type of totalitarian sys-\nthe author backed it up with his\nUnion and in most of its satellites is break-\ntem has left both our nations, Czechs and\nlife. It was not just his words, it was\ning down, and our nations are looking for a\nSlovaks, as it has all the nations of the So-\nhis deeds as well.\n\"\nTIME, MARCH 5, 1990\n15\nNation\nRipples in the American Lake\nCan the U.S. reap a peace dividend in the Pacific?\nWhile the U.S. bases are often picketed by\nNO\nleftists, polls show that a majority of Filipi-\nBANAN\nnos want them to stay. They provide 68,000\nFilipino jobs and inject $507 million annu-\nNA\nBASES\nSABWATAN\nally into the economy.\nTUNAY\nClark is clearly more expendable than\nNUSP\nSubic. The Air Force increasingly operates\nits long-range bombers and advanced fight-\ners out of Guam. Singapore's Prime Minister\nSP\nLee Kuan Yew has offered to accept some\nair units from Clark in his country. Subic's fa-\ncilities, on the other hand, cannot readily be\nreplaced. They include extensive machine\nshops that maintain the U.S. fleet with low-\ncost labor unavailable at alternative sites in\nSingapore or Japan.\nBut what are the bases protecting? At a\nmedia conference in Manila last week, So-\nviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadi\nGerasimov asked, \"Suppose the bases go\ntomorrow-where's the threat?\" The Sovi-\nets, he insisted, \"will not fill the vacuum.\"\nBase-less protest: Manila demonstrators at U.S. embassy want Yanks to go home\nAmerican planners are not so sure of that.\nSubic is strategically situated across the\nBy ED MAGNUSON\nBoth sides in the bases dispute may be\nChina Sea from Cam Ranh Bay, the for-\njust huffing, seeking an edge in the immi-\nmer U.S. naval base in Viet Nam, which\nE\nver since U.S. forces destroyed the\nnent bargaining. At the Pentagon, a Navy\nnow berths about 20 Soviet warships.\nJapanese Navy in World War II, the\ncaptain insisted that Philippine officials\nAnd while Mikhail Gorbachev has\nPacific Ocean has been, in military\n\"have cried wolf one time too often\" over\npromised to remove 120,000 troops from\nterms, an American lake. From naval bases\nSubic and that the U.S. might pull out.\nSoviet Asia and Mongolia, that would still\nin the Aleutian Islands and southward to Su-\nAquino, who was saved from a military\nleave 600,000 along the Soviet border with\nbic Bay in the Philippines, 107 U.S. warships\ncoup last December when U.S. jet fighters\nChina. At least 10,000 troops are based in\nand 51 submarines project commanding sea-\nfrom Clark kept rebel air power grounded,\nthe northern territories just off Japan that\npower. Ashore, mostly in South Korea, Ja-\ncaught a lot of domestic heat over her de-\nwere seized by the Soviets in 1945. The So-\npan and Okinawa, 120,000 American troops\npendence on the U.S. She may have used\nare poised to deter aggression along the Pa-\nCheney's visit to show some distance.\ncific's western rim. Now, with the Soviet\nthreat waning under the U.S.S.R.'s econom-\nSOUTH KOREA\nic and ideological decay, is that U.S. military\nAir Force 11,600\nArmy\n31,600\npresence still necessary?\nAs he ended a two-week tour of the Pa-\nU.S.S.R.\ncific last week, Defense Secretary Dick\nU.S. FORCES\nCheney concluded that the governments of\nSovetskaya\nJapan and South Korea still appreciate\nIN THE PACIFIC\nGavan\ntheir U.S. protectors, despite anti-Ameri-\nPetropavlovsk\nVladivostok\ncan sentiment among some political fac-\nJAPAN\n4\ntions. Yet Cheney caught a slap from Phil-\nAir Force 16,500\nNavy\n8,300\nCHINA\nippine President Corazon Aquino. The\nMarines 23,700\nArmy\n2,000\nSOUTH\nYokosuka\nU.S. Congress had recently cut $96 million\nKOREA\nSasebo\nJAPAN\nfrom a $481 million military and economic\nPACIFIC\naid package that Aquino apparently con-\nOkinawa\nOCEAN\nsidered a precondition for negotiations on\nrenewing U.S. leases to operate the huge\nSubic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base.\nPHILIPPINES\nAir Force\n9,200\nCam\nSubic\nMiffed, she canceled plans to meet Cheney.\nNavy\n5,500\nRanh\nBay\nClark\nGUAM\nThe Defense Secretary took the snub\nMarines\n2,000\nBay\nPHILIPPINES\nAir Force\n4,200\nArmy\n600\nVIET NAM\nNavy\n4,000\ngracefully but declared that the U.S. will re-\nGuam\nmain in the bases, whose leases expire next\nyear, \"only as long as the Philippine people\nU.S. bases\nwish it to stay-and only if the terms nego-\nSoviet bases\ntiated are acceptable to both parties.\"\nTIME Map by Paul J. Pugliese\n16\nTHE WASHINGTON POST\nVaclav Havel\nOur Freedom\nD\near fellow citizens:\nFor the past 40 years on this day you\nhave heard my predecessors utter different\nvariations on the same theme, about how\nour country is prospering, how many more\nbillion tons of steel we have produced, how.\nhappy we all are, how much we trust our\ngovernment and what beautiful prospects\nlie ahead of us. I do not think you. me\ninto this office so that I, of all people, should\nalso lie to you.\nOur country is not prospering. The great\ncreative and spiritual potential of our nation\nis not being used to its full potential. Whole\nsectors of industry are producing things in\nwhich no one is interested, while the things\nwe need are in short supply.\nThe state, which calls itself a state of the\nworking people, is humiliating and exploit-\ning the workers. Our outdated economy is\nsquandering energy, of which we are in\nshort supply. Acountry which could once be\nproud of the standard of education of its\npeople spends so little on education that\ntoday it occupies 72nd place in the world.\nWe have laid waste to our soil and the\nrivers and the forests that our forefathers\nbequeathed to us, and we have the worst\nenvironment in the whole of Europe today.\nAdults in our country die earlier than in\nWe cannot lay all the blame on those who ruled\nmost other European countries.\nus before, not only because this would not be true\nA\nllow me to tell you about a little\nbut also because it could detract from the\npersonal experience of mine. Flying to\nBratislava recently, I found time to look out\nresponsibility each of us now faces-the\nof the window. What I saw was the Slovnaft\n[oil refinery] complex and the Petrzalka\nresponsibility to act on our own initiative, freely,\nsuburb immediately beyond it. That view\nwas enough for me to understand that our\nsensibly and quickly.\"\nstatesmen and politicians had not even\nlooked, or did not even want to look, out of\nthe windows of their planes. None of the\nwear itself down, along with all the cogs in\ngeneration to the next in order for each of\nit.\nstatistics available to me would have en-\nus to discover them within us when the\nabled me to understand more quickly or\ntime was right, and to put them into prac-\nmore easily the situation we have gotten\nW\nhen I talk about a decayed moral\ntice.\nourselves into,\nenvironment, I do not mean merely\nOf course, for our freedom today we also\nBut not even all of that is the most\nthose gentlemen who eat ecologically pure\nhad to pay a price. Many of our people died\nvegetables and do not look out of their\nin prison in the '50e, many were executed,\nimportant thing. The worst thing is that we\nairplane windows. I mean all of us, because\nthousands of human lives were destroyed,\nare living in a decayed moral environment.\nall of us have become accustomed to the\nhundreds of thousands of talented people\nWe have become morally ill, because we\ntotalitarian system, accepted it as an inal-\nwere driven abroad. Those who defended\nhave become accustomed to saying one\nterable fact and thereby kept it running. In\nthe honor of our nations in the war were\nthing and thinking, another. We have\nother words, all of us are responsible, each\npersecuted, as were those who resisted\nlearned not to believe in anything, not to\nto a different degree, for keeping the totali-\ntotalitarian government, and those who\nhave consideration for one another and only\ntarian machine running. None of us is mere-\nsimply managed to remain true to their own\nto look after ourselves. Notions such as\nly a victim of it, because all of us helped to\nprinciples and think freely. None of those\nlove, friendship, compassion, humility and\ncreate it together.\nwho paid the price in one way or another for\nforgiveness have lost their depth and di-\nWhy do I mention this? It would be very\nour freedom today should be forgotten.\nmension, and for many of us they represent\nunwise to see the sad legacy of the past 40\nIndependent courts should justly assess the\nmerely some kind of psychological idiosyn-\nyears as something alien to us, handed\nappropriate guilt of those responsible, so\ncrasy, or appear to be some kind of stray\ndown to us by some distant relatives. On\nthat the whole truth about our recent past\nrelic from times past, something rather\nthe contrary, we must accept this legacy as\ncomes out into the open.\nsomething which we have brought upon\nThe previous regime\nourselves. If we can accept this, then we\nN\neither should we forget that other\nwill understand that it is up to all of us to do\nnations paid an even higher price for\nmade talented people\nsomething about it. We cannot lay all the\ntheir freedom today, and thus they also paid\nblame on those who ruled us before, not\nindirectly for us too. The rivers of blood\nwho were capable of\nonly because this would not be true but also\nwhich flowed in Hungary, Poland, Germany\nbecause it could detract from the responsi-\nand recently also in such a horrific way in\nmaking an enterprising\nbility each of us now faces-the responsibil\nRomania, as well as the sea of blood shed by\nity to act on our own initiative, freely\nthe nations of the Soviet Union, should not\nliving in their own\nsensibly and quickly.\nbè forgotten, primarily because all human\nThroughout the world, people are sur-\nsuffering affects every human being. But\ncountry into cogs in\nprised that the acquiescent, humiliated,\nmore than that, they must not be forgotten\nskeptical Czechoslovak people who appar-\nbecause it was these great sacrifices which\nsome kind of\nently no longer believed in anything sudden-\nweaved the tragic backdrop for today's\nly managed to find the enormous strength\nfreedom or gradual liberation of the nations\nmonstrous, smelly\nin the space of a few weeks to shake off the\nof the Soviet bloc, and the backdrop of our\ntotalitarian system in a completely decent\nnewly charged freedom too.\nmachine whose purpose\nand peaceful way. We ourselves are also\nWithout the changes in the Soviet Union,\nsurprised at this, and we ask where the\nPoland, Hungary and the GDR, the develop-\nno one can understand.\nyoung people, in particular, who have never\nments in our country could hardly have\nknown any other system, find the source of\nhappened, and if they had happened, they\ncomical in the era of computers and-space\ntheir aspirations for truth, freedom of\nsurely would not have had such a wonderful\nrockets, Few of us managed to cry out that\nthought, political imagination, civic courage\npeaceful character. The fact that we had\nthe powerful should not be all-powerful, and\nand civic foresight. How is it that their\nfavorable international conditions, of\nthat the special farms which produce eco-\nparents, the generation which was consid-\ncourse, does not mean that anyone was\nlogically sound and high-quality foodstuffs\nered lost, also joined in with them? How is it\nhelping us directly in those weeks. For\nfor them should send their produce to the\neven possible that so many people immedi-\ncenturies; in fact, both our nations have\nschools, children's hostels and hospitals,\nately grasped what had to be done, without\nrisen up by themselves, without-relying on\nsince our agriculture is not yet able to offer\nneeding anyone else's advice or instruc-\nany help from more powerful states or big\ntions?\nthis to everyone.\npowers.\nThe previous regime, armed with its\nI think that this hopeful aspect of our\nThis, it seems to me, is the great moral\nsituation today has two main reasons.\narrogant and intolerant ideology, denigrat-\nstake of the present moment. It contains\nAbove all, man is never merely a product of\ned man into a production force and nature\nthe hope that in the future we will no longer\nthe world around him, he is always capable\ninto a production tool: In this way it at-\nhave to suffer the complex of those who are\nof striving for something higher, no matter\ntacked their very essence and the relation-\npermanently indebted to someone else,\nhow systematically this ability is ground\nship between them. It made talented people\nNow it is up to us alone whether this hope\ndown by the world around him. Second, the\nwho were capable of managing their own\ncomes to fruition, and whether our civic,\nhumanistic and democratic traditions—\naffairs and making an enterprising living in\nnational and political self-confidence re-\nwhich are often spoken about in such a\ntheir own country into cogs in some kind of\nawakens in a historically new way.\nhollow way-nonetheless lay dormant\nmonstrous, ramshackle, smelly machine\nsomewhere in the subconscious of our na.\nThe writer is president of Caechoslovakia.\nwhom ПО was can 11\nHone\nnational\nminor-\nThis is excertive from his New Year's Day\nim\nPhoto Copy Preservation\nNAL FRIDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1989\nOutfoxed Again\nBy ANGELO CODEVILLA\nself-criticism or of policy innovation.\ndismantle those few steps the U.S. has\nIf, as Soviet Foreign Minister Edouard\nThen in 1983 came the discovery of a\ntaken in recent years away from the stra-\nShevardnadze has promised at U.S. insis-\nsixth \"Pechora class\" radar near the Si-\ntegic-conception behind the ABM treaty:\ntence, the Soviet Union actually dismantles\nberian city Krasnoyarsk-2,000 miles away\nthe SDI antimissile program, the highly\nthe huge ABM radar near Krasnoyarsk; it\nfrom the border it faced. This was a viola-\naccurate Trident, II submarine-launched\nwill have eliminated the most undeniable\ntion. Ironically, given its orientation to the\nmissile that is designed to threaten Soviet\nviolation of the U.S.-Soviet ABM treaty of\nBering Straits, one of the less likely places\nsilos, and the programs for basing U.S.\n1972. But U.S. officials, by focusing on\nfrom which missiles might come, the Kras-\nmissiles on roads and rails instead of in\nKrasnoyarsk, have succeeded only in\nnoyarsk radar was probably the least mili-\nvulnerable silos.\naverting America's eyes from the much\ntarily significant of the six, and obviously\nClearly, the real problem is not Kras-\nmore important whole of which Kras-\nmuch less significant than the six taken as\nnoyarsk, nor Soviet compliance or non-\nnoyarsk was just a part.\na whole. But the U.S. government chose to\ncompliance with the language of arms con-\nThey have ignored hugely threatening\nmake a big deal about it, and it alone. And\ntrol: treaties, but the determination of\nevents because those events happened to\nwhile the U.S. government was giving the\nAmerican policy makers to behave accord-\noccur very much within the letter of the\nimpression that Krasnoyarsk was the prob-\ning to their own vision of the ABM treaty,\nABM treaty. They have cried wolf.\nlem, U.S. intelligence discovered three\nhesitating to build even the things that\nThe primary long-term objective of the\nmore Pechora-class radars, at Mukachevo,\nthey concede that the U.S., like the Soviet\nAmericans who ne-\nUnion, has the right\ngotiated the ABM\nto build; while the\ntreaty between 1969\nAnti-Ballistic Missilo Radar\nSoviet Union has\nand 1972 was to\neliminate the five,\nin the Soviet Union\nbuilt everything it\ncould under the\nlater six, \"Hen\ntreaty, and then\nHouse\" radars then\nsome.\n(as now) on the pe-\nIf Krasnoyarsk\nriphery of the Soviet\ndisappears, the loss\nUnion, all more ca-\nOlenegorsk\npable than our best\nSkrunda\nKamchatka\nto the Soviet ABM\nPeninsula\nsystem will be mar-\nABM radars, and to\nBaranovichi\nginal. By no stretch\nkeep others from be-\nMukachevo\nPechora\nof the imagination\ning built. The So-\nwill the Soviet Union\nviets said \"nyet,\" SO\nMoscow\nbe as defenseless\nthe U.S. agreed to\nagainst ballistic mis-\nlanguage allowing\nsiles as the U.S. is.\nthe Soviets to build\nKrasnoyarsk\nIn no way will the\nwhatever radars\nLyaki\nMishelevka\ndevelopment and\nthey wanted, so long\nproduction of Soviet\nas they were on the\nSary\nanti-missile devices\nperiphery of the\nShagan\nbe slowed. On the\ncountry, and ori-\ncontrary, American\nented outward.\nreactions to the dis-\nBut putting battle\nmantling of Kras-\nmanagement radars\nnoyarsk are sure to\non the periphery\nraise the marginal\ndoes not necessarily\neffectiveness of ev-\ndegrade their per-\nery piece of Soviet\nformance. The large\nABM equipment.\nphased array radars in the planned Ameri-\nBaranovichi, and Skrunda in the vital\nThe principal reaction, a renewed U.S.\ncan ABM system of the late 1960s were to\nnorthwest missile corridor. These nine ra-\ncommitment to the ABM treaty, is a guar-\nbe on the periphery (Boston, North Da-\ndars, plus the six old Hen House radars,\nantee that the U.S. will build nothing to in-\nkota, Montana, etc.) The ABM treaty's lan-\nprovide double, and usually triple, cover-\nterfere with a disarming first strike by So-\nguage on big radars was a placebo to as-\nage of all approaches to the Soviet Union\nviet missiles.\nsure the U.S. Senate that these devices had\nthrough the most capable radars available\nSoviet First Strike\nbeen limited. In fact, the U.S. negotiators\nto mankind. The only radar gap on the\nhad simply translated their hopes that the\nmap of the Soviet Union faces such missile\nFor example, the acceptance of the\nSoviets might limit themselves into a con\npowers as the Central African Republic.\nSTART treaty by the U.S. would mean that\nviction that they would.\nThis network is backed up by the newly\nthe distribution of U.S. strategic forces\nmodernized Moscow ABM Complex. This is\nwould shrink from about 2,000 \"aim\nScreening the Buildup\nspecifically allowed by the ABM treaty. Its\npoints\" to perhaps 400, and that the ratio\nInstead, the treaty language served to\nSH-11 high-altitude interceptors fired from\nof Soviet counterforce warheads to Ameri-\nscreen the coming Soviet buildup. The Hen\nunderground launchers already incorpo-\ncan targets would rise from the present 3.5\nHouse network was modernized. Then, dur-\ning the 1970s and early '80s, the U.S. no\nrate SDI technology stolen from the U.S.\nto 1 to perhaps as many as 10 to 1. That\nThey cover much of European Russia. The\nmeans, far fewer American warheads\nticed that, first at Pechora, then at Lyaki,\nMishelevka, Olenegorsk, and Sary Shagan,\nSoviets also are producing the SA 12 mo-\nmight be expected to survive a Soviet first\nbile ABM, allowed by the ABM treaty be\nstrike. That, in turn, means that the Soviet\nthe Soviets were building radars hundreds\nof times more powerful than our best ABM\ncause it is dual-purpose: Finally, the Soviet\nABM system would have a much much\nradars. (See map., Absent the ABM\nUnion is producing a host of other rapidly\neasier job to do, and a much increased\ntreaty, the U.S. government would have\ndeployable ABM components and squirrel-\nchance of doing successfully.\ning them away who knows where. The\nThe Soviets are selling the Krasnoyarsk\nbeen obliged to note that a massive anti-\nABM treaty says nothing about produc-\nradar at a very good price. The cost to\nmissile system was being built. But all five\ntion.\nthem might be even lower if-and this is\nof these new Pechora class\" radars were\nlikely-they relocate the radar to northern\nallowed by the ABM treaty To denounce\nAs the Soviets no doubt foresaw, some\nKamchatka. There it would fully comply\nthem, U.S. officials would have had to de\nin Washington are taking the prospective\nwith the ABM treaty while making even\nnounce their own previous judgment. As a\ndemise of Krasnoyarsk to mean that the\ntimelier transmission of data to local ABM\nconsequence, they also would have obliged\nSoviet Union is rededicating itself to the\nsites in the interior\nthemselves to devise a new and more\npurposes of the ABM treaty The adminis-\nsomber American approach. But the U.S.\ntration is moving toward signing a new\nMr. Codevilla is a research fellow at\ngovernment proved incapable either of\nSTART treaty, while Congress rushes to\nStanford University's Hoover Institution.\nPhoto Copy Preservation\nTHE WASHINGTON POST\nQuebec Separatist Movement Enjoys Resurgence\nCanadians See Amicable Divorce of French-Speaking Province from Nation as Possible\nBy Lewis H. Diuguid\nbusiness class in Montreal has been\nTrudeau's efforts to resolve the Que-\nFotheringham that \"Meech Lake is\nWashington Post Foreign Service\ncast as radical with its rear-guard\nbec issue constitutionally culminated\nidead.\"\ncampaign to kecp English on the\nin June 1988 with a meeting of the\nNew Brunswick and Manitoba\nOTTAWA-Quebec separatism,\ncity's street signs.\nfederation's 10 premiers at. Meech\nprovinces have failed to ratify the\nthe issue that Canada has never quite\nAmong the English-speaking na-\nLake on the Ontario-Quebec border.\n1988 accord and another provincial\nresolved, is heating up anew.\ntional majority, a perception is\nIn what was described as a historic\nAn election in the French-speak-\nspreading that if Quebec did sepa-\nleader has indicated he may seek a\naccord, they provided assurances for\nrollback. Bourassa has made clear\ning province last month confirmed\nrate; it would be an amicable divorce,\nthe maintenance of Quebec's \"dis-\nthat this would be unacceptable.\nthe persistence of a 40 percent mi-\nwith the province's economic rela-\ntinctiveness.\nnority wishing to pull out of the fed-\ntionship to the federation enduring.\nAll 10 premiers agreed, and went\nThe stage is set for a failure to\neration, and by most interpretations\nAs Allan Fotheringham of Mac-\nhome to seek ratification within two\nmeet the June deadline for ratifica-\na majority for separation soon may\nlean's weekly news magazine wrote\nyears. But while Conservative Prime\ntion of the accords, and a threatened\nbe found.\n\"If Quebec walked out, you wouldn't\nMinister Brian Mulroney said last\npullout of Quebec ministers from the\nneed a passport to make it to Mon-\nMost English-speaking politicians\nweek, \"We simply cannot afford not\nfederal cabinet. Then, the question\ntreal's restaurants. The Edmonton\nto carry through to a successful con-\nwould be how Quebec's premier-\nhave railed against separation, but\nOilers will still be playing the\nclusion the process initiated by\nand electorate-will respond to an\nthey no longer are unanimous in\nCanadiens for the Stanley Cup.\"\nMeech Lake,\" most politicians and\nissue that keeps coming back unre-\ntheir willingness to compromise to\nEx-prime minister Pierre Elliott\njournalists consulted agreed with\nsolved.\nkeep the thorny Quebecois in the\nfederation.\nCanada officially became a bilin-\ngual country 30 years ago, a move\nthat was intended to disarm the Que-\nbec separatists. It did not. Premier\nRene Levesque agitated for 10 years\nuntil, in a 1980 referendum, the\nprovince said no to his formula for\nsovereignty.\nPower shifted from Levesque's\nParti Quebecois to the province's\nLiberal Party, which narrowly won\nthe election there last month. But\nwhile Liberal Premier Robert Bou-\nrassa avowedly is a federalist, he has\nindicated that he will follow the elec-\ntorate rather than lead it on the sep-\naratist question.\nLabor leader Gerard Docquier has\nmade this prediction about his native\nprovince: \"I have always said it will\nnot be the Parti Quebecois\" that pulls\nQuebec out of Canada, \"it will be the\nLiberals.\"\nPhoto Copy Preservation\nHis point, and that of other com-\nmentators, is that the separatist\nmovement now embraces an upbeat\nFrench-speaking entrepreneurial\nclass. The image of bomb-throwing\nParti Quebecois socialists has\nblurred. The once dominant English\nTHE WALL STREET JOURNAL MONDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1989\nA15\nYugoslav Tremors Along Balkans' Political Fault Line\nLJUBLJANA, Yugoslavia-Twohistoric\nthat instead of being fought with guns it is\nconcepts are emerging out of the ruins of\ngary. Thus the story here is less appealing\nAnother scenario is therefore more\nbeing waged through bureaucratic means.\ncommunist Eastern Europe. One, \"Central\nto journalists. Nevertheless, several dis-\nlikely: half-baked reform, continued infla-\nLate last month, Serbia fired a powerful\nEurope,\" the media is now beating to\ntinct patterns are emerging, each with far-\ntion and sporadic rioting in the poorer,\nsalvo at Slovenia, instructing all Serbian\ndeath. The other, \"the Balkans, the me-\nreaching implications not just for Yugosla-\nsouthern regions, as the two northern re-\norganizations to sever links with the rival\ndia has yet to discover.\nvia, but for Europe as well.\npublics-Slovenia and Croatia-are drawn\nrepublic. The move-nudging the country\nIn the optimistic scenario, the Inflation:\nCentral Europe suggests a place where\nfurther into the West German-fueled, Cen-\never closer to the long-predicted disinte-\nmay soon force even Serbia to embark on\nreason prevails. as national tensions are\ntral European prosperity sphere.\ngration of the Yugoslav federation-I\ndramatic economic reform that must inevi-\neased by democracy and bourgeois pros-\nlowed the introduction of emergency meas-\ntably lead to political pluralism and the de-\nBecause Journalists and other Western\nperity. The Balkans, on the other hand, is\nures in Slovenia to head off a rally in\nmise of Mr. Milosevic's one-man rule. Such\nvisitors tend to visit only Belgrade, the out-\nII Third World caldron where ethnic groups\nLjubljana on Dec. 1. The rally was being\ncircumstances would permit Slovenia, and\nside world has yet to grasp the degree to\nexist In psychological Isolation from each\norganized by Serbs in an apparent effort to\nwhich Slovenians and Croats view the fed-\nother, subverting attempts at political and\nneighboring Croatla to a lesser extent, to\nbring down Slovenia's relatively liberal\neral capital as merely the capital of a\neconomic reform.\nleadership. The Serbs have been claiming\nhated, retrograde local republic. Sloven-\nYugoslavia, a multinational state as\nthat Slovenia is supporting ethnic Alban-\nAUSTRIA\nMiles\nians, especially, whose identity was sub-\ntride the borders of Rome and Byzantium\nlans in Kosovo-which is true to the extent\n400\nmerged during hundreds of years of unin-\nand Catholicism and Orthodoxy. is on this\nthat Slovenia has been dissociating itself\nterrupted Hapsburg rule, are undergoing a\nfault line as well.\nfrom Mr. Milosevic's attempt to extend\nIJul/ljane\nROMANIA\nnational renaissance. Mr. Smole, who is\nIn the north, Slovenia is going the way\nSerbian dominance over the region.\nthe leading reformer within the republic's\nof Hungary. Economic reform here started\npolitical establishment, declared: 'We\nAnti-communist opposition groups in\nSlovenia responded to Serbia's action last\njoined Yugoslavia not to be Yugoslavs, but\nBelgrade\nEurope\nweek by forming an umbrella organization,\nbecause at the time It was the best way to\nSERBIA\ndefend the Interests of the Slovenian na-\nthe Democratic Opposition of Slovenia,\nBy Robert D. Kaplan\nwhich is demanding that \"all state organs\nBULGARIA\ntion.\"\nKOSOVO\nin Slovenia break off ties with state organs\nWhether the Slovenians-who make up\nin Serbia.\" They issued a statement on\n8% of the Yugoslav population yet account\nyears ago. Slovenian communists have\nDec. 8 declaring, \"Slovenia should respond\nALBANIA\nfor a quarter of the nation's gross national\ndropped the hammer and sickle from their\nto pressures mounting against It after the\nITALY\nproduct and a third of its exports to the\nbanner, are considering changing the party\nban of the rally In Ljubljana.\"\nWest-will in future years feel it is in their\nSerbla's rebellious ethnic-Albanian\nInterests to remain part of Yugoslavia is of\nname, and concede they may lose republic-\nwide elections slated for March. \"Just be-\nprovince of Kosovo in the south evokes the\npivotal Importance to Europe.\nWest Bank, with the streets patrolled by\nact as a motor dragging the whole of Yugo-\ncause Serbia doesn't want a multiparty\nslavia over many years into a Central Eu-\nA Yugoslavia propelled forward by Slo-\nsystem doesn't mean we have to wait,'\narmed troops. Besides national tensions,\nropean-like prosperity.\nvenian reformist values will help the\nJoze Smole, the head of the Slovene Social-\nKosovo and other poor regions of Yugosla-\nchances of successful liberalization not\nist Alliance, told me.\nvia may soon be plagued not only with na-\nBut cutting Inflation means closing un-\nonly in Bulgaria but eventually in Romania\nIn the central heartland of Yugoslavia,\ntional tensions but also with bread riots,\nproductive, state-supported factories and\nand Albania too. The Balkans would then\nSerbia is drifting more in the direction of\nas 50% monthly inflation tears apart the\nthus putting many people out of work in a\nexist purely in a geographical sense. How-\nRomania, A personality cult has formed\nsocial fabric.\ncountry where there is no social safety net.\never, were Yugoslavia to continue to fis-\naround the republic's president, Slobodan\nIt is extremely doubtful that the current\nThis complex, asymmetrical situation is\nsure, as it is now clearly doing, the whole\nMilosevic, who has pulled half-a-million\nlike the Soviet Union In miniature. Because\nfederal prime minister, Ante Markovic, de-\nof southeast Europe could become politi\npeople late the streets-not by delivering\nmuch of the discoutent is being released\nspite his reformist reputation, can muster\ncally and economically dislodged from the\nupinals of lism Ind By\nthe courage and the political closs to take\nrest of the Continent. And the Balkans\nand\nHP\nother,\n11/11/11\nExcerpts From Speech\nBy the Czech President\nSpecial to The New York Times\nPRAGUE, Jan. 1 - Following are excerpts from President Vaclav Havel\nNew Year's Day address, as translated by The New York Times:\ne\nd\nThe Truth, Unvarnished\nbest Government, the best Parlia-\nment and the best President cannot\nFor 40 years you have heard on this\ndo much by themselves. Freedom\nday from the mouths of my predeces-\nand democracy, after all, mean joint\nsors, in a number of variations, the\nparticipation and shared responsibil-\nsame thing: how our country is flour-\nity. If we realize this, then all the hor-\nishing, how many more millions of\nrors that the new Czechoslovak\ntons of steel we have produced, how\ndemocracy inherited cease to be SO\nwe are all happy, how we believe in\nhorrific. If we realize this, then hope\nour Government and what beautiful\nwill return to our hearts.\nprospects are opening ahead of us. I\nassume you have not named me to\nthis office SO that I, too, should lie to\nEverywhere in the world, people\nyou.\nwere surprised how these malleable.\nOur country is not flourishing. The\nhumiliated, cynical citizens of\ngreat creative and spiritual potential\nCzechoslovakia, who seemingly be-\nof our nations is not being applied\nlieved in nothing, found the tremen-\nmeaningfully. Entire branches of in-\ndous strength within a few weeks to\ndustry are producing things for which\ncast off the totalitarian system, in an\nthere is no demand whilewe are short\nentirely peaceful and dignified man-\nof things we need.\nner. We ourselves are surprised at it.\nThe state, which calls itself a state\nAnd we ask: Where did young peo-\nof workers, is humiliating and ex-\nple who had never known another sys-\nploiting them instead. Our outmoded\ntem get their longing for truth, their\neconomy wastes energy, which we\nlove of freedom, their political imagi-\nhave in short supply. The country,\nnation, their civic courage and civic\nwhich could once be proud of the\nresponsibility? How did their parents,\neducation of its people, is spending SO\nprecisely the generation thought to\nlittle on education that today, in that\nhave been lost, join them? How is it\nrespect, we rank 72d in the world. We\npossible that so many people immedi-\nhave spoiled our land, rivers and for-\nately understood what to do and that\nests, inherited from our ancestors,\nnone of them needed any advice or in-\nand we have, today, the worst envi-\nstructions?\nronment in the whole of Europe,\nAdults die here earlier than in the\nRecalling Ruined Lives\nmajority of European countries\nNaturally we too had to pay for our\npresent-day freedom. Many of our\nLearning to Belleve Again\ncitizens died in prison in the 1950's.\nThe worst of it is that we live in a\nMany were executed. Thousands of\nspoiled moral environment We have\nhuman lives were destroyed. Hun-\nbecome morally ill because we are\ndreds of thousands of talented people\nused to saying one thing and thinking\nwere driven abroad.\nThose who\nanother. We have learned not to be-\nfought against totalitarianism during\nlieve in anything, not to care about\nthe war were also persecuted.\nNo-\neach other, to worry only about our-\nbody who paid in one way or another\nselves. The concepts of love, friend-\nfor our freedom could be forgotten.\nship, mercy, humility or forgiveness\nIndependent courts should justly\nhave lost their depths and dimension,\nevaluate the possible guilt of those re-\nand for many of us they represent\nsponsible, SO that the full truth about\nonly some sort of psychological curi-\nour recent past should be exposed.\nosity or they appear as long-lost wan-\nBut we should also not forget that\nderers from faraway times, some-\nother nations paid an even harsher\nwhat ludicrous in the era of comput-\nprice for their present freedom, and\ners and space ships\npaid indirectly for ours as well. All\nhuman suffering concerns each\nCogs No Longer\nhuman being.\nWithout changes in\nthe Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary\nThe previous regime, armed with a\nand the German Democratic Repub-\nproud and intolerant ideology, re-\nlic, what happened here could hardly\nduced people into the means of pro-\nhave taken place, and certainly not in\nduction, and nature into its tools. So it\nsuch a calm and peaceful way.\nattacked their very essence, and their\nNow it depends only on us whether\nmutual relations. Out of talented\nthis hope will be fulfilled, whether our\nand responsible people, ingeniously\ncivic, national and political self-re-\nhusbanding their land, it made cogs\nspect will be revived. Only a man or\nof some sort of great, monstrous,\nnation with self-respect, in the best\nCopy\nthudding, smelly machine, with an\nsense of the word, is capable of listen-\nunclear purpose. All it can do is,\ning to the voices of others, while ac-\nslowly but irresistibly, wear itself out,\ncepting them as equals, of forgiving\nwith all its cogs.\nPhoto\nenemies and of expiating sins,\nIf I speak about a spoiled moral at-\nmosphere I don't refer only to our\nProsperity, Humanely\nmasters\nI'm speaking about all of\nus. For all of us have grown used to\nPerhaps you are asking what kind\nthe totalitarian system and accepted\nof republic I am dreaming about. I\nit as an immutable fact, and thereby\nwill answer you: a republic that is in-\nactually helped keep it going. None of\ndependent, free, democratic, a repub-\nus are only its victims; we are all also\nlic with economic prosperity and also\nresponsible for it.\nsocial justice, a humane republic that\nIt would be very unwise to think of\nserves man and that for that reason\nthe sad heritage of the last 40 years\nalso has the hope that man will serve\nonly as something foreign, something\nit\ninherited from a distant relative. On\nthe contrary, we must accept this\nThe People Hold Sway\nheritage as something we have in-\nMy most important predecessor\nflicted on ourselves. If we accept it in\nstarted his first speech by quoting\nsuch a way, we shall come to under-\nfrom Comenius. Permit me to end my\nstand it is up to all of us to do some-\nown first speech by my own para-\nthing about it.\nphrase. Your Government, my peo-\nLet us make no mistake: even the\nple, has returned to you.\nTHE WASHINGTON POST\nHenry Kissinger\nSuperpowers and the New Europe\nDon expect stability and peace to just happen.\nThe past year has seen an astonishing evolution in\ngrowing temptations to reduce NATO's conventional mili-\nEast-West relations. The Soviet Union is losing control of\ntary establishment unilaterally. Not only is opposition to\nthe political agenda in Eastern Europe at the same\nmoment that the United States is losing control of its\nmodernization of short-range nuclear weapons in West\nsecurity agenda in Western Europe. But Western rhetoric\nGermany becoming insurmountable, the entire nuclear\ndeployment on German soil is being challenged. The\nis stuck in familiar categories relating either to the arcane\ndenuclearization of Germany would threaten the political\ncatechism of strategic arms control or a diplomacy geared\nto \"helping\" Gorbachev.\ncontract under which American forces have been deployed\nin Europe for four decades. Finally, a START agreement\nBecause it is peripheral to the emerging central danger,\nwill weaken the rationale for initiating nuclear war, further\nmajor progress toward a START agreement is probable\nreducing the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent:\nby the time of next spring's summit. \"Helping\" Gorbachev\ncontributes to peace only if the Soviet leader is prepared\nTrends in both German-states compound these divisive\nto help in building a more stable international system. And\ntendencies. Any West German government is bound to\nin that case we in the West are not helping him but\nseek for the people of East Germany the same privileges\nourselves.\nalready accorded the populations of Poland and Hungary.\nAny analysis based on mutual interest must start from\nThe result is increasing West German-activism all over\nthe recognition that the fulcrum of international tensions\nEastern Europe. West German political figures are fond of\nhas returned to its historical place of origin at the center of\nrepeating Germany's alleged historic mission in Eastern\nEurope. A new design for Europe should end both Soviet\nEurope-an amazing proposition for which history offers\npolitical domination of Eastern Europe and potential super-\npower military confrontation in the center of Europe.\nDuring the next decade U.S. and Soviet ground forces\nshould be progressively withdrawn from Central Europe in\nan orderly negotiated fashion, with Soviet offensive capa-\nbilities, especially tank forces, returned deep into Russia.\nThe most startling changes have occurred in Eastern\nEurope. After monopolizing education, propaganda and\nbureaucracy for four decades, the Polish Communist Party\nwas able to win only one contested seat in the first nearly\nBYT.GIBSON\nfree election since World War II. The Communist Party in\nHungary is likely to split into two groups at the next party\nno evidence and which is likely to inspire premonition in\ncongress; polls indicate that its popular support hovers\nEastern Europe. Unless it keeps its foreign policy well\naround 40 percent. Though Czechoslovakia has not per-\nwithin a European framework and its security policy\nmitted free elections, its Communist Party is surely no\nclosely tied to NATO, West Germany could repeat the\nhistoric German flaw of self-isolation and become the\nmore popular.\ntarget of Western suspicions and Soviet attempts to stem\nAs a result, Moscow is on the verge of losing its grip on\nthe centrifugal tendencies in its empire.\nthe political evolution of Eastern Europe. Historically,\nCommunist parties have justified themselves as the advance\nforces of history destined to lead-and if necessary com-\nBoth East and West are being challenged to a new-vision of\npel-the majority on the high road to Communist ortho-\nEurope's future. The West must define for itself three\ndoxy. Therefore, Communist parties toying with democracy\nconcepts: for defense in an era of declining budgets and\nface a philosophical dilemma: if they become true democrats\nincreasing opposition to U.S. nuclear deployment in Central\nthey cease to be true Communists. If they remain Commu-\nEurope; for arms control policies that promote greater\nnist, they will act to undermine the new democratic system,\nfreedom for the people of Eastern Europe; and for devising\nfor example shifting to Solidarity the blame for the austerity\npolitical obstacles to Soviet pressure on Western Europe\nrequired to overcome the economic mess the Communists\nand Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, in part to replace\nleft behind. But whatever their motive, the leaders of the\nthe military obstacles in the process of being eroded.\nCommunist parties of Eastern Europe face an overwhelm-\nThe Soviet Union faces an even more profound chal-\ning new fact: having lost the capacity to compel by terror,\nlenge. Its massive troop presence in Europe is both a drain\nthey must turn to public opinion, appealing to nationalism\non economic resources and presents Moscow with a\nand challenging Moscow.\nHobson's choice between the humiliation of acquiescing in\nAt least for the time being-and so long as membership\nfundamental political change while its troops are present\nin the Warsaw Pact is not challenged-the Communist\nor repression with unforeseeable consequences. The test\nmonolith is weakening with Moscow's acquiescence. Prop-\nfor stability is whether for the first time in history Europe\nping up Communist rule in Eastern Europe by military\ncan live in equilibrium, with a Russian empire, with neither\nmeans apparently seems too risky to a Soviet leadership\nside fearing invasion by the other. If Gorbachev will work\nreluctant to hazard the carefully crafted new image. Mos-\ntoward that goal, he deserves generous support. If he does\ncow may be hoping that in the end calculations of the\nnot, his rule will have been an interesting psychological\nmutual national interest buttressed by geographic propin-\nepisode on the way to adventurism or repression or both.\nquity can substitute at least to some extent for ideological\nAssuming he opts for the first course, a new security\nconformity.\nsystem could have the following components: Soviet\nThe jury is still out as to whether this strategy will work\nground forces in Europe would return to national territory;\nCopy\nin Hungary or Poland. But it cannot work in East\nSoviet offensive capabilities-especlally tank forces-in\nGermany. There the Communist Party is in no position to\nthe area west of Moscow would be limited under interna-\nmobilize national feelings because these feelings\ntional inspection. In return, the United States should be\ncounter to the very existence of the East German state.\nprepared to withdraw in stages throughout the 90s most\nPhoto\nWest Germany by definition, and increasingly by its\nof its ground forces from: the European continent. Both\npolicies, keeps the hope for reunification alive. East\nnuclear superpowers could be allowed to maintain agreed\nGermany faces the dilemma that opposition to reform will\nair forces and material storages in Europe to make clear\nturn it into an anachronism while liberalization will under-\nthat an attack would involve an unacceptable risk of war.\nmine its reason for being,\nSuch military redeployments would inevitably project the\nDisintegrative tendencies exist inside the Soviet Union\nfuture of Germany to the forefront of European politics\nas well. Gorbachev undoubtedly launched glasnost and\nbecause East Germany will face new internal pressures,\nperestroika in the belief that reduced repression from;\nespecially once Soviet ground forces are removed. The\nMoscow would enlist support for his reforms. But the\nGerman issue can in any case no longer be avoided. If\nnon-Russian nationalities-especially those acquired as\nWestern cohesion is to be maintained, Germany's allies\nthe result of the Hitler-Stalin pact-march to their own\nmust come forward with plausible program, that meets\nGermany's aspirations without destabilizing Central Europe.\nWest Germany's contribution to such a program should\nAn empire assembled over a\nbe to accept the present frontiers of Germany as final and\nabandon the current ambiguous official rhetoric, which\nperiod of 400 years by force\nrenounces force only in changing frontiers. This is the\nprecondition for negotiations on an appropriate system of\nwill not disintegrate\nfree elections for East Germany, perhaps at first on the\nPolish model. The almost certain outcome of such a\npassively.\nprocess would be a step-by-step melding of the domestic\nstructure of the two Germanys. At that point a plausible\nguarantee that the change would not extend the frontiers\ndrummers. So strong is public feeling that even local\nof NATO to the East is essential-perhaps by creating\nCommunist parties have felt obliged to challenge Moscow.\nover time a confederation of the two states with East\nEconomic decentralization-essential for perestroika-\nGermany becoming essentially demilitarized.\nliberates pressures for autonomy if not outright indepen-\nI envisage a three-stage process. The first stage would\ndence within the framework of glasnost.\nbe the reduction of forces outlined in President Bush's\nToo many Western leaders seem to think that these\nproposal of last May. The principle of total Soviet with-\ntrends need little response beyond judicious doses of\ndrawal of ground forces should be established in this stage,\neconomic assistance. I strongly favor greatly increased aid\nfor example by the complete withdrawal from at least one\nto Poland and Hungary. But this is no substitute for a\nEuropean country such as Hungary.\nconcept for the future of Europe. An empire assembled\nThe next stage would establish four security zones:\nover a period of 400 years by force will not disintegrate\nfrom the Atlantic to the Rhine; from the Rhine to the\npassively. And the Western alliance is bound to be shaken\neastern frontier of West Germany; from that frontier to\nby the very events it is celebrating.\nthe Soviet-Polish frontier; from the Soviet-Polish frontier\nto the area of Moscow. The forces west of the Rhine and\nFor 40 years the Atlantic Alliance has been held together\nbetween the Polish-Soviet frontier and Moscow would be\nby the fear of Soviet military aggression. Its response has\nroughly equal, as would be the forces on both sides of the\nbeen to build up integrated conventional forces augmented\ndividing lines in the central sectors.\nby European-based nuclear weapons and backed by an\nThe final stage-toward the latter part of the decade\nintimate reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent Now each\n-would X free elections 111 hast Germany, uner\nPhoto Copy Preservation\nAL FRIDAY, MARCH 2, 1990\nCzechoslovakia's Free-Market Minister\nBy JOHN H. FUND\nfirst became exposed to Western economic\nfor an ambitious and dramatic push to-\nVaclav Klaus, Czechoslovakia's new\nthought during post-graduate studies in It-\nward'a free market. Within days of taking\nfree-market finance minister, kicked off\naly and at Cornell University in the U.S.\noffice, he drastically devalued the Czech\nhis whirlwind 24-hour, visit to New York\nduring the late 1960s. Just before the 1968\ncrown from eight to the dollar to 38, and\nlast week by speaking to a group of Wall\nPrague Spring, he was hired by a section\nproposed his country quit the communist\nStreet executives and others about how his\nof the Ministry of Economics that criti-\ntrading bloc, Comecon.\ncountry needed to adopt \"a market econ-\ncized non-Marxist economics. Mr. Klaus\nMr. Klaus sums up his overall policy as\nomy without any adjectives\nbecame converted to classical liberal\none of \"demonopolization.\" He aims to use\nAfterward, Alice Tepper Marlin, direc-\nthinking: \"By letting me see Western text-\nvery restrictive monetary and fiscal poli-\ntor of the leftish Council of Economic Pri-\nbooks, the government in a way paid for\ncies to squeeze state monopolies, while en-\norities, approached him with a gift: her\nits own undermining.\"\ncouraging competition from foreign com-\ngroup's guidebook on \"Shopping for a Bet-\nEven after the Soviet invasion, Mr.\npanies to help make Czech firms efficient\nter World,\" a sort of moral report card\nKlaus took délight in writing anti-statist es-\nplayers in the world market.\non U.S. corporations and the products they\nsays for a Czech Encyclopedia of Econom-\nMonday, President Havel announced a\nmake. After leafing through it, his reaction\nics. His dismissal of John Kenneth Gal-\npackage of sweeping new laws that will al-\nwas polite but firm: \"If this is another ef-\nbraith as a \"social critic\" rather than an\nlow state companies to sell-shares to their\nfort to make a third way between capital-\neconomist drew rebukes, He was fired in.\nworkers, permit citizens to start their own\nism and communism, we have tried this.\n1970 after being cited as the leading\ncompanies of whatever size, and allow for-\nWe wanted to create a New Man, with only\n\"counter-revolutionary\" in the Ministry\neign investors to own as much as 100% of a\nunselfish thoughts. I am afraid it is not\nFor most of the next 19 years, Mr.\nCzech firm. Next week, Mr. Klaus will\npossible.\" Ms. Marlin, somewhat taken\nKlaus worked in obscure positions in the\npresent an austere budget cutting state\naback by an Eastern European with such\nsubsidies by at least 15%.\nviews, retreated.\nAlthough he is satisfied with the pace of\nAdmirer of Milton Friedman\nRefreshingly, Czecho-\nreform for now, Mr. Klaus acknowledges\nthat his colleagues have some disagree-\nMr. Klaus, a slim, graying 48-year-old\nslovakia is not asking for\nments with his radicalism. Mr. Komarek,\nwith a dry sense of humor, Is one of three\nministers in charge of the Czech economy.\nWestern foreign aid. Mr.\nthe first deputy prime minister, appeared\nto fire a shot across Mr. Klaus's bow last\nThey are easily the most outspoken free\nKlaus believes such assis\nmonth when he warned that \"if a market\nmarketeers in post-communist Eastern Eu-\ntance would bring both in-\neconomy were to start immediately, eco-\nrope. An admirer of Nobel Prize-winning\nnomic agony\" and chaos would result.\neconomists Milton Friedman and F.A.\nHayek, Mr. Klaus says fundamental com-\nflation and timidity in pol-\nMr. Klaus may be forced to edge a little\ntoward the \"reform trap.\" He says It is\npromises with a market economy will only\nicy formulation.\nbest not to slash consumer subsidies fur-\ndelay solutions to his country's stagnant\nther until a \"legitimate\" government is in-\neconomy. He says the market is not divisi-\nstalled after the June 8 elections. Jan Ur-\nble; the only real issue is the proper se-\nCzech central bank. However, he is quick\nban, the secretary general of Civic Forum,\nquence of reforms needed to dismantle the\nto note that the image of total control that\nwonders if the government is tossing away\nstatist economy.\nthe communist government displayed to\na real opportunity for radical measures, at\nMr. Klaus is especially leery of what he\nthe West had little to do with reality. In\na time when people are most prepared to\ncalls the \"reform trap,\" in which cautious\nfact but not in name, Mr. Klaus became\nsacrifice:\nand partial reforms prove worse than none\nthe adviser to the bank's chairman Last\nMr. Klaus also says he has been criti-\nat all. He fears that Hungary and, to a\nyear, he was rehired by the Ministry of\ncized by some in the West for not moving\nlesser extent, Poland are in danger of fall-\nEconomics and once again began to criti-\nfaster to privatize Czech companies. He\ning into exactly that trap.\ncize the regime publicly. Mr. Klaus says\nsays that in the absence of firm rules for\nMr. Klaus and his colleagues-Valtr Ko-\nthat there were many Western misconcep-\nsuch sales It would be folly to unload state\nmarek, first deputy prime minister and\ntions about his country over the past year.\ncompanies now. He refuses to play Santa\nVladimir Dlouhy, the planning minister-\n\"We weren't an outpost of Stalinism,\" he\nKlaus to communist managers by letting\nknow that Czechoslovakia faces some hard\nsays. \"The communists had lost effective\nthem sell their firms at fire-sale prices to\ntimes in the short run. Machinery and\ncontrol; new thinking was everywhere.\nthe first Western buyer, often in exchange\nequipment exports to the Soviet Union\nEven the economy was moving away from\nfor a golden parachute.\n(70% of all Czech ex-\nthe bureaucrats. The party only had the\nports) will fall by at\nA Big Hit\npower to break up demonstrations.\nleast a fourth in the\nThen on Nov. 17, the pace of change\nStill, Mr. Klaus and his colleagues were\nnext few years. Most\nsuddenly lurched into overdrive. On that\na big hit in both Washington and on Wall\nof the lost exports\nnight, after a police beating of student\nStreet last week. Robert Hormats, vice\nare unsalable else-\ndemonstrators, opposition to the regime\nchairman of Goldman Sachs International,\nwhere. Moscow will\nswelled into a mass movement. Mr. Klaus\nsays the Czech team is very Impressive.\nalso deliver only\nremembers walking home from the train,\nThey mean to tackle underlying economic\n70% of promised oil\nstation about 11 that night, unaware of the\nproblems head-or and solve them.' Many\nshipments in the\nbrutality. Outside his home, he met his 20\nWall Streeters asked for assurances that\nfirst three months of\nyear-old student son, who was white with\nthe Czechs would be in office after the\nthis year.\nfright from what he had seen. The son\nJune elections. No guarantees were given,\nStill, Czechoslo-\nchallenged the father to do more than en-\nbut with Vaclav Havel likely to baw to de-\nvakia's long-term\ngage in academic criticism. \"We children\nmands that he seek a full term as presi-\neconomic prospects\ndid our job tonight, and now it is the re-\ndent, the Civic Forum team looks like a\nare the brightest of\nVaclav Klaus\nsponsibility of the parents to do some-\nwinner at the polls.\nany Eastern European country outside of\nthing,' he told his father. Similar conver\nLeaving his meeting with the Wall\nrapidly vanishing East Germany. Czechs\nsations took place all over Prague.\nStreet executives, Mr. Klaus banters with\nhave to remind visitors that in 1939 their\nTwo days later, Civic Forum was\na crowd of admirers in pin-stripes. A\ncountry ranked 10th in the world in per-ca-\nformed out of a loose. collection of dissi-\nChase Manhattan official tells him that her\npita income, ahead of Austria and Bel-\ndents, actors, academics and workers. Mr\nbank is'about to send a mission to Prague.\ngium.\nKlaus became a key political adviser to\nOh, would you like to buy a bank?\" Mr.\nAnd refreshingly, unlike every other\nVaclav Havel. The two men had met dur-\nKlaus asks, his eyes twinkling. \"Sure,\nEastern European country, Czechoslovakia\ning the Prague Spring when they served to\nwhat's your price?\" the executive coolly\nis not asking for Western foreign aid.\ngether on the board of a literary magazine\nreplies \"Well, the Austrians are also com-\n\"That is the last thing on our agenda,\"\nand had kept in close touch When, the rev.)\ning in a few days so you may have to com-\nsays Mr. Klaus, who believes such assis-\nolution succeeded, Mr. Klaus was pres\npete, Mr Klaus says. We are reformers,\ntance would bring both inflation and timid-\nsured into taking the highly visible job of\nbut we are not naive reformers.\"\nity in policy formulation.\nfinance minister. He had hoped for a qui-\nMr. Klaus has never been timid in his\neter post as head of the central bank.\nMr. Fund is a Journal editorial\nopposition to the communist regime. He\nInstead, he has become the point man\nwriter\nThe Oder Neisse Imbroglio\nPolitical judgments often boll down\nThere is indeed a nationalist fringe in\nto this: You:are right, but you lose.\nGerman politics in the form of the Re\nChancellor, Kohl seems to be\npublikaner party. Virulently patriotic,\nrelearning this lesson in the midst of\nxenophobic and anti free market, the\nthe current German election cam\nRepublikans prey on the kinds of re\npaign. While there seems to be gen-\nsentment found in any democratic\neral agreement in the West that a\nelectorate. After World War II, for\nunited Germany will be democratic,\nample, the Soviet \"liberators\" helped\nprosperous and firmly bound to NATO\nthemselves to allarge chunk of Polish\nand the European Community, the\nterritory in the east, while the country\nhead of West Germany is catching\nwas compensated from the histori\nheat for his position on the border be-\ncally German regions of Silesia; Po-\ntween East Germany and Poland.\nmerania and East Prussia to the west\nHis position is that before the mat-\nand north: The subsequent population\nter can be finally settled, Germany\nmovement caused no little suffering\nmust be reunited: There Is a certain\namong the defeated Germans a histo-\nlogic to the notion that until he has\nrian might say this was rough justice\nsome authority over East Germany he\nfor the Nazishorrors, but some per\ncan't decide-its border questions. In\ncentage of German voters might take\nfact, both West and East Germany\na different view.\nhave signed various treaties recogniz-\nThe Republikaners have recently\ning the present border at the Oder and\ndone well in local elections and are\nNeisse rivers, but Poland and certain\nnow running at about 5% in the polls.\nWest German and other Western poll-\nUnhappily, 5% is the percentage\nticians are demanding resolutions\nthat would entitle them to representa-\ncorresponding to a peace treaty.\ntion in Parliament under the German\nPressure has been applied by Po-\nelectoral system. Mr Kohl knows that\nland's prime minister, Tadeusz Ma-\nif the Republikaners do well his\nzowiecki, West Germany's opposition\nparty does. poorly. And if the Free\nSocial Democrats and Free Democrat\nDemocrats fail to mount the\nForeign Minister Hans-Dietrich\nthreshold, his present coalition would\nGenscher, part of Mr. Kohl's Chris-\ncollapse and he would have to choose\ntian Democrat-led coalition: The chan-\nbetween the unwanted support of the\ncellor told his cabinet this week that\nRepublikaners and a grand coalition\nhe would not oppose a joint resolution\nwith the Social Democrats:\nforswearing territorial demands on\nMr. Kohl's position on the Eastern\nPoland by the Bundestag and the Par\nterritor esprepresents a careful. tacti-\nliament to be elected in East Ger\ncal decision to avoid handing the Re\nmany this month. He stopped short of\npublikaners a volatile issue Surely\noffering a provisional treaty, however\nkeeping the Republikaners out of Par\nand later rejected suggestions about\nliament is worth.a temporary delay In\ntaking up the issue of war repara\ndotting the is and crossing the on:\ntions. The political barrage against\nthe Oder-Neisse Line. One can, of\nPhoto Copy Preservation\nhim continued, with France's foreign\ncourse, disagree with the chancellor\nminister, Roland Dumas; demanding\ntactical judgment, but his motives\nimmediate clarity about the borders.\nought to be respected by politicians\ntempted to play to anti-German re-\nThe way to understand Mr. Kohl's\nsentments in their own electorates\nposition is to sit back from the tran-\nMr. Kohl is not trying to fan the\nscendent Issue to the more immediate\nflames of German chauvinism, but to\ncontext of West German politics.\ncontain them:\nAsides\nReturn of the Gipper\nMarch 18 elections wants the origina-\ntor of the \"evil: empire\" speech to\nRonald Reagan even now remains\nspeak in East Berlin on their behalf\na figure of controversy and obloquy in\nWe know that some disagree with us\nsome American quarters, but they\non this, but future historians will have\nlove him in East Germany. Yes, a\nrich material for deciding: Who won\nparty coalition running there in the\nEastern Europe?\nRichard Cohen\nNo Double Standard for Germany\nThe polls tell us that most Americans\nOf course, no one can ignore what\nto see the revival of German language\nsupport German reunification. The fig.\nhappened the last time Germany was\nnewspapers In Polish areas with signifi-\nures are foverwhelming 67 percent\nunified. It produced Adolf Hitler, World\ncant numbers of ethnic Germans. To the\nand a German reading those figures\nWar II and the Holocaust. A visitor to\nPoles and others, these might seemina\nmight take both comfort and pride in\nGermany, especially one whose relatives\ntionalistic demands-as they might well\n(them. Not 80 fast, Helmut The Cold War\nperished in the Holocaust, cannot help\nbe-aut they are no different from what\nmay be over, but in certain neighbor\nstaring at people on the street Sand\nother countries would ask71\nhoods World War II is still being fought\nwondering about them: have they\nThe problem for Germany\nthat\nJournalists are warned not to put too\nchanged? do that on every visit, and in\nordinary manifestations of nationalism\nmuch faith in polls. They capture public\nmy imagination, put them in uniform.\nwill be viewed as a return to the past.\nopinion at particular moment and no\nThere: that's how they would look in\nThe German lunatic fringe will be ex-\nmore accurately predict the future than\nmilitary or: SS garb, There: that is\naggerated and the occasional victory at\ndoes Nancy Reagan's astrologer. At this\nGermany and nothing has changed.\nthe polls of a neo-Nar will be trumpet-\nparticular moment, Germany-both East\nBut a lot has changed. For almost half\ned 8 harbinger of things to come,\nand West-is looking pretty good Indeed,\na century, West Germany has been\nBut other countries, including our own,\nEast Germans are streaming over the\ndemocracy-an integral part of the dem-\nhave their lunatics, David Duke, the\nborder and being met by only the most\nocratic West, It has made reparations to\nformer Klansman, seat in the\nunderstanding and charitable of (former)\nHolocaust victims. West Germany-as\nLouisiana legislature, but that did not\ncountrymen. Who cannot be moved?\nopposed to East Germany-has never\nsignal the return of Jim Crow.\nAnd Americans have been, According\nducked its responsibility for that enory\nWhen such things happen in Ger-\nto:s New York Times/ CBS News poll\nmous crime, and indeed, it has taught its\nmany, Its high rating here\nonly 16 percent of those polled feared\nyoung the truth of the Nazi period.\nwill surely plummet, and some people\nGermany would once again try to domi-\ncontrast that effort with the experience of\nwill warn of the \"old Germany, But it\nnate the world. Americans are SO favor-\na young Mississippi woman I know. Not\nis 8 \"new Germany\" they will, be\nably disposed to the prospect of German\nuntil she saw the film \"Mississippi Burn-\nseeing It will be a nation acting much\nreunification that even the World War II\ning did she realize what had happened in\nlike any other-having its parades,\ngeneration has little apprehension.\nthe civil rights era in her own state:\nsaluting its flag and electing its occa-\nAmong persons 65 and older, 64 percent\nNo young West German could be 80\nsional extremist, Moreover, it will be\nwere untroubled by reunification.\nignorant: But along with that education\na nation where patriotism had been\nLet me make a prediction: It's only a\neffort has come some resentment. A\nrepressed. As a result, it may surface\nmatter of time. until those favorable\ncollege student I spoke with in Bonn said\nvery suddenly and rambunctiously. It\nfigures nosedive. That's because it's\nher classmates had just about had it with\nwould only help the worst elements in\nonly a matter of time until Germany,\ntheir national \"guilt trip.\" They wanted,\nGermany to apply a double standard\nboth East and West, becomes, well,\ninstead, to celebrate German accom-\nto the entire nation.\nGermany. I refer to a chauvinistic ren-\nplishments and revive a patriotism that\nGermany justifiably still remains on\naissance, an explosion of nationalism\nhas long been dormant,\nparole, But if a united Germany is ever\nthat is bound to make both the United\nOthers in Germany are feeling patriotic\nto take its place among nations it has to\nStates and Europe anxious. When that\nor, if you will, nationalistic. When it\nbe allowed to act much like any other\nhappens whole lot of people are\ncomes to Poland, for instance Germans\nnation, To treat it differently, to feeda\npoint\nto\nwant them dead cared OF in\nGerman\nIFPA\ndna\nDefense Nuclear Agency\nPROGRESS REPORT FOR\nTHE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY\nMay 1 - June 30, 1989\nContract Number: DNA 001-87-C-0033\nPolicy Considerations Affecting\nNuclear Forces Modernization\nUnited\nThe\nFederal\nNethariands\nXingdom\nBeigname\nRepublic\nof\nGermany\nFrance\nItaly\nSubmitted By:\nThe Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n675 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139\n1612 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nTable of Contents\nExecutive Summary\ni\nImplications for DNA and\nAcquisition Policy\nvi\nFederal Republic of Germany\n1\nWest German Perspectives of the\nNATO Summit's Comprehensive Concept and its\nHandling of the SNF Issue\n1\nThe Future of SNF\n5\nThe Vienna CFE Talks\n6\nBundeswehr Restructuring and Personnel Issues\n8\nUnited Kingdom\n13\nBritish Perspectives on the NATO Summit\n13\nBritish SNF Modernization\n14\nThe Bush CFE Proposal and U.S./British Relations\n15\nDefense White Paper: Major Procurement Themes\n16\nLabour Policy Review: Kinnock's Move to \"Multilateralism\"\n22\nSLD Defense Policy Statement\n25\nFrance\n27\nFrench Defense Council Decisions on Nuclear Weapons Procurements\n27\nThe SNF Controversy and Hadès\n28\nFrench Views of the Current CFE Proposals\n30\nDefense Austerity and the 1992 Budget Guidance\n35\nThe European Elections and the National Service Debate\n39\nThe Netherlands\n43\nFall of the Lubbers Government and Dutch SNF Perspectives\nLeading to the NATO Summit\n43\nThe Dutch \"Shift Concept\" Reflected in Summit Communiqué\n44\nImpact of the Government's Fall on Procurement\n47\nProspects for the Next Dutch Government:\nThe European Elections in the Netherlands\n51\nBelgium\n53\nThe NATO Summit and Arms Control Priorities\n53\nProcurement Issues and Defense Industrial Trends\n55\nEuropean Elections and Belgian Coaltion Politics\n60\nItaly\n62\nItaly's Governmental Crisis and the NATO SNF Debate\n62\nItalian Views of the NATO Compromise\n63\nImplications for Italian Defense Reorganization\n65\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nPOLICY CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING NUCLEAR\nFORCES MODERNIZATION\nExecutive Summary\nFederal Republic of Germany\nThe SNF debate continues to be controversial in the Federal Republic of Germany, not-\nwithstanding the NATO Summit's compromise formula on Lance modernization and SNF\nnegotiations. Even if the present government coalition is returned to power in the 1990\nelection, it is increasingly doubtful that the Germans will take a decision on FOTL in the\n1992 timeframe. Moreover, there is also the prospect that the West German government\nwill support opposition calls for an SNF negotiation that aims at an early reduction in the\nnumber of nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missile launchers, down from their present\ntotal of 88 to a number above zero, irrespective of progress achieved in the CFE negotiations.\nThe emergence of West German \"sovereignty\" as an issue in Alliance politics threatens to\nbecome more important in the future, and, together with the growing importance of\nenvironmental issues throughout all of Western Europe, may jeopardize Alliance decision-\nmaking on future weapons modernization decisions, including TASM. In the Federal\nRepublic, support for a \"Third Zero\" option is widespread, although for many it is considered\nonly with regard to land-based surface-to-surface missiles and nuclear-capable artillery\ndeployments, and not dual-capable aircraft platforms.\nWest German criticisms of the Bush CFE proposals focused on the inclusion of troop ceilings\nand aircraft platforms, although in the FRG there is widespread popular support for the\nPresident's initiatives and the opposition parties are in favor of an agreement at the CFE that\nincludes both categories. Military opposition to the Bush proposals is based primarily on\nfears that the inclusion of aircraft, for example, will dilute the focus of the talks, which, in\nthe military's view, must be the reduction of the Warsaw Pact's invasion capabilities. On\nthe question of troop reductions, some in West Germany fear that this will become a license\nfor the large-scale withdrawal from Western Europe of American conventional forces.\nIn the context of a prospective CFE regime, the West Germans are restructuring their ground\nforces to emphasize highly mobile units based, in large measure, on the utilization of reserve\nforces. For the West Germans, the prospective post-CFE force structures of the NATO allies\nand the Warsaw Pact nations will imply a change in the scale of projected conflict\nprobabilities, in stark contrast to current planning assumptions that are based on expectations\ni\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nof attack by large-scale and massed armored Soviet forces. In a CFE regime, West German\nmilitary analysts feel that the incentive for surprise attack may be increased and in this\ncircumstance nuclear weapons deployments will remain critical to war deterrence in Europe.\nBritain\nBritish perspectives on SNF continue to be shaped by Mrs. Thatcher's views of the\nrelationship between British strategic-nuclear forces and their contingencies for use, and\nNATO's requirement for Selective Employment options in the context of Flexible Response.\nIt appears as if the Prime Minister is seeking to maintain distance between a forward battle\ncontingency in the FRG and the prospective destruction of British territory, in line with her\nso-called \"firebreak\" thesis.\nBritish concerns that West Germany may not be prepared in 1992 to come to a decision on\nLance modernization have helped to solidify a U.K. decision to sign an MOU with the United\nStates on TASM cooperation. A final decision by the British Government on which\ntechnological option (related to TASM) to choose will be governed by assessments of the\nbest offset arrangements and cost/effectiveness issues pertaining to the incorporation of\nBritish \"front-end\" and other technologies.\nAs is true elsewhere in Western Europe, however, TASM modernization will likely face\ncriticism in Britain, although the Government's decision to replace the aging British\nstockpile of WE-177 free-fall bombs is likely to stand. Its major challenge may come from\nbudget austerity requirements which could sacrifice tactical nuclear aircraft programs to\nstave off budget cuts to either Trident or conventional force modernizations. However,\nbecause of the early decision on TASM cooperation with the United States, such a budget\ncontingency is not likely to occur.\nThe newly released Defense White Paper provides for little change in British procurement\npriorities. NATO commitments, apart from the Trident program, account for the largest\nsingle line items, and amount to 39% of the total spending in the procurement area.\nFrance\nOn June 2 the French Defense Council agreed to a series of austerity measures designed to\nstretch out and scale down major weapons procurements. While no major nuclear equipment\nprograms were shelved, there continues to be speculation that the S-4 mobile IRBM program\nwill be scrapped, in favor of the deployment of a ground-based variant of the M-5 SLBM,\nto keep up-to-date the 18 launchers deployed on the Albion Plateau. There is also speculation\nthat the Hadès \"prestrategic\" nuclear weapons program will be reduced, or even cancelled,\nif the President can be persuaded that its cancellation will not push the West Germans to\nii\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nforeclose a NATO option to modernize Lance, which, in turn, may be linked-from the\nFrench perspective-to the willingness of the United States to sustain its troop commitment\nto Western Europe.\nIn contrast, in conventional weapons procurement, the Defense Council decisions mean\ndelays in some programs like the PAH helicopter project and the construction of the Charles\nde Gaulle nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, although it still is not clear whether the Socialist\ngovernment will, ultimately, decide to cancel the carrier modernization program altogether.\nOver the next year, on the basis of cost-effectiveness studies, major force structure reor-\nganization decisions will be taken by the French. In this respect, it is widely speculated that\nFrench ground forces may be reorganized to emphasize highly mobile structures and reduced\npersonnel ceilings.\nThe French Government hastens to point out that these austerity measures are in no way\nrelated to Western CFE proposals and should not be taken as an impetus to rush toward an\nagreement. At the CFE talks, the French continue to be opposed to the inclusion of aircraft\nplatforms, even in a second round of the negotiations, and, reject any notion that French\noffe\nforces are to be included in \"NATO\" cuts, preferring to categorize their capabilities as reserve\nforces distinct from, but integral to, forces located in the \"central zone,\" or the areas of the\nFederal Republic and the Low Countries.\nThere is likely to be much political debate over the Government's austerity measures, and,\nin particular, its decision to retain, for the moment at least, French \"tactical\" nuclear weapons\nin the French inventory. There has never been great support in France for such systems, and\nrenewed debate in Parliament and the press over Hadès, for example, could erode the\nwidely-vaunted French defense consensus, which is much more fragile than is readily\nunderstood in the United States.\nFrench perspectives on defense issues, particularly nuclear weapons deployments in France,\nand NATO Europe more generally, are diverse and much more complex than is widely\nbelieved. As elsewhere in Western Europe, they are being subjected to influence as a result\nof changed threat perceptions of the Soviet Union and an evolving conception of policy\npriorities and French national interests. Thus, in the conceptualization of French interests,\narms control and environmental issues, for example, have emerged as central concerns in\nthe shaping of policy initiatives, as has the requirement to help to manage change in the\nrelationships between and among their Eastern neighbors and West European partners.\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nThe Netherlands\nThe fall of the Dutch center-right government on May 2, triggered largely by Liberal Party\nin-fighting (and the growing dissatisfaction of the Liberals' over their junior status within\nthe coalition), raises the distinct possibility of a center-left Christian Democratic/Labor\ncoalition coming to power after the September elections. In terms of future defense planning,\nsuch a coalition might lead, for example, to a greater willingness on the part of the Christian\nDemocrats to accept lower levels of defense spending and to press NATO toward early SNF\nnegotiations, in exchange for a more moderate Labor defense policy across the board\n(including on SNF issues).\nThe ongoing Dutch role in helping to fashion a NATO compromise on SNF can be seen in\nthe degree to which the Summit communique incorporated major aspects of the SNF strategy\noutlined by Foreign Minister van den Broek, which included: a call for unilateral Soviet\nreductions to the NATO level; an opening of SNF negotiations after an agreement has been\nreached on conventional force cuts in CFE; steps to ensure that such negotiations do not lead\nto a \"Third Zero\"; and support for the updating of NATO SNF systems \"where necessary\".\nThe fall of the Lubbers Government has had the immediate impact of delaying major\nprocurement programs formulated by the Dutch defense ministry. Key programs now on\nhold include the modernization of the Leopard I tank; selection of an attack helicopter for\nthe Dutch army; replacements for peacetime attrition in F-16s; the purchase of additional\nPatriot air defense systems; and the purchase of the Crotale SAM system.\nThe outcome of the European Parliament elections in Holland suggests that a CDA/PvdA\nsuccessor to the fallen CDA/VVD coalition is, while probable, not inevitable. The Dutch\nLabor party (PvdA) did not perform as well as had been expected, while the centrist CDA\nturned in a strong showing with the Dutch electorate. Should these trends persist, and if\nLabor Party centrists fail to gain adequate support among the rank and file for a more\nmoderate defense policy, Lubbers and the Christian Democrats may choose to govern once\nagain with a suitably chastened Liberal Party (which, nevertheless, continues to slide in the\npolls).\nBelgium\nThe center-left Martens government welcomed the formula for possible SNF negotiation\nand modernization reached at the NATO Summit, although both major party blocs in the\ncurrent coalition - - the Christians and the Socialists - - would prefer to begin SNF talks in\nthe nearer term (even parallel to the CFE negotiations).\niv\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nWhile still opposing (for the moment) a \"Third Zero\" option, the Government also continues\nto reject any \"updating\" of existing SNF assets that might significantly extend their range.\nIn this context, support in Belgium is weak for the deployment of air-launched stand-off\nsystems (such as TASM), which many on the center-left of the political spectrum believe\nmay violate the \"spirit\" - if not the letter - of the INF Treaty.\nThe Belgian Socialists - particularly the Flemish wing - still voice support for an ultimate\n\"Third Zero\", and argue (with the center-left in West Germany) that such an option was not\nforeclosed by the NATO Summit. In this formulation, negotiations toward a \"partial\nreduction\" of NATO SNF are viewed primarily as an intermediate step toward the final\nobjective.\nWith the decision to procure the French Carapace ECM system for the Belgian F-16 fleet,\nthe Ministry of Defense has announced the last major systems procurement for 1989-90.\nAlthough an American candidate was rejected in this competition (primarily due to the lack\nof a sufficiently attractive offset package for Belgian industry), future areas of potential sales\nopportunity include budgeted plans for the modernization of Belgium's Leopard I tanks and\nfield artillery, together with the acquisition of modern anti-tank, air-to-air, air-to-surface,\nand surface-to-air missile systems.\nResults from the elections to the European Parliament suggest shifting public support for the\nparties in Belgium's governing coalition. Prime Minister Martens' Christian Socialists\nfaired well, while their strongest rivals in the coalition - the Flemish Socialists - faired\npoorly. Also of note was a fall in support for the Flemish nationalist Volksunie party (now\nin the government), support which shifted primarily toward the more extreme Vlaams Blok.\nBelgian Greens also polled extremely well, while the Liberals in both language communities\ncontinued their slide in popularity.\nItaly\nItalian defense perspectives emphasize internal security threats and \"out of area\" contingen-\ncies, specifically Italy's interests in the Mediterranean basin and concern over the export of\nMiddle Eastern terrorism. On this basis, future Italian defense planning will revolve around\na defense model, called the Zanone Plan, that emphasizes power projection capabilities and\nhighly mobile ground forces structures.\nHowever, the funding that is necessary to support the new Italian defense model is unlikely\nto be forthcoming, and if anything, over the next several years, in line with the (former)\nGovernment's priority to bring into balance Italy's deficit spending, Italian defense ap-\npropriations are likely to be reduced. Already, a supplemental spending bill that authorizes\nfunds for major international collaborative programs, including Patriot procurement, EFA\nV\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nfunding and the NATO Frigate program, has been delayed in Parliament and is not likely to\nbe submitted for a vote in the near future.\nOn the SNF controversy in NATO, the Italians are generally supportive of the official West\nGerman governmental position, including Bonn's attempts to tie SNF negotiations to the\nCFE talks. In contrast to the official German governmental position, however, the (former)\nfive-party Italian governmental coalition is more skeptical of the deployment in Italy of\nstrike-tasked aircraft, and, on this basis, hopes that a CFE negotiation will preclude the\nnecessity for the redeployment of the American 401st F-16 squadron to Italy. This explains,\nin part, the widespread Italian support for President Bush's CFE proposals.\nThe formation of a new Italian government is proving to be somewhat more difficult than\nhad been expected, largely because of the personality clash between the Socialist leader,\nBettino Craxi, and Christian Democratic leader Ciriaco De Mita. Craxi apparently favors a\npartnership with either his friend in the Christian Democratic Party, Arnaldo Forlani, or the\nCD Foreign Minister, Giulio Andreotti. In either case, Italian government policy on national\nsecurity issues is unlikely to change.\nImplications for DNA and Acquisition Policy\nGeneral Political Observations\nPolitical considerations will affect policy decision-making in NATO to a far greater extent\nin the future than was the case in the past. Particularly with regard to nuclear modernization\nissues, political considerations have become as important as military requirements in\ndelineating the parameters for Alliance deployment and modernization of SNF. In NATO,\nthis can already be seen in the context of the national debates over Lance and nuclear-artillery\nmodernization. In future, it will be apparent especially in the context of the CFE talks and\nthe broad European desire for early SNF negotiations. Clearly, European political objectives\nand policy perceptions may impose upon U.S. and NATO planners real constraints in terms\nof SNF and force deployment contingencies.\nEnvironmental issues, too, will have a greater role in shaping European defense policy\noptions, from restraints on low-level flying to limitations on troop maneuvers in protected\nareas. Together with a greater West German sensitivity to sovereignty issues, environmental\npolitics will have implications for NATO planning, including, possibly, TASM deployment,\ndepending on how the issue is presented by the United States and Allied leadership.\nFew West German political analysts think that TASM modernization will be any less difficult\nto achieve than Lance modernization. Already members of the \"left\" have raised opposition\nto TASM on the basis that its deployment would be a circumvention of the INF Treaty, an\nvi\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nargument that is shared by many left-of-center politicians in other NATO countries (includ-\ning those examined in this Report).\nSNF\nThe NATO agreement on SNF, set forth in the joint communiqué document issued at the\nSummit, represents a fragile consensus among national views on the SNF issue that continue\nto diverge. Significant, however, is the widespread support throughout each of the countries\nreviewed in this report for the U.S. CFE proposals set forth by the President at the Summit.\nIt is necessary for the United States to maintain the perception now held in Western Europe\nthat it has seized the initiative at CFE. This perception will help to stall pressure for\nnegotiations on SNF before a CFE agreement is finalized.\nIn many respects, the prospects for a positive decision on Lance modernization are decreas-\ning, and even if the current government coalition in the FRG is returned to power in the 1990\nelection, its support for FOTL is questionable, given widespread public opposition to\nground-based short-range nuclear weapons deployments on West German soil.\nIt may be that the easiest route toward a more stable NATO consensus on nuclear weapons\ndeployments lies in TASM and enhancements to DCA survivability. Because TASM could\nbe deployed with the air forces of a number of NATO European countries, it would not single\nout West Germany as the only deployment country. By the same token, the range of a TASM\nstand-off system would make possible attacks launched against targets deeper in Warsaw\nPact territory (perhaps even in the western Soviet Union), thus obviating West German fears\nof deploying a system capable of being targeted only against sites in East Germany.\nYet, TASM modernization is not without potential pitfalls. A number of leading West\nEuropean officials and party leaders in most of the countries reviewed in this study argue\nthat an extended-range (400 km or over) TASM would violate the spirit of the INF Treaty.\nOthers oppose TASM because they reject the necessity of modernized SNF for NATO, based\non widespread opposition to \"nuclear warfighting\" concepts. In Western Europe, today,\nthere is a strong, popular and analytical attachment to \"massive retaliation\" as the favored\ndeterrence strategy for NATO. So, too, a growing number of West Europeans endorse a\n\"minimal deterrence\" concept based on a low nuclear threshold in NATO. This conception\nis driving West European arms control perspectives, as well, and provides a basis for\nrationalizing defense budget cuts, especially in ground forces structures.\nRecent announcements concerning the defense budgets of many of the countries reviewed\nin this Report suggest a continuing trend of reduced growth rates throughout NATO Europe,\ndespite a renewed commitment to 3% real growth per year. For reasons ranging from the\nfall of government coalitions to the reordering of budgetary priorities to emphasize spending\nvii\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nFederal Republic of Germany\nIn the second quarter of 1989, West German defense debate focused on the Alliance controversy\nover short-range nuclear forces (SNF), the NATO Summit and the U.S. and Soviet arms control\nproposals presented at the CFE talks. During this period the Federal Republic hosted state visits\nby President Bush and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. In June, the new budget\nfigures for the Bundeswehr were released and discussion of Bundeswehr planning attracted\nconsiderable attention from FRG defense analysts, both in and out of government.\nWest German Perspectives of the NATO Summit's\nComprehensive Concept and Its Handling of the SNF Issue\nWhile West German government offi-\nWest German officials, although pleased with the\ncials expressed relief over the results of\nunified picture presented by the NATO summit\nthe NATO Summit's SNF compromise,\nagreement, are critical of the Comprehensive\nthey have been highly critical, in private\nConcept. accusing it of lacking a \"vision\" of the\nconversations, of the Comprehensive\nfuture of East-West relations. Given the huge\nConcept's perceived lack of visionary\neconomic power of the FRG relative to its size,\ninitiative. This is based on a view that\nWest German leaders are making increasingly\nthe future role of the Alliance lies more\nclear their desire to be treated as a full partner in\nin the political, and not strictly the\nthe Alliance and with the United States; these\nmilitary, realm, as a manager of East-\ndesires are manifested in more vocal demands for\nWest relations and, in particular, of the\nfull sovereignty on issues which attract public\narms control process, which increasingly\nattention, namely SNF modernization, low-level\nis identified as the most important agen-\nflying, and NATO-maneuvers.\nda item in the evolving East-West\nrelationship. In this context, and to a\nconsiderable extent, West German policy officials, particularly those in the Foreign Ministry,\nfeel that the U.S. insistence on Alliance support for \"updating as necessary\" SNF deployments\nhas resulted in an inflexibility that detracts from the Comprehensive Concept's capacity to help\nfashion a creative Alliance policy relating to the future of East-West relations. Many West\nGerman politicians argue that NATO needs an agenda for East-West relations in which options\nand consequences are drawn from a systematic assessment of the changes taking place in Eastern\nEurope and the USSR. From this perspective, if NATO cannot adapt itself to such a role. its\ninstitutional framework may be less and less relevant to emerging European interests and policy\nobjectives.\n1\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nClearly, the role of the Federal Republic in the Alliance is under review across the spectrum of\npolitical opinion in West Germany. Only the most radical political spokesmen today advocate\nWest Germany's withdrawal from NATO altogether, but this is less a reflection of a convergence\nof opinion between the Alliance's supporters and its opponents, than an indication of a growing\nsense that the Federal Republic has a leadership role to play in the Alliance. Based in part on\na more narrow assessment of West German national interests arising from the FRG's solid\neconomic performance in recent years, as well as from a sense that U.S. and West German\ninterests may not necessarily coincide in all areas, support for an expanded West German role\nin the Alliance is a manifestation of the increasing importance of the \"sovereignty\" issue in West\nGerman politics. Paradoxically, however, it is also part of the more amorphous, less well-\ndefined, sentiment in support of greater European unity and the need to put forward regional\nperspectives on global economic and security issues. The European impetus is reflected in the\nWest German insistence on greater decision authority in the Alliance, to be sure. But it is also\nmanifested in the FRG's expressed desire for closer European collaboration in the defense area\non a bilateral and multinational basis (i.e., the Franco-German Brigade), including collaborative\nprojects under the auspices of the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) for weapons\nacquisition (i.e., NATO Frigate) and R & D cooperation (i.e., MSAM). The emergence of a\nnew assertiveness on the part of the West Germans with respect to Alliance issues was reflected\ndramatically in President Richard von Weiszäcker's remarks on the occasion of the fortieth\nanniversary of the Federal Republic. In this speech, von Weiszäcker stated that West Germany\nwas no longer prepared to be treated as anything less than a full partner in the Alliance.\nFurthermore, he noted that, while Europe may be leading the path toward change in a new\nstrategic situation on the Continent, the Federal German Republic is capable of playing a greater\nrole in Europe.\nIf von Weiszäcker's remarks are taken to heart, we must assume that in the future West German\nperspectives on security issues may not always correspond to, and may sometimes even conflict\nwith, those of the United States. For NATO this may mean greater difficulty in the future with\nregard to decision-making on issues that directly affect West German perceptions of Germany's\nnational interests. This is likely to be the case with respect to Alliance decisions on issues that\nare seen as infringing on West Germany's sovereignty, such as low-level flying and NATO\nexercises. Of higher visibility and, ultimately, of potentially greater significance to Alliance\ncohesion will be the West German position on the continuing SNF debate, which by no stretch\nof the imagination has been resolved as a result of the NATO Summit's compromise formula.\nIn fact, at the heart of West German criticisms of the Comprehensive Concept document is the\nSNF issue, and British and American insistence on an explicit statement excluding the \"Third\nZero\" option. The West German position entering the pre-Summit negotiations had been laid\n2\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nout by Chancellor Kohl in his speech to the Bundestag on April 27, 1989 (see IFPA's DNA\nQuarterly Report for January-April). In this speech, Kohl announced that any West German\ndecision on proceeding with a follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL) would not be made until 1992, and\nwould be dependent upon an evaluation, at that time, of \"political and security policy develop-\nments, especially considering the results of all arms control negotiations.\" Specifically, Kohl\ntied the decision to the achievement of three goals. First, there would have to be \"increased\nsecurity at a lower level of nuclear and conventional forces as a whole.\" Second, the Alliance\nwould have to judge whether \"binding agreements\" with the Warsaw Pact had been concluded,\n\"eliminating the capability for surprise attacks and offensives designed to conquer territory.\"\nThird, the Alliance would seek evidence of agreement creating \"a greater degree of mutual trust,\nbased on increased transparency and calculability of military procedure.\" Additionally, Kohl\nput forth the West German demand for \"speedy\" negotiations to reduce NATO and Warsaw\nPact deployments of SNF in Europe.\nHolding to these positions against what was perceived in West Germany to be extreme pressure\nfrom the United States and the United Kingdom to agree to modernization without arms control,\nthe coalition was able to make the argument domestically that it had fought up to the last minute\nto ensure that the Allies took account of West German interests. The compromise reached in\nBrussels, which delayed the FOTL modernization decision until 1992, tied the start of negotia-\ntions on SNF to the conclusion and implementation of the first stage of CFE reductions, and\nconfirmed that the Alliance seeks only a partial draw-down of its SNF assets. In the Federal\nRepublic, in the immediate aftermath of the NATO Summit, the SNF compromise was portrayed\nas a great victory. However, in recent IFPA discussions with West German officials, it became\nclear that, from their perspective, the Alliance debate over SNF and Lance modernization was\nfar from over, and few defense analysts in the FRG were optimistic over the prospects for\ndeployment in West Germany of FOTL.\nEven as Kohl, in his presentation on June 1 of the Government's view of the NATO Summit,\nsounded an optimistic tone with regard to SNF, and in particular the Lance modernization\ndecision, he proceeded to say that, in this context, the phrase \"for the foreseeable future,\" can\nmean \"only a relatively limited period of time,\" suggesting that the Alliance might eventually\ndecide that the conditions have been reached which make any or all of the SNF basing modes\nobsolete. From Kohl's perspective, then, the NATO compromise formula fails to rule out the\npossibility of significant change in Alliance deployments of short-range nuclear forces. In the\nfuture, as the nature of the threat changes either as a result of unilateral Soviet initiatives or\nbecause of a negotiated arms reduction regime, land-based SNF, in particular, could be\n3\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nconfigured differently than they are at present. For deterrence purposes, however, many West\nGerman policy officials and defense analysts agree that the political utility of SNF deployments\nwill be critical even under a CFE regime that is characterized by conventional parity. From this\nperspective, and under the circumstance of a CFE regime, ground-based nuclear surface-to-sur-\nface missile launchers could, perhaps, be reduced to below the current NATO inventory of 88\n(Lance) launchers, but not necessarily to zero, as is favored by some members of the government\ncoalition (principally members of the Free Democratic Party) and endorsed by the opposition\nSocial Democratic Party (SPD) and the Greens.\nOn the specific issue of what the NATO Summit compromise means for the modernization and\nfuture deployment of nuclear-capable surface-to-surface and other SNF systems, notably nuclear\nartillery and aircraft platforms, differences of interpretation among the government coalition\npartners, and between the government and opposition parties, have begun to be aired publicly.\nFor example, CSU Bundestag member Ortwin Lowack assesses the compromise to mean\nAlliance agreement to end the drift toward a \"Third Zero\" option in short-range forces. On this\nbasis, he recently stated that by the NATO formula the \"Third Zero\" was \"off the table.\"\nReflecting this view also is the NATO Secretary General and former West German Defense\nMinister Manfred Wörner, who declared that the wording of the agreement, which accepted\nonly a partial reduction of SNF, meant exactly that: \"partial means partial-and not complete.\"\nHowever, in Bundestag debate, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP)\ncalled upon the Federal Republic to shape the disarmament process so that there can be no\n\"compulsion for modernization\" in the case of short-range nuclear forces, and that negotiation\nof the \"Third Zero\" option should not be unilaterally ruled out by the NATO allies. It was widely\nreported in the Federal Republic and other NATO capitals that Genscher had threatened to bring\ndown the government coalition over the SNF issue if negotiations on short-range nuclear forces\nwere not somehow sanctioned by the Alliance. Although the Summit wording leaves ample\nroom for interpretation, Genscher did come away from the meeting with an Alliance commit-\nment to drop the modernization issue until 1992, stating: \"we have an agreement to negotiate\nwithout an agreement to modernize.\" Having put off the modernization issue until 1992,\nGenscher went even further in his efforts to discourage the potential for a positive decision at\nthat time. With regard to the language used at the Summit, Genscher commented that an\nagreement to negotiate a modemization decision is not a decision to modernize. It remains to\nbe seen whether the FDP's relatively poor showing (5.6%) in the June European Parliamentary\nelections will strengthen or diminish Genscher's objective of pushing for early SNF negotiations\nand thereby obviating, according to his view, the requirement for FOTL. Nevertheless, one\nthing is clear: while the European election results for the CDU were not extraordinary, attracting\n4\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nonly 37.8% of the vote, they were not so disastrous as to prompt a Party decision to oust Kohl\nfrom the CDU leadership. (It had been widely speculated in the Federal Republic that if the\nCDU failed to attract 35% to 40% of the popular vote in the Parliamentary election, the CDU\nmight turn to a more charismatic personality than the personally unpopular Kohl).\nHowever, despite the continuity of Kohl's leadership in the CDU, the prospects for a positive\nFOTL decision are diminishing steadily in the Federal Republic. The opposition Social\nDemocrats and Greens, both parties of which held their respective voter support in the June\nelections-37.3% for the SPD and 8.4% for the Greens-are opposed to SNF deployments on\nWest German soil, at least in the SSM and nuclear artillery categories, and both support\nimmediate calls for the start of negotiations on SNF reductions toward a \"Third Zero\" in parallel\nwith the CFE talks in Vienna. There is some division in the SPD on air-launched SNF systems,\nbut in general most party officials oppose TASM deployment, with some \"centrist\" defense\nanalysts supportive of DCA in the context of deterrence coupling and assuming no significant\nreduction in Soviet SNF capabilities.)\nThe Future of SNF\nParticularly since the signing of the INF Treaty,\nAlthough the NATO summit agreement\nWest German and American differences over\nincluded approval of only a partial reduc-\nthe roles of nuclear weapons in Alliance\ntion of short-range nuclear forces, and\nstrategy have become more pronounced. In line\nthen only after implementation of a CFE\nwith general European thinking on this issue,\nnegotiated reduction, modernization op-\nthe West Germans, apart from some military\nponents still call for a Third Zero option.\nofficers and defense analysts, emphasize the\nChancellor Kohl himself envisages a time\npolitical function of nuclear weapons in NATO\nin the future in which NATO SNF could be\nstrategy and reject any conceptualization of\nreduced below current NATO levels.\nSNF as \"warfighting\" capabilities, as was clear-\nly evident in their reaction to Wintex. In this respect, the West Germans, like their European\ncounterparts, are more comfortable with the strategic logic of \"massive retaliation\" and are\nhighly critical of NATO's Selective Employment options for the \"substrategic\" use of nuclear\nweapons. This perspective engenders criticism of SNF deployments, in particular because of\ntheir disproportionate destructive potential relative to German territory (East and West) and the\nlack of a \"shared\" risk that they bestow upon the other NATO allies, who do not themselves\nhost deployments of short-range nuclear weapons. In the Federal Republic, this has contributed\nto a convergence of opinion across the political spectrum against Lance modernization and\nnuclear-artillery deployments on West German soil. It is also reflected in the widespread support\nfor early SNF negotiations. Thus, the Chancellor's speech of April 27, calling for \"early\" or\n5\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\n\"speedy\" negotiations, was a product of pressure from both the political \"right\" and \"left\" which\nhe could not leave unanswered, even if this set him into direct conflict with the United States.\nMoreover, from the West German perspective, it is difficult to rationalize NATO's call for\nmodernization of SNF and, at the same time, support for the goal of deep cuts in conventional\nforces in Europe. The rationale for short-range nuclear force deployments is widely seen in the\nFederal Republic as compensation for Warsaw Pact conventional superiority. Thus, the logical\nnexus between a CFE regime and SNF deployments would be a force mix based on lower levels\nof short-range nuclear capabilities. It seems that in much the same way as NATO tied cruise\nand Pershing II missile deployments to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 IRBMs, the West\nGermans are seeking to tie Alliance SNF options to specific cuts in Soviet Warsaw Pact\nconventional forces. Clearly, in the Federal Republic, it will be extraordinarily difficult to build\nsupport for any SNF modernization, including FOTL and also TASM, in an era of perceived\nprogress on conventional force reductions.\nThere is little reason to believe that the opposition which coalesced around FOTL would leave\nTASM untouched, especially given the extreme West German sensitivity regarding aircraft in\nthe current environment. Already opposition to TASM has been broached among the public at\nlarge, based largely on the argument that the deployment of such systems would constitute a\ncircumvention of the INF treaty. It is conceivable that an attempt on the part of the Alliance to\nintroduce TASM as a routine technical improvement, after substantial consultation with the\nFRG in advance, might lessen opposition, but it is impossible to predict that even this approach\nwould meet with success. Even those who are not opposed in principle to TASM question its\nsurvivability, including the ability of its platform to penetrate enemy air defenses and to escape\naircraft interdiction on the ground, a concern that certainly diminishes its perceived credibility\nas a deterrent asset. Broader popular opposition to TASM is also possible in the context of West\nGerman concerns over FRG sovereignty. Calls for TASM deployment could help to coalesce\nthe divergent antinuclear and environmental groups opposed, in the context of the sovereignty\nissue, to the large concentration of \"foreign\" troops on West German soil. Whatever the validity\nof these observations, it is becoming increasingly apparent that TASM modernization may be\npolitically difficult to accomplish in an environment that now provides for the prospect of an\nSNF negotiation and a CFE regime which includes aircraft platforms.\nThe Vienna CFE Talks\nBecause the future of negotiations on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces in Europe is\nnow clearly tied to the achievement of progress in the conventional force talks, West German\nattention is more clearly focused on Vienna. Although the intent of President Bush's surprise\nproposals for the CFE talks may have been to suggest to the Bonn leadership that substantial\n6\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nprogress could be made toward an agreement\nSome West German military analysts were\nand its implementation-and thus toward SNF\ncritical of Bush's proposal to include\nnegotiations,-they also opened for discussion\naircraft in the CFE talks, and suggest that\nthe new issue areas of aircraft, helicopters, and\nNATO concentrate in the first phase of the\ntroop reductions. Based on previous ex-\nnegotiations on the more significant prob-\nperience in the MBFR, this expansion of the\nlem of ground forces.\nCFE mandate is widely expected in West Ger-\nmany to slow down progress at the talks substantially, making it unlikely that Bush's six-month-\nto-one-year deadline can be met. Nevertheless, Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher\nwere obviously relieved that President Bush had found in the CFE a means of mitigating the\nNATO dispute over \"early\" negotiations on SNF and of wresting the arms control initiative\nfrom Gorbachev, even if only temporarily.\nIn early assessments of the Bush proposals, West German defense analysts were critical of two\naspects: the inclusion of troop reductions and aircraft platforms (although on the aircraft issue\nthe political leadership is divided, with public opinion and the opposition parties strongly\nsupportive of this element of the President's CFE initiative). Thus, while members of the CSU\nand some CDU politicians oppose the inclusion of aircraft platforms in the CFE, even in a second\nround negotiation, on the basis that this will dilute the primary focus of the talks (which should\nbe directed toward the Warsaw Pact's ground force invasion capabilities), the leadership of their\ncoalition partner, the FDP, endorsed the Bush initiative, arguing that combat aircraft represent\nan area of Western superiority which must be considered in a CFE force reduction regime, if\nthe West is to be perceived as serious about its arms control efforts. With regard to the platforms\nfor inclusion, the West German Defense Ministry believes that the CFE proposals should be\nconfined to land-based aircraft (but including land-based West German naval air assets-i.e.,\nTornado, which Foreign Minister Genscher is said to have already conceded to the Soviet\nUnion). However, notwithstanding the inclusion, for planning purposes, of their land-based\nTornado assets, defense planners in Bonn continue to insist that the Alliance must not allow the\nCFE negotiations to affect NATO's structural combat capability. Thus, one West German\nworking proposal is to include only land-based aircraft and the West German Tornados, in the\nsecond phase of the negotiations, while first focusing on combat helicopters. In this way, the\nDefense Ministry may hope to diffuse the DCA issue. In other words, the Germans are\nconsidering a proposal that aims at finding a common Alliance position on aircraft by emphasiz-\ning cuts in combat helicopters (together with personnel) in the first phase, and accepting, in\nprinciple, negotiations on fixed-wing aircraft at a later time.\n7\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nBundeswehr Restructuring and Personnel Issues\nIn the context of the manpower issue, the\nBush and Soviet CFE proposals have ob-\nArms control agreements, demographic pres-\nvious implications for future Bundeswehr\nsures, and budgetary restrictions will all play\nplanning, and the force structure options\na part in shaping future Bundeswehr force\nbeing discussed at the Defense Ministry are\nstructure; the Bundeswehr of the future will\nsaid to be taking into account possible arms\nrely ever more heavily upon reserve units.\ncontrol outcomes. While it is anticipated\nthat West German ground forces will continue to emphasize the Brigade/Division/Corps\nstructure that is currently the basis of West German defense planning, there are likely to be\nchanges (restructuring) in the active strength-reserve forces ratio in some units. There also is\nlikely to be created a new \"Ready Reserve\" that will be structured to fill short-falls in personnel\ncreated in active force units which are not manned at optimal levels. Clearly, from the West\nGerman perspective, one of the implications of a CFE agreement will be to put a premium on\nhighly ready, limited, force structures, with a greater reliance on reserve force structures.\nFRG PROCUREMENT PLANS\nAgreement between FRG and France on 3 Joint Projects\n»MBB and Aerospatiale to develop fibre optic guided missile for aircraft and helicop-\nters; to be named Polypheme, and having an IOC of 1999\nNew fire control system\nOptical equipment for third-generation anti-tank missile\nFRG will purchase five Signaal multi-beam acquisition radar for targeting (SMART)\nfor its Type 123 frigates\nMBB joins GeneralElectric (USA), Aeritalia, Ferranti (UK), and Electronique Serge\nDassault to bid for NATO Battlefield Information Collecting and Exploitation System\n(BICES)\nCAE (Canada) selected to develop testbed simulator providing low-level flight training\nfor Tornado; CAE also selected to upgrade seven existing simulators\nFRG relents on demand that German company be granted contract for maintenance\nof aircraft for multi-service electric warfare group; decision now left to NATO Manage-\nment and Supply Agency (NMSA)\n8\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nTogether with the establishment of cooperative Confidence and Stability Building Measures\n(CSBMs), the resultant CFE force structures imply a change in the scale of projected conflict\nin stark contrast to current West German planning assumptions that are based on expectations\nof attack by large-scale, massed, Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces. In a CFE regime where inspections\nand rapid challenges are the norm-and limited forces structures the result-many West German\nmilitary analysts feel that the incentive for surprise attack may be increased and not diminished\nin the European theater.\nMoreover, in the context of the discussions at the CFE talks, and against the background of\nprospective defense budget cuts, West German defense planners are engaged in a detailed study\nof future Bundeswehr structures and personnel ceilings. It is interesting to note that in a briefing\nreceived by IFPA personnel from members of the Planning Staff (of the Defense Ministry), the\nWest Germans, in their working numbers, (in the aircraft category), appear to include all NATO\npersonnel, including naval forces manpower. The accompanying table reflects the planning\nassumptions of the West Germans related to their assessment of the Western and Eastern CFE\nproposals. With the content of the Bush proposals and the U.S. agreement to include troop\nceilings in the CFE discussions, the West Germans are grappling with means to maintain an\nactive force component end-strength of 450,000 up to the end of the century. Already facing\ndomestic opposition to his policies on SNF, Chancellor Kohl announced that the Coalition had\ndecided to postpone for three years the planned extension of military service from 15 to 18\nmonths. The extension for conscript personnel had been a highly contentious issue in West\nGerman political circles and Kohl was under a great deal of pressure, even within his own party,\nto postpone the military-supported initiative. (See Table II for survey results of recent West\nTable II\nPOLL RESULTS\nIn your opinion, who is performing the more important service for Society on the whole: a young\nman who performs military service as a soldier in the Bundeswehr, or someone who per-\nforms civilian service, in a nursing home or old peoples home, for example?\n1981\n1988\nPerson Entering Bundeswehr\n24\n19\nPerson Performing Civil Service\n23\n36\nSame\n46\n40\nUndecided\n7\n5\n9\nWest German View of theEffects of the\nWarsaw Pact CFE Proposal (23 May 89)\nNATO\nWarsaw Pact\nCategory\nUpper Limit\nCurrent Level\nReduction\nCurrent Level\nReduction\nPercentage\nPercentage\nPersonnel\n1.35 mil.\n2.93¹ mil.\n1.58 mil.\n54%\n4.07¹ mil.\n2.72 mil.\n67%\nCombat Aircraft\n1,500\n4,740\n3,240\n68%\n8,208\n6,708\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n80%\n10\nCombat Helicopters\n1,700\n2,627\n927\n35%\n3,664\n1,964\n53%\nTanks\n20,000\n22,809\n2,809\n12%\n50,000\n30,000\n60%\n24,000\n17,739\n2)\n2)\nArtillery\n42,715\n18,715\n44%\nAPCs\n28,000\n28,610\n610\n2%\n55,800\n27,800\n50%\n1 May 30 June 1989\n1) Includes land, air, and naval forces; for the Warsaw Pact, also includes special troops.\n2) Estimated at 6.261, theoretical reduction of 36%.\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nGerman attitudes on Bundeswehr service and public attitudes toward the military in general.)\nThe effect of this decision will be a drawdown in the country's active force strength unless\ncollateral measures are taken, including a tightening of permissible exemptions from service, a\nlowering of medical entry standards, and the collateral use of men who participate in local \"fire\nbrigades\" to fill out undermanned units. According to members of the Defense Planning Staff,\nthe West Germans have some breathing space on this issue, probably until the end of the century,\nbecause there are still enough reservists to fill in active units that could be mobilized in a wartime\ncontingency. By West German calculations, there is also a pool of approximately 300,000, men\nwho have received military deferments, but who would still be eligible for mobilization if called.\nNevertheless, the Bundeswehr structure for the year 2000 is based on projections of a reduced\nactive force strength and a greater reliance on reserve force structures, as was discussed above\nin the context of West German thinking about a post-CFE environment in Europe. Also as noted\nabove, West German thinking with regard to future force planning hinges substantially on the\nassumptions being made about the CFE and the prospective SNF negotiations. There is, from\nthe West German perspective, no doubt that under the current CFE proposals, the large scale\nSoviet offensive capability will be reduced dramatically if the current Western proposals are\nimplemented. At the same time, there is likely to be a political perception of a reduction in the\nSoviet threat even if Moscow's ability to implement an attack against Western Europe will\nremain. Under these conditions, the West German military, as well as members of the Defense\nMinistry's civilian bureaucracy, question their ability to fashion, together with NATO, a force\nposture that will meet the defense and deterrence needs of the twenty-first century.\nIn late June, this was placed further into question as a result of the agreement reached by Defense\nMinister Gerhard Stoltenberg and Finance Minister Theodor Waigel on the level of defense\nspending planned for the 1990 national budget. Stoltenberg's initial request for DM 55.3 billion,\n($28.43 billion) which would have represented a 4.7% increase over last year's expenditures,\nwas cut to DM 54.47 billion, ($28.00 billion), or an annual increase over FY89 funding of\napproximately 2.2%. Stoltenberg has characterized the agreement with Waigel as a \"tolerable\nand satisfactory compromise for the Bundeswehr,\" despite the fact that the proposed increase\ndoes not out-pace inflation and does not meet the 3% level approved by NATO defense ministers\n(including Stoltenberg) in Brussels in late May. Strong FDP resistance to substantial increases\nis said to have led to agreement on the lower figure. The full cabinet is expected to meet to pass\nthe FY90 budget on July 5, 1989.\nAccording to the new spending figures, approximately DM 400 million ($210.5 million) will\nbe programmed for incentives to enhance the attractiveness of military service, in order to\nincrease the number of soldiers deciding to remain in the Bundeswehr after the mandatory\n15-month term. Among other items, these incentives will also include modernization of\n11\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nbarracks and increased emphasis on practical training. Equipment procurements will have to\nbe reduced in this austere budget environment, with reductions in credits anticipated for the\nWest German contribution to EFA and other air defense modernization programs. The West\nGerman Navy faces similar cutbacks. In an appearance before the Bundestag's Defense\nCommittee in May, Inspector General, Admiral Mann (the FRG equivalent of the U.S. Chief of\nNaval Operations) described the cuts he is prepared to make in naval forces to meet financial\nconstraints. These include decisions to close one half of the Navy's bases located on the Baltic\nand North Seas, including those in Flensburg and Cuxhaven. In addition, according to Admiral\nMann, by the year 2000, only 80 of the current 188 ships will remain in service, while the number\nof men serving in the fleet will fall from the current 38,700 to approximately 20,000 in the year\n2005 to meet the projected budget austerity measures.\n12\nThe Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nUnited Kingdom\nBritish Perspectives on the NATO\nSummit\nBritish governmental perspectives on SNF are\nMost significant among defense-related\ndriven by Mrs. Thatcher's desire to maintain\ndevelopments in the United Kingdom\ndistance between Britain's strategic options and\nduring May and June was the Thatcher\nNATO's selective employment policies.\nGovernment's insistence on a near-term\nsystem-specific decision for a successor\nto the Lance missile and its continued opposition to East-West negotiations on short-range\nnuclear forces (SNF), a position that Prime Minister Thatcher pressed vigorously in the weeks\nleading to the NATO Summit. At the Summit itself, Mrs. Thatcher remained unalterably\nopposed to a \"Third Zero\" on short-range nuclear systems. Thus, in the agreement that emerged\nfrom the Summit, Britain was widely perceived to have made significant concessions in the\ninterests of Alliance unity; yet, Mrs. Thatcher continued to assert, to an increasingly skeptical\nBritish public, that Britain had secured its most important objectives in the final NATO\ncommunique by staving off a negative SNF modernization decision and ensuring that the \"Third\nZero\" was not a near-term Alliance option.\nThe Prime Minister's \"hardline\" on the SNF issue can be seen, in part, as a response to her\nperception that the Bush Administration might become so concerned with the achievement of\na NATO-wide consensus that major British interests-specifically, the maintenance of an\nup-to-date short-range nuclear forces element of the NATO force posture-would be pushed\naside. It can also be assessed in the context of British fears of West Germany's drift toward\n\"neutralism\", and Mrs. Thatcher's concerns over what she has called the \"mindless\" rush toward\narms control. On the surface, the British Government's strategy was successful, with the\nAlliance decision to push off but not foreclose, until 1992, a decision on the \"introduction and\ndeployment\" of a Lance successor. However, in fact, Foreign Office analyses of the Summit's\ncompromise formula are less optimistic about the future prospects for a Lance modernization,\nand, in this context, Foreign Office experts were relieved that the Summit Formula for endorsing\nSNF negotiations at least precludes, according to their understanding, the \"Third Zero\" option.\nThis latter point was particularly important to Mrs. Thatcher, who, during the course of the\nSummit wrangling on the language of the Communiqué, forced the NATO heads of state to\nagree that the \"Third Zero\" is not an option for NATO under present conditions. Even through\nthe condition that CFE implementation must be \"underway\" prior to the initiation of SNF\nnegotiations was a weaker formulation than Thatcher would have preferred, the Prime Minister\nstated clearly that her understanding of the clause was that \"not a single missile can be taken\n13\nThe Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nout until the whole conventional agreement has been implemented.\" Mrs. Thatcher's views on\nthe SNF issue are clearly shaped by her perspectives of the relationship between British strategic\nnuclear forces and NATO short-range \"tactical\" nuclear capabilities. In line with her \"firebreak\"\nanalysis (which reportedly sought to establish a barrier between NATO's selective employment\noptions and the requirement for use of British strategic nuclear forces), Mrs. Thatcher apparently\nis seeking to maintain distance between a forward battle contingency in the FRG and the\nprospective destruction of British territory. Mrs. Thatcher's critics have been quick to point out\nher efforts to separate Britain from its European NATO allies on the SNF issue, and, in\nParliamentary debate after the NATO summit, both opposition Labour Party members and\n\"centrist\" Social and Liberal Democrats criticized the Government's \"hard-line\" stance on the\nLance modernization and SNF negotiations issues.\nBritish SNF Modernization\nIn the context of British concerns that\nthe West Germans may not, in 1992, be\nBritish concerns that West Germany may not be\nin a position to go ahead with a modern-\nprepared to come to a decision on FOTL have led\nization decision on Lance, and holding\nto their signing of an MOU on TASM with the\nUnited States.\nto a view of deterrence that emphasizes\nNATO's escalatory options, the British\ngovernment is continuing its own SNF force modernization program, based on the procurement\nof a long-range stand-off strategic missile capacity. In this regard, in early May, Defense\nMinister George Younger announced that Britain's range of choices for a new generation\nnuclear-tipped tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM), to be deployed on the Tornado GR-1,\nwould not be based on collaboration with the French utilizing their air-to-ground medium-range\nmissile (ASMP) technology base. Younger pointed out that the French system was \"not suitable\nfor [British] needs either in timing or range.\" Though no mention of a specific selection choice\nwas made in the Statement on the Defense Estimates (the annual White Paper), which was\nreleased in June, the British government has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the\nUnited States on collaboration for the development and procurement of TASM to replace the\nU.K.'s ageing stockpile of WE-177 free-fall bombs. According to British MOD officials,\nBritain favors two U.S.-developed systems that are in competition for selection as the British\nchoice for TASM: the Boeing-developed Short-Range Attack Missile \"T\" (SRAM-T), a tactical\nvariant of the SRAM-2; and Martin-Marietta's Supersonic Low Altitude Target (SLAT) system.\nA British decision between these two systems will hinge on a number of considerations, primary\namong which will be the offset arrangements for British industry and the cost/effectiveness\n14\nThe Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nrelated to the incorporation of a British \"front end\" (i.e., warhead technologies) and adaptations\nto the Tornado airframe..\nAs is the case elsewhere in Western Europe, TASM modernization is not without its critics in\nBritain, and has the potential, therefore, for attracting widespread public opposition, as did\nBritish acceptance of cruise missile deployments in the late 1970s. Against criticisms that\nTASM deployment would be a circumvention of the INF Treaty, the British government has\ndefended its decision to move ahead on TASM on the grounds that the Soviet Union has not\ncurtailed its continuing modernization of Warsaw Pact SNF capabilities. More to the point, the\nThatcher Government has countered that: (1) as an air-based system, TASM does not fall within\nTreaty constraints, which apply only to land-based INF systems; and (2) the range of a British\nTASM would, in any case, be under the 500 km limit established by the INF Treaty. However,\narguments such as these are not convincing to diehard opponents of SNF and, as a procurement\ndecision appears to be imminent, popular and political opposition to a British government\ndecision is likely to increase for several reasons. First, as will be more closely examined below,\nthe Thatcher government is wary of President Bush's proposal to include combat aircraft in CFE\nnegotiations, and has already announced that its DCA are exempt from consideration in the\nnegotiations. Yet, in Britain, the inclusion of aircraft in the CFE talks is a popular initiative,\nand the Government's interest in TASM may be seen to fly in the face of NATO negotiations\npolicy. Secondly, British involvement in TASM development is likely to be opposed as well\nbecause of its perceived contribution to NATO's nuclear \"warfighting\" options and, in par-\nticular, its ability to target aimpoints located on Soviet territory. In addition, the potential\nexpense associated with modernization of aircraft systems, the survivability of which is in\nquestion in light of Soviet preemptive strike assets and the evolution of Soviet air defense\ncapabilities, could attract opposition from those who do not necessarily oppose the TASM\nsystem concept. In a budget constrained environment, tactical nuclear weapons programs may\nnot receive the support that conventional weapons procurements, especially naval systems,\nmight, and-given that the Trident is a \"sacred cow\"-budget cuts in the tactical nuclear area\nmay be easier to effect than would cuts in the British Army of the Rhine, whose forward\ndeployment in West Germany provides tangible evidence of Britain's European interests.\nThe Bush CFE Proposal and U.S.-British Relations\nAcross the British political spectrum, President Bush's proposals for the CFE talks-known as\nthe \"Conventional Parity Initiative\"-were well received. Martin O'Neill, Labour's shadow\nDefense Minister, characterized the Bush initiative as \"the first really constructive attempt by\nthe Bush Administration to address the challenges which Gorbachev has placed before the\nAlliance.\" Former Labour Defense Minister John Gilbert welcomed the linkage Bush had\n15\nThe Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nestablished to \"very drastic Soviet conven-\nBush's CFE proposals were welcomed across\ntional cuts,\" and Paddy Ashdown, leader of\nthe British political spectrum, although the\nthe centrist \"Democrats,\" hailed the Bush\nproposed inclusion of DCA in the talks is con-\nproposals as \"an historic moment which\ntroversial and opposed by some in the Conser-\nmust not be wasted.\"\nvative government.\nPerhaps the coolest reaction to the Bush\nproposals came from the Prime Minister herself, who voiced concern over both timing and\ncontent. While crediting the Bush proposals as having \"transformed\" the Summit, Mrs.\nThatcher stressed the need for NATO to retain adequate levels of dual-capable aircraft in its\nforce structure, an objective that she feared might be compromised by the President's call to\ninclude combat aircraft in the CFE mandate. The Prime Minister also called for a clause in any\npotential CFE agreement requiring the destruction, and not merely the removal, of weaponry,\nfor aircraft moved simply beyond the Ural Mountains, she noted, would still be only three hours'\nflying time from Western Europe. So, too, Thatcher characterized as \"very optimistic\" the Bush\nchallenge to complete CFE negotiations within six months to a year.\nMrs. Thatcher's concerns over the scope of President Bush's proposals did not cloud the\natmosphere at the London meeting between the President and the Prime Minister in early June.\nU.S. attempts to soothe British fears over a growing Washington-Bonn relationship, at the\nexpense of British interests, were met with repeated affirmations by Thatcher of the enduring\nimportance of the \"special relationship.\" So strong were the Prime Minister's statements on the\nimportance of the U.S./U.K. relationship that they were widely interpreted in Britain as a\ndecision by the Conservative Party government to place loyalty to the United States ahead of\nconsiderations of further European integration. In fact, Thatcher had said in formal remarks\nthat \"[f]or us, loyalty to the United States is paramount because we share so many of the same\nbasic beliefs.\" Coming as it did less than two weeks before the European Parliament (EP)\nelections, however, this statement was held by British commentators to underscore Thatcher's\nopposition to significantly increased European integration. This interpretation contributed to\nthe Conservatives' poor performance in the EP elections, and set off a round of opposition\ncriticism of Thatcher's handling of the British-U.S. relationship.\nDefense White Paper: Major Procurement Themes\nEarly May also saw the release of the British Government's annual Statement on the Defence\nEstimates. This year's White Paper again defied long-standing calls, from both the Labour\nranks as well as from voices within the Conservative party itself, for a full-scale review of\ncommitments and capabilities by the Thatcher Government. Instead, the 1989-90 White Paper\n16\nThe Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nThe defense White Paper provides for\nproposed a continuation of the large majority of all\nlittle change in British procurement\nBritish equipment programs and force commitments,\npriorities. NATO commitments,\ncutting back in small increments where savings\napart from Trident, account for the\nneeded to be made.\nlargest single line items.\nOverall British defense spending for 1989-90 was\nannounced in the White Paper to be $33.84 billion (at\nan exchange rate of $1.68 = £1.00). This represents an increase of $1.6 billion over the previous\n(1988-89) fiscal year, and an additional $294 million over 89-90 spending as projected in last\nyear's White Paper-which, while significant, is not nearly sufficient to compensate for inflation\nin defense costs over the past twelve months. (Retail inflation in Britain currently stands at\n7.9%, which alone would require an increase of $2.65 billion to stay even with last year's\nprojected expenditures.) Thus, the overall British defense budget for 1989-90 represents in real\nterms a cut of 0.7%. Specifically, this has forced a cut of approximately $168 million on the\nRoyal Navy, while providing for small increases in Army and Air Force spending. Moreover,\nin the area of manpower, Britain will increase spending on personnel by $504 million-but this\nincrease will go toward a total force level that will fall by 3,000 troops, to a level of 324,000.\nEven given increased personnel expenditure, however, Britain's retention rates are falling, and\na number of combat units are operating under strength.\nThe White Paper sets forth an equipment procurement budget for 1989-90 of $13.9 billion,\nwhich represents 41% of overall British defense spending (as shown in Figure 1) and an increase\nof only $28.56 million over last year (when equipment procurement stood at 38% of total British\ndefense spending). These resources are to be allocated among the Services, General Support,\nand Research areas. The breakdown of this allocation is seen in Figure 2. Significant major\nprojects in these major areas of equipment procurement include:\nRoyal Navy\ntwo nuclear-powered fleet (attack) submarines\nfour conventional submarines\neight frigates (including four Duke-class Type 23 frigates, for the ASW mission, at a value\nof $840 million)\nBritish Army of the Rhine (BAOR)\na sixth and seventh regiment of Challenger\nreplacement of Rapier with the advanced Rapier-C\n16 additional Lynx helicopters\n17\nFigure 1\nThe Divisions of the Defence Budget by Principal Heading 1989-1990\n1\nWorks and Miscellaneous\nstores and services\nForces Pensions\n19%\n6%\nCivillan Pay\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nThe Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n12%\n18\nEquipment 2\n41%\nForces Pay and Allowances\n23%\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nNotes\n1 Percentage of equipment expenditure based on the last five years. The total adds up to 101% because of roundings.\n2 Of which 75% to UK, 15% to collaborative procurement and 10% to overseas procurement.\nFigure 2\nThe Main Divisions of the\nProcurement Program 1989-1990\nAir Equipment\nDevelopment\n$1.08b\nProduction\n$4.03b\n7%\nProduction\n26.1%\n$2.31b\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nThe Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis\nLand Equipment\n15%\nResearch\nDevelopment\n3.3%\n4.7%\n$719m\n19\n$502.3m\n6.6%\nDevelopment¹\n$1.01b\n7.7%\nGeneral Support\n25.5%\nProduction\nProduction\n4.1%\n$1.09b\n$3.94b\nDevelopment\n$631.7m\nSea Equipment\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nNote:\n1) Including the cost of some HQ staff who are responsible for both research and development.\nFigure 3\nEstimated Costs of Defense\nCommitments for 1989-1990\n(in billions of dollars)\nRAF Germany\n(incl reinforcement\nCentral Front\nforces)\n6.741\n1.741\nBerlin\n4.903\n98\nBAOR\n(incl reinforcement\nforces)\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nThe Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis\nMaritime\n4.015\n3.174\n20\nEastern\nAtlantic\n.84\nChannel\nHome Base\n3.393\nOther\n1.274\nNuclear Strategic Force\n1.795\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nThe Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nAn Analysis of Defence Resources\nby Major Programs 1989-1990\nFigure 4\n5.7\nNuclear Strategic\n0.6\nForce\n1.3\nNaval General\n11.9\nPurpose Combat\n122\nForces\n7.0\n17.0\nEuropean Theater\n31.4\nGround Forces\n14.2\n0.9\nOther Army\n4.4\nCombat Forces\n3.5\n17.4\nAir Force General\n19.0\nPurpose Forces\n5.3\n2.2\nReserve and\nAuxiliary\n0.9\nFormations\n1.8\n11.7\nResearch and\n0.3\nDevelopment\n14.0\n6.7\n18.1\nTraining\n7.5\nEquipment Support\n5.2\nand Associated\n2.6\nFacilities in the UK\n21.0\nWar and Contingency\n2.5\nStocks\n18.8\nOther Support\n10.5\nFunctions\n24.4\nExpenditure as a percentage of the defence budget 1989-90\nService manpower as a percentage of estimated total average strengths\nCivilian manpower as a percentage of estimated total average strengths\n21\nThe Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nRoyal Air Force (RAF)\n6 additional mobile radars for the UK air defense ground environment\n15 additional Tornado ADV (air defense variant)\n26 additional Tornado GR1 (strike version)\nIn addition, progress continues on the Trident nuclear deterrent force, which is to begin\nreplacement of the existing Polaris force in the mid 1990s. Two of the boats are currently under\nconstruction, with the third (of a total of four) expected to be ordered by the British government\nlater this year.\nIn short, there are no surprises in the White Paper-especially in the absence of a complete\nreview of British defense commitments and capabilities. The cost of supporting British defense\ncommitments is illustrated in Figure 3. Clearly, the lion's share of Britain's defense commitment\nhas been, and continues to be, its contribution to NATO Central Front forces, which comprise\nfully 39% of overall British expenditure on defense commitments (and is almost exactly twice\nthat spent on the defense of Britain's home territory). When these defense commitments are\ndivided further into major programmatic areas of British defense spending, as represented in\nFigure 4, the preponderance of the NATO-European commitment becomes even more obvious.\nBritish ground forces dedicated to the NATO central front take up fully 31.4% of overall service\nmanpower, and 17% of the entire British defense budget. The allocation of effort in British\ndefense spending illustrated in Figure 4 may be expected to guide the U.K.'s procurement\npriorities for as long as the Thatcher Government continues in office.\nLabour Policy Review: Kinnock's Move to \"Multilateralism\"\nFor its own part, the opposition Labour party, guided by its leader Neil Kinnock, completed in\nmid-May its year-long review of Labour policies. Of primary importance in this effort was\nKinnock's determination to move the Labour party away from its long-held policy of com-\nprehensive, unilateral nuclear disarmament in the event a Labour government assumed office.\nKinnock, á member of Britain's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) since his college\ndays, argued forcefully for the \"unilateralist\" position during the 1987 general elections, which\nresulted in a crushing defeat for Labour and an unprecedented third consecutive victory for the\nConservative government of Prime Minister Thatcher. In the wake of this electoral disaster,\nand with the Labour party wrenched between its \"hard-left\" elements and what remained of its\nonce-predominant centrist wing, Kinnock launched a full-scale review of Labour policies.\nCentral to this effort was his insistence that in order to present a credible alternative to the\nConservative government, Labour would have to move away from its \"unilateralist\" stance and\n22\nThe Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\ntoward a position that has become labelled \"multilateralism.\" Instead of a unilateral elimination\nof all British nuclear forces (as well as the closure of all nuclear bases on British soil), a\n\"multilateralist\" Labour government would instead seek a denuclearized Britain through enter-\ning British forces into talks on strategic forces, presumably the START talks. While \"multi-\nlateralism\" did not (and does not) represent a fundamental shift away from the primary\nconviction of the Labour party that Britain should become denuclearized, the prospect of\nadopting the new policy became the primary point of debate as the new Labour policy document\nmoved toward public release.\nUltimately, one week after its stunning success in the Welsh by-election in May, Labour's\ngoverning board-the National Executive Council (NEC)-approved, by a 17 to 8 vote, the\nnew \"multilateralist\" policy. Major themes of the policy as adopted include:\nAll nuclear bases in Britain will be reduced, and eventually removed, under a Labour\ngovernment. While this represents a willingness to work out arrangements with NATO as\nBritain moves toward denuclearization, it still is représentative of Labour's rejection of a\nnuclear element to NATO's force posture.\nA policy of \"no first use\" to be adopted with respect to Britain's nuclear capability.\nPlacing all of the U.K.'s nuclear weapons in East-West negotiations, with the intention of\neliminating them. Thus, instead of giving up \"something for nothing\"-the major criticism\nof Labour's defense policy in the last election-Labour would now adopt a \"something for\nsomething\" approach to scaling down British nuclear forces.\nWithin this framework, however, other Labour perspectives on defense and security issues were\nmade clear. Of note are the following:\nLabour continues to oppose the modernization of NATO's SNF forces, and holds the view\nthat no convincing case has been made for NATO to take this step.\nLabour indicates its agreement with the West German perspective that SNF weapons, \"far\nfrom constituting a deterrent to conventional war, actually make conventional war much\nmore likely by lowering the threshold of nuclear response and blurring the difference\nbetween the use of conventional and nuclear weapons.\"\nContinued rejection of NATO's doctrine of Flexible Response. Labour holds the view that\nthe first use of nuclear weapons would lead to uncontrolable escalation up to and including\nand exchange of central strategic forces.\nSupport for a third zero. The Labour party believes that \"the third zero should be made a\nfirm objective.\"\n23\nThe Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nSupport for the objective of \"elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000\"-an\nobjective first enunciated by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev.\nUnilateral abandonment of further testing of British nuclear devices.\nCancellation of the fourth British Trident submarine. (The third is slated to be ordered later\nin 1989.)\nThe combination of what has been characterized as a \"sweeping change\" in Labour's policies—\nparticularly defense-and the party's dramatic successes in recent parliamentary by-elections,\nhas led to increasing speculation among analysts of the British scene that Labour may once again\nbe regarded by the British electorate as a credible governing alternative. In what appears to\nbe a two-track approach of his own devising, Kinnock has now sought to ensure the complete\nadoption of the \"new\" defense policy by isolating the hard \"left\" of the party-which has\nopposed the move to multilateralism-while suggesting through public comments a new\n\"pragmatic\" approach by Labour to the possession of nuclear weapons. Examples of the\nisolation tactic include, in addition to the vote approving the policy shift, the defeat of two\n\"left-sponsored\" amendments to the policy document which would have adopted a \"no use\"\npolicy on British nuclear weapons, together with a repudiation of the U.S. strategic nuclear\n\"umbrella\". With respect to public statements on nuclear weapons, Kinnock went so far as to\nsay in a speech to the Welsh Labour Party (of which he is a member) that he would never say\nyes or no \"if asked whether I would push the button.\" Such statements seemed intended to\nincrease in public perception the credibility of Kinnock's claim that the \"multilaterialist\" policy\nrepresents a significant departure from Labour's 1987 defense platform.\nHowever, Kinnock still must overcome a number of obstacles within the party before he can\nclaim to have completely brought about the change in policy. Before the new policy was even\nunveiled, a member of the Labour \"shadow cabinet\"-Bryan Gould, responsible for trade and\nindustry-criticized the new policy, noting that \"we have no intention of keeping a nuclear\ndeterrent either to use or to deter.\" The \"hard left\" of the party, meeting as the \"Socialist\nConference,\" condemned Kinnock and his allies in the policy review as \"new men with old\n24\nThe Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nideas,\" and characterized the new \"multilateral\" policy as \"a shambles.\" Many of the hard-left\ntrade union leaders-notably Ron Todd, head of the Transport and General Workers' Union\n(TGWU) and a member of the defense policy review committee-have already indicated that\nthey will direct the weight of their block votes against the multilateralist position. In addition\nto the TGWU, this list includes the Manufacturing, Science, and Finance Union. Supporters of\nthe new policy have included the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE), a major force\nin the trade block votes. In fact, the change in defense policy has opened a breach in Labour's\ntrade union support, with potentially far-reaching consequences for the internal cohesion of the\nparty.\nSLD Defense Policy Statement\nDuring the same time, but with much less fanfare, the centrist opposition \"Democrats\" (or Social\nand Liberal Democrats) presented their own policy statement on defense. During mid-May,\nfinal drafting sessions were held on the SLD's policy document, entitled After the Cold War, in\nwhich the party affirmed its acceptance of a nuclear element to deterrence (and criticized the\nLabour party's failure to do the same). Even so, however, support is also expressed for the\ndeployment of Trident with fewer warheads, to be followed by a stage-by-stage negotiated\nreduction of the British national deterrent force. The Democrats also express in their document\na clear opposition to the modernization of NATO SNF systems, and support the idea of a \"nuclear\nfree zone\" in Europe.\nThe document represented something of a departure from the Democrats 1987 election platform,\nunder which the party supported the cancellation of Trident. Response to its publication was\nmixed, even within the party, which is itself the result of a merger between the old British Liberal\nparty and elements of the Social Democratic Party. For example, Meg Beresford-chairperson\nof the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and a member of the Democrats' defense\npolicy review committee-criticized the final document as \"illogical and inconsistent.\" Beres-\nford, a member of the old Liberal party, represents a large antinuclear sector of the newly-merged\nparty, drawn from what was once the strongly antinuclear Liberals. At the same time, the party's\n* The Labour Party is goverened in its convention through votes from both constituencies (the parliamentary\ndistricts) and block votes from the British trade unions that have membership in the party. The trade union block\nvotes are a significant makeweight on a wide variety of party policy decisions, and have been a contributing\nfactor to the popular perception of the Labour party as controlled by the unions-a perception Thatcher has used\nto her advantage on numerous occasions. Realizing this, Kinnock is presently attempting to change the structure\nof the party's internal government, with the specific objective of reducing the impact of the trade union block\nvotes on party policy decisions.\n25\nThe Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\ndefense spokesman, Menzies Campbell, declared that the document represented a consensus on\nthe need to maintain a \"minimum deterrent\" under British control. There seems little doubt that\nthe defense policy statement will prove a source of contention when the Democrats hold their\nannual conference in September-a meeting which will likely determine whether or not the\nparty will continue to remain both politically and financially viable.\n26\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nFrance\nOver the last two months the French defense debate was focused on the NATO SNF controversy\nand the NATO Summit meeting; the Conventional Forces Talks, including the Warsaw Pact\nand Bush proposals; the Defense Council's military budget decisions; and the European\nParliamentary election debate, which in France turned largely on the issue of 'national service'.\nPublication of Richard Ullman's article (in Foreign Policy) alleging closer U.S.-French nuclear\ncollaboration than generally was publicly known to exist, also prompted brief attention in French\ndefense policymaking circles. In general, however, the furor that might have been expected\nnever erupted in France-in part because of the timing of the article's publication, which\ncoincided with the NATO Summit meeting, and in part because of the Government's swift and\npracticed response that admitted limited cooperation with the U.S., but denied that this in any\nway affected negatively French independence in strategic nuclear technologies and policy. In\ncontrast, the outcome of the NATO Summit and President Bush's CFE proposals attracted much\ncommentary and debate in France, and, as with the French Defense Council's revisions to the\n1987 guidance on force procurements, are influencing official and public perceptions of the\nfuture requirements of the French deterrence posture.\nFrench Defense Council Decisions on Nuclear Weapons Procurements\nBy far, the most immediate issue to affect the future\nWhile no major nuclear equipment\ncomposition of French military forces and their\nprograms were shelved, key\npreferred deployment contingencies was the June 2\nprograms have been stretched out\ndecision of the Defense Council, headed by French\nor delayed-including the Mirage\nPresident François Mitterrand, to stretch out and\n2000N and the M-5 SLBM-and the\nscale down a number of major weapons programs in\nS-4 IRBM SRM is likely to be\na series of austerity measures. While no major\nscrapped and Hadès deployments\nnuclear equipment programs were shelved, there con-\nare uncertain.\ntinues to be speculation that the S-4 IRBM and the\nHadès short-range nuclear missile will, ultimately, be\nscrapped, if cost analyses of these programs demonstrate that monies can still be saved from\ntheir cancellation. At the same time, several other nuclear programs were delayed or cutback,\nincluding the Mirage 2000N program which will be reduced to three squadrons (down from\nfive) making for a reduction to 45 from 75 aircraft capable of carrying the ASMP air-to-ground\nnuclear missile. In addition, the M-5 SLBM modemization program will be stretched out and\nis not expected to be operational until the turn of the century. The M-5 is widely expected to\nbe tapped as the candidate system, in a ground-based version, for replacement of the older S-3\nIRBMS, 18 of which are deployed on the Albion Plateau in the South of France. The prospective\n27\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nselection of the M-5 is largely for reasons of cost effectiveness; also significant is President\nMitterrand's own opposition to mobile, ground-based nuclear weapons (the S-4 program), and\nthe expectation that French Greens and other groups (such as members of the Communist (PCFs)\nand Radical (MRG) Parties) will oppose the program and undermine the much discussed French\nnational defense consensus (which is already eroding), This decision is expected to be taken\nthis fall by the Defense Council which will also, probably, formally cancel the S-4 program.\nSupport for the S-4 program has never been forthcoming among members of the Socialist Party.\nThe program was originated by the conservative government of Jacques Chirac during the\n\"cohabitation\" period of 1986-1988, and his defeat during last year's Presidential election\nvirtually signalled the end of the expensive mobile missile program.\nWith regard to the Hadès program, controversy has erupted between the offices of the Defense\nand Prime Ministers, with the Finance Minister siding with Michel Rocard (Prime Minister) in\nhis effort to cancel the program, and President Mitterrand having to mediate between the two\non the issue. According to a discussion with Prime Minister Rocard's chief defense advisor,\nMarisol Touraine, and with Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Jean-Pierre Chevènement's technical-\nmilitary counsellor, both the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister are staunchly committed\nto opposite positions on the Hadès program, with Chevènement apparently prepared to resign\nif Rocard persists is pushing for deep cuts in Hadès deployments or the cancellation, altogether,\nof the program. Hubert Vedrine, President Mitterrand's chief security advisor, is also reportedly\nskeptical of the Hadès program, but, like the French President, is apparently willing to consider\nsystems' deployment at a considerably reduced level. Vedrine sees this primarily as a means\nto help push the West Germans into acceptance of a Lance modernization decision and systems\ndeployment in the early 1990's, provided a CFE agreement does not radically alter the deterrence\nrequirements for longer-range, ground-based SNF-and assuming that a SNF negotiation has\nnot obviated the requirement for a ground-based surface-to-surface system altogether.\nThe SNF Controversy and Hadès\nChevènement's position on the Hadès is derived from a conception of deterrence coupling with\nthe United States that considers the American strategic relationship crucial to West European\nsecurity, admitting implicitly that French nuclear forces by themselves may not credibly form\nthe basis of a broader West European deterrence posture. Perhaps, more importantly,\nChevènement's position on Hadès stems from an apprehension that a West German refusal to\ndeploy a follow-on system to Lance on West German territory would contribute to debate in\nFrance over French nuclear systems and, thus, help to fracture the widely vaunted French defense\nconsensus. In this context it is important to note that neither Chevènement nor Rocard-nor\nthe French President, for that matter-appear to be interested in the military-operational\n28\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\ncontribution of SNF to NATO and French defense postures. In France, with the possible\nexception of a few French defense analysts and a handful of military personnel, the value of\nshort-range nuclear force deployments lies not in their potential \"warfighting\" roles but in their\nperceived contribution to deterrence and crisis stability. In French strategic thinking, SNF are\nconsidered \"prestrategic\" systems whose use in a European contingency would be closely tied\nto the employment of French (and other Western) strategic nuclear assets. Such a political\nconceptualization of nuclear weapons, then, appears to provide the basis for the French defense\nconsensus, and has allowed even opponents of nuclear weapons deployments (for example,\nmembers of the French Communist Party) to endorse the French deterrence posture. If pressed,\nhowever, most French policy officials and defense analysts, not to mention public opinion,\nwould support only minimal strategic nuclear weapons deployments-and, indeed, successive\nFrench governments since the Gaullist period, with the brief exception of the \"cohabitation\"\ngovernment of Jacques Chirac as Prime Minister and François Mitterrand as President (1986-\n1988), have sought to down-play the role of shorter-range nuclear weapons.\nClearly, the President's Defense Council decision to retain, for the moment, the Hadès program\nmust be seen in the context of the NATO Summit's compromise formula on SNF modernization\nand against fears that the Federal Republic of Germany is abandoning its linchpin role in the\nAtlantic Alliance. The French preoccupation with the perceived neutralist drift of West\nGermany has already prompted the current government to strengthen bilateral defense coopera-\ntion with the FRG through the creation of a joint brigade (for potential employment in a reserve\nrole in a European contingency) and the implementation of exercises designed to bring French\nconventional forces into a \"forward defense\" role in a European contingency. The contribution\nof French short-range nuclear weapons in a European scenario is still problematic, with the\nemployment of 'tactical nuclear' weapons inextricably tied, in French strategic thinking, to the\nprotection of French national territory, and under the direct command authority of the French\nPresident.\nWhile refusing to be drawn into the pre-Summit controversy between Britain and the United\nStates, on the one hand, and West Germany, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Spain and Norway, on\nthe other hand, the French President has consistently said that whereas he opposes a \"Third\nZero\" option at the moment, he does endorse a delay in pushing for a NATO modernization\ndecision (on Lance) until 1992, as the West Germans wish. French interests in the NATO SNF\ndebate relate directly to French security conceptions, which are based on the perceived\nrequirement for the continued deployment in the European theater of American conventional\nand \"substrategic\" systems (the NATO lexicon for SNF), both of which are viewed as essential\nfor deterrence coupling purposes and for the credibility of French nuclear force deployments\n29\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nthemselves. Thus, the official French governmental position is not to oppose SNF negotiations,\nas such, but to ensure that the \"Third Zero\" is not an option for NATO in the near future, so\nlong as Soviet SNF deployments outnumber those of NATO and before the CFE produces deep\ncuts in Soviet-Warsaw Pact offensive nonnuclear capabilities. For the French President, and\nfor most French defense analysts, negotiations to reduce conventional forces deployed in the\ncentral region of Europe continues to be the priority objective of East-West arms control\ndiscussions.\nFrench Views of the Current CFE Proposals\nAt the CFE, and in response to President Bush's arms\ncontrol proposal that was articulated at the time of the\nThe French government opposes\nNATO Summit, the French have voiced several con-\nPresident Bush's CFE proposals to\ncerns. The first, and foremost, relates to the concep-\ninclude aircraft platforms in the\ntualization of French forces in the context of proposed\nnegotiations.\nreductions for NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. France\nrejects any notion that its forces are to be included in \"NATO cuts,\" and prefers to categorize\nFrench forces as European reserve capabilities-distinct from, but integral to, forces located in\nthe \"central zone\" or roughly the areas of the Federal Republic, plus the Low Countries. (The\nGermans had long sought to resist this French conceptualization of a separation between their\nforces and those of the Federal Republic; but, for the sake of the unity of the Western proposal,\nthe West Germans conceded to placing France in a concentric, if separate, zone from the FRG).\nAt the heart of the French CFE position is their perception of the autonomy of French defense\nforces and probably, more importantly, their fear that through the \"backdoor\" French nuclear\nforces might be compromised. This is partly the reason for the French insistence that aircraft\nplatforms be kept out of the CFE discussions.\nThe proposed inclusion of fixed and rotary-wing aircraft in the conventional forces talks may\nalso be seen as the basis of French objections to the Bush arms control proposals. According\nto a number of French defense analysts, the real reason for the French opposition to the inclusion\nof conventional aircraft platforms in the CFE is far more complex than just an apprehension\nabout the prospect of compromising French na-\nThe much-vaunted French consensus on\ntional nuclear assets. Allegedly, it relates to\nfears that inclusion of aircraft in the CFE will\nnuclear forces is more fragile than it\noccasion debate in France over the role of French\nappears. In fact, it extends primarily to\nFrench strategic systems; support for\ntactical nuclear forces themselves, and perhaps\ntactical nuclear systems is tenous.\ncontribute to a fracturing of the much discussed,\nbut little understood, French defense consensus.\n30\nTable I\nOpinion Poll: European Views on Defense *\nFrance\nGreat Britain\nItaly\nFRG\nIn taking account of the International and\neconomic situation, do you think the country\nshould:\nIncrease military spending.\n**(9) 5\n(17) 9\n(8) 6\n(4) 2\nMaintain the present level.\n(45) 43\n(49) 54\n(22) 19\n(39) 36\nReduce military spending.\n(35) 46\n(27) 31\n(62) 70\nNo opinion.\n(11) 6\n(7) 7\n(7) 5\n(1) 2\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis\n(57) 61\nThe U.K. and France have their own nuclear\nweapons. Personally, would you prefer to see\nthese countries:\n31\nContinue the enhancement of the\nnuclear weapons.\n10\n4\n1\n2\nLeave things as they are.\n33\n37\n7\n23\nReduce the importance of nuclear\nweapons.\n28\n27.\n20\n28\nRenounce nuclear weapons.\n24\n26\n69\n46\nNo opinion.\n6\n6\n3\n0\nTo ensure their defense the majority of Western\nEuropean countries are linked to the United\nStates through NATO. Do you believe that Western\nEurope should:\nMaintain their military relations with\nthe United States within NATO.\n(26) 27\n(41) 43\n(19) 29\n(54) 56\nBuild a common European defense, independent\nfrom the United States within NATO,\n(35) 37\n(23) 23\n(38) 42\n(19) 26\nAssume the entire responsibility for its own\n1 May. 30 June 1989\ndefense.\n(20) 21\n(26) 23\n(31) 27\n(25) 17\nNo opinion.\n(20) 15\n(10) 11\n(12) 1\n(2) 1\nThis poll was conducted in 1989 by the OPTEN Institute, in cooperation with the U.K.'s ICM, Italy's ASM, and West Germany's Marplan. The survey was based on 1054 French\nrespondents, 1406 British, 1860 Italian, and 1801 West German. Respondents were all 18 or older.\n.. Numbers in parentheses represent results from the 1987 poll.\nOpinion Poll: European Views on Defense (continued)\nFrance\nGreat-Britain\nItaly\nFRG\nIf there were a common European defense,\nIndependent from the U.S. and NATO, which of the\nthree possibilities In your opinion, would be\nthe major desirable?\nUse the existing nuclear weapons of Great Britain\nand France as a foundation for a European nuclear\ndefense, but without the participation of the\nother countries in their development or in\ndetermining how they are to be employed.\n(8) 11\n(13) 18\n(3) 1\n(12) 30\nBuild a common European nuclear defense capability\nwith all countries that would like to participate\nin the development and use of nuclear weapons.\n(35) 36\n(35) 30\n(14) 11\n(14) 21\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis\nBuild a common European defense withoutnuclear\nweapons and reinforce conventional weapons.\n(25) 33\n(35) 37\n(70) 67\n(29) 46\nNo opinion.\n(31) 21\n(17) 16\n(13) 20\n(46) 4\n32\nIf the military threat of the USSR diminishes,\ndo you believe that Western European countries must:\nReduce their defense effort in the same\nproportions.\n34\n43\n59\n66\nMaintain a precautionary defense effort at\nthe same level that now exists.\n54\n48\n31\n33\nNo opinion.\n12\n9\n9\n1\nDo you believe that the leader of the USSR,\nMikhall Gorbachev, truly believes In arms control?\nYes\n41\n(31) 74\n65\n(31) 76\nNo\n36\n(57) 12\n18\n(68) 23\nNo opinion\n23\n(12) 15\n17\n(1) 1\nDo you feel that the U.S. President, George Bush,\ntruly believes In arms control?\n1 May 30 June 1989\nYes\n29\n(35) 38\n36\n(3) 55\nNo\n38\n(52) 27\n27\n(69) 42\nNo opinion\n33\n(13) 35\n37\n(1) 3\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nIn speaking with numerous French government officials and defense analysts, it is clear that the\nmuch-vaunted French defense consensus is more fragile than we in the United States understand.\nWhile there is great support for the French deployment of strategic submarine forces in the\ncontext of the East-West deterrence calculus, there is less and less support for the deployment\nof shorter-range nuclear weapons systems. This results from a diminished threat perception of\nthe Soviet Union, but also because of a general abhorrence of \"nuclear warfighting\" concepts-\nand, at the same time, a renewed interest in environmental concerns. Several recent public\nopinion polls confirm the tenuous state of the French defense consensus. When asked, for\nexample, if they thought France should continue to develop its nuclear armament systems, only\n10% of Frenchmen responded favorably, while 33% favored the status quo (no modernization,\nbut deployment of existing capabilities ); 28% thought that less importance should be placed on\nFrench nuclear weapons development; and, 24% said that they thought that France should\nrenounce, altogether, its nuclear capability. These results parallel those of a televised national\nsurvey (on French channel AN 2 on May 31, 1989) that found, in response to a question on\nFrench deterrent forces, a majority (52%) still favored the deployment of strategic nuclear\nweapons at present levels, but a growing minority (34%) favored renunciation of all French\nnuclear weapons. (Fourteen percent of those polled had no opinion.) More surprising, perhaps,\nwere the French responses to the question (published in L' Express, on June 9, 1989) of whether\nFrance should use its nuclear weapons to defend French territory. Fully 56% of the respondents\nstated that, in case of the entry of Soviet troops in France, the Government should \"negotiate\"\nand offer no armed resistance. (The accompanying Table I highlights French (and related\nEuropean) responses to the L' Express poll.) In light of these trends in the public perception of\nthe acceptability of nuclear force deployments in France, and against a diminished perception\nof a Soviet threat- 41% of the French sincerely believe that Mikhail Gorbachev wants to lower\nthe level of armaments in Europe, as opposed to 29% who believe that President Bush is sincere\nin this objective- and a growing desire to have the French government spend less money on\ndefense and more on education and health care, the French may seek to use the arms control\nnegotiations at Vienna to achieve defense economies in programs that are too costly. Indeed,\nin the French view, it is this motivation that drives the American CFE proposal. French security\nanalysts have observed that the Bush proposal to include aircraft, albeit in a second round\nnegotiation, may be the result of a considered American decision to withdraw several aircraft\nwings from Europe for budgetary or political reasons, such as the Italian opposition to the siting\nof the U.S. 401st F-16 squadron on Italian soil. At any rate, French interests at the CFE are\nclearly related to future force structure planning, the legitimacy of which could be placed in\nquestion if NATO's capacity to effect a credible forward defense is eroded by the arms reduction\nregime agreed to at the CFE.\n33\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis\n1 May 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nTable II: French Views of the CFE Proposals' Limitations\nNATO\nWARSAW PACT\nCurrent Total1\nProposed Limits\nProposed Limits\nUnilateral\nCurrent Total1\nReductions\nUnited States Troops\n317,000\n275,000\nSoviet Troops\n(2)\n240,000\n600,000³\nNumber of those troops sta-\ntioned in East Germany, Hun-\ngary, and\nCzechoslovakia\n50,000\nTanks\n16,364\n20,000\n20,000\n10,000 (4)\n59,470\nOther armored vehicles\n40,814\n28,000\n28,000\n70,330\nArtillery pieces (5)\n14,458\n16,500\n24,000\n8,500\n71,560\nAircraft\n4,077\n3,400 (6)\n1,500\n800\n7,876\nAttack Helicopters\n2,519\n2,140 (6)\n2,785\n1. The totals indicated here are those that each alliance announced last fail for its own forces. Part of the differences can be attributed to how the\ncategories are defined: thus, the Warsaw Pact credits NATO with 7130 attack aircraft and 5270 helicopters: however, the West recognizes only\n4077 and 2519. repectively. The numbers indicated for NATO include the French forces.\n2. The Soviet Union has not yet announced limits that would be imposed on its own troops outside its frontiers in Europe: the total of Warsaw Pact\nforces from the Atlantic to the Urais would be limited to 1,350,000 men.\n3. This number is obtained from the Bush communiqué, but has not been confirmed by Moscow, which has announced the total of its overall\nstrength west of the Urais (i.e. including the European part of the Soviet Union): to be 2,458,000 men.\n4. These will be retired from the Soviet Anny west of the Urais by 1991. included in this number are 5000 tanks which must be removed from\nEast Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. These numbers should be added to the unilateral reductions announced by Soviet allies.\n5. NATO considers all artillery pieces larger than 100mm as \"heavy\" artillery. The Warsaw Pact includes in this category all cannons greater than\n75mm and mortars larger than 50mm.\n6. These limits have been established as part of the 15% reduction announced by President Bush of the numbers of planes and helicopters\nrecognized by NATO.\nSource: Le Monde, May 31, 1989.\n34\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nAs elsewhere in Western Europe, there are differences in perception among French policy\nofficials and defense analysts regarding the American CFE proposal. (See Table II) While it\nappears that officials in the Defense Ministry and some in the Foreign Ministry are adamantly\nopposed to the inclusion of aircraft and the proposed reduction of American troops, the office\nof the Prime Minister and the President's advisors appear more willing to accept the U.S.\npropositions. However, they caution that there are, restrictions on their support, enjoining that\ntroop and aircraft reductions should only be considered after reductions are implemented in the\nthree categories of tanks, artillery and armored vehicles. Both the Prime Minister's defense\nadvisor and members of the Defense Ministry are leery of negotiations on combat helicopters,\ngiven that this is one area in which they believe that the West has a real advantage; but more\nthan this, such capabilities are projected to form the backbone of future Western force postures\nunder a CFE regime that inevitably will place a premium on highly mobile, and ready force\nstructures. This analysis notwithstanding, it appears that the French military has not yet begun\na systematic assessment of what the various CFE proposals might mean for French forces,\nalthough this is doubtless a priority, especially in the context of preliminary studies for the\npreparation of the new \"Programme Loi\" (the French five year budget guidance plan) for the\nyears 1992-1997. The question that the French are struggling to deal with is how, within the\ncontext of the CFE proposal, the reductions are going to be carried out. The French still appear\nto be resisting the Western position on the proportion of reductions within the Atlantic Alliance\ncountries. The French also make clear that the budgetary measures that were announced by the\nDefense Council in early June are separate from the CFE, and should not be construed as part\nof French arms control obligations. To do so, the French fear, will be to give the West an impetus\nfor a CFE agreement before the Allies have worked out how the reductions should be\napportioned\nDefense Austerity and the 1992 Budget Guidance\nIn preparing for development of the 1992-97\nThe revision of France's \"Programme Loi\"\n\"Programme Loi\", the Prime Minister's office\nhas lowered equipment procurement fund-\nis sponsoring a series of cost analysis studies\ning. Given that no nuclear programs are to\ndesigned to examine the criteria by which\nbe cancelled, this has resulted in the stretch-\nFrench procurement decisions are being\ning out of major French conventional\nmade. The stated purpose of these studies is\nprograms, including the Rafale aircraft, the\nto identify which programs are experiencing\nPAH-2 helicopter, and the Charles de Gaulle\ncost overruns and why; to evaluate the ration-\ncarrier.\nale for specific weapons procurements; and,\nto make policy recommendations to avoid bad acquisition decisions. Reminiscent of the U.S.\n35\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nDefense Department's quantitative studies methodology emphasized during Robert\nMcNamara's tenure as Secretary, the current French Defense Minister is opposed to this\napproach to defense decision-making. For example, with regard to the highly costly Rafale\naircraft program, Chevènement's view is that it is a politically important program which, even\nif too expensive, cannot at this late date be cancelled. Likewise, the Hadès program is regarded\nby Chevènement and his staff to be important politically (to shore up West German resolve in\nthe defense area); even though September 1989 is said to be the cross-over point (after which\nit would no longer make any sense to cancel the program), he is pressing for a systems\ndeployment decision this July at the next Defense Council meeting. (At that time, it is expected\nthat Mitterrand will support a reduced deployment decision of Hadès launchers, stretched out\nto the 1995-96 timeframe-incidentally, the same time-frame during which NATO Lance\nsystems would become obsolete.)\nThe Rocard-Chevènement controversy dates back to their long association in the Socialist party\nand reflects their respective perceptions, which differ, on the future role of France in Europe.\nRocard is much more European-oriented than is Chevènement, who is a French nationalist.\nRocard began his political career in the Algerian independence movement; Chevènement\nopposed Algerian independence on the basis of its implications for the French colonial empire.\nThus, whereas Rocard is seeking to support the American CFE proposals in the hope of\nnegotiating a successful European arms control regime, Chevènement is concerned about the\neffects that the proposed cuts would have upon the French national defense posture. While he\nis \"leftist\" on domestic economic issues, Chevènement is of the Gaullist school in foreign and\nnational security policy. However, he is isolated in the Socialist Party, which is further to the\n\"left\" on arms control and defense issues than even the more \"centrist\" positions of Rocard and\nMitterrand. Thus, in arbitrating the defense budget controversy between the Defense and Prime\nMinisters' positions, the President had to consider his Socialist Party constituency and the weight\nof public opinion-which, as noted above, is turning away from support for higher defense\nspending and the modernization of systems to emphasize highly sophisticated and costly\nweapons technologies.\nAs a result, in a revision of the spending levels for the next two years in the 1987-1991\n\"Programme Loi\" (an exercise that had been widely anticipated by French defense experts given\nthe rate of inflation over the last three years and the rising costs of weapons procurements), the\nFrench President opted to lower equipment procurement funding, in line with the suggestions\nof Finance Minister Pierre Bergovoy. Together with the Prime Minister, Bergovoy had sought\nto reduce defense spending by several percentage points (in relation to the Produit Interier Brut\nMarchand (PIBM), which corresponds to all the gross values of the domestic commercial\n36\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nproduct (GDP), including the Value Added Tax). Thus, for 1990, the French government\nlowered its acquisition and equipment budgets to FFr 103.1 billion ($15.6 billion in 1990's\nfigures), down from the \"Programme Loi's\" provision of FFr 100.1 billion (or $15.19 billion)\nin 1986 francs. In 1991, equipment funding is projected to be FFr 107.2 billion ($15.48 billion),\ndown from FFr 106.2 billion (or $15.33 billion) in 1986 francs. Using the projected franc value\nfor 1990, as compared to the \"Programme Loi's\". original reliance on the value of the 1986\nFranc, the Socialist's revised spending plan for military equipment in the year 1990 will amount\nto a less than 3% increase in credits (as compared to the 5% that was originally projected and\nthe 6% that Chevènement said was necessary to sustain all current procurement acquisitions).\nFor 1991, credits will rise to 3.9%. Over the following two-year period, 1992 and 1993,\nequipment credits are expected to reach a real annual growth rate of 4%, resulting, over the\nfour-year period, in a projected savings of approximately FFr 40-45 billion ($6.04-7.0 billion).\nIn announcing the proposed cuts, Mitterrand stated that they would not, however, affect France's\nability to carry out the four primary defense missions of nuclear deterrence, territorial defense,\nEuropean defense, and out-of-area force projection.\nYet, in practical terms, this means that without the outright cancellation of any currently planned\nnuclear forces programs (as noted above), major conventional weapons programs will have to\nbe delayed or stretched out. The accompanying Table III portrays the major equipment\nprograms that form French procurement priorities, to date. The most vulnerable program in this\nregard is the controversial Charles de Gaulle, the Navy's nuclear-powered aircraft carrier\nproject. By the President's decision the program will be delayed, with its entry into service\npushed back to 1998 from 1996. Similarly the new carrier's battle group will also be affected,\nwith the Atlantique, a maritime surveillance aircraft program, targeted for reductions. Three\n(instead of five) will now be purchased in the first year. The construction program for\nsurveillance frigates will be maintained; but the plans for development of a \"light\" frigate will\nbe delayed by one year. Likewise the fifth, sixth and seventh Améthyste-class nuclear attack\nsubmarines will be delayed, on average, for eight months; and Air Force orders of the Mirage\n2000 will be reduced from 33 per year to 28. For now, the main battle tank program, Leclerc,\nis being continued, but on a reduced basis order of 1050 (down from 1400).\nIt is still possible that this program may be cancelled if cost overruns continue and, more\nimportantly, if the Army is restructured to take account of possible CFE outcomes. As was\nreported in IFPA's DNA Quarterly Report for the months of January through April, 1989, the\nDefense Ministry is studying proposals for the reorganization of French conventional ground\nforces. Under the direction of Jean-François Delpech of the Center for the Study of Relations\nbetween Technologies and Strategies (CREST), the MOD-sponsored study is reported to be\n37\nTable III:\nMajor French Equipment Procurements Affected by Austerity Measures\nNuclear Deterrence\nCentral-European Defense\nOut-of-Area\nNew\nS4 Missile\nRafale\nFranco-German\nLeclerc Tank\nHadès\nCharles de\nNaval Aviation\nGeneration\nAttack\nPrestrategic\nGaulle Nuclear\nGroup\nSNLE-NG\nHelicopter\nMissile\nAircraft Carrier\nBallistic\n(PAH-2)\nSubmarine\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis\n(Rafale?)\nCost of Program:\nCost of Program:\nCost of Program:\nCost of Program:\nCost of Program:\nCost of Program:\nCost of Program:\n$12.07 billion\n$5.28 billion\n$22.02 billion\nCost of Program:\n$6.79 billion\n$2.26 billion\n$3.02 billion\n$3.02 billion\n38\n$9.05 billion\nNumber planned:\nNumber planned:\nNumber systems:\nNumber planned:\nNumber planned:\nNumber planned:\nNumber Planned:\n6\n18 with spares\n336, of which 86\nNumber systems:\n1050\n40-45\n2\n4 wings?\nare for naval\n427, of which\nProjected year of\nProjected year of\naviation\n215 are for\nFirst deliverles:\nFirst deliverles:\nYear of Service\nYear of Delivery:\ndeployment:\ndeployment:\nFrance\n1991, (110 per\n1992\nentry: 1996\n2002\n1994\n??\nFirst year for\nyear)\ndeployment:\nFirst deliverles:\nDelayed: 1995-6\nDelayed: 1998\nDelayed: ?\nDelayed: 1995?\nContractors:\n1996\n1997\nDelayed: ?\nAérospatiale\nContractors:\nContractors:\nContractors:\n(principal)\nDelayed:\nDelayed: 2000\nContractors:\nAérospatiale\nDirection des\nDCN of Cher-\nEnd of 1996\nGIAT (principal),\n(principal), CEA,\nConstructions\nbourg\nContractors:\nSagem, Creusot-\nSagem\nNavales Brest\n(principal),\nContractors:\nAérospatlate\nLoire\n(principal), CEA,\nCreusot-Loire,\nDassault (prin-\nand MBB (prin-\nFramatome,\nAlsthom, CEA\ncipal). Snecma,\ncipals),\nThomson,\nThomson,\nTurboméca,\nCreusot-Loire\n+ M4 and M45\nMatra, and\nMTU, Thomson\nmissiles:\nothers\napproximately\n1 May 30 June 1989\n$9.05 billion\n+M5 missiles\n(after the year\n2000):\n$12.07 billion\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nconsidering a reduction in the number of French Army Corps from three to two, with the\nelimination of the General Staff Corps headquartered in Metz. The operational structure of the\nFrench Army differs from the delineation of French territorial districts and has been in effect\nsince 1984. The First Army Corps in Metz is composed, principally, of two armored divisions,\none infantry division, and one division recruited from the infantry school in Montpellier, with\na total strength of 33,000 men. The Second Army Corps is essentially composed of three\narmored divisions stationed across the Rhine and has, in total, 42,000 men. The Third Army\nCorps, headquartered in Lille since 1984, is composed of 30,000 men forming one armored\ndivision, one infantry division, and a division recruited from the tank school in Saumur. The\nproposed elimination of the Metz Army Corps will place into question current operational\ndoctrine and will force a fundamental reassessment of the roles and missions of French\nconventional ground forces, especially in a CFE environment.\nThe European Elections and the National Service Debate\nDefense budget issues were insinuated\nIn the European Parliament elections, the com-\ninto the campaign for the European Par-\nbined French right (RPR and UDF) captured\nliamentary elections when former French\n26% of the French vote, compared to the\nPresident Valery Giscard d'Estaing (who\nSocialists' 22%. Remarkably, the French\nis running for the presidency of the\nGreens gained 10.6% of the vote. A significant\nEuropean Parliament, and headed the list\nissue during the EP campaign in France was the\nof the unified right, composed of the Rally\nsubject of national service, with former Presi-\nfor the Republican (RPR) and Union of\ndent Giscard d'Estaing calling for an end to\nthe Democratic Center (UDC) Parties)\nconscription and the creation of a professional\nwent on national television (May 29,\narmy.\n1989) and proclaimed his support for the\nend of conscription and the creation of a\nprofessional army. Giscard, whose center-right coalition captured 29% of the vote for a gain\nof 26 of France's 81 seats in the European Parliament, based his recommendation for a\nprofessional army on the assumption that if the CFE negotiations are successful the French\nconventional force structure will be profoundly affected, placing a premium on highly-trained\nbut smaller force structures. Moreover, according to the former French President, \"a profes-\nsional army would contribute to the objective of European defense unity and would facilitate,\nmore easily, cooperation between France and its European partners in areas such as language\ntraining and development of a familiarity with their armament and strategic concepts.\" The\nformer President also expressed the hope that by moving away from the conscript system the\nsocial injustice created by \"middle and upper class\" youth exemptions would be rectified, and\n39\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nthe Armed Forces would have the luxury of accepting only the most qualified volunteers. Within\nFrance, public opinion, by and large, appears to be opposed to the creation of a professional\narmy and, thus far, only the right-wing National Front Party, which won 12% of the French\nEuropean Parliamentary vote, has endorsed the concept in its program platform. According to\nthe ideas of National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, the French concept of a professional army\nshould encompass service by both males and females and be based on a voluntary period of\nservice of six to nine months. The leadership of the political center in France-which includes\nGiscard, but is not limited to him-is in disagreement over whether France alone should proceed\non this basis. Raymond Barre, for example, has stated that this, \"is a complex idea which needs\ngreat thought.\" Pierre Méhaignerie, president of \"centrist\" Democratic Socialist Grouping,\ngreeted the proposition with caution, stating that the idea should be discussed with France's\nEuropean partners.\nBeyond the expense that would be associated with the creation of a professional army force,\nFrench opponents of the Giscard concept fear that declining demographic trends especially\nevident in the years between 1992 and 2002, as depicted in the accompanying graphic, would\ncreate a situation in which available slots would outnumber the high quality volunteers. More\nthan this, however, conscription is viewed by most French defense analysts and policy officials\nas providing the basis of French national support for French defense policies. Thus, in a coalition\nof the \"right\" (the Rally For the Republic Party) and the \"left\" (the ruling Socialist, the\nCommunists, and the leader of the Greens Antoine Waechter) proponents of the national service\nconcept opposed the creation of a French professional army, although each of the \"leftist\" parties\ntied their respective opposition to several conditions. For the Socialists, opposition is strong,\nwith the possible exception of former Defense Minister Charles Hernu, who bases his support\non the complexity of emerging weapons technologies and the requirements of a common\nEuropean defense. The French Communist Party opposes the professional army concept but\nproposes a limit of six months on conscripted military service, while the French Greens favor\nnational service if a conscriptee has the option of choosing between military or civil service.\nThe most hostile opposition to the Giscard proposal came from Jacques Chirac's RPR, stating\nthat a \"professional army could lead to an authoritarian state,\" and, that, \"national service forms\nthe basis of French national defense and democracy.\"\nThe furor created by the Giscard proposals did not affect his prospects (as noted above), nor\nthose of the \"center-right\" in the European Parliamentary elections. Giscard's unified list of\nRPR and UDF candidates won 26 of France's 81 Parliamentary seats, while the ruling Socialist\nParty attracted only 24% of the vote or 22 seats. The \"Centrist\" list under the immensely popular\nSimone Veil, a former President of the European Parliament, won only 8% of the votes for 7\n40\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nAnticipated National Service Manpower Resources for the Next 20 Years,\n(x1000)\n450\n400\n1\n350\n2\n300\nPersonnel Strength\n3\n4\n250\n200\n150\n5\n100\n50\n0\n1986\n1967\n1988\n1989\n1990\n1991\n1992\n1993\n1994\n1995\n1996\n1997\n1993\n1999\n2000\n2001\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n6\nKey:\n1) average births, 1966-1985 (source: National Institute of Statistics and Economics Studies); 2) real average manpower resources at census time B 396,500; 3) anticipated\nmanpower resources through draft (working back from current data) average - 275,000; 4) useful manpower resources per birth year; 5) useful manpower resources per\nbirth year; 6) birth year class (actual birth year 20 years earlier)\nSource: Défense Nationale, March 1989, p. 24.\nseats; while Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front Party emerged with 12% of the vote or 10 seats.\nThe French Communist Party attracted 8% of voter support, making for 7 seats, while the big\nwinner, the Greens won 11% of the vote for 9 Parliamentary seats. Even as voter turnout (at\n50%) in France was the second lowest in the history of the Fifth Republic (surpassed only by\nthe low turnout during the referendum on New Caledonia last year), the clear winners in this\nelection were the Greens and Prime Minister Rocard. Rocard's aspirations for leadership of the\nSocialist Party (after Mitterrand exits the French political scene) is unlikely to be challenged by\nformer Prime Minister Laurent Fabius, as the Socialist Party's showing in the election under\nFabius' leadership is widely regarded as a political failure, and probably the end of his hopes to\n41\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Anlaysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nlead the French Socialist party. What these results mean for French defense policy may be\nprofoundly important, although caution must be exercised in analyzing these election results\nsince they do not affect significantly French national interests and hence they may not reflect\nprecisely future French voting patterns. Election of the Greens indicates, further, a loosening\nof the French defense consensus and the virtually unchallenged position of nuclear power in\nFrench defense and energy policies. Clearly, the Chernobyl disaster, coupled with a diminished\nthreat perception of the Soviet Union, has raised public sensitivity to the possibility of opposing\nestablished policy on French nuclear issues. In coming months the fragility of the French\ndefense consensus is likely to be further tested in the context of the French Parliamentary debates\non national planning and defense spending.\n42\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nThe Netherlands\nFall of the Lubbers Government and\nDutch SNF Perspectives leading to the NATO Summit\nThe centrally important event in the\nThe fall of the Dutch Government on May 2 was not\nDutch defense debate during the\nrelated to defense issues, but rather disagreements\nsecond quarter of 1989 was the un-\nwithin the coalition and, specifically, within the\nexpected fall of the Christian\nLiberal party-raising the prospect of a center-left\nDemocratic-Liberal (CDA-VVD)\ncoalition after the September elections.\ngovernment on May 2. Prime Min-\nister Ruud Lubbers' government,\nwhich had been the longest-lived postwar coalition (outlasting by five years the 26-month\naverage life of postwar Dutch governments), ultimately fell not over issues directly related to\ndefense and security, but rather over questions relating to the funding of the government's\nenvironmental plans. The smaller partner in the coalition, the People's Party for Freedom and\nDemocracy (VVD, or Liberal party), perceived the issue-mistakenly, it would appear-as one\nupon which it might effectively reassert its own identity and agenda within the governing\ncoalition, while simultaneously resolving internal party leadership questions. In any event, the\nLiberal's hardline stand on the environment issue had the effect of bringing about the\ngovernment's resignation in the midst of NATO consultations on the contentious subject of SNF\nmodernization leading up to the May summit of NATO heads of government.\nAs a result, Dutch influence in bringing about a NATO compromise on SNF was perhaps not\nfelt to the degree it might have been in the leadup to the summit. During this period, Dutch\nofficials continued to oppose calls for immediate negotiations on SNF, emanating chiefly from\nthe Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium. So high was the importance attached to this\nissue that Prime Minister Lubbers kept a scheduled meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl on\nthe afternoon of May 3rd, even though it was only the preceding morning that he had submitted\nthe Cabinet's resignation to the Dutch head of state, Queen Beatrix. Later reports of the\nLubbers/Kohl meeting indicated that the two had discussed \"party issues\" in advance of elections\nto the European Parliament (both are the leaders of Christian Democratic parties in their\nrespective countries). However, it seems unlikely that Lubbers and Kohl would have avoided\nthe single most important defense policy topic on the agenda during their meeting.\nThe Dutch position on SNF was underscored later in May- and closer to the summit\nmeeting-by Hans van den Broek, the Dutch Foreign Minister and a member of Lubbers' CDA\nparty. Van den Broek, in a speech at The Hague during the visit of Polish Foreign Minister\nTadeusz Olechowski, welcomed Gorbachev's announcement in early May of a unilateral Soviet\n43\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nwithdrawal of 500 Soviet SNF warheads from Warsaw Pact countries. Van den Broek took\nnote, however, of Moscow's continuing numerical advantage in SNF, and characterized\nGorbachev's withdrawal offer as a \"modest step\" against this background. The Dutch Foreign\nMinister indicated that the policy of the Netherlands vis-a-vis Moscow would be \"to continue\nto urge the Soviet Union to bring down unilaterally its 14-fold preponderance in SNF missile\nsystems to the current NATO level.\" Until progress was made along these lines, van den Broek\naverred, \"no realistic basis [will exist] for negotiations on mutual reductions to equal ceilings\nin land-based missiles.\"\nFinally, in the week before the NATO summit, Frits Bolkestein-the Liberal party Defense\nMinister in the CDA/VVD coalition, who will now continue in that position during the caretaker\nperiod leading up to the September general election-became the first Western defense minister\nto visit Hungary. This meeting had been arranged before the fall of the government and, while\nit was carried out in his official capacity as defense minister in the caretaker government,\nBolkestein did not hesitate to utilize the forum provided by his visit to promote the prospects\nof his own party, both in the European elections of early June and the September Dutch general\nelections. Even so, Bolkestein's visit to Budapest was significant, at least in so far as it\nrepresented the lessening of political tensions between East and West immediately before the\nNATO summit. Bolkestein, whose party is strongly Atlanticist, has been seen, since his\naccession to the post of Defense Minister, as sympathetic to U.S. policies and perspectives, and\nhas publicly voiced skepticism regarding the motivations behind Gorbachev's unilateral force\nreduction offers. During his trip to Hungary, Bolkestein did not directly challenge Gorbachev's\nintentions. The purpose of his trip, noted Bolkestein, was \"the awakening of reciprocal trust.\nWe are talking about small steps within the room for maneuver that the two countries are\noffered within their own alliances.\"\nThe Dutch \"Shift Concept\" Reflected in the Summit Communiqué\nIf the fall of the Dutch government limited the ability of Dutch officials to effect a compromise\nbetween contending perspectives on SNF\nmodernization and arms control before the\nDutch perspectives on SNF were largely\nsummit convened, the same cannot be said for\nreflected in the final language of the NATO\nthe outcome of the meeting. The Communiqué\nSummit Communiqué. This perspective in-\nissued by the assembled heads of government\ncluded support for modernized, longer-\nis clearly marked by the presence of major\nrange SNF at lower levels, together with an\nelements of the Dutch position defined and\nopening to SNF modernization after an\narticulated in the months leading up to the May\nagreement reducing conventional force\nmeeting. Primary elements in this position, as\nasymmetries.\n44\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nnoted in previous IFPA updates, have been the following:\nSupport for a \"phased approach\" to SNF modernization, with options at each step for\nupdating SNF systems, for reducing unilaterally shorter-range assets, for restructuring the\nNATO stockpile toward longer-range systems, and (if certain conditions are met) for\npursuing SNF negotiations.\nFirst phase would include allied agreement in principle to keep NATO's nuclear assets \"up\nto date where necessary\", coupled with unilateral cuts in NATO nuclear artillery.\nAt the same time, NATO would call on Soviet Union to reduce unilaterally its own SNF\nforces to the NATO level, at which point NATO would consider SNF negotiations.\nWith this option in mind, priority should be given to the formation of a special NATO\nworking group to consider the specific mechanics of SNF arms control.\nDeeper, negotiated cuts in SNF forces would be tied to progress at the CFE talks, but would\nin no case go to zero. In this phase, SNF negotiations might be directly linked to\nsecond-phase CFE talks.\nPrimary Dutch objective throughout all phases is to \"shift\" the orientation of NATO's SNF\naway from shorter-range capabilities and toward longer-range (400-450 km) systems, while\nreducing overall inventory.\nEach of these points is reflected, to a greater or lesser extent, in the final Communiqué issued\nby the NATO heads of government. The \"phased approach,\" an essential component in the\nDutch \"shift\" concept (to move the NATO SNF stockpile in the direction of fewer, longer-range\nsystems) is not mentioned directly; however, the recent steps taken by NATO (since the\nMontebello agreement) to reduce unilaterally its SNF arsenal is once again noted by the\nCommuniqué. Special emphasis is placed on the fact that NATO's SNF stockpile \"has been\nreduced by over one-third to its lowest level in 20 years.\" Moreover, the Communiqué notes,\n\"Updating where necessary of (NATO's) substrategic systems would result in further reduc-\ntions\"--a clear and concise statement of acceptance of the Dutch \"shift\" concept.\nIn line with the long-standing Dutch position, the Summit Communiqué also calls upon the\nSoviet Union \"to reduce unilaterally its short-range missile systems to the current levels within\nthe integrated military structure\"-nearly a word-for-word restatement of van den Broek's\nresponse to Gorbachev's 500-warhead cut (noted above). While such unilateral cuts were not\nestablished as a pre-condition for NATO participation in SNF reduction negotiations, the\nCommuniqué did establish the condition that implementation of a phase I CFE agreement must\nbe \"underway\" before the Alliance would consider it appropriate to enter into such negotiations.\nSuch a position is a reflection of the Dutch position that SNF talks should await the outcome of\n45\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nthe CFE negotiations. Furthermore, Holland's insistence that SNF not be reduced to zero in\nany circumstance-a position also held by the United States and Great Britain-was also\nreflected in the Communique's language. In what was widely reported to be the single most\nimportant phrase in clinching a consensus position [and agreement between the U.S. and West\nGerman delegations], the following language-thought to have been suggested by van den\nBroek, who chaired the Foreign Minister's meeting-was suggested:\nOnce implementation of such an agreement [the CFE talks] is underway, the United States,\nin consultation with the allies concerned, is prepared to enter into negotiations to achieve a\npartial reduction of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile forces of shorter range\nto equal and verifiable levels. (Emphasis in original)\nThe key phrase in this language referred to \"partial\" reductions, which seemed to satisfy the\nDutch, U.S., and U.K. requirement that a \"Third Zero\" be clearly ruled out. (Although, as\ndiscussed in the sections of this report dealing with the Federal Republic and Belgium,\nperceptions that a \"Third Zero\" opption had been foreclosed are not universally shared.)\nAs for the potential \"updating\" of existing SNF assets, there has been greater discussion in the\nNetherlands following the NATO Summit-as there has been in other countries examined in\nthis Report-of nuclear-tipped stand-off systems, and most particularly a tactical air-to-surface\nmissile (TASM) option, which many believe would be less controversial to deploy than new\nground-based systems. Yet, the emergence of broader support for TASM by leading Dutch\ndefense planners could result in friction between the partners in a future center-left governing\ncoalition in Holland-which, as discussed below, is a possible, and perhaps probable, successor\nto the fallen center-right coalition. At least two points of division between CDA and Dutch\nLabor (PvdA) leaders may be anticipated on the TASM issue. First, while CDA leaders\nreaffirmed after the INF Treaty their commitment to a continuing nuclear role for Holland's\nF-16s, and have openly endorsed-as have Liberal and D'66 party leaders-the deployment by\nNATO of air-launched stand-off weapons, PvdA leaders have continued to press in the recent\npast for a substantial reduction (if not elimination) of the nuclear tasks performed by Dutch\nforces, including that assigned to the F-16s. PvdA spokesmen have remained, studiously\nnoncommittal during the current SNF debate on the question of stand-off systems, be they air-\nor sea-launched. Secondly, and more importantly, Labor spokesmen-similar to their counter-\nparts in other NATO European countries-have become increasingly critical of TASM-like\nsystems (with ranges nearing, and possibly exceeding, the 500-kilometer threshold) as violating\nthe \"spirit\" of the INF Treaty, even though the accord deals solely with the elimination of\nground-based missile systems. It remains to be seen whether or not Labor's desire to enter the\nnext coalition-together with Labor leader Wim Kok's rather pragmatic approach to defense\n46\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\npolicy (compared to that of his predecessors)-will be strong enough to move the PvdA closer\nto the CDA position on TASM and SNF in general.\nImpact of the Government's Fall on Procurement\nFor the moment, the fall of the Government\nThe fall of the Government has resulted in\nin May has had a direct and immediate\ndelays in a number of major procurement\nimpact on Dutch defense procurement\nprograms. Though Prime Minister Lubbers\nplans. A number of key procurement\nhas appealed for movement on key programs\nprojects, detailed in earlier IFPA quarterly\nsuch as the Leopard I tank modernization, it is\nupdates, have now been deferred until a\nunlikely that decisions on major procurement\nnew government is assembled-a process\nprojects will be made before a new government\nthat could take some weeks (and perhaps\nis assembled.\nmonths) following the general elections on\n6 September. Significant procurement\nprojects and decisions that have been put off include:\nModernization plans for the Dutch Army's 468 Leopard I tanks\nA system decision on an attack helicopter to fill the Army's requirement for 50 platforms\n(a decision was to have been forthcoming in November, but is now not expected until early\n1990)\nA decision on whether or not to purchase replacements for peacetime attrition losses of F-16s\nThe purchase of four Patriot air defense systems\nThe acquisition of the FIST Verdac fire control system for the Army\nA decision on Dutch participation in the NATO Helicopter for the Nineties (NH-90) project\nin order to provide an ASW helicopter for the Dutch Navy\nThe previously-announced decision to procure 14 Crotale SAM systems to provide air\ndefense for seven Dutch air bases\nThe Defense Committee of the Dutch parliament informed Lubbers' caretaker government on\nMay 11 that it would suspend consideration of major defense procurement projects until after\nthe forthcoming elections. Prime Minister Lubbers is reported to have replied in a letter to the\nCommittee that the delay of parliamentary review of these projects could result in contractual\ndifficulties, the need to reopen negotiations with contractors, and increased costs. This is\nparticularly the case with respect to three major procurement decisions which are at a crucial\ndecision stage, and for which specific funding requests had previously been submitted:\n47\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nThe Leopard I modernization ($560 million)\nThe Crotale SAM system ($132 million)\nThe purchase of the Thomson-CSF ATILA field artillery command and control system ($79\nmillion)\nA significant result of the government's fall with respect to defense procurement was the\nannouncement by State Secretary for Defense Jan van Houwelingen of his intention to leave\noffice following the September elections. Van Houwelingen, a member of the CDA, has held\nthe number two slot at the Dutch Ministry of Defense for eight years. In this capacity, he has\nchampioned greater European defense cooperation, and was largely responsible for the\nrevitalization of the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) as a major focus of defense\nequipment collaboration among the major NATO European defense industrial countries,\nincluding France. Van Houwelingen has frequently expressed a preference for European\ncollaborative projects over similar projects involving the participation of U.S. firms. This has\nparticularly been the case of late with respect to two major recent or on-the-horizon procurement\ndecisions, namely, (1) a forthcoming decision on which attack helicopter system to choose for\nthe Army's air support requirement, and (2) the recent choice of Crotale air defense systems for\nair base defense over the U.S.-produced pedestal-mounted Stinger and the U.S./West German\nADATS system.\nIn a recent interview, van Houwelingen has expressed the view that a decision on an attack\nhelicopter system may be forthcoming by September-although, as noted above, most observes\npoint to January as a more likely target date. Van Houwelingen's preference is for the European\nLight Attack Helicopter (LAH), also referred to as the Tonal. Under discussion for two years\nbetween the Dutch, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain, there is as yet no agreement among\nthe partners on performance requirements for the LAH. As a result, some reports suggest\nthat-despite van Houwelingen's optimism-the Dutch will abandon participation in the LAH\nsometime in July, unless two conditions are agreed to by the other partners: (1) the LAH must\nbe capable of carrying the TRIGAT antiarmor missile; and (2) a firm timetable must be agreed\nto for production. The Hague is concerned that the four partners in the LAH are behind the\ngame in the procurement of modern attack helicopters. Simultaneously, reports suggest that the\nmajor Dutch aerospace firm, Fokker-the industry representative of the Netherlands in the LAH\nproject-is now pressuring The Hague to drop plans for participation in LAH in favor of the\nprocurement of Italy's A-129 Mangusta. Fokker's motivation is reputedly a hoped-for sale of\nits new F-100 commercial transport planes to the Italian national airline. It is thought, therefore,\nthat the way to this order could be smoothed by the Dutch Army's purchase of Italian helicopters.\n48\ninstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\nI May 1909\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nWhether or not this option materializes is yet to be seen. Other key contenders for the Dutch\nattack helicopter requirement is the \"Euro-Apache\" now being offered by McDonnell Douglas\nto the Dutch and other Allied countries, and the French-West German future helicopter project\ncurrently known as PAH/HAC. For his part, van Houwelingen has said that he is \"not exactly\nsure what the Euro-Apache is.\" He continues to express the conviction that the LAH project\nwill move ahead following what he anticipates will be the U.K.'s decision to continue with the\nprogram. In any event, notes van Houwelingen, \"the helicopter is only the platform. What\nreally matters are the weapons systems\"-a reflection of the Dutch insistence on TRIGAT\ncapability with whatever platform is selected.\nLate in May, the possibility that Holland might ultimately choose the French-West German\nPAH/HAC option was enhanced by developments in another helicopter arena, the NH-90. The\nNetherlands, currently holding a five percent stake in the utility helicopter program (and\nplanning, as noted above, to utilize the NH-90 in an ASW role with the Royal Navy), was\napproached by the Federal Republic with the request that Holland double its financial commit-\nment to the program (to ten percent). In last September's Defense White Paper, the Dutch\ngovernment had earmarked $287 million for its share of the NH-90 development costs; accepting\nthe West German offer would raise this stake to $574 million. The motivation for the German\noffer was simply a financial one. Recognizing the Hague's increasing doubts over the LAH\nprogram (see above), and given Bonn's continuing inability to commit resources to the NH-90\nproject sufficient to support its own 25% stake in the program, the German government offered\nHolland participation in the PAH program-with no entrance costs-in return for taking over\nan additional 5% stake in the NH-90. In addition to participation in the Franco-German project,\nthe Netherlands would be loaned a number of West German Bo-105 antitank helicopters until\nthe PAH's come into service. Given Dutch concern that, by waiting for the LAH, it is getting\nbehind the game in deployment of a modern attack helicopter, this option will probably receive\nconsiderable support within the Dutch MOD. However, the greatly increased outlays (relative-\nly) required to accept the West German offer would require review by the Dutch parliament-\nwhich seems unlikely to happen before a new government is formed. At the moment, no time\nlimit has been set on the West German offer.\nIn another significant area of procurement, reports during the quarter suggested that Dutch Air\nForce officials are now formulating requirements for a planned mid-life update (MLU) of\nHolland's F-16 fleet. The Netherlands, as the single largest European purchaser of the F-16,\nwill have a proportionately larger degree of influence over the MLU program, which it is hoped\nwill be adopted jointly by all European F-16 fleets (in Belgium, Denmark, and Norway in\naddition to the Netherlands). Air Commodore Cees Barendregt, now the Deputy Chief of Plans\n49\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nfor the Royal Netherlands Air Force (and soon to take command of the Dutch Tactical Air\nCommand), has recently stated this objective clearly: \"We hope to be able to agree on a joint\nMLU-suite, based on common core avionics and standard software, with optional loose ends to\nfacilitate individual extras.\"\nKey elements of the MLU proposal, which is to be submitted to the four European F-16 countries\nby General Dynamics at the end of this year, are expected to include radar, computer memory,\nprocessing and database interface capabilities similar to Block 50 F-16 C/D aircraft (the\nEuropean countries fly the F-16 A/B). Other elements anticipated are a digital terrain navigation\nsystem, and database technologies making possible the integration of threat intelligence data\nwith electronic warfare capabilities.\nOwing to the Dutch focus on the effectiveness of ground operations (noted in previous IFPA\nreports on the Netherlands), F-16s are expected (and their pilots are trained) to fulfill two\nmissions-both air superiority/air space control (air-to-air) and ground support (air-to-ground).\nBecause of the need to keep these missions in balance, Dutch planners have shied away from\nthe procurement of systems that in their view would impose intensive training requirements on\none mission only. Thus, even though Dutch F-16s continue to deploy laser-guided bombs that\nrequire remote laser designators (say, from other 2ATAF aircraft or ground-based designators),\nplans for updating these systems to the Maverick self-guided missile have been dropped on the\nargument that training requirements for the new system would orient Air Force operations too\nfar toward the air-to-ground role. Instead, future acquisition plans include the possible purchase\nof a future Modular Stand-Off Weapon (MSOW) and/or the U.S. Direct Airfield Attack\nCombined munition.\nProcurement practices generally in the Netherlands have been subject to increased scrutiny\nduring the second quarter of 1989. With the fall of the government, and the coming campaign\nfor the September general election, it may be that defense procurement will receive even wider\nattention in Holland. Recommendations for improving Dutch procurement processes-which\nhad been developed with the assistance of an external consulting firm-were accepted by the\nNetherlands Defense Council and submitted to Parliament during the quarter. These recom-\nmendations included specific proposals for improving the process in five major areas, including\nclarification of objectives; increased collaboration between the Ministries of Defense and\nEconomic Affairs; clearer definition of accountability, responsibility, tasks, and authority in the\nprocurement process; better coordination of operational requirements and procurement; and the\ncontrol of managerial information. One specific recommendation of note to emerge from this\nreview is the development of a joint task force between the Dutch Economic Affairs and Defense\n50\ninstitute IUI Analys\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nMinistries in order to develop a future strategy for Dutch defense industries, particularly with\nrespect to the coming single European market of 1992.\nProspects for the Next Dutch Government:\nThe European Elections in the Netherlands\nWhether these recommendations are\nThough observers have widely predicted a center-\nput into effect, however, hinges-as\nleft successor to the recently-fallen center-right\nindeed, the prospects of each of the\nDutch government, the European Parliament elec-\nprocurement programs noted above\ntions suggested that the Dutch Labor party's sup-\ndo-on the outcome of the September\nport is slipping, The centrist CDA did well,\ngeneral elections. To the extent that\nsuggesting that it will continue to exert considerable\nthe recent European elections are any\ncontrol over Dutch defense policy.\nindication of how the Dutch elec-\ntorate will shape its next government,\nit may be said that the Dutch Liberal party was ill-advised in bringing down the government by\nstanding firm against the CDA's environmental policies, if it had any intention of remaining in\nthe governing coalition. For the Liberal party fared poorly in the European election, losing two\nof its four seats in the Dutch delegation to the European Parliament (EP), while Lubbers' CDA\ngained two seats, making the CDA the largest single party in the Dutch EP delegation.\nMoreover, the CDA gained 34.6% of the total Dutch vote, which matched its best-ever electoral\nperformance recorded in the last national election (of 1986). At the same time, the opposition\nDutch Labor party (PvdA), unlike a number of other socialist parties across Western Europe\n(but similar to the Belgian Socialists), fared poorly in the Dutch European poll. The PvdA\nactually lost one of its seats in the Dutch delegation of 25, falling from nine to eight members\nwith a vote of only 30.7%-compared to its vote of 33.3% in the last Dutch general election.\nThe poor showing of the Dutch Labor party has increased the possibility that a government\nformed after the September election will incorporate three parties-the CDA, the PvdA, and the\nsmaller Democrats '66 party-in a center-left coalition. For a number of reasons (including\nquestions over internal party leadership and significant hostility within the party rank and file\ntoward the treatment received at the hands of the CDA, and specifically from Prime Minister\nLubbers), the right-of-center Liberal party seems unlikely to have a role in the next government.\nYet predictions immediately after the government's fall that a CDA-PvdA coalition would come\nabout from the September election now seem to have been clouded by Labor's poor showing\nin June. A number of emerging factors, not least among them being the greatly increased\nimportance of environmental issues on the Dutch domestic agenda, as well as Lubbers' own\npersonal preference for a more center-left approach (so long as the economy is sound and a\n51\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nmoderate security policy is pursued), point in the direction of a CDA-PvdA coalition succeeding\nthe center-right CDA-VVD government. Unless the Labor party can improve its showing over\nthe June elections, however, the degree of any leftward shift would likely be moderated by the\npresence of the more centrist D'66 party within the coalition.*\nWhat can be said about the next Dutch government with respect to defense policy is that it will\nface strong pressure to reduce public spending on defense. Within the Dutch electorate, there\nis a general sentiment that the years of austerity imposed in order to balance the Dutch budget\ndeficit did not fall equally on defense spending. As noted in previous IFPA reports on the\nNetherlands, increases in defense spending have not even approached NATO's agreed goal\n(recently reaffirmed at the Brussels summit) of three percent per year real growth in defense\nspending. Yet even so, the PvdA has long held that Dutch defense spending should be frozen,\nif not reduced, in order to restore cuts imposed in social welfare programs during the CDA/VVD\nausterity programs. Democrats '66 have proposed a freeze in the Dutch defense budget for the\nearly 1990s, with \"built-in flexibility\" to increase (or decrease) defense expenditures as\ndevelopments in the European arena warrant. For its own part, the CDA lead the governing\ncoalition that authored a proposed 2% per year increase in defense spending beginning in 1991;\nit is doubtful, however, that this plan will be observed by the next government, regardless of its\ncomposition.\nRecognizing the need to make its defense policies more palatable to the electorate, the Dutch\nLabor party has moved steadily away from the strongly antinuclear posture that had come to\ncharacterize its security perspectives in recent years. Marjanne Sint, the party chair, has stated\nthat pragmatism is called for if the PvdA is to be viewed as a credible coalition partner; this\nsentiment has also been reflected in the public statements of Wim Kok, the party's parliamentary\nleader, who has never really embraced the extreme antinuclear sentiments articulated by past\nLabor leaders. A prospective coalition agreement between the CDA and PvdA, therefore, might\nextend to the PvdA's more explicit acceptance of a continuing nuclear element to the NATO\nforce posture (carried out in part by Dutch forces), so long as the CDA agrees to press in NATO\nfor early negotiations on SNF and accepts lower levels of defense spending at home.\n* It is important to note that while in most of the other countries covered in this update the success of socialist and\nGreen parties can be attributed to rejectionist sentiments and low voter turnout, the Dutch case is somewhat\ndifferent. Because the fall of the government preceded the European Parliament poll, the June vote was widely\nseen as a \"primary\" of sorts in the leadup to the September general elections. The predictive value of the Dutch\nEuropean results were limited, however, by the surprisingly low turnout-which, at 47.2%, represented the\nlowest turnout of Dutch voters for a European Parliament election since they began.\n52\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nBELGIUM\nBelgium's center-left government\nThe NATO Summit and Arms Control Priorities\nwelcomed the NATO Summit\nIn Belgium, as in other countries examined in this\ncommuniqué as supporting its own\nReport, debates over security policy during the past\nposition, which favors near-term\ntwo months have revolved primarily around the proper\nSNF negotiations \"as soon as pos-\nfocus to be adopted in NATO's \"comprehensive con-\nsible\", while deferring any decision\ncept\"-or, in French, concept global-of arms control\non Lance until 1992. While reject-\nand disarmament, the final draft of which was being\ning, for the moment, a \"Third Zero\"\nreadied for approval at the NATO Summit on May\noption, the current Belgian coalition\n29-30. Indeed, ever since the October 1988 NPG\nopposes any significant increase in\nmeeting at Scheveningen, the current center-left Mar-\nthe range of existing SNF assets.\ntens Government (known locally as Martens VIII) has\ntaken a particularly active-if nonetheless skeptical-\nrole in the discussion of short-range nuclear force (SNF) modernization requirements, arguing\n(with the Germans) against any near-term decision by NATO to deploy a follow-on to Lance\n(FOTL), and pressing instead for East-West negotiations on SNF \"as soon as possible\"\n(preferably running parallel to the CFE talks in Vienna). Not surprisingly, therefore, in the\nweeks immediately preceding the NATO Summit, Belgian officials involved in the NATO\npolicy process continued to stress the \"arms control plank\" of the draft comprehensive concept,\ntogether with the need for Allied agreement on a common approach to potential SNF negotia-\ntions prior to any serious discussion of possible upgrades to NATO's existing SNF assets. On\nthe specific question of FOTL, moreover, the Martens Government (in the days leading up to\nthe Summit) held fast to its position-first publicly articulated by the Prime Minister in a speech\nbefore Parliament on April 11-that no decision was required before 1991-92, and that even\nthen such a decision should be sensitive to possible reductions in the threat achieved via the\nCFE talks. Perhaps, in a bid to guard against any compromise on this issue, the Chairman of\nthe Flemish Socialist Party (SP)-which remains the most stridently antinuclear political\ngrouping in Belgium-warned on May 23 that the Socialist bloc (or at least the larger Flemish\nwing) might well pull out of the governing coalition, if Belgium (for the sake of Alliance\nsolidarity) were to agree at the Summit to an SNF modernization program.\nGiven these views on arms control and SNF, Belgian reactions to the NATO Summit-which\nendorsed President Bush's proposals for deeper and broader force reductions at CFE, deferred\nany FOTL decision until 1992, promised only to update SNF \"where necessary,\" and secured\nU.S. support for SNF negotiations once implementation of a CFE agreement is \"underway\"-\n53\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nhave been quite favorable across party lines. In a speech before the Belgian Parliament on June\n9, Prime Minister Martens, speaking on behalf of the five-party coalition, praised the Allied\ndecision to include combat aircraft, helicopters and troops in the CFE negotiations as an\n\"important gesture toward the Soviet position\", which would make early agreement on conven-\ntional force reductions-and, by extension, the opening of SNF talks in the near-term future-far\nmore likely. Recalling Belgium's opposition (for the moment) to a \"Third Zero\" option and her\nwillingness to maintain-without significantly improving-NATO's tactical nuclear forces \"at\nwhatever level may be necessary\", Martens went on to describe the final concept global, as it\nappeared in the Summit Joint Communiqué, as \"an honorable compromise to which Belgium\ncould fully subscribe a compromise set within a dynamic approach to relations with the East.\"\nForty years after the Treaty of Washington, Martens concluded, the Alliance faced two major\ntrends-namely, progress toward European integration and the turn toward reform in the Soviet\nUnion and Eastern Europe-and the NATO Summit, in his estimation, would facilitate both.\nThis is not to suggest, of course, that the debate over SNF policy and arms control priorities has\ncome to an end in Belgium. For now, the Flemish Socialists-who pushed the governing\ncoalition to oppose SNF modernization-seem prepared to adopt a \"wait and see\" attitude, even\nthough they would prefer immediate SNF negotiations without any linkage to the state of\nprogress at the CFE talks. As do many in Western Europe, they perceive the object of their\ngreatest opposition-that is, the FOTL option-to be, in any event, \"dead in the water\", and are\nmore willing, as a consequence, to give the negotiators at Vienna a chance to produce concrete\nresults before pressing an alternative approach on the SNF front. If there are few signs of an\nimpending CFE agreement within six months to a year, however, the Belgian Socialists\n(especially from Flanders) will no doubt revive their campaign for SNF negotiations \"as soon\nas possible\", an appeal that almost certainly would be endorsed by other left-of-center parties\nin NATO Europe. Echoing statements made in the FRG, moreover, Socialist spokesmen in\nBelgium made clear, once the full text of the Summit Communiqué was released, that a \"Third\nZero\" for SNF forces definitely remained, in their view, a live option. While they may be willing\nto approve ambiguous Summit language endorsing East-West negotiations toward only a\n\"partial reduction\" of SNF (once implementation of CFE cuts are in progress), Socialist critics\nof NATO's nuclear policy still consider such reductions as merely a necessary phase in the\ncomplete elimination of SNF systems from the European theater.\nYet another possible complication that could dampen Belgian support for future Alliance\ninitiatives is the Martens Government's stated opposition to any upgrades of SNF forces that\nmight significantly increase their range, \"thereby undermining\", in the words of Martens'\nstatement before Parliament on April 11, \"the spirit of the INF Treaty\". As discussed at length\n54\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1\nMay\n-\nJune\n1909\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nin the last IFPA Report, the Belgian admonition that NATO avoid extended-range SNF can be\ntraced primarily to the Socialists' concerns that deployment of such systems would reverse what\nthey view as a generally positive trend toward reduced ranges brought about by the elimination\nof theater nuclear systems with ranges of 500 kilometers or more. What is more, it has become\nclear in recent debates in the Belgian Parliament that SNF systems with ranges much beyond\n400 kilometers would indeed be considered excessive by most of the Socialist bloc and (in fact)\nby many from the more centrist Christian parties. What this means in practical terms is that the\nNATO plan to deploy 400-plus kilometer air-launched SNF (such as TASM) is likely to trigger\nrather strong opposition from powerful elements within Belgium's governing coalition. This\nis true despite the widespread preference among most NATO allies (including the FRG) to shift\nfrom shorter to longer-range SNF. If the Belgian Socialists-and again, the Flemish activists,\nin particular-have their way, efforts to phase-in TASM-like systems as routine modernizations\nof NATO's air-delivered nuclear assets will proceed (if at all) with difficulty. Should the view\nthat TASM and similar range systems contravene the spirit-if not the letter-of the INF Treaty\nbegin to gather broader support in NATO Europe (and the signs are that this is occurring on the\ncenter-left of the political spectrum), then post-Summit assumptions that deferral of FOTL could\nbe compensated for, to some extent at least, by deployment of supposedly less controversial\nstand-off systems (both air and sea-launched) may need to be revised.\nProcurement Issues and Defense Industrial Trends\nOn the military equipment front, Belgian\nThe selection of the Carapace ECM system-\nMOD and General Staff officials took ad-\nlargely due to the offset package offered to\nditional steps in the May/June period to set\nBelgian industry-represents the last major\nin place the 1989-92 Mid-Term Procure-\nBelgian purchase for 1989-90. Future\nment Plan approved by the Martens\nprospects for U.S.-Belgian defense cooperation\nGovernment on March 24, announcing in\nwill be chiefly in Air Force and Army\nmid-May the selection of the Carapace\nprograms (Leopard Iupgrades, artillery mod-\nelectronic countermeasures (ECM) sys-\nernization, third-generation anti-tank\ntem-produced by the French firm\nweapons, and air-to-air/air-to-surface mis-\nElectronique Serge Dassault-to update\nsiles).\nthe Belgian F-16 fleet. With a total pro-\ngram value reaching some $220.4 million,\nthe ECM buy stands as the last major hardware purchase scheduled for the 1989-90 timeframe\n(the Army's VHF choice having been made earlier in the year). Significantly, this will be the\nfirst time, according to a Belgian MOD press release, that equipment built by a non-American\ncompany would be integrated with the F-16.\n55\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nPrincipal Belgian Procurement Programs for the Mid-Term\n1989-1992\n(in millions of dollars)\nGeneral Staff\n1989\n1990\n1991\n1992\nTOTAL\nBEMILCOM\n43.9\n43.9\nBEMILDAT\n11.6\n6.3\n17.9\nCOMPUTERS\n14.5\n8.5\n2.5\n1.6\n27.1\nAWACS MODERNIZATION\n24.6\n24.6\nGAS MASKS\n24.6\n24.6\nArmy\nBRIGADES REORGANIZATON\n1.1\n2.3\n37.7\n41.1\n3RD GENERATION ANTITANK\n15.6\n15.6\nLEOPARD MODERNIZATION\n45.0\n6.6\n87.7\n139.3\nVHF RADIO\n244.9\n2.1\n13.8\n260.8\nARTILLERY MODERNIZATION\n2.3\n15.8\n25.9\n44.0\nVEHICLES\n3.2\n32.9\n202\n238.1\nAir Force\nF-16 ECM\n175.6\n21.0\n23.8\n220.4\nMIRAGE UPDATE\n35.9\n53.8\n89.7\nAIR-TO-AIR MISSILES\n52.8\n35.9\n96.9\n185.6\nAIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES\n30.8\n30.8\nC-130 MODERNIZATION\n35.9\n25.4\n61.3\nSURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES\n83.6\n83.6\nNavy\nFRIGATE CONSOLIDATION\n17.9\n12.8\n30.7\nMINESWEEPERS\n0.64\n72.5\n73.0\nMedical\nSTERILIZERS\n9.4\n9.4\nMED. UNIT\n2.8\n2.8\nLogistics\nNATO\n73.0\n84.5\n89.6\n91.2\n338.3\nOTHER\n9.8\n56.4\n25.7\n2.2\n94.1\n56\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nPerhaps more important from the perspective of U.S. defense industry, this decision represents\na significant set-back for Litton Applied Technology's TWS (Tail Warning System) 95B project,\nwhich Litton had hoped would open the door-beginning in Belgium-to broader export sales\nin the NATO European market. The selection of Carapace, moreover, simply underscores the\ndifficulty American firms will continue to have in generating new sales in the increasingly\ncompetitive European market, unless they are prepared to offer much more attractive offset\npackages, including additional production opportunities for local industry. For Belgium-\nwhere the relatively small aerospace sector is finding it increasingly difficult to compete with\nthe larger European firms (especially in the wake of the current rash of mergers)-access to\nadvantageous offset terms for Belgian industry was almost certainly the single most decisive\nfactor in choosing between competing ECM systems. The French entry won, no doubt, not\nmerely because it met the technical requirements of the Belgian Air Force (as did Litton's TWS),\nbut because Electronique Serge Dassault was prepared to guarantee that a minimum of 80\npercent of the contract value would be returned to the Belgian marketplace in the form of direct\nsubcontracts, co-production schemes and indirect offsets (involving products unrelated to the\nspecific deal).\nThe importance of revitalizing Belgium's defense industrial base-and the entrée to the Belgian\nmarket that this process could provide to foreign firms-was reaffirmed by Minister of National\nDefense Guy Coëme in a speech in early June to a group of defense industry executives. Coëme\nnoted the need for Belgian industry-together with the three regional governments of Flanders,\nWallonia and Brussels-to make a far greater effort to help finance military procurement\nprograms (and to get involved early on in program planning), if they are to remain competitive\nin the European single market that will emerge in 1992. Joint funding from industry and the\nregions, Coëme implied, was perhaps the only way to avoid stagnation in the Belgian defense\nindustrial sector after 1992, and one sure avenue toward an improved financial footing for\nBelgian industry (and, by extension, for the regions themselves) was to encourage greater foreign\ninvestment. As noted above, this objective weighed heavily in Belgium's recent selection of\nprime contractors for the Army's combat helicopter and the Air Force's F-16 ECM suites. It\nseems to have been a key factor as well in the decision in June by Fabrique Nationale (FN) to\nsell a controlling interest (51 percent) of its aeronautics division-FN Moteurs-to the French\nengine manufacturer SNECMA, keeping a 42 percent interest for itself and providing the\nregional government of Wallonia (which agreed to pour some $26 million into FN Moteurs)\nwith a 7 percent share. The deal, which netted the FN Group approximately $45 million, permits\nFN to pay off its debts and finance a costly restructuring program, while still retaining a major\nminority interest in a far more competitive FN Moteurs (which will keep its separate identity\nand its production base near Liege).\n57\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nBelgian Procurement\nFunds by Service for the Mid-Term\n1989-1992\n(in millions of current dollars)\n308.9\n1989\n264.3\n18.54\n30.0\n1990\n141.5\n12.8\n96.5\n1991\n168.7\n303.5\n96.9\n1992\n72.5\n738.9\nTotal\n1989-1992\n671.4\n103.84\nArmy\nAir Force\ni Navy\n58\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nDivision of Belgian Procurement\nFunds for the Mid-Term\n1989-1992\n(in percentages)\nAir Force\n32%\nGeneral Staff\n7%\nArmy\n35%\nLogistics\n21%\nMedical\nNavy\n1%\n5%\n59\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nThe implications of the above for U.S. defense companies, then, seem rather obvious. If they\nare prepared to invest in Belgian firms-or, failing that, establish new subsidiaries within\nBelgium-as part of a broader strategy to improve their European production base in preparation\nfor 1992, they stand a far better chance of winning Belgian contracts. If they are unwilling or\nunable to do so, American firms will continue to be edged out by European competitors and\nothers (e.g., the Japanese) who seek to improve their market position in the post-1992 environ-\nment.\nAs for specific contract opportunities over the mid-term (1989-92), hardware needs of the Army\nand Air Force-as the accompanying charts graphically illustrate-will provide the most\nlucrative projects for .industrial participation. Looking beyond the VHF and ECM accounts,\nmajor equipment programs over the next four years will include (for the Air Force) the purchase\nof modern air-to-air, air-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, and (for the Army) an upgrade\nof the Leopard I tanks, artillery modernization, and acquisition of a third-generation anti-tank\nweapon (likely to be the joint European TRIGAT system).\nThe European Elections and Belgian Coalition Politics\nBeyond the election of national delegates to\nResults from the European Parliament vote\nthe European Parliament, the European elec-\nsuggest shifting levels of support for the par-\ntions in mid-June hold significance in Bel-\nties in Belgium's Chrístian/Socialist/Flemish\ngium for what they imply about the likely\nnationalist governing coalition, bringing into\nstability of the current coalition and the rela-\nquestion the continued stability of the Bel-\ntive strength of Belgium's various political\ngian government. Prime Minister Martens'\nparties, both in and out of government. In-\nCVP party gained strength, while the\ndeed, given the delicate political balance that\nFlemish Socialists and Flemish nationalists\nprevails in Belgium, even slight shifts in\npolitical popularity can open rifts among\n(Volksunie) lost support. Additionally, Bel-\ncoalition partners, and a preliminary assess-\ngian Green parties gained remarkable sup-\nment of the election results suggests that this\nport.\nmay very well be happening. To be specific,\nthe Flemish Nationalist Volksunie party-which has been slipping in the polls since the\nSeptember 1988 local elections-lost a significant portion of its vote (and a seat in the European\nParliament) to the more extreme, far-right, ultra-nationalist Vlaams Blok, a turn of events which\nmany feel will strengthen the Volksunie's pre-existing doubts about remaining in the coalition.\nGiven the importance of the Volksunie to the constitutional reform process (devolving greater\npowers to the regions), neither of the larger coalition groupings-the Christians and the\nSocialists-would look forward to the Volksunie's departure from government any time soon,\n60\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nat least not until the close of the current Parliament in January 1992. Yet, should the Volksunie's\nfortunes continue to slide, its leadership may very well opt out of the governing coalition.\nAmong the five parties now in power, the main winner in the European elections was Prime\nMinister Martens' Flemish Christian Socialists (the CVP), which gained a seat in Strasbourg,\nwhile the principal losers were the Flemish Socialists, who lost a seat. Martens' former coalition\npartners-the more conservative Liberal parties of Flanders and Wallonia-also lost support\n(and one seat in the European Parliament). Together with their failure to lead the voting in the\nBrussels regional elections (held parallel to the European elections), the Liberals did little to\nimprove their standing among the Belgian electorate (or, in consequence, their chances of joining\nanother coaltion in the near-term, should the current government fall). By far the true victors\nin the Belgian European elections were the two Green parties, the Walloon Ecolo and the Flemish\nAgalev. In French-speaking Wallonia, the Green turnout was particularly strong, giving Ecolo\n15 percent of the Walloon vote (just a notch less than that for the Francophone Liberals) and\nthe same level of representation at Strasbourg (two seats) as that for the venerable Walloon\nChristian Socialists (PSC). Belgium's Green presence in the European Parliament will probably\nbe bolstered still further by the sole remaining Volksunie delegate, who is expected to align with\nthe Green faction.\nWhat this means for defense is difficult to tell with precision. The annual summer negotiations\namong the governing parties over the national budget is about to begin, and the CVP's\ncomparatively stronger showing may help to hold off Flemish Socialist pressures to reduce\nfurther Belgian defense spending-pressures which a number of informed observers thought\nmight well increase in the wake of post-Summit arms control euphoria and NATO's more\nagressive efforts to achieve a CFE agreement at Vienna. On the other hand, CVP leaders-who\nmust contend with a vocal anti-defense/antinuclear minority within the party-have never been\nparticularly eager to expend scarce political capital protecting military expenditures. Given the\nGreen Party proclivities of the Volksunie on such matters, the Christians' only real ally (among\nits coalition partners) in the coming budget battle will be the French-speaking Socialists (the\nPS) of Wallonia, where most of Belgium's defense industries are located. Together, the CVP\nand the PS will likely sustain the Government's current commitment to a $2.7 billion Mid-Term\nProcurement Program, but efforts to maintain annual defense spending at the $2.66 billion\nlevel-thought by Belgian Chief of Staff Charlier to be the absolute minimum allowable-could\neasily falter.\n61\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nItaly\nOver the last three months, Italian strategic and political analysts were focused on; President\nBush's visit to Rome and the subsequent NATO Summit meeting; the outcome of the European\nParliamentary elections; and, the continuing search for a rationalization of the roles, missions\nand structures of the Italian armed forces. All of these issues were, however, overshadowed by\nthe fall, on May 19, of the forty-eighth Italian post-World War II government, occasioned by\nthe resignation of Christian Democratic Prime Minister Ciriaco De Mita.\nItaly's Governmental Crisis and the NATO SNF Debate\nAt the heart of Italy's current political crisis is a struggle for power between, on the one hand,\nSocialist Party leader Bettino Craxi and his\nChristian Democratic friend and ally Arnal-\nItalian defense perspectives are focused on\ndo Forlani, the former Prime Minister who\ninternal security and \"out-of-area\" threats.\naspires to leadership of the Christian\nDemocratic Party (CDI), and, on the other hand, the De Mita faction which has relied on\ncentralization of the government bureaucracy to sustain control over dissident party factions.\nThis rivalry helped to shape the Italian election campaign for the European Parliament which,\nultimately, resulted in a victory for the \"left\", as the Italian Communist and Greens Parties made\nsignificant inroads in cutting the popular majority of the five-party coalition government.\nEven as voter turnout was low, in fact the lowest in post-war Italian history, and the campaign\ncentered less around European questions - although in a related referendum Italian voters\noverwhelmingly approved a motion that Europe should be governed by a single government\nresponsible to Parliament-the June Parliamentary election results revealed several interesting\ninsights into Italian political, and hence strategic, perspectives. The first, and most obvious, is\nthe apparent rejuvenation of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) under its new dynamic leader,\nAchille Occhetto. With his Europeanist outlook (that was described in depth in IFPA's DNA\nQuarterly Report for January-April 1989) and his Party's innovative approach to domestic\neconomic issues, the new Italian Communist Party leader may succeed in attracting a greater\nshare of the Italian electorate in a national election, and, thus, disrupt the plans of Socialist Party\n(PSI) leader Bettino Craxi to form and head a new \"union of the left.\" Such a \"union\"\npresumably would take on many of the positions of the International Socialist Movement,\nincluding in the defense arena where both Parties have been supportive of West German NATO\npositions, in particular their insistence on starting SNF negotiations before implementation of\na CFE agreement. In this context, both the Socialist Craxi and PCI leader Occhetto have\nsupported a \"Third Zero\" option, pertaining to Lance (nuclear surface-to-surface) missiles and\nnuclear-capable artillery deployments. Their respective positions on NATO deployments of\n62\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\ndual-capable aircraft are less clear, although both men are said to oppose the Italian acceptance\nof the redeployment of the U.S. 401st air wing, primarily because of its collateral nuclear-strike\ntasking. This sensitivity of Italian officials (and public opinion, to nuclear deployments on\nItalian soil) threatens to emerge as a major political issue in regard to TASM, especially if the\nU.S. F-16s are, in fact, redeployed to Italy. Reinforcing this view is the apparent growing\nsympathy of Italian voters for the environmentalist cause which was manifested in the gains\nmade by the Italian Greens whose 6% of the vote translates into five seats in the European\nParliament. Together with the growth of antinuclear sentiments, the concern over environmental\nissues reflects the emergence in Italy, as well as in Western Europe, of a \"leftist\" trend which\nmay have a significant impact on the future conceptualization of national and European\ndefense/deterrence requirements.\nHowever, the extent to which the results of the European Parliamentary elections will influence\nthe nearterm shaping of Italian defense policy is unclear. At the moment, Italian perspectives\non defense and deterrence issues are preoccupied with a growing concern over the global\nproliferation of ballistic missile and chemical warfare technologies and, for the most part, a\ndiminished perception of a threat posed by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact forces. As has\nbeen noted consistently in previous IFPA Quarterly Reports for DNA, Italian threat perceptions\nhave changed over the years since World War П, to emphasize internal security and \"out of\narea\" threats, specifically from Libya to the South and terrorism from the Middle East. For at\nleast a decade the Italians have emphasized the Libyan threat in the context of their Mediter-\nranean obligations in NATO and in the course of Alliance debates over force dispositions and\nburdensharing. In their current defense plans, Italian forces are structured primarily for use in\nMediterranean scenarios, although they maintain a capability for employment in the North\nagainst a Soviet/Warsaw Pact contingency. It is in this context that Italian public opinion has\nbecome embroiled in the NATO SNF debate and the attendant discussion of Western CFE\nproposals.\nItalian Views of the NATO Compromise\nApart from sympathizing with the dilemma of the West Germans in the Alliance, and indeed,\nsupporting their position in the NATO controversy on Lance modernization and SNF negotia-\ntions, the last five-party Italian government coalition, under the lead of the long-serving,\nChristian Democratic Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, has been outspoken on the need to\nreconsider the deployment of all of NATO's frontline forces, nuclear as well as conventional,\nin the context of both the conventional force talks (CFE) and the prospective negotiation of an\nagreement to limit short-range nuclear forces in Europe. The Italian position on the relationship\nbetween the CFE talks and the proposed negotiation of short-range nuclear forces is based on\n63\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\na perception that NATO has more to gain by bringing Soviet short-range nuclear weapons into\ntalks which may result in their disproportionate dismantling (because of the larger inventory of\nSoviet SNF systems, as compared with that of the Alliance). But more than this, from the Italian\nperspective, the defense rationale for the deployment of SNF systems will inevitably be\ndiminished as the conventional force talks produce agreement on the reduction of armored and\nartillery force deployments in Europe. Thus, the five-party government coalition partners have\nbeen united in their support for an early SNF negotiation, tied to progress at the CFE, but not\nnecessarily to implementation of an agreement. At the same time, the Italians have also been\nmore or less united in the view that a Lance modemization decision need not be made by the\nAlliance this year. In part, in support of the West Germans, the Italians have stated that a\nmodernization decision on Lance could be pushed off until the early 1990's, at which time many\nItalian defense analysts anticipate that there will be negotiated a framework agreement at the\nCFE which would facilitate, from a military-operational perspective, a draw-down in Alliance\nSNF deployments.\nWhile there is widespread support in Italy for SNF negotiations, there are divergent views of\nwhether or not to support the \"Third Zero\" option. Among Italian public opinion, support for\nthe \"Third Zero\" is strong; but\namong defense experts and\nThe Italian position on SNF negotiations does not tie\npolicymakers in the Foreign and\nfuture negotiations to implementation of a CFE\nDefense Ministries and at NATO,\nagreement, although it does foresee some progress\nthis is widely regarded as a\nat CFE as a necessary precursor to talks.\ndangerous option for the strategic\nstability of Europe. There is among\nItalian defense experts strong support for the concept of minimal deterrence based upon the\nextension of a U.S. strategic-nuclear guarantee to Western Europe, manifested in the forward\ndeployment of American forces in the Central Region of NATO. In this context SNF may have\na coupling role, especially in the aftermath of the INF Treaty; but deployments of nuclear\nartillery and large numbers of SSM systems (i.e. the 88 Lance launchers) are widely regarded\nas unnecessary. On the precise question of a preferred NATO SNF force posture under a\nminimal deterrence concept, the Italians are divided as to whether NATO Europe should support\ndeployments of ground-based nuclear weapons capabilities at all. Ever since the INF deploy-\nment controversy and debate in Italy, the question of nuclear-capable systems located on Italian\nsoil has been controversial and sparks opposition, especially in those areas where these systems\nare to be sited. For many Italian defense analysts, the current NATO controversy over SNF\nshould be regarded as the \"tip of the iceberg.\" The real Alliance confrontation is said to be\n64\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\ncoming over military doctrine and the defense posture attendant with NATO's forward defense\nconcepts.\nFor many Italians, the differences in perspective between NATO's front-line states (of West\nGermany and Italy) and what were termed by the Italians as the \"second-line\" allies (of France,\nBritain and the United States) go to the core of the Alliance's nuclear \"warfighting\" posture.\nFrom the Italian perspective, the present NATO strategy of forward defense and early use of\nshort-range nuclear weapons, if conventional forces cannot hold their assigned wartime posi-\ntions, creates a distinction between \"front\" and \"second-line\" states, with Italy and the Federal\nRepublic of Germany facing prospective destruction and widespread radioactive contamination.\nFor the Italians who deploy six batteries of nuclear Lance missiles (in the northeast, near the\ntown of Portogruaro), with the objective of stopping a Warsaw Pact invasion down the Po valley,\ntheir use in a European contingency would ensure the destruction of Italian territory and\npopulation from Trieste to Udine. Increasingly, as with the deployment of nuclear-capable\nartillery launchers, the deployment on Italian soil of any short-range nuclear weapons is disputed\nexcept, perhaps by the Italian Army's leadership, and is likely to engender heated public and\npolicy debates that could have the effect of eroding Italian support for NATO as the preeminent\ninstitutional framework for defense cooperation in Europe. Already many Italian defense and\npolicy analysts and officials have jumped on the \"European\" bandwagon, preferring to explore\nthe future prospects for defense collaboration either under West European Union (WEU)\nauspices or in the context of the European Communities, which currently have no formal\ndefense-related responsibilities.\nItalian opposition to land-based short-range nuclear weapons deployments on Italian soil is also\nseen in the growing opposition to the planned redeployment of the U.S. 401 st F-16 wing. Apart\nfrom regional concerns which are not incidental and which focus on a range of environmental\nissues - from noise abatements to low-flight training - there is growing political opposition\nto the move on the basis of anti-nuclear sentiment, but also in the context of diminished threat\nperceptions of the Soviet Union and against the prospects of a CFE agreement. By and large,\nItalians are hopeful that a CFE framework agreement can be negotiated by 1991, especially in\nlight of President Bush's recent proposals which included aircraft and troop reductions, both of\nwhich the Italians have long supported for inclusion in the CFE.\nImplications for Italian Defense Reorganization\nIn line with projected changes in the European security environment as a result of a diminished\nItalian threat perception of the Soviet Union, and a possible CFE outcome that may affect\nfundamentally Alliance force deployments and military structures in Western Europe, the Italian\nmilitary is working on a major reorganization of Italy's defense forces. This effort is being\n65\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nundertaken in the context of reduced defense spending and against the assumption that austerity\nmeasures will be necessary well into the 1990's if the Italian economy is to meet the\ngovernment's objective of stabilizing the national debt before 1992, and the implementation of\nthe European Single Integrated Market structure. Within the new Italian defense model: the\nterritorial defense structure will be streamlined, with a progressive reduction of the number of\nconscripts and a revision in the numbers of personnel assigned to logistics; while redundant or\nunnecessary facilities will be closed or made available for civilian use. Additionally, both in\nthe administrative area and logistics services, automated systems and new organizational\nstructures will be put into operation, and, the length of military service will be reduced to take\naccount of political opposition to current conscription periods.\nOn the equipment side, the Zanone Plan, as the defense model is now termed, provides for major\nequipment procurements between the years of 1989 and 2000, related specifically to air defense\nof Italian territory; to sea-based air defense assets, including systems for the protection of\nland-based as well as naval assets; mobility enhancements; and, infrastructure modernizations\nfor the Italian ground forces. This Plan does not, however, include funding for major interna-\ntional procurement programs like Patriot, the European Fighter Aircraft, or the NATO Frigate\nprogram, which, when taken together, would \"break through current budgetary ceilings\" and\nthus, have to be authorized under a separate Parliamentarily-approved funding package. (In this\ncontext it is important to\nnote that the Zanone Plan\nDefense reorganization necessitated by the Italian\nis a draft law that also has\ngovernment's austerity measures into the 1990s will include:\nnot yet been submitted to\nstreamlining of the territorial defense structure, reduction in\nthe Italian Parliament for\nthe number of conscripts and revision of the number of\napproval.)\npersonnel assigned to logistics, and closure of unnecessary\nThe emphasis of the\nfacilities. The current defense plan includes funding for in-\nZanone Plan on Italian\nfrastructure and mobility enhancements and air-defense as-\ndefense interests in the\nsets, but not for major international procurement programs\nMediterranean and \"out-\nlike Patriot or the NATO Frigate. Funding to meet these\nof-area\" contingencies\ndemands would have to be authorized by Parliament under a\nreinforces, in the new\nseparate supplementary procurement package.\nItalian defense model, the\nrole of the Italian Navy\nwhich, until now, has been relegated a \"poor third cousin\" to the Air Force and the Army in\nbudgetary allocations. For example, the 1988 Italian defense budget assigns 42.5% of its funds\nto the Army, 35.7% to the Air Force, and only 21.8% to the Navy. Moreover, of the 3.189\n66\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May . 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nintervention for limited peacekeep-\ning and international security\nItaly at a Glance\noperations, \"will be the most prob-\nPopulation:\n56.8 million\nable ones in the next years.\"\nArea:\n30.2 million hectares\nYet, funding for the proposed\nWork force (average 1988): 24 million\nItalian defense reorganization is\nUnemployed (average 1988): 2.9 million\nnot likely to be available in the next\nDollar exchange rate\nten years. While Italy's Defense\n(average 1988):\none dollar =1,302 lire\nMinister, Valerio Zanone, has re-\nInflation (consumer\nprice index average 1988):\n5.0%\nquested budget authority for 30 tril-\nGDP 1988:\nL1,073,100 billion\nlion Lire ($21 billion) over the next\nten years for the modernization of\nGDP growth 1988:\n4.0%\nItalian armed forces, a large portion\nMoney supply\nM2 growth 1988:\n7.7%\nof it will be allocated to administra-\nPublic sector borrowing\ntive and service costs. Of the ap-\nrequirement 1988:\nL124,651 billion\npropriations\nto\n\"heavy\nPublic debt at\ntechnologies\" there will be a large\nyear end 1988:\nL 1,035,500 billion\ndeficit if each of the Services' mod-\nPublic debt/GDP:\n96.5%\nernization requirements are to be\nTrade 1988:\nmet. In his budget request, Zanone\nImports\nL180,059 billion\nExports\nL167,196 billion\nproposes to allocate three trillion\nMerchandise trade deficit\nL12,863 billion\nLire ($2 billion) per year to the\nHead of State:\nPresident Francesco\nServices, making for an allotment\nCossiga\nof one trillion Lire ($705 million)\nPrime minister:\nCiriaco De Mita\nfor each of the armed forces. This\n(ChristianDemocrat)\nis in addition to the 30,000 billion\nGovernment:\nFive-party coalition\ncomprised of:\nChristian Democrats (DC),\nLire ($20,9 billion) that the govern-\n(until May 19, 1989)\nSocialists (PSI),\nment requested Parliament to\nSocial Democrats (PSDI),\nRepublican (PRI) and\nauthorize for additional procure-\nLiberals (PLI)\nment funding over the next ten\nParliamentary composition\nyears.\nThis supplemental\n(three main parties):\nChristian Democrats 34.3%\nCommunists (PCI) 26.6%\nauthorization is supposed to cover\nSocialists 14.3%\nItalian participation in major inter-\nnational programs, notably the European Fighter Aircraft, Patriot, and the NATO Frigate\nprogram. Thus far, however, the funding bill has not been acted upon by the Parliament which,\ntogether with the governing coalition, had decided that it was of a lower priority than implemen-\ntation of proposed cuts in government spending. Without authorization of the supplemental\n68\nInstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis\n1 May - 30 June 1989\nProgress Report for the Defense Nuclear Agency\nfunding bill, Italian defense spending over the first three years of the requested budget\nauthorization would amount to just 0.1% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and would\npermit Italian defense to reach in 1992 (the year in which the national budget is to be stabilized\naccording to coalition government policy), an overall defense expenditure percentage of almost\n2.4% of the GDP, which compares favorably with the present spending level of 2.1% of the\nItalian GDP (in 1988). Even so, the budget request will barely be enough to preserve the status\nquo of the armed services and to authorize investments already made. To meet the objectives\nof the new defense model, Italy would have to have available at least a budget of 35 billion Lire\n($24.7 million) on an annual basis, according to analyses of the new Ministry of Defense think\ntank headed by General Carlo Jean.\n69"
}