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Karl Marx University - Hungary 7/13/89 [OA 8748] [1]
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Karl Marx University - Hungary 7/13/89 [OA 8748] [1]
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Records of the White House Office of Speechwriting (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Mark Davis Subject Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
S; 1998-0194-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series:
Davis, Mark, Files
Subseries:
Subject File, 1989-1991
OA/ID Number:
13872
Folder ID Number:
13872-010
Folder Title:
Karl Marx University-Hungary, 7/13/89 [1]
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19
2
6
5
FBIS-EEU-89-110
9 June 1989
36
HUNGARY
develop in accordance with imports from Austria, Hun-
Improving the working conditions of foreign journalists
gary's Trade Minister Tamas Beck complained. The
should be made a long-term element of Hungarian
outspoken minister stated that economic relations
foreign policy, since journalistic activity is an important
between Hungary and Austria "have by far not reached
element in the assertion of human rights, set down in the
the level of political relations which are considered
third basket of the documents. This is why we advocate
exemplary."
at all international forums the need for international
openness. Mr Szombath pointed out.
Beck openly stated that within the framework of the new
geographic orientation of Hungary's foreign trade and its
new openness to the world market, above all to its
CSSR Envoy Views Bos-Nagymaros Construction
traditional partner Austria, the expansion of institu-
AU0906092489 Budapest MTI in English
tional relations with EFTA [European Free Trade Asso-
1808 GMT 7 Jun 89
ciation] would be desirable and useful. [passage omitted]
[Text] Budapest, MTI, 07/06/1989-"The construction
of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros barrage is a clearly scien-
New Joint Enterprise Founded With United States
tific issue, the solution of which is the task of scientists",
AU0906085989 Budapest MTI in English
stressed Czechoslovak Ambassador Vlastimil Ehren-
1306 GMT 7 Jun 89
berger, at a forum on Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations,
held on Wednesday in Budapest, in the Political College
[Text] Budapest, MTI, 07/06/1989-The first US-Hun-
of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSMZP].
garian securities trading company was founded in
According to the ambassador, scientists are capable of
Budapest on Wednesday with a starting capital of 525
solving the problems related to the construction of the
million forints, shared equally by the founders.
power plant. taking the current technical standard into
consideration. In his view, the barrage construction
On the US side, the investors include companies with
should not be turned into a political issue, only the
interests in a New York-based firm. and on the Hungar-
numbers. scientific arguments and laws can have a say in
ian side the Termin Financial Consulting Group.
this issue.
The Hungarian-US broker firm intends to take part in
The ambassador, who participated in the recent talks
the establishment of a stock exchange in Hungary. They
between the Hungarian and the Czechoslovak prime
also propose to recruit and involve Hungarian private
ministers, said that at these talks. the Hungarian side
capital in business transactions.
mentioned seizmographical and ecological problems,
and profitability problems in connection with suspend-
When the Hungarian exchange is in operation. the joint
ing the further construction of the complex. Mr Ehren-
venture intends to act as dealer for US clients. mediating
berger said: They are not familiar in detail with the new
the sale of Hungarian company shares.
scientific arguments that justified to suspend the con-
struction. but the Czechoslovak scientists are ready to
examine the material together with their Hungarian
Radio Free Europe 'Wishes' Office in Budapest
colleagues. In conclusion, the ambassador said that if the
AU0906095589 Budapest MTI in English
contract for the common construction of the barrage is
0852 GMT 8 Jun 89
not observed. Czechoslovakia would request compensa-
tion. as would. according to its information. Austria.
[Text] Budapest. June 8 (MTI)-Radio Free Europe
(RFE) wishes to have a representative accredited to
Pozsgay To Establish New Movement. Social Model
Budapest and to open offices here. There is no obstacle
AU0906093589 Budapest MTI in English
to this in principle. and its implementation is already in
2006 GMT 7 Jun 89
progress. Jeno Szombath. deputy director of the Press
Department at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign
[Text] Budapest. June 7 (MTI)-"What is needed is to
Affairs. told the Thursday issue of the daily MAGYAR
HIRLAP.
create a new social model, as the political. power and
economic order of dictatorical socialism has become
bankrupt. The squandering of the forces of advance. and
An open information policy is in the country's interest,
and we do not make a distinction between RFE and
the continuous deterioration of the living circumstances
meanwhile. offers a scope of movement for the extremist
other news services. The final document of the Vienna
follow-up meeting went a step further than the Helsinki
groups. The various forces of pro-order dictatorship and
Final Act when it set down in point 39 that journalists
revenge are threateningly present. and can strengthen."
Imre Pozsgay stresses. among others. the appeal made
can neither be expelled nor punished for legally carrying
public on Wednesday in Budapest. at the session of the
out their profession. In addition. signatories have agreed
preparatory committee of the Movement for Democratic
not to hinder journalists' activity either for the contents
of their own reports or for those of the news company
Hungary. The movement wishes to rally people who
they work for.
accept the rise of the nation, European progress and
democratic socialism together, irrespective of their party
FBIS-EEU-89-110
9 June 1989
37
HUNGARY
standing or membership in organizations. The move-
The government is counting on a budget income of 1
ment awaits all who reject marking time and roll-back,
billion forints from such sales, Ministry of Defence offi-
who accept that a democratic road has to be taken to
cials informed members of the parliamentary Defence
create a democratic Hungary. The movement is expected
Committee.
to hold its founding session within one month.
The MPs [Members of Parliament] wanted to know how
Imre Pozsgay, member of the Hungarian Socialist Work-
the 100 million forints owed by the Soviet Army to
ers' Party Political Committee and minister of state,
Hungarian electric power supply companies will be
stressed at the session of the preparatory committee:
recovered.
"All sober political forces in our country are alike in that
At the meeting, the MPs pointed out that the Army still
a renewed, democratic Hungary is needed, and that this
considered itself in a state of "intensive development"
should be attained on a peaceful road, with an anti-
when it came to the issue of what consequences the
catastrophe policy. The movement needs members who
cutting of the military budget might have.
feel responsibility for a democratic Hungary, who firmly
take a stand for peaceful transition, who support the
This year, Hungary is to cut down on military expendi-
change in model, as according to some people there is a
ture by 3.7 billion forints as compared to the amount the
chance to create a group in politics in the old fashion, by
state budget approved last year.
exploring its reserves. This would pose a danger to
transformation. would promote roll-back, and this is
It was also announced at the Defence Committee meet-
what contemporary Hungary needs least of all. The
ing that the effective professional and civilian force of
fundamental goal is to create a new statehood, democ-
the workers' militia will be reduced by 30 per cent by
racy and constitutional state, and to organize free
September. (The workers' militia was set up in 1957 as
elections," Mr Pozsgay said, among others.
the HSWP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party]'s armed
force, but was placed under government supervision in
Members of Parliament Consider Defense Budget
1989).
LD0706224389 Budapest MTI in English
1434 GMT 7 Jun 89
The body is now seeking to work out a solution whereby
the workers' militia can be transformed into an armed
[Text] Budapest, June 7, 1989 (MTI-ECONEWS)-The
force equivalent to a voluntary militia of the Hungarian
Hungarian Government intends to sell off barracks and
People's Army. The armed body is trying to make up the
other buildings which become empty as a result of the
100-million-forint loss which came about with the cut in
withdrawal of part of the Soviet troops stationed in
state budget support, through renting out its camps and
Hungary.
vehicles.
FBIS-EEU-89-111
12 June 1989
HUNGARY
23
Shooting Incident Reported at Romanian Border
On the basis of investigations, the Supreme Prosecution
AU1206113489 Budapest MTI in English
has ascertained that the authorities dealing with the case
1759 GMT 9 Jun 89
at the time severely and in sequence violated the then
valid regulations of the rules of court. They limited the
[Text] Budapest, June 9 (MTI)-Colonel Sandor Barna,
accused's rights of freedom and defense. The prosecu-
chief commissioner of the Csongrad county police, told
tion almost exclusively gathered and utilized data con-
journalists on Friday that on June 4, Sunday, at dawn
sidered incriminating. They refrained from gathering
separate and serial shots were heard and the light of
evidence that would disprove guilt.
signal rockets seen in the vicinity of Nagylak on the
Romanian side of the border. This was observed by both
The accusation was unfounded and illegal. Further, the
locals and frontier guards who, in Hungarian territory,
prosecution against the case of Imre Nagy and his
rushed in the direction of the shooting. They saw Roma-
associates was not necessary because the verdict does not
nian frontier guards chasing and surrounding three per-
contain any statement at all which would correspond to
sons in civilian clothes, including a woman. None of the
the criterion of any kind of crime defined by the then
shots violated Hungarian territory. On June 8, Thursday,
legal regulations.
in the same region a Hungarian fisherman found a girl's
body in the Maros River, pulled it out to a sand island
The documents, which were recently obtained from
and notified the frontier guard. As the island belongs to
Yugoslavia, prove that in November 1956, the Hungar-
Romania, no Hungarian police investigations can be
ian Government gave a written guarantee to Imre Nagy
carried out there. On Friday morning the Romanian
and his associates who were staying at the Budapest
authorities examined the body in the presence of the
Yugoslav Embassy stating that they were not going to
Hungarian frontier officer. Although they found no
make any kind of reprisal against them. Personal immu-
traces of gunshot on the body, the child's ear bleeded
nity based on international law should have been given
because of a head injury caused by a blow or a shock. No
to those who were later sentenced, which, even according
connection was revealed between the two events. The
to laws at the time, would have been the obstacle to their
Romanian authorities denied to have captured people,
being punished.
stating that what the eyewitnesses saw from the Hungar-
ian side was an exercise to arrest presumed terrorists.
Pozgay Interviewed on Imre Nagy's Legacy
LD1006194389 Budapest Domestic Service
Nemeth, Szuros Plan To Attend Nagy Funeral
in Hungarian 1400 GMT 10 Jun 89
LD0806204589 Budapest MTI in English
1154 GMT 8 Jun 89
[From the "168 hours" program: Akos Mester interview
with Imre Pozgay, Hungarian Socialist Workers Party
[Text] Budapest. June 8 (MTI)-Matyas Szuros, presi-
Central Committee Politburo member: date. place not
dent of the Hungarian National Assembly, and Miklos
given-recorded]
Nemeth, chairman of the Council of Ministers, are to
represent parliament and the government at the June 16
[Text] [Announcer] What is the value of the spiritual
funeral of Imre Nagy and associates, all unlawfully
legacy of Imre Nagy and his fellow fighters today? What
executed after 1956.
is valid in the example of their lives? Imre Pozsgay is
interviewed by Akos Mester.
Agreement to this effect was reached between represen-
tatives of parliament, the government and the Commit-
[Mester] I acknowledge that the question with which I
tee for Historical Justice in the parliament building,
begin this conversation is oversimplified in view of the
Budapest. on Thursday morning. The meeting was
complexity of the answer that it requires. How do you
attended by Matyas Szuros. Miklos Nemeth and. on
see Imre Nagy's historical role?
behalf of the Committee for Historical Justice, by Miklos
Vasarhelyi, Imre Mecs, Andras B. Hegedus and Arpad
[Pozsgay] Indeed. this is a very difficult question to
Goncz.
answer, probably because we lack the necessary knowl-
edge. But perhaps even more difficult because what
Supreme Court Asked To Invalidate Nagy Ruling
happened to him burdens the conscience of a whole age
LD0906132189 Budapest Domestic Service
and it is now that we are trying to face up to the facts. I
in Hungarian 1000 GMT 9 Jun 89
am certain-and for this no particular research is
needed-that in 1953 he was the first statesman in
[Text] We have just received news that the supreme
Eastern Europe to take a truly determined step toward
prosecutor has submitted a protest on legal grounds
the dismemberment of the Stalinist structure, its destruc-
regarding the case of Imre Nagy and his martyr associ-
tion. He was the one who through his own fate experi-
ates, and he asks the Presidential Council of the Supreme
enced the consequences of the so-called roll-back: and I
Court to invalidate the illegal verdicts and to acquit Imre
am sure that at the time of the 1956 popular uprising,
Nagy, Ferenc Donat. Miklos Gimes. Zoltan Tildy, Pal
too. he fought for the creation of a free, independent, and
Maleter. Sandor Kopacsi. Jozsef Szilagyi, Ferenc Janosi,
democratic Hungary, in line with the same reform spirit
and Miklos Vasarhelyi.
and also under the pressure of the popular uprising.
FBIS-EEU-89-111
12 June 1989
24
HUNGARY
Taking these facts into consideration, and also weighing
So the possibility cannot be excluded that just like Imre
all his political acts, one can only reach one conclusion,
Nagy, you too, even if in a different form, might become
namely that we owe him justice. It is unavoidable to give
the victim of your own party.
him justice; and this is what will take place on 16 June at
the funeral ceremony.
[Pozsgay] This is not impossible either. A politician must
think such things through as well, particularly if I accept
Although the funeral of Imre Nagy and those who shared
what you have just said, namely that I regard what Imre
his fate is organized by an independent organization-
the Committee for Historical Justice-and the families,
Nagy did as one of the precursors of my own activities,
even if this was not necessarily the motive force of my
this event on 16 June will be a matter for the nation, the
end of a historical period. Perhaps the momentum of
actions at every turning point. If I immerse myself in the
study of this period, if I acquaint myself with Imre
self-purification will also be involved and we hope that it
Nagy's initiatives, then I have to say that I can still
will bring about national reconciliation.
identify with his goals. However, I hope that the fate will
be different, because though it is beyond question that
[Mester] Yes, but can we close a historical period when
the majority in society agrees with me-1 have been able
in the weeks before the funeral there are opposing camps
to verify this in many ways—I have also found that if I
which try to claim Imre Nagy, as a historical personality,
can come into direct contact with the party membership.
as their own?
I can also persuade them of the truth of my ideas.
[Pozsgay] This is something that generally happens to
historical personalities. This is true because his life and
Nonetheless, there are also murderous passions in this
his life's work carry values from which everyone would
country, the passions of a minority who have had the
like to benefit. I would only regard this as a problem if
ground taken from under their feet but whose interests
this would once again be a cause for opposition and a
and groundlessness are tied to the institutional form
continuation of the trials. if it were to give rise to rancor,
which has long lost its validity-which we often call
or if it were to increase the dangers besetting the country.
dictatorial socialism-with which the people never iden-
However, I believe that with the exception of the extrem-
tified itself. Thus, even today these people tend to think
ists-people who are also confused in their attitudes to
in terms of force rather than in terms of politics. I know
themselves-the majority's will, the fundamental will, is
of such people. Nonetheless, I believe and my experience
something different.
shows that they are in the minority, that they like to be
with each other; and this is why they do not leave where
[Mester] The life's work of Imre Nagy and of those who
they should have left a long time ago.
shared his fate has a validity which is felt to this day. It
is this which justifies the question: What do the lessons
I know that it is like shouting in the wilderness to call
of 1956 mean in 1989?
upon these people to do this: nonetheless, I hope that
they show some sense of reality and that they are
[Pozsgay] First of all, that as early as 1956 all those
isolated, for in reality they have never lived with the
important issues which occupy Hungarian society and
people, though they have never stopped speaking of the
public opinion today had been formulated. This includes
people. They have always spoken about the working
all the criticism of the Stalinist type of dictatorial social-
class, they always cherish a working class mythology in
ism. the demand for political institutions based on the
themselves merely to claim some sort of intellectual
new type of conscious and self-directed citizen, concern-
foothold, while during the past 40 years the worker has
ing civil society, the multiparty system, the political
never experienced that which they proclaimed. The
manifestation of pluralism. The lesson is that had it been
worker never felt that he was in power. never felt that he
possible to realize all this in 1956 and in the years before
had the possibility of self-determination. Rather. he
that. within the framework of an honorable political
always felt that they were misusing his name. the term
struggle. peacefully, then the popular uprising would
"worker."
have been avoidable.
If this is the lesson. then I believe that in organizing in
Well, this is why it is my view that it is not the use of the
1989 for the solution of the very same basic issues it is
word "worker" which shows a feeling of solidarity with
possible to reach a peaceful transition, I believe that it is
the workers but rather when someone also tries to act
possible to create human cooperation and solidarity
and tries to create a system where they can feel happy,
among Hungarians; that there will not be self-destruc-
where they receive scope for action and security of
tive, tragic, catastrophic events: and that, avoiding these,
existence.
Hungary will solve its problems.
[Mester] Yes, but the mere fact that you have brought
[Mester] So the exit from power of these people is only
this up shows that there are certain analogies. According
one of the preconditions for national reconciliation. I
to many people, your public activities, your commitment
think that there are a host of preconditions for national
to reform. strongly recall Imre Nagy's political approach.
reconciliation.
FBIS-EEU-89-111
12 June 1989
25
HUNGARY
[Pozsgay] Yes, there are even bigger barriers in the way
[Mester] At the May party conference you concluded
of national reconciliation than the stirring of such
your speech by saying that there will be a Hungarian
imbedded insects. The biggest barrier is the situation of
resurgence. Do you think that you now have more allies
the people, which is far from rosy. The situation of the
for this goal than you had in those days, in May?
people is extremely difficult; impoverishment is advanc-
ing at a rapid rate; the circumstances of life are deterio-
[Pozsgay] I think so and my experience shows that. I am
rating; people cannot protect even that which has been
skeptical, very self-critical regarding my own abilites and
achieved, even with overtime and excess efforts. This is
possibilities. But I am optimistic regarding the situation.
where I see the really great danger: That they will not
Hungary has never had such a good chance of bringing
understand that it is those who caused the great prob-
about a new statehood through self-determination, as a
lems who are now referring to them in the name of curing
sovereign country; and through this new statehood, a
the problems, that they will not notice that this decline of
new popular spirit and society.
the country was caused by the functioning of the system
of those who as the proud one-time possessors of posts
think that they can once again become the saviors of the
Politburo Member Nyers Interviewed on Nagy Issue
people. These savior of the people must be revealed to
LD1006231989 Budapest Domestic Service
the people; it must be shown where they have come from
in Hungarian 1400 GMT 10 Jun 89
and what they did during the past decades.
[From the "168 Hours" program; Eszter Raday inter-
view with Reszo Nyers. Hungarian Socialist Worker's
[Mester] In Hungarian public life the intention to
Party Politburo member and minister of state; date,
improve things comes from various directions. The
place not given-recorded]
event on Wednesday where you were also present, as the
number one person of a new movement, a movement
which calls itself the Movement for a Democratic Hun-
[Text] [Raday] To the simple reader, it is striking how
there is lacking a logic in the events. There is no logic
gary, was also perhaps one manifestation of this. I have
that in November of 1956, Janos Kadar made a promise
already heard a number of contradictory views. One of
of inculpability. In 1957, he promised that the number of
them asserts that there is some sort of elitism involved
here, another that it is a faction of whining intellectuals.
political prisoners would be reduced, and this was real-
ized in part. And the real reprisals came in 1958.
while a third says that this movement is the beginning of
the organization of a party split.
[Nyers] At the beginning of 1957, Imre Nagy was offered
participation in the government. Thus, talks of reconcil-
[Pozsgay] Let me start with the last of these points. I do
iation were initiated. Imre Nagy was not willing to do
now know the bogyman they call a party split. In a
this, owing to the armed character of the events, that
European political culture this is one of the most natural
Janos Kadar's men came into the capital with the assis-
things and not something in the sphere of traumatology.
tance of Soviet troops. and then he disputed the legiti-
But this was not what was involved here and now.
macy of the government of the time. That is why he was
Rather. it stemmed from the intention that among the
not willing.
political movements moving in different directions. hav-
ing various intentions but possessing the will to improve
[Raday] We already know, or perhaps we, or they, knew
matters. there should be one which can play a mediating
at the time that there was reason for dispute, for disput-
role between the healthy, well-meaning large majority
ing the legitimacy.
inside the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party and the
various other parties. movements. and institutions.
[Nyers] Well. very few people knew that. Rather. the
mobilizing people to create through peaceful means the
historical documents reveal that this is how it was.
reform. the new model to replace dictatorical socialism.
However. the statement of Janos Kadar at the time was
a democratic Hungary. Somebody always has to formu-
also published in the newspapers; in this he indicated the
late these mature necessities. But just this does not make
possibility that Imre Nagy could enter the government.
it an elitist movement. On the contrary, its role is to
Thus. these political accusations were not voiced in this
create a link with the silent majority, which is endan-
manner. Later, it was 1958 already, when these political
gered from many directions. I also have in mind that
accusations were voiced: of course in 1957 already, at the
which I just spoke about. namely that without a genuine
party conference, Jozsef Revai represented vigorously
political orientation. the silent majority might come
the political accusation that Imre Nagy had distorted
under the influence of the extremists and social dema-
policy in the direction of revisionism. and at the time
gogues. might become victims of misleading actions.
this was a very grave accusation. Then. in 1958 it gained
whereas an open dialogue can turn society into mature
strength. in connection with their-the Imre Nagy Gov-
citizens. It is in the joint creation of this maturity that we
ernment-having espoused leaving the Warsaw Pact.
want to engage and not in a pedagogical campaign. This
movement would also like to undertake to clear away of
[Raday] You say that it gained strength. but this process
this previous all-knowing. omnipotent view of the party,
obviously did not take place on its own. Weren't there
this condescending and paternalistic approach.
people behind it?
FBIS-EEU-89-111
12 June 1989
26
HUNGARY
[Nyers] Behind it were people, disputes, within and
regard these as the five people-of course other members
outside the country as well. It has not been fully
of the Soviet leadership were also involved-but these
researched, yet, but we know that Yugoslavia, the Soviet
symbolize the international factor, concerning who had a
Union, Hungary, Romania, and China were the five
role. They agreed that the Imre Nagy government could
countries which dealt most intensively with the Hungar-
not hold its own on 2 November 1956. There are many
ian question from the end of October 1956 throughout,
statistics on this; memoires on this subject have also
and who had a role in the Hungarian political events
been published. It could not hold its own, so a very
being viewed as an international issue, as well. However,
strong, counterrevolutionary, right-wing, and anti-
the complete researching of this is still in progress.
democratic danger was appearing which was sweeping
away this government, with everything it had, and this
[Raday] By the way, there is a series of entirely illogical
was dangerous for the socialist countries, it was danger-
things, here, which by all means raises the question of: If
ous for European peace and for Hungary, as well. That
it was not the decision of the Hungarian Socialist Work-
was the original decision.
ers Party [MSZMP], of the party, which played a role in
the sentencing of Imre Nagy's men, as Karoly Grosz, for
Then, in the reprisals, this unity certainly broke down,
example, said not long ago, then what played a role in it?
but it is a complete mystery to me, and to my knowledge
Is it possible that it was not the decision of the MSZMP
it is so to others, as well, how these international factors
which played a role in it?
played a role in the decision in 1958. What we know is
that Tito had withdrawn at this point.
[Nyers] Please, politically, the MSZMP leadership by all
means had to play a role in making the role of Imre Nagy
[Raday] If it is a mystery; while disconnecting the
the subject of an accusation. Regarding what kind of
Hungary party, can a Hungarian court be given a deci-
decision was reached, I do not dare say that the MSZMP
sion requisition, or instruction?
influenced this. I am not acquainted with the develop-
ment of the trial. It is only now that I heard, from a
[Nyers] In principle a Hungarian court can not be given
tape-recording, the trial's very short closing ritual. I did
an instruction, it cannot be given one officially. In my
not know anything about it.
opinion, it was not even given one which was officially
written down. That is dead certain. There were. and are,
[Raday] Are you serious, that, as a Central Committee
informal relations. I cannot say what informal relations
member, you knew nothing?
might have played a role here.
[Nyers] Nothing. The Central Committee was not
[Raday] You said earlier that as a Central Committee
informed of anything. Nor the other Central Committee
member and as a government commissioner with min-
members. We knew nothing.
isterial rank, you did not know
So, regarding the MSZMP, of course it can not be said
[Nyers. interrupting] I resigned my position as govern-
that it was outside the MSZMP. but the party-state here
ment commissioner in March of 1957. Only until then
did not mean that judicial action and party action were
was I in that position.
organically interconnected. No. Janos Kadar carefully
watched over this, so we did not know anything.
[Raday] Did you resign because you did not agree with
something, or because you had completed your task?
[Raday] But if not directly, for all that it could have been
indirectly connected.
[Nyers] I had completed my task. and there was a
conflict. as well
[Nyers] It could have been indirectly connected.
[Raday. interrupting] Was it a political conflict?
The historians who now are (?dissecting) the matter, in
its preresearched condition, would be better at saying
[Nyers] It was not directly political: rather. it in part
this. Isn't it so, you are asking that there must be
concerned economic policy and in part it was also
something and someone who staged it. I as well say that
political.
there must be someone who staged it. It either was X. in
Hungary, or abroad. Hungarians or foreigners in Hun-
[Raday] Surely you have found out that some members
gary, or both. Nor do we know the distribution of roles.
of the Committee for Historical Justice have lodged
objections to your presence at the funeral. not because of
[Raday] I am certain that Janos Kadar is perhaps one of
your person. but because you were a member of this
the last who could say something about this.
revolutionary workers'-peasant government which can
be held responsible for the reprisals.
[Nyers] Janos Kadar is the one who could say the most
about this. Please: the following people had a role in it:
[Nyers] I do not have accurate information. but I was not
before Janos Kadar-Khrushchev, Tito, and only after
a member of the revolutionary workers'-peasant govern-
them Kadar. then Zhou Enlai and Gheorghiu-Dej. I
ment; only from 1960
FBIS-EEU-89-111
12 June 1989
27
HUNGARY
[Raday, interrupting] But your having been a govern-
ment commissioner, doesn't that mean
they supported the convening of a congress. The delegates
urged that at the congress an elected Central Committee be
[Nyers] Yes, that did not entail membership in the
the center of the political reform of the MSZMP.
government. To my knowledge, it was not raised in this
manner, but that I was a member of the party Central
Grosz Interviewed 9 Jun on New Social Groupings
Committee-and I really was. Please, I say that the
LD0906195389 Budapest Television Service
Committee for Historical Justice, which is staging the
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 9 Jun 89
funeral, has the right to adopt all kinds of positions, since
it is their business. I cannot take a stand in this.
[Text] Experts of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party
[MSZMP] and the opposition roundtable have agreed to
What is a question which generally arises in current
commence substantive political negotiations. The docu-
Hungarian politics-and it is not that-is the question of
ment on commencing talks will be signed tomorrow.
who is the credible figure? I believe that there is very great
Three parties of equal standing will take part in these:
confusion in this. And I oppose every stand in which
the opposition roundtable. the MSZMP, as well as a joint
valuable party or national politicians are proclaimed to
delegation of the following organizations: the left-wing
lack credibility, because of earlier political actions or
Alternative Association. the Patriotic People's Front.
earlier political stands. The Rakosiite political leadership
Hungarian Democratic Youth League, the Association
committed this mistake, in Hungary, in a very heavy,
of Hungarian Resistance-Fighters and Anti-Fascists. the
criminal manner. To commit this mistake in the spirit of
National Council of Hungarian Women, the Ferenc
democracy is as anti-democratic as that of Rakosi's men.
Muennich Society and the National Trade Union Coun-
In vain does one wave the flag of democracy.
cil. Gyorgy Sebes asked the MSZMP general secretary
about this:
It is necessary to free ourselves from this uncultured and
antidemocratic tradition-and Hungary has had a long-
[Begin recording] [Sebes] Without a doubt, the news of
standing tradition of this.
the day is that the supreme prosecutor has submitted a
protest on legal grounds in the case of Imre Nagy and his
associates. Since yesterday. we have known that a mem-
Grosz, Party Members View 'Looming' Split
ber of the Poltburo-the prime minister-and a member
LD1006202689 Budapest Domestic Service
of the Central Committee. speaker of the National
in Hungarian 1200 GMT 10 Jun 89
Assembly, will, at the head of the delegation. place a
wreath at the funeral of Imre Nagy next Friday [16 June].
How do you view these developments?
[Text] Let all the party houses display black and national
flags on the day of the burial of Imre Nagy and his
[Grosz] I consider this to be a natural and very important
companions. This was proposed at the Hungarian Social-
episode in the [word indistinct] reconciliation process.
ist Workers Party [MSZMP] Gyor-Sopron county party
since Imre Nagy was president of the Hungarian
conference. At the meeting, also attended by party gen-
National Assembly. Imre Nagy was also prime minister.
eral secretary Karoly Grosz, the delegates first approved
Thus, it is natural that state leaders should pay tribute at
draft standpoints on democratization in Hungary, on the
the funeral. The paying of respects is an obligatory
talks to be begun with the opposition roundtable. and on
gesture on the part of all of us. We do it sincerely. from
the condemnation of the bloody events in China.
the depths of our hearts. and as we have become
acquainted with the facts. we have had to recognize that
The standpoint in connection with the opposition round-
all which we had believed for a long time was not proved
table highlights that, in the interests of the success of the
and supported by objective facts. What has happened
talks. the MSZMP Central Committee should be more
cannot be rendered into not having happened-but it is
patient and responsible than before so that an agreement
a moral and political (?duty) to give final respects.
can be reached within a foreseeable time.
[Sebes] The domestic political developments of the past
Laszlo Lakatos, first secretary of the MSZMP Gyor-
days reflect the creation of new forums one after the
Sopron county committee, said that a party split is
other. On Wednesday, the Movement for a Democratic
looming; public opinion is blaming the party and the
Hungary was founded. Tomorrow. the New March Front
party members are blaming the Central Committee and
is preparing to turn into a free forum.
its leaders for this.
[Grosz] I did not know earlier that an endeavor like the
Those participating in the debate referred to the contra-
Movement for a Democratic Hungary was being pre-
dictory statements made by members of the Politburo.
pared, although it generally is an established practice in
which unequivocally indicate that there is no unity in the
our country that if our party's political leaders take part
leadership. The participants in the conference called on the
in organizing such a grouping, the bodies are informed in
Central Committee to take steps in the interests of solidar-
advance. I, properly speaking. learned from the newspa-
ity and warding off a catastrophe. At the party conference.
per that this movement had been founded. and I do not
know much about its objectives. From its appeal. I dare
FBIS-EEU-89-111
12 June 1989
30
HUNGARY
Rainer Stefan, representative of the Austrian People's
[Juszt] So what is the difference?
Party, and Janusz Rozek, representative of the Polish
Peasant Solidarity, were foreign guests of the rally of the
[Szuros] Well, the situation is that I, as chairman of the
People's Party.
National Assembly, have to exhibit unbiased behavior. I
look and listen to this as well, I consider its objectives
Pozsgay on 'Movement for Democratic Hungary'
practical and correct. However, on Saturday, I will
LD0806091389 Budapest Television Service
participate in the founding session of the New March
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 7 Jun 89
Front, on Sunday, I am going to participate in the
founding of the people's party, etc.
[Text] [Announcer] The various forces of the order party
dictatorship [as heard] and revenge are dangerously
[Juszt] So, practically, you pay attention to everything.
present and can become stronger. Among other things,
this is what the draft appeal which was formulated today
[Szuros] The chairman of the National Assembly has to
by the organizers of the Movement for a Democratic
pay attention to everything.
Hungary contains. This movement wishes to gather
those people who undertake the national ascent. Euro-
[Juszt] Do you take part in any of these organizations as
pean progression, and the values of democratic socialism
a member?
together. Laszlo Juszt reports from the founding session.
[Szuros] No, not as a member.
[Begin recording] [Juszt] What could this organization
be called, to the founding of which you have just arrived?
[Juszt] The appeal says that it is the founding of the
Movement for a Democratic Hungary. Both you and
[Pozsgay] I do not even know whether it is an organiza-
Imre Pozsgay occupy a position in the government
tion or perhaps a movement, but the initiators have
power in which, it is not only your possibility but, I
already given a name to it: Movement for a Democratic
think. it is also your duty to fight for democracy and for
Hungary.
the constitutional statehood. In that position-that is, as
minister of interior or as minister of state. do you not
[Juszt] Who were the initiators? According to the news,
have the possibility?
you were the initiator.
[Szuros] Today, I think that the possibilities are increas-
[Pozsgay] I was also asked to take part in this movement
ingly better for this and the gates are opening forever
but this was talked about first in Szeged, at the meeting
wider. There was doubtless an earlier period, I was in
of the reform circles.
similar position then too, when in a different structure,
these possibilities were much more closed. [end recording]
[Juszt] Several people believe that this could be the core
of a future party, too.
Participant Views Discussions
LD0806095689 Budapest Domestic Service
[Pozsgay] I do not necessarily believe that one always
in Hungarian 1630 GMT 7 Jun
should think in the category of a party when gathering of
political strength is carried out. Here. now, the force of
[Text] Today those wanting a democratic Hungary con-
reform are gathering regardless their party membership
vened in Budapest for a session to prepare its founda-
or ideological belonging.
tion. Imre Pozsgay gave the introductory speech and
among other things he emphasized that the movement
[Juszt] So. do you reject the assumption that this is the
intends to pull together people who accept simulta-
basis of a future party?
neously the values of the rise of the nation. European
progress and democratic socialism regardless of the
[Pozsgay] I do not consider it impossible. but I do not
participants' party affiliation or organizational member-
think that this intention would have brought the partic-
ship. The discussion was chaired by university lecturer
ipants of today's meeting together.
Ferenc Gazso. Andras Kerekes interviewed him.
[Juszt] I read in MAI NAP [TODAY] that his new
[Begin recording] [Kerekes] What is the aim of such a
organization is to be founded for the democratic trans-
movement?
formation.
[Gazso] The movement's objective is to open a road for
[Szuros] That is right.
people committed to social transformation and demo-
cratic change in society and to change in the social model
[Juszt] But there one such organization has already been
of politics and participation in politics regardless of
founded, the New March Front. Do you not participate
party affiliation. In other words. it is not a movement
in that?
which is intent on becoming a party but it wants to
ensure a platform and means for those groups and
[Szuros] I take part in that as well, and also in this one.
individuals belonging to any party or even independent
FBIS-EEU-89-109
8 June 1989
24
HUNGARY
Demonstration Under Way
The Hungarian Government sincerely hopes that the
LD0806064289 Budapest Domestic Service
Chinese crisis will finally be solved and that the continu-
in Hungarian 1630 GMT 7 Jun 89
ing political reform will create the possibility for the
further advancement of the country.
[Text] [Announcer] A demonstration is under way in
Pozsgay Anticipates Implementation of Change
Budapest. It was ogranized by the Federation of Young
AU0706121489 Hamburg DIE WELT
Democrats and started at 1700. Our reporter, Zsuzsa
in German 7 Jun 89 p 10
Kun, reports from in front of the Chinese Embassy
building.
[Carl G. Stroehm report: "Pozsgay: There Will Be a
Change in Hungary in Any Event"]
[Kun] An opening speech, a poem, the lighting of can-
dles, and finally a petition to be submitted to the Chinese
[Excerpt] Budapest-The bloody events in Beijing have
ambassador. This is the agenda of the demonstration. I
increased the concerns of the reformers among the
have the text of the petition in my hand. Allow me to
Hungarian Communists and of the opposition groups
quote a few sentences from it:
that something similar might also happen in Hungary.
Answering a question asked by the Budapest magazine
We, the members of the Federation of Young Demo-
KEPES of whether there is an impending danger from
crats, who have been following the peaceful but deter-
those forces "who are even ready to defend their privi-
mined fight of the Chinese students for human rights
leges and the past with weapons in their hands," Polit-
with anxious confidence, we, who ourselves fight for
buro member and State Minister Imre Pozsgay stated:
constitutional democracy in a crumbling communist
"This is conceivable."
dictatorship, are profoundly shaken by the news that the
conservative, militarist wing of your leadership, which
"Hungary wants the change," Pozsgay continued. This
has grabbed power for itself, pushing aside leaders who
change will either be brought about by peaceful means—
think more sensibly, and in the interest of their own
that is, by a real national consensus-or without it.
narrow-minded purposes and guided by sheer fear for
However, the country will also implement the change if
their position, has ordered the shooting of a peaceful,
the latter happens. But then it will come to "tragedies,"
unarmed crowd.
Pozsgay stated. [passage omitted]
The opening speech has just finished and it was received
Grosz Meets With Israeli Bank Leumi Chairman
with enthusiastic applause. Several hundred. perhaps
TA0706125089 Jerusalem Domestic Service
several thousands of people are present. But I will
in Hebrew 1200 GMT 7 Jun 89
continue reading the text of the petition: The act com-
mitted by your faceless leadership is a crime. It is
[Text] Moshe Zanbar, the chairman of Bank Leumi's
impossible to move in front of the building. Naturally,
Board of Directors, met with Karoly Grosz, the general
the building is protected by a police cordon. It is forbid-
secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party in Budap-
den even to step on to the sidewalk. I have managed to
est.
speak to one of the embassy secretaries but he did not
give any opinion about either the Beijing events the
The meeting was also attended by Ze'ev Ben-Tzur. the
Hungarian demonstrations. The organizers do not know
secretary of the Public Committee for the Preservation
yet how the demonstration is going to proceed or when is
of the Heritage of Hungarian Jewry.
it going to finish. I hope it will end just as peacefully as
it started and as it is going on at the moment.
No information was given regarding the issues discussed
during the meeting.
[Announcer] The Hungarian Government has expressed
its deep worry in a communique regarding the events in
Military Industry Budget Cuts Cause Problems
China, emphasizing, however, that it has no intention of
AU0706131089 Budapest NEPSZAVA
interfering in that country's internal affairs.
in Hungarian 2 Jun 89 p 5
[Report by Correspondent Robert Gal: "Will There Be
At the same time. the government confirms its positiion
Further Manpower Cuts in the Military Industry? -
that respect for general and fundamental human rights is
Some 8,000 to 10,000 Jobs To Be Eliminated in the
a mutual affair and the international responsibility of all
of us. Therefore, it cannot be an exclusive internal affair
Country-State Orders Could Drop by Half-Large
of any country.
Stocks of Products Accumulated in Warehouses"]
[Text] Defense expenditures are to be further cut accord-
Our shock regarding the tragic events is only increased
ing to the package plan submitted by the government on
by the fact that they are happenning in a friendly
1 June. The National Assembly made a similar cut in
socialist country which has pledged itself to the modern-
December 1988. A total of 8,000 to 10,000 jobs will
ization of society, to democratic development and
become redundant in some 20 to 25 enterprises in the
reforms.
Hungarian economy.
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PAGE
2
1ST STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
Copyright (c) 1989 The Financial Times Limited;
Financial Times
June 3, 1989, Saturday
SECTION: WEEKEND FT; Pg. X
LENGTH: 577 words
HEADLINE: Books;
Sweet And Sour
BYLINE: David Pryce-Jones
BODY:
Budapest 1900 by John Lukacs. Weidenfeld & Nicolson 16.95 Pounds (pds),
255 pages.
Hungarians today are likely to surrender to unrestrained nostalgia when
recalling the Habsburg ancien regime. Those were the days! When will such
independence and prosperity return? The important part played by Hungarian
nationalism in destroying the old empire has been conveniently forgotton.
John Lukacs is a Hungarian who emigrated to the US after the last war. An
outstanding historian, he knows Hungarian defects well and makes no defence of
nationalistic attidues towards German or other minorities, such as Croats and
Jews. Magyars perhaps think (or thought) of other minorities as being that
little bit less than their equal. Budapest in 1900 was nonetheless, a wonderful
city in which to be alive and Lukacs does it justice, evoking a splendid and
creative place and time.
Successful political arrangements with Vienna allowed the city to quadruple
in size during the last quarter of the 19th century. A royal palace and a
parliament, new bridges, the opera, a stock exchange and the handsome Andrassy
Avenue (now once more recovering its name, having been Stalin Avenue in its day)
gave a cosmopolitan grandeur which suited the spectacular natural setting on the
Danube. Odon Lechner was an architect as formative in his designs for Budapest
as Otto Wagner was in Vienna. Among the novelties were electric locomotives and
subways.
The aristocracy dominated the city. It contained great men like Istvan
Szechenyi, Deak and Baron Eotvos, as well as those who did little more than
inherit estates. Nor should one omit to mention Count Karolyi, who SO
incompetently brought the whole structure down after the first war. Hungary
also had its gentry, borrowing the term from England, and it included Endre Ady
and Gyula Krudy, whom Lukacs values very highly as writers. Standards of
education were astonishingly high, with Latin still a living language to those
with claims to culture to make international reputations is also exceptional.
Here are portraits of the painter, Munkacsy, composers Bartok and Kodaly and
Ferenc Molnar, the playwright, amid a coffee-house throng of others.
The Jewish contribution to this intellectual and social ferment is crucial
but has been somewhat underplayed. In every sphere Jews were assimilating fast,
abandoning German or other languages in favour of the native Magyar. Liberalism
in the 19th century allowed them this entry everywhere, and the energies
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(c) 1989 Financial Times, June 3, 1989
released so suddenly in part caused the anti-Semitic backlash that ensued.
Round about 1900, Lukacs thinks, society began to polarise into Left and
Right, in parliament and in intellectual outlook, as well as on the streets, in
strikes, and between Jews and Magyars. By then, Budapest had become 50 dominant
that its troubles would be those of the entire country, and provincial centres
and other outside influences would be powerless. More ominous for the future,
Germany and its spirit of nationalism came to be perceived as a model to be
admired.
In additional to the experience of Nazism, Budapest has known two Communist
takeovers; by Bela Kun in 1919 and the Soviets in 1948. The Hungarian heritage
has become sadly skeletal in form but, if Lukacs is right, there is an enduring
national spirit upon which to base independence. This book offers the insight
that Hungarian nostalgia is a good deal more political in intention than it
might seem.
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2ND STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
National Review Copyright (c) 1989 Information Access Company;
Copyright (c) National Review Inc. 1989
January 27, 1989
SECTION: Vol. 41; No. 1; Pg. 60
LENGTH: 805 words
HEADLINE: Budapest 1900: A Historical Portrait of a City and Its Culture; Book
reviews
BYLINE: Gottfried, Paul inch(s)
BODY:
Budapest 1900: A Historical Portrait of a City and Its Culture, by John
Lukacs (Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 255 PP., $ 20.95)
IN A PUBLISHER'S advertisement for John Lukacs's newest book, we are told: "Not
unlike Carl Schorske's Finde-Siecle Vienna, Budapest 1900 offers an intimate
history of one of the great European capitals at its zenith." Now, it is true
that Lukacs, like Schorske, deals with one of the political capitals of the Dual
Monarchy: a constitutional creation set up in 1867, which provided for the
internal autonomy of the Hungarian nation within the Austrian empire. Moreover,
Lukacs, like Schorske, portrays the Central European bourgeoisie at the
beginning of the century as beset by problems, amid a flowering of urban
culture.
Even so, these two historians have produced dramatically different books.
Schorske writes in a ponderous style, applying psycho-Marxist categories to a
bourgeois society he plainly detests. Lukacs, by contrast, writes with verve and
affection about his forefathers' world. Indeed, he draws on family memory when
he recounts how his grandparents only rarely changed apartments in Budapest or
how his grandparents and later his parents as newlyweds took rail trips to
Venice from the elegant South Station in Buda. Lukacs scatters evidence (often
in footnotes) of his own connections among the gentry, and he is effusively
knowledgeable about the way Hungarians tended vineyards, rode horses, and
flirted with women. Scenes of wine being made in the hills above Budapest and
of pastry-eating and partygoing in the Inner City recall a compliment paid to
the French historian Fernand Braudel: "One can taste the olives growing on the
vines in his Mediterranean cities." Like Braudel in his reconstruction of
medieval Mediterranean society, Lukacs is unstintingly generous with the details
of urban life. From the composition of outhouses to the frequency of abortions
to the popular reaction to civic monuments, he tells his reader all that he can
possibly cram into a 255-page "historical portrait."
Though Lukacs cultivates what seems an impressionistic style, he is a serious
historian, shaking his fist at today's pseudo-scientific historiography. We
receive the same message from the opening scene-the funeral procession of the
Hungarian muralist Mihaly Munkacsy on May 1, 1900-to the close of the book. For
Lukacs, what is historically significant is what leaves its imprint on the minds
of nations and of generations. History, he says in Historical Consciousness, is
not a science but a means of remembering the past, which takes different forms
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National Review (c) 1989 IAC
at different times. The funerals of Munkacsy and (in 1894) of the patriot Lajos
Kossuth were watersheds in the way Hungarians viewed, and still view, their
past. They represented generational change taking place at the high noon of
Hungary's political greatness. In describing the districts of Pest (the more
populous of the twin cities forming the Hungarian capital), Lukacs pays more
attention to where Franz Josef took his oath as Hungarian king than to the
appearance of the workers' quarters. He quite deliberately stresses the
development of peoples, not of changing forces of production. Workers, like
others, belong to nations and share their memories and values.
The text that shaped this work is an impressive cultural study, Three
Generations, by the Hungarian social historian Gyula Szekfu. Surveying
Hungarian affairs in 1919, after a disastrous defeat in the First World War and
a subsequent civil war, Szekfu ascribed his country's downfall to the
deteriorating character of three successive generations of Hungarian leaders.
It was the genius of the Hungarian Protestant statesman Ferenc Desk that had
brought Hungary to the triumph of the Dual Monarchy, within two decades of the
suppressed revolution of 1848. The lack of statesmanship among the largely
Calvinist leadership of the dominant Liberal Party at the end of the century and
Hungary's excessively rapid urbanization contributed to the unraveling of Desk's
work.
Though Lukacs does not accept all the twists in Szekfu's interpretation, he
praises him more than any other Hungarian social thinker. He gives us Szekfu's
portrait of Istvan Tisza, the early-twentieth-century Hungarian prime minister,
and, like Szekfu, he depicts Tisza as a morally rigid advocate of a sort of
rural nationalism thrust into a position for which he was temperamentally
unsuited. On balance, however, Lukacs is more appreciative than critical of
those his mentor had chastised. It is not Szekfu's fire and brimstone but his
stress on generational and national character that has marked Lukacs decisively.
Three Generations helped make him what he remains in this book: our most
profoundly philosophical contemporary historian.
TYPE: Review
SUBJECT: Books, reviews, etc.
LOAD-DATE-MDC: May 9, 1989
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3RD STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
Copyright (c) 1989 The New York Times Company;
The New York Times
January 22, 1989, Sunday, Late City Final Edition
SECTION: Section 7; Page 13, Column 1; Book Review Desk
LENGTH: 1407 words
HEADLINE: BOOM TOWN ON THE DANUBE
BYLINE: By IVAN SANDERS; Ivan Sanders is preparing an English translation of
''Book of Memoirs, a new work by the Hungarian novelist Peter Nadas.
BODY:
BUDAPEST 1900
A Historical Portrait of a City and Its Culture.
By John Lukacs.
Illustrated. 255 pp. New York:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
$20.95.
It is one of the ironies of post-modern Europe that as its most prosperous
capitals betray more and more signs of physical and spiritual uniformity,
urbanists as well as tourists have begun to look toward the smaller, far less
streamlined, faded and neglected cities of the Continent for a unique sense of
history and continuity, for qualities still perceived as essentially European.
Some of these cities lie hundreds of miles east of the more renowned urban
centers, yet what they offer the curiosity seekers beyond quaint, old-world
manners is a cultural and social legacy that has remained intact in spite of -
and often because of - economic backwardness and political regimentation.
Of course such attractions are always suspect. Could it simply be our
insatiable nostalgia for the belle epoque that draws us now even to the lesser
cities of Europe? Are we down to glorifying the backwaters? Actually, by the
turn of the century the center of gravity of European culture had shifted
eastward. The critic George Steiner and the historian Carl Schorske have written
illuminatingly in recent years about the seminal importance of fin de siecle
Vienna. Now, in Budapest 1900, the Hungarian-born urban historian and
essayist John Lukacs has given us an admirably vivid portrait of the other
capital of the Austro-JU Hungarian Empire.
The junior partner in the Dual Monarchy, Hungary was in constant competition
with Austria, but its young capital (the previously separate cities of Buda and
Pest were unified in 1872), meant to be a superior copy of Vienna, turned out to
be a very different kind of city, at once more provincial and more restlessly
modern. And whereas Viennese culture in 1900 was already in its resplendent
decline, Budapest in that year was enjoying its 'noon hour, as Mr. Lukacs
puts it. Caught up in a fever of growth and expansion, energized by its ethnic
mix and a penchant for bigness, the new capital on the Danube was in fact more
like an American boom town than anything staidly European.
The statistics cited by Mr. Lukacs are staggering indeed. Between 1867 (the
year of Hungary's historic compromise with Austria, which virtually gave the
Hungarians home rule) and 1914 the city's population trebled; the number of
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(c) 1989 The New York Times, January 22, 1989
banks grew from 11 to 160; the volume of freight moved by Hungarian trains
increased from 3 million tons a year to 275 million. In 1900 22 daily newspapers
were published in Budapest, and this nascent center of culture was also, until
overtaken by Minneapolis, the largest city of flour mills in the world.
Overseeing the phenomenal growth was a progressive and farsighted municipal
government that helped Budapest become, within just a few decades, a model
European metropolis. Hungarians today like to point out that whatever is still
impressive about their capital, whatever still works, dates from this period.
In a pivotal chapter, ''The Generation of 1900,'' Mr. Lukacs discusses the
luminaries of Budapest, concentrating not 50 much on writers, musicians and
Nobel Prize-winning scientists who achieved fame after they left their native
city, but on those who stayed and whose accomplishments, often because they were
language-bound, didn't travel well either. What could have turned easily into
just another roster of Budapest-born international greats thus becomes a
searching look at the genius of a city. For instance, the author's own sensitive
translations of passages from the works of Gyula Krudy, a master of Hungarian
prose, suggest much about the earthiness and delicacy of a literary culture that
is still little appreciated in the West.
Yet there is no denying that the sophistication of this city was essentially
European and cosmopolitan, and for this very reason its detractors from the
beginning labeled the capital an alien phenomenon, a rootless, frivolous, wicked
place. To many a Hungarian nationalist Budapest was '' Judapest'' - the
achievements of world-famous Jewish Hungarians to them were not Hungarian
achievements at all. It so happens that a high percentage of notable Budapesters
discussed or mentioned in the book were Jewish-born, and though Mr. Lukacs
doesn't make much of this, implicit in his story of Budapest in 1900 is the
remarkably successful assimilation, or at least acculturation, of the Jews of
Hungary. Statistics are once again telling: during the last third of the 19th
century, 120 prominent Hungarian Jewish families were granted patents of
nobility by the Emperor Franz Josef, and although Jews constituted not quite 5
percent of Hungary's population, in 1910 nearly half the country's doctors,
lawyers and journalists were Jewish.
Perhaps nowhere else in Europe had Jews risen 50 high so fast; nowhere did
they embrace the dominant culture 50 wholeheartedly. But after 1900, the author
argues, the liberal alliance among the Hungarian aristocracy, the provincial
gentry and the up-and-coming middle classes began to break down, and a new kind
of intolerant nationalism, a far more virulent anti-Semitism, took hold. Jews
were now seen as an aggressive, 'hard'' minority imposing their values on a
''soft'' majority. Mr. Lukacs's sober response to this often-voiced charge is
worth quoting: 'What was - and still is - wrong with this view is the
attribution of conspiracy behind it.
Many people of the 'soft' majority,
surely in Budapest, had adopted some of the values and standards, and some of
the language and tone, of that minority without that minority having foisted
those upon them.'
John Lukacs is in many ways an old-fashioned chronicler, an 'impressionistic
historian'' as he himself says at one point, evoking with considerable artistry
the vibrant colors, pungent smells and melancholy undercurrents of his native
city. But he is also rather selective, revealing deeply conservative instincts.
Not only does he have very little to say about urban poverty in
turn-of-the-century Budapest; he is unrelentingly hostile to the radical social
movements that sprang up in that city, and is especially dismissive of the
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Marxist philosopher Georg Lukacs (''no relation of mine, he remarks dryly in a
footnote). All the same, Budapest 1900' is a special book - an eloquent
tribute to a city by an urbane man of letters.
EQUAL TIME FOR VIENNA'S NEIGHBOR
The obvious question for John Lukacs, born in Hungary in 1928 and writing
about it for the first time in a 13-book career, is: Were you nostalgic, trying
to recapture a lost past? No, he said, in a telephone conversation from his home
outside Philadelphia. It was not nostalgia that moved him to write 11 Budapest
1900, but an interest, perhaps tinged by national pride, in creating a
certain balance, giving Budapest back its importance to the history of the West.
''For some time,' he said, ''I thought there was an exaggerated and even
neurotic interest devoted to Vienna at the turn of the century and, way in the
back of my mind, I thought that somebody should do something about Budapest too,
which also flourished at that time. It's true, many of the ideas current in
Vienna fit the interests of the late 20th century, so Vienna is more important
in that sense. And yet I felt that all this interest in Vienna was a bit of a
mixed blessing.'
Mr. Lukacs, who has taught history at Chestnut Hill College in Philadelphia
for 42 years, has written a portrait of that city from 1900 to 1950 and a
20th-century history of the United States. He previously avoided Eastern Europe,
not wanting, he said, ''to be an Eastern European intellectual simply writing
about his native country. Now, particularly with the appearance in Hungary of
new scholarship on the turn-of-the-century epoch, ''I thought the time had come
to do a serious book on the subject.'
''My main interest - it sounds recondite but it really isn't is the history
of history,' he said. ''My most important but least known book is 'Historical
Consciousness,' and all of my books are about historical consciousness. I start
with a material description of the city and then a description of the people,
then move on to politics, to intellectual life and, finally, to certain
spiritual currents. This method is a reflection of a certain hierarchy that
embodies my historical philosophy.''
RICHARD BERNSTEIN
GRAPHIC: Photo of Hungarian political figures, including Ferenc Kossuth, in
ceremonial dress, about 1905
TYPE: Review
SUBJECT: BOOK REVIEWS
NAME: SANDERS, IVAN; LUKACS, JOHN (PROF)
TITLE: BUDAPEST 1900 (BOOK)
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9
5TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
Copyright (c) 1988 The Times Mirror Company;
Los Angeles Times
October 18, 1988, Tuesday, Home Edition
SECTION: Metro; Part 2; Page 7; Column 1; Op-Ed Desk
LENGTH: 835 words
HEADLINE: CORRUPT AND DIMINISHED, THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAS FINALLY MET ITS MATCH
BYLINE: By JOHN LUKACS, John Lukacs is a professor of history at Chestnut Hill
College in Philadelphia. His latest book, Budapest 1900, will be published
this winter by Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
BODY:
Mikhail S. Gorbachey's assumption of the presidency of the Soviet Union is a
portent of many things whose meaning may not be clear for some time. But there
is one matter whose meaning should be evident: It is the end of the supremacy of
the Communist Party in the government of the Russian empire.
This requires explanation, of the kind that must issue from the perspective
of history. All revolutions issue from a certain partisanship. But neither the
American nor the French revolution and not even the March, 1917, revolution in
Russia, were the makings of a particular political party. In November, 1917, it
was Vladimir Lenin, as the leader of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party, who made
his revolution. When he consolidated his power four years later, he made it
clear that the party would rule the Soviet Union, including its administrative
structure and its armed forces. The true leader of the Soviet Union would not be
a titular president, or even the head of its government, but the general
secretary of the Communist Party -- a hierarchy that continued for nearly 70
years. Until now.
Throughout the dim internal political history of the Soviet Union we may
discern the presence of three enormous, shapeless forms incarnating power: the
party, the government and the army. It was Lenin's idea - and ideal --- that the
government and the army should not merely be subordinated to the party; their
leadership should be largely, and perhaps even wholly, congruous. To some extent
- but only to some extent ----- this did come about.
For a long time, membership in the party was not only a matter of privilege;
it was indispensable for the holding of important positions in the
administration and the army. But gradually it appeared that a great country such
as the Soviet Union needed all kinds of people in all kinds of fields whose
participation in party affairs was less important than their expertise.
In many other ways, too, the interests and the security of the Soviet state
became more important than the cause of communist ideology -- especially in
foreign relations. Josef Stalin recognized this clearly. In 1941, even before
the German invasion of the Soviet Union, this all-powerful general secretary of
the Communist Party chose to make himself the head of the government, too; then,
during the war, he assumed the headship of the army --- marshal and
generalissimo.
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PAGE 10
(c) 1988 Los Angeles Times, October 18, 1988
After Stalin's death, during the regimes of Nikita S. Khrushchev and Leonid
I. Brezhnev, the separation of the functions of party leader and government
chairman was reinstated (except for a few transitory years). But this only
masked a more important and massive evolution: that of the gradual rise of an
administrative and a military hierarchy. Already 10 or 20 years ago, it began to
appear that the relative supremacy of the party over that of the government and
the army was diminishing -- even though, at the top of the state, the position
of general secretary of the party remained the most important one.
In the meantime, what had become more and more obvious, especially in the
Brezhnev years, was the corruption in the leading circles of the party. That
corruption was, of course, the inevitable human consequence of power - any
power - among monopolists. It was aggravated, and fatally, by another
condition: by the fact that, 50 or 60 years after Lenin, the idea of communism
ceased to have any attraction or even respect among the peoples and the leaders
of the Soviet Union.
By 1982 when, for a short time, Yuri V. Andropov was the Soviet leader, the
corruption and the inefficiency of the party had become matters of more-or-less
open discussion - not only among the inner circles of leadership but to many
people among the vast masses of the Soviet Union. It is also of some interest to
note that Andropov (whose protege was Gorbachev) had risen from the diplomatic
service through headship of the secret police (which is a state, not a party,
apparatus) to the leadership of the Soviet Union.
And now the constitutional changes initiated by Gorbachev truly mean the end
of an era: the end of the unquestioned and unquestionable predominance of the
party. This came about not only because of the internal rottenness of the
party's former leadership, but also because of Gorbachey's recognition that the
functioning of the Soviet Union must depend on the efficiency of a governmental
structure and not on the apparatus of a party, the very composition and ideas of
which have now proved to be corroded by the acid of human corruptibility and by
history itself.
Similar, though not at all identical, developments have already occurred in
other Eastern European states. But the historical development of Russia remains
a unique matter - and not only because of its power and size. In sum, the
spectacle before us involves the rejection of both Stalin's and Lenin's ideas --
not to speak of the ideological heritage of Marx that was discarded, in
everything but a few remnant phrases, long ago.
TYPE: Opinion
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aiding programs that have con-
feeding halls. It has, in other
Dismounting The Tiger:
that is otherwise easy for a more
hunger in Africa existed before
Lessons from Four Liberalizations
oport to aid the crisis, the problem
lines. But it did not gain visi-
Mark-
of the needy could be broadcast
only was it incorrect to predict
This an inciteful artful article
be sapped by surplus food distri-
may have been a key ingredient
have continued to enjoy.*
+ great for comparison purpose
(eg. spain).
See ni-lites.
cmn
JOHN ORME
The Carter administration's human rights policy had a number of
successes to its credit of which the administration and the American public can
be justly proud. But there was another side to the policy, which no evaluation can
neglect. On two occasions the liberalization programs pressed on friendly
authoritarian governments by the United States ran out of control, leading to the
governments' overthrow and replacement by regimes hostile to the United States
and even less solicitous about the human rights of their peoples.
The experience of the Carter years raises a crucial question for the proponents
of a human rights policy: can a dictatorial regime loosen its grip over the popula-
tion without losing control? I intend to explore that question here by examining
four attempts by autocratic governments to liberalize, two of which succeeded and
two of which did not. "Success" in this context can mean different things to different
people. The leaders of these four regimes may have differed in their ultimate aims
and their determination to stay in power, but none of them had any intention of
stepping down in the near future. In each case liberalization was undertaken to
stabilize authoritarian rule by making it less burdensome for the public, and was
not originally intended to evolve into full democratization.¹ If democracy is the
1 See Wayne Selcher, "Introduction," 4; Enrique Baloyra, "From Moment to Moment: The Polit-
ical Transition in Brazil, 1977-1981," 17, 33, 36, 48, 50; Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, "Transi-
tions through Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain," 201; all in Wayne Selcher, ed., Polit-
ical Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future Prospects (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 1986).
New York provided partial support for this
to one of the authors. For assistance
grateful to Janice Eisen, Renee Marlin,
JOHN ORME is associate professor of political studies at Oglethorpe University of Atlanta, Georgia.
are indebted to Ed Cooney, Susan Fisher,
He is author of a forthcoming book on United States foreign policy toward political instability in
nd Ed Stockwell for their comments on an
the Third World, from which this article is drawn.
the final manuscript.
Political Science Quarterly Volume 103 Number 2 1988
245
246
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
end result of the changes initiated by authoritarian leaders, as it was in one of
the policy was successful, though
the cases to be examined here, liberalization cannot exactly be called a success
for Franco's regime died with hi
from the regime's standpoint, though such an outcome would be even better than
Liberalization was also attemp
a partial ameliorization of repression from the U.S. perspective. But what both
the Stalinist period was perhaps
the United States and the regime's rulers want to avoid above all else is a deteriora-
to an abrupt end in 1953, when th
tion of the liberalization process into bloody revolution, leading to a victory of
to power in Moscow that sought
the most extreme elements of the opposition. Hence, I will define as a success
caused in the Soviet Union and th
here any serious liberalization that does not lead to violent upheaval of this sort,
whether it leads all the way to democracy or not.²
the Soviet leaders forced Matyas
the Stalinist system that Rakosi ha
The first case to consider is Francisco Franco's Spain. At the height of the repres-
ical prisoners, permitted peasants t
sion after the civil war, some 270,000 opponents of the Nationalists were held in
to upgrade living standards. The
prison camps. The civil guard placed machine guns at important crossroads and
shifted in the Kremlin and Rako
pairs of armed guardsmen patrolled the highways, while the army remained garri-
prevented him from utilizing the ha
soned outside major cities. Spain, in the words of one historian, "resembled a con-
ther Rakosi nor his successor, Er
quered land.' " Beginning in 1945, Franco permitted a gradual amelioration of con-
ditions over the next fifteen years. The civil guard's visibility throughout the
momentum that built up in Hung
intervene in the summer of that y
countryside was reduced and amnesties were announced on nine occasions. A large
we would have to categorize as a
number of exiles returned home, and by the 1960s the number of political prisoners
The third case is the shah of Iran
had fallen to between 500 and 1,500.4 In all its formative period in the late 1930s,
shah proceeded on two tracks. The
the regime had banned all political parties except the official Falange Español
Tradicionalista y de las JONS as well as independent trade unions. The workers
tion through the creation of a new p
Previously, effective participation h
in theory received representation in the corporatist syndicates set up for each in-
dustry. In the 1950s and 1960s, Franco relaxed the strict controls over labor and
Though the Resurgence party mad
did manage to recruit some five to
allowed moderate opposition groups to carry on a few activities without hindrance,
track was a relaxation of controls (
though strict limits on the freedom of public assembly remained in force. Finally,
sion in 1977, which had the immedi
the minister of information eliminated prior censorship of printed materials in
tion. The Shah was unable to cont
1966. The Spanish media reacted cautiously at first; but by the 1970s opposition
and radicalized, developing into a f
views were widely reported, and even Marxist literature was freely available in book-
Finally, there is Brazil, which can
stores.⁶ In short, Franco succeeded in gradually easing his controls on Spanish
zation was begun by General Erne
life over a span of nearly thirty years without endangering his regime. In this sense
or decompression. Geisel's first stej
zilian Democratic Movement (MDB
year; and the MDB did surprisingly
2 This definition is thus neutral between the regime's definition of success and the United States's
abuses that had taken place under h
view. The definition I will use here differs from that of Robert Dahl, who concentrates on the first
possibility maintenance, not regime transformation - in the introduction he wrote to Re-
in curbing violations of human righ
gimes and Oppositions (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), 16-17.
began to dismantle the legislative un
3 John Coverdale, The Political Transformation of Spain after Franco (New York: Praeger, 1979),
Institutional Acts, in 1978. Genera
13; Richard Herr, Spain (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), 212-213.
in January 1979 and continued the
4 Juan Linz, "Opposition to and under an Authoritarian Regime" in Dahl, ed., Regimes and Oppo-
sitions, 174.
5 Jose Amodia, Franco's Political Legacy (London: Penguin, 1977), 182; Coverdale, Political Trans-
formation of Spain, 18.
7 My sources on Hungary are Ferenc Vali,
6 Amodia, Franco's Political Legacy, 186; Linz, "Authoritarian Regime," 175, 211; Coverdale, Polit-
University Press, 1961); Paul Zinner, Revolu
ical Transformation of Spain, 9. Stanley Payne, Franco's Spain (New York: Crowell, 1967), 109-24,
1962); and Paul Kecskemeti, The Unexpected
44-45; Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpura, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy (London:
1961). The shifts in Soviet policy in Hungary
George Allen and Unwin, 1979), 138-40, 167, 193.
in Charles Gati, "Imre Nagy and Moscow, 19
8 John Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revol
FOUR LIBERALIZATIONS
247
horitarian leaders, as it was in one of
the policy was successful, though it apparently did not win the loyalty of the public,
on cannot exactly be called a success
for Franco's regime died with him.
an outcome would be even better than
Liberalization was also attempted in Communist Hungary in the 1950s. Here
n the U.S. perspective. But what both
the Stalinist period was perhaps the grimmest in all of eastern Europe. It came
nt to avoid above all else is a deteriora-
dy revolution, leading to a victory of
to an abrupt end in 1953, when the death of Stalin brought a collective leadership
to power in Moscow that sought to relieve some of the miseries the dictator had
ion. Hence, I will define as a success
t lead to violent upheaval of this sort,
caused in the Soviet Union and then imposed on the satellites as well. In Hungary,
or not.²
the Soviet leaders forced Matyas Rakosi to step aside and let Imre Nagy modify
the Stalinist system that Rakosi had erected. Nagy released the Communist polit-
nco's Spain. At the height of the repres-
nents of the Nationalists were held in
ical prisoners, permitted peasants to withdraw from collective farms, and attempted
to upgrade living standards. Then, early in 1955 the balance of political forces
ine guns at important crossroads and
shifted in the Kremlin and Rakosi was put back in control; but his sponsors
hways, while the army remained garri-
prevented him from utilizing the harsh methods to which he was accustomed. Nei-
rds of one historian, "resembled a con-
rmitted a gradual amelioration of con-
ther Rakosi nor his successor, Erno Gero, was able to break the revolutionary
momentum that built up in Hungary in 1956, and the Russians were forced to
ivil guard's visibility throughout the
intervene in the summer of that year to save the situation. Hungary, of course,
announced on nine occasions. A large
we would have to categorize as a complete failure.⁷
1960s the number of political prisoners
The third case is the shah of Iran's ill-fated liberalization of the late 1970s. The
its formative period in the late 1930s,
shah proceeded on two tracks. The first was an expansion of political participa-
except the official Falange Español
dependent trade unions. The workers
tion through the creation of a new political party, the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) party.
Previously, effective participation had been limited to a small circle of 300 to 400.
poratist syndicates set up for each in-
Though the Resurgence party made no effort to attract opposition elements, it
xed the strict controls over labor and
did manage to recruit some five to six million members in two years. The second
on a few activities without hindrance,
assembly remained in force. Finally,
track was a relaxation of controls over freedoms of press, assembly, and expres-
sion in 1977, which had the immediate effect of stimulating the opposition to ac-
or censorship of printed materials in
tion. The Shah was unable to control or coopt this opposition, which expanded
y at first; but by the 1970s opposition
literature was freely available in book-
and radicalized, developing into a full-fledged revolutionary movement by 1978.8
Finally, there is Brazil, which can now be classified as a success. Brazil's liberali-
dually easing his controls on Spanish
zation was begun by General Ernesto Geisel in 1974 under the label distensao,
t
endangering his regime. In this sense
or decompression. Geisel's first step was to permit an opposition party, the Bra-
zilian Democratic Movement (MDB), to compete in congressional elections in that
year; and the MDB did surprisingly well. In 1975 Geisel dismissed a general for
e's definition of success and the United States's
abuses that had taken place under his command and made considerable progress
of Robert Dahl, who concentrates on the first
in curbing violations of human rights. After a temporary reversal in 1977, Geisel
mation - in the introduction he wrote to Re-
niversity Press, 1973), 16-17.
began to dismantle the legislative underpinnings of the military dictatorship, the
Spain after Franco (New York: Praeger, 1979),
Institutional Acts, in 1978. General Joao Baptista Figueiredo succeeded Geisel
entice-Hall, 1971), 212-213.
in January 1979 and continued the policy of gradual liberalization. By 1980 the
arian Regime" in Dahl, ed., Regimes and Oppo-
Penguin, 1977), 182; Coverdale, Political Trans-
7 My sources on Hungary are Ferenc Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
thoritarian Regime," 175, 211; Coverdale, Polit-
University Press, 1961); Paul Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York: Columbia University Press,
co's Spain (New York: Crowell, 1967), 109-24,
1962); and Paul Kecskemeti, The Unexpected Revolution (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy (London:
1961). The shifts in Soviet policy in Hungary are attributed to the political competition in the Kremlin
in Charles 8 Gati, "Imre Nagy and Moscow, 1953-56," Problems of Communism 35 (May-June 1986).
John Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981).
248
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
last of the political prisoners had been freed; direct municipal, congressional, and
gubernatorial elections were held in 1982; and finally in 1985 Brazil's Electoral
for Persians to conceive of their 0
College ended the period of military rule when it chose a member of the opposi-
has made compromise difficult.
tion party as president.9
The political culture of Brazil ap
Thus, among these four cases we see two relatively successful liberalizations-
ical elites and the masses. Brazilia
Brazil and Spain- and two that ended in disaster - Hungary and Iran. What ex-
pragmatism and adaptability, so n
plains the difference? At least five factors come to mind: the nature of the opposi-
necessarily pejorative in Brazil. Br
tion; the regime's past, that is the evils it has committed; the state of the economy
recent study as remarkably patient
as liberalization takes place; the role played by outside powers in the process; and
interviewed by Janice Perlman in 1
the tactics used by the regime. I propose to take these up in turn.
the intention of "doing its best to
and seemed to possess "the aspirati
oneers, and the values of patriots.'
THE OPPOSITION
to go more smoothly in Brazil that
From the government's standpoint, liberalization would probably be easiest if its
To some extent, then, the prospec
opposition were weak and moderate, and most difficult if it were strong and rad-
accidents of personality and politic
ical. ("Moderate" here would imply that the opposition would be willing to settle
liberalizing leaders. But the oppositi
for modest improvements, more willing to wait for the government to proceed to
in a vacuum. The next question we
see what will develop, and less likely to resort to violence.) Any number of things
of the regime, both in the past and
could affect the disposition of the regime's opponents, but two would seem to
of opposition that it has to deal wi
be especially important. One would be the personal qualities of the opposition's
leadership. Some people would be inclined, for personal reasons, to seek confron-
THE SHAI
tation with the government, others to seek accommodation. One obvious case in
point would be the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who lost a son in what he as-
Let us consider first the question of
sumed was a government-sponsored assassination, and later stubbornly opposed
and what effect this may have later. ]
any suggestion of compromise with the shah during the revolution. In addition,
place on a massive scale. The victors j
the leaders of some oppositions are able to overcome the differences between them-
Republicans in prison camps by 194
selves, or at least paper them over for the time being, while others cannot stop
malnutrition, and of those released SO
quarreling and thereby reduce their effectiveness. The Spanish exiles, for example,
ditional liberty, a kind of political p
were not able to overcome the divisions between Communists and non-Communists
activity. 13 But the victors in the civil wa
in the early years and failed to form a government in exile, which would have im-
Exactly how many victims the repres
proved their chances of attracting foreign assistance considerably. The clash be-
dispute. The most conservative estima
tween the Communists and non-Communists (as well as other divisions) continued
states that 16,763 were shot in 1939 and
to bedevil the Spanish opposition's efforts later. 10
as 200,000 may have died as a result
The country's political culture probably also influences the mood of the oppo-
war, in addition to the 200,000 execu
sition in an important way. Various observers have speculated that Iranians may
still be influenced to an important extent by their Zoroastrian beginnings. It is
11 Peter McDonough, Power and Ideology 4
1981), 14; Janice Perlman quoted in Riordan
possible that the Manichean belief in extremes of good and evil made it difficult
York: Praeger, 1978), 51; Marvin Zonis, The Po
sity 12 Press, 1971), 73-5; Cuyler Young, "Iran in Cor
The contributors to the Dahl, ed., Regime.
9 David Fleischer and Robert Wesson, Brazil in Transition (New York: Praeger, 1983), 39-40; Wayne
they 13 provide somewhat different answers than
Selcher, "Contradictions, Dilemmas, and Actors in Brazil's Abertura 1979-1985" in Selcher, ed., Polit-
Linz, "Authoritarian Regime," 230-1; Her
ical Liberalization in Brazil, 60.
Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil Wa
10 Kenneth Medhurst, Government in Spain (New York: Pergamon, 1973), 35; David Gilmour, The
1965), 537.
Transformation of Spain (London: Quartet Books, 1985), 95, 100-1, 104; Herr, Spain, 231; Linz,
14 Ramon Salas Larrazabal, Perdidas de la Gue
"Authoritarian Regime," 222-3.
428-429. The higher estimates are from Elena C
Random House, 1964), 250-252; and Jackson,
FOUR LIBERALIZATIONS
249
municipal, congressional, and
for Persians to conceive of their opponents in less than satanic terms, and thus
in 1985 Brazil's Electoral
has made compromise difficult.
chose a member of the opposi-
The political culture of Brazil appears to be much different, both among polit-
ical elites and the masses. Brazilian elites have long prided themselves on their
successful liberalizations-
pragmatism and adaptability, so much so that the word "Machiavellian" is not
Hungary and Iran. What ex-
necessarily pejorative in Brazil. Brazilians of the lower class emerged from one
mind: the nature of the opposi-
recent study as remarkably patient and longsuffering. The urban slum dwellers
mitted; the state of the economy
interviewed by Janice Perlman in the early 1970s credited the government with
powers in the process; and
the intention of "doing its best to understand and help people like themselves"
these up in turn.
and seemed to possess "the aspirations of a bourgeoisie, the perseverance of pi-
oneers, and the values of patriots." If this is so, one would expect liberalization
to go more smoothly in Brazil than Iran, other things being equal.¹¹
To some extent, then, the prospects for political decompression are affected by
would probably be easiest if its
accidents of personality and political culture that are beyond the control of the
fficult if it were strong and rad-
liberalizing leaders. But the opposition to autocratic governments does not evolve
would be willing to settle
in a vacuum. The next question we must ask, then, is to what extent the actions
the government to proceed to
of the regime, both in the past and as liberalization is underway, shape the sort
violence.) Any number of things
of opposition that it has to deal with.¹²
onents, but two would seem to
qualities of the opposition's
THE SHADOW OF THE PAST
rsonal reasons, to seek confron-
modation. One obvious case in
Let us consider first the question of how bad the dictatorship was at its height
who lost a son in what he as-
and what effect this may have later. In both Spain and Hungary, repression took
and later stubbornly opposed
place on a massive scale. The victors in the Spanish civil war placed about 270,000
the revolution. In addition,
Republicans in prison camps by 1940. Many of the prisoners died of disease or
the differences between them-
malnutrition, and of those released some 140,000 were assigned the status of con-
while others cannot stop
ditional liberty, a kind of political parole that strictly circumscribed opposition
The Spanish exiles, for example,
activity. 13 But the victors in the civil war were not content merely to jail the defeated.
mmunists and non-Communists
Exactly how many victims the repression eventually claimed is still a matter of
in exile, which would have im-
dispute. The most conservative estimate is that of Ramón Salas Larrazabal, who
considerably. The clash be-
states that 16,763 were shot in 1939 and 1940. Others have maintained that as many
as other divisions) continued
as 200,000 may have died as a result of the Nationalist repression after the civil
10
war, in addition to the 200,000 executed during the conflict. 14
fluences the mood of the oppo-
speculated that Iranians may
11 Peter McDonough, Power and Ideology in Brazil (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
ir Zoroastrian beginnings. It is
1981), 14; Janice Perlman quoted in Riordan Roett, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society (New
York: Praeger, 1978), 51; Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer-
good and evil made it difficult
sity Press, 1971), 73-5; Cuyler Young, "Iran in Continuing Crisis," Foreign Affairs 2 (January 1962): 285-6.
12 The contributors to the Dahl, ed., Regimes and Oppositions volume also raise this issue, though
they provide somewhat different answers than I. See Linz, 221, 237, 257; and Dahl, 4, 13.
New York: Praeger, 1983), 39-40; Wayne
13 Linz, "Authoritarian Regime," 230-1; Herr, Spain, 212; Payne, Franco's Spain, 109-112; Gabriel
bertura 1979-1985" in Selcher, ed., Polit-
Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War 1931-39 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1965), 537.
rgamon, 1973), 35; David Gilmour, The
14 Ramon Salas Larrazabal, Perdidas de la Guerra Civil (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1977), 387-338,
100-1, 104; Herr, Spain, 231; Linz,
428-429. The higher estimates are from Elena de la Souchere, An Explanation of Spain (New York:
Random House, 1964), 250-252; and Jackson, Spanish Republic and Civil War, 563-569.
250
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
In Rakosi's Hungary, the situation was equally grim. The regime's determina-
rested. The number of "disap
tion to expand industry at all costs led to a fall of living standards of 15-20 per-
thirty-five in 1971, nine in 1975
cent, as well as chronic shortages in urban areas. Nearly one-third of the farms
the foundations of the econom
were collectivized by 1953, precipitating a decline in food production, which along
policy that reduced the minim
with the forced requisitions created conditions of near starvation in the country-
and sharply increased the ine
side. Rakosi's rule was buttressed, as elsewhere, by secret police terror. His AVH
What, then, is the relations
(State Security Authority) not only employed 100,000 policemen directly, but also
liberalization? It would certair
created a vast network of informers and spies. Between 150,000 and 200,000 people
of repression, the more difficu
were held in forced labor camps at the nadir of the repression in the early 1950s.
seems not to be the case. Liber
It is thought that about 2,000 victims were shot immediately; many more died under
Hungary, but succeeded to so
torture or in the camps, but the exact number is not known. As in the USSR, purges
Liberalization worked best in
were employed against the Communist party itself. Rakosi purged 200,000 members
Iran, where the abuses were no
of the Hungarian party, the most famous of whom was the former interior min-
is evidently more complicated t
ister, Laszlo Rajk. Rajk was arrested in 1949 and put through a show trial reminis-
by Machiavelli: " one ougl
cent of Stalin's productions of the 1930s in which fabricated evidence was intro-
for the two to go together, it i
duced linking the victim to a plot with "foreign imperialists" to restore capitalism
two has to be wanting. "19
in Hungary. Rajk and some others were hanged 15 October 1949, and a reign of
Brutality practiced on the SC
terror against much of the Hungarian party followed. 15
for the perpetrators, but it als
The shah of Iran's regime was somewhat less brutal than these, but still relied
things may go reasonably well
heavily on the mailed fist. Amnesty International (AI) reported in the mid-1970s
can be quite certain that the p
that the shah held between 25,000 and 100,000 political prisoners. Torture was
repeat the experiences of the civ
practiced "routinely" during interrogation, and political enemies were also executed
that the most important expla
frequently. (AI knew of fifteen in the first two months of 1976.) Further, the repres-
was the desire of most of the S
sion was directed even at nonviolent opposition. 16 In particular, the regime had
enjoy enthusiastic support at 1
turned its attention toward the clergy in the early 1970s. In the years that followed,
more one of apathy than seethi
the secret police infiltrated mosque meetings; the clergy's lands were expropriated;
sympathetic to the 1956 revolut
and mullahs were arrested, imprisoned, and even executed "regularly," according
discontent until quite soon be
to Iran specialist James Bill. This intensification of repression, Bill has concluded,
In other words, large-scale t
gave Iran's Shi'ite clergy little choice but to fight back to insure their survival. 17
Brazil is clearly the mildest dictatorship of the four. The Institutional Acts
declared by the military in the early years of their rule allowed the government
to suspend the political rights of those they considered dangerous and dismiss
18 Peter Flynn, Brazil: A Political A
elected officials without replacing them. 1,577 Brazilians were punished in this
Handelman and Thomas Sanders, eds.
in Latin America (Bloomington: India
way, including six senators and 110 deputies, which reduced the Congress to a rubber
March 1978. Brazil's population in 196
stamp by 1970. Like many of its neighbors, Brazil faced a growing threat from
9 million; and Spain's in 1939, 25.5 mil
urban terrorists at this time, and the military dealt with it successfully by making
tion, while Franco jailed 1 percent and di
a preemptive sweep in November 1970 in which 5,000 to 10,000 suspects were ar-
figures are roughly accurate and that m
ease.) The shah, in contrast held no m
the figures were miniscule in compariso
taken from Arthur S. Banks, et al., as
15 Vali, Rift and Revolt, 82-84, 87, 59-64; Kecskemeti, Unexpected Revolution, 41, 18. The figures
MIT Press, 1971).
on the AVH and the numbers killed and imprisoned are taken from David Pryce-Jones, The Hun-
19 Machiavelli, The Prince, Luigi R
garian Revolution (London: Ernest Benn Ltd, 1969), 41, 43.
20 See Herbert Matthews, The Yoke
16 Amnesty International, International Report, 1975-1976, 182-188.
Fusi, Spain, 135-6, 47; Payne, Franco's
17 James Bill, "Power and Religion in Revolutionary Iran," Middle East Journal 36 (Winter 1982):
Linz, "Authoriarian Regime," 181-182.
24-28.
21 Kecskemeti, Unexpected Revoluti
FOUR LIBERALIZATIONS
251
of living standards of 15-20
grim. The regime's determina-
rested. The number of "disappeared," however, was much less than elsewhere-
Nearly one-third of the farms per-
thirty-five in 1971, nine in 1975, and none afterward. Also, it should be noted that
in food production, which along
the foundations of the economic miracle of the later 1960s were laid by an austerity
of near starvation in the country-
policy that reduced the minimum wage 20 percent in real terms in the mid-1960s
by secret police terror. His AVH
and sharply increased the inequality of income.¹⁸
What, then, is the relationship between a regime's past and its prospects for
policemen directly, but also
ween 150,000 and 200,000 people
liberalization? It would certainly be plausible to assume that the worse the degree
the repression in the early 1950s,
of repression, the more difficulty a government would have in letting up. But this
mediately; many more died under
seems not to be the case. Liberalization failed in an extremely harsh dictatorship,
known. As in the USSR, purges
Hungary, but succeeded to some extent in Spain, which was scarcely any better.
Rakosi purged 200,000 members
Liberalization worked best in the mildest dictatorship, Brazil, but broke down in
Iran, where the abuses were not as great as in Hungary or Spain. The relationship
was the former interior min-
is evidently more complicated than one would imagine. A partial answer is provided
through a show trial reminis-
fabricated evidence was intro-
by Machiavelli: "
one ought to be both feared and loved, but as it is difficult
for the two to go together, it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one of the
perialists" to restore capitalism
two has to be wanting."19
October 1949, and a reign of
owed.
15
Brutality practiced on the scale of a Rakosi or a Franco obviously creates hatred
for the perpetrators, but it also creates fear. From the perspective of the tyrant,
than these, but still relied
(AI) reported in the mid-1970s
things may go reasonably well as long as the fear is greater than the hatred. We
olitical prisoners. Torture was
can be quite certain that the peoples of Spain and Hungary were in no hurry to
repeat the experiences of the civil war and Stalinism. Writers on Spain have stressed
enemies were also executed
that the most important explanation of the stability of the 1950s under Franco
ths of 1976.) Further, the repres-
was the desire of most of the Spanish to avoid another civil war. Franco did not
In particular, the regime had
70s. In the years that followed,
enjoy enthusiastic support at this time by any means, but the public mood was
more one of apathy than seething discontent. 20 In Hungary, most scholars, though
ergy's lands were expropriated;
sympathetic to the 1956 revolution, admit that there was little evidence of popular
xecuted "regularly," according
discontent until quite soon before the revolution's outbreak.21
repression, Bill has concluded,
back to insure their survival. 17
In other words, large-scale terror may create political stability by cowing the
four. The Institutional Acts
rule allowed the government
dered dangerous and dismiss
18 Peter Flynn, Brazil: A Political Analysis (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), 385-87; Howard
were punished in this
Handelman and Thomas Sanders, eds., Military Government and the Movement toward Democracy
duced the Congress to a rubber
in Latin America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 192, 196, 151; New York Times, 26
faced a growing threat from
March 1978. Brazil's population in 1966 was 83 million; Iran's in 1980, 38 million; Hungary's in 1950,
9 million; and Spain's in 1939, 25.5 million. Hence, Rakosi jailed 1.5 percent of his country's popula-
vith it successfully by making
tion, while Franco jailed 1 percent and did away with perhaps .5 percent (assuming Elena de la Souchere's
to 10,000 suspects were ar-
figures are roughly accurate and that many of the deaths above the 84,000 figure were caused by dis-
ease.) The shah, in contrast held no more than .3 percent of the population in prison, and in Brazil
the figures were miniscule in comparison to the other cases, especially the first two. Population figures
ected Revolution, 41, 18. The figures
taken from Arthur S. Banks, et al., assemblers, Cross-Polity Time-Series Data (Cambridge, Mass.:
from David Pryce-Jones, The Hun-
MIT Press, 1971).
19 Machiavelli, The Prince, Luigi Ricci, trans. (New York: Random House, 1950), chap. 17.
82-188.
20 See Herbert Matthews, The Yoke and the Arrows (New York: Braziller, 1961), 120-1; Carr and
ddle East Journal 36 (Winter 1982):
Fusi, Spain, 135-6, 47; Payne, Franco's Spain, 117, 119; Gilmour, Transformation of Spain, 17, 24;
Linz, "Authoriarian Regime," 181-182.
21 Kecskemeti, Unexpected Revolution, 117.
252
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
public for some time to come. It may also stabilize the situation by elimmmating
cynical account of this strategy in
the potential leadership of the opposition. Franco's terror of the 1940s drove many
how Remirro de Orco was made to
of the surviving opposition leaders into exile, where they never managed II over-
point, though, Machiavelli is less co
come their divisions. The repression that continued at home was extremely effec-
in 1978 by sacrificing General Nem
tive; in 1953 the entire leadership of the Socialist underground was arrester And
but the tactic backfired, demoralizi
the opposition never regained a firm toehold within Spain.²²
the public. The reasons are not far
The shah, on the other hand, harassed the Shi'ite clergy cruelly throughour the
responsible for what had happened
1970s, but never eliminated the mosque network. The mosques remained. 25 one
role must be more convincing.26 O
opposition leader recalled, "sanctuaries where we met, talked, prepared, organized,
of personnel takes place within a r
and grew. "23 Whatever the shah's intentions, Iran never became a totalitarian so-
the Russians, for example, had den
ciety. This brings to mind another admonition from Machiavelli:
of appropriate severity, they might w
enemies
must either be destroyed, or conciliated by benefits. Any other course will
be useless; and above all, half measures should be avoided, these being most damgerous,
as proved by the Samnites, who, when they hemmed the Romans in between the Caudine
TH
forks, disregarded the advice of an old man, who counselled them either to let the Romans
depart honorably, or to kill them all. And by taking the middle course of disarming them
How does the state of the economy
and obliging them to pass under a yoke, they let them depart with shame and rage in
there is an obvious and plausible h
their hearts.24
smoothly during a time of prosperi
port to this notion. The Spanish e
The regime's past is important in one other respect. The ruler or rulers may
the civil war in the 1940s, and much
inherit what we might call skeletons in the closet, that is, acts of which the public
sistence level. Production remained
is unaware, which could be extremely damaging if they were to become known.
republic. The vivid memories of the
In a creditable effort to make amends and serve justice, a government might unin-
kept the lid on for many years. But
tentionally deal itself a mortal blow. In Hungary, Imre Nagy got Moscow's per-
a general strike in Barcelona trigge
mission to release the remaining Communist political prisoners, though thousands
the regime, the economy began in
of non-Communists still languished in jail. This was perhaps the most important
prosperity for the rest of the decade
single precipitant of the revolution. The tales told by those released evoked a strong
nomic climate had much to do with
XIUT
sense of shame among many Hungarian intellectuals who had previously lent their
and may have given the regime the co
services to the government in writing apologies for Rakosi's brutality. The intellec-
zation measures.²⁷
tuals became the strongest defenders of Nagy's new course and the focus of the
Prosperity has two possible disad
opposition once Rakosi returned to power. In addition, Moscow inadvertently
tight labor markets that may tempt la
created even greater problems for Rakosi later in forcing him to admit publicly
to wring more from management by tl
that Rajk had been framed.25
temporarily in the mid-1950s when y
One solution to this problem, other than continuing to keep the skeleton in the
gime's prohibition on strikes. That cr
closet, is to satisfy the public's demand for justice by conspicuously punishing
wage increases that led to serious inf
someone who can be held accountable for the past abuses. Machiavelli gives a
rested the inflation by imposing a stif
dation for a sustained boom that las
industrial production tripled, and th
22 Matthews, Yoke and Arrows, 120-1; Carr and Fusi, Spain, 135-136, 47; Payne, Franco's Spain,
rose from $300 to $2446 (1957-1974). (
117, 119; Gilmour, Transformation of Spain, 83-84.
of the Spanish working class. Strikes
23 Sapehr Zabih, Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval (San Francisco: Alchemy Press, 1979), 20.
ized, and in the 1970s Spain became
24 Machiavelli, Discourses, Christian Detmold, trans. (New York: Random House, 1950), Book II,
in Europe (measured in days lost), r
chap. 23; also Book III, chap. 40.
25 Kecskemeti, Unexpected Revolution, 44-45; Vali, Rift and Revolt, 133, 143-150; Zinner, Revolu-
tion in Hungary, 170.
26 Stempel, Inside the Revolution, 100-102
27 Herr, Spain, 221, 233-235, 242, 284.
FOUR LIBERALIZATIONS
253
abilize the situation by eliminating
cynical account of this strategy in chapter 7 of The Prince, where he describes
terror of the 1940s drove many
how Remirro de Orco was made to serve as a fall guy for Cesare Borgia. On this
where they never managed to over-
point, though, Machiavelli is less convincing. The shah hoped to appease the public
at home was extremely effec-
list underground was arrested. And
in 1978 by sacrificing General Nematollah Nassiri, the head of the secret police,
but the tactic backfired, demoralizing the shah's supporters more than it satisfied
within Spain.²
Shi'ite clergy cruelly throughout the
the public. The reasons are not far to seek: Iranians held the shah, not Nassiri,
The mosques remained, as one
responsible for what had happened. If a man is to play the role of fall guy, the
met, talked, prepared, organized,
role must be more convincing. 26 On the other hand, situations where a change
never became a totalitarian so-
of personnel takes place within a regime are at least potentially manageable. If
from Machiavelli:
the Russians, for example, had demanded that Nagy give Rakosi a punishment
of appropriate severity, they might well have headed off the Hungarian revolution.
by benefits. Any other course will
avoided, these being most dangerous,
THE ECONOMY
the Romans in between the Caudine
ounselled them either to let the Romans
the middle course of disarming them
How does the state of the economy affect the prospects for liberalization? Again
them depart with shame and rage in
there is an obvious and plausible hypothesis: liberalization is more likely to go
smoothly during a time of prosperity. The experience of Spain lends some sup-
port to this notion. The Spanish economy did not recover from the ravages of
respect. The ruler or rulers may
the civil war in the 1940s, and much of the population continued to live at a sub-
that is, acts of which the public
sistence level. Production remained only 70 percent of what it had been in the
if they were to become known.
republic. The vivid memories of the civil war and fear of Franco's security forces
justice, a government might unin-
kept the lid on for many years. But opposition finally broke out in 1951, when
Imre Nagy got Moscow's per-
a general strike in Barcelona triggered a wave of protest elsewhere. Luckily for
prisoners, though thousands
the regime, the economy began improving the next year, and Spain enjoyed
is was perhaps the most important
prosperity for the rest of the decade. Most scholars think that the favorable eco-
by those released evoked a strong
nomic climate had much to do with the apathetic mood of Spain in the 1950s
tuals who had previously lent their
and may have given the regime the confidence to undertake the mid-1960s liberali-
for Rakosi's brutality. The intellec-
zation measures.²⁷
new course and the focus of the
Prosperity has two possible disadvantages, however. The first is that it brings
addition, Moscow inadvertently
tight labor markets that may tempt labor to take advantage of its increased leverage
in forcing him to admit publicly
to wring more from management by the use of strikes. Franco did face some trouble
temporarily in the mid-1950s when workers in a number of cities braved the re-
tinuing to keep the skeleton in the
gime's prohibition on strikes. That crisis was defused by the granting of enormous
stice by conspicuously punishing
wage increases that led to serious inflation by the late 1950s. The government ar-
past abuses. Machiavelli gives a
rested the inflation by imposing a stiff austerity program in 1959, laying the foun-
dation for a sustained boom that lasted till the early 1970s. In the next decade,
industrial production tripled, and the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
pain, 135-136, 47; Payne, Franco's Spain,
rose from $300 to $2446 (1957-1974). Once again, prosperity increased the militance
of the Spanish working class. Strikes for economic motives were eventually legal-
Francisco: Alchemy Press, 1979), 20.
ized, and in the 1970s Spain became one of the five most strike-prone nations
ew York: Random House, 1950), Book II,
in Europe (measured in days lost), ranking along with Britain and Italy.²
and Revolt, 133, 143-150; Zinner, Revolu-
26 Stempel, Inside the Revolution, 100-102, 133.
27 Herr, Spain, 221, 233-235, 242, 284.
254
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
It could be argued, however, that the increase in striking posed no threat to the
THE R
regime and in fact may have helped stabilize it. Most of the strikes concerned eco-
nomic or labor questions such as wages, working conditions, benefits, or the elec-
A fourth possible explanation,
tion of union officials. Few of them were directed toward broader political issues,
allies of the regime. The two mo
and the workers remained largely apathetic about politics. (A poll conducted in
where liberalization proceeded
1973 found that only 12 percent of them could be classified as "very interested"
gary and Iran, Moscow and W
in politics.) The apathetic mood of the Spanish workers was a severe handicap
much to their regret later.
to opposition organizers.²⁹
Outside powers may affect th
The second danger of prosperity is one identified first by Tocqueville and restated
alter the expectations of the pu
more recently by James Davies. 30 The risk is that good times will generate rising
they may constrain the governn
expectations, creating great danger for the regime should the economy fail tem-
weaken its ability to deal with g
porarily. According to this J-curve theory, those countries suffering an economic
the United States in Iran produ
decline after a prolonged period of prosperity will be the most vulnerable to revo-
One of the turning points in ]
lution.
in which he condemned Stalin's
Iran would seem to fit the theory. The shah's liberalization came at a time when
the Communist Party of the Sovi
Iran's oil boom was ending and his efforts to stem inflation were creating unem-
intellectuals had hesitated to atta
ployment among the urban masses and resentment among the bazaar, or tradi-
The speech was interpreted in H
tional merchant class. But Generals Geisel and Figueiredo carried out their decom-
abuses that had taken place unde
pression after the Brazilian economic miracle had failed and the economy was
fied in 1956 to the point where 0
running into its now infamous debt problems, though Geisel may have eased his
noted Marxist philosopher Gyor
difficulties to some extent by coupling liberalization with efforts to improve the
Hungarian Marxism. 32
lot of Brazil's poor. In Spain, as we noted, the general prosperity the country en-
By this time the intellectuals we
joyed was interrupted on two occasions, when the regime imposed an austerity
Rakosi was becoming concerned. 1
program in 1959 and during the recession of 1967. Both these downturns were
perspective, as Mao Zedong show
preceded by some steps at liberalization, yet in neither case did the liberalization
it encourages one's enemies to ma
run into serious difficulties. In Hungary, Nagy raised the standards of living some
up an enemies list of four hundre
15 percent by slowing the pace of industrialization and allowing peasants to leave
soon as possible. But on 17 July
the collectives. When Rakosi returned, he was not permitted by his Soviet sponsors
Budapest and bid Rakosi step dow
to shift course completely, and things were still better than they had been during
sions and did not deliver the crush
Rakosi's first tenure in office.31
cause of the Russians' objections.
The J-curve theory may be the best general explanation of the relationship be-
ably could have broken the revolu
tween the state of the economy and political stability, but it seems to be a relatively
that the Russians to work his will. In S
poor predictor of the fate of liberalization. Overall, the effects of the economic
only the Red Army could res
situation on liberalization have been uneven and less important than one might
Shaul Bakhash has reminded us
have guessed. Uninterrupted prosperity is preferable to anything else, but improved
hash critics of the Carter administration
economic conditions did not save the situation in Hungary and the worsening con-
the is right, but the American ro
ditions did not prevent the Brazilian decompression from succeeding.
Soviet role in Hungary. First, th
28 Ibid., 256, 259; Coverdale, Political Transformation of Spain, 1, 12; Linz, "Authoritarian Re-
gime," 234.
29 Coverdale, Political Transformation of Spain, 12; Amodia, Franco's Political Legacy, 150-3; Med-
Revolution, 32 Zinner, 69-70. Revolution in Hungary, 203; \
hurst, Government in Spain, 35, 38.
30 James Davies, "Towards a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review 27 (February
skemeti, of the Unexpected Revolution, 76; Paul 244-2 Kec:
Vali, Rift and Revolt, 233-234,
1962): 5-19.
34 American Academy of Political and
31 Vali, Rift and Revolt, 164-165, 133, 174-175; Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, 177.
Shaul Bakhash, "Who Lost Iran?" Net
FOUR LIBERALIZATIONS
255
THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE POWERS
rease it. Most in striking posed no threat to
of the strikes concerned the
rking conditions, benefits, or the elec- eco-
fourth possible explanation, and an important one, is the role played by instances foreign
rected about toward broader political issues,
A of the regime. The two most successful cases, Brazil and Spain, are Hun-
politics. (A poll conducted
allies where liberalization proceeded with relatively little outside interference; in
ould be classified as "very interested™ in
gary and Iran, Moscow and Washington played a significant role in the events,
anish workers was a severe handicap
much to their regret later.
Outside powers may affect the course of liberalization in two ways. They may
ntified first by Tocqueville and restated
alter the expectations of the public about what the government will tolerate, or
is that good times will generate rising
they may constrain the government, either actively or unintentionally, and thus
regime should the economy fail tem-
weaken its ability to deal with growing opposition. The Soviets in Hungary and
hose countries suffering an economic
the United States in Iran produced both effects.
One of the turning points in Hungary was Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech,
ty will be the most vulnerable to revo-
in which he condemned Stalin's purges on the grounds that they had weakened
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Prior to the speech, Hungarian
h's liberalization came at a time when
intellectuals had hesitated to attack Rakosi for fear of being branded "antiparty."
to stem inflation were creating unem-
The speech was interpreted in Hungary as a green light to speak freely about the
entment among the bazaar, or tradi-
d Figueiredo carried out their decom-
abuses that had taken place under Hungary's version of Stalin. Criticism intensi-
fied in 1956 to the point where one writer was likening Rakosi to Judas, and the
cle had failed and the economy was
noted Marxist philosopher Gyorgy Lucacs was speaking of the "bankruptcy" of
ns, though Geisel may have eased his
ralization with efforts to improve the
Hungarian Marxism.³²
By this time the intellectuals were beginning to attract a popular following, and
he general prosperity the country en-
Rakosi was becoming concerned. The one virtue of liberalization from the tyrant's
hen the regime imposed an austerity
perspective, as Mao Zedong showed in the "Hundred Flowers campaign," is that
of 1967. Both these downturns were
it encourages one's enemies to make themselves visible. In late June, Rakosi drew
in neither case did the liberalization
up an enemies list of four hundred names and proposed that they be arrested as
gy raised the standards of living some
soon as possible. But on 17 July, Anastas Mikoyan, Soviet leader, arrived in
zation and allowing peasants to leave
Budapest and bid Rakosi step down. Rakosi's successor, Gero, made a few conces-
not permitted by his Soviet sponsors
sions and did not deliver the crushing blow Rakosi had planned, presumably be-
still better than they had been during
cause of the Russians' objections. In the view of Paul Kecskemeti, Rakosi prob-
ably could have broken the revolutionary momentum if he had been allowed by
al explanation of the relationship be-
the Russians to work his will. In staying his hand, the Russians created a crisis
stability, but it seems to be a relatively
that only the Red Army could resolve to Soviet satisfaction.³³
Overall, the effects of the economic
Shaul Bakhash has reminded us that notwithstanding the polemics of certain
and less important than one might
critics of the Carter administration, the shah, not Jimmy Carter, lost Iran. 34 Bak-
ferable to anything else, but improved
hash is right, but the American role was still significant, if less important than
n in Hungary and the worsening con-
the Soviet role in Hungary. First, the Carter human rights policies did encourage
pression from succeeding.
on of Spain, 1, 12; Linz, "Authoritarian Re-
32 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, 203; Vali, Rift and Revolt, 224-225; Kecskemeti, Unexpected
modia, Franco's Political Legacy, 150-3; Med-
Revolution, 69-70.
33 Vali, Rift and Revolt, 233-234, 244-245, 254-257; Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, 227; Kec-
American Sociological Review 27 (February
skemeti, Unexpected Revolution, 76; Paul Kecskemeti, "Limits and Problems of Decompression," Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, May 1958, 105.
ner, Revolution in Hungary, 177.
34 Shaul Bakhash, "Who Lost Iran?" New York Review of Books, 14 May 1981.
256
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
the shah's opposition. For evidence on this point, we need only consult the oppo-
remarked during the crisis that
sition members themselves. As Mehdi Bazargan, the puppet head of Khomeini's
bance in this country with their di
first government, has said, "[the revolution] was the result of 25 years of cruelty,
the shah's forces had a choice be
oppression, and corruption. We did not believe the shah when he started the liber-
their heads.
alization policy, but when Carter's human rights drive lifted the hope of the people,
all the built up pressure exploded." Karim Sanjabi, a veteran National Front leader,
told a journalist that "President Carter's words on human rights were what origi-
nally raised the people's hopes and gave them courage to defy the dictatorship."
Richard Falk, a vocal critic of American foreign policy, reports that he was told
Particularly in the case of Hunga
on a visit to Iran that the religious opposition was also emboldened by the human
the last and most important fact
rights policy.3
dealing with the risks it inevitably
The effects of President Carter's policy on the shah are somewhat more diffi-
at least three dangers for the gov
cult to gauge. According to one account, the shah is said to have complained during
the opposition to operate more ef
the crisis in 1978, that "the Americans will not give me a free hand to settle this
ther change at a faster rate than t
crisis in my own way." In his memoirs, he suggests that the United States "wanted
for the government; and the public
me out" after a point. 36 On the basis of such statements, some critics of the Carter
regime and risk acts of defiance t
administration have contended that the United States demoralized the shah and
before. The fundamental dilemma
prevented him from taking firm action to contain his opposition. On the other
these dangers in check without da
hand, former government officials have pointed out that President Carter praised
regime is too cautious, the people
the shah effusively during his January 1978 visit to Iran and made declarations
improvement; if the regime loosen
of support so frequently during the revolution that the shah actually requested
of control. The ability of the gov
Washington to ease up at one juncture. I will not attempt to resolve this dispute
to the success or failure of liberal
here. My own view is that Ambassador William Sullivan's inability to confirm
These dangers are all too appa
the statements of support from Washington (because he had no clear instructions
destalinization led to the alienation
to do so) probably did shake the shah's confidence. But it is also true that the
cutting edge of the revolution. In 1
shah undertook liberalization largely on his own initiative, without any clear
the changes introduced by the shah
roadmap and without the willingness he had shown in 1963 to shed blood to save
ment." Far from appeasing the opp
his throne. As Sullivan has explained, the shah's illness not only reduced his effec-
[it] to press for even more." 40 In Br
tiveness as an executive, but also increased his inhibitions about the use of force.
ingness to permit an opposition to
Facing death, the shah did not want to be remembered as a sanguinary tyrant and
defeat for the governing party.⁴ Li
did not use force as freely as he had in 1963, when an estimated 1,000 supporters
ening of the opposition, at least in
of Khomeini died in an unsuccessful revolt.³⁸
the government is going to have to
One effect of the human rights policy is indisputable, however. The Human Rights
Franco's solution was to permit si
Bureau in the State Department embargoed riot control equipment to Iran for
in others, and in general to err on th
several months in 1978, and the equipment was missed. The Japanese ambassador
lifted on the press and unions, but
freely until the 1970s. Originally, the P
by creating syndicates where represen
to achieve both justice and productiv
35 Christian Science Monitor, 6 June 1978; New York Times, 9 July 1978; Sharif Arani, "Iran," "Dis-
sent 27 (Winter 1980): 14; Herman Nickel, "The US Failure in Iran," Fortune, 12 March 1979, 98;
nize independent unions under the
tions on management's rights of dismi
Zabih, Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval, 49.
36 William Lewis and Michael Ledeen, Debacle (New York: Knopf, 1980), 143-144, 153; William
interests were not ignored totally, bu
Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York: Norton, 1981), 168, 191-192, 204, 156-157; Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York: Stein & Day, 1981), 161, 164-165.
37 Confidential interview with a Carter administration official.
Stempel, Inside Iranian Revolution, 92,
38 See the shah's own comments, Answer to History, 167; also Sullivan, Mission to Iran, 167-168, 188.
Stempel, Inside Iranian Revolution, 37-
Handelman and Sanders, Military Gove
FOUR LIBERALIZATIONS
257
we need only consult the oppo-
remarked during the crisis that "the Tokyo riot squad could handle any distur-
the puppet head of Khomeini's
bance in this country with their duty squad." Lacking such equipment and training,
the result of 25 years of cruelty,
the shah's forces had a choice between firing on the demonstrators or firing over
the shah when he started the liber-
their heads.³
drive lifted the hope of the people,
bi, a veteran National Front leader,
on human rights were what origi-
TACTICS
courage to defy the dictatorship."
Particularly in the case of Hungary, the influence of foreign powers is related to
policy, reports that he was told
also emboldened by the human
the last and most important factor - the judgment and skill of the leadership in
dealing with the risks it inevitably runs in easing repression. Liberalization creates
he shah are somewhat more diffi-
at least three dangers for the government: the slackening of controls may allow
is said to have complained during
the opposition to operate more effectively; the people may begin to anticipate fur-
give me a free hand to settle this
ther change at a faster rate than the regime can deliver it or set higher standards
that the United States "wanted
for the government; and the public and the opposition may lose their fear of the
ements, some critics of the Carter
regime and risk acts of defiance that would have been considered too dangerous
States demoralized the shah and
before. The fundamental dilemma faced by liberalizing autocrats is how to hold
his opposition. On the other
these dangers in check without damaging the credibility of liberalization. If the
out that President Carter praised
regime is too cautious, the people may become cynical about the prospects for
it to Iran and made declarations
improvement; if the regime loosens the reins too quickly, the process may run out
that the shah actually requested
of control. The ability of the government to cope with this dilemma is the key
to the success or failure of liberalization.
ot attempt to resolve this dispute
Sullivan's inability to confirm
These dangers are all too apparent in the cases discussed here. In Hungary
ause he had no clear instructions
destalinization led to the alienation of most of the intellectuals, who became the
ence. But it is also true that the
cutting edge of the revolution. In the view of one American official in Teheran,
wn initiative, without any clear
the changes introduced by the shah "led to the rebirth of the revolutionary move-
wn in 1963 to shed blood to save
ment." Far from appeasing the opposition, "increased political leeway encouraged
[it] to press for even more." 40 In Brazil, General Geisel was rewarded for his will-
Illness not only reduced his effec-
hibitions. about the use of force.
ingness to permit an opposition to run in the 1974 congressional elections by a
bered as a sanguinary tyrant and
defeat for the governing party.4 Liberalization, then, often leads to a strength-
an estimated 1,000 supporters
ening of the opposition, at least in the short run. If liberalization is to continue,
the government is going to have to develop some strategy for dealing with this.
Franco's solution was to permit significant liberalization in some areas but not
able, however. The Human Rights
control equipment to Iran for
in others, and in general to err on the side of caution. Specifically, controls were
ssed. The Japanese ambassador
lifted on the press and unions, but the opposition was not permitted to operate
freely until the 1970s. Originally, the Falangists had hoped to overcome class struggle
by creating syndicates where representatives of labor and management would meet
to achieve both justice and productivity. Labor gave up the right to strike or orga-
9 July 1978; Sharif Arani, "Iran," "Dis-
nize independent unions under the plan, but was to be compensated by restric-
in Iran," Fortune, 12 March 1979, 98;
tions on management's rights of dismissal. The Labor Ministry saw that the workers'
Knopf, 1980), 143-144, 153; William
interests were not ignored totally, but in practice the denial of the right to strike
1-192, 204, 156-157; Mohammad Reza
161, 164-165.
39 Stempel, Inside Iranian Revolution, 92, 133-134; Sullivan, Mission to Iran, 168.
ficial.
40 Stempel, Inside Iranian Revolution, 37-38; also 56, 288.
Sullivan, Mission to Iran, 167-168, 188.
41 Handelman and Sanders, Military Government, 151, 153.
258
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
and the system of indirect elections meant that the system functioned more as
tator's death. But Franco's re
a means of control than of representation for the workers. It did not win their
achieving stability also mear
confidence.⁴² In the late 1950s, two changes were made. Larger numbers of en-
In the late 1960s, two years
laces, the representatives directly elected by the workers, were created, and a form
tion the regime was to make,
of collective bargaining was introduced at the local level. In the mid-1960s, the
of the rest of West Europe. Ba
enlaces were instrumental in forming the independent worker's commissions that
robbery, and assassination in
were the motive force behind the resumption of strike activity. The government
ception" (exempting the auth
declared the commissions illegal and arrested the leaders, but was unwilling or
promulgated in 1945) in the p
unable to suppress them and ended up with a great increase in the number of strikes.
of opposition groups lodged p
As I argued above, however, this may not have been an entirely bad thing from
sive apparatus. 1,300 intellectu
the regime's perspective, since the commissions' efforts went mostly into economic,
the police, women relatives of 1
not political protests.4
sit-ins in churches in the large c
Franco tried harder and was more successful in preventing the growth of overtly
lona called for the abolition of
political opposition. FET y de las JONS continued to be the country's only legal
in January 1969 a severe wave
political organization, and the ban on competing parties was enforced. However,
Madrid. On the 24th, Franco ex
the regime permitted opposition moderates to conduct political discussions in their
The harsh measures contained
homes, travel inside and outside the country, and publish abroad and eventually
at home as well. Thus the moderates came to enjoy a sort of twilight existence
legitimacy of exception was a catastroph
Franco's govern
that Juan Linz has characterized as "alegal." Far from endangering the regime,
opposition that the country wa
the limited toleration afforded the alegal opposition, in Linz's view, actually helped
If Franco's liberalization faile
undercut support of the opposition. As he put it in 1973:
to allow the regime to survive 1
Their freedom permits their activity to be visible to the government but not necessarily
worst from happening from the
to any large constituency, and this allows the government to co-opt and corrupt them,
was so poorly conceived that it
to know their weaknesses and failings. On the other hand, this freedom creates a subtle
able situation into a revolution.
gratitude and dependence on those in power that limits their contestation activities. This
when his New Course seemed to
in turn transforms them, in the view of many opponents of the system, into a sham op-
having brought back to power a I
position, [which] weakens their legitimacy as an alternative.4
as a murderer, the Russians faile
For the opposition that the regime considered more dangerous, there was still
ability to strike fear into the he
repression. In the regime's later stage, the methods were not extremely harsh, espe-
Kecskemeti: "[The revolution] wa
cially by the standards set earlier. By the 1960s, "only the most active and directly
of the past, a reaction released w.
subversive political opponents were arrested; almost none were shot," as one ob-
of the regime. 48 That the people o
server explained. The mature dictatorship had a variety of other means at its dis-
hatred is amply evident from the
posal to keep opponents in e-revoking drivers licenses, interfering with careers,
munist authority that broke out
etc. So Franco could afford to forego some of the old brutality. In its immediate
Hungarians dared to express this
purpose, the repression was effective: the Socialist party, which was to play a leading
The Soviet constraining of Rak
role later, had virtually no organization inside of Spain at the time of the dic
thing a liberalizing government m
from limited "elite" groups to a }
42 Medhurst, Government in Spain, 33-35; Amodia, Franco's Political Legacy, 147-149; Coverdale,
Political Transformation of Spain, 17.
Carr and Fusi, Spain, 165, 46, 181;
43 Medhurst, Government in Spain, 36; Herr, Spain, 14-15. The regime did crack down on the Worker
Herr, Spain, 285-6; see also Medhur
Commissions after a large scale protest in 1967, however. The PCE had infiltrated the bodies by that
"Limits and Problems of
time. Gilmour, Transformation of Spain, 93.
44 Linz, "Authoritarian Regime," 220, 216-219.
Vali, Rift and Revolt, 268-269; Kecsl
Kecskemeti, Unexpected Revolution,
FOUR LIBERALIZATIONS
259
tator's death. But Franco's reliance on apathy and demobilization as a means of
e system functioned more as
workers. It did not win their
achieving stability also meant that the regime did not put down deeper roots. 45
made. Larger numbers of en-
In the late 1960s, two years after the most dramatic moves toward the liberaliza-
kers, were created, and a form
tion the regime was to make, Spain began experiencing the same unrest as much
al level. In the mid-1960s, the
of the rest of West Europe. Basque terrorists began a campaign of sabotage, armed
ent worker's commissions that
robbery, and assassination in 1968. Franco responded by declaring a "state of ex-
rike activity. The government
ception" (exempting the authorities from the guarantees against arbitrary arrest
leaders, but was unwilling or
promulgated in 1945) in the province of Guipuzcoa. At the same time, a number
crease in the number of strikes.
of opposition groups lodged protests over the remaining parts of Franco's repres-
en an entirely bad thing from
sive apparatus. 1,300 intellectuals signed a petition decrying the use of torture by
rts went mostly into economic,
the police, women relatives of the jailed leaders of the Workers Commissions held
sit-ins in churches in the large cities, and lawyers' associations in Madrid and Barce-
eventing the growth of overtly
lona called for the abolition of the special courts used for political cases. Finally,
to be the country's only legal
in January 1969 a severe wave of student protest broke out at the University of
arties was enforced. However,
Madrid. On the 24th, Franco extended the state of exception to the entire country.
ct political discussions in their
The harsh measures contained the protest, but in one observer's words, "the state
ublish abroad and eventually
of exception was a catastrophic blow to the [regime's] long efforts to achieve
y a sort of twilight existence
legitimacy
Franco's government had proved far more dramatically than the
from endangering the regime,
opposition that the country was still a police dictatorship."46
in Linz's view, actually helped
If Franco's liberalization failed to win over the public and build enough support
in 1973:
to allow the regime to survive the death of its founder, at least it prevented the
worst from happening from the regime's standpoint. In Hungary, Soviet policy
e government but not necessarily
was so poorly conceived that it transformed what may well have been a manage-
ent to co-opt and corrupt them,
able situation into a revolution. The first mistake was in replacing Nagy at a time
and, this freedom creates a subtle
when his New Course seemed to be winning some support for the regime. Next,
their contestation activities. This
ts of the system, into a sham op-
having brought back to power a man many Hungarians perceived (quite correctly)
native.44
as a murderer, the Russians failed to exploit the one asset Rakosi possessed - his
ability to strike fear into the hearts of potential opponents. According to Paul
ore dangerous, there was still
Kecskemeti: "[The revolution] was a delayed reaction to all the negative experiences
ere not extremely harsh, espe-
of the past, a reaction released when elements of weakness appeared in the image
y the most active and directly
of the regime. 48 That the people of Hungary bore the Communist regime immense
t none were shot," as one ob-
hatred is amply evident from the spontaneous attacks on all symbols of Com-
iety of other means at its dis-
munist authority that broke out in Budapest in the summer of 1956.49 But the
enses, interfering with careers,
Hungarians dared to express this only after the Russians tied Rakosi's hands.
ld brutality. In its immediate
The Soviet constraining of Rakosi was important in a more specific sense. One
ty, which was to play a leading
thing a liberalizing government must guard against is the spread of disaffection
Spain at the time of the dic-
from limited "elite" groups to a broader audience. The effects of the easing of
Political Legacy, 147-149; Coverdale,
45 Carr and Fusi, Spain, 165, 46, 181; Coverdale, Political Transformation of Spain, 18.
46 Herr, Spain, 285-6; see also Medhurst, Government in Spain, 52.
regime did crack down on the Worker's
47 Kecskemeti, "Limits and Problems of Decompression," 105; also Kecskemeti, Unexpected Revo-
CE had infiltrated the bodies by that
lution, 117.
48 Kecskemeti, Unexpected Revolution, 117.
49 Vali, Rift and Revolt, 268-269; Kecskemeti, Unexpected Revolution, 111.
260
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
censorship in Spain, for example, were offset by the regime's continued control
late November, 200 government go
over television, which reached a much wider audience than the print media. When
of a moderate leader and roughed up
controls were lifted on censorship of the press in Brazil in 1978, articles began
attack helped to destroy the hope of
appearing on torture and other abuses of power earlier. But as in Spain, television
lution to an acceptable political soci
and radio remained under close government supervision, so the damage was con-
the massacre at Jaleh Square on 8 Se
tained. 50 In Hungary, the ferment began with the intellectuals at a time when the
on a large crowd that refused to disp
public was sullen but quiescent. The two major forums for the intellectuals be-
the massacre, several of the modera
came the Petofi Circle, a debating club that Rakosi permitted within the Federa-
go. Over the next two months the m
tion of Working Youth, and Irodalmi Ujsag, the official literary journal. By the
opportunity to form a cabinet as lo
summer of 1956, the previously innocuous publication was selling out on the news-
no takers.
stands and the Petofi Circle was drawing crowds in the thousands to its meetings.
While a number of the shah's acts
Either Rakosi was slow to grasp the importance of these developments or the Rus-
at the same time to strengthen his m
sians again held him back. In any case, these two maverick Communist institu-
was his release of political prisoners
tions played a key role in the transmission of ideas from the intellectuals to the
release, as in Hungary, lead to incre
people as a whole. By June a "revolutionary spirit" was taking hold of the entire
provided the extremists with new lea
country. As Khrushchev remarked later, "if ten or so Hungarian writers had been
free were Tudeh union officials who
shot at the right moment, the revolution would never have occurred. "51 Finally,
strikes that were so important to the
Khrushchev's success in defusing an equally threatening situation in Poland sug-
mobilized their forces for the decisi
gests that the Soviets missed one last chance to stave off the tragedy of 1956 when
But the shah's cause was lost, more
they brought in Gero, a man closely associated with Rakosi, rather than returning
arch was unable to use force effective
Nagy to power. 52
the summer of 1978, the regime p
Perhaps more than any other case, the shah's failure illustrates the difficulties
Machiavelli cautions all rulers to av
a ruler faces in mixing concession and repression, for where some leaders might
crack down on rioters one day and
have alienated the opposition in trying to control their protests and others might
of the regime without precluding th
have lost control in attempting to win them over, the shah managed to do both
later - the declaration of martial law
simultaneously. As of August 1977, Iran's future was still open. 53 Only the far left
tary government in November - the
and a few extremists in the clergy ruled out compromise with the government.
tion with the armed forces. Despite Kh
The moderate opposition was still suspicious, but had convinced the radicals to
in no hurry to lay down their lives. E
abstain from violence while they explored the possibilities for peaceful change.
spond firmly. After the disaster at J
Unfortunately, the government took a number of steps in late 1977 that undercut
to fire on demonstrators. In Novem
the moderates. The first was the arrest of a Teheran ayatollah, Mahmoud Tale-
air and kill the opposition only in se
qani, in August. Taleqani was tried secretly, contradicting the earlier pledges that
in both cases, but once the army's ord
trials would now be held in public. Throughout the early fall, the dissidents suc-
and began to resume its activities. By
ceeded in attracting growing numbers of people to their meetings. The regime's
he had in public opinion and the m
response was uneven. SAVAK monitored all the meetings, but sometimes broke
In Brazil the outcome was entirely
them up, and sometimes did not. After some of the gatherings were vandalized,
generals' promises of democratizatio
the police were told to "control" the meetings but not "disrupt" them. Finally, in
government claims to be undertaking
to mitigate the evils of an authoritaria
50 Amodia, Franco's Political Legacy, 187; Robert Levine, "Brazil's Definition of Democracy," Cur-
rent History 76 (February 1979), 83.
51 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, 140, 205-210; Vali, Rift and Revolt, 220, 228-231. Khrushchev
Zabih, Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval, 5
quote from the epigraph in Ned Barber, Seven Days of Freedom (New York: Stein & Day, 1974).
Stempel, Inside Iranian Revolution, 110-11
52 Kecskemeti, "Limits and Problems," 105; Kecskemeti, Unexpected Revolution, 117.
the manuscript.
This explanation was suggested to the at
53 I am adopting the interpretation of John Stempel, Inside Iranian Revolution, 38-39, 265, 99.
FOUR LIBERALIZATIONS
261
the regime's continued control
late November, 200 government goons arrived at a large gathering at the home
than the print media. When
of'a moderate leader and roughed up the guests. According to John Stempel, "the
in Brazil in 1978, articles began
attack helped to destroy the hope of moderate dissidents that there could be evo-
arlier. But as in Spain, television
lution to an acceptable political society." The last straw for many moderates was
ervision, so the damage was con-
the massacre at Jaleh Square on 8 September 1978, when government forces fired
intellectuals at a time when the
on a large crowd that refused to disperse, killing approximately 300 to 400. After
forums for the intellectuals be-
the massacre, several of the moderates began to say that the shah would have to
permitted within the Federa-
go. Over the next two months the monarch offered the moderate opposition the
official literary journal. By the
opportunity to form a cabinet as long as it was done under his aegis. He found
was selling out on the news-
no takers.
in the thousands to its meetings.
While a number of the shah's acts offended the moderates, the shah managed
these developments or the Rus-
at the same time to strengthen his most implacable enemies. One example of this
maverick Communist institu-
was his release of political prisoners at the height of the crisis. Not only did the
from the intellectuals to the
release, as in Hungary, lead to increased public awareness of past abuses, it also
was taking hold of the entire
provided the extremists with new leadership. Included in the 1,500 that were set
so Hungarian writers had been
free were Tudeh union officials who played a key role in organizing the crippling
never have occurred. Finally,
strikes that were so important to the revolutionary cause and guerilla leaders who
atening situation in Poland sug-
mobilized their forces for the decisive street fighting.54
off the tragedy of 1956 when
But the shah's cause was lost, more than for any other reason because the mon-
Rakosi, rather than returning
arch was unable to use force effectively to curb the extreme opposition. During
the summer of 1978, the regime practiced exactly the sort of half measures
failure illustrates the difficulties
Machiavelli cautions all rulers to avoid. SAVAK and other security forces would
for where some leaders might
crack down on rioters one day and free them the next, reinforcing their hatred
their protests and others might
of the regime without precluding them from venting it. At two decisive points
the shah managed to do both
later - the declaration of martial law in September and the formation of a mili-
was still open. 53 Only the far left
tary government in November - the opposition drew back to avoid a confronta-
npromise with the government.
tion with the armed forces. Despite Khomeini's braggadoccio, the opposition seemed
had convinced the radicals to
in no hurry to lay down their lives. But on both occasions, the shah failed to re-
ossibilities for peaceful change.
spond firmly. After the disaster at Jaleh Square, the shah told his soldiers not
steps in late 1977 that undercut
to fire on demonstrators. In November the army was instructed to fire into the
eran ayatollah, Mahmoud Tale-
air and kill the opposition only in self-defense. The streets were quiet for a time
adicting the earlier pledges that
in both cases, but once the army's orders became clear, the opposition lost its fear
he early fall, the dissidents suc-
and began to resume its activities. By December the shah had lost what support
to their meetings. The regime's
he had in public opinion and the morale of the armed forces was cracking.⁵
meetings, but sometimes broke
In Brazil the outcome was entirely different. Some might attribute this to the
the gatherings were vandalized,
generals' promises of democratization.⁵⁶ It is reasonable to think that when the
not "disrupt" them. Finally, in
government claims to be undertaking liberalization to transform and not merely
to mitigate the evils of an authoritarian government the public may exhibit greater
Brazil's Definition of Democracy," Cur-
and Revolt, 220, 228-231. Khrushchev
54 Zabih, Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval, 56.
edom (New York: Stein & Day, 1974).
55 Stempel, Inside Iranian Revolution, 110-111, 119-121, 134, 153; my own research confirms Stempel.
Unexpected Revolution, 117.
56 This explanation was suggested to the author by William Perry and an anonymous reader of
de Iranian Revolution, 38-39, 265, 99.
the manuscript.
262
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
patience and the process may proceed more smoothly. But these promises were
the military's hardliners had reacte
not made in Brazil until after the economy reached its nadir in the early 1980s
threat from the opposition by dem
and cannot account for the success of liberalization up to that point. 57 A better
dictatorship by the more moderate I
explanation, in my view, is the tactics adopted by the Brazilian leadership.
still a force to be reckoned with in
Throughout 1975-1977, Geisel continued to use the Institutional Acts to de-
well aware of this. This division in 1
prive opposition figures of their political rights. The progress of decompression
to decompression in that it allowed (
in Brazil was so uneven that critics said that the country moved two steps back
to maintain control without genera
for every one forward. But Geisel himself had warned that it would be so. The
intentions.
pace, he explained, would be "slow, gradual, and sane" in order to avoid "incon-
Obviously, the existence of a stro
venient, premature, or imprudent" changes. The use of repression would remain
blessing. The colonel's regime in G
"widespread and flexible." 58 According to David Fleischer and Robert Wesson,
from its beginning in 1967 till 1973. I
Figueiredo adopted a similar approach:
canceled martial law in Athens, fre
some further steps toward democra
The process was consequently gradual and limited, subject to a delicate balance between
pressures for fuller democracy and fears of a loss of control. Stronger demands, as the
outbreak of violent protest since 190
parties pushed for ever new concession, and radical speeches, as deputies tested the limits
control of the Polytechnic University
of official toleration, made the government hesitate to grip the reins more tightly
ship of Demitrios Ioaniddes decide
President Figueiredo and his ministers continued their commitment to democratization
removed Papadopoulos. 61
as a necessity for the country; however, Figueiredo wanted to move at his own initiative
That this did not happen in Brazi
not that of Congress, and concessions were to be made on the government's terms.
alizing generals. At times Geisel mc
The Brazilian strategy seemed to be designed to prevent expectations from rising
nents of his policies, taking commar
too rapidly and to maintain the people's awe of the government. If the conces
or even putting them under protect
sions were granted under pressure, the government would seem to be acting from
occurred in October 1977 when the I
weakness and that could encourage further demands. If the government were seen
to Figueiredo, was dismissed in an
as acting on its own timetable and not being stampeded, the likelihood was less
incident. 62 On the other hand, Geisel
charges of weakness. In 1977 he add
that the concessions would be destabilizing.
The one danger of this strategy was that the Brazilian public would lose pa
electoral competition to the benefit
tience with the slow pace of change or lose confidence in the intentions of the
Alliance. The promulgation of the A
leadership. There was, however, one convincing reason for giving the government
ical protest in Brazil and was conde
a chance: the most likely alternative seemed worse. As one opposition member
groups in Brazil. 63
told an American journalist in 1975, "maybe it's better to go along with Geisel's
Even so, the success of the Brazili
slow decompression than to provoke a new clampdown by the hardliners," and
chance. On 30 April 1981, an explosio
that seemed to be the predominant mood in Brazil at that time. 60 In the 1960s,
in Rio de Janeiro on the same day a
an army intelligence officer and sev
Brazil that the hardliners in the mil
57 Wayne Selcher, "Contradictions, Dilemmas, and Actors in Brazil's Aberture 1975-1985" in Selcher,
rorist attack during the concert and
ed., Political Liberalization in Brazil, 57.
from Riordan Roett, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society (New York: Praeger, 1984), 147-148.4
58 Quotes from Handelman and Sanders, Military Government, 155, 172-173. Information above
Figueiredo. The president preferred i
investigation of the incident was un
Riordan Roett agrees, "The message was clear if there was going to be liberalization, Geisel would
ample, was never interviewed. The m
orchestrate it." See also, Selcher, "Introduction," 1, 3; Baloyra, "From Moment to Moment," 29-30;
decompression continued on course
and Luciano Martins, "The "Liberalization' of Authoritarian Rule in Brazil" in Guillermo O'Donnell,
Phillippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America
New York Times, 25 November 1973.
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 83-84.
Roett, Brazil, 147; Levine, "Brazil's Def
59 Quote from Fleischer and Wesson, Brazil in Transition, 41. See also Martins, "The 'Liberaliza
Levine, "Brazil's Definition," 63.
tion' of Authoritarian Rule," 85-7.
Robert Levine, "Brazil: The Dimensions d
60 Fleischer and Wesson, Brazil in Transition, 41; New York Times, 25 November 1973.
Roett, Brazil, 153.
FOUR LIBERALIZATIONS
263
nore smoothly. But these promises were
the military's hardliners had reacted to what they took to be an increase in the
my reached its nadir in the early 1980s
threat from the opposition by demanding and getting a severe tightening of the
beralization up to that point. 57 A better
dictatorship by the more moderate President Castello Branco. The hardliners were
dopted by the Brazilian leadership.
still a force to be reckoned with in Brazil in the 1970s, and the opposition was
ued to use the Institutional Acts to de-
well aware of this. This division in the armed forces, then, may have been a boon
rights. The progress of decompression
to decompression in that it allowed Geisel and Figueiredo to proceed slowly enough
that the country moved two steps back
to maintain control without generating complete skepticism about their ultimate
If had warned that it would be so. The
intentions.
ual, and sane" in order to avoid "incon-
Obviously, the existence of a strong threat from the far right is not an unmixed
ges. The use of repression would remain
blessing. The colonel's regime in Greece experienced virtually no public dissent
to David Fleischer and Robert Wesson,
from its beginning in 1967 till 1973. In August of that year, Georgios Papadopoulos
canceled martial law in Athens, freed several political prisoners, and promised
imited, subject to a delicate balance between
some further steps toward democracy in the future. Three months later, the first
a loss of control. Stronger demands, as the
outbreak of violent protest since 1967 occurred when students and workers seized
radical speeches, as deputies tested the limits
control of the Polytechnic University in Athens. Hardline elements under the leader-
t hesitate to grip the reins more tightly
ship of Demitrios Ioaniddes decided that liberalization had gone far enough and
inued their commitment to democratization
removed Papadopoulos.61
ueiredo wanted to move at his own initiative,
That this did not happen in Brazil was due in large part to the skill of the liber-
re to be made on the government's terms.59
alizing generals. At times Geisel moved aggressively to eliminate possible oppo-
gned to prevent expectations from rising
nents of his policies, taking commands away from those who opposed his policies
awe of the government. If the conces-
or even putting them under protective arrest. A particularly important instance
vernment would seem to be acting from
occurred in October 1977 when the minister of the army, a potential hardline rival
er demands. If the government were seen
to Figueiredo, was dismissed in an atmosphere of high tension, though without
eing stampeded, the likelihood was less
incident. 62 On the other hand, Geisel was firm enough with the opposition to avoid
ing.
charges of weakness. In 1977 he adopted the "April Package," which altered the
hat the Brazilian public would lose pa-
electoral competition to the benefit of the pro-government National Renovating
ose confidence in the intentions of the
Alliance. The promulgation of the April Package touched off an upsurge in polit-
incing reason for giving the government
ical protest in Brazil and was condemned by representatives from many leading
ned worse. As one opposition member
groups in Brazil.63
tybe it's better to go along with Geisel's
Even so, the success of the Brazilian liberalizers may ultimately have rested on
ew clampdown by the hardliners," and
chance. On 30 April 1981, an explosion took place outside a large convention center
d in Brazil at that time. 60 In the 1960s,
in Rio de Janeiro on the same day a popular music concert was scheduled, killing
an army intelligence officer and severely wounding another. It was rumored in
Brazil that the hardliners in the military had intended to stage an apparent ter-
Actors in Brazil's Aberture 1975-1985" in Selcher,
rorist attack during the concert and then use it as a pretext to seize power from
y Government, 155, 172-173. Information above
Figueiredo. The president preferred not to provoke the hardliners, and no serious
ial Society (New York: Praeger, 1984), 147-148.
investigation of the incident was undertaken. The surviving participant, for ex-
here was going to be liberalization, Geisel would
ample, was never interviewed. The moderate opposition rallied to Figeuiredo, and
3; Baloyra, "From Moment to Moment," 29-30;
decompression continued on course.⁶⁴
britarian Rule in Brazil" in Guillermo O'Donnell,
ransitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America
61 New York Times, 25 November 1973.
83-84.
62 Roett, Brazil, 147; Levine, "Brazil's Definition of Democracy," 70.
ransition, 41. See also Martins, "The 'Liberaliza-
63 Levine, "Brazil's Definition," 63.
64 Robert Levine, "Brazil: The Dimensions of Democratization," Current History 81 (February 1982),
New York Times, 25 November 1973.
82; Roett, Brazil, 153.
264
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
CONCLUSION
Americans must remember that con
Liberalization seems most likely to succeed when it is not undertaken under out-
ness are more likely to be destabili
side pressure, when the economic climate is favorable, when it aims at a transfor-
require some tactical retreats, as it
mation of the autocracy and not just its amelioration, and when the regime has
It may be said in objection that ba
avoided the half-measures that Machiavelli warned of. A regime is probably best
is best served when they do. This is
off when it has as little to apologize about as possible, but rulers that are suffi-
rulers discussed here probably did de
ciently ruthless may enhance the prospects for liberalization in the future by li-
from a lamp post. But the major n
quidating the opposition thoroughly and instilling terror in their publics. Regimes
leaders get what is coming to them,
in which a perpetrator can be identified and punished may have an easier time
the suffering of those living under 0
satisfying their people's desire for justice than ones in which the ruler himself
the reader that revolution is and oug
cannot evade responsibility.
last resort. The toll taken in most re
All of the factors above, however, are less important than the tactics the govern-
of that. Moreover, history has often
ment uses in dealing with the question of how to deter and contain protest without
the cause of freedom by replacing or
destroying the credibility of liberalization. In both Spain and Brazil, the regimes
is no better, and frequently worse. H
moved slowly and gradually, careful to preserve the image that they were dealing
Russia, China, Cuba, Vietnam, Iran
from a position of strength. The liberalizers in the Brazilian military may well
in Central America- the record is no
have been aided by the visible division in their ranks, with the existence of the
will be best achieved by a policy of
hardliners allowing Geisel to escape the blame for the slow pace of decompression.
doctrinaire insistence on the immedi
The history of these four countries thus corroborates Tocqueville's admoni-
tion that "the most perilous time for a bad government is when it seeks to mend
its ways." But there is also wisdom in John Locke's observation that Revolu-
tions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public affairs. Great mis-
takes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of
humane frailty will be born by the People, without mutiny or murmur. "65
It is still surprising how strong a case one can make that things could have been
different in the two cases that I have classified as failures, Iran and Hungary.
In both of these, it was only after the government's actions had caused the people
to lose both their fear and their hope that the people took up arms against their
rulers.
The implications of this for the United States and its foreign policy are not
obvious. It would be difficult, of course, to interpret the record above as justifi-
cation for an aggressive human rights policy of the kind advocated by some in
the Carter administration. On the other hand, if the Hungarian and Iranian revo-
lutions were brought about to an important extent (though certainly not entirely)
by tactical mistakes, our conclusions need not be completely pessimistic about
the possibilities of improving conditions in other countries without damaging
American interests.
The United States, in my view, need not abandon all efforts to persuade friendly
governments to liberalize, but must pursue this aim with a greater understanding
of the dangers a bad government faces as it tries to change its ways. In particular,
65 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution (New York: Doubleday, 1955),
176-177; John Locke, Second Treatise (New York: New American Library, 1965), chap. xix, para. 225.
FOUR LIBERALIZATIONS
265
Americans must remember that concessions that appear to be made from weak-
it is not undertaken under out-
ness are more likely to be destabilizing, and that successful liberalization may
torable, when it aims at a transfor-
require some tactical retreats, as it did in Brazil.
oration, and when the regime has
It may be said in objection that bad governments deserve to fail and that justice
of. A regime is probably best
is best served when they do. This is undoubtedly true in some cases. Some of the
possible, but rulers that are suffi-
rulers discussed here probably did deserve to end their days on this earth swinging
liberalization in the future by li-
from a lamp post. But the major moral concern should not be seeing that the
terror in their publics. Regimes
leaders get what is coming to them, but rather doing what one can to minimize
unished may have an easier time
the suffering of those living under oppressive rule. Here, I only want to remind
ones in which the ruler himself
the reader that revolution is and ought to be a desperate remedy, a means of the
last resort. The toll taken in most revolutions in recent history is ample evidence
portant than the tactics the govern-
of that. Moreover, history has often mocked those who have given their lives to
deter and contain protest without
the cause of freedom by replacing one tyrannical government with another that
Spain and Brazil, the regimes
is no better, and frequently worse. How often has that happened in this century?
the image that they were dealing
Russia, China, Cuba, Vietnam, Iran, and now perhaps one or more countries
the Brazilian military may well
in Central America - the record is not encouraging. In such cases, improvements
ranks, with the existence of the
will be best achieved by a policy of caution and flexibility, and not through a
the slow pace of decompression.
doctrinaire insistence on the immediate elimination of all existing evils.
roborates Tocqueville's admoni-
ernment is when it seeks to mend
observation that "
Revolu-
in public affairs. Great mis-
avenient laws, and all the slips of
thout mutiny or murmur. "65
make that things could have been
as failures, Iran and Hungary.
actions had caused the people
eople took up arms against their
and its foreign policy are not
erpret the record above as justifi-
the kind advocated by some in
the Hungarian and Iranian revo-
(though certainly not entirely)
be completely pessimistic about
countries without damaging
all efforts to persuade friendly
with a greater understanding
to change its ways. In particular,
Revolution (New York: Doubleday, 1955),
Library, 1965), chap. xix, para. 225.
World
EASTERN EUROPE
A Freer, but Messier, Order
In Poland and Hungary, George Bush will confront Communism in flux
vived seven years of repression, forced the
General Czeslaw Kiszczak, 63, the Interi-
BY WALTER ISAACSON BUDAPEST
government into half-free elections, then
or Minister who won the confidence of the
n the waning years of the 20th centu-
humiliated it.
union as the government's main negotia-
ry, the greatest challenge posed by
Walesa and his allies are discovering
tor during the round-table talks that led to
Communism will not be containing its
the cruelty of the ironic punishment that
the democratic reforms. Moscow has in-
spread but coping with its decline. From
the Greek goddess Nemesis reserved for
vited Walesa to come for a visit to discuss
the bloodshed in Beijing to the political
her cheekiest victims: granting their very
the political situation.
paralysis in Poland, efforts to shed hard-
desires. Solidarity's success at the polls ex-
After more than 40 years of Commu-
line systems are provoking agonal gasps
poses the fact that for all its popularity, it
nism, Poland is an economic cripple. In-
that are at turns cheering and frightening.
has no program or philosophy. Its leaders
flation is running close to 100% a year, the
When he begins his tour of Poland
are dancing desperately to avoid being
zloty is not considered real money, and all
and Hungary this weekend, President
forced to share power with the Commu-
important transactions are done in dol-
George Bush will seek to certify a new era
nists. It is as if the penalty one pays for
lars. The wait for an apartment is 20 years,
emerging from these convulsions. For Po-
losing an election in Poland is having to
an almost inconceivable reality that domi-
land and Hungary are where the cold war
be in power.
nates the personal planning of most Poles.
began 42 years ago. And when historians
Partly because of opposition from Sol-
The country's underlying problem is that
write about the implosion of Communism
idarity, General Jaruzelski, the Commu-
it invested in all the wrong industries. The
in the late 1980s, they will note that it
nist Party leader who declared martial
state has squandered foreign loans and
likewise began when those two satellites
law in 1981, made a startling announce-
subsidized shipyards, steel mills and coal
meandered from the Soviet orbit.
ment last Friday that he would not be a
mines. In an age when information and
Back in 1947, as it became clear that
candidate in this week's election by Par-
high technology are the driving force of
Poland's Peasant Party would beat the
liament for the powerful new office of
economic growth, Poland is saddled with
Communists, Stalin's army cut off its
President. Instead, with Solidarity's ap-
a string-and-can phone system and a work
phones and eventually sent the party's
proval, the party is expected to nominate
force that spends much of its time moon-
chieftain, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, fleeing
to the West. In Hungary that year, after the
anti-Communist Smallholders Party won
power, the Soviet army arrested its leader
and forced a confession of subversion.
This time in Poland, the opposition
movement Solidarity was able to reduce
the Communist Party to the role of a sup-
plicant, and may end up forcing the coun-
try's ruler, General Wojciech Jaruzelski,
out of power. In Hungary, the Small-
holders Party is back, feuding with itself
and with the dozen or so other parties ex-
pected to take part in free elections sched-
uled for next year.
In both countries, Bush will find the
disjuncture between economic and politi-
cal progress that has, in very different
ways, plagued Mikhail Gorbachev's glas-
nost-led revolution as well as Deng Xiao-
ping's marketplace-led revolt. Poland
combines robust political competition
with a downtrodden economy almost too
far gone for reform. Hungary combines
an explosion of private enterprise with a
less vigorous attitude toward democracy.
The message the U.S. and its West Euro-
pean allies can bring to both places is the
truth that lies at the heart of democratic
capitalism: economic and political free-
doms work best in tandem.
The political reforms in Poland have
the most dramatic flair of any in the Com-
munist world, in part because they are be-
ing won under the inspiring banner of Sol-
idarity. Roughhewn shipyard workers
such as Lech Walesa and Bogdan Lis sur-
38
TIME, JULY 10, 1989
I
THE REAR-WHEEL-DRIVE MIATA. YOU'LL FIND IT IN THE 16-VALVE, DOHC, FUEL INJECTED ENGINE. SHORT
ESIGNED TO NOT ONLY MAKE MIATA PERFORM RIGHT, BUT ALSO FEEL RIGHT.
mazDa
lighting as middlemen for goods and ser-
ty's opposition, and what does exist is
to ask seriously whether they could defeat
vices that no one is producing.
dominated by intellectuals. Instead, the
Rumania's disciplined army.
Hungary also struggles under a large
push toward democracy is being led from
An end to the division of Europe could
foreign debt. But with an economic exu-
within the Communist Party by members
create pressure for a reunited Germany.
berance that matches Poland's political
of its reform wing, most prominently by
The history of European wars (and world
exhilaration, Budapest is making progress
Politburo member Imre Pozsgay. At a
wars) has been partly the story of nation-
toward recovery. Western visitors who
meeting of the party's Central Committee
alist rivalries and partly the story of Ger-
evince any interest in investing in Hunga-
last weekend, Pozsgay was nominated to
man expansionism. As the cold war ends,
ry are likely to find officials knocking at
become the country's new state President
Germany-formally reunited or not-
their hotel doors with lists of state enter-
as soon as constitutional changes imbue
will dominate middle Europe economi-
prises for sale. Hungary now permits its
that office with real power. The party's
cally, politically and culturally.
citizens to start large-scale private busi-
other leading reformer, Rezsö Nyers, was
In time, there could be a backlash
nesses and hire up to 500 workers. A
tapped as party chairman. The moves di-
against capitalism. The excesses inherent
fledgling stock market has 147 listings.
luted the power of General Secretary
in even a successful capitalist system will
Within three years, half of Hungary's
Károly Grósz, who until a few months ago
create resentments, and may give birth to
economy is expected to be in private
was himself considered a reformer.
the sort of extremist parties emerging in
hands. Consumer goods are expensive,
As Poland and Hungary succeed in
Western Europe.
but, unlike in Poland, they are plentiful.
charting a more independent course,
Democratic passions are not likely to
Hungarians proudly use the phrase "like
Czechoslovakia may ultimately follow-
resolve deep-seated economic problems.
an American movie" to describe their
once it outgrows the generation of leaders
Solidarity's base of support, for example,
store shelves and dinner tables.
whose power stems from the crushing of
is among workers in the shipyards, steel
Reforms in Hungary were begun
the Prague Spring in 1968. Reforms in the
mills and coal mines. Solidarity is not
slowly in the early 1960s, with care taken
other three Soviet satellites may take
likely to close down unproductive indus-
not to aggravate the Soviet sensibilities
longer. East Germany, moderately pros-
tries, or to impose the wage restraints and
that caused tanks to roll in 1956. Today
perous, puts a premium on order and cau-
price rises the country needs.
the barbed wire of the Iron Curtain sepa-
tion. Rumania, historically prone to re-
Without a Warsaw Pact threat, NATO
rating Hungary from Austria has been
pressive regimes, has been impoverished
may gradually dissolve. Likewise, the de-
snipped into souvenirs, Russian is no
by Nicolae Ceauşescu's brutal combina-
nuclearization of Europe could become
longer required in school, the Karl Marx
tion of despotism and nepotism dubbed
nearly total. Appealing as this may sound,
University of Economics in Budapest has
"socialism in one family." Bulgaria like-
it could endanger the armed balance that
stopped preaching Marxist economics,
wise remains an unrepentant police state.
has kept the peace since 1945. The cold
and there is open discussion about with-
The East bloc was always an unnatural
war was also a cold peace: now in its 45th
drawing from the Warsaw Pact.
construct: a collection of diverse nations
year, the era that historian John Lewis
Hungary has no parallel to Solidari-
and peoples consigned by fate to live with
Gaddis calls the "long peace" is surpass-
the occupying tanks of an increasingly in-
ing the stable stretches imposed by Met-
secure empire. To the extent that this sub-
ternich and then Bismarck in the 19th
jugation is dissipating, the cold war is end-
ILLUSTRATION FOR TIME BY DAVID SUTER
century. One reason is that nuclear weap-
ing. Yet such progress will also bring
ons made localized wars and territorial
challenges in a world no longer anchored
disputes too dangerous to allow. They also
by the stability of a superpower rivalry.
made a direct confrontation between East
The waning of Communist dominance in
and West or a Soviet invasion of Central
Eastern Europe may create a better world,
Europe unthinkable.
but not necessarily a simpler one.
Under the Brezhnev Doctrine, the So-
Nemesis may be at work again, grant-
viet Union declared that socialism was ir-
ing the West's wish for a rollback of Soviet
reversible, which translated into a decree
domination in Eastern Europe. And so as
that its Warsaw Pact neighbors not be al-
Bush gives two cheers for the changes in
lowed to free themselves of Communist
Poland and Hungary, the West would do
clutches. Hence the tanks of 1956 and
well to pay heed to the difficulties and
1968. Now comes the Gorbachev Doc-
problems such an evolution could bring.
trine, as articulated in his 1988 U.N.
Among them:
speech: "Freedom of choice is a universal
Democracy can be messy. Eastern Eu-
principle that
applies both to the capi-
rope has only limited experience with
talist and the socialist system."
multiparty systems, and there are no signs
Does this mean that the Soviets will
SO far that Poland or Hungary will evolve
let Poland and Hungary drift as far as
toward a Western-style, genteel competi-
they want? Even Gorbachev might not
tion between moderate right and left. In-
know the answer to that question. What
stead, nationalism, anti-Semitism, neo-
seems likely now is that Moscow may tol-
Stalinism and other philosophies ripe for
erate Poland's political pluralism and
demagoguery may come to the fore.
Hungary's economic experimentation,
Nationalist passions have been the
but it will be tempted to intervene if either
bane of Central Europe for centuries,
seemed about to withdraw from the War-
sometimes spilling over to engulf the Con-
saw Pact and expel Soviet troops.
tinent in wars. The division of Europe
A primary goal of the West must be to
into two blocs served to subdue the more
avoid such a crackdown. Thus the U.S.
parochial animosities. But as the Iron
and the U.S.S.R. have a common interest:
Curtain lifts, hatreds may be rekindled.
defining the Soviet Union's proper securi-
Hungary's border with Rumania has been
ty concerns and ensuring that they are re-
closed even as the one with Austria has
spected. That is the notion behind Henry
opened. A dispute over Rumania's ethnic
Kissinger's proposal that critics have
Hungarians has caused some Hungarians
dubbed Yalta II. If the Soviets felt assured
TIME, JULY 10, 1989
39
that the U.S. would not ex-
watch the music-video
ploit the changes militarily,
shows. Recently, the stu-
they could be expected to al-
low the reforms more lee-
speech in West Germany in
late May, he said he wanted
ILLUSTRATION FOR TIME BY DAVID SUTER
dents have been tuning in to
reports from China instead.
way. Bush has indicated sup-
George Orwell prophesied
port for this approach; in a
that advances in informa-
tion technology would lead
to Big Brother's total con-
to "let the Soviets know that
trol. It is more likely that, as
our goal is not to undermine
Reagan said, the "Goliath of
their legitimate security
totalitarianism will be
interests."
brought down by the David
Bush-and the West as
of the microchip."
a whole-should go farther.
Understanding the chal-
Poland and Hungary are
lenges that will arise from
striving toward a societal
the fracturing of the Soviet
ideal based on more than
bloc will help the U.S. avoid
economic and democratic
the unseemly tendency to
reforms. The components: a
gloat. But it should not ob-
legal structure that guaran-
scure the epochal nature of
tees individual rights and
the change occurring. Po-
the existence of indepen-
land and Hungary are aban-
dent institutions-such as
doning the basic tenets that
churches, trade unions, news-
Lenin distorted after Marx
papers, political organiza-
and that Stalin distorted af-
tions, professional associa-
ter Lenin: a rigidly central-
tions, private businesses-that prevent
network of military alliances. That period
ized economy, a one-party political sys-
the state from exerting a dominating in-
is passing, being replaced by what has
tem and a suppression of personal
fluence in everyday life. Mark Palmer,
been dubbed a "Fax Americana." Ameri-
freedoms. People are electing their repre-
America's energetic Ambassador to
ca's influence will derive, in part, from its
sentatives for the first time. They are
Hungary, argues persuasively that the
role as an exemplar of ideas and a purvey-
reading independent newspapers and
U.S. should follow Western Europe's ex-
or of information. Ronald Reagan, in a
starting their own businesses. They are
ample in shoring up this evolution by
speech in London last month, talked
even tearing down the fences that have
creating a web of social, political, busi-
about how "electronic beams blow
kept the world in an armed standoff for
ness and economic links to the people of
through the Iron Curtain as if it were
almost two generations. With help from
Eastern Europe.
lace." In Bratislava, Czechoslovak stu-
the rest of the world, these freedoms could
During the postwar "Pax Ameri-
dents sometimes drop by the city's new
be savored long after the problems they
cana," Washington's world role largely
hotel, equipped for international televi-
may cause are relegated to a historical
involved resisting Communism through a
sion reception, where the maids let them
footnote.
SOVIET UNION
Yes, he told reporters in Mos-
The Odd Case
cow, Orlov was Souther, who
TASS/AFP
Italy. Kryuchkov refused to
confirm that but said more de-
first surfaced in the Soviet
tails of Souther's career in es-
Union last July claiming that
pionage would be published.
of M. Orlov
the FBI had been harassing
"We can be quite open about
him. "I lost my future," he
this," he said. "We have our
said. But Souther acquired his
spies, and you have yours."
A defector who dies in Moscow
Russian name only after he
Souther left the Navy in
turns out to be a spy
was granted asylum last year.
1982 to study Russian litera-
What was news was that
ture at Virginia's Old Domin-
T
he obituary read like the opening page
Souther, as Izvestia reported
ion University. He also
of a spy novel. Mikhail Yevgenyevich
last week, had been spying for
Glenn Souther
worked as a reservist at the
Orlov, alias Glenn Michael Souther, who
the Soviets "for a long time"
Atlantic fleet intelligence cen-
had "made a large contribution" to Soviet
and had acquired the rank of KGB major.
ter in Norfolk. He was assigned to a lab-
state security, had "died suddenly" at 32.
Souther had aroused suspicions before
oratory processing satellite-reconnais-
For the KGB leadership committee, which
his defection. Graduating from high
sance photos and also might have been
signed the article in the military newspa-
school in Cumberland, Me., in 1975, he
privy to sensitive communications inter-
per Red Star last week, Orlov's death was
enlisted in the Navy and was trained as a
cepts. The investigation into his ex-wife's
a "huge loss." But could this Orlov really
photographer. Based in Italy at Sixth
allegations was reopened in 1986, and af-
be Souther, a onetime U.S. Navy photog-
Fleet headquarters from 1979 to 1982, he
ter questioning by the FBI, Souther defect-
rapher who had defected to the Soviet
married an Italian woman. They later
ed. In spite of his warm reception by the
Union more than a year ago? In calling
separated, and in 1986 his estranged wife
KGB, his marriage to a Russian and the
Souther by a Russian name, the obituary
approached a Navy officer to report
birth of their daughter, he was not happy
seemed to suggest that the deceased had
Souther as a spy. Souther had too much
in Moscow. "I haven't found my niche ex-
actually been a Soviet mole, sent to live in
extra money, she claimed, and took Gov-
actly," Souther told Soviet television view-
America at an early age and assigned to
ernment documents home in violation of
ers last year, but he had decided "to live
burrow into the U.S. military.
regulations. Authorities initially dis-
here or not to live." He apparently decid-
In a surprising show of glasnost, Gen-
missed her accusations as an ex-wife's
ed on the latter course: according to
eral Vladimir Kryuchkov, head of the
spite, but now suspect that Souther was
Kryuchkov, Souther had committed sui-
KGB, hurried to correct that impression.
recruited by the KGB during that tour in
cide "in a nervous state of mind."
40
TIME, JULY 10, 1989
THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JULY 2, 1989
A Voice From Budapest
Making Democracy: Stir Often, Do No
of its le
dency.
East Europe's
the cra
protest
that the
lessons from its
to show
The
own Tiananmen
have no
turn. TI
Squares.
Soviet
declara
have tl
thoritie
By MIKLOS HARASZTI
gotten
As
June 1
BUDAPEST
bled cr
RESIDENT BUSH will see
thankfull
an enormous leap forward
sacred
on the way from Commu-
since y
nism to democracy when he
author
visits Poland and Hungary in a week
a situa
or so. He will have the problem of
press u
deciding whom to congratulate for it.
If
His other problem might well be
only fr
whether he may come to regret those
Comm
congratulations after he leaves. To
saw an
avoid the kind of disappointment that
part of
he must be suffering now when he re-
part of
flects on his visit to Beijing, he should
provid
not be too shy or too diplomatic about
Th
continuing to press for human rights.
Easter
The Hungarian developments
men So
over the last year surprise even me,
sons f
the perpetual oppositionist. Only two
democ
and a half weeks ago, I came back to
rope t
Budapest after spending the aca-
with th
demic year at Bard College in New
1981 in
York. There, as a "dissident in resi-
warne
dence," I tried to observe and under-
racy i
stand the upheavals taking place in
flame.
the Soviet-occupied part of Europe.
Po
How could I not be optimistic at
gaged
this time? I came back on the eve of
democ
June 16, when a crowd officially esti-
tries h
mated at 250,000 gathered in Buda-
taking
pest for a ceremony marking the re-
and to
burial of Imre Nagy, Prime Minister
from p
during the 1956 uprising against
Bu
Soviet domination, and to commemo-
its pai
rate executed freedom fighters
the W
whom Janos Kadar, the General Sec-
resolu
retary and then President of the
Sygma/Thierry Orban
H
Communist Party, had fought to for-
The coffin of Imre Nagy, Prime Minister during the 1956 uprising against Soviet domi-
Europ
get with a Macbethian obsession.
Exactly one year before, Mr.
nation, at reburial ceremony in Budapest last month.
huma
never
Kadar's successor, Karoly Grosz,
foreig
had ordered the police to use trun-
whose work was banned. Today I wouldn't qualify for the
sure is never counterprod
cheons and tear gas to break up a rally in-Budapest by a
thousand people, including myself, demanding just such
position. Censorship has absolutely ceased to exist in
tries that would like to ke
a ceremony. "Never," Mr. Grosz said.
Hungary. Our journal has become a regular weekly with
the West, such pressure a
public distribution. And the Communist Party has
to halt the worsening of op
I received the invitation to Bard in spring 1988 whenI
agreed to negotiate with the opposition. I am now a mem-
Mr. Bush will addres
was an editor of an underground paper and a writer
ber of the opposition delegation meeting with Govern-
when he comes to Poland
ment authorities to prepare a new press law.
only as a guest of the Cor
Miklos Haraszti, who returned to Budapest in June
So why am I still worried?
as a guest of the people di
after a year in the United States, is a Hungarian writer
If I think of Beijing it is not only because Mr. Grosz is
can send a strong messa
and an editor of the journal Beszelo.
still in power, even with the Communist Party's widening
human rights concessions
HE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JULY 2, 1989
E
3
om Budapest
Bush and Beijing
Stir Often, Do Not Boil
Taking the
of its leadership to a four-man presi-
dency. So too are those who ordered
Measure of
the crackdown against those whose
protest a year ago forced the changes
that the Government is now so eager
to show Mr. Bush.
There should be no mistake. We
A 'Measured
have not yet reached a point of no re-
turn. There is no guarantee from the
Soviet Union that, in spite all of its
declarations, it won't interfere. Nor
Response'
have the Polish and Hungarian au-
thorities at the negotiating table yet
gotten rid of the guns in their pockets:
As Victor Orban, a speaker at the
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
June 16 ceremony, told the assem-
bled crowd: "We are not especially
WASHINGTON
thankful that we are not being mas-
VERY time President Bush and Secretary of
sacred like those students in Beijing,
State James A. Baker 3d have spoken with
since we could be massacred if the
the press in the last two weeks, they have
authorities wished. We need to create
been badgered with the same question, "Why
a situation in which they cannot op-
aren't you saying and doing more about China?"
press us, even if they want to."
Each time, with increasing exasperation, they have
If there is hope, it doesn't come
answered, "Look at all we have said and done."
only from the growing realism of the
Mr. Baker himself said: "We think a measured re-
Communist parties in Moscow, War-
sponse is just that. It calls for a response which
saw and Budapest. Realism on the
clearly expresses our outrage, but does not resort to
part of the West and realism on the
an overly emotional response which involves inflam-
part of us oppressed East Europeans
matory rhetoric."
provides much more hope than that,
But one person's inflammatory rhetoric is another
There is also hope in the fact that
person's poetry, and because the Administration's
Eastern Europe has had its Tianan-
déclarations on Tianamen Square have contained no
men Squares and has learned its les-
poetry, no memorable language, nothing seems to
sons from them. Even though the
have stuck in the public's mind.
democratic movements of East Eu-
While the President seemed to find the perfect com-
rope today are stronger than ever,
bination of words and deeds to express the nation's
with the experiences of 1956, 1968 and
desire for progress with Moscow on arms control on
1981 in mind, we don't have to be
his recent swing through Europe, his attempts to
warned that post-Communist democ-
strike a similar balance in relation to Beijing have:left
racy is best when cooked on a low
many unsatisfied.
flame.
The Administration has been criticized as being nei-
Poland and Hungary are en-
ther forceful enough in its condemnation of what hap-
gaged in a conspiracy of caution. The
pened in Tiananmen Square nor convincing enough in
democratic movements in both coun-
its articulation of what it calls the "countervailing
tries have decided to renounce the
geopolitical considerations," which require a mainte-
taking of revenge for earlier failures
nance of ties with Beijing.
and to let the Communists retire
As a result, Congress put forth its own sanctions
from power step by step.
and declarations last week, which the Administration
But to help the one-party rule to
rejected as superfluous.
its painless collapse, we need from
Presidents shape their policy environment through
the West not only caution but also
their words. "We often think of political rhetoric as a
resolution.
bad word, as pandering, as mere talk - it's action
Sygma/Thierry Orban
Here are some truths that East
that counts," said Michel J. Sandel, a political theorist
during the 1956 uprising against Soviet domi-
Europeans have learned from their
at Harvard University. "But that is a mistaken idea
last month
human rights battles; oppression
and one that the President seems to share. At the level
never eases without pressure from
of the Presidency, there is no sharp distinction be-
foreign governments; external pres-
tween words and deeds. Talk is action. Words are
Today I wouldn't qualify for the
sure is never counterproductive, and in the case of coun-
deeds."
absolutely ceased to exist in
tries that would like to keep advantageous relations with
He added, "The President's measured policy re-
become a regular weekly with
the West, such pressure always helps, at the very least,
sponse on China was very reasonable, but because he
the Communist Party has
to halt the worsening of oppression.
did not at the same time articulate the importance of
he opposition. I am now a mem-
Mr. Bush will address these issues the right way if,
the moment, give clear expression to the principles
legation meeting with Govern-
when he comes to Poland and Hungary, he responds not
and ideals at stake, his deeds were lost."
a new press law.
only as a guest of the Communist governments but also
Ronald Reagan's "genius," argued Mr. Sandel, was
ried?
as a guest of the people demanding democracy. Thus he
his ability to articulate a clear moral message vis-à-
is not only because Mr. Grosz is
can send a strong message that the West will not make
vis the Soviet Union. As a result, Mr. Sandel said, peo-
Communist Party's widening
human rights concessions on political grounds to anyone.
ple were confident that they knew where he stood and
therefore they were ready to accept a nuanced policy
toward Moscow, including sweeping armsucent
agreements.
The Larger Themes
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PAGE 16
Proprietary to the United Press International 1983
September 23, 1983, Friday, PM cycle
SECTION: Washington News
LENGTH: 440 words
BYLINE: By JIM ANDERSON
DATELINE: WASHINGTON
KEYWORD: Bush-React
BODY:
dialogue orbit between suggested the that super-powers. it could play a role as a moderating influence of in the
Hungary and has politely turned down a U.S. invitation to move out Moscow's
independent President of the Kremlin was made publicly in Vienna Wednesday Vice
The American invitation to Hungary, as well as Romania, to play a role more
George Bush at the conclusion of an eastern European by tour.
nations who took a more western-oriented policy.
He said the United States would respond positively to those eastern European
The Bush speech was described by a State Department spokesman as
differently, restatement of the U.S. policy of ''differentiation'' -- treating Soviet a
given less according to their behavior. In that policy, East Germany would allies be
trade or credit benefits than Hungary, for example.
Soviet made it shooting a down of the Korean airliner over Sakhalin island on Sept to 1 --
But the timing of Bush's remarks, in the aftermath of world reaction the
sensititve issue.
The approach for better relations was also made privately to Hungarian
visit Foreign when Minister Bush made Peter the Varokyin, speech in who Vienna. happened to be in Washington on an official
United rules the talk, told reporters that Hungary seeks better ground
A Hungarian of official, who could not be further identified under the
Union. States, but not at the expense of Hungary's close ties relations with the with Soviet the
we 'We are. want We to be partners (with the United States), but you have to us
with as the Soviet are members of the Warsaw Pact and have a common foreign accept policy
Union, he said.
different between Moscow and Washington and suggested that Hungary could play a
However, the official expressed deep concern over the strained relations
role than it does now:
period, effort is made to understand the nuances, it will be very difficult. problem. If
'Translating from Russian to English is not only a language no
countries such as Hungary can do much to damp emotions and In to have this a
Proprietary to the United Press International, September 23, 1983
PAGE 17
translasting I role in order to create the conditions for a minimum of mutual
trust.
understanding. The official said the airliner incident has maginified the lack of
'Since the Soviet Union was formed in 1917, he said, ''It has not had ten
years when it did not feel threatened and encircled from the outside. That
feeling is so strong ... that they still feel threatened, and react.'
a lower level of armaments.
He insisted the Soviets, like the United States, want a strategic balance at
our problems.
''If If we are not going to blow up the world, we'll have to work together on
NEXIS
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Central
32ND STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
PAGE 18
The Associated Press
materials The materials in the AP file were compiled by The Associated Press. These
Associated may Press. not be republished without the express written consent of The
September 20, 1983, Tuesday, PM cycle
SECTION: International News
LENGTH: 275 words
DATELINE: BUDAPEST, Hungary
KEYWORD: Bush
BODY:
faith intermediate-range missile talks, and said NATO would begin
Vice at President the George Bush today accused the Soviets of bargaining in bad
deploying new arms in December unless an accord is reached.
"We. have two tracks, one is negotiating, one is deployment," Bush told
East reporters bloc in Communist Hungary before flying to Vienna at the end tour of
talks in nations. He said if the Soviets and Americans fail to agree of at a the
Geneva, "that deployment track is firm," he said.
Nov. what deadline, saying, "We'd be still willing to negotiate on the theory that
Bush 15 indicated that talks on the weapons would likely continue beyond their
goes in can also come out."
Geneva the number of Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missiles, said the
The vice president, listing U.S. figures showing a progressive increase in
(Atlantic) "keep Alliance's saying there stay is at a zero." balance when their numbers are going Soviets up and at the
end of the year to counter the Soviet threat.
NATO plans to begin deploying 572 U.S. cruise and Pershing 2 missiles at the
Council, whose duties are largely ceremonial.
Earlier, Bush met with Pal Losonczi, head of Hungary's Presidential
of cooperation," the official news agency MTI reported of the closed meeting.
They discussed Hungarian-U.S. relations and "opportunities for the promotion
"Both parties stressed the importance of disarmament talks and confirmed
tension their view that meetings that can contribute to the reduction of international
were of paramount importance," the report said.
morning. Bush laid a wreath at the Hungarian Heroes Monument in central Budapest this
PAGE 19
38TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
Copyright (c) 1983 The New York Times Company;
The New York Times
September 20, 1983, Tuesday, Late City Final Edition
SECTION: Section A; Page 4, Column 3; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 334 words
HEADLINE: BUSH PRAISES HUNGARY ON RIGHTS
BYLINE: UPI
DATELINE: BUDAPEST, Sept. 19
BODY:
Vice President Bush praised Budapest's human rights record today and said
the United States wanted better relations with all East European countries.
But Mr. Bush also stressed that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while
seeking a ''fair agreement'' on arms control, would respond to Soviet threats to
military stability in Europe.
In Rumania, before flying to Hungary, he said that even though Washington
was willing to prolong the United States-Soviet arms control talks in Geneva
beyond the November cut- off date, new United States Pershing 2 and cruise
nuclear missiles would be deployed in Europe in December if no agreement was
reached by then.
Mr. Bush arrived in Budapest on the sixth leg of a 10-day, 7-nation tour of
North Africa and Eastern and Central Europe.
'We in the United States are heartened by Hungary's efforts to expand
contacts, to foster tolerance and to meet the commitments that bind both our
countries under the Helsinki final act, he said in a toast at a dinner at
which Prime Minister Gyorgy Lazar was host.
''In the relations between our two nations, human rights and fundamental
together, he said.
freedoms have not represented a point of discord, but instead brought us closer
He called United States-Hungarian relations a model for the rest of the world
and added, ''The United States is deeply committed to the construction of a
sounder, more cooperative and constructive relationship with all of the nations
with which your country is aligned.
Mr. Bush, however, said that NATO ''is responding and will continue to
respond to threats to the military stability that has for nearly four decades
kept the peace in Europe and much of the rest of the world.
'We seek agreements that are in the enlightened self-interest of both
alliances for and of all peoples, he said. ''We look for signs of understanding,
to a readiness to construct this new relationship and we will readily respond
the outstretched hand that seeks a fair agreement.'
EXIS®
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39TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
PAGE 21
Copyright (c) 1983 Reuters Ltd.
September 20, 1983, Tuesday, AM cycle
SECTION: International News
LENGTH: 95 words
DATELINE: BUDAPEST, Sept 20
KEYWORD: Bush-Reagan
BODY:
run term next year and said his chances for victory were Reagan good.
for Vice a second President George Bush predicted today that President would
publicly he he to wanted be Reagan's him on the running ticket. mate, as the president had made Hungary clear
expected Bush told a news conference at the end of a two-day visit to that
election Reagan were going to be exceptionally difficult to beat," Bush present, the
"If the is United States economy continues to recover as at President
forward." held today, he would beat anybody the democrats said. would "If put
Data
Central
PAGE 22
40TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
Copyright (c) 1983 Reuters Ltd.
September 20, 1983, Tuesday, PM cycle
SECTION: International News
LENGTH: 470 words
BYLINE: By Ronald Farquhar
DATELINE: BUDAPEST, Sept 20
KEYWORD: Bush
BODY:
new Kadar are believed to have exchanged widely diverging views on the dangers of
Vice President George Bush and Hungarian Communist Party chief Janos
nuclear weapons in Europe in yesterday's talks in the Hungarian capital.
No details were disclosed of Bush's meeting with Kadar or of his talks with
Prime Minister Gyoergy Lazar, but Lazar said in his toast at an official dinner
consequences. for Bush that a new round of the arms race threatened Europe with the gravest
He said Hungary was against new nuclear missiles being based in countries
at present without such weapons.
Lazar seemed clearly to be referring to NATO's plans to deploy new U.S.
missiles in Western Europe and the likelihood Moscow would base new missiles in
some Warsaw Pact countries if East-West arms control talks in Geneva fail.
In his reply Bush, who arrived yesterday on the last leg of a five-day tour
stability in Europe.
through East Europe, said NATO would continue to respond to threats to military
self-interest of both alliances."
He said Washington wished to negotiate agreements "in the enlightened
Bush said he came away from his 1- 3/4 -hour talks with Kadar "convinced that
it is possible for the members of our two alliances to talk soberly and
responsibly in a mutual search for understanding and for peace."
and leadership capability."
He described the 71-year-old Hungarian leader as "a man of enormous capacity
Lazar said the visit by Bush, the highest-ranking Americn official ever to
come to Hungary, was "an important landmark."
He said that despite international tensions and differences between their
and countries there were possibilities of increasing trade and economic, scientific
cultural cooperation as well as human contacts.
U.S. diplomats in Budapest said the visit was intended as a mark of
and recognition of Hungary's comparatively relaxed social and cultural
continued commitment to economic reforms and cultural ties with the policies West.
A
PAGE 23
(c) 1983 Reuters Ltd., September 20, 1983
Bush praised Hungary's human rights record and its efforts to foster
rights and fundamental freedoms.
tolerance and said there was no discord between the two countries on human
In a reference to Hungary's moves to honor its Western debts, Bush said
solvency. Washington understood and admired Budapest's efforts to maintain fiscal
The United States was also impressed by Hungary's economic reforms and
innovative policies giving opportunities for enterprising and creative citizens.
Economic relations between the countries were good and active and should
become more regular and dynamic in future years, Bush said.
The Vice President winds up his visit tomorrow with a call on President Pal
Losonczi has before leaving for Vienna, the final stop on a seven-nation tour that
taken him also to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Yugoslavia and Romania.
LEXIS® NEXIS® LEXIS® NEXIS
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46TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
The Associated Press
The materials in the AP file were compiled by The Associated Press.
Associated Press.
materials may not be republished without the express written consent These of The
September 19, 1983, Monday, AM cycle
SECTION: International News
LENGTH: 686 words
HEADLINE: Bush and Western leaders YOW continued efforts on arms reduction
BYLINE: By GEORGE JAHN, Associated Press Writer
DATELINE: BUDAPEST, Hungary
KEYWORD: NATO Missiles
BODY:
good faith" to reduce the threat of war.
Monday America would continue nuclear arms talks talks with the Soviets country "in
Vice that President George Bush told the leaders of this Soviet-bloc
Also on Monday, the United States received renewed expressions of support
Geneva from British, West German and Italian leaders in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations in
on medium-range missiles in Europe.
Bush, at a dinner given by Prime Minister Gyoergy Lazar, referred to the
Geneva levels talks and said the United States has put forward proposals "to the
president, of the most dangerous, destabilizing weapons now in Europe. The lower vice
returns to winding up a seven-nation tour, flies to Austria Tuesday and then
the United States.
Lazar, in his response, did not directly criticize the United States, but
suitable said Moscow's to position in the Geneva negotiations "is fair and certainly
serve as grounds for substantive negotiations."
The missile talks have entered their last scheduled phase, and if there is no
Moscow has Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe later deploying this
U.S. progress, -made the North Atlantic Treaty Organization plans to begin 572
Eastern indicated it would react by placing more new SS-20 missiles year. in
Europe.
Bush, in Romania Sunday, said deployment of the NATO missiles would ahead
as the planned, United but the Geneva talks could extend beyond the Nov. 15 cutoff go date and
States would negotiate for "as long as it takes.
Both Romania and Hungary are Soviet allies, but Romania has skirted
missile States of issue while Hungary supports the Soviet stand, accusing the United the
seeking arms superiority.
There were these other developments involving the Geneva talks:
R
The Associated Press, September 19, 1983
PAGE 25
written prepared to heads of all the NATO governments telling them the United Reagan States wa
In Washington, the administration sources disclosed that President has
make limited changes in its negotiating position.
One source said, "The changes under consideration are by no means
earthshaking. said there They are mostly at the edges. He declined to provide details, but
would be no yielding in the basic U.S. stand.
proposals" written Chancellor Helmut Kohl "several days ago" describing "modified
West to German government spokesman Peter Boenisch said in Bonn that Reagan had
that the United States would offer in Geneva.
He said the contents of the letter were secret, and denied a in
Bonn-based of new Die Welt newspaper that said Reagan was willing to reduce report the number the
missiles to be deployed by NATO from 572 to 300.
"I have not read the letter," Boenisch said. "Those who have read the letter
told me that number (300) is wrong, but they refused to name the number."
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, visiting the Netherlands, told a
missiles, news conference in the Hague that even if NATO begins deploying the
halted the Geneva negotiations should continue. The deployment could new be
at a later date if progress is made in the talks, she said.
In an interview with the British Broadcasting Corp., she said it was certain
expressed some NATO missiles would be installed before the end of the but again
hope the deployment wouldn't scuttle the Genera negotiations. year,
Saturday back its that it would be the beginning of the end of NATO if West Germany went
Mrs. Thatcher will to to West Germany Tuesday and meet with Kohl, who said
on commitment to deploy some of the new missiles.
deployment an agreement with the Soviets at Geneva even if NATO goes ahead
In Rome, Italian Premier Bettino Craxi also said the West should press for
States Reagan last week asking for his "personal judgment" responding before the to United a
from plans. Craxi's office said the premier was with its letter
took a final position at the negotiations.
allies the should deployment plan if there is no Geneva agreement and said support
Craxi's NATO office reported the socialist premier reaffirmed Italy's of
with be prepared to state "their readiness to resume the negotiations the Western
equal resolution even after a possible start of deployment."
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL MONDAY. JUNE 12, 1989
The West's Challenge, as Communism Declines
By HENRY GRUNWALD
tion here is that a potentially splendid sys-
We are all fascinated by reformers' at-
cally. Our pragmatism will ultimately
tem was destroyed by management mis-
tempts to mix communism with enough
serve both sides.
I once knew a man who thought the
West was doomed. or very nearly SO. That
takes. especially over-centralization.
economic and political freedom to make
Decaying empires can be dangerous. In
But the explanations aren't good
the system work. Some reformers now
Eastern Europe. there is a particularly ex-
was in the 1950s and '60s. He believed that
enough. Stalin has been dead for 3½ dec-
speak in praise of private property, profit,
plosive situation. The constant question is
unless the decadent democracies made a
heroic effort. communism would surely tri-
ades. Besides. it was the system that made
incentives and market forces as if they
how the Soviets would act if liberalization
umph. Communism. he wrote, "challenges
him possible and that tolerated a Brezh-
were magic-and, above all, as if they
got out of hand and threatened to undo the
nev. Similarly. the errors of over-central-
were compatible with communism. In ef-
Warsaw Pact. Even Mr. Gorbachev would
man to prove by his acts that he is the
ization and ineffective planning are not
fect, they reject the system's moral and in-
not tolerate that. The hope that some day
masterwork of the creation. It is an in-
managerial accidents, but a consequence
tellectual legitimacy.
the pact would survive in name only. but
tensely practical vision. The tools to turn it
of the system's underlying philosophy.
In the past, even in the West, political
that Eastern European countries would. in
into reality are at hand-science and tech-
Its first commandment is
The real causes must be traced to com-
freedom was often regarded as an enemy
fact, be free and neutral, is very much
nology.
found. not in the Communist Manifesto, but
munism's conception of man and society.
of efficiency, and we certainly have seen
worth cherishing. but it is far from clear
in the first sentences of the physics
What it comes down to is that Marx, de-
great economic progress in unfree states.
how it could be achieved.
Communism will fight many harsh
primer: 'All of the progress of mankind to
date results from the making of careful
rear-guard actions. And a failed commu-
Marx, despite his stress on the future, yearned for the
nism is not easily replaced by democracy
measurements.
The author of these lines was Whittaker
past. There is in communism a desire for order. and
and the free market; both are extremely
hard to achieve and to maintain. At least
Chambers, one of the protagonists in the
now largely forgotten Hiss case. I was a
stability that has not existed since the Middle Ages.
as likely an alternative are right-wing, na-
friend of Chambers-a complicated and
tionalist dictatorships. These could arise in
troubling man, an ex-communist who saw
response to reform attempts that have ac-
spite his stress on the future, yearned for
But it is increasingly clear that those were
it as his mission to warn the world against
tually made the consumer's lot worse.
the past. There is in communism a desire
temporary situations, and that political
the communist danger. Many thought his
for order and stability that has not existed
freedom is essential to an efficient econ-
We must recognize that the failure of
view too apocalyptic. But except for his
since the Middle Ages.
omy. That is why Poland and Hungary,
communism does not automatically ensure
somewhat melodramatic style, his judg-
Marx based much of his intellectual
and to an extent the Soviet Union, are en-
the West's success. We face a tremendous
ment did not really differ much from that
system on the forces of economics, yet he
gaged in experiments with pluralism.
intellectual and political challenge of im-
of many others who also believed that
did not really understand economics. Nei-
Some of the more daring reformers want a
proving our own societies. and, at the
communism was on a triumphal march.
ther did most other communist theorists.
new order that would look remarkably like
same time, of helping fill the void left by
The threat in Western Europe-the pros-
In a curious way, they remind one of the
social democracy. In effect they are seek-
communism. In effect, we must help build
pect of France or Italy "going commu-
monarchs who, throughout the long. slow
ing a peaceful dismantling of the system-
the post-Marxist world.
taken very seriously.
evolution of capitalism, failed to under-
what might be called the Cold
Early Symptoms
stand what was going on. Economic forces
Counter-Revolution.
Anything but Secure
Today, the idea seems quite fantastic.
to them meant tribute. taxes and trade. If
But the odds are against it. If one be-
In the Third World. the decline of com-
World-wide, people know that communism,
one needed more money, one raised taxes
lieves that it can happen, one has to be-
munism's appeal will make it somewhat
in Chambers's phrase, cannot make "care-
or borrowed. Or one might even resort to
lieve in the willingness of communism to
easier for the West to deal with inept or
ful measurements"- it has taken the
desperate measures-like Louis XIV, who
liquidate itself, which would be the ulti-
corrupt regimes that in the past have been
wrong measure of history, of economics
melted down his silver furniture to help fi-
mate confirmation of its failure.
able to argue that they provided the only
and of man himself. We now know that
nance his endless wars. Most monarchs
It is naive in the extreme to assume, as
'guarantees against a communist takeover.
the failure of communism is one of the
felt that economic forces could be com-
SO many in the West do, that the economic
But in many Third World countries, com-
great events of our time.
manded; their independent dynamism
and political reforms are irreversible, "be-
munism is still seen by some as a potent
It certainly did not happen suddenly. In
wasn't recognized. Much the same could
cause they can't go back to Stalinism."
weapon against intolerable social condi-
hindsight, we can see many early symp-
be said of most communist rulers.
But that isn't the only alternative to Mr.
tions, and by many as a means to power.
toms: the persistent inability of the Soviet
But the most serious misconception of
Gorbachev's policies. Many reforms could
The recent advances in democracy are
Union to produce enough food; the shoddi-
communism has to do with psychology-
be reversed without a return to Stalinism,
anything but secure.
ness of its industrial output, despite its
the failure to understand what motivates
or even to Brezhknavery. Chances are,
In what looks like a moment of triumph
achievements in armaments and space;
people. Property was seen as a form of
Zbigniew Brzezinski and others believe,
for democracy and the free market, it is
the eruptions in the satellite countries; the
theft rather than the object of a seemingly
that most communist countries will simply
important to remember what gave rise to
emergence of Euro-communism. Finally,
universal instinct. Profit was seen merely
muddle along with some reforms of the
communism in the first place. Despite the
we saw the Soviet expansionist drive grind
as capitalist greed, not a necessary incen-
system but no fundamental change.
fact that it developed into unspeakable to-
to a halt in Afghanistan. Above all, we saw
tive. Equality was seen as a universal
In dealing with the failing communist
talitarian regimes, it grew out of a humane
the contrast between the Western and
ideal, not an ambiguous value-ambiguous
regimes, the West requires double-track
idealism and a legitimate protest against
Asian economies forging ahead, and the
because. while most people want equality
thinking. We should cheer the genuine
the miseries of early capitalism. Long be-
Soviet economy falling further behind.
in certain respects, they resent the en-
changes in the communist world, encour-
fore the rise of communism, Rousseau de-
Soviet analysts offer various explana-
forced equality that downgrades individual
age them to the extent that we can, and be
nounced "men SO odious as to dare to have
tions for the failure of communism:
merit. effort or luck. And individual free-
ready for the opportunities they offer in
more than enough, while other men are dy-
The devil theory. The devil, of
dom was seen as a bourgeois vice, not a
arms control and perhaps in the evolution
ing of hunger.' That challenge remains.
course. is Stalin, who, it is said, perverted
deep human need. In the classic commu-
of a new European order.
despite the miracles of prosperity we have
the revolution and is now blamed for al-
nist trade-off. freedom was exchanged for
But at the same time, we must remem-
since achieved. and it will not disappear
most everything that went wrong since. in
equality-except that in communist prac-
ber that we cannot yet tell how far these
with the decline or even disappearance of
a sort of inverted cult of personality.
tice. equality proved to be a sham.
changes will go or where they will lead. In
communism.
The smaller devil theory. The
Mr. Gorbachev has said that this is
the field of defense and foreign policy. Mr.
smaller devils are Stalin's successors (no-
communism's last chance. The question is
Gorbachev's "new thinking" so far is, to a
tably Brezhnev , who are accused of
great extent, confined to promises. albeit
Mr. Grunwald, retired from Time Inc.,
whether communism can be reformed. or
greed. corruption and incompetence.
some fairly stunning promises. We must
is ambassador to Austria. This is ex-
whether it must be replaced. The answer
The mismanagement theory. The no-
evaluate his words and actions realisti-
cerpted from a May speech in Munich.
seems increasingly obvious.
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