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MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
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Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
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Speechwriting, White House Office of
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Speech File Backup Files
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13762-014
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American Defense Preparedness Association, 7/9/91
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5
1
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 8, 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
TONY SNOW TS
SUBJECT:
DEFENSE ADDRESS
%
I. SUMMARY
On Tuesday, July 9, at 10:15 a.m., you will address the
American Defense Preparedness Association at the J.W.
Marriott Hotel. The audience will consist of about 700
defense contractors.
II. DISCUSSION
The speech (12 minutes, on teleprompter) closely
follows your address at the Air Force Academy. The speech
is designed to influence the Senate's work on the defense
bill this week by strongly defending the Administration's
plan --- including full funding for the B-2 and G-PALS, and
cuts in the Reserves and National Guard.
Snow/Simon
DEFENSE. TS
Draft Two
July 8, 1991
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: AMERICAN DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS ASSOCIATION
J.W. MARIOTT HOTEL
JULY 9, 1991
10:15 A.M.
$
Thank you, General Skibbie, for that wonderful introduction.
And thanks also to your chairman, Mac Cramer.
[[I've seen some incredible things in the last week: Mt.
Rushmore at its dedication; Americans celebrating their nation
and their fighting forces. And here in Washington, we enjoyed an
incredible fireworks display last Thursday -- a spectacle
surpassed only by the red glare of Patriot missiles over Israel
and Saudi Arabia. // ]]
[[You may not realize it, but today is the anniversary of
Zachary Taylor's death. I know the poor man has suffered his
share of indignities recently. But before we leave him alone
entirely, I do want to set the historic record straight. I am
told that his last words were not, "Please pass the broccoli," //
but instead, "I have endeavored to do my duty. "]] //
Well, I've come here to talk about our shared duty to
maintain an effective national defense. The Senate has started
looking at our defense budget, and its deliberations could have a
profound impact on our future national security.
Recognizing the changing international environment and
taking into account domestic fiscal constraints, our
2
Administration has proposed a tough, lean defense budget. This
proposal consumes a smaller proportion of our gross national
product than any defense budget since the Great Depression. Now,
you don't have to have an accounting degree or a chest full of
medals to understand the importance of spending wisely. In
present circumstances, every penny we spend on unnecessary
defense items will come at the expense of defense muscle.
I know that some budget cuts will hurt some of you. I also
know that some of you build or support systems that we do not
consider absolutely vital. But as President, I have a duty to
serve the national interest -- and our national interest demands
a defense budget that guarantees our security at the lowest
feasible cost.
Last August I announced plans to restructure our armed
forces in light of the Cold War's end and the emergence of a new
kind of world. That proposal recognized some fundamental facts:
One: We don't have a blank check for defense. We must live
within our means.
Two: Instabilities around the globe still threaten us.
Many nations have acquired weapons of mass destruction. When
despots such as Saddam Hussein combine modern weapons and ancient
ambitions, they threaten us all. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union
remains a military superpower, with an increasingly sophisticated
war machine.
Three: we need the right kind of military. Our forces must
have the strength to discourage aggression, the mobility to meet
3
unexpected challenges, and the flexibility to deal with
everything from ICBMs to regional conflicts to hostage crises.
These principles lie at the heart of our Administration's
defense proposals. Any defense bill that fails to incorporate
them will get my personal veto. //
With that in mind, let me talk about a few items I consider
crucial, beginning with the B-2 Stealth bomber.
I have asked for 75 B-2 bombers, the most revolutionary
military aircraft in our nation's history. When you hear
members' complaints about the B-2's cost, remember that a single
B-2 does the job of literally dozens of aircraft: tankers,
escort craft, suppression and surveillance craft, and other
bombers -- at a lower overall cost.
When people play cute by arguing that we only need a few B-
2s because they're so technologically advanced, ask yourselves:
Should we risk our security, the lives of our sons and daughters,
and our national credibility just because some members of
Congress don't want to come to grips with a revolution in
warfare? Should we be content to rely on a bomber designed in
the Forties and built in the Fifties?
Think about the costs; think about military operations;
think about our long-range national security needs, and you'll
conclude that we need two operational wings -- 75 aircraft -- of
the B-2.
Some also seem reluctant to spend money protecting
Americans, our armed forces, and our allies from accidental -- or
4
intentional -- ballistic missile attacks. We have asked Congress
to support the G-PALS system -- that's Global Protection Against
Limited Strikes. Anyone who thinks we will face threats no more
severe than the SCUD missile lives in a dream world. If we want
to protect ourselves and deter aggression, we have a
responsibility to develop defense technologies, such as brilliant
pebbles, within our reach. This includes G-PALS. //
As we prepare for our future, we also must ask what kind of
military structure we need. Our Gulf experience showed just how
valuable reserves can be. It also showed that we don't need the
kind of reserve component the House insists we keep. The House
defense bills will spend nearly 12 billion dollars over the next
five years on unneeded reserve positions and operations. This
money, I might add, would come at the expense of programs that
all our forces -- active and reserve -- will need.
We learned many things in the Gulf -- many of which were
anticipated in the defense speech I gave last August 2nd --
ironically, the day Saddam invaded Kuwait.
We learned that nations of the world can and will act
collectively to deal with aggression. They will try diplomacy
first, and use military action only as a last resort.
We learned that the United States alone can mobilize the
international community and lead it through such efforts.
We learned that high-tech weapons are not "toys," as critics
have claimed for years. They minimize civilian casualties,
maximize damage to military targets, shorten wars and save lives.
5
It would be a shame if, so soon after the war, we ignored
these lessons. It would be a travesty if we wasted money on
defenses that would not have helped us in our last war, and won't
make any sense in the next.
As the Senate begins its deliberations, I urge it to pass a
budget that defends people, not pork; that enables us to fight
the next war, not the last one; that emphasizes national
security, period.
Our Administration has tried to restore proportion to
federal government and use the office of the presidency to make
decisions that might seem too painful for representatives or
senators. I've served in Congress and I know the pressure to
advance the interests of the home district.
A president, charged with the national interest, can help.
The Base Closure Commission provides a case example of a fair and
impartial attempt to serve the national interest; to ensure that
government lives within its means without abandoning its
fundamental responsibilities.
Thirty years ago, in his valedictory address to the nation,
Dwight Eisenhower talked about themes that remain important
today. "A vital element in keeping the peace is our military
establishment," he said. "Our arms must be mighty, ready for
instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to
risk his own destruction."
6
Yet, Ike also cautioned that our efforts must serve national
interests and national needs -- not the narrow concerns of
specific industries or interest groups.
A New World Order demands a new set of defense priorities.
Together, we can put those priorities into action -- and retain
the sacred trust the public has placed in us. As attention turns
toward the Senate, I ask your help in this vital task.
Thank you for letting me join you today -- and may God Bless
the United States of America.
#
#
#
#
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
It's a real pleasure to be here today to share with you our thoughts on
stealth. Your support of our military, and your understanding of the
leverage that advanced technology brings to it, was critical to success in the
Gulf. On behalf of all the aircrews that flew in harm's way-I thank you.
Additionally, as you know, there were many thousands of support
personnel who made those missions possible. Your support of their
training and well being was vital to our success.
During Operation Desert Shield/Storm, I was General Schwarzkopf's
Joint Force Air Component Commander-Brigadier General Buster C.
Glosson was my Director of Campaign Plans. As such, we have a unique
appreciation of the contribution of stealth to this war. The following is a
summary of our views.
Desert Storm was our first large scale employment of stealth
aircraft-the F-117-in combat. Their performance was eye-watering.
We're still coming to grips with the implications, but I can honestly say
that stealth has revolutionized warfare.
The F-117 allowed us to do things that we could have only dreamed
about in past conflicts. Stealth enabled us to gain surprise each and every
day of the war. For example, on the first day of the air campaign the F-117s
delivered the first bombs of the war against a wide array of targets,
paralyzing the Iraqi air defense network. The attacks on radar sites and
command and control bunkers used to control Iraqi defenses allowed waves
of conventional aircraft to strike with high effectiveness and very low losses.
But F-117s did much more than that. They allowed us to strike the
'heart" of the enemy-downtown Baghdad-not only on Day 1, but night
1
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07:29
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
002
Bob Simon
7730
Mike Hayden x4970
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
PRESENTATION TO THE COMMITTEE ON
APPROPRIATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SUBJECT: STEALTH AND DESERT STORM
STATEMENT OF: LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHARLES A.
HORNER
Command
Forcess
BRIGADER GENERAL BUSTER C.
GLOSSON
Director of Campaign Plans, U.S. Central
Command Air Forces
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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07:27
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
004
after night. Stealth allowed us to maintain continuous pressure on vital
target sets (see appendix 1) regardless of the defenses-anywhere in Iraq.
F-117s were the only aircraft that attacked "downtown" Baghdad targets-
by most accounts more heavily defended than any Eastern European targets
at the height of the Cold War. They did it with impunity. Without the F-117
the fighter pilot losses and the civilian casualties would have been an order
of magnitude higher.
I flew the F-105 in Vietnam. On those missions, a whole set of
support assets would go with me to deal with the enemy's defenses. Some
aircraft would jam enemy radars. Others would suppress enemy radars
and surface-to-air missile sites. Air-to-air fighters would sweep in front to
shoot down enemy interceptors. This whole gaggle would be supported by a
fleet of tankers. In the attack on the Paul Doumer Bridge in 1972, for
example, we had about four support aircraft for every attacking aircraft.
The war in Iraq would have been more of the same without stealth. For
example, in one attack against one airfield, 4 A-6 bombers and 4 Saudi
Tornados were escorted by 4 F-4G Wild Weasels, 5 EA-6B radar jammers,
and 21 F/A-18 fighters carrying radar-homing missiles-38 aircraft-only
8 dropping bombs. At the same time 21 F-117s were dropping bombs on 37
targets-21 aircraft-21 dropping bombs.
Stealth allows operations without the full range of support assets
required by non-stealthy aircraft. It gave us greater combat capability from
a smaller force structure. Eight F-117s with eight pilots could achieve the
same results as 75 non-stealth aircraft and over 100 aircrew (see appendix
2). For example, though F-117s represented only 2.5% of the assets, on Day
1 of the war they flew against over 30% of the targets. Over the course of the
entire war, preliminary estimates illustrate that the F-117s, which flew
only about 1% of the total COMBAT A sorties, covered about 40% of the strategic air
campaign's target base.
Viewed in terms of the total requirements to hit a target-stealth
provides the best bargain. Initial acquisition cost is higher, but stealth
systems expose fewer lives, reduce total sorties, and reduce requirements
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2
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SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
005
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for munitions, manpower, fuel, support infrastructure, and therefore total
overall cost.
The reduction in support requirements provided by stealth also gave
us tremendous flexibility. Let me give you a notional example based on my
recent experience. If intelligence indicated a particular target that we
needed to strike quickly-a target located in the teeth of Iraqi air defenses,
and if only conventional aircraft were available, we would have some
difficult choices. The defenses might be so tough that we would have to
forego hitting the target until the defenses were beat down-this could take
time and risk lives and material. Or if it was vital to hit the target, we
would have to orchestrate a large attack package to get our attack aircraft
in. This also takes time and requires a major adjustment to our original
plans-additionally Wild Weasels, fighter escorts, jammers, and tankers
must be rescheduled-and we would probably lose some airplanes. It's
those kind of decisions that account for a lot of additional grey hairs. With
the F-117, all we would have to do is change the target and let those fighter
pilots do their job; as we did numerous times during the Gulf war,
The next generation of stealth is the B-2. The B-2's acquisition cost
has been the subject of some controversy. But the B-2 can carry over 10
times the load of an F-117 at over 5 times the unrefueled range. Put another
way, the B-2 combines the range and payload of the B-52 with the
advantages of the stealth F-117 that proved 80 valuable in Desert Storm.
Even the most conservative calculations reveal that the B-2 offers from 5-10
times more ton-miles of payload for every dollar invested. There are very
few, if any, defense investments, that offer you 5-10 times more capability
per dollar.
Would I have used a B-2 in Desert Storm? You bet 1 would-not only
because of its enormous increase in conventional capability over any other
attack system, but because we would be putting fewer lives at risk to
accomplish the same mission. At appendix 3, are some examples of how
the B-2 could have been used with great effectiveness in real Desert Storm
situations. I urge you not to focus solely on aircraft unit cost the bottom
line is not dollars per aircraft, but overall capability per dollar (see
3
05/14/91
07:28
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
006
appendix 4). Would I risk a B-2 in combat? Well, I didn't have any trouble
risking the most expensive fighter in our inventory-the F-117-on a daily
basis. And I was able to do that because we had confidence in the
survivability provided by stealth. The B-2 would be no exception.
One final point regarding the B-2-and one often overlooked. We may
not have 161 days to build up our forces in the next war. One of our
principal concerns early on was what if Saddam crossed the line shortly
after August 2 and rolled into Saudi Arabia? The B-2 would provide an
important option to deliver a knockout punch immediately, without the
force buildup that was necessary in this case (see Appendix 5). The view
that the B-52s could have done this, is mistaken. It simply couldn't survive
in a heavy threat environment. The B-2 could.
As a father, taxpayer, commander, and pilot I can assure you that
stealth will give America the cutting edge capability it needs to ensure our
security for the long term.
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4
Spectrum of F-117 Targets
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Hardened
Military Production
Biological &
Bridges
Surface-to-Air
Aircraft
Factories (Tanks,
Chemical
Missile Sites
Shelters
Ammo, Scuds, etc.)
Production & Storage
07:28
Nuclear R& D &
Sector/Interceptor
Airfields
Ops Centers
Aircraft in Open
Production
Facilities
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
Early Warning Radar
Communication
Leadership Targets
Fire Trenches
Facilities
007
APPENDIX 1
THE VALUE OF STEALTH
STANDARD PACKAGE
PRECISION BOMBS
PRECISION AND STEALTH
Bomb Droppers
05/14/91
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Air Escort
07:29
$
****
Enemy AM
****
Tankers
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
Procurement cost &
20 year O&S cost
$6.5B
$5.5B
$1.5B
Viewed in context, stealth aircraft-like the F-117-are costly, but cost-effective
800
APPENDIX 2
DESERT STORM: B-2 POTENTIAL
Need: High payioad to cover an area target in a high threat
Need: Penetration of very hard, multiple targets In close
environment
proximity
Example: Military Industrial complex
Example: Chemical Munitions Bunkers
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Many military, production, storage, and maintenance
8 chemical munitions bunkers near Baghdad
facilities in large complex just north of Baghdad
05/14/91
Very hardened bunkers (demand precision,
"
Because of large area, very good B-52 target, but
penetration, and multiple weapons) In high threat
because of high surface to air missile threat not
area (demands stealth)
able to use B-52s alone
...
Required 2000 lb high explosive bombs to
00
Number of almpoints excessive for complete
07:29
soften bunker followed by penetrating 2000
coverage by F-117s alone
lb bomb in exact same spot
To deal with high threat, used F-117s (stealth) to eliminate
Over 50 F-117 sortles flown against bunkers
SAMs (required PGMs) to allow B-52s to attack from high
Solution: 2 B-2s (each carrying 8 large penetrating weapons)
altitude above AAA threat
could do same job
:
Because of more immediate target priorities and
high threat, this solution not Implemented until
later In the war
Solution: The B-2, even with non-precision munitions, would
have allowed attacks against this complex from Day 1
Need: Range, precision, and hard target penetration capability
Example: Kirkuk/Qayyarah/Mosul-Nuclear R&D sites, bunkers,
and hardened aircraft shelters
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
Tankers (and their associated EW/force protection support)
NEED: Multiple weapons to cover multiple aimpoints on
required to fly well into Iraq to extend F-117 range
soft single target In high threat area
Required air superiority to move tankers north
EXAMPLE: Nuclear Research Facility: More than 15
aimpoints
Solution: B-2 range, stealth, and PGM potential would allow
attacks from Day 1, obviating need for tankers, electronic
Over 50 F-117 sortles
warfare assets, and fighter protection
Over 50 F-16 sorties and over 20 F-111
sortles and associated support
600
SOLUTION: 2 B-2s with stealth, large payload, and
precision munitions could accomplish same task
APPENDIN 3
WHAT THE B-2 OFFERS
STANDARD PACKAGE
PRECISION BOMBS
PRECISION AND STEALTH
B-2
Rome Droppers
********
AAAA
++++++++
********
AAAA
++++++++
++++++++
Air Recort
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********
11111111
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I #
4V
Defenses
****
****
++++++++
++++++++
Tankers
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
Procurement cost &
$6.5B
$5.5B
$1.5B
$1.3B
20 year O&S cost
010
APPENDIX 4
WHAT IF SADDAM HADN'T WAITED?
1200
1000
B-2 daily delivery potential
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Daily fighter delivery potential (Desert Shield
deployment plan)
800
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Tons of Ordnance per day
07:30
600
400
200
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
0
Aug 3
8
13
18
23
28
Assumes same fighter build-up as In Desert Storm
2.0 sortle rate for A-10 and F-16
1.0 sortle rate for F-15E, F-111, and F-117
011
B-2 delivery potential assumes 60 B-2s
First sortle flown from CONUS
0.5 sortie rate out of a rear area base
AP NDIX 5
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SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
012
B-2 CONV ENTIONAL
CAPABILITIES
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THE VALUE OF STEALTH
STANDARD PACKAGE
PRECISION BOMBS
PRECISION AND STEALTH
Stealth aircraft can
Bomb Droppers
++++++++
********
AAAA
overfly targets and
++++++++
attack with precision
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++++++++
bombs
Air Escort
Advantages
07:31
********
Unprecedented
survivability-not a
Suppression of
Auius à
Delenses
****
****
single F-117 scratched
++++++++
++++++++
against Iraq
Restores element of
surprise (enduring
principal of successful
warfare)
Tankers
Responsive targeting
and strike assessment
Fewer lives at risk
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
Disadvantages
Unit acquisition cost
urement cost &
appears high
ar O&S cost
$6,493M
$5,547M
$1,528M
013
Viewed in context, stealth aircraft-like the F-117-are costly, but cost-effective
WHAT THE B-2 OFFERS
STANDARD PACKAGE
PRECISION BOMBS
PRECISION AND STEALTH
B-2
Bomb Droppers
++++++++
AAAA
++++++++
++++++++
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Air Escort
07:31
Suppression of
Enemy At
Defenses
****
****
++++++++
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Tankers
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
Procurement cost &
$6,493M
20 year O&S cost
$5,547M
$1,528M
$1,329M
014
And the B-2 can do jobs no other aircraft can do
THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF STEALTH
REUSABLE VS. EXPENDABLE INVESTMENT:
Cost of F-117-delivered precision-guided weapons in Desert Storm
compared to
Cost to deliver same tonnage with cruise missiles
05/14/91
5000
Cost at
500/year
4500
Cost at
07
1000/year
4000
3500
3000
Millions of $FY91
Preservation
All costs expressed In
$ FY91 flyaway dollars
2500
2000
1500
Photo Copy
1000
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
500
0
Cost of F-117A
Cost of cruise missiles required to
operations
substitute for tonnage of
(precision guided
precision-guided weapons
weapons
delivered by F-117A*
015
expenditure)
"Replacement" cost of F-117 airframes
"Cruise missiles Ineffective against
would be $2.4 billion
certain classes of targets
COST-EFFECTIVENESS: Measuring "Work"
300
F-117
B-2
250
05/14/91
200
Ton-Miles
150
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07:32
100
50
0
Flyaway
Program
Flyaway
Program
TARY OF THE AIR FORCE
Unit Cost
Unit Cost
Unit Cost
Unit Cost
PRECISION PAYLOAD
MAXIMUM PAYLOAD
Ton-Miles of munitions per million dollars
016
The F-117 is costly, but cost-effective.
The B-2 is even more costly, but even more cost-effective
DESERT STORM: B-2 POTENTIAL
Need: High payload to cover an area target in a high threat
Need: Penetration of very hard, multiple targets in close
environment
proximity
Example: Military Industrial complex
Example: Chemical Munitions Bunkers
Many military, production, storage, and maintenance
8 chemical munitions bunkers near Baghdad
facilities In large complex just north of Baghdad
05/14/91
Very hardened bunkers (demand precision,
"
Because of large area, very good B-52 target, but
penetration, and multiple weapons) In high threat
because of high surface to air missile threat not
area (demands stealth)
able to use B-52s alone
... Required 2000 lb high explosive bombs to
..
Number of aimpoints excessive for complete
soften bunker followed by penetrating 2000
coverage by F-117s alone
33
lb bomb in exact same spot
To deal with high threat, used F-117s (stealth) to eliminate
--
Over 50 F-117 sortles flown against bunkers
SAMs (required PGMs) to allow B-52s to attack from high
altitude above AAA threat
Solution: 2 B-2s (each carrying 8 large penetrating weapons)
could do same job
:
Because of more Immediate target priorities and
high threat, this solution not Implemented until
later in the war
Solution: The B-2, even with non-precision munitions, would
have allowed attacks against this complex from Day 1
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Need: Range, precision, and hard target penetration capability
Example: Kirkuk/Qayyarah/Mosul-Nuciear R&D sites, bunkers,
and hardened aircraft shelters
Tankers (and their associated EW/force protection support)
NEED: Multiple weapons to cover multiple aimpoints on
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
required to fly well into Iraq to extend F-117 range
soft single target in high threat area
Required air superiority to move tankers north
EXAMPLE: Nuclear Research Facility: More than 15
aimpoints
Solution: B-2 range, stealth, and PGM potential would allow
attacks from Day 1, obviating need for tankers, electronic
Over 50 F-117 sorties
warfare assets, and fighter protection
Over 50 F-16 sorties and over 20 F-111
sorties and associated support
019
SOLUTION: 2 B-2s with stealth, large payload, and
precision munitions could accomplish same task
PRECISION-GUIDED ORDNANCE DELIVERY POTENTIAL
(2000 lb guided weapons)
One Day of Operations
F-117A Fleet (42 PAA)
B-2 Fleel (60 PAA)
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+
+
+
05/14/91 07:33
+
+
+
+
+
+
++
-ETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
+
+
+
+
018
Assumes .05 Mission capable rate
CONVENTIONAL DELIVERY POTENTIAL
OF STEALTH PLATFORMS
05/14/91
F-117A
B-2
07:32
Baseline
Projected
+
Precision-guided
Guided
Guided
munition with
2000 lb
500 lb
classified
4
capabilities
500 lb
Cluster
2000 lb
Precision-
bombs
weapons
bombs
guided
Inertially
deep
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guided
penetrator
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
500 lb
Precision-
guided
2000 lb
017
CONCLUSIONS
The B-2 offers unprecedented conventional
warfighting capabilities
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05/14/91
Combines stealth of the F-117 with greater payload and range
than B-52
07:34
Very cost-effective compared to the work" it does
gh payload provides great versatility and a powerful punch
without a host of support assets
Long range and stealth permits operations against an enemy
anywhere on the planet within hours-can strike confidently
at the heart of the enemy from Day One
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
"The B-2 has the potential to make all other air forces in the world
obsolete overnight."
General Merrill A. McPeak, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
020
AMERICAN DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS ASSOCIATION
J.W. MARIOTT HOTEL
JULY 9, 1991
10:15 A.M.
THANK YOU, GENERAL SKIBBIE, FOR THAT WONDERFUL
INTRODUCTION. AND THANKS ALSO TO YOUR CHAIRMAN, MAC
CRAMER.
[[I'VE SEEN SOME INCREDIBLE THINGS IN THE LAST
WEEK: MT. RUSHMORE AT ITS DEDICATION; AMERICANS
CELEBRATING THEIR NATION AND THEIR FIGHTING FORCES.
AND HERE IN WASHINGTON, WE ENJOYED AN INCREDIBLE
FIREWORKS DISPLAY LAST THURSDAY -- A SPECTACLE
SURPASSED ONLY BY THE RED GLARE OF PATRIOT MISSILES
OVER ISRAEL AND SAUDI ARABIA. // ]]
[[YOU MAY NOT REALIZE IT, BUT TODAY IS THE
ANNIVERSARY OF ZACHARY TAYLOR'S DEATH. I KNOW THE POOR
MAN HAS SUFFERED HIS SHARE OF INDIGNITIES RECENTLY.
BUT BEFORE WE LEAVE HIM ALONE ENTIRELY, I DO WANT TO
SET THE HISTORIC RECORD STRAIGHT. I AM TOLD THAT HIS
LAST WORDS WERE NOT, "PLEASE PASS THE BROCCOLI," //
BUT INSTEAD, "I HAVE ENDEAVORED TO DO MY DUTY. "]] //
- 2 -
WELL, I'VE COME HERE TO TALK ABOUT OUR SHARED DUTY
TO MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE NATIONAL DEFENSE. THE SENATE
HAS STARTED LOOKING AT OUR DEFENSE BUDGET, AND ITS
DELIBERATIONS COULD HAVE A PROFOUND IMPACT ON OUR
FUTURE NATIONAL SECURITY.
RECOGNIZING THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT DOMESTIC FISCAL CONSTRAINTS,
OUR ADMINISTRATION HAS PROPOSED A TOUGH, LEAN DEFENSE
BUDGET -- A PROPOSAL THAT CONSUMES A SMALLER PROPORTION
OF OUR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT THAN ANY DEFENSE BUDGET
SINCE THE GREAT DEPRESSION. NOW, YOU DON'T HAVE TO
HAVE AN ACCOUNTING DEGREE OR A CHEST FULL OF MEDALS TO
UNDERSTAND THAT, UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, EVERY
PENNY WE SPEND ON UNNECESSARY DEFENSE ITEMS WILL COME
AT THE EXPENSE OF DEFENSE MUSCLE.
. 3 -
I KNOW THAT BUDGET CUTS WILL HURT SOME OF YOU. BUT
WE WILL HAVE TO SET NEW PRIORITIES AND FOCUS ON ONLY
OUR MOST IMPORTANT, ABSOLUTELY VITAL PROGRAMS. AS
PRESIDENT, I HAVE A DUTY TO SERVE THE NATIONAL INTEREST
-- AND OUR NATIONAL INTEREST DEMANDS A DEFENSE BUDGET
THAT GUARANTEES OUR SECURITY AT THE LOWEST FEASIBLE
COST.
LAST AUGUST I ANNOUNCED PLANS TO RESTRUCTURE OUR
ARMED FORCES IN LIGHT OF THE COLD WAR'S END AND THE
EMERGENCE OF A NEW KIND OF WORLD. THAT PROPOSAL
RECOGNIZED SOME FUNDAMENTAL FACTS:
ONE: WE DON'T HAVE A BLANK CHECK FOR DEFENSE --
NEVER HAVE. WE MUST LIVE WITHIN OUR MEANS.
TWO: INSTABILITIES AROUND THE GLOBE STILL THREATEN
US. MANY NATIONS HAVE ACQUIRED WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION. WHEN DESPOTS SUCH AS SADDAM HUSSEIN
COMBINE MODERN WEAPONS AND ANCIENT AMBITIONS, THEY
THREATEN US ALL. AND, SADDAM HUSSEIN ISN'T THE ONLY
DESPOT AROUND, NOR WILL HE BE THE LAST.
- 4 -
MEANWHILE, THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS A MILITARY
SUPERPOWER, WITH AN INCREASINGLY SOPHISTICATED WAR
MACHINE.
THREE: WE NEED THE RIGHT KIND OF MILITARY. OUR
FORCES MUST HAVE THE STRENGTH HERE AND ABROAD TO
DISCOURAGE AGGRESSION, THE MOBILITY TO MEET UNEXPECTED
CHALLENGES, AND THE FLEXIBILITY TO DEAL WITH EVERYTHING
FROM I.C.B.M.'S TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS TO HOSTAGE
CRISES.
THESE CONSIDERATIONS LIE AT THE HEART OF OUR
ADMINISTRATION'S DEFENSE PROPOSALS. ANY DEFENSE BILL
THAT FAILS TO INCORPORATE THEM WILL GET MY VETO. //
WITH THAT IN MIND, LET ME TALK ABOUT A FEW ITEMS I
CONSIDER CRUCIAL, BEGINNING WITH THE B-2 STEALTH
BOMBER.
- 5 -
I HAVE ASKED FOR 75 B-2 BOMBERS, THE MOST
REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY AIRCRAFT IN OUR NATION'S
HISTORY. WHEN YOU HEAR MEMBERS' COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE
B-2'S COST, REMEMBER THAT A SINGLE B-2 DOES THE JOB OF
LITERALLY DOZENS OF AIRCRAFT: TANKERS, ESCORTS,
SUPPRESSION AND SURVEILLANCE CRAFT, AND OTHER BOMBERS.
WHEN PEOPLE ARGUE COYLY THAT WE ONLY NEED A FEW B-
2S BECAUSE THEY'RE SO TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED, ASK
YOURSELVES: SHOULD WE RISK OUR SECURITY, THE LIVES OF
OUR SONS AND DAUGHTERS, AND OUR NATIONAL CREDIBILITY
JUST BECAUSE SOME MEMBERS OF CONGRESS DON'T WANT
ACKNOWLEDGE THE REVOLUTIONARY ADVANTAGE THIS WEAPON
SYSTEM WILL GIVE THE NATION? SHOULD WE ENTER THE 21ST
CENTURY RELIANT UPON A BOMBER DESIGNED IN THE FORTIES
AND BUILT IN THE FIFTIES? NO: THE B-2 COMBINES THE
RANGE AND PAYLOAD OF THE B-52 WITH THE ADVANTAGES OF
STEALTH TECHNOLOGY. AND IN THE END IT OFFERS
DETERRENCE -- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, CONVENTIONAL
DETERRENCE, DETERRENCE ALL ACROSS THE SPECTRUM.
- 6 -
THINK ABOUT THE COSTS; THINK ABOUT MILITARY
OPERATIONS; THINK ABOUT OUR LONG-RANGE NATIONAL
SECURITY NEEDS, AND YOU'LL CONCLUDE THAT WE DO INDEED
NEED TWO FULL WINGS OF THE B-2. //
SOME ALSO SEEM RELUCTANT TO SPEND MONEY PROTECTING
AMERICANS FROM ACCIDENTAL -- OR INTENTIONAL --
BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACKS. WE HAVE ASKED CONGRESS TO
SUPPORT THE G-PALS SYSTEM -- THAT'S GLOBAL PROTECTION
AGAINST LIMITED STRIKES. ANYONE WHO THINKS WE WILL
FACE THREATS NO MORE SEVERE THAN THE SCUD MISSILE ARE
DELUDING THEMSELVES. IF WE WANT TO PROTECT OURSELVES
AND DETER AGGRESSION, WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO
DEVELOP DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES, SUCH AS BRILLIANT
PEBBLES, THAT LIE WITHIN OUR REACH. THIS INCLUDES
G-PALS. //
- 7 -
AS WE PREPARE FOR THE FUTURE, WE ALSO MUST ASK WHAT
KIND OF MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE WE NEED. OUR GULF
EXPERIENCE REINFORCED THE VALUABLE ROLE RESERVES CAN
PLAY. IT ALSO SHOWED THAT WE DON'T NEED THE KIND OF
RESERVE COMPONENT THE HOUSE INSISTS WE KEEP. THE HOUSE
DEFENSE BILLS WOULD SPEND NEARLY 12 BILLION DOLLARS
OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS ON UNNEEDED RESERVE POSITIONS
AND OPERATIONS. THIS MONEY WOULD COME AT THE EXPENSE
OF PROGRAMS THAT ALL OUR FORCES -- ACTIVE AND RESERVE
-- WILL NEED.
WE LEARNED MANY THINGS IN THE GULF -- A NUMBER OF
WHICH WERE ANTICIPATED IN THE DEFENSE SPEECH I GAVE
LAST AUGUST 2ND -- IRONICALLY, THE DAY SADDAM INVADED
KUWAIT.
WE LEARNED THAT NATIONS OF THE WORLD CAN AND WILL
ACT COLLECTIVELY TO DEAL WITH AGGRESSION. THEY WILL
TRY DIPLOMACY FIRST, AND USE MILITARY ACTION ONLY AS A
LAST RESORT.
- 8 -
WE LEARNED THAT THE UNITED STATES ALONE CAN
MOBILIZE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND LEAD IT
THROUGH SUCH EFFORTS. THAT LEADERSHIP WAS NOT JUST
COINCIDENCE, OR NICE TO HAVE -- IT WAS A PREREQUISITE
FOR OUR COLLECTIVE SUCCESS.
WE LEARNED THAT HIGH-TECH WEAPONS ARE NOT PRICEY
"TOYS," AS CRITICS HAVE CLAIMED FOR YEARS. THEY
MINIMIZE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, MAXIMIZE DAMAGE TO
MILITARY TARGETS, SHORTEN WARS AND SAVE LIVES --
AMERICAN LIVES, COALITION LIVES, AND EVEN ENEMY LIVES.
WE MUST NEVER FORGET ANY LIFE UNNECESSARILY LOST IS A
TRAGEDY -- ESPECIALLY IN TIMES OF WAR.
IT WOULD BE A SHAME IF, so SOON AFTER THE WAR, WE
DISREGARDED THESE LESSONS. // AND IT WOULD BE A
TRAVESTY TO WASTE MONEY ON DEFENSES THAT WOULD NOT HAVE
HELPED US IN THE GULF, AND WON'T HELP US MEET OUR
FUTURE CHALLENGES. //
- 9 -
AS THE SENATE BEGINS ITS DELIBERATIONS, I URGE IT
TO PASS A BUDGET THAT DEFENDS PEOPLE, NOT PORK; // THAT
ENABLES US TO FIGHT THE NEXT WAR, NOT THE LAST ONE; //
THAT PROMOTES NATIONAL SECURITY, PERIOD. LET ME TELL
YOU NOW -- IF THE CONGRESS SENDS ME A DEFENSE BILL THAT
IS INADEQUATE, THAT FAILS TO FUND NEEDED PROGRAMS AND
WASTES MONEY AT THE EXPENSE OF DEFENSE MUSCLE, I WILL
VETO IT. //
OUR ADMINISTRATION HAS TRIED TO RESTORE PROPORTION
TO FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND USE THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENCY TO MAKE DECISIONS THAT MIGHT SEEM TOO
PAINFUL FOR REPRESENTATIVES OR SENATORS. I'VE SERVED
IN CONGRESS AND I KNOW THE GENUINE PRESSURE ON THE
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TO ADVANCE THE INTERESTS OF THE
HOME DISTRICT.
- 10 -
THIRTY YEARS AGO, IN HIS VALEDICTORY ADDRESS TO THE
NATION, DWIGHT EISENHOWER EMPHASIZED SEVERAL THEMES
THAT REMAIN IMPORTANT TODAY: "A VITAL ELEMENT IN
KEEPING THE PEACE IS OUR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, HE
SAID. "OUR ARMS MUST BE MIGHTY, READY FOR INSTANT
ACTION, SO THAT NO POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR MAY BE TEMPTED
TO RISK HIS OWN DESTRUCTION. "
YET, IKE ALSO CAUTIONED THAT OUR EFFORTS MUST SERVE
NATIONAL INTERESTS AND NATIONAL NEEDS -- NOT THE NARROW
CONCERNS OF SPECIFIC INDUSTRIES OR INTEREST GROUPS.
A NEW WORLD ORDER DEMANDS A NEW SET OF DEFENSE
PRIORITIES. TOGETHER, WE CAN PUT THOSE PRIORITIES INTO
ACTION. // AS ATTENTION TURNS TOWARD THE SENATE, I
ASK YOUR HELP IN CREATING A MILITARY STRONG ENOUGH TO
PROTECT OUR INTERESTS BUT LEAN ENOUGH TO PRESERVE
PUBLIC FAITH IN GOVERNMENT. //
- 11 - -
THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONTINUED EFFORTS TO KEEP
AMERICA SAFE AND STRONG. THANK YOU FOR LETTING ME JOIN
YOU TODAY - -- AND MAY GOD BLESS THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA.
#
#
# #
Snow/Simon
DEFENSE.TS
Draft One
July 5, 1991
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: AMERICAN DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS ASSOCIATION
J.W. MARIOTT HOTEL
TUESOAY, 10 A.M.
JULY 9, 1991
Mac Cramer chm.
Thank you, General Skibbie, for that wonderful introduction.
[Introductory acknowledgments]
[[I've seen some incredible things in the last week: Mt.
Rushmore at its dedication; Americans celebrating their nation
and their fighting forces. In front of this group, I think of
the incredible fireworks display last Thursday: It was the most
wonderful thing I've seen since our Patriot Missiles set off
their own fireworks over Israel and Saudi Arabia. ]] //
see
[[You may not realize it, but today is the anniversary of
file
Zachary Taylor's death. I know the poor man has suffered his
share of indignities recently. But before we leave him alone
am told
entirely, I do want to set the historic record straight. I said
^
the other day that his last words were, "Please pass the
broccoli. " H Actually, that was his next to last statement
Our researchers tell me that his real last words were, "I have
endeavored to do my duty. "Il BE and not, "Please pass the broccoli.
Well, I've come here to talk about our shared duty to build
an effective national defense. The Senate will start looking at
our defense budget this week. Its deliberations could have a
profound impact on our future national security.
2
Some Americans seem to think that the collapse of communism
and our triumph in the Gulf have reduced the importance of
thinking about defense. But sensible defense is as important --
and as difficult to achieve -- as ever.
A changing international environment and tight budgets have
cheney
led our Administration to propose a defense budget that will
testimony
consume a smaller proportion of our gross national product than
to
SASC
any since the Great Depression. You don't have to have an
2-21-91
accounting degree or a chest full of medals to understand that
this budget doesn't leave any room for pork. Every penny spent
on unnecessary items comes at the expense of defense muscle.
I know that some budget cuts will hurt some of you. I also
know that some of you build or support systems that we do not
consider absolutely vital. But as President, I have a duty to
serve the national interest -- and our national interest demands
a defense budget that provides security for everyone on American
soil at the lowest feasible cost.
Last August I announced plans to restructure our defensive
systems in light of the Cold War's end and the emergence of a new
kind of world. That proposal recognized some fundamental facts:
One: We don't have a blank check for defense;
we/are still threatened by
Two:
Instabilities around the globe, still threaten us
Many nations have acquired high-tech weapons of destruction.
When despots such as Saddam Hussein combine modern weapons and
ancient ambitions, they threaten us all. At the same time, the
3
Soviet Union remains a military superpower, with an increasingly
sophisticated war machine.
aspen
Three: we need the right kind of military. Our forces must
speech
have the muscle to discourage aggression, the mobility to meet
8-2-90
unexpected challenges, and the flexibility to deal with
everything from ICBMs to regional conflicts to hostage crises.
These principles lie at the heart of our Administration's
defense proposals. Any defense bill that fails to incorporate
them will get my personal veto. //
With that in mind, let me talk about a few items I consider
crucial, beginning with the B-2 Stealth bomber.
I have asked for 75 B-2 bombers, the most revolutionary
military aircraft in our nation's history. When you hear members
of Congress complaining about the B-2's cost, remember that a
single B-2 replaces literally dozens of aircraft: tankers,
escort craft, suppression and surveillance craft, and other
bombers. In the end, it costs less to purchase and operate than
many
the aircraft it replaces.
And when members of Congress play cute by arguing that we
only need a few B-2s because they're so technologically advanced,
ask yourselves: Should we risk our security, the lives of our
sons and daughters, and our national credibility just because
Congress doesn't want to come to grips with a revolution in
In the 21st this nation can't keep relying on a bomber designed in the 1940s + built in
warfare? Think about the costs; think about military operations; the 1950s.
think about our long-range national security needs, and you'll
conclude that we need two flight wings of the B-2.
4
Congress also seems reluctant to spend money protecting
Americans from accidental -- or intentional -- ballistic missile
attacks. We have asked Congress to support the G-PALS system --
that's Global Protection Against Limited Strikes. People who
think we will face threats no more severe than the SCUD missile
live in a dream world. If we want to protect ourselves and deter
aggression, we have a responsibility to develop technologies
within our reach. This includes G-PALS. A budget without G-
PALS will be a budget with a veto. //
As we prepare for our future, we also must ask what kind of
military structure we need. Our Gulf experience showed just how
valuable reserves can be, but it also showed that we don't need
the kind of reserve component the House insists we keep. The
off
House defense bills will spend $11 billion over the next five
Jones
NSC
years on unneeded reserve positions and equipment. This money, I
might add, would come at the expense of programs that all our
forces, active and reserve, will need.
Aspen speech We learned many things in the Gulf -- many of which were
8-2-90 anticipated in the defense speech I gave last August 2nd --
ironically, the day Saddam invaded Kuwait.
We learned that nations of the world can and will act
collectively to deal with aggression. They will try diplomacy
first, and use military action only as a last resort.
We learned that the United States alone can mobilize the
international community and lead it through such efforts.
5
We learned that high-tech weapons are not "toys," as critics
have claimed for years. They let us minimize civilian
casualties, maximize damage to military targets, shorten wars and
save lives.
It would be a shame if Congress, so soon after the war,
ignored the lessons of the Gulf. It would be a travesty if we
wasted money on defenses that would not have helped us in our
last war, and won't make any sense in the next.
As the Senate begins its deliberations, I urge it to pass a
budget that defends people, not pork; that enables us to fight
the next war, not the last one; that places greater priority on
national security than on congressional incumbency.
Our Administration has tried, in domestic policies and
defense policies, to restore proportion to federal government,
and use the office of the presidency to make decisions that might
seem too painful for representatives or senators.
[[Tomorrow, I will ask Congress to adopt the recommendations
of the Base Closure Commission. The commission had a tough job,
but performed its task with admirable fairness, impartiality, and
commitment to the national interest. This decision reflects our
commitment to government that lives within its means without
abandoning its fundamental responsibilities. ]]
Farewell
Thirty years ago, in his valedictory address to the nation,
address Dwight Eisenhower talked about themes that remain important
1-n-61 today. "A vital element in keeping the peace is our military
establishment," he said. "Our arms must be mighty, ready for
6
instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to
risk his own destruction."
Yet, Ike also cautioned that our efforts must serve national
interests and national needs -- not the narrow concerns of
specific industries or interest groups.
Let us remember that today and every day. Our job is to
serve the American people and address their needs. If we want to
keep that job, we must create a military force strong enough to
protect our interests but lean enough to preserve public faith in
government.
A New World Order demands a new set of defense priorities -
- a set I have discussed today. Together, we can put those
priorities into action -- and retain the sacred trust the public
has placed in us. As attention turns toward the Senate, I ask
your help in this vital task.
Thank you for letting me join you today -- and may God Bless
the United States of America.
#
#
#
#
Administration of George Bush, 1991 / June 11
makes the Fourth of July a favorite summer
Independence with appropriate ceremonies
holiday carries deeper symbolism and
and activities.
ed States of America, do
meaning. Each resonates with the singular
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set
he week beginning June
joy of a free people.
my hand this eleventh day of June, in the
il Scleroderma Awareness
This year we are particularly grateful for
year of our Lord nineteen hundred and
the people of the United
the blessings of liberty because we have
ninety-one, and of the Independence of the
this week with appropri-
been reminded of the price that many
United States of America the two hundred
activities that will en-
brave and selfless individuals have been
and fifteenth.
standing of scleroderma
willing to pay to secure them. Just months
George Bush
ontinued research.
ago, when forces led by a brutal tyrant in-
[Filed with the Office of the Federal Regis-
reof, I have hereunto set
vaded a small, defenseless country-raping,
ter, 11:46 a.m., June 12, 1991]
enth day of June, in the
pillaging, and threatening not only the sta-
nineteen hundred and
bility of an entire region but also vital inter-
Remarks to Members of the Defense
the Independence of the
ests of all freedom-loving peoples-thou-
sands of courageous Americans answered
Community at Andrews Air Force Base,
merica the two hundred
the call of duty. Our celebration of Inde-
Maryland
pendence Day, 1991, is dedicated in a spe-
June 11, 1991
Stealth
George Bush
cial way to them-to the regulars, reserv-
ists, National Guardsmen, and members of
Thank you all very much. And I hope
fice of the Federal Regis-
the United States Merchant Marine who
everybody's enjoyed this tour as much as I
2 12, 1991]
helped to liberate Kuwait.
have. And first, let me pay my respects to
Of course, as we honor our Persian Gulf
the men and women of the U.S. Air Force.
veterans, we also remember in prayer each
I was telling General McPeak and the Sec-
of their comrades who made the ultimate
retary that I'm always so impressed by you
sacrifice in service to our country. We
all's dedication, certainly service. And I'm
4-Independence
salute with great pride and gratitute the
just delighted to be here with those that
military personnel who offered vital support
have made this exhibition possible from the
for our mission from bases here at home
research stage and right on up until now. I
and around the world, and we pay due trib-
want to salute Dick Cheney, of course; our
ute to all those who have served in the
the United States
leader-one of our leaders, Bob Dole is
United States Armed Forces.
with us today; Don Rice, of course, our Sec-
The Americans who fought tyranny and
retary; General McPeak, you've heard me
lawlessness in the Persian Gulf have upheld,
speak about him; and Members of the
once again, the principles that were first
with a firm reliance on
Senate who took the time to come out here
affirmed on these shores 215 years ago
Divine Providence, our
today-our chairman, Sam Nunn, and
when our Nation's Founders elected "be-
boldly declared Ameri-
others. And I'm just delighted you all are
tween submission or the sword." On this
here.
and affirmed the truth
Independence Day-a day marked by tri-
created equal, that they
Senator Warner, Senator Nunn, and the
umphant homecomings and by the promise
eir Creator with certain
members of the committee have been
of a safer, more peaceful world-it is fitting
that among these are
that we recall the words that Thomas Jeffer-
strong supporters of Stealth technology
e pursuit of Happiness."
son wrote shortly before his death on July 4,
even before the first prototype F-117 in
g that they risked noth-
1826:
1977. And we've now seen the promise of
ives, their fortunes, and
Stealth fulfilled with a remarkable success
On this occasion, we
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the
of the F-117 in Dèsert Storm.
found act of faith and
rights of man.
These are grounds
The F-117 carried a revolution in warfare
anks for the rich legacy
of hope for others. For ourselves, let
on its wings over Baghdad. And these re-
is country has enjoyed
the annual return of this day forever
refresh our recollections of these
markable aircraft flew only about 2 percent
rights, and an undiminished devotion
of the combat sorties, but struck over 40
enabled us to enjoy un-
to them.
percent of the strategic targets. The success
security and prosperity,
of the F-117 is a tribute to those men and
ed millions of people
Now, Therefore, I, George Bush, Presi-
women who could see-even in the seven-
their own struggles for.
dent of the United States of America, do
ties-the potential of Stealth, the need for
ernment. Thus, ever,
hereby ask all Americans to join in celebrat-
Stealth, and had the strength and persever-
every backyard barbe-
ing this 215th anniversary of our Nation's
ance to see it through.
play of fireworks that
755
June 11 / Administration of George Bush, 1991
Among those who deserve special credit
the American forces in the next century
for the accomplishment are the members of
will be able to count on control of the air.
this committee who gave that plane, the F-
Stealth has really brought a revolution to
117, their strong and continuous support.
air power. It is a leap in technology that
And there now is no question, Stealth
comes from American genius and ingenuity.
works. And it's been proven in combat. And
It works, and it's needed. And it's an edge
it broke the Iraqis' back, and it saved pre-
that can help guarantee our security in the
cious American lives. It flew hundreds of
ever more complex world that we will face
sorties through the most heavily defended
in the future. And it's an edge that I want
areas without a scratch.
to give our country, and an edge that
And the B-2 takes the next generation of
America's fighting men and women deserve
Stealth and applies it to a strategic bomber.
to have should they ever be called on again.
This leap in technology will make a unique
I'll fight for Stealth, and I will fight for
contribution to nuclear deterrence and will
the B-2. And I appeal to the leaders here
deliver the enhanced conventional capabili-
today and to others in the Congress to step
ties that F-117 pilots say they'd most like to
up to the challenge and give it full support
have: more range, more payload. The B-2
and full funding this year.
has 5-to-6 times the range and 10 times the
And I want to thank you again, every-
body from the Senate that took the time to
payload-10 times the payload of the F-
117.
come out here today. And for those that are
committed, let me tell you, please, let us
Some claim they don't understand the
know what we can do because this is priori-
mission of the B-2. Well, let me try to clear
ty, not simply to the administration but, in
it up. The mission of the B-2 is deterrence:
my view, to the country.
nuclear deterrence, conventional deter-
Thank you all very much for taking the
rence, deterrence all across the spectrum.
time to join us.
And with the smaller forces and budgets
that we're looking at in the nineties, that's
Note: The President spoke at 2:58 p.m. in
the kind of flexibility and value that Amer-
Hangar 3 at the base. In his remarks, he
ica needs. We need the B-2 bomber. We
referred to Gen. Merrill A. McPeak, U.S. Air
cannot allow the House actions that would
Force Chief of Staff; Secretary of Defense
terminate this vital program to stand.
Dick Cheney; Robert Dole, Senate minority
Partners with the B-2 in deterrence are
leader; Secretary of the Air Force Donald B.
the new cruise missiles that also embody
Rice; and Sam Nunn, chairman of the
Stealth technology, and they will provide a
Senate Armed Services Committee. Prior to
cost effective way to keep some of our
his remarks, the President participated in a
older bombers viable, and they add a
briefing and toured strategic and tactical
unique capability to even our most modern
fighter aircraft at the base. A tape was not
systems.
available for verification of the contents of
No student of the Gulf war can doubt
these remarks.
how the combination of cruise missiles and
manned aircraft can overwhelm an enemy's
air defenses.
Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater
And finally, Desert Storm should have
on United States Agricultural Loan
made the importance of control of the air
Credit to the Soviet Union
crystal clear to all. Air superiority-air supe-
June 11, 199f
riority enabled the allied forces, air and sur-
face, to operate with an effectiveness that
President Bush has informed President
amazed the world and, thank God, to oper-
Gorbachev today that the United States will
ate with allied casualties as low as possible.
meet the Soviet request for up to $1.5 bil-
Today's generation of fighters drove the
lion in credit guarantees toward the pur
Iraqi Air Force from the skies. The F-22,
chase of American agricultural products.
that we see here, the prototype of the next
Secretary of Agriculture Ed Madigan will
air superiority fighter, combined Stealth
follow up immediately with Soviet officials
and maneuverability in a way that ensures
to work out the details of this agreement.
756
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960
421
era-
Pursuant to that legislation agreements for cooperation were concluded
ized
with four of our NATO partners in May and June 1959. A similar
agreement was also recently concluded with our NATO ally, the Repub-
lic of Italy. All of these agreements are designed to implement in
lletin
important respects the agreed NATO program.
This agreement with the Government of Italy will enable the United
States to cooperate effectively in mutual defense planning with Italy and
in the training of Italian NATO forces in order that, if an attack on
NATO should occur, Italian forces could, under the direction of the
Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, effectively use nuclear weapons
al
in their defense.
These agreements previously concluded and this Italian Agreement
represent only a portion of the work necessary for complete implementa-
tion of the decision taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in
nbers
December 1957. I anticipate the conclusion of similar agreements for
prin-
cooperation with certain other NATO nations as the Alliance's defensive
ATO
planning continues.
elop-
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, I am sub-
nt in
mitting to each House of the Congress an authoritative copy of the agree-
1 was
ment with the Government of Italy. I am also transmitting a copy of
:neral
the Secretary of State's letter accompanying an authoritative copy of the
1 and
signed agreement, a copy of a joint letter from the Secretary of Defense
Soviet
and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission recommending my
forces
approval of this document and a copy of my memorandum in reply thereto
ATO
setting forth my approval.
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
it the
NOTE: The text of the agreement and re- gressional Record of March 7, 1961 (vol.
tilable
lated documents is published in the Con-
107, p. 3095).
Any
utual
421
I
Farewell Radio and Television Address to
train-
ership
the American People. Fanuary 17, 1961
to the
[Delivered from the President's Office at 8:30 p.m. ]
other
e that
My fellow Americans:
ess.
Three days from now, after half a century in the service of our country,
nding
I shall lay down the responsibilities of office as, in traditional and solemn
1958.
ceremony, the authority of the Presidency is vested in my successor.
1035
421
Public Papers of the Presidents
This evening I come to you with a message of leave-taking and farewell,
and to share a few final thoughts with you, my countrymen.
CC
Like every other citizen, I wish the new President, and all who will
labor with him, Godspeed. I pray that the coming years will be blessed
a
with peace and prosperity for all.
Our people expect their President and the Congress to find essential
agreement on issues of great moment, the wise resolution of which will
1
better shape the future of the Nation.
My own relations with the Congress, which began on a remote and
tenuous basis when, long ago, a member of the Senate appointed me to
West Point, have since ranged to the intimate during the war and imme-
diate post-war period, and, finally, to the mutually interdependent during
these past eight years.
In this final relationship, the Congress and the Administration have,
on most vital issues, cooperated well, to serve the national good rather than
mere partisanship, and so have assured that the business of the Nation
should go forward. So, my official relationship with the Congress ends
in a feeling, on my part, of gratitude that we have been able to do so
much together.
II.
We now stand ten years past the midpoint of a century that has wit-
nessed four major wars among great nations. Three of these involved
our own country. Despite these holocausts America is today the strongest,
the most influential and most productive nation in the world. Under-
standably proud of this pre-eminence, we yet realize that America's leader-
ship and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material prog-
ress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the
interests of world peace and human betterment.
III.
Throughout America's adventure in free government, our basic pur-
poses have been to keep the peace; to foster progress in human achieve-
ment, and to enhance liberty, dignity and integrity among people and
among nations. To strive for less would be unworthy of a free and re-
ligious people. Any failure traceable to arrogance, or our lack of com-
prehension or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt
both at home and abroad.
1036
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960
421
Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the
conflict now engulfing the world. It commands our whole attention, ab-
sorbs our very beings. We face a hostile ideology-global in scope,
atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Un-
happily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To
meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and
transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry
forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a pro-
longed and complex struggle-with liberty the stake. Only thus shall we
remain, despite every provocation, on our charted course toward perma-
nent peace and human betterment.
Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or
domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some
spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to
all current difficulties. A huge increase in newer elements of our de-
fense; development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture;
a dramatic expansion in basic and applied research-these and many
other possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested
as the only way to the road we wish to travel.
But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader considera-
tion: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs-
balance between the private and the public economy, balance between
cost and hoped for advantage-balance between the clearly necessary and
the comfortably desirable; balance between our essential requirements as
a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual; bal-
ance between actions of the moment and the national welfare of the
future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually
finds imbalance and frustration.
The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their
government have, in the main, understood these truths and have re-
sponded to them well, in the face of stress and threat. But threats, new
in kind or degree, constantly arise. I mention two only.
IV.
A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment.
Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential
aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.
Our military organization today bears little relation to that known
1037
421
Public Papers of the Presidents
by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men
old blackbo
of World War II or Korea.
The pros
Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no arma-
ment, proj
ments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and
is gravely to
as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emer-
Yet, in h
we must al
gency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create
could itself
a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this,
It is the
three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the de-
fense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than
these and
the net income of all United States corporations.
cratic syst
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large
arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence-
Anothe
economic, political, even spiritual-is felt in every city, every State house,
every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative
As we pe
must avc
need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave
ease and
implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the
very structure of our society.
mortgag
also of i
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition
survive f
of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-
of tomor
industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced
power exists and will persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties
Dowr
or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an
this WO:
alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the
munity
huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful
of mutu
methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.
Such
Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our indus-
to the
trial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent
we are
decades.
though
In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more
certain
formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is con-
Disa
ducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.
impera
Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been over-
with :
shadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In
is so S
the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free
bilities
ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct
has W
of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government con-
know
tract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every
been
1038
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960
421
old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.
The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employ-
ment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present-and
is gravely to be regarded.
Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should,
we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy
could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.
It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate
these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our demo-
cratic system-ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.
v.
Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time.
As we peer into society's future, we-you and I, and our government-
must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering, for our own
ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot
mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss
also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to
survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom
of tomorrow.
VI.
Down the long lane of the history yet to be written America knows that
this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a com-
munity of dreadful fear and hate, and be, instead, a proud confederation
of mutual trust and respect.
Such a confederation must be one of equals. The weakest must come
to the conference table with the same confidence as do we, protected as
we are by our moral, economic, and military strength. That table,
though scarred by many past frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the
certain agony of the battlefield.
Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing
imperative. Together we must learn how to compose differences, not
with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose. Because this need
is so sharp and apparent I confess that I lay down my official responsi-
bilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who
has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war-as one who
knows that another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has
been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years-I wish I
1039
421
Public Papers of the Presidents
could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight.
ice to th
Happily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress toward
never see
our ultimate goal has been made. But, so much remains to be done.
up. [Sh
As a private citizen, I shall never cease to do what little I can to help the
Now,
world advance along that road.
Q. W
VII.
than 2
So-in this my last good night to you as your President-I thank you
problem
for the many opportunities you have given me for public service in war
be short
and peace. I trust that in that service you find some things worthy;
THE
as for the rest of it, I know you will find ways to improve performance
that we
in the future.
the ina
You and I-my fellow citizens-need to be strong in our faith that
in such
all nations, under God, will reach the goal of peace with justice. May
somethi
we be ever unswerving in devotion to principle, confident but humble
Q. ]
with power, diligent in pursuit of the Nation's great goals.
the 8 y
To all the peoples of the world, I once more give expression to
for 6 y
America's prayerful and continuing aspiration:
loyal 01
We pray that peoples of all faiths, all races, all nations, may have their
THE
great human needs satisfied; that those now denied opportunity shall
may h
come to enjoy it to the full; that all who yearn for freedom may ex-
the re
perience its spiritual blessings; that those who have freedom will under-
fault u
stand, also, its heavy responsibilities; that all who are insensitive to the
Q.
needs of others will learn charity; that the scourges of poverty, disease
you h
and ignorance will be made to disappear from the earth, and that, in the
wond
goodness of time, all peoples will come to live together in a peace guaran-
THE
teed by the binding force of mutual respect and love.
After
me to
422
Ч
The President's News Conference of
speed
Q.
Fanuary 18, 1961
think
TH
THE PRESIDENT. Good morning. Please sit down.
Q.
I came this morning not with any particularly brilliant ideas about the
TH
future, but I did want the opportunity to say goodbye to people that I
of fa
have been associated with now for 8 years, mostly I think on a friendly
Q
basis-[laughter]-and at least it certainly has always been interesting.
soun
There is one man here who has attended every press conference that
impl
I have had, at home and abroad, and who has been of inestimable serv-
your
1040
162
July
July
"States have no rights-only people have rights. States have responsi-
bilities. George Romney, July 8, 1964
The day's birthdays:
Artist James Whistler 1834, Lowell, Mass.; theologian John Calvi
JULY 9
1509, Noyon, France; writer Marcel Proust 1871, Paris; invento
Nikola Tesla 1856, Smiljan, Croatia; television's David Brinkle
Zodiac sign for the day: Cancer, the crab.
1920, Wilmington, N.C.; artist Giorgio de Chirico 1888, Volo
Zodiac birthstone for the day: Agate (pearl, alexandrite, moon-
Greece.
stone).
Quotation of the day:
The day in history:
"Every monopoly and all exclusive privileges are granted at tl
1816-Argentine Independence Day marks 1816 formal declaration
expense of the public, which ought to receive a fair equivalent."
of independence from Spain. (see May 25.)
Andrew Jackson, July 10, 1832
1850-President Zachary Taylor died in the White House of infection
and was succeeded by Millard Fillmore.
JULY 11
1947-Engagement was announced of England's Princess Elizabeth
and Philip Mountbatten.
Zodiac sign for the day: Cancer, the crab.
1971-Presidential aide Henry Kissinger began secret visit to Red
Zodiac birthstone for the day: Agate (pearl, alexandrite, moor
China to arrange for visit by President Nixon.
stone).
The day's birthdays:
The day in history:
Inventor Elias Howe 1819, Spencer, Mass.; Prime Minister Edward
1804-Aaron Burr fatally wounded Alexander Hamilton in duel
Heath 1916, Broadstairs, England; football's O.J. Simpson 1947, San
Weehawken, N.J.
Francisco.
1936-Triborough Bridge linking Manhattan, Bronx and Queens i
New York City was opened.
Quotation of the day:
1955-U.S. Air Force Academy opened at Lowry Air Force Base
"A man ought to read just as inclination leads him; for what he reads
Colo.; moved to Colorado Springs three years later.
as a task will do him little good."-Samuel Johnson, July 9, 1763
The day's birthdays:
"I have endeavored to do my duty."-President Zachary Taylor's last
President John Quincy Adams 1767, Braintree, Mass.; merchant Joh
words, July 9, 1850
Wanamaker 1838, Philadelphia; editor Thomas Bowdler 1754
Ashley, England; King Robert I, "The Bruce" 1274, Turnberry
JULY 10
Scotland.
Zodiac sign for the day: Cancer, the crab.
Quotation of the day:
Zodiac birthstone for the day: Agate (pearl, alexandrite, moon-
"Idleness and pride tax with a heavier hand than kings an
stone).
parliaments."-Benjamin Franklin, July 11, 1765
The day in history:
1890-Wyoming admitted to U.S. as 44th state.
JULY 12
1929-New, smaller-size paper money went into use in U.S. (still
used).
Zodiac sign for the day: Cancer, the crab.
1943-U.S. & British invaded Sicily in World War II.
Zodiac birthstone for the day: Agate (pearl, alexandrite, moon
1953-Soviet secret police head Lavrenti P. Beria purged by U.S.S.R.
stone).
Administration of George Bush, 1991 / May 29
is, you
Kenneth Burman, chief of endocrinology at
Remarks at the United States Air Force
always
the Walter Reed Army Medical Center;
Academy Commencement Ceremony
on't get
Lawrence Mohr, White House physician;
in Colorado Springs, Colorado
ve you
Colum Gorman, endocrinologist at the
and we
May 29, 1991
Mayo Clinic; Marlin Fitzwater, Press Secre-
got to
tary to the President; Yevgenity M. Prima-
What a day. Please be seated, and thank
When
kov, Soviet Presidential Council member
you for that warm welcome. To my old
at they
and envoy for President Gorbachev; Mik-
friend, Senator Goldwater; to Secretary
uestion
hail A. Moiseyev, Chief of the General Staff
Rice and General McPeak; to General
proach
of the Soviet Union; Grigory A. Yavlinsky,
Hamm, who's done such a fantastic job
to see
Director of the Soviet Center for Economic
here; ladies and gentlemen; graduates. Our
f we're
and Political Research; Prime Minister
altitude is 7,250 feet above sea level-far,
gs will
Brian Mulroney of Canada; Prime Minister
far above that of West Point or Annapolis.
John Major of the United Kingdom; Ed
And I'm sorry I'm a little late. I flunked my
and C
Hewett, Special Assistant to the President
room inspection at Kennebunkport this
for National Security Affairs and Senior
morning. [Laughter] Barbara gave me 20
the ag
Director of Soviet Affairs; Brent Scowcroft,
demerits. Then it took time to talk the pilot
Assistant to the President for National Secu-
of Air Force One, Colonel Barr, out of
natters
rity Affairs; Carla Hills, U.S. Trade Repre-
doing an Immelmann over this stadium.
ov and
sentative; and Robert A. Mosbacher, Secre-
[Laughter]
nt, and
tary of Commerce.
It is an honor for me to join you here at
it they
"Wild Blue U"-the home of the quick and
edits-
the brave. There's never been a better day
ey look
to be part of this magnificent team.
esident
Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater
For 40 years, my generation struggled in
'e it to
on the President's Health
the confines of a divided world-frozen in
the ice of ideological conflict, preoccupied
May 28, 1991
with the possibility of yet another war in
it it in
Europe. More recently, many here and
to see
Because of the remarkable coincidence of
abroad wondered whether America still
ot just
the President and First Lady both having
possessed the strength and the will to bear
aps to
Graves' disease, the President's physician is
the burden of world leadership. My fellow
ystem.
exploring any possible link to environmen-
Americans, we do-and we will.
there.
tal or other causes. While the doctors feel it
Through strength of example and com-
ant to
is highly unlikely that their thyroid condi-
mitment, we lead. You've been taught the
pecial-
tion could be related, or in any way related
price and the importance of leadership. As
ell re-
to the lupus disease suffered by Millie, pru-
you leave the Academy, you answer your
dence dictates that all such possibilities be
nation's call to advance the cause of free-
e 4th,
examined.
dom-to lead. There's a new sense of pride
The Secret Service is taking water sam-
and patriotism in our land. And it's good for
don't
ples at Camp David, the Vice President's
our nation's soul.
residence, the White House and Walker's
The beltway cynics may call this renewal
Point to ascertain any possible presence of
of patriotism old-fashioned, but Americans
's? But
iodine or lithium, two substances which
rarely mistake cynicism for sophistication.
t's my
have been associated with thyroid disease.
Patriotism binds the real and lasting fabric
S back
In addition, Dr. Charles L. Christian, head
of our nation. Assertive but not arrogant-
of medicine at the Hospital for Special Sur-
self-assured, kind, generous-we remain
gery in New York, has been asked to review
committed to our fundamental values.
press
the medical history of the First Family, in-
So today I speak to you, and to every
cluding Millie, to ensure that there is no
member of America's Armed Forces, to say
relationship in any way. These tests and re-
thanks. When others weren't sure we were
èrence
views will be made over the next few
up to the task-you were. When your coun-
rundel
weeks. We do not expect conclusions for
try asked you to serve-you did. And when
red to
some time.
others said, "No, no, we're not ready, we
683
May 29 / Administration of George Bush, 1991
can't"-you said, "Yes, we are ready, we
As superpower polarization and conflict
go
ahad
can." You and your colleagues in all the
melt, military thinkers must focus on more
services prove that Americans consider no
volatile regimes-regimes packed with
4
quote
risk too great, no burden too onerous to
modern weapons and seething with ancient
defend our interests and our principles-in
ambitions. We are committed to stopping
JFK
short, to do what's just and to do what's
the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
right.
struction. But there is danger that despite
Consider our fundamental decency and
our efforts, by the end of this century
humanity-our commitment to liberty. Our
nearly two dozen developing nations could
service men and women in the Gulf, weary
have ballistic missiles. Many already have
from months in the desert, now help suffer-
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons
ing Kurds and the people of Bangladesh.
programs.
When a carrier on the way home after
Nowhere are the dangers of weapons of
months in the Gulf was diverted to Bangla-
proliferation more urgent than in the
good
desh, a crewman was asked, "Aren't you
Middle East. After consulting with govern-
disappointed that you don't get to go
ments inside the region and elsewhere
home?" He replied, "Not at all. We're
about how to slow and then reverse the
saving lives. We're doing what we ought to
buildup of unnecessary and destabilizing
do."
weapons, I am today proposing a Middle
We do not dictate the courses nations
East arms control initiative.
follow, but neither can we overlook the fact
It features supplier guidelines on conven-
that our examples reshape the world. We
tional arms exports; barriers to exports that
can't right all wrongs-but neither can any
contribute to weapons of mass destruction;
nation lead as we can.
a freeze now, and later a ban on surface-to-
Joined by the world's leading nations, we
surface missiles in the region; and a ban on
worked to create a coalition in which coun-
production of nuclear weapons material.
tries great and small joined forces to liber-
Halting the proliferation of conventional
ate Kuwait. That coalition saw soldiers from
and unconventional weapons in the Middle
dozens of lands fight shoulder-to-shoulder,
East-while supporting the legitimate need
fly wingtip-to-wingtip in the cause of free-
of every state to defend itself-will require
dom. And it saw our forces as fully integrat-
the cooperation of many states, in the
ed as any in our history, demonstrating the
region and around the world. It won't be
true strength of joint operations.
easy-but the path to peace never is.
A year before you came to Colorado
And as the world changes, our military
Springs, I was privileged to be here. And I
must evolve and change with it. Last year, I
told the Class of '86, "There's no doubt the
announced a shift in our defense focus:
Soviets remain our major adversary. Our
away from old threats and toward the dan-
two separate systems represent fundamen-
gers that will face us in the years to come.
tally different values."
We need a more agile, flexible military
Since then, we've seen remarkable politi-
force that we can put where it is needed,
cal change. But let's not forget the Soviet
when it is needed. I also called for new
Union retains enormous military strength. It
technology in our defense systems. And I
will have the largest land force in Europe
proposed a defense package to the Congress
for the foreseeable future. With perhaps
that meets these demands.
five new strategic missile systems in devel-
In the years ahead, defense spending will
opment, they'll be ready for yet another
drop to below four percent of our gross
round of strategic modernization by the
national product-the lowest level in over
mid-1990's.
50 years. But we must spend that money in
At the same time, however, Soviet troops
ways that address the threats that we are
have embarked on the long trek home from
likely to face in the future. Although we
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland-and,
developed this budget before the Gulf war,
happily, from a reunified Germany. We are
it anticipates very important lessons of that
hopeful that the Soviet Union itself will con-
war-lessons that, frankly, some in the
tinue its move toward freedom.
United States Congress now ignore:
684
Lesson ,2,34 should
have parallel
const.
Administration of George Bush, 1991 / May 29
need conclusion punch
Gulf Lesson One is the value of air
technologies of defense to pick up where
power. I remember meeting with General
theories of deterrence left off. You see,
McPeak up at Camp David. In his quiet but
Saddam Hussein was not deterred, but the
forceful way, he told me exactly what he
Patriot saved lives and helped keep the coa-
felt air power could do. After he left, I
lition together.
turned to my trusted National Security Ad-
That's one reason that we've refocused
viser, who's with me here today, a former
strategic defense toward Global Protection
political science professor here at the Acad-
Against Limited Strikes, or "G-PALS," as
emy and a pilot, General Scowcroft-and
we call it. It defends us and our allies from
said, "Brent, does this guy really know what
accidental launches or from the missile at-
he's talking about?" General Scowcroft as-
tacks of international renegades. While the
sured me he did-and General McPeak,
Patriot worked well in the Gulf, we must
like the entire Air Force, was right on
prepare for the missiles more likely to be
target from day one. The Gulf war taught
used by future aggressors. We can't build a
us that we must retain combat superiority
in the skies.
Surprise
defense system that simply responds to the
threats of the past.
Then there's Gulf Lesson Two: The value
Yet some in Congress want to gut our
of Stealth. Surprise is a classic principle of
warfare-and, yes, it depends on sound in-
ability to develop strategic defenses. Last
telligence work. But Stealth adds a new di-
week the House irresponsibly voted to cut
mension of surprise. Our air strikes were
nearly $2 billion from G-PALS and to kill
the most effective, yet humane in the histo-
its most promising technologies. I call on
ry of warfare.
the Senate today to restore our missile de-
The F-117 proved itself by doing more,
fense programs, to safeguard American and
doing it better, doing it for less, and target-
allied lives, and to promote security.
ing soldiers, not civilians. It flew hundreds
Gulf Lesson Four, the most fundamental,
of sorties into the most heavily defended
is the value of people. People fight and win
areas without a scratch.
wars. And this nation never has fielded
The F-117 carried a revolution in warfare
better fighting men and women than it
on its wings. The next step in that revolu-
does today. In 1980, 68 percent of those
tion is the Stealth bomber, the B-2. Not
enlisting in the military had high school di-
only for its contribution to nuclear deter-
plomas-now it's 95 percent and climbing.
rence, but also from the standpoint of con-
The military has become our greatest equal
ventional cost-effectiveness, the B-2 has no
opportunity employer. It offers everyone a
peer. It carries over 10 times the conven-
chance and it promotes people solely on the
tional load of an F-117 and can fly 5 times
basis of merit. The men and women you
further between refuelings. It gets to the
will soon be leading are the best educated
job faster, with more tons of ordnance-
and most motivated anywhere, anytime,
without the force buildup and time we
ever. You know the standards. You know, I
needed prior to Desert Storm-and without
was tempted to ask General Scowcroft how
needing foreign airfields in the immediate
he thought I was performing during the
proximity of a conflict. And it replaces B-52
war, but I was afraid he'd say, "Fast, neat,
aircraft approaching twice the age of you
average, friendly, good, good." [Laughter]
graduates-and I say that respectively.
Although we will cut troop levels 25 per-
[Laughter]
cent by mid-decade, we must ensure that
Yet, last week, the House of Representa-
they remain fully prepared to respond
tives voted to terminate the B-2, redirect-
quickly and decisively to crises. We must
ing those funds at unnecessary weapons.
ensure that they are totally integrated,
Anyone who tells you the B-2 is "too ex-
taking full advantage of the kinds of joint
pensive" hasn't seen flak up close lately.
operations so powerfully demonstrated in
America needs the B-2 bomber, and I'm
the Gulf. We must ensure that they have
going to fight for it every inch of the way.
weapons that emerge from military necessi-
Gulf Lesson Three: We learned that mis-
ty-not pork barrel politics. We must
sile defense works and that it promotes
ensure that the cuts in the active and re-
peace and security. In the Gulf, we had the
serve components result in the most effec-
685
May 29 / Administration of George Bush, 1991
tive and efficient forces possible. We must
Forces in Europe (CFE) Joint Consultative
The
not compromise our readiness just to pro-
Group and to the Negotiations on Conven-
directe
tect unneeded bases, programs, and forces.
tional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). He
tees o
Look, no president-no president could
would succeed R. James Woolsey.
and th
or would deny Congress its right to approve
Since 1989 Dr. Hansen has served as the
thority
budgets or conduct oversight. But as Com-
John M. Olin Distinguished Professor of Na-
the Fe
mander in Chief, my greatest responsibility
tional Defense and Security Studies at the
is national defense-and I will veto any bill
United States Air Force Academy in Colora-
that doesn't support and sustain my defense
do Springs, Colorado. Prior to this Dr.
program.
Hansen served as Assistant Director at the
And so I ask the Congress to help make
United States Arms Control and Disarma-
our forces leaner and more effective. Don't
ment Agency in Washington, DC, 1986-
Memo
weigh them down with pork. Don't deny
1989.
May &
our people the tools that they will need to
Dr. Hansen graduated from Utah State
do their jobs in the next century.
University (B.S., 1960) and the University of
Preside
You graduates will find that no other
Utah (M.A., 1966; Ph.D., 1970). He was
Memo
combat force you encounter will have your
born December 27, 1935 in Idaho Falls,
Subjec
skills, your technology, or support. You'll
Idaho. Dr. Hansen served in the United
402(d)
find that in world leadership we have no
States Air Force, 1960-1983, retiring as a
Amend
challengers, but in our turbulent world, you
colonel. Dr. Hansen is married, has seven
Author
will find no lack of challenges. And I know
children, and resides in Monument, CO.
you are ready.
Purs
So, to all of America's servicemen-all of
under
them, wherever they may be-and all of
Public
America's servicewomen, I salute them-I
after
salute you. And to this 1991 graduating
Memorandum on Disaster Assistance
ant to
class of the United States Air Force Acade-
for Bangladesh
U.S.C.
my, may I say, you have earned your com-
May 29, 1991
of the
missions. Well done, and Godspeed. And
tion 40
Presidential Determination No. 91-35
may God bless you and the United States of
mote 1
America. Thank you all very, very much.
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
Act, I
The Secretary of Defense
ation c
Note: The President spoke at 11:15 a.m. in
ple's F
Subject: Drawdown of Department of
Falcon Stadium. In his opening remarks, he
promo
Defense Articles and Services for
Act.
referred to Secretary of the Air Force
International Disaster Assistance in
You
Donald B. Rice; Gen. Merrill A. McPeak,
Bangladesh
lish thi
Air Force Chief of Staff; and Gen. Charles
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by
ter.
Hamm, superintendent of the U.S. Air Force
Academy.
section 506(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C.
2318(a)(2)) (the "Act"), I hereby determine
that it is in the national interest of the
United States to draw down defense articles
Nomination of Lynn M. Hansen for the
from the stocks of the Department of De-
Letter
Rank of Ambassador While Serving as
fense and defense services of the Depart-
Trade
United States Representative to the
ment of Defense, for the purpose of provid-
May 2
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
ing international disaster assistance in Ban-
Joint Consultative Group
gladesh.
Dear M
May 29, 1991
Therefore, I hereby authorize the furnish-
I hea
ing of up to $20 million of defense articles
in subs
The President today announced his inten-
from the stocks of the Department of De-
1974,
tion to nominate Lynn Marvin Hansen, of
fense and defense services of the Depart-
("the A
Colorado, for the Rank of Ambassador
ment of Defense, for the purposes and
of a wa
during his tenure of service as the U.S. Rep-
under the authorities of Chapter 9 of Part I
and (b)
resentative on the Conventional Armed
of the Act.
People'
686
Draft Speech Insert for A.F. acaday
I must tell you that I am very disappointed with the House of
Representatives actions on this year's Defense Authorization
Bill.
My budget, my defense program, recognizes that we can make cuts
because of the historical and dramatic changes in the
international security environment. It recognizes that we must
make cuts to meet our own fiscal goals.
The cuts I've proposed are, quite literally, draconian.
Virtually every military unit and every defense program will be
affected to some degree. Some units will be disbanded, some
bases closed, and some programs cancelled. Virtually every state
and every congressional district will see the effects. But there
is no alternative if we are to fashion a defense program that is
tailored to the new world order.
The defense budget I put forward is a logical, coherent program,
designed for maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the
available resources. The House bill would unravel the logic of
the program; killing the B-2 that is SO vital to our new security
objectives, emasculating our ability to develop and deploy
strategic defenses; and preventing needed reductions in the Guard
and Reserve. At the same time, the House bill would force us to
buy expensive and unneeded aircraft and other weapons which I
never requested.
This is not the time for business as usual. This is no time for
pork-barrel politics. Make no mistake -- I will veto a bill that
does not allow us to meet today's defense needs or our future
challenges.
Mark -
The President
will Sign - veto
Latter today on the
HASC bill.
Above a suggested add to
the peach. Use as you
See for
John Gordon x 3330
July 2, 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR TONY SNOW
FROM:
BOB SIMON Ro
SUBJECT:
DEFENSE SPEECH
The President will speak to the American Defense Preparedness
Association on July 9 at 10 a.m. at the J.W. Marriott. The
association is made up of arms merchants, i.e. friendly.
The outline was approved by Scowcroft. He sees this speech as a
chance for the President to lay down some markers before the Senate
Armed Services Committee starts mark-up on the 10th or 11th.
Essentially, the outline goes through the same material as the Air
Force Academy speech, but with an added emphasis on the need to cut
Guard and Reserve forces as well as active forces. Congress is
really resisting cuts to the Reserves because they are politically
potent, so we need to give some political cover to our GOP troops
up on the Hill.
Also, the President will send the base closing report to Congress
the day after this speech, so we should hit them hard about how
painful cuts must be made.
Historical notes: On July 9, 1850, President Zachary Taylor died.
His last words: "I have endeavored to do my duty." Also, on July
12, 1862, the Congressional Medal of Honor was authorized. How
about "130 years ago, Congress created the Medal of Honor. Now
Congress has a chance to win a medal of honor by passing a defense
bill that
....
10Am
Luly 9.
OUTLINE FOR A SPEECH ON THE DEFENSE PROGRAM
A New World Order
Any view of defense issues must be anchored in a broader vision.
-
In the Gulf we caught a glimmer of the future, a new world
order characterized by a growing consensus that force cannot
be used to settle disputes and characterized by a world
willing to act when that consensus is broken.
-
The Gulf crisis showed the value of collective action in
dealing with aggression, but it also showed that only the
United States can mobilize the international community.
We remain the country to whom others turn when in distress.
We can't do it alone, but no one else can mobilize and lead
as we can.
This leadership must include effective military forces,
forces appropriate to the challenges and opportunities
before us.
Aspen II
Last year in Aspen I announced a shift in our defense focus
toward forces 25 percnet smaller and restructured for a new era.
-
Events since then -- in the Gulf, in Europe, in the Soviet
Union -- have validated this shift, a shift away from many
of the threats of the Cold War toward a new agility for our
armed forces, an ability to respond to unpredictable
regional crises, even as we continue to deter nuclear
attack.
We are moving from a force that has largely been garrisoned
at likely points of attack by known enemies to one that is
agile enough to respond to a variety of new and
unpredictable dangers.
Let me make this clear. This is a fundamental redirection
of our defense effort -- conceptually a different kind of
force. And fiscally, for the first time in over 40 years,
we are planning to spend progressively less for defense.
-
The threats have changed. The ability -- indeed, the
willingness -- of the Soviet Union to project conventional
military power beyond its borders has been significantly
reduced. This permits us to scale back our forces.
But dangers remain. We still face the sobering truth that
the Soviet Union will retain the physical ability to destroy
the United States in a single cataclysmic attack and
Saddam Hussein's barbarity dramatized the terrible menace of
outlaw states armed with modern weapons and ancient
ambitions.
2
Our forces will be smaller but we can't afford to let them
be less ready, to be equipped with the wrong kinds of
weapons, or to be weighed down with unneeded systems,
unneeded bases or unneeded units.
Holding the Line
The defense program we sent to Congress provides for effective
military forces and it stays within the limits agreed to in last
year's budget summit.
-
But there is no slack here. This is a defense program that
meets minimum defense needs.
-
When Congress adds fat (or should I say pork) to this
program, they have to take muscle out to pay for it.
-
That's why I intend to hold the line on defense. I will
veto any defense bill that does not do what it has to do to
defend this nation, its values and its interests.
-
This is not a question of politics but of putting American
interests and lives unnecessarily at risk in the future.
-
I will fight for the B-2. This aircraft will advance the
revolution in warfare begun by the F-117, but with greater
range and payload, to deter across the spectrum of conflict.
Some have suggested we should compromise -- accept a total
of 15 aircraft. That makes no sense operationally or
fiscally. Our program -- 75 B-2s -- is the compromise.
I will fight for strategic defenses. GPALS will pick up
where deterrence leaves off, offering protection in the
event of accidental launch and defending against
international renegades who will soon possess threats more
sophisticated than the Model-T SCUD. I will not accept a
defense program that guts our ability to pursue the most
promising technologies for the future.
guard
I will fight for the right kind of active-reserve'mi -- and
that means reshaping our reserve forces as we reshape the
total force. When the House adds hundreds of millions of
dollars to buy reserve equipment we do not want -- when the
House makes the Pentagon retain tens of thousands of reserve
positions we do not need -- they are taking dollars away
from those things that will make all of our forces, active
and reserve, more effective in the future. House action on
reserve personnel alone would cost us more than $11 billion
over the next five years.
3
I will fight for the mobility programs we must have to get
our forces where they are needed when they are needed. We
can't let the lightning success of our forces in the 100
hour ground war blind us to the fact that it took us a full
six months to deploy those forces.
House
And I will fight to eliminate the pet programs and pet
projects that have been added to the defense bill. Things
like aircraft the Air Force and Navy have not asked for or
tanks the Army has not requested. Things like nearly two
billion dollars in construction projects that Dick Cheney
says that we can do without.
Managing Risk
This isn't an argument about how much to spend on defense. We
settled that last year with the Budget Agreement. Rather it is a
question of how to spend our money.
-
We cannot live with a defense program that has been at one
and the same time both bloated and gutted by narrow
interests. The defense program has to serve the national
interest.
I've been a Congressman and I've been a businessman so I
know something of the pressures that a changing defense
budget can create. But N-I-M-B-Y -- not in my backyard --
cannot be the foundation of a defense program.
What we are really doing here is managing risk. We can't
have everything we might like to have for defense. We never
could and we certainly can't now.
-
We have to focus on those things we need and make the tough
choices. Business as usual just won't do it!!!
[Today I sent to the Congress with my approval the final
report of the Base Closure Commission recommending we close
XX bases and reduce or realign forces at yy more. The
Commission did its work fairly, impartially and with a sense
of the national interest.]
[This is the spirit we have to have as we work on the
defense budget. This is the spirit that will enable us to
scale back and restructure our forces rationally.]
I challenge the Senate to do what is right, to pass a
defense program that will allow us to take the Nation safely
into the 21st century.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE
STATEMENT OF
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DICK CHENEY
BEFORE THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
IN CONNECTION WITH
THE FY 1992-93 BUDGET FOR
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FEBRUARY 21, 1991
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE
STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DICK CHENEY
IN CONNECTION WITH THE FY 1992-93 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
FEBRUARY 21, 1991
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to discuss the Administration's fiscal year
(FY) 1992-93 defense budget request.
As we meet here today, the Defense Department is engaged in
two formidable tasks. First, the men and women of our armed
forces, under the mandate of the United Nations, are engaged in
war in the sands of Arabia to liberate Kuwait. Their dedication
and professionalism are making us proud.
Yet even as we fight a significant war far from our shores,
the Department, in the second task, is restructuring and
reducing American military forces to adapt to changes in the
strategic environment and to meet the challenge and
opportunities of the post-Cold War era. Today is an important
step in that process, and I welcome the opportunity to testify
before you on these crucial matters.
Underpinning each of these formidable tasks is a new
strategy for America's defense. This strategy was first set
forth publicly in a speech by President Bush last August 2--the
very day Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. This is ironic, because
the strategy President Bush presented directs attention away
from a global war beginning in Europe -- the contingency that
had necessarily preoccupied America's planners for four decades.
The new strategy focuses our efforts instead on regional
contingencies and on sustaining the forward military presence in
peacetime necessary to deter the outbreak of regional wars.
This new strategy also emphasizes that technological
breakthroughs will change military art, even as our Stealth
fighters today carry a disproportionate role in the air war. It
calls for ballistic missile defense, much as American Patriot
units are now engaged almost nightly. It directs resources for
increased mobility, as we conduct one of the largest and most
rapid deployments in our history. And it recognizes potential
new roles for us, for our allies and for the Soviets, even as an
unprecedented international effort has been forged.
But it is also a strategy that recognizes the importance of
continuing historic roles for America's defense, as our Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marines prepare for one of the largest land
assaults of modern times. It cites the continued importance of
the quality of our armed forces and the critical need to
maintain and modernize our strategic capabilities. And it warns
of the continued need for caution in an uncertain world, the
need to be ready to rebuild, even as we plan to reduce
dramatically over the next several years.
Today I would like to discuss this new strategy, the
elements that underlie it, and its implications for our defense
budget. For an effective strategy for America's defense
requires first a sound understanding of the challenges and
opportunities ahead of us, a clear sense of our interests and
goals, and an honest appreciation of our strengths and
characteristics as a nation. On these sound bases the President
has built America's defense strategy for the 1990s, a strategy
fully reflected in the force structures and programs contained
in the defense budget recently submitted to the Congress.
THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES
The remarkable changes of 1989 in Europe and the Soviet
Union brought to the fore the need to reexamine the strategy of
containment that had guided us from early post-World War II
days. But there are other changes afoot, as well, partly as a
consequence of the end of the Cold War, and partly from other
historical trends. These have interlocking effects on our
purposes as a nation and on the resources we will devote to our
defense. Let me discuss briefly problems and opportunities
presented in four categories:
Changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Changes in future regional threats.
Changes in relations with our allies.
Changes in the nature of future warfare.
Changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
The past two years have seen extraordinary, historic changes
in the strategic environment. The revolutionary change in the
nations of Eastern Europe has been more wide-ranging and
sweeping than anything we have seen in the last forty years.
Noncommunists now lead each of the former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
states. Germany has been unified in NATO. The Soviet Union has
agreed to withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Germany and is unilaterally reducing its general purpose forces
at home. The Warsaw Pact is set to be dissolved April 1. In
short, the West has achieved a great strategic success.
The Soviets have played a responsible and helpful role in
many of these developments. Communism collapsed in Eastern
Europe and is under siege elsewhere because it failed to nurture
the spirit and innovation of its individual citizens. Democracy
and free market economies have proven more durable, more
successful and more responsive to the aspirations of the
majority of mankind. But the Soviets helped change along and in
the past two years took some steps toward reform at home as
well. Significantly, the Soviets have also joined with the
overwholming majority of the international community in
2
supporting 12 UN Security Council resolutions condemning Iraq's
wanton aggression in the Persian Gulf. In this sense it is now
common to say, at last, "the Cold war is over."
Last fall, during trips to Poland and the Soviet Union, I
witnessed some of these advances first hand. In Moscow, I
addressed a joint meeting of the Defense and State Security and
International Affairs committees of the Supreme Soviet, and this
experience in particular left me with a sense of the great
changes taking place in the Soviet Union.
But the moves towards democracy and demilitarization of the
Soviet Union that we all welcomed now appear to be in doubt.
Recent, worrisome events raise questions about the prospects for
needed economic and political reform and the Soviet Union's
future course.
The economic situation in the Soviet Union today is as bleak
as it has been since the end of World War II. In October 1990,
just about the time I visited the Soviet Union, the central
government rejected the Shatalin plan, the only economic program
that had any real prospect to reform the Soviet economy. The
Soviet government has taken other steps that make any
significant improvement in the Soviet economy less likely,
including reasserting the priority of state orders in the
economy, authorizing the KGB to search business enterprises for
economic data, and otherwise countering the movement toward free
markets and prices. These actions are certain to trouble
western businessmen contemplating investment in the Soviet
Union. In short, the Soviet central government has for now
abandoned economic reform and in turn has been abandoned by the
most prominent economic reformers, many of whom are now working
with the government of the Russian Republic.
As a result of the center's policies, the Soviet economy is
collapsing. There only remains the question of how rapidly the
shrinkage is occurring. Estimates for 1990 range from an
official Soviet estimate of some 2 percent reduction in Soviet
economic activity to at least a 10 percent reduction in the 12
months ending in February 1991. Many experts anticipate that
1991 will see a further contraction of the Soviet economy.
Mr. Gorbachev's success in the eyes of many hinged upon his
ability to deliver economic reform, to move the Soviet Union
into the modern era so that it could compete with the West.
Success depended first and foremost upon his ability to
dismantle the old structures that clearly did not work, and put
new structures in their place. In my view, to date, he has
clearly not yet achieved that transformation. Given this
failure, we have to anticipate that there will continue to be
economic decline and increased prospects for significant unrest.
If the government pursues additional anti-reform steps, Moscow
will find itself locked in a vicious cycle. It is hard to
3
discern, at this point, a strategy at the center for dealing
with these problems or regenerating a process of reform.
Political reform in the Soviet Union is also under attack.
Leading liberal political figures have left the government, most
notably former Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, whose resignation
speech warned of an impending dictatorship. Shortly thereafter,
Gorbachev resorted to and sanctioned a crackdown on the freely
elected governments in the Baltic states. There has been a
reversal of progress in human rights and a broad campaign
attacking press freedoms. Political conflict is worsening.
Rather than moving toward greater openness to resolve the
underlying problems, Gorbachev appears ready to rely on the
security services and the military and their use of force to
maintain order inside the Soviet Union. He has issued a decree
establishing joint Interior Ministry-Army patrols. There is now
a widespread consensus among Soviet observers that the central
government is increasingly influenced by the military and the
security services, as well as the Communist party bureaucracy.
In the absence of ongoing reform there is no prospect for a
permanent transformation in U.S.-Soviet relations. Experience
shows that ultimately U.S.-Soviet relations are driven by how
the Soviet Union governs itself. Except at the margins, long-
term improvement depends on the democratization and
demilitarization of Soviet society. The failure of reform would
not necessarily mean a return to the worst days of the cold war,
but it would prevent movement to thoroughgoing, across the board
cooperation with the Soviet Union.
Reform need not fail. Our President has said many times
that we want the process of reform in the Soviet Union to
succeed. We still hope that it will be successful, and the
central government, we believe, may still be able to take steps
to return to the path of reform.
But what do these conflicting trends mean for our long-term
defense requirements? Five implications must be weighed.
First, the Warsaw Pact is dead as a military organization.
I do not see any possibility of resurrecting it. Even though
the Soviet military will remain, by a wide margin, the largest
armed force on the continent, the threat of a short-warning,
global war starting in Europe is now less likely than at any
time in the last 45 years. The USSR will, very likely, continue
withdrawing forces from Eastern Europe. The withdrawals from
Hungary and Czechoslovakia are well on their way to completion;
and, despite some recent difficulties, we anticipate that
withdrawal from Germany and Poland will be completed some time
thereafter.
Second, the Soviet ability to project conventional power
beyond its borders will continue to decline, whether that
decline is part of a broad strategy of improving relations with
4
the West or is simply an unintended effect of the continued
economic collapse of the Soviet Union. For the moment there
does not appear to be a constituency for a revanchist policy
toward Europe or a forward policy in the Third World. More
generally, as many Soviets have noted, the Soviet Union has a
sick economy, and it is getting sicker. The military is not
able to insulate itself completely from this broader social
illness, and as a consequence some of its capabilities
inevitably will be degraded. Thus, I think overall the Soviets
are going to find it increasingly difficult to project power
beyond their borders, and that obviously reduces the threat we
have been faced with for the past 40 years.
Third, there is enormous uncertainty about developments
inside the Soviet Union, and this should be reflected in our
planning. Absent a return to the course of reform, I believe
the Soviet decline will continue. Growing unrest and violence
in the Soviet Union would threaten its neighbors in Central and
Eastern Europe since some of the turmoil may well spill over the
borders of the Soviet Union. This unrest will be particularly
troubling to the Soviet Union's neighbors since, as former
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said not long ago:
[N]o one can calculate the consequences of a social
explosion capable of igniting not only befogged minds but
also the giant stockpiles of nuclear and chemical weapons
and nuclear power stations and the zones already weakened by
environmental and natural disasters and regions shaken by
interethnic strife.
As the situation deteriorates in the Soviet Union,
anticommunist democrats and ethnic nationalists could well take
to the streets in protest or flee. Large flows of refugees to
Europe are possible. This will only heighten the concerns of
Eastern European nations, as they seek solutions to their
longer-term security needs.
Fourth, and a key point, the Soviets not only retain
significant strategic capability but are modernizing it
virtually across the board. It is expected that Soviet nuclear
forces will be fully modernized by the mid-1990s, including
Typhoon/Delta IV submarines, SS-24 and SS-25 missiles and
follow-ons to each, and a new highly accurate version of the ss-
18 missile. They will also modernize their air-breathing forces
with the ALCM-carrying Bear-H, Blackjack and Backfire bombers,
among other improvements. In all, we see five or six new Soviet
long-range ballistic missiles under development. The USSR also
continues to modernize its strategic defenses. While we seek to
capitalize on the significant reductions in conventional
capabilities, we must recognize the continued importance of
maintaining robust strategic offensive and defensive
capabilities.
5
Fifth, the prospects for arms control are in doubt. We have
serious, unresolved differences with Moscow over the agreement
to reduce Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). There is still,
at this time, no resolution on START, although at various times
there has been reason to believe we were close to finishing a
START agreement. These setbacks in arms control demonstrate the
spillover effects of Soviet domestic unrest and the resurgent
role of the military. Nevertheless, we remain hopeful that we
may Soviets. yet conclude meaningful arms control agreements with the
Changes in Future Regional Threats
The cooling of the superpower rivalry has implications for
the regional conflicts we confront as well. The containment
strategy dictated that part of our regional interests derived
directly from Moscow's expansionist strategy, and our own
efforts to counter that expansionism. U.S.-Soviet rivalry did
not create U.S. regional interests but gave them a special
context and urgency. A new era holds the prospect for treating
regional issues independent of the East-West context.
A true demise to the Cold War therefore promises many
positive effects on regional conflicts, including greater
superpower cooperation, with the most dramatic example to date
being the Soviet support in the United Nations against Iraq.
The cooling of superpower rivalry decreases the chances that a
regional conflict will escalate into global war--a worrisome
concern throughout the Cold War. This shift drains many
regional insurgencies of their most common source of military
and economic support, and undercuts adherents to Communist
ideological fervor. On the other hand, there is a risk that the
end of the bipolar world could unleash local, destructive forces
that were previously kept in check. For example, there is some
thought that Saddam Hussein saw the end of the Cold War as an
opportunity to pursue his own expansionism.
Whatever the positive consequences of Soviet "new thinking"
on foreign affairs, we face the sobering truth that local
sources of instability and oppression will continue to foster
conflicts small and large virtually across the globe. The Gulf
conflict has illustrated once again that these regional crises
and conflicts are likely to arise, or to escalate, unpredictably
and on very short notice. This will require that we be able to
respond if necessary, very rapidly, often very far from home,
and against hostile forces that are increasingly well-armed with
conventional and unconventional capabilities.
No one can predict with certainty the precise course of the
war with Iraq. Nonetheless, we are confident that we will
ultimately prevail. In the near future, one way or another,
Iraqi forces will leave Kuwait. Similarly, the region's post-
crisis political and military relationships remain uncertain,
but we are confident of a more favorable post-crisis future
6
there. Several points will guide our approach. First, the
security structure that was in place on August 2 failed; we need
a new structure which can maintain the peace. Second, our
friends in the gulf will have to take the lead; they are most
directly affected by conflict there. Third, we have major
interests in that part of the world; we must remain engaged to
protect those interests, consistent with the wishes of our local
friends. Fourth, we are prepared to increase our presence
compared to the pre-crisis period. We will want to have the
capability to return forces quickly to the region should that
ever be required. We will want to do much more prepositioning
of heavy equipment in the region than was the case before, while
seeking to minimize any long-term, large U.S. presence.
But while we are confident of success in the Gulf, this war
presages very much the type of conflict we are most likely to
confront again in this new era--major regional contingencies
against foes well-armed with advanced conventional and
unconventional weaponry. In addition to Southwest Asia, we have
important interests in Europe, Asia, the Pacific and Central and
Latin America. In each of these regions there are opportunities
and potential future threats to our interests. We must
configure our policies and our forces to effectively deter, or
quickly defeat, such future regional threats.
Iraq's forces are considerable, but not entirely unique:
there are other regional powers with modern armored forces,
sophisticated attack aircraft and integrated air defenses, anti-
ship cruise missiles, and even modern diesel submarines. The
problem will be exacerbated by post-Cold War phenomenons:
transfers of Cold War surplus armaments, increasing economic
pressures on international arms dealers, and growing indigenous
technical capabilities in the Third World. Opponents in
regional conflicts are unlikely to possess the across-the-board
technical sophistication of the USSR. It will not be uncommon,
however, for U.S. forces to face sophisticated systems
containing high technology in regional confrontations.
Iraq also illustrates the growing problem of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For the first
time in more than 70 years, we face the possibility of the use
of chemical and biological weapons against us in a conflict.
The use of such capabilities would require a devastating
response. We must respond resolutely not only because of
current combat requirements, but also to deter future use. Only
a few years hence, had it continued on its same path, Iraq could
well have credibly threatened a nuclear weapons capability as
well. By the year 2000, it is estimated that at least 15
developing nations will have the ability to build ballistic
missiles--eight of which either have or are near to acquiring
nuclear capabilities. Thirty countries will have chemical
weapons, and ten will be able to deploy biological weapons as
well.
7
One implication for future regional conflicts emerging from
Hussein's aggression is the need for tighter arms transfer and
proliferation controls. Those responsible for violations of
such control should be held strictly accountable. We cannot
allow the end of cold-war-level hostilities to open further the
door to transfer of unconventional or ballistic systems.
A second implication for future regional conflicts that
clearly emerges from the current crisis is the military and
political importance of enhancing defenses to counter missile
proliferation. Patriot missiles have demonstrated the technical
efficacy and strategic importance of missile defenses. This
underscores the future importance of developing and deploying a
system for Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) to
defend against limited missile attacks--whatever their source.
As President Bush said last week, "Thank God that when the Scuds
came-the people of Israel and Saudi Arabia, and the brave
forces of our coalition had more to protect their lives than
some abstract theory of deterrence."
A third implication is the importance of being able to focus
intelligence efforts more on specific regional threats in the
post-Cold war world. This is not simply a matter of redirecting
our intelligence specialists from the study of the Soviet Union
to concentration on other areas. We will need, if anything, to
continue our close attention to the Soviet Union and the
increasingly diverse activity we must understand as we also
track developments in other regions.
Separate and apart from the broad regional conflicts
discussed above, there is another set of demanding threats.
They are low intensity conflicts, including insurgencies,
terrorism, and drug trafficking. Some of these challenges
require uniquely tailored military capabilities. Countering
such challenges deserves our attention and support.
Changes in Relations with Our Allies
The third area of change is our relations with key allies.
Europe is experiencing fundamental changes. In security terms,
the challenge from the Warsaw Pact has disintegrated, and the
military capability of the Soviet forces that remain in Eastern
Europe is diminishing. The countries of Eastern Europe are
seeking to reweave themselves back into the larger political and
economic fabric of Europe. A unified Germany stands at the
center of the continent. Economic change is also underway: the
United States supports European efforts to create a single
unified market by 1992. As the continent works through the
political, economic and security challenges of this new era, and
discovers a new identity, there will be pressures and
temptations to question fundamental elements of our trans-
Atlantic commitments. These ties must not weaken: the U.S.
shares with its allies in Western Europe a common history and
8
heritage--a shared Diamitment to freedom and individual rights.
The continued strength of NATO remains critical.
As our concerns shift from the containment of the Soviet
Union to possible instability in Europe, a substantial American
presence and continued cohesion within the Western alliance
remain vital to furthering our interests. A U.S. presence will
provide reassurance and stability as the new democracies of
Eastern Europe mesh themselves into a larger and evolving
Europe. The Soviet Union will retain the largest army in Europe
by far even after its forces are pulled back within its borders
and projected conventional force reductions are completed.
While its mission may be changed in this new era, the North
Atlantic Alliance remains indispensable to peace and stability
in Europe. To keep the Alliance strong and viable in a new
environment, we must recognize that there are important tasks
beyond the changed--but still important--task to balance and
deter Soviet military power. In this regard, it is important to
note that both our new friends in Eastern Europe and the leaders
of the Soviet Union have made it clear to me in my visits that
they consider a continued U.S. presence in Europe and a strong
NATO to be essential to overall European stability.
We expect to share more equitably with our increasingly
strong allies and partners the worldwide responsibilities that
go with leadership. Operation Desert Shield/Storm is a good
model for dealing with future crises.
Changes in the Nature of Future Warfare
For some time the Soviets have been writing about a military
technological revolution that lies just ahead. They liken it to
the 1920s and 1930s, when revolutionary breakthroughs--such as
the blitzkrieg, aircraft carriers, and amphibious operations--
changed the shape and nature of warfare. We have already seen
the early signs of this revolution in the recent breakthroughs
in Stealth, information, and other key technologies. This
revolution will present enormous challenges, not just
technologically, but in the development of doctrine and
operational concepts. Whatever we do, the Soviets and others
will be pursuing this revolution diligently. Revolutionary
military capabilities are a reality with which our future
strategy must deal.
The military technological revolution will have political,
as well as military import, both in our competition with the
Soviets and more broadly in the military arena. The recent
changes in the Soviet Union reflect in no small degree the
Soviet perception of this military technological revolution. In
large part the Soviet leadership accepted the changes Gorbachev
sought because they perceived they could not keep pace in this
technological revolution. By the same token, the technological
revolution could be used as justification to devote more
resources to Soviet defense spending, further inhibiting
any other potential aggressor will look at tho the relative
ease with which we beat draq 9 T thank twice conventional determed
economic prospects. The technological edge we have shown in
Desert Storm and the promise of breakthroughs tomorrow will have
an even greater effect on the calculations of regional powers.
Staying ahead in this technical revolution will help shape the
future security environment in ways favorable to us and will
help give us capabilities that we are comfortable employing for
deterrence or defense against tomorrow's regional aggressors.
ENDURING U.S. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
Technology =
In the first exhilaration of the dramatic changes of 1989,
some began to question the nature of enduring U.S. interests.
"conventional determine
Let me review briefly some broad American purposes that
to
persist--even in this changed world I have described.
regional
aggressors,
Security. Security is the first requirement upon which all
our individual and national aspirations depend. We must accept If we
that even after historic Cold war successes we live in a
dangerous world. The Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal is the
can beat
most dramatic example of our vulnerability because the USSR
them
continues to possess, and indeed has a modernized capability, to
easily,
destroy this country with little warning. This is not to imply
then
that we believe a bolt from the blue attack is likely, but to
note our vulnerability. We must also ensure the safety of our
they will
commerce and of our people at home and abroad as they pursue the
be detened
normal conduct of their daily affairs. Thus our security
from
requires maintaining capabilities for deterrence and defense
across the broad spectrum, from low intensity threats and
noncombatant evacuation efforts to strategic nuclear threats.
attaching.
Democracy and Prosperity. Second, we seek to promote a
world environment in which societies with values similar to our
own--political and economic freedom, human rights, and
democratic institutions--can flourish. We engage in such
efforts because they benefit our friends abroad, but also
because we know our own security and prosperity are well-served
when we are surrounded by friends and allies who share our
fundamental values and aims. We know we cannot long remain
secure in isolation.
The President, in his State of the Union address, spoke of
these "universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security,
freedom, and the rule of law." For 200 years we have served
such ends through our example. But it is also necessary from
time to time to help others in providing for their own
security, to join in security alliances, and to promote regional
military and political stability through economic and social
development and the pursuit of just resolutions of persistent
regional conflicts. And, at times, where our interests merit
the sacrifice, it will be necessary to use force to deter
aggressors or defend freedom. In the Persian Gulf today, in
Panama last year, and in our longstanding commitments in Asia,
the Pacific and Europe we have demonstrated our readiness to
bear the burdens our interests domand.
10
Leadership. The President clearly outlined his view of
America's role in the world in the State of the Union address:
"Today, in a rapidly changing world, American leadership is
indispensable
Among the nations of the world, only the United
States of America has had both the moral standing and the means
to back it up. We are the only nation on this earth that could
assemble the forces of peace." Our experience in the Persian
Gulf demonstrates once again the continued importance of
American leadership. In my recent discussions with world
leaders, I have been struck by how unique a role America plays
in furthering the President's vision of a world "where diverse
nations are drawn together in common cause," and "aggression
will meet collective resistance."
THE NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY
To meet our aims in the changing and increasingly
interdependent world around us, we must be ready to show moral
and political leadership; to reassure others of our commitment
to protect our interests; and, if necessary, to respond to
threats resolutely with forces for deterrence or defense. These
aims and a close appreciation of the changes and continuities in
today's world give rise to the main emphases of our new defense
strategy.
Let me summarize briefly the key elements of the new defense
strategy outlined by the President last August. First, we need
to maintain a system of alliances worldwide. Second, to give
substance and meaning to those commitments, we want to maintain
US forward deployed forces, although at lower levels than in the
past. Third, we must retain the forces and mobility to respond
to crises and to reinforce those forward units. Fourth, we need
a robust navy to control the world's oceans. Fifth, as we
reduce forces deliberately--based on continuing reevaluations of
the strategic environment, we must retain the national capacity
to reconstitute forces, should this be needed. Sixth, we need
to preserve a strong strategic offensive and defensive
capability.
The most important change reflected in this new strategy is
that we no longer are focused on the threat of a Soviet-led,
European-wide conflict leading to global war. Our strategy
continues to recognize the massive conventional capabilities the
Soviets will retain for the foreseeable future. Yet, we judge
that the striking political and military changes in the USSR and
Eastern Europe noted earlier would alter the character of the
remaining Soviet threat from the capability to wage global war
to a threat to a single region in Europe or elsewhere. To size
and shape the forces we will need in the future, the new
strategy therefore shifts its focus to regional threats and the
related requirements for forward presence and crisis response.
We believe we will have sufficient warning of the redevelopment
11
of a Soviet threat of global war, so that we could reconstitute
forces over time if needed.
Our program of reductions and our budget have thus been
based on certain assumptions about the future strategic
environment. If trends prove less favorable along the way than
we first projected, we may not be able to reduce forces as fast
or as far as we have planned. Remarkably, the reshaping and
reducing of our forces now underway is occurring against the
backdrop of a major war in the Persian Gulf and worrisome trends
in the Soviet Union. I know of no historical precedent for our
country making changes of this magnitude under such conditions.
This in itself is cause for due caution.
Strategic Deterrence
I have earlier noted that the Soviets continue to modernize
their strategic nuclear arsenal at a pace that seems out of step
with their positive actions in other spheres. Given all that is
at stake, this is an area in which we can ill-afford to accept
much risk. America must continue to maintain a diverse mix of
survivable and highly capable offensive nuclear forces, as well
as supporting command and control assets. At the same time as
we modernize, we have planned to scale back our strategic forces
in accordance with our expectations of a START agreement
covering such forces. Negotiations with the Soviets are
continuing intensively but have not yet yielded success in
negotiation. We hope to be able to complete a treaty in the
near future, as we assumed when we formulated our currently
planned reductions.
Future Secretaries of Defense are going to have to be able
to deploy defenses against ballistic missiles--whether against
the kind of theater threat we face today against SCUDs, or the
far more sophisticated threats we anticipate in the future. We
will pursue a defensive system for global protection against
limited ballistic missile strikes--whatever their source.
Forward Presence
Our new strategy emphasizes the importance of U.S. presence
abroad, albeit at reduced levels. This is one of the key roles
on which we will size our forces. The success of our historic
strategy of forward presence should be carefully recognized. We
should be slow to make destabilizing changes. Recent attention
has focussed on our plans to reduce our levels of forward
deployed forces, especially in Europe under CFE, but also in
Asia under last year's strategy initiative.
Despite its historic success, the great importance of
maintaining a forward military presence may not be widely
appreciated. Our presence sends an unmistakable signal to
allies and adversarion alike of our commitment to be engaged in
a region. It: supports our aim of continuing in play a
12
leadership role in international events. In this era of
shifting regional power balances, our forward military presence
supports our aim of maintaining the stability that lets other
nations flourish, by preventing the emergence of dangerous power
vacuums or imbalances and by staving off regional arms races.
Forward forces also provide an initial capability to respond
rapidly to regional crises or contingencies.
Presence can take many forms. The stationing of forces in
selected forward bases is perhaps the most tangible
demonstration of U.S. commitment in key areas. Periodic
deployments, rotations, exercises, and visits provide a flexible
operational presence, and may loom larger than before as a way
of maintaining our future forward presence. Not least, we must
maintain the infrastructure and logistics arrangements that are
so essential to being able to sustain a forward presence.
While we will reduce our forward presence, there are risks
in reducing too far or too fast. These risks regarding reduced
forward presence are sometimes likened to thin ice: you don't
know for sure how much is too little, until you've fallen
through--and then the consequences can be dire and long-lasting.
To keep this risk acceptable, reductions in presence to levels
near the minimum acceptable should be gradual and part of a
carefully developed and agreed long-term plan. Our phased plan
for reductions in Asia, including the agreement with our allies
on a 10 percent reduction in our forces there by FY 1992,
exemplify this commitment to keeping our forward presence as
trim as possible. Let me reemphasize, however, that we cannot
withdraw from the world. Our forward military presence will
remain a key factor in our overall national defense strategy and
in the strategies at our allies as well. always has been, america
Crisis Response
must be defended abroad. If the
battle ever reaches our
The need to respond to regional crises is one of the key
elements of our new strategy and plays a significant role in how
shores,
we size our active and reserve forces. We have already noted--
we've
and we see today--how important regional threats can be to our
interests. Under conditions pertaining during our policy of
lost.
containment, safety demanded that we assume that a major
regional conflict involving superpower interests might not stay
limited to that region, but could well escalate to a global
conflict. This made any single-regional conflict a 'lesser-
included case" or a potential precursor to a global war
scenario. In contrast, we now focus on a disparate array of
possible regional conflicts that we believe are more likely to
remain localized.
The regional contingencies we might face are many and
varied, including differences in terrain, climate, distance from
the U.S., nature of threat forces, potential for outside
involvement, and level of infrastructure and host nation
support. One trait nost of them share, however, is that they
13
will arise on very short notice, and therefore. require a highly
responsive military capability. As we have learned again most
clearly in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, a regional
crisis can also mean mounting a very large military operation.
Furthermore, the proliferating unconventional threats of
ballistic missiles and chemical, biological or even nuclear
weapons, plus the potentially confounding threat of terrorism,
raise the risks our forces face if deployed to respond to such
crises, and raise the stakes involved in forestalling or
containing them.
Finally, we must recognize that when the U.S. is engaged
(perhaps in concert with others) in responding to a substantial
regional crisis, potential aggressors in other areas may be
tempted to capitalize on our preoccupation. The requirements of
both deterrence and defense dictate that we not reduce forces to
a level that would leave ourselves overly vulnerable to this
threat.
Force Reconstitution
The dramatic changes of 1989 and 1990 in Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union allow us to plan on dramatic increases in the
time available to meet any renewed threat of a massive, theater-
wide attack on Europe that could lead to global war. Such long
warning of a renewed global threat enables us to reduce our
forces in being to levels sufficient to meet the regional
threats which are now our focus. This allows us to reduce our
forces now, so long as we are prepared to build, as the
President has said, "wholly new forces" should the need to
counter a global threat reemerge.
Timely reconstitution requires that we take care to preserve
the longest-lead elements of our security. This includes
particularly our alliance structures, forward deployments and
access, and the technological and doctrinal edge that comes from
vigorous innovation and development. This also includes
particular weapons systems or capabilities that take a long time
to rebuild, such as large weapons platforms that require long
production or recommission times, and highly skilled personnel,
like unit commanders and specialized technicians. We can
benefit from our defense investments over the last decade by
retaining some equipment of disestablished units in laid-up
status, and tapping the pool of trained personnel exiting units
but still accessible in reserve manpower categories. We also
will retain some units in very low-strength, cadre-type status.
But our emphasis has been on removing from the force those units
needed for a resurgent global threat that could be reconstituted
in the expected time available. Moreover, our reconstitution
concept is not necessarily simply to recreate the same forces
that we "deconstituted." Rather, we would consider what new
forces were most needed for a specific reemerging threat.
14
We recognize that to take major reconstitution measures
would require major political decisions, potentially on the
basis of early strategic warning indications. We will therefore
give increased attention to the intelligence and warning
processes that would support such decision making, as well as
measures that will provide an early response while minimizing
undue escalatory pressures.
Following a strategy of reconstitution prudently accepts
some risk during a time of reduced likelihood of global
conflict, to permit adequate attention to other concerns. These
include capabilities for the more likely regional threats we
face now, plus the long-term technological and doctrinal
innovation which may be decisive against future threats--
including those in the further future which we cannot now even
foresee.
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM
The 1990 budget summit agreement specified that incremental
costs associated with Operation DESERT SHIELD are to be treated
as emergency funding requirements, not subject to the defense
caps in the agreement. The President's FY 1992-93 defense
request and its projected long-term outlays do not reflect those
costs, including DoD's eventual requirements as a result of
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. It is possible that some of the
program decisions in the FY 1992-93 request will have to be
adjusted in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis.
FY 1990 incremental costs associated with DESERT SHIELD and
increased fuel prices were covered by shifts in previously
appropriated DOD funds ($800 million) and by a supplemental
appropriation ($2.1 billion). For FY 1991, the President is
requesting a supplemental appropriation which, when added to
contributions from our allies, could cover the DESERT
SHIELD/STORM costs that we project for the foreseeable future.
I urge timely passage of this supplemental request.
Pending passage of our supplemental request, U.S. forces
engaged in and supporting combat operations in the Middle East
must have the support they need, and our servicemembers must
receive their pay and allowances. To that end, I have
authorized the obligation of funds in excess of available
appropriations, in accordance with section 3732 of the Revised
Statutes, commonly called the Feed and Forage Act. The
incurring of deficiencies has been authorized for clothing,
subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, transportation, and medical
and hospital supplies. Additionally, pursuant to Section 2201
of Title 10 and in view of the President's determination of the
necessity to continue on active duty more members of the armed
forces than were provided for in DOD appropriations, I have
authorized the incurring of deficiencies for the costs of such
personnel.
15
IMPLEMENTING THE NEW STRATEGY
The Administration's FY 1992-93 budget request is the first
installment of the Defense Department's comprehensive FY 1992-97
multiyear defense program. That program is the result of the
Department's rigorous analysis of the capabilities needed to
support the new U.S. defense strategy. The overall goal is to
streamline and restructure America's armed forces, in order to
provide those needed capabilities within projected fiscal
constraints. In essence, U.S. forces are becoming smaller, but
still fully capable of securing our nation and its global
interests.
The FY 1992-93 DOD budget reflects priorities that flow
directly from our new strategy. (Chart 1) Rapid response to
global crises requires sustainment of the current high quality
and superior capabilities of U.S. forces, especially as their
total size is reduced. This in turn requires continued support
for the high quality of U.S. military personnel, vigorous
defense research and development, the fielding of advanced
military systems as soon as necessary, and the preservation of
critical elements of America's defense industrial and technology
base. These priorities also enable DoD to reconstitute a larger
military posture, if needed.
Other priorities include the ability to project military
power rapidly to areas of U.S. strategic interest. The new
strategy also requires that U.S. forces sustain their
traditional high readiness. To ensure credible nuclear
deterrence, DOD will maintain strong offensive nuclear forces.
We will also pursue strategic and theater defenses to provide
global protection against limited ballistic missile strikes--
regardless of their source.
DOD budget proposals also reflect my commitment to continue
to strengthen defense management and streamline the U.S. defense
infrastructure, to extract the greatest security value from
increasingly scarce resources. Special attention is going
toward efficient acquisition. The goals include funding
sustainable production rates for essential programs and
terminating lower priority programs.
FY 1992-93 DEFENSE BUDGET REQUEST
Budget Topline and Trends
The FY 1992 DoD request is $278.3 billion in budget
authority and $283.0 billion in outlays. Adjusting for
inflation, this means a real decline in DOD budget authority of
1 percent below FY 1991, 12 percent below FY 1990, and 24
percent below FY 1985, In FY 1996, the mulative real decline
since FY 1985 will reach 34 percent. (Chact 2-3)
16
DoD budget authority levels for FY 1991 through FY 1995 are
consistent with the discretionary caps for defense in last
fall's budget summit agreement. These topline numbers represent
a nominal freeze in DoD budcet authority at about $278 billion,
starting in FY 1992. Total. DOD budget authority for FY 1991
through FY 1995 will be $131 billion less than estimated in the
President's January 1990 request. After an 11.3 percent real
decline in FY 1991, DOD budget authority will decline, in real
terms, an average 3 percent per year through FY 1996. (Chart 4)
DoD outlays as a share of America's Gross National Product
(GNP) are expected to fall to 3.6 percent in FY 1996, the lowest
level since before World War II and well below the 4.7 percent
reached during the defense decline of the 1970s. (Chart 5)
The Administration's FY 1992-93 budget request is the result
of many months of intense scrutiny. We have come down to the
budget summit's lower defense levels through a combination of
cuts in force structure and major procurement programs,
management initiatives, and numerous reductions made during a
rigorous budget review this past fall. (Chart 6)
Force Structure
The FY 1992-93 request includes reductions in the U.S. force
structure that continue a prudently phased plan for reaching the
force targets established for the new strategy and threat
projections. Our FY 1995 forces will approximate those targets
and be well below FY 1990 levels. (Chart 7)
U.S. strategic forces are programmed to be scaled back in
accordance with expectations regarding arms reductions
agreements and to enable DOD to maintain credible strategic
deterrence at the least cost. Retirement of the Minuteman II
force will begin in FY 1992. Retirements of submarines with the
aging Poseidon missile are to be accelerated. During the 1990s,
the current mix of 34 Poseidon and Trident boats will be reduced
to a force of 18 Trident submarines carrying Trident I (C-4) and
Trident II (D-5) missiles. Strategic bombers will decrease from
268 in FY 1990 to 171 in FY 1993, as older B-52s are retired and
FB-111s are transferred to tactical use.
U.S. conventional forces will be restructured so that they
best support the new strategy. For crisis response, we must be
able to deploy to regions of U.S. interest sufficient forces
with the capabilities needed to counter a wide variety of
contingencies. Thus the restructured force will include a high
airlift and sealift capacity, substantial and highly effective
maritime and amphibious forces, a full and sophisticated array
of combat aircraft, both heavy and light Army divisions, and
appropriate special ope: tions forces.
17
Because serious contingencies can arise quickly, a timely
U.S. response would require mostly active forces. Reserve
forces would initially provide airlift, sealift, and some other
vital support for deploying forces. When longer preparation
allowed, reserve components could provide additional support,
plus combat units that would be needed for larger or prolonged
deployments.
In working out these roles for the new strategy, DoD will
continue its Total Force Policy to ensure the optimal
utilization of its active and reserve components. That Policy
will be driven by this principle: The composition of our total
force must be derived from the requirements of our new strategy.
For example, forces for forward presence must be almost entirely
active, as must be a sufficiently large stateside rotation base
to replace those forward forces periodically.
In applying the new strategy to our total force structure,
we project that overall U.S. reserve forces will decline by
about the same percentage as active forces. That circumstance,
however, should not mask the fact that our future force will not
merely be a proportionally scaled-back version of today's force.
We are planning to eliminate those forces--be they active or
reserve--whose justification has been based on the previous
threat of short-notice global war. We also have given priority
to preserving a mix of forces that can best meet our strategy's
requirements for forward presence and crisis response. Some
types of reserve forces will be fully retained or even
increased, while others will be cut considerably. For example,
Army reserve (and active) components will be cut substantially;
in contrast, the Air Force reserve will decline only slightly.
The criteria for such restructuring have come from the new
strategy.
To help provide for reconstitution in our new strategy, some
reserve forces will be maintained in "cadre" status. Cadre
units would have greatly reduced manpower and training; but they
would have the equipment and other preparations needed to
facilitate a smooth transition to full strength if required.
Our plans currently include two cadre divisions in the Army (not
counted in the 18 divisions programmed for FY 1995), plus
creation of a new status for some Navy frigates.
Personnel Programs and Issues
In connection with the restructuring of America's armed
forces, U.S. military manpower will decline considerably in the
coming years. By the end of FY 1995, active military end
strength will fall to 1,653,000, 24 percent below its post-
Vietnam peak of 2,174,000 in FY 1987. In FY 1995, reserve
personnel levels will drop to 906,000, 21 percent below FY 1987.
18
While manpower is projected to decline, there will be no
diminution in DOD support for pay and other incentives aimed at
preserving the high quality and morale of America's uniformed
men and women. The budget requests pay raises of 4.2 percent
for FY 1992 and 4.7 percent. for FY 1993. These proposals are
based on projected increases in the Employment Cost Index.
In FY 1993, DoD civilian strength will fall to 976,000,
about 9 percent below FY 1990. In FY 1995, DOD civilian
strength is projected to drop to 940,000, about 17 percent below
its post-Vietnam peak of 1,133,000 in FY 1987. This decrease
will be the result of both a smaller military force structure
and DoD management improvements. (Chart 8)
Readiness
A strategy geared to crisis response demands that its
component forces be ready to perform their missions on short
notice. The FY 1992-93 request includes spending on training,
maintenance, and other relevant accounts at levels sufficient to
sustain the traditionally high readiness of U.S. forces. The
request funds a training tempo approximately the same as in
FY 1991. Active Army ground and air training operations will
continue at 800 miles per year for combat vehicles and 14.5
flying hours per month for tactical aircrews. Navy steaming
days remain at 50.5/29.0 days per quarter for the deployed/non-
deployed fleets. Flying hours for active Air Force tactical
aircrews will hold at about 19 hours per month.
Investment
In FY 1992-93, the fielding of advanced weapons and other
systems will continue, although many programs have been adjusted
in recognition of evolving requirements and to bring acquisition
plans in line with reduced defense spending projections. For
example, major adjustments have been made in the B-2 bomber,
C-17 transport, SSN-21 attack submarine, and Milstar
communications satellite programs.
My overall acquisition approach for the 1990s differs
markedly from the past. This will be a decade of development,
more than of production. Scaling back production helps us to
(1) preserve our technological superiority through ambitious
research and development, (2) procure high priority systems at
more efficient rates, and (3) lay the foundation for sustaining
U.S. military strength through the year 2000 and beyond.
The FY 1992-93 budget submission terminates a number of
programs including TRIDENT submarine, P-7A anti-submarine patrol
aircraft, F-14D aircraft remanufacture, Naval Advanced Tactical
Fighter, A-12 stealth aircraft, Air Force Advance Tactical
Aircraft, Peacekeeper missiles, Mark XV aircraft identification
system, Boost Surveillance and Tracking System, and TACIT
19
RAINBOW cruise missile. (As a consequence of the decision to
terminate the A-12 for default, funds are requested to pursue
development of medium attack aircraft alternatives and seek a
longer-range, more capable variant of the F/A-18 aircraft.)
(Chart 9) These terminations come on top of those made in DOD's
FY 1991 request, most notably: V-22 OSPREY, M-1 tank, new F-14D
production, F-15E aircraft, Apache helicopter, and Army
Helicopter Improvement Program. (Chart 10) Our request also
includes rescissions of $3.4 billion in FY 1991, reflecting
proposed program terminations in FY 1992 and the elimination of
other lower-priority expenditures.
Strategic Forces and SDI. Modernization of U.S. strategic
systems is being scaled back or adjusted substantially. Funding
for the Rail-garrison Peacekeeper is cut back significantly, but
development of the small ICBM is continuing. No Trident
submarines will be built beyond the 18th boat approved in the
FY 1991 budget. ASAT funding has been substantially reduced.
The backfit of 8 Trident submarines to carry D-5 missiles has
been deferred beyond FY 1997. The Milstar satellite program has
been substantially restructured to reduce costs, eliminate
certain expensive survivability features, and support most
effectively both tactical and strategic requirements.
Consistent with my restructuring last year of the B-2 Stealth
bomber program, the request calls for procurement of 4 aircraft
in FY 1992 and 7 in FY 1993. (Chart 11)
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is being reoriented
to provide global protection against limited ballistic missile
strikes--whatever their source. This reorientation will make
possible major savings, about 20 percent over the next 6 years
compared to the earlier plan. In FY 1992, $4.6 billion is
requested for SDI and $4.9 billion in FY 1993.
This refocused defensive concept, known as Global Protection
Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), includes theater missile
defenses to protect U.S. and allied troops deployed abroad. To
centralize and accelerate development of such defenses, the
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization has been charged with
developing advanced defensive technologies to deploy much
improved, transportable theater missile defenses within the next
5 years. Budget authority for the Tactical Missile Defense
Initiative (TMDI) will $218 million in FY 1991, $603 million in
FY 1992 and $724 million in FY 1993.
Conventional Forces. The Army's major modernization effort,
begun in the early 1980s, is nearly complete. However,
important development continues on the Light Helicopter and
armored vehicles. (Chart 12)
Procurement of the Navy's SSN-21 attack submarine has been
scaled back to one per year. Other naval modernization
priorities include Aegis destroyers, F/A-18 fighters, and
several types of tactical missiles. Regarding sealift, DOD
20
expects to be able to meet its most important contingency
requirements worldwide, especially because of the programmed
increase of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) from 96 to 142 cargo
and tanker ships by FY 1994. DoD is also initiating a sealift
program in FY 1993 to improve U.S. response time for those
contingencies. Consistent with this effort, a program is being
structured to utilize funds appropriated in FY 1991. (Chart 13)
Modernization of U.S. tactical air forces continues with
procurement of F-16 fighters, C-130 transports, and AMRAAM
missiles. The next generation air superiority fighter--the
Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF)--continues in development. The
C-17 program has been scaled back and extended. But the C-17 is
needed more than ever to begin to replace aging C-141s, which
have been used so heavily in the Gulf crisis. (Chart 14)
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E).
Reflecting the emphasis on preserving the technological
superiority of U.S. forces, FY 1993 RDT&E budget authority will,
after inflation, be 10 percent above FY 1991 levels. DoD
Technology Base funding--$3.9 billion in FY 1992 and
$4.0 billion in FY 1993--will include emphasis on high
performance computing and improved materials for electronics,
gas turbine engines, and airframe components.
Base Closure. The streamlining of the military's base
structure is continuing with the elimination or closure of 86
domestic bases and 139 overseas sites. In addition, 5 domestic
bases will be partially closed and another 25 overseas sites
will be drawn down. During 1991 a new commission will review my
proposals for additional base closures and realignments and make
recommendations for consideration by the President and the
Congress. No new proposals are included in this FY 1992-93
request; but savings of $150 million in FY 1992 and $735 million
in FY 1993 are included in its legislative contingency account,
in anticipation of Congressional approval.
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
DoD management continues to undergo fundamental change
through implementation of my July 1989 Defense Management Report
(DMR). Special emphasis is going toward streamlining and
improving defense acquisition. DoD is eliminating unnecessary
management layers, limiting unneeded reporting requirements,
reducing burdensome regulations, and enhancing the education and
quality of its acquisition professionals. (Chart 15)
Central to these management efforts is the goal of bringing
down the Department's cost of doing business. This means
reducing overhead, cutting excess infrastructure and redundancy,
and consolidating and improving a number of common functions.
An example is the creation of the Defense Finance and Accounting
Service (DFAS). Whis proposal was announced along with other
FY 1990 initiatives and was under debate last year. On January
21
15, 1991, the military departments' accounting centers were
finally merged under the new organization. This will streamline
and strengthen DoD's financial management, and better enable it
to employ new technologies to cut costs even further.
Other management improvements involve supply operations,
maintenance depots, and RDT&E. To enhance supply depot
efficiency, DOD will consolidate the management of supply
operations under the Defense Logistics Agency. This will save
base and headquarters overhead costs, systems development costs,
and inventory and transportation costs, plus significantly
improve utilization of our existing supply capacity.
For DoD's maintenance depots, we are working toward fuller
use of our depot capacity, greater competition among the
services and with the private sector, reduced infrastructure,
and improvements in DoD's maintenance productivity.
To increase efficiency and reduce the costs of RDT&E
operations, there will be greater coordination within the
Department on specific technology areas, consolidation of
facilities, and enhanced competition for Science and Technology
(S&T) tasks among laboratories. Management oversight also will
be increased to improve the quality, productivity, and
effectiveness of RDT&E operations.
As a result of its DMR-related management efforts, the
Department anticipates reductions of over 30,000 civilian and
40,000 military positions by the end of FY 1997. DOD expects
its management initiatives to save about $72 billion from
FY 1991 through FY 1997.
CONCLUSION
We are at the dawn of a new era. For much of the past 45
years our primary security concern has been the Soviet threat in
Europe. We met that challenge successfully. The threat to
Western Europe has diminished. But as the war in the Gulf
demonstrates, meeting regional threats can be quite demanding
even when we can marshal international cooperation.
To preserve our unique international role, to consolidate
the changes in Europe, and to contain and defeat the many
possible regional threats we may one day face, we must sustain
America's military forces for the new world. We must remember
that military strength of the kind we have relied on in the
Persian Gulf cannot be built overnight. Continued investment in
America's defense is a must, as we look forward with confidence
to the years ahead.
22
Chart # 1
DEFENSE BUDGET PRIORITIES
People
Power Projection/Mobility
Force Quality
Readiness
Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces
Technological Advantage
Efficient Acquisition
Streamlined Infrastructure
Chart # 2
NATIONAL DEFENSE TOPLINE
(Current $ Billions)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
BUDGET AUTHORITY
DoD 051
273.0 278.3 277.9 278.2 280.7 282.6
DoE & Other
12.6
12.5
13.0
13.7
14.4
15.1
TOTAL 050
285.6
290.8
290.9
291.9
295.1
297.8
OUTLAYS
DoD 051
287.5 283.0 279.1 273.3 274.6 278.5
DoE & Other
11.5
12.2
12.8
13.4
14.0
14.7
TOTAL 050
298.9
295.2
292.0
286.7
288.6
293.2
Chart # 3
360
DOD BUDGET AUTHORITY
(CONSTANT DOLLARS IN BILLIONS)
APRIL 1989 PLAN
Average Real Increase = 1.2% per year
330
ACTUAL
300
FY 91 DOD BUDGET
Average Real Decline = 2% per year
270
Cumulative Real Decline:
FY 1991 - -11.3%
1990-1992 = 12%
1985-1992 = 24%
FY 92 DOD BUDGET
1985-1996 = 34%
Average Real Decline = 3% per year
after FY 91
240
FY 85
FY 86
FY 87
FY 88
FY 89
FY 90
FY 91
FY 92
FY 93
FY 94
FY 95
Chart # 4
DoD BUDGET AUTHORITY
($ in Billions)
Cumulative
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1991-1995
President's Budget
January 1990
295.1
300.0
304.4
308.0
311.8
1,519.3
Real Program Decline
-2.6%
-2.0%
-2.0%
-2.0%
-2.0%
-10.6%
Dollar Reduction
-22.1
-21.7
-26.5
-29.8
-31.1
-131.2
President's Budget
February 1991
273.0
278.3
277.9
278.2
280.7
1,388.1
Real Program Decline
-11.3%
-0.9%
-3.9%
-3.6%
-2.7%
-22.4%
Chart # 5
13
11.9%
Defense Outlays as a Share of GNP
12
11
10
9.1%
9
8
7
6.3%
6.8%
6
5
4.4 %
4
4.7%
FY 1992 = 4.7%
3
3.6 %
2
The lowest share
1
in over 50 years
0
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
FISCAL YEAR
Chart # 6
375
RESPONDING TO SUMMIT REALITIES (1991-1997)
HOW WE GOT THERE
(DOLLARS IN BILLIONS)
Management Initiatives = - 72
355
TOTAL REDUCTIONS FY 91-97 = - 410
335
SUMMIT BASELINE =
FY 90 + Inflation
310
Force Structure & Program Cuts = - 213
290
Budget Scrub = - 125
FY 92 President's Budget
270
FY 90
FY 91
FY 92
FY 93
FY 94
FY 95
FY 96
FY 97
Chart # 7
FORCE STRUCTURE
FY 1990
FY 1995
Army Divisions
28 (18 active)
18 (12 active)
Aircraft Carriers
13
12
Carrier Air Wings
15 (13 active)
13 (11 active)
Battle Force Ships
545
451
Tactical Fighter Wings
36 (24 active)
26 (15 active)
Strategic Bombers
268
181
Chart # 8
DoD MANPOWER
(End Strength In Thousands)
FY 87-95
FY 87
FY 92
FY 93
FY 94
FY 95
Change
ACTIVE MILITARY
ARMY
781
660
618
577
536
-245
NAVY
587
551
536
516
510
-77
MARINE CORPS
199
188
182
176
171
-28
AIR FORCE
607
487
458
445
437
-170
TOTAL ACTIVE
2,174
1,886
1,795
1,714
1,653
-521
SELECTED RESERVES
1,151
1,068
989
924
906
-245
CIVILIANS
1,133
1,003
976
958
940
-193
Chart #9
MAJOR PROGRAM TERMINATIONS
(FY 92-93 BUDGET)
Savings in Billions
FY 92 FY93-97
Bradley Fighting Vehicle
0.7
1.7
TRIDENT Submarine
1.4
2.8
LHD Amphibious Ship
-
2.1
P-7A Anti-Submarine Warfare Aircraft
0.6
5.4
F-14D Remanufacture
1.4
13.4
Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter
0.1
2.0
A-12 Aircraft
2.7
19.5
Air Force Advanced Tactical Aircraft
-
0.8
F-16 Aircraft (End of FY 93)
1.6
13.8
PEACEKEEPER Missiles
0.7
2.2
MARK XV Combat Identification System
0.1
0.2
BSTS Warning System
0.4
5.5
TACIT RAINBOW Program
0.2
2.3
Chart # 10
MAJOR PROGRAMS TERMINATED LAST YEAR
V-22 OSPREY (Production)
F-14D Aircraft
Army Helicopter Improvement Program (AHIP)
PHOENIX Missile
M-88A2 Improved Recovery Vehicle
F-15E Aircraft
Apache Helicopter
M-1 Tank
Maverick Missile
Chart # 11
FY 1992/FY 1993 STRATEGIC FORCES
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1992
FY 1993
System
Quantity
Dollars
Quantity
Dollars
B-2A Bomber
4 4,822
7
4,639
Strategic Defense Initiative
- 4,581
-
4,933
TRIDENT II Missile
28
1,271
31
1,380
PEACEKEEPER/Rail Garrison
-
458
-
106
Small ICBM
-
549
-
715
Advanced Cruise Missile
120
626
102
552
Chart # 12
FY 1992/FY 1993 LAND FORCES
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1992
FY 1993
System
Quantity
Dollars
Quantity
Dollars
UH-60 Helicopter
60
508
60
428
SINCGARS
-
288
-
292
Light Helicopter
-
550
-
617
Apache Longbow
-
233
-
264
Medium Tactical Vehicles
1,815
170
3,288
293
Chart # 13
FY 1992/FY 1993 NAVAL FORCES
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1992
FY 1993
System
Quantity
Dollars
Quantity
Dollars
Aircraft Carrier Replacement
-
-
-
852
SSN-21 Submarine
1 2,382
1
2,464
DDG-51 Destroyer
5 4,335
4 3,480
LSD (CV)
1
245
1
251
MHC Coastal Minehunter
2
231
2
222
TAGOS Surtass Surveillance Ship -
-
1
150
AOE Replenishment Ship
1
540
-
-
Chart # 14
FY 1992/FY 1993 TACTICAL AIR FORCES
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1992
FY 1993
System
Quantity
Dollars
Quantity
Dollars
F/A-18
36
2,423
20
2,534
Advanced Tactical Fighter
- 1,637
-
2,325
F-16 D
48
1,419
24
923
C-17
6 2,831
12
4,212
EA-6B Remanufacture
-
110
3
556
AMRAAM
1,191
1,031
1,469
1,049
MILSTAR (Restructured)
- 1,404
I
1,536
Chart # 15
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT REPORT INITIATIVES
Data Processing & Corporate Information Management
Consolidate Finance and Accounting Services
Coordinate Maintenance Depot Services
Consolidate Supply Depots
Reorganize Contract Management
Improve Technical/Engineering Research & Development
Consolidate Commissary Operations
J. W. MARRIOTT HOTEL
ADPA's concept for Presidential speech, Tuesday, 9 July 1991, 10:15 am.
The White House still camera group plus the ADPA photographer will assemble in the
Holding Room NLT 1005 hours.
The ADPA head table party will assemble in the Holding Room at 1010 hours.
The head table party* to consist of:
Mac Cramer
Chairman of the Board ADPA
President/CEO
Vitro Corporation
LTG Skibbie
President, ADPA
Ken Driessen
Board member (Executive Committee)
CEO
MRJ Group, Inc.
John Myers
Board member (Executive Committee)
President
Textron Lycoming
Greg Sharp
President Washington Chapter ADPA
Director
Ferranti International
Steve Hammer
1st Vice President Washington Chapter ADPA
Vice President
FMC Defense Systems
Wayne Tingle
Director
2nd Vice President Washington Chapter ADPA
LTV
* Social Security numbers and biographies must be provided for the above
group.
1191
Acre taken by Richard the Lionhearted and the
1838
John Wanamaker, merchant, born
1859
Treaty of Villafranca, French-Austrian
3rd Crusade after a 2-year siege
1328
settlement over Italy
David II, infant King of Scotland, married
1869
"Buffalo Bill" and the Cavalry surprised
Joanna, sister of King Edward III
the Indians at Summit Spring,
of England
1536
Erasmus, Dutch intellectual and writer, died
Nebraska
1645
Michael, first Romanov Czar of Russia, died
1873
Bismarck Tribune, North Dakota newspaper,
1691
first published
Antonio Pignatelli was elected Pope as Inno-
1877
Battle of the Clearwater in the Nez Perce
cent XII, a compromise candidate,
due to a severe heat wave
War began
1730
Lorenzo Corsini elected Pope (Clement XII)
1895
Thomas Mitchell, actor, born
1779
3 Swedes left Spitzbergen, Norway, in an
British burned Norwalk, Connecticut
1897
1808
unsuccessful attempt to fly a
Missouri Gazette, the first in the state,
balloon over the North Pole
founded in St. Louis and pub-
lished till 1822
1899
1915
E. German cruiser Konigsberg sunk by the British
B. White, humorist, born
1817
Henry David Thoreau, writer, born
1849
in the Rufiji River
Dolley Madison, heroic First Lady, died
1851
Louis Daguerre, daguerreotype photography
1916
Second Battle of the Somme began
First federal-aid Road Act for highway con-
inventor, born
1854
struction passed by Congress
George Eastman, inventor and founder of
King George II of Greece removed from
Eastman Kodak, born
1917
1859
Pawnee Indian camp in Nebraska attacked by
succession
1920
Eugenie, wife of Napoleon III, died
the Cavalry
1861
Palestine shaken by a severe earthquake
"Wild Bill" Hickok shot it out with the
1927
King Edward V of England and his brother,
McCanles gang at Rock Creek Sta-
1933
murdered in 1438, reburied
tion, Nebraska
Hitler signed a treaty guaranteeing Austria's
1862
Congressional Medal of Honor established
1936
1870
Celluloid, an early plastic, patented
frontier
1874
1938
David Lawrence Pierson, originater of Con-
Lydd Fair in Kent, England held for the last
time
stitution Day, died
1877
Battle of the Clearwater in the Nez Perce
1955
U.S. Air Force Academy opened
U.S. frogmen swam the English Channel under-
War ended
1962
1887
Mound Bayou, Mississippi, settled, all resi-
water, in 18 hr
First U.S. television programs broadcast by
dents being former slaves on
the BBC via satellite
cotton plantations
Argentine ship Ciudad de Asuncion burned in
1895
Oscar Hammerstein II, composer, born
1963
1912
First foreign movie shown in the U.S.
the River Platte
1917
Elektrons III and IV, Russian satellites,
Andrew Wyeth, artist, born
1964
1918
Grand Duke Michael, brother of Russia's Czar,
launched
OV 1-15 and OV 1-16, atmospheric testing
shot by Bolsheviks
1968
1922
Senator Mark Hatfield born
satellites, launched
Salmon Festival held at Arcata, California
1934
Van Cliburn, pianist, born
1970
1942
Green Corn Festival held at Bixby, Oklahoma
Lidice, Illinois, changed its name
1951
Allie Reynolds pitched a no-hitter and New
York beat Cleveland 1-0
1954
Federal highway program proposed
July I2th
1961
Tiros III, weather satellite, launched
1970
Oldtime Fiddlers' Jamboree held at Shoshone,
Feast of St. John the Iberian
Idaho
Feast of Sts. Nabor and Felix
Green River Rendezvous held at Pinedale,
Feast of St. Veronica
Wyoming
100 BC
Julius Caesar born
526 AD
Felix III became Pope
1073
St. John Gaulberto died (Feast Day)
1153
Anastasius IV crowned Pope
THE WHITE HOUSI
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
July 9, 1991
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
IN ADDRESS TO THE
AMERICAN DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS ASSOCIATION
The J.W. Marriott Hotel
Washington, D.C.
10:28 A.M. EDT
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you ladies and gentlemen. Thank
you very much for that warm welcome. Ladies and gentlemen, and,
General Skibbie, thank you, sir, for that introduction. It's a
pleasure to be your guest here. My thanks also to the Chairman, Mac
Cramer, and to all of you for coming. I would single out, except I
can't see them, our three service Secretaries and Ambassador Cooper
who are all with us today. And I might say, all four of them are
doing a superb job for our country, and I'm extraordinarily grateful
to them.
I've seen some wonderful things just in the last few days
around our country. Larry touched on it, referred to it a little
bit, but last week, Mt. Rushmore had its dedication, Americans
celebrating their nation and their fighting forces. And here in
Washington, we enjoyed an incredible fireworks display last Thursday
-- a spectacle surpassed perhaps only by the red glare of those
Patriot missiles over Israel and Saudi Arabia.
And I can tell you, maybe not as well as some of you
could tell me, that the mood in this country is one of confidence, is
one of renewed patriotism and pride, and nobody can take that away
from the United States. It's out there and it's strong, and a lot of
it, of course, stems from the way our men and women performed in
Desert Storm. And somebody touched elusively, the General did a
little bit, or alluded to it, the Vietnam period. And let me just
say that one of the beautiful things about what's happened out there
is there is now a justifiable, long-overdue recognition and credit
given to those who served in Vietnam. And I can't tell you how much
pride and pleasure I take out of that. (Applause.)
You may not realize it, this is a little-known fact, but
today is the anniversary of Zachary Taylor's death. (Laughter.) The
poor guy has really suffered his share of indignities recently --
(laughter) -- digging him up. But I want to set the historical
record straight about Zachary. I was told that his last words were,
"Pass the broccoli." (Laughter.) Not SO. His last words were
really, "I have endeavored to do my duty."
And what I've done here today is come to talk about our
shared duty to maintain an effective national defense. The Senate,
as everybody here knows, has started looking at our defense budget.
And its deliberations could have a profound impact on our future
national security.
Recognizing the changing international environment and
taking into account domestic fiscal constraints, our administration
has proposed a tough, lean defense budget -- a proposal that consumes
a smaller percentage of our gross national product than any defense
budget since the Great Depression. Now, you don't have to have an
accounting degree or a chest full of medals to understand that under
present circumstances, every penny we spend on unnecessary defense
items will come at the expense of defense muscle.
MORE
- 2 -
I know that budget cuts are going to hurt. They're going
to hurt some right here in this room, and I understand that. But we
will have to set new priorities and focus on only our most important,
absolutely vital programs. As President, I have a duty to serve the
national interest, and our national interest demands a defense budget
that guarantees our security at the lowest feasible cost.
And last August I announced plans to restructure our
Armed Forces in light of the Cold War's end and the emergence of a
new kind of world. And I might say that that proposal was carefully
thought out by the top people in the Pentagon -- not only the Joint
Chiefs, but others; people in whom I have so much confidence. And
that proposal recognized some fundamental facts: One, we don't have
a blank check for defense -- never have. We must live within our
means. Two, instabilities around the globe still threaten us and
many nations have acquired weapons of mass destruction. And when
despots such as this Saddam Hussein combine modern weapons and
ancient ambitions, they do threaten us all. And Saddam Hussein isn't
the only despot around and -- nor regrettably, will he be the last.
And meanwhile, the Soviet Union remains a military
superpower, with an increasingly sophisticated war machine and a
program to modernize, to modernize many of its weapons systems.
And three, we need the right kind of military. Our
forces must have the strength here and abroad to discourage
aggression, the mobility to meet unexpected challenges, and the
flexibility to deal with everything from ICBMs to regional conflicts
to hostage crises.
These considerations lie at the heart of our
administration's defense proposals. And any defense bill that fails
to incorporate them will get my veto.
With that in mind, let me talk about a few items that I
consider absolutely crucial, beginning with the B-2 stealth bomber.
I've asked for 75 B-2 bombers, the most revolutionary military
aircraft in our nation's history. And when you hear certain members
of Congress complain about the B-2's cost, remember that a single B-2
does the job of literally dozens of aircraft, tankers, escorts,
suppression and surveillance craft and other bombers. And when
people argue coyly that we only need a few B-2s because they're SO
technologically advanced, ask yourselves: Should we risk our
security, the lives of our sons and daughters, and our national
credibility just because some do not want to acknowledge the
revolutionary advantage this weapon system will give the nation?
Should we enter the 21st century reliant upon a bomber designed in
the '40s and built in the '50s? No. The B-2 combines the range and
payload of the B-52 with the advantages, the enormous advantages, the
proven advantages, of stealth technology. And in the end it offers
deterrence -- nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence --
deterrence all across the spectrum.
Think about the costs; think about military operations;
think about our long-range national security needs, and you'll
conclude that we do, indeed, need two full wings of the B-2.
Some also seem reluctant to spend money protecting
Americans from accidental or intentional ballistic missile attacks.
We've asked Congress to support the GPAL's system -- that's Global
Protection Against Limited Strikes. Anyone who thinks we will face
threats more severe than the Scud missile -- won't face them --- are
deluding themselves. If we want to protect ourselves and deter
aggression, we have a responsibility to develop defense technologies,
such as brilliant pebbles, that lie within our reach. This includes
GPALS.
As we prepare for the future, we must also ask what kind
of military force structure we need. Our Gulf experience reinforced
the valuable role that the reserves can play. And it also showed
that we don't need the kind of reserve components the House insists
that we keep. The House defense bills would spend nearly $12 billion
MORE
- 3 -
over the next five years on unneeded reserve positions and
operations. This money would come, frankly, at the expense of
programs that all our forces -- active and reserve -- will need.
We learned many things in the Gulf -- many, many things
-- a number of which were anticipated in the defense speech that I
gave last August 2nd -- ironically, if you think back, the very day
Saddam invaded Kuwait. And we learned that nations of the world can
and will act collectively to deal with aggression. They 11 try
diplomacy first, as well we should and as well we did, and use
military action only as a last resort. We learned that the United
States alone -- it's only the United States that can mobilize the
international community and then lead it through such efforts. That
leadership was not just coincidence or nice to have, it was a
prerequisite for our collective success. And I salute those in our
country that led.
We learned that high-tech weapons are not pricey,
expensive "toys," as critics have claimed for many years. They
minimize civilian casualties, maximize damage to military targets,
shorten wars, save lives -- American lives; in this instance,
coalition lives, and, yes, even enemy lives. We must never forget
any life unnecessarily lost is a tragedy, especially in times of war.
It would be a shame if, so soon after this war, we
disregarded these lessons. And it would be a travesty to waste money
on defenses that would not have helped us in the Gulf and won't help
us meet our future challenges.
As the Senate begins its deliberations, I urge it to pass
a budget that defends people, not pork; that enables us to fight the
next war, not the last one; that promotes national security, period.
Let me tell you now, if the Congress sends me a defense
bill that is inadequate, that fails to fund needed programs and
wastes money at the expense of defense muscle, no matter how big a
bill, how urgent, I will veto it. (Applause.)
You see, we have tried, we have tried to restore
proportion to federal government and use the office of the presidency
to make decisions that might seem too painful -- understandably so --
to representatives or senators. I understand where they're coming
from. I was a member of the United States Congress; I've served
there, and I know the genuine pressure on members of Congress to
advance the interests of their home district or of their state.
Thirty years ago, in his valedictory address to the
nation, Dwight Eisenhower emphasized several themes that remain
important today. "A vital element in keeping the peace is our
military establishment, he said. "Our arms must be mighty, ready
for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to
risk his own destruction." And yet, Ike also cautioned that our
efforts must serve national interests and national needs -- not the
narrow concerns of specific industries or interest groups.
A new world order demands a new set of defense
priorities. And together, we can put those priorities into action.
As attention turns toward the Senate now, I ask your help in creating
a military strong enough to protect our interests, but lean enough to
preserve public faith in government.
I am delighted to have had this opportunity to express
those who are knowledgeable in this field and who can be
extraordinarily helpful in pursuing the ends I've outlined here.
Thank you for all you do. Thank you for your continued
efforts to keep America safe and strong.
Let me close on a matter not exactly related to our
defense program. Yesterday I had an interview with some journalists.
I'm fixing to go overseas on a rather prolonged trip, and we met with
the journalists from many of the countries that I will be visiting.
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And one of the people asked the question to me about the war against
Saddam Hussein. And the question was put, well, given events since
victory, do you think it was worthwhile? Do you think what you did
as a country, not individually, but do you think what you did was
worthwhile? I think that was the way the question was phrased. And
I said, I have never been more convinced that what we did was
worthwhile. Some are moving the goalposts. Some are trying to
redefine what the war was about. Was it instant democracy in Kuwait?
Was it the total demise of Saddam Hussein? It wasn't these.
An international coalition came together. We utilized
the United Nations in a way that it's never been utilized, but
perhaps its framers thought it would be utilized. And we decided
that aggression would not stand. And one of the reasons we were
successful in proving to the world that aggression would not stand
was because of the men and women in the Armed Forces and because we
had the equipment, because we had the technology to make our words of
warning count.
And I am absolutely convinced that this revisionistic
theory thinking that we're hearing around this town and other places
is as wrong as it can be, because, in my view, with the thanks of a
fantastic military and the equipment and the people, we did something
noble. We kicked aggression right out of Kuwait, and we said to the
aggressor the international community and international law won't
stand for this kind of behavior in the future. And that was the
message. It is relevant; it is strong. And that is why I am so
determined that we have a defense budget and a defense capability in
the future that will permit us, if ever called upon, to make very
clear to an aggressor, your aggression will not stand.
Thank you all very much. (Applause.) And may God bless
our country. (Applause.)
END
10:45 A.M. EDT