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Records of the White House Office of Speechwriting (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Tony Snow Subject Files
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MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Speechwriting, White House Office of
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Snow, Tony, Files
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Subject File, 1988-1993
OA/ID Number:
13894
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13894-002
Folder Title:
[Eastern Europe, 1989-1991]
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18
29
2
2
CAMP DAVID
89 JUN 26 P4: 33
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
TO : JIM BAKER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT.
RE: POLAND TRIP
THE ATTACHED MEMO FROM ZBIG HAS SOME CONCRETE
SUGGESTIONS.
ALL YOURS ( PLURAL )
GB
6-25-89
cc: John Sununu
POLAND
BREZINSKI
6/19/1989
To: the President
From: Zbigniew Brzezinski 25.
long shaned trad of values
Subject: Your Forthcoming Trip
of P. freedom + red
Your trip to Hungary and to Poland could be historic, for reasons you understand SO well. I have
andy
recently been to Poland, and the following impressions may be helpful:
WE t NA.
1. Expectations: On the popular level, they are higher than they ought to be. The public seems to
expect major and prompt U.S. aid in pulling Poland out of its economic crisis. The government
and the Solidarity leadership know better, but the Communist government may even find it
useful to nurture in the public such high hopes, SO that the subsequent public letdown somewhat
deflates your own and America's popularity in Poland.
make
2. The Political Situation: Poland has entered the post-communist phase. The Party is
discredited and knows it. If there is no political collision between the increasingly
self-confident political opposition and the top Communist leaders, a collision precipitated
toward
perhaps by the deepening economic crisis, one can anticipate the progressive dismantling of
communist rule over the next several years.
which
3. The Economic Situation: In the longer-run, it is not too bad. Poland has a well-trained labor
reform
force that could perform well if given sufficient incentives. It has good engineering-technical
cadres. Polish agriculture is potentially very productive, and the countryside is relatively well
in EG now
off already. That is testimony to the benefits of free enterprise. However, in contrast, the cities
(where "socialism" has been most pervasive) are decaying, while the state-owned industrial
sector is antiquated. Inflation and potential unemployment, the latter likely to be generated by
morng.
movement towards more efficient free-market practices, are a major source of concern.
In the short-run, the most imminent danger is posed by the prospect of higher food prices
because of the likely elimination of state controls and price subsidies. With the Polish standard
of living depressed over the last decade and with the situation of the industrial labor class
already literally catastrophic, higher food costs could spark a series of massive and even violent
social outbreaks. That could polarize the political situation and set back the political progress
currently under way.
Implications for your trip:
1. Expectations: To some extent, it may be be in your interest to lower public expectations, but
not to the point that the public ceases to have faith in America's capacity to influence positively
Poland's future. Hence, the issue of expectations must be handled most delicately. Perhaps the
best way is to place greater emphasis on your public statements, and in any background
briefings, on the long-term character of the changes that are needed as Poland reenters Europe,
and particularly on the necessity of combining both continuing political as well as economic
reforms.
Nonetheless, some short-term relief is clearly needed even though it will cost money. But
without it, Poland faces, quite literally, the prospect of a major domestic explosion that could in
turn precipitate even 8 Chinese-type repression. Accordingly, some consideration should be
given to an emergency international consortium, involving not only the United States but EEC and
Japan, to provide, even if only on modest scale, the needed short-term relief.
2
2. Specific U.S. Actions: A combination of symbolically significant acts with tangible economic
initiatives would have the greatest impact. The initiatives ought to be designed to have broad
public visibility, SO that they underline America's positive involvement in Poland's future.
Several possible areas of action come to mind, as follows:
i) Enhancement of arliamentary skills.
The new Polish parliament will have little experience in genuine legislation and oversight. A
dramatic step would be for you to invite to the United States, for a series of badly needed and
highly concentrated briefings on legislative procedures and organization, the entire newly
elected Polish Senate of 100 members. With transportation provided by the U.S. Air Force and
with the USIA and the U.S. Senate arranging the pertinent seminars, such an initiative is doable
and it would be both useful and highly symbolic. It would certainly generate a great deal of press
play.
ii) Sharing of ecological expertise.
Poland is in an ecological crisis, and an American-sponsored program either to clean up the
Vistula river or the Gdansk Bay would have a positive impact on the quality of life in Poland and
it would symbolize America's constructive engagement.
iii) Cooperation in agribusiness.
Agriculture is potentially the Polish economy's major asset, and American techniques could
greatly enhance the productivity of Polish agriculture. This should be a major target area for
joint ventures, and pertinent American businessmen might be invited to accompany you.
iv) Credit relief.
You might wish to announce that you plan to place this matter on the agenda of the Paris summit,
in addition to the proposed special consortium, perhaps modeled on past consortia for such
countries as Turkey and others. Consideration might also be given to the possible applicability
of the Brady Plan to Poland (and also to Hungary).
3, Public Themes: Given the Polish feelings about America and about you personally, special
attention should be paid to symbolic gestures and rhetoric calculated to leave an enduring
impression. The following might be considered:
i) Announce at Westerplatte (in Gdansk) that September 1 will be proclaimed in America as the
day of "Poland's Struggle for Independence". Westerplatte is where the first shots of World War
R
II were fired and the garrison of that small fortress, numbering less than 150 men, held out for
more than a week against the combined sea, air, and land assault by German forces in excess of
one full division. You should also make some mention of Stalin's collaboration with Hitler which
led to the Soviet stab in the back on September 17. In any case, Westerplatte would make an
excellent setting for 8 speech on undoing the combined legacies of World War II and of the
subsequent Cold War.
ii) Make the point in the major speech of the trip that change in Poland is key to ending the Cold
War. You might state that the Cold War started largely over Poland and that it followed World
War II which similarly had started over Poland. You could say: Poland is where Wor War II
began. Poland is also why World War II began. And Poland is where and why -- the Cold War
started. Hence it is fitting to speak here of how America envisages the end of the Cold War, and it
is here, in Poland, that the Cold War should be buried."
3
ii) In you major speech you should refer specifically to the Constitution of May 3, 1791, which
was one of the West's three great constitutional innovations (preceded only by America and
France). The Poles are understandably proud of this. That would then give you the peg for
suggesting that a suitable target for the attainment of genuine democracy in Poland should be the
200th. anniversary of that Constitution -- for it is important that the momentum of movement
towards full democracy should not be derailed or slowed by the likely economic difficulties.
4. Further Contacts: Since Walesa is expected to visit America, it might now be appropriate to
invite Jaruzelski to visit the White House. It would be better to invite him rather than the
Prime Minister because Jaruzelski is about to be elected President and he will have a continuing
role in Poland's inevitably difficult transition. In any case, the current Prime Minister has no
Rahowshi
standing in the country and was recently repudiated in the elections. In contrast, Jaruzelski
will continue to control the army and the police. Hence it is desirable to lock him into a posture
of compromise and accommodation with the recently triumphant democratic majority.
z.b.
see rates on
USSR.
unnest in 9.0.15
upullios.
ESTONIA, CITH. LATVIA -
autonomy per resolutions.
ARMENIA - AZERBAIJAN
STRIKES IN KUZBASS /SIBERIA July 89
DONBISS/URRANE
April 9, 89 "INDEPENDENCE" - RIOB in Georgia
PROTEST MARCH July 24 (Red Bldir White Flas)
(ABKHAZIA Region) - succession.
"Downwith the
9:00 pm
THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush conclude participation
in House Ways and Means Committee Bicentennial
Dinner, depart Committee Room, and proceed to
Motorcade.
9:05 pm
THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush board Motorcade and
depart Longworth House Office Building en route
White House.
MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS:
Same as on Arrival
(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)
9:10 pm
THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush arrive White House.
Page Four
EG-WG
all trops Saw out 1991 -(mor- East
March 18 - B380,00 + 380,00
Germany
July I - MARK
Hungary
March 25 ~ June June 30, all Son temps out. (50,000)
Romania
Yugoslavia *nonPact
April 1990 (tentative) 0-
May
Bulgaria
June June May 10 1990 8 parliament ? not Prestat. (70,300 0842.)
April/May 1990 -0-
ort bn'il
Czechoslovakia
40,000
Sortroops Sov. troops Poland
Summer 1990 (local elections)
TESTIMONY OF
THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER, III
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1991
TRANSCRIPT PREPARED BY:
STATE DEPARTMENT
COURT REPORTERS
ROOM 2117
-2-
PROCEEDINGS
****
(Introductory remarks by the Chairman and other Senators were
not transmitted by VOA)
SECRETARY BAKER: Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege to appear
before this Committee to testify on behalf of our Foreign
Affairs funding proposal for FY 1992. With your permission,
I would have my detailed written statement entered into the
record.
This year, even more SO than most years, the funds requested
should be seen as an investment in a better future .......... a world
of secure nations, free peoples, and peaceful change.
I realize that as armies fight in the Persian Gulf such a
world seems far distant. Yet I believe that it is vitally
important to see the challenges we face also as opportunities
to build a more secure and just world order. And so, today I
would like to make a few comments concerning our ideas about
post-crisis challenges and arrangements.
The basic observation I would begin with is this: the great
international coalition that is now winning the war must also
be strong enough to secure the peace. Winston Churchill once
observed that "We shall see how absolute is the need of a
broad path of international action pursued by many states in
common across the years, irrespective of the ebb and flow of
national politics." If we are going to redeem the sacrifices
now being made by the brave men and women who defend our
freedom with their lives, then we must fashion a peace worthy
of their struggle. And that can be done if we can hold
together in peace the coalition tempered by war.
1 believe that when Congress voted the President authority to
use force in support of the United Nations Resolutions, it
voted also for peace - a peace that might prevent such wars
in the future. I believe that the American people support
our role in the coalition not only to defeat an aggressor but
to secure a measure of justice and security for the future.
-3-
Mr. Chairman, we and every nation involved in this conflict
are thinking about the post-war situation and planning for
the future. It would be irresponsible not to do SO, At the
same time, it would be both premature and unwise for us to
lay out a detailed blueprint for the postwar Gulf or, for
that matter, the region as a whole.
The war itself and the way it ends will greatly influence
both the security of the Gulf and the rest of the area. The
deepest passions have been stirred. The military actions now
underway necessarily involve many casualties, great
hardships, and growing fears for the future.
Tough times lie ahead.
We should therefore approach the postwar problems with a due
sense of modesty. Respect for the sovereignty of the peoples
of the Gulf and Middle East must be uppermost. In any event,
modern history has shown that no single nation can long
impose its will or remake the Middle East in its own image.
After all, that is partly why we are fighting Saddam Hussein.
Yet among all the difficulties we face, one fact stands out:
The peoples of the Gulf and indeed the entire Middle East
desperately need peace. I truly believe that there must be a
way, working in consultation with all of the affected
nations, to set a course that brings greater security for all
and enduring peace.
We should therefore make every effort not just to heal the
Persian Gulf after this war but also to try to heal the rest
of the region which needs it so badly.
So I would like to discuss several challenges that 1 believe
we must address in the post war period.
One challenge will be greater security for the Persian Gulf.
After two wars in ten years, this vital region needs new and
different security arrangements. In our view, there are
three basic issues to be resolved: the purposes or
principles of the security arrangements; the role of the
local states, regional organizations, and the international
community; and in the aftermath of the war, the military
requirements until local stability is achieved, and
thereafter.
I think we would find already a wide measure of agreement on
the principles.
They would include:
Deterrence of aggression from any quarter.
-4-
Territorial integrity. There must be respect for existing
sovereignty of all states and for the inviolability of
borders; peaceful resolution of disputes; border problems and
other disputes that have long histories ------ and there are many
beyond the Iraq/Kuwait example --- should be resolved by
peaceful means as prescribed by the Charter of the United
Nations.
These principles must be put into action first and foremost
by the local states SO that conflicts can be prevented and
aggression can be deterred.
We would expect the states of the Gulf and regional
organizations, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, to take
the lead in building a reinforcing network of new and
strengthened security ties.
No regional state should be excluded from these
arrangements. Post-war Iraq could have an important
contribution to play, and SO could Iran as a major power in
the Gulf.
:
There is a role, too, I think for outside nations and the
international community, including the United Nations, to
encourage such arrangements and to stand behind them.
As for the United States, we have deployed small naval forces
in the Persian Gulf ever since the Truman Administration in
1949. We had and we continue to have very strong bilateral
ties with Saudi Arabia and other local states, and through
the years we've conducted joint exercises with, and we have
provided military equipment for, our friends in the region.
The President has said that we have no intention of
maintaining a permanent ground presence on the Arabian
Peninsula once Iraq is ejected from Kuwait and the threat
recedes. Before security is assured, however, important
questions have got to be answered. We will be going through
an important transitional phase in the immediate aftermath of
the war as we try to establish stability.
Let me list just a few of the questions that will need to be
answered. Should there be a permanent locally stationed
ground force made up of local troops under United Nations
auspices or under regional auspices such as the GCC?
How can the international community reinforce deterrence in
the Gulf, whether by contributing forces or through other
political arrangements such as resolutions or security
commitments?
-5-
No one has the answers yet to these and other questions.
Some may never be answered. But however we eventually
proceed, we will conduct extensive consultations among all of
the concerned parties to any such arrangements.
A second challenge will surely be regional arms proliferation
and control. This includes both conventional weapons and
weapons of mass destruction. The terrible fact is that even
the conventional arsenals of several Middle Eastern states
dwarf those of most European powers. Five Middle Eastern
countries have more main battle tanks than the United Kingdom
or France.
The time has come to try to change the destructive pattern of
military competition and proliferation in this region and to
reduce arms flows into an area that is already
over-militarized.
That suggests that we and others inside and outside the
region must consult on how best to address several dimensions
of the problem. How can we cooperate to constrain Iraq's
post-war ability to retain or rebuild its weapons of mass
destruction and most destabilizing conventional weapons?
How can we work with others to encourage steps toward broader
regional restraint in the acquisition and use of both
conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction?
What role might the kinds of confidence-building measures
that have lessened conflict in Europe play in the Gulf and in
the Middle East?
And, finally, what global actions would reinforce steps
towards arms control in the Gulf and Middle East?
These could include rapid completion of pending international
agreements like the chemical weapons convention, as well as
much tighter supply restraints on the flow of weapons and
dual-use technology into the region. And what implications
does that have for arms transfer and sales policies?
A third challenge will be economic reconstruction and
recovery. An economic catastrophe has befallen the Gulf and
the nations trading with it. Kuwait, of course, has been
looted and wrecked. Hundreds of thousands of workers have
lost jobs and have fled. Trade flows and markets have been
disrupted.
-6-
I'm confident that the people of Kuwait will rebuild their
country. As we have worked with the Kuwaitis in their moment
of trial, SO we shall look forward to cooperating with them
in their hour of recovery.
And no one should forget, Mr. Chairman, that for the second
time in a decade, the people of Iraq will be recovering from
a disastrous conflict. The time of reconstruction and
recovery should not be the occasion for vengeful actions
against a nation forced to war by a dictator's ambition.
The secure and prosperous future that everyone hopes to see
in the Gulf has to include Iraq. of necessity, most of the
resources for reconstruction will be drawn from the Gulf.
Yet should we not be thinking also of more than just
reconstruction. It might be possible for a coalition of
countries using both local and external resources to
transform the outlook for the region in expanding free trade
and investment, in assisting development, and in promoting
growth oriented economic policies which have taken root
across the globe.
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I will urge the consideration of a
Middle East bank for reconstruction and development to
support these objectives. We have created regional banks for
Asia, for Africa, for the Americas and, of course, recently
for Europe. And, of course, the World Bank and IMF were
important components of our post-war planning in the 1940s.
Efforts to secure the peace in this region, I think, warrant
the same spirit of multilateral commitment to reconstruction
and development.
Any economic effort must also have a special place for water
development. Well over half the people living in the Middle
East draw water from rivers that cross international
boundaries or depend on desalinization plants.
We have all been incensed by Saddam Husayn's deliberate
poisoning of the Gulf waters which could affect a large
portion of Saudi Arabia's drinking water.
Finally, we will want to consult with governments both from
the Middle East and from other regions about specific
arrangements that might best serve the purposes of
region-wide economic cooperation.
Such cooperation would surely be helpful in reinforcing our
overall objective reducing one by one the sources of
conflict and removing one by one the barriers to security and
prosperity throughout the area.
-7-
A fourth challenge is to resume the search for a just peace
and real reconciliation for Israel, the Arab states and the
Palestinians. By reconciliation, I mean not simply peace as
the absence of war, but a peace based on enduring respect on
tolerance and on mutual trust.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, .[ personally have devoted
considerable effort before the war to facilitating a dialogue
between Israel and the Palestinians, an essential part of an
overall peace process. But let's not kid ourselves. The
course of this crisis has stirred emotions among Israelis and
Palestinians that will not yield easily to conciliation.
Yet, in the aftermath of this war, as in earlier wars, there
may be opportunities for peace if the parties are willing.
And, if they really are willing, we're committed to working
closely with them to fashion a more effective peace process.
The issues to be addressed are, of course, familiar, and they
are more challenging than ever. How do you go about
reconciling Israelis and Palestinians? What concrete actions
can be taken by each side?- What will be the role of the Arab
states in facilitating this process and their own
negotiations for peace with Israel?
How will regional arms control arrangements affect this
process? What is the best diplomatic vehicle for getting the
process underway?
Again, Mr. Chairman, we will be consulting and working very
closely with our friends and all parties who have a
constructive role to play in settling this conflict.
A fifth and final challenge concerns the United States. We
simply have to do more to reduce our energy dependence. As
the President has stressed, only a comprehensive strategy can
achieve our goals. That strategy should involve energy
conservation and efficiency, increased development,
strengthened stockpiles and reserves, and greater use of
alternative fuels. We must bring to this task the same
determination we are now bringing to the war itself.
ns you can see, Mr. Chairman, some of these elements are
political, some of them are economic, some of them of
necessity are related to security. That suggests that we
should view security not just in military terms but as part
and parcel of the broader outlook for the region.
We're not going to have lasting peace and well being without
sound economic growth, and we're not going to have economic
-8-
growth if nations are threatened or invaded, or if they are
squandering precious resources on more and more arms. And,
surely, finding a way for the peoples of the Middle East to
work with each other will be crucial if we are to lift our
eyes to a better future.
Before closing, I'd like to say a few words on another
challenge we Face, mentioned by Senator Helms, and that is
our relations with the Soviet Union.
The President has spoken often of a new world order in which
freedom and democracy might flourish, secure from the fears
of the Cold War. We've been hopeful about such an order,
partly because of the growing cooperation between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
In the fall of 1989, I described that cooperation as a search
for points of mutual advantage, and this search, Mr.
Chairman, has yielded good results. Three examples, I think,
will suffice.
First, over the past year a democratic Germany, fully a
member of NATO, was united in peace. The Iron Curtain has
vanished and with it the Cold War.
Second, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have
emerged in their own right once more, free to pursue
democracy and economic liberty.
And, third, the Soviet Union has joined the international
coalition confronting Iraqi aggression. As Foreign Minister
Bessmertnykh reiterated last week, the Soviet Union continues
to completely support the full implementation of the United
Nations Security Council resolutions.
Over the course of several summits and numerous meetings, we
have become much more familiar with the ups and downs of
perestroika, the enormous and daunting difficulty of changing
after 70 years a society's basic direction and many of its
values.
In the last several months, however, we have seen a series of
unsettling events. They include the tragic violence in the
Baltics, an apparent turn toward economic recentralization, a
less free media, extension of army and KGB authority, and the
resignation or departure from the government of key advocates
of reform.
These actions are completely inconsistent with the course of
peaceful change, democratic principles, the rule of law and
-9-
real economic reform. There is simply no justification for
the use of force against peaceful and democratically elected
governments.
Our hearts go out to the courageous people of the Baltic
states who have acted throughout with dignity and restraint.
The President and I have had extensive discussions with
President Gorbachev and other Soviet officials about these
developments. We and our European allies have pointed out
the inevitable consequences if the Soviet government
continues on this path, and we've stated our belief that the
Soviet Union cannot hope to succeed in meeting its own
objectives if it should abandon perestroika, glasnost and
democratization.
On the Baltics, 1 could do no better here than to quote the
President's words from the State of the Union address. "Our
objective is to help the Baltic peoples achieve their
aspirations, not to punish the Soviet Union."
We have had representations from the Soviet leadership about
their continuing commitment to reform, to peaceful dialogue
:
with the Baltics, and to creating a society ruled by law and
not by force. We're going to watch this situation closely,
Mr. Chairman, to see whether these representations become
enduring realities.
I hope that the Soviet Union can relearn quickly the lessons
from its own hard experience, and that is that the old ways
are not the right ways. Perestroika cannot succeed at
gunpoint: Clearly, we cannot rule out the possibility that
matters may still turn more for the worse, but at the same
time I think we must be careful not to jump to premature
conclusions.
The Soviet leadership is at a crossroads. We have made clear
that their last several steps have taken them down a path of
no benefit for them or for us or for anyone else. For the
sake of history and for the sake of the world, I hope they
resume the march that has given the entire world hope of a
better future.
So, Mr. Chairman, let me sum up these comments with this
observation. When I appeared before you a year ago to review
our overall foreign policy, we were well on our way to a
whole and free Europe, secured by expanding United
States/Soviet cooperation in resolving the Continent's
outstanding political and military problems.
-10-
The possibility, even the idea, of this terrible conflict in
the Gulf was beyond anyone's imagination. Yet now we face
the challenges of hot war in the Gulf and growing uncertainty
about the course of Soviet reform.
There can and probably will be different views on how to
handle these situations. I look forward to the Committee's
counsel and good words on both issues. Yet on one point I
think that we are in very basic agreement, and that is on the
need for American leadership.
More clearly than we could ever have imagined a year or even
six months ago, Mr. Chairman, the world emerging from the end
of the post-war era will be shaped by the United States of
America and by its international allies. Our constant
purpose must be to make of that world a fitting place for
free peoples to live.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN PELL: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We have
pretty good attendance here, SO we'll limit ourselves to ten
minutes and hope that we squeeze within this time.
My first question concerns the role of Kurdistan, or the
Kurds should play in any settlement following the war. Do
you believe that they should be at the negotiating table, or
what would be your view on that?
SECRETARY BAKER: Mr. Chairman, our policy is that we do not
seek the destruction of Iraq. We have no quarrel, as the
President has said many, many times, with the Iraqi people,
and we support the maintenance of the territorial integrity
of Iraq. We do not want to see the situation evolve into a
grab bag in which countries bordering lraq with varying
interests, past or present, would be tempted to suggest
changes in the territorial integrity of Iraq.
CHAIRMAN PELL: How then do you think the problem should be
handled? As you know, the treaty (inaudible) --- there was a
reference to Kurdistan as a country. Let's eliminate that --
border boundaries -- but for the people who have been abused
all these years, should there not be some arrangement made
that they're represented at the table?
SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I think we should, as we have in the
past, take into account and consideration the human rights
abuses that have been visited on the people. We've made the
point, as you know, over and over, that Saddam Husayn in the
past has not hesitated to use weapons of mass destruction
-11-
against some of his own people, including on occasion the
Kurds. And these human rights violations, I think, have to
be taken into account, considered, and to the extent that
they can be redressed.
But in terms of territorial integrity or the creation of a
separate state, I do not think that is something that is or
should be embraced by our policy goals or our war aims.
CHAIRMAN PELL: Another subject: As you know, there's
considerable repression in Yugoslavia, as documented in the
annual report, the State Department's human rights
provisions. And this is particularly severe in Kosovo,
Croatia and Slovenia. How would you adapt U.S. policy
towards Yugoslavia in this regard?
SECRETARY BAKER: I would not at this time, Mr. Chairman,
suggest a change in U.S. policy which requires a. continued
effort on our part to restrain the central government of
[Yugoslavia], to make it aware of its obligation from the
standpoint of human rights in the areas that you've just
mentioned; to make it clear to the central government and to
the republics of Yugoslavia that the United States supports a
united but democratic Yugoslavia.
We were very active here a week or ten days or two weeks or
SO ago when there was a serious threat of armed conflict in
Yugoslavia -- we and some of our European allies particularly
in demarches to the central government of Yugoslavia ------ and I
think that we must continue to pursue that kind of a policy
approach.
Fortunately, armed conflict was forestalled, and we hope that
that will continue to be the case.
CHAIRMAN PELL: After the war, will we support a ban on all
weapons of mass destruction, mass killing, in the Gulf area?
SECRETARY BAKER: Will we support -- ? Give me the question
again, Mr. Chairman?
CHAIRMAN PELL: Yes. Will we support a ban on all weapons of
mass destruction in the Middle East?
\
SECRETARY BAKER: Well, we have supported and do support the
concept of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East.
Other regional parties, including Israel and Egypt, have
supported this goal. We recognize that given the deep
animosities there that's not going to be something that's
easy to achieve and it's not going to be something that can
be imposed from the outside.
-12-
I mentioned in my formal remarks the degree to which I think
a global chemical convention can be helpful in banning
chemical weapons of mass destruction in the region, and
therefore 1 think we should redouble our efforts in Geneva to
achieve that chemical ban, and we intend to do what we can in
that regard.
I just think that in the aftermath of this war, Mr. Chairman,
there may be greater receptivity in the region to arms
control efforts, particularly those involving the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction than there has
been in the past.
CHAIRMAN PELL: Speaking of arms, what are your own thoughts
with regard to the START Treaty? Will we get to it in the
next few weeks or months, or do you see it being on hold for
a longer period?
SECRETARY BAKER: I don't see the START Treaty as being in
any sense on a formal hold, Mr. Chairman. The President's
view is that the strategic arms treaty is very much in the
national security interests of the United States and that he
would like to see that treaty concluded on a basis acceptable
to us as promptly as possible, keeping in mind that we take
the position that when we pursue arms control objectives with
the Soviet Union we're not doing favors for the Soviet
Union. We're doing something that's in our national
interest. And we used to engage in arms control discussions
with the Soviet Union when Chairman Brezhnev ran the show.
So this is something we should continue to pursue.
Having said that, we have some problems with the conventional
forces treaty, which I think you're aware of and about which
I've spoken publicly, and even though there's no formal
linkage --- well, there is no Tinkage, period -- that tends to
make it more difficult to make progress in other areas until
we can get a resolution of the conventional forces
differences that now exist between us. And we are working on
both fronts.
We have just sent Under Secretary Bartholomew of the State
Department, together with an inter-agency team, to Geneva to
meet the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union to see
if the last few remaining issues on START could be resolved.
There are three issues particularly that remain now, Mr.
Chairman: the issue of data denial or telemetry encryption,
the issue of new types, the issue of downloading. But how
those issues are resolved will depend upon whether other
issues will remain in agreement.
-13-
CHAIRMAN PELL: Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, do you think there should be a war crimes
trial, a tribunal, of any sort? And, if so, how would it be
set up?
SECRETARY BAKER: I think that we should avoid expanding our
war aims at this stage, Mr. Chairman. However, we are, as
you know, extremely concerned about the treatment,
particularly, that our prisoners of war have been subjected
to. We have repeatedly told that Government of Iraq that we
expect it to live up to its obligations under the Geneva
Convention and to adhere to the rules of armed conflict.
I really don't think it's appropriate for ine at this stage to
speculate what we might or might not decide to do with
respect to Iraqi war crimes. That's, after all, something
that will have to be decided in consultation with our
coalition partners.
I have to say this: Nobody that I'm aware of in the
international coalition has ruled that out as an option.
CHAIRMAN PELL: Thank you very much indeed, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Helms.
SENATOR HELMS: This joint communique that you and Alexander
Bessmertnykh issued recently -- I forget the date -- has
caused a lot of concern. I had a bunch of rather erudite
people in my office yesterday who still are worried about
the statement: "This unequivocal commitment must be backed
by immediate concrete steps leading to full compliance with
Security Council resolutions."
They claim -- and this is endemic in this city and among the
media and SO forth - that this is all of a sudden a change
of policy. And I'm going to take up a little bit of my ten
minutes to give you an opportunity to say whether it is in
fact a change in policy or not.
SECRETARY BAKER: I can handle that very easily. It is not a
change in policy. I've said that, the White House has said
that, the State Department has said that -- it is not a
change in policy.
In fact let me quote you the President's words from the day
before yesterday: "We must have a credible, visible
withdrawal before any cease-fire. What Saddam must say is:
'I'm going to get out of Kuwait now and I'm going to get out
-14-
fast and I'm going to do it so everybody knows I'm not making
this up.
That's the same, in my view, as saying, it has to be an
unequivocal commitment followed by concrete and immediate
steps to the full implementation of the United Nations
Security Council resolutions, which is what the Joint
Statement said.
But let me put your mind at rest, Senator Helms.
SENATOR HELMS: My mind is not ---
SECRETARY BAKER: No policy change.
SENATOR HELMS: O.K.
Now, a further concern about the linkage of Israel with the
Arab states, the Palestinians, et cetera: Now, this does
appear to put the United States on record, pressuring Israel
into an international conference with the assistance of --
and I quote --- "mutual U.S. -Soviet efforts. 11
Now, Mr. Secretary, is it really a good idea to change our
horses now and to bring the Soviet Union into the concept of
an international conference on the Middle East?
SECRETARY BAKER: It doesn't do that, Senator Helms.
SENATOR HELMS: No. O.K.
SECRETARY BAKER: There's no mention in there of an
international conference. But to answer the second part of
your question, it is in our interest to have the Soviets
involved in the Middle East -- in my view. And the old idea
that somehow we don't want the Soviets involved is a
mistake. If we didn't have the Soviets involved as a part of
this international coalition, 1 dare say we would not be
doing some of the things that we are now doing and we would
not have been able to do some of the things that we have been
able to do in trying to reverse this unprovoked aggression.
SENATOR HELMS: Well, we've never permitted this before.
It's been an ironclad policy of this Government.
SECRETARY BAKER: l've spoken to this over the course of the
past year.
SENATOR HELMS: You were going to be be talking about that
later.
-15-
SECRETARY BAKER: Over the past year and a half, Senator
Helms, I've said 1 thought that the policy was wrong, and we
changed it; and that was a year and a half or SO ago. And I
think the wisdom of changing it is demonstrated by the fact
that the Soviet Union has been participating with us as a
coalition partner in our efforts in the Gulf, and I think we
should be and are very pleased that that's been a fact.
In fact, they've been participating with us since they stood
shoulder to shoulder with us on the 3rd of August, the day
after the invasion, and said they condemned the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait.
SENATORS HELMS: Well, we'll remind you of farewell confirmed
reports about the Soviet Union being not even-handed on this
business of Iraq. Now, how about all those advisers they
have still there?
SECRETARY BAKER: Don't have any, Senator Helms. They don't
have any advisers still there.
SENATOR HELMS: There are no Soviet advisers in Iraq?
SECRETARY BAKER: No, sir.
SENATOR HELMS: When did the last one get out?
SECRETARY BAKER: I think around the 9th of January, but I'm
not certain. Don't hold me to that. They've got some people
in their embassy -
SENATOR HELMS: Well, I'll hold you to what you say because I
don't think you're right, Mr. Secretary.
SECRETARY BAKER: What date would you pick -- or do you think
they're still there?
SENATORS HELMS: I say they're still there, and I think I can
document it pretty well. But don't take everything they say
----
SECRETARY BAKER: I'm taking what our intelligence agencies
and others say, Senator Helms, not just what the Soviets say.
SENATOR HELMS: O.K.
Yesterday, or the day before, some of us met with Brent
Scowcroft about the Export Administration Act, and the
Administration is trying to prevent the legislation that
Senator Pell and [ pushed through the Senate twice about
poison gas. And we had a rather firm discussion.
-16-
Will you explain to me why the Administration --- and I assume
the State Department and the Secretary of State -- all are
opposed to the Pell-Helms Amendment.
SECRETARY BAKER: First of all, let me say we are fully
committed to fighting chemical and biological weapons,
Senator Helms, and that's why we've been working as hard as
we have toward getting a treaty banning chemical weapons
entirely.
And let me just say, by way of an aside, that had we not been
able to get a bilateral agreement from the Soviets on that we
wouldn't be as close as we are to getting a chemical weapons
treaty.
We've been working for more effective international export
controls on chemical and biological weapons. In the first
few months of this Administration, we came up here and asked
the Congress to work with us on chemical and biological
weapons sanction legislation. All we ask ---- all we ask ------------------------- is
that there be some sort of a national interest or national
security waiver that would give the President some
flexibility, that would in effect not totally rule the
President out of th process. That's all we ask.
That's the only difference between us, and yet we can't seem
to get agreement to that.
SENATOR HELMS: Well, that difference -- why, Mr. Secretary?
SECRETARY BAKER: Well, it's the only difference between -
SENATOR HELMS: Either it's a hellish business or it isn't.
And, you know, at the end of World War II a British court
hanged the two executives of a. German chemical company which
supplied the poison gas used in the holocaust. Did you know
that?
SECRETARY BAKER: It is a hellish business.
SENATOR HELMS: Yes.
SECRETARY BAKER: We agree. That's why we came up to talk to
you about getting some legislation.
SENATOR HELMS: Well, l've dealt with these waivers many,
many times. But that's one thing we cannot compromise. I
can't. I don't know whether you can or not.
-17-
SENATOR PELL: 1 would agree with you. 1 think the waiver
makes it wide open and negates the purpose.
SENATOR HELMS: Yes.
SECRETARY BAKER: I would think that you could craft a waiver
sufficiently narrowly, Mr. Chairman, that that would not be
the case and that you could do so in a way that would not
totally rule out, totally exclude, the President of the
United States from the process. That's all I'm saying. And
I think that really is the only difference, as I understand
it.
And I would hope that we could work in a cooperative and
bipartisan way to reach a conclusion that's satisfactory to
the Legislative and Executive Branches.
We both see this as a terrible problem. We both want to take
action to deal with it. And it's just that the Executive
Branch I think feels -- correctly SO - that it ought to be a
participant and not totally excluded.
SENATOR HELMS: Well, let me ask you a hypothetical
question. And I don't like to answer hypothetical questions
myself, and I seldom ask them. But going back to this
hanging of the executives of the German chemical company
Following World War II, if there are to be trials for major
Iraqi war criminals, do you feel that the executives of the
major corporations who have just went and nearly supported
the building of chemical weaponry in Iraq ---- do you think we
ought to do anything with them?
SECRETARY BAKER: 1 think it's outrageous that that has gone
on and that that has happened to a greater extent and degree
in some countries than it has in others. But I think that
there should be very, very severe penalties. Without having
that constitute a "Yes" answer to your question about hanging,
I think that there ought to be very, very severe penalties
with respect to this kind of activity.
And that's what I meant in my opening remarks, Senator
Helms, when I said I think that there are going to be,
hopefully, some opportunities to finally maybe get a good
handle on this question of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. There's nothing more heinous, in my view, than
the use of those -- and, collaterally, making possible the
use of those kinds of weapons.
SENATOR HELMS: I assume you're talking about criminal
penalties.
-18-
SECRETARY BAKER: Yes. I think there ought to be --
SENATOR HELMS: O.K., O.K.
SECRETARY BAKER: --- severe penalties -------
SENATOR HELMS: One final thing -------
SECRETARY BAKER: --- but I think it's a question too of
making sure that all of our allies join with us in this.
And that's another reason, if I may say so --- I ought to
leave this subject alone now that we've passed it, but that's
another reason that the Executive Branch thinks they ought to
have some possibility of say with respect to this because
inflexible, absolutely arbitrary legislation that puts the
United States in one position without giving it the potential
of bringing in other countries to support a nonproliferation
regime sometimes 1. think can be counterproductive.
That would be another argument that I would use to just ask
for some minimum flexibility on the part of the President of
the United States.
SENATOR HELMS: Let me quickly, Mr. Secretary, ask you what
you meant yesterday --- as I understand it, when you appeared
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee ---- when you urged
rebuilding of Iraq after the war. Does that mean -- and
these are the questions being asked of me. Can you rule out
that you were not suggesting that the American taxpayers are
going to be given a tab on that?
SECRETARY BAKER: I'm not suggesting that the American ---
what I've said in my remarks was that most of the economic
reconstruction and development, I think, support is going to
have to come from the region. But I do think that there has
to be American leadership -- again, as I indicated --- and I
don't think that the American leadership should be limited
just to the security and political fields. I think that
there ought to be some American leadership economically as
well.
But I'm not suggesting that we pick up a tab, but I am
suggesting, Senator Helms, that we really mean it when we say
our quarrel is not with the Iraqi people and we mean it when
we say that we want to preserve peace and stability, or
secure peace and stability, in the region in the aftermath of
this conflict. And to do that we have to recognize, I think,
that Iraq is going to continue to be a country in the region
that we want to see in a stable posture.
-19-
SENATOR HELMS: Does that mean with Saddam Hussein still in
power that you would do something?
SECRETARY BAKER: It doesn't get to that question at all, and
I would give you the same answer to that as 1. gave the
Chairman on the question of war crimes. We are not at the
point of enlarging or enhancing our war aims and goals to
talk about removal of Saddam Hussein from power as a war aim
or goal.
The President has said, and Prime Minister Major and other
members of the coalition made it very clear, we wouldn't shed
any tears if that happened. We haven't enlarged our war aims
to that point.
SENATOR HELMS: I'm stopping now. Mr. Secretary, don't
expect any help from me if you're going to rebuild Iraq with
Saddam Hussein still in power.
CHAIRMAN PELL: Thank you very much, indeed.
Senator Biden.
SENATOR BIDEN: Mr. Secretary --
SECRETARY BAKER: How are you, Senator?
SENATOR BIDEN: you're obviously doing pretty well.
Mr. Secretary, let me begin by saying since I was one who has
been openly critical of the lack of discussion of
post-victory plans that 1 want to compliment you on your
statement and your testimony yesterday and today. And for
those who suggest that it's premature to be talking about how
to deal with the region after victory before the victory has
occurred, I would just remind them that some of the best
minds in this country were well at work doing that prior to
anybody landing on the shores of Normandy in World War II.
And I think it just shows that you are very well in command
of what's going on, and I compliment you.
SECRETARY BAKER: Thank you.
SENATOR BIDEN: Let me ask about another subject first; and
maybe it's the only question I'll get to ask, Mr. Secretary.
As you stated today, developments in the Soviet Union remain
the central concern of American foreign policy. And after
the unconscionable violence in Lithuania and Latvia, many of
us, like you, are wondering whether Gorbachev is still a
-20--
reformer or whether the Soviet military is now playing a
dominant role.
And this gives rise to a key question about our own policy
with regard to arms control, which you touched on very
briefly in response to a question from the Chairman.
In a series of landmark speeches a year ago, which you
referred to in your statement, you said, "Any uncertainty
about the fate of Soviet reform is all the more reason, not
less, for US. to seize the present opportunity. A diminished
Soviet threat and effectively verifiable arms agreements can
endure even if perestroika does not."
Now, you went on to say that our goal should be to lock in
the Soviet policies the new policies we're negotiating
through formal treaties. Now, my question to you is this --
and I'm going to ask it and then elaborate on it slightly, if
I may: Is this still American policy.
SECRETARY BAKER: Yes, sir, it is,
SENATOR BIDEN: My further question, then, is: How can we
overcome the current hang-up on a CFE treaty and get the
Soviets cuts locked in?
Before you answer that, let me suggest something. Right now
the Soviets are engaging in what night be called a legally
incorrect broad interpretation of Article III. I think their
dead wrong. I think you're right. I think your position is
correct. They argue with no apparent basis that some 3,500
pieces of equipment should be excluded from the CFE treaty
because they label it "naval equipment."
My view is, as I said, you've correctly rejected that claim
and you have said that until this issue and two other issues,
relating to the database are resolved, you will not submit
the CFE treaty to the Senate.
What I would propose for your consideration and comment
today, if you're willing, is that assuming the two other
issues -- that is, relating to the database -- are resolved,
that you, in fact, submit the treaty to the Senate without
further delay, nothwithstanding the fact that the first
measure is not cleared up. Then when the resolution of
ratification is considered by this Committee -- the Chairman
has indicated that he would like me to hold hearings on that
and move that if and when it comes --- [ would offer, 1
suspect with the support of a number of members in this
Committee, if not all -- a Formal reservation whereby the
-21-
Senate would consent to ratification on condition that the
naval units would not be considered exempt under Article III.
The reason I mention this is as follows: This position, in
my view, would be consistent with that already adopted by 21
other parties to the treaty. In that event, as in the case
of the Krasnoyarsk radar, where most of us in Congress share
the Administration's view, this country and its allies would
be on Record and all united and then President Gorbachev and
other Soviet leadership would face a Fundamental question
with the whole world watching. And that is, do they want to
be a responsible partner in a new Europe, governed by
international law or do they want to return to the days of
being outcasts from the Western community?
1 would suggest that if you were armed with a ratification
conditioned upon an interpretation of Article III, as you
have interpreted it, then it would really drop the ball
clearly in the court of Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviets. They
would either have to step up or, at that point, indicate that
they've yielded to the reactionaries in the Communist Party
or the military, in the process.
I realize that it's somewhat of an unorthodox suggestion.
But how do you respond to that proposition?
SECRETARY BAKER: It's an interesting suggestion, Senator
Biden. But let me make just a couple off-the-top-of-my-heac
comments and then I'd be pleased to have something from you
in writing and we'd take a look at it.
Number 1, it would take some time, in any event, to clear up
the other two issues.
SENATOR BIDEN: I understand that.
SECRETARY BAKER: We think what we are doing is seeking to
make the point that you suggest would be made by ratification
with a condition. And that is to say, very clearly up front,
we're not going to send the treaty up until you clear up this
question with respect to naval infantry. We, frankly, think
it's a clearly erroneous interpretation, one that came up
after the fact, and you know what our position is.
So what I think we are doing is seeking to make the case, as
you just put it -- at an earlier stage ------------------------- make it clear that
this is a matter of quite some importance to us, and it has
to be resolved. We have, under the treaty language, until
the 17th or 19th of February -- I can't remember what it is
-- to clear up these interpretative kinds of things. So it's
-22-
important, we think, that we make every effort to do that;
really, to make the same point that you suggest be made by
sending it up anyway.
We'll take a look at what you have there and discuss it
internally and see whether it's something we'd be willing to
do. But we're still hopeful, Senator Biden, that we'll get a
response From the Soviet Union that would permit us to move
forward on the conventional forces agreement and, as you and
1 both put it, lock in those reductions.
SENATOR BIDEN: Let me make clear. I have no doubt about the
fact that you are doing everything in your power to attempt
to clear this up. I'm not suggesting that anything be sent
here absent, at a minimum, the clearing of the other two
elements that are still outstanding relating to the database.
What I was attempting to do is to suggest that when the
Executive and the Senate unanimously have agreed, and on
record as unanimously agreeing, on a critical point relating
to treaty interpretation that that has seemed to have in the
past an impact an impact on the rest of the word and,
quite frankly, an impact on the political dimension of the
process. That's the reason why I suggest what I am
suggesting, not in any way to suggest that you are not doing
everything in your power to make it clear.
SECRETARY BAKER: Let me also say, I'm not sure you're
correct when you say that this would put us in sync with 21
other nations. I'm not sure all other nations have expressed
a willingness to go forward with ratification procedures
before this thing is cleared up.
SENATOR BIDEN: They have all expressed the same view that
you've expressed with regard to the interpretation of Article
III.
One of the things that often gets debated and confused is the
ratification process. The Soviets are very good in the past,
and I suspect in the future if this breaks down, in arguing
that the ratification process is something they can't ever
count on anyway from the United States. So the mere fact
that this broke down because of Article III does not mean
that it broke down because of them. It may have broken down
anyway in the Senate.
SECRETARY BAKER: We make the point very forcefully that that
is not the case, when we say we're not even going to send it
up before- you clear this up and when 21 other nations take
the same position.
-23-
SENATOR BIDEN: 1 want to do whatever is most helpful. I
offer it as a consideration. If you conclude it is not, then
I can understand that.
My time is almost up. Let me conclude with this question.
After the constitutional processes here were abided by and
the President got the constitutional equivalent of a
declaration of war, I believe his role as Commander-in-Chief
took over and we should not be second-guessing how the
conduct of the war should take place. That's why I have been
low.
As a matter of fact, l've been totally silent on the question
of whether you resort to land war, don't resort to land war.
I'm not qualified to make that judgment.
One of the things that's discussed by everyone, including the
Administration, with regard to that judgment is the political
considerations impact on that. For example, will the
coalition hold together the longer we wait; the unrest that
seems to be gathering in Egypt and North Africa, etc.?
1 would respectfully suggest that Point 3 of your 4-point
program --- 5-point program; excuse me --- of the 5-point
program you're suggesting as to how to deal with the
aftermath of victory -- if Point 3, the economic condition,
the establishment of a regional bank or any version of that,
whereas Howard Baker used to say, where the other Arab
nations believe and understand they have a dog in this fight,
that there's something they can benefit from, may very well
impact short term on one of the potentially military -
potential aspects of a military decision that apparently is
underway and being considered.
1 compliment you and strongly urge you to move, if you can,
with all else that you doing, our wealthy Arab friends toward
making clear to the rest of the Arab world that they've
signed on already to the principle that you enunciating in
principle three. That's my unsolicited advice. It's worth
what you're paying for, but 1 think your suggestion is a
very, very positive.
SECRETARY BAKER: Thank you, Senator.
CHAIRMAN PELL: Thank you very much. Senator Lugar.
SENATOR LUGAR: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Baker, I appreciate it. .[ know all members of the Committee
do, the comprehensive statement that you have given. That is
certainly worthy of consideration, not only the parts that
-24-
you have read or mentioned but extensive mention of Foreign
assistance and other initiatives of the Department.
Let me state for the record that I would like to submit two
questions on Yugoslovian issues, the Republican leader,
Senator Dole, has asked me to bring up. These will deal
essentially with the oppression of Albanians in Kosova and,
likewise, the evolution of elections and our policy towards
these elections in Yugoslovia. So I would submit those for
the record.
SECRETARY BAKER: Thank you.
SENATOR LUGAR: Secondly, I want to mention, for the record,
my own personal enthusiasm for the enterprise, the Americans
Initiative, which I'm hopeful we'll be able to complete.
Much work was done on that last year, as you know, and with
your cooperation.
I'm hopeful that the Administration, in all of its aspects --
State, as well as the Trade Representative, and even the
President himself -- will push very hard to complete the GATT
negotiations, even including personal representations to
Chancellor Kohl, for example, on the argicultural issues
which are SO critical and moving that along.
1 favor strongly the United States-Mexico-Canada free trade
agreement. I'm delighted to see that given high profile by
the President and yourself. Likewise, I'm hopeful that the
Philippine base negotiations will move to conclusion. They
appear to have good momentum; and, likewise, that the
multilateral assistance initiative in the Philippines will
once again receive the attention that your message gives it
and the Congress will concur.
I applaud President's de Klerk's speech in South Africa, as
you have and the President has. We are hopeful that
implementation will occur, a movement that seems to be
promised by that.
We appreciate likewise a movement in the Central American
democracies. The visit this week by Mr. Lucaya of Nicaragua
gives new hope in a situation in which not as much attention
has been given but really a great deal more ought to be to
follow up an important American initiative.
Finally, a small item: A free trade agreement with Chile, it
seems to me, doable. I appreciate the priorities of affairs,
namely, GATT. Mexico, Canada, the United States, Chile, and
-25-
others may be interested in this but these are opportunities
that are there for us and that we might seize.
Having stated all of that, I want to make comments now on the
Middle East, or the Persian Gulf situation, more
particularly, just as refinements in agreement with -
SECRETARY BAKER: Senator, may 1 just interrupt and say thank
you, though, for taking note of some of the very important
things that we've got going on elsewhere in the world.
SENATOR LUGAR: Thank you. Let me say, first of all, Mr.
Secretary, that I appreciate the response you have given to
others already. Myown view is that we have addressed the
question of Saddam Husayn, as you have this morning again, by
saying that tears would not be shed if something were to
occur to him. Or, indirectly, that if he is in a bunker or a
command position, he might not survive and what-have-you.
My hope would be that our policy would become one in which we
state this more forthrightly, namely, that Saddam Husayn must
be removed from a position of leadership in Iraq. This does
not mean that he should be killed, assassinated, bombed,
chased. This simply means that the conclusion of our efforts
ought to be a disconnect between Saddam Husayn and
leadership. I think that the American people would find any
other policy, short of this, finally to be unsatisfactory.
I'm hopeful we can, at least, arrive at that fairly short
statement soon.
SECRETARY BAKER: Senator Lugar, let me take it advantage of
that statement/question that you just propounded to make
clear that there's no suggestion on our part that the
rebuilding or reconstruction of Iraq could proceed if the
current leadership of Iraq remained in power to the same
degree and effect and extent that it would otherwise.
Also, it should be said that if they should somehow remain in
power that we might very well be adopting different measures
with respect to weapons of mass destruction, international
arms embargoes, and things like that, that would not pertain
if they did not remain in power or you had some termination
of this war through some sort of a formal peace treaty.
This is what I meant when 1 said in my formal remarks that
some decisions cannot be made until we know how the war will
terminate.
--26-
SENATOR LUGAR: I appreciate that. I would even argue that
the sanctions we might leave, or the pressures we might bring
to bear would still be designed, finally, to disconnect
Saddam Husayn and his group from leadership. Because until
that occurs, as you pointed out, the process of
reconstruction and a stable Iraq is very difficult and I
would submit, I think, impossible.
Leaving that point aside for the moment, I applaud the
thought that you've given that American leadership is of the
essence in this. I would contend, without being boastful,
that our participation in the Persian Gulf has led to renewed
confidence in ourselves in this country as well as confidence
others have in us. We have remarkable opportunities which
your statement seizes and which the President has reiterated.
With that in mind, let me suggest that I believe the United
States and its allies -:: United States as the leader ------ needs
to reconstruct the governance of Kuwait and of Iraq in the
post-war period. But that I mean, it appears to me that it's
going to be a very difficult exercise in political science
for the Kuwait situation to come back together. The problem
of voting rolls ----- who is a Kuwaiti? Who elects whom and who
has legitimacy, to a great extent is not easy to come by.
That may be especially true in Iraq if we have a disconnect
with the current leadership.
What I'm suggesting, I suppose, is a follow through from what
the Administration has already done in constructing an
international financial plan for the payment of all that is
going on there - in constructing an energy-balancing
situation in which you put very strong pressure and guidance
to get an equilibrium of oil supplies during this period of
time. In fact, in the original invitation of the President,
personally, of all nations in the world to come together in
this coalition.
So, as a follow-through, I'm hopeful that we will provide a
construction. I have no particular authorship or desire, but
someone will have to be a leader of a group that draws up how
Kuwait and Iraq actually come back together into some stable
governments, given the holocaust, literally, that has swept
across both of those countries and continues to do so.
Beyond that, it seems to me that the United States leadership
will be of the essence in monitoring the Iraqi payments to
others.
One of the U.N. resolutions deals with reparations. That
will not happen by chance. It appears to me, in addition to
bringing a construct for governance of Iraq, we will need to
-27-
likewise provide a financial control system in which the
revenues that Iraq finds available are allocated,
constructively, to payments to others as well as the
rebuilding of the country.
I would share Senator Helms sentiment in this respect, that
the revenues for the rebuilding of lraq and Kuwait must come
From the region.
SECRETARY BAKER: I say that in my statement.
SENATOR LUGAR: I understand that. I just want to make that
explicit, that there has to be, I suppose, a blunt statement
to the American people at this point that Americans tax
dollars will not be involved in the rebuilding of Iraq ----------
with or without Saddam Husayn --- or in the rebuilding of
Kuwait. I think that's clear to you and it's clear in the
statement. I think it might not have clear to Senator Helms
in his question. I simply want to underline that, that there
is not floating out there that somehow the taxpayers are
going to pay for this.
Finally, let me say that I believe that we have opportunities
to construct a diplomatic arrangement in which the questions
surrounding the lsraeli/Palestine recognition of Israel,
secure borders for Israel, can come forward. You have
touched upon that and that's a very important thought. But
without for a moment pressuring any one, this is just a
moment in which our diplomacy is at a high point. We've made
a great sacrifice with 500,000 Americans there -- of expense
as well as lives --------- and the American people anticipate that
we ought to push Forward boldly while we have the
opportunity, and I think we do.
SECRETARY BAKER: Thank you, Senator Lugar. As I said, I
think there will be some opportunities. Obviously, as we've
said before, we cannot impose peace in the region. There
will only be peace if the parties to the conflict are willing
to make the necessary effort to move toward peace, but if the
parties are willing, 1 think it's important that the world
know that the United States is willing to make the effort.
But it's not something we're going to be able to impose or
anybody else is going to be able to impose.
SENATOR LUGAR: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN PELL: Thank you very much. Senator Dodd.
SENATOR DODD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first of all
say to the Secretary that much of what Senator Lugar has
-28-
raised --- and I want to commend him; that was a tour de force
in terms of a few minutes of giving sort of a global
appraisal -- and I would associate myself with almost
everything he has raised. And I think your point that there
is a lot else going on in the world, although you'd find it
hard to believe by paying attention to the news media with SO
much coverage, as it obviously should be, on the Persian Gulf.
I would add, and I don't believe you mentioned, Panama, which
was a little more than a year ago, of course, on December
20th, that we were involved there militarily. And it seems
to me given some reports that are received that a lot of that
good will that was engendered because of that action has
deteriorated because of perceived lack of support there.
I would just make note on the free trade agreement with
Mexico to caution there are some things that can be done
through Executive Order that could contribute significantly
to improved trading relationships with Mexico. You've heard
already from others ---- I would just be repeating here ---- but
the notion that there's a great deal of concern about the
potential job loss, the exodus of American business and
industrial capacity to the maquiladora region and what that
means to American jobs, And that's been raised by business as
well as labor in this country. 1 think they're legitimate
questions. It's SO important that how we fashion that trade
agreement be done wisely and done well, so that we can build
upon it within the region.
As Senator Lugar has mentioned, Chile, I think, is a prime
example of a nation with whom we could develop a free trade
agreement almost immediately. And I suspect, based on my
conversations, that any concerns we might have that Chileans
would be willing to accept -- and there's an economy that I
think could immediately become a very active participant in
our economy.
I won't dwell on that, but I just think those are important
things to move forward. The Enterprise for Americas, we hope
to move on that as well and do so in a way that will really
build on the economic relationships in this region.
1 would like to raise with you -- and I should say that when
I've approached my colleagues, I've chatted with the
Secretary very briefly about two of these questions --- but
one has to do, Mr. Secretary, as you know with an article
that appeared in The New York Times on Friday, January 31,
regarding the role of the United Nations in the Salvador
talks.
-29-
It was disturbing to me that there was that kind of an
unnamed, unquoted source talking about that particular
effort. My feeling is the U.N. is doing a good job; that
it's maybe our last best hope to try and achieve a peace in
that troubled country, and I wonder if you might want to just
comment on that.
SECRETARY BAKER: I'll be glad to, Senator Dodd. First of
all, let me say that there was no authorization for those
quotes by unnamed sources and I share your view that the
story was very unfortunate. Let me say that we strongly
support the mediation efforts that the Secretary General has
been pursuing.
You've heard me say that 1 think we have the opportunity ---
had the opportunity to end the last war in Central America.
We hope that the Secretary General will remain actively
engaged and spend as much time himself on this important
endeavor as he possibly can.
I have to say that I think that some reports we've received
from the last round of talks are somewhat encouraging.
Hopefully, a political agreement and a cease-fire can be
achieved prior to the legislative elections that are
scheduled for the 10th of March.
We do believe that the FMLN has been dragging its feet, and
we are concerned when we see the FMLN with SA-14s shooting
down aircraft and really changing the character of the war.
So we hope that the mediation efforts will be balanced with
respect to both sides of the conflict. But we strongly
support what the U.N. is doing. I find that story, just as
you do, to be extremely unfortunate, because we want the U.N.
to remain engaged, and we want them to continue to try and
bring the parties to an agreement.
SENATOR DODD: I appreciate your response to that, Mr.
Secretary. The second one has to do with the fact that last
year the Congress, with the support of the Administration,
ultimately, 1 think, on the dealing with the $400 million in
housing loan guarantees for Soviet Jews resettling in Isreal,
to my knowledge those funds have not been released, despite
the fact that Israel has accepted over somewhere in the
neighborhood of a quarter of a million new refugees in their
country.
1 wonder if you might just give us some sense of whether or
not those Funds have been released or are in the process of
being released, and what the status of that is.
-30-
SECRETARY BAKER: There have been some technical requirements
that still remain to be satisfied, Senator Dodd. I spoke to
this yesterday in the other body. There was a proposal that
those Funds be released in three separate tranches. I have
made a decision that once the technical requirements have
been satisfied, we ought to get the funds out as quickly as
we can and release them all in one tranche, and we will do
that.
As you probably know, it was a matter of great importance to
the United States that these funds not be used for the
construction of housing in the Occupied Territories, or the
construction of or addition to settlements in the Occupied
Territories.
SENATOR DODD: Israel has agreed to that, haven't they?
SECRETARY BAKER: As a consequence of that, we worked out a
-- yes. We worked out a letter of agreement between the
Foreign Minister of Israel and myself which called for Israel
to supply us with certain information. We haven't received
that information yet. We are talking to the relevant Israeli
agencies and bureaus. AID had a technical team in Israel as
recently as December. As soon as we receive the information
that's called for in the letter, we're quite prepared to
disburse and not just hold it up for three tranches but to
disburse it in one.
SENATOR DODD: 1 appreciate the response to that as well.
Let ine come back to one of the points that Senator Lugar
raised, and, as I said, much of what he said, he could have
easily been speaking for me in his questions.
1 wonder if you might -- I'll just take another crack at this
and give you a chance to respond to it. I think most of us
here have received some inquiries over the last 24 hours
about this notion of rebuilding of Iraq, and I think I
understand clearly what you're saying as well.
But just to raise the question again and give you a direct
question, a chance to respond to it. If Saddam Husayn at the
end of the military conflict departs from Kuwait or we force
him out of Kuwait and yet he remains in power and control in
his country, it is not your intention or the intention of the
Administration to provide reparations or to ask U.S.
taxpayers to fund reconstruction assistance for Iraq under
those circumstances at all?
SECRETARY BAKER: No. And we've never mentioned anything
about reparations.
-31-
SENATOR DODD: Excuse me. I didn't mean reparations. I
apologize.
SECRETARY BAKER: No, sir. You're absolutely correct. But
at the same time 1 think it's important that we make clear
our quarrel here -- as the President as done before ------ our
quarrel here is not with the people of Iraq. And in the
aftermath of the sacrifices that we have made and are making,
we want to see a region that has some chance for peace and
stability --- a semblance of peace and stability in the
region.
Iraq is going to continue to be there, and, therefore, there
is an important economic dimension, and we must approach
post-crisis planning in my view, not just from the political
and military or security point of view, but also from the
economic.
That's what I'm trying to say, Senator Dodd, and 1 think it's
clear from the remarks I made. But, obviously, we're not
seeking to ask the American taxpayers to subsidize the
continued existence of an Iraq with that kind of leadership.
And what happens after a termination of this war in that area
as well as other areas - and some of the political areas and
security areas ---- will be influenced by how the war
terminates and whether that possibility exists.
SENATOR DODD: Let me raise the issue of Syria and Iran, if I
can, with you. The other day the President rejected out of
hand, and I think correctly so, the notion of some sort of a
diplomatic effort on the part of the Iranians to try and
resolve this issue.
I realize in a sense asking you this, obviously, you're not
going to be capable of talking about in detail any private
conversations But 1 would wonder whether or not in your
view it would be wrong For us to try. to develop some sort of
an approved relationship with Iran at this particular time.
That offer, while it may not have made a great deal of sense
at this particular time, certainly it's a more pregnant
proposal than just what's on the table. It seems to me as I
read it, there was an indication there of something that went
Far beyond any particular offer out of this particular crisis
but rather maybe an opening to try and see if we can't
re-establish a far better relationship with Iran than we've
had.
-32-
SECRETARY BAKER: As you read what, Senator?
SENATOR DODD: The proposal by Rafsanjani to act as some sort
of a diplomatic liaison. I mean, that was the proposal.
That was rejected, as it should have been, but it seemed to
me there may be something more in that particular offer than
just that particular proposal. And the question is basically
whether or not the Administration has any intention of trying
to pursue an improved relationship with Iran.
SECRETARY BAKER: Let me answer it by saying, number one,
there is no proposal from Iran as we speak here this
morning. There has been no proposal as yet. The President
has said that in terms of the manner in which Iran has
conducted itself during the course of this crisis, we see
that as credible.
Our policy with respect to increasing our contacts and
improving the relationship, -if you will, is very clear.
We've made it very clear for a long time. We're prepared to
sit down with authorized representatives of the Government of
Iran if they will renounce state-sponsored terrorism and
commit to do something about our hostages in Lebanon.
Now, that's been our position for a long time, and I think
the Government of Iran knows that.
SENATOR DODD: Well, we're sitting down with Syria and
working with them, and yet it's not any great secret of what
Syria --- the role Syria's played in state-sponsored terrorism.
SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I'm saying we've offered to do the
same thing in effect with Iran if they will simply take the
two steps that we have discussed. That's been our policy for
a long, long time. When we sit down with Syria, we talk to
them about their sponsorship of terrorism. It is a problem
that we have with them, and we raise it with them when we
have the opportunity.
CHAIRMAN PELL: Thank you very much.
SENATOR DODD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN PELL: Senator Kassebaum.
SENATOR KASSEBAUM: Mr. Secretary, your plate is indeed
full. I'd like to start with another area first, if I might,
and that's sub-Sahara Africa.
-33-
I think that from a positive standpoint first, we must all be
very pleased that President de Klerk has continued his
commitment to dismantle apartheid, and also I think the very
positive meeting between Dr. Buthelezi and Nelson Mandela,
which 1 hope will continue to be a step in ending some of the
tragedies within South Africa.
But I'd like to raise another question regarding sub-Sahara
Africa that 1 think becomes forgotten, of course, in the
scope of all the issues before us.
But it's the deadly combination of drought and civil conflict
which exists in SO many areas of sub-Sahara Africa. There
are about nine million at risk in Sudan. Potentially, I
think, about six million - three million at risk in Ethiopia
and about two million potentially in Angola.
And then on top of that, there are the refugee problems there
in Somalia and Mozambique. There are still refugees in
Malawi. And I guess that I would just urge you, as you look
at the foreign aid priorities regarding refugees, that this
particular situation all told worldwide in the last ten years
has gone from approximately eight million to fifteen million,
and 80 percent of those are women and children.
So I think when we talk about refugees, it isn't something
that we can just deal with in one area of the world in
resettlement; it has to be worldwide. And I hope it will
continue to receive the full attention and resources in our
foreign aid budget that they want, Mr. Secretary.
SECRETARY BAKER: It will continue to receive the same
resources and attention, Senator. The resources, as you
know, are finite. It would be good, quite frankly, if we
could see substantial increases, just from a humanitarian
standpoint, because what you say is absolutely true,
particularly with respect to Sudan, Ethiopia and Angola.
We are spending a lot of time trying to do what we can to
assist relief efforts by private voluntary organizations, to
work diplomatically and politically to permit assistance to
go across war zones and across boundaries, and that sort of
thing.
We have made some very good progress with the Soviet Union
with respect to Ethiopia and Angolan relief. I mean, things
that we heretofore have not been able to do, we have recently
been able to do because of the better relationship we've had
with the Soviet Union.
-34-
But I'd say these things simply by way of agreeing with what
you've said, because I do agree -
SENATOR KASSEBAUM: I'm sure that that's true, and it leads
me, of course, to the foreign aid earmarks, and I very much
appreciate the Fact that you're dedicated to reform and more
flexibility in the foreign aid program.
But, unfortunately, it tends to usually be more just all of
us saying, "We wish there were more flexibility in the
Foreign aid priorities than ever really accomplishing it."
When you save more money, I, myself, would just say, Mr.
Secretary, am not going to support more money for foreign aid
until 1 really see reform in the foreign aid budget.
We have, as Senator Dodd mentioned, the $400 million in the
pipeline for resettlement in Israel, and I think that is
important, but it's anticipated there's going to be a
significant additional request for resettlement funds in
Israel. And I think this is really one reason I wish to
reiterate that this is a problem that goes beyond Israel as
well.
SENATOR KASSEBAUM: Now, since I've made that, let me go on
to another area before you respond on that and just say that
I'd like to ask a moment about China. It's my understanding,
I think, that the President --- and I don't know the context
of how it came up in his speech last night in New York ----
said that China must be a part of the new world order. At
the same time, of course, the report of the State Department
on human rights abuses certainly has criticized and raised
the issue of China; and I heard on the news this morning that
China was very critical of the State Department's report.
1 guess I would like to ask you how you envision China
fitting in to the new world order.
SECRETARY BAKER: Well, China is a very, very important
country, as the President I think pointed out in those
remarks. It is a country that we are going to have
relationships with by virtue of its geopolitical importance.
That does not mean that we will not be concerned about human
rights standards in China just as we are in other country.
And, you know, the purpose of that Human Rights Report is to
point out instances everywhere where we think there are
problems.
And I might say that we have to be careful in looking at the
Human Rights Report that we're not too selective in the
-35-
countries that we pick out of it because some of our very,
very closest friends and allies are in that Human Rights
Report, because we have problems with some of the human
rights practices. But that doesn't mean that we don't
continue to deal with those friends and allies, that we don't
continue to support those friends and allies, and that we
don't even at the same time that we are pressing them to
improve their human rights performances.
SENATOR KASSEBAUM: I very much agree. In fact, I think it
can be, I would hope, as we deal in this new era, an
opportunity to bring sort of collective means together to
work with the human rights abuses and point that out, whether
it would be with our allies or adversaries, because I think
it can be a useful opportunity --- just as we were concerned
about Iraq before, actually, their invasion of Kuwait.
SECRETARY BAKER: Senator, could I just say one thing back on
earmarking for a minute, because you've given me an
opportunity. I haven't had a chance this year to say what I
said quite forcefully last year.
We really do need more flexibility on this question of
earmarking foreign assistance. I'm pleased that the economic
support funds we were earmarking last year in support funds
was reduced from 82 percent to 68 percent; and that's a very,
very positive development. And I want to thank the Congress
for that and ask you to please give some further
consideration to removing some of these earmarks,
particularly now in light of the Budget Summit agreement that
puts caps on all of these accounts. So when you want to
increase assistance for your favorite country, just remember
that that is going to come at the expense of some other
countries.
We have already, as you pointed out last year --- you and I
engaged in a colloquy on this --- we already are absolutely
hammering Africa and Latin America because they don't have
big support --- you know, lobbies up here -- pushing for
earmarks for those countries; and it makes it very, very
difficult.
I'd finally just like to say that the FMF percentage declined
from 92 percent to 87 percent. We still have a heavy
proportion of our military assistance or security assistance
funds that are absolutely totally earmarked.
SENATOR KASSEBAUM: And you would eliminate that?
-36-
SECRETARY BAKER: I would like to see, as I said last year --
and I'll say it again --- we would support total flexibility,
of course, SO that we can respond to situations as they
develop and as they occur and not be absolutely,
categorically, wedded to the same --------- you know, the same
practices that have taken place, in years past, arbitrarily
wedded to them.
SENATOR KASSEBAUM: I'm not going to get through my list
before the time goes off
SECRETARY BAKER: Sorry.
SENATOR KASSEBAUM: ------- but let me just say you said --- and 1
welcome the comment -- the time has come to reduce arms flow
into an area already overmilitarized
But let me just say, Mr. Secretary, I am sure as soon as the
crisis is over in the Gulf and the conflict that we are going
to get requests from everybody for new arms sales. That's
already on the horizon. And we are going to have to balance
it and ration it up and if someone gets one thing, then
somebody else is going to get another.
SECRETARY BAKER: But, you see, Senator --
SENATOR KASSEBAUM: How do you plan to deal with this?
SECRETARY BAKER: Well, Senator, as I point out in my
remarks, I think that there is an opportunity, at least
there's some potential for changing that -- but we're not
going to change it acting alone. We're only going to change
it if we get all of our major allies to agree with us because
if we're unwilling to sell a particular item and somebody
else in Europe is willing to sell it, then it's totally
self-defeating, so we've got to --
SENATOR KASSEBAUM: I agree.
SECRETARY BAKER: -- work too.
But I do think that there will be greater receptivity to this
concept and this idea on the part of both supplier nations
and nations in the Middle East that have been recipients of
these.
SENATOR KASSEBAUM: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN PELL: Thank you very much.
Senator Sarbanes.
-37-
SENATOR SARBANES: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, 1 want to focus on a paragraph on page 14 of
your prepared statement, the one that reads:
"In 1990, our coalition partners pledged $9.7 billion to meet
Desert Shield costs, representing 88 percent of the roughly
$11 billion in total incremental expenses we incurred. II
Then 1 want to take a Few minutes to try to develop this
because we have these hearings and we get these sort of broad
assertions about burden-sharing and assumption of
responsibilities and SO forth, and I find myself frustrated
that we don't press into it to find out exactly what's
involved.
First of all, what does the phrase "incremental expenses"
mean?
SECRETARY BAKER: You'd have to ask the Defense Department
that, Senator Sarbanes. That is a formula that they
developed. And when we approached allies, we used the term
:
"direct incremental expenses."
But what I think it means is the out-of-pocket expenses,
exclusive of salaries and things that would be paid anyway --
salaries on the part of the personnel. But you would have to
get the exact definition, if you would, From the Defense
Department.
Well, you know, there are other things excluded from
"incremental expenses."
SENATOR SARBANES: So I take it the overwhelming costs of our
participation in this military action are not embraced within
"incremental expenses" since, I take it, you treat those as
costs that are not incremental but are direct; is that
correct?
SECRETARY BAKER: That would be my understanding, Senator.
We are going to pay the 82nd Airborne, whether they're in
Europe or whether they're in Saudi Arabia -- if it is the
82nd, and I don't mean to suggest it. I don't remember
whether they were in Europe and are now in Saudi Arabia or
not.
But salaries, I think, are excluded from that.
SENATOR SARBANES: I see.
-38-
Is the use of munitions an incremental expense?
SECRETARY BAKER: It is in the post-hostilities phase,
Senator, in my opinion.
Again, I would direct you to Defense for a specific answer.
But once hostilities commenced ---------- of course, we have asked
for significantly greater amounts by way of
responsibility-sharing. And I believe that the expenditure
of some of these expensive munitions is what has increased
that cost.
SENATOR SARBANES: Well, when you --------
SECRETARY BAKER: It's part of what's increased that cost
substantially.
SENATOR SARBANES: When you went to these countries to get
them to make the contribution, what was it that you told them
that they were supposed to contribute towards? What expenses?
SECRETARY BAKER: In 1990; I said it was to -- well, it
depends on whether you're talking about economic assistance
for front-line states. Let's take that out for a moment
because this question doesn't relate to that.
What I asked thein to do was to help defray some of the
incremental expenses of the cost of our deployment for Desert
Shield. That was in 1990.
In 1991, I asked them to do the same thing with respect to
those expenses vis-a-vis Desert Storm.
SENATOR SARBANES: Well, now, as I understand it ------ and I
guess I'll have to accept for the moment the shifting off of
the burden of explaining "incremental expenses" to the
Department of Defense. I mean it's very clear that there's a
huge bill that we are paying because of this exercise.
SECRETARY BAKER: You ought to talk to the Defense Department
or the Office of Management and Budget about that, Senator
Sarbanes. I'm not sure it's -- when you say a "huge 6111,"
we have a huge bill in terms of human cost, in terms of the
additional economic costs that are involved.
Because we first deployed on Desert Shield and now are
engaging in hostilities under Desert Storm, I'm not sure that
your description is necessarily accurate. It's my
understanding that we, the United States, picked up close to
20 percent of the economic costs of Desert Shield --- the
-39.-
additional economic cost to the military --- and that we are
looking at something in that range, roughly in that range,
with respect to Desert Storm.
That's the only way I know to answer your question.
SENATOR SARBANES: Well, now, I'm looking at an article in
the paper of February the 6th that says that for the period
August 2nd through December 31, 1990, the allies pledged $9.7
billion in cash and in kind contributions ---
SECRETARY BAKER: Yes.
SENATOR SARBANES: - which gibes exactly with the figure
you're using here --
SECRETARY BAKER: Right.
SENATOR SARBANES: - but that of that amount only about
two-thirds of that amount has been received. Is that correct?
SECRETARY BAKER: I think that's correct; I think that's
correct. Six point five billion is what my recollection is
of what's been received.
SENATOR SARBANES: Well, why is that the case?
SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I think it's probably because it
takes a while to get those pledges in, Senator. I don't
think there's any question about whether it's actually going
to been paid. That's the only way I know to answer your
question.
SENATOR SARBANES: Well, who's slow in getting their pledges
in? (Laughter.)
SECRETARY BAKER: Ask the Office of Management and Budget. I
can't answer that.
SENATOR SARBANES: Well, the paper says the Japanese are
slow; is that correct?
SECRETARY BAKER: Again, I would refer you to the people that
keep the books; and I don't really keep the books, Senator.
I go out and ask for the money. (Laughter.) And so far I'm
really happy with the answers I've gotten. And I don't think
people are welshing on their pledges, and I don't think
they're going to welsh on their pledges. And particularly
with respect to the first three months of 1991, I think that
pledges have been received already in excess of $42 billion
-40-
and we're going to get more just for the first three months
of '9] --- and those have begun to be paid.
So, you know, I can't give you all that detail, but you can
certainly get it from OMB .
SENATOR SARBANES: What's your operating principle on the
percentage of incremental cost that ought to be paid by the
allies?
SECRETARY BAKER: As I've just told you, in 1990, it ended up
being close to, as I understand it, 20 percent. Perhaps even
less by the United States --- 12 percent; between 12 and 20
percent. I would think it would be something in that broad
range in 1991, first three months.
SENATOR SARBANES: Why should we pay any of the incremental
costs?
SECRETARY BAKER: Because the United States military is not a
mercenary force.
"
SENATOR SARBANES: Well, I understand that. But we're paying
a very huge bill, aside from the incremental cost.
SECRETARY BAKER: We have a very large interest to support
and defend there, Senator Sarbanes. So it's our thinking
that the United States should not refuse to participate at
all economically.
SENATOR SARBANES: Mr. Secretary, if we're committing our
human resources and if we are assuming all of the direct
costs, why isn't it reasonable to expect the others to pick
up the incremental costs?
SECRETARY BAKER: I think the direct costs would be paid
anyway, it's my understanding of this, the way this works, as
1. just indicated to you. Salaries are going to paid
regardless of where the forces are. Whether or not
additional combat pay is an incremental cost, I would refer
you to the Defense Department for all of those.
on the question of why we think the United States ought to
bear some percentage or some proportion of the cost
economically, nothwithstanding our --
SENATOR SARBANES: No, no, I want to make my point very
clear. My perception is that we are bearing a very
substantial portion of the cost, economically, aside from the
incremental cost. That that's a very significant and heavy
-41-
economic burden which, in fact, dwarfs the incremental costs,
and, in addition, we're bearing the full range of the human
cost that are involved.
SECRETARY BAKER: There are others that are -
SENATOR SARBANES: In other words, why shouldn't these other
countries at least cover the incremental costs?
SECRETARY BAKER: There are others that are bearing human
costs as well, as you know. We've got some 250,000 or more
other forces out there, forces that are taking casualties
/right alongside ours. So we're not the only people bearing
the human cost.
SENATOR SARBANES: We're not asking those countries to bear
the incremental cost, are we? That would be Egypt, and I
assume England. They're not contributing towards our
incremental cost, are they?.
SECRETARY BAKER: Not toward ours, no. But they're carrying
some of their own. As I said before, the economic costs that
are not incremental are going to be borne by the United
States in any event. We would be bearing those. It was our
conclusion, and it is our conclusion, that we should also be
participants in the incremental economic expenses. You can
argue with that and say, well, you ought to go out and you
ought to cover the whole thing a hundred percent and maybe
make a profit. We don't think we should.
SENATOR SARBANES: It's a question of who shares in this
cost. This is an issue that 1 think needs to be explored
because I think while we're being told that the allies are
picking up a very large share of the cost, they are picking a
large share of a limited portión of the cost. I'm now
talking economic cost; not human cost. In human costs, it's
an even more disparate comparison.
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
CHAIRMAN PELL: Thank you very much, indeed. Senator
Pressler.
SENATOR PRESSLER: Thank you very much. Welcome, Mr.
Secretary. I guess I would start out with the question -- a
general philosophy one. I just held some listening meetings
in my state recently. But a question that is asked,
following up on the questions that have been raised here ----
and I might put it to you: How would you briefly summarize
to the American people or to a group of constituents how we
-42-
should pay our foreign military and aid obligations and meet
our domestic needs? I know this is the question of the
hour. People want to be helpful. These are well-informed
people who watch CNN and SO forth.
The impression, at least, is very much that Japan and Europe
are not doing nearly as much as we are. The impression is
that there are demands for new arms and for increased aid in
different parts of the world. Indeed, we talk about
rebuilding Iraq. The impression is that the United States
will pay a good portion of that.
We talked this morning about organizing a new international
bank for a part of the world which -- the impression is,
certainly, that the United States will pay a major part of
that.
Meanwhile, on the domestic front, our state governors just
had their conference here and all of them are out of money.
Our counties are out of money. We've just had a proposal
from the Administration that Pell grants will have a ten
thousand dollar income limitation. I think we all know the
problem both on the domestic and international front.
llow would you, as Secretary of State, summarize how we can
pay For our foreign military and aid obligations and still --
where is the money going to come front?
SECRETARY BAKER: I would say, Senator Pressler, the way we
pay for that is for the Congress to pass the President's
budget.
SENATOR PRESSLER: As is?
SECRETARY BAKER: Yes, sir, as is, with all of the caps --
with all of the caps --- and particularly since it represents
an agreement between the Executive and Legislative Branches
as a result of last year's budget summit agreement.
SENATOR PRESSLER: In terms of our international obligations,
how would you explain or advocate some of the increased
spending that's implied, certainly, for example, to rebuild
Iraq after the war, the new bank, and SO forth?
SECRETARY BAKER: On that one, I would direct them to the
Secretary of State's opening remarks before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee today in which he said that the
vast majority of this is going to have to come from the
region.
-43-
SENATOR PRESSLER: Let me ask a question regarding Syria. I
know that they are a part of the allies at this moment. Is
the Administration considering taking Syria off the list of
terrorist nations? And what nuclear, chemical, or biological
capabilities does Syria possess?
SECRETARY BAKER: The answer to the first question is no. And
the answer to the second question is, I would be glad to
discuss it with you in Executive Session.
SENATOR PRESSLER: So the first question regarding Syria, we
do not plan to take it off the list of terrorist nations?
SECRETARY BAKER: We have no such plans now. We have made it
very clear to the Syrians that we have a problem with the
position of the Syrian Government with respect to terrorism.
If they were to take some steps to deal with those problems,
that would be a different situation.
SENATOR PRESSLER: Following up on one of the questions
Senator Lugar raised regarding Yugoslovia, I understand the
latest State Department human rights reports on Yugoslovia
paints a very grim picture. In view of these serious
problems, can we assume there are no plans or proposals for
U.S. aid or credits to Yugoslovia?
SECRETARY BAKER: I'm not aware of any, Senator Pressler.
But before you take that as gospel, I'd like to check it.
I'm not aware of anything and staff tells me there is
nothing. I think they do receive loans from the
international financial institutions. And, of course, the
United States participates in those institutions.
SENATOR PRESSLER: In a specific way, does the Administration
intend to notify Congress of any arm sales to the Middle East
prior to the end of the war, and what future arm sales are
planned?
SECRETARY BAKER: I think there's an obligation on the
Administration to send the Javits Report up here reasonably
soon. We will be sending it up, as we always do.
SENATOR PRESSLER: But are there any specific plans for arms?
SECRETARY BAKER: Well, there's nothing that I can talk about
in open session with respect to the Javits Report, Senator
Pressler, but we 11 be sending it up.
SENATOR PRESSLER: Mr. Secretary, 17 years ago Turkey invaded
Cyprus, as we all know. The tragic situation continues
-44--
despite the passage of numerous U.N. resolutions calling for
the removal of Turkish troops and the reunification of Cyprus.
After the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi troops, what steps
will the United States take in Cyprus? Is it an analogous
situation? What plans do you have?
SECRETARY BAKER: I do not believe that the U.N. resolutions
respecting Cyprus are analogous to the U.N. resolutions with
respect to the issue of Iraq-Kuwait. In the Former case, I
think the resolutions speak primarily of negotiations and
negotiating. of course, the United States has long
supported, and will continue to support, efforts by the
United Nations Secretary General to negotiate a settlement of
this issue. It's a very difficult issue, as you point out.
We will continue to support the U.N. in those efforts.
SENATOR PRESSLER: A final question regarding the impact of
the GATT trade agreement, the failure on world trade, and the
economies of countries. If the current deadlock continues
over agricultural trade and if the GAIT treaties are not
ratified, what impact will that have on the economies and on
our foreign policy?
SECRETARY BAKER: I think it will have a major adverse
economic impact worldwide, Senator Pressler. But more
importantly than that even, 1 would be worried that it would
have a major adverse political impact because it will
encourage resort to protectionism at a time when the world
economy is not in all that good shape; at a time when the
economy in the United States is in recession. That's why we
think it is so very, very important that we have a successful
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, because it's more than just
a trade or economic matter, in our view. Failure of the
Round would be a major political setback, I think, for the
United States and, indeed, for the world.
SENATOR PRESSLER: Just a final comment. You may not want to
comment on this. Your earlier point about "pass the
President's budget," last year I voted for most of the
President's budget and tax policies. .[ hope they do not
change come September and October as I feel they did last
year. So those of us who jump off the cliff on some of these
votes on tax and spending policies, we hope the White House
consistently sticks with their proposals when the going gets
rough in September and October?
SECRETARY BAKER: Senator, thank you. Let ine just say also,
by way of addition to my answer to that question you asked,
the foreign aid budget of the United States is less than two
-45-
percent - less than two percent of the overall budget of the
United States. Our budget submitted this year is $1.4
trillion. We are asking for less than two percent of that by
way of foreign assistance.
CHAIRMAN PELL: Thank you very much. Senator Kerry.
SENATOR KERRY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I
would like to begin, if I may, with - and I'm sure I may
because you'll like it ------------------------- a compliment.
SECRETARY BAKER: Please.
SENATOR KERRY: It struck me - yeah, please do. (Laughter)
I would like, really, to the Administration and through you,
and to Chairman Powell and Secretary Cheney, I have been
struck personally throughout the conduct of the campaign from
the 17th on with the candor of the briefings and the
reporting that we have had in private as well, I think, as
the quality of the presentations and the estimates that have
come From Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.
I've listened to a lot of them. I was particularly struck by
the repetiveness with which the issue of friendly fire was
broached. I remember a number of years ago, there was a
family or two that spent years fighting with the Defense
Department struggling to learn how someone had died. In
fact, there was a movie made called "Friendly Fire" which
traced that adversarial relationship. I was really not only
impressed but dumbstruck by the readiness with which that
obviously difficult admonition was made. I think it's
indicative of the way in which there has been an effort to be
conservative, to be realistic, to try not to raise
expectations, and to try to keep all of this in proportion.
I really do compliment you and they for that effort. I think
that all of us are better served by that, frankly - much
better served by it?
SECRETARY BAKER: Thank you, Senator.
SENATOR KERRY: In keeping with that sort of candor, I would
like to see if we can explore a similar effort of candor with
respect to policy, not just the reporting of the military
aspects of it. I genuinely want to pursue with you a couple
of questions in keeping with that effort to try to understand
better, as I think many Americans are grappling with this
issue of the ground war portion of the campaign -- where and
why we may be proceeding ahead.
-.46-
Your earlier statements in this effort, significantly and I
think appropriately, underscored one of the major goals,
together with the expulsion of Iraqi forces From Kuwait, is
the minimization of all allied casualties ----- minimization of
casualties. I take it that remains a major goal, principal
goal?
SECRETARY BAKER: I think the President has spoken to that.
1 don't recall stating that as a goal. But, clearly, [ think
everyone would agree that if we have to resort to force, we
should resort to it in a way that produces the minimum number
of casualties.
SENATOR KERRY: What has struck me thus far in the briefings
we've received, privately and otherwise, is the progressive,
utter decimation and degradation of the Iraqi capacity to
fight --------- at least to fight in the current stricture.
We've got now got the air supremacy declared that we
essentially had from the first 36 hours. We can fly with
impunity. We can take out any bridge with impunity. We can
take out any supply channel with impunity. The electrical
grid is gone. The water supplies are gone. Increased
rationing is taking place. Increasingly, we are told of the
steady degradation of communications, and so forth.
The question therefore arises, why the sudden talk of the
land war portion of it? 1 want to emphasize that. Secretary
Cheney and Chairman Powell have emphasized that it's an
on-going campaign, multi-part, and the land portion is one
part of it. I understand that.
I wonder if you could share with us a little bit the thinking
of the external pressures that may or may not exist? We all
know a few weeks ago we were hearing talk of perhaps six
months of war - expect six months. With that expectation
being publicly announced came a sort of de facto denunciation
of the Ramadan theory, the hajj theory, the summer theory,
the coalition fragility theory, and all these things that
seem to say, "You've got to move sooner rather than later."
Now, suddenly, we're back to sooner rather than later. It
seems to be that there's an escapable reality that sooner is
more casualties rather than later. Therefore, why would we
not continue the process of degradation, continue what is in
some view the best of both worlds: the use of force coupled
with the sanctions, which are sanctions with force? What is
your thinking? Can you share with us a little bit --- and it
may be that there are absolutely compelling reasons that one
has to move more rapidly and therefore soon, whatever those
increased casualties are.
--47-
But as of yet, I don't think a lot of Americans -- and I know
that I have not yet come to a conclusion as to what those are
as to why that might be. I'd very much like to have you
share your thinking with US here SO we can try to clarify it?
SECRETARY BAKER: Senator Kerry, I'm not sure that I want to
do that, and the reason is because that is basically a
military operational decision. You know, I could speculate
here with you and talk a little bit about some of the things
that I think are important considerations but I want to pick
up on what Senator Biden, and I'm not sure you had arrived at
that point.
SENATOR KERRY: No. I did. I heard him, and I'm sensitive
to that. I know he said that ----
SECRETARY BAKER: This is a decision for the Commander in
Chief, and it's not one really that I think that we should be
debating without having the military advisers do the
debating. It's a military decision. It is a decision for
the Commander in Chief.
I would make the point, for instance, that when we had the
debate earlier about whether we should just let sanctions do
the job, weren't sanctions going to be enough alone to get
him out of Kuwait. And we argued, no, they would not be
enough, and this same argument could be made about that --
that casualties would be fewer if you're willing to let
sanctions do the job.
Well, it was our view that sanctions wouldn't do the job, and
so now there are some casualties which are tragic and, as the
President said, even one casualty is one too many.
But this would be a repetition of that same debate, and the
Congress now has acted, in effect given the President the
authority to use force. Let's let him use it as the
Constitution calls for and requires as the Commander in
Chief, and don't debate when and whether and should - you
know, because you take it to its logical conclusion, Senator
Kerry, you could say, "Why in the world are you sending the
101st around here on this side? why wouldn't you minimize
casualties if you did this or that?" So I'm going to avoid
that discussion.
SENATOR KERRY: I respect that, Mr. Secretary. I thought you
might. And, obviously, I can't extract it from you. But 1
can perhaps say to you why I think there was a distinction
between deciding where the 101st goes and this larger issue.
-.48-
There are contradictory statements that have been put out
thus far that can lead people to different conclusions, and 1
don't want argue that. I think that the people have been
doing a good job over there so far, but this raises a major
issue.
If the military can't fight during the summer, because it's
literally too hot, or the hajj is such a consideration that
it might literally defeat your ability to prosecute it or so,
those are major military reasons for proceeding forward.
But those contradict other assertions that had been made
previously, and, therefore, I'd ---
SECRETARY BAKER: Like what, Senator?
SENATOR KERRY: Well, for instance, that this would be
potentially a war that we should steel ourselves for that
night last six or seven months. If that's true, that seems
to negate the notion that you're not going to go through the
summer. Now, that was said very publicly by our military
people.
So to suddenly now be questioning why we're going to go
forward seems to contradict the notion that we could have
prevailed through the summer, that the hajj really wasn't
such a big deal for us in terms of the military prosecution
of this effort, or that Ramadan really didn't make a
difference to our ability to continue.
Now, maybe there are economic forces, political forces,
others that are at work here ---------- and I'm sure there are some
-- and you may not want to share them now, and I respect
that. But in terms of our ability to prosecute this with
minimum casualties, it seems to me that we hold all the cards
right now, and I'm having some trouble deciding why, if you
can essentially cut off the supply routes to the south, to
the (inaudible) area, it's so necessary to move so rapidly
when you can continue to bomb and continue to harass and
isolate.
Anyway, my time is up. I want to simply call your attention,
if I may, Mr. Secretary, one issue that is of grave concern
ongoing to me as subcommittee chairman, the biannual report
to the Congress on narcotics - and this will just be a brief
statement, Mr. Chairman -- has demonstrated that heroin
supplies from Southeast Asia are up. Supplies of cocaine
from the Andean countries are up. More new coca is being
planted every year than is being eradicated. We're now
spending more money every day in the Persian Gulf than we
-49-
spend in one year in the State Department for the whole drug
war.
Colombia appears now to have given up its fight on the drug
war. The truce with the extraditables and the
non-extradition agreement is troubling, and we're having
grave problems with our counter-narcotics efforts in both
Peru and Bolivia.
There is also an indication of increased drug ties with
officials and foreign governments from Syria, with whom we're
now dealing - to Burma, to Belize, Haiti, Colombia and Peru
-- and, therefore, I simply want to flag that as one of these
other issues that people here have been concerned about that
I think that while this war has diverted our attention,
there's another one right here at home that is the
consequence of this. And somehow I think we've got to renew
those efforts or find a way to refocus our energy on it.
CHAIRMAN PELL: Thank you very much, indeed, Senator Kerry.
Senator McConnell.
SENATOR McCONNELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I want to go back to the subject of war
crimes, but I want to just sort of set Saddam Husayn aside
for a moment.
1 believe it's correct that 41 years ago, 61 countries became
signatories to what is commonly referred to as the Geneva
Conventions.
SECRETARY BAKER: Yes,
SENATOR McCONNELL: I think it is correct that there is
currently no way to prosecute someone who violates the Geneva
Accords. So completely aside from the question of the fate
of Saddam Husayn, would it, Mr. Secretary, be a good idea to
have some kind of tribunal? Typically, we think when we
commit a crime, there ought to be some way to be brought to
justice. Would it be a good idea to have some kind of
international tribunal for the adjudication of those who
might commit violations of the Geneva Accords?
SECRETARY BAKER: I would want to give that some thought,
Senator McConnell, because we dealt rather effectively, 1
think, and in keeping with our judicial principles in the
aftermath of World War II with the question of war crimes,
and there was no international tribunal then, if I'm not
mistaken.
-50-
SENATOR McCONNELL: May I interject?
SECRETARY BAKER: Sure.
SENATOR McCONNELL: That was essentially the victors trying
the losers.
SECRETARY BAKER: Right.
SENATOR McCONNELL: And I wouldn't rule that out as a way to
approach it here, but I was suggesting possibly another
alternative, which is to try to work something possibly
through the United Nations that creates a tribunal for the
pursuing of those who violate the Geneva Accords.
SECRETARY BAKER: But the reason I mention the World War II
experience is because ---------- and, of course, I haven't seen what
you have in mind, but to the extent that you create an
international organization, you might constrain the
flexibility or freedom that a collection of countries might
otherwise have.
SENATOR McCONNELL: So it might be more desirable to use the
previous precedent --
SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I think that you ----- without ---
because I have consistently refused to speculate on whether
or not we would expand our war aims to include war crimes
trials over the course of the past two days. And without in
any way changing that posture, it seems to me that it would
be better to keep your options open and to possibly --
SENATOR McCONNELL: I was really trying to separate the
current crisis from the larger question, which is what is the
appropriate way to pursue those who violate the Geneva
Accords?
SECRETARY BAKER: I think that's something that would have to
have a lot of study and that would have to be looked at by
legal authorities. But from a political standpoint, it would
occur to me that right now nobody's ruled war crimes out as
an option, but there has not been -- nobody that I'm aware of
has as yet embraced it as a war goal or war aim.
SENATOR McCONNELL: If I may be so bold, Mr. Secretary, I
might suggest that in establishing the new world order, it
might be appropriate for us to spend a good deal of time on
the question of what one does when he violates that order --
what price you pay for that --- in terms of adjudicating
somebody who is clearly a war criminal.
-51-
Let me change to another subject. The Administration
suspended discussions with the PLO a little under a year ago,
and, obviously, the PLO has openly and aggressively supported
Iraq in the current conflict. I'm wondering what your view
is now as to the role the PLO could play, if any at all, in
the aftermath of the current conflict in establishing a
peaceful Middle East.
SECRETARY BAKER: Well, the PLO, as I testified yesterday in
the other body, Senator, in supporting Saddam Husayn made the
wrong choice. I don't think there's much doubt about that,
and I would think that there might be some sense or
recognition of that, even on the part of some in that
organization.
But by doing that, what the PLO did was signal that it
prefers confrontation over peace. The PLO had no role in the
efforts that we made over 14 months to try and bring about an
Israeli/Palestiniar dialogue. So I think those would be my
responses in answer to your question.
SENATOR McCONNELL: Are you suggesting then that whatever
right they may have had to be at the table, if there are
subsequently discussions with Israel and its neighbors
regarding the Occupied Territories, that the PLO may well
have forfeited their place at the table?
SECRETARY BAKER: I think it's important that Palestinians ----
let's talk about Palestinians -- clearly and unequivocally
demonstrate that they are committed to peace if they are
going to participate in efforts to achieve peace in the
aftermath of this crisis.
SENATOR McCONNELL: So the PLO may have forfeited its spot at
the table.
SECRETARY BAKER: I'm not ----
SENATOR McCONNELL: If it ever had one to begin with.
SECRETARY BAKER: Well, that's correct. I mean, the question
assumes that there was one to begin with, and there are
differing views with respect to that, of course.
SENATOR McCONNELL: Speaking of those who picked the wrong
side, I don't think we've discussed yet this morning King
Hussein's statement of yesterday.
I don't have to tell you that a number of fundamentalists, 1
understand, are now in the Cabinet in the Jordanian
-52-
government. It obviously appears as a result of yesterday's
speech that the King, if not moving to the other side, is
there in this conflict, and I'd like your assessment of
what's going on in Jordan and how you see this whole
situation.
SECRETARY BAKER: The President spoke to this last night,
Senator, on his way to a dinner in New York, and he made the
point very forcefully that we have a major disagreement with
the King and what he said in that speech and the position
that he's taken.
You know, to allege that our effort against Iraq is unjust
and exceeds the U.N. resolution is something that is patently
not true. We have repeatedly emphasized that our objective
is not the destruction of Iraq; it is the liberation of
Kuwait.
Quite frankly, we find it very sad that the King omitted in
this rather long speech any reference whatsoever -- not one
single reference --- to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and omitted
any reference, therefore, to any call for withdrawal.
So we try to understand the pressure that the King is under,
and he is under quite a bit of pressure -- the point you made
about membership in the Cabinet, and SO forth. We intend to
keep lines of communication open to the King, notwithstanding
the fact that he's on the wrong side, and we have a major
disagreement here with him.
When we look at alternatives, we don't see what we perceive
to be a particularly pretty picture -- alternatives to the
King, and, therefore, we would think that it's important to
keep our lines of communication open and to make it clear to
him and to that government that we fundamentally disagree
with that position.
SENATOR McCONNELL: While we're talking about what I guess
could be called behavior modification in the aftermath of
this conflict, where do you see, Mr. Secretary, the prior
relationship between the Saudis and the PLO?
SECRETARY BAKER: Between what?
SENATOR McCONNELL: The Saudis and the PLO in the aftermath
of what's been happening.
SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I don't think it's any secret that
the Saudis have cut the PLO off from financial support.
-53-
SENATOR McCONNELL: We expect that to continue, I assume.
SECRETARY BAKER: I don't have any reason to believe it's
going to change any time in the near future.
SENATOR McCONNELL: With regard to Syria, Mr. Secretary, do
you think we are in an enhanced position now to encourage the
Syrians in some kind of post-war discussion to be a
constructive partner in settling their dispute with the
Israelis?
SECRETARY BAKER: I think that there, as I. indicated in
generic terms, Senator, in my remarks, I think that there are
not only challenges but opportunities ---------- or will be, sorry ----
in the aftermath of this crisis. I would hope that there
would be some opportunity there. A lot will depend upon the
attitude of the Government of Syria and whether or not they
are willing to fundamentally change some of the policy
approaches that they've taken in the past.
SENATOR McCONNELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
"
CHAIRMAN PELL: Senator Simon.
SENATOR SIMON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
First let me give you a little buckshot from a variety of
things. The Syrian situation that Senator McConnell just
mentioned, the front--page story in The New York Times today
concerns me. I'm not asking for any comments here now.
I think caution has to be exercised as we work with Syria in
the situation there. On the African situation that Senator
Kassebaum mentioned -- and I appreciate her mentioning it,
and I also appreciate your comments --------- I would simply add to
the Sudan and Ethiopian and Angolan situation --- Liberia is
another one where clearly I think we have major
responsibilities.
SECRETARY BAKER: I agree with that. I agree with that,
Senator. I had it on my list. I just never --
SENATOR S1MON: No, no. Well, I --
SECRETARY BAKER: There were so many of them --
SENATOR SIMON: All right.
SECRETARY BAKER: - - but I agree with you.
-54-
SENATOR SIMON: Just a point of clarification: You were
asked about the $400 million bond, the 400 million for Israel
for relocation. This is a loan guarantee; it's not a grant
from the United States. And I just for the record want to
make that clear for anyone who may be looking at the record.
In regard to the Middle East situation, Senator Helms said we
don't want to be assisting a government headed by Saddam.
And 1 think we're all unanimous on that.
SECRETARY BAKER: Yes.
SENATOR SIMON: Now, speaking just for myself, I also believe
we ought to make equally clear to the people of Iraq if they
change that government ---- and we would welcome a change in
that government --------- we are eager to work with them.
Now, the primary financing for that, obviously, should come
from other countries in the Middle East.
SECRETARY BAKER: We agree on that too, Senator; and we have
tried to make that clear.
SENATOR SIMON: Yes. I guess I would like to see us do
everything we can to stress that. But we're not only willing
to shoot and bomb people in the name of justice but to help
them in the name of justice, and the more that we can do that
I think the better off we are.
And then as regards the Palestine situation, as has been
mentioned here, my own feeling -- this is our chance to lobby
you here -- my own feeling is that two things that you have
already mentioned might very well be initial steps before we
move to questions of people and territory.
One is the water situation. It's very interesting that in
the trip that some of us took to the Middle East a few weeks
ago, Prime Minister Shamir, President Mubarak --- the leaders
of that area ***** all talk about water. I've been working for
a couple of years on an attempt to get our Government to do
more in the area of Finding an inexpensive way of converting
salt water to fresh water. It would be important for the
Southwest United States, for Florida, but extremely important
in the Middle East where, with the population growth in
Egypt, for example, they still have to live on four percent
of the land. And that's not going to change unless we can
get more water for them. So the water policy is extremely
important, and I'm pleased to note that the President's
budget includes some money in this area.
-55-
And this is an area where it seems to me we can pull Israel
and the Arab countries together and work constructively.
The second area, where there is agreement on the part of
Israel and the Arab countries that we ought to be doing
something, is on arms control nuclear, chemical,
biological. Let's eliminate that threat from the Middle East
with proper verification procedures.
If you can work on those two things first ------ things that are
achievable - and build trust and reduce fears, then it seems
to me then you can move to that third step. I'm talking
about territory and people. And my hope is that we can move
in that direction.
Then, finally, may I ask you? You talk about the Middle East
Bank --
SECRETARY BAKER: Senator, may I just say I agree with
practically everything you've said. I would suggest though
that confidence building measures ----- if we can lump all of
that under that heading -- and direct dialogue - that is,
direct negotiations --------- are not mutually exclusive.
SENATOR SIMON: No. It can't work.
SECRETARY BAKER: And the two things can and should go on
hand in hand right at the same time.
SENATOR SIMON: But some are a little more sensitive
politically politically --
SECRETARY BAKER: True.
SENATOR SIMON: --- than others.
SECRETARY BAKER: True enough.
SENATOR SIMON: But we are in agreement there.
The Middle East Bank for Reconstruction and Development ---
this is the first I had heard about it, frankly. We are
talking about a multi-nation bank here, are we?
SECRETARY BAKER: Yes. Again, in keeping with the general
tenor of my remarks, I think most of the economic
reconstruction efforts have got to come from countries in the
region. And we have, indeed, as members of our coalition,
some very, very wealthy countries. They have an interest in
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security and stability in this region and in economic
development in the region.
And SO it would seem to me that, you know, what I suggest
urging here is something not unlike the African Development
Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American
Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. We have it for all these other areas. We don't
have it for the Middle East.
SENATOR SIMON: And you contemplate all the countries in the
Middle East being involved, right?
SECRETARY BAKER: I don't think it should be an exclusive
organization at all. It ought to be an inclusive
organization, just like these other countries are inclusive
--- provided that they are willing to subscribe to the goals
and purposes of the organization. And that, of course, would
have to be worked out through diplomatic exchanges and
consultations with the various parties.
SENATOR SIMON: I understand. But it seems to me that goes
along with these other confidence-building measures that you
talked about.
If I can ask one final question, Senator McConnell mentioned
Muslim fundamentalists in the Jordanian cabinet; and we have
seen the rise, particularly since January 16th, of Muslim
fundamentalism, you know, in Morocco, in Pakistan, in South
Africa -------- in a great variety of places. Are there any
reflections that you have on this? Is this a phenomenon that
we can in some way deal with constructively? What do we do
in this area?
SECRETARY BAKER: Well, it is a phenomenon. You mean that
you're talking now about the question of Muslim
fundamentalism? It is an issue that is developing in
different countries in different ways. I mean some countries
are tending more toward that; others are, frankly, tending
less toward that.
And I don't want to -- because it is a sensitive subject ----------
get into naming countries in this session. But it is
something that we are very much aware of. lt is something
that will have to be taken into consideration in our post-
crisis planning and in our discussions and decisions with
respect to what we do politically, militarily and
economically in the region in the aftermath.
That's the only way 1 know how to respond to your question.
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I did say yesterday, and I'll repeat here, that the dissent
that is, as has been evidenced in many Arab countries to
the coalition's action has not been, frankly, as great as
many anticipated before hostilities erupted. And I know you
remember all of the suggestions that the region from the
Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, or wherever, would be
aflame. That hasn't really happened.
There are some substantial shifts in public opinion in some
countries and there are manifestations of dissent from the
actions being taken.
So these are things that we continually work with and keep in
mind.
SENATOR SIMON: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
CHAIRMAN PELL: Thank you very much. Senator Brown, welcome
to the Committee.
SENATOR BROWN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I
believe that your efforts to build this coalition and to
=
raise money from it will go down as one of the most dramatic
successes in diplomatic history of this country.
I'm surprised that a member of the Senate wouldn't understand
the difference between getting pledges and collecting, but
each of us have a different electoral process, 1 guess.
SECRETARY BAKER: Thank you, Senator Brown.
SENATOR BROWN: l'd like also to express a very deep thanks
that this Administration has not decided to have politicians
set military strategy. It seems to me one of the lessons we
have to learn From Vietnam is that having politicians set
strategy, set detailed bombing raids, do detail work that
they're not equipped or trained to is a disaster. And it
seems to me that's one of the lessons of Vietnam that,
hopefully, we've learned.
I would like your thoughts in a number of areas, if I could.
First of all, your budget includes a recommendation for an
expanded authorization for the International Monetary Fund.
It's an increase in budget authority in excess of $12 billion
this year.
Would you share with us your thoughts as to what happens if
we do not approve additional funds? What consequences would
follow that might be SO severe that we would need to make
that extension of authority?
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SECRETARY BAKER: Well, the most significant and severe one,
in my view, would be the abdication of United States'
leadership in international economic affairs, and I think
that would be a serious consequence, Senator.
We have the largest economy -- we are the largest economy in
the world, twice as large as the Japanese economy. We are
the largest participants in both the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund by a significant amount, and we
have led in the past in international economic matters.
1 think, as 1 indicated in my opening remarks, when 1 said I
would hope that everyone on the Committee and the
Administration would be in agreement that United States'
leadership is required ---------- leadership in the post-crisis
environment.
1 happen to believe that continuing United States' leadership
politically and economically in international affairs is very
important to the United States, and we should maintain it,
and we should not abdicate it.
Now, let me just say, having said that, that it's important
that the American people know and understand that the $12
billion figure is a capital increase. It is the United
States' share of an overall capital increase for the
International Monetary Fund, and it does not involve any
outlays of dollars. So I think it's important that we all
understand that.
SENATOR BROWN: I appreciate that. Let me observe: I like
you very much better as a fund raiser for democracy rather
than a fund spender. From my own perspective, it strikes me
that we've gone from 50 percent of the world's GNP in 1946
down to somewhere in the neighborhood of 22 percent, if I'm
correct.
We've gone from the biggest creditor nation in the world to
the biggest debtor nation in the world or in the history of
the world, and we've gotten to the point where we have the
biggest trade deficit in the world or in the history of the
world from a country that had the biggest trade surplus.
It seems to me that we need to be willing to understand
there's a change that's needed; that what was appropriate at
the end of World War II in the way of leadership may not be
possible any longer. Obviously, this appears to be a point
of difference.
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But I do think we cannot continue to ignore what's a building
crisis in our own economy. l'd like to get your thoughts on
another subject, if I could, as well. The GATT negotiations,
obviously, 1 know, have received a great deal of attention
From you, and I think justifiably SO. I think the growing
protectiveness, the growing size of the European Economic
Community and the protectionism that that Community exhibits
has to be a concern to us.
How would you view Congress developing some statutes that
call for reciprocal trade policy, specifically imposing
penalties on the European Economic Community commensurate
with the kind of trade abuses they levy against us?
SECRETARY BAKER: I'm a free trader, Senator Brown, and that
concept is not consistent with the principles of free trade.
[[ understand the politics of it, because I've had some
experience in that arena as well, but that is not consistent
with the principles of free trade. I think it would move the
United States in the wrong direction. I think it would move
the United States' economy in the wrong direction, and I
"
think it would end up hurting us rather than helping US.
Now, must we have fair trade as well as free trade? You
bet. And shouldn't we have the same opportunities?
Absolutely. But we really ought to look at them across the
broad spectrum and not sector by sector on a pure reciprocity
basis or we'll find reciprocity being applied against us, and
it will, frankly, in my view move US in the wrong direction.
SENATOR BROWN: 1 share your belief in the value of free
trade. Just the question I have is, how do you persuade an
entity such as the European Economic Community to make
concessions without some potential consequences for them if
they don't.
SECRETARY BAKER: You negotiate hard, and you continue to
negotiate hard, and you make the point, as I made here
earlier today in direct discussions with the EC, that the
failure of the Uruguay Round would be more than just a trade
or economic failure; it would be a major political failure,
and it would create major political problems for the United
States, for the European Community, and for other countries
around the world.
SENATOR BROWN: You mentioned with regard to the guarantee on
Israeli housing that there were some technical matters that
had held it up. Can you share with us what those are and ----
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SECRETARY BAKER: I'm sending a list, in response to a
question in the other body, Senator Brown, and I will send
the same thing to you. It's information primarily that was
agreed to be provided and that has not as yet been provided.
SENATOR BROWN: So you don't see it as a major hurdle?
SECRETARY BAKER: I would hope that we could get the
information and move forward. As I indicated, I'm perfectly
willing to do it in one tranche in order to expedite it. The
recommendations from the technical people were. that we do it
in separate tranches. I understand the need and the
importance of expediting this, but I also understand that we
work very hard to negotiate this agreement. Because the
United States and many, many other countries have serious
concerns about using these funds to build settlements in the
Occupied Territories. We deserve to know that they're not
going to be so used. I think you would probably even agree
with that.
SENATOR BROWN: Certainly. 1 wonder if you could share with
us any thoughts you have as to what might be included in the
supplemental with regard to Desert Storm? Are you at a point
where you can share some of what all you want to include in
that supplemental?
SECRETARY BAKER: That would be a DoD supplemental, Senator
Brown. I'm not in a position to answer those questions. I
would refer you to DoD.
SENATOR BROWN: Your thought would not be to include any
assistance to other countries that have been impacted by the
war in that supplemental? I would assume that would come
under the State Department?
SECRETARY BAKER: Yes. First of all, we haven't received any
request. Until we receive a request, we're not in a position
to consider it.
SENATOR BROWN: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN PELL: 1hank you very much, Senator Brown. Mr.
Secretary, I understand you have an appointment, but we still
have two Senators.
SECRETARY BAKER: Absolutely.
CHAIRMAN PELL: Thank you very much. Senator Moynihan.
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SENATOR MOYNIHAN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I have two
questions. They won't be long.
First is a sensitive matter. I know that you're equally
sensitive sensitive with you and you're concerned about it.
On March 16, it will be the sixth year that Terry Anderson
has been in captivity in Beirut, we assume. That's the
longest of our hostages there. Have you anything you can
tell US. In particular, we do have a relationship with Syria
that we haven't had in other times ------------------------- times in his captivity
when he was taken hostage. Is there any movement there?
I know how sensitive this is for you, sir. I don't mean to
pressure you, but I would not want to not ask you.
SECRETARY BAKER: Senator Moynihan, I would be glad to chat
with you after the hearing. Every time we get into this
matter publicly, it has the potential for moving things in
the very direction we don't want them go. It has the
potential of being counterproductive, and I'm sure you can
understand that.
So let me share with you what we know, what we have learned
over the past several weeks and months, privately.
SENATOR MOYNIHAN: I would be happy. I'd appreciate that
you would want to do that. Just one other question. You
mentioned confidence-building measures with respect to arms.
They are equivalent in diplomacy, and we're thinking of the
future after the Gulf conflict.
One of the conspicuous facts of our present activity is the
involvement of the United Nations. You have been masterful
in bringing that forward. [ think you probably will want to
keep. a U.N. role in the future. It's a commitment the
President has made.
With respect to Israel, the binding difficulty has been that
resolution 3379 that declares Zionism to be a form of
racism. While that is the stated position of the United
Nations, why would a country want to have anything to do with
the United Nations?
In December a year go, the Vice President went up to New York
to the Yeshiva University and said, "We want to lead a
campaign to reverse that resolution." It's an obscene
thing. President Ford, as you remember, was outraged by it.
-62-
SECRETARY BAKER: Yes.
SENATOR MOYNIHAN: Could 1 ask if there's any progress
there? Because if there was, that might indicate a role of
the U.N. in the post-Gulf crisis? In particularly, have we
talked to the Soviets? That was a Soviet initiative. I was
our Ambassador at that time. They clearly have moved away
from that view and it would not be difficult for them to
disassociate themselves from it. It might be a
confidence-building test with them.
SECRETARY BAKER: Senator Moynihan, it would, indeed, be a
good confidence-building measure if we could be successful in
seeing a repeal of that.
The Soviet Union, as you know, very recently has improved its
relationship with Israel. There is not a full normalization
there yet but it was certainly has been moving in that
direction. We've worked very hard with the Soviets to move
it in that direction, and we were pleased to see the
movement. I hope it continues. A lot will depend upon what
happens, 1 think, internally.
What happens in Soviet foreign policy is going to be affected
by what happens internally, along the lines I mentioned in my
opening remarks.
But I don't disagree with you one bit that that would be one
good thing that could be looked at. Whether or not there
would be any chance of success, it's too early to try and
judge that.
SENATOR MOYNIHAN: Perhaps you would explore the matter and
privately let us know what you, --
SECRETARY BAKER: On that one, of course, it's not just the
Soviets, now that it's there.
SENATOR MOYNIHAN: We might even get Kuwait to join us.
(Laughter) Well, I don't ask for the impossible, Mr.
Secretary. Thank you very much, sir.
SECRETARY BAKER: Thank you, Senator.
CHAIRMAN PELL: Senator, thank you. Senator Robb.
SENATOR ROBB: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I
suspect that you recognize that when I get a chance to ask a
question on this particular panel, you know that your
endurance is finally going to be tested to the final point;
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that we're coming to a conclusion, and I appreciate your
patience. I realize that your principal appearance this
morning is to discuss the 1992 budget and some of the matters
that are in it.
1 have just a couple of questions. One relates to one that
Senator Brown asked. It goes to what, I guess, many of us
had been referring to as "burden-sharing. II You have done
more recently creative responsibility-sharing, in terms of
how we provide whatever economic and military assistance to
allies and to others who participate with us in this venture
or are impacted economically or otherwise as a consequence of
their geographical proximity to it.
You mentioned that the DOD participation in the supplemental
would probably be more important than the State Department
participation in the upcoming request. But I. wonder if you
could just speak very briefly about the philosophy, if you
will, of the kind of assistance that ----- let me preface my
question by saying that there have been a number of reports
that various types of assistance have been offered to allies,
presumably as part of their inducement to remain in the
alliance, whatever the case might be that may or may not be
appropriate for public discussion at this point.
There are also those who do, indeed, suffer economic
consequences; some quite severe in the case of our longest
and most loyal ally in this particular area. Could you give
us some indication of the types of economic assistance that
the United States might be expected to provide to both allies
who have participated as well as those who might be impacted
and participated in the near term and whether or not you
would expect similar participation from the major economic
trading partners, for instance, Germany and Japan?
SECRETARY BAKER: I'll try to do that, Senator Robb. But,
first, without wanting to get you in any trouble in your
caucus, may I take this opportunity to thank you for the
support that you have given us on a number of foreign policy
issues over the course of the past year or SO since joining
this panel, and it's always a pleasure to respond to your
questions.
First of all, the United States is not offering or promising
assistance that's any different than the kind of assistance
that we have furnished some of these countries in the past.
We do have substantial assistance, for instance, going to
Egypt. We expect to continue that, direct economic
assistance. Some of it's economic support funds. Others,
FMF assistance. So we would expect to continue that.
..64
What we've done with our coalition partners is consult with
them about two general types of assistance to the coalition
effort. One is direct financial assistance --- economic
assistance to the United States to defray our incremental
costs by virtue of our deployment to the region.
The second is assistance to the Frontline States,
particularly Egypt, lurkey, and Jordan, but some others as
well, that have occasioned losses as a consequence of this
conflict. That has taken the form of some assistance in
kind. There's some military assistance involved there. Some
of it's weaponry; some of it's cash, and there's some
economic assistance that's cash.
1 should also say with respect to some of the payments to
defer our incremental costs, some of that has been in terms
of equipment that's been provided. I specifically am
thinking about the Federal Republic of Germany. I don't know
whether that answers your question.
SENATOR ROBB: It does, in part, Mr. Secretary. One country
that you did not specifically mention there and the one that
has certainly been impacted and shown remarkable restraint, I
think in the eyes of the international community and those of
us in the United States, they know that they certainly have
the power and the will to respond, is Israel. 1 appreciate
the fact that you've indicated that the $400 million loan
guarantee is --
SECRETARY BAKER: That's a very good point.
SENATOR ROBB: You didn't make any specific reference to
Israel.
SECRETARY BAKER: Israel is a Frontline State. Let me make
sure that you understand. We think it's a Frontline State.
We don't put that appellation on it.
SENATOR ROBB: It was just that you didn't mention it in the
other Frontline States, and I was --
SECRETARY BAKER: Yes. We don't put that appellation on it
in terms of the financial coordinating committee group.
Because for the most part, we are raising funds from
countries that are at war. Some of them are at war with
Israel, and it's not likely that they are going to be
contributing to Israel as a Frontline State: But we have
talked on behalf of Israel to the European Community and to
other countries that are making some substantial
contributions to Israel. It is suffering from direct Scud
-65-
attacks, from an absence of tourism. So it has economic loss
and economic damage as a direct consequence of this crisis.
For our part, of course, we're doing everything we can
militarily to deter and diminish and prevent those attacks.
We're glad to see that in recent days that, at least, the
volume and degree have been scaled back. I don't want to sit
up here and say to you that that's solely because of what we
have been able to do out there in western Iraq, but I think,
certainly, it plays a part.
We have provided Israel with a number of Patriot missile
batteries on an expedited basis. Some of those have been
provided by way of grant. We've provided them, of course,
with the missiles to fire those batteries and we've provided,
in some instances, American crews to man those batteries.
SENATOR ROBB: Mr. Secretary, I recognize the very
sensitivity of these --
SECRETARY BAKER: We're also giving Israel some CH-53
helicopters and some F-15s under the Southern Region
Amendment. As you know, in last year's budget, there's a
provision for a $700 million ---- there's authority for a $700
million drawdown of Defense Department stocks. I don't know
what the status of that is with respect to whether that's
going to happen because of the needs of the American military
forces now with 500,000 Americans in the Gulf.
SENATOR ROBB: Many of us are obviously very pleased by both
the restraint that has been shown by Israel and the maturing
of the relationships between Israel and some of our allies in
this particular operation. I hope that continues.
I wonder, Mr. Secretary, sincé you're here, just a couple of
concurrent events that I don't believe you've touched on. We
don't have an opportunity to have you before the Committee.
These events that have all occurred in the last few hours, or
24 hours, there was a meeting that took place some time
yesterday, I guess it was, between the Deputy Foreign
Minister of the Soviet Union, the Turkish Foreign Minister,
the Iranian leadership. I wonder if you would comment on
anything that would be appropriate for public disclosure that
you might know about that meeting?
And, secondly, the attack this morning on Whithall? I don't
believe you've made any reference to that. If you know that
the IRA, who apparently take credit for it, and have been at
least given credit --- whether there's any known association
between that and Operation Desert Storm?
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SECRETARY BAKER: I do not know, Senator Robb, anything more
than what I knew coming in here at 10:00, because I have been
here ever since 10:00. So I don't know anything beyond what
you've just stated with respect to either one of those issues.
SENATOR ROBB: Mr. Secretary, I thank you again. Your
endurance and patience is appreciated. Mr. Chairman, I think
it's time we let him get on to other business.
CHAIRMAN PELL: Thank you very much. A question I would have
is, in light of King Hussein's statement, will there be any
change in our aid policy to Jordan?
SECRETARY BAKER: Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, I said before the
House that there would not be. That was before the speech
was made. But, again, I have to repeat what the President
said yesterday, which is, we try to understand the pressures
that the King is subject to. When we look around and
consider the alternatives to the King, it is not all that
bright a picture.
CHAIRMAN PELL: I understand. One comment, in connection
with the war crimes. Maybe we should look at the example of
World War II, when we had the most organized war crimes
tribunal, I think, in history practically. At first, they
set up a United Nations War Crimes Commission that did the
ground rules and then the trials followed afterwards. I
speak subjectively because my father was the commissioner.
It worked pretty well.
SECRETARY BAKER: I said, when the question first came up
today, 1 think, Mr. Chairman, that before we would make --
even if we were prepared to make a decision on that, before
we could act in any way, we would have to consult with our
allies and probably with the United Nations.
CHAIRMAN PELL: Thank you. Without objection, the record
will stay open for any further questions for a written
reply. Thank you, Secretary, very much for being with us.
SECRETARY BAKER: Thank you very much.
(Thereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 12:52 p.m.)
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PRESS STATE
No. 78
May 5, 1989
ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER, III
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE
THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
MAY 4, 1989
The Challenge of Change in
U.S. Soviet Relations
[Introduction by Ambassador David Abshire, CSIS President]
David, thank you very much, and thank you, ladies and
gentlemen.
I am honored to once again be here at the CSIS. Ever since its
founding, I think this Center has combined an understanding of
international problems with a vigorous debate over how America
should conduct its foreign policy. Those of us who have been
privileged to serve this nation in one capacity or another, to
serve this nation abroad or to participate in the formation of
policy here at home, know full well the ardors of this task.
We know, too, that assessments of reality are not enough.
Judgments and words ultimately have to be turned into action if
we are going to serve the public interest.
The assessment of reality has become more difficult in today's
world because the pace of international change has accelerated
considerably. Some years ago I happened across a scholarly
study of the late 18th century entitled The Age of Revolutions,
and perhaps one day historians might describe our times the
same way.
Just consider for a moment, if you will, some of the trends
which are transforming our world. Democracy, an idea and
political system challenged for much of the post-war era,
really is on the offensive. Millions of people in our own
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NO. 78
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hemisphere and in countries such as the Philippines and Korea
have achieved now democratic governments. Millions elsewhere,
in Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union and in the People's
Republic of China, are demanding free institutions in a way
that we've never seen before. So I think it is fair to say
that the quest for democracy is the most vibrant political Fact
of these times.
Another great transformation that we are seeing is economic.
Free markets, private initiative have become the new watchwords
of economic development because those concepts work - - and we
know this very well now -- actually work in practice. And
closely allied to economic change is technological progress.
The new technologies of information and communication have
helped to create a global economy, an economy which transcends
the traditional boundaries of the nation state.
There have been other transformations as well. Emerging
technologies open new horizons, I think, for greater military
stability. Other trends, though, such as the proliferation of
chemical weapons and missiles -- as David mentioned to you --
the proliferation of those weapons to volatile regions and to
irresponsible states present us with greater dangers.
And while we struggle to deal with traditional political and
military problems, I think we all must become increasingly
aware of new transnational threats -- threats such as
environmental hazards, terrorism, the drug trade -- that demand
greater and greater international cooperation if they are going
to be properly addressed.
Every nation has been affected in one way or another by these
transformations. And, as a consequence, really, no
international relationship has remained the same. This, of
course, is especially true of United States-Soviet relations.
The result, I think, is a rare opportunity -- a chance to
transform our attitudes, our words and, above all, our actions
toward each other for the better. But this opportunity is also
-- and I think David touched on this as well -- at the same
time a challenge, a challenge to understand first what is
happening and secondly, why and how to seize the opportunity
for progress toward a freer and more peaceful international
community.
The challenge of change in United States-Soviet relations
begins, I think, with change, fundamental change, in the Soviet
Union. For nearly half a century now we and our allies have
confronted a Soviet superpower along the great fault lines of
the post-war period. This struggle has been rooted in two
profoundly different visions -- the democratic vision and the
communist vision. We differ over the rights of the individual:
we differ over the power of the state; we differ over the rule
of law, the use of force. the role of religion. In short, we
differ over what we consider to be the basic values of society.
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While we may have erred from time to time, on the whole I think
it's fair to say that we in the West have been very, very
faithful to our vision. Great sacrifices have been made. The
burdens were -- and, indeed, the burdens still are sometimes
very difficult to bear. There were and there always will be
risks. But we upheld our values. And we prevented for 40
years war in Europe.
Surely some of the change we see now in the Soviet Union is a
consequence of our success. There would be no quest For
democratic institutions if democratic institutions had failed.
There would be less soul-searching of the communist vision if
the democratic vision had somehow faded or disappeared. And an
alliance of free nations, working together, sharing risks and
responsibilities while pursuing freedom and extending economic
progress, has always, I think, offered a rather convincing
alternative.
I think it can also be said, however, that the dramatic changes
which are sweeping the Soviet Union are not due simply to
Western fortitude. It is also the failure of the communist
vision to produce results, judged by its own standards, that
inspires calls for perestroika. It is the fear that outdated
dogma and unworkable institutions will leave Soviet society
behind, isolated from technological progress and the global
economy, that really accelerates reform in the Soviet Union.
And just as surely, change is motivated also by the belief of
some in the Soviet Union that revolutions have a tough time
living by slogans alone.
The President has said and I have said that we have absolutely
no wish to see perestroika fail. To the contrary, we would
very much like it to succeed. And that achievement could have
great international effect.
As Foreign Minister Shevardnadze told the Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affairs -- and I quote --
"
we must labor solidly to
convince the people that we are thinking first and foremost
about their interests We are aware of and declare the truth
that foreign policy cannot be divorced from domestic
realities.' A process that promises to increase the freedom
and improve the well-being of the Soviet peoples really is in
everyone's interest. R process that promises to change Soviet
international behavior towards diplomatic solutions and
problem-solving, rather than the use of force or intimidation,
I think offers hope for a radically improved international
order.
That's why we've been so encouraged by the words and the
concepts of what General Secretary Gorbachev refers to as the
"new thinking.' And in a number of places, I think it's fair
to say that words have turned into realities. The General
Secretary pledged that Soviet troops would leave Afghanistan on
February 15, and they did. He signed the INF Treaty, and
SS-20s are being destroyed. Last December he announced
unilateral troop cuts in Europe, and now we've seen Soviet
tanks leaving Hungary. Soon we hope to see them destroyed.
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The Soviets have begun releasing political prisoners. And, as
we all know, great strides have been made in permitting Freer
emigration. Most importantly, the Soviets now talk of
enforcing the rule of law and other guarantees of individual
rights which are very, very familiar and very basic to us in
the West. Limited elections have taken place. The growing
dissatisfaction with the Soviet system and pressure for change
is unmistakable, and it j.s widespread.
Words of hope are indeed not limited just to the Soviet Union.
In Poland, the free labor union Solidarity has been legalized
following unprecedented Roundtable agreements. And in Hungary,
the mechanics of a multi-party system are actively being
considered.
In the economic sphere as well, the spread of private
ownership, cooperatives, and decentralization of power creates
some promising opportunities. Soon we may see the Soviets move
forward to join the global economy. I think we would welcome,
and welcome strongly, a Soviet economy open to world markets
with a freely convertible ruble.
We also recognize, however, that in this critical area, as in
many others, there are many hard choices to be made. It is far
too early for us to know, of course, whether perestroika will
or will not succeed. But it begins and it ends with the people
of the Soviet Union, and they will determine whether it
succeeds or whether it fails.
These great changes, however, are not the only realities of the
Soviet Union today.
There is an uneasy and, I might add, a not always peaceful
coexistence between the slogans of the "new thinking" and the
reality of both Soviet capabilities and Soviet actions. We
must all, I think, face the fact that the Soviets continue to
pose a significant military threat to Western interests. Even
after the unilateral Soviet reductions in Europe take place,
the Warsaw Pact would retain a two-to-one edge in tanks and
artillery. At a time when we hear talk of unilateral
reductions, of the need to cut defense spending, and of the
necessity to transfer precious resources from the military
economy to the civilian sector, 3,500 --- that's right, 3,500 --
new Soviet tanks continue to roll off the production lines each
year. That happens to be a production rate five times greater
than our own.
For all the talk of "defensive defense,' Soviet military
exercises still continue to show a marked inclination for
taking the offensive.
For all the talk of openness, the Soviets have yet to publish a
real defense budget - a budget that would reveal what the
Soviets really are spending on defense: a budget that would
provide a guide to Soviet defense production; a budget, in
effect, that would show the direction of future Soviet defense
plans. If they were to publish such a budget, I think we could
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then evaluate the Soviet pledge to cut their defense budget by
14 percent and we could measure its impact. Indeed, we
challenge them to present such a budget and to publish openly,
as we do, the details of their worldwide forces and deployments.
For all of the talk of a common European home -- and we hear &
lot of that now -- the European house remains divided by Soviet
force. If there is ever to be a true "Common European House,"
the Soviets must no longer prevent the residents from moving
from room to room. But today the Wall still stands, and the
Brezhnev Doctrine remains unrenounced.
Unfortunately, there are still many regions where the "new
thinking" has yet to take root. We still see -- and we've
mentioned this from time to time -- many signs of the old
thoughts and the old actions in Central America where the
Soviets sent over $500 million in military aid to the
Sandinistas just last year. In the Middle East, long-range
bombers have just been sent to Qhaddafi. In Korea, the heavily
fortified North, supported by Soviet arms and aid, still
threatens the South. And in the Far East, of course, the
Soviets continue their occupation of Japan's Northern
Territories.
So the reality of Soviet change, as I have described it from
both sides, I think is both promising and problematic. How do
we address the very serious difficulties remaining on the
agenda, while giving due credit to the remarkable progress that
has been made in the past few years?
There are some who say that we don't need to do much of
anything because trends are so favorable to us. Their counsel
is to sit tight and simply await further Soviet concessions.
I don't happen to be of this school. I don't think we can be
passive in the face of these great strategic changes, nor can
we simply yield the initiative to a Soviet agenda that may not
reflect the best interests of the West. our foreign policy has
to be based on an understanding of change in the Soviet Union,
but it cannot wholly rely on that change to produce the results
that we want.
our actions, of course, will play an important role in shaping
the future of -Soviet relations. our policy has got to be
to press forward with our agenda, to test the application of
Soviet "new thinking" again and again.
In areas such as human rights and arms control, much progress
has been made and a framework for diplomatic exchange and
negotiations already exists. Our purpose here, I think, should
be to institutionalize these changes to make them, if we can,
more difficult to reverse. And we want both Soviet intentions
and capabilities to become more transparent.
Human rights will always head the list. As a democracy, of
course, we could not do otherwise and still be true to our own
values. We will always be concerned about how the Soviet Union
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and the governments in Eastern Europe treat their own
citizens. That is important not only for humanitarian reasons,
but also because we believe that a government's treatment of
its own people is a good measure of how it will treat other
states.
We are encouraged by recent Soviet performance with respect to
human rights and democratization, and we hope to see these
changes become a permanent part of the Soviets' legal system
and political code. By expressing these hopes, we seek not to
interfere in Soviet affairs but only to see the fulfillment of
the promises once made by the Soviet Union when it signed the
Helsinki Accords. These promises were, after all, reiterated
by General Secretary Gorbachev at the United Nations as
recently as December.
We shall also continue with the existing arms control framework
because it serves our objectives of stable deterrence at lower
levels of arms and risk. We intend to preserve and to
strengthen this framework. Indeed, the United States will soon
suggest a date for the resumption of the Strategic Arms Talks.
The talks on Conventional Forces in Europe and Confidence
Building Measures that began in Vienna last month I think can
contribute substantially to our objectives of deterrence at
lower levels of force. These give us a forum to challenge the
Soviets and their allies to come clean on the true level and
nature of their forces and to engage in careful reductions that
diminish the threat to the West. As I said in Vienna, current
force levels and structure in Europe are not engraved in stone.
But the challenge of change, ladies and gentlemen, cannot stop
there. Indeed, "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy gives
us a unique opportunity to take Moscow at its word -- take it
at its word -- across all areas of US-Soviet relations. Are
the Soviets willing to live up to the promise of their
rhetoric? Are the Soviets really prepared to recognize the
constraints of an interdependent world? Is Moscow really ready
to abandon the quest for unilateral gain? Can military
confrontation really be replaced by political dialogue and even
by cooperation? Will the slogans of "new thinking" be
translated into enduring action?
The only way to answer these questions is to test the "new
thinking" on issues that go beyond the recent intense Focus on
human rights and arms control. We face new threats and new
challenges in regional conflicts, in the proliferation of
advanced weapons, and in pressing transnational issues.
By testing Moscow across the board, we have the opportunity to
turn many of the opportunities presented by the "new thinking"
into reality. We can establish frameworks and baselines for
common dialogue in areas where no real dialogue or basis for
cooperation exists today. We can see whether the "new
thinking" is real once we probe beyond the slogans. We can
help fill the "new thinking" with content, and we can take
advantage of change in the Soviet Union to achieve a new level
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of cooperation and international stability. And we can also,
while we're at it, determine where the old thinking still holds
force.
Let me, if I might, be just a bit more specific:
First, we will focus on regional conflicts, a significant
source of East-West and international tension in the post-war
period. While the Soviet Union has not necessarily been the
cause of these conflicts, too often Soviet military aid and
diplomacy have impeded the search for solutions and have even
sometimes encouraged the violence. Now is the time to engage
the Soviet Union in a serious dialogue to determine whether
such policies really have changed. And the slogans of "new
thinking" must be given content for this dialogue to work.
The Soviets have got to understand that their inclusion in the
important process of resolving regional disputes requires them
to act responsibly and not just to make high-profile assertions
about a peace-loving intent. Establishing a basis for
cooperation depends not on a Soviet commitment to vague
generalities of peace but to the responsible behavior that will
in fact make peace possible.
There can be little doubt that the proliferation of advanced
weapons around the globe creates a strong need, and it creates
a greater urgency, to develop a common framework for resolving
regional disputes. Regional wars are unlikely to remain
limited for very long. Rather, they are likely to escalate
quickly, drawing us into conflicts that we should have helped
to resolve in the first place.
Second, in the areas of ballistic missile and chemical weapons
proliferation, we have only begun to establish new
international rules addressing these problems -- rules to which
the Soviets have not as yet agreed. It will be an objective of
mine in Moscow next week to determine whether we might develop
a Framework for working together to control a phenomenon which
threatens us all.
Third, we will approach the Soviets on transnational issues,
particularly the problems of the environment, which do not
respect national boundaries. Pollution, drugs, and terrorism
are all issues that should join, not separate, the Soviet Union
and the United States. These are new testing grounds for our
ability to work together. I believe that we can discover
whether the Soviet Union seriously understands the need to deal
with such issues, or whether it is prepared to pretend that
"old thinking" will somehow isolate Moscow from the
consequences.
Ladies and gentlemen, I'd like to conclude on a note of
historical perspective. Students of American-Soviet relations
are familiar with de Tocqueville's famous prophecy that the
world would eventually be dominated by the United States and
the Russian Empire --- the one based on freedom, the other based
on a denial of freedom. That prophecy very nearly came to
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pass. But in my view, a wise American diplomacy prevented it.
An important part of our vision was the rejection of a
condominium, of a division of the world according to spheres of
influence. Instead we sought to build up our allies, to
assemble a coalition of Free nations -- free to seek their own
destiny however they wished, just as our citizens are Free to
develop their own individual talents.
Now we are living in a time when these Western values are in
the ascendancy, when our allies have become strong and for the
most part prosperous. This changing world has challenged the
Soviet Union. It is a challenge that the Soviet Union, acting
in its own interests, has tried to meet through perestroika.
Yes, we have heard claims of "new thinking.' and we have seen
some of it translated into action. And we are saying to the
Soviet Union: let us continue. Free people can work together
peacefully, linked by a common destiny. Let us deal,
therefore, with the new problems of a different era guided by a
vision of a free and peaceful world.
Thank you all very, very much.
* * H. *