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[Heritage Foundation, 2/8/91]
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2
2
The 2 Backgrounder
Heritage Foundation
808
No.
The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002 (202) 546-4400
February 8, 1991
CONGRESS BICKERED OVER WEAPONS
NOW PROVING THEMSELVES IN THE GULF
INTRODUCTION
The early days of the war against Iraq confirm that high-technology
weapons are America's trump card against Saddam Hussein. America's top-
of-the-line warplanes and missiles have destroyed much of Iraq's air, in-
dustrial, nuclear, and chemical military power, and they have given allied for-
ces air supremacy over the 700-strong Iraqi air force. Now these weapons are
hammering Saddam's ground forces, cutting their supplies and weakening
their ability to fight a land battle. The defensive Patriot missile, meanwhile,
has spread a protective shield over Saudi and Israeli populations. Hundreds
and perhaps thousands of lives have been saved by the Patriot's ability to
knock almost all Iraqi Scud missiles out of the sky.
Had many members of Congress had their way, however, America would
not have these weapons which are winning the war against Saddam Hussein.
Critics in the 1980s charged that aircraft carriers, F-15 Eagle fighters, Patriot
air defense missiles, and other high-tech weapons were too expensive or un-
workable. Yet Ronald Reagan and George Bush continued to push for these
weapons against strong and often contemptuous opposition, ensuring that
America's best technology found its way from the laboratory to the battlefield.
Critics' Challenges. Critics in Congress of the Reagan military build-up
challenged many weapons critical to the Gulf war effort. Former Senator
Gary Hart, then Democrat from Colorado, claimed that the aircraft carriers
now sending waves of planes over Iraq, and the battleships now launching vol-
leys of Tomahawk cruise missiles against Baghdad, were obsolete. The M-1
Abrams tank - America's answer to Saddam's 5,000 Soviet tanks - was called
"vulnerable" and a "questionable buy" by Representative Ron Dellums, the
Note: Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt
to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
Democrat from California. Dellums also charged that the top-of-the-line
aircraft like the F-15 Eagle were "gold plated. ,,1 Military reformer Sheila
Tobias in 1982 wrote of the F-15 that once in battle, "the confusion of mass
combat [would] cancel out qualitative superiority.' The score in air-to-air
combat so far in Iraq: 28 Iraqi planes downed, zero for the U.S. Who now can
say that superior technology does not matter in battle?
Proven Worth. Many of the weapon systems once criticized already have
proved their worth in combat against Iraq. Among these: Patriot anti-missile
defenses against Iraqi Scud missile attacks; aircraft carriers from which
thousands of air "sorties" have been launched over Iraq; and Tomahawk
cruise missiles that have destroyed Iraqi command and control sites with pin-
point accuracy from a distance of over 500 miles. Others such as the JSTARS
airborne radar, which is designed to locate enemy armored forces, and the
Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which is a newly produced anti-
armor missile system, are contributing to America's success against Iraq only
months after an August 1990 House Armed Services Committee report
recommended their cancellation. Other systems strongly criticized in the
1980s, including the Apache attack helicopter, the M-1 Abrams tank, Bradley
infantry fighting vehicles, and Maverick anti-tank missiles, have not yet seen
widespread use against Iraqi forces, but they likely will acquit themselves well
once the ground war is joined. 3
Reagan and Bush cannot take sole credit for these weapons. The research,
development, and production for many of today's advanced systems began
under Presidents Jimmy Carter, Gerald Ford, Richard Nixon, and even
before. Yet Reagan and Bush provided the funding and the tireless political
backing needed to get the new technology into the field, where today it is win-
ning the war and protecting the lives of American GIs deployed in the Per-
sian Gulf. In many ways the war against Iraq is the first real test of the
Reagan and Bush military. The battle is far from over, but so far Reagan and
Bush are passing with flying colors; their critics are flunking completely.
THE HERO OF THE GULF WAR: THE PATRIOT MISSILE
No weapon used so far in Operation Desert Storm has performed so
surprisingly well as has the Patriot missile system. It is an anti-aircraft missile
system first deployed in Europe in 1984. The system consists of an advanced
phased-array radar for tracking targets in flight, canisters containing the mis-
siles themselves (usually in blocks of four), and a launch, or "fire-control,"
center.
1 Congressman Ronald V. Dellums, Defense Sense: The Search for a Rational Military Policy (Cambridge, MA:
Ballinger, 1983), pp. 147-157.
2 Sheila Tobias, et al., What Kind of Guns Are They Buying For Your Butter? (New York: William Morrow, 1982).
3 This Backgrounder will focus on systems already used in combat.
2
100 Percent Success Rate. In Operation Desert Storm, Patriots specially
modified to shoot down missiles, not just aircraft, have seen combat for the
first time. The Patriot has struck every one of the 34 Scud missiles against
which it was fired, a 100 percent success rate. In some cases people were in-
jured from falling debris after the Scuds were hit. The Iraqis have launched a
total of 57 Scuds at both Israel and Saudi Arabia. The 23 remaining missiles
were not intercepted either because the Patriots sent to Israel were not opera-
tional at the time of attack, or because the Scuds were flying toward unpopu-
lated areas and intentionally were left alone. Patriot batteries were able to
deflect a five-missile barrage against the allied airbase in Dhahran, Saudi
Arabia, on January 20. This
PATRIOT AIR DEFENSE
demonstrated the ability of the Patriot
SYSTEM
system to perform the technically dif-
ficult mission of intercepting several
Missile length: 17 feet
missiles simultaneously.
Launch weight: 2,000 lbs
In the 1980s there was strong con-
Warhead: 200 lbs. fragmentation
gressional opposition to transforming
Propellant: solid fuel
the Patriot anti-aircraft missile into a
weapon capable of destroying ballistic
Range: 43 miles
missiles in flight - precisely the mis-
Radar: phased-array
sion it now serves in Israel and Saudi
First deployed: 1984
Arabia. The House Armed Services
Initial mission: anti-aircraft
Committee on April 19, 1984, voted to
slash funding for modifying the Patriot
First tested against missiles: 1986
into a missile interceptor, reducing the
Source: Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-88.
Reagan Administration request of
$92.3 million to $15 million. 4 The
Heritage InfoChart
majority on the House Armed Services Committee voted on April 15, 1987,
5
to delete all funds for testing the Patriot missile as an anti-missile system.
The Senate, however, approved funding for the program, which allowed it to
go forward.
Saddam Hussein has used Scud missiles to terrorize the citizens of Israel
and Saudi Arabia, and to attack U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. If Patriot missiles
in Israel and Saudi Arabia had not intercepted Iraqi Scuds, surely thousands
more Israeli and Saudi men, women, and children would have died or been
injured. The early Scud attacks on Israel, before the Patriots were deployed,
injured scores of people and killed seven. If the Patriot had not been sent to
Israel to protect Israeli citizens from Scud attacks, moreover, Israel surely
would have been forced into the war. This could have splintered the anti-Iraq
4 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Report on the Department of Defense
Authorization Act, 1985, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rpt. 98-691 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984), p. 152.
5 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Report on the Department of Defense
Authorization Act, 1988 and 1989, 100th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rpt. 100-58 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1987), p. 109.
3
coalition if other important members of the coalition opposing Iraq - includ-
ing Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria - did not want be seen as siding with Israel
against another Arab country.
THE NAVY'S SILVER BULLET: THE TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILE
Over 250 Tomahawk cruise missiles have been launched against Iraq since
the start of Operation Desert Storm. This is the first time this weapon has
been used in combat. Cruise missiles are unmanned projectiles propelled by
air-breathing engines and capable of sustained flight very close to the ground.
These missiles have hit their targets (although not necessarily destroying
them) 94 percent of the time. The Tomahawks used in Operation Desert
Storm are armed with conventional high explosive warheads, although they
can carry nuclear warheads. Military
commanders typically fire cruise mis-
TOMAHAWK
SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE
siles against targets too well
defended for manned bombers.
MISSILE (conventionally-armed)
Such targets include bunkers hous-
Length: 20 feet
ing Iraqi political and military
Power: 600 lbs. thrust turbofan engine
leaders. The first shot fired by U.S.
forces in the Persian Gulf War was a
Range: 775 miles (if launched from
Tomahawk.
surface ship)
Speed: 550 miles per hour
The Tomahawk program ran into
Guidance: terrain contour
congressional opposition in the early
1980s. The Senate Armed Services
matching/inertial
Committee in 1983 threatened to
Warhead: conventional high explosive
terminate the program. 6 The com-
mittee charged that the Tomahawk
Source: Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-88.
cost too much. Arms control con-
Heritage InfoChart
siderations also prompted opposi-
tion to the cruise missile program. In the House, Representative Les Aspin,
the Wisconsin Democrat who is now Chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee, offered an amendment on May 31, 1984, blocking the deploy-
ment of nuclear-armed Tomahawks. 7 He claimed that nuclear-armed
Tomahawks would hinder arms control agreements with the Soviets. A
similar effort was made in the Senate by Republicans David Durenberger of
Minnesota and Charles Mathias (now retired) of Maryland, on June 19 of the
same year. 8 The sponsors wanted nuclear-armed Tomahawks banned through
an agreement with the Soviets.
6 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Report on the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984,
98th Cong., 1st sess., S.Rpt. 98-174 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1983), pp. 66-68.
7 Congressional Record., May 31, 1984, p. H5049.
8 Congressional Record., June 19, 1984, p. S7555.
4
Despite statements that it was not their aim to ban conventional
Tomahawks, Mathias and the others endangered the entire Tomahawk pro-
gram in trying to ban the nuclear missiles. Under any feasible arms control
verification plan, it is virtually impossible to distinguish between nuclear and
conventional cruise missiles. Thus any outright ban on nuclear Tomahawks
would have generated political pressure to ban the conventional version as
well. This is precisely what happened with the 1987 Intermediate-range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which banned all ground-based cruise missiles
- conventional and nuclear - with ranges between 300 and 3,400 miles. The
U.S. and the Soviets agreed to eliminate all ground-based cruise missiles be-
cause they could not be sure which were armed with nuclear and which with
conventional warheads.
Follow-Up Killed. Even today Congress is trying to hamper cruise missile
development. The logical follow-up to Tomahawk, the Long-Range Conven-
tional Stand-Off Weapon, was opposed by the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee in its report accompanying the fiscal 1991 Defense Authorization Bill.
This program would design a long-range conventional cruise missile to be
deployed on ships and airplanes. The Senate report charged that the long-
range missile was a " technology in search of a rationale. ,,,9 The Department
of Defense terminated the program in the fiscal 1992 budget.
Absent the Tomahawk cruise missile, Navy and Air Force pilots would
have been forced to attack heavily defended bunkers housing the Iraqi
military leadership. Cruise missiles can fly through dangerous air defense sys-
tems and destroy their targets with no risk to the lives of American pilots.
Without cruise missiles, more American pilots would have been killed,
wounded, or taken as prisoners of war. Fighting a war without cruise missiles
also would have meant more expense to the American taxpayer. A
Tomahawk cruise missile costs about $1.3 million. Losing an Air Force F-15
Strike Eagle attack aircraft to enemy fire would cost $50 million, while losing
a Navy F/A-18 Hornet would cost $30 million. Finally, the highly accurate
Tomahawk also results in fewer civilian deaths or injuries. Because it is so ac-
curate - it can land within 50 feet of a target - it can strike precisely at
military targets.
JSTARS RADAR SYSTEM DIRECTS PRECISION ALLIED BOMBING
Originally designed to meet an overwhelming Soviet armored threat in
Central Europe, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS) was rushed to the Persian Gulf after performing well in tests in
Europe last summer. Until the war against Iraq, it had not seen combat.
9 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Report on the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1991,
101st Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rpt. 101-384 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), p. 136.
5
JSTARS is a radar and information processing system for U.S. artillery,
aircraft, and missiles. Installed on a modified Boeing 707 aircraft, it scans the
ground day or night and in all weather seeking enemy tanks and armored per-
sonnel carriers (APCs) up to 56 miles away. Once it detects enemy tanks or
APCs, it passes targeting information to U.S. artillery, aircraft, and missile
commanders on the ground, enabling them to destroy them. It also can assess
the damage caused by U.S. attacks. Since being brought into the Persian
Gulf, JSTARS has helped to gauge the
extent of damage caused by allied
JOINT SURVEILLANCE
TARGET ATTACK RADAR
planes to enemy supply lines. It is
SYSTEM
probably also monitoring the location
and movement of Iraqi tanks and ar-
Mission: targeting and monitoring
mored vehicles.
enemy armor
The House Armed Services Com-
Airframe: modified Boeing 707
mittee voted in 1990 to terminate the
Radar coverage: 56 miles beyond
JSTARS program. The August 3, 1990,
frontlines
committee report said: "The require-
ment for this system is unique to the
Source: Jane's Information Group.
U.S. European Command Given
the
Heritage InfoChart
changes in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union and the balancing of NATO/Warsaw Pact force ratios that will
be driven by unilateral reductions, the requirement for JSTARS is no longer
valid. ,,10
The war with Iraq shows how wrong this assertion is. Saddam Hussein has
5,000 tanks and 8,000 armored personnel carriers, most of them the same
Soviet-made weapons which JSTARS would have confronted in a war in
Europe. If JSTARS were not available for Operation Desert Storm, the air
campaign would have more trouble stopping Iraqi armored forces. The tanks
and armored vehicles not destroyed in the air campaign would be used by
Saddam against allied forces if a ground campaign begins.
Armored forces are the heart of the Iraqi military. If the air campaign fails
to destroy large portions of these forces, a ground campaign is certain to be a
bloody one. U.S. Army and Marine deaths in a ground campaign, under these
circumstances, could easily run into the thousands. JSTARS not only can help
reduce allied casualties, but help destroy Saddam's armored columns, making
victory more likely.
10U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, 101st Cong., 2nd sess.,
H.Rept. 101-665 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), pp. 170-171.
6
NEW AIRCRAFT CARRIERS PROVIDE FIREPOWER
One of the most important high-technology weapons employed by U.S.
troops in the Middle East are aircraft carriers. The U.S. has six aircraft car-
riers in the region supporting Operation Desert Storm, including the USS
America, the USS John F. Kennedy, the USS Midway, the USS Ranger, the
USS Saratoga, and the USS Theodore Roosevelt.
The attack and fighter aircraft based on these carriers, including A-6 In-
truder bombers, F-14 Tomcat fighters, and F/A-18 Hornet fighter bombers,
have played a major role in the air campaign that began on January 17. About
one-third of all sorties flown in Operation Desert Storm have been flown by
these carrier-based aircraft. Each carrier is launching about 150 aircraft per
day. They have attacked such important strategic targets in Kuwait and Iraq
as nuclear and chemical weapons production facilities, command and control
centers, and airbases.
Despite its ability to project American air power worldwide, the aircraft
carrier often has been the target of
criticism in and out of Congress.
NIMITZ CLASS
Large carriers were derided as ob-
AIRCRAFT CARRIER
solete "sitting ducks" by Carter Ad-
Displacement: 74,000 tons (unloaded)
ministration Central Intelligence
Agency Director Admiral
Power: 2 water cooled nuclear reactors
Stansfield Turner and others. These
Length: 1,092 feet
critics urged that America deploy
Speed: 30 knots
"smaller carriers." Yet the carriers
Number of aircraft: 80
that they advocated could not have
handled the sophisticated, fixed-
Personnel: 5,900
wing aircraft, such as F-14 Tomcats
Source: June's Fighting Ships 1989-90.
and F/A 18 Hornets, now flying mis-
sions over Kuwait and Iraq.
Heritage InfoChart
Representative Dellums offered an amendment to the fiscal 1983 Defense
Authorization Bill on July 22, 1982, eliminating $6.9 billion for two aircraft
carriers. While his amendment was defeated in the House by a vote of 303 to
83, Democratic Representatives Les AuCoin of Oregon, Don Edwards of
California, Patricia Schroeder of Colorado, and Timothy Wirth of Colorado
(now a Senator) voted for the amendment. 11 That year, too, former Senator
Hart offered an amendment in the Senate to substitute smaller carriers for a
large one. Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts led an effort in the
Senate Armed Services Committee in May 1987 to delete funds for the initial
11 Congressional Record, July 22, 1982, pp. H4515-H4522.
7
purchase of components, primarily for nuclear reactors, for two carriers. The
12
Kennedy amendment failed.
Making A Difference Early. Aircraft carriers have been critical to the Gulf
operation from the day Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2. Only large aircraft
carriers could have delivered the airpower needed to deter Iraq from moving
against Saudi Arabia last fall. While two squadrons of F-15 fighters were or-
dered to Saudi Arabia after the invasion of Kuwait, the bulk of U.S. airpower
in the days after Saddam's invasion of Kuwait came from three aircraft car-
riers. If Iraqi forces had not been deterred from attacking Saudi Arabia, al-
lied forces would have had to force their way into Saudi territory already par-
tially occupied by Iraqi forces. This would have been a far more bloody opera-
tion than the war now underway. Aircraft carriers also enforce the embargo
the United Nations imposed on Iraq. The effectiveness of the embargo has
weakened Iraqi forces by cutting off war supplies imported to the country.
If Dellums, Kennedy, and the others who tried to block funding for aircraft
carriers had been successful, U.S. forces would likely lack the firepower in
the Middle East to pummel Saddam Hussein's forces. The U.S. Navy now has
fourteen active aircraft carriers. If the Navy had cut back on carriers - Del-
lums believed six might be enough - it could not have spared the six carriers
now used in Operation Desert Storm. Even if the U.S. had cut back to twelve
carriers, Desert Storm would have been a tight squeeze, since three carriers
now are in port for maintenance and overhauls. Only three would have been
available to operate outside the Persian Gulf to patrol the entire Pacific, the
Atlantic, and the Mediterranean. Normally, the U.S. stations three carriers in
the Pacific, three in the Atlantic, and one or two in the Mediterranean. The
Indian Ocean would have been left without carriers at all.
Fewer Carriers, Fewer Sorties. Rather than leaving so much of the world's
oceans defenseless, the Navy likely would have dispatched fewer aircraft car-
riers to the Gulf War. Fewer aircraft carriers would have diminished U.S. air-
power against Iraq. Thus, the air campaign against Iraq would have been less
efficient and consumed more time because of the fewer allied aircraft avail-
able for combat. Example: with two fewer carriers in the Gulf, the U.S. would
fly up to 300 fewer sorties a day. Fewer of Saddam's command and control
centers in Iraq and Kuwait, fewer of the bridges he uses to resupply Iraqi
troops in Kuwait and fewer of his forces in the field would be targeted each
day. Without the extra carriers, Saddam's ground forces ultimately might have
been able to mount a stronger defense of Kuwaiti territory.
12Pat Towell, "Critical Showdown Over SDI Under Way on Capitol Hill," Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report, May 16, 1987, p. 980.
8
NEW MISSILE COULD BE A KEY PLAYER IN A GROUND CAMPAIGN
Another high-tech U.S. system that may prove critical in a ground war is
the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). ATACMS is an Army surface-
to-surface missile designed to strike large concentrations of tanks and ar-
mored personnel carriers behind
ARMY TACTICAL MISSILE
enemy lines. It is well-suited for
SYSTEM
countering Iraq, which has
thousands of tanks and armored
Mission: destroying enemy armored
personnel carriers in southern Iraq
forces
and Kuwait. If the air campaign
Type of missile: surface-to-surface
does not break Iraq's hold on
ballistic
Kuwait, a ground campaign will be
Range: 93 miles
necessary. Among the highest
priorities in such an attack will be
Weight: 3,373 lbs.
to destroy the armored forces not
Warheads: cluster, anti-armor
yet knocked out by the air war. The
highly accurate ATACMS, armed
Source: Forecast International/DMS Market
Intelligence Report.
with cluster bombs or special
armor-piercing warheads that are
Heritage InfoChart
deadly against armored forces, can
destroy Iraq's armor before it threatens U.S. troops. The first ATACMS mis-
sile was fired against Iraqi forces on January 28, but the Army has not
released a report on its performance.
The House Armed Services Committee, chaired by Representative Aspin,
tried to kill the ATACMs program last year. The Committee reported on
August 3 that the withdrawal of large portions of Soviet armored forces from
Europe would eliminate the need for a system capable of "striking large con-
centrations of armored vehicles. 13 Iraq, with its over 5,000 tanks, has likely
deployed armored systems in large numbers in Kuwait and southern Iraq.
This is just the sort of force ATACMS is designed to counter.
There is no report yet how well ATACMS is doing in the field, but success-
ful tests indicate that it will perform well. Critics took aim at the system be-
cause they said that it would not be needed, not because they claimed that it
would not work. Saddam's armored war machine shows how wrong they are.
If allied ground forces cannot destroy Iraqi armored forces with ATACMS,
Iraq could better direct its armored forces to stop an allied ground attack.
Free of ATACMS' fire, Saddam could better maneuver his tank forces to
stop attempts by allied tanks to break through strongly defended Iraqi posi-
tions.
13U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, 101st Cong., 2nd sess.,
H.Rept. 101-665 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), p. 35.
9
CONCLUSION
America's success thus far in the war against Iraq is the result mainly of the
bravery and tenacity of America's fighting forces. It also is the result of tire-
less efforts over the years by the White House, many members of Congress,
U.S. Armed Forces, and American taxpayers to provide GIs with the best
weapons the country can design. America managed to achieve this despite in-
tensive debates about which weapons were best and how much should be
spent on them.
Enduring Lessons. If Congress had reduced drastically the numbers of
aircraft carriers, the U.S. would have lacked the airpower needed to stop
Iraqi forces without leaving U.S. interests dangerously vulnerable elsewhere
around the globe. Another lesson of the war is that missile defenses are cru-
cial. Without the anti-missile Patriot, which the House Armed Services Com-
mittee tried to terminate in the mid-1980s, thousands of Israeli and Saudi
civilians would have been victims of Saddam Hussein's Scud attacks. Other
lessons: conventional cruise missiles are key weapons in the U.S. arsenal; and
even if the Cold War ends, such advanced combat systems as the JSTARS air-
borne radar and the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) are critical
against enemy tanks, even those deployed by Third World foes.
Technology is the "force multiplier" that allows U.S. forces to shoot farther
and more precisely than their enemies. The best always is expensive, but the
price for deploying anything less ultimately will be paid in the lives of
American soldiers, sailors, and airmen. This lesson will endure well after the
fighting in the Persian Gulf ends.
Baker Spring
Policy Analyst
All Heritage Foundation papers are now available electronically to subscribers of the "NEXIS" on-line data
retrieval service. The Heritage Foundation's Reports (HFRPTS) can be found in the OMNI, CURRNT, NWLTRS,
and GVT group files of the NEXIS library and in the GOVT and OMNI group files of the GOVNWS library.
10