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2
3
THE MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS
SINCE MADRID
MORE PROGRESS THAN MEETS THE EYE
Interim Report, April 1992
AIPAC
American Israel Public Affairs Committee
440 First Street, N.W., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20001
Principal Author: Raphael Danziger
with Arthur Rublin
AIPAC
The American Israel Public Affairs Committee
America's Pro-Israel Lobby
440 First Street, N.W., Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 639-5200
President: David S. Steiner, NJ.
Chairman of the Board: Mayer Mitchell, AL.
Chairmen of the Board, Emeriti: Robert H. Asher, IL; Edward C. Levy, Jr., MI; Lawrence Weinberg, CA.
Vice Presidents: Michael M. Adler, FL; Norman Brownstein, CO; Barnard J. Gottstein, AK; Bernice
Manocherian; Robert Mazer, IL; Abe Pollin, MD; Roselyne C. Swig, CA; Harriet Zimmerman, GA.
Regional Vice Presidents: Leonard Barrack, PA; Jack C. Bendheim, NY; Amy Friedkin, CA; Harvey Friedman,
FL; Steven Grossman, MA; Jonathan E. Mitchell, CA; Shaol Pozez, AZ; Timothy F. Wuliger, OH.
Secretary: Monte Friedkin, FL.
Treasurer: Gary P. Wallin, NH.
Presidents Emeriti: Robert H. Asher, IL; Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein, NY*; Irving Kane, OH; I.L. Kenen, DC*;
Louis Lipsky, NY*; Edward C. Levy, Jr., MI; Mayer Mitchell, AL; Edward Sanders, CA; Morton Silberman, FL*;
Lawrence Weinberg, CA.
(*Deceased)
Executive Director: Thomas A. Dine.
Deputy Executive Director: Howard A. Kohr.
Operations Director: Robert V. Dietz. Legislative Director: Ester Kurz. Foreign Policy Issues
Director: Steven J. Rosen. Policy and Development Director: Roy I. Rosenbaum.
Political
Director: Elizabeth Schrayer.
Regional Directors: Seth Buchwald, New York; Leonard J. Davis, Jerusalem; Richard Fishman, Florida; Caryn
Garber, Midwest; Naomi Lauter, Pacific Northwest; Mark Moskowitz, Southeast; Sam Witkin, Southwest;
Murray Wood, Southern Pacific.
THE MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS SINCE MADRID
MORE PROGRESS THAN MEETS THE EYE
Interim Report, April 1992
Raphael Danziger
with Arthur Rublin
CONTRIBUTORS:
Miriam Kleiman
Steven Liebes
Charles Perkins
Mindy Weisenberg
CONTRIBUTING INTERNS:
Ruth Cheifetz
Geoffrey Einhorn
Mark Lebow
Allison MacDonald
Samuel Newman
AIPAC Papers on the Mideast Peace Talks
Editor: Raphael Danziger
No. 1 Guide to the Mideast Peace Conference (October 1991)
No. 2 The Mideast Peace Process Since Madrid (April 1992)
A publication of: The American Israel Public Affairs Committee
440 First Street, N.W., Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 639-5200
Copyright 1992 by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
V
Executive Summary
vii
I. BREAKTHROUGH IN MADRID
1'
A. Sitting Down to Direct Negotiations
1
B. Committing to the Peace Process
3
1. Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation
4
2. Lebanon
5
3. Syria
5
4. Israel
7
C. Setting Forth a U.S. Vision of Peace
9
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
13
A. Toward Resolution of the Venue Issue
13
B. Israel-Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation
16
1. Clearing the Procedural Hurdle
16
2. The PLO Versus the Palestinian Negotiators
19
3. The Israeli Document: Transferring Powers to the Palestinians
22
4. The Palestinian Document: Blueprint for a Palestinian State
24
5. The Settlements Issue: Washington Preempts the Process
25
6. Israel and Jordan Discuss the State-to-State Agenda
28
C. Israel-Syria
30
1. Damascus Upgrades Its Public Relations
30
2. Syria's Hard-Line Stance Persists
31
D. Israel-Lebanon
35
1. Israel Proposes Security Arrangements
35
2. Lebanon Demands Immediate Israeli Withdrawal
37
III. LAUNCHING THE MULTILATERALS
41
A. Progress at the Moscow Conference
41
1. U.S. Leadership
41
2. International Engagement
42
3. Arab Participation: Another Setback for Syria and the PLO
43
4. Israeli Hopefulness
47
B. Arms Control
50
1. The Moscow Talks
50
2. Limited Progress Expected
51
iii
C. Water
52
1. Technology Transfers
52
2. Collection and Exchange of Water Data
52
3. Water Transfers to the Region
53
4. A Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal
53
5. Agreement on the Unity Dam (Yarmouk River)
53
D. Economic Development
53
1. West Bank and Gaza
54
2. Agriculture
54
3. Energy
55
4. Gulf of Eilat/Aqaba Area
55
E. Environment
55
1. Gulf of Eilat/Aqaba Area
55
2. Collection and Exchange of Data on the Environment
56
3. Eastern Mediterranean Sea
56
4. Regional Environmental Thinktank
56
F. Refugees
56
1. The Moscow Talks
57
2. Palestinian Refugee Issues Likely to Be Lead Agenda Item
57
3. Palestinian Refugees in the West Bank and Gaza
57
4. Palestinian Refugees in Arab States
58
APPENDICES
A. U.S.-Soviet Invitation to the Mideast Peace Conference in Madrid, October 18, 1991
59
B. President George Bush's Address to the Mideast Peace Conference, October 30, 1991
60
C. Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian, Statement, Madrid, November 3, 1991
63
D. Israel-"Ideas for Peaceful Coexistence in the Territories During the Interim Period,"
February 20, 1992
64
E. Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation-"Outline of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government
Arrangements," March 3, 1992
66
F. Israel-Working Papers on Multilateral Issues: "Multilateral Regional Cooperation";
75
"Water in the Middle East"; "Regional Cooperation: Economy"; "Regional
Cooperation: The Environment," January 28, 1992
iv
PREFACE
We are now five months into the first real peace negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbors since the
Israeli-Lebanese talks nearly a decade ago. Plenary sessions have been held in Madrid and Moscow to launch
bilateral and multilateral negotiations; four rounds of intensive bilateral meetings have been held; and substan-
tive multilateral negotiations on regional issues are set to begin soon. We have seen first-ever negotiations be-
tween the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza-sitting within the framework
of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation-and the first-ever formal bilateral negotiations between Israel and
three of its immediate neighbors: Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Saudi Arabia, as well as other Gulf Arab and North
African states, are participating as well, and most republics of the former Soviet Union, China, India, and other
countries have resumed formal diplomatic relations with Israel as part of the peace process.
The United States did a great deal to initiate and facilitate this process, particularly by establishing a framework
for negotiations that is fair to both sides. Up to the present, the United States has resisted Arab pressure to in-
tervene directly in the substance of the negotiations, recognizing that this would undermine the principle of direct
negotiations between the parties that is the foundation of the process. On the other hand, the upheaval that has
created in the U.S.-Israel relationship by the Administration's management of the loan guarantee and technology
transfer crises may have a deleterious effect on the peace process.
AIPAC published a Guide to the Mideast Peace Conference immediately before the opening Madrid Conference last
October. A great deal has happened since then, and we believe that the time has come to publish a first interim
report on the progress of the negotiations. We expect to produce additional reports as the negotiations proceed,
in order to help inform Members of Congress and their staffs, Administration officials, journalists, academic
specialists, and activists in the pro-Israel community.
The principal author of this interim report is Raphael Danziger, AIPAC's Director of Research and Information.
Dr. Danziger joined this organization in 1990 after serving as Foreign Policy Analyst and Assistant Director of
International Affairs at the American Jewish Congress. Previously, he taught modern Middle Eastern history at
the University of Haifa and the University of Washington, and served as a consultant on Middle Eastern affairs
at the Hudson Institute. The report's co-author is Arthur Rublin, AIPAC's Special Assistant for the Peace Proc-
ess. Like Dr. Danziger, Mr. Rublin came to this organization in 1990 from the American Jewish Congress, where
he served as Legislative Assistant in the agency's Office of the Washington Representative.
Thomas A. Dine
Executive Director
April 1, 1992
v
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The four rounds of direct bilateral Arab-Israeli negotiations held since the Madrid plenary session last October
have validated Secretary Baker's repeated statements downplaying expectations about instant substantive solu-
tions to deep-seated conflicts. There have been many setbacks and much acrimony in the bilateral talks-between
Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon-and no substantive
issues between the parties have been settled.
Yet in many respects, Israel and its Arab interlocutors have made important initial progress in the bilaterals. The
unprecedented direct negotiations continue; procedural problems such as the structure of the Jordanian-Palestinian
delegation have been resolved, and others such as the venue of the bilateral talks are on their way to resolution;
and negotiations on substance have started with the presentation and discussion of proposed agendas and ideas
on such key issues as interim self-government arrangements for the Palestinians living on the West Bank and
Gaza. The bilateral process has moved forward at about the pace that could have realistically been expected.
Substantive progress in the bilateral negotiations could be further advanced by movement in parallel substantive
multilateral discussions-scheduled to begin in May-on Middle East regional issues such as arms control, water
resources, the quality of the environment, economic development, and refugee rehabilitation. The Administra-
tion hopes that multilateral talks will increase trust between Arabs and Israelis and thus promote bilateral agreements.
Another U.S. objective in convening the multilateral talks is to promote discussion of critical regional issues which
cannot easily be solved by one nation alone or even in a bilateral framework.
The Moscow Conference was a promising start to the multilateral process, despite the refusal of three out of Israel's
four interlocutors in the bilaterals-Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians-to attend. Most Arab states sat down
with Israel in Moscow, including Gulf Cooperation Council and North African nations. Although many Arab
participants ruled out regional cooperation until Israel cedes territory, Arab delegates attended initial working
group sessions with their Israeli counterparts and agreed to come to follow-up meetings in May.
Just as the key to the launching of the current peace process was the Arab decision to accept Israel's longstanding
call for direct negotiations, the key to substantive progress in the process will be an Arab decision to negotiate seriously
with the Israelis. As of now, it does not appear that the Arab parties are prepared to do this. A senior U.S. official
recently criticized the Arab delegations for public posturing. "What we're looking for is more serious engage-
ment in the negotiating process," he said.
At this stage, Syria and the PLO are essentially blocking further movement by the Arab parties in negotiations
with Israel. Closed-door Israeli-Lebanese and Israeli-Jordanian talks have been amicable and constructive, but
Syria and the PLO seem to be scaring Lebanon and Jordan away from settling even small issues of agenda with
Israel. The PLO's influence on the Palestinian delegation has resulted in a hardening of its position. U.S. officials
have criticized the attempt by the Palestinians to precondition talks for self-rule in the territories on an Israeli
settlement freeze, as well as their effort to define interim self-government arrangements in a way that is tanta-
mount to a Palestinian state.
Israel has indicated that it is prepared to negotiate with all its interlocutors on a forward-leaning set of interim
arrangements and-at the appropriate time-on such final-status issues as settlements and borders. Israeli negotiators
have presented the Palestinians with a document on interim self-government arrangements proposing to negotiate
the transfer to West Bank and Gaza Palestinians of powers and responsibilities in 20 critical areas including budget,
taxation, education, commerce, and police. In addition, Israel has said that it is ready to negotiate an Israeli withdrawal
vii
from southern Lebanon given proper security arrangements; that it is prepared to negotiate with Syria on any
issue including territory; and that it is eager for a peace treaty with Jordan and is ready to discuss its border claims.
Washington's role in the peace process has been instrumental. Baker's eight Middle East shuttles produced the
Madrid Conference, and his continued engagement has kept the bilaterals going and launched the multilaterals.
The main principles Bush articulated in his Madrid speech-full peace treaties and normal relations, with secure
borders and adequate security arrangements arrived at through direct negotiations among the parties concerned
without the imposition of any solutions by outside parties-raised hopes that the peace process would have the
solid foundation of a constructive U.S. policy approach.
But Washington has sent mixed signals to the Arabs. The Administration continues to declare that the United
States will not impose any settlement, saying that solutions can only be reached through direct negotiations among
the parties. Syrian officials have said, however, that the Administration has assured them it will act as a "driving
force" in the process. In general, the Administration has resisted Arab calls for intervention. In a few cases, however,
it has yielded, thereby reducing Arab motivation to engage in serious give-and-take negotiation with Israel. The
unilateral U.S. decision to impose a Washington venue for bilateral talks just after Madrid was an important exam-
ple. And the loan guarantee imbroglio appears to have enhanced Arab hopes that the United States will "deliver"
Israel through the use of financial leverage.
The substantive direct negotiations held and the procedural agreements reached between Israelis and Arabs since
Madrid provide hope that given strict U.S. adherence to the principles set forth by President Bush in Madrid,
real progress on substance is possible. Most notably, Israel and the Palestinians could agree on interim self-
government arrangements for the Palestinians in the territories. This could help pave the way for progress toward
further agreements between Israel and Jordan, Israel and Lebanon, and even Israel and Syria. If U.S. policy develops
in such a way that Arab parties find it in their interests to engage seriously in multilateral talks, initial regional
cooperation on such issues as environmental protection in the Gulf of Eilat/Aqaba area is possible. There are real
opportunities for forward movement toward Middle East peace, and sound U.S. policy will go a long way toward
unlocking this potential.
viii
I. BREAKTHROUGH IN MADRID
At 10:30 a.m. on Wednesday, October 30 of last year, under the gaze of
billions of television viewers around the world, Prime Minister Felipe Gon-
zalez of Spain opened a carefully planned Middle East peace conference in
Madrid. U.S. and Soviet representatives as conference co-sponsors; represen-
tatives of Israel, a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, Lebanon, and Syria as
the parties concerned; Egypt and the European Community as participants;
and the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Maghreb Union, and the United
Nations as observers had filed into the marble Hall of Columns in the Royal
Palace and sat down at a huge, T-shaped table. Never before had there been
such a gathering. Neither Syrians nor Palestinians had ever sat with Israelis
in a public political forum; neither Arab states from the Persian Gulf nor
Arab Maghreb nations had ever attended a public meeting with Israel out-
side of the United Nations even as observers; and representatives of more
than one Arab state had never sat together with Israelis at one table even at
a closed meeting. It was arguably the most stirring moment in Arab-Israeli
peacemaking since President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of
Israel had signed an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in Washington in 1979.
There was striking symbolism in the choice of Madrid as the site of the first-
ever public meeting between Israel and a broad group of Arab parties. As
capital of a country that witnessed Jewish-Arab cooperation in medieval times
and the expulsion of Jews and Arabs 500 years ago after it came under Chris-
tian domination, Madrid was now hosting a conference dedicated to recon-
ciliation between a sovereign Jewish state and her Arab neighbors. The
symbolism was not lost on the conference participants, and added to the sense
that history was being made in Madrid.
Even more significant than the opening plenary session in the Hall of Col-
umns were the subsequent closed-door encounters, in separate rooms, be-
tween Israel and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation; Israel and Syria; and
Israel and Lebanon. These were the first meetings ever in which any Arab
parties other than Egypt sat down for publicly acknowledged, face-to-face
Arab-Israeli negotiations without the presence of a third party-as Israel
had implored her Arab neighbors to do for more than four decades. The par-
ties in Madrid took the proverbial first small step, after the Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty, in the thousand-mile journey toward Arab-Israeli peace.
A. Sitting Down
As historically important as the plenary session in Madrid was, it was merely
to Direct
a legitimizing forum for the main event: the direct negotiating sessions be-
tween Israel and its neighbors. As Secretary of State James Baker had stated
Negotiations
in Congressional testimony last May 22, the plenary "is a means to an end.
A tool in our efforts to get the parties to sit down face to face to sort out
1
I. BREAKTHROUGH IN MADRID
A. Sitting Down to Direct Negotiations (continued)
their differences and to break anachronistic taboos." And as the October 18
U.S.-Soviet letter of invitation to the Madrid Conference (text in Appendix
A) had stated, the plenary "will have no power to impose solutions on the
parties or veto agreements reached by them. It will have no authority to make
decisions for the parties and no ability to vote on issues or results."
At the same time, the plenary unquestionably paved the way for the direct
negotiations. The novel experience of sitting at the same table with Israeli
representatives, glancing at them (albeit furtively) and listening to their
speeches, doubtless made it easier for the Arab negotiators to plunge into
the uncharted waters of direct talks with their Israeli counterparts. In ac-
cordance with the invitation to Madrid, the bilateral talks opened four days
after the plenary session.
The transition from plenary session to direct negotiations was neither smooth
nor effortless. Until virtually the last moment, the Syrians not only refused
to attend direct talks but also called on the other Arab delegations to boycott
the discussions. Even after the other delegates said they would attend whether
or not the Syrians did, it took marathon efforts on the part of the U.S., the
Soviet Union, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to coax the Syrians into the direct
talks. The Israeli-Syrian negotiations finally opened at 10:00 p.m. on
November 3-hours after the scheduled time, and not before the Syrians
had twice failed to show up at previously announced meeting times.
No progress on substance was made during the three separate direct
negotiating sessions held on November 3 between Israel and the Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and Syria. The discus-
sions focused mostly on the venue in which the subsequent negotiations were
to be conducted. As had been the case with the Israeli-Egyptian negotia-
tions of 1977 to 1982 and the 1983 Lebanese-Israeli peace talks, Israel wanted
the negotiating sessions to alternate between cities in Israel and in the Arab
countries. The Israelis argued that discussions held in each other's homes
were more likely to succeed than talks held elsewhere, and that the logistics
would be simpler and more efficient. All the Arab parties rejected the Israeli
proposal, claiming it would constitute a gratuitous unilateral concession. In-
stead they insisted on remaining in Madrid for the duration of the bilateral
talks. Israel refused because it viewed the Arab proposal as a ploy to relegate
the bilateral negotiations to subsets of the Madrid plenary session. No agree-
ment was reached.
But this setback did not detract from the achievement. As one wit had it,
the Arab-Israeli talks could be compared to a talking dog: It doesn't matter
much what he says; the miracle is that he says anything at all. It was clear
that direct Arab-Israeli negotiation is not a sufficient condition for peace, but
Secretary of State Baker had expressed the widely held view that face-to-
face negotiation was a necessary condition for its achievement.
2
I. BREAKTHROUGH IN MADRID
B. Committing to the Peace Process
All three sets of the bilateral negotiations opened sullenly, with no hand-
shakes or smiles. The Syrians maintained that atmosphere throughout the
session, and have persisted in keeping it so ever since. Not so in the other
two sets. Both in the Israeli-Lebanese talks and in the negotiations between
Israel and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, the mood quickly changed;
jokes and personal stories were swapped, joint coffee breaks taken, addresses
and telephone numbers exchanged, and hands warmly shaken. The ice had
broken. Despite continuing disagreements on substance, the cordial at-
mosphere has been preserved in those negotiations to this day.
Some may argue that given the huge gaps on substance between the par-
ties, pondering the personal warmth among negotiators is the political
equivalent of playing Trivial Pursuit. While it is true that hard decisions
leading to substantive progress toward peace cannot be made by negotiators
but only by their governments, the course of Egyptian-Israeli peacemak-
ing demonstrated that atmosphere in Arab-Israeli negotiations does matter.
Due to the nature of the Syrian regime, the consistently cold and aloof manner
of the Syrian delegates could only have been decided by President Assad
himself, and it constitutes an unmistakable signal of Syria's disinterest in
serious negotiations with Israel. Until the Syrian negotiators change their
attitude, the Israelis will likely find it far more difficult to entertain any no-
tions of compromise with Damascus than with other Arab parties.
Yet despite the persistent unfriendliness of the Syrian delegates, they
nonetheless joined the other Arab delegations at the Madrid Conference in
sitting down to direct, face-to-face Arab-Israeli peace negotiations without
the presence of any outside parties, and after three further rounds of direct
negotiations in Washington, they are still adhering to this format. This is
Madrid's most promising legacy.
B. Committing
Questions abound as to the motivations and objectives of some of the Arab
to the Peace
delegations attending the Madrid talks. Clearly, several Arab governments
strove to persuade Washington to "deliver" Israeli concessions, and there
Process
were indications that they were seeking to "decouple" Israel from the United
States in the process. Furthermore, while Palestinian negotiators from the
territories sat down with the Israelis, the PLO was stepping up its threats
against Israel, and Palestinians were escalating intifada violence and engag-
ing in terrorist acts. In particular, Syria's conduct raised grave concerns. Not
only did the Syrian delegates maintain cold aloofness from their Israeli
counterparts, but its foreign minister delivered an extraordinarily nasty anti-
Semitic and anti-Israel speech in Madrid; and during the process Damascus
was acquiring advanced Scud-C missiles from North Korea and continu-
ing to sponsor terrorist groups. It is a monument to the success of U.S.
diplomacy that despite these setbacks and provocations, all the parties com-
mitted themselves in Madrid to a peace process which is still in progress five
months later.
3
I. BREAKTHROUGH IN MADRID
B. Committing to the Peace Process (continued)
1. Jordanian-
Prior to Madrid a power struggle took place just below the surface between
Palestinian
the Tunis-based PLO, which continues to adhere to maximalist objectives,
and the nascent Palestinian leadership in the territories, which may be will-
Delegation
ing to settle for a deal on the West Bank and Gaza. Madrid was made pos-
sible when Washington agreed to back Israel's demand that the PLO be ex-
cluded from any direct negotiating role, instead reserving seats at the table
for Palestinian negotiators from the territories. The Palestinians put together
a delegation of mostly young professionals representing every major popula-
tion center and religious group in the territories, yet excluding the poten-
tially disruptive elements of refugees and Islamic radicals.
Weakened by its support for Saddam Hussein during the Gulf crisis and for
the perpetrators of the abortive coup in Moscow, the PLO had no choice
but to acquiesce in its exclusion from the negotiating table. But it did every-
thing it could to gain control over the Palestinian delegation. After declar-
ing in an interview on Radio Monte Carlo last October 29-a day before
the Madrid Conference-that "the intifada will continue, wave after wave,
and will escalate through all means and ways until the Palestinian flag waves
over the walls, the minarets, and churches of Jerusalem," Arafat sent his trusted
advisor Nabil Shaath to Madrid to "guide" the Palestinian delegation. Shaath
had stated on October 23: "We have to struggle through diplomacy inside
the peace conference. We have to intensify the intifada
Using diplomatic
struggle alone cannot realize anything" (Mideast Mirror, 10/24/91).
The relationship between the Palestinian delegation in Madrid and the PLO
in Tunis was ambiguous. The New York Times (11/4/91) quoted a Palestinian
delegate as saying, "Most of the faxes went from [Madrid] to Tunis, not the
other way around." Referring to a document long denounced by the PLO
as a sellout of the Palestinians, another Palestinian delegate told the Times:
"You know, flying here, for the first time I read the Camp David accords.
They were really interesting." While paying pro-forma homage to the PLO
by referring to the delegation's "acknowledged leadership" and invoking
Arafat by name, chief Palestinian negotiator Haidar Abdel Shafi in his Madrid
speech broke from past PLO positions by publicly accepting the Madrid
framework of interim arrangements for the Palestinians to precede any final
settlement, and by directly addressing the Israeli people and even evoking
their anguish and fears. Abdel Shafi firmly committed the Palestinian residents
of the territories to the new peace process, though some elements of his
speech-such as his identification with the Palestinian National Council's
1988 declaration of Palestinian independence based on the UN's 1947 par-
tition resolution, implying a challenge to Israel's pre-1967 borders-raised
concern in Israel.
Still smarting from the backlash in the West and in much of the Arab world
to its support for Saddam Hussein during the Gulf crisis, Jordan played a
low-key role in Madrid. Jordanian Foreign Minister Kamal Abu Jaber's
Madrid speech was predictable and bland. Concerned both with improv-
ing its standing in Washington and with moving the peace process forward,
4
I. BREAKTHROUGH IN MADRID
B. Committing to the Peace Process (continued)
however, Jordan made an important contribution in Madrid. In addition to
openly shaking hands and chatting with Israeli delegates, Jordanian nego-
tiators provided important backing for the new stance adopted by the Palesti-
nian delegation, and, most important, defied Syrian obstructionism by stating
it would enter into bilateral talks with Israel even if Damascus objected.
During the bilateral talks held between Israel and the Jordanian-Palestinian
delegation, not only the venue of the next round was discussed but also the
relationship between the Jordanians and the Palestinians in the joint delega-
tion. Responding to the Palestinians' desire to deal with the Israelis separately
from the Jordanians, Israel agreed to conduct further bilateral negotiations
on two tracks: Palestinian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli. At the end of the
November 3 bilateral meeting, chief Jordanian delegate Abdul Salam Majali
read a statement (text in Appendix C) committing the two delegations to
the continuation of the direct negotiations along the two agreed-upon tracks.
Chief Israeli delegate Elyakim Rubinstein said that Israel "basically agree[d]"
with the statement.
2. Lebanon
Israeli-Lebanese direct negotiations were viewed as a side show. With over
40,000 Syrian soldiers on its territory, Beirut usually does what Damascus
instructs it to do. In his Madrid speech, Lebanese Foreign Minister Fares
Bouez was reduced to demanding a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the
security zone in southern Lebanon under UN Security Council Resolution
425 of 1978, saying nothing about a withdrawal of the Syrian forces which
control far more Lebanese territory than do the Israelis. And unlike the Jor-
danians and Palestinians, Lebanon agreed to enter into the direct bilateral
talks with Israel only after getting Syrian permission to do so. Nonetheless,
the Lebanese delegates quickly warmed up to their Israeli interlocutors during
the bilateral session, unlike their Syrian counterparts, and openly shook hands
with the Israelis. That small display of independence from the Syrians sug-
gested that Lebanon was pleased to commit itself to the peace process with
Israel. This required considerable personal courage. On the day the Madrid
Conference opened, 10,000 Hezbollah demonstrators marched in Beirut,
pledging to destroy Israel and warning the conference participants of severe
punishment for negotiating with the Jewish state (United Press International,
10/30/91).
3. Syria
The Syrian delegation came to Madrid against the backdrop of actions on
the ground by the Assad regime which cast doubt on Damascus' commit-
ment to the direct negotiations process and to regional stability: accelerated
Syrian purchases of advanced Scud missiles, modern tanks, and other of-
fensive weapons; continued sponsorship of Palestinian and Kurdish terrorist
groups; support for drug trafficking; oppression of Syria's 4,000 Jews; and
an abysmal record on general human rights matters. Both at the Madrid
5
I. BREAKTHROUGH IN MADRID
B. Committing to the Peace Process (continued)
Conference and during the subsequent bilateral negotiations in Washington,
furthermore, the Syrians presented the most rigid position of any negotiat-
ing party.
In an extraordinarily hard-line opening speech at Madrid both in tone and
in substance, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa rejected or ignored the
major U.S. terms for peace negotiations: meaningful bilateral negotiations
leading to peace treaties and security arrangements, and immediate uncon-
ditional multilateral negotiations on regional issues. He invoked a 40-year-
old UN resolution whose implementation would dismantle Israel through
the "return" of the Palestinians; denied Israel's right to receive Jewish im-
migrants; demanded the removal of all the Jewish settlements; and summoned
the old anti-Semitic canard of coercive Jewish control over the world media.
As pointed out in a New York Times editorial (11/1/91), Syria "offered nothing
more than a boilerplate assault on Zionism and a demand for the return of
'every inch' of Arab land occupied since 1967-thus staking a position in
which any compromise might seem a sellout to unprepared Syrians." Ac-
cording to the Times (11/2/91), Sharaa's subsequent personal attack on Shamir
as a terrorist "seemed to embarrass even some of his Arab colleagues."
Syria's negative performance in Madrid did not stop with Sharaa's intran-
sigent speech and aggressive rebuttal. Until almost the end of the conference,
the Syrians persisted in trying to block any steps forward in the negotia-
tions progress. They announced their refusal to participate in any direct talks
with Israel in Madrid or elsewhere, whether in a bilateral or multilateral
framework, and demanded that the other Arab delegations follow suit.
Damascus found itself completely isolated. It received bad press in the West,
and all the other delegations in Madrid aside from the hamstrung Lebanese
rejected its position. The Jordanian-Palestinian delegation announced it
would attend the bilaterals even if Syria did not. The U.S., Soviet Union,
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia undertook to lobby Syria heavily to honor its pre-
Madrid commitment to direct talks with Israel. Riyadh, in fact, played a sur-
prisingly important role in Madrid. The influential Saudi Ambassador in
Washington, Prince Bandar, unexpectedly showed up in the Spanish capital
and contributed to the successes of the conference. His role was instrumental
in finally persuading the Syrians to change their position-at least on the
bilateral negotiations.
No progress on substance was made during the Syrian-Israeli bilateral
meeting which took place November 3 in Madrid after Damascus finally
agreed to come to the table. Israel's chief negotiator with Syria, Yosef Ben-
Aharon, told the New York Times (11/5/91), "It was in every respect futile,
because what they kept telling us constantly was, 'When will you withdraw
from the territories?" Still, the Syrians stayed in the room face-to-face with
their Israeli adversaries for five hours, and agreed to resume the negotiating
process in subsequent meetings. Rejectionism had been dealt a blow.
6
I. BREAKTHROUGH IN MADRID
B. Committing to the Peace Process (continued)
The public, humiliating defeat of Syria's intransigence provided a serious
boost to the peace process. U.S.-backed Arab conservatives, traditionally on
the defensive, displayed unaccustomed determination and self-confidence
in facing down the Syrian hard-liners. While unable to soften Syria's underly-
ing obduracy, they helped the U.S. to prevail upon Damascus to meet with
Israel face-to-face.
4. Israel
Though the vast majority of the Israeli public supported Jerusalem's agree-
ment to enter into negotiations in Madrid under the terms of reference laid
out by Secretary of State Baker, a potent minority exercised political pressure
on Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir aimed at preventing Israel's acceptance
of Baker's terms. Shamir's coalition government, which the press described
as "the most right-wing government in Israel's history," was forced to con-
tend with threats from three parties to the right of Likud-Moledet, Tehiya,
and Tzomet-which said they would bring down the coalition if Israel ac-
cepted the Secretary of State's conditions. In the end, however, Shamir's
Cabinet agreed to accept Baker's terms for negotiations, and the three far-
right parties did not immediately carry through with their VOW to bring down
the Government.
Another reason for Israel not to participate in the Madrid process was the
fact that Palestinian and Lebanese terrorists had sought to scuttle the talks
by mounting an intensive campaign of violence against Israel. During the
month of October 1991 alone, a mother of seven and a father of four were
gunned down on a civilian bus; a retired city gardener and local council
employee were stabbed to death; a building contractor was shot to death;
two soldiers were murdered when a van was deliberately driven into a packed
hitchhiking station; and another three soldiers were killed when an explosive
device was detonated in the security zone. Other terrorist attacks caused in-
juries and damage but no deaths. Prime Minister Shamir, nevertheless,
responded to these attacks by reiterating Jerusalem's commitment to the
Madrid process. "Some might have expected that in the face of this terror,
I would not attend the [Madrid] conference," Shamir told reporters, "but
despite this violence, our quest for peace is unrelenting. These talks will not
be easy. But they will lay the crucial foundation on which a solid, stable,
permanent peace will be built" (New York Times, 10/30/91).
Shamir decided to head the Israeli delegation to Madrid himself-the only
head of government among the direct parties concerned to attend the plenary.
(The other delegations were led by their foreign ministers.) By so doing, he
sent important signals to his own population and to the international com-
munity. Shamir's message to the Israeli public was that he was committed
to the peace process in spite of the far-right parties' threats. Internationally,
he signaled he was personally taking responsibility for Israel's participation
in the process. In a most unusual article in a Saudi newspaper (Asharq al-Awsat,
quoted in Mideast Mirror, 10/31/91), the argument was made that had
7
I. BREAKTHROUGH IN MADRID
B. Committing to the Peace Process (continued)
Shamir wanted to torpedo the conference, he would have allowed Foreign
Minister David Levy to lead the Israeli delegation. That would have enabled
him to veto any concessions Levy may have made on the pretext that the
Foreign Minister had overstepped his mandate.
In his Madrid plenary speech, Shamir associated himself with the American
approach to the peace process; made a direct appeal to the Arabs to make
peace with Israel; expressed a commitment to uninterrupted peace negotia-
tions; invited Arab leaders to come to Israel to make peace; and clearly im-
plied that the territorial issue would be open to negotiation. In Israel, only
the far right criticized the speech; Geula Cohen of Tehiya stated on Israel
Television: "The speech, in my opinion, was very grave and very disappoint-
ing
Zionism in reverse" (Mideast Mirror, 10/31/91). In contrast, one of
Shamir's most vocal critics from the left, Yossi Sarid of the Citizens' Rights
Movement, commented: "There was no mention of settlements and that
is not by chance. The Prime Minister took into account the possibility of
territorial compromise. It was not a speech of 'not one inch" (Reuters,
10/31/91). The New York Times, a frequent critic of Shamir as well, said in
an editorial (11/1/91): Shamir "sounded like a statesman. He pleaded the need
for dialogue and accommodation, and spoke of Israel's yearning for peace."
Shamir further surprised observers by choosing to tolerate what seemed to
the Israeli government to be serious provocations. He overlooked the PLO's
open presence at the conference and undisguised coordination with the
Palestinian delegates; he ignored the last-moment decision to allow Jorda-
nian Foreign Minister Kamal Abu Jaber and chief Palestinian negotiator
Haidar Abdel Shafi to deliver two separate speeches as if there were no joint
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation; he sat through the Abdel Shafi speech even
though the Gaza resident violated previous understandings by invoking
Arafat's name and alluding to the PLO by referring to "our acknowledged
Palestinian leadership"; and upon his return to Israel from Madrid for the
Jewish Sabbath, he was low-key in his reaction to Syrian Foreign Minister
Farouk Sharaa's personal attack on him in Rebuttal remarks after the Prime
Minister had left the conference. "I do not get worked up about Shamir
told reporters at Israel's Ben-Gurion Airport when asked about Sharaa's
speech, "and this will not prevent me from going ahead with my activities"
(Israel Radio, 11/1/91).
Israel expressed its willingness to enter into direct negotiations with a joint
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, a Syrian delegation, and a Lebanese team
and conducted a first round of bilateral negotiations with all three delega-
tions on November 3 in Madrid after the opening conference. The Israelis
committed themselves to continuing direct talks with its Arab neighbors
both bilaterally and multilaterally. The stage was now set for the continua-
tion of the peace process beyond Madrid. The party most responsible for
this success was the United States, which combined persistence and
diplomatic skill to make the breakthrough possible.
8
I. BREAKTHROUGH IN MADRID
C. Setting Forth a U.S. Vision of Peace
C. Setting Forth a
Madrid was a significant achievement for Secretary of State Baker. It came
about as a result of his eight exhausting shuttles to the Middle East, in which
U.S. Vision
he pressed Arab parties and Israel to come to the conference. The plenary's
of Peace
proceedings followed, almost to the letter, to the script written by Baker
following his discussions in the region.
In his Madrid Conference speech, President Bush reinforced Baker's efforts.
Among the key principles the President set forth in his landmark speech (text
in Appendix B):
Full peace treaties and normalization of relations: "Our objective must
be clear and straightforward. It is not simply to end the state of
war in the Middle East and replace it with a state of non-
belligerency. This is not enough. This would not last. Rather, we
seek peace. Real peace. And by real peace, I mean treaties, security,
diplomatic relations, economic relations, trade, investment, cultural
exchange, even tourism."
The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as a model: "The Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty is striking proof that former adversaries can make and
sustain peace."
Israel has legitimate security needs which must be recognized and ad-
dressed: "For too long, the Israeli people have lived in fear, sur-
rounded by an unaccepting Arab world. And now is the ideal mo-
ment for the Arab world to demonstrate that attitudes have
changed, that the Arab world is willing to live in peace with Israel
and make allowances for Israel's reasonable security needs."
Israel's final borders must reflect its security needs: "Boundaries should
reflect the quality of both security and political arrangements."
Peace must be based on Israel's security needs: "Real peace, lasting
peace, must be based upon security for all states and peoples, in-
cluding Israel."
Only direct negotiations can lead to peace: "Peace will only come as
the result of direct negotiations, compromise, give-and-take. .The
real work will not happen here in the plenary session but in direct,
bilateral negotiations."
There will be no imposed solution: "Peace cannot be imposed from
the outside by the United States or anyone else This conference
cannot impose a settlement on the participants or veto agreements.
And just as important, the conference can only be reconvened with
the consent of every participant."
Negotiations will be protracted: "We don't expect peace to be
negotiated in a day or a week or a month or even a year. It will take
time."
Time is needed for building mutual trust: Peace negotiations "should
take time-time for the parties so long at war to learn to talk to
9
I. BREAKTHROUGH IN MADRID
C. Setting Forth a U.S. Vision of Peace (continued)
one another, to listen to one another, time to heal old wounds and
build trust."
Interim Palestinian self-government will precede final-status negotiations:
"For Israel and the Palestinians, a framework already exists for
diplomacy. Negotiations will be conducted in phases, beginning
with talks. on interim self-government arrangements. We aim to
reach agreement within one year; and once agreed, interim self-
government will last for five years. Beginning the third year,
negotiations will commence on permanent status
In negotiating interim self-government, Israel will not be required to commit
itself to any specific final outcome: "Nothing agreed to now will
prejudice permanent-status negotiations. To the contrary, these
subsequent negotiations will be determined on their own merits."
The final outcome will not necessarily be a Palestinian state: "No one
can say with any precision what the end result will be. In our view,
something must be developed, something acceptable to Israel, the
Palestinians and Jordan, that gives the Palestinian people meaningful
control over their own lives and fate and provides for the accep-
tance and security of Israel."
The final borders will reflect a territorial compromise: "I make these
points with no map showing where the final borders are to be
drawn. And, nevertheless, we believe that territorial compromise
is essential for peace. Boundaries should reflect the quality of both
security and political arrangements, and the United States is
prepared to accept whatever the parties themselves find acceptable."
(According to Associated Press, 10/30/91, one of Shamir's top aides
said he was pleased Bush had used the term "territorial com-
promise" rather than the usual "land-for-peace" formulation.)
Multilateral talks on regional issues will facilitate progress in the bilateral
negotiations: "[P]rogress in the multilateral issues can help create an
atmosphere in which longstanding bilateral disputes can more easily
be settled."
Unilateral acts should be avoided: "I call upon all parties to avoid
unilateral acts, be they words or deeds, that would invite retalia-
tion or, worse yet, prejudice or even threaten the process itself."
Confidence-building measures will be helpful: "I call upon all the
parties to consider taking measures that will bolster mutual con-
fidence and trust, steps that signal a sincere commitment to recon-
ciliation."
Peace agreements will be bolstered by financial aid: "[W]e will call upon
our friends and allies in Europe and in Asia to join with us in pro-
viding resources so that peace and prosperity go hand in hand."
The United States will guarantee peace agreements: "We're prepared
to extend guarantees, provide technology and support, if that is
what peace requires."
10
I. BREAKTHROUGH IN MADRID
C. Setting Forth a U.S. Vision of Peace (continued)
In remarks at the end of Madrid's plenary sessions, Secretary of State Baker
further elucidated the prospective U.S. role in the peace process. "The United
States," he said, "is willing to be a catalytic force, an energizing force and
a driving force in the negotiating process
The United States will be an
honest broker
[It] will provide encouragement, advice, recommendations,
proposals and views to help the peace process." But, Baker emphasized, "none
of this
will relieve you, the parties, of the obligation of making peace."
In the formal terms of public international law, Bush and Baker had thus
upgraded the American role from "good offices" which the third party
tries to induce the parties concerned to negotiate between themselves-to
a restricted version of "mediation," when it takes a part in the negotiations
themselves but does not decide the quarrel for the disputing parties. The self-
imposed restriction was that the United States would join the direct bilateral
negotiations only upon the consent and invitation of all parties concerned.
The President and the Secretary of State had clearly excluded a U.S. role of
"arbitration," in which the third party does not merely propose terms of set-
tlement but is authorized by the disputing parties to dictate those terms.
In a concurrent resolution it passed by a 426-0 vote just after the Madrid
Conference, the U.S. House of Representatives supported a "good offices"
American role in Arab-Israeli talks. The House stated in its resolution, H.
Con. Res. 226, that it "encourages the President and Secretary of State to
continue their active roles in facilitating direct negotiations among the parties [em-
phasis added]" (Congressional Record, 11/19/91-11/20/91).
Indeed, Baker spent much of his time in Madrid exercising U.S. good of-
fices to induce Syria to join the other Arab parties in entering into direct
negotiations with Israel. By the end of the Madrid Conference, all three
scheduled sets of direct bilateral negotiating sessions had taken place. Since
then, the Bush Administration has merged a U.S. role of providing good
offices with that of restricted mediation. But as we shall see below, nothing
has buffeted the peace process as much as the Administration's apparent at-
tempts, after Madrid, to assume the disavowed and unauthorized approach
of binding arbitration on two important issues-venue and settlements.
Though there would be serious problems after the Madrid Conference, there
is no question that the Administration played a constructive role in making
the plenum possible and turning the gathering into a successful launching
pad for direct negotiations between Israel and Arab parties. The main prin-
ciples President Bush articulated in Madrid-full peace treaties and normal
relations, with secure boundaries and adequate security arrangements ar-
rived at through direct negotiations among the parties concerned without
the imposition of any solutions by outside parties-had raised hopes that
the peace process would have a solid foundation by way of a constructive
U.S. policy approach.
11
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
In announcing the issuance of Madrid Conference invitations last October
18, Secretary of State cautioned against inflated expectations about quick
substantive breakthroughs in the peace process. "The road to peace will not
be simple," Baker said in a prepared statement. "To the contrary, it will be
extremely difficult, with many problems, many hitches and probably many
interruptions along the way. Old suspicions will not disappear quickly; the
gaps are real, and the gaps will not be easily overcome."
Indeed, the four rounds of direct bilateral Arab-Israeli negotiations that have
elapsed since convened in Madrid have validated Baker's effort to downplay
expectations. There have been many setbacks and much acrimony, and not
a single substantive issue between Israel and any of its Arab neighbors has
been settled. The parties have made important headway, though; procedural
problems have been resolved or are on their way to resolution, and negotia-
tions on substance have been initiated through the discussion of proposed
agendas and ideas. The process has moved forward at about the pace that
could have realistically been expected. The issues being negotiated are in many
respects even more complex and sensitive than those discussed at great length
in the 1970s by Israel and Egypt before they concluded three interim
agreements and then, in 1979, a formal peace treaty.
A. Toward
Among the many procedural issues plaguing Baker's eight pre-Madrid trips
to the region, the question of the venue of the bilateral negotiations seemed
Resolution
one of the most trivial. It became, however, one of the only key procedural
of the
issues related to the Madrid-based Arab-Israeli negotiations that are not fully
resolved to this day. There are strong indications, however, that the venue
Venue Issue
issue is now close to resolution.
Since the beginning of the current peace process, Israel has expressed a
preference for alternating the venues of the bilateral peace negotiations be-
tween sites in Israel and in the Arab countries. The Israeli government believes
that Middle East venues would help prepare the local publics for Arab-Israeli
peace, minimize the intrusive presence of the world media, and simplify
logistics and communications with the home governments. At a minimum
the Israelis wanted the negotiations to be held in the region or as close as
possible to it; even though the most important anticipated gain-preparing
for peace-would be lost, at least the other two expected benefits-reduced
media presence and easy logistics-would likely be achieved. In principle,
the Israeli position has been supported by the United States; as State Depart-
ment spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler stated as early as last November 27
and several times since, "Our policy has been and will continue to be that
in the United States' view, at the appropriate time-we don't know what
13
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
A. Toward Resolution of the Venue Issue (continued)
that time would be-we think that yes, it makes sense to move to the region,
and we've stated that continuously."
In Madrid, the Arab parties strongly objected to the U.S.-backed Israeli con-
cept. The delegations argued that holding negotiations in Israel would
amount to recognition of the Jewish state and thus constitute a unilateral
Arab concession. They expressed a preference for continuing the bilateral
negotiations in the Spanish capital; the idea was to turn the bilateral sessions
into an extension of the Madrid plenum so as to minimize their significance
as an independent-indeed, the most important-component of the peace
process.
Precisely for that reason, Israel rejected the Arab proposal. Baker announced
two days after the Madrid bilaterals that he would grant the parties "at least
two weeks" for consultations on the venue and date of the second round
of bilateral negotiations, and then make his own proposal. The Israelis tried
to consult with the Arabs but were rebuffed.
On November 21, Baker discussed the issue in Washington with Prime
Minister Shamir, but no agreement was reached. The following day, just
hours prior to a scheduled meeting between Shamir and President Bush, the
Administration issued formal invitations summoning the parties for bilateral
meetings in Washington on December 4.
While the Arab parties gladly accepted the Washington venue-the Palesti-
nians thought it would be a prelude to a resumption of the U.S.-PLO
dialogue, and the Syrians hoped it would lead to their country's removal
from the State Department list of countries supporting terrorism-the in-
vitations precipitated a minor crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations. Jerusalem com-
plained bitterly about the Administration's unilateral act, which it perceived
as a deliberate snub to the Prime Minister and by extension to Israel as a whole.
Members of Congress also reacted against the Administration's move. In a
November 27 letter to Secretary of State Baker, a bipartisan group of
Members of the U.S. House of Representatives warned that "the refusal to
consult adequately with Israel and to take into account Israel's concerns could
threaten the entire peace process." The House Members went on, "We urge
you to consult more closely with Israel, the only democratic participant in
the negotiations. We ask that you be particularly mindful of how the lack
of forbearance and patience can undermine the process of give and take."
The Washington venue was particularly objectionable to the Israelis because
it would work against all of their major peace talks objectives: It would not
prepare the local publics for peace; it would virtually guarantee an intrusive
international media presence; and it would present what they viewed as a
nightmare for logistics and communications. To protest the State Depart-
ment's handling of the Arab-Israeli difference on venue, Jerusalem announced
it would arrive only on December 9. The first Washington round of
14
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
A. Toward Resolution of the Venue Issue (continued)
bilateral negotiations ("Washington I") actually began on December 10 and
lasted until December 18.
At the time, many observers in Israel and abroad criticized the Shamir
Government's decision to come to Washington five days late. But Shamir-
supported on the consultation issue by Members of Congress and others-
seems to have succeeded in getting his message across to the Administration.
The State Department issued invitations to the subsequent two rounds of
bilateral negotiations only after consulting with all parties concerned. And
with the exception of the issue of settlements (see below), Washington has
thus far scrupulously avoided any further attempts at unilateral binding ar-
bitration in the Arab-Israeli negotiations. The day after the adjournment of
Washington I, President Bush recommitted the United States to the role of
a "catalyst"-"not attempting to dictate solutions." And Israeli Ambassador
to the U.S. Zalman Shoval commended the Administration for "not letting
itself be provoked to interfere at this stage of the process."
After the adjournment of the second Washington round ("Washington II"),
which was held January 12 to 16 of this year, Israel agreed to hold the third
post-Madrid bilateral round in Washington as well, but made it clear that
it wanted an agreement on a different venue for the following round. In
response to Israel's concern about the venue, the State Department asked
each of the parties to list 10 cities other than Washington which they preferred
for the following round. The Department said it would try to match the
responses in order to come up with a mutually acceptable non-Washington
venue. Israel was the only party that submitted such a list to the Administra-
tion. Reportedly it included Arab and Israeli cities as well as sites in Turkey
and Greece. Despite the absence of any Arab responses to the State Depart-
ment's request, Israel sat through the third Washington round ("Washington
III"), which was held on February 24 to March 4 of this year.
During Washington III, the Administration made plain to the Arab delegates
it agreed with Israel that the bilateral negotiations should be moved from
the U.S. capital. State Department officials urged the Arab delegations to
meet the U.S. request for a list of 10 alternative venues. While the Syrian
and Lebanese chief negotiators publicly objected on March 6 to moving the
next round of bilateral talks from Washington, the Palestinians and Jorda-
nians told reporters that they were willing, in principle, to move the venue
to a European site.
At the time of this writing, a resolution of the vexing issue of venue may
be in the offing. There are indications that while the next round of bilateral
negotiations is scheduled to convene on April 27 in Washington, the four
Arab parties may finally agree to meet with Israel for the following round
in Europe. No one, however, is ruling out a last-minute hitch.
It appears, in any event, that the gravity of the venue issue has diminished.
Whereas in the wake of the Madrid Conference it looked as if the lack of
15
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
A. Toward Resolution of the Venue Issue (continued)
agreement on venue might scuttle the entire process of bilateral negotiations,
the issue seems today more an irritant than a threat. Israel has repeatedly
yielded on this issue and sat for three rounds in Washington despite its ob-
jections. Unless the Administration unexpectedly backslides to unilateral
action, it now seems unlikely that an impasse on the venue issue would lead
to a breakdown in the negotiations.
B. Israel-
As stipulated in the formal U.S.-Soviet letter of invitation to the Madrid Con-
Jordanian-
ference, the bilateral meetings between Israel and the Jordanian-Palestinian
delegation are to be held within the framework of a two-stage peace pro-
Palestinian
cess. During the current first stage, the parties are not authorized to negotiate
Delegation
any final-status issues: such issues as sovereignty, borders, and the final status
of settlements. The topic on the agenda during the first stage is to be "in-
terim self-government arrangements" for the Palestinian residents of the West
Bank and Gaza that "will last for a period of five years." Final-status negotia-
tions are to begin only during "the third year of the period of interim self-
government arrangements."
There has been much acrimony and little discernible progress on substance
during the first four rounds of bilateral negotiations held so far between Israel
and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. But important progress on pro-
cedure has been made, agendas and ideas have been exchanged, and discus-
sions on substance have begun.
1. Clearing the
The formal invitation to Madrid, which constitutes the binding procedural
Procedural Hurdle
framework of the peace negotiations, states clearly that the Palestinians "are
part of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation." It also says that the bilateral
negotiations are to be held "along two tracks, between Israel and the Arab
states, and between Israel and the Palestinians." Despite the clear-cut stipula-
tion of a joint delegation, the Palestinians chose to insist on recognition as
a separate delegation at the start of the bilateral talks in Washington last
December. The Palestinian demand bedeviled Washington I and wasted
precious time. Thanks largely to the Administration's refusal to intervene
in the dispute, the Palestinians gave up on the issue. The unnecessary hurdle
was cleared, in time for Washington II.
As early as the initial bilateral meeting between Israel and the Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation in Madrid last November 3, the joint delegation re-
quested that negotiations between the two delegations be conducted along
two tracks: a Palestinian-Israeli track and a Jordanian-Israeli track. The
language of the Madrid invitation allowed for an interpretation, which Israel
favored, that the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation as a whole would negotiate
along the Palestinian track. Nevertheless, Israel accepted the joint delega-
tion's request in Madrid. Israeli chief negotiator Elyakim Rubinstein told
16
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
B. Israel-Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation (continued)
reporters after the meeting that Israel "basically agree[d]" with a statement
read by Jordanian chief negotiator Abdul Salam Majali which referred to
this two-track format (Mideast Mirror, 11/4/91).
That did not satisfy the Palestinians, however. Palestinian "Advisory Com-
mittee" member Hanan Ashrawi said at a press conference after the
November 3 meeting that the joint delegation was "a very loose framework
that contains two Arab sides as separate delegations within a certain
framework" (Federal News Service transcript, 11/3/91).
When Washington I opened last December 10, the Israelis and Palestinians
were still mired in disagreement over the issue. Hanan Ashrawi had told
reporters the previous day, "Tomorrow we are showing up as the Palesti-
nian delegation with a Jordanian component and they're showing up as a
Jordanian delegation with a Palestinian component" (Federal News Service
transcript). Ashrawi freely acknowledged that the purpose was to indicate
"mutual respect for the independent sovereignty of each side"-a purpose
opposed by the United States as much as by Israel. To symbolize their claim
to a separate delegation, the Palestinians insisted on conducting the negotia-
tions with Israel in a separate room from that in which the Israeli-Jordanian
talks were to be held.
The Israelis for their part demanded that the negotiations with the Jorda-
nians and Palestinians be held in the same room to indicate the joint delega-
tion concept. The Administration sided with Israel; State Department
spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler said on December 9 that "the terms of
reference is joint delegation," and that the Administration had prepared "one
site" for the delegation (Federal News Service transcript). The Washington Post
(December 12) commented that the Palestinians had "overreached" with their
insistence on a formal splitting of the joint delegation, and the New York Times
(December 20) said the Palestinians were "in fact breaching a pre-conference
agreement."
To bypass the problem of the rooms, the Israelis, Jordanians, and Palesti-
nians agreed that until the issue was settled, their chief delegates would sit
on a couch in a State Department corridor to negotiate its resolution. The
"couch diplomacy" continued until the end of Washington I, with the parties
exchanging memoranda, proposals, draft agreements, and even views on the
weaknesses of the coffee provided by the State Department. Indeed, the New
York Times reported (12/11/91) that Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Zalman
Shoval broke the ice between the parties on the first day of the corridor talks
when he offered a cup of the U.S.' fresh-brewed to a Palestinian delegate and
said: "I think there is one thing we can agree on: the coffee is terrible."
The New York Times' anecdote notwithstanding, the corridor talks were
generally portrayed by the media as they stretched on as an exercise in futility.
It became clear over time, however, that the discussions between the parties
17
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
B. Israel-Jordanian-Palestiniar Delegation (continued)
were valuable: they produced a significant narrowing of procedural dif-
ferences, a development of the lines of communication established in Madrid,
and an agreement to continue the direct talks on January 7. (The date was
later postponed by a few days.) As Elyakim Rubinstein told reporters on
December 18, "This has never happened before" (Federal News Service
transcript).
The Bush Administration lent important support to the direct negotiations
process by resisting Palestinian pressures to dictate a formula for the status
of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. A U.S. official was quoted by the
New York Times (December 11) as saying, "The good news is that [the chief
Israeli, Palestinian, and Jordanian negotiators] spent all day together
[negotiating]-without us getting involved. These guys are here, they are
talking to each other, and we are not leaping in."
The breakthrough occurred on the eve of Washington II, which opened on
Monday, January 13. As a result of an exchange of proposals by fax between
Israelis and Palestinians over the weekend, a formula was found that enabled
the three chief delegates to meet on Monday morning in a room-not in
a corridor-to hammer out the final details. The historic negotiations began
late in the day with a full-dress session of the Israeli and Jordanian-Palestinian
delegations. This success was made possible after the Palestinians had accepted
a carefully crafted Israeli proposal. Within the framework of Israel's negotia-
tions with the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, Jerusalem proposed,
there would be two separate tracks: an Israeli-Palestinian track with 11 Israelis,
9 Palestinians, and 2 Jordanians; and an Israeli-Jordanian track with 11 Israelis,
9 Jordanians, and 2 Palestinians. Upon request, general meetings of the Israeli,
Palestinian, and Jordanian delegates, or meetings of the three chief negotiators
alone, could be convened as well.
The Palestinian bid to split the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation had failed.
The agreed two-track format within the joint delegation was one that the
Israelis had accepted at the first bilateral round in Madrid, but the Palesti-
nians had viewed it as insufficient. There is no question that the Palestinians
yielded on this issue after they realized that the Administration was not go-
ing to intervene on their behalf. The agreement was a vivid demonstration
that Israeli and Arab delegates could hammer out agreements directly,
without active U.S. intervention. And faced with the necessity of negotiating
directly with Israel, the Palestinians actually highlighted the success of the
direct negotiations on the matter.
The Bush Administration lauded the agreement between Israel and the joint
delegation, which was the first piece of paper in history with the signatures
of Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian officials. U.S. officials said publicly and
privately that the agreement was the most significant event of Washington
II, paving the way for further Arab-Israeli agreements on procedure and
substance.
18
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
B. Israel-Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation (continued)
2. The PLO Versus
Palestinian dogma has it that all Palestinians wherever they live are one people,
and that the Tunis-based PLO is its sole legitimate leadership. In recent years,
the Palestinian
however, the nearly two million Palestinian residents of the West Bank and
Negotiators
Gaza-sometimes referred to as "internals"-have developed an un-
mistakable sense of local identity and a distinctive outlook that is often at
odds with that of Palestinians living outside the territories who are sometimes
called "externals." Although in virtually all their public utterances the newly
emerging "internal" leaders have paid homage to the PLO as the national
Palestinian leadership, a silent but acute struggle for control over the cur-
rent peace process has developed between "internal" and "external" leaders.
This development has had a profound effect on the peace process. Israel (as
well as the United States) opposes any direct dealings with the PLO, which
is still formally committed to its 1968 national covenant calling for Israel's
destruction and has a bloody record of terrorism against Israeli civilians. On
the other hand, Israel has agreed to enter into direct negotiations with Palesti-
nian leaders from the West Bank and Gaza. During Secretary Baker's pre-
Madrid shuttles, he agreed with Israel on excluding the PLO from any direct
role in the peace process and admitting into the negotiations only Palesti-
nian leaders from the territories. As a result, "internal" Palestinian leaders
were suddenly catapulted into the world's limelight when they came to
Madrid, and later to Washington, to represent their people at bilateral peace
talks. This development enhanced their standing and legitimacy among
Palestinians and strengthened their hand in their behind-the-scenes contest
with the PLO. Tunis has fought back fiercely in an attempt to reverse the
trend. To a significant extent, the chances for success in the current peace
process depend on the ability of the West Bank and Gaza leaders to hold
their own against Tunis.
The United States had taken a firm position in favor of "internals" participa-
tion and against PLO participation in the peace talks several months prior
to Madrid. As early as last May 22, Secretary Baker stated in Congressional
testimony that the Palestinian negotiators would be "leaders from the Oc-
cupied Territories who accept the two-track approach, who accept the phased
approach, and who commit to living in peace with Israel" (Federal News Service
transcript). Last June 14, State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler
said, "[W]e obviously are not, have never, and are not going to ask Israel
to negotiate with the PLO" (Federal News Service transcript).
During the run-up to Madrid, the PLO made no effort to conceal its aim
to flout the American terms of reference for the peace talks. PLO spokesper-
son Ahmad Abdel Rahman said on September 27, for example, "We already
have an indirect, clear-cut implicit role. Every day it changes, and ultimately
we are seeking a direct PLO participation, something only the stupid will
try to avoid" (Washington Post, 9/28/91).
Unable to obtain direct access to the negotiating table, the PLO has engaged
since before the Madrid Conference in a continuing effort to gain control
19
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
B. Israel-Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation (continued)
over the Palestinian "internals." Among the tactics the PLO has used to
achieve this objective:
Getting PLO loyalists into the Palestinian negotiating team. This tactic almost
wrecked the process when Palestinian delegate Saeb Erakat stated on Cable
News Network last October 23, "We are the PLO delegation; this delega-
tion was chosen by the PLO." It was only because Israel agreed to avoid mak-
ing a big issue out of this violation of the ground rules that the process
remained on course in spite of it.
Shackling the Palestinian negotiators with four layers of PLO adherents and officials.
The first layer is the "Advisory Committee" of Palestinians from the territories
and Jerusalem. A number of the Committee members were disqualified from
direct participation in the talks because of their close identification with the
PLO, if not for another reason such as Jerusalem residency. But these peo-
ple, who include Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi, have not always toed
the PLO line. The PLO, however, has set up a second layer, comprised of "ex-
ternal" PLO officials, to monitor and supervise the delegates and advisors.
Several PLO officials showed up in Madrid. Despite U.S. visa restrictions,
at least four were allowed to come to Washington for one or more rounds:
Nabil Shaath, Akram Haniyeh, Tayseer Arouri, and Azmi Sh'aibi. A third
layer is the PLO-Jordanian "Federal Council" headed by Arafat and King
Hussein; this PLO-initiated body enables Tunis to keep an eye on any Jor-
danian moves intended to influence the Palestinian delegation. The fourth
layer is the PLO headquarters in Tunis. Through frequent telephone calls,
faxes, letters, and public statements, Arafat and his subordinates have con-
tinually sought to control the Palestinian negotiators and advisors.
Making public statements claiming that the Palestinian delegation is a PLO delega-
tion. Just days before the Madrid Conference, for example, Arafat stated:
"Everyone knows that the Palestinians will represent the PLO. Every Pales-
tinian is a member of the PLO, inside and outside [the territories]" (New York
Times, 10/23/91).
Arafat's touting himself as a world leader to buttress his claim that he is the elected
leader of a Palestinian state-in-exile. In an interview with Reuters just before the
Madrid Conference, Arafat said: "I have the power to take the decisions. What
the negotiators cannot resolve, I will resolve in the corridors thanks to our
international relations. The Palestinian parliament has given me the man-
date to direct the peace process" (10/27/91). Prior to each bilateral round of
negotiations thus far Arafat has tried to initiate "Arab Ring States" summits
on the Madrid process, including the PLO, so as to give his group the aura
of a political leadership.
At the United Nations on March 11 of this year, the PLO distributed as its
own official document-with a cover letter signed by Arafat-the outline
of interim self-government arrangements submitted by the Palestinian
delegation to its Israeli counterpart during the Washington III bilaterals. Israeli
officials said the PLO act flagrantly violated prior agreements between Israel
20
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
B. Israel-Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation (continued)
and the United States, according to which the PLO would not take part in
the process and the United Nations would not serve as a forum for
propaganda.
Undermining the standing of "internal" leaders in the territories through local PLO
activists. As Israel Television Middle East correspondent Ehud Yaari has noted
(Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policywatch, 2/21/92), Arafat's
loyalists in the territories "have begun to withdraw the protection they used
to extend to Husseini et al as they toured the territories, thereby leaving them
open to attack-both verbal and physical-from radical opponents of the
peace process."
The "internal" Palestinian leaders have had precious little ammunition to
counter this formidable PLO assault. Although their stature in the territories,
already high because of their role in the intifada, was further enhanced by
their successful performance in Madrid, they have not received a mandate
to challenge the PLO. Given this fact, and even more so the widely-held
assumption that any such challenge would place their lives at risk, it is
remarkable that they have still managed to play a somewhat independent
role in Madrid and beyond.
Despite many statements by "internal" Palestinian negotiators and advisors
that they represent the PLO, in rare flashes of candor they have told a dif-
ferent story. Hanan Ashrawi told the Los Angeles Times just before the Madrid
Conference, for example, "There are phases when the PLO in exile is more
prominent and phases when the inside is. This is a phase for the inside"
(10/21/91). And the prominent Palestinian journalist and activist Daoud
Kuttab was quoted by the Washington Post (12/17/91) as saying, "[The Palesti-
nian negotiators] are not taking orders from Tunis
The key to their suc-
cess is to convince Tunis to take a back seat." Israel TV's Yaari reports that
during the last few months, however, the PLO has been gaining on the "in-
ternals" (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policywatch, 2/21/92).
If allowed to continue, this trend could undermine the entire peace process.
Despite claims to moderation and peaceful intentions, the PLO remains
unregenerated. The following is a small sample of recent PLO statements
and actions:
The PLO fully supported Saddam Hussein throughout the Gulf crisis, and Arafat
recently visited the Iraqi leader in Baghdad.
Arafat demands a holy war against Israel. After delegates to an Islamic Con-
ference Organization conference in Senegal last December decided to omit
a reference to jihad (holy war) against Israel from the ICO's final statement,
for example, the PLO chief rhetorically asked, "Shall I tell the Palestinians
that you have eliminated the word jihad from the Islamic encyclopedia and
dictionary? You cannot wipe away jihad with a sponge. I am sad, and everyone
in this hall should share this sorrow with me" (Mideast Mirror, 12/12/91).
21
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
B. Israel-Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation (continued)
Arafat continues to call for escalation of intifada violence. As recently as mid-
March of this year, he urged "daily escalation of our blessed intifada" (Mideast
Mirror, 3/11/92).
The PLO continues to engage in terrorism. The group's Democratic Front for
the Liberation of Palestine faction, represented on the PLO Executive Com-
mittee by two of its leaders, claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack two
days before the Madrid Conference on a civilian bus on its way to Tel Aviv
(Reuters, 10/29/91). Terrorists ambushed the bus with machine gun fire, kill-
ing two Israeli adults and wounding five children. One of the Israelis killed
was a school teacher and mother of seven.
Arafat speaks contemptuously of Jews. In an intercepted telephone conversa-
tion with Tunis' chief representative in Paris about the worldwide criticism
of French leaders for giving the PLO's George Habash medical treatment
without detaining the terrorist leader, Arafat exclaimed: "The Jews at work.
Damn their fathers. Dogs. Filth and dirt
[T]he trash is always trash
And
thanks to the rotten Jews, with whom we will settle accounts in the future."
Cable News Network broadcast a tape of the intercepted telephone con-
versation on February 11 of this year. The network said it received the tape
from a Western law enforcement agency that intercepted the conversation.
There are indications that the recent hardening of the Palestinian position
in the peace talks (see below) has to a significant extent resulted from the
PLO's ascendancy. Many analysts in Washington believe that if the PLO's
power and control is curbed, strengthening the position of the "internals"
in the process, the chances for forward movement in the peace talks would
be considerably enhanced.
3. The Israeli
During the Washington II bilaterals in January of this year, after Israel and
the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation worked out a procedural formula
Document:
for negotiations, the two delegations opened discussions on the substance
Transferring
of interim self-government arrangements (ISGA) for West Bank and Gaza
Powers to the
Palestinians. As noted above, the ISGA talks were prescribed by the U.S.-
Soviet invitation to the Madrid Conference.
Palestinians
At Washington II, as described above, the two delegations agreed that the
joint-delegation team at ISGA talks would be comprised of nine Palestinians
and two Jordanians. When the two delegations opened the ISGA talks, Israel
presented a draft agenda for the negotiations. During the first ISGA-track
session of the following round in Washington on February 24, Israeli delegates
presented their joint-delegation interlocutors a greatly expanded version of
the draft agenda in the form of a document entitled, "Ideas for Peaceful Coex-
istence in the Territories during the Interim Period" (text in Appendix D).
The document proposed to cede to the Palestinians, for a five-year interim
22
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
B. Israel-Jordanian-Palestinian, Delegation (continued)
self-government period, powers and responsibilities in 20 critical policy areas:
1. Justice.
11. Commerce.
2. Civil Service.
12. Tourism.
3. Manpower.
13. Labor.
4. Agriculture.
14. Social welfare.
5. Education.
15. Local police and prisons.
6. Culture.
16. Internal transportation.
7. Budget.
17. Communications and posts.
8. Taxation.
18. Municipal affairs.
9. Health.
19. Housing.
10. Industry.
20. Religious affairs.
Jerusalem's chief negotiator in the talks, Israeli Cabinet Secretary Elyakim
Rubinstein, told reporters on February 25 that these arrangements "would
enable the Palestinians to run their own affairs in the majority of the walks
of life while not prejudging the outcome, the final status." The Israeli official
also said that "more is to come" as the Israelis and Palestinians proceed with
the negotiations (Federal News Service transcripts, 2/25/92).
Rubinstein, a veteran of Palestinian self-government talks who in 1979 had
accompanied then-Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan to a meeting in
Gaza with Haidar Abdel Shafi (Jerusalem Report, 11/21/91), now was
negotiating with the Gaza resident under a pre-Madrid agreement that they
would endeavor to hammer out a workable plan for Palestinian self-
government in the territories in the early 1990s. In their 1979 meeting,
Rubinstein and Abdel Shafi had spoken in Palestinian Arabic. In 1992,
Rubinstein was concerned not only about speaking the same Semitic language
as the chief Palestinian negotiator, but also about speaking the same diplomatic
language about Palestinian self-rule.
Responding to a reporter's question on why Israel did not include in the docu-
ment its 1989 proposal for Palestinian elections in the territories, senior Israeli
bilaterals delegate Yossi Ben-Aharon said on March 3 that such elections "will
be one of the stages in implementing the objective which will be the
framework of the interim self-government arrangements." Responding to
criticism that Israel failed to include in the document any reference to a Pales-
tinian self-governing authority, Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Shoval told
reporters on March 6, "[W]e'll have to see how we delegate authority to the
self-governing authority We have to negotiate the modalities, how this
is going to occur." Asked whether the Israeli army would be limited in what
it could do under ISGA as compared to what it can do today, Israeli
spokesperson Yossi Gal said on March 2 that its role "should be discussed
and decided in the framework of the negotiations." The Israeli delegation
brought along an economics expert and a health care expert to discuss its
23
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
B. Israel-Jordanian-Palestiniar Delegation (continued)
ideas in depth, and offered to bring in legal experts and other experts on par-
ticular policy areas should the need arise (Federal News Service transcripts).
The Palestinians rejected the Israeli ideas out of hand. A senior Palestinian
negotiator was quoted by Reuters (2/26/92) as saying, "Those who presented
[them] deserve to have their necks broken." Pressed by reporters for com-
ment on the not-for-attribution statement, Palestinian spokesperson Hanan
Ashrawi offered an oblique response. "It's very unfortunate it was reported,"
she said (Mideast Mirror, 2/27/92).
The Administration was disappointed with the Palestinian reaction to Israel's
Palestinian self-government proposals. On March 5, a day after the conclusion
of Washington III, a senior U.S. official was quoted by New York Times
diplomatic correspondent Thomas Friedman as saying, "The Palestinians
have to engage where they can, pocket whatever the Israelis will give them
and put aside the rest for later. But they can't come and complain to us that
the talks are meaningless, and that their constituency back home is aban-
doning them, when they could be engaging on things and selling it back
home" (New York Times, 3/6/92). Another senior U.S. official was reported
by Friedman as suggesting on the same day that the Israeli plan provided
a vehicle for substantive negotiations. In Friedman's words, the official said
that "the sides can talk about real things, like taxation or education, and build
on them, and that is what makes it preferable to the Palestinian approach."
4. The Palestinian
The "Palestinian plan" criticized by a senior U.S. official on March 5 had
been presented by the Palestinians to Israel two days earlier. An elaboration
Document:
of an outline the Palestinians gave their Israeli interlocutors during
Blueprint
Washington II in January, the 16-page document [Appendix E] builds on
for a Palestinian
a demand that "all the powers presently exercised by the military govern-
State
ment and civil administration of the occupier should be transferred to the
PISGA [Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority] upon its election and
inauguration." The text of the "Outline of "PISGA" stipulates full executive
power and a 180-seat elected "Legislative Assembly" for the PISGA; it
demands an Israeli military withdrawal to the borders ahead of the Authority's
establishment; it demands full foreign policy powers and complete control
over land, water, and air space; and it delineates Jerusalem as part of an "Oc-
cupied Palestinian Territory (OPT)".
After the Palestinian delegation presented their expanded outline to Israel,
Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Shoval made the case to reporters that the
Palestinian outline was "a proposal to establish a Palestinian state, except in
name" (Federal News Service transcript, 3/6/92). While the Palestinians denied
they had presented a blueprint for a Palestinian state, chief Palestinian
negotiator Haidar Abdel Shafi stated on March 2 that "the transition process
must lead to a Palestinian state" (Federal News Service transcript). The Palesti-
nian position as articulated by chief negotiator Abdel Shafi was in
24
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
B. Israel-Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation (continued)
contravention of U.S. policy. At his speech in Madrid, President Bush had
stated that "nothing agreed to now will prejudice permanent-status negotia-
tions. To the contrary, these subsequent negotiations will be determined on
their own merits."
Consequently, as related above, the U.S. criticized the Palestinian proposal.
U.S. officials' comments on March 5 about the Palestinian approach to self-
government negotiations with Israel were not limited to the remarks cited
above. One senior U.S. official on March 5 "chastised the Palestinians for
presenting a plan on self-rule that he called an unrealistic, thinly disguised
vehicle for independence aimed not at the Israelis but at their own Palesti-
nian public" (New York Times, 3/6/92). The senior official further stated: "It
seems that the Palestinians are more focused on the media than on the negotia-
tions. The Palestinians need to do more negotiating than posturing. In our
view, they ought to have experts present their views as the Israelis did in this
round." The official concluded, "What we are looking for is more serious
engagement in the negotiating process" (Washington Post, 3/6/92). Finally,
the official was quoted by Thomas Friedman as saying, in the Times reporter's
words, that "what distinguishes the Israeli approach from the Palestinian
approach today is that the Palestinians see self-government as something
that is supposed to be implemented, not negotiated." Friedman added,
"Palestinian independence is treated as a predesignated outcome, and it is
not consistent with the terms of reference for the negotiations or a realistic
assessment of what is possible, he said."
5. The Settlements
The impact of Jewish settlements in the territories on the peace process is
a contentious issue. Washington has for years described settlements as "an
Issue: Washington
obstacle to peace." On the other hand, Bethlehem mayor and Palestinian
Preempts the Process
delegate Elias Freij told the Washington Post just before the Madrid Conference
(10/24/91), "The Palestinians now realize that they will not win a military
victory, that time is now on the side of Israel, which can build settlements
and create facts, and that the only way out of this dilemma is face-to-face
negotiations." A Palestinian delegate in Madrid was quoted by the New York
Times (11/4/91) as saying, "Our land is being gobbled up by Israeli settlements
so we have to get moving" on the peace process. And East Jerusalem Palesti-
nian leader Faisal Husseini said last November that the Palestinians are now
ready to accept Interim Self-Government Arrangements which they had re-
jected in 1978 because of the current settlement drive in the territories (Mideast
Mirror, 11/15/91).
While there is a debate about whether settlement activity is an obstacle to
peace or a spur to the peace process, it is clear that Israel has said settlement
activity is an important subject for negotiations with Arab delegations. As
Shamir told reporters following a meeting with President Bush last
November 22, "The settlements are a part of the territorial problem, and
the territorial problem will be discussed and negotiated during the
negotiations" (Federal News Service transcript, 11/22/91).
25
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
B. Israel-Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation (continued)
Though former President Reagan said at one point during his Presidency
that he did not view settlements as obstacles to peace, U.S. Administrations
since 1967 have generally criticized settlements as hindering efforts to recon-
cile Arab-Israeli differences (Reagan 5/26/83, statement quoted in Jerusalem
Post, 6/22/83). Former Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan
never took it upon themselves, however, to "deliver" an Israeli freeze on set-
tlement activity through a conditioning of U.S. aid to Jerusalem. Last sum-
mer, despite speculation that the Administration was planning to condition
its support for U.S. loan guarantees for immigrant absorption in Israel on
a settlement freeze, President Bush seemed to dispel doubts about whether
he would maintain his predecessors' no-linkage policy. Asked directly by
a reporter last July 1 whether his support for an Israeli request for the loan
guarantees would be linked to a settlement freeze, President Bush stated: "I
don't think there ought to be a quid pro quo. What I do think [is] that it
is against U.S. policy for these settlements to be built. So, I'll leave it right
there and avoid the linkage that you understandably ask about (Federal
News Service transcript, 7/1/91).
Even after the President's announcement last September 6 that he intended
to postpone consideration of the loan guarantees for 120 days, Secretary of
State Baker denied any linkage to the peace process. In remarks to reporters
on September 13, Baker stated: "What we're saying is we do not want to
link the issues. We think it would be wrong to link the issues and that it would
operate against the prospects of peace because these are indeed divisive issues,
they're difficult issues, they are issues that we have said we think need to
be resolved at the negotiating table and not before" (UPI, 9/13/91). Four days
later, Baker told reporters in a not-for-attribution session which was later
publicly traced to him: "I don't think we can produce a settlement freeze,
but even if we could, it is a matter for [Arab-Israeli] negotiation" (State
Department transcript, 9/17/91).
On February 24 of this year, however, Baker made public a stunning rever-
sal of the Administration's position. Baker told the House Appropriations
Committee's Foreign Operations Subcommittee, "[W]e will support loan
guarantees of up to $2 billion for five years if there is a halt or an end to set-
tlement activity" (Federal News Service transcript). The previously rejected
'quid pro quo' between loan guarantees and settlements had become explicit
Administration policy.
At the watershed February 24 hearing, Baker went on to state: "[D]uring
the course of trying to put together a peace process, we even suggested that
the Arabs agree to terminate the boycott in exchange for some action on the
part of Israel, for instance the suspension of settlement activity, and the Arabs
agreed to do it and Israel said no dice."
In fact, Arab acceptance was far from universal. The Arab League, which
launched the Arab boycott and is responsible for its operation, sharply
26
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
B. Israel-Jordanian-Palestinian, Delegation (continued)
criticized the proposed boycott-settlement swap in a statement by its Assistant
Secretary General for Political Affairs (Reuters, 7/17/91). The Jordanian parlia-
ment formally rejected the idea after King Hussein had vaguely accepted
it in principle "if the dynamics of the situation could be worked out" (Mideast
Mirror, 7/23/91). Syria, where the Arab boycott headquarters are located, re-
mained silent on the proposed swap, but the Damascus-backed Palestine
National Salvation Front (PNSF), which is known to clear its policies with
the Syrian government before announcing them, condemned and rejected
the deal (Mideast Mirror, 7/23/91).
Baker in fact had tried to put together a three-way agreement: not just a
boycott-settlement swap, but also, he told reporters at the Madrid Con-
ference, "a suspension
of the intifada in exchange for a suspension of the
settlement activity" (Federal News Service transcript, 11/1/91). The Palestinians
rejected the idea out of hand. Palestinian spokesperson Hanan Ashrawi told
reporters in Madrid, "You cannot equate settlement activity with the inti-
fada
So long as there's an occupation, there will have to be a popular
expression of
the intifada" (Federal News Service transcript, 11/3/91).
Given that there was no general Arab acceptance of Baker's triangular deal
and that the Palestinians had flatly rejected it, the Administration's decision
to single out Israel for condemnation and punishment was more likely to
undermine Israeli confidence in the United States than to persuade Arab
parties of the need to make concessions in the peace process.
The impact of the Bush Administration's linkage policy on the peace proc-
ess had surfaced even before it became official in February. Amid clear signs
after Madrid that President Bush would seek a 'quid pro quo' on absorp-
tion loan guarantees despite his public protestations, Palestinian negotiators
in particular and Arab delegates to the bilaterals in general concluded that
they did not need to negotiate substance in face-to-face talks with Israel
because the United States would deliver Israeli concessions for them. Palesti-
nian delegate Ghassan al-Khattib, for example, stated last December: "We
are not going to proceed to any other point on the agenda until we reach
a solution that stops the settlements
Our position on this [a settlement
freeze] is strong, mainly because it is supported by different means of pressure
by the United States. All we have to do is be consistent with the bases laid
down by the co-sponsors of the peace conference and by the international
community" (Christian Science Monitor, 12/2/91). And just one day after Baker's
February 24 linkage statement, Palestinian spokesperson Hanan Ashrawi
suggested that the Palestinians would stop discussing self-government
arrangements proposals with Israel until Israel froze settlements. "We have
to solve the settlement issue
before we can enter into any discussion of
the transitional phase," Ashrawi said at a press conference (Federal News Serv-
ice transcript, 2/25/92).
In a Washington speech on March 10, Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Shoval
explained Israel's view of the impact Washington's linkage policy was likely
27
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
B. Israel-Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation (continued)
ly to have on the Arab negotiating posture. "I have no doubt in my mind,"
he said, "that the Palestinians, seeing the controversy between Israel and the
United States about the loan guarantees and the settlements, may have had
a perception
that in this
cooling atmosphere between Israel and the
United States, they don't have to be more flexible, they don't have to be more
compromising, more forthcoming." The Ambassador continued, "On the
contrary, they believe this may give them an opportunity to press their
demands and perhaps being backed, at least atmospherically, by the United
States." Furthermore, he said, the Arabs "may get one of their major, major
prizes in this whole process [a settlement freeze], not as a result of negotiating
with us but as a result of American pressure on Israel" (Federal News Service
transcript, 3/10/92).
As Shoval's remarks reflect, the Administration's linkage of loan guarantees
to settlements has badly eroded Israel's confidence in the United States. Given
the historical relationship between the strength of U.S.-Israel ties and
Jerusalem's capacity to make high-stakes concessions for the sake of peace,
the dismay in Jerusalem over President Bush's major policy move is expected
to hamper the effort to make real progress in the current Arab-Israeli talks.
Members of Congress in both Houses and in both parties have criticized
the Administration's loan guarantee policy on the grounds that it has under-
mined the peace process. Utah Republican Senator Orrin Hatch wrote in
a March 27 Washington Times column, for example, that "holding the loans
hostage reduces the incentive of the Arab states and the Palestinians to nego-
tiate seriously, and undermines the confidence in U.S. security guarantees
that Israel must have in order to make concessions."
Officials in the Administration itself have in the past recognized the impor-
tance of the U.S.-Israel bilateral relationship to peace efforts. Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell said on March 19 of last year, for exam-
ple, "Peace in the Middle East, a peace we all yearn for, can only be secured
if the U.S.-Israel relationship remains strong and vibrant" (Federal News Service
transcript, 3/19/91). Indeed, the negative consequences of the Administra-
tion's linkage of loan guarantees with settlements threaten to undermine its
considerable achievements in convening the Madrid conference and launch-
ing bilateral and multilateral peace negotiations.
6. Israel and Jordan
It has been said that Jordan is Israel's best neighbor. Although, unlike Egypt,
it does not have a formal peace treaty with Israel, unofficial yet practical ties
Discuss the State-
thrive. If Jordan were free to pursue the peace negotiations with Israel on
to-State Agenda
purely bilateral issues and without outside constraints, a peace treaty could
probably be signed within weeks. But Jordan has dangerous neighbors to
the north and east-Syria and Iraq-and a large Palestinian population within
its borders which is no less hazardous to its existence. Even President Sadat
28
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
B. Israel-Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation (continued)
of Egypt-a far larger and more powerful country than Jordan-found it
impossible to conclude a wholly separate peace treaty with Israel and engaged
in tough and protracted negotiations with the Israelis on self-government
for the Palestinians. As participants in a joint delegation with the Palesti-
nians, moreover, the Jordanians need to appear at least as concerned for the
Palestinians as for themselves. King Hussein's move in 1988 to formally cut
off Jordan's legal and administrative ties with the West Bank led some to
speculate that this would pave the way for a separate peace between Jerusalem
and Amman that would not involve the territories. Against the backdrop
of constraints it now faces, however, Jordan has publicly insisted during the
course of the bilaterals that Israeli-Jordanian bilateral issues must be tackled
in the context of discussions on Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank.
In a cordial atmosphere, the Jordanians and Israelis have mainly engaged in
exchanging proposed agendas for the state-to-state negotiations between
them. The initial Israeli draft agenda presented this January during
Washington II when Israeli-Jordanian track talks began included two main
items: "1. Peace treaty: components of peace"; and "2. Possible preliminaries
for peace (during the course of the negotiations)." The first item referred to
"termination of the status of war and establishment of peace, including full
diplomatic relations; security; borders; normalization, including various
spheres (trade, civil aviation, culture etc.); and areas of cooperation for special
attention: water, energy, environment and economy." The second item re-
ferred to "liaison arrangements; opening of borders and mutual visits; liaison
system between the two militaries; and non-political exchange in spheres
of mutual interest, including cooperation in the areas of water, energy and
environment and economy." No draft Jordanian agenda or subsequent Israeli
drafts have been made available.
Israel's first draft agenda contained all the major bilateral issues the Jorda-
nians are known to have raised. In particular Israel responded to a Jorda-
nian request, transmitted to Foreign Minister David Levy in Secretary Baker's
invitation to Washington I last November, that Jordanian border claims
against Israel be placed on the agenda. Most of the other issues in the Israeli
draft echoed U.S. suggestions for a Jordanian-Israeli agenda included in
Baker's invitation to the Washington talks.
Nonetheless, the Jordanians rejected the Israeli agenda. The chief Jordanian
delegate, Marwan Mouasher, explained the difficulty at a press conference
during Washington III. He said that "the Israelis are always eager to show
progress on issues that are not in contention to start with, while we would
like to see progress on contested issues." The "contested issues," he said, are:
the meaning of Resolution 242; Israeli withdrawal from the territories; the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the territories; and the
"need to freeze settlements." To the Jordanians, he added, these issues must
be the first part of the negotiations; "talks on cooperation or coordination"
should be the second part. But, he said, "The Israelis want to move directly
to the second part without talking at all about the issues that divide us" (Federal
News Service transcript, 3/4/92).
29
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
B. Israel-Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation (continued)
The nub of the problem, it is clear, is Amman's insistence on discussing the
Palestinian situation before taking up bilateral Israeli-Jordanian issues. Fur-
thermore, these matters are not even part of the Palestinian interim self-
government arrangements which are on the table in the Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations, but rather final-status issues which are supposed to be discussed
only during the second stage of the negotiations scheduled to begin three
years after the implementation of the first stage. The draft agendas exchanged
between the Israelis and Jordanians are therefore far apart.
Nonetheless, the Jordanian-Israeli negotiations have made some headway.
As chief Israeli negotiator Elyakim Rubinstein told reporters during
Washington III, "[W]hile there are obviously gaps and difference of view
in a number of areas, there are also areas of commonality and we hope to
be able to work on this in the next round." Rubinstein noted that "the
meetings here also enabled experts on both sides, experts on economy, law,
energy, water-all very important areas-to exchange views on these issues"
(Federal News Service transcript, 3/4/92).
In order to move the Jordanian-Israeli talks forward, however, the United
States will have to persuade the Jordanians to remove the final-status Pales-
tinian items from their draft agenda and concentrate on bilateral issues such
as those included in the Israeli draft and in the U.S. invitation to Washington
I. The Jordanian-Israeli track was specifically designed to deal with bilateral
Jordanian-Israeli issues; only if it is confined to these issues does it have any
chance of leading to a successful conclusion.
C. Israel-Syria
Whereas the bilateral talks between Israel and the Jordanian-Palestinian
delegation are governed by the elaborate two-stage Camp David framework,
negotiations between Israel and Syria are open-ended. In the first four rounds
of Israeli-Syrian talks since the Madrid plenary, Syria has predictably
demanded the return of the Golan Heights. Israel has said it is prepared to
discuss territorial issues, but wants Syria to first recognize the existence of
the Jewish state. It is quite possible that the two sides will ultimately deter-
mine that as in the case of the West Bank and Gaza, confidence-building
transitional arrangements will have to precede the resolution of any
final-status issues.
1. Damascus Upgrades
Madrid provided the Syrians a painful but valuable learning experience. They
Its Public Relations
discovered that the kind of public truculence Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa
displayed in his Madrid speech loses them points in the West and boosts
Israel's public relations. And they found that in the wake of their Soviet
patron's demise and the U.S. victory in the Gulf war, Damascus was no longer
able to intimidate its weaker Arab neighbors into adopting its hard-line posi-
tion on negotiations with Israel. To the contrary, Syria's attempt to pressure
them into boycotting the bilateral sessions with Israel at the end of the Madrid
Conference backfired, isolating and humiliating Damascus. In the end it was
30
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
C. Israel-Syria (continued)
Syria that had to adopt the other Arab parties' position and send its own
representatives to sit down with the Israelis for the first-ever session of direct
bilateral negotiations between the two countries.
The Syrians have learned from their experience. Unlike his boss Farouk
Sharaa, chief Syrian negotiator Muwaffaq Allaf has adopted a moderate tone
in most of his Washington press briefings. His soft-spoken manner, moreover,
contrasts sharply with Sharaa's harsh demeanor. At a news conference dur-
ing the third Washington round, Allaf even suggested that Syria is ready to
sign a peace treaty if its demands are met and said that Damascus would agree
to "the establishment of peace with all its attributes by the Arabs with Israel"
(Federal News Service transcript, 3/6/92). And while bitterly complaining about
Israel's stance in the negotiations, the Syrians joined the other Arab delega-
tions in showing up for all the scheduled bilateral Washington meetings with
the Israelis.
Although there is strong evidence that the new Syrian posture has less to
do with any genuine change of heart toward Israel than with a desire to win
the public-relations war against it, the new posture has benefited the peace
process. Moreover, Syria's continued participation in the bilateral talks has
helped keep them on track. This is not to say, however, that Damascus is
now embarked on a course of seeking to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel.
All indications point in a different direction.
2. Syria's Hard-Line
Despite the milder rhetoric, Syria's conditions for any settlement with Israel
Stance Persists
remain the same. Foreign Minister Sharaa said in Madrid that "it is imperative
for Israel to withdraw from every inch of the occupied Syrian Golan, the
West Bank, Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the south of Lebanon." Using more
diplomatic terms, chief Syrian negotiator Muwaffaq Allaf said the same thing
at the end of Washington III: A settlement must be "based on Israeli
withdrawal
to the lines of 1967" (Federal News Service transcript, 3/4/92).
Even if Israel agreed to withdraw from every inch of the Golan, Allaf in-
dicated, Syria would still not make peace with it; as Allaf said at a press con-
ference during Washington III, the Israelis "might agree with us or not agree
with us on the Golan, but they might agree with the Lebanese or with the
Palestinians or with the Jordanians
The important thing is that nobody
should try to make a separate peace at the end
So, we are for a comprehen-
sive settlement" (Federal News Service transcript, 2/27/92).
Syria's insistence on an Israeli commitment to a total withdrawal prior to
the discussion of any other issue has bedeviled the Israel-Syria negotiations
since Day One. As related above, chief Israeli negotiator Yosef Ben-Aharon
reported after the two parties' meeting in Madrid last November that the
Syrians repeatedly asked the Israelis, "When will you withdraw from the
territories?" Toward the end of Washington III, Ben-Aharon still reported
"persistent [Syrian] reference to withdrawal" (Federal News Service transcript,
31
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
C. Israel-Syria (continued)
3/3/92). Syrian chief negotiator Allaf himself explained three days later that
Israel would have to give up the land before a discussion of its security re-
quirements could begin: "[R]elinquishing the land Israel occupied in 1967
would permit discussion of security for Israel" (Federal News Service
transcript, 3/6/92). In any event, Ben-Aharon reported, the Syrians "say there's
no such thing as secure borders, you have to withdraw in toto, and that in
itself will give you the kind of security that you are seeking" (Federal News
Service transcript, 3/3/92).
Israel's position has been that while it is prepared to negotiate on territory,
Syria first needs to acknowledge that it is talking to a real state, not some
illegitimate entity. Ben-Aharon said during Washington II this January, for
example, that what Israel needs is a Syrian "acceptance of the fact that there
is a State of Israel in the Middle East" (Federal News Service transcript, 1/13/92).
Syria's rejection of Israel's right to exist, Ben-Aharon said, means that it "has
no place for an Israel in the Middle East." He added: "Once we overcome
this hurdle we will be able to talk to [Syria about] the delineation of the
border. We have no problem in dealing with the issue of territory and borders
between us and Syria at the right time" (Federal News Service transcript,
1/14/92). Ben-Aharon emphasized that Israel is not seeking at this stage formal
diplomatic recognition, which, he said, could be discussed together with
the territorial issue at a later time.
Ben-Aharon has indicated that Israel is willing to discuss possible interim
confidence-building measures (CBMs) with Syria pending an agreement
on final-status issues. "We do not rule out the option of CBMs which may
come up at the appropriate time at a setting which is conducive to such
moves," he said after Washington I last December (Middle East Insight,
January/February 1992). The Administration has suggested that it supports
the concept of CBMs in Arab-Israeli negotiations, not necessarily limited
to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Secretary of State Baker noted in a May
22, 1989, speech that there is a long-standing U.S. commitment to the prin-
ciple that "the issues involved in the negotiations are far too complex and
the emotions far too deep to move directly to a final settlement. Accordingly,
some transitional period is needed, associated in time and sequence with
negotiations on final status. Such a transition will allow the parties to take
the measure of each other's performance, to encourage attitudes to change,
and to demonstrate that peace and coexistence is desired" (State Department
transcript).
As Israeli-Syrian bilateral talks began last year, there were reports that the
State Department and Pentagon were each working on studies exploring
the possibility of interim arrangements between Jerusalem and Damascus.
This January, the chief spokesperson for Prime Minister Shamir would
neither confirm nor deny speculation in Israel that Jerusalem might propose
an interim arrangement whereby Israel would cede control to Syria of some
Druze villages in the Golan in exchange for some Syrian gesture, perhaps
a termination of its state of war against Israel (Reuters, 1/1/92).
32
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
C. Israel-Syria (continued)
The Syrians have rebuffed all Israeli attempts to move forward-even on the
most trivial of issues. At a press conference during Washington I, Ben-Aharon
said:
[W]e tried to establish a communication, and at this last meeting, I pro-
posed to [chief Syrian negotiator Allaf] that we communicate through
our ambassador in Washington. He rejected. I proposed to him some kind
of a positive note to the end of this round by-through a joint communi-
que which was innocuous, and I gave him the text which, after some
hesitation, he proceeded to handle for a moment and then sent it back,
gave it back to me. He said this is not the time for anything that is joint
(Federal News Service transcript, 12/18/91).
Similarly, Ben-Aharon reported during Washington III that the Israelis
"presented [the Syrians] with a paper containing eight points of agreement
on issues that are very, very basic. It's really the lowest common
denominator." Chief Syrian negotiator Allaf studied the document, rejected
it, "and gave it back to us." The Syrian delegation head, Ben-Aharon said,
was unwilling to accept any "expression of something he can point to as being
positive from our side. And that's a pity" (Federal News Service transcript,
2/26/92).
Coupled with their persistent refusal to shake hands with the Israelis or even
engage them in small talk, the Syrians' unyielding stance on both the pro-
cedure and the substance of the negotiations has led Israeli officials to the
conclusion that the Syrians had come to Washington not to negotiate with
the Israelis, but to get the United States to "deliver" Israel. Ben-Aharon said
during Washington III, "They have expectations
that if and when they
reach any sort of crisis, the United States will intervene. And intervene in
their favor" (Federal News Service transcript, 2/26/92). The Israeli interpreta-
tion was borne out by Syrian statements. Syrian spokesperson Bushra
Kanafani, for example, told reporters during Washington III: "It's always in
our intention that the United States of America, as the main initiator of this
process, as the honest broker-we were promised that the United States
would be the driving force-that this country, as a sponsor, must practice
its role to push the peace process forward" (Federal News Service transcript,
2/26/92).
Underlying Israel's concern over Syria's conduct at the negotiating table is
an even deeper worry about Syria's actions on the ground in the Middle East.
Syria's brutality toward its own citizens has been noted in the recently released
State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991: "The
major human rights problems [in Syria] include torture, arbitrary arrest and
detention, lack of fair trial in security cases, and the denial of freedom of
speech, press, association, the right of citizens to change their government,
and certain worker rights." Syria's 4,500 Jews have been singled out for par-
ticularly harsh treatment. The Administration has also made reference to
Syria's continued support for international terrorism. In testimony last
November before the Europe and the Middle East Subcommittee of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near
33
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
C. Israel-Syria (continued)
Eastern and South Asian Affairs Edward Djerejian said that "Syria allows
the presence-on its territory and in the Bekaa where Syrian troops are gar-
risoned nearby-for various groups that are known to be groups engaged
in international terrorism, including [the Palestinian group] PFLP-GC"
(Federal News Service transcript, 11/20/91). The State Department announced
on March 12 of this year that in conducting its annual review of the U.S.
list of nations supporting terrorism, it determined that Syria should remain
on the list-in the company of Iraq, Iran, Cuba, Libya, and North Korea.
Syria's involvement in drug trafficking was also noted by Djerejian in his
testimony last November, when he said that "there is definitely informa-
tion of Syrian military involvement in the drug trade in Lebanon."
Most troubling to Israel has been Syria's rush to acquire missiles, tanks, and
other offensive weapons even as its delegates continue to sit down with the
Israelis in Washington. On February 21 of this year, as the United States called
on North Korea to halt a ship carrying advanced Scud missiles and missile-
related equipment to Iran for transfer to Syria, State Department spokesperson
Margaret Tutwiler told reporters, "Syria
has had Scud missiles in its arsenal
for years, and we believe that they are still trying to procure more, including
from North Korea" (Federal News Service transcript). The Scud missiles' suc-
cessful arrival in Iran en route to Syria was seen by the Israelis as a reminder
that Syria, whose powerful armed forces already constitute the biggest threat
of any Arab army to Israel's security, had not abandoned its efforts to build
an offensive military option against Israel.
Despite their concerns over Syria's intentions and actions, the Israelis ex-
pressed readiness to negotiate with the Syrians on any issue, including ter-
ritorial withdrawal. Although, according to Israel, Damascus was completely
unresponsive to Jerusalem's willingness to negotiate Syrian territorial
demands, the Jewish state said it would remain engaged in talks with Syria.
Ben-Aharon said toward the close of Washington III that Israel "will con-
tinue as long as it takes because
if there is that sliver of an opportunity
to talk to the delegation that represents a country that for 43 years has adopted
perhaps the most extreme position, that in itself is something which we
should not belittle, and we'll do our best to continue the exchange, hoping
that this will open the way to some kind of mutual understanding and then
basing even on that slim basis, maybe we will reach points of agreement that
will then serve the objective of future progress" (Federal News Service transcript,
3/3/92).
Ben-Aharon said during Washington II in January that despite the difficulties
and frustrations, the very fact that Israel and Syria are holding direct talks
represents progress: "If Syria has over the years rejected any kind of pro-
posal to meet with us directly, and now has agreed, no matter what are the
considerations and reasons for it, we appreciate and record this as a
fact
[T]he fact that they have agreed is in itself progress" (Federal News
Service transcript, 1/14/92). Even the Syrians have reported some progress
in the negotiations process. Chief Syrian negotiator Allaf said on Feb-
34
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
D. Israel-Lebanon
ruary 25 as Washington III opened, "[W]e were able to introduce some sub-
stantive discussion again about the concept of peace and security, compre-
hensive peace, how to implement the resolution [242] in a manner which
shows good faith" (Federal News Service transcript).
D. Israel-
There is no question that if Lebanon were truly an independent country, a
full-fledged Lebanese-Israeli peace treaty could be signed within a very short
Lebanon
time. Neither Israel nor Lebanon has any territorial claims against the other;
both nations want the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and
the extension of full Lebanese army control over the entire country; and both
nations want to live in peace with each other.
But Lebanon is not an independent state. More than 40,000 Syrian soldiers
control over half of its territory, and Syrian loyalists occupy most of the key
positions in Lebanon's government, parliament, and army. Lebanon's foreign
policy is largely determined in Damascus, and its foreign policy interests are
subordinated to Syria's. The Assad regime scuttled the 1983 Israeli-Lebanese
treaty, and it is not permitting Lebanon to conclude a separate peace treaty
with Israel in the current talks. While Lebanese negotiators in the bilaterals
have been allowed some leeway on marginal issues, Lebanon's negotiating
stance in these discussions seems to reflect Syrian objectives more than
Lebanese needs.
1. Israel Proposes
Southern Lebanon, appropriately dubbed by journalists "The Wild South,"
Security
is one of the most chaotic and dangerous places on Earth. Bands of fun-
damentalist Muslim Hezbollah suicide fighters roam the nation, placing ex-
Arrangements
plosive charges on roads and booby traps elsewhere, shooting at passing
vehicles, firing Katyusha rockets into northern Israel, and averaging about
one attempted cross-border terrorist raid per week. After taking "credit"
for blowing up the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires on March 17 of this year,
Hezbollah's political arm Islamic Jihad stated, "We proudly announce that
the operation
is one of our continuous strikes against the criminal Israeli
enemy in an open war that we will not finish until Israel is wiped out of ex-
istence" (Washington Post, 3/19/92). Hezbollah had earlier acknowledged blow-
ing up the Marine headquarters and U.S. Embassy in Beirut and taking most
of the former American hostages in Lebanon. The PLO and other Palesti-
nian and Lebanese armed groups are active in southern Lebanon as well. To
protect its citizens Israel maintains a narrow security zone in southern
Lebanon, patrolled by IDF and South Lebanon Army soldiers.
A recent Wall Street Journal article (March 19) reported that Syria has given
Hezbollah free rein to mount operations against Israel, because Damascus
believes that these activities can serve its goal of extracting concessions from
Israel and the United States. Iran for its part supplies financial and technical
35
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
D. Israel-Lebanon (continued)
aid, and Iranian Revolutionary Guards stationed nearby provide guidance
and operational assistance. The Israelis find this situation intolerable. They
seek to negotiate an agreement with Lebanon that would replace the armed
groups in the south with regular Lebanese army troops who will maintain
order and prevent attacks against Israel; in return, the Israeli army would
withdraw from the security zone. The Israelis further seek a full peace treaty
with Lebanon to replace the shaky armistice agreement of 1949.
Chief Lebanese negotiator Souheil Chammas stated after Washington I,
"[T]he Israelis have assured us that they have no claims or designs on
Lebanese territory, not even on one centimeter
They even went further
and they assured us that they do not covet or have any designs or any claims
on one drop of Lebanese water" (Federal News Service transcript, 12/20/91).
Indeed, co-chair of the Israeli delegation Yosef Hadass had stated at the open-
ing of Washington I in December, "Israel has no territorial designs over
Lebanon. All we seek is security for the northern part of Israel and to pro-
tect the lives of our citizens from terrorist attacks" (PRI Newswire transcript,
12/10/91). Hadass reiterated this pledge during Washington III: "We have
no claims, I repeat it here, over any inch of Lebanese territory" (Federal News
Service transcript, 2/27/92). Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Shoval had stated
earlier that "if all foreign forces-Syrian, PLO, Hezbollah-leave Lebanon,
Israel has absolutely no purpose to have any position in Lebanon at all" (CNN
"One on One," quoted in Federal News Service transcript, 10/27/91). And on
the eve of the Madrid Conference, co-chairman of the Israeli delegation Uri
Lubrani said that Israel was prepared to negotiate the withdrawal of its soldiers
from the security zone if its security needs were met (Washington Post,
10/29/91).
Israel's stance is compatible with Washington's long-established position on
this issue. Nearly a decade ago, the United States formally committed itself
not to seek an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon unless a
simultaneous withdrawal is implemented by Syria and the PLO (U.S.-Israel
Memorandum of Understanding, 5/17/83). More recently, according to a
press report of U.S. pre-Madrid assurances to Lebanon, the Administration
stated that "Lebanon and Israel have the right to secure borders," and that
nothing in the process would alter the United States' "commitment to the
unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, as well as to the
withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from [its territory] and the disarm-
ing of all militias" (Mideast Mirror, 10/29/91). UN Secretary General Boutros
Ghali for his part has expressed support for "the process of deployment of
the Lebanese Army in southern Lebanon, thus helping to re-establish the
Government's authority there" (letter to the Security Council, 1/30/92).
Boutros Ghali's letter is consistent with Security Council Resolution 520
(1982), which calls for "strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive
authority of the Government of Lebanon through the Lebanese Army
throughout Lebanon."
36
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
D. Israel-Lebanon (continued)
The Israelis' ultimate goal in the bilateral negotiations with the Lebanese
is a full peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon. As Hadass stated on March
3 of this year toward the end of Washington III, "[W]e are here not to discuss
partial peace, not to discuss another armistice or cease-fire agreement, or
even non-belligerency. We have come here and we are here to achieve bilateral,
comprehensive peace between Lebanon and Israel." But for now, Hadass
said on February 25, the Israeli negotiators have "tried not to confine
[themselves] to
peace
but to
negotiate concretely, [making] a very
concrete proposal which can
move [the parties] forward toward this
peace." Hadass said on March 4 that the Israelis had focused in their discus-
sions with the Lebanese on security problems, and emphasized particularly
the issues of terrorism from Lebanese territory and of the Syrian and Ira-
nian presence in Lebanon. Among other proposals, the Israelis suggested
the establishment of two working groups, one on security and one on civilian
affairs. The chief Lebanese negotiator Souheil Chammas said on March 1
that while Lebanon objected to the proposal, "We never said we will not
discuss [it]" (Federal News Service transcripts).
2. Lebanon Demands
The polite statement by Hadass on February 26 that Israel was "negotiating
Immediate Israeli
with a delegation of an independent and sovereign country" was gratefully
acknowledged by the Lebanese; Chammas said on the same day, "The chair-
Withdrawal
man of the Israeli delegation clearly stated that the delegation he
faces
represents a free and sovereign Lebanon. And for us, that's a satisfac-
tory statement." But all indications are that Lebanon's freedom and
sovereignty are severely curtailed by the Syrians. A statement by Ben-Aharon
on March 5 that the issues would remain as they are "as long as Syria rules
[Lebanon]" was borne out by Lebanese positions and statements (Federal News
Service transcripts.)
Asked last December 20 at the end of Washington I when the Lebanese army
would be ready to take up security responsibilities in the south, Chammas
responded: "I think by now we're ready .We have an army. It's ready to
move. The decision will be political, not military
[W]e hope others would
respond to our needs and requirements" (Federal News Service transcript). By
"others" Chammas could only have meant the Syrians. Despite the well-
known Lebanese desire to see a Syrian troop withdrawal from their coun-
try, Chammas said on February 26 of this year that the Syrians' "continued
presence is acceptable to the Lebanese authorities." He then made the follow-
ing extraordinary statement, however:
His Excellency the President of Syria, President Al-Assad, had assured
the Lebanese leadership at the highest level that he will be happy when
the day will arrive that the Lebanese authorities would request him to
withdraw the Syrian troops from Lebanon (Federal News Service transcript).
It stands to reason that Lebanon's own interests would be best served by
linkage of an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon to a simultaneous
37
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
D. Israel-Lebanon (continued)
withdrawal by Syria and all other foreign forces from the rest of the coun-
try; a unilateral Israeli withdrawal would remove Lebanon's strongest leverage
for securing the withdrawal of the other forces. Yet throughout the three
Washington rounds which have taken place, the Lebanese delegation per-
sistently demanded an immediate, unilateral Israeli withdrawal-a long-
established Syrian objective. During Washington III (February 26), Cham-
mas said that the "effort to lay down the basis for a linkage between Syria's
presence and Israeli occupation is only a futile attempt on the part of Israel
to continue and justify its occupation of Lebanon" (Federal News Service
transcript).
The Lebanese based their demand for a unilateral Israeli withdrawal on UN
Security Council Resolution 425 (1978); they chose to ignore both the resolu-
tion's implicit demand for a withdrawal of all foreign forces in its call for
"strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political in-
dependence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries,"
and Resolution 520's call for implementing "sole and exclusive authority
of the Government of Lebanon through the Lebanese Army throughout
Lebanon."
The Israelis acknowledged Resolution 425's relevance and importance.
Hadass said on February 26, "425 is a very, very, very important resolu-
tion. We understand Lebanon's concern about it." But, Hadass explained,
"it has to fit into the comprehensive framework of peace. It's not an isolated
element." He added: "We'll discuss it, in due time, when we are going to
discuss the different elements
of a peace treaty." But Chammas was ada-
mant: He stated on March 2 that Resolution 425 is "the only starter available
in the discussions of peace" (Federal News Service transcripts). The gap be-
tween these two positions has yet to be bridged.
Nonetheless, the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations have been useful and con-
structive by all accounts. Chammas stated at the conclusion of Washington
I (December 20), "[W]hat we have done with our Israeli interlocutor is that
we've
been
moving
.The talks were open, they were direct, they were
bilateral." Toward the end of Washington III (March 3) he was even more
upbeat: "We're achieving much. We're defining areas of disagreement, and
to define areas of disagreement is already an accomplishment." Israeli delega-
tion co-chair Lubrani agreed. He told reporters on March 4, "It has been
a very constructive round
I think that the most important achievement
is that both we on our part, and I hope also the Lebanese delegation on its
part, [are] clear about the problems and the subjects which need to be dis-
cussed and agreed upon before we can reach a peace agreement."
No less important, the Lebanese delighted in shaking hands with the Israelis
and in conducting cordial exchanges with them, unlike the Syrian delegates.
As Hadass stated on December 19, the talks were held in a "good atmos-
phere." It was a "relaxed atmosphere, with no tension, with jokes even,"
38
II. HEADWAY IN THE BILATERALS
D. Israel-Lebanon (continued)
he said. Even the Hezbollah Katyusha rocket shelling across the border did
not affect the atmosphere. "On the contrary," said Hadass on February 24,
"it gave both sides the sense that we need to move forward and to achieve
this peace, to avoid such incidents or such serious threats to our security"
(Federal News Service transcripts).
Given Syria's control over Lebanon, a breakthrough toward the achievement
of an Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty will ultimately depend on a change in
Syrian policy toward Lebanon. Nonetheless, the ongoing direct dialogue
between the Israelis and the Lebanese on issues relating to peace and security
is an important step.
39
III. LAUNCHING THE MULTILATERALS
A. Progress at
On January 28 of this year, just under three months after the historic Madrid
Conference had launched the new Middle East peace process, Secretary of
the Moscow
State Baker and Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev opened
Conference
a two-day multinational conference in Moscow dedicated to launching
multilateral discussions on Middle East regional issues. The opening ses-
sion of the conference took place in the chandelier-adorned Hall of Col-
umns in Moscow's House of Unions.
The House of Unions had gained international notoriety for being the site
of the late Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's "show trials" of his political opponents
in the 1930s. Now, in post-Stalinist, post-Communist, post-Soviet Union
Russia, it was the site of a more uplifting spectacle-a majority of the Arab
League's member nations was participating with the State of Israel at a con-
clave on interstate Middle East cooperation. Delegates from Israel and 11
Arab states-including Gulf Cooperation Council and Maghreb nations not
bordering on the Jewish state-were joined at the conference by represen-
tatives of 24 other nations: the U.S.; the Russian Federation; the European
Community Twelve; the six nations of the European Free Trade Associa-
tion; Turkey; Canada; China; and Japan.
"Look around you, ladies and gentlemen, at the parties gathered around this
table," Secretary of State Baker urged the delegates during the conference's
opening session. "Who would have imagined fifty years ago that the na-
tions of Europe, many of whom were for centuries the fiercest of enemies,
would find lasting common purpose in a vibrant European Community?
And who would have imagined even five years ago that the United States
would launch a new partnership with a democratizing Russia? Who really
knows what kinds of cooperation, however improbable it might seem to-
day, might be possible in the Middle East over the rest of this decade?"
As Baker spoke, most of the world's attention was focused elsewhere. Lead
headlines in U.S. newspapers on the day after the opening of the Moscow
Conference were reserved for President Bush's much-anticipated State of
the Union Address January 28. Even for the host of the conference, the Rus-
sian Federation, the plenum was hardly a focus of attention; Russian Presi-
dent Boris Yeltsin did not attend the Moscow meeting, flying instead to the
Russian port of Novorossisk for talks with military leaders on the future of
the former Soviet Union's Black Sea fleet.
1. U.S. Leadership
There was no doubt, however, that Secretary of State Baker was paying close
attention to the course of the Moscow Conference. Baker deemed the launch-
ing of multilateral negotiations between Arab parties, Israel, and others in
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III. LAUNCHING THE MULTILATERALS
A. Progress at the Moscow Conference (continued)
the international community as a critically important element of the peace
process, and he worked to secure the agreement of Arab parties to participate
even in the face of a call from Syria for a boycott of the session unless Israel
committed to withdraw from additional territory it had captured in the 1967
Six Day War. The Secretary of State also reached out to powerful nations
in Europe, Japan, and elsewhere around the globe and lined up their par-
ticipation in the talks.
To be sure, the heart of the peace process in the Bush Administration's view
is the direct bilateral negotiation between Israel and immediate neighbors of
hers, with the objective of achieving peace treaties following the precedent
of the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. But progress in multilateral
negotiations-as President Bush said in his speech at the Madrid
Conference-"is not intended as a substitute for what must be decided in
the bilateral talks. To the contrary, progress in the multilateral issues can help
creaté an atmosphere in which longstanding bilateral disputes can more easily
be settled." President Bush explained, "For too long, the Israeli people have
lived in fear, surrounded by an unaccepting Arab world." For Israel to take
additional national security risks for the sake of a "comprehensive settle-
ment," the Administration understood, it would need signs that the Arab
world was now ready to coexist with her.
Multilateral discussions on regional issues were viewed by the U.S. as im-
portant in their own right as a means of addressing such issues as arms control
which affect the life of the Middle East across national boundaries.
Multilateral talks, Baker told the assembled delegates in the domed Hall of
Columns, "offer a real and valuable chance to address issues of major im-
portance that do not lend themselves to discussion in the bilateral framework."
2. International
In his address at the Moscow Conference, Japanese Foreign Minister Michio
Engagement
Watanabe echoed the U.S. view on the importance of the multilateral negotia-
tions being launched. "[W]e should be fully aware that progress in the
multilateral conference could facilitate direct negotiations through
confidence-building among the parties," Watanabe stated, "and thus sus-
tain the Middle East peace process." The Japanese Foreign Minister also made
clear Tokyo shared the view that multilateral cooperation was also a necessary
means of addressing regional issues. On environmental protection, for exam-
ple, Watanabe said, "The environmental problems are hard to solve by one
country alone and cooperation among countries in the region is absolutely
necessary
Arms control in the Middle East is as urgent a task for all of
us as moves to ameliorate conflict among the parties concerned."
Representing the 12 nations of the powerful European Community in his
position as President of the EC Council of Ministers, Portuguese Foreign
42
III. LAUNCHING THE MULTILATERALS
A. Progress at the Moscow Conference (continued)
Minister Joao de Deus Pinheiro also spoke to the value of the multilateral
discussions in his Moscow Conference address. "The Twelve attach much
significance to progress in the multilateral track of the negotiations as they
view the creation of a climate of stability and confidence among the different
parties as essential to fostering regional cooperation," Pinheiro said. "This
is the key that will open the door to a new Middle East, demonstrating the
benefits of peace." Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara
McDougall voiced a similar view, saying, "The approach being encouraged
is fully consistent with Canada's concept of 'cooperative security,' that is,
that true peace and security depend on comprehensive dialogue and coopera-
tion among all concerned."
Through their support for the U.S. approach to the multilateral negotiations
process, Japan, the EC, Canada, and the seven other participating nations
outside the Middle East played a constructive role at the Moscow Conference.
Additionally, several of these nations made an important contribution in
Moscow by taking steps to strengthen their ties with Israel and thus reduce
the Jewish state's sense of isolation in the international sphere. After a meeting
in Moscow between Japanese Foreign Minister Watanabe and Israeli Foreign
Minister David Levy, for example, a Japanese official announced that Tokyo
would urge its private sector to halt its compliance with the Arab boycott
of Israel. There were also indications that Japan might soon sign an avia-
tion agreement with Israel.
3. Arab Participation:
Participating Arab governments at the Moscow Conference took pains to
Another Setback for
declare to their populations and to the international community that they
were loath to actually cooperate with Israel unless the Jewish state commit-
Syria and the PLO
ted to ceding additional territory to her immediate neighbors. Some, either
in their speeches or through their state-run media outlets, expressed sup-
port for the most prominent Arab no-shows at the conclave-Syria, Lebanon,
and the Palestinians, three of the four parties with whom Israel had engaged
in direct bilateral negotiations after the Madrid Conference. And while both
of Jordan's TV channels covered Israeli Foreign Minister Levy's speech live,
complete with an Arabic translation (Mideast Mirror, 1/29/92), the Jordanian
delegates at the conference made sure not to applaud when he finished. In-
deed, only the delegation of Egypt applauded Levy's appeal for Arab-Israeli
coexistence and cooperation (New York Times, 1/29/92).
Still, the Arab delegations' participation was significant. As noted above,
Syria had called on Arab parties to condition their attendance at multilateral
talks on an Israeli commitment to withdraw from additional lands it cap-
tured in the Six Day War. Last October 16, just two weeks before the Madrid
Conference, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa had stood next to
Secretary of State Baker in Damascus and told reporters that Syria would
urge "all our brother Arab states" to refuse to participate in multilateral talks
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III. LAUNCHING THE MULTILATERALS
A. Progress at the Moscow Conference (continued)
until Israel provided "tangible proof' that would cede additional territory.
Sharaa expressed confidence that Arab states would heed Syria's call. "I am
sure that the Arab countries would not come forward to multilateral talks
before they are sure that the Israelis' intentions have been genuinely reversed,"
he said (New York Times and Washington Post, 10/17/91).
At a meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Damascus the following week,
however, Syria was unable to persuade its Arab counterparts to announce
a unified Arab boycott of the multilaterals. A joint communique issued by
the ministers at the close of the meeting on October 24 made no mention
of the multilaterals.
Syria's call was publicly rebuffed by the Gulf Cooperation Council just three
days later. In an October 27 communique after an emergency session in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, GCC foreign ministers announced that the GCC
nations-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates,
and Oman-would participate in the multilateral negotiations, and no con-
ditions for their participation were set forth. The GCC foreign ministers
said that "in continuation of GCC efforts to achieve peace, security and
stability in the Middle East," the Council looked forward to the Madrid Con-
ference and would send an observer, and that "the states of the GCC will
also take part in the multilateral meetings." GCC Secretary General Abdallah
Beshara, a Kuwaiti who would attend the Madrid Conference as an observer,
was quoted by a Kuwaiti daily as saying that the announced GCC decision
to participate in the multilaterals with Israel was "a big step" (Mideast Mir-
ror, 10/28/91).
An Arab newspaper close to Saudi Arabia reported that the GCC ministers
issued their communique after receiving an "urgent message" from Secretary
of State Baker asking for a "more supportive stand" with regard to the
negotiations (Mideast Mirror, 10/28/91). It was readily apparent that urging
from Washington in favor of constructive Gulf engagement with Israel was
more potent than urging from Damascus in the other direction.
When he arrived in Madrid, GCC Secretary General Beshara foreshadowed
the manner in which Arab delegations at the Moscow meeting would take
pains to publicly devalue their participation in multilateral talks with Israel.
"The third phase [the multilateral phase, with Madrid being the first phase
and the bilateral talks being the second] will address regional problems,"
Beshara told reporters. "These are not negotiations but deal with issues like
disarmament, the problem of water, economic and ecological development.
These are all issues that cannot be discussed until after the states directly in-
volved [in the Arab-Israeli conflict] agree on urgent issues like the issues
of peace, withdrawal, water and settlements" (Mideast Mirror, 10/29/91).
Protestations aside, the bottom line was that the GCC had bucked Syria's
call and had announced its intention to participate in multilateral talks.
Moreover, the Gulf states would later reaffirm that they viewed the
44
III. LAUNCHING THE MULTILATERALS
A. Progress at the Moscow Conference (continued)
multilaterals as serving their own interests. In a joint statement issued last
December 25, for example, GCC leaders announced that the Council "ex-
presses its determination in taking part in the multilateral talks out of its desire
in boosting the regional security" (United Press International, 12/26/91).
Other Arab parties joined the GCC in publicly affirming their intention to
participate in the multilaterals despite the Syrian call for a boycott. At the
Madrid Conference Jordanian Foreign Minister Kamal Abu Jaber referred
reporters to a speech by King Hussein to a Jordanian national congress on
October 12, in which the Jordanian leader made the case for Jordanian par-
ticipation in the multilaterals. The King had stated at the congress (Mideast
Mirror, 10/14/91):
[T]he conference is a peace conference. In other words, the retrieving of
territory would be one and not all of its consequences. For there is also
the issue of regional security and peace between the countries of the region
as well as the issue of the environment, water and economic development.
These issues require cooperation and collective agreements. Jordan, which
is at the center of the East Mediterranean region, cannot dissociate itself
from the efforts aimed at resolving those issues and not be a party in the
agreements that could be reached.
After Madrid, King Hussein reaffirmed Jordan's opposition to the Syrian
position on the multilaterals. He told the French newspaper Le Monde that
he thought the bilateral talks and the multilaterals "should be simultaneous,"
in part because "regional talks would be an extra stimulus."
By the time of the Moscow Conference, Jordan felt confident enough about
its participation in the multilaterals that it turned the tables on Damascus
and urged Syria to participate. "From a Jordanian point of view, the Moscow
talks will not be an alternative to the bilateral peace talks," said Abdul Salam
Majali, chief negotiator for Amman in the Jordanian-Israeli bilateral talks,
just before Jordanian Foreign Minister Abu Jaber left for Moscow (Reuters,
1/25/92). "Arabs should not give Israel the pretext to withdraw from the talks."
Abu Jaber made clear to reporters before leaving that Jordan felt no com-
pulsion to heed Damascus' boycott appeal. "We don't need an Arab
authorization to go to the talks," Abu Jaber said. "We have our own indepen-
dent views and we are going as a Jordanian delegation" (Reuters, 1/26/92).
In an interview with the Wall Street Journal just before Moscow (1/27/92), Jor-
danian spokesperson Marwan Muasher reaffirmed King Hussein's public
argument that the multilaterals were in the Jordanians' own interests and
in the interests of the peace process: "Money needs to be injected into the
region," Muasher told the Journal. "People have to feel that the quality of
life improves, that compromise pays."
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had initially indicated support for the
Syrian position. After meeting in Egypt with Sharaa just days before the
Madrid Conference, Mubarak was quoted as saying, "It is natural that there
be significant progress in the bilateral negotiations before we start talking
about the multilateral negotiations." (Mideast Mirror, 10/28/91). But Cairo,
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III. LAUNCHING THE MULTILATERALS
A. Progress at the Moscow Conference (continued)
no doubt encouraged by Washington, subsequently shifted its approach and
took on a leading role in support of an unconditional launching of multilateral
talks. After the U.S. and the Russian Federation issued invitations to the
Moscow Conference in January, Egypt urged all Arab parties to attend. "Per-
suasion is the name of the game, but no coercion, no pressure, nothing of
that sort," a spokesperson for the Egyptian Embassy in Washington was
reported as saying on January 21 (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 1/21/92).
Though they ultimately joined Syria and Lebanon in a boycott of the Moscow
Conference, the Palestinians at the same time undermined the Syrian posi-
tion on the multilaterals by pressing to participate in the Moscow plenum
on their own terms. This reportedly infuriated Damascus, particularly since
the PLO had indicated its support for the Syrian multilaterals boycott as part
of a Damascus-Tunis reconciliation process linked to the peace talks. Days
after the reopening last November of the Damascus office of PLO chief Yasir
Arafat's Fatah faction (closed in 1983 amid a rift between Syrian President
Assad and Arafat), PLO political chief Farouk Kaddoumi told reporters that
the PLO and Syria had fully coordinated their positions on the multilaterals.
"If there is tangible progress in the bilateral negotiations, the multilateral
negotiations can be held, and in that event we can participate in them," Kad-
doumi was quoted by the leading Saudi Arabian daily as saying. "But if the
progress we seek does not occur, we will never attend the multilateral negotia-
tions" (Mideast Mirror, 11/14/91).
As it became increasingly clear, however, that Arab states were going to defy
the Syrian boycott call and that the multilaterals were going to be launched,
the PLO decided it did not want to be left behind. The group lobbied for
Arab support for a PLO seat at the multilaterals. Arab states still resentful
of the PLO's support for Saddam Hussein did not even pay lip service to
the idea.
Arafat quietly abandoned his effort. When the U.S. and the Russian Federation
issued invitations to the Moscow Conference in January, however, Palesti-
nian delegation spokesperson Hanan Ashrawi made sure to tell reporters that
the decision on Palestinian participation in Moscow would ultimately be
made by the PLO. Additionally, she indicated that Tunis would insist on the
participation of Palestinians from outside the territories-in contravention
of the terms of reference set before Madrid. "We feel that the terms or con-
ditions of participation that were imposed on us in the bilaterals should not
and cannot logically and in all fairness apply to the multilaterals," Ashrawi
told reporters on January 13 (Federal News Service transcript). Participation
of "external" Palestinians would mean, of course, an enhanced role for the
"external" PLO.
Meanwhile, Syria pressed the PLO to support its boycott. During an Islamic
Conference Organization meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco, the week before
the Moscow Conference, Syrian Foreign Minister Sharaa held lengthy talks
with Arafat and pressed him to support Damascus' position. After the
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III. LAUNCHING THE MULTILATERALS
A. Progress at the Moscow Conference (continued)
meeting, Sharaa reported that the two had agreed Arab participation in the
Moscow conference would serve the Israeli objective of "peace for peace"
instead of "land for peace." Just days before, Syria released a leading member
of Arafat's Fatah faction from a Syrian jail (Mideast Mirror, 1/24/92).
On the weekend before the Moscow Conference, the PLO in Tunis debated
strategy for the plenum. Ultimately, it decided to direct a delegation in-
cluding both "internals" and "externals" to go to Moscow and to press
Secretary of State Baker for inclusion in the conference. When Baker insisted
that a Palestinian delegation for the conference meet the "internals" criteria
set before Madrid, the Palestinians boycotted the meeting. The Secretary
made a significant concession to the Palestinians, however, by declaring after
the opening session in the Hall of Columns that the U.S. would be "sup-
portive of representation by diaspora Palestinians ["externals"] in working
groups where that representation was appropriate" (State Department
transcript).
Algeria and Yemen also sent delegations to Moscow in defiance of the Syrian
position, but boycotted the meeting when it was apparent that the Palesti-
nians were not going to participate. On the face of it, it might have seemed
that Tunisia, host to the PLO, would also show solidarity with the Palesti-
nians and stay away from the Moscow conclave. Eager, however, for a restora-
tion of U.S. aid withheld as a result of its support for Iraq during the Gulf
crisis, Tunisia decided to participate. Two other Maghreb Union members-
Morocco and Mauritania-also participated. As he built the current peace
talks, Secretary of State Baker had made clear to the four Maghreb Union
nations besides Libya that the U.S. considered their participation in
multilateral talks with Israel to be an important confidence-building step.
Last August he had visited Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria and discussed the
multilaterals with the nations' leaders. In North Africa as in the Gulf,
Washington's wishes proved more important than those of Damascus.
4. Israeli Hopefulness
After the conclusion of the Moscow Conference, Israeli Foreign Minister
David Levy stated that Israel was pleased with the progress that had been
made at the plenum. "Our expectations were fulfilled," he declared, adding
that the conference gave the Arab parties, the Israelis, and the others gathered
"a taste of the fruits of the coming peace" (Associated Press, 1/30/92).
Levy's comments reflected the general satisfaction among Israeli delegates
about the course of each stage of the Moscow meeting. Choosing to accent
the positive in the speeches by his Arab counterparts, Levy said on the first
day of the conference, "Although each one has its own position, the ma-
jority generally focused on constructive issues, spoke about the future that
must be built together, and openly spelled out the word peace, which had
been blurred in the past. All in all, the trend is positive" (IDF Radio, 1/28/92).
Briefing reporters after working group sessions on five regional issues-
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III. LAUNCHING THE MULTILATERALS
A. Progress at the Moscow Conference (continued)
arms control, environmental protection, water resources, refugee rehabilita-
tion, and economic development-convened on the second day, Israeli
delegates credited their Arab counterparts for a "businesslike approach and
the care they took to avoid political point-scoring" (Associated Press, 1/29/92).
Overwhelmed Israeli delegates shared anecdotes with reporters about in-
formal conversations and exchange of banter with their Arab interlocutors.
The upbeat Israeli assessment of the multilateral organizing meeting could
be attributed to the fact that Jerusalem came to Moscow with "modest ex-
pectations," as Israeli Foreign Ministry official Moshe Raviv said on the eve
of the conference. "We have no illusions," Raviv told reporters. "We know
how difficult it is to move things ahead in the Middle East" (transcript released
by the Israeli delegation, 1/27/92).
Cognizant of the Arab parties' hesitancy to embark at this juncture on
regional cooperation projects with Israel, Jerusalem's delegation brought with
it to Moscow a set of working papers outlining practical ideas for modest
first steps in cooperative ventures (Appendix F). Officials in Israel had worked
intensively on the ideas over the course of a year and a half, and Jerusalem
was praised by the Bush Administration and European officials for its detailed
project suggestions.
The working papers Israel presented in Moscow outlined possible projects
in a variety of issue areas. With regard to the Gulf of Eilat/Aqaba, for exam-
ple, an area in which U.S., Japanese, and Israeli officials are particularly hopeful
that some modest programs can be initiated even in the short term, Jerusalem
proposed: "Quality of the environment and regional emergency ar-
rangements, including: prevention of pollution of the Eilat/Aqaba Gulf;
regional life-saving services; regional navigation and flight-safety measures;
regional authority for environmental management, including nature reserves
and coastal activity planning."
Israeli officials, it should be noted, were somewhat unnerved by Secretary
of State Baker's handling of Palestinian demands that Palestinians from out-
side the West Bank and Gaza be credentialed as delegates to the multilateral
talks. As mentioned above, the Secretary made a significant concession to
the Palestinians by declaring in Moscow that the U.S. would be "supportive
of representation by diaspora Palestinians ["externals"] in working groups
where that representation was appropriate."
Though Baker did not say that the U.S. would insist on the participation
of Palestinians that did not meet the Madrid criteria, Jerusalem was con-
cerned that the Secretary of State appeared to be distancing himself from
an understanding on Palestinian participation in the current stage of the
Madrid process which he had painstakingly negotiated before the conference
last October. In an editorial just after the Moscow Conference (2/1/92), the
New York Times expressed concern about Secretary of State Baker's statements
in Moscow on including Palestinians that do not meet the Madrid criteria.
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III. LAUNCHING THE MULTILATERALS
A. Progress at the Moscow Conference (continued)
"Mr. Baker has already made a concession to the Arabs by resisting Israeli
pressure to hold talks in the region, thereby giving tacit legitimacy to the
Israeli state," the Times stated. "With Israel heading into a June election,
Washington has to avoid even the perception of bending the Madrid rules."
Israeli officials were also uncomfortable with Secretary of State Baker's an-
nouncement after the opening session in Moscow that a working group on
refugees had been created. Prior to the Moscow plenum the State Depart-
ment had raised the possibility that a working group on refugees would be
created, and Israel's prime expert on refugee rehabilitation since the 1950s
returned from his retirement to direct Jerusalem's preparation for prospec-
tive talks on the issue. The refugee issue, however, was not among the four
issue areas for which a "working group organizational meeting" was listed
on a Moscow Conference schedule which the State Department had sent
to plenum participants. The schedule said that at a steering group meeting
after the working group meetings, "the U.S. would lay out advisory role
of group with respect to agenda of working groups, function as clearinghouse
for launching future groups on such items as refugees (emphasis added)." Israeli
Transportation Minister Moshe Katzav said in an interview that it was "sur-
prising" that Baker had unilaterally announced the formation of a refugee
working group. "We view the United States as Israel's best friend, and rightly
so," Katzav said. "But some of its decisions are taken without coordination
with us, and harm its special standing as an honest broker" (Mideast Mirror,
1/29/92).
Despite Israel's concerns, Foreign Minister Levy in his conference address
recognized the important success of Secretary of State Baker and the U.S.
in bringing about the Moscow Conference and the other facets of the Madrid
process. "My special thanks," Levy said, "go to the American people and
their President for the courageous example of leadership which they have
set for the world, and to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker for his con-
tribution and determination in setting the wheels of this historic peace process
in motion."
Shortly after the Moscow Conference, the State Department issued a gen-
erally upbeat follow-up report to the participating nations. The Department
wrote that "the meetings created a mechanism both in the working groups
and in the steering group to provide continuity and follow-up action," and
that "the meetings identified and began work on some of the issues which
are crucial to the development and stability of the region, and to the welfare
of the people living there." On the other hand, the State Department indicated
that it recognized Arab parties may not be prepared to move forward on these
vital issues. "Neither peace nor regional cooperation can be imposed from
the outside," the Department said. Indeed, the Moscow Conference
demonstrated at once the potential for real peace and stability in the Middle
East and the obstacles to a realization of this potential.
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B. Arms Control
B. Arms Control
There is a broad consensus among military analysts that the need for con-
trols on the Middle East arms race and on the proliferation of military
technology has never been more clear. Since the end of the Gulf War last
year, Israel's principal adversaries have been importing growing quantities
of new military equipment. Syria is receiving advanced conventional arms
from Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well
as additional shipments of North Korean advanced Scud ballistic missiles
(Scud-Cs). Iran is making a bid to become the dominant power in the Per-
sian Gulf through a massive rearmament program including the develop-
ment of nuclear technologies. Saudi Arabia has purchased $15 billion in U.S.
arms in the last 18 months and is planning to request 72 advanced F-15
fighter-bombers, increasing its air force to over 300 aircraft. The primary
threats to Israel's security and to the general stability of the Middle East, many
Israeli experts believe, remain these large arsenals of conventional weaponry.
These analysts view the commonly used term "military balance" as a
misnomer in the Arab-Israeli context, given the growing imbalance between
Arab and Israeli arsenals.
Since last year, there has been an ongoing dialogue among the five major
world arms suppliers-the United States, the former Soviet Union, France,
Great Britain and China-aimed at limiting arms supply to the Third World.
A meeting at foreign minister level was scheduled for March 26-27. In the
course of several previous gatherings, the five states have agreed on prior
notification of arms sales in an effort to shed some of the secrecy which has
traditionally surrounded the weapons trade. There has been predictably little
consensus, however, on the actual limitation of exports, beyond general
references to avoiding "destabilizing" transfers.
Israel says it hopes for an arms control process that will result in a genuine
reduction in the threat of a future military conflict. Discussions on arms con-
trol, Israeli analysts believe, will be to Jerusalem's advantage if they introduce
measures to stabilize the arms race in the short term and ultimately lead to
a reduction in regional arsenals. It is anticipated that arms limitations would
also reduce the burden imposed on Israel's economy by the need to keep
pace with the Arab buildup. At the same time, however, experts warn that
ill-conceived arms control measures could weaken rather than enhance Israel's
own security. The process is viewed as holding dangers as well as oppor-
tunities.
1. The Moscow Talks
At the Moscow multilateral session on arms control in January of this year,
the parties set forth their basic positions on the arms control issue but did
not engage in substantive negotiations. Participants brought proposals for
follow-up rounds, the first of which had been set to take place in Washington
in May but may be delayed. Nevertheless, the very fact that both arms sup-
pliers and recipients sat down together to begin a dialogue was welcomed
as an unprecedented historic event. In order for regional arms control
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B. Arms Control (continued)
measures to have any lasting impact, a consensus of analysts and officials
holds, both supplier and recipient states must have a role.
At the Moscow plenary, Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy stated that "we
see great importance in the fact that the agenda for the multilateral talks in-
cludes monitoring and reduction of the arms race, coupled with confidence-
building measures as an essential component in the coalescence of regional
defense agreements." Although the specific agenda for the upcoming regional
arms control discussions has not been finalized, Israeli Defense Ministry
Director General David Ivri has hinted at what specifically Israel will pro-
pose. Confidence-building measures Israel may suggest include joint naval
patrols and search & rescue operations with Israel's Arab neighbors. Coor-
dination between Israel and Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia would help build
trust, Ivri has indicated. Another possibility, modelled on arms control steps
taken by NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, would be allowing Egyptian
and perhaps other Arab commanders to observe large-scale Israel Defense
Forces maneuvers and visit Israeli army and air force bases.
At the same time, Ivri has indicated that Israel could not agree at this stage
to monitoring of unconventional weapons or discussion of nuclear issues,
which have traditionally been used by Arab states to deflect criticism of their
own large-scale arms programs and numerical military superiority.
2. Limited Progress
As important as arms control is as an agenda item for the multilateral talks,
Expected
it is unlikely there will be any substantial progress toward slowing the regional
arms race in the upcoming Washington round. All the participating regional
parties will still be in a learning mode, trying to develop experience in an
area that has rarely been addressed in the Middle East.
There is also a fundamental problem that it is precisely the states which pose
the greatest risk to peace that will not be attending. At this time, it is still
uncertain whether Syria will join the arms control talks. Even if Damascus
were to participate, however, it is doubtful much progress would result. Syria's
performance at the bilaterals indicates it is not ready to move from its
demanding an Israeli commitment to unconditional withdrawal from all the
territories the Jewish state captured in the Six Day War prior to addressing
any other issues. Israel has proposed confidence-building measures to reduce
tensions on the Golan front, but Damascus has thus far not been responsive.
Other major Middle Eastern military powers are also not part of the arms
control group. These include Iran, Iraq, Libya and Algeria, each of which
has both unconventional and conventional military capabilities that threaten
Israel. Officials of various governments committed to participation in regional
talks recognize that these other states, as well as suppliers such as North Korea
and Eastern Europe, must be included in any serious efforts to limit arms
proliferation in the Middle East.
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C. Water
C. Water
Though Arab parties and Israel disagree on a variety of issues, they agree
that one of the most pressing issues facing the Middle East region today is
the scarcity of water, although a momentary respite has been provided by
the recent rainfall. Given the natural infrastructure of available water
resources, regional experts say, no nation in the Middle East can effectively
solve the certain long-term water deficits that all are likely to face.
While there are several areas of dispute on water between Israel and the Arab
countries that surround her, such disputes in the region extend far beyond
the Israeli-Arab sphere. Syria and Iraq have raised objections to Turkey dam-
ming the Euphrates, Syria's principal water supply. The Turkish dam has
cut nearly half of the Euphrates' flow to Syria. Jordan and Syria have a dispute
on water allocations of the Yarmouk, Jordan's principal water source.
As severe as the water problems facing the region are, they are not viewed
as insurmountable. Most professionals agree that if regional agreements are
reached, the problems can be solved. As one Syrian water official stated: "If
it were left to the technical people, we could reach an agreement
in
three
months."
1. Technology Transfers
Large amounts of available water are wasted, analysts say, as a result of lack
of technology in the areas of waste water management, agricultural irriga-
tion techniques and desalination of brackish water. Israeli experts in particular
are optimistic that technology transfers in these and other areas such as cloud
seeding could enhance the efficiency of current water supplies.
Israel has proposed to create workshops to examine each individual area of
technology to make the most effective use of existing water resources. These
workshops, Israeli officials suggest, could be made up of experts on the
technical level from the region, with assistance and technology transfers from
countries outside the region.
2. Collection and
Israel has proposed that data collection centers be established in the Middle
Exchange of Water
East, with standards negotiated among the regional parties, so as to prop-
erly assess and address regional water problems.
Data
Currently, there are no uniform standards in the region to assess waste and
salinity levels of water, "red line" levels for water reserves, and other key
measures.
Experts in Jerusalem suggest that the project could be overseen by a spon-
sor to the multilateral talks. The sponsoring nation, they say, could set up
a clearinghouse for data from the region.
52
III. LAUNCHING THE MULTILATERALS
D. Economic Development
3. Water Transfers
Several ideas have been proposed by Israel and other nations on
to the Region
transferring water to the region from other countries with quantities to spare.
One such idea is a "peace pipeline," or canal, extending from Turkey to Israel,
Jordan and Syria. The estimated cost of a pipeline or canal is about $20 billion.
While these projects may be prohibitively expensive in the short term, agree-
ment could be reached on long-term financing with assistance from out-
side parties.
Another initiative proposed is the transferring of run-off water from the Nile
to Jordan and Israel.
4. A Mediterranean-
The Dead Sea, a vital mineral source for both Israel and Jordan, is at critically
Dead Sea Canal
low levels. Israel has suggested that building a canal from the Mediterra-
nean to the Dead Sea could raise the levels and provide hydro-electric power
to both Israel and Jordan.
5. Agreement on the
Jordan's principal water source, the Yarmouk River, forms the border be-
tween Syria and Jordan before flowing into the Jordan River, Israel's main
Unity Dam
source of water. For years, U.S. and World Bank experts have considered
(Yarmouk River)
the building of a dam on the Yarmouk essential to harnessing future water
supplies. The World Bank has offered financing for such a dam.
To date, there has been no progress on the dam because of lack of agree-
ment on allocation of water between Syria, Jordan and Israel. Jordan accuses
Israel and Syria of withdrawing amounts of water greater than the shares
recommended by the U.S. in its ill-fated 1956 Johnston Plan, which allocated
precise shares of the water resources of the Jordan River and its tributaries
to Israel, Syria, and Jordan.
Experts in Israel have pointed out that the building of such a dam on Syrian
and/or Jordanian soil would make Israel's water supply highly vulnerable.
D. Economic
One of the major potential benefits of Middle East peace is a large economic
dividend, officials and analysts in the U.S., Europe, Israel, and elsewhere con-
Development
cur. Conversely, the consensus view holds, cooperative economic ar-
rangements can enhance political cooperation.
In addition to the future economic benefits of peace, it is recognized, any
peace agreement would be accompanied by the cost of economic rearrange-
ment, as was the case with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The Group Seven
(G-7) nations could play a crucial role in alleviating the economic costs of
53
III. LAUNCHING THE MULTILATERALS
D. Economic Development (continued)
peace, as the United States did after the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty. The
European Community (EC), sponsor of the multilateral talks on economic
development, has already committed nearly $3 billion toward the economic
development of the Middle East.
The economic disparity between populations among and within countries
of the region are great. The per-capita Gross National Product (GNP) in
the Gulf states of Qatar and the U.A.E. is $17,000 and $12,000 respectively;
Jordan, Syria, Yemen and Egypt, on the other hand, all have per-capita GNPs
of less than $1800. The great majority of individuals in the Arab world, in
fact, live in poverty. Israel has joined the U.S., EC nations, and other coun-
tries which make the case that there is an urgent need to address the issue
of economic development through cooperation among the countries of the
Middle East rather than separately.
In addition to reaping the future economic benefits of allocating fewer
resources to defense, Israel has been vocal in saying that all nations of the
region could benefit by agreement and cooperation in the following areas:
1. West Bank
The U.S. and Japan have urged that economic development of the West Bank
and Gaza
and Gaza should be an initial focus of the economic development working
group. Ever since Israel captured the territories in the 1967 Six-Day War,
their economic development has been a high priority for Jerusalem.
Since 1967, the economic conditions of the West Bank and Gaza have im-
proved considerably. Such improvement is viewed as important to political
normalization. Israel recently took steps that will allow for greater economic
development in the West Bank and Gaza, including: establishing financial
tools for business development; harmonizing tax policy; and organizational
changes that will allow greater agricultural exports from the West Bank and
Gaza. Continued development of these territories can be facilitated through
assistance from the U.S., Japan and the EC.
2. Agriculture
Agriculture plays a dominant role in the economies of the Middle East. Ex-
panded cooperation in the area of agriculture might begin under the
framework of existing agreements such as the Middle East Regional
Cooperation (MERC) program, facilitated through the U.S. Agency for In-
ternational Development (AID). Israel's expertise in several areas of
agricultural technology has proven highly beneficial to many countries in
Africa, including Egypt, as well as to the agriculture industry in the United
States.
54
III. LAUNCHING THE MULTILATERALS
E. Environment
3. Energy
There is a large disparity between energy-rich countries (Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and Iran) and energy-poor countries
(Jordan, Israel and Lebanon). The disparity could be bridged through
cooperation on such energy projects as hydro-electric dams and joint research
on alternative energy sources.
4. Gulf of Eilat/
In addition to environmental protection matters related to the Gulf of
Aqaba area
Eilat/Aqaba area, there are economic issues to be addressed in the area. The
four countries that share this area-Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt-
all have economic interests that could be expanded through cooperation. All
parties could benefit through future agreements in the areas of transporta-
tion, tourism, scientific research, and regional energy.
E. Environment
Environmental issues in the Middle East have never been addressed on a
regional scale because of the refusal of Arab states to cooperate with Israel
even on non-political issues. The multilateral negotiations on environment
have provided a historic opportunity to address pressing regional en-
vironmental problems. The oil fires and spills during and after the Gulf war
have been cited as demonstrations of the argument that environmental pro-
blems do not recognize international boundaries. The environment work-
ing group is viewed by U.S. officials and analysts as having the best chance
of any of the working groups which have been created to achieve some
substantive progress.
The multilateral environment working group is scheduled to meet in Tokyo
in May. Following that meeting, working groups may to be established in
the following areas to deal with environmental problems:
1. Gulf of Eilat/
The current level of pollution in the Gulf of Eilat/Aqaba is at alarming levels,
Aqaba Area
according to most professionals who have surveyed the area. Given that the
Gulf of Eilat/Aqaba is shared by Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia,
cooperation among all the parties in reducing pollution is essential.
The head of a Japanese fact-finding mission to the Eilat/Aqaba area after the
Moscow Conference reported the environmental problems there as "severe."
Currently, there is cooperation among the parties of the region on a technical
level limited to specific areas such as: water circulation; transport and fate
of pollutants; coral reef communities; and mariculture. This could be ex-
panded to include all areas of ecological/environmental concern.
55
III. LAUNCHING THE MULTILATERALS
E. Environment (continued)
2. Collection and
Israel has proposed the creation of environmental data collection centers in
Exchange of
the Middle East, with uniform standards to be determined by the parties
of the region. Environment and water data collection centers could be struc-
Data on the
tured together, Israel has suggested, and could be overseen by a sponsor of
Environment
the multilateral talks.
3. Eastern
While the ecological/environmental problems in the Mediterranean are not
Mediterranean
as acute as in other areas, Israel has proposed that they be monitored and
addressed. A regional working group surveillance center to prevent pollu-
Sea
tion there could be established, Jerusalem says.
4. Regional
Israel has proposed a regional environmental thinktank, which would col-
Environmental
lect and analyze data and determine the proper regional approach to be taken
on the above environmental issues as well as others, such as climate change
Thinktank
and toxic waste disposal.
F. Refugees
Secretary of State Baker's announcement at the opening of the Moscow Con-
ference that a working group on refugees had been created came as a sur-
prise, as was noted above, since the State Department had written to invitees
before the Conference that the question of convening "future groups" on
refugees or other matters would be discussed in a steering group meeting
toward the end of the plenum.
It appeared that Baker unilaterally announced the creation of the group as
a concession to the Palestinians, who demanded in Moscow that Palestinians
from outside the West Bank and Gaza be allowed to participate in the
Moscow Conference. After lengthy and intense negotiations with Palesti-
nians who came to Moscow, Baker told reporters that while Palestinian at-
tendance at the Moscow Conference would have to be consistent with the
Madrid rules prohibiting "externals," the U.S. would be supportive of "ex-
ternals" participation "in working groups that were created to discuss, for
instance, the question of refugees." Palestinians had highlighted refugee
rehabilitation as one regional issue which they said demanded the participa-
tion of "externals," despite the political reality that decisions on rehabilita-
tion of any refugee population will be made by the states in which the refugees
are located.
Israeli officials had actually anticipated before Moscow that the Palestinians
would be opposed to regional talks on refugee rehabilitation. Officials in
Jerusalem calculated that the Palestinians would not want to discuss the issue
56
III. LAUNCHING THE MULTILATERALS
F. Refugees (continued)
of refugees in a multilateral context because, one official told an interviewer
after the Madrid Conference, "This would turn it into an economic reset-
tlement problem" (Jerusalem Report, 12/26/91).
1. The Moscow Talks
Despite its concern about the prospect that the U.S. would insist on par-
ticipation of "externals" in future sessions, Israel participated in the organizing
meeting of the refugee working group on the second day of the Moscow
Conference. Israel's delegation leader at the session, Israeli Foreign Ministry
official and political researcher Yehoyada Haim, made the best of the meeting.
Asked by reporters if there were expressions of friendship, Haim answered:
"Yes, a Jordanian came up to me. I shook his hand. I introduced myself, he
introduced himself. The Oman representative, who speaks very nice English,
said we more or less deal with the same subject-political research-and we
exchanged experiences" (Reuters, 1/30/92). Friendly gestures aside, Arab par-
ticipants reportedly rejected an Israeli proposal that the talks include discus-
sion of Jews who fled Arab countries after Israel's founding (Jewish Telegraphic
Agency, 1/30/92).
2. Palestinian Refugee
It does appear, however, that the refugee working group may deal with a
Issues Likely to Be
range of other regional refugee problems, including the tragedy of the Palesti-
nian refugees who have lived with their descendants for more than four
Lead Agenda Item
decades in refugee camps in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza;
the plight of 400,000 Kurdish refugees still living in camps in Turkey, Iran,
and northern Iraq; and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palesti-
nians and other Arabs from their homes and jobs in Iraq, Kuwait, and other
Gulf Arab countries as a result of the Gulf crisis. A State Department report
to Moscow Conference participants after the plenum stated that at the ini-
tial substantive meeting of the refugee working group-to be hosted by
Canada in the middle of May-"a seminar will be conducted to discuss the
magnitude of the problem."
It is likely that the discussions will focus on the Palestinian refugees and their
descendants in refugee camps in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the territories.
Israel is planning to make a major contribution to these discussions.
3. Palestinian Refugees
Some 900,000 UN-registered Palestinian refugees now live under Israeli con-
in the West Bank
trol in the West Bank and Gaza, including over 350,000 in refugee camps.
Since taking control in 1967, Israel has sought to move the camps' inhabitants
and Gaza
into permanent structures. As reported in a December 18, 1971 New York
Times news article, Israel had begun to implement a long-term plan to
"disperse the refugee concentrations and offer economic alternatives to the
57
III. LAUNCHING THE MULTILATERALS
F. Refugees (continued)
life of misery in charity-supported camps." Approximately 1,900 families
were resettled from camps in other parts of the Gaza Strip or the Sinai town
of El Arish. Israel's efforts, however, infuriated Arabs and their supporters.
The New York Times article explains: "Arab governments believe that the
misery and poverty of Gaza serve as a constant reminder to the world of
what they term the usurpation of Palestinian lands by the Jewish settlers."
Citing international law, the Arabs generated sufficient international pressure
to halt resettlement of the refugees. The fundamental Arab position on the
political role of the Palestinian refugees is still unchanged. It applies not only
to refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza but also to those located in Syria,
Lebanon, and Jordan, where there are still 1.5 million registered Palestinian
refugees including 420,000 in camps.
For its part, Israel continues to express a wish to rehabilitate the Palestinian
refugees living in the territories. In its May 14, 1989; peace initiative, Israel
"calls for an international endeavor to resolve the problems of the residents
of the Arab refugee camps" in the territories "in order to improve their liv-
ing conditions and to rehabilitate them. Israel is prepared to be a partner in
this endeavor." In his opening address at the Moscow Conference, Secretary
of State Baker also called for an international effort directed at refugee
rehabilitation.
After U.S. officials had urged the Israeli government to demonstrate the
seriousness of its formal readiness to rehabilitate the refugees by way of pro-
ducing a concrete plan of action, Israel's Ministry of Defense issued, in June
of last year, a detailed list of approved development projects for the territories.
Apart from industrial, agricultural, and infrastructure projects, the list in-
cludes approved refugee resettlement projects for the West Bank and Gaza
totaling approximately $140 million. As in the case of the other economic
development projects, the multilateral negotiations could deal with Gulf Arab
funding for the implementation of Israel's refugee rehabilitation and reset-
tlement projects. Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe's call at the
Moscow Conference for an emphasis on international cooperation over
economic development of the West Bank and Gaza could be a useful prod
to the Gulf states to fund the Israeli initiatives.
4. Palestinian Refugees
Most Palestinian refugees live in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Thus far, all
in Arab States
Arab states other than Jordan have refused to resettle the refugees or even
grant them citizenship. The multilateral negotiations could provide an ex-
cellent opportunity for discussing the resettlement of the Palestinian refugees
in the countries where they now live-the standard solution for refugee prob-
lems around the world when refugees find themselves among people who
share their language, culture, and religion as is the case here. Gulf Arab coun-
tries could provide funding for this project as well, and Israel-which has
vast experience in quick resettlement of Jewish refugees-could provide
technical advice.
58
APPENDICES
A. U.S.-Soviet Invitation
to the Mideast Peace Conference in Madrid,
October 18, 1991
Following is the complete text of the invitation to the Madrid peace conference on October 30, 1991, obtained
by the Jerusalem Post. The invitation was jointly issued by the U.S. and Soviet Union to Israel, Syria, Jordan,
Lebanon and the Palestinians.
After extensive consultations with Arab states, Israel and the Palestinians, the United States and the Soviet
Union believe that an historic opportunity exists to advance the prospects for genuine peace throughout
the region. The United States and the Soviet Union are prepared to assist the parties to achieve a just,
lasting and comprehensive peace settlement, through direct negotiations along two tracks, between Israel
and the Arab states, and between Israel and the Palestinians, based on United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338. The objective of this process is real peace.
Toward that end, the president of the U.S. and the president of the USSR invite you to a peace conference,
which their countries will co-sponsor, followed immediately by direct negotiations. The conference will be
convened in Madrid on October 30, 1991.
President Bush and President Gorbachev request your acceptance of this invitation no later than 6 p.m.
Washington time, October 23, 1991, in order to ensure proper organization and preparation of the conference.
Direct bilateral negotiations will begin four days after the opening of the conference. Those parties who
wish to attend multilateral negotiations will convene two weeks after the opening of the conference to organize
those negotiations. The co-sponsors believe that those negotiations should focus on region-wide issues such
as arms control and regional security, water, refugee issues, environment, economic development, and other
subjects of mutual interest.
The co-sponsors will chair the conference which will be held at ministerial level. Governments to be invited
include Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Palestinians will be invited and attend as part of a joint Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation. Egypt will be invited to the conference as a participant. The European Community
will be a participant in the conference, alongside the United States and the Soviet Union and will be represented
by its presidency. The Gulf Cooperation Council will be invited to send its secretary-general to the conference
as an observer, and GCC member states will be invited to participate in organizing the negotiations on
multilateral issues. The United Nations will be invited to send an observer, representing the secretary-general.
The conference will have no power to impose solutions on the parties or veto agreements reached by them.
It will have no authority to make decisions for the parties and no ability to vote on issues or results. The
conference can reconvene only with the consent of all the parties.
With respects to negotiations between Israel and Palestinians who are part of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian
delegation, negotiations will be conducted in phases, beginning with talks on interim self-government ar-
rangements. These talks will be conducted with the objective of reaching agreement within one year. Once
agreed the interim self-government arrangements will last for a period of five years, beginning the third
year of the period of interim self-government arrangements, negotiations will take place on permanent status.
These permanent status negotiations, and the negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, will take
place on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338.
59
APPENDICES
A. U.S. Soviet Invitation to the Madrid Peace Conference (continued)
It is understood that the co-sponsors are committed to making this process succeed. It is their intention
to convene the conference and negotiations with those parties who agree to attend.
The co-sponsors believe that this process offers the promise of ending decades of confrontation and conflict
and the hope of a lasting peace. Thus, the co-sponsors hope that the parties will approach these negotiations
in a spirit of goodwill and mutual respect. In this way, the peace process can begin to break down the
mutual suspicions and mistrust that perpetuate the conflict and allow the parties to begin to resolve their
differences. Indeed, only through such a process can real peace and reconciliation among the Arab states,
Israel and the Palestinians be achieved. And only through this process can the peoples of the Middle East
attain the peace and security they richly deserve.
Source: Jerusalem Post, October 21, 1991
B. President George Bush's Address
to the Mideast Peace Conference
Madrid, Spain
October 30, 1991
Prime Minister Gonzalez. President Gorbachev. Excellencies. Let me begin by thanking the government
of Spain for hosting this historic gathering. With short notice, the Spanish people and their leaders stepped
forward to make available this magnificent setting. And let us hope that this conference of Madrid will mark
the beginning of a new chapter in the history of the Middle East.
I also want to express at the outset my pleasure at the presence of our fellow co-sponsor, President Gor-
bachev. At a time of momentous challenges at home, President Gorbachev and his senior associates have
demonstrated their intent to engage the Soviet Union as a force for positive change in the Middle East.
And this sends a powerful signal to all those who long for peace.
We come to Madrid on a mission of hope to begin work on a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement
to the conflict in the Middle East. We come here to seek peace for a part of the world that in the long
memory of man has known far too much hatred, anguish and war. I can think of no endeavor more worthy
or more necessary.
Our objective must be clear and straightforward. It is not simply to end the state of war in the Middle East
and replace it with a state of non-belligerency. This is not enough. This would not last. Rather, we seek
peace. Real peace. And by real peace, I mean treaties, security, diplomatic relations, economic relations,
trade, investment, cultural exchange, even tourism. What we seek is a Middle East where vast resources
are no longer devoted to armaments; a Middle East where young people no longer have to dedicate and
all too often give their lives to combat; a Middle East no longer victimized by fear and terror; a Middle
East where normal men and women lead normal lives.
Let no one mistake the magnitude of this challenge. The struggle we seek to end has a long and painful
history. Every life lost, every outrage, every act of violence, is etched deep in the hearts and history of
the people of this region. There is a history that weighs heavily against hope. And yet history need not
be man's master.
60
APPENDICES
B. President George Bush's Address to the Madrid Peace Conference (continued)
I expect that some will say that what I'm suggesting is impossible. But think back. Who, back in 1945,
would have thought that France and Germany, bitter rivals for nearly a century, would become allies in
the aftermath of World War II? And who, two years ago, would have predicted that the Berlin Wall would
come down? And who, in the early 1960s, would have believed that the Cold War would come to a peaceful
end, replaced by cooperation, exemplified by the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are here
today, not as rivals but as partners, as Prime Minister Gonzalez pointed out?
No, peace in the Middle East need not be a dream. Peace is possible. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty
is striking proof that former adversaries can make and sustain peace. And moreover, parties in the Middle
East have respected agreements, not only in the Sinai, but on the Golan Heights as well. The fact that
we are all gathered here today for the first time attests to a new potential for peace. Each of us has taken
an important step toward real peace by meeting here in Madrid. All the formulas on paper, all the pious
declarations in the world, won't bring peace if there is not a practical mechanism for moving ahead.
Peace will only come as the result of direct negotiations, compromise, give-and-take. Peace cannot be impos-
ed from the outside by the United States or anyone else. And while we will continue to do everything possible
to help the parties overcome obstacles, peace must come from within. We come here to Madrid as realists.
We don't expect peace to be negotiated in a day or a week or a month or even a year. It will take time.
Indeed, it should take time-time for parties SO long at war to learn to talk to one another, to listen to one
another, time to heal old wounds and build trust. In this quest, time need not be the enemy of progress.
What we envision is a process of direct negotiations proceeding along two tracks, one between Israel and
the Arab states, the other between Israel and the Palestinians. Negotiations are to be conducted on the
basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The real work will not happen here in the plenary
sessions but in direct, bilateral negotiations. This conference cannot impose a settlement on the participants
or veto agreements. And just as important, the conference can only be reconvened with the consent of
every participant.
Progress is in the hands of the parties who must live with the consequences. Soon after the bilateral talks
commence, parties will convene as well to organize multilateral negotiations. These will focus on issues
that cross national boundaries and are common to the region-arms control, water, refugee concerns, economic
development. Progress in these four is not intended as a substitute for what must be decided in the bilateral
talks. To the contrary, progress in the multilateral issues can help create an atmosphere in which longstanding
bilateral disputes can more easily be settled.
For Israel and the Palestinians, a framework already exists for diplomacy. Negotiations will be conducted
in phases, beginning with talks on interim self-government arrangements. We aim to reach arrangements
within one year; and once agreed, interim self-government arrangements will last for five years. Beginning
the third year, negotiations will commence on permanent status.
No one can say with any precision what the end result will be. In our view, something must be developed,
something acceptable to Israel, the Palestinians and Jordan, that gives the Palestinian people meaningful
control over their own lives and fate and provides for the acceptance and security of Israel. We can all
appreciate that both Israelis and Palestinians are worried about compromise, worried about compromising
even the smallest point, for fear it becomes a precedent for what really matters. But no one should avoid
compromise on interim arrangements for a simple reason. Nothing agreed to now will prejudice permanent
status negotiations. To the contrary, these subsequent negotiations will be determined on their own merits.
61
APPENDICES
B. President George Bush's Address to the Madrid Peace Conference (continued)
Peace cannot depend upon promises alone. Real peace, lasting peace, must be based upon security for
all states and peoples, including Israel. For too long, the Israeli people have lived in fear, surrounded by
an unaccepting Arab world. And now is the ideal moment for the Arab world to demonstrate that attitudes
have changed, that the Arab world is willing to live in peace with Israel and make allowances for Israel's
reasonable security needs. We know that peace must also be based on fairness. In the absence of fairness,
there will be no legitimacy, no stability. And this applies above all to the Palestinian people, many of whom
have known turmoil and frustration above all else.
Israel now has an opportunity to demonstrate that it is willing to enter into a new relationship with its Palesti-
nian neighbors, one predicated upon mutual respect and cooperation.
Throughout the Middle East, we seek a stable and enduring settlement. We've not defined what this means.
Indeed, I make these points with no map showing where the final borders are to be drawn. And nevertheless,
we believe that territorial compromise is essential for peace. Boundaries should reflect the quality of both
security and political arrangements, and the United States is prepared to accept whatever the parties themselves
find acceptable. What we seek, as I said on March 6th, is a solution that meets the twin tests of fairness
and security.
I know, I expect we all know, that these negotiations will not be easy. I know too, that these negotiations
will not be smooth. There will be disagreement and criticism, setbacks-who knows, possibly interruptions.
Negotiation and compromise are always painful.
Success will escape us if we focus solely upon what is being given up. We must fix our vision on what
real peace would bring. Peace, after all, means not just avoiding war and the cost of preparing for it. The
Middle East is blessed with great resources-physical, financial, and, yes, above all, human. And new oppor-
tunities are within reach if we only have the vision to embrace them.
To succeed, we must recognize that peace is in the interest of all parties, war to the absolute advantage
of none. The alternative to peace in the Middle East is a future of violence and waste and tragedy. In any
future war lurks the dangers of weapons of mass destruction. As we learned in the Gulf War, modern arsenals
make it possible to attach urban areas, to put the lives of innocent men, women, and children at risk, to
transform city streets, schools, children's playgrounds into battlefields.
Today we can decide to take a different path to the future: to avoid conflict. And I call upon all parties
to avoid unilateral acts, be they words or deeds, that would invite retaliation or, worse yet, prejudice or
even threaten the process itself. I call upon all parties to consider taking measures that will bolster mutual
confidence and trust, steps that signal a sincere commitment to reconciliation.
I want to say something about the role of the United States of America. We played an active role in making
this conference possible, and both the Secretary of State Jim Baker and I will play an active role in helping
the process succeed.
Toward this end, we've provided written assurances to Israel, to Syria, to Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palesti-
nians, and, in the spirit of openness and honesty, we will be-brief all parties on the assurances that we
have provided to the other. We're prepared to extend guarantees, provide technology and support, if that
is what peace requires. And we will call upon our friends and allies in Europe and in Asia to join with
us in providing resources SO that peace and prosperity go hand in hand.
62
APPENDICES
C. Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian Statement, 11/3/91
Outsiders can assist, but in the end, it is up to the peoples and the governments of the Middle East to
shape the future of the Middle East. It is their opportunity and it is their responsibility to do all that they
can to take advantage of this gathering, this historic gathering and what it symbolizes and what it promises.
No one should assume that the opportunity before us to make peace will remain if we fail to seize the
moment. Ironically, this is an opportunity borne of war-the destruction of past wars, the fear of future wars.
The time has come to put an end to war. The time has come to choose peace.
And speaking for the American people, I want to reaffirm that the United States is prepared to facilitate
the search for peace, to be a catalyst, as we've been in the past and as we've been very recently. We
seek only one thing, and this we seek not for ourselves, but for the peoples of the area and particularly
the children: that this and future generations of the Middle East may know the meaning and blessing of peace.
We have seen too many generations of children whose haunted eyes show only fear, too many funerals
for their brothers and sisters, the mothers and fathers who've died too soon; too much hatred, too little
love. And if we cannot summon the courage to lay down the past for ourselves, let us resolve to do it
for the children.
May God bless and guide the work of this conference, and may this conference set us on the path of peace.
Thank. you.
Source: Federal News Service transcript, 10/30/91
C. Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian Statement
Madrid, November 3, 1991
Following is the text of the statement issued by the Israeli and the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegations
following nearly five hours of talks. The statement was read by the Jordanian team leader, Abdul Salam Majali.
In the name of God the compassionate, the merciful.
The joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and the Israeli delegation met today to start direct negotiations
on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. These negotiations will be conducted along two
tracks: a Palestinian-Israeli track and a Jordanian-Israeli track.
The talks were held in a good, businesslike atmosphere. Matters discussed were procedural issues at the
talks, which it is hoped will take place soon.
The parties expressed their views on the possible venue of the negotiations. Consultations will continue
in this regard, as well as on other matters pertaining to the negotiations.
Source: Associated Press, 11/3/91
63
APPENDICES
D. Israel-"Ideas for Peaceful Coexistence in the Territories During the Interim Period"
D. Israel-"Ideas for Peaceful Coexistence in the Territories
During the Interim Period"
February 20, 1992
A. General Concept
1. Interim Arrangements
a. The concept of interim arrangements for the Palestinian Arab inhabitants for five years stems
from the basic premises that:
- The wounds inflicted by the long and bitter Arab-Israeli conflict, need a time for healing,
and trust must be built gradually.
- The deeply differing points of view of the parties concerned, cannot be bridged in one
comprehensive step. The gap can be bridged only through a process of building coex-
istence, through interim arrangements followed by an agreement on final status.
b. The interim period must present an opportunity:
- to examine and test the arrangements agreed upon for this period, including the fulfillment
of all commitments;
- to accommodate to the reality of living together on the same soil;
- to build mutual confidence;
C. The interim arrangements should create a change in the reality of life of the Palestinian Arabs
in the territories; this change must be delineated by certain guidelines:
- it should not prejudge the outcome of the final status negotiations;
- it must deal with people, not with the status of the territories;
- it must be based on a strict adherence to the arrangements as agreed before the implemen-
tation; and
- no change in the terms of the arrangements can take place unilaterally.
2. Coexistence
a. The interim arrangements are based on the agreed terms of reference that stipulate an agree-
ment on:
- establishment of interim self government arrangements for the Palestinian Arab inhabitants
of the territories;
- keeping the established links between Judea, Samaria, Gaza district and Israel intact;
- arrangements for cooperation and coordination between the ISGA administrative organs
and Israel;
- keeping the traditional ties between the Palestinian Arab inhabitants and Jordan.
b. During the interim period:
- The Palestinian Arab inhabitants will be given, in the framework of the interim self govern-
ment arrangements, an opportunity to run their own affairs in most spheres, according
to the agreement.
- Residual powers and certain responsibilities will be reserved by Israel.
- Israelis will continue, as of right, to live and settle in the territories.
- The sole responsibility for security in all its aspects-external, internal and public order-will
be that of Israel.
64
APPENDICES
D. Israel-"Ideas for Peaceful Coexistence in the Territories During the Interim Period" (continued)
B. Interim Self Government Arrangements (ISGA)
1. Modalities
The organs of the ISGA, which will be agreed upon by the parties concerned, will be established
in an agreed way.
2. Structure and Procedure
a. The organs of the interim self government arrangements will be of administrative-functional nature.
b. The basic structural and functional configurations of the ISGA will be determined in the course
of the negotiations.
3. Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the ISGA organs will apply to the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria
and the Gaza district.
4. Powers and Responsibilities
a. In the negotiations Israel will propose to negotiate delegation of powers and responsibilities
to the proper organs of ISGA in the following spheres of operation (subject to agreement on
the general concept and structure, and to coordination and cooperation arrangements, as well
as Jordanian-related aspects):
(1) Administration of Justice-Supervision of the administrative system of local courts in the
areas; dealing with matters connected with the prosecution system and with the registra-
tion of companies and partnerships.
(2) Administrative Personnel Matters-Appointments and working conditions of employees.
(At the present time the civil service of the inhabitants of Judea-Samaria and Gaza, within
the framework of the Military Government's Civilian Administration, comprises approximately
20,000 persons.)
(3) Agriculture-Various branches of agriculture, fisheries, etc.
(4) Education and Culture-Operation of the network of schools in the areas, from nursery
to higher education; supervision of cultural, artistic and sporting activities.
(5) Budget and Taxation-Budgeting of the administrative operations and allocations of funds;
direct taxation.
(6) Health-Management of hospitals and clinics; operation of sanitary and other services
related to public health.
(7) Industry, Commerce and Tourism-Development of industry, workshops, commerce and
tourist services.
(8) Labour and Social Welfare-Management of welfare services, labour and employment
services.
(9) Local Police-Operation of a local police force for criminal affairs, and maintenance of
prisons for criminal offenders sentenced by local courts in the areas.
(10) Local Transportation and Communications-Maintenance and coordination of local transport
and internal postal services.
(11) Municipal Affairs-Matters concerning Arab municipalities and their effective operation,
including municipal water supply, housing, sewage and electricity supply.
(12) Religious Affairs-Provision and maintenance of religious services for all religious com-
munities among the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district.
65
APPENDICES
D. Israel-"Ideas for Peaceful Coexistence in the Territories During the Interim Period" (continued)
Powers and responsibilities in an agreed framework can be gradually delegated to the designated
administrative organs, as determined in the negotiations.
b. Cooperation and Coordination
(1) Agreement will be reached on arrangements to ensure cooperation and coordination be-
tween the designated organs and Israel in certain domains, for mutual benefit.
(2) The ISGA organs will, therefore, operate in its spheres of competence in three ways:
- As appropriate in the domains allocated to its agreed organs.
- In coordination with Israel-in certain spheres; coordination means joint planning.
- In cooperation with Israel-in certain spheres; cooperation means joint operation from
the higher level of planning to the lower level of implementation.
5. Residual Powers and Responsibilities
a. Powers and responsibilities which are not delegated to the agreed organs of the ISGA will be
reserved by Israel, being the source of authority.
The powers and responsibilities of the organs of the ISGA will not apply to the Israeli Defense
Forces or to Israeli civilians in Judea, Samaria and Gaza District, as well as to the Palestinian
Arabs who reside in Jerusalem, the capital of Israel, which is not part of the territories.
b. Security
- The sole responsibility for external and internal security as well as public order will be that
of Israel.
- In the area of public order there will be cooperation between the Israeli relevant authorities
and the local police force.
C. Laws
- The laws and orders in force in Judea, Samaria and Gaza District, and all powers vested
by virtue of them shall remain in force.
- The powers to promulgate regulations in the spheres of operation of the organs of the
ISGA will be determined in the agreement, subject to coordination and cooperation with
Israel as mentioned above.
Source: Photocopy of the original document
E. Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation-
"Outline of the Palestinian Interim
Self-Government Arrangements"
March 3, 1992
From: The Palestinian side in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation
To:
The Israeli delegation
The Palestinian delegation presented, on January 14, 1992, an outline of the model for Palestinian Interim
Self-Governing Authority (PISGA), as part of interim arrangements for self-government. That outline is based
on free elections under international supervision, and entails the orderly transfer of the powers and responsi-
bilities at present exercised by the Israeli military and/or other Israeli authorities in the Occupied Palestinian
66
APPENDICES
E. Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation-"Outline of the Palestinian Self-Government Arrangements" (continued)
Territory (OPT), including Jerusalem, to the PISGA.
The establishment of PISGA would create a new authority based on the will of the people, and would provide
a framework under which the Palestinians in the OPT, along with the Palestinians in exile, will be able to
participate, on an equal footing, in all negotiations leading to the permanent solution of the Palestinian ques-
tion in all its aspects.
The objective of the negotiations at this stage is to establish a Palestinian Self-Governing Authority as part
of the interim arrangements for a transitional period. These proceedings must enable the Palestinian People
to gain control over political, economic and other decisions that affect their lives and fate.
The acceptance, by the Palestinian People, of interim self-government arrangements does not in any way
prejudice the exercise of their legitimate right to self-determination as embodied in the United Nations Charter
and in the UN Resolutions affirming the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. The General Assembly
of the UN, by Resolution 181 of 1947, has consecrated the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination
and statehood, and has affirmed the legal foundation of the independent Arab State of Palestine.
The Palestinian people is resolved to establish its own independent state. However, and after the conclusion
of final status negotiations, the Independent State of Palestine, established alongside the State of Israel,
would opt for a confederal relationship with Jordan.
The Letter of Invitation to the present negotiations states that these should take place on the basis of Resolu-
tions 242 and 338, which affirm the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war and are the basis of
the principle of the exchange of "Territory for Peace," and which demands a total Israeli withdrawal from
the territories occupied in 1967.
Security Council Resolution 242, also calls, inter alia, for achieving a just solution of the refugee problem,
on the basis of General Assembly Resolution 194, which recognizes the right of the Palestinian refugees
to return to their homeland.
We also call your attention to the fact that the government of Israel and its armed forces are bound by
the IVth Geneva Convention of 1949, as well as by the Hague Regulations of 1907, which are applicable
to the OPT. UNSC Resolution 726, reaffirms that the IVth Geneva Convention is applicable to the totality
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem. Practices proscribed under the Geneva conven-
tions, particularly settlement activities, shall be halted immediately, and the consequences of earlier violations
should be reversed.
In accordance with the above, the Palestinian delegation is willing to put forward concrete and workable
proposals. At this stage, however, and while Israeli illegal practices impede our engagement in substantive
negotiations, we would like to recall the basic assumptions underlying our participation in the process.
I
Throughout the centuries, Palestine has been the cradle where our people's identity was shaped, the homeland
of its collective soul. The attachment of the people of Palestine to the land of Palestine is a permanent
feature of their ancient as well as contemporary history.
All the successive wars and occupations that have befallen our people in the course of this century have
not been able to erode this attachment. The Palestinian people have struggled, and will continue to struggle
67
APPENDICES
E. Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation-"Outline of the Palestinian Self-Government Arrangements" (continued)
for freedom on the soil of their homeland until they achieve their inalienable national rights, in accordance
with international legality.
We have entered and remained in this process of bilateral negotiations with open hearts, open minds and
sincere intentions in order to achieve a just and comprehensive settlement.
The Palestinian delegation, expressing the will of the Palestinian people inside and outside the OPT, em-
phasizes once again that the only way to pursue negotiations and engage them on the path of progress
is a commitment, on the part of Israel-the occupying power-to abide by the provisions of international
law and to implement, de jure, the IVth Geneva Convention, thus bringing an immediate halt to all forms
of settlement activities. The continuation of these activities does not only impede our engagement into the
following phases of negotiation on interim agreements. It also threatens to destroy the peace-process as a whole.
The Palestinian delegation hereby presents its full vision of the interim arrangements on the way to peace,
including the holding of free elections based on universal suffrage and conducted by secret ballot, under
international supervision, to provide the Palestinians in the OPT, including Jerusalem, with the democratic
modalities, structures and institutions needed for the free exercise of their political will. It however considers
peace as a global process, starting with the cessation of all illegal settlement activities all the way to the
implementation of PISGA.
Israel's position vis-a-vis this key issue determines the continuation of the collapse of the very process making
peace possible in our area. The choice rests with Israel; either to move on the road to peace, or to continue
on the road to settlement.
This proposal constitutes a new and important contribution, by the Palestinian side, to the progress of the
negotiations, and we hope that the Israelis [sic] side will respond to it in a similarly positive and constructive spirit.
In this context. It is necessary to reaffirm that Jerusalem is an integral part of the OPT, and that all transitional
arrangements are applicable to it. Its annexation, as well as the artificial extension of its municipal boundaries,
are illegal unilateral acts. As such they are null and void, and therefore should be reversed. Jerusalem
is also a universal symbol and a repository of cultural creativity, spiritual enrichment and religious tolerance,
in tune with the longstanding traditions of openness and generosity which have characterized our Palestinian
people throughout its long history. Jerusalem lies at the heart of our people's aspirations, and we are commit-
ted to make it the capital of our future independent state.
The fact that the six million Palestinians, albeit physically torn between occupation and exile, constitute one
single people is another basic element of our approach to peace. Their rights as a people must be respected.
Our people, inside and outside the OPT, including Jerusalem, have one sole leadership. Thus our very
presence here, in conformity with the Palestinian peace initiative of November 1988 and other relevant PNC
resolutions, derives from the unity of our national decision, and the unity of our representation, which must
be recognized in the course of the negotiating process.
II
The Palestinian delegation is now presenting an expanded outline of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government
Arrangements: concepts, outline, preliminary measures and elections modalities, which is based on the following:
68
APPENDICES
E. Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation-"Outline of the Palestinian Self-Government Arrangements" (continued)
(1) Interim Self-Government Arrangements are by definition transitional. The transitional period must lead,
through a phased negotiated process, to the full exercise of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.
The success of such a process and the attainment of peace can only materialize if the Palestinian
Interim Self-Governing Authority (PISGA) fully assumes powers and responsibilities throughout the OPT,
including Jerusalem.
(2) The Palestinians in the OPT, including Jerusalem, have the right and the wish to govern themselves
according to democratic principles, through free elections. The PISGA should be an embodiment of
the principle of democratic government-"By the People, of the People, for the People."
Part One: Concepts and expanded outline of the PISGA
1.
Introduction
The immediate objective of the Palestinian-Israeli bilateral talks, as laid out in the co-sponsors' letter
of invitation of October 18, 1991, is to negotiate interim self-government arrangements. These talks are
conducted within the context of international legitimacy, which recognizes the right of the Palestinian
people to self-determination.
The interim self-government arrangements are also intended to provide the basis for the second stage
of negotiations on the permanent status of the West Bank including Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and
al-Himmah. According to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the IVth Geneva
Convention and the Hague Regulations, these areas are occupied territories and Israel is a belligerent
occupant. (These territories are hereafter referred to as the Occupied Palestinian Territory-OPT.)
The Palestinian people have accepted to negotiate interim self-government arrangements in a phased
approach that would allow them, in the second and final phase the free exercise of their legitimate
right to self-determination. Moreover the Palestinians in the OPT and in exile are one people and the
interim self-government arrangements should facilitate the exercise of the legitimate rights of those in
exile, who will participate in the second phase of the negotiations to determine the final status of the
OPT and achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Palestine Question in all its aspects.
II.
The transitional nature of the interim phase
According to the co-sponsors' letter of invitation the entire negotiating process we have embarked upon
including the "negotiations along two tracks," are "based on United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tions 242 and 338." These resolutions stipulate that Israel's acquisition of the territories it occupied
in the 1967 war is inadmissible, and are the basis of the principle of the exchange of territory for peace.
It should be clear that resolutions 242 and 338 must guide all phases of the negotiations. They must
be fully implemented by the final stage.
The interim phase therefore does not constitute a regime which would be stabilized short of self-
determination. It represents, on the contrary, a framework whereby Resolutions 242 and 338 and inter-
national legality shall be implemented.
III. Authority in the interim phase
The term "interim self-government arrangements" can only mean arrangements for an interim self-
government: a central, political entity that allows the Palestinian people in the OPT to govern themselves
69
APPENDICES
E. Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation-"Outline of the Palestinian Self-Government Arrangements" (continued)
by themselves. The Palestinians in the OPT have the right and have expressed the wish to govern
themselves according to democratic principles, i.e. through free elections without external interference.
The success of the transitional process is only possible if the PISGA is vested with all the powers of
a true self-governing authority. All the powers presently exercised by the military government and civil
administration of the occupier should be transferred to the PISGA upon its election and inauguration.
IV. Powers and responsibilities of the PISGA
1.
Being the representative of the Palestinian people in the OPT, the PISGA's authority is vested
in it by them. Its powers and responsibilities cannot be delegated by a foreign authority. Israel
was never entitled to sovereignty over the OPT but rather has exercised certain powers as a belligerent
occupant since the entry of its armed forces into the areas occupied in 1967. With the start of
the interim phase and the abolition of the Israeli military government and civil administration, Israel
shall cease to enjoy all these powers, which shall be assumed by the PISGA.
2.
There should be no limitations on the powers and responsibilities of the PISGA, except those
which derive from its character as an interim arrangement and from the mutually agreed outcome
of the peace process.
3.
In order for the PISGA to exercise freely its powers and responsibilities and be assured a peaceful
and orderly transfer of all powers to it, the Israeli armed forces shall complete their withdrawal
in phases to mutually-agreed specific redeployment points along the borders of the OPT by the
time the PISGA is inaugurated.
4.
The jurisdiction of the PISGA should extend to all of the OPT, including its land, natural resources,
water, sub-soil, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and air space. The PISGA shall exercise
its jurisdiction throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
5.
The PISGA should have legislative powers. The transition from the state of occupation to the final
status necessitates the assumption of such powers. No self-governing authority can function without
having the power to enact, amend and abrogate laws.
6.
The PISGA should wield executive power. It should formulate and implement its policy without
any foreign control.
7.
The PISGA shall determine the spheres, objectives and means of cooperation with any states,
groups of states or international bodies, and shall be empowered to conclude binding cooperation
agreements free of any foreign control.
8.
The PISGA should administer justice through an independent judiciary, exercising sole and ex-
clusive jurisdiction throughout the OPT.
9.
The PISGA should establish a strong police force responsible for security and public order in the OPT.
10. The PISGA can request the assistance of a UN peacekeeping force.
70
APPENDICES
E. Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation-"Outline of the Palestinian Self-Government Arrangements" (continued)
11. A standing committee should be established from representatives of the five permanent members
of the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the PISGA, Jordan, Egypt,
Syria and Israel, to supervise the implementation of the self-government arrangements during the
interim phase and settle disputes arising therefrom.
Part Two: Preliminaries for the interim phase
1.
The conclusion of the negotiations on the interim phase and the establishment of the PISGA require
implementation of a number of necessary preliminary measures and the provision of appropriate
conditions for the conduct of elections.
2. The period between the commencement of the peace process on October 29, 1991 and the
elections for PISGA and its subsequent inauguration on a date no later than October 29, 1992,
during which these preliminary measures are to be implemented constitutes a preliminary phase.
3.
The IVth Geneva Convention and Hague Regulations and United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tions 242, 338 and 726, provide the basis and principles for the implementation of the above.
4.
During its prolonged occupation of the Palestinian Territory, the Israeli military government and
the Israeli government have diverged increasingly since 1967 from the principles laid down in
the Hague Regulations of 1907, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, United Nations Security
Council 242 and 338, and other international conventions and standards.
5.
The Israeli authorities have introduced illegally a large number of substantial changes into the
body of law applicable in the OPT which have made possible the establishment and expansion
of illegal Israeli settlements. These changes have resulted in the creation of a system approaching
apartheid. The consolidations of the system undermines the short- and long-term objectives of
the ongoing peace process.
6.
Discriminatory and extra-territorial legislation must therefore be rescinded and the issue of new
military orders whether in the guise of primary or secondary legislation, must cease.
7.
Dismantling the legal basis of this discriminatory system in the OPT is necessary for the successful
transition into the interim phase and for the ultimate success of the peace process as a whole.
8.
In order to establish the proper conditions for the conclusion of the interim negotiations, the exer-
cise of the powers and responsibilities of the PISGA and the conclusion of the second stage of
negotiations on the final status of the OPT, the Israeli authorities should immediately implement
the following measures with regard to land and natural resources:
a. Cease all settlement activity, including construction of new settlements or expansion of existing
ones, road construction and other infrastructural activity.
b. Cease acquisition, by any means, of land, water, and other natural resources.
C. Refrain from any and all unilateral actions affecting the legal, demographic or geographic
status quo in the OPT.
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APPENDICES
E. Jordanian-Palestinian Delegations-"Outline of the Palestinian Self-Government Arrangements" (continued)
d. Revoke military order 291 which suspended the land registration process, thus allowing land
registration to continue according to law.
e. Return all land and immovable properties seized under military order 58 on the basis of being
absentee property.
9.
In order to provide the proper atmosphere and conditions for the conduct of the elections and
the establishment of the PISGA, the Israeli authorities should:
a. Release all Palestinian political prisoners, including administrative detainees.
b. End the practice of administrative detention.
C. Allow the return of all deportees.
d. Revoke military order No. 224 that revived the 1945 Emergency Regulations.
e. Refrain from closing educational and other public institutions, blocking economic activity, im-
posing curfew, or otherwise impeding the normal conduct of the daily lives of the Palestinian
people in the OPT.
f. Refrain from all forms of collective punishment.
g. Lift all restrictions on Palestinian social, cultural, political and economic activity, and formally
revoke all military orders that affect those areas of daily life in the OPT.
h. Provide full protection of, and free access to, religious sites.
i. Approve all pending family reunification applications.
j.
Make available all public records regarding all aspects of the resources and inhabitants of the OPT.
Part Three: Elections modalities
1.
The elections are intended to produce the legislative assembly of the PISGA, comprising 180 members.
2.
Basic principles:
a. The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights provide the universally accepted basis for the conduct of free elections.
b. The elections for the establishment of the PISGA constitute a significant step towards realizing
the national and political rights of the Palestinian people in the OPT.
C. The PISGA should be the self-governing authority which represents the Palestinian people
in the OPT. It should be freely elected on the basis of the universal democratic principle of
"by the people, of the people, for the people."
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APPENDICES
E. Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation-"Outline of the Palestinian Self-Government Arrangements" (continued)
d. All guarantees should be provided for free elections. It is necessary that elections be con-
ducted and supervised by an international body. All measures must be taken to guarantee
that Israel should not interfere in the election in any way.
3.
Purpose of the elections:
a. To enable the Palestinian people in the OPT to elect democratically accountable representatives.
b. To provide a democratic basis for the establishment of the institutions of the PISGA.
C.
To give democratic legitimacy to the assumption of its powers and responsibilities by the PISGA,
in the OPT during the interim phase.
4.
Proper conditions. The preliminary measures mentioned in Part Two of this document, including
in particular an immediate halt to all settlement activities, should be implemented before the elec-
tions. Further steps must also be undertaken in order to provide the proper conditions for the
conduct of the elections, as follows:
a. Withdrawal of Israeli Army units, Border Police and other military and paramilitary forces outside
all populated areas and main communication routes.
b. Disarming of Israeli settlers, disbanding of their paramilitary formations, and guaranteeing their
noninterference in the election process.
C. The provision of international supervision (see below).
5.
Full participation. In order to ensure full participation by the Palestinian people in the OPT in the
elections, the Israeli authorities should guarantee full freedom of:
a. Political expression, including the end of military censorship.
b. Access to, and establishment of, all forms of audio-visual or print media.
C. Assembly.
d. Public election campaigning.
e. Political activity, including formation of political parties.
f. Movement throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
6.
The various preliminary measures described above should be implemented at least three months
before the elections, and by a date no later than 31 July 1992.
7.
International supervision. International supervision is to be provided by the United Nations, or any
other appropriate and mutually agreed international body. This international body shall provide
the following:
73
APPENDICES
E. Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation-"Outline of the Palestinian Self-Government Arrangements (continued)
a. Designate a high commissioner to supervise the preparations for, and conduct of, the elections.
The commissioner's mandate will continue at least until the inauguration of the Palestinian
interim self-governing authority.
b. Establish an international supervisory committee that, in addition to assisting the high commis-
sioner, will arbitrate disputes arising from implementation and allocate responsibility.
C. Station UN or other international observers to ensure continued respect of the above-mentioned
preliminary measures.
d. Station UN or other appropriate international or multinational forces to provide for public order
during the elections.
e. There shall be free access throughout the OPT for the international media as well as foreign visitors.
8.
The elections:
a. The elections shall be conducted in accordance with an electoral system endorsed by the
international supervisory committee.
b. The elections shall be based on universal suffrage, and be conducted by secret ballot.
C. The elections shall take place at lease one month prior to the inauguration of the PISGA,
which is to take place at a date no later than 29 October 1992.
9.
All Palestinians, who, on June 4, 1967, were listed in the relevant official population registers in
any part of the West Bank, including Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, and al-Himmah, and their descen-
dants, have the right to vote in the elections or stand as candidates.
10. In order that all Palestinians eligible to vote can exercise that [sic] rights, the Israeli military authorities
should:
a. Facilitate the return of all persons displaced and/or deported since June 5, 1967 and their
descendants.
b. Submit all relevant population records for the preparation of electoral registers.
C. Complete the above measures by a date not later than 31 July 1992, under international
supervision.
Source: Mideast Mirror, 3/4/92.
74
APPENDICES
F. Israel-Working Papers on Multilateral Issues
F. ISRAEL-WORKING PAPERS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES:
"Multilateral Regional Cooperation"
"Water in the Middle East"
"Regional Cooperation: Economy"
"Regional Cooperation: The Environment"
January 28, 1992
MULTILATERAL REGIONAL COOPERATION
Two distinct negotiating frameworks relating to the peace process are referred to in U.S. Secretary of State
James Baker's letter of invitation (October 18, 1991): direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and its Arab
neighbors, and multilateral negotiations for regional development. The assumption is that the multilateral
regional negotiations, in addition to their own intrinsic importance and potential, should carry considerable
weight as a supplementary and confidence-building element in facilitating the bilateral talks.
Israel feels that the regional negotiations could well inaugurate a new chapter in relations among the states
of the Middle East, if they focus on issues which reflect a common regional interest and require concerted
action by the states concerned to ensure their advancement.
Indeed, the absence of joint action among neighboring states on subjects of vital concern can cause, in
the medium and long-term, irreversible damage to the area in which the inhabitants of the region live and
raise their families. This constitutes a moral and regional imperative obliging all the states in the area to
work together to ensure that these negotiations will provide a better future for the entire region.
Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have already announced their readiness to participate in the multilateral
talks. Israel suggests formulating an approach which will enable countries which have not yet agreed to
attend, to join the talks at a later stage when they decide to do SO. There are undoubtedly subjects at
the multilateral level in which progress can be made without reference to issues which touch on sovereignty
or territory.
Secretary Baker's letter of invitation specifically mentioned five topics: regional security and arms control,
refugee issues, water resources, quality of the environment and regional economic development. Israel pro-
poses the inclusion at this stage of two further subjects: cooperation in the Eilat/Aqaba Gulf area and health.
The following thoughts and ideas relate to the last five topics listed above:
WATER RESOURCES
The water crisis, which has been building up over recent years, and the danger that the region will "dry
up" are of great concern to all the countries of the Middle East. If no solution is found, the conflict over
water resources will become much more acute. Water resources do not know or recognize political boun-
daries, thus constituting a classic example of a problem which cannot be effectively resolved within any
given national framework, but should be approached on a regional, multilateral basis.
The key factor is the water shortage itself, involving, among other things, incorrect usage of existing water
resources. Solutions are required which would be directed primarily toward:
- Producing potable water, mainly through desalination;
75
APPENDICES
F. Israel-Working Papers on Multilateral Issues (continued)
- Developing a comprehensive program of sewage disposal to recycle these waters for agricultural use
and, at the same time, address the ecological problem caused by sewage.
In addition, a program for desalination, combined with electric power production, should be worked out,
with the objective of "defusing the time bomb" of the threat of severe regional drought and all that eventually
would imply. Such a project would help to alleviate the water shortage in the region, enable the removal
of present restrictions on development due to lack of water, and contribute to a solution of one of the main
elements of the Arab-Israel conflict.
Other items of cooperation in this field could include the following:
- Exchange of geophysical and rainfall data;
- Joint regional workshops dealing with common technical issues such as advanced irrigation techniques;
prevention of salination and brine-disposal methods; schemes for limiting evaporation; etc.
- Establishment of a joint task force on rain-inducement techniques such as cloud seeding;
- integration of solar energy utilization and desalination.
QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Protection of the seas and preservation of the seacoast are issues of paramount importance. They transcend
geographical borders, and thus active cooperation among all the states of the region is essential if the
region is to benefit from ecological protection. (Presumably, support for this program will be forthcoming
from international bodies, as well as from the European Community, Japan and the United States.)
The following environmental subjects could be considered in a multilateral context for the entire Mediterra-
nean region:
- Establishment of an eastern Mediterranean center for the prevention of pollution of the sea and a forecasting
and communications network to combat sea pollution;
- Cooperation in formulating guidelines for the development of the coastline through integration of the
planning agencies of all the countries concerned;
- Control measures to prevent destruction of coastal areas;
- Regional research on climatic changes and analysis of their impact on the region;
- Study of the possibilities of a regional approach to the elimination of solid and toxic wastes.
REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
In a peaceful Middle East, changes will occur which will require adaptation to a new reality and to the
challenges arising from changes taking place in other parts of the world. The subject of the agenda, in
this context, could be: 'Aspects of the Economic Development of the Middle East in an Era of Peace.' The
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APPENDICES
F. Israel-Working Papers on Multilateral Issues (continued)
main categories to be discussed could be the following:
- The gradual transition from national economies based on security interest to peace economies;
- Regional development plans which will complement, rather than compete with each other;
- Joint projects to raise the standard of living.
Special attention should be devoted to the agricultural domain. Based on past experience, the agenda
should focus, in the first stage, preferably on one central project. It is proposed, therefore, to begin with
the establishment, on a regional basis, of applied and research cooperation in arid and semi-arid zone
agriculture, on the model of the projects now being implemented in Egypt within the framework of MERC
and in cooperation with US AID.
Other subjects to be considered could include:
- Projects essential for all the countries of the region such as: modern irrigation techniques through op-
timal utilization of available water (development and increased productivity of plant species with a low
level of water consumption); plant protection and disease prevention.
- Projects of mutual benefit such as: deciduous fruit tree cultivation in hot climate conditions; increasing
fruit and vegetable yields through adaptation to prevailing regional conditions; establishing a gene bank
for fruit species of the Mediterranean basin; genetic methods of raising the fertility of sheep and other
livestock; pest control by biological and other means minimizing ecological harm, including the damage
to ground water resulting from the use of pesticides; preservation of harvested fruits and vegetables;
food technology; methods of storing foodstuffs and seeds; etc.
THE EILAT/AQABA GULF AREA
The Eilat/Aqaba Gulf area includes four countries, all of which are undergoing economic development. The
area thus offers an opportunity of particular interest-and, in some respects, urgency-to promote regional
cooperation. In order to prevent the deterioration of the area's unique natural resources as well as to avoid
conflicts of interest and negative mutual influences, joint steps should be taken with regard to planning,
coordination and supervision.
Many of the subjects touching on cooperation in the Eilat/Aqaba area belong to the bilateral Israel-Jordan
domain and, in fact, were thus noted in the American invitation to the bilateral talks. Other issues, however,
have wider implications which would also affect Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These should therefore be con-
sidered as belonging to the multilateral sphere.
In the multilateral context, regional arrangements should be arrived at in the following area:
- Quality of the environment and regional emergency arrangements, including: prevention of pollution
of the Eilat/Aqaba Gulf; regional life saving services; regional navigation and flight safety measures;
regional authority for environmental management, including nature reserves and coastal activity planning.
- Expansion of water and energy resources, including: construction of an integrated power-and-desalination
plant; exploitation of clean energy sources.
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F. Israel-Working Papers on Multilateral Issues (continued)
- Open tourism, including: free movement of tourist from third countries throughout the region; offers
of regional tour packages; expansion of the existing Taba-Aqaba ferry services to include stops at Eilat
and in Saudi Arabia.
- Other subjects could include: cooperation in aquaculture unique to the area; activation of a joint regional
health center; coordination in seaport and airport operation; arrangement for the joint utilization of roads
and rail facilities; establishment of a regional scientific center.
HEALTH
Each of the countries in the region would benefit from cooperation in the spheres of health and medical
services, including the prevention of epidemics prevalent in the region and the fight against contagious
and viral diseases. Considerable scope exists for cooperation, which should be activated in stages, beginn-
ing with subjects which can be easily implemented such as:
Joint research projects utilizing health teams from the countries of the region;
- Cooperation in the development of health data systems;
- Contagious and viral disease control;
- Development of services such as rehabilitation facilities, children's hospitals and the fight against blindness;
- Establishment of a regional center for poison control treatment;
- Establishment of a regional center for the use and maintenance of sophisticated medical equipment;
- Exchanges of medical and paramedical personnel;
- Exchanges of publications, establishment of medical education networks and the like;
- Development of basic medical facilities and services in rural and peripheral areas.
WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST
COMMON WATER SOURCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Scarcity of water is a central problem throughout the entire Middle East, and what is available is usually
shared by more than one country. Political boundaries are meaningless when dealing with the common
use of limited resources. Thus, water could serve as a catalyst for cooperation for the advancement of peace
and the development of the region and no longer be a focal point for war, crises and tensions.
At present, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states deal with their water shortages by operating desalination plants.
Egypt is totally dependent upon the Nile River for its water, with its supply affected both by natural causes
and by the states (Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda) which control the river sources and influence the flow
of water. Iraq, Syria and Turkey are mutually dependent for most of their water on the Tigris, Euphrates
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F. Israel-Working Papers on Multilateral Issues (continued)
and Orontes rivers, the damming of any one of which could prove devastating for one or more of these
countries. Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Israel draw most of their water from the same sources. In the area
west of the Jordan River, the residents of Israel, Judea-Samaria and Gaza have shared the same water
sources, both before 1967 and since.
WATER-ENHANCING PROGRAMS IN ISRAEL
Water is in constant short supply in Israel. Rain falls only between November and April, with uneven distribu-
tion of yearly precipitation ranging from some 28 inches (70 cm) in the north to less than 2 inches (5 cm)
in the south. Water sources include the Jordan River, Lake Kinneret (Sea of Galilee) and a few small river
systems, as well as natural springs and underground water tables, which are tapped in controlled quantities
to prevent depletion and salination. Annual renewable water resources amount to some 56 billion cubic
feet (1.6 billion cu.m.), of which 75 percent is used for agriculture.
To overcome regional imbalances in water availability, most of the country's fresh-water sources have been
joined in the National Water Carrier, an integrated network of pumping stations, reservoirs, canals and pipelines
which transfers water from the north, where most of the sources are, to the agricultural areas of the semi-arid
south. As maximum use has been made of all freshwater sources, ways are being developed to exploit
marginal water resources through the recycling of waste water, cloud-seeding and desalination of brackish water.
The water-saving measures applied in Israel include:
- Heightening public awareness to the need to conserve water;
- Regulations on the use of water in both the private and public sectors;
- Encouraging the installation of water-saving devices in homes, factories and farms;
- Utilization of advanced water-saving devices such as drip irrigation, which directs water flow straight
to the root zone of plants, and computerized irrigation systems;
- Switching to growing less water-intensive crops as well as to hothouse agriculture;
- Enlarging underground reservoirs and building new facilities for collecting rain water.
THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION
Understanding of the need for cooperation in the use of the water resources of the region was recognized
as early as 1953 when the United States proposed the Johnston Plan to allocate the waters of the Jordan
River, whose sources are shared by Israel and its neighbors. According to this plan, 46.7 percent was to
go to Jordan, 38.5 percent to Israel, 11.7 percent to Syria and 3.1 percent to Lebanon. Israel accepted
the agreement, but the Arab countries refused to sign any accord involving Israel as a partner and mutual
beneficiary. Although the Johnston Plan was never ratified, Israel and Jordan have been tacitly abiding
by its quotas.
In the context of the Middle East peace process, the water issue could serve as an important element
in building relations between Israel and the surrounding countries. Joint projects for desalination, the recycl-
ing of waste water and making more efficient use of water for irrigation would provide mutually beneficial
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F. Israel-Working Papers on Multilateral Issues (continued)
areas of cooperation for the betterment of the entire region.
REGIONAL COOPERATION: ECONOMY
Economic cooperation in the Middle East serves not only the interest of the countries in the region, but
also of the entire world community. At a time when countries all over the world are establishing mechanisms
for stable and common economic systems, economic understanding in the Middle East is a welcome and
long-awaited step.
The issue of economic growth is on the agenda of every country in the Middle East. On a regional level,
sharing of resources would allow each country to maximize its growth potential. Furthermore, cooperation
between countries through joint research and sharing of technology would create a framework of common
goals and interests, within which to build a strong base for regional development.
ECONOMIC RELATIONS BUILD PEACE
Economic ties based on equality and mutual interest constitutes an important step in building a solid and
lasting peace between countries.
In the Middle East, economic relations could contribute to peace in two ways: as a constructive lever of
mutual interest in peace negotiations; and as a common framework in which to maintain and strengthen
peace after it is achieved.
ECONOMIC COOPERATION ENCOURAGES REGIONAL GROWTH
The Middle East holds tremendous potential for economic development, with its reservoir of renowned specialists
and skilled personnel, vast untapped natural resources and ongoing technological research and develop-
ment. The joining of personnel from neighboring countries as well as joint research and exchange programs
for teachers, engineers, scientists and technicians would reduce duplication and catalyze economic develop-
ment. As the Middle East continues to modernize and advance, cooperation within the framework of peace
would establish the potential for accelerated development and growth for all the countries of the region.
ECONOMIC COOPERATION ENABLES ENTRANCE INTO THE WORLD MARKET
Regional economic cooperation would expand the economic market of the countries of the Middle East.
This expanded market would attract investments, especially by foreign companies and oil exporting states,
and would generate more capital for investments.
Peace in the region would induce international finance corporations to invest in the development of regional
infrastructure.
ECONOMIC COOPERATION OFFERS OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
A variety of joint and multilateral projects for economic cooperation, which would be of equal benefit to
all parties concerned, would enhance the well-being of the parties and thus foster a solid interest in the
promotion and stabilization of mutual relations. The gulf shared by Eilat and Aqaba could serve as a microcosm
for regional cooperation. Bordered by four countries, it offers a unique site for a variety of joint and multilateral
cooperation ventures.
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F. Israel-Working Papers on Multilateral Issues (continued)
Possible areas of regional cooperation include: agriculture, energy and infrastructure, tourism and health.
AGRICULTURE
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: Projects for the development of agriculture in arid and semi-arid zones could
be implemented on tripartite or multilateral bases, modelled on the Arid Lands Research Program carried
out since 1981 by Egypt, Israel, and the United States. The project, which involves one university in each
country, deals with research on the irrigation of desert crops with brackish water, cultivation of animal feed
and breeding of livestock in desert conditions, and adaptation of crops to arid conditions.
JOINT VENTURES: The establishment of a master plan for agricultural extension services and the expansion
of projects in horticulture, dairy production, sheep desert farming and aquaculture would help improve agricultural
practices in the countries of the region.
INTERTRADING OF AGRICULTURAL INPUTS: Exchanges of means of production, including machinery
and equipment, irrigation systems, fertilizers, pesticides, veterinary products, storage and packing equip-
ment, breeding animals, day-old chicks and the like would enhance agricultural output in the region.
Specific fields of cooperation could include:
- Developing high-yield, high-quality and pest-resistant varieties of field crops and vegetables adapted
to the Mediterranean region;
- Establishment of a gene bank for fruit species originating and abundant in the Mediterranean basin,
to preserve valuable specimens and for future breeding purposes;
- Promotion of genetic and cultural means to improve development and production of temperate-zone
fruits in warm climates;
- Improving the management and productivity of tropical and subtropical fruit species;
- Recycling of saline and effluent water for irrigation and developing methods of water application to
increase irrigation efficiency;
- Efficient use of fertilizers to prevent pollution of groundwater and soil;
- Protection of the environment by preventing the pollution of soils and groundwater caused by agrochemicals,
heavy metals, organic waste and oil products;
- Methods of increasing the natural resistance of fruits and vegetables to post-harvest diseases;
- Use of food-grade plant constituents to replace toxic chemicals in the preservation of fresh and process-
ed agricultural products;
- Increasing production of lamb and mutton by introducing genes of prolific breeds;
- Developing crops-pasture systems for semi-arid areas by using improved pasture methods.
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F. Israel-Working Papers on Multilateral Issues (continued)
AQUACULTURE: The development of food production technologies based on seawater could be applied
in other Middle Eastern countries with similar scarcity of freshwater. The importance of aquaculture (marine
culture and freshwater ponds culture) as a means of food production and food supply is constantly increas-
ing, and therefore, the development of this field should be emphasized. In addition to its many freshwater
fish farms, Israel has developed seawater ponds as a potential means of food production, with tangible
results, It is hoped that the freshwater ponds may be converted into marine fish ponds using seawater.
ENERGY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Israel's accumulated experience and expertise in aspects of energy and infrastructure management could
be applied to other countries in the region such as:
- LOCATING NATURAL RESOURCES: Israel's geological survey has established a good record in map-
ping mineral resources, with particular experience in phosphates and Dead Sea limnology. Cooperation
in these fields may prove rewarding to neighboring countries.
- USE OF GEOTHERMAL WATER: The Arava region in southeastern Israel has reservoirs of geothermal
water which can be utilized for heating protected crops on both sides of the Israel-Jordan border.
- DESERT ARCHITECTURE: Israel has developed architectural designs aimed at conserving energy while
making maximum use of solar energy. This technology could be applied in desert climates throughout
the region.
- SOLAR ENERGY: Israel is in the forefront of development in the field of solar water heaters. Cooperation
could include open individual thermosyphonic system, open central systems, closed central systems,
water quality, systems, manufacturing, operation and regulation.
Studies could be conducted to ascertain the viability of establishing a relatively large solar power plant
in the region, with the aim of setting up a power station at a chosen site supplying power to neighboring
countries.
- SEISMIC RESEARCH: An advanced earthquake reporting system in Israel has accumulated much data
which could be of considerable importance for development and planning in other states situated along
the Syrian-African Rift Valley.
- DESALINATION PROGRAMS COMBINED WITH ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCTION: Solar or gas energy
centers including desalination units could be built at selected sites. The centers could serve as advanced
training schools for engineers and technicians.
TOURISM
Regional cooperation in the area of tourism would both serve to enhance the national economies of the
cooperating countries and make tourist attractions in each of them available to all visitors to the region,
with the appeal and advantages of combined tourist packages for travel agent and consumer alike. The
promotion of tourism between countries could also include direct flights.
The establishment of a joint forum (EMTC) to promote tourism in the area is recommended, with the coopera-
tion of Greece, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and other interested countries.
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F. Israel-Working Papers on Multilateral Issues (continued)
Joint efforts should be encouraged in the investment and development of tourist sites shared by several
countries such as the Eilat/Aqaba Gulf region which hosts resorts along the coast of Egypt, Israel and Jordan.
HEALTH
In the field of health, regional cooperation should be aimed at improving the health standards of all the
inhabitants of the region; increasing the capacity of medical institutions in the area; establishing a significant
level of interaction among scientists and health personnel in the countries concerned; and promoting good
health practices and social development.
The following are suggested:
- A regional center for poison control treatment;
- Decompression tanks for diving casualties in the Red Sea;
- A regional center for the maintenance of sophisticated medical equipment for utilization by the health
services in the region.
- Extension of the facilities and services available at the children's hospital at Israel's Beilinson Medical
Center to all children of the Middle East.
THE GULF OF EILAT/AQABA
The need for regional cooperation among the countries bordering the Gulf of Eilat/Aqaba-Israel, Jordan,
Egypt and Saudi Arabia-is particularly striking.
A process of continuing ecological pollution in the Eilat/Aqaba Gulf could result in irreversible damage to
the environment and heavy economic losses to the Red Sea coastal countries. There is genuine concern
among the coastal countries directly concerned and the international community about the need to safeguard
the economic and natural resources of this area through mutually-agreed pollution control measures.
The limited amount of available land between the mountains on both sides has compelled the towns of
Eilat and Aqaba to expand along the Israel-Jordan border. As a result, the two towns have, over time, developed
into virtually a single urban area, separated by an armistice line. Aqaba's economy is dominated by its
port, and the town is industrially oriented; in Eilat, tourism is the main economic endeavor. Common ventures
between the two towns would benefit both.
REGIONAL COOPERATION: THE ENVIRONMENT
The past few years have brought an increased world-wide awareness of environmental issues. Many con-
ferences have been convened to discuss global environmental problems such as expected changes in
climate, the threat to the earth of a deteriorating ozone layer, the disposal of toxic waste, pollution and disease
control, and more. These issues are not confined within the arbitrary borders of individual countries, but
rather they span the borders of many nations. Therefore, it is necessary for all parties to create a framework
for strategic cooperation by which to cope with regional problems.
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F. Israel-Working Papers on Multilateral Issues (continued)
The following are regional environmental topics which would benefit from institutionalized mechanisms for
multilateral cooperation.
PROTECTION OF NATURE
It is suggested that a joint committee be established to develop and manage natural landscape reserves,
protect endangered species and repair damaged ecosystems.
AIR QUALITY
Air pollution is not confined by the boundaries of any country. Pollution from the part of Haifa can reach
Jordan in a matter of hours, given the proper weather conditions, and phosphorus dust from the Jordanian
port of Aqaba easily reaches the shore of Eilat with the help of an eastern wind. Air quality deterioration
is both a health threat to humans as well as a threat to vegetation and buildings.
SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL AND RECYCLING
It is suggested that joint disposal and recycling plants be established.
DUMPING SITES FOR TOXIC WASTE
Toxic waste disposal is a problem which all developed countries must face. The solution involves a suitable
site, the proper technology and adequate funding.
Separate dumping sites and duplication of technology are both costly and unnecessary. It is suggested
that regional dumping sites be combined in order to improve disposal technology and share disposal costs.
MOSQUITOES
Mosquito breeding sites such as those in the Jordan Valley and Dead Sea area are not simply local problems
which are contained within the immediate area of the site. They create a serious nuisance to the economic
activities (especially tourism) for surrounding area, as well as pose a threat of disease.
It is suggested that a multilateral committee be established, which will convene regularly and maintain direct
contact all year long. Such a committee will coordinate mosquito control activities, inform each other of
existing breeding sites and conduct anti-malaria research.
CLIMATE CHANGES
Every country in the Middle East is affected by climate changes in the region. Experts have observed warning
signs that the drying of the deserts will further extend the desert regions. Such an eventuality is a threat
to all the inhabitants of the area. The only way in which to combat such an awesome challenge of nature
is through cooperation.
It is suggested that a joint research team be established to study the problem and make suggestion [sic]
for the development of advanced technology, agriculture, construction adapted for desert conditions and
climate manipulation.
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F. Israel-Working Papers on Multilateral Issues (continued)
MEDITERRANEAN REGION
Ocean pollution control is an issue which necessitates the cooperation of all the countries which share
waterway and fishing rights. Proposals in this field call for:
- The establishment of an Eastern Regional Center for Marine Pollution Abatement, comprising an emer-
gency response unit and a monitoring network;
- The setting up of a project for defining and implementing principles for coastal environmental planning,
including the use and application of GIS (Geographic Information System) and EIS (Environmental Im-
pact Statement) and a network for the monitoring, surveillance and safeguarding of coasts;
- The establishment of a regional project to evaluate climatic changes.
SOIL ENRICHMENT BY ORGANIC WASTE
Cooperation in soil enrichment programs has the potential for both economic and environmental improvements.
Possible projects include: the establishment of joint factories; the establishment of joint land-monitoring sta-
tions; and the joint disposal of solid waste and recycling of materials.
OTHER SUGGESTIONS
- Common standards, institutional and legal frameworks for regional environment and management;
- Joint environmental research, education and information centers;
- Rehabilitation and preservation of ancient cities and other sites of historical and cultural importance;
- The establishment of a regional monitoring network for environmental radiation;
- Cooperation in the preservation of historical sites, and exchanges between archaeologists and other experts.
85
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AIPAC Papers on the Mideast Peace Talks
No. 2 The Mideast Peace Process Since Madrid