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[News Summaries-Foreign Policy, 10/91-11/91]
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5
Research Memorandum
United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547
Office of Research
USIA
October 25, 1991
Turkey
TURKS APPLAUD BUSH FOR GULF POLICIES;
LIMITED SUPPORT FOR U.S. PRESENCE IN AREA
This report is based on a USIA-commissioned personal interview survey conducted
among 1009 adults in Turkey between May 25 and June 6, 1991. Interviews were
conducted by PIAR, the local Gallup affiliate, among a nationally representative
sample of adults 18 years and older. This is one of several detailed reports; opinions
on domestic, security-defense and international issues are published separately.
Highlights have been previously published.
Key Findings:
On the Gulf War, two-thirds of the adult Turks:
agreed that the defeat of Iraq was a "good" thing for Turkey, but there was no
consensus on whether Turkey did enough to support the war effort;
applauded President Bush's handling of the crisis, but half continued to oppose
the use of the NATO airbases by the U.S. during the war.
Opinion was evenly split as to whether the U.S. military should remain in the Gulf to
ensure peace; half opposed Turkish participation in a UN peacekeeping force.
Most held Iraq accountable for the war, with large majorities agreeing that Iraq
should pay to rebuild Kuwait, should compensate Turkey for the refugees, and that
Iraqi leaders should stand trial for war crimes.
At the time of the survey, half of the adult Turks believed that Saddam Hussein
remained a serious threat to Turkey and that his removal from power would be
necessary for securing world stability. But a slim majority doubted that a war would
break out in the Middle East in the next five years (54% unlikely). Among those who
felt war was likely (41%), most named Israel as probable instigator.
Turks identifying with the ruling ANAP party generally approved of their
government's decisions and actions during the Gulf crisis but were divided on the use
of NATO airbases. Those identifying with the opposition parties were much more
critical of the government's action and more likely to oppose the continued U.S.
military presence in the Gulf.
2
Defeat of Iraq Seen to Have Benefitted Turkey
Two-thirds (64%) of Turkish adults agreed that the defeat of Iraq was a "good" thing for
Turkey (Figure 1; Table 1). These sentiments were most intensely felt by residents of
Adana province, which neighbors Iskedrun, the terminus of the Iraqi pipeline. In the
Adana province, 85 percent agreed that the defeat of Iraq was a "good" thing for Turkey,
with 64 percent agreeing very strongly. This is not surprising since the province was
most directly affected by the closing of borders with Iraq.
1
But Opinion Split on Whether Turkey Did Enough to Support Effort
Even though most Turks agreed that the defeat of Iraq was in their national interest,
there was little sentiment that Turkey should have done more in the war effort. As many
believed that Turkey's contribution to the coalition of nations fighting against Iraq was
"about right" as said it was "too much" (38% and 35% respectively); only a few (8%) said
Turkey contributed "too little" (Figure 1; Table 2). Prior to the war, a majority of Turks
consistently opposed military action against Iraq .
2
Figure 1. Turkish Opinions on the Gulf War
For Turkey, Outcome of Gulf War was:
Turkish Contribution to War Effort was:
"A Good Thing" 64
About Right 38
Too Little 8
Don't know 6
Don't know 19
Too Much 35
"A Bad Thing" 30
1
In compliance with the UN sanctions, Turkey sealed its borders with Iraq, closing the
oil pipelines, which supplied 60% of Turkey's oil needs, the payment for the oil covered by the
fees for the pipelines. The losses from the pipeline closure are estimated at up to 7 billion
U.S. dollars for 1990 and could run as high as 15 billion U.S. dollars by the end of 1991.
Therefore, it is not surprising that residents of the region most directly affected by the closing
of the pipelines see the defeat of Iraq as a desirable resolution of the crisis.
2 An October 1990 survey of urban Turks showed a majority opposing military action
against Iraq, if the economic blockade failed (58% oppose to 36% favor; see USIA Office of
Research report M-117-90). An earlier nationwide survey (fielded late August/early
September) found a majority (66%) not wanting to become involved in a Gulf war (reported
in Milliyet, September 17, 1990).
3
President Bush's Gulf Policies Given Accolades
In line with the widely held perception that the defeat of Iraq was in Turkish interests,
most Turks approved President Bush's Gulf policies -- two-thirds (65%) said he handled
the crisis "well" (Table 3). President Bush received broadest endorsement from residents
of Turkey's three major cities -- Istanbul (76%), Ankara (76%), Izmir (78%) -- and from
residents of the Adana area (80%), who were, as noted previously, also most ardent in
saying that Iraq's defeat served Turkish interests. The endorsement of President Bush's
policies was much lower in the other urban centers (59%) and in the rural settlements
(63%). As expected, approval of U.S. Gulf policies was more widespread among those
politically right-of-center than those left-of-center.
Turkish opinion on President Bush's Gulf policies improved notably as the crisis unfolded.
The initial decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia was met with hesitancy: more urban
Turks disapproved (50%) than approved (42%) of the decision to "send armed forces to
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf."3 Yet by February 1991 (in a three-city survey) a majority
said the President was handling the crisis "well" (60%, only 29% said "poorly"). 4 In June
of this year, in these three cities, approval of the President's policies was even more
widespread, with three-fourths saying he handled the crisis "well" (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Turkish Approval of President Bush's Handling of Gulf Crisis
Increased from February to June in Turkey's Key Cities
76
76
78
Bush has handled crisis:
60
63
58
Very Well
Fairly Well
Fairly Poorly
(25)
(24)
(20)
(19)
(33)
(28)
Very Poorly
02/91
Insurance 06/01
Ankara 02/91
Ankara 06/91
Izmir 02/91
Izmir 06/91
3
October 1990 survey of urban Turks.
4 February 1991 survey of urban Turks; commissioned by the USIA Office of Research;
see USIA Office of Research Report "Urban Turks Fear Iraq, Narrowly Support Coalition
Forces," 2/11/91.
4
Opposition to the Use of NATO Airbases Continued Unabated
Almost all Turks were aware that the U.S. used NATO airbases in Turkey to attack Iraq
(a scant 9% had no opinion on the issue). 5 Notwithstanding the widespread acclaim for
President Bush's Gulf policies and the widely held view that the defeat of Iraq was "good"
for Turkey, half (54%) objected to the government's decision to allow the U.S. to use the
NATO airbases (only 37% support the decision; Table 4). Opposition to the government's
decision was more intensely felt in Turkey's three major cities, particularly in Istanbul
(53% opposed strongly; Ankara, 39%; Izmir, 34%), than in the rest of the country (where
between 25% to 27% opposed strongly).
Opposition to the use of NATO airbases was expressed throughout the Gulf crisis and
continued unabated even during the war. In early fall of last year, a majority (68%) of
urban Turks said they would oppose the use of the NATO airbases by the U.S. "in the
event of a hot war." 6 During the war, a majority (58%) of the residents of Istanbul,
Ankara and Izmir still disapproved of the use of the NATO bases (only 38% approved).⁷
After the war, in these three cities solid majorities (62%-to-37%) continued to oppose the
use of the NATO airbases (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Opposition to Allied Use of NATO Bases Unabated After War
Favored Use of Bases
Opposed Use of Bases
38
36
36
36
39
39
(57)
(59)
(60)
(57)
(59)
(64)
Istanbul 02/91
06/01
Ankara 02/91
Ankara 06/91
Izmir 02/91
Izmir 06/91
5
The use of the NATO airbases was widely debated in the Turkish media, despite the
government's frequent denials that the issue was even under consideration. On January 17,
following the Turkish cabinet's approval of the use of the NATO airbases by the coalition
forces, U.S. aircraft from Incirlik bombed strategic sites in Iraq.
6
October 1990 survey of urban Turks.
7 February 1991 survey of urban Turks.
5
Most Agreed Iraq Should Pay Reparations to Kuwait, Compensation to Turkey
Over three-fourths (80%) of adult Turks agreed that Iraq should "pay to rebuild Kuwait,"
with residents of Istanbul and Izmir the most demanding (in each city, 91% said they
would demand reparations; Table 5). Three-fourths (74%) of all Turks also agreed that
Iraq "has an obligation to reimburse Turkey for the cost of taking care of the refugees"
(Table 6). Least insistent upon compensation from Iraq were residents of Eastern and
Southeastern Anatolia, areas close to the Iraqi border (only a third said Iraq should pay, a
view expressed by 80% or more in the other areas).
Most Felt Iraqi Leaders Should Be Tried as War Criminals
Three-fourths (75%) of all Turks also supported putting Iraqi leaders on trial for war
crimes, with most (54%) strongly favoring this action (Table 7). Similar to sentiments on
reparations to Kuwait and compensation to Turkey, residents of Eastern and
Southeastern Anatolia were not as demanding -- roughly half supported having the Iraqi
leaders stand trial.
In June, Half Concerned that Saddam a Threat to Turkey and to the World
In June, a half (53%) of adult Turks considered Saddam Hussein a serious threat to
Turkey, with a third (32%) saying he is a very serious threat (Figure 4; Table 8). But in
Ankara a large majority (73%) considered Saddam Hussein a serious threat. The same
level of concern was expressed about Saddam Hussein's threat to world peace. About half
(50%) of all Turks agreed that "the security and stability of the world can only be secured
by removing Saddam Hussein from power" (42% disagreed; Figure 4; Table 9). However,
in Ankara and Istanbul the perception of Saddam Hussein as a threat to world peace was
more widely held (Ankara, 65%-to-32%; Istanbul, 58%-to-43%).
Figure 4. Concern About Saddam Hussein Most Acute in Ankara
% Agreeing:
Saddam a Serious Threat to Turkey Removal of Saddam Necessary for Peace
73
Nationwide
65
56
57
56
58
Istanbul
53
50
49
51
Ankara
40
38
Izmir
Other Urban
Rural
6
The end of the Gulf War assuaged some Turkish fears of Iraq and Saddam Hussein.
During the Gulf crisis, the Turkish public expressed widespread hostility toward Saddam
Hussein and feared his regime. During the war Iraq was seen as the principal military
threat to Turkey, 8 but in the most recent survey (June) Turkey's traditional rival Greece
was perceived as posing the most serious military threat to Turkey. Additionally, during
the war vast majorities in Ankara (86%), Istanbul (81%) and Izmir (90%) supported the
removal of Saddam Hussein from power by the coalition forces (in addition to liberating
Kuwait). 9 However, in the June survey, in Istanbul and Ankara majorities, though
smaller than during the Gulf war, saw Saddam Hussein as a threat, but in Izmir opinion
was mixed (49% agreed and 50% disagreed that Saddam Hussein threatens world peace).
Turks Divided on Need for Peacekeeping Force in the Gulf
In light of the lessened concern about Saddam Hussein, it is not surprising that in June of
this year opinion was divided on whether the U.S. military presence in the area was
necessary "to ensure peace in the Persian Gulf" (46% necessary, 45% not; Table 10). The
most supportive of a continued U.S. military presence were residents of the Adana area
(58% very and 11% somewhat necessary), a city whose residents were also staunch
supporters of President Bush's Gulf policies and most likely to have said that the defeat of
Iraq served Turkish interests. Least supportive were residents of Izmir (61% said the
U.S. "is not needed") -- the city which hosts many U.S. military personnel and serves as
the headquarters (both naval and air) for NATO's southern command.
By a small margin (51%-to-40%) Turks also opposed their country's participation in a UN
peacekeeping force in the Persian Gulf (Table 11). Opposition to participation in a UN
force was most widespread in Eastern Anatolia, the area just north of Iraq.
Majority Felt War Unlikely to Erupt in Middle East in Next Five Years
A slim majority felt that it was "unlikely" that a war will break out in the Middle East in
the next five years (54% unlikely, 40% likely, Table 12). Women were much more
optimistic than men (compare: women, 60%-to-30% war unlikely; men, 49%-to-49%).
Residents of Anatolia (Eastern, Southeastern, and Inner) were more likely to foresee a
war than residents in the rest of Turkey.
Among those who perceived a likelihood of a war, a majority (72%) named Israel as
probable instigator of the next armed conflict; in distant second place was Iraq (named by
39% of those who saw war as likely). Additionally, one-in-five named Iran, Syria, or the
Palestinians (Table 13).
8 February 1991 survey of urban Turks.
9 February 1991 survey of urban Turks.
7
Better-Educated More Opposed to U.S. Military Presence and Less Worried
About Saddam Hussein Than the Less-Educated 10
The better-educated group were more opposed to a continued U.S. military presence in the
Gulf (66% said U.S. not needed, but among those with primary education 51% said U.S.
needed). In part, opposition to a U.S. military presence could be accounted for by the
lower threat perception among the better-educated (35% of better-educated, but 54% of
those with primary education saw Saddam Hussein as a threat to world peace). However,
the better-educated were also more likely to foresee a war erupting than the less-educated
(55% better-educated, but only 39% of those with primary education said war is likely).
Political Orientation Colors Assessment of Gulf War
Turkish opinions on the Gulf War have fairly consistently reflected individual ideological
orientations, with those on the right of the political spectrum more supportive of U.S.
initiatives than those on the left. Those who identify with the ruling Motherland Party
(ANAP) were more sympathetic to the government's decisions than those who identify
with the other political parties. Thus, only among ANAP supporters did a definite
plurality say the Turkish contribution to the coalition forces was "about right" and only
among ANAP supporters was opinion split on the use of NATO airbases (opposition
prevailed among all of the other party supporters). Adherents of the center-right DYP
tended to share the views of ANAP followers, though not as extensively and generally not
as intensely.
In the June survey, views on the future security needs in the Persian Gulf also differed
along party lines. Specifically, among ANAP and DYP supporters the prevailing view was
that Saddam Hussein is a threat to Turkey and to the world, but among those politically
center-left opinion was divided or majorities did not see Saddam Hussein as a threat.
Among ANAP and DYP supporters majorities saw a need for the continued U.S. military
presence in the Gulf, but among the center-left opinion was diffused.
Additionally, supporters of the Welfare Party (RP), many of whom are former members of
the Islamic fundamentalist National Salvation Party, were much less likely to demand
reparations or compensation from Iraq than those who identify with the other political
parties. RP members were also less demanding that Iraqi leaders stand war crime trials
(supported reparations from Iraq to Kuwait -- 57% of RP supporters, but 80% or more in
any of the other parties; supported compensation to Turkey -- 59% of RP, but 75% or more
among others; demanded trials for Iraqi leaders -- 63% RP, but 80% or more among
others).
Prepared by:
R/WE - Elehie Natalie Skoczylas
(202) 619-5142
Approved by:
R - Ronald H. Hinckley
M-171-91
Director, Office of Research
10 The "better-educated" are defined as those adults who completed academic high school
or have at least some university education; this group accounts for 16% of Turkey's adult
population. For further details on educational groups, see "Operational Definitions" in
Appendix.
8
HOW THE POLL WAS TAKEN
This survey of public opinion was conducted by means of in-home, face-to-face interviews
with 1009 residents of Turkey. Personal interviews took place from May 25 to June 6,
1991.
The questions were written by the USIA Office of Research and were translated by PIAR,
the Istanbul firm which conducted the interviews.
The sample is representative of the adult (18 and older) national population. Interviewing
took place nationwide, covering cities of all sizes as well as the rural areas. The
contractor designed the sample through a multi-stage, stratified procedure, applying
random probability at all but the last stratum -- the selection of respondents -- when a
quota sample was used.
Nineteen times out of twenty, results from samples of this size will differ by no more than
3.1 percentage points in either direction from what would be found if it were possible to
interview every adult in the country.
In addition to sampling error, the practical difficulties of conducting a survey of public
opinion may introduce other sources of error into the results.
9
APPENDIX
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS: In this Turkish survey, for purposes of analysis the population
was divided into mutually-exclusive demographic groups. Below in bold are the specific subgroups
referred to in the text, and the definitions used to identify the group.
EDUCATIONAL GROUPS:
None
No formal education
Primary
Some or completed primary school
Secondary
Some or completed secondary school
Better-educated
Completed academic high school,
some or completed university
GEOGRAPHIC GROUPS -- Region:
Major Cities:
Aegean
Izmir, Manisa
Marmara
Istanbul, Bursa
Black Sea
Zonguldak, Ordu
Inner Anatolia
Ankara, Yozgat
Eastern Anatolia
Elazig, Mus
Southeastern Anatolia
Mardin, Gazinatep
Mediterranean
Isparta, Adana
PARTY AFFILIATION:
ANAP
Motherland Party; the ruling party since 1983; headed by Turgut Ozal;
center-right
SHP
Social Democratic Populist Party; the main opposition party; headed
by Erdal Inonu; left-of-center
DYP
True Path Party; headed by Suleyman Demirel; right-of-center
DSP
Democratic Left Party; headed by Bulent Ecevit; center-left, populist
RP
Welfare Party; many former members of the Islamic fundamentalist
National Salvation Party
MCP
Nationalist Labor Party; extreme right-wing; not represented in
National Assembly
DMP
Reformist Democratic Party; right-wing
10
TABLE 1: IMPACT OF GULF WAR ON TURKEY
Question:
Overall, do you think that the defeat of Iraq is a good thing or a bad
thing for Turkey? Do you feel that way strongly or somewhat?
Date:
06/91
Sample Size:
(1009)
A good thing (felt strongly)
34%
A good thing (felt somewhat)
30
A bad thing (felt somewhat)
17
A bad thing (felt strongly)
13
Don't know
6
Total:
100%
TABLE 2: TURKEY'S CONTRIBUTION TO GULF WAR
Question:
What is your opinion of the support the Government of Turkey gave
to the coalition of nations fighting against Iraq -- did Turkey do too
much, too little, about the right amount, or do you not know enough
to say?
Date:
06/91
Sample Size:
(1009)
Too much
35
Too little
8
About the right amount
38%
Don't know enough to say
19
Total:
100%
TABLE 3: ASSESSMENT OF PRES. BUSH'S GULF POLICIES
Question:
How well do you think U.S. President Bush handled the crisis in the
Persian Gulf -- very well, fairly well, fairly poorly, or very poorly?
Date:
06/91
Sample Size:
(1009)
Very well
33%
Fairly well
32
Fairly poorly
11
Very poorly
10
Don't know
14
Total:
100%
11
TABLE 4: USE OF NATO AIRBASE DURING THE GULF WAR
Question:
As you are aware, the United States was allowed to use a NATO
airbase in Turkey from which to attack Iraq. Do you favor or oppose
this decision to allow the use of the NATO base in Turkey? Strongly
or somewhat?
Date:
06/91
Sample Size:
(1009)
Favor strongly
14%
Favor somewhat
23
Oppose somewhat
22
Oppose strongly
32
Don't know
9
Total:
100%
TABLE 5: IRAQI COMPENSATION TO KUWAIT
Question: Do you think that Iraq should or should not pay to rebuild Kuwait?
Date:
06/91
Sample Size:
(1009)
Should pay
80%
Should not pay
16
Don't know
4
Total:
100%
TABLE 6: IRAQI COMPENSATION TO TURKEY
Question:
You may be aware that many refugees fled here to Turkey during the
crisis. Do you think Iraq does or does not have an obligation to
reimburse Turkey for the cost of taking care of these refugees?
Date:
06/91
Sample Size:
(1009)
Should reimburse Turkey
74%
Should not reimburse Turkey
24
Don't know
3
Total:
101%
12
TABLE 7: WAR TRIALS FOR IRAQI LEADERS
Question:
Do you favor or oppose putting Iraqi leaders on trial for war crimes?
Is that strongly or somewhat?
Date:
06/91
Sample Size:
(1009)
Favor strongly
54%
Favor somewhat
21
Oppose somewhat
9
Oppose strongly
8
Don't know
9
Total:
101%
TABLE 8: IS SADDAM HUSSEIN A THREAT TO TURKEY?
Question:
In your opinion, how much of a threat does Saddam Hussein now
pose to Turkey does he pose a very serious threat, a somewhat
serious threat, not a very serious threat or no threat at all to the
security of Turkey?
Date:
06/91
Sample Size:
(1009)
Very serious threat
32%
Somewhat serious threat
21
Not a very serious threat
24
No threat at all
18
Don't know
4
Total:
99%
TABLE 9: IS SADDAM HUSSEIN A THREAT TO THE WORLD?
Question:
Some people say that the security and stability of the world can be
secured only with the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Do
you agree or disagree with this statement? Strongly or somewhat?
Date:
06/91
Sample Size:
(1009)
Agree strongly
30%
Agree somewhat
20
Disagree somewhat
21
Disagree strongly
21
Don't know
8
Total:
100%
13
TABLE 10: U.S. PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN PERSIAN GULF
Question:
In order to ensure peace in the Persian Gulf, is a U.S. military
presence in the area necessary or is it not necessary? Do you feel that
way strongly or somewhat?
Date:
06/91
Sample Size:
(1009)
Very necessary
19%
Somewhat necessary
27
Somewhat unnecessary
19
Very unnecessary
26
Don't know
10
Total:
101%
TABLE 11: TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE
Question:
What if a United Nations peacekeeping force is placed in the Persian
Gulf? Would you favor or oppose Turkey participating in this
peacekeeping force? Strongly or somewhat?
Date:
06/91
Sample Size:
(1009)
Favor strongly
18%
Favor somewhat
22
Oppose somewhat
24
Oppose strongly
27
Don't know
8
Total:
99%
TABLE 12: LIKELIHOOD OF WAR IN MIDDLE EAST IN NEXT FIVE YEARS
Question:
How likely is it that in the next five years there will be another war
in the Middle East -- is this very likely, rather likely, not very likely,
or not likely at all?
Date:
06/91
Sample Size:
(1009)
Very likely
10%
Rather likely
30
Not very likely
27
Not likely at all
27
Don't know
6
Total:
100%
14
TABLE 13: WHO WOULD INITIATE WAR IN MIDDLE EAST
Question: ASKED ONLY OF THOSE WHO SAY "WAR VERY OR SOMEWHAT
LIKELY." Which country or countries, if any, do you think are most
likely to begin the next armed conflict in the region?
Date:
06/91
Sample Size:
(409)
Israel
72%
Iraq
39
Palestine
19
Iran
19
Syria
13
Jordan
7
Libya
3
Saudi Arabia
3
Egypt
3
Kuwait
2
United States
2
USSR
*
Others
3
Don't know
2
Total:
187%'
* Less than .05 percent.
,
Due to multiple responses
Research Memorandum
United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547
Office of Research
USIA
November 14, 1991
RUSSIA'S NEW GUARDIAN OF THE PRESS
The Russian Republic's Ministry of the Press and Mass Media
This report analyzes events in the USSR as reported by Soviet print and broadcast media,
RFE/RL and FBIS from August to October 1991.
Key Findings:
Under the leadership of Mikhail Poltoranin, a long-time associate of Russian President
Boris Yeltsin, the Russian Federation's Ministry of the Press and Mass Media is now
Russia's chief institutional guarantor of a free press. The moribund USSR Ministry of
Information and the Press is in eclipse.
Since the failed coup in August, the Russian ministry has redoubled efforts to eliminate
Communist Party dominance over the press. Existing and proposed legislation are key
weapons in the battle to demonopolize the press.
The Russian press ministry faces formidable challenges. Hardline Russian nationalists
accuse the ministry of "information dictatorship." Financial hardships continue to plague
virtually every Russian periodical, now that almost all newspapers in the USSR are
formally "independent," having lost all Party and government subsidies.
Although the economic troubles of Russia's press will continue for some time, free
competition is emerging among newspapers. Increasingly, they can now rise or fall on
their own merits and readership, rather than on their subsidies and sponsors.
The Russian Ministry of the Press and Mass Media
Russia's Ministry of the Press and Mass Media [Ministerstvo pechati i massovoi informatsii
RSFSR] was created in July 1990, supplanting the RSFSR State Committee for Publishing Houses,
Printing Plants, and the Book Trade [Goskomizdat RSFSR]. Mikhail Poltoranin, a long-time
associate of Russian President Yeltsin, has been its minister since inception. Fortified by a liberal
USSR Press Law enacted in June 1990, the ministry has taken the lead role in registering
independent newspapers, magazines, TV and radio stations, and information agencies throughout
the Russian Federation. The ministry has helped these media outlets overcome many of the
Communist old guard's obstacles (e.g., restrictions on paper supplies and printing facilities) that
were especially evident before the failed coup in August. These outlets, among them
Nezavisimaia gazeta, Rossiiskaia gazeta, and Russian TV, have pushed glasnost to new frontiers.
Michael Schneider
USIA
Deputy Associate Director,
Programs
United States Information Agency
301 4th St., S.W.
Washington, D.C., 20547
(202) 619-6048
2
A clear indication of Minister Poltoranin's reformist philosophy is his choice of the youthful
jurist Mikhail Fedotov as his deputy. Fedotov was one of the original drafters of the USSR
Press Law, as well as an author of an even more far-reaching draft Russian law on the mass
media. A tireless proponent of a free press, Fedotov asked in an interview earlier this year:
"Can the press be the 'Fourth Estate' when it is somebody's organ?"
USSR Ministry in Eclipse
While the Russian press ministry's star continues to rise, the all-union Ministry of Informa-
tion and the Press, headed by Mikhail Nenashev, is moribund. Since the abortive coup in
August, the ministry's status has been in doubt. The coup's failure precipitated a wholesale
shakeup of the Soviet governmental structure, chiefly because almost every USSR minister
openly or passively supported the coup plotters. (Minister Nenashev did not speak out against
the coup and probably was branded as too "passive.") One newspaper reported that all former
ministers were sent on vacation in September pending a decision on their future; no such
decision has yet been made.¹ Meanwhile, the functions of the USSR Ministry of Information
and the Press have increasingly been parceled out to the republics' ministries.
Russian Ministry Takes Charge After Failed Coup
Following the abortive putsch, Yeltsin issued a decree on August 22 establishing control over
all mass media in Russia and temporarily prohibiting Party publications (Pravda, Sovetskaia
Rossiia, et al.) from being issued on Russian territory because of their "active support for the
illegal actions" of the coup committee. Minister Poltoranin claimed that the closure of Party
papers was a "demonopolizing" step consistent with the USSR Press Law passed in June 1990
-- in particular a clause stipulating that no party or individual group may "monopolize" the
country's periodical press.² (Poltoranin asserted that similar legal clauses exist in France and
many other countries.)
¹Little has been heard from Minister Nenashev of late besides his surprising 11th-hour decision in early
September to cancel the Eighth Annual Moscow International Book Fair, scheduled for September 3-9.
Observers suggest that official publishers' fear of competition from the 100 or so independent publishers slated
to be at the fair led to its last-minute cancellation. (American publishers, many of whom had already arrived in
Moscow when word of cancellation came, reportedly plan to sue the fair's Soviet organizers for $6 million.)
Minister Nenashev's erstwhile first deputy, Dmitrii Mamleev, left even before the coup to become first deputy
chief editor of the newspaper Izvestiia.
²A draft RSFSR Law "On Mass Media," published in mid-1991, is more specific than the USSR Press Law
in its anti-monopoly provisions. Authored by Yurii Baturin, Mikhail Fedotov, and Vladimir Entin (the same trio
that wrote much of the USSR Press Law), the draft carries the union law further. For example, the union law
does forbid monopolistic control over the mass media, but the Russian draft spells out how to ensure this ban:
"The total annual print-run of periodicals owned by one person or one group cannot exceed 30 percent of the
annual print-run of all periodicals registered on the same territory." Also, while the union law prohibits censor-
ship, the draft Russian law eliminates all financing of any censorship agencies (e.g., Glavlit). (The Russian draft
reportedly is near completion and will soon be submitted for approval to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.)
3
Yeltsin's late-August decree allowed reinstatement of closed papers once they re-registered
with new founders, a procedure to be overseen by the Russian press ministry. But the
closures evoked sharp criticism from reformers and hardliners alike, including USSR
Confederation of Journalists' Unions Chairman Eduard Sagalaev, who complained that the
USSR Press Law and journalists' rights were being violated and recommended that the
shutdowns be rescinded and that only "guilty journalists" be dismissed.
On September 11, Yeltsin relented, issuing a decree "On Measures to Defend Freedom of the
Press in the RSFSR." This decree nullified his earlier one that temporarily closed certain
Party papers, and affirmed that they now had been re-registered with the RSFSR Ministry of
the Press and Mass Information as "independent publications." Yeltsin instructed the Russian
press ministry to "restore" [vosstanovit] the principle of freedom of the press and to punish
violators of the USSR Press Law.
Russia Seizes "Novosti"
Yeltsin's August 22 decree allowed Russia to take control of the "Novosti" Information
Agency, which he accused (along with TASS) of spreading "disinformation" during the coup
(accusations that both agencies denied). Press Minister Poltoranin took the lead, merging
"Novosti" with the Russian Information Agency [RIA] and appointing RIA's president,
Andrei Vinogradov, general director of the new agency, now called "RIA 'Novosti."
Taking over all rights and properties of the old "Novosti" Information Agency, the new
agency is subordinate to the Russian press ministry. The agency reportedly has already halted
publication of foreign-language propaganda materials. Poltoranin hints at plans to transform
"RIA "Novosti" into a shareholders' association, and supports similar reforms at the newly
independent TASS press agency; he wants competitive relations to develop between them.
New State Inspectorate to Defend Media
Yeltsin's September 11 decree also created a State Inspectorate to Defend Freedom of the
Press and Mass Media, to be attached to the Russian press ministry. The Inspectorate is
charged with monitoring existing USSR and RSFSR legislation on the press and mass
media.⁴ Inspectorate subdivisions are to be created in Russia's oblasts and autonomous
³The Russian Information Agency [RIA] was created by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in early 1991 as an
umbrella organization uniting such independent news agencies as "Postfaktum" and "Interfax." An indication of
Vinogradov's reformist credentials may be his recently stated willingness to rid his agency of the magazine
Soviet Life, for years published by "Novosti" in joint agreement with the U.S. Information Agency. "Perhaps I'm
mistaken, but today we [in Russia] shouldn't get into self-advertisement [samoreklama]. Let Russia be
advertised by the fullness, trustworthiness and energy [operativnost'] of [our] information We need to reflect
life as it is -- with democrats, monarchists, sexual [-persuasion] minorities -- in all its variety and contradiction."
4Especially since the failed coup, the Russian press ministry has demonstrated the willingness and ability to
decide the law's applicability within the Russian Federation. Violations of the law are thus not as likely to
escape attention and punishment as they were prior to the coup. For example, in a clear infringement on the
USSR Press Law, hardliner Vladimir Sevruk's June 1991 appointment (two months before the coup) as chief
4
regions. Finally, the decree gave the RSFSR Council of Ministers 10 days to adopt measures
to protect the publishing industry and the mass media during the transition to market
relations.
Ministry Butts Heads With Hardline Newspapers
Despite widespread approbation, the Russian press ministry is not without detractors. Its
harshest critics are hardline newspapers, many of which supported the coup (for which they
were temporarily shut down). On October 3, the press ministry sought to file suit in a
Moscow district court to close down Sovetskaia Rossiia (circ. 1.4 million), one of very few
mass-circulation central newspapers to emerge unreconstructed, unapologetic, and with the
same staff, after the failed coup. The ministry alleges that, in the past year, the paper
repeatedly violated Article 5 of the USSR Press Law, which prohibits using the press to call
for the violent overthrow of the state. The ministry's suit claimed that Sovetskaia Rossiia
issues published on August 20-21 were an "informational and ideological cloak" for the
abortive coup.6 The newspaper categorically denies the charges.
Deputy Russian press minister Fedotov later explained that his ministry sought to close down
the pre-coup Sovetskaia Rossiia, which was founded by the CPSU Central Committee and
registered with USSR Goskompechat. His ministry has no designs on the post-coup paper of
the same name, founded by the editorial board and registered with the Russian press ministry.
Fedotov planned similar suits against other newspapers formerly sponsored by the Communist
Party, including Pravda, so as to deprive the erstwhile sponsors of any juridical pretenses
against the reborn papers (most of which have retained their old names).
Also on October 3, the entire editorial staff of the hardline Russian nationalist newspaper
Den' (circ. 150,000) picketed the building of the Russian press ministry because of the latter's
refusal to re-register their paper after the coup.⁷ Claiming his was "now essentially the only
USSR Press Law, hardliner Vladimir Sevruk's June 1991 appointment (two months before the coup) as chief
editor of the weekly Nedelia took place without the knowledge of Izvestiia's editorial collegium (Nedelia's
legally registered founder). The USSR and Russian press ministries proved unable to oppose the process.
SThe Russian ministry's only reported conflict with the reformist press is brewing at this moment.
According to the Christian Science Monitor (October 31), Minister Poltoranin publicly warned the radical
newspapers Nezavisimaia gazeta and Moscow News that they violated the USSR Press Law by recently printing
articles reporting discussions within the Russian government over the possibility of nuclear conflict between
Russia and Ukraine. It remains unclear whether the newspapers will be punished.
°It was Sovetskaia Rossiia that, one month before the August coup, published the notorious "Word to the
People" [Slovo k narodu] -- a virtual call for a coup d'état. Before that, the paper printed Nina Andreeva's
infamous neo-Stalinist manifesto on March 13, 1988.
⁷According to Deputy Minister Fedotov, Den', which changed its masthead just before the coup attempt in
August from "Newspaper of the USSR Writers Union" to "Newspaper of the Spiritual Opposition" [Gazeta
Dukhovnoi Oppozitsii], violated the USSR Press Law twice. After Den' changed its legal founder from the
5
opposition newspaper," Den' Chief Editor Aleksandr Prokhanov (who co-authored the
insidious "Word to the People") warned: "If our demands are not met, then we will become a
dissident newspaper." Five days later, Deputy Minister Fedotov signed the paper's
registration certificate, but also fined it 300 rubles for printing an issue while still not
registered.
Political and Economic Challenges Loom
The Russian press ministry faces ongoing challenges and responsibilities. Among the imme-
diate tasks is "de-partyization," or elimination of the Communist Party's dominance over the
press. This process has economic and political repercussions. Traditionally, Party publica-
tions received at least 70 percent of total state subsidies to local newspapers, as well as state-
subsidized prices on over 70 percent of their paper purchases. The Russian press ministry
now refuses to sanction state financing and paper allotments for publications associated with
any political parties. The ministry promises instead to support publications created outside
the auspices of political parties. This is a clear blow to previously subsidized publications,
whose continued existence is now in question.⁸
The political side of de-partyization is more complicated. Yeltsin's post-coup decree shutting
down several central Communist Party newspapers ignited what some called a "witch-hunt"
throughout Russia for newspapers and individual journalists who supported coup plotters. In
Saratov, for example, local authorities shut down the oblast newspaper Kommunist and fired
journalists for publishing the coup committee's decrees. The same happened in neighboring
Volgograd oblast, although the local prosecutor's office there has declared the closure of
Party newspapers illegal. In Omsk, the staffs at the two main local newspapers removed their
editors after the coup collapsed (and new founders were registered for the papers), but the
Omsk city council organized a special commission to investigate the activities of all
journalists at the newspapers during the coup attempt.
Financial Hardship Bedevils Press
Probably the most intractable challenge confronting Russia's press is its economic viability.
The press, which has done so much to explain and popularize the transition to market rela-
tions, has ironically ended up suffering as a result of them. Skyrocketing paper, printing, and
postal costs threaten many periodicals with bankruptcy, even though subscription prices are at
USSR Writers Union to the Russian Writers Union, the paper was required to re-register with the Russian press
ministry. Despite lacking the necessary new registration document, the paper's editors printed one Den' anyway.
Fedotov also questioned whether Den' had violated Article 5 of the USSR Press Law.
⁸Just after the coup failed, the Russian press ministry offered a refund to those who wanted to cancel their
1991 subscriptions to any newspapers or magazines, a move aimed primarily at the Party press.
6
an all-time high.⁹ Declining readership and stiffer competition from thousands of new publi-
cations compound the press's problems. (Nearly half of the 8,000 newspapers, magazines,
and bulletins now registered in the Soviet Union have been founded since passage of the
USSR Press Law in June 1990.) Renewals of subscriptions to central newspapers for 1992
are sharply down from 1991 totals, continuing a recent trend.
"Economic independence" is the watchword of the day. The USSR Confederation of Journal-
ists' Unions, headed by Eduard Sagalaev, convened in September in Moscow to review the
"lessons of the [August] putsch." Participants in the meeting agreed that the mass media must
not again be "prisoners of the situation." One speaker noted that "there's no freedom without
money" [svoboda bez deneg ne byvaet]. The journalists decided to create a commercial bank
with brokers' offices at the commodities exchange [birzha] for paper and printing services.
(Not surprisingly, some observers fear this commercialization of the press. Independent news
agency "Interfax" Chief Director Mikhail Komissar recently warned that large exchanges,
banks, and various export enterprises in Russia are simply trying to buy the press -- to the
detriment of media independence and objectivity.)
Perhaps only as a formality, the journalists also adopted an appeal to USSR President
Gorbachev, requesting him to take measures to ensure the very existence of the press. Such
measures might presumably include maintaining fixed prices for newsprint, although steps in
this direction have proved fruitless thus far. Newsprint costs roughly 1,000 rubles per ton at
the official, state-controlled price and 8,000-10,000 rubles at the free-market price. This
discrepancy discourages many newspapers from going totally independent, lest they be forced
to pay free-market prices. Union authorities may also adjust their "state order" [goszakaz], or
output quota that they demand from paper manufacturers, either raising it to ensure that more
paper is distributed in controlled fashion, or reducing it to allow more paper to float on the
free market, available to the highest bidder.¹⁰ The August coup's failure may help matters
by freeing up paper previously earmarked for Party press quotas. Most important, however,
administrative measures to protect the press sharply contradict economic reforms even
Gorbachev claims to favor -- rapid privatization and free-market pricing.
The USSR Ministry of Communications: Glasnost Profiteer?
The Russian press ministry's objective of a free press is handicapped by the USSR Ministry
of Communications, which monopolizes postal services in the country. Fully 90 percent of
9In August, the RSFSR Union of Journalists organized a protest against the economic "noose" [udavka]
threatening them. Because of drastic increases in the costs of paper and postal delivery services, some 34,000
journalists and 78,000 editorial staffers reportedly are on the verge of "unemployment and poverty."
¹⁰Given the economic anarchy and barter relations now rampant in the USSR, the central authorities'
manipulation of plans, quotas and prices may be increasingly irrelevant. For more on the Soviet newsprint-
making industry, see The Soviet Paper Chase: Newsprint Crisis Imperils Glasnost, USIA Research
Memorandum (M-63-91), April 29, 1991.
7
all Soviet newspapers and magazines are distributed by subscription through the mail service
under the communications ministry's auspices. In July 1991, the ministry boosted postal rates
for delivery of all newspapers and magazines in 1992 by four to five times, pushing some of
the press, especially local newspapers, to the brink of financial ruin. At the same time, the
ministry has not raised employee salaries despite the windfall (although it did give them
Sundays off).
In its defense, the communications ministry cites lack of state support in the face of rising
input costs. Its own fleet of mail cars is decrepit. To deliver all the mail, the ministry must
now find and rent autos (including taxi fleets controlled by local mafias and cooperatives) and
pay higher prices for increasingly scarce fuel. Rates for air transport (vital for mail delivery
to the Russian North and Far East) were raised by five to eight times in January 1991 by the
USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation. Local city councils have hiked commercial rents for
premises used by the communications ministry for postal operations. To make ends meet, the
ministry claims, it has become hugely indebted to Soviet banks.
In late September, the RSFSR Council of Ministers issued a decree transferring all USSR
Ministry of Communications enterprises and organizations located on Russian territory to
Russian jurisdiction, but it is too early to judge the results of this change.
Reverberations Beyond Russia
To a degree, Russia's success in seizing control of its own economic affairs comes at the
expense of other present (and former) Soviet republics. The Russian Federation manufactures
nearly 100 percent of all Soviet newsprint. In recent weeks, Ukraine has suffered a grave
"paper famine." One by one, Ukrainian newspapers are ceasing publication because they lack
newsprint. According to one report, the Russian paper mill that supplies most of Ukraine's
newsprint will agree to supply only 60 percent of paper needs at state-set prices; the rest must
be purchased at high free-market prices or bartered for with food.
Some areas of Ukraine (Khar'kov oblast, for example) plan to curtail publication of central
newspapers and channel scarce resources to print only Ukrainian newspapers. Citing paper
shortages, Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, and the newly independent Baltic states are following
suit in shortchanging central newspapers -- some of which are among the most progressive in
the USSR -- to concentrate on issuing their own publications. Individual Soviet republics are
increasingly insulating themselves from centrally directed information structures. 11
"Other republics have followed Russia's lead in taking local media under their own purview. In September,
for example, Kazakh President Nazarbaev liquidated his republic's Goskompechat', Gosteleradio, and Glavlit.
They now are administered by a newly created republic Ministry of the Press and Mass Information. The
reorganization is designed to "ensure the informational independence" of Kazakhstan and provide state support
for newspapers and magazines, TV and radio, and book publishing, all of which have suffered financial losses in
the transition to market relations.
8
Outlook
"Today we are already close to the time when we'll be able to say: Freedom of
speech has arrived and glasnost, thank God, devised by Gorbachev and his team of
partocrats as a publicity stunt to begin perestroika, is on the way out."
-- Pavel Gusev, Chief Editor of Moskovskii komsomolets and
Chairman, Moscow Journalists' Organization
The Russian Ministry of the Press and Mass Media is the bastion of the democratic press in
Russia. Under Poltoranin's leadership, the ministry continues efforts to demonopolize and
privatize the press, liberating it from decades of Communist Party domination. At the same
time, Poltoranin warns that financial constraints will hamper developments for the time being.
Print-runs of Russian publications will not increase, largely because of the high cost of paper
and the republic's increasingly rich media environment. While small district [raionnye]
newspapers may not survive, long-term prospects are favorable for regional [regional' nye]
publications in Russia, of which there are now about 40. Publications will compete more and
more with one another for readers' loyalties. Poltoranin is sanguine: "Some publications will
die off, others will arise: this is the market, this is very good business."
Prepared by:
Scott Righetti (R/SU), (202) 619-5132
M-185-91
Approved by:
Ronald H. Hinckley, Director of Research
The T Backgrounder
Herîtage Foundation
869
No.
The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002-4999 (202) 546-4400
November 27, 1991
BORIS YELTSIN'S FIRST 100 DAYS
INTRODUCTION
Russian President Boris Yeltsin's one-hundredth day in office since the failed
communist coup of August 19-21 will be November 29. Although Yeltsin was
elected President of Russia on June 13, 1991, his position largely was symbolic
until after the coup. Before that time his powers had been severely limited by the
communist bureaucracy led by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. As a result,
Yeltsin's presidency did not really begin until August 21, 1991, the day on which
the hardline coup was defeated and Yeltsin, who played the key role in thwarting
the coup, emerged as the most powerful and most popular man in Russia.
Yeltsin's first hundred days in office are important. What the Russian President
does then will set the course for the remainder of his five-year term as president.
Yeltsin's policy decisions during this time also will shape the character of the
world's largest country for years, if not decades, to come. In this respect, Yeltsin's
first hundred days in power may be even more critical for Russia than were those
of Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan for the United States. Russia
is at a crossroads in its history, and the actions of Yeltsin may very well decide
whether the new Russia will emerge as a free market democracy or a dictatorship.
Radical Reforms. Since the August coup Yeltsin has made major policy
decisions. He has launched a radical program of free market reform. He has
strengthened democracy in Russia by neutralizing the three key institutions of the
Soviet totalitarian state: the Communist Party, the KGB secret police, and the
armed forces. And he has begun to change the direction of Soviet foreign policy
in such areas as relations with Afghanistan, Cuba, and Japan. All of this was done
to advance the declared goal of the Yeltsin administration: the creation of a
democratic and prosperous Russia committed to political freedom, free markets,
and friendly relations with its neighbors.
Note: Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt
to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
At the same time, Yeltsin and his aides have made some incautious statements
that unsettled the newly-independent republics and revived in the minds of their
leaders the image of the old imperial Russia. Likewise, the Russian President's
use of force in November to solve the nationalist crisis in the Checheno-Ingush
Autonomous Republic, located in southeastern Russia, further heightened the
republics' wariness of Russia.
As it evaluates the beginning of the Yeltsin administration, the U.S. should as-
sume the position of a true, but by no means uncritical, friend. After three years
of diplomatically, politically and economically snubbing Yeltsin and Russia in
favor of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union, the U.S. should demonstrate its support
for Yeltsin and his long-overdue political and economic reforms. George Bush
could do this by giving Yeltsin greater diplomatic recognition and publicly sup-
porting his free market and democratic reforms while reserving the right to
criticize him in private when necessary.
Bush should:
Invite Yeltsin to make his first official state visit to the U.S. Yeltsin has
made two visits to America. He came as a private citizen in September 1989. He
was invited in June 1991 by the Senate Majority and Minority leaders, George
Mitchell, the Maine Democrat, and Robert Dole, the Republican from Kansas. An
invitation by Bush would signal U.S. recognition of Russia's growing inde-
pendence, demonstrate U.S. approval of Yeltsin's free market and democratic
policies, and boost the Russian President's image at home.
Urge Congress to invite Yeltsin to address a joint session of Congress.
This would underscore to Russia and the world that not only the U.S. government
but the American people support the revolutionary changes spearheaded by
Yeltsin.
Create a U.S-Russian Consultative Commission on Arms Control.
This would involve the Russian government directly in negotiations on such key
arms control agreements as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. As Russia gains
control over most of the military potential of the former U.S.S.R., arms negotia-
tions should be conducted directly with Russia.
Open direct negotiations with Russia on economic, trade, and cultural
cooperation. As the power of the Soviet central government diminishes, political
and economic agreements will have to be negotiated directly with the former
Soviet republics. Russia, which is the largest, most powerful, and most populous
of these republics, is the logical place for the U.S. to begin such negotiations.
Establish a U.S. consulate in Moscow accredited to Russia. This is
necessary to accommodate the rapidly increasing volume of direct U.S.-Russian
diplomatic contacts and to signal the recognition of Russia's growing inde-
pendence.
2
THE AUGUST REVOLUTION
THE AUGUST REVOLUTION IN
Anter the defeat of the
MOSCOW: A SELECTED
hardline communist coup on
CHRONOLOGY
August 21, the most urgent
task before Yeltsin was to
June 13: Boris Yeltsin is elected president of
take control of the Soviet
the Russian Republic.
state bureaucracy. Especial-
August 21: Hard-line communist coup is de-
ly critical for the success of
feated as demonstrators surround the Russian
an anti-communist revolu-
Parliament building to prevent Yeltsin's capture
tion was neutralizing the
by troops loyal to the coup plotters.
three pillars of Soviet
August 22: Yeltsin issues a decree forbidding
totalitarianism: the Com-
political activity in the armed forces.
munist Party, the KGB and
August 23: Yeltsin suspends the activities of
the armed forces.
the Communist Party of Russia, and publication
of the Party-directed newspapers Pravda,
Dismantling the Party.
Sovetskaya Rossia, Glasnost, Rabochaya Tri-
Yeltsin signed a decree on
buna, Moskovskaya Pravda and Leninskoye Zna-
August 23 suspending the
mia. Mikhail Gorbachev appoints Vadim
activities of the Communist
Bakatin as the Chairman of the KGB. Air Force
Party of Russia. The next
chief Colonel-General Evgeny Shaposhnikov is
day, under pressure from
appointed Minister of Defense of the USSR.
Yeltsin, Gorbachev resigned
August 24: Gorbachev resigns as General Sec-
his position as the General
retary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Secretary of the Communist
Union, and issues a decree ordering that Party
Party of the Soviet Union
property be turned over to the local govern-
and issued a decree ordering
ments. Yeltsin transfers the Party's archives to
the property of the Party to
the jurisdiction of the Russian Soviet Federative
be turned over to the local
Socialist Republic (RSFR). Bakatin removes the
elected bodies in each
KGB from control of the government's commu-
republic. On the same day
nications lines. KGB archives are transfered to
Yeltsin transferred the Com-
RSFR jurisdiction. Yeltsin takes control of the
munist Party's archives to
U.S.S.R.'s economic ministries and agencies.
the jurisdiction of the Rus-
August 26: Gorbachev transfers the 250,000-
sian government, and
strong KGB border troops to the Soviet Army.
suspended major Party-
August 29: The Congress of People's Deputies
directed newspapers, includ-
suspends activities of the Communist Party on
ing Pravda, Sovetskaya Ros-
the entire territory of the Soviet Union,
sia, Glasnost, Rabochaya
September 5: The Congress of People's Depu-
Tribuna, Moskovskaya Prav-
ties votes to dissolve itself.
da, and Leninskoye
September 24: Bakatin disbands the KGB
Znamia. 1 Finally, on August
department responsible for spying on the
Soviet population.
Heritage InfoChart
1
Yeltsin rescinded the suspension decree on September 10, after all of these newspapers formally severed their
ties with the Communist Party. All six newspapers have since resumed publication.
3
29, the Congress of People's Deputies of the U.S.S.R. suspended activities of the
Communist Party throughout the Soviet Union.
Yeltsin's decrees suspending the Communist Party and its publications were
justified. The reason: the Communist Party was not a voluntary political associa-
tion in a Western sense, but the most powerful and effective tool of political con-
trol employed by the Soviet totalitarian state. Within two weeks of the abortive
coup, the Communist Party collapsed as an effective political force. It was
deprived of state funding and its control over the economy, police, and the armed
forces was ended. Although various leftist groups, such as the All-Russian Com-
munist Party of the Bolsheviks, were formed in all of the republics to replace the
discredited Communist Party, they now no longer represent a monolithic political
force directed from a single center.
Taming the KGB. Gorbachev on August 23 appointed Vadim Bakatin, a
former Soviet pro-reform official, as the Chairman of the KGB, replacing
Vladimir Kruchkov, a hardliner arrested for his role in the coup. Bakatin had
served as Gorbachev's Minister of Internal Affairs from October 1988 to Novem-
ber 1990, but he was dismissed by Gorbachev because of pressure from com-
munist hardliners. The day after his appointment, Bakatin ordered the KGB to
relinquish control of government communication networks. On the same day, the
KGB archives were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Russian government.
Gorbachev announced on August 26 the transfer of the 250,000-strong KGB
border guard to the Soviet Army. A month later, on September 24, Bakatin dis-
banded the infamous KGB "Department for the Preservation of Constitutional
Order," responsible for spying on Soviet citizens.
Drawing in the Reins on the Armed Forces. Moving quickly after the failed
coup, Yeltsin issued a decree on August 22 forbidding political activity in the
armed forces. The reason: to eliminate the Party's control over the military. The
next day, Gorbachev appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force,
Colonel General Evgeny Shaposhnikov, as the Minister of Defense of the
U.S.S.R. He replaced hardliner General Mikhail Moiseev whom Gorbachev had
appointed only the day before. Yeltsin overruled Gorbachev's choice for this criti-
cal post and forced the weakened Soviet president to pick his candidate, Shaposh-
nikov.
Shaposhnikov had refused to support the coup. He called Yeltsin during the
coup to tell him that he would not allow the Air Force to be used against the
defenders of the "White House," as the Russian Parliament building is known.
Gorbachev appointed the former Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Airborne
Troops, Colonel General Pavel Grachev, as Deputy Defense Minister also be-
cause of his opposition to the coup.
Two days after his appointment, Shaposhnikov announced his intention to
replace 80 percent of the Collegium, the Defense Ministry's highest consultative
body, which is roughly equivalent to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The majority
of the Collegium were hardline communist generals. By September 16, according
4
to Soviet press agency TASS, nine of the seventeen members of the Collegium
had been ousted.
Seizing Control of the State Ministries and the Media. Yeltsin on August 24
took control of most of the Soviet Union's economic ministries and agencies.
These included the Ministry of Economy and Forecasting, the Ministry of
Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Trade, and
the State Bank. Two days later, Yeltsin consolidated his hold on these institutions
by appointing members of his cabinet to administer them.
Yeltsin took charge not only of Soviet economic ministries, but of the Soviet
media. The editor of the pro-reform Moscow News, Egor Yakovlev, was ap-
pointed Chairman of the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Com-
mittee on August 27, replacing the communist hardliner Leonid Kravchenko. The
committee controls all Soviet TV and radio stations.
Under Yeltsin's pressure, Gorbachev also ordered personnel changes at the
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He fired Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexandr
Bessmertnykh on August 28 because of his "passivity" during the coup and
replaced him with Boris Pankin, the Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, who
had publicly denounced the coup on Czech television. Pankin promised a "serious
reorganization" of Soviet embassies abroad. Pankin announced on September 17
that the KGB staff in the embassies would be reduced "to the lowest possible min-
imum required by our security interests. KGB personnel previously had made
up an estimated 35 percent of Soviet Embassy staffers. Foreign Minister Pankin
was replaced by former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on November 19.
Finally, on September 5, Yeltsin abolished the last key hardline institution of
the Soviet Union, the U.S.S.R. Congress of People's Deputies, which was the
Soviet Union's highest representative body. Established in 1989, when the Com-
munist Party still maintained a stranglehold on Soviet politics, most of the
Congress's Deputies were approved by the Party. The resulting reactionary
majority of the Congress was one of the major obstacles to radical political and
economic reforms in the Soviet Union. After three days of heated debates, the
Congress, in effect, abolished itself by voting to transfer supreme power in the
Soviet Union to a revamped Supreme Soviet whose members would be elected by
the republics.
FORGING A NEW FOREIGN POLICY
Although Yeltsin has given higher priority to domestic affairs, he has launched
several foreign policy initiatives that differ significantly from the pre-coup Soviet
foreign policy of Gorbachev.
2 Report on the U.S.S.R., September 27, 1991, p. 32.
5
Afghanistan. Long before the August coup, Yeltsin and his camp were critical
of Soviet military and economic support for the communist regime of Afghan dic-
tator Najibullah. Subsidizing communism in Afghanistan is estimated by the U.S.
to cost the Soviet Union roughly $300 million per month. Largely because of
Yeltsin's opposition to aid to Afghanistan, the Soviet Union in September tem-
porarily stopped the shipment of weapons, food and fuel to Afghanistan. While
Moscow did not promise to withhold aid permanently, the suspension of supplies
may have facilitated the September 13 joint U.S-Soviet statement pledging to end
Soviet and U.S. military assistance to Afghan clients by January 1, 1992. This
joint statement, announced by Secretary of State James Baker and Foreign Mini-
ster Pankin in Moscow, will not by itself bring peace to Afghanistan-there still
is no mechanism in place for the transfer of power from the Najibullah dictator-
ship to a successor democratic government-but it is a step in the right direction.
One reason for optimism in Afghanistan has been the favorable reaction of the
moderate wing of the Afghan anti-communist resistance to the Soviet initiative. A
delegation of moderate mujahideen Freedom Fighters met in Moscow with the
Vice President of Russia, Alexandr Rutskoy, on November 11 to discuss a politi-
cal solution to the thirteen-year-old war in Afghanistan. Rutskoy, who served as a
fighter pilot during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, told the Afghans that it
was "the standpoint of Russian President Boris Yeltsin" to "take all measures to
bring about peace to the long-suffering land of Afghanistan. ,,3 The moderate
mujahideen delegation was received on November 12 by Pankin, who suggested
that a permanent Soviet diplomatic delegation be stationed in Peshawar, Pakistan,
to continue the dialogue.
Cuba. Speaking to an American audience during a joint television appearance
with Gorbachev on September 6, Yeltsin stated that Soviet "troops should be
gradually withdrawn from Cuba.' A week later, on September 11, Gorbachev
followed up by promising to begin negotiations with Havana on the withdrawal
of 11,000 Soviet troops from Cuba. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Valery
Nikolayev was dispatched to Havana on September 19 to begin the talks.
The Kurile Islands. The Kurile Islands are a chain of small islands in the Sea
of Okhotsk. The Soviet Union illegally seized four of them, known in Japan as the
"Northern Territories," from Japan at the end of World War II. Japanese outrage
over the Soviet occupation of the Kuriles has been the major obstacle to the im-
provement of Soviet-Japanese relations. Hoping to reverse the decades of
Japanese-Russian animosity, then acting Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Rus-
sia, Ruslan Khazbulatov, said on September 9 during a visit to Tokyo that Yeltsin
"does not want the problem [of the Kurile Islands] to drag on. ,,5 Two days later,
3
RFE/RL Daily Report, November 13, 1991, p. 3.
4
The New York Times, September 7, 1991.
5
The Washington Post, September 10, 1991.
6
Yeltsin stated on Russian television that the islands should be returned quickly
and not in "fifteen to twenty years."
RELATIONS WITH OTHER REPUBLICS
The Second Russian Revolution of August 1991 transformed relations between
the Yeltsin government and the other republics of the former Soviet Union. As a
result of the sudden collapse of the Gorbachev-led central government in the after-
math of the coup, Russia inherited most of the military resources and police of the
Soviet Union, including the huge nuclear arsenal, the 3.5 million armed forces,
and the KGB. Yeltsin's image in the eyes of the non-Russian peoples of the
U.S.S.R. quickly was transformed from that of a trusted comrade-in-arms in the
struggle against the imperial communist "center" to a ruler of a reemergent Rus-
sian state, which for centuries was an expanding imperial power that menaced its
neighbors. This called for an especially sensitive treatment of the other republics,
the sort of sensitivity Yeltsin had displayed while he was in opposition to Gor-
bachev prior to the coup.
Such sensitivity, however, was lacking. In the exhilaration of victory after the
defeat of the communist coup, the Yeltsin camp did not demonstrate the necessary
statesmanship and foresight in conducting relations with the newly-independent
republics. For example, Yeltsin's Press Secretary, Pavel Voshchanov, stated on
August 26 that Russia intended to raise "frontier issues" with the republics of
Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. 6 Voshchanov used
the term "frontier issues" as a code phrase for redrawing the U.S.S.R.'s internal
borders between the republics.
Exacerbating Anxieties. Gavriil Popov, the mayor of Moscow and one of
Yeltsin's closest allies, further exacerbated anxieties in the neighboring republics
when he proclaimed in an August 27 interview on Soviet television that the recent
declarations of independence by the republics were illegal. Popov insisted that if
the republics intended to secede, the question of borders would have to be dis-
cussed. 7 In this respect, Popov specifically referred to the Ukrainian territories of
Crimea, 8 the Odessa area on the Black Sea, and the Dniester region in the south-
west. Finally, also on August 27, in his talks with President Nursultan Nazar-
bayev of Kazakhstan, Yeltsin reiterated Russia's claim that it may have to redraw
its borders with other republics.
6 Yeltsin was reportedly furious that Ukraine declared independence on August 24 without consulting him first.
He was also alarmed by Ukraine's intention to assume control over Soviet military assets on the Ukrainian
territory, including the Black Sea Fleet.
7
In addition to Ukraine, Popov probably was referring to Byelorussia and Moldavia, which declared
independence on August 25 and August 27 respectively.
8
The Crimean peninsula was part of Russia until 1954 when it was transferred by the Kremlin to Ukraine.
7
These statements from Moscow caused alarm and anxiety in the other
republics. Most of the internal Soviet borders between the republics were arbitrari-
ly drawn by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. This was the case, for example, with the
Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia, and
Uzbekistan. To call for the renegotiation of these borders, therefore, was to
threaten to open a Pandora's box of
territorial claims and counter-
claims which quickly could esca-
late into violent confrontations.
1991 RUSSIAN REPUBLIC
Worse yet, the statements by
STATISTICS
Yeltsin, his aides and allies,
seemed to fit the stereotype of Rus-
Official Name: Russian Soviet Feder-
sian imperialism, which for cen-
ative Socialist Republic
turies drove Moscow continuously
to "adjust" Russia's borders at its
Capital: Moscow
neighbors' expense.
Head of State: President Boris Yeltsin
Independence-Minded Uk-
Head of Government: same
raine. The greatest damage was
Area: 6,591,100 square miles, nearly
done to Russia's relations with Uk-
twice as large as the U.S.
raine, after Russia, the second most
Natural Resources: huge deposits of
populous of the former Soviet
coal (50% of world's reserves), oil, nat-
republics. Ukraine has a huge eth-
ural gas, iron ore, gold (20% of world's
nic Russian minority of 11.3 mil-
deposits), diamonds, copper, silver, tim-
lion, or roughly 22 percent of
ber (20% of world's supply), uranium,
among other raw materials.
Ukraine's total population. Thus,
Yeltsin has a keen interest in seeing
Population: 147,386,000; annual
Ukraine remain friendly and as-
growth: 1.5% (1989)
sociated with Russia in some
Ethnic Groups: Russian: 82.6%,
capacity. The Ukrainians, however,
Tatar: 3.6%, Ukrainian: 2.7%,
seem bent on independence and
Chuvash: 1.2%, Dagestani:1.0%,
they fear Russian designs on Uk-
Bashkirs: 0.9%, others: 8.0%. (1989)
raine. A Ukrainian Deputy to the
Source: Deutsche Bank, The Soviet Union at
All-Union Supreme Soviet, Serhiy
the Crossroads, 1990; and from other sources,
Ryabchenko, accused Russia on
August 27 of "recreating imperial
Herltage InfoChart
structures, but under different
names," and he demanded that the Russian leadership retract the statement about
redrawing borders. 9 On the same day, the leading democratic nationalist organiza-
tion of Ukraine, Rukh, issued a statement deploring the "high-handed rejection"
of Ukrainian independence by "certain newly democratized leaders of Russia."
Rukh also accused Russia of harboring "imperial aspirations regarding one's
9
Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine and Russia: Before and after the Coup," Report on the USSR, September 27, 1991,
p. 16.
8
,,10
neighbors.
The Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Leonid Kravchuk,
warned on August 27, that "territorial claims [were] very dangerous. ,,11
Fence-Mending in Kiev. Confronted with a brewing storm, the Russian leader-
ship belatedly launched a campaign to control the political damage caused by the
statements on revising borders. On August 28, Vice President Alexandr Rutskoy,
State Counsellor Sergei Stankevich and Leningrad mayor Anatoly Sobchak were
dispatched by Yeltsin to Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, to mend fences. They were
met by huge crowds of angry protestors. The Russian delegation in Kiev did its
best to defuse the border issue by confirming, in the official communique, the
"territorial integrity" of Ukraine. Sobchak called Voshchanov's August 26 state-
ment on the "frontier issue" a "mistake" and "unfortunate," while Stankevich ar-
gued that the statement had no official force and that Yeltsin was not speaking for
12
the Russian parliament.
A month later, Yeltsin tried to restore his reputation as an ally of the republics
by arranging, together with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev, peace talks
between the Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, which effectively have been
at war for over two years. Thanks to Yeltsin's mediating efforts, Armenian Presi-
dent Levon Ter-Petrosian and Azerbaijani leader Ayaz Mutalibov met in the
southern Russian town of Zheleznovodsk on September 23. At that meeting the
Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders signed a "preliminary" agreement on the condi-
tions for settling the conflict. Only the day before, Yeltsin had traveled to the dis-
puted Nagorno-Karabakh region in Western Azerbaijan, where most of the fight-
ing between Armenia and Azerbaijan was taking place, to broker a deal between
the two republics. This trip broke the deadlock in the Armenia-Azerbaijan con-
flict, paving the way for the Zheleznovodsk agreement the next day.
YELTSIN'S LOSS OF MOMENTUM
The Yeltsin-led democratic revolution began to lose momentum in the latter
part of September. On September 24 Yeltsin left Moscow for a two-week vaca-
tion at the Black Sea resort of Sochi. This vacation was extremely ill-timed: not
only did Yeltsin's absence from Moscow slow the process of revolutionary
change, but the Russian President failed to indicate to his top aides who would be
left in charge. Vice President Rutskoy later claimed that he had tried to telephone
Yeltsin twelve times during his vacation but did not succeed in getting through to
him.
Predictably, the blurred lines of authority and the lack of direction from the top
soon produced open political infighting within Yeltsin's team, and his top
lieutenants resorted to public recriminations. The acting Chairman of the Supreme
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., p. 17.
9
Soviet of Russia, Ruslan Khazbulatov, for example, on October 5 accused State
Secretary Gennady Burbulis and State Counselor Sergei Shakhrai of incom-
petence and demanded that they resign. 13 On October 10, Vice President Rutskoy
lambasted the chief of the Russian KGB. Viktor Ivanenko, calling him "lazy," "in-
competent," and "a danger to the state. 14 State Counselor Sergei Stankevich was
quoted on October 2 by The Philadelphia Inquirer as saying that he was
frustrated with Yeltsin's inability to organize the Russian government and was
prepared to resign.
Yeltsin's ill-timed vacation also damaged his personal authority. It was
rumored that he was working on a book about the August 19-August 21 coup for
a Western publisher. Whether or not the rumor is true, the perception began to
spread in Russia that fame abroad was more important to Yeltsin than the plight
of his nation. Russian Supreme Soviet Deputy Anatoly Greshnevikov said in the
October 11 Washington Post that, while Yeltsin's book undoubtedly was an inter-
esting one, it "was not what people expected from him" at the time.
Although Yeltsin's reputation suffered, the most damaging result of his absence
from Moscow was the loss of revolutionary momentum. At a time when Russia
faced its most difficult political and economic choices since the abdication of the
Tzar in 1917, Yeltsin's puzzling lapse in leadership left a disquieting sense of
drift and indecisiveness.
YELTSIN'S ECONOMIC REFORM
When he returned from Sochi on October 10, Yeltsin badly needed to make up
for-lost time and to get Russia moving again. He accomplished this with his his-
toric October 28 address to the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, in which
he outlined a program for radical free market reform. The key planks of Yeltsin's
reform included:
Price Liberalization
Yeltsin calls the "unfreezing of prices" the "most painful measure" the Russian
people will have to undergo. Nevertheless, he insists that without price liberaliza-
tion "all the talk about reforms and market are empty blabber. ,,15
Says Yeltsin:
"No government bureaucrat can invent prices that are more just [than ones
created by market]. The experience ,,16 of world civilization shows that only the
market can solve this problem.
13 RFE/RL Daily Report, October 7, 1991, p. 2.
14 RFE/RL Daily Report, October 11, 1991, p. 2.
15 TASS, October 28, 1991. All quotations in this section are from this source.
16 Yeltsin's top advisor on economic reform, Egor Gaidar, later stipulated that the government will continue to
"regulate" prices of bread, milk and salt (Pravda, November 11, 1991).
10
Privatization
The Russian President emphasizes "small-scale" privatization as a key element
of his program. State-owned small and medium enterprises involved in services,
trade, industry, and transportation will be privatized. Yeltsin insists that there is "a
real possibility" to privatize up to 10,000 such enterprises, or 50 percent of the
total number in Russia, within three months. Once the process begins, Yeltsin
promises that a law will be passed to assure that privatization of individual
enterprises takes no longer than five days. The state agencies in whose jurisdic-
tion enterprises are located will be ordered to lease them to their workers. If the
workers refuse to lease them, the enterprises will be auctioned to the public.
Privatization of large industrial enterprises will take longer. In the next several
months shares of large-scale enterprises will be divided between the state and the
workers. The state's shares then will be sold to anyone wishing to buy them at the
market price. Adds Yeltsin: "The main thing is a quick separation of [large]
enterprises from the state."
Private Farming
Although Russia already has nearly 30,000 "personally owned" farms, Russian
agriculture continues to be dominated by state-owned or state-subsidized collec-
tive farms. Even when private farming was legally permitted in 1989, the com-
munist authorities in the countryside discriminated against private farmers, deny-
ing them adequate land and equipment. Yeltsin hopes to change this with his
agricultural privatization program. Yeltsin has earmarked 6.5 billion rubles for the
purchase of tractors, trucks, and other machinery for farmers in the next few
months. During the same period, Russia will buy $100 million worth of agricul-
tural equipment from abroad. The Yeltsin program requires the "transfer" of land
belonging to unprofitable collective farms to local peasants or anyone else willing
to work the land. Finally, Yeltsin promises to introduce legislation in the Russian
Supreme Soviet to allow the buying and selling of land-a measure that a
majority of Russian legislators so far has rejected.
State Budget Reductions
Yeltsin plans to cut the budgets of unprofitable state enterprises and govern-
ment bureaucracies. Russia stopped financing up to 70 Soviet ministries and agen-
cies on November 1. In addition, Yeltsin will terminate the Russian contribution
to "all aid and credits" made by the Soviet Union to foreign countries. The Rus-
sian President also calls upon the Russian parliament to refrain from approving ex-
penditures for which "there are no real sources of financing." All these measures
are designed to eliminate the budget deficit by the end of 1992 and to lower the
rate of inflation, which is now estimated to be 2 percent to 3 percent a week.
Banking Reform and Creating a Viable Currency
Yeltsin promises soon to prepare a "packet of measures" to curb the "uncon-
trolled emission of banknotes and credits" that cause hyperinflation. Unless Rus-
sia and the former Soviet republics reach an agreement on establishing a new in-
terstate bank, Yeltsin warns that Russia will establish its own control over the
11
printing of rubles and even may create a new Russian currency. His plan also in-
cludes creating a Russian hard currency reserve to strengthen the ruble.
On November 16 and 17, Yeltsin began to take steps toward creating a convert-
ible ruble that can be exchanged for foreign "hard" currencies. He issued a set of
presidential decrees lifting state control over hard currency transactions, allowing
the value of ruble to be set by the market, rather than by the government. Both
enterprises and private citizens inside Russia will be able to buy and sell rubles
for hard currency. The decree takes effect on January 1, 1992.
Help for the Disadvantaged
According to Yeltsin, 55 percent of families in Russia live below the official
poverty line. While a year ago this was 120 rubles a month, it is close to 200
rubles today. Rather than mandating that salaries be raised to keep up with infla-
tion-a process called wage indexation-Yeltsin in his October 28 program
proposes instead to create a system of "social protection" for the poor through
food stamps, soup kitchens, and access to subsidized goods. At the same time,
Yeltsin admits that the Russian government will not be able "to protect everyone"
and claims "the development of business" and the creation of new jobs are the
keys to raising the standard of living. He says: "The main condition for the social
protection of the population lies not so much in redistribution of what we have
but in the speediest revival of production. It is on this road that we will find the
salvation of the economy of Russia."
Relations with other Republics
Trying to repair the political damage caused by his statements about revising
borders, Yeltsin goes out of his way in the October 28 program to allay the fears
of Russia's neighbors. In the preamble to the program, he states that "the reforms
in Russia paved the way to a democracy not an empire" and that "Russia would
not allow an emergence of another center that would stand over the sovereign
states."
Yeltsin also insists that Russia will introduce its own banking system and cur-
rency only if it fails to secure an agreement with the other republics on a "com-
mon ruble zone," which would make the ruble the dominant currency throughout
the former U.S.S.R. The Russian President is equally circumspect on another sen-
sitive political issue: the creation of Russian armed forces. Yeltsin says he prefers
a "united armed forces of the commonwealth of the sovereign states under a
single command." Russia would establish its own armed forces only if other
republics proceeded with the creation of national armies. Adds Yeltsin: "This,
however, is not our choice."
Likewise, in his discussion of the status of ethnic Russians living in other
republics, Yeltsin carefully avoids mentioning the need for "frontier adjustments,"
which earlier alarmed the republics bordering on Russia, especially Ukraine and
Kazakhstan. Instead, the President claims he prefers to protect the Russian
minorities in other republics by negotiating with them. Says Yeltsin: "We have an
adequate opportunity to solve these problems on a legal, democratic basis."
12
Claiming that the depth of the crisis called for urgent measures, Yeltsin in his
October 28 address requested that the Russian Supreme Soviet grant him emer-
gency powers to reform the economy. He also asked that he be allowed to serve
as his own prime minister, which would make him not only head of state, but in
charge of the government. Rather than a grab for personal power, this should be
interpreted as a willingness on Yeltsin's part to assume full responsibility for his
program. This is a sign not of authoritarianism, but of political courage. The Rus-
sian legislature on November 1 granted his request by an overwhelming margin.
Except for the November 16 and 17 decrees on currency reforms, the October
28 program remains a plan only, awaiting concrete laws and decrees. Yeltsin will
probably begin taking such steps on January 1, 1992. Although not much has hap-
pened yet, the October 28 program still is a bold plan. After five and a half years
of Gorbachev's half-measures it gives Russians a sense of direction and is build-
ing the confidence of the fledgling Russian private sector.
THE NATIONALITY CHALLENGE TO YELTSIN
Along with the economic crisis, a major challenge to Yeltsin and nascent Rus-
sian democracy arises from the demands for independence from non-Russian
nationalities inside the Russian Republic. 17 Yeltsin's reaction to the calls for inde-
pendence from the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Republic in southeastern Rus-
sia, precipitated perhaps the most serious crisis of his first 100 days in power.
Conquered by Russia after a protracted and bloody struggle in the 19th century,
the Muslim Chechens and Ingush were deported by Stalin to Central Asia in 1944
and allowed to return to their native land only in 1957. Today the population of
the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Republic is 1, 277,000, of which 48 percent
are Chechens, 26 percent are ethnic Russians, 11 percent Ingush, and 15 percent
other nationalities. The Chechens live predominantly in the eastern part of the
republic, while the Ingush are settled mostly in its western part. On October 5,
1991, the nationalist organization the National Congress of the Chechen People
seized the key government buildings and declared itself the supreme power in the
Chechen part of the republic, which includes the capital, Grozny. In the October
27 elections, called by the Congress, General Dzhokhar Dudaev was elected the
Chechen President by 85 percent of the Chechens. The Chechens declared their
republic's independence on November 2.
Emergency Decree. Dismissing the elections as "illegal" and accusing the
Dudaev supporters of "stirring up mass unrest through the use of violence,"
Yeltsin decreed a state of emergency in the Autonomous Republic on November
8. The decree banned all meetings and demonstrations and ordered the confisca-
17 There are sixteen so-called "Autonomous Republics" on the territory of Russia and fifteen smaller
"Autonomous Regions."
13
REPUBLIC
OF LAT VIA
Komi ASSR
3
REPUBLIC OF
REPUBLIC
Yakut ASSR
LITHUANIA
OF ESTONIA
St. Petersburg
Kaliningrad
(Russia)
Moscow
Tatar
ASSR
RUSSIA
Irkutsk
Bashkir
ASSR
Dagestan
ASSR
Viadivostock
Gorno Altal AR
Checheno-Ingush
Khakass AR
ASSR
RESTIVE AUTONOMOUS AREAS OF YELTSIN'S RUSSIAN REPUBLIC
Scale:
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR)
500 Miles
Autonomous Regions (AR)
Note: Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.
tion of firearms. Two days later, the Russian President sent 630 special riot-con-
trol Ministry of Internal Affairs troops to enforce the decree.
The Chechens responded with defiance. Dudaev called upon all men from ages
15 to 55 to come to the defense of the Republic, resulting in an army of 62, 000
volunteers. At the same time, neighboring Georgia and Azerbaijan declared their
support for the Chechens. Dudaev's supporters surrounded the troops at the air-
port and destroyed railroads leading to the capital to prevent more Russian troops
from arriving. On November 11, the Ministry of Internal Affairs troops withdrew.
The Russian parliament dealt another blow to Yeltsin's authority by voting over-
whelmingly on the same day to annul Yeltsin's emergency decree. The parliament
also decided to begin an investigation "to bring to light people responsible for the
insufficiently prepared political and military-technical decisions" that let to the
November 8 state of emergency decree.
THE U.S. AND YELTSIN'S RUSSIA
Russia today faces a fundamental choice-one that it has not seen since the
1917 February Revolution. The country not only has to choose between a produc-
tive free-market economy and the moribund command economy, but between
democracy and back-sliding toward authoritarian rule. As Yeltsin asserted in his
October 28 speech, this is "one of the most critical moments of Russian history,
[when] it is being decided what Russia will be in years and decades to come."
14
People's Trust. Yeltsin is the first democratically elected leader in Russia's
1,000 years of existence. Because of his personal courage and opposition to
Gorbachev's regime, Yeltsin more than any other political leader in Russia today
possesses one political asset without which any radical economic and political
reform would be doomed: the people's trust. Whatever his errors, Yeltsin is likely
to remain Russia's, and the West's, best hope for a peaceful transition to a stable
free market democracy.
If Yeltsin does not succeed in leading Russia through this transition, no one
will do so any time soon. If he succeeds, the result is likely to be a peaceful,
democratic and economically viable Russia that would not pose a threat to its
neighbors or to America's interests. If he fails, the most likely result will be grind-
ing poverty for the majority of the Russian people and, possibly, the coming to
power of an authoritarian nationalist regime, which once again will make Russia a
menace to its neighbors, the U.S., and world peace.
The Bush Administration must adjust to the new reality in the Soviet Union.
The central government of Gorbachev becomes more impotent every day, while
the republics are fast becoming the only governments that command authority
from the people and the state institutions. Thus, Bush must begin to deal more
with the increasingly independent Russia which Yeltsin leads. After Yeltsin's Oc-
tober 28 speech, U.S. diplomatic, political, and economic support for Yeltsin
means a U.S. endorsement of Russian democracy and free market economic
reforms.
Practical Guidance. This support should not be unconditional. Like Russia,
Yeltsin will need considerable practical guidance and even constructive criticism.
For example, the Checheno-Ingush episode demonstrates that Yeltsin will over-
react when confronted with a troublesome nationalist challenge to the integrity of
the Russian Republic. This is the same behavior for which Yeltsin, while in op-
position, so effectively criticized Gorbachev. The Chechen-Ingush crisis shows
that Yeltsin has not yet adjusted fully to the limitations of power that democracy
imposes on political leaders.
Yet Yeltsin can learn from his mistakes. After all, he transformed himself from
a Communist Party boss to the leader of Russia's first democratic revolution. The
Bush Administration should not be afraid to criticize the Russian leader, provided
that it is not personally offensive, as it was in the past, when unnamed "senior ad-
ministration officials" told the U.S. media that Yeltsin was "uncouth," "unstable,"
"boorish," or "authoritarian."
Before the coup, the Bush Administration may have been partly justified in
preferring to deal with Gorbachev rather than Yeltsin. At that time, Gorbachev
controlled the Soviet armed forces and his cooperation was needed not only to
reach arms control agreements, but for the Soviet army to withdraw from Eastern
Europe. The situation is radically different today. Gorbachev and his "center" mat-
ter much less than before August 19-even in such national security matters as
arms control and defense. At the same time, Russia is emerging as the largest
Eurasian state and a military superpower in its own right.
15
A basic rule in international relations is that if a nation refuses to get involved,
it will lose influence. U.S. engagement with Russia and the influence it would
bring with it is more important today than ever before. The reason: Although the
fate of Russia will be decided by the Russians themselves, the U.S. can help
Yeltsin stay on course with his democratic and free market reforms. To do this,
the Bush Administration should:
Invite Yeltsin to make his first official state visit to the U.S.
Yeltsin has visited the United States twice. On his first trip to the U.S. in Sep-
tember 1989, he came as a private citizen because he did not have an official in-
vitation from the U.S. government. This was in spite of the fact that Yeltsin was a
recognized leader of the democratic opposition to Gorbachev and one of the Co-
Chairmen of the Inter-Regional Group in the Congress of People Deputies of the
U.S.S.R., the principal democratic organization in the Soviet Union at the time.
Reportedly afraid to offend Gorbachev, the White House snubbed Yeltsin and
rejected his request for an official meeting with Bush. Instead Bush dropped by
the office of National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft for a few minutes to
greet Yeltsin.
Even when Yeltsin became the first popularly elected chief executive in Rus-
sian history on June 13, 1991, the White House again refused to extend an invita-
tion for a state visit. Instead, the Russian President arrived on June 18 at the in-
vitation of Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell and the Senate Minority
Leader Robert Dole. Although this time Yeltsin was received by Bush in the
White House, this did not make up for the absence of an official invitation from
the President.
Such an invitation is long overdue. A state visit by Yeltsin would signal the
Bush Administration's acceptance of an independent democratic Russia and its
leader. A White House invitation now would be especially helpful as Yeltsin
prepares to press forward with difficult economic reforms. A state visit would
offer a public and official endorsement of the Russian economic and political
revolution unleashed by Yeltsin. Given the immense moral authority of the U.S.
in the eyes of millions of Russians, an official state visit would go a long way
toward popular acceptance of Yeltsin's policies.
Urge Congress to invite Yeltsin to address a joint session of Congress.
An invitation to address a joint session of Congress must come from the
Speaker of the House of Representatives after a consultation with the Senate and
the White House. In the last two years, Congress thus has honored three leaders of
victorious anti-Communist revolutions: Lech Walesa of Poland on November 15,
1989, Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia on February 21, 1990, and Violeta
Chamorro of Nicaragua on April 16, 1990. A de-facto leader of the democratic op-
position to Gorbachev since 1989, Yeltsin played the key role in the defeat of the
hardline communist coup of August 19-August 21 and today he is the leader of
the democratic revolution that followed. He undoubtedly deserves to address a
joint session of Congress. Such an invitation would underscore to Russia and the
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world that not only the U.S. government but the American people support the
revolutionary changes spearheaded by Yeltsin.
Create a U.S-Russian Consultative Commission on Arms Control.
As the heir to all Soviet nuclear weapons and most conventional forces, Russia
becomes a party to all arms control agreements between the Soviet Union and the
U.S. and its allies. Unless Russia approves, the Gorbachev-led Soviet government
is in no position to comply with existing agreements or to negotiate any new
ones, such as the Defense and Space Talks concerning missile defenses. The Bush
Administration should recognize the new reality of Russia's paramount role in
arms control and create a U.S.-Russian Consultative Commission on Arms Con-
trol. This would serve as a forum in which the Russian leadership could be
briefed on the status of the existing arms control agreements and compliance is-
sues. It could also be used to explore new U.S.-Russian arms control initiatives.
To prepare for the first session of the Commission, U.S. Ambassador to the
Soviet Union Robert Strauss should begin consultations with top Russian national
security policy makers. They include: Deputy Prime Minister and State Secretary
Gennady Burbulis who oversees the Russian Foreign Ministry, Armed Forces,
and the KGB; Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev; State Counsellor for
Defense General Konstantin Kobets; Chairman of the Russian Republic Defense
Committee General Pavel Grachev; Deputy Chairman of Russian Republic
Defense Committee Vitaly Shlykov; Chairman of the Committee on International
Relations of the Russian Supreme Soviet Vladimir Lukin; and Chairman of the
Committee on Defense and Security of the Russia Super Soviet Sergei Stepashin.
Open direct negotiations with Russia on economic, trade, and cultural
cooperation.
As the central government of the U.S.S.R. looses political and economic power
to the newly-independent republics, the control of the "center" over Soviet
foreign policy is bound to diminish. Reflecting this process, former Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei Pankin stated on November 15 that the republics, and
not his Ministry, should be handling their own economic, cultural, scientific and
humanitarian relations with the outside world. 18 Although Pankin was replaced
on November 19 by Eduard Shevardnadze, who resigned as Foreign Minister in
December 1990, it is doubtful that Shevardnadze will be willing, or able, to
change this aspect of his predecessor's policy.
The Bush Administration should respond to the logic of events in the former
Soviet Union by gradually shifting the entire range of negotiations on non-
military matters to the republics. The need to do this was underscored by the Bush
Administration's November 18 decision to channel most of the $1.5 billion in
economic assistance directly to the republics. While the Administration should
18 The New York Times, November 16, 1991.
17
begin direct negotiations on economic, trade and cultural cooperation with all of
the former Soviet republics, Russia, which is the largest and most populous of the
republics, is the logical place to start.
Establish a U.S. consulate in Moscow accredited to Russia.
Russia already has made the first step toward achieving diplomatic repre-
sentation in the U.S. On November 20, the Russian government announced that
Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Kolosovsky would represent Russia in
Washington. He will serve as Minister-Counselor in the Soviet Embassy in
Washington, which is the second highest ranking position in the Embassy.
Until now, whenever American officials wished to consult with the Russian
leadership, it was done by diplomats in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The prob-
lem is that the U.S. Embassy there is accredited to the Soviet Union, not Russia.
For that reason it soon may become obsolete as a channel for direct U.S.-Russian
consultations and negotiations.
To accommodate the rapidly increasing volume of direct U.S.-Russian
diplomatic contacts and to signal the recognition of Russia's growing diplomatic
independence, the U.S. should open in Moscow a consulate accredited to Russia.
In addition to facilitating direct negotiations and consultations with Russia, this
would be a first step toward establishing a full-scale diplomatic representation in
Russia in the form of an embassy.
CONCLUSION
Russia stands at an historical crossroad. As Yeltsin said on October 28:
Today we need to make a decisive choice Your
President has made such a choice. This is the most
important decision of my life. I have never looked for
easy roads but I can see quite clearly that the next
months will be the most difficult in my life. If I have
your support and trust, I am prepared to travel this road
with you to the very end.
If Yeltsin succeeds, and if he lives up to the standard of heroism and steadfast-
ness set during the August 19-21 resistance to the communist coup, he may enter
history as the founding father of Russian democracy. But he will need all the help
he can get to achieve that goal. Provided the Russian President does not waiver
from the course he outlined on October 28, the U.S. should try to help him along
the difficult path to a peaceful, democratic and prosperous Russia.
Chance for Free Market and Democracy. To encourage the growth of free
market, and democratic institutions in Russia, the Bush Administration should in-
vite Yeltsin to make an official state visit to the U.S., arranging as well for an ad-
dress to a joint session of Congress. The U.S. also should not only open direct
negotiations with Russia on economic trade and cultural cooperation, but estab-
lish a special arms control commission where American and Russian negotiators
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can discuss disarmament. Finally, to signal the growing recognition of Russia's
new power, the U.S. should open in Moscow a consulate accredited to Russia.
This may be the only chance for free markets and democracy to emerge in Rus-
sia soon. The U.S. should do what it can to ensure that this opportunity is not
missed.
Leon Aron, Ph.D.
Salvatori Senior Policy Analyst
in Soviet Studies
All Heritage Foundation papers are now available electronically to subscribers of the "NEXIS" on-line data
retrieval service. The Heritage Foundation's Reports (HFRPTS) can be found in the OMNI, CURRNT, NWLTRS,
and GVT groupfiles of the NEXIS library and in the GOVT and OMNI group files of the GOVNWS library.
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