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29
2
7
Reprinted by Permission
THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Summer 1990
Waiting for Yeltsin
Is Boris Good Enough?
Leon Aron
Everything's in disarray, and no one's there
distant and hostile camps that dominate the
To say, as cold sets in, that disarray
Soviet political landscape: Gorbachev and the
Is everywhere, and how sweet becomes the
establishment reformers; the pro-capitalist
prayer:
and pro-Western Moscow intelligentsia;² and
Rossia, Lethe, Lorelei.
the rapidly radicalizing, and increasingly self-
-Osip Mandelshtam,
conscious and unified populist movements.
"The Decembrists," 19171
Instead, in a country rapidly polarizing and
depleted of trust-the most essential ingredi-
ITH THE DEATH of An-
ent of peaceful reform-Sakharov left behind
W
drei Dmitrievich Sakharov
a slew of vocal, energetic, and willful stone
on December 14, 1989, the
throwers. Of these, Boris Nikolaevich
Soviet Union may have lost its only personi-
Yeltsin-now president of the Republic of
fied hope for national reconciliation. Sa-
Russia-is by far the most formidable.
kharov's disappearance from the Soviet polit-
Still, he is enigmatic, perhaps deliber-
ical scene marked the point at which what
ately so. From Yeltsin's past, one can form a
had been known as the "Soviet crisis" entered
fairly good idea of how he might go about
the terminal stage: national catastrophe.
doing things, but not of what specific things
History rarely produces figures who can
he is likely to do. This puzzle comes from the
both throw stones and gather them, who can
unique nature of Yeltsin's political base: he is
destroy the old order and lay the foundation
the only Soviet politician who enjoys both
for a new one, who can trumpet discord and
the ardent, often fanatical, devotion of the
celebrate harmony. George Washington was
Soviet boi polloi and the solid, albeit guarded
one. Sakharov might have become another.
and qualified, support of most of the intelli-
Sakharov left no heir, no stone gatherer
of national stature. There is no one in today's
¹All Russian translations in the text are the au-
Soviet Union who, like Sakharov, is admitted
thor's own.
to and trusted by the three progressively
²In the confusing Soviet political parlance, to be
procapitalist and pro-Western is to be thought
of as one of "the Left." The proponents of
Leon Aron, who emigrated from the Soviet Union
hard-line communist orthodoxy are labelled
in 1978, is the Salvatori Senior Policy Analyst
"the Right" and "the conservatives." For au-
in Soviet Studies at the Heritage Foundation
thenticity's sake, these denominations are pre-
in Washington, D.C., and is gathering mate-
served in the text, but for clarity's sake, they
rials for a book about Boris Yeltsin.
are enclosed in quotation marks.
The National Interest-Summer 1990
39
gentsia. As we shall see, keeping both con-
area. In rushing to appoint Yeltsin, the
stituencies happy is no easy matter.
Brezhnev Politburo had violated the rules;
Soviet totalitarianism can be divided into
not only had Yeltsin leapfrogged the obliga-
four stages: the mature, when people were
tory tenure as the second secretary of the
afraid to think (Stalin); the aging, when they
regional committee; he was, in fact, pro-
could think but were still afraid to talk.
moted while the current second secretary,
(Khrushchev); the decaying, when thinking
who ordinarily would have taken over the
and talking privately was usually safe but
province, was still in office.
acting was not (Brezhnev); and the dying,
During his nine years as the Sverdlovsk
when, gradually, people have been allowed to
ruler, Yeltsin gave a foretaste of things to
act (Gorbachev). Yeltsin himself has been
come. He permitted his subordinates to crit-
instrumental to the arrival of this last stage;
icize him; he fielded "provocative" questions
he has also been symbolic of it.
at meetings with the "laboring masses"; he
Until the era of Gorbachev, however,
initiated call-in TV shows in which the leaders
Yeltsin's reactions to the life around him were
of the province were forced to appear. Dur-
not atypical. He did not think under Stalin
ing one such show, a caller inquired angrily
(and, by his own admission, wept when the
why Yeltsin's wife was driven to work in her
tyrant died); he thought but did not talk
husband's state car-a practice considered a
under Khrushchev; and he talked but did not
normal perk of the state and party nachal'niki.
act under Brezhnev.
Yeltsin promised that his wife would use his
car no more. He kept his word.
I
N THE PITCH darkness of 1931, as
That such transgressions were tolerated
Stalin celebrated his victory over
by Moscow is a testimony to the apathy,
the Russian village-starved, arrested, up-
emaciation, and rot of the waning years of
rooted, and murdered-two peasant Russian
Brezhnev's reign. It helped that the "human
boys were born who would do more than
face" of Yeltsin's rule lurked safely behind the
anyone else to undermine the very founda-
Ural Mountains, thirteen hundred kilometers
tions of the house that Stalin built. Boria
from Moscow: nothing of the sort would have
Yeltsin arrived on February 1, in a Ural
been allowed in Central Russia.
village. A month later, Misha Gorbachev was
Then, too, Yeltsin knew when to put
born in the southern Russian province of
limits on his mild iconoclasm. When Brezh-
Stavropol. They were to rise fast and in
nev's seventieth anniversary came around,
parallel; ultimately their paths would inter-
Yeltsin obediently lent his voice to the chorus
sect, travel closely together, and then diverge
of tributes to the now much-vilified "architect
sharply and painfully.
of stagnation." The missive from the Sverd-
Like Gorbachev's, Yeltsin's career was
lovsk Regional Party Committee, signed by
swift and stellar. A graduate of the Depart-
Yeltsin, extolled Brezhnev's "wisdom, a giant
ment of Civil Engineering of the Ural Poly-
organizing talent, bubbling energy, [devoted to]
technic Institute, he became chief engineer of
the construction of communism." Yeltsin's
the Construction Directorate in his mid-
message to Brezhnev went on to say that
twenties and manager of a huge industrial
complex at thirty-two. Five years later,
We who live in the Urals thank you ardently
Yeltsin was appointed the construction sec-
and from the bottom of our soul, Leonid Ilyich,
tion chief of the Sverdlovsk Regional Party
for your constant care for the strengthening of
Committee. He then became a secretary, and
the economic and military might of our Moth-
a year later, at the tender Soviet political age
erland, the raising of material and cultural level
of forty-five, first secretary. This made him
of people's life, for your titanic activity aimed
absolute master of the Sverdlovsk province,
at the establishment of solid peace in the whole
the Soviet Union's third largest industrial
world.
40
The National Interest-Summer 1990
Again, following the Politburo's secret deci-
cracks, which delighted Muscovites, traced
sion to demolish the Ipatiev House, in the
marital discord in the Soviet capital to the size
basement of which Czar Nicholas II, his
of Moscow kitchens-kitchens totally incapa-
wife, and children were executed in 1918,
ble, according to Yeltsin, of accommodating
Yeltsin sent in the bulldozers in the middle of
mightily proportioned Russian women, and
the night. By morning, only a patch of fresh
thus progenitors of ugly family feuds.
asphalt marked the spot.
Yeltsin authorized the mass media in his
But undoubtedly the greater leniency
domain to begin publishing and broadcasting
accorded Yeltsin was also Moscow's tribute
the truth. Thanks to a new line of publica-
to his leadership. He was bright, hard work-
tions of Moskovskaya Pravda and Moskovskiy
ing, well-liked by the people, and did not take
Komsomoletz, Muscovites were the first Rus-
bribes-a Soviet wonder. These qualities
sian readers in the country to behold, aston-
prompted a new general secretary, Mikhail
ished, words like prostitutka, narkoman (drug
Sergeevich Gorbachev, five days after his
addict), and mafia-this time to describe So-
election, to summon Yeltsin to Moscow to
viet, not "bourgeois," reality.
join the Central Committee apparatus. Nine
The new first secretary initiated a spate
months later, Yelstin became the first secre-
of entertainments, from dog shows to wind
tary of the Moscow City Committee, the
orchestra competitions. But his most popu-
most prestigious of all the local party posts
lar brain child was open-air trade fairs-
and one traditionally given to the general
yarmarki. Unable to break the trade mafia,
secretary's most trusted ally.
Yeltsin decided to bypass it by having agri-
Ryba portitsia s golovy, a Russian proverb
cultural produce sold by farmers directly to
claims-"a fish begins to rot head first." As
Muscovites. Yet exercises in free marketing
Yeltsin took over in December 1985, Moscow
yarmarki were not: unlike the several "farm-
was a thoroughly rotten head of the country.
ers' markets" in the city, the prices at
From eight till two in the morning, Yeltsin
yarmarki were kept lower by fiat. Every now
fired and harangued, thundered and ca-
and then Yeltsin made surprise visits to
joled-and still, as he put it, "could not get to
fairs. On one of such visits, he harangued
the bottom of the filthy well." One wholesale
Azerbaijani farmers: "Aren't you ashamed
purge of the party bosses and trade officials
of yourself, to squeeze the Muscovites like
followed another. But still the Soviet capi-
this? They send you machinery, refrigera-
tal-whose worn-out transportation and
tors.
Come, come, you can take a ruble
theft-ridden stores could not cope with daily
off your fruit, half a ruble off the vegies."
invasions of visitors (two million a month in
Such reproofs by a nonvoting member of
winter, three million in summer) looking for
the Politburo were not to be taken lightly;
something, indeed anything, to buy-
the prices dropped as prescribed. That
showed no sign of improvement.
night, recalls a witness, as the boss' words
were repeated in Moscow kitchens, Yeltsin
As
YELTSIN correctly claimed later,
"became a legend."
the only thing to improve during
In the meantime, the Moscow party ap-
his short Moscow tenure was the "atmo-
parat, whose undying hatred Yeltsin earned
sphere." After eighteen years of Victor Gri-
almost instantaneously, ran for cover under
shin-Brezhnev's distant, corrupt, servile,
the wings of the guardian angel of party
and high-handed crony-the new master,
professionals, Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev, at
who began riding buses and metros instead of
that time was the "second" secretary of the
zooming down a special line in a black limo,
party and Gorbachev's deputy. A fellow Si-
became an instant star. Voluble and gregari-
berian and a former party boss of the Tomsk
ous, he liberally dispensed his opinions on a
province, Ligachev-ironically, in light of his
multitude of subjects. One of Yeltsin's
future relationship with Yeltsin-was the Pol-
Waiting for Yeltsin
41
itburo member who pushed the hardest for
ing Gorbachev's cue, one Central Committee
Yeltsin's transfer to Moscow.
member after another got up to denounce
A series of clashes between the two men
Yeltsin. Three weeks later, the ritual slaugh-
followed. Yeltsin saw his initiatives stifled,
ter was repeated at a plenum of the Moscow
his designs overruled, his proposals dis-
City Committee, to which Yeltsin, in the
missed. Frustrated in his efforts to bring what
hospital with a nervous and physical break-
he considered a true perestroika to the capital,
down and pumped with tranquilizers, was
Yeltsin sent Gorbachev a letter of resigna-
summoned by Gorbachev.
tion. Gorbachev pocketed the letter and kept
Three months later, Gorbachev called
postponing the decision. Yeltsin grew more
again, this time offering Yeltsin a Council of
and more anxious. His rendezvous with Rus-
Ministers-rank position in charge of construc-
sian history was set.
tion. The offer was a curious one. Why did
There is a verse in Vassily Grossman's
Gorbachev not deliver a coup de grace, by
Life and Fate, one of the greatest novels about
making Yeltsin ambassador to Mongolia, as
communist totalitarianism:
Khrushchev did with Molotov? The answer
"What's your shell made of, my dear?"
is most likely to be found in the role that
Once I asked a turtle. And was told:
Gorbachev, the master tactician; must have
"It's of fear. Stored and hardened fear.
assigned to Yeltsin from the beginning.
There is nothing stronger in the world."
Yeltsin is to Gorbachev what Medusa's head
was to Perseus: when Gorbachev reaches
Yeltsin's decision to crack his own shell of
inside the bag and produces Yeltsin, the
fear-a very personal and painful step, the
"conservatives" freeze in fear. By compari-
agony of which nearly cost him his life-
son, Gorbachev looks supremely moderate,
turned out to be more than one man's liber-
reasonable, and well worthy of support. Gor-
ation. It ushered in a new, terminal era of
bachev needed Yeltsin in Moscow, handy,
Soviet communism. What happened on Oc-
within reach. As Yeltsin perceptively com-
tober 21, 1987, remains the pinnacle of
mented on numerous occasions: "If I did not
Yeltsin's political life. Regardless of what
exist, Gorbachev would have to invent me."
follows, the events of that morning alone
At the same time, the destination of
assure his place in history.
Yeltsin's institutional exile was not, as the
Soviet papers in the pre-glasnost days used to
AT
THE CLOSING of a largely ritu-
say, accidental. Alongside food, medical
alistic Central Committee meet-
care, finance, and crime, housing is the most
ing on that day, Yeltsin requested the floor
explosive issue in grass roots politics: over one
and delivered a speech in which he deplored
hundred million Soviet citizens (every third
the absence of "revolutionary change" in the
one!) have less living space per person than
party apparat; warned about popular disap-
even the miserable Soviet "sanitary norm"
pointment with perestroika because of the
allows-nine square meters per person. In
lack of results; noted Gorbachev's budding
Moscow, as Izvestia has acknowledged,
cult of personality, and, finally, complaining
344,800 families are on the waiting list for
of the lack of support from the Politburo,
housing-12 percent of all families in the
asked to be released from the post of the first
Soviet capital; 282,900 families in Leningrad
secretary of the Moscow City Committee.
(20 percent); 208,000 in Kiev (26 percent).
As he walked back through a stunned
Gorbachev knew Yeltsin better than
silence, his "heart pounding and ready to
Yeltsin knew himself. The general secretary
burst through the rib cage," he wrote in his
was convinced that Yeltsin would reemerge,
memoirs, Yeltsin prepared himself for an
"organized" and "methodical" slaughter.³
³Against the Grain (New York: Summit Books,
And that is precisely what happened. Follow-
1990), p. 102.
42
The National Interest-Summer 1990
no matter how crushing the blow was, and
progress and populism are rarely compatible.
Perseus would recover Medusa's head. And
"Our political life," writes Nikolai Shmeliov,
Gorbachev was right: only a few months after
perhaps the most authoritative of the Soviet
his political demise, Yeltsin began campaign-
radical economists, "has one sad feature: the
ing for a seat on the 1988 Extraordinary Party
most pronounced are levelling trends, born
Conference. Thus, at the age of fifty-six,
out of the ideology of equality of all in
Yeltsin became the first politician in sixty-
poverty." Along with meat, clean towels, 800
four years (since the time of Lenin's death),
grams of soap a month, refrigerators, and
who openly took on the Big Boss, lost, and
shoes, the closing of kooperativy (small private
rose again. A new era of Soviet political
enterprises) was at the top of the list of
history began. A year later, in the elections to
demands of striking miners last July. A huge
the Congress of People's Deputies, Yeltsin
segment of Yeltsin's constituency are social
triumphed over his apparat-supported oppo-
Luddites-scared of the havoc, the uncer-
nent, polling close to 90 percent of the Mos-
tainty, the need for initiative and self-reliance
cow vote.
that radical economic reform will bring. Un-
"There is one story and one story only/
doubtedly there are Yeltsin supporters
That will prove worth your telling," Robert
among those who burn private farms and
Graves advised budding poets. Yeltsin the
vandalize cooperative shops and restaurants.
budding politician did discover his own
Most important of all, Yeltsin's populism
story, and it has proved remarkably well
appeals to those who hate the neighbor who
worth his telling. It is a story of extramone-
does better than they, no matter how hard he
tary remuneration of the Soviet bureau-
or she works. Yet earnings-based inequality
crats-the "social justice" issue, to use the
is both the key condition and the assured
currently accepted euphemism. No feeling is
outcome of any radical economic reform. As
more widely and more passionately shared in
Gavriil Popov, a leading Soviet economist
today's Soviet Union than hatred of the po-
who in April was elected the mayor of Mos-
litical elite's privileges: all those special drug,
cow, has put it in Literaturnaya Gazeta: "The
book, and department stores, special box
increase in wealth for some will become the
offices, special hospitals, special food rations,
basis for raising the standard of living for all."
special food processing plants, even special
Yet it is precisely the increased "social layer-
farms where this food is produced.4
ing based on property" that bothers Yeltsin
Setting an example, and earning enor-
the Leveller. What Popov rightly sees as the
mous political capital, Yeltsin gave up all his
"key problem" of perestroika-"the contra-
ministerial-rank privileges-including, in
diction between the democracy that we need
May of last year, the holy of holies of the
and the growth of economic inequality"-is
Russian perks, a dacha. After thirty years of
bound, sooner or later, to split the Yeltsin
apparat privileges, he told Moscow News, it is
constituency. And contributing to the rift
not easy to cope: "It is hard when your wife
between the pro-reform progressives and the
stands in lines for hours to buy food," Yeltsin
populists is the age-long bitter mistrust be-
complained, "or when something is not avail-
tween the liberal Russian intelligentsia and
able in the store, or when drugstores have no
the narod, the people, on whose behalf the
medicine and your grandson's temperature is
intelligentsia is supposedly laboring.
over 40 Centigrade."
Yeltsin's constituency of the reform-
⁴A "commission on privileges," created by the
oriented democratic "progressives" and boi
Supreme Soviet, confirmed the existence of
polloi-united by hatred of the stupidity,
privileges in the following areas: "health care,
rapacity, and privileges of the party and
leisure, trade, transportation, housing, cul-
government bureaucrats-may prove only
ture, pensions and services" (Izvestia, Septem-
temporary. And small surprise if it does:
ber 29, 1989).
Waiting for Yeltsin
43
Because of his constituency, Yeltsin is
book written for this paragraph? If so, it is
uncharacteristically reticent on the key sub-
probably worth it: when Yeltsin's autobiog-
ject of property. Philosopher Igor Kliamkin,
raphy is published in the Soviet Union, the
who is among the most perceptive observers
paragraph will do more to boost his popular-
of Soviet politics today, notes that Yeltsin
ity and sink that of Gorbachev than anything
talks about the market "through clenched
else in the book.
teeth." Thus Yeltsin tells the New York Times
that he is for "something close to" private
ownership of farmland. In his memoirs, he
IN THE MEANTIME, Gorbachev
continued his cat-and-mouse game:
states that the issue of property divides "the
now letting Yeltsin roam loose and even
so-called left and right" but does not indicate
protecting him, now throwing him high in
where he stands on the issue. The Financial
the air. When the "conservative" majority of
Times reports Yeltsin supporting "private
the First Congress of People's Deputies last
ownership of the production means and
May failed to elect Yeltsin to the permanent
land"-but only in general and with a proviso
legislature (the Supreme Soviet), Gorbachev
that "positive aspects of socialism" are incor-
acceded to-possibly arranged-a resignation
porated.
of one of the elected deputies in order that
The other pillar of Yeltsin's political
Yeltsin take his seat. That summer Gorbachev
strategy, meanwhile, is safe from cracks and
authorized a televised address by Yeltsin to
grows stronger by the day. These days, to
striking miners. When last fall Pravda re-
attack Gorbachev is almost as advantageous
printed an Italian newspaper article that ac-
as attacking the party itself. And as Gor-
cused Yeltsin of drinking non-stop during his
bachev's popularity declines, Yeltsin's cri-
U.S. tour and spending honoraria on jeans
tique of the general secretary grows progres-
and VCR's instead of charities, Gorbachev
sively sharper and more personal. Perestroika
sacked Editor-in-Chief Viktor Afanasiev.
has "failed," Yeltsin told the Financial Times,
Yet on October 16, just a few weeks
because "the leadership" failed. Moreover,
later, Gorbachev, in his capacity as the chair-
"five years should be enough for a president
man of the Supreme Soviet, humiliated
to prove his worth. He hasn't fulfilled his
Yeltsin during a nationally televised session.
obligation to the pledges to the people."
He had the minister of Internal Affairs report
Yeltsin's memoirs cast Gorbachev as "incon-
on a bizarre incident: Yeltsin, the minister
sistent" and "timid," a man who "loves"
alleged, appeared late at night and soaking
half-measures and "semi-decisions."
wet at a police station in the exclusive country
Yeltsin seems to regard the political mile-
house retreat of the Moscow elite, stating that
age to be gotten out of the "social justice"
he had been kidnapped and thrown off the
issue as far from exhausted. The single long-
bridge by unknown assassins.
est topical passage in his book is eleven pages
Yeltsin said later that he himself had
devoted to the privileges of the top party
concealed the episode for fear of provoking
leadership. Toward the end of the passage,
protest strikes and riots by his supporters. At
Yeltsin lurches for Gorbachev's political jug-
the time, though, his response in the Su-
ular: "Why has Gorbachev been unable to
preme Soviet was suspiciously confused: he
change this? I believe the fault lies in the basic
said that nobody had tried to harm him and
cast of his character. He likes to live well, in
that the whole episode was "his private life."
comfort and luxury." And-a twist of the
(A rumor began circulating in Moscow,
knife-"what about [Raisa Gorbachev's] ZIL
meanwhile, that he was visiting his mistress
limo? My daughter, at her workplace, is
who threw a bucketful of water over him.)
given one small cake of soap per month. My
Yeltsin's detractors are not confined
wife.
has to spend two or three hours a
solely to the apparat. Some in the Moscow
day in shopping lines.
" Was the entire
intelligentsia are skeptical, even alarmed. Ac-
44
The National Interest-Summer 1990
cording to Novy Mir, they see in Yeltsin a
World nation called the Soviet Union. To the
"neo-Bolshevik," the "central point" of whose
intelligentsia, Yeltsin is the epitome of mass
program-redistribution of goods and serv-
democracy-something for which the intel-
ices accumulated by the ruling class-was
lectuals ostensibly struggle, but whose arrival
"the leitmotif of all Bolsheviks, both before
threatens their exalted status. At stake for the
and after the [1917] revolution." His pro-
intelligentsia is its place behind the throne, its
gram, the article reports, is seen by some as a
right and duty to advise the state on matters
"collection of primitive quasi-solutions."
of culture, its ruling the arts by virtue of
The Moscow intelligentsia is heavily
government's mandate-all privileges that
overrepresented among the sources of West-
many of their Western counterparts can, and
ern correspondents in the Soviet Union, so its
do, only dream about.
weariness of Yeltsin permeates Western me-
For better or worse, however, these de-
dia. Nonetheless, the intelligentsia's attitudes
tractors of Yeltsin cannot stop him, not now.
are themselves somewhat suspect.
He began this year as one of the five chairmen
Perhaps nowhere in the world does there
of the Interregional Group of Deputies, an
exist a more snobbish intelligentsia than in
increasingly disloyal and numerically grow-
Moscow. A wrong accent, a gesture that is
ing "left" opposition to Gorbachev in the
not comme il faut, or (God forbid) grammatic
Congress of People's Deputies. In May he
deficiency are all valid reasons for excommu-
won a narrow victory to become president of
nication. (Although Gorbachev speaks better
the Russian republic, thus securing a power-
Russian than any Soviet leader since Lenin,
ful political base. This year may be the one he
without the heavy Georgian accent of Stalin
has prepared for all his life.
and the Ukrainian of Khrushchev and Brezh-
The central, most fateful aspect of Soviet
nev, he too has taken his lumps. His fall from
political life today is a desperate race between
grace began at the televised proceedings of
two parallel processes: the disintegration of
the First Congress of People's Deputies last
the Soviet economy (and the concomitant
summer, when he several times used the
delegitimation and demise of the current po-
incorrect third person plural form of the verb
litical regime); and the emergence of new
klast', to put down, saying lozbut, instead of
political structures enjoying popular support
kladut.)
and consent. If the former outpaces the lat-
A son of a Siberian peasant, Yeltsin can
ter-if the economy collapses before a legiti-
hardly count on acceptance by Moscow intel-
mate central government is installed-then
lectuals. In his book, Yeltsin notes that Mus-
this giant land, this military "superpower" in
covites "make no attempt" to hide their
possession of over 12,000 nuclear charges, is
"snobbery and arrogance" toward provincials
likely to plunge into violent political chaos, a
and that, prior to his move to Moscow, his
Lebanon-like war of all against all.
rare encounters with the inhabitants of the
It is no longer possible to talk about the
capital left "a nasty taste" in his mouth.
Soviet "national" economy. Shortages and
Another, more powerful, source of the
inflation make the ruble less and less fit to
intelligentsia's resentment is deeper and per-
serve as a medium of exchange. Moscow now
haps subconscious. For generations, it cast
leaves local party and state leaders to fend for
itself as fighters and martyrs for the narod.
themselves if-or, rather, when-food riots
But, with a few notable exceptions, the intel-
break out. Regions more and more often
lectuals know nothing of the narod. They do
refuse to surrender their produce to central
not know how "the people" live, do not share
ministries; they export goods only when bar-
their habits, and (except in books) do not
ter offerings of other regions look attractive-
speak "the people's" language. Yeltsin, on the
or when hard currency is paid. In March, for
other hand, is a voice of the tired, hungry,
the first time in my memory, a Soviet econ-
huddled masses of that second-rate Third
omist writing in Kommunist, an official Soviet
Waiting for Yeltsin
45
publication (and a theoretical journal of the
nizations"-nor Gorbachev himself has the
Central Committee at that), used the term
required legitimacy. The pace of economic
"dollarization" to describe the process.⁵
disintegration is such that it may be too late
Perhaps the most troubling consequence
now even for "roundtable" negotiations of the
of economic Lebanization of the Soviet
Polish type. The only means of creating a
Union is a steady decline of grain deliveries
legitimate government is for Gorbachev to
for all-Union distribution. Thus, while last
dissolve the Congress, resign the presidency,
year's overall grain harvest was 16 million
and proceed with direct multi-party national
tons higher than in 1988, the amount of grain
elections of a new parliament and a new
sold to the state was lower than in 1988. And
president. And Gorbachev may well be rea-
this in a country where every third loaf of
sonably assured of gaining the presidency-if
bread, as A. Sizov acknowledged in Kommu-
Yeltsin, already installed as the president of
nist, is already made from imported grain.
the Republic of Russia, decides not to chal-
In a country which is already seventy-
lenge him. In that case, Yeltsin could savor
seventh in the world in terms of personal
the exquisite revenge of watching his nemesis
consumption, these economic abstractions
struggling as the head of a disintegrating
have translated into another turn of a down-
Soviet Union.
ward spiral-this time perilously close to the
If such elections do not materialize by the
bottom. Of 211 essential food products,
end of the year, three other scenarios suggest
Vassily Selunin reports in Glasnost, only 23
themselves. The first is a democratic, procap-
were available at state stores as of last sum-
italist revolution that would finish what Gor-
mer-and perhaps even fewer now. In order
bachev started but took too long to complete.
to buy children's soap in a department store
The second is an authoritarian, anticapitalist,
in the ancient Russian city of Kostroma, one
anti-Western, "neo-Bolshevik" revolution.
must show a stamp in one's internal passport
And third: a KGB-military junta of "national
to prove that one has children under three
salvation." While Yeltsin's role in the third
years old.
case is hard to imagine, except as that of a
victim, he is well-positioned to occupy a
T
HE SOVIET UNION'S only
prominent, perhaps even central, place in the
chance to win the deadly race
other two.
with a total economic collapse and violent
In public opinion polls, Yeltsin is second
political anarchy is a government vested with
only to Gorbachev in popularity, while his
authority and having enough legitimacy to
"negatives" are even slightly lower than those
administer the very bitter pill of radical eco-
of the president. He has little advertised but
nomic reform. The creation of such a govern-
strong and growing ties to the military-
ment is the central and most urgent issue of
another source of the intelligentsia's concern.
Soviet politics today. Gorbachev's much
During his campaign for nomination to the
touted "grab" for the "emergency powers" of
Congress of People's Deputies, Yeltsin was
the presidency is thus irrelevant. Back in
ferreted about the country in military planes.
March 1985, as the newly elected chief of the
He is a key organizer of the Democratic
country's sole and dictatorial political party,
Front, one of whose institutional members is
Gorbachev had immeasurably more real
Shchit (or Shield), a union of radical "left"
power than any presidency could procure
officers. A Russian "Red Carnations" revolu-
him. Today, his "emergency" power may
tion led by the junior military, à la the April
best be compared to that of the captain of the
25, 1975, revolution in Portugal, is a very
Titanic.
Neither the Congress of People's Depu-
ties-a third of whose delegates were ap-
⁵Egor Gaidar, "Trudny vibor" ("The hard choice"),
pointed by the party-controlled "social orga-
Kommunist (January 1990), p. 25.
46
The National Interest-Summer 1990
plausible subscenario of a democratic revolu-
pionship volleyball player, is fully recovered
tion.
from his post-plenum breakdown. He gets up
But would Yeltsin lead a populist revolt?
at five, reads till seven, does his calisthenics,
His critics say he very well might. They
takes a cold shower, and works until one in
point out, for example, his flirtation with
the morning. (On his U.S. tour last fall,
Pamyat, the nationalist, neo-Bolshevik orga-
Yeltsin challenged President Bush to a tennis
nization whose representatives he met during
match.)
his tenure in Moscow. (Yeltsin claims that he
In speeches and interviews in the United
met with the Pamyat demonstrators, who
States last September, Yeltsin repeated over
occupied Red Square, only because he
and over again that Gorbachev has at most a
wished to defuse a tense situation and prevent
year to improve the economic situation-or
police crackdown.) A more serious, and per-
vacate the space at the top for a more success-
suasive, argument in favor of Yeltsin-
ful politician. "If not, then what happens?"
the-authoritarian stems from the ill-defined
asked Jim Lehrer last September. "A revolu-
nature of his objectives. What does he want
tion from below will begin," answered
beyond the elimination of privileges, the dis-
Yeltsin.
solution of the apparat, and the effective abo-
Half a year later, Yeltsin told the Associ-
lition of the party monopoly on power? The
ated Press:
character of his constituency and its mood
give rise to gloomy predictions, like those of
The time of compromises and half-measures is
Andronik Migranian in Novy Mir:
past. We are sitting on top of a volcano, and
very soon neither Gorbachev, nor anyone else
The past is shameful, the present is monstrous,
will be able to control the events. The people
and the future cannot be defined, cannot be
will take their fate in their own hands, as it
predicted. In such a psychological state the
happened in Eastern Europe. If we are lucky,
masses are ready to accept any leader who will
everything will happen orderly, as in GDR,
say: "I know what to do and how to do it." And
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. But what hap-
the Yeltsin phenomenon
is
explained
pens if the situation develops in the Rumanian
by this psychological condition of the people.
pattern? Bloodshed? Tragedy?
The popular mood that has made Yeltsin
the populist leader is very dangerous.
Fur-
"Would you like to be President of the Soviet
ther deterioration of the general situation in the
Union some day?" Jim Lehrer pressed him.
country will further widen the circle of the
"It's a possibility," Yeltsin answered, "if I am
"decisive" people ready to support any leader
not too old and have strength."
offering simple, quick and effective decision in
Dr. Johnson is said to have remarked
the name of social justice. [But] the course on
about Lord Chesterfield: "This man, I
re-distribution of the present goods is a course
into the blind alley of a new slavery. Soon there
thought, had been a Lord among wits, but, I
will be nothing left to redistribute. And terror
find, he is only a wit among Lords." Only
will follow.
time will tell whether Boris Nikolaevich
Yeltsin is a democrat among the populists or
But whichever of the two scenarios Yeltsin
only an authoritarian populist among the
would prefer, he is ready for battle. The
democrats. Now we may not have to wait
strapping six-footer, a former national cham-
long to find out.
Waiting for Yeltsin
47
The
Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
(202) 546-4400
Telex: 440235-HRTG UI
Cable: HERITAGE, WASHDC
Fax: (202) 546-8328
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STATE
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs
Office of the Director
Washington, D.C. 20530
The following 16 -page transmission is for the attention
of Peggy Dorley
e
Please contact him/her
immediately at
.
It is from
of the Office of Public
Affairs.
Please contact
if there is a problem in
transmission. FTS 368-2007 or 202-514-2007.
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Department of Justice
"THE RULE OF LAW IN THE SOVIET UNION:
A NECESSARY FRAMEWORK FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM"
REMARKS
BY
DICK THORNBURGH
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
BEFORE THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION
WASHINGTON, DC
TUESDAY, JULY 10, 1990
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Whether or not the present 28th Communist Party Congress in
Moscow is, as some predict and more hope, a true precursor to the
"withering away of the party," the extraordinary debate which is
taking place in that forum parallels in important ways President
Gorbachev's stated desire to create a "law-based state" -- a
Soviet Union founded on the rule of law.
Heritage Analyst Leon Aron has identified the creation of "a
government vested with authority and having enough legitimacy to
administer the very bitter pill of radical economic reform.
.as
the central and most urgent issue of Soviet politics today."
It is my view, in the context of recent exchanges between
the Department of Justice and our Soviet counterparts, that the
rule of law is the only basis upon which such a government can
eventuate from the upheaval presently under way in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe.
Our October 1989 trip to the Soviet Union -- the very first
by a sitting United States Attorney General -- occurred at the
very beginning of the Supreme Soviet's effort at institutional
reform and enabled us to open an historic, and continuing,
dialogue on the rule of law and human rights.
It was a remarkable experience. At the invitation of Soviet
Minister of Justice, Venyamin F. Yakovlev, we met for a week with
Soviet leaders in the fields of law enforcement and the
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administration of justice -- ministers, jurists, law students,
even the Chief of the K.G.B., Vladimir Kryuchkov. Our agenda was
a full one, devoted to topics central to what makes our democracy
work: our Bill of Rights, our federal system, the principle of
separation of powers, with its checks and balances, our two-party
political process -- all from that curriculum of liberties we
teach (but don't always learn) in our basic high school civics
courses.
And I have to credit our Soviet hosts, even at that early
juncture, with a bold exercise. our political discussions were
open and free-ranging, covering everything from our mutual
interest in stopping international terrorism to their obligation
-- as we see it, and they increasingly recognize it --to allow
freer emigration of Soviet Jews. But our talks still took place
within an historical legal context that must be understood, if
their present difficulties are to be fully recognized, or ever
surmounted.
To summarize abruptly a great deal of history, Soviet
justice derives from three legal traditions: customary law among
the peasantry, the imperial law of the Czars, and, much later,
the Romanist law of civil codes. Customary and imperial law have
had by far the overwhelming impact, creating a government of men
above the law, from the Mongols to the boyars to the Czars and
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beyond. Various formal codifications of imperial law did appear.
But the operative legal power was still vested in what we
commonly know as the ukase. "A proclamation of a Russian Czar,"
as Webster's says, "having the force of law."
This violently changed - yet did not really change - when
the Bolsheviks came to power. Initially Lenin abolished imperial
law, along with private property, and set up the people's courts.
Judges were instructed to follow the decrees of the revolution --
or their "socialist conscience." Later, Lenin and his successors
moved to keep authoritarian sway over the courts by what became
known as "telephone justice." Party officials frequently rang up
judges, who then ruled in particular cases according to what the
party told them to do. The ukase had been reduced, by 20th
century technology, to a phone call. The legalistic way was
prepared for Stalin's Moscow show trials during the Great Terror
and, thereafter, the habitual subordination of the law to party
interests.
Against this unpromising background, so-called "new
thinkers" in the Soviet Union have now embarked upon what appears
to be a truly idealistic and laudable attempt to establish the
rule of law -- or in Gorbachev's words, a "law-based state."
Could it actually happen? So often you hear it optimistically
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said: remember that Mikhail Gorbachev was trained as a lawyer.
Yes, but so was Lenin.
The chances are certainly there -- as we saw during that
week, and continue to see as we visit with Soviet officials and
lawyers, both here and in the Soviet Union. Indeed, we are
presently preparing for a return visit by Minister Yakovlev next
month to extend our dialogue on democracy. But chances of
success in this endeavor must always be measured against the long
fatigues of history --- the institutional neglect and political
disrespect for what we know as the rule of law.
What is really missing is what might be called a "legal
culture." Time and again, for example, we found an almost naive
belief that all that was needed was to pass the correct statutes,
to get the right laws on the books to create a "rule of law." We
did our best to try to disabuse them of this legalistic and
somewhat simplistic notion. Laws on the books, we explained,
must be conscientiously obeyed and impartially enforced within a
structure, and through a process, recognized and acknowledged by
all. .citizen and bureaucrat alike.
The rule of law works in a democracy, we pointed out,
because of the supremacy of the judiciary, because men adhere to
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a government of laws, and act to see that the laws are enforced,
in such ways that no man is above -- or below -- the law.
Happily, the very things the Russians found most curious
about our democracy let us discuss those practices in our law
that really make our democratic process work. Our Ambassador to
the U.S.S.R., Jack Matlock, reports this phenomenon is common --
as Soviet citizens seek him out to gain insight into the
functioning of the most basic of American institutions. Soviets
quiz him on remarkably practical questions. If the Russians are
writing a law on the press, they might query, for example, "How
do Americans treat libel law? What can your press say? What can
it not say?"
One of the first, most insistent questions I was asked by
nearly everyone was, inevitably, a constitutional one: how does
your federal system work? How did you weld together the separate
states as the United States? How do you keep things from falling
apart through incessant struggles between the national government
and 50 different state governments?
Obviously, they are worrying about the unrest among their
own Republics. You only need look at the independence movements
in Lithuania and the other Baltic states -- as well as similar
secessionist rumblings in the Republic of Russia, under Boris
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Yeltsin, and most recently, in Uzbekistan -- to understand their
anxiety. They are also looking to us for ways, if you will, to
deal with their own diversity.
We gave them a very pragmatic answer. We did our best to
explain, "Look, this is the way we do it, but the central thing
about our system is its accommodation to change. Most of the
mechanisms and components of our government are designed to
accommodate change. And mastering that process is going to
require far more than just the passage of new laws by the Supreme
Soviet. " It is going to take a commitment to the lawful,
democratic process, and we tried to emphasize legal process --
due process of law --- even over substantive rights, as the true
safeguard of the people's liberties.
Again, they asked us often, and in much confusion, about the
separation of powers. The idea of deliberately building in a
tension between separate branches of government - our concept of
checks and balances -- was extremely puzzling to them and, to
some, incomprehensible. Accustomed to their own monolithic
system, they would have to struggle hard to understand, for
example, Justice Brandeis' observation that we adopted the
separation of powers in 1787 "not to avoid friction, but by means
of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of
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7 I I
government powers among the [branches], to save the people from
autocracy."
We called attention to their own guarantees of civil rights
under the Soviet constitution. There they are, all fully
documented, like our own Bill of Rights. Only there is also the
carefully worded escape clause: "Civil rights shall be protected
by law --" Just as our rule of law would hold -- but with this
kicker. "-- Except as they are exercised in contradiction to
their purpose in socialist society in the period of communist
construction."
That, of course, admits the ubiquitous specter of party
tyranny. Attempts are being made to toss this offensive language
off the train by the new thinkers. But it's not litter down the
tracks of history yet. And still to come is the real test as to
whether the Soviet courts themselves can and will act to protect
the people's rights. In short, will respect for legal process
eliminate the prior abuses of "telephone justice"?
True reform must reach down into the legal culture itself,
and create an inherent respect not only for individual rights,
but for legal procedure and due process. In a statement before
the Communist Party Congress last Monday, K.G.B. Chief Kryuchkov
affirmed this elemental truth:
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We cannot speak in favor of the universal development of
democracy and at the same time refrain from speaking in
favor of law and order, and the supremacy of the law. A
society which allows the law to be mocked is a diseased
society
Fine words indeed, but one problem is that much of the motivation
for legal reform is coming from a different direction altogether.
The Soviets face one great, dire urgency -- besides national
unrest - and that is their economy. To survive, they must enter
the free world marketplace. To do that, they realize they must
position themselves to recognize -- and take advantage of -- the
rules of free commerce. The rule of law is the fundamental
prerequisite for turning away from a command economy -- to a
market economy.
One of the Soviets' principal reasons for their great
interest in the rule of law is just that -- they have an
immediate and pressing need to jump-start their participation in
the world economy, to attract foreign know-how and investment.
To do that, they realize they must display the predictability and
stability that can only emerge from a body of commercial law --
which, in turn, respects the sanctity of contracts and, yes,
recognizes property rights as well. Fear of abrogation of
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contract rights or expropriation of investments can stunt
otherwise attractive commercial and industrial initiatives.
This is one reason why property rights have been so hotly
debated in the Soviet Union. A young reformer, whom my wife and
I met last year, Ilya Saslavski, is involved in a property battle
which typifies the disputes taking place on a local level across
the Soviet Union. Saslavski, an elected member of the Congress
of Peoples' Deputies, who is visiting here this week, has
announced the take-over -- for ordinary families -- of an
apartment building built for the party elite. Though the
controversy will be settled in court, such a confrontation would
never have been attempt were Saslavski not assured of a
favorable hearing from
ro-reform judge. The action taken by
Saslavski is but one manifestation of the myriad crises arising
as local leaders vie for power in the Communist system which has
an endemic antagonism to property rights reform.
On the very day we visited the Supreme Soviet agency a semi-
democratically elected legislature, and a developing seat of
power -- debate on the subject of property rights went on
seemingly endlessly, and with very good cause. The Soviet
Constitution says that property belongs to the state alone. But
might such state property be legally leased to cooperative, joint
ventures? And how does a Soviet citizen without ownership "act
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like an owner," as Gorbachev has instructed, or even enjoy
"something close to ownership" as espoused by Boris Yeltsin?
As
we watched, the late Dr. Andrei Sakharov, among others, rose to
voice his objections to the Government's bill. Finally, two
bills, partially in conflict, were sent off to a commission for a
further massaging
which continues to this day.
Adept legal accommodation can also be seen in the
liberalization of their emigration policies. We are convinced
they are now doing their legal utmost to facilitate the issuance
of emigration visas -- as a new exodus follows hard upon a rise
in anti-semitism in Russia -- but, here again, their interest is
not wholly altruistic. They would like to meet the strictures of
our Jackson-Vanik legislation in order to secure the most-favored
nation status that would much enhance their prestige in world
markets.
Still, we must be convinced -- as in so much else undertaken
in the name of Soviet legal reform -- that not just the letter,
but the spirit, of the law has taken root in the Soviet Union.
That is the essence of the agreement reached between Presidents
Bush and Gorbachev during the recent summit, that any trade
agreement remains contingent upon legislative action by the
Supreme Soviet in support of free, emigration. We are, in short,
watching to see that opportunities to emigrate are
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institutionalized in law and practice, and are not just episodic,
in the present uncertain flux of Soviet democratization.
All that being said, at the same time, I do not want to
downplay their efforts to achieve the rule of law, or
underestimate the modern-day difficulties of democratization.
Two hundred years ago, we could call upon our English, common law
heritage, and an American over-abundance of legal talent, to
create our written Constitution, even in crisis. Also, we were
then only four million, relatively homogeneous Americans, mostly
concentrated on the Atlantic Coast -- not 290 million multi-
cultured Soviet citizens, spread across eleven time zones.
Moreover, our Constitutional Convention deliberated in secret --
not under glasnost. Imagine, if you will, George Washington on
worldwide television, in the midst of a currency crisis, trying
to suppress Shay's Rebellion, letting Vermont and New Hampshire
pursue Yankeeism in their own way, negotiating with Quaker
Solidarity, while trying to cut an arms deal with the British and
French to put a cap on heavy frigates. George Washington, you
will recall, said not one single word while presiding at
Philadelphia.
The Soviets suffer all the drawbacks of history, including
their own, most recent, flawed history. But do they now
recognize these flaws, particularly in law, and do they sincerely
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institutionalized in law and practice, and are not just episodic,
in the present uncertain flux of Soviet democratization.
All that being said, at the same time, I do not want to
downplay their efforts to achieve the rule of law, or
underestimate the modern-day difficulties of democratization.
Two hundred years ago, we could call upon our English, common law
heritage, and an American over-abundance of legal talent, to
create our written Constitution, even in crisis. Also, we were
then only four million, relatively homogeneous Americans, mostly
concentrated on the Atlantic Coast -- not 290 million multi-
cultured Soviet citizens, spread across eleven time zones.
Moreover, our Constitutional Convention deliberated in secret --
not under glasnost. Imagine, if you will, George Washington on
worldwide television, in the midst of a currency crisis, trying
to suppress Shay's Rebellion, letting Vermont and New Hampshire
pursue Yankeeism in their own way, negotiating with Quaker
Solidarity, while trying to cut an arms deal with the British and
French to put a cap on heavy frigates. George Washington, you
will recall, said not one single word while presiding at
Philadelphia.
The Soviets suffer all the drawbacks of history, including
their own, most recent, flawed history. But do they now
recognize these flaws, particularly in law, and do they sincerely
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Hazard of Columbia Law School says -- is another John Marshall to
arrive on the scene and guide their deliberations.
So there appears to be a will to a rule of law, if still
much wandering in pursuit of untried, democratic ways. Going for
such high stakes means that it is far too early to determine
their chances of success. But I do remind you of two highly
successful, post-war experiments in democratic reformations:
Germany and Japan. Again, there are large differences in
national circumstances - whole histories, wartime sufferings,
other relevant factors. But we have seen the political
adaptability of West German democracy overcome many obstacles
from the totalitarian German past, and witnessed -- sometimes to
our chagrin -- the Japanese experiment's continuing, modern
triumph over centuries of emperor-worship. And both experiments
were undertaken in similar adversity: by an undone people -- even
a conquered people -- in economic extremis, at a moment of deep
disillusionment with their own society. Could something far
different, yet alike, happen again? For the sake of world
harmony, we can hope so, while also providing whatever
encouragement is possible.
One final, positive observation. In 1979, when I visited
the Soviet Union as a state governor, I found each official
session invariably opened with an almost obligatory denunciation
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of the United States and our system of government. Ten years
later, nearly every meeting with our counterparts began with a
litany of woes -- their recitation of the shortcomings of their
system -- and an almost wistful yearning for more knowledge about
how our democracy works.
so I come away from my most recent visit to the Soviet Union
-- and our subsequent contacts with their legal delegations --
well aware that Soviet justice does not yet embody what we know
as the rule of law, but convinced that patience and example, and
even some advocacy, might help certain determined Soviet
officials to establish their rule of law.
Like everybody else's democratic experiment, it will have to
be attempted and achieved within their own society. If ever we
needed dramatic reinforcement of that truth, it has come from the
recent elections in Eastern Europe. On the one hand, East
Germany has all but reunited with West Germany after its first
free parliamentary election in four decades. on the other hand,
Romania seems to have reverted to a government-sponsored
vigilantism in the streets following the electorate's return to
office of former Communists.
We cannot count upon constitutionalism simply to arise as
virtue triumphant from the totalitarian ruins of Europe. Even
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where constitutionalism seems likely to prevail, the rule of law
will be formalized differently by the Czechs, or the Poles, or
the Hungarians -- and most certainly, by the Russians. Nobody
else but their own judges, lawyers, ministers and citizens can
evolve the judicial fairness and institute the legal restraint
that underpin any rule of law. And it is only inherent respect
for the law -- such as we have seen people steadfastly demanding
in the open squares and open parliaments and newly open societies
- that will bring to a tolerable end the last vestiges of
tyranny in these formerly closed Communist monoliths.
In sum, only the rule of law can provide a sturdy bridge
over the yawning political chasm between upheaval and democracy.
And we will know it when, and if, it appears. By the human
rights the rule of law protects, by the governmental powers it
limits, by the judicial independence it preserves. We will know
it, constitutionally, when we see it. After more than two
hundred years of experience and experiment on our own -- who
better to judge its emergence elsewhere?
Center for Strategic & International Studies Conference
The 1990s: Critical Change
1 April 1989
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Gorbachev and Critical Change in the Soviet Union:
Implications for the West
It is an honor to speak to this distinguished audience
examining critical change in the 1990s. I can think of no more
appropriate or timely topic, for we are in a truly extraordinary
period. Europe is moving steadily toward greater economic and
political integration in 1992. Authoritarian governments from the
Philippines and the Republic of Korea in the East to Latin America
in the West are giving way to democracy. China is in the midst of
a momentous reform program, and, in the Soviet Union, a revolution
from above has been launched, albeit with no assurance it will
succeed. Capitalism and democracy are ascendant; economic
statism and political despotism are in retreat.
1
There has been a remarkable change in the relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union over the past two
years, including the signing of the Treaty on Intermediate Range
Nuclear Forces. The Soviets have announced a first and important
step toward reducing their overwhelming conventional force
advantage in Europe. Conventional force reduction negotiations
opened last month and negotiations on strategic force reductions
will resume in the near future. A Sino-Soviet Summit is scheduled
for mid-May. The Soviets have withdrawn from Afghanistan, the
Vietnamese may be leaving Cambodia, and a settlement getting the
Cubans and South Africans out of Angola has been negotiated.
Exhausted, Iraq and Iran have agreed to and are, in the main,
observing a ceasefire. Structural change is reshaping international
economic relationships in dramatic ways.
Accordingly, critical change in the 1990s is a most appropriate
subject. It certainly is a subject with which the Bush Administration
has been preoccupied for the last two months. Resisting the siren
song of the quick fix and the big headline, we actually are trying to
think about the 1990s -- to absorb and understand the many
2
changes that have taken place in recent years, those that are still
underway, and those that are only just above the horizon of the
future. Our task, then, is to devise policies that look to the end of
the century and beyond. We are working to develop economic,
political, military and arms control strategies that are grounded in
reality and yet build upon opportunities for constructive, stabilizing
change. We see opportunities to expand freedom, to strengthen
both peace and security at lower levels of military forces, to
enhance economic growth and extend it, and to promote
international cooperation on such common problems as terrorism,
drugs, the environment, and the spread of chemical and biological
weapons and the means to deliver them.
Seizing such opportunities requires preparation and planning.
Too often the energies and time of senior officials are consumed
day in and day out by the crisis of the moment -- a diplomatic
demarche, a newspaper story, a Congressional hearing, a
bureaucratic dispute or a multitude of other short-term
preoccupations. We in government, as a rule, spend too little time
thinking about and planning for the future. We spend too little time
reflecting on history and experience; we neglect strategy for tactics.
3
The Bush Administration is trying to resist this. Accordingly, our
reviews of the international setting and our policies are focused on
the development of long range strategy. Failure to take stock, to
understand, to look ahead, and to plan would ensure failure to seize
the opportunities we see now and discern in the future.
This brings me to the Soviet Union. On this subject, more
than on any other, there has been speculation about the views of
the new administration and directions the President will take. We
have heard such nuanced and sophisticated questions as "Should
we help Gorbachev" -- and we have resisted the temptation of
monosyllabic answers. I expect our Soviet review to be complete
very soon. This afternoon, rather than focus prematurely on
possible outcomes or specific policies, I want to share with you the
framework within which we approach the Soviet-American
relationship.
We do live in a time of dramatic change -- change that now
has spread to the Soviet Union. The failure of a system of
government -- economic, political, social and moral failure -- is a
powerful inducement to dramatic departures from the past, to
4
unprecedented distancing from many of the precepts that have
guided the system for so long. It is the self-evident failure of the
Soviet system, and the absolute imperative to change it, that form
Gorbachev's mandate, are his primary sources of political support,
shape his radicalism, and cause us all to wonder if the wheel of
history is at last about to turn for that vast empire. Regardless of
the substantial odds against him, we take seriously Gorbachev's
determination to modernize the Soviet economy. We applaud the
measures he has taken to increase openness in the press, to ease
restrictions on religion, to take the first faltering steps toward
democratization, and to contribute constructively to settling certain
international disputes. We welcome his commitment to reduce
Soviet conventional forces and to pursue a further relaxation of
tensions and arms control. These are all positive steps, and they
have led to widespread hope and optimism. We, too, are hopeful.
At the same time, long term policy must not be based on
hopes, but on past experience, present realities and future
probabilities - as well as possibilities. Just as I believe we must try
to look well into to the future in developing foreign policy, I also
advocate looking to the past -- examining the historical record for
5
insights pertinent to the future. This is especially true with respect
to the Soviet Union, where Western views too often are shaped by
the latest leadership change, pronouncement or enticing proposal.
Looking back over one's shoulder with respect to the USSR is
not for the faint hearted. What we see, above all, is a system of
rule that over a seventy year period has brought to the peoples of
the old Russian empire suffering on a scale previously unknown in
human history. Mentioning this often elicits a reaction similar to a
display of bad manners at a dinner party or a dismissive gesture
suggesting the irrelevance of this past to our future. Commonly, the
horrors of Soviet history are blamed on Stalin, both within and
outside of the Soviet Union. Yet, I believe it essential for us today
to understand that this record is not confined to the Stalin era
alone, was not the doing of a single demented leader, but covers
the entirety of Soviet history, and is the product of the very nature
of the system itself.
Soviet history did not begin in the Spring of 1985. A brief
reminder of the record and of the cycles in that record are useful,
even for an audience as well informed as this one.
6
--
Under Lenin, 10 million people were killed in the civil war from
1918 to 1920, and another 5 million died in the War
Communism famine of 1921-22. In 1921, in the midst of
catastrophe, Lenin set a precedent for his successors by
retreating, falling back to tried and true methods of economic
growth - private markets, small private business,
denationalization, and legalization of private trade. By 1923, 83
percent of retail trade had been privatized. Whether the New
Economic Policy and associated measures would have endured
had Lenin lived is one of those finally unanswerable questions.
Regardless, Lenin himself admitted, "We showed quite clearly
that we cannot run the economy." Truer and more prophetic
words were never spoken. While economic policy might have
turned out rather differently, I believe Lenin contemplated no
such flexibility in terms of politics -- the controlling monopoly
of the Communist party.
Meanwhile, in another precedent important for the future, as
early as 1920-21, facing disastrous internal problems, Lenin
turned to the West for help, signing trade treaties with Britain,
7
Norway, Italy and Sweden and obtaining a major loan from
France. By 1921, the American Relief Administration was
feeding nearly 10 million Soviet citizens.
--
Under Stalin, another 14 million people died from 1928 to 1937
-- the war against the peasants. Countless more were killed in
the Great Terror, as Stalin first purged the Party and then the
military to eliminate opposition, both real and imagined. By
the late 1930s, some 12 million people were in forced labor
camps. Constant terror and periodic purges were
characteristic of the Soviet regime to the very end of Stalin's
life in 1953.
At the same time, Stalin eagerly and successfully sought
foreign assistance for the Soviet regime from the United States,
Britain, Germany, Italy and France. The majority of the largest
Soviet power plants before the war were built by the British
firm Metropolitan-Vickers; western companies designed, built
and equipped the industrial complexes at Magnitogorsk and
Kuznetsk as well as the Urals Machine Works, and many more.
The great Dnepr dam was built by the firm of Colonel Hugh
8
Cooper, an American hydraulic engineer. And, yet, during the
period before the war the Soviet Union intervened in the
Spanish Civil War, invaded Finland, and with Hitler's blessing
seized the Baltic States and carved up Poland. I need hardly
mention Soviet expansionism in Europe, Southwest Asia and
East Asia in the immediate post-war period.
-- Khrushchev, as described by the emigre historians Heller and
Nekrich, demonstrated that the system could forego mass
terror without altering the Stalinist socialist state. This more
selective terror stopped at the doors of the Central Committee
as Khrushchev released millions from Stalin's camps but soon
began refilling them. The means of intimidation became more
sophisticated with the use of psychiatric incarcerations and
other punishments.
Domestic reform again became the order of the day as
Khrushchev moved to decentralize and modernize the
economy, made management more flexible and eased
pressures on the rural population. Under Khrushchev, the
Soviet authorities declared their intention to increase
9
production of consumer goods and food. They again turned to
private plots in agriculture and espoused the need for material
relief of the people. He launched an anti-corruption campaign,
sought to have senior party officials elected by secret ballot to
limited terms of office, and tried to limit the privileges of senior
officials. And in 1962, the Liberman economic reforms were
begun with the central theme that profitability would be the
main criterion for gauging the economic performance of
enterprises.
Remember the "Thaw" of the 1950s -- the first and last time to
this day that a work of Alexander Solzenitsyn has been
published in the USSR? A new openness emerged as the
central newspapers published thousands of complaints about
the arbitrariness of local leaders and demands for legality.
And, of course, Khrushchev exposed many of the crimes of the
Stalin period.
Meanwhile the new Soviet leaders moved immediately to
normalize relations -- to establish a detente -- with the United
States and the West. The Korean Armistice was signed in July
10
1953, a cease fire was quickly agreed in Indochina and in
1955, Soviet forces left Austria. Eisenhower and Khrushchev
met in Geneva and the Soviet leader visited the United States.
Khrushchev unilaterally reduced conventional military forces by
1.8 million men between 1955 and 1957. There was much talk
of the end of the cold war. Yet, during this period the Soviets
crushed revolts in East Germany and Hungary, built and
deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles for the first time,
sent some of those missiles to Cuba, precipitated several
dangerous crises in Berlin and built the Berlin Wall.
--
The popular impression of the Brezhnev period, reinforced by
Gorbachev, is one of doddering old men presiding ineffectively
and incompetently over a stagnating economy while pursuing
detente and arms control with the West. This is Western
historical amnesia and Soviet selectivity, if not disinformation.
In 1965, the Soviet leaders already knew their economy was in
serious difficulty. They ratified many of Khrushchev's
economic reforms, with the Liberman concepts at the core.
The leadership turned again to the law of supply and demand,
11
material incentives and broad autonomy. Premier Kosygin
tried to implement significant reforms, but plainly Brezhnev and
the rest of the Politburo had little interest in paying any
political, economic or social price to pursue reform. Then, as
now, they tried to reconcile the irreconcilable: to enlarge the
rights of individual enterprises and also restore the power of
the central economic ministries.
By the late sixties, twin crises enveloped the USSR -- a
political crisis reflecting the nationalities problem, and an
economic crisis as growth decreased sharply. Brezhnev
needed a breathing spell and, as so often in Soviet history,
outside assistance. The West was happy to oblige.
Relationships with Europe and the United States blossomed.
Tensions relaxed, warmer relationships were cultivated with
European countries, the Quadripartite Treaty on Berlin was
concluded, the first SALT Treaty and many narrower technical
agreements were signed with the US, and Western trade,
credits and technology flowed.
Yet, consider what Brezhnev was up to elsewhere during this
12
same period. His was the regime that invaded Czechoslovakia
in 1968 and crushed the Prague Spring. The Western
reaction? President Johnson said, "We hope - and we shall
strive - to make this setback a temporary one." The then
French Foreign Minister said it was "an unpleasant incident
along the road." The next year, the Soviets attacked China
along the Ussuri River and dropped heavy hints, including in
Washington, that a nuclear attack against China was under
consideration. Recklessly or intentionally, the Soviets helped
provoke the 1967 Middle East War. In the mid-1970s, they
supported Cuban surrogate forces in Angola and Ethiopia.
The same leaders toasted in the West provided the wherewithal
for North Vietnam's final conquest of the South, underwrote the
Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, and sold $12 billion worth
of weapons to Libya. In 1979, Brezhnev ordered the invasion
of Afghanistan. In 1980-81, this leadership forced the
imposition of martial law in Poland and the suppression of
Solidarity. And, all of this took place against the backdrop of
the greatest peacetime military buildup in history.
We also have too easily forgotten the wave of internal
13
repression inside the Soviet Union during this period. In 1965,
there were mass arrests of those involved in nationalist
movements in the Ukraine, Lithuania and the Transcaucasus.
The first show trials since Stalin convicted Sinyavsky and
Daniel in 1966 for slandering the Soviet state. Political trials
all over the USSR followed -- in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev,
Lvov, Gorky, Riga, Tashkent and Omsk. Remember Aleksandr
Ginzburg, Pavel Litvinov, Yuri Galanskov and all the others?
By the late 1970s, the KGB had destroyed the dissident and
human rights movements.
--
Finally, Andropov, as head of the KGB architect of the
suppression of dissent. His contribution as General Secretary
to solving the Soviet crisis? Tighter discipline, a call to arms
against "consumer instincts," squeezing the fat out of the
economy - but not a single substantial reform. During his
fifteen months in the top job, we saw wide scale arrests of
dissidents, Baptists, Jews and many others.
I offer this thumbnail sketch of Soviet history to underscore
that our view of the Soviet Union cannot be based on the
14
personality of one or another leader, but must be based on the
nature of the Soviet system itself. We face a deeply entrenched
philosophy and system of government that to date has depended
upon repression at home and promoted aggression beyond its
borders. It is the Soviet system itself, and the 70 year continuity we
see from leader to leader, from Lenin to Chernenko, and even
Gorbachev, that shapes our view of the USSR. Gorbachev is
challenging some aspects of this system but even he acknowledges
he has not yet significantly changed it. We cannot ignore Soviet
history or the apparent strength and durability of the system that
produced it. Nor can we ignore the cyclical turn to reform, "detente"
and foreign assistance each time the system has hovered on the
brink of catastrophe or fallen into it.
Le Monde has said, "One cannot minimize the scope of this
reform. By every available measure, it is without doubt of the first
importance It will have major consequences if it runs its course.
Gradually, the entire Soviet system of planning will be overturned."
Regrettably, those words were published in December 1964.
In important respects, Gorbachev has made quite clear he has
15
no intention of dismantling fundamental features of the system.
There will be no political party but the Communist Party, as
demonstrated by the prompt crushing of the Democratic Union. The
economy is, and will remain, governed by political decisions. Rights
are granted by the Party to the people. Glasnost is a grant,
possibly temporary, from Gorbachev to the Soviet people suited to
his own political needs and purposes. Indeed, it seems clear that
Gorbachev turned to political reform only because he concluded that
it had become necessary to achieve his economic objectives.
Moreover, we cannot make long-term decisions and devise
strategies affecting freedom and the future that depend on the
continued political (or even physical) survival of one man. Indeed,
not a leader in the West goes to bed unaware that he or she could
wake up to a new Soviet counterpart. Unlike any Western or other
modern state, politics at the highest level in the Kremlin today are
as hidden from public view as in generations past. Much has
changed, but more that is fundamental remains the same.
In sum, we proceed with care and prudence because we are
dealing with a system where the roots of oppression, aggression,
16
and secrecy are deep, because for seventy years we repeatedly
have seen a system in crisis proclaim reform and turn to the West
for help while the essential features of that system at the end of the
day remained unchanged.
Prudence, however, is not synonymous with inaction. Nor is
wariness to be equated with pessimism and cynicism. It would be
the worst sort of myopia not to recognize that profound changes are
underway in the Soviet Union. There is a degree of openness and
vigor of political debate in the USSR unknown since the days of the
first (or February) revolution in 1917. Indeed, we need only reflect
on the openness of debate at the Party Conference last summer or
the elections this last week. (Who could not be amazed at the
defeat of the Leningrad Party Chief, who ran unopposed, or the
demonstration of support for Boris Yeltsin?) In a number of areas --
Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, conventional force reductions,
various aspects of arms control, China - we are seeing the Soviets
change their policies, abandon old positions, and remove
themselves from longstanding dead-ends. We do see "new thinking"
in some areas, although in others -- as in Central America and the
Middle East -- the old ways of thinking and behavior remain.
17
We are generally encouraged by what we see. Maybe this
time things will be different. The changes plainly offer opportunities
-- opportunities for further reducing tensions, for enhancing strategic
stability, for promoting human rights and democracy, for arms
control, and for cooperation on transnational issues such as the
environment, narcotics trafficking, and stopping the proliferation of
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
Ironically, given Gorbachev's priorities, the pace of some
aspects of political change is far outstripping economic
modernization and performance. Indeed, what Gorbachev has set in
motion represents a political earthquake. He is pulling all of the
levers of change in a society and culture that historically has
resisted change -- and where change usually has been violent and
wrenching. He is a figure of enormous historical importance. The
forces he has unleashed are powerful but so are the people and
institutions he has antagonized -- thus setting in motion a
tremendous power struggle and purge no less dramatic for the
absence of show trials and terror. The outcome is by no means
clear, and prolonged turbulence seems certain.
18
Gorbachev seeks a system in which some -- though certainly
not all -- elements of the Stalinist economic structure and
bureaucracy are eliminated thus opening the way to greater
flexibility and innovation and thereby to modernization and improved
performance. However, elections notwithstanding, Gorbachev's
Leninism still means the continued political monopoly of the
Communist Party. Gorbachev's dictatorship of the Communist Party
remains untouched and untouchable. He seeks still a system based
on the same Leninist political principles that guided his
predecessors. As he said in 1987, "We will not retreat an inch from
the path of socialism, of Marxism-Leninism."
Westerners for centuries have hoped repeatedly that Russian
economic modernization and political reform -- even revolution --
signaled an end to despotism. Repeatedly since 1917, the West has
hoped that domestic changes in the USSR would lead to changes in
Communist coercive rule at home and aggressiveness abroad.
These hopes, dashed time and again, have been revived by
Gorbachev's radical domestic agenda, innovative foreign policy and
personal style.
19
Enduring characteristics of Soviet governance at home and
policy abroad make it clear that -- while the changes underway offer
opportunities for a relaxation of tensions and for cooperation in
many areas -- Gorbachev intends improved Soviet economic
performance, greater political vitality at home, and more dynamic
diplomacy to make the USSR a more competitive and stronger
adversary in the years ahead.
What we seek is a Soviet Union that is pluralistic internally,
non-interventionist externally, observes basic human rights,
contributes to international stability and tranquility, and a Soviet
Union where these changes are more than an edict from the top
and are independent of the views, power and durability of a single
individual. We can hope for such change but all of Russian and
Soviet history tells us to be skeptical and cautious.
We cannot -- and should not -- close our eyes to momentous
developments in the USSR. But we should not make concessions
based on hope and popular enthusiasms in the West or attractive
personalities in the USSR. We should, however, take advantage of
20
opportunities where the terms are favorable to us, where we can
solve problems to mutual advantage, or where we can bring about
desirable changes in Soviet policies -- whether to promote human
rights, freer emigration, solutions to Soviet generated problems such
as Afghanistan, reduce the military threat or even to expand
business ties (if there is no transfer of sensitive technology). Above
all, we must establish realistic criteria by which we can judge in the
coming months and years whether political or economic change in
the Soviet Union genuinely is reshaping the foundations of the
system -- or whether the historically oppressive structure of the
Soviet Union, including the instruments of central control and
repression, endures discreetly in the shadows, available at the
beckon of Gorbachev's successor, or even for Gorbachev.
Gorbachev has spoken of a European home, from the Atlantic
to the Urals. But "Europe" and "the West" are not just geographic
terms. They represent a community and continuity of values, a
common historical experience reflected in this year's bicentennial
celebration of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the
inauguration of our First President under the Constitution. The
principles set forth in these two documents compared to the central
21
tenets of Leninism still held dear by Gorbachev mark the distance
that remains between us.
For all the changes underway, the Soviet Union philosophically
and politically still embodies the primacy of the State over the
individual. Because of this unbridgeable difference in values and
beliefs, whether Gorbachev succeeds, fails, or just survives, a still
long competition and struggle with the Soviet Union lie before us.
Preserving the peace and fostering an enduring relaxation of
tensions even as the competition continues depends upon seeing
this reality clearly. Keeping this long range perspective - with keen
awareness of perhaps unprecedented opportunities as well as the
dangers - will be an extraordinary challenge for the United States
and the Western democracies.
22
Process and Product: Soviet A1 Control Strategy
An Address by Ambassador Edward L. Rowny
Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State
for Arms Control Matters
National War College Alumni Association Symposium
San Antonio, Texas - April 27, 1989
The Soviets view arms control policy as an integral element of
their national security policy. They see it from two perspectives.
First, they think arms control can help decrease the likelihood of
attack against the Soviet Union. Second, they sense that arms
control has great utility in a wide variety of Soviet diplomatic
efforts. Over the long course of US-Soviet arms control
negotiations, they have developed a strategy to use arms control in
pursuing their national security objectives. These objectives are
internal, military, and political in nature:
*
To legitimize the Soviet political system and ensure rule by the
Communist party.
To extend and enhance Soviet influence worldwide.
To defend the Soviet Union against potential aggression.
*
To maintain dominance over the land and sea adjacent to Soviet
borders.
To protect planned Soviet force modernization and developments.
To constrain and reduce US and Western forces.
*
To fragment NATO and decouple the United States from its friends
and allies around the globe.
To undermine support in the West for defense, and hamstring
Western military programs.
Obviously, arms control will be more directly relevant to some
of these objectives than to others, but each is an important factor
in the equation. The overarching criterion by which the Soviets
judge the utility of arms control is how well it serves the
achievement of these objectives, which determine the correlation of
forces between East and West.
The Importance of Process
To understand how the Soviets use arms control to achieve their
national security objectives, it is necessary to grasp the dual
components of Soviet arms control strategy: process and product.
In their arms control strategy, the Soviets place greater and
more consistent emphasis on the political utility of the process
than does the United States. This process includes everything other
than the terms of an agreement itself: the conduct of talks,
high-level meetings, summits, and public and media exploitation.
The process is continuous and does not end with the signature of an
agreement. The Soviets view this process to be of paramount
importance, both because it creates political opportunities for them
to exploit in the campaign to secure their policy objectives, and
because it consolidates and sustains their efforts.
Historically, the Soviets have used arms control as an element
of their foreign policy. With varying degrees of success, they have
put arms control in the center of the U.S.-Soviet agenda. They do
this not because they believe that arms control is the issue most
critical to improving relations between East and West, but because
-2-
by fomenting a Western fixation with arms control they believe they
can best direct East-West relations in their interests.
Preoccupation with arms control diverts attention from the critical
underlying causes of East-West tension which the Soviets clearly
recognize -- the differences in the values of our respective social
systems. As well, it has served to distract attention from other
areas, like regional affairs and human rights, where Soviet policy
is not SO attractive.
The United States, in contrast, has sought to conduct its
relations with the Soviets on a wider plane. The introduction by
President Reagan of the four-part agenda of human rights, regional
issues, bilateral affairs, and arms control, was a turning point in
U.S.-Soviet relations. It marked a fundamental change in the
US-Soviet dialogue by insisting on breadth and balance in the our
relationship with the Soviet Union. The success of this agenda is
seen in the fact that the Soviets have gradually come around, and
increasingly engage the United States on the wider range of issues.
President Bush's expansion of this broad agenda to include global or
transnational interests, such as the environment, is confirmation
that he will pursue the full range of East-West issues, and not
permit arms control to be the weather vane of U.S.-Soviet relations,
The Soviets use a number of time-tested techniques in applying
their strategy to the process. By setting up arms control as the
centerpiece of East-West relations, the Soviets attempt to foster a
benign image of the USSR through arms control proposals, public
diplomacy and propaganda activities. They create the image of
Soviet "initiative" by going public with their negotiating
positions, or by making vague, incomplete, but superficially
appealing proposals.
In one recent example, Gorbachev declared a halt to Soviet
production of weapons grade uranium. The US halted such production
in 1964, and it has long been clear that the Soviets would not
require further production, even despite new Soviet missile
programs. The Soviets use access to the media to promote the image
of forthrightness, often while doggedly stalling at the negotiating
table. This is a common technique used to put pressure on the
United States to make concessions and to make us appear less
committed to reaching agreement.
The Soviets attempt to characterize the U.S. as the culprit for
the lack of progress in curbing the "arms race." By fostering the
impression that it is simply the number of nuclear weapons that
influences the danger of nuclear war -- not a more accurate
calculation including their number, type, deployment, and technical
capabilities, or the behavior of states -- they hope to play to the
grandstand of public opinion while masking their own very real
efforts to achieve military advantage. For example, in the early
stages of the INF talks, various Soviet "freeze" proposals simply
would have locked in an overwhelming Soviet military superiority and
decoupled the US from Europe.
One important technique they use is the refusal to acknowledge a
distinction between "stabilizing" and "destabilizing" weapons. In
START, the Soviets long sought simply to limit each side to an equal
number of nuclear "charges." This made no distinction between a
nuclear weapon atop a vulnerable ICBM, which could reach its target
with deadly accuracy in half an hour, and one carried by a slow
-3-
flying, recallable bomber less vulnerable to a first strike,
Accordingly, the Soviets long resisted the US START proposal for
special "sublimits" on those weapons best suited for a first
strike. In the past few years, however, there has been some
important progress in this area. For example, at the Reykjavik
meeting in 1986, the Soviets agreed to a START sublimit of 4900
ballistic missile weapons,
Another Soviet technique is to stigmatize Western defense
programs they hope to kill. For example, at the Reykjavik summit,
Soviet "spin doctors" sought to create the impression that, but for
President Reagan's intransigence on SDI, we would have reached an
historic nuclear disarmament agreement. This was not the case.
There were several issues, notably the future of strategic offensive
nuclear forces and verification, that remained unresolved. These
issues were equally as important as the fate of strategic defense.
Still, for weeks we had to fight the impression that SDI alone had
blocked a breakthrough.
Currently the Soviets are seeking to stigmatize NATO's intention
to modernize its short-range nuclear forces (SNF) while they have
been modernizing their own. This Soviet propaganda is a far cry
from "new thinking" -- it's old-fashioned inversion of the truth.
Last month Foreign Minister Shevardnadze charged that "modernization
can destroy the genuine trust that has just begun to emerge in
Europe." This month in London, President Gorbachev asserted that
the Soviets had ceased modernizing their own short-range nuclear
forces.
The truth is that the Soviets have been modernizing their SNF
for a decade, and they show no sign of abandoning that effort. SCUD
missiles are replacing the SS-23s banned by the INF Treaty. The
SCUDs, which are being improved qualitatively, have a range of 300
km, nearly three times the range of NATO's LANCE, which will be
outmoded by the mid-1990s. The Soviets also have been replacing old
FROG missiles with SS-21s offering greater range and accuracy. Over
the past several years the Soviets have increased the number of
refire missiles for their forward-deployed SNF launchers by at least
50 percent, perhaps as much as 100 percent. All told, the Warsaw
Pact now has a 16-1 advantage in SNF missile systems. On this
issue, the Soviets have created a credibility gap SO wide one could
drive a tank through it.
Bids to Split Western Allies
The Soviets also use the technique of wedge driving. Through
the use of controversial, unresolved issues they work to create and
exploit friction in U.S. domestic politics, or in intra-Alliance
relations. They do this both to weaken the West, and to create
pressure for Western concessions, During the early phases of
negotiation on the INF Treaty, the Soviets proposed inclusion of
British and French nuclear forces, in order to cause a rift between
the U.S. and its European allies. Later, under Gorbachev, the
Soviets sought to include 72 Pershing I-A missiles belonging to the
Federal Republic of Germany in the bilateral, US-Soviet INF Treaty.
This was a clear attempt to get the United States to repudiate a
program of defense cooperation with an ally for the sake of a deal
with the Soviet Union. We refused. In the end, German Chancellor
Kohl promised unilaterally to scrap the FRG's P-Is after the
implementation of the INF agreement.
-4-
The Soviet technique of advocating vague "agreements in
principle" serves three purposes. First, this fosters the false
impression that a complete agreement is at hand. Second, the
Soviets hope through this means to gain agreements that do not
legally bind the USSR while contributing to relaxation of efforts in
the West to secure agreement on necessary details. And third, they
also hope to create pressure on the U.S. to compromise on critical
unresolved issues.
While the Soviets place great importance on the process of arms
control, the product also serves important Soviet national security
interests, Products -- joint statements, agreements, or treaties --
represent an important means to constrain or reduce Western
defensive capabilities. In addition, the products are often used to
codify important political principles. For example, in the "Basic
Principles" agreement signed in 1972 along with SALT I and the ABM
Treaty, they got the U.S. to agree to the Soviet code phrase
"peaceful coexistence," which the Soviets interpreted as granting
them a free hand to support communist insurgencies in the Third
World. SALT II endorsed the "Basic Principles" agreement, and
stipulated that the U.S. and Soviet Union should conduct their
relations on the basis of "eguality and equal security," a loaded
Soviet term that would grant the USSR superiority over any
combination of its adversaries.
The Soviets also habitually use arms control products where
possible to achieve or maintain a measure of military superiority.
In SALT I, they insisted on retaining their numerical superiority,
because of U.S. qualitative superiority. However, by the time of
SALT II, they had caught up in some measures of quality, and
expanded their important advantages in ICBM warheads and
throwweight. With the ABM Treaty, they cut off an area of
comparative technological disadvantage, while leaving competition in
offenses relatively unconstrained. In SALT II, they sought to
retain key advantages -- in heavy ICBMs, in throwweight, and in
staving off effective verification -- the treaty's fatal flaws that
prevented its ratification by the Senate.
It must be obvious from the above that process and product
continually interact. The Soviets use the general atmosphere of
improved relations following a major arms control agreement to
further other aims, such as access to Western financial markets or a
broad slowdown of Western defense efforts. Gorbachev's success in
securing billions of dollars in credit from European sources, and
the willingness of some in the West to question necessary defense
efforts -- such as keeping NATO's nuclear forces up to date -- on
the grounds they will antagonize the Soviets, speaks for itself.
Gorbachev's Approach to Arms Control
Under Gorbachev we have seen both promising changes and
disturbing continuity in the way the Soviets have conducted their
arms control policy. While the conclusion of the INF treaty, the
progress made on START, and Gorbachev's promising announcement of
unilateral conventional reductions point to a seemingly more
forthcoming and flexible Soviet approach, we should be careful not
to infer a fundamental change in Soviet interests or goals.
Gorbachev's tenure as General Secretary has been short, and the
evidence of a long-term or lasting change is inconclusive,
-5-
INF, as à completed agreement, provides a good case study to
examine whether and how Gorbacnev has used arms control to further
traditional Soviet ends. Soviet conduct in the INF negotiation
shows a high degree of continuity in the use of process and product
to serve Soviet interests, while the outcome of the agreement
represents a qualitative difference from those the Soviets accepted
in past negotiations, Notably, the INF Treaty represents two major
breaks from past Soviet practice in arms control: Gorbachev
ultimately accepted tough verification including intrusive
inspection, and a highly asymmetrical reduction (because the Soviets
had built so many missiles in the first place) to an equal, global
zero outcome. But he did so only after a consistent and intense
campaign to fracture the global U.S. alliance. system.
A few short examples illustrate this campaign. The first was
Soviet insistence on keeping SS-20 missiles in Asia. This proposal
would have required the U.S. effectively to ignore the security
interests of our Japanese and Korean allies and Chinese friends.
Additionally, there was Gorbachev's demand -- in the closing phase
of the negotiation -- that third party German Pershings be included
in the bilateral US-Soviet treaty. Each of these maneuvers was
designed to exploit the naturally differing regional interests of
America's global allies.
In the end, however, the Soviets accepted our global zero
proposal. Gorbachev may have felt that the political need for the
agreement outweighed the military advantage sacrificed. However,
this military sacrifice was limited by (1) residual Soviet
conventional superiority, (2) the removal of GLCM and especially
Pershing II, the most modern and capable weapons in NATO's nuclear
arsenal, and (3) the anticipated effect on future NATO modernization
decisions. Gorbachev may have gambled a short term military "loss"
in the hope of a bigger long term gain.
START, while not yet complete, indicates further the Soviet
willingness to agree to equitable terms when the U.S. negotiates
from a position of strength. Some difficult key issues remain
unresolved such as heavy missiles, mobile ICBMs, verification, and
nuclear SLCM, among others. Moreover, the fate of START still rests
on Soviet linkage to the ABM Treaty. The Defense & Space
negotiations, in which we and the Soviets discuss the future of
strategic defenses, have been another prime example of how the
Soviets try to use arms control to undercut an area of US
technological advantage, e.g., with their propaganda on "space
strike arms."
It is in the area of conventional arms control, however, that
the most interesting developments may come. The talks on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) will demonstrate whether
Gorbachev's "new thinking" on arms control will be applied where the
rubber meets the road. Blunt conversations I have had with Soviet
military men revealed that the Soviets had been happy to mesmerize
the West with the specter of nuclear war, while the Soviet Union
built up a critical advantage in "useable" conventional forces. The
apparent Soviet willingness to engage seriously on the central
security problem in Europe -- the conventional imbalance favoring
the Warsaw Pact -- may stem from their desire to lessen the
perception in the West of the threat from Soviet forces to Western
Europe, and to reduce the burden of the world's largest conventional
army on a Soviet economy in dire straits,
-i-
The initial Seviet proposal :- CTE also Indicates willingness to
make asymmeti lcal requetions to equality, though it does have some
crawbacks, such as its reference tc reductions in tactical nuclear
weapons, a subject clearly outside L.E agreed CFE mandate. However,
it is too soon to assess the ultimate Soviet interest in an
agreement.
Conventional arms are also the area in which an important new
technique in Gorbachev's arms control arsenal -- unilateral measures
-- may have the greatest political and military effects. So far
signals have been mixed. His announced unilateral reduction
undoubtedly makes a virtue of necessity -- the need for military
restructuring in a time of severe economic straits and declining
Soviet demographic trends. Subsequent details on where and how the
reductions would be taken, and the fate of the forces to be
withdrawn, seemed to indicate that the Soviets are making a genuine
effort to address oft-stated Western security concerns.
But just this month the Soviets opened up a credibility gap
concerning their conventional cuts. Gen. B.V. Snetkov, commander of
the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, said in remarks published in
Sovetskaya Rossiya April 18:
II
some
of
the
being withdrawn from East Germany will remain in the Army's arsenal, tanks
most
modern
others will be mothballed, and yet others will have their guns and
machineguns removed and will perform 'peaceful service' in the
national economy
This contradicts Gorbachev. On January 18 Gorbachev told
members of the Trilateral Commission that none of the 10,000 tanks
to be cut in Europe would remain in the Army's active inventory or
even be put in storage. "Five thousand will be physically
liquidated," Gorbachev said, "the rest will be converted into
tractors for civilian needs and training vehicles.'
Conclusions and Recommendations
The Soviets' arms control strategy is to use both the process
and product to serve their national security objectives.
Specifically, * Soviet arms control policy is designed to:
Promote a positive image of the USSR: using negotiations to
*
enhance the Soviet regime's diplomatic and domestic prestige.
Promote an acceptable military balance and "correlation of
forces.
"
*
Establish the USSR as a superpower with international status
equal to that of the United States,
*
Undercut the political consensus on the common defense role of
NATO, and exploit what the Soviets call "contradictions" in the
Western wedge-driving. alliance and among its member states. In other words,
*
Portray the arms competition as the preeminent aspect of the
superpower relationship, downplay the political causes of
tension in East-West affairs, and reduce attention to the
fundamental problems of the Soviet economic and social system.
Contribute to the achievement of a favorable military situation
by restricting areas of Western technological advantage,
hamstringing specific Western defense programs, and relieving
the pressure of Western military competition through the
creation of a benign image.
-7-
The overriding criterion by which the Soviets judge the utility
of arms control is how well it serves their broad objectives. While
WE have seen some significant and welcome recent shifts in Soviet
tactics, and even in the types of agreements the Soviets are willing
to make, we cannot necessarily conclude that there has been change
in long-term Soviet interests,
An understanding of the means and ends of Soviet arms control
strategy provides important guidelines for U.S. arms control policy
by which we may achieve our own national objectives and protect our
interests, We must continue to conduct our relations on a broad
agenda and negotiate from a position of strength. This strength is
not only military, but political. Reaching fair and equitable
agreements requires not only that we have the military strength to
make the Soviets negotiate seriously, but also the political
strength to resist sophisticated Soviet wedge-driving efforts and
pressure for unwise concessions. Only then do we have the leverage
to secure equitable agreements with the Soviets.
We must be realistic, patient, and prudent. Our objectives for
arms control can be ambitious, as was the zero option in INF and the
50% reduction goal in START, but we must realistically assess the
time and effort needed to come to agreement. We must negotiate
patiently on the basis of our principles to achieve our goals.
Again, INF provides an object lesson. In 1981, we set out our
principles: deep reductions to equal levels, preferably zero;
global limits; no detrimental impact on our conventional capability;
no compensation for third country forces; and effective
verification, In December 1987, we achieved all these objectives.
Finally, we must continuously assess the significance of arms
control in the larger scheme of US-Soviet relations and be prudent
in its application. Arms control is an important item on our agenda
for relations with the Soviets, but arms control will continue to
treat a symptom, not a cause, of East-West tension.
NATO on Track with a Solid Plan for Conventional Arms Cuts
By Edward L. Rowny
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization marks its 40th
anniversary this year in vigorous health. Its 16 nations are on
track, joined in consensus behind a far-reaching new plan for
conventional arms reductions. NATO's success in the East-West talks
in Vienna, which resume May 5, would propel the entire European
continent toward a more stable relationship.
NATO's proposal in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
talks directly addresses the three fundamental security problems
which have overshadowed Europe for the past four decades: First,
the artificial division of Europe caused by Soviet occupation of
Eastern Europe at the end of World War II. Second, the enormous
concentration of Soviet forward deployed offensive armored
formations giving them capability for surprise attack. And third,
the Soviets' potential for large-scale and protracted offensive
operations resulting from the preponderance of their conventional
forces.
For the past 16 years, the East and West sparred over the
complicated issue of European conventional force reductions in the
Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks. These talks
failed to produce any arms cuts. Their scope was limited to the
central European countries instead of Europe from the Atlantic to
the Ural mountains. Primarily because neither side could produce
force data acceptable to the other side, MBFR stalled short of
producing a vision for the Europe of the future.
Learning from this experience, NATO's current proposal goes
right to the heart of all three fundamental security problems.
-2-
Remarkable for its simplicity and logic, it calls for deep cuts in
those weapon systems best suited for seizing and holding territory
in Europe. Among its goals is security at equal, lower levels of
forces. Its focus is on asymmetrical reductions and limits on
tanks, artillery, and armored troop carriers,
To prevent one country from dominating Europe with conventional
arms, the NATO plan limits any single country to 30 percent of both
alliances' tanks, artillery pieces, and armored troop carriers.
This is highly important, since the Soviet Union has over 50 percent
of the active heavy tanks of the two alliances combined. NATO's
proposal also significantly limits the forces any one nation could
deploy outside its own borders. Based on current holdings, this
would require the Soviets to cut at least 2,000 more heavy tanks in
addition to the 5,000 they've already pledged to remove from Eastern
Europe.
This proposal would address a wide range of potential
hostilities in Europe from surprise attack to protracted large scale
offensives. In accounting for the unique security requirements of
various countries and regions, it limits readiness and force
concentrations in geographical sub-regions yet avoids creating
artificial boundaries within the alliances.
The Warsaw Pact has also presented a proposal which contains
some notions similar to NATO's. The Soviet Bloc nations now at
least implicitly accept the Western insistence upon deep,
asymmetrical cuts to reach equal force levels below those of today.
They agree in principle to the need for robust verification,
including on-site inspection. However, their plan also contains
-3-
some pitfalls. For example, they want to include tactical aircraft
in the initial focus, arguing that aircraft are an essential
component of any offensive surprise attack.
What they don't say is that aircraft cannot seize or hold
territory without large, mobile armored forces like those of the
Warsaw Pact. They also seem to care little that aircraft withdrawn
or limited by the negotiations can be rapidly returned to the
theatre of operations in time of crisis. This high degree of
mobility also presents significant problems in verification. NATO
does not refuse to talk about aircraft, which are covered by the
agreed mandate. Moreover, the Pact has far more combat aircraft
than NATO. But priority must be given to reducing asymmetries in
ground systems that seize and hold territory.
The Pact proposal also calls for "zones of reduced levels of
armaments" between the forces of each alliance. This is an old ploy
to exploit the West's lack of territorial depth, limiting its
ability to conduct a forward defense. It is an attempt to remove
NATO's tactical nuclear weapons from the forward area even though
nuclear weapons themselves are excluded from the negotiations.
The Soviet Bloc also is staging a spectacular sideshow with its
announcement of unilateral force reductions. The West will resist
pressures to respond with unilateral cuts of its own for three solid
reasons:
First, the Soviets' promise of significant reductions remains
just that -- a promise for the future. Their plans call for
completion of force cuts in late 1990. NATO should not exacerbate
existing imbalances with cuts in its own forces. Second, in the
-4-
absence of a formal treaty, unilateral conventional force reductions
by the East can be reversed at any time, and much more rapidly than
any reciprocal reductions undertaken by the Western democracies.
Finally, even if all Warsaw Pact reductions are carried out as
announced, NATO will still be outgunned by 2 1/2 to 1 in tanks and
artillery and almost 2 to 1 in combat aircraft.
The Communist Bloc is attempting to make a virtue of necessity.
Its declining economies and demographic shortcomings are making it
ever more difficult for it to field large offensive formations,
The Soviets may attempt to divert us with clever propaganda. But
NATO must stay on track. The Western proposal provides a solid basis
for an agreement that could strengthen security for all the peoples
of Europe.
Edward L. Rowny is Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of
State for Arms Control Matters.
Talking points and background on Nitze's criticisms of Bush arms
cohtrol policy
- We and the Soviets do not share objectives for nuclear forces
in Europe. The Soviets profess to want the goal of a nuclear free
Europe. But they have no vision for replacing the contribution of
nuclear weapons in guaranteeing deterrence and peace in Europe.
NATO continues to see that nuclear weapons are a vital element to
the deterrence of war -- nuclear or conventional.
- That the Soviets have a massive advantage in SNF missiles is
unquestionable -- on the order of 16:1. Our SNF missile level is so
low, and theirs so high, that it is hard to imagine a successful
negotiation where both sides can compromise. The Soviets would have
to do all the giving, and that's not the kind of negotiation they
enter into.
- Given today's political climate in Western Europe,
particularly in West Germany, and Gorbachev's talent for
manipulating public opinion, it's easy to see that negotiation would
be a slippery slope to a third zero. This is unacceptable to US.
Nitze's Comments on SNF
- A point that Nitze seems to miss is that we want to continue
to develop modernized SNF systems in accordance with the Montebello
Decision of 1983. Recent history demonstrates that we are more
successful in dealing with the Soviets when we are bargaining from a
position of strength. The issue, then, isn't really whether or not
to negotiate, but to adhere to the step-by-step process agreed to in
the June 1987 Statement on the Ministerial Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) at Reykjavik.
-2-
- Accordingly, the burden is not on the West to enter into
negotiations where the Soviets seek an outcome against our
interests. The burden is on the Soviets to respond to NATO's
unilateral reductions of 2400 nuclear warheads since 1979 with
reductions of their own. They should apply perestroika to their
European nuclear forces.
- Nitze simply hasn't thought things through. For example,
his proposal to negotiate the withdrawal of nuclear artillery
pieces is ill-conceived. These pieces are all dual capable, and
the guns themselves are already covered in the talks on
conventional forces. Nitze's proposal would not only be
unverifiable, because you can't tell a nuclear artillery piece
from a conventional one, but would also lead to double counting.
Other Arms Control Matters
- Nitze's idea of negotiating a ban on all naval nuclear
weapons at sea except SLBMs has many drawbacks. In addition to
being nearly impossible to verify without unacceptable
intrusiveness, it would capture sea-launched cruise missiles
which are essential to naval operational effectiveness across
the full spectrum of conflict. It also goes contrary to the
U.S. Government position that we will not negotiate naval forces
at this time.
- His criticism of the Navy for phasing out three obsolete
nuclear weapons without extracting analogous cuts from the
Soviets doesn't stand scrutiny. If we'd negotiated them away,
we would have cut off future force options needed to counter
possible Soviet naval technological breakthroughs.
- His comments on negotiating a ban on deployment of
anti-satellite weapons are worrisome. If Soviet systems in
space threaten us on earth, we should not be denied the
opportunity to protect ourselves. Furthermore, some existing
Soviet intelligence satellites threaten our free use of the seas.
Attachment:
Background.
background
A. The SNF issue is about defending NATO, not about arms control.
NATO's strategy of flexible response requires an adequate force of
modern conventional and nuclear weapons,
B. NATO has unilaterally reduced its nuclear stockpile by 2400
warheads since 1979. The INF Treaty will result in a reduction of
another 500 warheads. This is consistent with our view that we
will keep the minimum number of nuclear weapons in Europe necessary
for deterrence.
C. The Warsaw Pact enjoys superiority in conventional, chemical,
and short-range nuclear weapons in Europe.
Tanks
3:1 (2.4:1 if unilateral cuts are made as announced)
Arty
3:1 (2.4:1
11
)
CBT A/C 2:1 (1.8:1
"
)
Chemical Stockpiles
The Soviet Union acknowledges a 50,000 metric ton stockpile of
chemical munitions. The U.S. maintains slightly over 5 percent of
that total. This represents a minimal retaliatory capability.
SNF
88 NATO SNF missile launchers VS, over 1400 for the Warsaw Pact
D. European history has shown that deterrence solely by means of
conventional weapons is impossible, even when one side holds a
clear advantage over the other.
E. A step-by-step approach is the best approach, given our
uncertainties with Gorbachev's intentions:
- Reduce conventional imbalances to rough force parity
- Eliminate the chemical threat
- Negotiate SNF reductions to equal lower levels once the need
for flexible response is eliminated.
United States Department of State
Washington. D.C. 20520
Contact Joe Duggan, 202-647-4153
BUSH ADVISOR SEES SOVIET 'CREDIBILITY GAP' ON EUROPEAN FORCES
SAN ANTONIO, Apr. 27 -- Soviet leaders have created a "wide
credibility gap" on conventional and short-range nuclear forces in
Europe, President Bush's senior arms control advisor said.
Ambassador Edward L. Rowny made his remarks at a symposium sponsored
by the National War College Alumni Association.
"The Soviets are seeking to stigmatize NATO's intention to
modernize its short-range nuclear forces (SNF),' Rowny said, "while
they have been modernizing their own. The current Soviet propaganda
is a far cry from 'new thinking' -- it's old-fashioned inversion of
the truth. Last month Foreign Minister Shevardnadze charged that
'modernization
can destroy the genuine trust that has just
begun to emerge in Europe.' This month in London, President
Gorbachev asserted that the Soviets had ceased modernizing their own
short-range nuclear forces.
"The truth is that the Soviets have been modernizing their SNF
for a decade, and they show no sign of abandoning that effort,"
Rowny said. SCUD missiles are replacing the SS-23s banned by the
INF Treaty. The SCUDs, which are being improved qualitatively, have
a range of 300 km, nearly three times the range of NATO's LANCE,
which will be outmoded by the mid-1990s. The Soviets also have been
replacing old FROG missiles with SS-21s offering greater range and
accuracy. Over the past several years the Soviets have increased
the number of refire missiles for their forward-deployed SNF
launchers by at least 50 percent, perhaps as much as 100 percent.
All told, the Warsaw Pact now has a 16-1 advantage in SNF missile
systems.
Rowny also pointed to contradictory Soviet statements on
implementing the unilateral conventional force cuts announced last
December by President Gorbachev. He cited a remark by Gen. B.V.
Snetkov, published in Sovetskaya Rossiya April 18. Snetkov,
commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, said "some of
the most modern tanks being withdrawn from East Germany will remain
in the Army's arsenal, others will be mothballed, and yet others
will have their guns and machineguns removed and will perform
'peaceful service' in the national economy.
"This contradicts Gorbachev," Rowny said. On January 18
Gorbachev told members of the Trilateral Commission that none of the
10,000 tanks to be cut in Europe would remain in the Army's active
inventory or even be put in storage. "Five thousand will be
physically liquidated," Gorbachev said, "the rest will be converted
into tractors for civilian needs and training vehicles."
"On SNF and conventional forces, the Soviets have created a
credibility gap SO wide one could drive a tank through it," Rowny
said. "This should only strengthen our resolve to keep the focus on
Soviet capabilities, not what they say are their intentions."
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN
THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND
CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS
SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN
THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME
RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.
IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE
UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS,
SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO
IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION
FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET
SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.
1
AFTER ALL OF THE TALK OF GLASNOST AND DEMOCRATIZATION,
STALIN WOULD HAVE BEEN PROUD OF THE SMOOTHLY ORCHESTRATED 44
MINUTE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION IN WHICH PEOPLE WERE FIRED,
RETIRED, DEMOTED AND PROMOTED WITH NO DISSENT OR EVEN
DISCUSSION AND 1500 DELEGATES VOTING AS ONE. THE SESSION WAS A
POWER PLAY IN THE GRAND AND TRADITIONAL SOVIET MANNER. WHILE
THE SESSION WAS TESTIMONY TO GORBACHEV'S POWER, THE NEED FOR IT
ALSO WAS A MARK OF HIS VULNERABILITY AND HIS FRUSTRATION AT THE
LACK OF PROGRESS, BUREAUCRATIC OBSTRUCTIONISM AND OPPOSITION IN
THE PARTY TO HIS PROGRAMS AND POLICIES -- AND OF THE DESPERATE
SITUATION FACING THE SOVIET UNION.
THIS MORNING I WOULD LIKE TO PUT ASIDE THE DISCUSSION OF
PERSONALITIES AND RECENT PROMOTIONS AND DEMOTIONS IN THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP AND FOCUS INSTEAD ON WHAT IS GENUINELY IMPORTANT
BOTH IN THE SOVIET UNION AND FOR THE WEST -- WHAT CHANGES
ACTUALLY ARE TAKING PLACE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW GORBACHEV
IS DOING IN IMPLEMENTING HIS PROGRAM.
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
-- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WAS AFFECTING THEIR MILITARY
POWER AND POSITION IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC
POWER AND RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE
SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY
WIDENING GAP WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN.
2
THESE TRENDS, AT A TIME OF WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION,
REMARKABLE TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AND DRAMATIC ECONOMIC GROWTH,
FORCED THE POLITBURO TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD
NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS.
THEY COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM
THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ALTERING THE
BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR COMMUNIST PARTY.
STRENGTHENING THE LEADERSHIP AND HIS POSITION
THERE HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY STRONG SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO
SINCE 1985 FOR MODERNIZATION OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY. THIS
REMAINS GORBACHEV'S GREATEST POLITICAL ASSET. EVEN SO, NEARLY
EVERY STEP GORBACHEV SEEKS TO TAKE TOWARD STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC
OR POLITICAL CHANGE IS A STRUGGLE AND SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO
FOR HIS INITIATIVES SHIFTS CONSTANTLY, FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE.
AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING TWO WEEKS AGO, GORBACHEV
SHOWED REAL POLITICAL MUSCLE IN ADVANCING SEVERAL PROTEGES AND
SUPPORTERS WHILE REMOVING MOST OF THE REMAINING BREZHNEV
HOLDOVERS. BUT EVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS CLASSIC POLITICAL
STROKE IN THE KREMLIN, THE LIMITS TO GORBACHEV'S POWER -- OR AT
LEAST THE DEGREE OF RISK HE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT -- ARE
APPARENT. TWO SENIOR POLITBURO MEMBERS WHO PURPORTEDLY HAVE
3
BEEN MAJOR OBSTACLES TO FAR-REACHING CHANGE --- SECOND SECRETARY
YEGOR LIGACHEV AND FORMER KGB CHIEF VIKTOR CHEBRIKOV -- REMAIN
ON THE POLITBURO AND IN POWERFUL POSITIONS, ALTHOUGH WITH
DIMINISHED CLOUT. MEANWHILE, GORBACHEV STILL HAS BEEN UNABLE
TO PROMOTE ONE OF HIS MOST IMPORTANT PROTEGES, PARTY SECRETARY
GEORGY RAZUMOVSKIY. GORBACHEV PROBABLY CAN COUNT ON ONLY 3 OR
4 OUT OF 12 POLITBURO MEMBERS AS BEING TOTALLY HIS MEN,
CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTIVE ACROSS THE BOARD. So, WHILE THIS SET
GOES TO GORBACHEV, THE MATCH IS FAR FROM OVER. IT IS CLEAR
THAT FOR THE LONG TERM THERE WILL BE A CONTINUING INTENSE
STRUGGLE OVER THE PACE AND SCOPE OF MODERNIZATION AND OVER
POLITICAL POWER.
THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE POLITBURO IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT
TO GORBACHEV BECAUSE THERE ARE POWERFUL CONSTITUENCIES OUTSIDE
THE POLITBURO THAT ARE RESISTANT TO CHANGE -- ESPECIALLY THE
FAR-REACHING CHANGE HE SEEKS. SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ECONOMIC
BUREAUCRACY STAND TO LOSE THE MOST IF GORBACHEV MOVES TO
DECENTRALIZE THE SYSTEM AND ARE IMPORTANT OBSTACLES TO
IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS PROGRAM. WHILE MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACIES UNDERSTAND THE CONNECTION
BETWEEN A STRONG DEFENSE AND A HEALTHY ECONOMY, THEY ALSO ARE
UNHAPPY WITH THE IDEA OF GREATER CONSTRAINTS ON DEFENSE
SPENDING AND SKEPTICAL OF PROMISED BENEFITS. OTHERS, FOR
EXAMPLE THE KGB, ARE CONCERNED -- JUSTIFIABLY IT WOULD SEEM --
ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY IN THE SOVIET UNION AND IN
4
EASTERN EUROPE CREATED BY ANY RELAXATION OF POLITICAL
CONTROLS. (INDEED, WE HAVE COUNTED SOME 600 POPULAR
DISTURBANCES SINCE EARLY 1987, ABOUT HALF OF THEM RELATING TO
ETHNIC ISSUES. THERE HAVE BEEN MAJOR NATIONALIST
DEMONSTRATIONS IN 9 OF THE 15 SOVIET REPUBLICS SINCE LAST
JANUARY.) THE SOVIET POPULATION SEEMS TO BE PASSIVELY
SUPPORTIVE, BUT THEY HAVE SEEN CAMPAIGNS FOR CHANGE COME AND
GO. THEY ARE DEEPLY SKEPTICAL THAT GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS WILL
PRODUCE LASTING RESULTS OR EVEN IMMEDIATE PAYOFFS. THE
INTELLIGENTSIA ARE PROBABLY THE ONLY GROUP THAT COMES CLOSE TO
GIVING WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT -- A WEAK REED IN THE SOVIET UNION.
IT IS, HOWEVER, OPPOSITION WITHIN THE PARTY AND
PARTICULARLY IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARTY APPARATUS THAT
HAS BECOME THE PRINCIPAL AND CRITICAL PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV,
AND THE TARGET OF HIS POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. ONE OF THE MAIN
DEVELOPMENTS AT THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUNE, BEYOND APPROVAL
OF HIS PROGRAM, WAS HIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE PARTY ITSELF
IS THE CHIEF OBSTACLE TO MODERNIZATION AND REFORM. HE TACITLY
ADMITTED THAT HE HAS FAILED TO OVERCOME THAT OPPOSITION, AND
HIS STRATEGY NOW SEEMS TO BE TO CIRCUMVENT THE PARTY BY
STRENGTHENING THE SUPREME SOVIET AND ITS CHAIRMAN, TO TAKE THAT
POSITION HIMSELF, AND TO TRY TO FORCE THROUGH HIS ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL CHANGES. HE HAS SECURED APPROVAL FOR A TIMETABLE TO
DISMANTLE THE ECONOMIC APPARATUS OF THE PARTY AND THEREBY
SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKEN ITS CAPACITY TO INTERFERE IN THE DAY TO
DAY MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY.
5
IN SUM, GORBACHEV HAS DECLARED WAR ON THE PARTY APPARATUS
MUCH AS STALIN DID IN THE LATE 1920S AND 1930s. A MAJOR
DIFFERENCE IS THAT HIS ADVERSARIES WILL LOSE POWER, PRESTIGE
AND THEIR JOBS, BUT NOT THEIR LIVES. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN
WHETHER HE CAN so RADICALLY ALTER THE ROLE OF THE PARTY IN
SOVIET LIFE, WHETHER HE CAN DO so WITHOUT CREATING CHAOS, AND
WHETHER THE PARTY APPARAT WILL ALLOW ITSELF TO BE WEAKENED AND
EVEN DISMANTLED. AND NO MATTER HOW MANY PERSONNEL OR
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES GORBACHEV MAKES, IF HE CANNOT MAKE HIS
POLICIES WORK, IF HE CANNOT TURN AROUND THE ECONOMY, TODAY'S
SUPPORTERS WILL AT SOME POINT BECOME TOMORROW'S ADVERSARIES.
MODERNIZATION OF THE ECONOMY
GORBACHEV NOW ADMITS THAT WHEN HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY
HE UNDERESTIMATED THE SEVERITY OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
AFFLICTING THE SOVIET UNION. AS GORBACHEV HAS SEEN THE
DIMENSIONS OF THE CRISIS, HIS VIEWS OF WHAT IS NEEDED TO
CORRECT THESE PROBLEMS HAVE MOVED TOWARD MORE RADICAL PROPOSALS
FOR CHANGE.
TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE REFORM MEASURES PUT IN PLACE IN
GORBACHEV'S THREE YEAR TENURE ARE AN IMPRESSIVE PACKAGE.
NEVERTHELESS, THE REFORMS DO NOT GO NEARLY FAR ENOUGH. THE
6
REFORM PACKAGE AS NOW CONSTITUTED IS A SET OF HALF MEASURES
THAT LEAVES IN PLACE THE PILLARS OF SOCIALIST CENTRAL
PLANNING. THE POLITBURO SIMPLY IS UNWILLING TO LET GO OF THE
REINS GOVERNING THE ECONOMY. BECAUSE OF INTERNAL
CONTRADICTIONS AND THE RETENTION OF SO MANY ELEMENTS OF THE
PRESENT SYSTEM, THE REFORMS, EVEN IF FULLY IMPLEMENTED BY 1991
AS INTENDED, WILL NOT CREATE THE DYNAMIC ECONOMIC MECHANISM
THAT GORBACHEV SEEKS AS THE MEANS TO REDUCE OR CLOSE THE
TECHNOLOGICAL GAP WITH THE WEST. TO THE CONTRARY, AGGRESSIVE
IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS IS CAUSING SERIOUS DISRUPTIONS AND
TURBULENCE IN THE ECONOMY. SPECIFICALLY:
-- SOVIET GNP GROWTH FELL TO LESS THAN 1% IN 1987, DOWN
FROM ALMOST 4% IN 1986. GNP GROWTH WILL BE ABOUT 2-3%
THIS YEAR. GORBACHEV WOULD NEED NEARLY 8% GROWTH PER
YEAR IN 1989 AND 1990 TO MEET THE FIVE YEAR PLAN
TARGETS, A TARGET THAT IS FAR BEYOND REACH.
-- IMPLEMENTATION OF GORBACHEV'S QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAM
CAUSED MAJOR DISRUPTIONS IN PRODUCTION LAST YEAR,
FORCING THE REGIME TO BACK OFF ITS ENFORCEMENT.
--- NEW INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ARE
CREATING CONFUSION AND APPREHENSION IN SOME QUARTERS,
AND BUREAUCRATIC FOOT-DRAGGING AND OUTRIGHT RESISTANCE
IN OTHERS.
7
-- DESPITE CONSIDERABLE RHETORIC, WHAT HAS ACTUALLY BEEN
DONE SO FAR HAS NOT GREATLY CHANGED THE SYSTEM OF
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES THAT DISCOURAGE MANAGEMENT
INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND PRIVATE
INITIATIVE.
-- TRYING TO RESHAPE THE ENTIRE STALINIST ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE GRADUALLY WHILE LEAVING KEY PROBLEMS OF PRICE
REFORM AND THE GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY OVER GOODS UNTIL
LAST IS LIKE A PHASED CHANGE FROM DRIVING ON THE RIGHT
HAND SIDE OF THE ROAD TO THE LEFT. THE RESULTS ARE
LIKELY TO BE SIMILAR. TO ILLUSTRATE JUST HOW TOTALLY
OUT OF KILTER THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS, CONSIDER THAT
RENTS FOR HOUSING -- WHICH IS GENERALLY AWFUL -- HAVE
NOT BEEN RAISED SINCE 1928; THE CURRENT PRICE OF BREAD
WAS SET IN 1954, AND MEAT PRICES IN 1962. STATE
SUBSIDIES ARE SO HUGE THAT IT IS CHEAPER FOR A PEASANT
TO FEED HIS PIGS BREAD THAN TO GIVE THEM GRAIN.
-- UNDER GORBACHEV, THE DEFICIT IN THE SOVIET STATE BUDGET
HAS SOARED TO THE POINT THAT IT IS NOW EQUAL TO ABOUT
7% OF GNP, ABOUT 66 BILLION RUBLES. BY WAY OF
COMPARISON, THE COMBINED DEFICITS OF THE US STATE AND
FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS REACHED A HIGH OF 3 1/2% OF GNP TWO
YEARS AGO.
8
FINALLY, FOR A MODERNIZATION DRIVE THAT DEPENDS IN
SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE ON HARDER WORK, THERE ARE FEW REWARDS FOR
SUCH WORK. UNSATISFIED CONSUMER DEMAND IS REFLECTED IN EMPTY
SHELVES, LONG LINES IN STATE STORES, AND RISING PRICES IN
RETAIL MARKETS. INDEED, STAGNATION ON THE CONSUMER SCENE AND
RECOGNITION THAT PERESTROIKA CANNOT SUCCEED WITHOUT WORKER
SUPPORT HAS PROMPTED THE LEADERSHIP TO UNDERTAKE A SERIES OF
NEW POLICY INITIATIVES. TARGETS HAVE BEEN RAISED FOR SPENDING
ON HOUSING, EDUCATION, HEALTH, CONSUMER SERVICES, AND
INVESTMENT IN THE LIGHT AND FOOD INDUSTRIES. EVEN SO, THE
POPULATION WON'T SEE MUCH CHANGE IN ITS LIVING STANDARDS IN THE
SHORT TERM BECAUSE THESE INVESTMENTS WILL TAKE TIME TO SHOW
RESULTS AND THE SHORTAGES OF HOUSING AND DECENT HEALTH CARE ARE
so LARGE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SHIFT TOWARD GREATER PRIORITY
FOR THE CONSUMER IN THE MIDDLE OF THE FIVE YEAR PLAN HAS BEEN
AT THE EXPENSE OF HEAVY INDUSTRY, MODERNIZATION OF WHICH IS THE
CRITICAL ENGINE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH.
THUS, WHILE IMPORTANT BATTLES HAVE BEEN WON IN PRINCIPLE,
THE WAR TO CHANGE FUNDAMENTALLY THE MAIN PILLARS OF THE
STALINIST ECONOMIC SYSTEM AT THIS POINT IS BEING LOST. AFTER
THREE YEARS OF REFORM, RESTRUCTURING AND TURMOIL, THERE HAS
BEEN LITTLE, IF ANY, SLOWING IN THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL OF THE
SOVIET ECONOMY. THE GAP BETWEEN PRONOUNCEMENT AND
IMPLEMENTATION IS HUGE, AND GROWING. IT IS THIS REALITY THAT
9
LED TO THE JUNE PARTY CONFERENCE AND THE DRAMATIC PERSONNEL
CHANGES TWO WEEKS AGO.
POLITICAL REFORM
AN IMPORTANT MILESTONE IN THE EVOLUTION OF GORBACHEV'S
VIEWS WAS RECOGNITION THAT THE REVITALIZATION OF SOCIETY AND
ECONOMY COULD SUCCEED ONLY IF THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN
THE POLITICAL ARENA AS WELL. THE REGIME APPEARS TO BE MOVING
ON AT LEAST THREE FRONTS TO CREATE THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IT
SEEKS:
-- THE FIRST IS IDEOLOGY. GORBACHEV IS FRUSTRATED WITH
THE STRAITJACKET OF INHERITED DOCTRINE THAT OPPONENTS
OF CHANGE HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPOSE ON HIM. HE SEEKS TO
EXPAND HIS ROOM TO MANEUVER BY AN INCREASINGLY OPEN
ATTACK ON STAGNATION IN IDEOLOGY AND BY DEPICTING HIS
OWN PROPOSALS AS AN EFFORT TO RETURN TO LENIN'S
ORIGINAL INTENT AND EXPAND THE BOUNDS OF WHAT IS
PERMISSABLE UNDER SOCIALISM: HIS VERBAL CONTORTIONS IN
EXPLAINING HOW GIVING PEASANTS A 50 YEAR FARM LEASE
DOES NOT REPRESENT A RETREAT FROM SOCIALISM HAVE BEEN,
AT THE LEAST, IMAGINATIVE.
10
---- THE SECOND FRONT IS DEMOCRATIZATION. GORBACHEV'S
CAMPAIGN FOR "DEMOCRATIZATION" IS DESIGNED TO
REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. THE
PARTY CONFERENCE WAS ITSELF AN EXTRAORDINARY POLITICAL
HAPPENING, WITH A FREEDOM OF DEBATE AND EXPRESSION NOT
SEEN IN THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE REVOLUTION.
MOREOVER, THE CONFERENCE APPROVED REMARKABLE PROPOSALS
INCLUDING LIMITING THE TERMS OF OFFICE FOR PARTY
OFFICIALS AND THE USE OF SECRET BALLOTS AND LISTING OF
MULTIPLE CANDIDATES IN ELECTIONS. GORBACHEV APPARENTLY
BELIEVES THAT WITHOUT SUCH REFORM, IT WILL BE
IMPOSSIBLE TO BREAK THE RESISTANCE WITHIN THE PARTY TO
HIS AGENDA. BY THE SAME TOKEN, AS HE DEMONSTRATED TWO
WEEKS AGO, THE OLD METHODS REMAIN AVAILABLE WHEN MORE
DEMOCRATIC MEANS SEEM UNLIKELY TO YIELD THE DESIRED
RESULTS.
-- THE THIRD FRONT IS GLASNOST, OR OPENNESS. TIGHT
CENTRAL CONTROLS OVER THE FLOW OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION
LIE AT THE HEART OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. REMARKS BY
GORBACHEV AND HIS KEY ALLIES INDICATE THAT THE NEW
LEADERSHIP BELIEVES THAT THIS APPROACH IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH AN INCREASINGLY WELL-EDUCATED SOCIETY, COMPLEX
ECONOMY AND THE POLITICAL NEEDS OF THE MOMENT. I SEE
OTHER MOTIVES AS WELL BEHIND GLASNOST, NOT LEAST OF
11
WHICH IS USE OF AN APPARENT LIBERALIZING FORCE TO
ACHIEVE SOME RATHER OLD-FASHIONED OBJECTIVES.
GLASNOST IS BEING USED TO CRITICIZE OFFICIALS
GORBACHEV SEES AS HOSTILE AND TO PRESSURE THEM TO
GET WITH THE PROGRAM.
IT IS BEING USED TO HIGHLIGHT PROBLEMS HE WANTS TO
ATTACK -- SUCH AS ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE,
STALIN'S LEGACY, AND BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA -- IN
ORDER TO MOBILIZE SOCIETY BEHIND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
HE HOPES TO USE THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER OPENNESS
TO COOPT INTELLECTUALS AND PARTICULARLY ENGINEERS
AND SCIENTISTS TO BE FULL PARTNERS IN THE ATTEMPT
TO MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY -- TO OVERCOME THEIR
CYNICISM.
IT ENABLES THE REGIME TO COMPETE WITH FOREIGN AND
OTHER UNOFFICIAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE
POPULATION WILL HEAR ABOUT RIOTING IN KAZAKHSTAN
AND ARMENIA AND THE DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL ANYWAY,
GORBACHEV BELIEVES IT IS BEST TO PRINT THE NEWS AND
PUT AN OFFICIAL SPIN ON IT.
12
FINALLY, HE INTENDS TO LEGITIMIZE BROADER
DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAN
PERMITTED HERETOFORE IN ORDER TO BREAK THE BACK OF
DOMESTIC RESISTANCE AND INCREASE HIS ROOM FOR
MANEUVER AT HOME.
TO KEEP GLASNOST IN PERSPECTIVE, THERE HAS BEEN
GROWING CRITICISM BY OTHERS IN THE POLITBURO THAT
"OPENNESS" HAS GONE TOO FAR. GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAS
CAUTIONED MEDIA OFFICIALS NOT TO GO TOO FAR LEST THEY
UNDERMINE SOCIALIST VALUES OR CREATE A CLIMATE OF
DISRESPECT FOR PARTY OFFICIALS. YET, GORBACHEV HAS SET
LOOSE FORCES THAT WILL BE IMMENSELY DIFFICULT AND
PAINFUL TO LEASH -- AS WE ARE SEEING IN ARMENIA,
AZERBAIJAN, ESTONIA, LATVIA AND EVEN IN MOSCOW.
IN SUM, WHILE GORBACHEV'S BOLD POLITICAL MOVES AND RADICAL
RHETORIC HAVE SHAKEN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, HE HAS NOT YET REALLY
CHANGED IT. THE ULTIMATE FATE OF HIS VISION OF REFORM WILL
DEPEND ON HOW SUCCESSFUL HE IS IN PUSHING AHEAD WITH ITS
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE FACE OF DESIGN FLAWS, ECONOMIC
DISRUPTION, TREMENDOUS OPPOSITION AND, WORSE, APATHY. AS ONE
RUSSIAN RECENTLY SAID, "THERE HAVE BEEN MANY BOOKS WRITTEN ON
THE TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO SOCIALISM BUT NOT ONE ON THE
TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM TO CAPITALISM." BUREAUCRATIC AS WELL
13
AS POPULAR HOSTILITY IS GROWING AS DISRUPTION AND DISLOCATION
BROUGHT ABOUT BY CHANGE RESULT IN ECONOMIC SETBACKS AND A
WORSENING SITUATION FOR THE CONSUMER. WHAT GORBACHEV IS
SUCCESSFULLY CHANGING IS THE OFFICIALDOM OF THE PARTY AND STATE
BUREAUCRACY. AS USUAL IN THE USSR, THE PURGE HAS BECOME THE
VEHICLE FOR CONSOLIDATING AND ENHANCING PERSONAL POWER, AS WELL
AS FOR IMPLEMENTING CHANGE.
IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN -- I WOULD EVEN SAY IT IS
DOUBTFUL -- THAT GORBACHEV CAN IN THE END REJUVENATE THE
SYSTEM, BUT HE HAS DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO RISK HIS POWER
AND POSITION AND THE STABILITY OF THE SYSTEM ITSELF IN THE
EFFORT. AS MUCH AS ANYTHING, THIS INDICATES HOW DESPERATE HE
BELIEVES THE SOVIET PREDICAMENT REALLY IS. AND EVEN HE NOW
ADMITS THE STRUGGLE WILL LAST FOR DECADES.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND FOR US STRATEGY
THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE POLITBURO THAT,
FOR NOW, ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION REQUIRES A MORE PREDICTABLE, IF
NOT BENIGN, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN
POLICY THAT SPRING FROM DOMESTIC ECONOMIC WEAKNESS ARE A MIX OF
NEW INITIATIVES AND LONGSTANDING POLICIES. FIRST, GORBACHEV
WANTS TO ESTABLISH A NEW AND FAR-REACHING DETENTE FOR THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE TO OBTAIN TECHNOLOGY, ENCOURAGE INVESTMENT
14
AND TRADE, AND, ABOVE ALL, AVOID LARGE INCREASES IN MILITARY
EXPENDITURES WHILE THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS REVIVED. GORBACHEV
MUST SLOW OR STOP AMERICAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION THAT
THREATENS NOT ONLY SOVIET STRATEGIC GAINS OF THE LAST
GENERATION BUT WHICH ALSO, IF CONTINUED, WILL FORCE THE USSR TO
DEVOTE HUGE NEW RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY IN A HIGH TECHNOLOGY
COMPETITION FOR WHICH THEY ARE ILL-EQUIPPED.
SECOND, A LESS VISIBLE BUT ENDURING ELEMENT OF FOREIGN
POLICY -- EVEN UNDER GORBACHEV -- IS THE CONTINUING
EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE AND SWEEP OF SOVIET MILITARY MODERNIZATION
AND WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. AT THIS POINT WE SEE NO
SLACKENING OF SOVIET WEAPONS PRODUCTION OR PROGRAMS. SOVIET
RESEARCH ON NEW, EXOTIC WEAPONS CONTINUES APACE. VIRTUALLY ALL
OF THEIR PRINCIPAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS WILL BE REPLACED WITH NEW,
MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS BY THE MID-1990S, AND A NEW
STRATEGIC BOMBER IS BEING ADDED TO THEIR ARSENAL FOR THE FIRST
TIME IN DECADES. THEIR DEFENSES AGAINST US WEAPONS ARE BEING
STEADILY IMPROVED, AS ARE THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR WAR-FIGHTING.
AS THE RATE OF GROWTH OF OUR DEFENSE BUDGET DECLINES AGAIN,
THEIRS CONTINUES TO GROW, ALBEIT SLOWLY.
THE THIRD ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS
CONTINUED PURSUIT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND PROTECTION OF SOVIET
CLIENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD. UNDER GORBACHEV, THE SOVIETS AND
CUBANS PROVIDED NEARLY A BILLION DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC AND
15
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA IN 1987; MORE THAN TWO BILLION
DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SENT TO VIETNAM, LAOS
AND CAMBODIA LAST YEAR; AND MORE THAN ONE AND A HALF BILLION
DOLLARS IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SENT TO ANGOLA LAST YEAR --
TWICE THE 1985 LEVEL. AND, OF COURSE, CUBA GETS NEARLY SEVEN
BILLION DOLLARS IN SOVIET SUPPORT EACH YEAR. AT A TIME OF
ECONOMIC STRESS AT HOME, THESE COMMITMENTS SAY A GREAT DEAL
ABOUT SOVIET PRIORITIES.
AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIET UNION PLAINLY WOULD LIKE TO
EASE THIS BURDEN AND IS INTERESTED IN RESOLVING SOME OF THE
THIRD WORLD ISSUES THAT HAVE LED TO ADVERSE REACTIONS IN THE
WEST AND IN ASIA. THE SOVIET RECOGNITION OF DEFEAT IN
AFGHANISTAN IS THE MOST VIVID EXAMPLE. FACED WITH AN
UNWINNABLE WAR, THE KREMLIN LEADERSHIP REASSESSED THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS AND CONCLUDED THAT SOVIET INTERESTS AT HOME AND ABROAD
WERE BETTER SERVED BY LEAVING AFGHANISTAN. SIMILAR
CALCULATIONS ALSO EXPLAIN THE APPARENTLY MORE CONSTRUCTIVE
SOVIET APPROACH TOWARD CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS IN ANGOLA AND
CAMBODIA. THIS TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY IN MY VIEW REFLECTS
INCREASING POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION IN THE KREMLIN. EVEN so,
SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE THIRD WORLD -- AS DEMONSTRATED IN
GORBACHEV'S RECENT PROPOSAL TO TRADE CAM RANH BAY FOR OUR BASES
IN THE PHILIPPINES -- REMAIN ADVERSARIAL AND SEEK TO DIMINISH
US GLOBAL INFLUENCE AND REACH.
16
THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS NEW AND
DYNAMIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO WEAKEN TIES BETWEEN THE US
AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES, CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE THIRD WORLD; TO
PORTRAY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL AND
PEACE. WE CAN AND SHOULD EXPECT OTHER NEW AND BOLD
INITIATIVES, PERHAPS INCLUDING UNILATERAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE
REDUCTIONS THAT WILL SEVERELY TEST ALLIANCE COHESION.
SIMILARLY, NEW INITIATIVES HAVE BEEN TAKEN WITH CHINA THAT
LIKELY WILL LEAD TO A SUMMIT IN A MATTER OF MONTHS; OVERTURES
TO JAPAN ALSO SEEM LIKELY IN AN EFFORT TO OVERCOME BILATERAL
OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED RELATIONS.
IN THIS CONNECTION, I BELIEVE WE CAN ANTICIPATE FURTHER
SIGNIFICANT SOVIET INITIATIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL -- MOST OF THEM
AMBITIOUS AND UNREALISTIC, BUT VIRTUALLY ALL WITH ENORMOUS
GLOBAL POLITICAL APPEAL. GORBACHEV IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE --
AND, I THINK, REACH -- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS, BUT
PAST SOVIET PRACTICE SUGGESTS HE WILL SEEK AGREEMENTS THAT
PROTECT EXISTING SOVIET ADVANTAGES, LEAVE OPEN ALTERNATIVE
AVENUES OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, OFFER COMMENSURATE POLITICAL
GAIN, OR TAKE ADVANTAGE OF US UNILATERAL RESTRAINT OR
CONSTRAINTS (SUCH AS OUR UNWILLINGNESS IN THE 1970S TO COMPLETE
AND KEEP A PERMITTED LIMITED ABM).
FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS THE BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR
GORBACHEV, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ARE
17
PRIMARILY STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC. IN TERMS OF
POTENTIAL SAVINGS, STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ACCOUNT FOR ONLY
ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY BUDGET AND THE SOVIETS
ALREADY HAVE MADE THE INVESTMENT NECESSARY FOR PRODUCTION OF
THEIR STRATEGIC WEAPONS FORCE THROUGH THE MID-1990S. ONLY
THROUGH SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS COULD
GORBACHEV BEGIN TO REALIZE ANY MAJOR ECONOMIC BENEFIT AND, TO A
GREAT EXTENT, THIS WOULD BE YEARS IN THE FUTURE.
THE POLITICAL BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV ARE
EVIDENT. IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON
WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOW WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION,
WEAKEN RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD,
AND OPEN TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY
AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ARMS CONTROL GIVES CREDENCE TO SOVIET
CLAIMS OF THEIR BENIGN INTENTIONS AND MAKES THEM APPEAR TO BE A
FAR MORE ATTRACTIVE PARTNER TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN POLITICAL,
CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC ARENAS.
ARMS CONTROL IS AN ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION FROM GORBACHEV'S
POINT OF VIEW FOR ITS STRATEGIC IMPACT AS WELL -- AS LONG AS
ANY AGREEMENT INCORPORATES BASIC SOVIET POSITIONS: PERMITTING
CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS AND DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE
ICBMS, PREVENTING THE UNITED STATES FROM DEPLOYING AN EFFECTIVE
SPACE-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE, AND CONSTRAINING AIR AND SEA
LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. FROM THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE, DEEP
18
CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH THESE PROVISOS, OFFER
THE MEANS TO LIMIT THE GROWING NUMBER OF HARD-TARGET WEAPONS IN
THE US ARSENAL AND TO CONSTRAIN US PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES. WHILE START OBVIOUSLY WOULD
ALSO LIMIT SOVIET WEAPONS PROGRAMS, THEY PRESUMABLY BELIEVE
THAT AN AGREEMENT THAT ENCOMPASSED THEIR BOTTOM-LINE POSITIONS
WOULD, AT MINIMUM, NOT DEGRADE THEIR RELATIVE STRATEGIC POSTURE.
ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER NEW INITIATIVES ALSO ARE INTENDED TO
BREAK SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF LONGSTANDING TACTICAL
DEADENDS AND TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION A MORE EFFECTIVE,
FLEXIBLE AND VIGOROUS PLAYER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE RESULT
IS LIKELY TO BE A SOVIET POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO THE US ABROAD
THAT COULD POSE GREATER PROBLEMS FOR OUR INTERNATIONAL
POSITION, ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FUTURE THAN THE
HERETOFORE ONE DIMENSIONAL SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE.
CONCLUSIONS
WHILE ACTUAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY OF THE SOVIET UNION so
FAR HAVE BEEN SMALL AND FREQUENTLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, WHAT
GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS SET IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL
EARTHQUAKE. HE IS PULLING ALL OF THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A
SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY HAS RESISTED CHANGE --
AND WHERE CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. HE IS
19
A FIGURE OF ENORMOUS HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE. THE FORCES HE HAS
UNLEASHED ARE POWERFUL BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS
HE HAS ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A TREMENDOUS POWER
STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE ABSENCE OF SHOW
TRIALS AND TERROR.
THE STRUGGLE IS ESSENTIALLY BETWEEN THOSE SEEKING TO
PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO -- AND THEIR POWER IN IT -- AND
GORBACHEV AND HIS ALLIES WHO SEEK TO REPLACE THOSE NOW IN POWER
AND, IRONICALLY, TO TURN THE CLOCK BACK, BACK BEFORE STALINISM
TO LENINISM. GORBACHEV SEEKS A SYSTEM IN WHICH SOME -- THOUGH
CERTAINLY NOT ALL -- ELEMENTS OF THE STALINIST ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE AND BUREAUCRACY ARE ELIMINATED THUS OPENING THE WAY
TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND INNOVATION AND THEREBY TO
MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVED PERFORMANCE. HOWEVER, GORBACHEV'S
LENINISM STILL MEANS THE CONTINUED POLITICAL MONOPOLY OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY -- ALBEIT A REJUVENATED ONE, ITS ROLE AS SOLE
ARBITER OF THE NATIONAL AGENDA, ITS CONTROL OF ALL THE LEVERS
OF POWER, AND ITS ULTIMATE AUTHORITY OVER ALL ASPECTS OF
NATIONAL LIFE -- INCLUDING THE LAW. THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY REMAINS UNTOUCHED AND UNTOUCHABLE.
WESTERNERS FOR CENTURIES HAVE HOPED REPEATEDLY THAT RUSSIAN
ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL REFORM -- EVEN REVOLUTION
-- SIGNALED AN END TO DESPOTISM. REPEATEDLY SINCE 1917, THE
WEST HAS HOPED THAT DOMESTIC CHANGES IN THE USSR WOULD LEAD TO
20
CHANGES IN COMMUNIST COERCIVE RULE AT HOME AND AGGRESSIVENESS
ABROAD. THESE HOPES, DASHED TIME AND AGAIN, HAVE BEEN REVIVED
BY GORBACHEV'S AMBITIOUS DOMESTIC AGENDA, INNOVATIVE FOREIGN
POLICY AND PERSONAL STYLE.
ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET GOVERNANCE AT HOME AND
POLICY ABROAD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT -- WHILE THE CHANGES UNDERWAY
OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR A RELAXATION
OF TENSIONS -- GORBACHEV INTENDS IMPROVED SOVIET ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, GREATER POLITICAL VITALITY AT HOME, AND MORE
DYNAMIC DIPLOMACY TO MAKE THE USSR A MORE COMPETITIVE AND
STRONGER ADVERSARY IN THE YEARS AHEAD.
THE QUESTION I AM MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED IS WHETHER IT IS IN
OUR INTEREST FOR GORBACHEV TO SUCCEED OR FAIL. THE FIRST THING
WE SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE IS THAT THERE IS LITTLE THAT THE UNITED
STATES CAN DO TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF THE STRUGGLE GOING ON
INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION. THAT SAID, WE SHOULD ASK OURSELVES IF
WE WANT THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION OF
THE HISTORICAL AND CURRENT SOVIET SYSTEM. I THINK NOT.
WHAT WE DO SEEK IS A SOVIET UNION THAT IS PLURALISTIC
INTERNALLY, NON-INTERVENTIONIST EXTERNALLY, OBSERVES BASIC
HUMAN RIGHTS, CONTRIBUTES TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND
TRANQUILLITY, AND A SOVIET UNION WHERE THESE CHANGES ARE MORE
THAN A TEMPORARY EDICT FROM THE TOP AND ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE
21
VIEWS, POWER AND DURABILITY OF A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL. WE CAN
HOPE FOR SUCH CHANGE BUT ALL OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET HISTORY
CAUTIONS US TO BE SKEPTICAL AND CAUTIOUS.
WE CANNOT -- AND SHOULD NOT -- CLOSE OUR EYES TO MOMENTOUS
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR, BUT WE SHOULD WATCH, WAIT, AND
EVALUATE. AS LONGTIME SOVIET-WATCHER WILLIAM ODOM HAS SAID, WE
SHOULD APPLAUD PERESTROIKA BUT NOT FINANCE IT. WE SHOULD NOT
MAKE CONCESSIONS BASED ON HOPE AND POPULAR ENTHUSIASMS HERE OR
PLEASING PERSONALITIES AND ATMOSPHERIC OR SUPERFICIAL CHANGES
THERE. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES
WHERE THE TERMS ARE FAVORABLE TO US OR WHERE WE CAN BRING ABOUT
DESIRABLE CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICIES -- WHETHER TO PROMOTE
HUMAN RIGHTS, FREER EMIGRATION, STRATEGIC STABILITY, SOLUTIONS
TO SOVIET GENERATED PROBLEMS SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN, OR EVEN
EXPANDED BUSINESS TIES (IF THERE IS NO TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE
TECHNOLOGY). ABOVE ALL, WE MUST ESTABLISH REALISTIC CRITERIA
BY WHICH WE CAN JUDGE IN THE COMING MONTHS AND YEARS WHETHER
POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION GENUINELY IS
RESHAPING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SYSTEM -- OR WHETHER THE
TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE
INSTRUMENTS OF CENTRAL CONTROL AND REPRESSION, ENDURES
DISCREETLY IN THE SHADOWS, AVAILABLE AT THE BECKON OF
GORBACHEV'S SUCCESSOR, OR EVEN FOR GORBACHEV.
22
THERE ARE MANY UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING THE SOVIET UNION
TODAY, BUT ONE FACT IS APPARENT: WHETHER GORBACHEV SUCCEEDS,
FAILS, OR JUST SURVIVES, A STILL LONG COMPETITION AND STRUGGLE
WITH THE SOVIET UNION LIE BEFORE US. PRESERVING THE PEACE AND
FOSTERING AN ENDURING RELAXATION OF TENSIONS DEPEND UPON SEEING
THIS REALITY CLEARLY. KEEPING THIS LONG RANGE PERSPECTIVE --
WITH KEEN AWARENESS OF THE OPPORTUNITIES AS WELL AS THE DANGERS
-- WILL BE AN EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND
THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS AHEAD.
23
A) trip.
what theme : meroage,
"big picture" on tip.
B) Domeotic speedics
(diection?)
USSP
Kennan
For the Record
From testimony by George F. Kennan
to the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee April
The domestic political personal situation
of [Mikhail] Gorbachev is indeed in certain
respects precarious, particularly in view of
the meager.results to date of his program
of perestroika. But his position also has
had important elements of strength, as
does his program; and both have now been
strengthened by the results of the recent
election. His initiatives in foreign policy
DUKAKIS
MONDALE
have not met with serious internal political
resistance There is therefore no reason to
suppose that agreements entered into with
his government under his leadership would
not, if properly negotiated and formalized
be respected by his successors.
appears to me that whatever
reasons there may once have been for re-
CHICAGO
garding (the Soviet Union primarily as a
PRIMARY
possible, if not probable, military opponent,
the time for that sort of thing has clearly
CANDIDATE
passed M hat country should now be re:
SAWYER
garded essentially as another. great.nower
Supported
like ner-greatipowers-one,that) S
whose aspirations and policies are condi-
bydesse
tioned outstandingly by its own geographic
Jackson
situation, history and tradition, and are
therefore not identical with our own but
are also not so seriously in conflict with
ours as to justify any assumption that the
outstanding differences could not be ad
justed by the normal means of compromise
and accommodation. It ought now to be
our purpose, I consider, while not neglect
ing the needs of our general security, to
eliminate as soon as possible, by amicable
negotiation, the elements of abnormal mile
tary tension that have recently dominated
Soviet American relations, and to turn our
01989XERBLOCK
attention instead to the development of
the positive possibilities of this relation-
ship, which are far from insignificant.
Photocopy-Preservation
The Soviet public is not rushing toen:
THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1989 A232A
embrace any free-market mecha-
nisms that bring pain or risk, as the
Jim Hoagland
continuing internal battle over price
reform shows. True price reform
means the doubling of the price ord?
Perestroika
milk, meat, bread and most other
staples. It would also mean open un-
employment, rather than the con-
cealed variety practiced in the Soviet
At a Crawl
Union today.
Perestroika at this stage is a
catalog of problems of the old system
MOSCOW-The Soviet Union's
rather than a master plan for solu
first brush with free elections in 70-
tions. Having backed off confronting
years has demonstrated that the elec-
the public on prices, the economists
torate's antipathy for the Communist
are now concentrating on the fiscal art
Party is stronger than its growing
problems that have accumulated in
frustration with perestroika. That re-
the past four years of falling oil reve-
bn-
sult provides Mikhail Gorbachev with
nues, uneven harvests and climbing
some badly needed breathing space as
budget deficits.
he ends the equivalent of his first
They are at last trying to deal
four-year term in office. But it also
with macro-economic problems, but Yes
sharpens the struggle still to come.
their system has no tools available forbive
Gorbachev resembles no one so
dealing with inflation, budget deficitsvide
much as Jimmy Carter after four
and the huge monetary overhang ofd to
years in power. He has met severele
rubles," says an experienced Western BM
diplomat. "But the shift in focus has
economic problems at home withdu
moralizing and constantly changing
the advantage of stopping all the rhet-
hoi>
policies. The domestic confusion has
oric about price reform and competi-
dulled the luster of his foreign policy
tion, which was close to creating a
successes. He has dispersed energy
public panic.
and credit across a broad spectrum
Unlike Carter after four years,
rather than taking on a few selected
Gorbachev is still in power and plan-obro
manageable issues.
ning, to stay there. He has avertedivhc
Fortunately for Gorbachev and for
disaster, which he and many others11
perestroika, political reforms do notwor
believe would have struck by now
require the Kremlin leader to seekss
without this visible commitment to mo?
reelection after four years. A recent
change by the Kremlin. He has been
decision to postpone serious discus-
unable, however, to mobilize the sup
sion of retail price reform for-two or
port either of the party apparatus on a
three years is proof of the unpopulari
new political order or of the public on
ty of perestroika now.
radical economic change. He is reach-
Abel Aganbegyan one of the eco-
ing the point where he will need to
nomic theorists who has helped shape59
rely on the support of one of these
forces to move the other if he wants
Gorbachev's perestroika program,
Photocopy-Preservation
gives this indication of how severe
to do more than muddle through.
public disaffection is at the moment:
The reformers' own painful new
We had to take this delay because of
awareness of what they are up against
is perhaps their best chance for even-
our worsening financial situation. Iffire
we had not delayed retail-price re-
tually achieving change. They are 327
form, perestroika might have per- mo.
reaching out for support and ideas 199
ished. People would have risen up.
01
wherever they can find them. "We
He speaks with regret in his voice.
know now that this is a process, and
Aganbegyan has led the way in argu-
not something that will happen over-
ing that bringing the Soviet Union's
night," says Aganbegyan, who recent-
ly returned from a trip to China to
to
wholly unrealistic pricing system into
line with market conditions is the
study the Chinese experience with
market mechanisms.
tedic
essential mechanism in achieving the
radical economic restructuring Gor-
This week he hosted a meeting offsion
bachev seeks.
about 80 economists, businessmen firt
Aganbegyan's economic view is
officials, bankers and others fromaos
that this needs to be done rapidly and
America, Europe, China and Japan in
comprehensively. But politically herb
a free-wheeling three-day discussion
0
has reconciled himself to the "crawked
of perestroika and the global econo-
ing reform" on prices that has been orl:
my. By Washington standards, it was
adopted to avoid popular protest.
no more than a lively "BOGSAT
OVER
The Soviet economist frankly ac-r
(bunch of guys sitting around a table)
that focused mercilessly on Soviet
knowledges that a major part of the
shortcomings
problem has been mistakes made by
the reform team in the past four
But this meeting would have been
15
years-principally not starting with
unthinkable in Moscow even four
agriculture as a way to increase food
years ago. What this reappraisal
supplies and "underestimating the in-
means for perestroika, for the West
ertia of the old system.
and for the Soviet Union's continuing
Recent Western assessments of ori)
effort to become a normal place, is
the subject of m" next column.
perestroika have tended either them
concentrate on these missteps and to &
conclude gloomily that the experience
has "failed," or to argue in equally
simplistic terms that Gorbachev two
rhetorical endorsement of private ini-ds
tiative and market forces means that qu
communism has been abandoned here and
and capitalism has won the final bat-i
tle. Both views are premature.
A18 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL TUESDAY, MARCH 21, 1989
INTERNATIONAL
Despite Hopes, Many Soviets Will Find
They Have No Choice on Sunday's Ballot
By PETER GUMBEL
of an alternative candidate to one unpopu-
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
lar local party official, people held up plac-
KIEV, U.S.S.R. - Vladimir Shcher-
ards complaining of "podtasovka," a term
bitsky, 71 years old and increasingly frail,
used by card players to describe dealing
is a man of the past. He is a remnant of
from the bottom of the deck.
Leonid Brezhnev's now discredited rule.
Clubs have even been formed in some
Even many of his supporters here in the
cities that aim to expose electoral short-
Ukraine, the republic he has governed
comings, says Ms. Zaslavskaya.
since 1972, say privately that it is time he
Much of the fuss concerns the proce-
retired.
dure by which candidates are registered.
Yet, when Soviet voters go to the polls
Mr. Gorbachev introduced a system de-
Sunday to elect a new and new-style par-
signed to limit their numbers. He said he
liament, the old and old-style Mr. Shcher-
wanted to prevent ballot papers becoming
bitsky is certain to win a seat. He is the
too long and confusing.
only candidate in his constituency in the
Under the procedure, a public meeting
coal-mining town of Dnepropetrovsk.
in each constituency decided how many
Under Mikhail Gorbachev's plans for
candidates would be registered to contest
the Soviet political system, this wasn't sup-
the seat. To pass through this stage, the
posed to happen. Voters were meant to
candidates had to win the support of at
have a choice of at least two candidates.
least 50% of the meeting.
Indeed, the Soviet leader last November
Some Blatant Fiddling
described contested elections as "the most
important, distinctive feature" of his so-
Some of the complaints may be just
cialist version of democracy.
sour grapes, of course. A senior party offi-
cial, Georgy Barabashev, recently rejected
But the election is falling short of that
talk of manipulation, saying that the over-
lofty goal. Many Communist Party big-
whelming number of Communist Party
wigs, especially in the Ukraine, have been
members who got through the procedure is
able to use electoral law loopholes to keep
just "evidence of (their) authority among
their rivals off the ballot. In 385 of the 1,500
the broad mass of the people.
Soviet electoral districts just a single can-
Nonetheless, some fiddling was so bla-
didate is registered.
tant that even the Central Electoral Com-
Legal 'Ambiguities'
mission reacted. For example, Mr. Go-)
"The law does have ambiguities," ad-
lovko says it ordered a repeat of the regis-
mits Dmitri Golovko, deputy head of the
tration process in the Belorussian town of
Central Electoral Commission, which has
Grodno following public protests there.
received more than 7,000 letters of com-
Only one candidate was registered, even
plaint. "It must be subject to streamlining
though the meeting initially decided to
and amendments."
choose two.
For a country. long ruled by despots,
Something similar happened to Yuri
from Russian czars to Soviet commissars,
Shcherbak, a Ukrainian writer, who de-
it is perhaps not surprising that first at-
scribes himself as having become politi-
Photocopy-Preservation
tempts to give people a limited choice in
cal gladiator.' Hoping to be registered as
who governs them are less than perfect.
a candidate in Kiev's Zhovten district, he
The electoral law was drawn up quickly
quickly sensed something was wrong when
and Mr. Goloyko says, "it isn't dogma."
people at the meeting started asking him
Yet changing the law will require a bold
aggressive personal questions about his
act of political will on the part of the Soviet
Polish wife and his bank account. Then,
leadership. For the parts of the law most
even though three out of the nine nomi-
easily manipulated are the ones that give
nated candidates were supposed to be reg-
the Communist Party some control over
istered, the chairman stopped the meeting
the process. To get rid of them could open
and sent everyone home as soon as the
the floodgates to a less managed, less pre-
first one received 50%.
dictable type of "democracy."
"It was a crude violation of the law,"
As a result, the election campaign has
says Mr. Shcherbak, who has managed to
created mixed feelings. Almost everyone
be registered in another constituency.
agrees that it represents a break with past
Voters can reject a single candidate by
practice, when voters were given no
crossing out his or her name on the ballot
choice. But much of the public remains
sheet. But at least one-half of those voting
deeply skeptical.
would have to take such action to prevent
Many Are Indifferent
a candidate being elected.
To be sure, not every uncontested seat
Tatiana Zaslavskaya, a leading Soviet
is a sign of manipulation. One of the great-
sociologist and pollster, says 40% of the
est ironies of the current election cam-
electorate is indifferent to the campaign.
paign is that some of the most ardent sup-
According to a poll published in the news-
porters of multi-candidate elections find
paper Komsomolskaya Pravda, as many
themselves running unopposed. In the Bal-
as 79% of those asked said they believe
tic republic of Latvia, for example, there
there is a danger the vote could turn out to
are seven constituencies with only one can-
be merely "a spectacle."
didate. In five of them, the candidate is a
"It is imperative that the millions of
member of the pro-reform Popular Front
voters should not feel they are being
Movement who beat the local party nomin-
cheated," a group of intellectuals worried
ees at the registration meeting.
about electoral abuses wrote in the weekly
Janis Skapars, a Popular Front leader,
Moscow News this month.
is happy that his organization is doing SO.
Some voters already feel cheated and
well. But he feels awkward about the lack
are taking to the streets to say SO. At a re-
of competition. "It really isn't normal," he
cent protest in Leningrad against the lack
says.
Soviet Bottom Line
Is That Few People
Know What One Is
Institute Plans MBA School,
With U.S. Help, to Teach
The Lessons of Capitalism
By JOHN. J. FIALKA
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON-Sovilet managers con-
fused about perestroika and fearful of
making marketing decisions without or-
ders from Moscow need worry no longer.
The Khabarovsk Institute of National
Economy, some 4,300 miles east of Mos
cow, is setting up what is believed to be
the Soviet Union's first masters-degree
program in business administration: The
two-year program, complete with profés-
sors from Portland State University in Or-
egon, will attempt to teach the hard-nosed
lessons of capitalism to regional bureau-
crats who are being weaned from a cen-
trally run economy.
"This will give us independence in mak-
ing decisions,' says Pyotr M. Konevskih,
rector of the institute, who will sign papers
today in Portland making the project offi-
cial:
According to Mr. Konevskih, there has
been some sporadic teaching of business:-
by visiting Western professors in the Soviet
Union, but "a completely worked-out.pro-
gram such as this doesn't exist" there. He
said he expects the program to be copied
widely throughout the Soviet Union.
Finding the Bottom Line
First, though, there are some problems
to sort through. For example: the word
"market" has no equivalent in the Russian
language. "It's like the word rock roll;
It goes straight through Into the Russian.
There was never anything before quite like
that either," says Earl Molander, a Port-
land State University business school pro-
fessor who is helping to set up the pro-
gram.
Next, there is the whole concept of man-
agement. Mr. Molander, who has visited
Khabarovsk, says Soviet managers have
tended to take very narrow views of their
Photocopy-Preservation
work, relying on detailed orders from Mos-
cow in lieu of market analysis.
"All that has changed with peres-
troika," he says. "They are being told that
their firms must become self-sufficient."
U.S. accounting rules also will be hard
to fathom in a country that hasn't devel-
oped a wholesale pricing system. Even the
bottom line, according to Mr. Konevskih,
will take some explaining. Communist ac-
countants "tend to pay more attention to
the details of certain questions and lose
track of the end results."
Helping the Most Needy
The first class of Soviet MBA candi-
dates, about 50 students, will begin their
studies next April. They largely will be
drawn from the managers of Soviet enter-
prises in the France-sized Khabarovsk re-
gion who are being forced to make their
agencies self-sufficient as controls from
Moscow are phased out under the eco-
nomic restructuring.
"The majority of questions are now be-
ing decided on the spot," says Mr. Konevs-
kih, who adds that three days ago some en-
terprises were allowed for the first time to
begin dealing with foreign buyers without
going through Moscow.
Japan's Motor-Vehicle Sales
TOKYO-Motor-vehicle sales in Japan
edged up 0.9% in March from the year-ear-
lier month to a-record 683,299 vehicles, the
automobile dealers association said.
4/5/89
4/3/89
Jeane Kirkpatrick
Gorbachev vs. Lenin
It is true that the nominating process for
elections in six major cities or that a nonvot-
Soviet elections was severely restricted and
ing Politburo member whose election was
partly rigged and that it excluded important
uncontested would nonetheless be defeated,
opposition groups. It is also true that in nearly
or that Boris Yeltsin would win nearly 90.
one-fourth of all districts the official candidate
percent of the votes against the designated
ran unopposed and that about 80 percent of
party candidate, or that dissident historian
all candidates were Communist Party mem-
Roy Medvedev would run first in a field of six
bers. It is true too that these elections were
or that so many official candidates might lose
only one stage in the selection of one govern-
even though they were unopposed.
ing body and that the final outcome is stacked
Medvedev was probably right when he said
in favor of the Communist Party.
it must have been "a very sobering day for
Still, these Soviet elections were extremely
the Communist Party and for Mikhail Gorba-
important. For the first time in 70 years
chev." It is impossible at this stage to guess
Soviet citizens had an opportunity to express
the consequences of this fascinating Soviet
their views about those who govern them.
experiment with limited choice: But certain
Since Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and his band of
conclusions almost leap out of the experience.-
Bolsheviks ignored the outcome of legislative
First, the campaign and elections demon-
elections and seized power in 1917, the
strated that 70 years of repression have not
Communist Party of the Soviet Union has
deprived the Soviet people of a capacity to
claimed its right to rule is based on iron "laws
form independent views and to express them.
of history" and does not require popular
They are neither too apathetic nor too brain-
approval.
washed to think or act for themselves.
While claiming that they spoke for "the
Second, in spite of 70 years of official
people," successive Communist leaders never
propaganda, the Soviet people have not been
found it necessary to ask "the people" about
persuaded that the Communist Party neces-
who should rule or to what broad ends. They
sarily represents their views or interests.
have governed instead by force and imposed
Both the campaign and the outcome reveal a
policies that stifled Soviet society and the
good deal of explicit distrust and dislike of
economy. By force they incorporated former-
party officials.
ly independent nations into the U.S.S.R. By
Third, the campaign also made clear that
force they eliminated opposition parties, si-
lenced critics and blocked all the channels
the Soviet people do believe their society is
rent by a class struggle but not the one
through which the Soviet people might have
described by Karl Marx. Rather it is a class
expressed their views. Dogs, fences and
system created by Marxism, which pits a
guard towers have prevented emigration-
small privileged party elite against the peo-
denying the people an opportunity to vote
plc. Boris Yeltsin based his campaign- on
with their feet. Elections have been staged
popular resentments of this elite.
plebiscites in which the government scored
Fourth, while the outcome was far worse
99 percent of the votes. Public opinion polls
Photocopy-Preservation
have been strictly forbidden. Control consoli-
for party conservatives such as Ligachev than
for Gorbachev himself, Gorbachev had an
dated under Stalin by terror was maintained
opportunity to learn the same lesson the U.S.
by his successors, who jailed or banished
refuseniks, philosophers, whistle-blowers,
government was taught in El Salvador a few
evangelicals, dissidents, poets and musicians.
weeks ago: given a choice, people cannot
necessarily be counted on to vote as their
So thoroughly did the Soviet leadership
leaders wish. The election results provide
control expression and stifle dissent that no
strong proof of the persistence of intense
one, including Soviet leaders themselves,
national identifications of Baltic peoples and
could say what the Soviet people thought
the Ukraine. The Estonian popular front won
about anything. No one knew for certain what
25 of 36 seats, Latvia's popular front won 25
the Soviet people wanted; what they opposed,
of 29 seats, and in Lithuania the nationalist
for whom or what they were willing to work.
Sajudis took 32 of the 42 seats. In the
No one could say how the Soviet people felt
Ukraine several official candidates running
about the Communist Party, religion, art,
unopposed were defeated when an electoral
Afghanistan, perestroika, Ligachev-or any-
boycott deprived them of the 50 percent
thing. Anyone could and did claim to repre-
needed to win.
sent the people-as long as the people could
not speak for themselves.
Finally, and most important, there is the
fact of the elections and of Gorbachev's
One step at a time Mikhail Gorbachev has
promise that those lacking party support
provided the Soviet people opportunities to
might lose their jobs. When Gorbachev says
express their views: in media, books, meet-
officials should have public approval, he is
ings, and now in a campaign and elections.
moving toward the view: that government
Gorbachev could not have known the out-
should be based. on the consent of the gov-
come of this unprecedented experiment in
erned. That is a big step toward the demo-
free expression. Probably he is disappointed
cratic view of legitimacy that Lenin rejected.
by some of the results. Probably he did not
The biggest news of all is that Mikhail Gorba-
guess the strength of the popular movements
chev has reopened the question about the
in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Probably he
appropriate relations between people and
did not foresee that party chiefs would lose
their rulers.
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
BEYOND,
CONTAINMENT
Selected Speeches by President George Bush
on Europe and East-West Relations
April 17 - June 2, 1989
And let me say, it is truly gratifying that all of this was understood
so well at home and abroad. While keeping our defenses up and our eyes
wide open, we must go forward. We must stay on the offensive. We
must get to work now to end the Cold War. The world has waited long
enough, and if we succeed, the world your children will know-the
world of the 21st century-will be all the better.
The White House
I
n this series of speeches, President
George Bush projects a policy that seeks to move beyond containment-to
integrate the Soviet Union into the community of nations.
It is a policy based on the strength and vitality of the Atlantic Alliance, which
has brought Europe its longest period of uninterrupted peace in the modern age.
The Alliance's unity and the force of its democratic foundations have opened up
new possibilities-of a less militarized Europe, of a stronger and more united
Western Europe, of a Europe whole and free and at peace with itself.
President Bush articulates policies and proposes concrete initiatives aimed
at helping end the division of Europe. From proposals for more comprehensive
and faster negotiated cuts in conventional arms to initiatives aimed at supporting
the growth of democracy in Eastern Europe, they have the same purpose: to
promote a reconciliation based on shared values, where East joins West in a
United States Information Agency
commonwealth of free nations.
July 1989
preserving the peace in Europe-the longest period without war in all the
Table of Contents
recorded history of that continent.
And we were reminded that once again the future of SO many
nations depends on NATO's unity and resolve. We were reminded that
NATO must remain strong and together, and we were challenged to
seize this new opportunity for progress while staying true to the principles
that got us here.
Well, we met that challenge. We agreed to strive-to hope-for a
Europe that is whole and free. At the Rheingoldhalle in Mainz, in the heart
of Germany, I said that the Cold War began with the division of Europe,
and it must end with a reconciliation based on shared values, where East
joins West in a commonwealth of free nations.
Arms and Environment
And that is my vision for the future, and here is how we get there. The
Remarks to Citizens of Hamtramck
Warsaw Pact has a lot more planes, a lot more arms, a lot more troops in
Hamtramck, Michigan
Europe than the NATO Alliance, and we challenge the Soviets, if they
April 17, 1989
2
are serious, to reduce to equal numbers. Our proposal is bold, but
fundamentally fair, and every single one of our allies agreed with our
Remarks at the Texas A&M University
proposal.
Commencement Ceremony
We proposed a new initiative for more comprehensive and faster
College Station, Texas
negotiated cuts in conventional arms to lift the West at last from the
May 12, 1989
7
shadow cast over Europe since 1945 by massive Soviet ground and air
forces, and our allies agreed. And we proposed that Berlin, East and West,
Remarks at the Boston University
become a center of cooperation, not confrontation. And our allies
Commencement Ceremony
agreed. And we proposed that we strengthen the Helsinki Process to
Boston, Massachusetts
support free elections in Eastern Europe, and our allies agreed.
May 21, 1989
12
Because the threat of environmental destruction knows no
borders, we proposed that the West enlist the countries of Eastern Europe
Remarks at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy
in one of the great causes of our time-the common struggle to save
Graduation Ceremony
our natural heritage.
New London, Connecticut
And, with our agreement in NATO on our short-range nuclear
May 24, 1989
16
forces in Europe, we demonstrated as an Alliance that we can manage
change while remaining true to the strategy of deterrence which has
Remarks Upon Departure for Europe
kept the peace.
Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland
May 26, 1989
21
New World
In short, this week's NATO summit in Brussels showed that we are
Remarks at Rheingoldhalle
ready to help shape a new world. In this period of historic change, the
Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany
NATO Alliance has never been more united, never been stronger, and
May 31, 1989
23
we issued a summit declaration detailing our vision for the future and
plan of action. And ours is not an arrogant challenge to Mr. Gorbachev,
Remarks Upon Arrival at Pease Air Force Base
it's an appeal in good faith. The summit was a triumph for the Alliance, a
Portsmouth, New Hampshire
triumph of ideas, and-most of all-it was a triumph of hope.
June 2, 1989
31
32
REMARKS TO CITIZENS OF HAMTRAMCK
REMARKS UPON ARRIVAL AT PEASE AIR FORCE BASE
Hamtramck, Michigan
Portsmouth, New Hampshire
April 17, 1989
June 2, 1989
I
n the last week, Barbara and I have been to Rome and the Vatican,
Brussels, Bonn and London, and working with our allies in Europe, we set
a course for the future. And we must move to fulfill that promise,
moving beyond containment, moving beyond the era of conflict and Cold
War that the world has known for more than 40 years, because keeping
the peace in Europe means keeping the peace for America. Our Alliance
seeks a less militarized Europe-a safer world for all of us.
And I'm now returning from Europe with a message for the
American people-a message of hope. We have a great and historic
opportunity to shape the changes that are transforming Europe. This
chance has been delivered not just because of our strength and resolve,
I
but also because of our power of ideas, especially one idea which is
sweeping the communist world-democracy.
want to address, at this important gathering, the health and
prosperity of a whole nation: the proud people of Poland. You know, we
Charting the Path to Peace
Americans are not mildly sympathetic spectators of events in Poland.
For the last six weeks, I've presented, in a series of speeches, ways to
We are bound to Poland by a very special bond: a bond of blood, of
deal with these changes to make the most of this opportunity. And let me
culture and shared values. And so, it is only natural that as dramatic
summarize: In Michigan I stressed that the United States will actively
change comes to Poland we share the aspirations and excitement of the
encourage peaceful reform led by the forces of freedom in Eastern
Polish people.
Europe. The Texas speech explains America's commitment to a
balanced approach in our relationship with the Soviet Union-that we
Old Ideas and New Thinking
must remain strong and realistic, judge their performance, not their
In my Inaugural Address, I spoke of the new breeze of freedom gaining
rhetoric, all the while seeking a friendship with the Soviets that knows no
strength around the world. "In man's heart," I said, "if not in fact, the day
season of suspicion.
of the dictator is over. The totalitarian era is passing, its old ideas
And at Boston University the focus was our partnership with a
blown away like leaves from an ancient lifeless tree."
more united Western Europe-how a strong Europe means a strong
I spoke of the spreading recognition that prosperity can only come
America. And then at the Coast Guard Academy I said that America is
from a free market and the creative genius of individuals. I spoke of the
ready to seize every-and I do mean every-opportunity to bring the
new potency of democratic ideals: of free speech, free elections and the
Soviet Union into the community of nations. And then, with my
exercise of free will. We should not be surprised that the ideals of
colleagues in Brussels, on the 40th anniversary of the founding of the
democracy are returning with renewed force in Europe, the homeland
North Atlantic Alliance, we celebrated NATO's 40 years of success in
2
31
can rejoice-a continent that is diverse, yet whole.
of philosophers of freedom, whose ideals have been so fully realized in
Forty years of Cold War have tested Western resolve and the
our great United States of America. Victor Hugo said: "An invasion of
strength of our values. NATO's first mission is now nearly complete. But if
armies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come." My friends,
we are to fulfill our vision-our European vision-the challenges of the
liberty is an idea whose time has come in Eastern Europe, and make no
next 40 years will ask no less of us. Together, we shall answer the call. The
mistake about it.
world has waited long enough.
For almost half a century, the suppression of freedom in Eastern
Europe, sustained by the military power of the Soviet Union, has kept
nation from nation, neighbor from neighbor. As East and West now
seek to reduce arms, it must not be forgotten that arms are a symptom,
not a source, of tension. The true source of tension is the imposed and
unnatural division of Europe. How can there be stability and security in
Europe and the world as long as nations and peoples are denied the
right to determine their own future, a right explicitly promised by
agreements among the victorious powers at the end of World War II?
How can there be stability and security in Europe as long as nations
which once stood proudly at the front rank of industrial powers are
impoverished by a discredited ideology and stifling authoritarianism? The
United States-and let's be clear on this-has never accepted the
legitimacy of Europe's division. We accept no spheres of influence that
deny the sovereign rights of nations.
Yet the winds of change are shaping a new European destiny.
Western Europe is resurgent, and Eastern Europe is awakening to
yearnings for democracy, independence and prosperity. In the Soviet
Union itself, we are encouraged by the sound of voices long silent and the
sight of the rulers consulting the ruled. We see new thinking in some
aspects of Soviet foreign policy. We are hopeful that these stirrings
presage meaningful, lasting and more far-reaching change. Let no one
doubt the sincerity of the American people and their government in their
desire to see reform succeed inside the Soviet Union. We welcome the
changes that have taken place, and we will continue to encourage greater
recognition of human rights, market incentives and free elections.
East-West Negotiations
East and West are now negotiating on a broad range of issues, from
arms reductions to the environment. But the Cold War began in Eastern
Europe, and if it is to end, it will end in this crucible of world conflict.
And it must end. The American people want to see East and Central
Europe free, prosperous and at peace. With prudence, realism
and patience, we seek to promote the evolution of freedom-the
opportunities sparked by the Helsinki Accords and the deepening East-
West contact. In recent years, we have improved relations with
countries in the region, and in each case, we looked for progress in
international posture and internal practices: in human rights, cultural
openness, emigration issues, opposition to international terror. While we
3
30
want relations to improve, there are certain acts we will not condone or
our military activities. And therefore, I want to reiterate my support for
accept, behavior that can shift relations in the wrong direction: human
greater transparency. I renew my proposal that the Soviet Union and its
rights abuses, technology theft, and hostile intelligence or foreign
allies open their skies to reciprocal, unarmed aerial surveillance flights,
policy actions against us.
conducted on short notice to watch military activities. Satellites are a very
important way to verify arms control agreements. But they do not
Reform
provide constant coverage of the Soviet Union. An "Open Skies" policy
Some regimes are now seeking to win popular legitimacy through
would move both sides closer to a total continuity of coverage, while
reforms. In Hungary, a new leadership is experimenting with reforms that
symbolizing greater openness between East and West.
may permit a political pluralism that only a few years ago would have
These are my proposals to achieve a less militarized Europe. A
been absolutely unthinkable. And in Poland, on April 5th, Solidarity
short time ago they would have been too revolutionary to consider. And
leader Lech Walesa and Interior Minister Kiszczak signed agreements
yet today, we may well be on the verge of a more ambitious agreement
that, if faithfully implemented, will be a watershed in the postwar history
in Europe than anyone considered possible.
of Eastern Europe.
But we are also challenged by developments outside of NATO's
Under the auspices of the roundtable agreements, the free trade
traditional areas of concern. Every Western nation still faces the global
union Solidarnosc was today-this very day, under those
proliferation of lethal technologies, including ballistic missiles and
agreements-Solidarnosc was today formally restored. And the
chemical weapons. We must collectively control the spread of these
agreements also provide that a free opposition press will be legalized,
growing threats. So we should begin as soon as possible with a
independent political and other free associations will be permitted,
worldwide ban on chemical weapons.
and elections for a new Polish Senate will be held. These agreements
testify to the realism of General Jaruzelski [Chairman of Poland's
A Vision for Europe
Council of State] and his colleagues, and they are inspiring testimony to
Growing political freedom in the East, a Berlin without barriers, a
the spiritual guidance of the Catholic Church, the indomitable spirit of
cleaner environment, a less militarized Europe-each is a noble goal, and
the Polish people, and the strength and wisdom of Lech Walesa.
taken together, they are the foundation of our larger vision: a Europe
Poland faces, and will continue to face for some time, severe
that is free and at peace with itself. And so, let the Soviets know that our
economic problems. A modern French writer observed that communism
goal is not to undermine their legitimate security interests. Our goal is
is not another form of economics: It is the death of economics. In
to convince them, step by step, that their definition of security is obsolete,
Poland, an economic system crippled by the inefficiencies of central
that their deepest fears are unfounded.
planning almost proved the death of initiative and enterprise-almost.
When Western Europe takes its giant step in 1992, it will
But economic reforms can still give free rein to the enterprising impulse
institutionalize what's been true for years-borders open to people,
and creative spirit of the great Polish people.
commerce and ideas. No shadow of suspicion, no sinister fear, is cast
between you. The very prospect of war within the West is unthinkable to
Agenda for Poland
our citizens. But such a peaceful integration of nations into a world
The Polish people understand the magnitude of this challenge.
community does not mean that any nation must relinquish its culture,
Democratic forces in Poland have asked for the moral, political and
much less its sovereignty.
economic support of the West. And the West will respond. My
This process of integration, a subtle weaving of shared interests,
administration is completing now a thorough review of our policies
which is so nearly complete in Western Europe, has now finally begun in
toward Poland and all of Eastern Europe, and I've carefully considered
the East. We want to help the nations of Eastern Europe realize what
ways the United States can help Poland. We will not act unconditionally.
we, the nations of Western Europe, learned long ago. The foundation of
We're not going to offer unsound credits. We're not going to offer aid
lasting security comes, not from tanks, troops or barbed wire. It is built
without requiring sound economic practices in return. We must
on shared values and agreements that link free peoples.
remember that Poland still is a member of the Warsaw Pact. I will take
The nations of Eastern Europe are rediscovering the glories of
no steps that compromise the security of the West.
their national heritage. So let the colors and hues of national culture
The Congress, the Polish-American community... the American
return to these gray societies of the East. Let Europe forego a peace of
labor movement, our allies and international financial institutions-our
tension for a peace of trust, one in which the peoples of the East and West
4
29
On Monday [May 29], with my NATO colleagues in Brussels, I
allies-all must work in concert if Polish democracy is to take root
shared my great hope for the future of conventional arms negotiations in
anew and sustain itself. We can and must answer this call to freedom. And
Europe. I shared with them a proposal for achieving significant
it is particularly appropriate here in Hamtramck for me to salute the
reductions in the near future.
members and leaders of the American labor movement for hanging tough
And as you know, the Warsaw Pact has now accepted major
with Solidarity through its darkest days. Labor deserves great credit for
elements of our Western approach to the new conventional arms
that.
negotiations in Vienna. The Eastern bloc acknowledges that a
Now the Poles are now taking steps that deserve our active
substantial imbalance exists between the conventional forces of the two
support. I have decided as your president on specific steps to be taken by
alliances. And they've moved closer to NATO's position by accepting
the United States, carefully chosen to recognize the reforms underway
most elements of our initial conventional arms proposal. These
and to encourage reforms yet to come now that Solidarnosc is legal. I will
encouraging steps have produced the opportunity for creative and
ask Congress to join me in providing Poland access to our Generalized
decisive action, and we shall not let that opportunity pass.
System of Preferences, which offers selective tariff relief to beneficiary
countries. We will work with our allies and friends in the Paris Club to
Arms Reductions and Parity
develop sustainable new schedules for Poland to repay its debt, easing a
Our proposal has several key initiatives.
heavy burden SO that a free market can grow. I will also ask Congress to
I propose that we "lock in" the Eastern agreement to Western-
join me in authorizing the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to
proposed ceilings on tanks and armored troop carriers. We should also
operate in Poland, to the benefit of both Polish and U.S. investors. We
seek an agreement on common numerical ceilings for artillery in the
will propose negotiations for a private business agreement with Poland to
range between NATO's and that of the Warsaw Pact, provided these
encourage cooperation between U.S. firms and Poland's private
definitional problems can be solved. And the weapons we remove must
businesses. Both sides can benefit. The United States will continue to
be destroyed.
consider supporting, on their merits, viable loans to the private sector
We should expand our current offer to include all land-based
by the International Finance Corporation. We believe that the roundtable
combat aircraft and helicopters by proposing that both sides reduce in
agreements clear the way for Poland to be able to work with the
these categories to a level 15 percent below the current NATO totals.
International Monetary Fund on programs that support sound, market-
Given the Warsaw Pact's advantage in numbers, the Pact would have to
oriented economic policies. We will encourage business and private
make far deeper reductions than NATO to establish parity at those
non-profit groups to develop innovative programs to swap Polish debt for
lower levels. Again, the weapons we remove must be destroyed.
equity in Polish enterprises, and for charitable, humanitarian and
I propose a 20-percent cut in combat manpower in U.S.-stationed
environmental projects. We will support imaginative educational, cultural
forces, and a resulting ceiling on U.S. and Soviet ground and air forces
and training programs to help liberate the creative energies of the
stationed outside of national territory in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone
Polish people.
at approximately 275,000 each. This reduction to parity, a fair and
When I visited Poland in September of 1987, I was then vice
balanced level of strength, would compel the Soviets to reduce their
president, and told Chairman Jaruzelski and Lech Walesa that the
600,000-strong Red army in Eastern Europe by 325,000. And these
American people and government would respond quickly and
withdrawn forces must be demobilized.
imaginatively to significant internal reform of the kind that we now see.
And finally, I call on President Gorbachev to accelerate the
Both of them valued that assurance. So, it is especially gratifying for me
timetable for reaching these agreements. There is no reason why the five-
today to witness the changes now taking place in Poland and to announce
to-six year timetable, as suggested by Moscow, is necessary. I propose
these important changes in U.S. policy. The United States of America
a much more ambitious schedule. And we should aim to reach an
keeps its promises.
agreement within six months to a year and accomplish reductions by
If Poland's experiment succeeds, other countries may follow.
1992, or 1993 at the latest.
While we must still differentiate among the nations of Eastern Europe,
Poland offers two lessons for all. First, there can be no progress without
"Open Skies" and Proliferation
significant political and economic liberalization. Second, help from the
In addition to my conventional arms proposals, I believe that we ought
West will come in concert with liberalization. Our friends and European
to strive to improve the openness with which we and the Soviets conduct
allies share this philosophy.
28
5
Vision of Freedom
Environment
The West can now be bold in proposing a vision of the European future.
My generation remembers a Europe ravaged by war. And of course,
We dream of the day when there will be no barriers to the free movement
Europe has long since rebuilt its proud cities and restored its majestic
of peoples, goods and ideas. We dream of the day when Eastern
cathedrals. But what a tragedy it would be if your continent was again
European peoples will be free to choose their system of government and
spoiled, this time by a more subtle and insidious danger-the chancellor
to vote for the party of their choice in regular, free, contested elections.
referred to it-that of poisoned rivers and acid rain.
We dream of the day when Eastern European countries will be free to
America has faced an environmental tragedy in Alaska. Countries
choose their own peaceful course in the world, including closer ties
from France to Finland suffered after Chernobyl. West Germany is
with Western Europe. And we envision an Eastern Europe in which the
struggling to save the Black Forest today. And throughout, we have all
Soviet Union has renounced military intervention as an instrument of
learned a terrible lesson: Environmental destruction respects no borders.
its policy-on any pretext. We share an unwavering conviction that one
So my third proposal is to work together on these environmental
day all the peoples of Europe will live in freedom. And make no mistake
problems, with the United States and Western Europe extending a hand
about that.
to the East. Since much remains to be done in both East and West, we
Next month, at a summit of the North Atlantic Alliance, I will meet
ask Eastern Europe to join us in this common struggle. We can offer
with the leaders of the Western democracies. The leaders of the Western
technical training, assistance in drafting laws and regulations, and new
democracies will discuss these concerns. These are not bilateral issues
technologies for tackling these awesome problems. And I invite the
just between the United States and the Soviet Union. They are, rather, the
environmentalists and engineers of the East to visit the West to share
concern of all the Western allies, calling for common approaches. The
knowledge SO we can succeed in this great cause.
Soviet Union should understand, in turn, that a free, democratic Eastern
Europe as we envision it would threaten no one and no country. Such
Arms Control
an evolution would imply and reinforce the further improvement of East-
My fourth proposal, actually, a set of proposals, concerns a less
West relations in all dimensions-arms reductions, political relations,
militarized Europe, the most heavily armed continent in the world.
trade-in ways that enhance the safety and well-being of all of Europe.
Nowhere is this more important than in the two Germanys. And that's
There is no other way.
why our quest to safely reduce armaments has a special significance for
What has brought us to this opening? The unity and strength of
the German people.
the democracies, yes, and something else: the bold, new thinking in the
To those who are impatient with our measured pace in arms
Soviet Union, the innate desire for freedom in the hearts of all men. We
reductions, I respectfully suggest that history teaches us a lesson-that
will not waver in our dedication to freedom now. If we're wise, united and
unity and strength are the catalysts and prerequisites to arms control.
ready to seize the moment, we will be remembered as the generation
We've always believed that a strong Western defense is the best road to
that made all Europe free.
peace. Forty years of experience have proven us right.
Two centuries ago, a Polish patriot, Thaddeus Kosciuszko, came to
But we've done more than just keep the peace. By standing
these American shores to stand for freedom. Let us honor and remember
together, we have convinced the Soviets that their arms buildup has been
this hero of our own struggle for freedom by extending our hand to
costly and pointless. Let us not give them incentives to return to the
those who work the shipyards of Gdansk and walk the cobbled streets of
policies of the past. Let us give them every reason to abandon the arms
Warsaw. Let us recall the words of the Poles who struggled for
race for the sake of the human race.
independence: "For your freedom and ours." Let us support the peaceful
In this era of both negotiation and armed camps, America
evolution of democracy in Poland. The cause of liberty knows no limits;
understands that West Germany bears a special burden. Of course, in this
the friends of freedom, no borders.
nuclear age, every nation is on the front line. But not all free nations
are called to endure the tension of regular military activity or the constant
presence of foreign military forces. We are sensitive to these special
conditions that this needed presence imposes.
To significantly ease the burden of armed camps in Europe, we
must be aggressive in our pursuit of solid, verifiable agreements between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
27
6
And I said that positive steps by the Soviets would be met by steps
of our own. And this is why I announced on May 12 a readiness to consider
REMARKS AT THE TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY
granting to the Soviets a temporary waiver of the Jackson-Vanik* trade
COMMENCEMENT CEREMONY
restrictions, if they liberalize emigration. And this is also why I announced
College Station, Texas
on Monday [May 29] that the United States is prepared to drop the "no
exceptions" standard that has guided our approach to controlling the
May 12, 1989
export of technology to the Soviet Union-lifting a sanction enacted in
response to their invasion of Afghanistan.
And in this same spirit, I set forth four proposals to heal Europe's
tragic division, to help Europe become whole and free.
First, I propose we strengthen and broaden the Helsinki Process to
promote free elections and political pluralism in Eastern Europe. As the
forces of freedom and democracy rise in the East, so should our
expectations.
And weaving together the slender threads of freedom in the
East will require much from the Western democracies. In particular, the
great political parties of the West must assume an historic
responsibility-to lend counsel and support to those brave men and
women who are trying to form the first truly representative political
parties in the East, to advance freedom and democracy, to part the Iron
Curtain.
W
are reminded that no generation can escape history.
The Wall
Parents, we share a fervent desire for our children, and their children, to
In fact, it's already begun to part. The frontier of barbed wire and
know a better world, a safer world. Students, your parents and
minefields between Hungary and Austria is being removed, foot by foot,
grandparents have lived through a world war and helped America to
mile by mile. Just as the barriers are coming down in Hungary, so must
rebuild the world. They witnessed the drama of postwar nations
they fall throughout all of Eastern Europe. Let Berlin be next. Let Berlin
divided by Soviet subversion and force, but sustained by an Allied
be next.
response most vividly seen in the Berlin Airlift.
Nowhere is the division between East and West seen more clearly
And today I would like to use this joyous and solemn occasion to
than in Berlin. And there this brutal Wall cuts neighbor from neighbor,
speak to you and to the rest of the country about our relations with the
brother from brother. And that Wall stands as a monument to the
Soviet Union
failure of communism. It must come down.
Now, glasnost may be a Russian word, but openness is a Western
Containment-and Beyond
concept. West Berlin has always enjoyed the openness of a free city. And
Wise men-Truman and Eisenhower; Vandenberg and Rayburn;
our proposal would make all Berlin a center of commerce between East
Marshall, Acheson and Kennan-crafted the strategy of containment.
and West-a place of cooperation, not a point of confrontation. And we
They believed that the Soviet Union, denied the easy course of
rededicate ourselves to the 1987 allied initiative to strengthen freedom
expansion, would turn inward and address the contradictions of its
and security in that divided city. This, then is my second proposal-bring
inefficient, repressive and inhumane system. And they were right. The
glasnost to East Berlin.
Soviet Union is now publicly facing this hard reality.
Containment worked. Containment worked because our
democratic principles and institutions and values are sound and always
have been. It worked. because our alliances were, and are, strong and
*These restrictions, set out in the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, prohibit the extension of credits
because the superiority of free societies and free markets over stagnant
and Most-Favored-Nation |MFN| trade status to any non-market economy country that restricts the free emigration of its
socialism is undeniable.
citizens.
7
26
We are approaching the conclusion of an historic postwar
The Cold War began with the division of Europe. It can only end
struggle between two visions: one of tyranny and conflict, and one of
when Europe is whole. Today, it is this very concept of a divided Europe
democracy and freedom. The review of U.S.-Soviet relations-that my
that is under siege. And that's why our hopes run especially high,
administration has just completed outlines a new path toward
because the division of Europe is under siege not by armies, but by the
resolving this struggle.
spread of ideas that began here, right here. It was a son of Mainz,
Our goal is bold, more ambitious than any of my predecessors
Johannes Gutenberg, who liberated the mind of man through the power of
could have thought possible. Our review indicates that 40 years of
the printed word.
perseverance have brought us a precious opportunity, and now it is
And that same liberating power is unleashed today in a hundred
time to move beyond containment to a new policy for the 1990s, one that
new forms. The Voice of America, Deutsche Welle allow us to enlighten
recognizes the full scope of change taking place around the world and
millions deep within Eastern Europe and throughout the world.
in the Soviet Union itself. In sum, the United States now has as its goal
Television satellites allow us to bear witness from the shipyards of
much more than simply containing Soviet expansionism. We seek the
Gdansk to Tiananmen Square. But the momentum for freedom does
integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations. And
not just come from the printed word or the transistor or the television
as the Soviet Union itself moves toward greater openness and
screen. It comes from a single powerful idea-democracy.
democratization, as they meet the challenge of responsible international
behavior, we will match their steps with steps of our own. Ultimately,
Struggle for Democracy
our objective is to welcome the Soviet Union back into the world order.
This one idea-this one idea is sweeping across Eurasia. This one idea
is why the communist world, from Budapest to Beijing, is in ferment. Of
New Thinking
course, for the leaders of the East, it's not just freedom for freedom's
The Soviet Union says that it seeks to make peace with the world and
sake. But whatever their motivation, they are unleashing a force they will
criticizes its own postwar policies. These are words that we can only
find difficult to channel or control-the hunger for liberty of oppressed
applaud. But a new relationship cannot be simply declared by Moscow
peoples who have tasted freedom.
or bestowed by others; it must be earned. It must be earned because
Nowhere is this more apparent than in Eastern Europe, the
promises are never enough. The Soviet Union has promised a more
birthplace of the Cold War. In Poland, at the end of World War II, the
cooperative relationship before, only to reverse course and return to
Soviet army prevented the free elections promised by Stalin at Yalta.
militarism. Soviet foreign policy has been almost seasonal: warmth
And today, Poles are taking the first steps toward real elections, so long
before cold, thaw before freeze. We seek a friendship that knows no
promised, so long deferred. And in Hungary, at last we see a chance for
season of suspicion, no chill of distrust.
multi-party competition at the ballot box.
We hope perestroika is pointing the Soviet Union to a break with the
As president, I will continue to do all I can to help open the closed
cycles of the past-a definitive break. Who would have thought we would
societies of the East. We seek self-determination for all of Germany and
see the deliberations of the Central Committee on the front page of
all of Eastern Europe. And we will not relax, and we must not waver.
Pravda, or dissident Andrei Sakharov seated near the councils of power?
Again, the world has waited long enough.
Who would have imagined a Soviet leader who canvasses the sidewalks
But democracy's journey East is not easy. Intellectuals like the
of Moscow and also Washington, D.C.? These are hopeful, indeed,
great Czech playwright, Vaclav Havel, still work under the shadow of
remarkable signs. Let no one doubt our sincere desire to see perestroika,
coercion. And repression still menaces too many peoples of Eastern
this reform, continue and succeed. But the national security of America
Europe. Barriers and barbed wire still fence in nations. So when I visit
and our allies is not predicated on hope. It must be based on deeds.
Poland and Hungary this summer, I will deliver this message: There
We look for enduring, ingrained, economic and political change.
cannot be a common European home until all within it are free to move
While we hope to move beyond containment, we are only at the
from room to room.
beginning of our new path. Many dangers and uncertainties are ahead. We
must not forget that the Soviet Union has acquired awesome military
U.S. Proposals
capabilities. That was a fact of life for my predecessors, and that's always
And I'll take another message: The path of freedom leads to a larger
been a fact of life for our allies. And that is a fact of life for me today, as
home-a home where West meets East, a democratic home-the
President of the United States.
commonwealth of free nations.
8
25
old animosities. The NATO Alliance did nothing less than provide
As we seek peace, we must also remain strong. The purpose of our
a way for Western Europe to heal centuries-old rivalries, to begin an era
military might is not to pressure a weak Soviet economy or to seek
of reconciliation and restoration. It has been, in fact, a second
military superiority. It is to deter war. It is to defend ourselves and our
Renaissance of Europe.
allies, and to do something more: to convince the Soviet Union that there
can be no reward in pursuing expansionism, to convince the Soviet
Four Decades
Union that reward lies in the pursuit of peace.
As you know best, this is not just the 40th birthday of the Alliance. It's
also the 40th birthday of the Federal Republic-a republic born in hope,
Fulfilling a Vision
tempered by challenge. At the height of the Berlin crisis in 1948, Ernst
Western policies must encourage the evolution of the Soviet Union
Reuter called on Germans to stand firm and confident, and you
toward an open society. This task will test our strength. It will tax our
did-courageously, magnificently.
patience. And it will require a sweeping vision. Let me share with you
And the historic genius of the German people has flourished in
my vision. I see a Western Hemisphere of democratic, prosperous nations,
this age of peace. And your nation has become a leader in technology and
no longer threatened by a Cuba or a Nicaragua armed by Moscow. I see
the fourth largest economy on Earth. But more important, you have
a Soviet Union as it pulls away from ties to terrorist nations, like Libya,
inspired the world by forcefully promoting the principles of human rights,
that threaten the legitimate security of their neighbors. I see a Soviet
democracy and freedom. The United States and the Federal Republic
Union which respects China's integrity and returns the Northern
have always been firm friends and allies. But today we share an added
Territories to Japan, a prelude to the day when all the great nations of
role: partners in leadership.
Asia will live in harmony.
Of course, leadership has a constant companion-responsibility
But the fulfillment of this vision requires the Soviet Union to take
And our responsibility is to look ahead and grasp the promise of the
positive steps, including:
future.
First, reduce Soviet forces. Although some small steps have
I said recently that we're at the end of one era and at the beginning
already been taken, the Warsaw Pact still possesses more than 30,000
of another. And I noted that, in regard to the Soviet Union, our policy is to
tanks, more than twice as much artillery and hundreds of thousands
move beyond containment.
more troops in Europe than NATO. They should cut their forces to less
For 40 years, the seeds of democracy in Eastern Europe lay
threatening levels, in proportion to their legitimate security needs.
dormant, buried under the frozen tundra of the Cold War. And for 40 years,
Second, adhere to the Soviet obligation, promised in the final
the world has waited for the Cold War to end. And decade after decade,
days of World War II, to support self-determination for all the nations of
time after time, the flowering human spirit withered from the chill of
Eastern and Central Europe. This requires specific abandonment of the
conflict and oppression. And again, the world waited. But the passion
Brezhnev Doctrine. One day it should be possible to drive from Moscow to
for freedom cannot be denied forever. The world has waited long enough.
Munich without seeing a single guard tower or a strand of barbed wire.
The time is right. Let Europe be whole and free.
In short, tear down the Iron Curtain.
Third, work with the West in positive, practical-not merely
One Europe
rhetorical-steps toward diplomatic solutions to these regional disputes
To the founders of the Alliance, this aspiration was a distant dream,
around the world. I welcome the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
and now it's the new mission of NATO. If ancient rivals like Britain and
and the Angola agreement. But there is much more to be done around the
France, or France and Germany, can reconcile, then why not the nations
world. We're ready. Let's roll up our sleeves and get to work.
of the East and West?
Fourth, achieve a lasting political pluralism and respect for human
In the East, brave men and women are showing us the way. Look at
rights. Dramatic events have already occurred in Moscow. We are
Poland, where Solidarity-Solidarnosc-and the Catholic Church have won
impressed by limited, but freely contested elections. We are impressed
legal status. The forces of freedom are putting the Soviet status quo on
by a greater toleration of dissent. We are impressed by a new frankness
the defensive.
about the Stalin era. Mr. Gorbachev, don't stop now.
In the West, we have succeeded because we've been faithful to our
Fifth, join with us in addressing pressing global problems,
values and our vision. And on the other side of the rusting Iron Curtain,
including the international drug menace and dangers-to the environment.
their vision failed.
We can build a better world for our children.
24
9
Arms Control and Openness
As the Soviet Union moves toward arms reduction and reform, it will
REMARKS AT RHEINGOLDHALLE
find willing partners in the West. We seek verifiable, stabilizing arms
control and arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union and its
Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany
allies. However, arms control is not an end in itself, but a means of
May 31, 1989
contributing to the security of America and the peace of the world. I
directed Secretary [of State] Baker to propose to the Soviets that we
resume negotiations on strategic forces in June; and, as you know, the
Soviets have agreed.
Our basic approach is clear. In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
[START], we wish to reduce the risk of nuclear war. In the companion
Defense and Space Talks, our objective will be to preserve our options
to deploy advanced defenses when they're ready. In nuclear testing, we
will continue to seek the necessary verification improvements in
existing treaties to permit them to be brought into force. We're going to
continue to seek a verifiable global ban on chemical weapons. We
support NATO efforts to reduce the Soviet offensive threat in the
negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. And as I've said,
fundamental to all of these objectives is simple openness.
Make no mistake, a new breeze is blowing across the steppes and
the cities of the Soviet Union. Why not, then, let this spirit of openness
grow, let more barriers come down. Open emigration, open debate,
open airwaves-let openness come to mean the publication and sale of
T
banned books and newspapers in the Soviet Union. Let the 19,000
oday, I come to speak, not just of our mutual defense, but of our
Soviet Jews who emigrated last year be followed by any number who wish
shared values. I come to speak, not just of the matters of the mind, but of
to emigrate this year. And when people apply for exit visas, let there be
the deeper aspirations of the heart.
no harassment against them. Let openness come to mean nothing less
than the free exchange of people and books and ideas between East
A Common Heritage
and West.
Just this morning, Barbara and I were charmed with the experiences we
And let it come to mean one thing more.
had. I met with a small group of German students, bright young men and
women who studied in the United States. Their knowledge of our
"Open Skies"
country and the world was impressive to say the least. But sadly, too many
Thirty-four years ago, President Eisenhower met in Geneva with Soviet
in the West, Americans and Europeans alike, seem to have forgotten
leaders who, after the death of Stalin, promised a new approach toward
the lessons of our common heritage and how the world we know came to
the West. He proposed a plan called "Open Skies," which would allow
be. And that should not be, and that cannot be. We must recall that the
unarmed aircraft from the United States and the Soviet Union to fly over
generation coming into its own in America and Western Europe is heir to
the territory of the other country. This would open up military activities
gifts greater than those bestowed to any generation in history-peace,
to regular scrutiny and, as President Eisenhower put it, "convince the
freedom and prosperity.
world that we are lessening danger and relaxing tension." President
This inheritance is possible because 40 years ago the nations of
Eisenhower's suggestion tested the Soviet readiness to open their
the West joined in that noble, common cause called NATO. First there was
society. The Kremlin failed that test. Now, let us again explore that
the vision, the concept of free peoples in North America and Europe
proposal, but on a broader, more intrusive and radical basis, one which I
working to protect their values. And second, there was the practical
hope would include allies on both sides. We suggest that those
sharing of risks and burdens, and a realistic recognition of Soviet
countries that wish to examine this proposal meet soon to work out the
expansionism. And finally, there was the determination to look beyond
10
23
United Europe
necessary operational details, separately from other arms control
The importance of the Alliance and its democratic underpinnings is the
negotiations. Such surveillance flights, complementing satellites, would
message I now take to Europe. NATO has been a success by any measure.
provide regular scrutiny for both sides. Such unprecedented territorial
But success breeds its own challenges. Today, dramatic changes are
access would show the world the true meaning of the concept of
taking place in Europe, East and West. For us, those changes bring new
openness. The very Soviet willingness to embrace such a concept
challenges and unparalleled opportunities.
would reveal their commitment to change.
For too long, unnatural and inhuman barriers have divided East
from West. We hope to overcome that division, to see a Europe that is
U.S.-Soviet Cooperation
truly free, united and at peace. We are ready to work with a united
Where there is cooperation, there can be a broader economic
Europe, to extend the peace and prosperity we enjoy to other parts of the
relationship. But economic relations have been stifled by Soviet internal
world. And we hope to move beyond containment-to integrate the
policies. They've been injured by Moscow's practice of using the cloak
Soviet Union into the community of nations.
of commerce to steal technology from the West. Ending discriminatory
We welcome the political and economic liberalization that has
treatment of U.S. firms would be a helpful step. Trade and financial
taken place so far in the Soviet Union and in some countries of Eastern
transactions should take place on a normal commercial basis.
Europe. We watch hoping that more changes will follow.
And should the Soviet Union codify its emigration laws in accord
with international standards and implement its new laws faithfully, I am
Trans-Atlantic Partnership
prepared to work with Congress for a temporary waiver of the Jackson-
Many common concerns confront us. Beyond the traditional economic
Vanik Amendment,* opening the way to extending Most-Favored-Nation
and security spheres, we and our partners in the Alliance are working hard
trade status* to the Soviet Union The policy I have just described
on a growing international agenda-from a common approach to
has everything to do with you
environmental protection, to cooperation against terrorism and drug
It is a sad truth that nothing forces us to recognize our common
trafficking.
humanity more swiftly than a natural disaster. I'm thinking, of course, of
We also welcome Europe's progress towards a truly common
Soviet Armenia, just a few months ago-a tragedy without blame, war-
market and growing European cooperation on security issues as the basis
like devastation without war. Our son took our 12-year-old grandson to
of an even more dynamic trans-Atlantic partnership. As we approach
Yerevan. At the end of a day of comforting the injured and consoling
1992, it is essential that we work with our European partners to ensure an
the bereaved, the father and son went to church, sat down together in the
open and expanding world trading system, and that we take strong
midst of the ruins and wept. How can our two countries magnify this
steps to prevent trade disputes from obscuring our common; political and
simple expression of caring? How can we convey the goodwill of our
security concerns.
people?
NATO is based on the many bonds between us: our shared
Forty-three years ago, a young lieutenant by the name of Albert
heritage, history and culture; our shared commitment to freedom,
Kotzebue, Class of 1945 at Texas A&M, was the first American soldier to
democracy and the rights of the individual. These values represent the
shake hands with the Soviets at the banks of the Elbe River. Once
moral compass of America and the values I will bring to the summit.
again, we are ready to extend our hand. Once again, we are ready for a
hand in return. Once again, it is a time for peace.
*An amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 that prohibits the extension of credits and Most-Favored-Nation |MFN] trade
status to any non-market economy country that restricts the free emigration of its citizens.
"A country receiving such status gets the lowest tariff rate that the U.S. government generally extends to its other
trading partners.
11
22
REMARKS AT THE BOSTON UNIVERSITY
REMARKS UPON DEPARTURE FOR EUROPE
COMMENCEMENT CEREMONY
Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland
Boston, Massachusetts
May 26, 1989
May 21, 1989
T
ake a look at our world today. Nations are undergoing changes
so radical that the international system you know and will know in the
future will be as different from today's, as today's world is from the
time of Woodrow Wilson. How will America prepare, then, for the
challenges ahead?
It's with your future in mind that, after deliberation and a review,
we are adapting our foreign policies to meet this challenge. I've outlined
how we're going to try to promote reform in Eastern Europe and how
we're going to work with our friends in Latin America. In Texas, I spoke to
another group of graduates of our new approach to the Soviet Union,
one of moving beyond containment, to seek to integrate the Soviets into
the community of nations, to help them share the rewards of
international cooperation.
Change in Western Europe
But today, I want to discuss the future of Europe, that mother of
nations and ideas that is so much a part of America. And it is fitting that I
I
share this forum with a very special friend of the United States-
depart for Europe this morning to meet with all our North
President Mitterrand, you have the warm affection and high regard of
Atlantic allies, and also to pay visits to Italy, Germany and the United
the American people. And I remember well about eight years ago when
Kingdom for discussions with the leaders of those Alliance nations on
you joined us in Yorktown [Virginia] in 1981 to celebrate the
issues of common interest.
bicentennial of that first Franco-American fight for freedom. And soon, I
will join you in Paris, sir, to observe the 200th anniversary of the French
Celebrating NATO
struggle for liberty and equality.
I am especially pleased that my first visit to Europe as president is to
This is just one example of the special bond between two
celebrate the 40th anniversary of NATO. America is a proud partner in the
continents. But consider this city. From the Old North Church to Paul
Atlantic Alliance-and American interests have been well served by
Revere's home, nestled in the warm heart of the Italian North End, to
the Alliance.
your famous song-filled Irish pubs-the Old and New Worlds are
Twice in the first half of this century, Europe was the scene of
inseparable in this city. But as we look back to Old World tradition, we
world war. Twice, Americans fought in Europe for the sake of peace and
must look ahead to a new Europe. Historic changes will shape your
freedom. Today, Europe is enjoying a period of unparalleled prosperity
careers and your very lives.
and uninterrupted peace-longer than any it has known in the modern
The changes that are occurring in Western Europe are less
age. NATO has made the difference-and the Alliance will prove every
dramatic than those taking place in the East, but they are no less
bit as important to American and European security in the decade ahead.
12
21
Let me emphasize-our aim is nothing less than removing war as
fundamental. The postwar order that began in 1945 is transforming
an option in Europe.
into something very different. Yet certain essentials remain because our
The USSR has said that it is willing to abandon its age-old reliance
Alliance with Western Europe is utterly unlike the cynical power
on offensive strategy. It's time to begin. This should mean a smaller force,
alliances of the past. It is based on far more than the perception of a
one less reliant on tanks and artillery and personnel carriers that
common enemy. It is a tie of culture and kinship and shared values. As
provide the Soviets' offensive striking power. A restructured Warsaw
we look toward the 21st century, Americans and Europeans alike should
Pact-one that mirrors the defensive posture of NATO-would make
remember the words of Raymond Aron, who called the Alliance a
Europe and the world more secure.
"moral and spiritual community." Our ideals are those of the American
Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. And it is
Openness
precisely because the ideals of this community are universal that the
Peace can also be enhanced by movement towards more openness in
world is in ferment today.
military activities. And two weeks ago, I proposed an "Open Skies"
Now a new century holds the promise of a united Europe. As you
initiative to extend the concept of openness. That plan for territorial
know, the nations of Western Europe are already moving toward greater
overflights would increase our mutual security against sudden and
economic integration, with the ambitious goal of a single European
threatening military activities. In the same spirit, let us extend this
market in 1992. The United States has often declared it seeks a healing of
openness to military expenditures as well. I call on the Soviets to do as we
old enmities, an integration of Europe. At the same time, there has
have always done. Let's open the ledgers. Publish an accurate defense
been an historical ambivalence on the part of some Americans towards a
budget.
more united Europe. To this ambivalence has been added
But as we move forward, we must be realistic. Transformations of
apprehension at the prospect of 1992. But whatever others may think, this
this magnitude will not happen overnight. If we are to reach our goals, a
administration is of one mind. We believe a strong, united Europe
great deal is required of us, our allies and of the Soviet Union. But we
means a strong America.
can succeed.
Western Europe has a gross domestic product that is roughly
equal to our own and a population that exceeds ours. European science
Inheritance of Freedom
leads the world in many fields, and European workers are highly
I began today by speaking about the triumph of a particular, peculiar,
educated and highly skilled. We are ready to develop, with the European
very special American ideal: freedom. And I know there are those who may
Community and its member states, new mechanisms of consultation
think there's something presumptuous about that claim, those who
and cooperation on political and global issues, from strengthening the
will think it's boastful. But it is not, for one simple reason: Democracy
forces of democracy in the Third World to managing regional tensions,
isn't our creation; it is our inheritance.
to putting an end to the division of Europe. A resurgent Western Europe is
And we can't take credit for democracy, but we can take that
an economic magnet, drawing Eastern Europe closer, toward the
precious gift of freedom, preserve it and pass it on, as my generation does
commonwealth of free nations. A more mature partnership with Western
to you, and you, too, will do one day. And perhaps-provided we seize
Europe will pose new challenges. There are certain to be clashes and
the opportunities open to us-we can help others attain the freedom that
controversies over economic issues. America will, of course, defend its
we cherish.
interests. But it is important to distinguish adversaries from allies and
As I said on the Capitol steps the day I took this office, as
allies from adversaries. What a tragedy; what an absurdity it would be if
President of the United States, "There is but one just use of power, and it
future historians attribute the demise of the Western Alliance to
is to serve people." As your commander in chief, let me call on this
disputes over beef hormones and wars over pasta. We must all work hard
Coast Guard class to reaffirm with me that American power will continue
to ensure that the Europe of 1992 will adopt the lower barriers of the
in its service to the enduring ideals of democracy and freedom.
modern international economy, not the high walls and the moats of
medieval commerce.
NATO: Maintaining Peace in Europe
But our hopes for the future rest ultimately on keeping the peace in
Europe. Forty-two years ago, just across the Charles River, Secretary of
20
13
State George Marshall gave a commencement address that outlined a
-and second, the need to maintain an approach to arms reduction
plan to help Europe recover. Western Europe responded heroically, and
that promotes stability at the lowest feasible level of armaments.
later joined with us in a partnership for the common defense-a shield
Deterrence is central to our defense strategy. The key to keeping
we call NATO. This Alliance has always been driven by a spirited debate
the peace is convincing our adversaries that the cost of aggression against
over the best way to achieve peaceful change. But the deeper truth is
us or our allies is simply unacceptable.
that the Alliance has achieved an historic peace because it is united by a
In today's world, nuclear forces are essential to deterrence. Our
fundamental purpose. Behind the NATO shield, Europe has now
challenge is to protect those deterrent systems from attack. And that's
enjoyed 40 years free of conflict-the longest period of peace the
why we'll move Peacekeeper ICBMs out of fixed and vulnerable silos,
continent has ever known. Behind this shield, the nations of Western
making them mobile and thus harder to target. Looking to the longer
Europe have risen from privation to prosperity-all because of the
term, we will also develop and deploy a new highly mobile single-
strength and resolve of free peoples.
warhead missile, the Midgetman. With only minutes of warnings, these
With a Western Europe that is now coming together, we recognize
new missiles can relocate out of harm's way. Any attack against
that new forms of cooperation must be developed. We applaud the
systems like this will fail.
defense cooperation developing in the revitalized Western European
We are also researching-and we are committed to deploy when
Union, whose members worked with us to keep open the sea-lanes of the
ready-a more comprehensive defensive system, known as SDI (Strategic
Persian Gulf. We applaud the growing military cooperation between
Defense Initiative). Our premise is straightforward: Defense against
West Germany and France. We welcome British and French programs to
incoming missiles endangers no person, endangers no country.
modernize their deterrent capability and their moves toward cooper-
ation in this area. It is perfectly right and proper that Europeans
Arms Reductions
increasingly see their defense cooperation as an investment in a secure
We're also working to reduce the threat we face, both nuclear and
future. But we do have a major concern of a different order-a growing
conventional. The INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty
complacency throughout the West.
demonstrates that willingness. In addition, in the past decade, NATO
Of course, your generation can hardly be expected to share the
has unilaterally removed 2,400 shorter-range theater warheads. But
grip of past anxieties. With such a long peace, it is hard to imagine how it
theater nuclear forces contribute to stability no less than strategic
could be otherwise. But our expectations in this rapidly changing world
forces, and thus it would be irresponsible to depend solely on strategic
cannot race SO far ahead that we forget what is at stake. There's a great
nuclear forces to deter conflict in Europe.
irony here. While an ideological earthquake is shaking asunder the very
The conventional balance in Europe is just as important and is
communist foundation, the West is being tested by complacency.
linked to the nuclear balance. For more than 40 years-and look at your
We must never forget that, twice in this century, American blood
history books to see how pronounced this accomplishment is-the
has been shed over conflicts that began in Europe. We share the fervent
Warsaw Pact's massive advantage in conventional forces has cast a
desire of Europeans to relegate war forever to the province of distant
shadow over Europe.
memory. But that is why the Atlantic Alliance is SO central to our foreign
The unilateral reductions that President Gorbachev has promised
policy. That's why America remains committed to the Alliance and the
give us hope that we can now redress that imbalance. We welcome those
strategy which has preserved freedom in Europe. We must never forget
steps because, if implemented, they will help reduce the threat of
that to keep the peace in Europe is to keep the peace for America.
surprise attack. And they confirm what we've said all along, that Soviet
NATO's policy of flexible response keeps the United States linked
military power far exceeds the levels needed to defend the legitimate
to Europe and lets any would-be aggressors know that they will be
security interests of the USSR. And we must keep in mind that these
met with any level of force needed to repel their attack and frustrate
reductions alone, even if implemented, are not enough to eliminate
their designs. Our short-range deterrent forces, based in Europe and kept
the significant numerical superiority that the Soviet Union enjoys right
up to date, demonstrate that America's vital interests are bound
now.
inextricably to Western Europe, and that an attacker can never gamble on
Through negotiation, we can now transform the military landscape
a test of strength with just our conventional forces. Though hope is
of Europe. The issues are complex, stakes are very high. But the Soviets
now running high for a more peaceful continent, the history of this
are now being forthcoming, and we hope to achieve the reductions that
century teaches Americans and Europeans to remain prepared.
we seek.
14
19
American interests in light of the enduring reality of Soviet military
East-West Relations
power.
As we search for a peace that is enduring, I'm grateful for the steps that
We want to see perestroika succeed. And we want to see the policies
Mr. Gorbachev is taking. If the Soviets advance solid and constructive
of glasnost and perestroika-so far, a revolution imposed from top
plans for peace, then we should give credit where credit is due. We're
down-institutionalized within the Soviet Union. And we want to see
seeing sweeping changes in the Soviet Union that show promise of
perestroika extended as well. We want to see a Soviet Union that
enduring, of becoming ingrained. At the same time, in an era of
restructures its relationship toward the rest of the world, a Soviet
extraordinary change, we have an obligation to temper optimism-and I
Union that is a force for constructive solutions to the world's problems.
am optimistic-with prudence.
The grand strategy of the West during the postwar period has been
For example, the Soviet foreign minister informed the world last
based on the concept of containment: checking the Soviet Union's
week that his nation's commitment to destroy SS-23 missiles under the
expansionist aims, in the hope that the Soviet system itself would one
recently enacted INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty may
day be forced to confront its internal contradictions. The ferment in the
be reversible. The Soviets must surely know the results of failure to
Soviet Union today affirms the wisdom of this strategy. And now we
comply with this solemn agreement. Perhaps their purpose was to
have a precious opportunity to move beyond containment. You're
divide the West on other issues that you're reading about in the papers
graduating into an exciting world, where the opportunity for
today. But regardless, it is clear that Soviet new thinking has not yet
peace-world peace, lasting peace-has never been better.
totally overcome the old.
Our goal, integrating the Soviet Union into the community of
I believe in a deliberate, step-by-step approach to East-West
nations, is every bit as ambitious as containment was at its time. And it
relations because recurring signs show that while change in the Soviet
holds tremendous promise for international stability.
Union is dramatic, it's not yet complete. The Warsaw Pact retains a
Coping with a changing Soviet Union will be a challenge of the
nearly 12-to-one advantage over the Atlantic Alliance in short-range
highest order. But the security challenges we face today do not come from
missile and rocket launchers capable of delivering nuclear weapons;
the East alone. The emergence of regional powers is rapidly changing
and more than a two-to-one advantage in battle tanks. For that reason, we
the strategic landscape.
will also maintain, in cooperation with our allies, ground and air forces
in Europe as long as they arè wanted and needed to preserve the peace in
Proliferation of Weapons
Europe. At the same time, my administration will place a high and
In the Middle East, in South Asia, in our own hemisphere, a growing
continuing priority on negotiating a less militarized Europe, one with a
number of nations are acquiring advanced and highly destructive
secure conventional force balance at lower levels of forces. Our
capabilities-in some cases, weapons of mass destruction and the
aspiration is a real peace--a peace of shared optimism, not a peace of
means to deliver them. And it is an unfortunate fact that the world faces
armed camps.
increasing threat from armed insurgencies, terrorists, and as you in the
Coast Guard are well aware, narcotics traffickers-and, in some regions,
A Moral and Spiritual Community
an unholy alliance of all three.
Nineteen-ninety-two is the 500th anniversary of the discovery of the
Our task is clear: We must curb the proliferation of advanced
New-World. So we have five centuries to celebrate, nothing less than our
weaponry; we must check the aggressive ambitions of renegade regimes;
very civilization-the American Bill of Rights and the French Rights of
and we must enhance the ability of our friends to defend themselves.
Man, the ancient and unwritten Constitution of Great Britain, and the
We have not yet mastered the complex challenge. We and our allies must
democratic visions of Konrad Adenauer and Alcide de Gasperi.
construct a common strategy for stability in the developing world.
And in all our celebrations, we observe one fact: This truly is a
moral and spiritual community. It is our inheritance and so let us protect
Deterrence
it. Let us promote it. Let us treasure it for our children, for Americans
How we and our allies deal with these diverse challenges depends on
and Europeans yet unborn.
how well we understand the key elements of defense strategy. And so let
me just mention today two points in particular:
-first, the need for an effective deterrent, one that demonstrates to
our allies and adversaries alike American strength, American resolve;
18
15
free market system generating prosperity and progress on a global
REMARKS AT THE COAST GUARD ACADEMY
scale. The economic foundation of this new era is the proven success of
GRADUATION CEREMONY
the free market, and nurturing that foundation are the values rooted in
New London, Connecticut
freedom and democracy.
May 24, 1989
Our country, America, was founded on these values and they gave
us the confidence that flows from strength. So let's be clear about one
thing: America looks forward to the challenge of an emerging global
market. But these values are not ours alone; they are now shared by our
friends and allies around the globe.
T.
The economic rise of Europe and the nations of the Pacific Rim is
the growing success of our postwar policy. This time is a time of
tremendous opportunity, and destiny is in our own hands. To reach the
oday our world-your world-is changing, East and West. And
world we want to see, we've got to work, and work hard. There's a lot of
today I want to speak to you about the world we want to see, and what we
work ahead of us.
can do to bring that new world into clear focus.
We must resolve international trade problems that threaten to pit
friends and allies against one another. We must combat misguided
The Democratic Idea
notions of economic nationalism that will tell us to close off our
We live in a time when we are witnessing the end of an idea-the final
economies to foreign competition, just when the global marketplace has
chapter of the communist experiment. Communism is now
become a fact of life.
recognized-even by many within the communist world itself-as a
We must open the door to the nations of Eastern Europe and
failed system, one that promised economic prosperity but failed to deliver
other socialist countries that embrace free market reforms.
the goods, a system that built a wall between the people and their
And finally, for developing nations heavily burdened with debt, we
political aspirations.
must provide assistance and encourage the market reforms that will set
But the eclipse of communism is only one-half of the story of our
those nations on a path towards growth.
time. The other is the ascendancy of the democratic idea. Never before
If we succeed, the next decade and the century beyond will be an
has the idea of freedom SO captured the imaginations of men and
era of unparalleled growth, an era which sees the flourishing of freedom,
women the world over. And never before has the hope of freedom
peace and prosperity around the world.
beckoned so many: trade unionists in Warsaw, the people of Panama,
But this new era cannot unfold in a climate where conflict and
rulers consulting the ruled in the Soviet Union. And even as we speak
turmoil exist. And therefore, our goals must also include security and
today, the world is transfixed by the dramatic events in Tiananmen
stability: security for ourselves and our allies and our friends; stability
Square. Everywhere those voices are speaking the language of democracy
in the international arena and an end to regional conflicts.
and freedom, and we hear them, and the world hears them, and
Such goals are constant, but the strategy we employ to reach them
America will do all it can to encourage them.
can and must change as the world changes. Today, the need for a dynamic
So today I want to speak about our security strategy for the
and adaptable strategy is imperative. We must be
1990s-one that advances American ideals and upholds American aims.
strong-economically, diplomatically and, as you know, militarily-to
Amidst the many challenges we'll face, there will be risks. But let
take advantage of the opportunities open to us in a world of rapid
me assure you, we'll find more than our share of opportunities. We and
change. And nowhere will the ultimate consequences of change have
our allies are strong-stronger really than at any point in the postwar
more significance for world security than within the Soviet Union itself.
period-and more capable than ever of supporting the cause of freedom.
There's an opportunity before us to shape a new world.
Change in the Soviet Union
What we're seeing now in the Soviet Union is indeed dramatic. The
Free Markets and Security
process is still ongoing, unfinished. But make no mistake-our policy is to
What is it that we want to see? It is a growing community of
seize every, and I mean every, opportunity to build a better, more stable
democracies anchoring international peace and stability, and a dynamic
relationship with the Soviet Union-just as it is our policy to defend
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