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Records of the White House Office of Speechwriting (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Tony Snow Subject Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
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This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series:
Snow, Tony, Files
Subseries:
Subject File, 1988-1993
OA/ID Number:
13899
Folder ID Number:
13899-014
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[Soviet-U.S. Relations, 1989-1990]
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18
29
2
7
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
74
(George Bush Library)
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Subject/Title
Date
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01. Transcript
Re: Ambassador Yerxa Speaks Out on the Uruguay Round in
n.d.
P-1, (b)(1)
C
London.
[Document not located.] (1 pp.)
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Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series:
Snow, Robert Anthony (Tony)
Subseries:
Subject File
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
[Soviet - U.S. Relations] 1989 - 1990
Pinksheet Number:
RML1864
OA/ID Number:
08676
Date Closed:
12/28/2004
FOIA/Sys Case #:
Processed by: Matt Lee
Re-review Case #:
2005-0485-S
Processed by: Matt Lee
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/
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(New York, New York)
For Immediate Release
September 23, 1991
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT'
TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
United Nations
New York, New York
12:44 P.M. EDT
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. President, thank you, sir. Mr.
secretary General, distinguished delegates to the United Nations, I
am honored to speak with you as you open the 46th Session of the
General Assembly.
I'd first like to congratulate outgoing President Guido
de Marco of Malta, and salute our incoming President Samir shihabi of
saudi Arabia. I also want to salute especially Secretary General
Javier Perez de Cuellar, who will step down in just over three
months. But let me say, Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has
served with great distinction during a period of unprecedented change
and turmoil. For almost 10 years we've enjoyed the leadership of
this man of peace; a man that I, along with many of you, feel proud
to call friend. so today, let us congratulate our friend, and praise
his spectacular service to the United Nations -- and to the people of
the world. Mr. Secretary General. (Applause.
Let me also welcome new members to this chamber: two
delegations representing Korea, particularly our democratic friends,
the Republic of Korea; the Republics of Estonia, Latvía, and
Lithuania; and new missions from the Marshall Islands and Micronesia.
Twenty years ago, when I was the permanent
representative here for the United States, there were 132 U.N.
members. Just one week ago, 159 nations enjoyed membership in the
United Nations. Today, the number stands at 166. The presence of
these new members alone provides reasons for us to celebrate.
My speech today will not sound like any you've heard
from a President of the United states. I'm not going to dwell on the
superpower competition that defined international politics for half a
century. Instead, I will discuss the challenges of building peace
and prosparity in a world leavened by the Cold War's end and the
resumption of history.
Communism held history captive for years. It suspended
ancient disputes; and it suppressed ethnic rivalries, nationalist
aspirations, and old prejudices. As it has dissolved, suspended
hatreds have sprung to life. People who for years have been denied
their pasts have begun searching for their own identities MO often
through peaceful and constructive means, occasionally through
factionalism and bloodshed.
This revival of history ushers in a new era, teeming
with opportunities and perils. And let's begin by discussing the
opportunities.
First, history's renewal enables people to pursue their
natural instincts for enterprise. Communism froze that progress
until its failures became too much for even its defenders to bear.
MORE
- 2 -
And now citizens throughout the world have chosen enterprise over
envy; personal responsibility over the enticements of the state;
prosperity over the poverty of central planning.
The U.N. Charter encourages this adventure by pledging
"to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic
and social advancement of all peoples." And I can think of no better
way to fulfill this mission than to promote the free flow of goods
and ideas.
Frankly, ideas and goods will travel around the globe
with or without our help. The information revolution has destroyed
the weapons of enforced isolation and ignorance. In many parts of
the world technology has overwhelmed tyranny, proving that the age of
information can become the age of liberation if we limit state power
wisely and free our people to make the best use of new ideas,
inventions, and insights.
BY the same token, the world has learned that free
markets provide levels of prosperity, growth and happiness that
centrally planned economies can never offer. Even the most
charitable estimates indicate that in recent years the free world's
economies have grown at twice the rate of the former communist world.
Growth does more than fill shelves. It permits every
person to gain -- not at the expense of others, but to the benefit of
others. Prosperity encourages people to live as neighbors, not as
predators.
Economic growth can aid international relations in
exactly the same way. Many nations represented here are parties to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The Uruguay Round, the
latest in the postwar series of trade negotiations, offers hope to
developing nations, many of which have been cruelly divided "
cruelly deceived by the false promises of totalitarianism.
Here in this chamber we hear about North-South problems.
But free and open trade, including unfettered access to markets and
credit, offer developing countries means of self-sufficiency and
economic dignity.
If the Uruguay Round should fail, a new wave of
protectionísm could destroy our hopes for a better future. History
shows all too clearly that protectionism can destroy wealth within
countries and poison relations between them. And therefore, I call
upon all members of GATT to redouble their efforts to reach &
successful conclusion for the Uruguay Round. I pledge that the
United States will do its part.
I cannot stress this enough: Economic progress will
play a vital role in the new world. It supplies the soil in which
democracy grows best.
People everywhere seek government of and by the people.
And they want to enjoy their inalienable rights to freedom and
property and person.
Challenges to democracy have failed. Just last month
coup plotters in the Soviet Union tried to derail the forces of
liberty and reform, but Soviet citizens refused to follow. Most of
the nations in this chamber stood with the forces of reform, led by
Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, and against the coup plotters.
The challenge facing the Soviet peoples now -- that of
building political systems based upon individual liberty, minority
rights, democracy and free markets -- mirrors every nation's
responsibility for encouraging peaceful, democratic reform. But it
also testifies to the extraordinary power of the democratic ideal.
MORE
- 3 -
As democracy flourishes, so does the opportunity for a
third historical breakthrough: international cooperation. A year
ago, the soviet Union joined the United States and a host of other
nations in defending a tiny country against aggression -- and
opposing Saddam Hussein. For the very first time on a matter of
major importance, superpower competition was replaced with
international cooperation.
The United Nations, in one of its finest moments,
constructed a measured, principled, deliberate and courageous
response to Saddam Hussein. It stood up to an outlaw who invaded
Kuwait, who threatened many states within the region, who sought to
set a menacing precedent for the post-Cold War world.
The coalition effort established a model for the
collective settlement of disputes. Members set the goal -- the
liberation of Kuwait -- and devised a courageous, unified means of
achieving that goal.
And now, for the first time, we have a real chance to
fulfill the U.N. Charter's ambition of working "to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the
equal rights of men and women and nations large and small to promote
social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."
Those are the words from the Charter.
We will not revive these ideals 1f we fail to
acknowledge the challenge that the renewal of history presents.
In Europe and Asia, nationalist passions have flared
anew, challenging borders, straining the fabric of international
society. At the same time, around the world, many age-old conflicts
still fester. You see signs of this tumult right here. The United
Nations has mounted more peacekeeping missions in the last 36 months
than during its first 43 years. And although we now seem mercifully
liberated from the fear of nuclear holocaust, these smaller, virulent
conflicts should trouble us all.
We must face this challenge squarely: first, by
pursuing the peaceful resolution of disputes now in progress; second,
and more importantly, by trying to prevent others from erupting.
No one here can promise that today's borders will remain
fixed for all time. But we must strive to ensure the peaceful,
negotiated settlement of border disputes.
We also must promote the cause of international harmony
by addressing old feuds. we should take seriously the Charter's
pledge "to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one
another as good neighbors."
UNGA Resolution 3379, the so-called "zionism is racism"
resolution, mocks this pledge and the principles upon which the
United Nations was founded. And I call now for its repeal.
Zionism is not a policy; it is the idea that led to the
creation of a home for the Jewish people, to the state of Israel.
And to equate Zionism with the intolerable sin of racism is to twist
history and forget the terrible plight of Jews in World War II and,
indeed, throughout history. To equate Zionism with racism is to
reject Israel itself -- a member of good standing of the United
Nations.
This body cannot claim to seek peace and at the same
time challenge Israel's right to exist. By repealing this resolution
MORE
- 4 -
unconditionally, the United Nations will enhance its credibility and
serve the cause of peace.
As we work to meet the challenge posed by the resumption
of history, we also must defend the Charter's emphasis on inalienable
human rights.
Government has failed if citizens cannot speak their
minds; if they can't form political parties freely and elect
governments without coercion; if they can't practice their religion can't
freely; if they can't raise their families in peace; if they
enjoy a just return from their labor; if they can't live fruitful
lives and, at the end of their days, look upon their achievements and
their society's progress with pride.
Politicians who talk about "democracy" and "freedom"
but provide neither eventually will feel the sting of public
disapproval and the power of people's yearning to live free.
some nations still deny their basic rights to the
people. And too many voices cry out for freedom. For example, the
people of Cuba suffer oppression at the hands of a dictator who
hasn't gotten the word, the lone hold-out in an otherwise democratic
hemisphere; a man who hasn't adapted to a world that has no use for
totalitarian tyranny. Elsewhere, despots ignore the heartening fact
that the rest of the world has embarked upon a new age of liberty.
The renewal of history also imposes an obligation to
remain vigilant about new threats and old. We must expand our
efforts to control nuclear proliferation. We must work to prevent
the spread of chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to
deliver them.
It is for this reason that I put forward my Middle East
arms initiative, a comprehensive approach to stop and, where
possible, reverse the accumulation of arms in that part of the world
most prone to violence.
We must remember that self-interest will tug nations in
different directions, and that struggles over perceived interests
will flare sometimes into violence.
We can never say with confidence where the next conflict
may arise. And we cannot promise eternal peace -- not while
damagogues peddle false promises to people hungry with hope; not
while terrorists use our citizens as pawns, and drug dealers destroy
our peoples. We, as a result -- we must band together to overwhelm
affronts to basic human dignity.
It is no longer acceptable to shrug and say that one
man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Let's put the law
above the crude and cowardly practice of hostage-holding.
In a world defined by change, we must be as firm in
principle as we are flexible in our response to changing
international conditions. That's especially true today of Iraq. Six
months after the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 687 and
688, Saddam continues to rebuild his weapons of mass destruction and
subject the Iraqi people to brutal repression.
Saddam's contempt for U.N. resolutions was first
demonstrated back in August of 1990. And it continues even as I am
speaking. Mis government refuses to permit unconditional helicopter
inspections, and right now is refusing to allow U.N. inspectors to
leave inspected premises with documents relating to an Iraqi nuclear
weapons program.
MORE
. 3 -
And it is the United States view that we must keep the
United Nations sanctions in place as long as he remains in power.
And this also shows that we cannot compromise for a moment in seeing
that Iraq destroys all of its weapons of mass destruction and the
means to deliver them. And we will not compromise.
This is not to say -- and let me be clear on this one
-- that we should punish the Iraqi people. Let me repeat, our
argument has never been with the people of Iraq. It was and is with
a brutal dictator whose arrogance dishonors the Iraqi people.
security Council Resolution 706 created a responsible mechanism for
sending humanitarian relief to innocent Iraqi citizens. We must put
that mechanism to work.
We must not abandon our principled stand against
Saddam's aggression. This cooperative effort has liberated Kuwait;
and now it can lead to a just government in Iraq. And when it does,
when it does, the Iraqi people can look forward to better lives; free
at home, free to engage in a world beyond their borders.
The resumption of history also permits the United
Nations to resume the important business of promoting the values that
I've discussed today. This body can serve as a vehicle through which
willing parties can settle old disputes. In the months to come, I
look forward to working with Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and
his successor as we pursue peace in such diverse and troubled lands
as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cyprus, El Salvador, and the Western
Sahara.
The United Nations can encourage free-market development
through its international lending and aid institutions. However, the
United Nations should not dictate the particular forms of government
that nations should adopt. But it can and should encourage the
values upon which this organization was founded. Together, we should
insist that nations seeking our acceptance meet standards of human
decency.
Where institutions of freedom have lain dormant, the
United Nations can offer them new life. These institutions play a
crucial role in our quest for a new world order, an order in which no
nation must surrender one iota of its own sovereignty; an order
characterized by the rule of law rather than the resort to force; the
cooperative settlement of disputes, rather than anarchy and
bloodshed; and an unstinting belief in human rights.
Finally, you may wonder about America's role in the new
world that I have described. Let me assure you, the United states
has no intention of striving for a Pax Americana. However, we will
remain engaged. We will not retreat and pull back into isolationism.
We will offer friendship and leadership. And in short, we seek a Pax
Universalis built upon shared responsibilities and aspirations.
To all assembled, we have an opportunity to spare our
sons and daughters the sins and errors of the past. we can build a
future more satisfying than any our world has ever known. The future
lies undefined before us, full of promise; littered with peril. We
can choose the kind of world we want: one blistered by the fires of
war and subjected to the whims of coercion and chance, or one made
more Deaceful by reflection and choice. Take this challenge
seriously. Inspire future generations to praise and venerate you, to
say: On the ruins of conflict, these brave men and women built an
era of peace and understanding. They inaugurated a new world order,
an order worth preserving for the ages.
Good luck to each and every one of you. And thank you
very, very much. (Applause.)
END
1:08 P.M. EDT
EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERED
Statement of
2
Robert B. Zoellick
Under Secretary of State for
Economic and Agricultural Affairs
and Counselor
U.S. Department of State
Before the
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee
on
Relations of the U.S. with the Soviet Union and the Republics
October 2, 1991
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to have this opportunity to report on recent
events in the Soviet Union and the republics.
I will stress five points:
O
First, the events of August 1991 in the Soviet Union
constitute one of the undeniable watersheds of our
age. As President Bush stated last week, "[t]his
revival of history ushers in a new era, teeming with
opportunities and perils." And the President took a
major initiative in setting the course for this new
age last Friday through his announcement of bold steps
and proposals to reduce the nuclear threat.
- 2 -
Second, power has shifted almost completely to the
republics of the Soviet Union; the fundamental
question now is whether a new form of cohesion among
them is possible or desirable
O
Third, democratic reformers are now in key positions,
but myriad threats lurk around them. Their success is
by no means assured.
O
Fourth, in this new post-Cold War era, the U.S. must
continue to be deeply engaged with the Soviet Union
and the republics -- on matters of internal political
evolution, economic reform, and foreign and security
policy.
O
Fifth, we need a sensible and realistic basis for
assessing what constitutes successful policy in this
time of transition.
A New Era of History
Government officials are frequently accused, fairly I suppose,
of overdramatizing changes in policy or events. Not this
time. We have leapt into a new era of history.
Consider the situation in the wake of the failed Apparatchik
Counterrevolution. The Russian Empire, and then the Communist
- 3 -
Empire that succeeded it, have been among the great forces
that determined the history of Europe, Asia, and indeed the
world, for the past three centuries. That empire is now
but
shattered. The Communist Party that ran it is banned or
Russia
remains
suspended in its homeland, its assets have been taken away,
intact,
and it is under investigation. A country that reaches across
itself an
11 time zones is in the throes of political, economic, and
empire.
social upheaval.
It may be many years before this new age settles into its own
pattern. Even the first label in common usage -- the
post-Cold War era -- reflects the fact that to date its single
most dominant characteristic is the abandonment of the Cold
War that came before. (Indeed, a former colleague recalled
the story of the Chinese historian who, when asked recently to
comment on the historical consequences of the French
Revolution, responded, "It is too soon to tell.")
In grasping for historical analogies, it is natural to seize
on other lost, multinational empires -- for example, the
Austro-Hungarian or the Ottoman. Like earlier multinational
empires that fragmented, our longstanding antagonist is
struggling to determine how the pieces might relate to one
another. But I would also like to draw attention to another
point of comparison: the dangers and opportunities that the
United States faced in the aftermath of World War II, when we
reached out to former enemies, Germany and Japan, helping to
establish them as democratic market economies and allies. Now
- 4 -
the Cold War has ended. Many of the new leaders in the Soviet
Union and the republics are looking to the United States to
help guide them into becoming contributors in the democratic
community of nations.
Last week at the United Nations, President Bush referred to
the challenges of building peace and prosperity as we face
this "resumption of history." Last Friday, the President
outlined steps we will take, and others that we propose, to
stand down from the tense nuclear confrontation with the
Soviet Union -- a state of imminent danger that my generation
had etched onto its early consciousness in 1962 and had
expected to have persist through its existence.
The new security environment that President Bush hopes to
establish also has enormous political implications for the
future. As Secretary Baker stated this June in Berlin, "the
door to the Euro-Atlantic community is open. But only the
Soviets can decide to step over the threshold."
The agents of the old Soviet regime did not want to take that
step. But ironically, their actions in August to backtrack
ended up toppling them and sending the Soviet Union and its
republics stumbling ahead The direction is right, but there
are serious questions as to whether new leaders of reform can
keep their footing.
- 5 -
The reformers are attempting to transform the traditional
institutions of repression in the Soviet Union. Their effort
with the KGB and the Army may offer one of the most startling
examples of the Soviet Union's metamorphosis.
Vadim Bakatin, the new head of the KGB, told us in September
that he intended to cut back many of the KGB's activities and
establish those that remain on a legal foundation. Bakatin
was particularly interested in learning more about the legal
and oversight systems that Western countries have developed
for their intelligence services. Nor were these just musings;
he demonstrated the detailed knowledge he had already obtained
about Western legislation on wiretaps. Bakatin also seemed
eager to strengthen exchanges with the CIA. While our
anti-terrorism discussions with the KGB have already broken
new and potentially beneficial ground, Bakatin's interest
clearly extended further. He wanted to draw from the
experience of Western intelligence agencies to establish the
KGB as a responsible institution in the new Soviet society.
One important element of Bakatin's strategy is to bring in new
people and then build up new leaders who are committed to
reform. The new democrats were deeply troubled by the
quiescence of many officials during the August coup.
The new ways have dangers of their own, of course. One
Russian told us that when the new head of the KGB for a large
city asked what he was supposed to do, he was told that one
- 6 -
task alone would ensure success: He was to make sure his
democratic bosses were alerted in advance of any other coup
attempt.
The new Minister of Defense, Air Marshal Shaposhnikov, also
outlined his intention to redirect a defense establishment
that for decades had been a pillar of the totalitarian state.
He is seeking to build upon the military's pride in being an
army of the people. At critical moments in Russian and Soviet
history, the military became the embodiment of the
Motherland. Shaposhnikov is proud that during the critical
moments of August, this army of the people would not fire on
them.
But Shaposhnikov is not content with an army guided by its
heart; he wants to support these impulses by winning over the
minds of soldiers and civilians alike. His strategy, like
Bakatin's, is to establish a Defense Ministry and military
subject to civilians and the rule of law.
Shaposhnikov intends to reduce the size of his forces and to
increase the role of volunteers. He plans to transform the
military to reflect a new state of center-republic relations:
He speculated about working out legal arrangements with each
republic, establishing clearly that the military's role would
be to defend, and not to interfere, in the republics. Indeed,
his questions about U.S. stationing and status of forces
arrangements abroad appeared to be a search for appropriate
models.
- 7 -
I was struck particularly by Shaposhnikov's interest in the
U.S. code of military justice and our military police. He
wants to build public legitimacy for the Soviet Army. And he
believes that to do so, the civilian public must trust that
the military adheres to the rule of law in its own internal
affairs as well as toward the society at large. Given all the
demands on Shaposhnikov's time, his attention to this means of
building the military's place in a civilian society suggested
to me that a very new man is in charge.
The democrats hope to transform the old institutions of
repression into what they describe as a "safety net" for
democracy. They can build on the fact that during the August
coup many people in the security apparat simply refused to act
against democratic leaders or, just as important, against the
people in the streets. Nevertheless, it will take time for
the new thinking to be accepted by all the old rank and file.
It is too early to know whether these courageous leaders will
succeed. If this is indeed a second Russian revolution, we
must also face up to the fact that the furies of revolutions
have frequently created consequences that were impossible to
foresee or control. The forces now unleashed in the Soviet
Union could lead to disintegration and conflict that could
plague Eurasia and the world for decades to come. One or more
autocrats may seek to impose dominating authority at a
- 8 -
terrible price, as Lenin was able to do after the Civil War
period. Whatever the course of the future, we can shape it
only if we recognize that the policy framework that we have
used for the Soviet Union over the past 40 years is now
history.
The Great Power Shift: The Dominance of the Republics
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the post-coup
environment is the dramatic shift of power from the center to
the republics. Almost overnight, the key question about the
political compact has been transformed: Before August, we
asked what would be the division of political power between
the center and the republics; today the question is whether
cohesion among republics is possible.
1. From the Center to the Republics to
Mayor Popov of Moscow placed this dramatic development within
a context. He outlined three different stages of political
contract and related them to the reform impulse. In the
first, Gorbachev had tried to reform Soviet society from the
center. Like Peter the Great or Alexander II, the other great
Russian modernizers who preceded him, Gorbachev had launched
an era of reform from above.
- 9 -
But as the reforms met resistance from the established order,
an order based on the entrenched power of highly centralized
institutions, some Soviets -- Russians and non-Russians --
speculated that the route to reform would have to run through
the individual republics. But this second alternative, while
theoretically possible, also confronted many obstacles. It
divided the combined force of reformers.
Nationalism, and old
animosities, at times superseded the drive for democracy and
market reforms. Moreover, the republics were linked by a
highly centralized industrial structure, and even if the old
economic structure could be overcome, autarkic republics would
forgo the potential benefits from higher degrees of
integration.
Popov's third stage was a division of labor between the center
and the republics. The first effort to legally establish such
an allocation of power came from the center earlier this year
when Gorbachev negotiated the one-plus-nine agreement --
Gorbachev plus nine republic leaders -- that was to lead to
the new union treaty. Indeed, it was the prospect of signing
that treaty in late August that probably led the coup plotters
to act when they did. But in the aftermath of the coup, Popov
concluded, only what he labels a "nine-plus-one arrangement"
is possible. By this he means it is up to the independent
republics to determine what authorities they will cede to a
new center.
- 10 -
Another Russian reformer was even more explicit about the loss
of central authority, at least in economic matters. The
concept of one-plus-others is gone, he said. The question now
is whether they' 11 even have a zero-plus-nine or -twelve or
some other number. Thus, he believes that any common economic
authority will have to be newly created by the republics.
2. A Crisis of Legitimacy
I suspect that the underlying problem of fragmentation runs
even deeper than a shift of power to the republics. We are
already seeing signs that subordinate groups or regions within
the republics are questioning republican authority as well.
In testimony I gave to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in February of this year, I stated that the fundamental
problem confronting all leaders and governments in the Soviet
Union is to overcome a crisis of legitimacy
As perestroika
and glasnost gave people the freedom to question, as the grip
of fear loosened, people would not follow a leadership that
had no right to govern. That is still a primary problem
today. It is true for both the center and many republics.
During the winter and early spring, the Soviet leadership
tried to cope with the crisis of legitimacy by restoring
order. They falsely equated order with political legitimacy.
And for them, order depended on authority.
- 11 -
But equating legitimacy with order and authority turned out to
be a backward formula. The heavy hand of authority could not
restore order in the Baltics, at least not at a price the
leadership was willing to pay. Nor could authority reorder a
broken down economy or currency. The leadership failed to
reestablish the power of the center through national
institutions like the Army, the KGB, and the Communist Party.
Then when Gorbachev tried to reestablish political legitimacy
based on a new Union Treaty linked to the development of a new
constitution and elections, the old Communist boyars made
their last gasp through the coup. The brave and successful
resistance mobilized by President Yeltsin around the Russian
Republic doomed the old center that Gorbachev had sought to
maintain through a new union treaty.
So we are now in a period when the republics are seeking to
establish their legitimacy. They have declared independence.
Now they must determine what independence means for their
people and the relation of republics to one another.
We have also seen that one cannot necessarily equate republics
with reform. After decades of a Cold War waged against the
totalitarian center, some assumed that those within the Soviet
Union who opposed this center must also stand for the
democratic principles the center crushed. And in fact, as the
old central authorities delayed or retreated, many republics
had become the driving forces for reform. But we have already
seen, in a relatively short time, that the republics also have
- 12 -
a mixed record. Some leaders are using the disintegration of
central authority to maximize their own power at home. Others
use violence and intimidation against those who challenge them
and to threaten minorities within their republics.
We need to be careful not to examine the development of
republican independence solely through the lens of our
conceptions of the nation-state. Nationalism, one of the
momentous movements of the 19th and 20th Centuries in the rest
of the world, has followed a somewhat different course in the
Soviet Union. Russian nationalism has existed for some time,
but it had been harnessed to serve the ends of Soviet
Communism. Russian chauvinism had antagonized many other
peoples in the USSR. Now the national movements in the border
republics have been freed to define their own national
characters and their origins in culture, literature, language,
territory, and history; they are still evolving and still
exploring how they relate to one another. While many of the
nationalisms have old and distinguished lineages, the relation
between nationalism and the state is frequently not yet well
defined.
Moreover, the national movements do not fit neatly within
republic boundaries. One in five Soviet citizens lives
outside his or her ethnic republic or area. So there is
substantial potential for friction and conflict between
republic governments and national movements.
- 13 -
Ultimately, political legitimacy, and the stability that it
offers, must be based on consent of the governed. That's one
reason why President Yeltsin, one of the few leaders elected
by his people, has a particularly important role to play.
Republican independence must be complemented by democracy.
Yet the rule of the majority must respect the rights of the
minority. As Thomas Jefferson stated in his First Inaugural
Address: "Though the will of the majority is in all cases to
prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; the
minority possess their equal right, which equal laws must
protect, and to violate which would be oppression."
3. Cooperation Among Independent Republics
The newly independent republics also need to recognize the
benefits of integrating or coordinating structures. This is
not the same as seeking a recentralization of power. As
former Secretary of State Kissinger pointed out recently in a
thoughtful op-ed piece, the highly centralized Russian state
-- through different leaders, ideologies, and centuries -- has
relied on hegemonic armed forces and outward expansion to try
to dominate at least two continents. But autarkic republics,
suspicious and perhaps even hostile to one another, pose
dangers, too.
- 14 -
In particular, cooperation among republics may be important in:
O
Avoiding ethnic discord and even civil war;
Enhancing security, particularly through the central
command and control of nuclear weapons; and
o
Strengthening the prospects for a successful economic
reform program.
Given the ethnic patchwork of the Soviet Union, some basic
cohesion may be important to stave off disintegration. The
importance of some cooperation among the republics was driven
home to us by our conversations a few weeks ago with Aleksandr
Yakovlev, Eduard Shevardnadze, and other reform leaders. They
were particularly anxious about the Ukraine. Of the 52
million people in the Ukraine, an estimated 11 million are
Russian; many have intermarried. While Yakovlev and
Shevardnadze acknowledged the fact of the Ukraine's
independence, they also pointed out the danger that if the
Ukraine totally disassociates itself from Russia, large
Russian minorities in places like Kharkov, the Donbas, Odessa,
and the Crimea may try to secede. If the Russians in the
Ukraine leave, they continued, the Russians that comprise 38
percent of the population in Kazakhstan may decide they, too.
wish to restore ties with Russia. A divided Kazakhstan could
spur the rise of a new Islamic tide across the southern
- 15 -
reaches of the Soviet Union. The two reformers concluded this
could have far-reaching spillover effects -- not only on the
Islamic neighbors, but also in nearby multi-ethnic nations
like India.
This may well be an overly fearful picture. But these men are
serious observers, and their warnings bear careful reflection
on the part of all sides. It will be particularly important
for Russian leaders to demonstrate to non-Russians that they
will be able to receive fair treatment and can exert equitable
influence in any arrangements that are struck.
Some cohesion is important for security and stability, too.
Central control of nuclear forces is critical to preventing
proliferation. Eurasian stability also will not be served by
the creation of large, independent republican armies. Nor can
economic reform be pursued by small states striving to build
military establishments.
Finally, there are significant economic reasons for some
common policies among republics. As the United States has
demonstrated for over 200 years and as the Western Europeans
have also learned, there are substantial economic benefits to
a large internal market unhindered by trade barriers. Indeed,
it is vital that the reform leaders finally move ahead with a
serious, comprehensive program for a market economy, and that
effort will be far harder if the republics cannot agree on
common economic policies.
- 16 -
Robert Hormats elucidated this point in his recent testimony
before the Senate. One of the legacies of Stalin and his
successors is a highly interdependent structure of
production. Hormats reported that one recent Soviet study
examining 6000 different products determined that about three
quarters were supplied by just one producer. Soviet
industrialists told him that single factory monopolies tend to
be the rule, not the exception, and that they account for an
estimated 30-40 percent of industrial output. The CIA has
pointed out that "the Soviet Union's entire output of potato,
corn and cotton harvesting equipment comes from single
factories -- all in different republics."
This extraordinary economic monopolization already makes price
decontrol exceedingly difficult; if the republics do not
maintain open trade and agree to instituting reforms at a
roughly similar pace, the already substantial dislocations
will intensify. Similarly, the development of a macroeconomic
stabilization program -- to establish some steady value for a
currency -- depends on sound monetary and fiscal policies.
These policies depend, in turn, on agreements to cut spending,
collect revenues, and control the money supply. Therefore,
one of the critical challenges facing the people of the Soviet
Union is how to strike the appropriate balance between
smaller, independent political units and cohesion that
recognizes economic and political interdependencies. This is
not a new question, and the leaders of the republics can draw
from the experiences of others as they search for answers.
- 17 -
4. Balancing the Devolution and Evolution of Sovereignty
As Secretary Baker pointed out in a speech in Berlin this
June, one of the most striking phenomena across all of Europe
today is the combined and simultaneous devolution and
evolution of the nation-state. While the nation-state remains
by far the most significant political unit, its political role
is being increasingly supplemented by both supranational and
subnational units.
In Western Europe, an intense and comprehensive voluntary
evolution of governing authority above the national level has
been accompanied by the devolution of power to state and local
governments, to regions that sometimes cross national borders,
and to the private sector. In Central and Eastern Europe, and
now clearly in the Soviet Union as well, devolution is
certainly the more prominent phenomenon. The collapse of
Communism has freed ethnicity to re-emerge as a powerful
political force, threatening to erect new divisions between
countries and, even more acutely, within multinational
states.
Evolution and devolution need not be alternatives, but instead
can be complementary, and indeed interdependent developments.
The foundation must be democracy and grassroots involvement in
political processes. The challenge for democracy is to
encompass, to represent, but also to transcend, ethnic ties on
the basis of common values.
- 18 -
The United States balances democracy and diversity through
federalism. The architects of a united Europe have adopted
the principal of "subsidiarity" -- the devolution of
responsibility to the lowest level of government capable of
performing it effectively. By the same token, it makes sense
for the various parts of the Soviet Union to consider
balancing devolution of authority with the voluntary common
delegation of powers for basic matters such as defense, trade,
monetary systems, and the protection of basic human rights --
particularly equal treatment of minorities. Given the
strength of the drive for independence, it may take time
before the citizens of the republics are willing to consider
such combinations -- but the need will not go away.
In 1945, much of Western Europe was broken, hungry, and
hostile. But the integration of Western Europe within the EC
and NATO has virtually transcended all the old territorial
disputes, irredentist claims, and ethnic grievances among and
within their member states. Euro-Atlantic integration has
made it literally inconceivable that localized disputes could
become a source for serious conflict among these states. The
incentives for cooperation within these multi- and
supranational frameworks are overwhelmingly high compared to
with the remaining areas of discord.
Eventually, similar structures will have to develop to shape
interdependence with and among the lands of Central and
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union if they are to ever share
- 19 -
in comparable levels of peace and prosperity. The processes
of evolution and devolution need to be kept in constructive
equilibrium. Only by achieving balanced progress in both
directions can the individual be assured a voice in a
democratic and interdependent world.
5. In Sum
In sum, although power has now shifted to the republics, the
crisis of political legitimacy remains acute. The
fragmentation of authority could continue -- down to still
smaller units -- if the new leaders fail to establish
legitimacy through democracy with respect for minority
rights. A preoccupation with republican independence is
yesterday's battle, a conflict waged and won against
totalitarian central authority. Decentralized power in the
republics will not necessarily overcome ethnic strife or
economic autarky. At this point in time, an ongoing reform
effort needs to turn to these new challenges. We need only
look as far as Yugoslavia to see the costs of devolution that
slides into disintegration.
An Opportunity for Democracy
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Aleksandr Yakovlev
told us that he and his fellow democrats owed a great debt of
- 20 -
thanks to the coup plotters. Those eight men, he explained,
had opened the way for the democrats to propel reform five or
ten years ahead. Old apparatchiks could be moved to the
side. The confrontation had produced a real revolution in the
minds of the people. Power was now with the democrats. But
Yakovlev still asked, "Can we cope?"
There is now a great opportunity to launch true, far-reaching
reforms in the Soviet Union and its republics. Conditions at
home remain extraordinarily difficult. The old command
economy has broken down, but no market system exists to
succeed it. The traditional system of authority has
collapsed, but the forces of the new, rough-edged pluralism
have yet to work out cooperative arrangements so that they can
design and implement a program.
The democrats recognize that they must build a stronger base
of support. One reform leader told us that during the coup
the democrats drew vital support from the "oppositionists".
These people are not necessarily the same as democrats. They
have rejected the old Communist ways, but as of yet they do
not have a deep commitment to any successor system.
Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Popov, Sobchak, Stankevich and others
launched in July 1991 a new Movement for Democratic Reform.
At present, it is an umbrella organization that draws from the
various fledgling democratic parties that had already been
forming, as well as from new participants. They are working
- 21 -
to avoid the traditional Russian reform problem of failing to
link the intelligentsia with other groups. Interestingly,
Shervardnadze told us that two core groups of support were
young people and some leaders in the defense industrial
sector. The latter -- intelligent, technologically
sophisticated leaders -- recognize that the old system does
not work, and they believe there is an opportunity to put
their skills to use in a market economy.
The greatest danger the reformers now face is the discrediting
of democracy. The average man or woman on the street seems
sullen, tired of talk. The new parliaments, like the old
Dumas of 1905-17, seem to offer high drama, but no change for
the better. One person summarized the situation with an
anecdote: The first person who puts vodka on the shelves, she
said, will carry the day. Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin,
who seem to be working in concert, both told us: We need to
help people.
Gorbachev also told us that the coup removed the head of the
serpent, but a large body of traditionalists remains. He
pointed to two significant risks. First, indifference and
apathy would weigh down efforts to stimulate a new political
and economic system. Alternatively, frustrations might build
into an acute response, a demand for action, any action.
Authoritarian strains run deep in Russian and Soviet society.
At some point, desperate people may turn back to the autocrat
- 22 -
who claims a firm hand is needed to pull people back up. Yet
the coup demonstrated that an organized resistance, assembled
around newly elected leaders, could defeat authoritarians.
Moreover, important groups -- including the Army and parts of
the KGB -- would not intervene against the democrats.
Frankly, the big unknown variable is the legendary ability of
the Russian people to endure.
A visitor to Moscow or St. Petersburg knows that winter is
coming. Perhaps because winter has played such a major role
in Russian history, defeating invaders and leaders alike, the
encroaching winter appears to be taking on a symbolic feature
of challenge. While the task ahead for the democrats will of
course extend much beyond the next six months, the new
democratic mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg are mobilizing
to meet the needs of their publics over this period.
For Mayor Sobchak of St. Petersburg and other new, dynamic
leaders, these preparations are part of a larger strategy:
They understand people need confidence in the future; they
need hope; they need some examples of success. Sobchak also
recognizes that the spirit of the people needs to be
invigorated by their own sense of what they can accomplish,
not by what others can give to them.
These are proud people. They want their accomplishments and
potential -- which are great -- to be recognized. They want
our support and cooperation. But they prefer investments or
- 23 -
loans to handouts. Perhaps the most encouraging sign is that
the type of leaders who will need to step forward if Russia
and the other republics are going to be successful -- people
like Sobchak and Nazarbayev of Kazahkstan -- recognize that
the great opportunities to be seized and the dangers to be
avoided ultimately depend on tapping the creativity and energy
of the people they represent.
A Policy of Active U.S. Engagement with the Soviet Union and
the Republics
Throughout four decades of Cold War, America's relations with
the Soviet Union were the primary preoccupation of our foreign
policy. Although the old Communist regime is now gone, it
would be a tremendous mistake to disengage just as the Soviet
Union and its republics are moving into a critical stage of
transition. The United States continues to have strong
national interests in the course of events in that country.
U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union and the republics must
continue to adapt to meet changed and changing circumstances.
One strong national interest draws from a strain of our
foreign policy that dates back to our earliest days as a
nation. The United States has always viewed itself as a
practical experiment in liberty and democracy. And we have
welcomed, encouraged and, when possible, even protected those
who aspire to these same values. This is the important
- 24 -
element of idealism in American foreign policy. Today's
events in the Soviet Union and its republics offer one of our
greatest historical opportunities to promote those values, and
through doing so, to foster a democratic partner that can help
us address other challenges around the world.
But America's statecraft has also sought to blend realism with
this idealism. In this situation, our realistic national
self-interests also dictate serious engagement. There is the
potential for a democratic and market-oriented Soviet Union to
contribute to global peace, stability, and prosperity.
But even if this potential fails to be fulfilled, we have an
interest in precluding a return to an authoritarian state or
states that may threaten neighbors. Within the past two
centuries, the armies of Russia and the Soviet Union have
marched from the shores of the Pacific to Paris and Berlin.
Today, the borders of the Soviet Union mark an arc of other
lands in transition: from the aspiring democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe, through the Islamic lands of the Mideast,
on to South Asian countries struggling with their own
religious and national conflicts, and extending to the
Communists of Eastern and Northern Asia who are trying to
bolster bankrupt regimes. A large share of the world's
nuclear weapons remains in the Soviet Union. Various
republics have great factories for producing advanced
conventional weapons, and some may be already looking for new
markets in the world's troublespots. Upheaval in the heart of
Eurasia could threaten the very countries that are our primary
- 25 -
In sum, because of both our ideals and our self-interest, our
foreign policy must continue to direct considerable energy and
creativity to the Soviet Union and its republics.
Let me briefly highlight our thinking on three topics:
(1) political evolution; (2) economic reform; and (3) foreign
and security policy.
1. Political Evolution
Our policy towards the political evolution of the Soviet Union
needs to respect the fluidity of the situation. And we must
acknowledge the limits of any outsider's ability to affect the
future course of events.
This is a key point: The fundamental need to establish
political legitimacy can only be accomplished by the people of
the Soviet Union and its republics. It's up to them to
determine the outcome, not us.
But we are not disinterested bystanders. Many Soviet
reformers, people of great reputation at home and abroad, have
told us that the opinions of the Western democracies, and in
particular the United States, are important. And although it
is not our place to delineate the final outcome of the new
political arrangements, we can speak to the process by which
the decisions are reached.
- 26 -
Therefore, we have informed the leaders of the Soviet Union
and its republics that our policies towards them will be
guided by five principles set out by Secretary Baker on
September 4:
O
First, they should determine the future of the country
peacefully, consistent with democratic values and
practices, and the principles of the Helsinki Final
Act.
O
Second, we urge respect for existing borders, internal
and external; any change of borders should only occur
by peaceful and consensual means, consistent with CSCE
principles.
Third, all levels of government should be based on
democracy and the rule of law, especially through
elections.
O
Fourth, all parties should safeguard human rights,
based on full respect for the individual and including
equal treatment of minorities.
O
Fifth, we urge respect for international law and
existing international obligations.
These principles are of course not only applicable to the
Soviet Union. They are drawn from the core principles of
CSCE, the Helsinki Process, including the Charter of Paris.
- 27 -
They have been adopted by 38 countries reaching from North
America throughout Europe.
These principles are not mere guidelines. They are also
standards of accountability. Those Soviet leaders and peoples
who adhere to these principles should know they are building
the only sure basis for our support and assistance.
That's the message Secretary Baker conveyed to all Soviet and
republic leaders when he went to the Soviet Union last month.
That's a message we've asked our allies to reinforce. And
that's a message we ask the Congress to support, too.
I would also draw special attention to the fact that human
rights remains at the heart of our policy toward the USSR and
the republics. It is as important now as ever before, as the
republics gain authority over such issues as emigration and
other fundamental human liberties. Some of the republics are
potential abusers of human rights. So we're making very clear
to all of them that human rights, including equal rights for
minorities, must be respected and that their behavior in this
regard will be a major factor in determining our engagement
with them.
As I pointed out in February, we also need to try to manage
uncertainty by multiplying our points of access within a
society that is transforming itself. We have been working for
- 28 -
some time to expand our contacts with republic and local
leaders. This has included a program of "circuit riders"
-- regular visits by U.S. Embassy officials to republics where
they can develop special ties. These contacts need to be
strengthened further through opening new American consulates
or "small posts" in various republics. We have sought ways to
support democrats, free trade unions, the development of a
free media, and market reformers. We have recently proposed
Peace Corps programs.
We also believe that it's time for the Soviet Union and the
U.S. to eliminate the impediments to human contacts that are
among the most pernicious legacies of the Cold War. We urge
Soviet agreement to our "Open Lands" proposal that would open
all closed areas in both countries to travel by each others'
citizens. We are also eager to work to lift onerous travel
controls, visa restrictions, and other barriers to regular
contacts between our citizens.
Our efforts are designed to expand our contacts with the full
range of important groups in the newly pluralistic Soviet
Union. Indeed, the need may be greatest with "swing groups",
such as the Soviet military and the defense industrial
complex. These remain powerful institutions or groups, and
they reflect the anxiety that troubles much of the society.
No Soviet leader will be able to ignore the military's concern
about housing and jobs for the troops withdrawn from Central
- 29 -
and Eastern Europe and the Baltics. No economic reform
program will be politically successful if it does not address
the fears of the skilled and influential workers in the
defense industrial sector.
2. Economic Reforms
Market economic reforms also must catch up with the new
political freedom.
The most obvious need is to offer humanitarian support to
ensure that basic needs are met during the winter. We have
already sent two high-level missions to evaluate needs and
distribution problems throughout the Soviet Union. This week
Secretary Madigan is leading another team, including a number
of private business executives. Since a significant dimension
of the food problem is the failure to acquire, transport,
store, and distribute foodstuffs effectively, an important
part of USDA's work is to identify ways to help the Soviets
and the republics introduce markets, thus fully utilizing what
they produce. We are also sharing our assessments with the
other G-7 countries, and our experts will meet within about a
week to strengthen our cooperation.
In the meantime, WE have decided to accelerate the
availability of the $1.5 billion of CCC credit guarantees that
the President announced this June, and increased the coverage,
SO the Soviets can secure credit to buy large quantities of
- 30 -
American grain and other basic foodstuffs. (This $1.5 billion
is in addition to $1 billion of CCC credit guarantees we
provided in December 1990.) And we are examining other
possibilities to meet emergency food needs.
Since early this year, we have worked with Project Hope to
deliver urgently needed medical supplies directly to target
locations. A number of U.S. pharmaceutical firms have made
generous in-kind donations to this effort. So far, we have
sent shipments to the Ukraine, the Aral Sea region of
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and Moscow, and we have others
planned for the Urals industrial region and elsewhere. AID is
working with Project Hope to extend and expand this program.
The second element of our economic effort is to work with the
Soviet Union and its republics to develop expeditiously a
serious and comprehensive market economic reform plan. The
new Special Association with the IMF and World Bank, first
proposed by President Bush last December, enables the
reformers to start working right away with Western experts to
develop a reform program that meets the standards of the
international economic community. It is very important that
the reforms meet these standards -- not because Western
governments want to establish hurdles, but because these
reforms are the key to tapping the Soviet Union's own
considerable resources and talents. Private capital will only
invest where businesses determine the mix of return and risk
to be worthwhile. The critical fact is that given the size of
- 31 -
the Soviet economy, even large infusions of funds from Western
governments would be insufficient to make a difference on the
fundamental question of economic growth. We don't do the new
reform leaders any favor by obscuring the fact that only
private capital flows will enable them to create growth and
jobs.
Most economists could probably agree on the components of a
suitable market economic reform plan for the Soviet Union.
That's not the problem. The plan will need to include the
clear establishment of property and contract rights,
privatization, competition among producers, macroeconomic
stabilization, price decontrol, and some narrowly delineated
system to ensure that the general public receives necessities
in the aftermath of price decontrol and before producers
respond to price signals by increasing supplies. The
difficult task is the sequencing of these actions.
There is no doubt that the implementation of such a plan would
be difficult. But as we have told the Soviets for years now,
the situation will not get better while they wait. Indeed, I
believe it is imperative to act promptly SO as to draw upon
public support in the aftermath of the coup. I believe
leading reform economists, such as Grigory Yavlinskiy, share
this perspective. But they are struggling at present to
secure a new economic treaty among republics that might enable
them to have the authority to implement such a plan.
- 32 -
The third component of our economic engagement is an enhanced
program of technical cooperation. We began this effort in the
autumn of 1989; now we need to expand it. As you are aware,
the Administration is seeking authorization from Congress to
spend a limited sum of foreign assistance monies for technical
assistance to the Soviet Union and the republics.
Our political assistance will concentrate on helping to build
democratic institutions.
Our present economic priorities are:
o
Improvements in the food distribution system, so the
Soviets can use their own resources to help meet basic
needs.
O
Promotion of private investment in the energy sector,
which could help the Soviets and the republics
increase their hard currency earnings in the medium
term.
Support for defense conversion, which, while
extraordinarily difficult, is obviously highly
significant politically and economically.
Finally, we need to expand our efforts to train people
in the basics of business and to improve the
understanding of how a market economy works.
- 33 -
President Bush sought to lend high visibility to the priority
of helping to build a private sector by hosting a large
breakfast for business entrepreneurs when he visited Moscow.
The Commerce Department has begun an internship program with
American businesses, which we would like to expand. The Peace
Corps has proven helpful in Central and Eastern Europe at a
low cost, and we are examining whether we might draw on its
skills in this area in the Soviet Union. In addition, as
Secretary Brady has suggested, we are working on ways to draw
on the capabilities of our private sector, including through
groups like the Citizen Democracy Corps.
We hope the Congress will be able to support our efforts by
authorizing expenditures for enhanced technical assistance to
help build democracy and a market economy, by repealing the
Stevenson and Byrd limitations on our credit programs, and by
ratifying the Trade Agreement.
3. Foreign and Security Policy
Our third area of engagement is through our foreign policy
agenda. We are pleased with the accomplishments in this realm
to date, but WE have much more to do. Our strategy since 1989
has been to explore and develop possible "points of mutual
advantage" for both the United States and the Soviet Union.
We probed the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy, seeking
to shape and, where possible, to alter Soviet policy
- 34 -
calculations so that they might face up to the contradictions
between the new thinking and old habits. This strategy
required us to broaden and deepen our agenda with the
Soviets.
Our first objective was to work with the Soviets to overcome
the division of Europe, the original cause of the Cold War.
Our cooperative approach avoided singularizing or isolating
any party that respected moves towards freedom. The Iron
Curtain was scrapped, and we achieved German unification
peacefully and democratically. The Baltics have been freed.
Although many Soviet troops still need to return home from
Germany, Poland, the Baltics and Cuba, we are close to
achieving some of the key goals of U.S. foreign policy for
over 45 years.
Second, we stressed our common interest in resolving regional
conflicts peacefully, often seeking to rely on elections as a
means of establishing legitimacy and the local popular will.
To create an appropriate context for elections, we sought to
use our respective influence to persuade conflicting parties
that the use of arms would not produce an enduring solution.
This has been the approximate formula for our cooperative
efforts in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Cambodia, Angola, and
Afghanistan. The experience provided the basis for the
immediate, joint U.S.-Soviet denunciation of Iraq's attack on
Kuwait, which in turn provided the basis for unprecedented UN
and multinational action.
- 35 -
Since the failed August coup, the pathways of cooperation that
we established have multiplied. We have agreed with the
Soviets to cut off all arms to the antagonists in Afghanistan
by the end of the year. The Soviet Union has agreed to
withdraw its troops from Cuba and put its economic
relationship with Cuba on a commercial basis. We hope the
increasing isolation of Castro will eventually persuade him
that the people of Cuba can only prosper if they are given the
freedom that more and more people around the world now enjoy.
There also now is a chance that the rebels in El Salvador
recognize there is no future in killing, and that both sides
of that deeply wounded society have decided to try to leave
hatred behind for peaceful reconciliation. There may be
possibilities for returning the Northern Territories to Japan,
ending one of the last territorial disputes of World War II.
Finally, we are working with the Soviets to launch a Mideast
peace conference.
Third, over the past two years, we have deepened and expanded
the arms control agenda. This led to landmark agreements on
conventional forces, strategic arms, and chemical weapons
destruction. We still must focus on the ratification and
complete implementation of such agreements.
But now we can also move to a different threshhold of
accomplishment. President Bush pointed the way to a whole new
attitude toward nuclear weapons, stability, and security in
his Friday address.
- 36 -
Indeed, inherent in the President's message was an important
theme: The dangers that we, and the Soviets, will face in the
future are more likely to come from rogue third parties than
from one another. So it makes sense that our arms control
thinking shift increasingly to the risks of proliferation and
regional conflicts.
Our fourth objective was to launch joint efforts to solve
transnational problems of common interest, such as narcotics,
terrorism, and the environment. Now this work must
increasingly involve republic leadership.
In sum, our foreign policy agenda remains rich in potential.
As we sweep away the items on the old agenda, it is our
intention to move to a new agenda, one where we hope the
changing Soviet Union can act increasingly as a partner in
addressing future problems.
Defining Policy Success
I would like to conclude by raising a point that might seem
somewhat unusual, but which I believe is important as the
United States considers its future relations with the Soviet
Union and the republics. We are likely to be working through
a transitional period for what could be a considerable period
of time. So we need to reflect carefully on what we would
consider to be the results of a successful policy.
- 37 -
I suspect we would generally share a sense of the objectives
on the foreign policy agenda I outlined. But what constitutes
success in the other dimensions of our policy -- especially
those related to political evolution and economic reform?
Frankly, we should not be surprised if the Soviet Union and
its republics are not able to completely transform themselves
into a stable, prosperous democracy or democracies on the
Western European model within the next few years.
Nevertheless, there are numerous results short of that goal
that might be possible. These intermediate results could
prove beneficial to the United States and the world at large.
And they could be steps on a pathway to a tremendous
achievement.
I suggest that we direct our efforts at maintaining the
conditions in which democratic and market economic reformers
can continue to strive to bring the Soviet Union within the
larger Euro-Atlantic community. We should expect that there
will be setbacks. We should expect that some republics will
go through periods of struggle, violence, factionalism, and
even a return to the old tools of repression. But these
twists and turns should not dissuade us from continuing to
encourage and support those who continue the effort to embrace
the five political principles I outlined above.
1
- 38 -
For 45 years, other Americans held fast so that freedom and
liberty could finally light the lives of hundreds of millions
of people frozen in a backward and frightening age. These
people will need the leadership, spirit, and example that only
America can supply. And subsequent generations of Americans
will be better off for our continued effort.
koro
DW
EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL 12:00 noon EDT (6:00 p.m. Berlin time)
3
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman
AS PREPARED
EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY AT APPROXIMATELY 6:00 PM JUNE 18, 1991
ADDRESS
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III
TO THE
ASPEN INSTITUTE BERLIN
Steigenberger Hotel
Berlin, Germany
Tuesday, June 18, 1991
THE EURO-ATLANTIC ARCHITECTURE:
FROM WEST TO EAST
I am pleased to be back in Berlin.
When T visited you in 1920, the Wall had just become a Gatcway.
When I returned in 1090, I took part in negotiations to end the
division of this city, this nation, this continent.
And now, in 1991, I have the honor of meeting in the capital of a
united Germany.
ict as great as this progross has been, there is something clse of
lasting vitality we have created here. Berlin is much more than a
city to Americans. Berlin is the birthplace of a special kinship
bctween Germans and Americans. It is here that Cermans and
Americans, once adversaries, stood together. This is the place
where we suffered, shared, and strove for freedom.
We started the trans-Atlantic community here.
And it is from here that we must extend it.
When I spoke in Rerlin in December 1989, I outlined our ideas about
the architecture of a New Europe and a Now Atlanticiem. we have
made notable advances in this architecture for a post-Cold War era.
Yet our vision must look beyond.
we must begin to extend the trans-Atlantic community to Central and
Eastern Europe, and to the Soviet Union. These are the still
incomplete pieces of our architccture. The revolutions of freedom
in Central and Eastern Europe need our ongoing eupport to become
lasting democracies. Perestroika needs our encouragement to move
further toward a free society and free markets.
- 2 -
Our objective is both a Europe whole and free, and a Euro-Atlantic
Community that extends east rom Vancouver to vladivostok.
President Bush spoke in Prague about a "new commonwealth of
treedom restíing] on shared principles that constitute our
common valuce."
lic are starting to build this larger Euro-Atlantic Community here,
in the eastern Laender of Cermany.
America's commitment to the unification of Germany did not end with
the ratification of the Two-plus-Four Treaty. That's why I wanted
to listen to some of the people of the East myself today, to see
their home with my own eyes. That's why we have launched a
comprehensive program to extend America's hand to all Germans.
! have no doubt that before LOO long this part of Germany will be
:nc of the foremost engines in Europe. on that day, I believe
Americans and Germans will be standing on the shop floor together.
nut we cannot LESL with the Integration or all or Germany.
The Atlantic Community. A Community of Values
TO me, Lne crans-Atlantic relationship stands for cortain
Enlightenment ideals of universal applicability Thoso values are
based upon the concept of individual political rights and economic
liberty rooted in European ideas of the 17th and 18th Centuries.
..... Ciret. Planced in eno new American nesion.
While these values were originally associated with Western Europe
and the United States, they transcend national borders. Indeed,
these ideals stand in sharp contrast to some later 19th Century
views about the intrinsic qualities of societies and peoples, based
upon nistory and heredity, which could allegedly find their highest
expression in the state.
Ironically, perhaps, the narrow 19th Century European nationalism
also qave way to another. and very different. rationalist and
universalist ideology that would also transcend national borders:
Marxism. In the Soviet Union, Bolsheviks blended this ideology
with a Slavophile movement that was itself a reaction against
allegedly alien Western values. Stalin imposed this ideology on
half of Europe. Now its failures and destruction are obvious to
all.
- 3 -
As the shackles of this failed ideology have been lifted or broken
-- in Central and Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union itself, and
elsewhere in the world -- old 19th Century nationalisms and
inimosities have reemerged. These forces cast shadows over the new
iemocracies, particularly those cooking root in multi-cthnic
cocieties. They expose anxieties about political, economic, and
military security. Thoy rick creating new divisions of Curope.
We need to offer an inspiration, even a goal. to these peoples
redicoovering new values upon which they can build pluralistic,
democratic, and free market societies. We need to picture their
place in the new architecture.
Our architecture needs to fulfill the long-established NATO goal,
isom Line 1207 liarmel Report, or achieving a just and lasting
peaceful order in Europe. To do so, our structures need to
promote Euro-Atlantic political and economic values, the ideals or
the Enlightenment. They need to astablish the components of
cooparative security for us Europe whole and free. And we need to
lemonstrate how integration can copc with new dangers from old
cnmities.
The Devolution and Evolution of the European Nation-State
Perhaps the most striking phenomenon across all of Europe today is
the combined and simultaneous devolution and evolution of the
nation-state. while the nation-state remains by far the most
significant political unit, its political role is being
increasingly supplemented by both supranational and subnational
units. In other words, some of the nation-state's functions are
being delegated "upward" and others "downward."
In Western Europe, the process of evolution has been striking.
over the past forty years, West Europeans have transferred more and
more functions from the national to the supranational level. The
European Community has achieved nistory's most inconse and
comprehensive voluntary evolution of governing authority above the
national level. The Atlantic Alliance, for its part, may have
achieved the most fundamental intergovernmental cooperation, for it
is to NATO that Europeans as well as North Americans have entrusted
not merely their proepcrity, but their personal and national
existence.
In Western Curope. evolution has been accumpented by Life devolution
06 power to state and local governments. to regions that sometimes
cross national borders, and to the private sector.
In Central and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, devolution is
cortainly the more preminent phenomenon. with the collapse of
Communism, ethnicity has reemerged as a powerful political force,
threatening to erect new divisions between countries and, even more
acutely, within multinational states.
- 4 -
Yet even in the East, there is a simultaneous process of evolution
underway. We are seeing the beginnings of us Europe of Regions that
may well be overlapping. Cooperation among Poland, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia; the Pentagonale; and the exploration of ties among
northern states that rim the Baltic and of southern states on the
Black Sea are examples of early efforts. Similarly, the
Nine-plus-One accord within the Soviet Union is a first effort to
reestablish the legitimacy of that multinational state on the basis
of voluntary association among component parts. Furthermore, the
interest of these states in associating themselves with Western
institutions like the IMF, the EC, and the OECD is also evidence of
this evelutionary tendency.
Evolution and devolution are not alternatives, but complementary,
and indced interdependent developments. The building of a
Euro-Atlantic Community can only be achieved on a democratic basis
if there is grassroots involvement in the process. Thus, the
architects of a united Europe have adopted the principle of
"subsidiarity," something like American "federalism" -- that is.
the devolution of responsibility to the lowest level of government
capable of performing it effectively. By the same token, the
process of devolution in the East will lead to fragmentation,
conflict, and ultimately threaten democracy if it is not
accompanied by the voluntary delegation of powers to national and
even supranational levels for basic matters such as defense, trade,
currency, and the protection of basic human rights -- particularly
minority rights.
The United States is a nation of ideas, not of blood, birth, or
creed. Americans know that many levels of government can coexist
and cooperate effectively, and that one can thereby build a strong
nation out of diversity. Throughout the Euro-Atlantic community,
and indeed elsewhere around the globe. a fundamental challenge for
democracy is to encompass. to represent, but also to transcend
ethnic ties on the basis of common, indeed universal, values.
The integration of Western Europe within the EC and NATO has
virtually transcended all the old territorial disputes, irredentist
claims, and ethnic grievances among and within its member states.
Euro-Atlantic integration has made it literally inconceivable that
localized disputes could become a source for serious conflict amona
these states. The incentives for cooperation within these multi-
and supranational frameworks are overwhelmingly high in comparison
with the remaining areas of discord. If we are to ensure
comparable levels of peace and prosperity for Europe as a whole,
comparable structures should be introduced to shape and develop
interdependence among these countries.
In cum, in both East and west. the processes of evolution and
devolution need to be kept in constructive equilibrium. Only by
achieving balanced progress in both directions can the individual
be assured a voice in the management of an ever more interdependent
world.
- S -
Let me turn now to this architecture's essential structures ..
NATO, the EC, and CSCE. I will examine how they have developed
since December 1989, and consider how they might contribute to a
Euro-Atlantic architecture axtending from North America across
Europe to the Soviet Union.
NATO's New Missions
so far, NATO'S adaptability has attested to its vitality. It is,
in fact, both a sturdy cornerstone and initiator of cooperative
structures of security for a Europe whole and free.
First and foremost, our London Summit Declaration paved the way for
the peaceful unification of a democratic Garmany.
Next, our common resolve in the CFE nagotiations resulted in a
landmark agreement that will transform the military map of Europe.
Within the past two weeks, the Alliance's foreign ministers agreed
on NATO's core security functions in the new Europe. We agreed
that the Alliance provides one of the indispensible Coundations Cur
3 stable European security environment. It serves as 3
trans-Atlantic forum for allied consultations and coordination in
fields of common concern. It deters and defends against any threat
of aggression against the territory of any member state. And it
preserves the strategic balance within Europe.
We also agreed that the development of a European security identity
would further strengthen the Alliance and enhance its capabilities
to fulfill these functions in the future, while encouraging an even
more prominent European role in the process. The United States has
pledged to support our European Allies in the development of this
identity and work with them in expanding cooperation between
European fields. and Atlantic institutions in the defense and security
The Alliance's new agenda, especially its political role, is
evident as well in our plans to build partnerships with the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. we
have proposed initiatives to intensify contacts among security
officials, military authorities, parliamentarians, leadership
groups, and scientific and environmental experts.
The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe are already
committed to our shared values: now we must focus on the practical
relationships that will help promote and secure them.
These Alliance contacts are also designed to draw the Soviet Union
toward the new architecture. If reform in an increasingly
pluralistic Soviet Union is going to succeed, we must reach out to
the Soviet military and defense industrialists, as well as to
reformers. We want them to know about NATO's strategy, doctrine,
and defensive nature. They may be able to draw from our experience
with civil-military relations. And we want to support efforts to
convert defense industries to civilian production that will benefit
the well-being of working men and women.
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- 6 -
The European Community: Continuing Integration and Support for an
Eastern Agenda
The European Community's success at integration enables its member
nations to benefit from common policies, preserve distinctive
national attributes, and also devolve authority to local
governments closer to the people. The Community is now in the
midst of two intergovernmental conferences that will deepen its
political and economic integration. As I said in Berlin in 1989.
this was the goal supported by the United states of Marshall and
Acheson. And we support it today.
of course, we do so in the expectation that a European union will
assume a place as a responsible leader contributing to the
strengthening of structures of global, as well as continental,
interdependence. our commonwealth of freedom must reach out
further, to Japan and Asia, to Latin America, to Africa.
It is in this global context that the EC's energetic commitment to
3 successful Uruguay Round looms large. Unfortunately, EC
agricultural policies have raised concern. While we recognize the
important role that the Common Agricultural Policy played in
Europe's integration, we hope that Europeane now recognize that its
continuation in its present form will injure developing nations and
the GATT system. It would be tragić for the Community to send a
signal of global insularity during the very year that it was
achieving new levels of European integration.
The strength of the Euro-Atlantic community depends on cooperation
between the Community and the United States keeping pace with
European integration and institutional development. Our US-EC
declaration, complated late last year, refloots a first stop on
this path. Under Luxembourg's strong leadership, our contacts wit:
the Council Presidency and the Troika have developed rapidly and
fruitfully. Similarly, we are opening new ties with the Commission
in areas such as energy, competition policy, and privacy.
It is my hope that as the Community makes decisions on its own
future, it will continue to develop the possibilities for effective
interaction with the United States and others as global partners.
The successful creation of a coherent internal structure for the
Community should also strengthen its capacity for effective
external relations and responsibilities.
In the near term, perhaps the EC's greatest external challenge is
to reach out to the East. The EC's very political and economic
success has already served as a magnet, drawing Eastern nations
toward democracy and market economics.
The Commission complemented this appeal through its coordinating
role for the Group of 24 effort for the new market democracios of
Central and Eastern Europe. We hope this is but the first of many
steps to removing the economic barriers these countries face within
Europe. The Community's intention to negotiate expanded
association agreements, consistent with CATT, is another stage.
- 7 -
It is a simple fact that the new market democracies will not be
able to draw foreign investment, to privatize, to build competitive
businesses that will create jobs -- if they are not allowed to
compete fairly for markets.
I am optimistic that the European Community will meet this
challenge of extending the Euro-Atlantic community eastward.
Whether by example, supportive policies, association, ties with
other regional groups, or even, if some day Europeans so decide.
through further integration, the EC can help these market
democracies establish a home in our larger community of common
values.
CSCE: A Comprehensive Framework for Building a Euro-Atlantic
Community
CSCE, the Helsinki process, remains the one group that brings
together all the countries of Europe and North America on the basic
of a common commitment to human rights and democratic principles.
These rights and principles are the foundation for a Furo-Atlantic
Community already reaching beyond Berlin to the East.
We need to build a practical record of success for CSCF., with
appropriate capabilities in all three baskets in a mutually
supportive fashion, and thus support the process of reform that
will allow CSCE to become a true community of values.
Tomorrow, CSCE Foreign Ministers will meet for the first time as
the Council of Ministers established in the Charter of Paris. 1
hope that over the next two days my colleagues and I will be able
to take additional steps to enrich CSCE along the lines of the
proposals Foreign Minister Conscher and I made in May. We should
adopt a procedure for calling emergency meetings of CSCE officials
it the sub-ministerial level. we can strengthen the Conflict
Prevention Center. And I hope we can also develop procedures under
which ministers could direct the establishment of fact-finding
missions.
We also need to entertain other ideas. Minister Bessmertnykh has
made a proposal for a standing CSCE human rights body. This merits
serious attention. It might be complemented by adding fact-finding
missions as a fifth step in the Human Dimension Mechanism.
I propose we consider convoking a specialized CSCE meeting on
support for free media. We might also expand the mandate of the
Office OF Free Elections to become an office of Democratic
Institutions so that voting day will be matched by 364 other days
of liberty in the year.
In the economic area, I propose we establish new CSCE Chambers of
Commerce in countries moving to market economies to organize and
speak for the interests of private businesses. We might also
organize a seminar on the social and financial implications of
defense conversion and budget cuts.
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- 8 -
CSCE is also an appropriate forum to address the issues of
migration within Europe. An experts' meeting could seek to develop
humanitarian principles for handling massive immigration and
refugces within the CSCE region and cooperative arrangements to
anticipate and address the causes and benefits of such population
movements.
In sum, I envisage CSCE developing an agenda that can foster the
sharing of ideas and cooperation on issuez of common concern. That
is a prerequisite to more complex integration.
It is also important that we view CSCE as a framework, not a
unitary body for the Euro-Atlantic agenda. Indeed, as we extend
the Furo-Atlantic architecture to the East, we need to be creative
about employing multiple methods and institutions -- including
NATO, the EC, the OECD, the Council of Europe, and others -- to
address common concerns.
Take the issue of security. We have in fact becn developing
arrangements for cooperative security to meet the needs of the
newly emerging democracies and to engage a reformed Soviet Union.
One, CSCE will contribute by creating the political, economic, and
security conditions that may defuse conflict. CSCE will also have
systems to warn of potential dangers. mechanisms to attempt to
mediate them, and ways to engago others to help resolve them. In
this way, the structure would help avoid the conditions and bias
toward escalation that characterized Europe in August 1914.
Two, NATO would provide a complementary role. A strong defensive
Alliance allows for lower levels of military forces and provides .1
foundation of stability within Europe as a whole. Tha arms control
aqenda pursued by NATO will augment this security. NATO's liaison
missions will communicate the Alliance's peaccful intentions,
encourage civil-military relations, and contribute to a climate
discouraging intimidation and aggression.
Three, such other integrating institutions of the Euro-Atlantic
community as the EC, the Council of Europe, and the OECD are
creating a network of political and economic support. This support
both strengthens the new market democracies intornally and signals
to any would-be threat that these nations are part of a larger
community with a stake in their success.
Finally, it is also important to shape the future security agenda
in Europe to meet changing challenges, including the special needs
of the East. The time has come to set new goals, which go beyond
the concept of balance, and begin to establish the basis for a real
cooperative security. To this end, T propose a three-tier agenda
for future CSCE activities in the arms control and security area.
First, we need to institutionalize openness and transparency in our
military affairs. We should intensify our efforts to reach an Cpen
Skies treaty. We should establish a regular dialoque about
military forces. budgets, defense plans, and doctrines.
- 9 -
And to address the possible regeneration of forces within the
Atlantic to the Urals region, we should consider measures that
would provide early and clear indications of rebuilding efforts ..
not simply to avoid surprise but also to inhibit such moves.
The second part of our agenda is conflict prevention. Such
milestone measures as the CFE Treaty and the CSBMG agreement will
all but eliminate the threat of a short-warning, massive war in
Europe. But we also need to address more discrete localized
problems within the CSCE area with the potential to lead to
conflict between CSCE members.
These might include new measures to address some of the security
concerns of particular regions. They might include new measuros to
cope with the problems of the Balkans or other areas where
stability could be at risk. Some of these measures could be along
the lines or arms control and confidence-building measures. They
might also involve a broader, political approach, such as supplying
CSCE fact-finding, mediation, and peace-keeping capabilities when
requested by nations immediately concerned.
Third is the challenge of proliferation: stopping the spread of
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons -- as well as the
missiles that deliver them -- and cooperating in the development ot
national policies to exercise restraint in the sale of conventional
weapons. President Bush has called for a concentrated global
effort to meet this challenge. We in the CSCE can contribute by
building a partnership of responsibility and restraint.
CSCE members are some of the most important arms suppliers in the
world. As an offshoot of East-West confrontation, some CSCE
economies have become heavily dependent on exporting weaponry.
This is a problem we must address together to find innovative
approaches to the problems of defense industry conversion.
Taken as a set -- the CFE Treaty and the manpower declarations
being negotiated in CFE 1A, CSCE, including this new agenda for
arms control: the continued vitality of NATO, including its liaison
missions; the EC and other European institutions -- we are building
the basis for a cooperative security in Europe.
Extending the Trans-Atlantic Community to the Soviet Union
Our greatest challenge will be to extend the trans-Atlantic
community to the Soviet Union. While the new architecture can
accomplish much short of that goal, it will be incomplete as long
as the USSR hesitates outside.
Perestroika is an opportunity for "new thinking" in many areas --
not only in foreign policy, where we have achieved much together,
but also in defense policy, economics, democratization,
Center-Republic relations, and human rights.
The revolution of perestroika has unleashed a new pluralism. The
old political and economic structures have broken down. And it
will take time to build new ones based on the popular will.
- 10 -
The elections in Russia and elsewhere are a good start. We need to
engage the diverse groups -- reformer and traditionalist --
recognizing that coalitions will form, break down, and form again.
The transformation of the Soviet Union will inevitably have its ups
and downs.
It should be our ongoing objective, however, to reassure and even
buttress this home-grown Soviet effort. Perestroika is a Soviet
concept and a Soviet objective, driven by the realization that
change is essential to reverse stagnation and deterioration. It is
in the interest of the Soviet peoples to embrace a real market
economy, democracy, and the rule of law. It is in our interest to
support them.
I have spoken in recent weeks of the political, economic,
nationalities, foreign, and defense policy context that could
enable the Soviet Union to fulfill the hopes of perestroika.
And I have spoken today of a number of ways that NATO, the EC,
CSCE, and other Euro-Atlantic structures can serve as models for
Soviet internal reform and international cooperation.
Yet I also recognize that the United States, for reasons of
history, has a special role to play in supporting the process of
change in the Soviet Union. As the Soviets demonstrate the will to
help themselves, to follow President Gorbachev's call in Oslo to
"stay the course" on perestroika and the new thinking, then we can
and should join them step-by-step.
As I said last week before the US Senate, "[w]e can serve as a
catalyst for political and economic reform. Indeed, we are
developing a package of supportive measures, which we hope to
coordinate with other Western governments."
The complete package is, of course, for the President to announce.
But as we have pointed out in recent weeks, elements could include
a special association with the IMF and world Bank to help design
and implement serious economic reforms: a public-private project to
resolve impediments to private investment in energy development,
which can earn hard currency and provide an example of a successful
sector operating with property and contract rights; a mutual effort
to invigorate the food distribution sector to produce improvements
for consumers soon through the establishment of market incentives;
work to support defense conversion: enhanced technical cooperation,
including in the field of economic education; more open trade; and
the additional $1.5 billion of credit guarantees the President
authorized last week for the purchase of grains.
I hope President Gorbachev now brings forward a new effort at
serious market reform that will enable us to advance perestroika --
to advance a Soviet agenda and Soviet goals. The door to the
Euro-Atlantic Community is open. But only the Soviets can decide
to step over the threshold.
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The Euro-Atlantic Outlook
A half century ago, it would have seemed impossible that an
American Secretary of State would stand in Berlin, speaking to
Germans and Americans, about the values of the Euro-Atiantic
Community. Particularly, that he would describe ideas about
securing these values in the new market democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe. extending them to a Soviet Union in the
throes of reform, and indeed promoting these values in the world
at large. But our predecessors have made the impossible,
possible. Now it is the turn of our generations to draw out and
then help sustain the Enlightenment spirit. TO do so, we must
be idealists and realists, setting a goal, and then adapting our
successful, workable trans-Atlantic architecture to meet the new
challenges of a post-Cold War era.
It is most fitting that in Berlin, Freedom's City, we would
chart this course.
***
PRESS
4
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY
AT 1:20 PM LOCAL TIME
7:20 AM EST
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1989
"A NEW EUROPE, A NEW ATLANTICISM:
ARCHITECTURE FOR A NEW ERA"
ADDRESS BY SECRETARY OF STATE
JAMES A. BAKER, III
TO THE
BERLIN PRESS CLUB
STEIGENBERGER HOTEL
BERLIN
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1989
AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY
For further infoomation contart.
It is a great honor for an American to speak at this time in
this city. For me and for millions of my fellow citizens,
Berlin is the crucible of half a century of history.
-- Here we have seen clearly what elsewhere hid in shadows.
-- Here the ambiguous disclosed its true nature.
-- Here we made the choices and took the stands that shaped
today's world.
In 1945, pictures of a bombed-out Berlin brought home to us
the terrible cost of war.
In 1948, the Soviet Union stalked out of the Four Power
Control Commission and blockaded Berlin -- the clear declaration
of cold wer.
In 1953, Berliners staged the first popular revolt against
Soviet tyranny in Eastern Europe.
In 1961, the Berlin Wall closed the last escape hatch from
the prison camp of nations which Eastern Europe had become.
In 1971, the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin epitomized
the terrible dilemma of detente -- the proposition that
cooperation between East and West assumed the continued division
of this continent.
Then in 1989, the most important event -- certainly the most
dramatic -- of the postwar era occurred, right here in Berlin.
On November 9, the Wall became a gateway. Berliners
celebrated history's largest, happiest family reunion. And all
of us who watched these scenes felt, once again: We are all
Berliners.
Once more images from Berlin flashed around the world,
images that again heralded a new reality. This new reality has
its roots in those older Berlin scenes -- the scenes of West
Berlin's dramatic postwar reconstruction; the scenes of Allied
aircraft supplying a blockaded city; the scenes of American and
Soviet tanks facing off at Checkpoint Charlie.
- 2 -
By standing together, in Berlin as elsewhere, Western
nations created the essential preconditions for overcoming the
division of this city, of this nation, and of this continent.
As these recent events have unfolded, the Soviet Union has
shown a remarkable degree of realism. And President Gorbachev
deserves credit for being the first Soviet leader to have the
courage and foresight to permit the lifting of repression in
Eastern Europe.
But the real impulse for change comes from an altogether
different source: the peoples of Poland, of Hungary, of
Czechoslovakia, of Bulgaria, and of East Germany.
They have freed themselves.
From the Baltic to the Adriatic, an irresistible movement
has gathered force -- a movement of, by, and for the people. In
their peaceful urgent multitude, the peoples of Eastern Europe
have held up a mirror to the West and have reflected the
enduring power of our own best values. In the words of Thomas
Jefferson, the first American Secretary of State, "Nothing is
more certainly written in the book of fate than that these
people are to be free."
The changes amount to nothing less than a peaceful
revolution.
Now, as President Bush stated last week, "the task before us
is to consolidate the fruits of this peaceful revolution and
provide the architecture for continued peaceful change."
The first step is for free men and women to create free
governments. The path may appear difficult, even confusing, but
we must travel it with understanding. For true stability
requires governments with legitimacy, governments that are based
on the consent of the governed.
The peoples of Eastern Europe are trying to build such
governments. Our view, as President Bush has told President
Gorbachev, is that the political and economic reforms in the
East can enhance both long-term stability in Europe and the
prospects for perestroika. A legitimate and stable European
order will help, not threaten, legitimate Soviet interests. An
illegitimate order will provide no order at all.
Free men, and free governments, are the building blocks of a
Europe whole and free. But hopes for a Europe whole and free
are tinged with concern by some that a Europe undivided may not
necessarily be a Europe peaceful and prosperous. Many of the
- 3 -
and threatening decades are now coming down. Some of the
guideposts that brought us securely through four sometimes tense
reemerging. divisive issues that once brought conflict to Europe are
As Europe changes, the instruments for Western cooperation
must into adapt. Working together, we must design and gradually put
place a new architecture for a new era.
and structures that remain valuable -- like NATO -- while
This new architecture must have a place for old foundations
The recognizing that they can also serve new collective purposes.
new architecture must continue the construction of
West while also serving as an open door to the East. And the
institutions -- like the EC -- that can help draw together the
new architecture must build up frameworks -- like the CSCE
process the -- that can overcome the division of Europe and bridge
Atlantic Ocean.
This new structure must also accomplish two special
there purposes. First, as a part of overcoming the division of Europe
freedom must be an opportunity to overcome through peace and
will States and NATO have stood for unification for 40 years, and we
the division of Berlin and of Germany. The United
not waver from t it goal.
linked security -- politically, militarily, and economically --
Second, the architecture should reflect that America's
Europe's neighborhood.
to Europe's security. The United States and Canada remains share
U.S. will will remain a European power". And as he added last is and
As President Bush stated in May, "The United States
effort". desire our presence as part of a common security as
as our Allies maintain significant military forces in Europe week, "The long
Europe, a need even acknowledged by President Gorbachev.
recognition of a need for an active United States role a in
This is our commitment to a common future,
New Europe and the New Atlanticism.
The charge for us all, then, is to work together toward the
New Missions for NATO
colleagues for NATO. that it was time to begin considering New Missions his NATO
In May of this year, President Bush suggested to
with has the peace in Europe through both deterrence Organization
secured For over forty years, the North Atlantic Treaty
NATO'S is reduced and the political is enhanced. military This is
component structure for Europe, one in which the
security East. Today, NATO is working in Vienna to build and dialogue a new
first new mission.
- 4 -
A conventional forces agreement is the keystone of this new
security structure. In May, NATO adopted President Bush's
suggestion to seek such an agreement on an accelerated
timetable. President Gorbachev has responded to this
opportunity positively. And we have moved significantly closer
to concluding an agreement limiting conventional armaments from
the Atlantic to the Urals. In Malta, President Bush proposed a
summit meeting to sign such an agreement in 1990.
Today, I further propose that the Ministers of the 23 NATO
and Warsaw Pact nations take advantage of our February meeting
in Ottawa, where we will launch the Open Skies negotiations, to
review the status and give a further push to the Vienna Talks on
Conventional Forces.
As we construct a new security architecture that maintains
the common defense, the non-military component of European
confidence-building medsures and other political consultative
security will grow. Arms control agreements,
arrangements will become more important. In such a world the
role of NATO will evolve. NATO will become the forum where
Western nations cooperate to negotiate, implement, verify and
extend agreements between East and West.
In this context, the implementation and verification
monitoring of a conventional forces agreement will present a
major challenge for enduring security. NATO must make an
important contribution.
I therefore invite Allied governments to consider
establishing a NATO Arms Control Verification staff.
Verification will remain a national responsibility. But such a
new Staff would be able to assist member governments in
monitoring compliance with arms control and confidence building
measures in Europe. A NATO organization of this sort could be
valuable in assisting all Allies and coordinating the
implementation of inspections. It could provide a clearinghouse
for information contributed by national governments, perhaps
joining with collective European efforts through the Western
European Union.
As the East-West confrontation recedes, and as the prospects
for East-West cooperation advance, other challenges for European
and Atlantic security will arise. They point to NATO's second
new mission. Regional conflicts -- along with the proliferation
of missiles and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons --
present growing dangers. Intensified NATO consultations on
these issues can play an important role in forming common
Western approaches to these various threats.
Third, NATO should also begin considering further
initiatives the West might take, through the CSCE process in
particular, to build economic and political ties with the East,
to promote respect for human rights, to help build democratic
- 5 -
institutions, and to fashion, consistent with Western security
interests, a more open environment for East-West trade and
investment.
Finally, NATO may have its greatest and most lasting effect
on the pattern of change by demonstrating to the nations of the
East a fundamentally different approach to security. NATO's
four decades offer a vision of cooperation, not coercion; of
open borders, not iron curtains. The reconciliation of ancient
enemies, which has taken place under the umbrella of NATO's
collective security, offers the nations of Eastern Europe an
appealing model of international relations.
Whatever security relationships the governments of Eastern
Europe choose, NATO will continue to provide Western governments
the optimal instrument to coordinate their efforts at defense
and arms control, and to build a durable European order of
peace. The interests of Eastern Europe, and indeed the
interests of the Soviet Union, will be served by the maintenance
of a vigorous North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
The Role of the European Community
The future development of the European Community will play a
central role in shaping the New Europe.
The example of Western cooperation through the European
Community has already had a dramatic effect on Eastern attitudes
toward economic liberty. The success of this great European
experiment, perhaps more than any other factor, has caused
Eastern Europeans to recognize that people as well as nations
cooperate more productively when they are free to choose. The
ballot box and the free market are the fundamental instruments
of choice.
But the European experiment has succeeded not just because
it has appealed to the enlightened self-interest of European
producers and consumers. This experiment has succeeded because
the vision of its founders encompassed and yet transcended the
material. This experiment has succeeded because it also held
out the higher goal of political as well as economic barriers
overcome, of a Europe united.
This was the goal of Monnet and Schumann. This was the goal
supported by the United States of Marshall and Acheson. This
was the goal contained in the Treaty of Rome and more recently
in the European Single Act. The United States supports this
goal today with the same energy it did 40 years ago.
Naturally, the United States seeks a European Community open
to cooperation with others. We believe Americans will profit
from access to a single European market, just as Europeans have
long profited from their access to a single American market.
However, it is vital to us all that both these markets remain
open -- that both become even more open.
- 6 -
As Europe moves toward its goal of a common internal market,
and as its institutions for political and security cooperation
evolve, the link between the United States and the European
Community will become even more important. We want our
transatlantic cooperation to keep pace with European integration
and institutional reform.
To this end, we propose that the United States and the
European Community work together to achieve, whether in treaty
or some other form, a significantly strengthened set of
institutional and consultative links. Working from shared
ideals and common values, we face a set of mutual challenges --
in economics, foreign policy, the environment, science, and a
host of other fields. so it makes sense for us to seek to
fashion our responses together as a matter of common course.
We suggest that our discussions about this idea proceed in
parallel with Europe's efforts to achieve by 1992 a common
internal market so that plans for US-EC interaction would evolve
with changes in the Community.
The United States also encourages the European Community to
continue and expand cooperation with the nations of the East.
The promotion of political and economic reform in the East is a
natural vocation for the European Community. That is why we
were exceptionally pleased with the agreement at the Paris
Economic Summit that the European Commission should assume a
special role in the Group of 24 effort to promote reform in
Poland and Hungary.
The United States has worked closely with the European
Community in mobilizing economic and financial support for
Hungary and Poland. Indeed, the United States has authorized
almost $1 billion of assistance to these two nations. This
week, we look to the Group of 24 meeting to move as close as
possible toward achieving the $1 billion stabilization fund
Poland requested to support its major move toward currency
convertibility and macroeconomic reform.
That should be just the start of our common labor. Poland
and Hungary have forty years of economic stagnation to overcome,
and this will take time and our steady support. Às
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic
undertake political and economic reforms comparable to those
already underway in Poland and Hungary, we believe the
activities of the Group of 24, centered around the EC, should be
expanded to support peaceful change in these countries as well.
As the nations of Eastern Europe achieve more open political
and economic systems, they may seek new relationships with the
European Community, with the Council of Europe and with other
institutions serving both Europe and the broader international
community. In fact, such ties could be fundamental to our
strategy of rebuilding the economies of Eastern Europe through
- 7 -
private capital and initiative: Private investors in Eastern
Europe will want to know that they can sell their products in
Western markets.
I am confident that creative new arrangements can be devised
to encourage and sustain the process of political and economic
reform in the countries of Eastern Europe, while at the same
time preserving the integrity and the vitality of existing
institutions. We need to offer the nations of the East hope,
opportunities that can be seized as they take steps toward
democracy and economic liberty. Perhaps the recent work on an
agreement between the EC and the six nations of the European
Free Trade Association will set a pattern for improved ties with
others.
We see no conflict between the process of European
integration and an expansion of cooperation between the European
Community and its neighbors to the East and West. Indeed, we
believe that the attraction of the European Community for the
countries of the East depends most on its continued vitality.
And the vitality of the Economic Community depends in turn on
its continued commitment to the goal of a united Europe
envisaged by its founders -- free, democratic and closely linked
to its North American partners.
The Helsinki Process -- The New Role of CSCE
The institution that brings all the nations of the East and
West together in Europe, the Conference on Security and
Cooperation. in Europe, is in fact an ongoing process launched
over 14 years ago in Helsinki. There have been different
perceptions as to the functions of this CSCE process. Some saw
the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 as a ratification of the status
quo, the equivalent of a peace treaty concluding World War II,
and thus the legitimization of Europe's permanent division.
Others, however, saw this process as a device by which these
divisions could be overcome.
The dynamic concept of the CSCE process has prevailed. In
1975, the governments of Eastern Europe may not have taken
seriously their commitments to respect a wide range of
fundamental human rights. Their populations did. The standards
of conduct set by the Helsinki Final Act are increasingly being
met through international pressure and domestic ferment. Last
month, here in Berlin, we witnessed one of the proudest
achievements of the CSCE process as the GDR fulfilled its
commitment to allow its people to travel freely.
Now it's time for the CSCE process to advance further. We
can look toward filling each of its three baskets with new
substance.
- 8 -
First, we can give the security basket further content
through the 35-nation negotiations on confidence-building
measures currently underway in Vienna. The agreements under
consideration there should help prevent force, or the threat of
force, from being used again in an effort to intimidate any
European nation. Apart from reducing further the risk of war,
new confidence building measures can create greater openness.
They can institutionalize a predictable pattern of military
interaction, a pattern that is difficult to reverse and that
builds a new basis for trust.
Second, the relatively underdeveloped economic basket can
assume new responsibilities. President Bush suggested to
President Gorbachev at Malta that we could breathe new life into
this CSCE forum by focusing it on the conceptual and practical
questions involved in the transition from stalled, planned
economies to free, competitive markets. When our nations meet
in Bonn in May of next year to discuss economic cooperation, I
suggest we concentrate 'on this issue.
Third, the CSCE process has made its most distinctive mark
in the field of human rights One fundamental right, however,
has not yet been fully institutionalized. This is the right for
people to choose, through regular, free, open, multi-party
elections, those who will govern them.
This is the ultimate human right, the right that secures all
others. Without free elections, no rights can be long
guaranteed. With free elections, no rights can be long denied.
on May 31, in Mainz, President Bush announced a major new
Helsinki initiative to help end the division of Europe. He
called for free elections and political pluralism in all the
countries of Europe. Now, this is coming to pass.
In June, the United States and the United Kingdom
co-sponsored a free elections initiative at the CSCE human
rights meeting in Paris. This proposal called on all 35 CSCE
participating states to allow periodic, genuine and contested
elections based on universal and equal suffrage, by secret
ballot, and with international observers. Individuals would be
allowed to establish and maintain their own political parties in
order to ensure fully democratic procedures.
Free elections should now become the highest priority in the
CSCE process. In 1945, Josef stalin promised free elections and
self-determination for the peoples of Eastern Europe. The fact
that those elections were not free, and that those peoples were
not allowed to determine their destiny, was a fundamental cause
of the Cold War.
NOW this Stalinist legacy is being removed by people
determined to reclaim their birthright to freedom. They should
not be denied. They will not be denied.
- 9 -
As all or nearly all the CSCE states move toward fully
functioning representative governments, I suggest we consider
another step: We could involve parliamentarians more directly
in CSCE processes, not only as observers as at present, but
perhaps through their own meetings. To sustain the movement
toward democracy, we need to reinforce the institutions of
democracy.
Germany and Berlin in a New Europe
A new Europe, whole and free, must include arrangements that
satisfy the aspirations of the German people and meet the
legitimate concerns of Germany's neighbors. Before the
Bundestag on November 28, Chancellor Kohl laid out an approach
designed to achieve German aspirations in peace and freedom. At
last week's NATO Summit, President Bush reaffirmed America's
long-standing support for the goal of German unification. He
enunciated four principles that guide our policy, and I am
pleased to note these ideas were incorporated into the statement
issued last week by the leaders of the European Community
nations at Strasbourg.
-- One, self-determination must be pursued without
prejudice to its outcome. We should not at this time
endorse nor exclude any particular vi ion of unity.
-- TWO, unification should occur in the context of
Germany's continued commitment to NATO and an
increasingly integrated European Community, and with
due regard for the legal role and responsibilities of
the Allied powers.
-- Three, in the interests of general European stability,
moves toward unification must be peaceful, gradual, and
part of a step-by-step process.
-- Four, on the question of borders, we should reiterate
our support for the principles of the Helsinki Final
Act.
President Bush concluded that "an end to the unnatural
division of Europe, and of Germany, must proceed in accordance
with and be based upon the values that are becoming universal
ideals, as all the countries of Europe become part of a
commonwealth of free nations."
As an American, I am proud of the role my nation has played
and will continue to play standing with you. Yet this very
positive course will not be easy, nor can it be rushed. It must
be peaceful. It must be democratic. It must respect the
legitimate concerns of all the participants in the New Europe.
- 10 -
As Berlin has stood at the center of a divided Europe, so it
may the embattled bastion of freedom, but instead a beacon hope
stand at the center of a Europe whole and free -- no of longer
for a better life.
A New Europe, A New Atlanticism
My friends, the changes we see underway today in the East
a source of great hope. But a new era brings different
are concerns for all of us. Some are as old as Europe itself.
Others are themselves the new products of change.
the West to abandon the patterns of cooperation that we
have Were built up over four decades, these concerns could grow the into
But the institutions we have created -- NATO,
problems. Community, and the CSCE process -- are alive. Rooted that
European in democratic values, they fit well with the people power
is shaping history's new course.
More important, these institutions are also flexible and
capable as we update and expand our cooperation with each other
of adapting to rapidly changing circumstances. As we
adapt, and with the nations of the East, we will create a New Europe on
the basis of a New Atlanticism.
NATO will remain North America's primary link with Europe.
As arms control and political arrangements increasingly
supplement the still vital military component of European
security, NATO will take on new roles.
transatlantic The relationship. It will also take on, perhaps
European Community is already an economic pillar of in the
concert with other European institutions, increasingly evidenced important
political roles. Indeed, it has already done so, as support
by the Community's coordination of a Western effort to the
reform between the United States and the European Community should
in Eastern Europe. And as it continues to do so,
link become stronger, the issues we discuss more diversified, and our
common endeavors more important.
the same time, the substantive overlap between NATO and
European not friction. Better communication among European and
At institutions will grow. This overlap must lead to
transatlantic synergy, institutions will become more urgent.
The CSCE process could become the most important forum of
East-West cooperation. Its mandate will grow as this
cooperation takes root.
these changes proceed, as they overcome the division be of
Europe, As so too will the divisions of Germany and Berlin
overcome in peace and freedom.
- 11 -
This fail a powerful cry went up from the huge
demonstrations in Leipzig, Dresden and Berlin. "We are the
people!" the crowds chanted at the Party that ruled in their
name. on the other side of the globe, Lech Walesa was
addressing the U.S. Congress, thanking America for supporting
Polish liberty. He began with words written two hundred years
ago, the words that open the U.S. Constitution: "We the
people."
Between 1789 and 1989, between the expressions "We the
people" and "We are the people," runs one of history's deepest
currents. What the American Founding Fathers knew, the people
of East Germany and Eastern Europe now also know -- that freedom
is a blessing, but not a gift. That the work of freedom is
never done, and it is never done alone. Between the America of
"We the people" and the Europe of "We are the people," there can
be no division. on this basis a New Atlanticism will flourish,
and a New Europe will be born.
###
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INFO: CIC/OSB, CIC/SOV, CIC/WWB, DONOVA, FBIS6,
NIO/ECON, OLPB, ODPD, ODPK, ODPS, ODPW, OPCTR/EEWE, OPCTR/TERR, STATDICT,
FILE, CNC/ASG, CNC/CCG, CNC/OPS-6, CNC/SPG-3, CNC/TECH, D/CNC-2,
DOSO/IABCT, NIO/STP, NPIC, OTS/SAD, OTS/TOB, PPS/CLBC, PPS/INSC, STG/TCB,
(23/W)
90 2206427 SUP
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NC 2206427
TOR: 3022342 NOV 90
STATE 405376
HEADER
PP RUEAIIB
ZNR UUUUU ZOC STATE ZZH
MPA5376
PP RUEHC
DE RUEHC #5376 3342220
ZNR UUUUU ZZH ZEX
P 302219Z NOV 90
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO EC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
BT
CONTROLS
See for consultations lastitutionalized page
UNCLAS STATE 405376
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
E.O. 12356: N/A
BODY
TAGS: PREL, US, EEC
SUBJECT: TEXT OF US-EC DECLARATION
REF:
(A) 90 ROME 21818
1. THERE WAS AN OMISSION IN THE TEXT OF THE USEC
DECLARATION TRANSMITTED IN REFTEL. THE TICK ON THE US-EC
COMMISSION MINISTERIALS IN THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
SECTION WAS INADVERTENTLY LEFT OUT. WE ARE TRANSMITTING
BELOW THE OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE DECLARATION AS RELEASED IN
Announced Summit 20 Nov 90. in is The a Hague result
WASHINGTON NOVEMBER 23.
2. BEGIN TEXT:
DECLARATION ON US-EC RELATIONS
US-EC 8-9 Nov this qlis agreement.
of
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE:0002
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON ONE SIDE AND, ON THE
OTHER, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS MEMBER STATES,
-
MINDFUL OF THEIR COMMON HERITAGE AND OF THEIR CLOSE
HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL TIES,
GUIDED BY THEIR FAITH IN THE VALUES OF HUMAN
DIGNITY, INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND IN
THE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS WHICH HAVE EVOLVED ON BOTH
SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC OVER THE CENTURIES,
-
RECOGNIZING THAT THE TRANSATLANTIC SOLIDARITY HAS
BEEN ESSENTIAL FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND FREEDOM
AND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREE AND PROSPEROUS ECONOMIES
AS WELL AS FOR THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE RESTORED
UNITY IN EUROPE,
-
DETERMINED TO HELP CONSOLIDATE THE NEW EUROPE,
UNDIVIDED AND DEMOCRATIC,
-
RESOLVED TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY, ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF
THE CSCE, AND IN OTHER FORA,
NOTING THE FIRM COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THE EC MEMBER STATES CONCERNED TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC
ALLIANCE AND TO ITS PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES,
ACTING ON THE BASIS OF A PATTERN OF COOPERATION
PROVEN OVER MANY DECADES, AND CONVINCED THAT BY
STRENGTHENING AND EXPANDING THIS PARTNERSHIP ON AN EQUAL
FOOTING THEY WILL GREATLY CONTRIBUTE TO CONTINUED
STABILITY, AS WELL AS TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS
IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD,
AWARE OF THEIR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, NOT ONLY TO
FURTHER COMMON INTERESTS BUT ALSO TO FACE TRANSNATIONAL
CHALLENGES AFFECTING THE WELL-BEING OF ALL MANKIND,
BEARING IN MIND THE ACCELERATING PROCESS BY WHICH
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IS ACQUIRING ITS OWN IDENTITY IN
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY MATTERS, IN FOREIGN POLICY AND IN
THE DOMAIN OF SECURITY,
DETERMINED TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN TRANSATLANTIC
SOLIDARITY THROUGH THE VARIETY OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS,
HAVE DECIDED TO ENDOW THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH LONG-TERM
PERSPECTIVES.
COMMON GOALS
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE:0003
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
AND ITS MEMBER STATES SOLEMNLY REAFFIRM THEIR
DETERMINATION FURTHER TO STRENGTHEN THEIR PARTNERSHIP IN
ORDER TO:
SUPPORT DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW AND RESPECT FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY, AND PROMOTE
PROSPERITY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS WORLDWIDE;
SAFEGUARD PEACE AND PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
BY COOPERATING WITH OTHER NATIONS AGAINST AGGRESSION AND
COERCION, BY CONTRIBUTING TO THE SETTLEMENT OF CONFLICTS
IN THE WORLD AND BY REINFORCING THE ROLE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS;
PURSUE POLICIES AIMED AT ACHIEVING A SOUND WORLD
ECONOMY MARKED BY SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH WITH LOW
INFLATION, A HIGH LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT, EQUITABLE SOCIAL
CONDITIONS, IN A FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL STABILITY;
PROMOTE MARKET PRINCIPLES, REJECT PROTECTIONISM AND
EXPAND, STRENGTHEN AND FURTHER OPEN THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM;
CARRY OUT THEIR RESOLVE TO HELP DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
BY ALL APPROPRIATE MEANS IN THEIR EFFORTS TOWARDS
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS;
-
PROVIDE ADEQUATE SUPPORT, IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER
STATES AND ORGANISATIONS, TO THE NATIONS OF EASTERN AND
CENTRAL EUROPE UNDERTAKING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS
AND ENCOURAGE THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTILATERAL
INSTITUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE.
PRINCIPLES OF US-EC PARTNERSHIP
"
TO ACHIEVE THEIR COMMON GOALS, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND
ITS MEMBER STATES AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WILL
INFORM AND CONSULT EACH OTHER ON IMPORTANT MATTERS OF
COMMON INTEREST, BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC, WITH A VIEW
TO BRINGING THEIR POSITIONS AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE, WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO THEIR RESPECTIVE INDEPENDENCE. IN
APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL BODIES, IN PARTICULAR, THEY WILL
SEEK CLOSE COOPERATION.
THE USEC PARTNERSHIP WILL, MOREOVER, GREATLY BENEFIT
FROM THE MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING ACQUIRED
THROUGH REGULAR CONSULTATIONS AS DESCRIBED IN THIS
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE:0004
DECLARATION.
ECONOMIC COOPERATION
BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF STRENGTHENING THE
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM. THEY WILL SUPPORT FURTHER
STEPS TOWARDS LIBERALIZATION, TRANSPARENCY, AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF GATT AND OECD PRINCIPLES CONCERNING BOTH
TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES AND INVESTMENT.
THEY WILL FURTHER DEVELOP THEIR DIALOGUE, WHICH IS
ALREADY UNDERWAY, ON OTHER MATTERS SUCH AS TECHNICAL AND
NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE,
SERVICES, COMPETITION POLICY, TRANSPORTATION POLICY,
STANDARDS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER
RELEVANT AREAS.
EDUCATION, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL COOPERATION
"
THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS
MEMBER STATES ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE UNITED STATES ON
THE OTHER, WILL BE BASED ON CONTINUOUS EFFORTS TO
STRENGTHEN MUTUAL COOPERATION IN VARIOUS OTHER FIELDS
WHICH DIRECTLY AFFECT THE PRESENT AND FUTURE WELL-BEING OF
THEIR CITIZENS, SUCH AS EXCHANGES AND JOINT PROJECTS IN
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, INCLUDING, INTER ALIA, RESEARCH IN
MEDICINE, ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION, POLLUTION PREVENTION,
ENERGY, SPACE, HIGHENERGY PHYSICS, AND THE SAFETY OF
NUCLEAR AND OTHER INSTALLATIONS, AS WELL AS IN EDUCATION
AND CULTURE, INCLUDING ACADEMIC AND YOUTH EXCHANGES.
TRANS-NATIONAL CHALLENGES
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
AND ITS MEMBER STATES WILL FULFIL THEIR RESPONSIBILITY TO
ADDRESS TRANS-NATIONAL CHALLENGES, IN THE INTEREST OF
THEIR OWN PEOPLES AND OF THE REST OF THE WORLD. IN
PARTICULAR, THEY WILL JOIN THEIR EFFORTS IN THE FOLLOWING
FIELDS:
COMBATTING AND PREVENTING TERRORISM;
PUTTING AN END TO THE ILLEGAL PRODUCTION,
TRAFFICKING AND CONSUMPTION OF NARCOTICS AND RELATED
CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS THE LAUNDERING OF MONEY;
-
COOPERATING IN THE FIGHT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL CRIME;
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT, BOTH INTERNATIONALLY AND
DOMESTICALLY, BY INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE:0005
GOALS;
PREVENTING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS,
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONSULTATION
BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT A FRAMEWORK IS REQUIRED FOR REGULAR
AND INTENSIVE CONSULTATION. THEY WILL MAKE FULL USE OF
AND FURTHER STRENGTHEN EXISTING PROCEDURES, INCLUDING
THOSE ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL
AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON 27TH FEBRUARY
1990, NAMELY:
BI-ANNUAL CONSULTATIONS TO BE ARRANGED IN THE UNITED
STATES AND IN EUROPE BETWEEN, ON THE ONE SIDE, THE
PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE
COMMISSION, AND ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES;
BI-ANNUAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY FOREIGN MINISTERS, WITH THE COMMISSION, AND THE
US SECRETARY OF STATE, ALTERNATELY ON EITHER SIDE OF THE
ATLANTIC;
AD HOC CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENCY FOREIGN
MINISTER OR THE TROIKA AND THE US SECRETARY OF STATE;
BIANNUAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMISSION AND
THE US GOVERNMENT AT CABINET LEVEL;
"
BRIEFINGS, AS CURRENTLY EXIST, BY THE PRESIDENCY TO
US REPRESENTATIVES ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION (EPC)
MEETINGS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL.
BOTH SIDES ARE RESOLVED TO DEVELOP AND DEEPEN THESE
PROCEDURES FOR CONSULTATION so AS TO REFLECT THE EVOLUTION
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND OF ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
UNITED STATES.
THEY WELCOME THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
AND THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES IN ORDER TO IMPROVE
THEIR DIALOGUE AND THEREBY BRING CLOSER TOGETHER THE
PEOPLES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC.
BAKER
ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
OUTGOING
5
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INFO: (01) DW(01) JH (01) JF (01) MO (01) SH (01) JI (01)
SECURITY IN EUROPE BASED ON DEMOCRACY AND RESPECT FOR THE
CFE (01) SF (01) JR (01) CSCE (01)
HELSINKI PRINCIPLES WHICH WOULD COMPLEMENT AND NOT
03/05022
A1
ORT
(TOTAL
COPIES:
011)
DETRACT FROM NATO AND ITS INDISPENSABLE ROLE. ON THE
ORIGIN EUR-00
FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF GERMAN UNIFICATION, SECRETARY BAKER
CONGRATULATED THE MINISTER ON THE SUCCESS OF THE GERMAN
INFO LOG-00 ACDA-13 ADS-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 CFE-00 C-01
PEOPLE AND LEADERS IN MEETING THE DIFFICULT CHALLENGE
DODE-00
ANHR-01
CSCE-00
HA-09
H-01
IMMC-01
INRE-00
THAT IT POSED. MINISTER GENSCHER EXPRESSED APPRECIATION
INR-01
10-19
L-00
NRRC-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 01C-02
FOR THE STRONG AND CONTINUING SUPPORT OF THE UNITED
OIG-00
OMB-01
PA-02
PM-00
PRS-01
P-01
SB-00
STATES THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS OF UNIFICATION.
SNP-00
SP-00
SSO-00
SS-00
TRSE-00
T-01
USIE-00
/068R
ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF GERMANY,
MINISTER GENSCHER WELCOMED THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE OF
DRAFTED BY: EUR/RPM/S: NMCELDOWNEY: NEM
SEPTEMBER 27 WHICH CLEARLY SIGNALS TO THE LEADERS AND
APPROVED BY: EUR:RCALDWELL
PEOPLES OF THE SOVIET UNION THAT THE COURSE THAT NATO IS
EUR/RPM: JMLEKSON
C:MFOULON
EMBARKED ON WILL ENHANCE THEIR SECURITY AND BUILD
EUR/P:MPEARSON(SUBS)
S/S:RLAMANTIA
STABILITY. IT SENDS THE SAME MESSAGE TO ALL THE PEOPLES
S/S-O:DORTBLAD
OF THE TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNITY AND AROUND THE GLOBE. IT
9BE55C 030121Z /38
OPENS THE DOOR TO AN ERA OF COOPERATION, PEACE AND
0 030115Z OCT 91
COMMON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WHOLE WORLD. THIS
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INITIATIVE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THE ENDURING VALUE OF THE
TO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WHICH ARE THE LIFEBLOOD OF THE NATO
ALLIANCE AND OF THE .S./GERMAN RELATIONSHIP. THEY CALL
UNCLAS STATE 327685
ON THE SOVIET UNION TO RESPOND WITH EQUAL BOLDNESS AND
IMAGINATION TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S INITIATIVE.
BRUSSELS FOR USEC; VIENNA FOR CSBMS; USVIENNA FOR CFE
MINISTER GENSCHER AND SECRETARY BAKER AGREED THAT THE
E.O. 12356: N/A
PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE DOES EVEN MORE THAN TRANSFORM THE
TAGS: PREL, NATO CSCE, FRG
SUBJECT: OCTOBER 2 BAKER-GENSCHER STATEMENT
EUROPEAN SECURITY LANDSCAPE. IT ALSO HELPS IMMEASURABLY
IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW EURO-ATLANTIC COMMONWEALTH
REF: STATE 155815
OF FREE NATIONS WE ARE WORKING TO BRING INTO BEING. IN
THAT CONTEXT, THE MINISTERS TODAY REVIEWED THE SUCCESSFUL
1. FOLLOWING THEIR OCTOBER 2 MEETING, SECRETARY BAKER
IMPLEMENTATION OF MANY OF THE IDEAS IN THEIR MAY 10
AND FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER ISSUED A JOINT
STATEMENT, AND DISCUSSED THEIR LONG-RANGE POLITICAL GOALS
STATEMENT ADDRESSING CURRENT POLITICAL AND SECURITY
FOR THIS EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. THEY ALSO SURVEYED
ISSUES. TEXT OF THE STATEMENT IS EMBARGOED UNTIL 7 A.M.
PROGRESS MADE UNDER THE TRANSATLANTIC DECLARATION OF 1990
(WASHINGTON TIME) OCTOBER 3. TEXT FOLLOWS AT PARA 2.
AND CONSIDERED FUTURE PROSPECTS.
FOLLOWING EMBARGO POSTS SHOULD PROVIDE TEXT TO HOST
GOVERNMENTS, NOTING THAT WE SEE IT AS A CONTRIBUTION TO
THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE FORTHCOMING
ONGOING NATO CONSULTATIONS ON THESE TOPICS. FURTHER
SUMMIT MEETINGS OF NATO AND OF THE EC WILL BE CRITICAL TO
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL POSTS WILL BE
THIS OBJECTIVE BOTH INSTITUTIONS AS WELL AS CSCE
PROVIDED SEPTEL.
WEU, AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE -- ARE OF FUNDAMENTAL
IMPORTANCE TO THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF EUROPE AND
2. BEGIN TEXT:
OF THE WIDER EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. THEY ARE IN THE
PROCESS OF FUNDAMENTAL TRANSFORMATIONS WHICH WILL ENSURE
JOINT STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER III
THAT THEY MAINTAIN THEIR VITALITY. THESE PROCESSES ARE
AND
COMPLEMENTARY AND INTERDEPENDENT, AND THE MINISTERS
HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER
REITERATED THEIR COMMITMENT TO WORK TOGETHER WITH THEIR
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
COUNTERPARTS TO ENSURE THE FULL SUCCESS OF BOTH SUMMITS.
GERMANY
THEY AGREED THAT, AS SECRETARY BAKER STATED THIS JUNE IN
WASHINGTON, D.C.
BERLIN THEIR COMMON OBJECTIVE IS A EURO-ATLANTIC
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1991
COMMUNITY THAT EXTENDS EAST FROM VANCOUVER TO
VLADIVOSTOK. THE ATLANTIC LINK, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
MEETING TODAY IN WASHINGTON, FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER
AND COOPERATION WITH OUR EASTERN NEIGHBORS ARE THE
AND SECRETARY BAKER REVIEWED THE NEXT STEPS IN
LINCHPINS OF THIS COMMUNITY. RECENT EVENTS HAVE
STRENGTHENING AND EXTENDING THE TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNITY.
DEMONSTRATED ONCE AGAIN THE STRENGTH OF THIS VISION.
NOW, THE WESTERN ALLIES, RECOGNIZING THEIR COMMON
THEY DID SO IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DRAMATIC CHANGES
BROUGHT ABOUT BY TWO MOMENTOUS DEVELOPMENTS: THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO HELP THE REFORM EFFORTS TO SUCCEED,
ASCENDENCY OF THE FORCES OF REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION,
MUST FOCUS ON THE PRACTICAL RELATIONSHIPS THAT WILL HELP
AND THE INITIATIVE BY PRESIDENT BUSH TO PUT BEHIND US THE
PROMOTE AND SECURE FOR COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN
BALANCE OF NUCLEAR TERROR THAT CHARACTERIZED THE COLD WAR
EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION THE INSTITUTIONS OF
AND TO ACHIEVE THE GOAL OF A JUST AND LASTING ORDER OF
DEMOCRACY FREE ECONOMIES, AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
TO WHICH THEY HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES.
PEACE IN EUROPE. THEY LOOK FORWARD TO THE NATO SUMMIT IN
ROME THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SUMMIT IN MAASTRICHT, AND
SECRETARY BAKER AND MINISTER GENSCHER SEE A SPECIAL PLACE
THE CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE NEXT YEAR IN HELSINKI AS KEY
FOR CSCE IN THEIR VISION OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. THEY
OPPORTUNITIES TO HELP BUILD A NEW SYSTEM OF COOPERATIVE
AGREED THAT THE CSCE HAS A UNIQUE ROLE IN BOTH WIDENING
UNCLASSIFIED
IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED
OUTGOING
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AND DEEPENING THE REACH OF DEMOCRACY THROUGHOUT EUROPE,
PARTICULAR, THEY STRESSED THAT THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION
AND THAT THE NATO SUMMIT MUST THEREFORE CONTRIBUTE TO THE
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND IS IMPERATIVE IF WE ARE TO BE ABLE
FURTHER EVOLUTION OF THE CSCE PROCESS AND ITS NEW
SUCCESSFULLY TO PURSUE OUR COMMON GOALS OF ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS. THE ROME SUMMIT SHOULD LOOK TO THE 1992
GROWTH, SUPPORT FOR REFORM IN THE EAST AND ASSISTANCE TO
HELSINKI REVIEW CONFERENCE, IN THE SPIRIT OF THE
THE POORER COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CSCE MADE BY
NATO'S LONDON SUMMIT AND COPENHAGEN DECLARATION, TO TAKE
IN THIS CONNECTION, THEY EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE
MAJOR STEPS TOWARD THESE GOALS.
EFFORTS UNDERWAY BY PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, PRESIDENT
YELTSIN AND OTHER UNION AND REPUBLIC LEADERS IN THE
NATO ITSELF CAN DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT
SOVIET UNION, TOGETHER WITH THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
OF A STRONG DEMOCRATIC EUROPE, AS IT HAS DONE SINCE ITS
INSTITUTIONS TO DEVELOP A NEW ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM.
FOUNDING 42 YEARS AGO. NATO WILL WORK TO ADAPT ITS
THEY EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS, TOGETHER WITH OTHER
MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, TO PROVIDE
STRUCTURES TO ENCOMPASS EUROPEAN DESIRES FOR A DISTINCT
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION TO HELP MEET
SECURITY IDENTITY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND WILL ENCOURAGE
THE NEEDS OF THE WINTER. THEY ALSO PLEDGED THEIR
GREATER EUROPEAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR EUROPEAN DEFENSE.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A EUROFEAN SECURITY IDENTITY AND
CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORTS, UNDERTAKEN IN THE
DEFENSE ROLE. REFLECTED IN THE STRENGTHENING OF THE
CONTEXT OF THE GROUP OF 24, TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE
EUROPEAN PILLAR WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, WILL REINFORCE THE
REFORMING ECONOMIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. THEY
INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVENSS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.
INVITE THE NEW DEMOCRACIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
TO JOIN IN THE EFFORT TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN THE SOVIET
UNION.
THE MINISTERS ALSO AGREED TO WORK WITH THEIR ALLIED
PARTNERS TO DEVELOP NATO'S NEW INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP
THEY NOTED THAT THE SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA POSES A
WITH THE NEW DEMOCRACIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
SERIOUS THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.
AND THE SOVIET UNION. THEY BELIEVE THAT PROMOTING
SECRETARY BAKER EXPRESSED CONTINUED UNITED STATES SUPPORT
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM IN THE EAST
FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, IN THE CONTEXT
COMPLEMENTS THE MAINTENANCE OF A COMMON DEFENSE IN
OF THE CSCE, TO BRING THIS CRISIS TO A PEACEFUL AND
ENSURING OUR SECURITY. IN ADDITION TO MOVING AHEAD WITH
DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION.
THE IDEAS THEY SET FORTH IN MAY, THEY BELIEVE THAT NATO
SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AT ITS ROME SUMMIT TO:
FINALLY, THEY CALLED ON THEIR PARTNERS TO JOIN WITH THEM
IN SEIZING THE EXTRAORDINARY OPPORTUNITY THE END OF COLD
FORMALIZING THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP BY ESTABLISHING
WAR HAS OPENED FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC
A MORE ROUTINE SET OF MEETINGS AMONG THE SIXTEEN AND THE
COMMUNITY AND INDEED FOR THE ENTIRE WORLD. RARELY HAVE
LIAISON COUNTRIES, PERHAPS AS A "NORTH ATLANTIC
PROSPECTS BEEN SO BRIGHT, THANKS IN LARGE PART TO THE
COOPERATION COUNCIL";
COOPERATION BETWEEN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA TO WHICH
BOTH MINISTERS REDEDICATED THEIR SUPPORT.
-- HAVING SUCH A COUNCIL MEET REGULARLY AT THE
AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL, AND PERIODICALLY AT THE MINISTERIAL
END TEXT.
BAKER
LEVEL, AND AT OTHER TIMES AS THE NAC AGREES THAT
CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT;
-- WELCOMING PERIODIC LIAISON PARTICIPATION IN MEETINGS
OF NATO'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COMMITTEES AND POLICY
PLANNING SESSIONS OF THE ATLANTIC POLICY ADVISORY GROUP,
AS WELL AS ROUTINE PARTICIPATION IN NATO'S CIVILIAN
EMERGENCY PLANNING SESSIONS AND THE COMMITTEE ON THE
CHALLENGES OF MODERN SOCIETY;
ENCOURAGING NEW CIVILIAN AND MILITARY EXCHANGES
DESIGNED TO PROMOTE WESTERN CONCEPTS OF CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS;
CONSIDERING THE DEDICATION OF NATO RESOURCES AS
AVAILABLE TO THE OPENING OF NATO INFORMATION OFFICES IN
EASTERN CAPITALS;
OFFERING TO COMMENCE PLANNING WITH LIAISON COUNTRIES
FOR JOINT ACTION ON DISASTER RELIEF AND REFUGEE PROGRAMS,
AND PLEDGING NATO'S SUPPORT FOR CSCE IN DEALING WITH
THESE AND OTHER NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE; AND
EXAMINING ON A PRIORITY BASIS THE CONTRIBUTION THAT
NATO CAN MAKE TO SUPPORT EFFORTS TO CONVERT DEFENSE
INDUSTRIES IN THE EMERGING DEMOCRACIES TO CIVILIAN
PRODUCTION.
THE MINISTERS ALSO NOTED THE DIVERSITY OF THE TIES THAT
BIND THE MEMBERS OF THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. IN
UNCLASSIFIED
6
Europe
ing, friendly, agreeable talks, as al-
ways. This visit today was made pos-
US-German Views on the New European
sible by the fact that I've been in New
York yesterday and today and that I
and Trans-Atlantic Architecture
will be going to South Carolina tonight
to deliver a speech, as I've done in New
Secretary Baker, German Foreign
York today, and I've used this opportu-
Minister Genscher, Joint Statement
nity to continue our standing exchange
of views on matters of general impor-
tance.
Secretary Baker and Foreign
possible. Germany has always, right
Joint Statement, May 10, 1991
Minister Genscher, May 10, 1991
from the beginning, supported the ef-
forts that the United States has under-
Joint statement issued by Secretary
Opening remarks following their
taken in this respect and we once again
Baker and Foreign Minister Genscher,
meeting at the Department of State,
extend our support to you for your next
May 10, 1991, Washington, DC.
Washington, DC.
visit to that region, because we believe
that the momentum must be main-
Foreign Minister Genscher and Secre-
Secretary Baker: I'm pleased to have
had the opportunity today to welcome
tained, and this, once again, is very im-
tary Baker, who met today in Washing-
my friend Hans-Dietrich Genscher
portant.
ton, have had a comprehensive dialogue
over the past months on mutual efforts
back to the State Department. We've
The paper that has been published
had a wide-ranging discussion of a host
today-as a result of close consulta-
to address the evolution of the Euro-
tions between the American and Ger-
pean and Trans-Atlantic architecture.
of different issues focusing primarily on
the agenda for the NATO and CSCE
man side, in order to prepare the
In particular, they have focused on the
NATO conference and the equally im-
security concerns of Central and East
Ministerials that will be held in
Copenhagen and Berlin, respectively,
portant Berlin CSCE meeting-is
European countries and on ways to
in June.
pointing to the fact that both our coun-
continue to reach out to the USSR so
We talked at some length about re-
tries agree as far as important ques-
as to demonstrate a spirit of coopera-
tions, such as the future of the alliance,
tion.
lationships between NATO and the
the West-East relationship, the devel-
The success of the ongoing reforms
CSCE process and the Soviet Union
and the countries of Central Europe.
opment in Europe and the relationship
in all fields in Central and East Euro-
We had an opportunity to discuss, as
with Middle, the Central and East Eu-
pean countries and the Soviet Union is
well, the forthcoming visit of Chancel-
ropean countries and the Soviet Union
in the interest of all 34 CSCE [Confer-
lor Kohl to the United States later this
is concerned. And I think that this is a
ence on Security and Cooperation in
month to visit President Bush.
constructive effort on our part to try to
Europe] member states. It is an indis-
increase the stability in Europe on the
pensable element of the stability of Eu-
We have issued, as you know, al-
basis of the Paris Charter. And when I
rope as a whole. Foreign Minister
ready issued a joint statement regard-
speak of stability in Europe, I'm not
Genscher and Secretary Baker there-
ing our discussions this afternoon. We
only thinking of military stability, but
fore stressed their commitment to en-
talked about the situation in Yugosla-
via. I reviewed for the Minister the
also of political and economic stability.
courage this ongoing reform process.
process we are trying to put together
I also reported to the Foreign Min-
They also emphasized that stability
ister, the Secretary of State, that is, on
embraces political, economic, social and
in the Middle East to promote peace, to
the situation and the development in
ecological security, as well as the tradi-
promote a conference that would move
the five new Laender of the Federal
tional military dimension. NATO, the
us in the direction of peace.
We talked about the Minister's re-
Republic of Germany, the eastern in-
European Community, the WEU
cent visit to Iran, and we talked as well
terest in the development going on in
[Western European Union], the CSCE,
about some bilateral issues. And it's a
these Laender of the Federal Republic,
and the Council of Europe are impor-
and he has made a great contribution
tant cornerstones of European stabil-
real pleasure to have had this opportu-
nity to visit with my friend and col-
toward the establishment of Germany
ity. The European Community is open-
unity.
ing up to the new democracies of Cen-
league, and we'd be delighted to re-
spond to your questions after he's had
We have a great interest in seeing
tral and Eastern Europe.
as many American investors as possible
Secretary Baker welcomed the 10
an opportunity to make some remarks.
come to that area of Germany, because
principles regarding the future of Eu-
Foreign Minister Genscher (through
we believe that in a couple of years
rope as agreed in Prague on April 11,
interpreter): First of all, I should like
from now they will belong to the most
1991, between Minister Genscher and
modern, industrialized areas in Europe.
Czechoslovak Foreign Minister
to express our desire to my friend and
I also invited the Secretary of State
Dienstbier. The Minister and the Sec-
colleague, Jim Baker, the desire that
Jim Baker to visit these five new
retary emphasized in particular the
his renewed visit to the Near and the
Middle East will be as successful as
Laender as soon as possible.
Trans-Atlantic dimension of European
As usual, we have had, and this I
security, the need for the CSCE
can say, on the whole and totally speak-
process to be given new institutional
May 13, 1991
US Department of State Dispatch
345
Europe
impetus on the basis of the Charter of
II. NATO Liaison Function
Paris for a New Europe and the neces-
Dispatch Supplement
sity to include the Soviet Union in the
NATO, in its London Summit Declara-
A special Dispatch Supplement
European and Trans-Atlantic architec-
tion, extended the hand of friendship to
containing the text of the Charter of
the Soviet Union and the countries of
ture.
Paris and the Joint Declaration of 22
Minister Genscher and Secretary
Central and Eastern Europe. In keep-
States can be purchased for $1.25
Baker believe the June 6-7 meeting of
ing with NATO's historic role as both
(stock no. 044-000-02308-3) through
NATO foreign ministers in Copen-
the Superintendent of Documents,
guarantor of stability and agent of
hagen and the June 19-20 meeting of
Government Printing Office, Washing-
change, NATO agreed at London to en-
CSCE foreign ministers in Berlin offer
ton, DC, 20402-9325 (tel. 202-783-
hance the political component of the Al-
important opportunities for construc-
3238).
liance as provided for by Article 2 of
tive initiatives in these areas.
the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO has
In their 1990 London Declaration,
undertaken to expand the East/West
NATO leaders stated that "the Atlantic
of security for a Europe whole and free,
dialogue as a means of helping ensure
community must reach out to the coun-
the Alliance must continue to perform
an enduring peace in a Europe whole
and free.
tries of the East which were our adver-
fundamental security tasks.
saries in the Cold War, and extend to
As NATO agreed at Brussels in De-
To this end, NATO proposed high-
them the hand of friendship." The up-
cember, "a European security identity
ranking visits, establishment of a regu-
coming NATO Ministerial meeting
lar diplomatic liaison, and an intensifi-
and defense role, reflected in the con-
should respond to the interest ex-
cation of military contacts.
struction of a European pillar within
pressed by the Soviet Union and the
the Alliance, will not only serve the in-
Secretary Baker and Foreign Min-
new democracies of Central and East-
terests of the European states but also
ister Genscher strongly favor building
ern Europe for greater contact with
help to strengthen Atlantic solidarity."
upon and developing this liaison func-
tion to include more intensive contacts
NATO, in furtherance of this goal. It
In their meeting today, Secretary
between NATO and Central/East Eu-
also should advance NATO's strategy
Baker affirmed that the United States
review and the related development of
ropean states, as well as the Soviet
is ready to support arrangements the
a European security and defense iden-
Union. They believe this can be accom-
European Allies decide are needed for
tity. In keeping with the London Dec-
plished through:
the expression of a common European
laration and Article 2 of the North At-
foreign, security, and defense policy.
High-ranking political visits in
lantic Treaty, the meeting should also
Minister Genscher affirmed that the
both directions;
be used to enhance the political compo-
Atlantic Alliance as a whole should be
Contacts below the political level
nent of the North Atlantic Alliance.
enhanced by strengthening the role of
in Brussels and in capitals in the politi-
One of the most effective ways to do
giving added responsibility to the Eu-
cal and military fields, including visits
this will be to advance concrete ideas
ropeans in the context of security and
by delegations of young leaders;
for how the Berlin Ministerial can be
defense policy, and that in that respect
Organization of seminars, sympo-
used to strengthen CSCE institutions
a European security and defense iden-
sia, and policy planning sessions, about
to respond to the political and security
tity should be reflected in the develop-
topics in the security policy field with
needs of an evolving Europe.
ment of a European pillar within the
political and military participants;
With these goals in mind, Secretary
Alliance.
Invitation of military officers
Baker and Foreign Minister Genscher
They both agreed that to ensure
from the Soviet Union and Central and
offer the following ideas as contribu-
this development will strengthen the
Eastern European countries to NATO
tions to these two important ministerial
integrity and effectiveness of the At-
Academy programs;
meetings:
lantic Alliance, NATO should be the
Establishing training programs
principal venue for consultation and the
at NATO's Defense College for military
I. NATO Strategy Review and
forum for agreement on all policies
officers on issues connected to civilian
the Development of a
bearing on the security and defense
oversight of defense;
European Security Identity
commitment of its members under the
Providing the Soviet Union and
North Atlantic Treaty.
Central and East Europeans with ex-
At its London Summit, NATO man-
They further agreed that NATO
pertise on conversion of defense indus-
dated a thoroughgoing review of its
should maintain an effective integrated
tries to peaceful purposes;
strategy. The discussions underway,
military structure to provide for collec-
Participation of Soviet and Cen-
both in NATO and in European fora, on
tive defense; and that appropriate ar-
tral and East European experts in cer-
the development of a European secu-
rangements should be instituted so that
tain NATO activities, including those
rity identity, are an essential element
all European members of NATO could
related to NATO's "third dimension,"
of this process.
participate in some appropriate manner
airspace management, or civil emer-
The Alliance's ultimate goal re-
in the development of a European pillar
gency questions;
mains the establishment of a just and
within the Alliance.
Greater contacts between Soviet
lasting order of peace in the whole of
and Central and East European parlia-
Europe. While striving to develop as
ments and the North Atlantic Assem-
far as possible cooperative structures
bly, as agreed among the parliamentar-
ians concerned;
346
US Department of State Dispatch
May 13, 1991
Iraq
When further progress has been
The CPC should organize a fur-
interfere with the system's ability to
made, discussing questions relating to
ther seminar on military doctrines with
handle its primary tasks related to the
NATO's strategy review;
participation of high-level military rep-
implementation of the CSBMs agree-
Seeking increased outlets in the
resentatives. Other specific topics for
ment and of the CFE Treaty.
USSR and Central and Eastern Eu-
future seminars at lower levels might
rope for NATO publications; and
be discussed.
In addition to these immediate deci-
Proposals for the establishment
The CPC should be tasked to
sions, Secretary Baker and Foreign
of "Atlantic Councils" in those coun-
function as the "nominating institution"
Minister Genscher will ask their coun-
tries.
for the CSCE Dispute Settlement
terparts in the CSCE Council to con-
Mechanism, which was worked out by
sider whether, to strengthen CSCE's
III. CSCE in the New Europe
the Valletta Meeting of Experts on
ability to facilitate the peaceful resolu-
Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and
tion of disputes, procedures might be
Genscher attach great importance to
which could be endorsed by the CSCE
developed under which ministers could
the Conference on Security and Coop-
Council in Berlin. In this capacity, the
direct the establishment of fact-finding
eration in Europe-the Helsinki
CPC could maintain the register of me-
missions as appropriate.
diators envisaged under the Valletta
Secretary Baker and Foreign Min-
Process. The decisions taken at last
ister Genscher also believe that the
year's CSCE Summit in Paris, many of
proposal and could help organize the
appropriate dispute resolution pro-
Berlin meeting should address the is-
which stem from initiatives launched at
cesses.
sue of modalities, in particular the pre-
the NATO Summit in London, will help
CPC communication facilities
paratory consultations for the
strengthen the CSCE to meet the chal-
should be endorsed for use as a
CSCE-wide security negotiations
lenges of a new era. The meeting of
"hotline" for emergency communica-
which will follow the Helsinki Review
CSCE ministers this June in Berlin will
tions between CSCE capitals. Of
Conference, on the basis of proposals
mark a major opportunity to reflect
course, such use of these facilities
developed in the appropriate fora and
and build on those successes.
should be structured so that it does not
endorsed at the NATO Ministerial in
To enlarge the instruments en-
Copenhagen.
abling CSCE to cope with potential cri-
ses, the CSCE Council of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs should adopt in Berlin
a procedure for calling emergency
meetings of CSCE officials at
Algeria: Iraq's Protecting Power
subministerial level. It should provide
for the possibility of holding an emer-
Statement by Margaret Tutwiler,
The interests section will be staffed by
gency meeting at the request of a par-
Department Spokesman, May 7, 1991.
three individuals (two diplomats, one
ticipating state particularly concerned
administrative and technical) who were
about a serious emergency situation
Algeria has become the protecting power
notified to the United States on May 7 as
arising from a violation of a Principle of
for Iraq in the United States.
members of the Algerian diplomatic
the Helsinki Final Act or from a major
As President Bush has made clear,
mission. These three are Iraqi nationals
disruption of another nature.
we cannot have normal relations with
who were formerly accredited with the
To ensure that such a mechanism
Iraq so long as Saddam Hussein remains
United States as members of the Iraqi
plays a constructive and effective role
in power. Establishment of a protecting
diplomatic mission. There may also be
in enhancing stability, the request for
power will permit us to maintain a
local employee support staff, individuals
minimal channel of communication with
such an emergency meeting should be
who must be US citizens or resident
the Iraqi government.
seconded by a number of member
aliens whose immigration status permits
Property. Upon completion of
them to work in the United States.
states to be determined. Substantive
accreditation of the interests section
The interests section will facilitate
decisions would, of course, continue to
staff, the Algerians will take over the
maintenance of minimal communications
require the consensus that is at the
former Iraqi chancery which housed the
between the United States and Iraq and
heart of CSCE's processes. The minis-
offices of the embassy. The Algerians
provide basic consular services.
ters should endorse such a mechanism
will not take over custody of the former
Travel Restrictions. Iraqi nationals
at their June meeting in Berlin.
residence of the Iraqi ambassador.
staffing the interests section in Washing-
The Berlin meeting can also be used
Custody of this property will remain with
ton will continue to be restricted to a 25-
to strengthen the Conflict Prevention
the Office of Foreign Missions as it has
mile zone of free movement. They must
been since March 8.
Center in order to assist the Council in
seek permission from the Department of
Interests Section. The Algerians
reducing the risk of conflict. For this
State to travel for any reasons beyond
are permitted to use the former Iraqi
that zone.
purpose, Ministers should consider in
chancery for an Iraqi interests section.
Berlin the following steps:
Meetings of the Center's Consul-
tative Committee should be held on a
more frequent basis, e.g., once or twice
during each round of the CSBM nego-
tiations.
May 13, 1991
US Department of State Dispatch
347
Finland
ago, establishing new lives in the
Delaware River valley. Over a century
US-Finnish Relations
later, John Morton, a Finnish-American
delegate to our Continental Congress,
cast the deciding vote for our Declara-
Presidents Bush and Koivisto
tion of Independence.
The ideals that led him-liberty and
Remarks upon departure, White House, May 7, 1991
self-government-remain dear to both
our nations. Just look to Philadelphia,
1776, and Helsinki, 1917. And since
President Bush
discussed the new Europe, from
that time we've enjoyed over 70 years
economic integration to arms control,
of warm diplomatic relations. And I
President Koivisto, welcome again to
from new challenges to the Conference
look forward to continuing this friend-
the United States. It's a pleasure to
on Security and Cooperation in Europe
ship.
try to return the hospitality you
(CSCE) to the continuing role of NATO
May God bless the people of
showed President Gorbachev and me in
in European security.
Finland and the United States. Thank
Helsinki last September. And we're
The United States and Finland
you, sir.
very grateful for that hospitality, and
share a deep interest in events in the
I'd like to think that meeting was very
Soviet Union. I've always valued the
President Koivisto
constructive.
opportunity to exchange views with
Our meeting today was only the
Mr. President. Let me first thank you,
President Koivisto, who is a knowl-
latest of many exchanges that we have
Mr. President, for the excellent
edgeable, an expert, a most perceptive
shared. It's been nearly a decade since
hospitality extended to me and my
observer of the USSR.
you and I first met. Today, as always, I
party here in Washington. We enjoyed
We discussed the very complex
greatly value your views on world
our stay very much. It was also a great
situation in the Baltic states. And I
events and your efforts over many
pleasure to meet you again and ex-
reaffirmed the policy of the United
years to build the excellent relationship
change views on the changing world
States to support a process of change
between the United States and
situation.
through constructive and fair negotia-
Finland.
When we last met in Helsinki in
tions. We agreed on the inadmissibility
This visit, albeit very brief, gave me
September at the American-Soviet top-
of the use of force and the importance
an opportunity to thank you personally
level meeting on the Persian Gulf, the
of pragmatism by all parties in the
for Finland's constructive policy in the
world was facing a direct challenge to
search for a solution to this problem of
Middle East. Your country's strong
the rule of law. The Iraqi aggression
the Baltics.
leadership in the UN Security Council
was repelled by the coalition. Kuwait
The United States and Finland will
and the Iraqi Sanctions Committee last
is now free. Finland faced its responsi-
continue to support the process of
fall and your generous aid to the people
bility in the UN Security Council in its
reform in the USSR which was initi-
suffering from Iraqi oppression
decision to thwart the aggression. And
ated by President Gorbachev. We
represent Finland's fine tradition of
now work must continue to build a new,
want to see that process continue. We
active partnership in the community of
equitable world.
want to see it strengthened. And we
nations.
Finland and the United States are
will be ready to assist the Soviet and
This sense of responsibility led
different in many ways, yet we share
republic governments in attaining the
Finland, within a year of its admission
the same values of freedom, democracy,
twin goals of democratization and
to the United Nations, to serve as part
justice, and human rights. We both
market economic reform.
of the UN Emergency Force in 1956
want to see the world based on these
Finally, we discussed another issue
following the Suez crisis. Finns have
fundamental principles. But principles
of major importance to both of our
served bravely in virtually every
are not enough. The economic, social,
countries: the transition to free
peace-keeping force since then, contrib-
and the ecological problems can only be
markets and liberal political systems by
uting more troops than any other
overcome through determined interna-
the new democracies of Eastern
country. Your nation continues this
tional cooperation.
Europe. We are determined to make
proud tradition in the current UN
For Finland, developments in
every effort to assist them in their
observer force in Kuwait and Iraq.
Europe and particularly in our vicinity
historic quest to remake themselves
Finland and the United States
are of vital importance. While we must
and find a place in the new Europe.
enjoy a long and healthy trade relation-
encourage progress everywhere
This must be a priority for all Western
ship. Today, we touched on some new
toward our shared values, we must at
countries.
economic issues, including the advan-
the same time maintain stability.
As democratic peoples, Finns and
tages that could come from a Finnish
Reform efforts in Eastern Europe,
Americans share many special bonds of
purchase of our advanced aircraft.
including the Soviet Union, now need
friendship. Finns have long added to
Let it be said in fairness that you
our support. With the Cold War
the American experience. Mr. Presi-
made a pitch to us on several items that
behind us, no new devices must be
dent, your countrymen were among the
might benefit Finland's trade, so this
drawn, but avenues of cooperation be
first to settle in this country 350 years
was a mutual exchange. We also
opened for all.
348
US Department of State Dispatch
May 13, 1991
PRIORITY
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DELORS. SEPARATELY, COMMISSION OFFICIALS TOLD US APRIL
ACTION EUR-00
4 THE COMMISSION WAS EXAMINING A BROAD RANGE OF
1
PRODUCTS, IN CLUDING AGRICULTURAL ONES, ON WHICH THE EC
INFO
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AID-00
AMAD-01
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COULD OPEN ITS MARKETS TO THE POLES. THE PROBLEM, WE
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3. (U) POLISH DEMANDS FOR SPECIFIC TRADE CONCESSIONS ON
P 041727Z APR 91
FOOD, STEEL AND TEXTILE EXPORTS UNDER THE EC/POLAND
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AGREEMENT WILL BE REFERRED TO THE NEGOTIATORS. WALESA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8069
TOLD REPORTERS HE HAD REACHED HIS OBJECTIVE IN GETTING
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY
"UNDERSTANDING" FOR THE POLISH DEMANDS (REFTEL). HE WAS
INFO RUFHBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
CONFIDENT THAT DELORS' "CONVICTION" AND THE COMMUNITY'S
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
"GOODWILL" WILL EVENTUALLY PAVE THE WAY TO COMPROMISES
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AND ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. TO ANOTHER QUESTION, HE SAID
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
HE HAD MET "POLITICAL FRIENDS, SEEING FAR AHEAD."
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
HOWEVER, HE COULD NOT HIDE HIS IMPATIENCE WITH
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
LIMITATIONS ON POLISH EXPORTS. POLISH SHOPS WERE FULL
EC POSTS COLLECTIVE
OF EUROPEAN GOODS BUT THE REVERSE WAS NOT TRUE.
DOL WASHDC
4. (LOU) IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH DG I OFFICIALS
INVOLVED IN BOTH THE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT TALKS AND THE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BRUSSELS 04455
WALESA VISIT, WE WERE TOLD THAT WALESA'S PITCH HAS
INDEED BEEN HEARD. OUR CONTACTS TOLD US THE WORKING
FROM USEC
GROUPS FOCUSSING ON WHAT SPECIFIC POLISH EXPORTS TO THE
DEPT FOR EUR/RPE, EUR/CE, EUR/EEY, S/IL, AND EUR/SOV
EC COULD BE LIBERALIZED HAD IDENTIFIED A NUMBER OF SUCH
PRODUCTS. ON THAT BASIS, WE WERE TOLD, THE COMMISSION
E.O. 12356: N/A
WILL PROBABLY PROPOSE SOME SUCH LIBERALIZATION TO
TAGS: PREL, RAID, PGOV, PINR, PL, EEC, ELAB
FOREIGN MINISTERS TO CONSIDER AT THEIR APRIL 15 GENERAL
AFFAIRS COUNCIL IN LUXEMBOURG. THE DIFFICULTY, OUR
SUBJECT: DELORS MEETS WALESA: WELCOME TO EUROPE BUT
COMMISSION CONTACTS NOTED, WILL BE POLITICAL. THEY
DON'T RUSH INTO THE EC
UNCLASSIFIED
REF.: BRUSSELS 3856
NOTED THAT REGARDLESS OF OBJECTIVE POSSIBILITIES, IT IS
A POLITICALLY SENSITIVE TIME TO ASK, FOR EXAMPLE,
1. (U) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: PRESIDENT LECH WALESA
FARMERS TO OPEN UP THEIR MARKETS MORE.
OF POLAND CALLED ON THE EC COMMISSION APRIL 3 AS PART OF
A THREE-DAY "INFORMAL" VISIT TO BRUSSELS. WALESA'S
5. (U) IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE, DELORS CAUTIONED NOT TO
APRIL 4 VISIT TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IS REPORTED
PUT THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE ON THE ROAD TO FULL
SEPTEL. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY FOREIGN MINISTER
MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY. HE RECALLED THAT SPAIN AND
SKUBISZEWSKI AND MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL ECONOMIC
PORTUGAL HAD TO WAIT FOR SEVEN YEARS. "I WOULD PREFER A
RELATIONS LEDWOROSKI DURING HIS ENTIRE STAY IN
SUCCESSFUL ACCESSION IN A FEW YEARS' TIME RATHER THAN
BRUSSELS. TALKS WITH PRESIDENT DELORS AND
HURRIED ACCESSION RIGHT AWAY WHICH COULD LEAD TO
VICE-PRESIDENT ANDRIESSEN (EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND TRADE
DISAPPOINTMENT AND RANCOUR," DELORS ADDED. HE WARNED
POLICY) WERE FOLLOWED BY A WORKING SESSION WITH THE
THAT EXPANDING THE EC TOO SOON COULD TURN THE COMMUNITY
ENTIRE COMMISSION AND A JOINT DELORS/WALESA PRESS
INTO "A VAGUE WHOLE" ("UN ENSEMBLE MOU") WHICH WOULD
CONFERENCE WHICH FOCUSED ON FUTURE TIES BETWEEN THE EC
HAVE NO FUTURE.
AND POLAND.
6. (U) ASKED TO SPECIFY THE TIMETABLE FOR POLISH
2. (LOU) "THE IRON CURTAIN HAS BEEN DESTROYED: WE DON'T
ACCESSION TO THE COMMUNITY, DELORS ARGUED THAT THE
WANT IT TO BE REPLACED BY A SILVER CURTAIN SEPARATING A
FUTURE EUROPE PACT COMBINED WITH STRENGTHENED POLITICAL
RICH
AND CULTURAL CONTACTS WILL BRING POLAND INTO "THE CLOSE
CIRCLE OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN COOPERATION."
WEST FROM A POOR EAST," WALESA TOLD THE EC PRESS CORPS.
AS THE EC WILL HAVE COMPLETED ITS OWN "FACELIFT,"
HE CALLED FOR THE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT BEING NEGOTIATED
(POLITICAL UNION, ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION), TIME
BETWEEN THE EC AND POLAND TO BE SIGNED THIS YEAR.
DELORS SAID THE COMMISSION WAS WILLING TO SIGN BEFORE
WILL COME WHEN POLAND WILL HAVE MADE "THE PROGRESS
THE YEAR'S END BUT CAUTIONED ABOUT MAKING TOO SPEEDY AN
NECESSARY FOR ACCESSION TO BE MORE PROFITABLE THAN
APPLICATION FOR FULL EC MEMBERSHIP. HE REFERRED TO THE
DAMAGING."
FUTURE PACT AS A "EUROPE AGREEMENT" THAT WOULD SEND A
TWOFOLD SIGNAL TO THE POLES AND THE REST OF THE WORLD.
7. (U) DELORS FURTHER CAUTIONED THAT THE ENLARGED
COMMUNITY SHOULD REMAIN "A REAL COMMUNITY, WHICH
THE POLES WILL BE TOLD THEY ARE "A FULL PART OF EUROPE,"
IMPLIES "MORE POWER AT THE CENTER, MORE DECENTRALIZATION
ACTING AS A LINK BETWEEN DIFFERENT COMPONENTS OF THE
AND MORE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL AT THE CENTER." HE SAID
CONTINENT. TO THE REST OF THE WORLD, THE AGREEMENT WILL
THE COMMISSION WOULD PROPOSE A FRAMEWORK FOR A COMMUNITY
SIGNAL THAT POLAND HAS "SEALED ITS DESTINY" WITH
OF 20 TO 24 MEMBERS BEFORE THE END OF ITS TERM (END
DEMOCRACY AND THAT THE EC CAN VOUCH FOR THAT, WHICH
1992).
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8. (U) TO A QUESTION ON POLISH SECURITY, WALESA SAID
FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN EUROPE SHOULD AVOID
THREATENING THE SOVIET UNION, A POINT HE HAD ALREADY
MADE TO REPORTERS AFTER MEETING NATO SECRETARY-GENERAL
WOERNER AT THE POLISH EMBASSY. "WE WANT TO LIVE IN A
SAFE EUROPE AND HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH THE SOVIET
UNION AND GERMANY," HE STRESSED.
NILES
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DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES THAT CAN HELP YOU MEET THE
ACTION EUR-00
CHALLENGE OF CHANGE PEACEFULLY AND LEGITIMATELY.
INFO
LOG-00
ACDA-13
ADS-00
AID-00
AMAD-01
CIAE-00
CFE-00
IN PARTICULAR, I'D URGE YOU TO FOLLOW FIVE FUNDAMENTAL
DODE-00
ANHR-01
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PRINCIPLES.
INR-01
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38
FINAL ACT. IF, INDEED, YOUR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE IS A
P 112226Z SEP 91
THRIVING DEMOCRACY, YOU CAN DO NOTHING LESS.
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INTIMIDATION, ILLEGALITY, AND VIOLENCE ARE NOT THE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4918
HANDMAIDENS OF DEMOCRACY, THEY ARE THE HARBINGERS OF
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
DESPOTISM. JUST AS YOU FACED DOWN TANKS, SEE THESE
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY
EVILS OF INTOLERANCE SQUARELY FOR WHAT THEY ARE.
AMCONSUL STRASBOURG
TWO, WE URGE ALL TO RESPECT EXISTING BORDERS, INTERNAL
UNCLAS MOSCOW 25956
AND EXTERNAL; ANY CHANGE OF BORDERS SHOULD ONLY OCCUR
LEGITIMATELY BY PEACEFUL AND CONSENSUAL MEANS,
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CSCE, C, E (YOUNG) EUR/RPM, HA, 10
CONSISTENT WITH CSCE PRINCIPLES. THE AGREEMENTS
VIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL CSBM, BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC,
RECENTLY ACHIEVED BY SOME REPUBLICS UNDERSCORE THIS
ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN
PRINCIPLE. THE ALTERNATIVE IS SPIRALING INSTABILITY.
AUTARKY, SCØRE-SETTLING AND THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, CSCE, PHUM, UR
FOR TERRITORIAL GAIN CANNOT BE LEGITIMATE ELEMENTS OF
SUBJECT: CSCE: MOSCOW CHD MESSAGE NO. 6:
THE NEW EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. EUROPEAN HISTORY IS
TEXT OF SECRETARY BAKER'S ADDRESS
REPLETE WITH T00 MANY EXAMPLES OF HOW SUCH IRRESPONSIBLE
BEHAVIOR HAS LED TO IMMENSE SUFFERING ON THIS CONTINENT.
1. THIS IS A MESSAGE FROM THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE
MOSCOW MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN DIMENSION.
THREE, WE URGE SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF
LAW. WE SUPPORT PEACEFUL CHANGE ONLY THROUGH ORDERLY
2. THE FOLLOWING IS THE PREPARED TEXT OF THE ADDRESS
BUT NOT ALL OF THE CHANGES IN EUROPE HAVE BEEN SO
GLVEN BY SECRETARY BAKER AT THE SEPTEMBER 11 PLENARY OF
THE MOSCOW MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN
PEACEFUL. WE REMAIN DEEPLY SADDENED AND CONCERNED BY
DIMENSION.
THE TRAGIC BLOODSHED IN YUGOSLAVIA. TO THOSE WHO WOULD
PERSIST IN THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, WE SAY: THERE IS
BEGIN TEXT.
NO HONOR IN IT, NO LASTLNG GAIN, NO FUTURE. YOU CANNOT
ACHIEVE PROSPERITY AND SECURITY FOR YOUR PEOPLE BY
WHEN, A LITTLE OVER ONE YEAR AGO, I ADDRESSED THE
FORCE. YOU CAN ONLY REAP A WHIRLWIND OF MISERY,
COPENHAGEN CSCE MEETING, LOOKED AROUND AND SAW THE
TURMOIL, AND LOSS.
CHANGING FACE OF EUROPE. ARRAYED AT THE TABLE WERE
DELEGATES FROM A REFORMING SOVIET UNION, FROM TWO
I WISH TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO ALL PARTIES -- AND MOST OF
GERMANIES ONLY A FEW MONTHS SHY OF UNIFICATION, AND FROM
ALL TO THE SERBIAN LEADERSHIP AND THE YUGOSLAV FEDERAL
THE NEW CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES.
ARMY THAT WITH EVERY USE OF AGGRESSIVE FORCE THEY
FURTHER ISOLATE THEMSELVES FROM THE NEW EUROPE AND RAISE
IN THE INTERVENING MONTHS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE
THE COSTS TO THEIR OWN PEOPLE OF AN ALREADY SEVERE
HAS CONTINUED WITHOUT PAUSE. THE DIFFICULT TASK OF
ECONOMIC CRISIS. WE DOUBT THE PEOPLES OF YUGOSLAVIA
CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY AND ESTABLISHING MARKET
TRULY WISH TO PAY THE HIGH PRICE OF POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIES HAS ADVANCED ACROSS CENTRAL AND EASTERN
ECONOMIC EXILE.
EUROPE. GERMANY IS UNITED, AND ALBANIA IS OPEN.
LATVIA, LITHUANIA, AND ESTONIA, DEPRIVED OF THEIR
WE JOIN OTHER MEMBERS OF CSCE IN REITERATING OUR STRONG
INDEPENDENCE BY FORCE HALF A CENTURY AGO, HAVE AT LAST
SUPPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S CONTINUING EFFORTS
TAKEN THEIR RIGHTFUL PLACE AMONG US.
TO BRING ABOUT A GENUINE CEASEFIRE AND A POLITICAL
AHEAD WILL SURELY TEST AND REVEAL THE STRENGTH OF
SETTLEMENT. WE URGE ALL PARTIES TO REACH OUT OF THE
THEIR COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES. THE SCOPE,
ABYSS OF VIOLENCE INTO WHICH THEY HAVE DESCENDED AND
DEPTH, AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECISIONS THAT THE
CITIZENS OF THIS COUNTRY ARE NOW MAKING ARE INDEED
GRASP HOLD OF THIS OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE. THE REST OF
UNPRECEDENTED. BUT IN SHAPING THEIR DEMOCRATIC FUTURE,
EUROPE IS MOVING FORWARD TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
THEY ARE NOT WITHOUT GUIDELINES FOR ACTION, OR STANDARDS
FREEDOM.
OF ACCOUNTABILITY.
GUIDELINES FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION
AT THIS TIME OF CHANGE IN ALL ASPECTS OF SOVIET NATIONAL
LIFE, WE SHOULD TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS ALL
NO ONE IS MOVING FORWARD MORE VIGOROUSLY THAN THE
SOVIET CITIZENS AND THEIR LEADERS. MY MESSAGE IS
PEOPLES OF THE SOVIET UNION. FOR THE PEOPLES OF THIS
SIMPLE: THE COURAGE YOU SHOWED IN AUGUST MUST BE
LAND, THIS IS TRULY DEMOCRACY'S SEASON. AND, WITH YOU,
CONTINUED AND CONSOLIDATED NOW IN ENDURING POLITICAL AND
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE REJOICE IN ITS COMING. HERE IN
ECONOMIC FREEDOM. AS YOU WORK TO BUILD DEMOCRACY AND
MOSCOW, WE BREATHE THE WARM WIND OF NEW-WON FREEDOMS.
UNCLASSIFIED
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ACTION STR-18
THE COMMUNITY'S IMPORTANCE IN THE TRADING SYSTEM
IS UNDERLINED BY THE EXTRAORDINARY EFFORT BY THIS
INFO
LOG-00
ADS-00
AGRE-00
AID-00
AMAD-01
CEA-01
CIAE-00
COLLECTION OF TWELVE GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES TO
CTME-00
DINT-05
DODE-00
EB-00
E-01
FRB-01
H-01
DISMANTLE THE REMAINING BARRIERS IN ITS INTERNAL
INRE-00
INR-01
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ITC-01
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MARKET, MOVING IT CLOSER TO ITS OWN IDEAL OF A TRULY
NSAE-00
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UNION.
5ADC59 171051Z /21 38
R 170908Z APR 91
THROUGH THIS TRANSFORMATION, THE EC ASPIRES TO BE
FM USMISSION GENEVA
AN ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER. WITH THAT NEW STATUS MUST COME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4956
INCREASED LEADERSHIP, INCLUDING LEADING BY EXAMPLE.
INFO RUCPDC/USDOC WASHDC
OECD CAPITALS
THUS, IT IS APPROPRIATE TO EVALUATE THE EC'S TRADE
REGIME IN TERMS OF OUR HIGHEST ASPIRATIONS FOR THE GATT
UNCLAS GENEVA 04492
SYSTEM AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY.
E.O. 12356: N/A:
OVERALL ASSESSMENT
TAGS: ETRD, GATT, USTR, MTN, EFIN
SUBJ: EC TRADE POLICY REVIEW U.S. STATEMENT
THE UNITED STATES COMMENDS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
FOR ITS EFFORTS TO PROMOTE REGIONAL ECONOMIC
1. BELOW IS THE TEST OF THE STATEMENT DELIVERED BY MR.
INTEGRATION. WE WELCOME THE EC'S EFFORTS TO
PETER ALLGEIER, ASSISTANT USTR FOR EUROPE AND THE
CONTINUALLY DEEPEN AND BROADEN THIS INTEGRATION
MEDITERRANEAN, AT THE TRPM REVIEW FOR THE EC ON APRIL
PROVIDED THAT THE INTEGRATION IS IMPLEMENTED WITHIN THE
15, 1991.
FRAMEWORK PROVIDED BY ARTICLE XXIV OF THE GENERAL
BEGIN TEXT:
AGREEMENT AND PROVIDED THAT THE BENEFITS OF THE SINGLE
MARKET ARE EXTENDED TO THIRD COUNTRIES AS WELL.
INTRODUCTION
THE SHEER SWEEP OF THE COMMUNITY'S TRADE POLICIES
MR. CHAIRMAN, DISTINGUISHED DISCUSSANTS, FELLOW
PREVENTS ONE FROM COMMENTING COMPREHENSIVELY ABOUT ITS
TRADE REGIME. WILL CONFINE MYSELF TODAY, THEREFORE,
CONTRACTING PARTIES:
TO A FEW OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AREAS OF MY COUNTRY'S
CONCERN ABOUT EC TRADE POLICY.
OURS IS A WEIGHTY TASK TODAY, THAT IS, TO REVIEW
THE TRADE POLICY REGIME OF THE LARGEST TRADING ENTITY
AGRICULTURE
IN THE WORLD. THAT TASK HAS BEEN MADE MUCH EASIER,
HOWEVER, BY THE OUTSTANDING SECRETARIAT REPORT THAT
ACCOMPANIES AND COMPLEMENTS THE COMMUNITY'S OWN
DOCUMENT. STRONGLY COMMEND THE SECRETARIAT FOR
NO ONE IN THIS ROOM WILL BE SURPRISED THAT THE U.S.
COMPILING AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, FOR ANALYZING SO
GOVERNMENT SEES THE COMMUNITY'S AGRICULTURAL TRADE
OBJECTIVELY SUCH AN ENORMOUS QUANTITY OF MATERIAL.
POLICIES AS BEING PARTICULARLY DESTRUCTIVE TO THE
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM. THE COMBINATION OF
THE COMMUNITY'S DOCUMENT, WHILE LESS SPECIFIC, IS A
VARIABLE IMPORT LEVIES, DOMESTIC PRICE SUPPORTS, AND
USEFUL INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY.
EXPORT SUBSIDIES HAVE LED TO DISTORTED COMPETITION ON
IN PARTICULAR, THE SECTIONS ON THE TRADE POLICY
WORLD MARKETS. THIS CERTAINLY IS NOT LEADERSHIP WORTH
FRAMEWORK WERE EXTREMELY INTERESTING, AND HAVE SPARKED
FOLLOWING.
A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ON OUR PART WHICH WE WILL OFFER
FOR RESPONSE EITHER AT THIS MEETING OR LATER.
MANY CONTRACTING PARTIES, PARTICULARLY THE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, HAVE BEEN SEVERELY AFFECTED BY
GENERAL COMMENTS
THESE POLICIES SINCE THE SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM IS
ENORMOUS. THE GATT SECRETARIAT NOTES THAT FOR MAJOR
BEFORE LAUNCHING HEADLONG INTO OUR TASK, I SUGGEST
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, SUCH AS CEREALS, DAIRY PRODUCTS
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AND BEEF, SUBSIDIZED EXPORTS HAVE REPLACED INTERVENTION
STORAGE AS THE PRINCIPAL TOOL FOR REGULATING EC
THAT WE REFLECT ON WHAT BENCHMARK WE MIGHT USE IN
MARKETS.
CONDUCTING SUCH A REVIEW.
AT A MINIMUM, WE SHOULD COMPARE THE EC'S TRADE
:
IT SURELY WAS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE CAP'S
REGIME TO THE GATT IDEAL OF NON-DISCRIMINATION,
FOUNDERS TO ESTABLISH A THREAT TO THE MULTILATERAL
TRANSPARENCY, AND THE ABSENCE OF QUANTITATIVE
TRADING SYSTEM, AND WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE
RESTRICTIONS, NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AND TRADE-DISTORTING
COMMUNITY CAN RECONCILE ITS CURRENT AGRICULTURAL TRADE
SUBSIDIES. THIS IS THE STANDARD TO WHICH WE ALL SHOULD
POLICIES WITH THE EXPRESSED OBJECTIVE OF ARTICLE 110 OF
THE TREATY OF ROME "TO CONTRIBUTE, IN THE COMMON
BE HELD.
INTEREST, TO THE HARMONIOUS DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD
TRADE."
BUT THE SECRETARIAT DOCUMENT CORRECTLY IDENTIFIES
THE COMMUNITY AS ONE OF THE "PACEMAKERS" OF
WE REALIZE THE EC HAS UNDERTAKEN EFFORTS TO GAIN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY AND OF "CRITICAL INFLUENCE
SOME MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER AGRICULTURAL SPENDING AND
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PRODUCTION.
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION.
FACED WITH THE NADEQUACIES OF THESE MEASURES,
WE LOOK FORWARD TO INTENSIFYING OUR EFFORTS WITH
HOWEVER, WE ENCOURAGE THE EC TO INTENSIFY RECENT
THE COMMUNITY AND OTHER NEGOTIATING PARTNERS TO ACHIEVE
EFFORTS AIMED AT UNDERTAKING FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES TO THE
A SUCCESSFUL RENEGOTIATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY.
PROCUREMENT CODE. THIS IS AN AREA IN WHICH THE SINGLE
MARKET PROGRAM CAN MAKE A TRULY SIGNIFICANT
IT WAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED IN BRUSSELS LAST
CONTRIBUTION TO THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM.
DECEMBER THAT THE LARGE MAJORITY OF PARTICIPANTS VIEWED
SUCH REFORM AS A SINE-QUA-NON FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE
STANDARDS
URUGUAY ROUND.
OVER THE YEARS, WE HAVE COMPLAINED ABOUT WIDELY
THEREFORE, THE EC CAN BEST DEMONSTRATE ITS
DIFFERING STANDARDS, TESTING, AND CERTIFICATION
COMMITMENT TO THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM BY UNDERTAKING
THE NECESSARY STEPS TO REFORM ITS AGRICULTURAL POLICIES
PROCEDURES AMONG EC MEMBER STATES FOR BOTH INDUSTRIAL
AND TO JOIN THE REST OF THE WORLD IN THE PROGRESSIVE
AND CONSUMER PRODUCTS.
LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE IN AGRICULTURE.
THERE OFTEN HAVE BEEN LENGTHY DELAYS IN SALES WHILE
SUBSIDIES
OUR EXPORTERS WAITED FOR PRODUCTS TO BE TESTED AND
CERTIFIED MANY TIMES TO ACCOUNT FOR DIFFERING NATIONAL
REQUIREMENTS. THESE CONFLICTING REQUIREMENTS WERE
WILL LEAVE IT TO OTHER CONTRACTING PARTIES TO
OFTEN COSTLY AND CUMBERSOME.
ADDRESS IN DETAIL THE BORDER MEASURES THAT THE
COMMUNITY APPLIES IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTORS. I WOULD
THROUGH THE SINGLE MARKET PROGRAM, THE EC HAS
PREFER TO FOCUS ON A MATTER THAT RECEIVED EXTREMELY
FOCUSED ON PROBLEMS TO THE FREE FLOW OF GOODS
SHORT SHRIFT IN THE COMMUNITY'S SUBMISSION, NAMELY,
THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY POSED BY THIS PATCHWORK-QUILT
SUBSIDIES.
OF DIFFERING NATIONAL STANDARDS AND IS UNDERTAKING A
MAJOR EFFORT TO MINIMIZE TRADE IMPEDIMENTS STEMMING
THE SECRETARIAT'S DOCUMENT POINTS OUT HOW
FROM DIFFERING OR EXCESSIVE TECHNICAL RESTRICTIONS. WE
WIDESPREAD WITHIN THE COMMUNITY ARE SUBSIDIES TO
APPLAUD THIS EFFORT.
ENTERPRISES AND INDUSTRIES. BETWEEN 1986 AND 1989, FOR
EXAMPLE, THE NUMBER OF STATE AID PROPOSALS NOTIFIED TO
WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THIS PROGRESS EXPANDED, WITH
THE COMMISSION UNDER ARTICLE 93 WAS SUCH (1,121) THAT
THE RECOGNITION OF COMPETENT THIRD COUNTRY
ON AVERAGE MORE THAN ONE STATE AID WAS NOTIFIED FOR
ORGANIZATIONS TO TEST AND CERTIFY CONFORMITY TO EC
EVERY SINGLE WEEKDAY OF THE FOUR YEARS. MOREOVER, THE
HEALTH AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS, AND WE URGE THE EC TO
COMMISSION'S OWN REPORT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT "SOME MEMBER
IMPLEMENT PROCEDURES THAT WILL ENSURE ACCESS FOR NON-EC
STATES HAVE GRANTED A RELATIVELY LARGE NUMBER OF AIDS
EXPORTERS TO A STANDARDS, TESTING AND CERTIFICATION
WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION".
SYSTEMS EQUAL TO THAT ACCORDED EC PRODUCERS.
IT CERTAINLY WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE COMMUNITY
AND, OF COURSE, ALL SUCH HEALTH AND SAFETY
WOULD DESCRIBE FOR US DURING THIS REVIEW WHAT STEPS IT
REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE BASED ON SOUND SCIENCE RATHER
PLANS TO TAKE TO CORRECT THIS PATTERN OF PRODUCTION-
THAN FORMULATED AS A MEANS OF BLUNTING COMPETITION OR
AND TRADE-DISTORTION.
STIFLING INNOVATION.
IN FAIRNESS, I DO WANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE
RESIDUAL QUOTAS AND BILATERAL RESTRAINT AGREEMENTS
COMMISSION HAS TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN RECENT YEARS TO
REIN IN CERTAIN STATE AIDS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY
WHILE THE EC HAS MADE PROGRESS TOWARD ELIMINATING
DISTORT INTERNAL COMPETITION. SECTORS COVERED HAVE
QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN MAINTAINED BY
INCLUDED STEEL, COAL, SHIPBUILDING AND AUTOMOBILES.
INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATES, THE UNITED STATES WOULD
REMIND THE EC THAT THESE RESTRICTIONS ARE IN
WE HOPE THAT THE FINAL 18 MONTHS OF THE SINGLE
CONTRAVENTION OF GATT ARTICLE XI AND SHOULD BE
MARKET PROGRAM WILL BE A TIME OF AGGRESSIVE COMPETITION
ELIMINATED.
MEASURES BY THE COMMISSION.
THE UNITED STATES IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT
THE COMMUNITY NOT TRANSFORM THE REMAINING MEMBER STATE
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT PRACTICES
RESTRICTIONS INTO COMMUNITY-WIDE RESTRICTIONS AFTER
1992, FOR EXAMPLE, BY EXTENDING THE DURATION OF QUOTAS
GOVERNMENT-OWNED UTILITIES IN THE EC MEMBER STATES
AND RESTRAINT ARRANGEMENTS IN PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE
HAVE CONSISTENTLY FOLLOWED BUY-NATIONAL POLICIES IN
SECTORS SUCH AS AUTOMOBILES. ANY SUCH BROADENING WOULD
SEVERAL SECTORS, SUCH AS HEAVY ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT,
UNDERMINE SERIOUSLY THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF EC-92.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SWITCHING EQUIPMENT AND SATELLITES,
AND IN SOME SERVICES SECTORS.
:
THE MOST EGREGIOUS EXAMPLE OF THIS OCCURRING IS THE
"BROADCAST DIRECTIVE. WHEREAS ONLY A FEW MEMBER
WE REALIZE THAT RESISTANCE TO LIBERALIZATION IS
STATES HAD QUOTAS PRIOR TO 1989, AND SOME OF THOSE WERE
FORMIDABLE- MEMBER STATES HAVE ONLY RECENTLY AGREED
RARELY ENFORCED, NOW ALL EC MEMBER STATES HAVE
TO OPEN PROCUREMENT TO PRODUCERS IN OTHER MEMBER
STATES. NEVERTHELESS, THE COMMUNITY CAN HARDLY LAY
CLAIM TO LEADERSHIP OF THE TRADING SYSTEM IF IT
COMMITTED TO APPLY QUOTAS TO NON-EUROPEAN TELEVISION
WITHHOLDS MORE THAN 15 PERCENT OF ITS GDP FROM
ENTERTAINMENT PROGRAMS.
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PREFERENTIAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS
OUTSIDE OF EC CREATION AND ENLARGEMENT, THE
COMMUNITY HAS DEVELOPED A VAST ARRAY OF PREFERENTIAL
TRADING ARRANGEMENTS.
THE EXCLUSION FROM COVERAGE OF THESE AGREEMENTS OF
SIGNIFICANT SECTORS, PARTICULARLY AGRICULTURE, CLEARLY
CONTRADICTS THE BASIC ARTICLE XXIV REQUIREMENT THAT
SUCH ARRANGEMENTS COVER "SUBSTANTIALLY ALL TRADE."
THIS CONCERN ARISES ONCE AGAIN WITH THE FREE TRADE
ARRANGEMENTS THE EC IS CURRENTLY NEGOTIATING WITH
EASTERN EUROPE, WHICH REPORTEDLY SEEK TO EXCLUDE
AGRICULTURE, TEXTILES AND STEEL. SUCH EXCLUSIONS WOULD
WORK TO DEFEAT THE STATED PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENTS,
PARTICULARLY IF THE EXCLUDED SECTORS CONTAINED A
SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF CURRENT EXPORTS INTO THE EC.
TRANSPARENCY
THE COMMUNITY'S TPRM SUBMISSION INCLUDED A CANDID
DISCUSSION OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS WITHIN THE
COMMUNITY, AND PARTICULARLY THE TENSION BETWEEN MEMBER
STATES' PAROCHIAL INTERESTS AND THE COMMUNITY'S GLOBAL
OBJECTIVES. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE COMMUNITY COULD
BOLSTER THE LATTER INTERESTS BY INCREASING THE FORMAL
TRANSPARENCY OF ITS DECISION-MAKING.
A CONCERTED EC EFFORT TO OPEN UP ITS DECISION-MAK
ING PROCESS, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO AREAS LIKE
DRAFTING REGULATIONS AND CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS,
WOULD GO A LONG WAY TOWARD AVERTING MISUNDERSTANDINGS
AND SUSPICION ON THE PART OF ITS TRADING PARTNERS AND
THEIR FIRMS.
A LEADER OF THE TRADING SYSTEM SHOULD HAVE THE
CONFIDENCE TO LET THE REST OF THE WORLD SEE AND COMMENT
FORMALLY ON ITS EVOLVING LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS.
CONCLUSION
IN CONCLUSION, MR. CHAIRMAN, I WANT TO MAKE CLEAR
THAT DESPITE THE SERIOUS CONCERNS THAT MY GOVERNMENT
HAS WITH VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE EC'S TRADE REGIME, WE
CONGRATULATE THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY FOR ITS VISION AND
DETERMINATION IN BUILDING THE SINGLE MARKET. DESPITE
STRONG PRESSURES FOR PROTECTIONISM BOTH WITHIN THE
COMMUNITY AND AMONG SOME OF ITS EXTERNAL TRADING
PARTNERS, THE EC HAS CARRIED OUT THE SINGLE MARKET
PROGRAM LARGELY AS A TRADE EXPANDING EXERCISE.
OUR HOPE IS THAT THE COMMUNITY WILL EXHIBIT A SIMILAR
DEGREE OF VISION AND DETERMINATION -- AND LEADERSHIP
TO BRING THE
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