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[United Nations Progress Report, 9/91]
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GENERAL
A/46/1
6 September 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH/
SPANISH
Forty-sixth session
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION*
September 1991
This is an advance version of the report of the Secretary-General on
the work of the Organization, which will be issued in printed form as Official
Records of the General Assembly, Forty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1
(A/46/1).
91-28835 2577f (E)
I
This has been another year in a series marking a great turning point in
history. Indeed, as this report is being written, events are changing the
political map of a good part of the northern Eurasian landmass. The wave of
democracy is surging in diverse other places as well. Intense yearnings for
self-determination are in increasing display. It will be some time before a
settled shape comes into view.
The causes of the transformation of the global scene, under way since
1985, are beyond the compass of this report. One of its direct effects,
however, has been the end of the long season of stagnation for the United
Nations. We can derive satisfaction from the fact that at no point in this
time of tumult has the United Nations failed to keep pace with historic
change. But the concern that the principles of its Charter should govern the
emerging international order continues and is accentuated by all current
developments.
The renaissance of the Organization has reflected a qualitative change in
attitudes and perceptions. It is the outcome of the active cooperation of
Member States and of long preparation and intense effort by the Secretariat
despite discouragements. It originated several years ago when opportunities
for peace-making began to be discerned in a changing international climate.
The contrast between the position I am stating now and what I recorded in my
first annual report is all too clear.
II
In 1982, I spoke of the erosion of the authority and status of the United
Nations and the inaction of the Security Council in the face of conflicts.
Fearing international anarchy, I suggested a number of ways in which the
Council and the Secretary-General might become more effective in keeping the
peace. At first, the results were discouraging. However, a slow but
meticulous process of institutional self-analysis was set in train. A
re-examination of the Security Council's role and procedures was accompanied
by agreement in the General Assembly on the manner in which the Organization's
budget should be adopted by consensus. A major, even if by its nature
incomplete, effort was commenced to streamline the Secretariat SO as to adapt
it to the requirements of the period ahead. These, and other intermediate
moves, spread over five years, indicated a concern that went beyond purely
organizational issues. They reflected an urge to end a period of drift. A
renewed focus on the Organization's working corresponded to a sense of the
deeper stirrings for change in the world. With the end of the cold war, the
measures I had suggested in 1982 have mostly become, as I had hoped,
commonplace and routine.
In January 1987, I urged the Security Council to find ways of working
collectively to resolve some of the issues that had stayed on its agenda for
years. What followed is now a matter of general public awareness. A
remarkable coordination developed between the work of the Security Council and
the Secretary-General. The adoption of a plan for the termination of the war
between Iran and Iraq, the conclusion of the Geneva Accords followed by the
withdrawal of the forces of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and the bringing
to independence of Namibia were among the major fruits of this rejuvenation of
the United Nations. Steady progress was also maintained with regard to the
situations in Western Sahara, Cambodia, Central America and elsewhere.
None of these accomplishments was a matter merely of diplomatic
ingenuity; all required, or will require, complex operations in the field,
duly authorized by the competent organs, which go far beyond the earlier,
innovative and highly useful concept of peace-keeping by the United Nations.
As against 13 operations launched all through 43 years, 5 were mounted in 1988
and 1989, and 4 during the period under review. The mandates of these
operations are set out in the relevant resolutions; their results are dealt
with in my reports. Here I will only mention that never before in the history
of the Organization were so many new insights gained about the varied tasks of
keeping, making or building the peace in areas riven or threatened by
conflict. Never before were such precedents set as has been done, in
different ways, in Namibia, Haiti, Angola, Nicaragua and now, most notably, in
Central America, particularly El Salvador. Indeed, today, the Organization is
conducting some missions that were unthinkable in the previous era.
All these operations, in one way or another, relate to the implementation
of plans negotiated in detail with the parties concerned with the active
participation of the Secretary-General. They have a wide range. To take two
that have already concluded, the one in Namibia leading the country to
independence and the other, the election observer mission, with a
complementary military undertaking, in Nicaragua helped end situations of
dangerous strife. Two other operations that have achieved their purpose are
the observer mission along the Iran-Iraq border and the monitoring of the
departure of foreign troops from Angola. The election observer mission in
Haiti, with its security component, set an example of the undertaking by the
United Nations, with appropriate legislative backing, of the impartial
supervision of national elections in a situation with possible international
repercussions. The mission in Western Sahara relates to a referendum about
the future status of the territory. The expected one in Cambodia will provide
the supportive structure for the project of national reconciliation after
years of fighting. The second mission in Angola launched this year supervises
the cease-fire between the formerly warring parties. The mission in
El Salvador has, for the present, the innovative task of monitoring human
rights on a long-term, nationwide basis. United Nations personnel drawn from
the programmes and the agencies, together with civilian guards, have been
deployed to further humanitarian assistance to all of the people of Iraq,
including notably the Kurds. To a large extent, the purpose of my mission in
Afghanistan and Pakistan has changed since the Geneva Accords, as has the role
of my mission in Iran and Iraq since the completion of the withdrawal of
forces to the internationally recognized boundaries. Nevertheless, these
missions represent a significant evolution in the role of the United Nations
in areas relating to international security.
Alongside these new operations, older peace-keeping missions are being
maintained. In Cyprus, a United Nations force separates the parties while
progress is made in negotiations toward an overall settlement. In Central
America, an observer mission maintains supervision of adherence to
undertakings made by five Central American countries under the Esquipulas II
Agreement. In the Middle East, the United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization in Palestine, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force continue to contribute an
important element of stability in the region, while the United Nations
Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan is stationed in Kashmir to
supervise the cease-fire.
In addition to manning all these ramparts of peace, the Secretariat is
now engaged in tasks of a complexity and scope untried before to secure the
implementation of the decisions of the Security Council relating to the
Iraq-Kuwait situation. Only one of them, the military observation mission,
conforms to the traditional pattern of peace-keeping. Others that follow from
the Council's decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter include the
demarcation of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait through the mechanism of a
commission, the elimination of Iraq's mass destruction capability through an
effort involving a special commission and the International Atomic Energy
Agency, the management of a compensation fund, arranging the return of all
Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq and the discharge of onerous tasks deriving
from Security Council resolution 706 (1991). These are breaking new ground in
international experience and the responsibilities of the Secretariat.
Activity, not argument, has thus answered two questions about the
Organization that troubled the public mind through most of its existence:
one, whether it could ever muster the power to repair breaches of the peace
and reverse acts of aggression; two, whether the Secretariat would be able to
execute the increasingly versatile projects of peace. The answers are
affirmative. The effectiveness of the United Nations can no longer be in
doubt. It is a fact of no small significance that world leaders assembled at
three recent summit conferences in London, Abuja and Guadalajara issued
declarations recognizing the central place of the United Nations in the
international system and solemnly affirmed their reliance on it. At totally
different planes of international life as well, the United Nations is being
increasingly looked upon as a trusted intermediary.
Against this background of a near-universal harmony of view, some
discordant notes, however, are still audible. One is the persistence of the
trend, even if now in lesser degree, not to avail of the machinery of the
United Nations to resolve certain important issues, including some relating to
areas of incipient or potential conflict. The other is the pronounced
contrast between the tasks imposed on the Organization and the resources
provided to it. The dynamism and liberality of vision hardly accords with the
indigence to which the Organization has been financially reduced.
III
Looking beyond the Organization itself to the world situation, we witness
a unique juxtaposition of promise and perils. The promise is expansive and
the perils only partly perceived. The extinction of the bipolarity associated
with the cold war has no doubt removed the factor that virtually immobilized
international relations over four decades. It has cured the Security
Council's paralysis and helped immensely in resolving some regional
conflicts. By itself, however, it does not guarantee a just and lasting peace
for the world's peoples. We still see a dappled international landscape, with
large spots of threatened trouble and incipient conflict.
It is unnecessary to mention in detail the specific situations that are
reviewed in my reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly and on
which I shall have occasion to offer my suggestions and comments in the coming
weeks. As the earlier account of United Nations field operations shows, peace
is being guarded or built in a number of situations. Not all the situations
of danger to the peace, however, figure currently on the active agenda of the
United Nations. The reasons vary from the use of an alternative peace process
to the inability or unwillingness of one or more of the parties concerned to
refer the matter to the United Nations. This does not in any way detract from
the seriousness of these situations nor diminish the acute suffering of the
people most directly affected.
A new factor in the international situation has been introduced by the
manifold difficulties of transition in a good part of the northern Eurasian
landmass. The way in which this transition is handled by leadership both
inside and outside that vast region is certain to have far-reaching
implications for the emerging international order as a whole. Indeed,
statesmanship of the highest order is required for civil strife to be avoided,
for crises to be resolved by peaceful means, for minorities to be securely
protected, for human rights to be upheld and for dangerous repercussions on
international relations to be averted.
A volatile world situation is certain to contain multiple sources of
conflict. It would be unrealistic to suppose that all of them can be
dissolved by multilateral action. However, the United Nations, if supported
by the generality of its membership, can help purge international relations of
the lethal elements that lead to violent hostility between States or cause a
pervasive sense of insecurity. There is no magical formula for it: the only
available course is that of organizing international life on a stable basis in
accordance with principles clearly understood, generally accepted and
consistently applied. The principles are those articulated in the Charter of
the United Nations.
The performance and capacity of the United Nations provide a crucial
element in this process and the greatest effort must be made to improve them.
The areas on which I propose to focus are the maintenance of international
peace and security with justice, the protection of human rights and the
treatment of global problems, including the level of armaments, the
persistence of widespread poverty, the deterioration of the environment and
the proliferation of social evils like drug trafficking and crime. All these
impinge on the development of international legal norms and practices. The
areas overlap to some extent and I shall deal with them only to the extent
that new perspectives have been opened by recent developments.
IV
During the period under review, the Security Council took action of
extraordinary consequence to reverse the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and to
deter aggression in future. The considerations that arise from some of the
aspects of this action are plainly central to the maintenance of international
peace and security. I believe they will need to be carefully borne in mind in
future.
[1raqi]
Once the invasion occurred, the response of the Security Council was not
only swift but systematic; in adopting 14 resolutions regarding the situation,
the Council followed a step-by-step and considered approach to the use of its
powers under Chapter VII of the Charter. Far from acting in haste, the
Council afforded ample time - from 2 August 1990 to 15 January 1991 - for the
Government of Iraq to comply with the Council's demand. It was only when all
warnings - including my own pleadings to Iraq to correct a manifest wrong
went unheeded and all friendly advice was rejected that armed force was
finally employed to restore the independence of Kuwait. This is the factual
side of that fateful occurrence, which no balanced assessment, now or in the
future, can ignore.
Another important aspect is that the enforcement action was not carried
out exactly in the form foreseen by Articles 42 et sequentia of Chapter VII.
Instead, the Council authorized the use of force on a national and coalition
basis. In the circumstances and given the costs imposed and capabilities
demanded by modern warfare, the arrangement seemed unavoidable. However, the
experience of operations in the Gulf suggests the need for a collective
reflection on questions relating to the future use of the powers vested in the
Security Council under Chapter VII.
In order to preclude controversy, these questions should include the
mechanisms required for the Council to satisfy itself that the rule of
proportionality in the employment of armed force is observed and the rules of
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts are complied with. Moreover,
careful thought will have to be given to ensuring that the application of
Chapter VII measures is not perceived to be overextended. In today's
conditions of economic interdependence, the effect of the imposition of
comprehensive economic sanctions on third States that are economic partners of
the offender State requires that Article 50 of the Charter be supplemented by
appropriate agreements creating obligations to assist concretely the
disadvantaged third State or States. The human effect of sanctions on the
population of an offending State, if it lacks the political means to bring
about a reversal of the policy that gives rise to the offence, will also need
to be carefully borne in mind. As I stated at meetings of the Security
Council, enforcement is a collective engagement, which requires a discipline
all its own.
V
The hostilities in the Gulf have made it agonizingly clear that the
devastation of two States, with untold loss of innocent lives, appalling
dangers to public health, damage to the environment and immense suffering of
millions, represented a startling failure of collective diplomacy. In the
aftermath of these hostilities, therefore, a renewed emphasis is rightly being
placed on the need for preventive diplomacy.
In my previous annual reports, I have, time and again, dwelt on what
preventive diplomacy by the United Nations requires. The main problem today
is the same as before: the lack of means at the disposal of the United
Nations to maintain an impartial and effective global watch over situations of
potential or incipient conflict. Preventive diplomacy presupposes early
warning capacity, which, in turn, implies a reliable and independently
acquired database. At present, the pool of information available to the
Secretary-General is wholly inadequate. Lacking access to the technological
means, such as space-based and other technical surveillance systems and
without field representation commensurate with need, it is hard to visualize
how the Secretariat can monitor potential conflict situations from a clearly
impartial standpoint. A modest beginning has been made in this regard during
the last four years with the establishment of political offices of the
Secretary-General in Kabul and Islamabad, and more recently in Tehran and
Baghdad. Work of that nature seems to be indispensable if we wish to develop
the preventive capacity available to the Secretary-General. The traditional
lack of such ability hinders the use of Article 99 of the Charter, especially
in its anticipatory aspect. The Charter does not contemplate that the United
Nations should wait for fighting to erupt, for aggression to take place, for
violations of human rights to attain massive proportions before it moves to
rectify the situation. Too often, the Organization's mediatory or
investigative capacity, in situations threatening large-scale conflict, has
been kept in reserve while wars have occurred and disputes have festered.
There is a complementarity between the Secretary-General being fully equipped
with the means presupposed in Article 99 of the Charter and the Security
Council (in conformity with the spirit of Article 34) maintaining a peace
agenda not confined to items formally inserted at the request of the State or
the States concerned. I believe this complementarity can translate preventive
diplomacy from a phrase into a working reality.
Conflict control or conflict resolution come under, but are not exactly
synonymous with, the pacific settlement of disputes to which the Charter
devotes a whole Chapter. The basic assumption of Chapter VI a point that I
repeat for emphasis is that neither the Security Council itself nor the
Member States of the United Nations will remain passive until a situation of
international friction gives rise to a dispute and until the dispute, in turn,
leads to belligerency. For the machinery of settlement to work, however, the
prime requisite is a radical change in the view that parties to major
international disputes take of the role and capabilities of the United Nations
in the matter of settling those disputes. Over long years, there has grown a
view of the United Nations itself, not only its judicial organ, as a place of
litigation that is likely to result in a negative verdict for one or the other
party. I believe that we need now actively to foster the perception that,
except in cases of action with respect to breaches of the peace or acts of
aggression (matters dealt with in Chapter VII), the United Nations is more an
instrument of mediation that can help reconcile legitimate claims and
interests and achieve just and honourable settlements.
I must stress here that, for itself, the United Nations is not designed
to monopolize the peace process. The role of regional arrangements or
agencies in pacific settlement of disputes is explicitly recognized in
Articles 33 (1) and 52 (2) of the Charter. As long as a credible peace
process is in motion as envisaged in these two Articles, there can be no cause
for complaint that the United Nations is being bypassed. However, when such a
process is not initiated or appears to be interminably suspended or to have
clearly failed, then there would be little reason why recourse to the United
Nations should still be avoided. Recognizing the central part of the United
Nations in the international system should be more than theoretical.
In this context, it is important also to recall that Article 52 (1) of
the Charter requires activities of regional arrangements or agencies to be
consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. That
provision has become more pertinent in today's interdependent world, in which
major developments in one region have inevitable repercussions in another.
The efforts of a resurgent regionalism should, therefore, complement rather
than compete with or complicate those of the United Nations. This requires a
working relationship based on mutual rapport between the United Nations and
the regional agencies. Otherwise, the incoherence and fragmentation of the
peace effort can impair the machinery of peace.
Another deficiency in the working of the system of collective security is
the insufficient use of the principal judicial organ of the United Nations,
the International Court of Justice. Many international disputes are
justiciable; even those which seem entirely political (as the Iraq-Kuwait
dispute prior to invasion) have a clearly legal component. If, for any
reason, the parties fail to refer the matter to the Court, the process of
achieving a fair and objectively commendable settlement and thus defusing an
international crisis situation would be facilitated by obtaining the Court's
advisory opinion. Article 96 of the Charter authorizes the General Assembly
and the Security Council to request such an opinion from the Court. I,
therefore, repeat the suggestion I have made before that the extension by the
General Assembly of the authority to the Secretary-General would be wholly in
accord with the complementary relationship between the three concerned organs
of the United Nations, which has grown fruitfully over the years. Such a
development would also strengthen the role of the Secretary-General, which is
a frequently stated objective of the membership as indicated by statements
made at the highest level. This would be an important way of developing
international law and legal norms as the basis of the activity of the United
Nations and of international relations.
VI
Over the years, a certain dichotomy has marked the theme of human
rights. This has become more pronounced in recent years. On the one side,
there has been legitimate satisfaction at providing the world community with
the International Bill of Human Rights, consisting of the Universal
Declaration and the two International Covenants, followed by a corpus of other
instruments. On the other, there has been dismay at the barbaric realities of
the world in which we live, arising from the indiscriminate use of power to
brutalize populations into submission. Public opinion now demands
emphatically that the gulf between aspiration and fact be narrowed if the
former is not to become totally ineffectual.
It would be unfair to belittle the positive accomplishments made SO far.
Much has been done to lay the foundations of a universal culture of human
rights. Procedures have been developed whereby alleged violations are
examined and discussed by the Commission on Human Rights and the various
bodies established pursuant to the various conventions to monitor their
implementation. Moreover, the consciousness of human rights that now pervades
the globe has in no small degree been raised by the considerable thought and
work that have been devoted to the cause by the United Nations and, under its
influence or inspiration, by concerned individuals, non-governmental
organizations and the media.
Indeed, the effort to end apartheid in South Africa, sustained over
decades, provides lasting testimony of the profound and active concern of the
United Nations with eradicating racial segregation and persecution. It will
signify attainment of one of the Organization's major goals when the notable
progress made so far is consolidated and a post-apartheid regime based on
democratic principles and racial harmony is firmly put in place in that
country.
Nevertheless, the fact must be squarely faced that the campaign for the
protection of human rights has brought results mostly in conditions of
relative normalcy and with responsive Governments. In other conditions, when
human wrongs are committed in systematic fashion and on a massive scale -
instances are widely dispersed over both time and place the
intergovernmental machinery of the United Nations has often been a helpless
witness rather than an effective agent for checking their perpetration.
It would betray a callous or an overly bureaucratic attitude to expect
the victims of these horrors to utilize the normal time-consuming procedures
and mechanisms that are available for seeking redress. The encouragement of
respect for human rights becomes a vacuous claim if human wrongs committed on
a major scale are met with lack of timely and commensurate action by the
United Nations. To promote human rights means little if it does not mean to
defend them when they are most under attack.
I believe that the protection of human rights has now become one of the
keystones in the arch of peace. I am also convinced that it now involves more
a concerted exertion of international influence and pressure through timely
appeal, admonition, remonstrance or condemnation and, in the last resort, an
appropriate United Nations presence, than what was regarded as permissible
under traditional international law.
It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference with
the essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a
protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or
systematically violated with impunity. The fact that, in diverse situations,
the United Nations has not been able to prevent atrocities cannot be cited as
an argument, legal or moral, against the necessary corrective action,
especially where peace is also threatened. Omissions or failures due to a
variety of contingent circumstances do not constitute a precedent. The case
for not impinging on the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of States is by itself indubitably strong. But it would only be
weakened if it were to carry the implication that sovereignty, even in this
day and age, includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching systematic
campaigns of decimation or forced exodus of civilian populations in the name
of controlling civil strife or insurrection. With the heightened
international interest in universalizing a regime of human rights, there is a
marked and most welcome shift in public attitudes. To try to resist it would
be politically as unwise as it is morally indefensible. It should be
perceived as not SO much a new departure as a more focused awareness of one of
the requirements of peace.
I would emphasize that novel doctrines are not only not required on this
issue; they can also upset established understandings. It is possible that in
the ongoing debate among legal experts and political theoreticians, new
concepts may emerge and gain broad acceptance. However, at the
intergovernmental level, what the present stage in international affairs
demands, in the context of human rights as much as in any other, is not a
process of theorizing but a higher degree of cooperation and a combination of
common sense and compassion. We need not impale ourselves on the horns of a
dilemma between respect for sovereignty and the protection of human rights.
The last thing the United Nations needs is a new ideological controversy.
What is involved is not the right of intervention but the collective
obligation of States to bring relief and redress in human rights emergencies.
It seems to be beyond question that violations of human rights imperil
peace, while disregard of the sovereignty of States would spell chaos. The
maximum caution needs to be exercised lest the defence of human rights becomes
a platform for encroaching on the essential domestic jurisdiction of States
and eroding their sovereignty. Nothing would be a surer prescription for
anarchy than an abuse of this principle.
Some caveats are, therefore, most necessary at this point. First, like
all other basic principles, the principle of protection of human rights cannot
be invoked in a particular situation and disregarded in a similar one. To
apply it selectively is to debase it. Governments can, and do, expose
themselves to charges of deliberate bias; the United Nations cannot. Second,
any international action for protecting human rights must be based on a
decision taken in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. It must
not be a unilateral act. Third, and relatedly, the consideration of
proportionality is of the utmost importance in this respect. Should the scale
or manner of international action be out of proportion to the wrong that is
reported to have been committed, it is bound to evoke a vehement reaction,
which, in the long run, would jeopardize the very rights that were sought to
be defended.
VII
Another principal source of chronic instability is the militarization of
human society represented by the level of armaments and military outlays in
the world today. The unconscionable waste of resources and energies is only
one of its results. Equally deleterious is the obsession with military
security, which has corroded international relations and hampered the advance
of most developing countries towards stable democratic institutions. The
obsession has been as ruinous in political, cultural and psychological terms
as it has been financially costly.
Over the years, however, the cold war overshadowed the whole field of
arms limitation and disarmament. The perspectives that have now been opened
should enable us to weave collective approaches in this field more tightly
into the fabric of peace-making and conflict control. The opportunities now
presented to us are not likely to remain open indefinitely.
At the global level, the priorities include a search for new, stabilizing
reductions in nuclear weapons, maintaining the regained momentum of support
for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, arresting the
uncontrolled proliferation of advanced weapons of mass destruction and the
relevant technology, a swift conclusion of a convention for the comprehensive
prohibition of chemical weapons and strengthening the basic obligations of the
Biological Weapons Convention. The challenge that is to be overcome to
achieve non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is that of devising
regimes of verification which will build confidence, safeguard peaceful
applications and above all reliably detect non-compliance, wherever and
whenever it occurs.
Assuring orderly flows of badly needed technology to developing
countries, without leading to weapons proliferation, is an issue of great
importance. What is needed is a formula for cooperation involving greater
willingness by the industrial countries to meet the needs of developing
countries for science and technology for peaceful purposes, coupled with
genuine openness among recipients about their end-use.
For several years, I have expressed grave concern over the problem of
excessive and destabilizing transfers of conventional armaments. Recent
expressions of support for the idea of promoting transparency in the arms
trade through a United Nations-based scheme for registration and disclosure
are encouraging. If applied fairly to, and worked out in concert by, arms
suppliers and recipients alike, a register would foster a climate that is
conducive to voluntary restraint and more responsible behaviour. Over the
longer term, we must seek to develop fair criteria for multilateral control of
arms transfers while at the same time meeting the legitimate security needs of
States.
Dismantling the military edifice of the cold war should mean designing a
credible architecture for regional security. In this connection, one cannot
disregard the existing imbalances and asymmetries within regions that cause
recurrent tensions and insecurity. This again shows how difficult it is to
detach arms limitation negotiations from the peaceful settlement of
international disputes. For its part, the Secretariat has given high priority
to organizing regional and interregional meetings as a way to explore
solutions tailored to the distinctive needs of regions and subregions. But
only when this dialogue engages the policy makers of States will our aim be
realized. The mist of unreality that has hung over discussions of limiting
and reducing the level of arms needs to be blown away. That, I believe, is a
most impelling call of the present moment in history.
VIII
Rising affluence and increasing poverty are a pronounced and paradoxical
feature of the present world scene. The world situation offers overwhelming
evidence that poverty undermines the cohesion of societies and States,
destroys the base of human rights and damages the health of the environment.
This major cause of instability needs to be addressed with the same sense of
urgency as is evoked by political crises. No system of collective security
will remain viable unless workable solutions are sought to the problem of
poverty and destitution, afflicting the greater part of the world.
A reinvigoration of the North-South dialogue has now become more urgent
than ever. Fortunately, conditions exist now for advancing it constructively
without a needless overlay of rhetoric or ideological controversy.
The profound changes in the world economy in recent years have brought
prosperity to many parts of the world. However, the position of most of the
developing countries within the world economy has been deteriorating for some
time. World trade has increased fairly rapidly but not SO the exports and
imports of developing countries. Foreign direct investment flows have
quadrupled in the 1980s but the share of developing countries has fallen
sharply. As a result of the debt crisis, the indebted countries as a whole
are suffering a net outflow of resources. The external debt of
capital-importing countries, which was less than $600 billion in 1988, has
reached $1.2 trillion. Income per capita has declined in many parts of the
world during the last decade. All this has fed the forces leading to violent
strife; it has exacerbated health and ecological problems; it has alarmingly
increased the ranks of the poor and the displaced. Over one billion people
now live in absolute poverty. Nearly 37 million have been uprooted by
conflicts. These are the huge areas of blight in the present international
landscape and nowhere is the situation more serious than in Africa, on which I
have recently reported at some length. It is clear to me that what is needed
is a renewal of the commitments arrived at in the compact between African
countries and the international community five years ago. There is no greater
human and economic imperative than to initiate and implement plans for
creating conditions that would allow sustainable development in the entire
developing world, especially in Africa.
The reactivation of economic growth and development in poor countries
requires a dynamic trading system that allows exports from these countries
unrestricted access to markets in the industrial countries, an urgent and bold
solution to the problem of indebtedness, an adequate volume of lending from
official and multilateral creditors, increased foreign investment flows and
enhanced official development assistance as an essential source of
concessional finance to the developing countries, particularly the poorest and
the least developed. Moreover, a significant increase in the financial
resources of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the regional
development banks is crucial if these institutions are to effectively support
structural adjustment, continue to provide concessional assistance to
low-income countries and resources for debt and debt-reduction schemes, and
facilitate the economic transformation of countries that are making great
efforts to restructure their economies.
It has become apparent that, in order to safeguard the environment, to
finance the transition to market economies, to deal with the reconstruction
needs of countries in the Gulf region and above all to sustain development
efforts in the developing world, substantially increased levels of resources
would need to be mobilized. The acceleration in growth could be the most
important source for generating resources for investments. A positive factor
is the end of the cold war, which offers realistic prospects of releasing the
substantial resources for social and economic development that were consumed
by military expenditures. With the realization that national security gains
strength from economic development, there is a palpable need for the
developing countries themselves to reduce the close to $200 billion they spend
on arms and, with the necessary financial assistance, to convert military
structures and integrate them into the civilian economy. The unique
opportunity that is now being presented to the world should be the subject of
reasoned discussion and negotiation in the best interests of the global
community.
It was with these ideas and problems in mind that I have proposed
consideration of the convening of an international conference on the financing
of development in order to formulate a coherent response to the challenge.
Benefiting from the preparatory work and the agreements reached at both the
eighth session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the conference
could devise agreed ways to ensure that developing countries and others that
are striving to integrate their economies into the emerging global economy
have the resources to support their efforts.
My experience has convinced me that the United Nations system has a key
role to play in addressing the host of transborder issues that have come to
the fore in recent years. In revitalizing that role, we have to look beyond
the procedural or organizational aspects of reform and restructuring. For the
fundamental and far-reaching changes in existing institutional arrangements
and practices that may be required, the search for a broad consensus needs to
be undertaken now.
IX
The way we treat the new generation of global problems that now confront
humanity may very well determine the quality of life for all the peoples
living on the planet. Next year the United Nations will face a very important
test of its capacity to meet global challenges in the Conference on
Environment and Development - the first world summit conference formally
mandated by the General Assembly.
The Conference will be a test of the willingness of Governments to adopt
long-term policies on matters of vast significance to human well-being even
survival. It will also test the capacity of nations to cooperate in the
United Nations in developing effective global strategies and in the evolution
of respected even enforceable - international law. For these strategies to
work in a future that will depend more and more on public awareness and
participation, the cooperation of Governments with non-governmental
organizations and the private sector will also be essential. The process will
further develop the capacity of the United Nations system and its ability to
work as a team in response to the challenges of a rapidly changing world.
That the environment is humanity's common inheritance is now merely a
platitude. But it entails a common responsibility to mount a global attack on
what depletes and degrades that inheritance. Traditional patterns of
industrialization and the consumption of industrial products are not the only
cause. Other major ones are poverty, overpopulation and the lack of the
technological or material capability for developing countries to move to
environmentally sound and sustainable practices. The difficult and complex
issues that have to be addressed range over a whole spectrum; effective
solutions likewise will require new approaches in urban and industrial
planning, technology transfer, energy consumption, to name only a few. The
success of the 1992 Conference will depend primarily on the broad consensus
that is reached on all major relevant issues during the preparatory stage.
Mobilizing new and adequate financial resources to support sustainable
development and agreement on terms for the transfer of technology will need
focused attention. The Conference should decide on built-in mechanisms for
follow-up action and periodical stocktaking. The stakes are high for the
entire human race.
X
The health of the global society does not depend only on political
relations and economic growth. We are witnessing grave afflictions at present
that cross State or cultural frontiers and, in one way or another, defy the
remedies that Governments can administer in isolation from one another. The
resentments and dislocations of groups within societies, the decay of
traditional structures of loyalty, discipline and emotional support - the
family being the outstanding example - and the disorientation of vast numbers
of individuals are among the negative consequences of rapid societal change.
They manifest themselves in the plague of drug abuse and trafficking, in the
thriving black market in weapons, in the taking of hostages, in the use of
terror against civilian populations - indeed, in the modernization of crime.
If the security of nations is to be viewed not in terms of external threats
alone, if progress is to be measured not only by economic indicators and if
change is to be managed from the perspective of human welfare, the social
agenda of the United Nations is equal in rank with the political, economic or
environmental.
In the complex battle against international drug abuse, some recent
initiatives have given better definition to the Organization's functions and
also aroused higher public expectations. The new United Nations International
Drug Control Programme has been established in order to formulate a coherent
and integrated strategy. The division of labour with regional and
international institutions and partnership with Governments in drug control
efforts should strengthen multilateralism when national initiatives abound but
results are sadly wanting.
The upsurge and transnationalization of crime endangers the internal
security of States, erodes the individual's basic freedom from fear and can
also disrupt international relations. This calls for effective
intergovernmental mechanisms and much stronger judicial and police cooperation
among States.
Beyond addressing these two menacing problems, the global social strategy
would be sadly deficient if it did not include constructive action to revive
basic social institutions and to end social discrimination against the weaker
members of society. The intended observance of the International Year of the
Family in 1994, the development of standard rules for the equalization of
opportunities for the disabled, the collaboration with non-governmental
organizations in establishing principles for the treatment of older persons,
the commitment to attain equality in law and managerial practice between men
and women as a basic human right - all reflect a continuity of concern with
social health and justice. On the question of gender equality, which is a
concern second to none, it is discouraging to observe that progress slackened
during the 1980s, in large measure as a result of distracting economic and
political factors. I believe that the pace can be quickened through the
preparations for the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995.
The restructuring of economic systems does not and will not by itself
answer the demands of social justice and equity. Indeed, there is a serious
danger that in the difficulties of transition, the social advances made in the
past might not be maintained. The fundamental principles of social welfare
and the provision of essential services will remain valid regardless of the
configuration of economic systems. The war against hunger, disease,
illiteracy and unemployment cannot be left for the market to fight. To
examine the whole gamut of issues relating to social development, the Economic
and Social Council has requested me to consult Governments on the possibility
of convening a world summit for social development. I believe the idea is
timely and would help place the human being at the centre of the development
agenda.
XI
It is a mark of growing human solidarity that relief of the intolerable
suffering caused by disasters is now one of the major items on the
international agenda. Tragically, disasters - some natural, others entirely
man-made - have been more frequent in recent years. We witness spectacles of
displacement, devastation and death at several points of the globe. I believe
that some clarifications are necessary to prevent the issue of the
international response to disasters becoming a seed-bed of controversies.
International relief efforts in emergencies caused by famine or flood,
earthquake or drought are mounted at the request of the affected State or
States and generally create no legal or political problems. But international
action with regard to situations where a population is torn by war or
oppression raises sensitive political issues, calls for early warning capacity
of a different character and has to be based on a determination made by a
competent organ of the United Nations. It would be unwise to put the two
kinds of emergencies in the same conceptual basket, even though the actual
operations may on occasion assume a similar physical or logistical shape. For
this reason, it is hard to visualize a unified system of emergency relief that
would be automatically triggered by situations that, between themselves, are
wholly disparate.
There is, of course, no question that the incidence and magnitude of
humanitarian emergencies of all types calls for mechanisms of greater
coordination of the various agencies and the enhancement of their early
warning capacities. But even these mechanisms, no matter how well designed,
will be of little avail without enhanced stand-by arrangements, which, in
turn, cannot be put in place by the United Nations lacking a prior earmarking
by Governments of substantial necessary resources. I intend to make a
detailed report later on this subject and I trust that it will be considered
by Governments at the highest policy-making level.
In this context, a reminder has been rendered necessary by the experience
gained in addressing the humanitarian emergency that occasioned Security
Council resolution 688 (1991). The Secretary-General cannot be expected to
use powers that are not vested in him and deploy resources that are not
available. For large-scale field operations, the Secretariat needs clear
mandates, with assured financing, in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter and under established procedures.
XII
As the foregoing makes clear, the United Nations is now entering
uncharted territories and undertaking tasks of a kind unforeseen in its
original design. This prompts an examination of its executive organ, that is,
the Secretariat.
I shall describe later the strains on the administrative machinery.
Despite all those strains, however, it should be a matter of gratification to
the entire membership - as, for me, it is a cause for enduring satisfaction -
that, at no stage, has the Secretariat failed to respond effectively to
challenge. This is a tribute to the commitment and ability of all those
involved in the planning, deployment, operation and administration of the
great variety of field missions and also to the dedication of the staff at
Headquarters. For myself, I am grateful for the exemplary cooperation and
understanding - enhanced this year - between the Secretariat and the different
bodies representing Governments.
Considering the unique nature of the Secretariat's tasks, it would be
unfair to expect that it would escape criticism; some of that has been
thoughtful and refreshing. However, the judgements sometimes made from one
vantage point have ignored the fact that the Secretariat has to answer the
priorities and preferences, not of one group of States but of all. Being
multilingual and multinational, it is unlike any other administrative set-up
in the world and cannot be run as the foreign ministries of Governments are.
Its heterogeneous composition, as much as the variety of its mandates, demands
cohesive and integrated control at the top. That kind of control can be
eroded if there is excessive interference from outside.
In this context, a standing problem to which I drew attention in my
annual report in 1984 is that there sometimes seems to be a blurred perception
of the exact delimitation of functions between the Secretariat, headed by the
Secretary-General and the other principal organs. Article 101 of the Charter
empowers the General Assembly to establish regulations for the appointment of
the staff. Regulations, however, should mean broad guidelines under
principles set out in the Charter and not detailed or rigid directives that
can only upset operational efficiency and dilute the authority of the
Secretary-General. Judicious use of funds is naturally a matter of concern to
all Member States, particularly the principal contributors. However, beyond
the legislative responsibility of scrutinizing expenditures and ensuring as
wide a geographical basis for recruiting the staff as possible, the management
of the Secretariat needs to be left in the hands of the chief administrative
officer. To secure efficiency, he needs the freedom to define the different
spheres of responsibility, to allocate staff according to need and to reward
merit and performance. Over-legislation itself can cause strains that are
wholly avoidable.
The time seems to have come to examine afresh the conditions in which
increasingly varied and complex mandates are entrusted to the Secretariat.
In the first place, it is hardly comprehensible that Governments impose
far-reaching and costly responsibilities on the Organization, as they judge
they must, but are themselves unwilling to fulfil corresponding financial
obligations. Voluntary contributions, however welcome and generous they may
be, cannot reliably fill the gap. This places the Secretary-General in an
often intolerable situation, as I have stated time and again during my period
in office. Under the Charter, it is a legal duty of Member States to pay
their assessed contributions. By improved mechanisms, payments must be made
on time and in full if the Secretariat is to retain the capability of
responding, on behalf of the membership as a whole, to the pressing tasks
required of it. At the time of writing this report, the level of outstanding
contributions to the regular budget was $809, 445, 015, and only 49 Member
States had fully paid their annual contributions. Peace-keeping assessments
unpaid by Governments amounted to $486,994,618. It can thus be seen that the
financial crisis of the Organization is still not over. I trust that, along
with enlarging the Organization's role by their own decisions, Governments
will revise their approach to funding the vital and far-reaching tasks they
request the Secretariat to perform.
Furthermore, constrained as the Secretariat is by zero-growth budgets, it
would at first sight appear necessary that Governments prioritize the mandates
conferred upon the Organization. Since, however, this is difficult in
practice, some flexibility has to be left within its budgets for redeployment,
in the light of the demands of changing situations, of existing resources on a
discretionary basis. At present, there is virtually no such flexibility.
Difficulties are aggravated by divergent decisions coming from the different
legislative bodies, as happened several times this year.
All this becomes stranger if it is borne in mind that the proportion of
national budgets that Governments devote to the United Nations is minuscule
compared with their military outlays; indeed, by any reckoning, resources
devoted to the Organization constitute an extremely economical investment for
Governments.
There is an urgency to replenish, increase and maintain the Working
Capital Fund and the Special Account, both of which are gravely depleted.
Member States may also wish to consider the establishment of a strategic
reserve fund specifically designed to meet the costs arising from
unanticipated pressures upon scarce resources. Had such a fund been available
in the past year, the Organization might not have become a mendicant as it did
in order to secure, at very short notice, sizeable resources so as to
undertake urgent and unexpected tasks. Alternatively, perhaps the time has
come again to consider permitting the Organization to borrow, since such a
facility could help to provide the necessary flexibility in unanticipated
contingencies.
The staff retrenchment called for by the General Assembly at its
forty-first session was completed in 1990. This year, the pace at which the
Organization has had to deploy new complex field missions, most of which
require innovative work, has so quickened as to stretch the already slender
human resources dedicated to such operations almost to breaking-point. While
a number of missions have been successfully staffed, staffing pressures have
become acute in certain areas and some existing programmes have been
maintained only with extreme difficulty. The strain on the personnel, both at
Headquarters and in the field, should be easily imaginable.
The staff is our most important asset and the Secretariat must be enabled
to maintain the appropriate conditions of service if it is to attract and
retain the kind of talent required to meet extraordinary challenges.
Unfortunately, those conditions have deteriorated steadily. It is ironical
that, on the one hand, complaints are heard about the high salary scales
within the Secretariat and, on the other, some Governments find it necessary
to pay subsidies to their nationals in order to induce them to serve on the
staff. The result of this as well as certain aspects of the practice of
secondments, now fortunately being reviewed, has been to create anomalies that
demoralize the staff. I hope that Governments will realize that the present
situation must be corrected for it hinders the realization of the objectives
they have jointly laid for the Secretariat.
The present juncture suggests taking a fresh, searching look at our
structures and the way in which the Organization is engineered and equipped to
handle new demands. The United Nations and its system of allied agencies are
now 45 years old and were established in a very different era. Vast changes
in human society and human needs have occurred since 1945. The Organization's
membership has itself more than tripled. It is only natural, therefore, that
the structures of the Organization and the system now need to be overhauled in
the light of current and foreseeable challenges.
Many of the constraints due to the cold war, which made it impossible in
previous years to reorganize and update the Secretariat, are now vanishing.
The workload of the Secretariat has also vastly increased and diversified, and
its responsibilities become greater every year. It is clearly essential to
introduce further reforms to allow the Secretariat to respond to changing
circumstances.
An inspection of the anatomy of the Organization cannot be a substitute
for its real work. Devising new oganizational charts for the Secretariat and
rearranging the number and disposition of high-level posts and departments can
certainly be of value, provided it is remembered that there cannot be a
credible way of strengthening the Secretariat by weakening the authority of
the Secretary-General. In the long term, it is far more important to deal
with the fundamental difficulties facing the Secretariat and the United
Nations system, for only then would the reforms be real and their objectives
served. Some useful discussions are taking place both within and outside the
Organization on these matters and the idea of a "unitary United Nations" has
also been floated. I believe that some of the issues involved are of a
fundamental nature and require thought of the same depth and scope as was
devoted to the formulation of the mandates of the United Nations, its
programmes and the specialized agencies at the time of their establishment.
At that time, the different global problems and issues were not viewed as
being as interconnected as they are now. I would, therefore, suggest that a
serious and well-organized process of analysis and consultation be initiated,
in which Governments can outline their priorities, and the Secretary-General,
as the senior manager of the Organization, can discuss with them and with his
colleagues in the United Nations system the most effective ways and means of
achieving the desired objectives. These would relate to the future shape and
structure of the Secretariat, the United Nations system and the related
intergovernmental bodies. The aim should be a more effective fulfilment of
the purposes of the Charter in the interest of the global society that is
rapidly evolving now.
XIII
Earlier in this report, I mentioned the two nagging doubts about the
Organization's will and the Secretariat's efficiency, which have now been
allayed. There is, however, a larger question that should continue to occupy
our minds: whether, by its decisions and actions, the United Nations inspires
and retains the trust of peoples across all cultures and continents. To try
to answer this question from the perspective of one group of nations,
dismissing that of another, would betray either complacency or undue
suspicion. There are nations that have reason to be satisfied with the
status quo, relying on the dynamics of power or economics, and there are
nations with deep grievances, political or economic, which ask to be
redressed. Any view of the implementation of the principles of the Charter of
the United Nations that reflects the interests and outlook of one group of
nations and is imperceptive of those of another is bound to prove divisive.
Closely related to this is the question whether the balance between the
principal organs, including the General Assembly, the Security Council and the
Secretariat, envisaged in the Charter is being consistently maintained. This,
I would submit, is not merely an issue of the internal working of the
Organization; it bears on the guardianship of peace exercised by the United
Nations. The action relating to the Iraq-Kuwait situation this year has made
it timely to express the hope that the unity of the permanent members of the
Security Council will be complemented by a balanced constitutional
relationship within and between the various principal organs. Moreover, it is
important to preserve the political acquis that the office of the
Secretary-General has accumulated over 45 years. It is an essential asset
built as much on an incumbent's personal impartiality, tact and sensitivity as
on the integrity of the international civil service that provides the base for
his functions.
Two years ago, in my annual report in 1989, I said that agreement among
the permanent members must carry with it the willing support of a majority of
nations if it is to facilitate movement towards a better and a saner world.
Events since then have lent emphasis to that observation.
In this time of massive transition, extraordinary care needs to be taken
against disequilibrium in the management of international affairs by the
United Nations. The traditional concept of balance of power can hardly be
invoked in a situation in which economic and technological capability and its
uneven distribution have become critical, often decisive, factors. For the
quality of peace built through the United Nations, the necessary balance can
be provided only by consistent adherence to the principles articulated in the
Charter of the United Nations.
These principles are by no means frozen; their scope and the manner of
their application is determined by changing global conditions. It should be
the purpose of the international discourse constantly to develop shared
understandings not only of the standards of acceptable international behaviour
but also of the procedures to be employed for upholding them and correcting
their infractions. A rigid interpretation that fails to take human realities
into account would ossify international law and diminish its contemporary
relevance. To an equal extent, loose interpretations would create disorder.
As the era unfolding now displays the opposite qualities of fusion and
fission, we need constantly to hark back to basic principles like that of
respecting the territorial integrity and political independence of States. We
have little ground to expect that States and societies will escape internal
turbulence but we have every reason not to allow that turbulence to imperil
international peace and security.
The Charter of the United Nations furnishes guidance that remains timely
even in conditions its framers could not have anticipated. We cannot, of
course, regard the Charter as immutable. Some of its provisions, for example,
the composition of the Security Council, have already come under questioning.
But it is the only multilateral treaty of its nature and scope that has been
accepted by, and is binding on, all States and any revisions in it except on
the basis of genuine consensus will create more problems than they will
solve. The facilitation of peaceful and constructive change, not the
perpetuation of the status quo, will remain the United Nations principal
concern.
XIV
As my term of office will soon come to an end, I may be forgiven if I
share with Member States some feelings relating to the experience. I have
been associated with the Organization for some two decades in various
capacities. It has been my privilege to serve it as Secretary-General during
what are generally regarded as some of its most productive years. Throughout
this latter period, I have felt impelled more to dwell on problems that are
still to be resolved than to muse on accomplishments. A Panglossian frame of
mind is hardly appropriate for the United Nations. The present report too
suggests initiatives to overcome serious difficulties in averting conflicts,
eradicating poverty and protecting human rights.
None of these difficulties, however, diminishes from the metamorphosis of
the United Nations. I believe that the change which the United Nations has
channelized has not been fortuitous. The radical shift in political
perceptions testifies to the resilience of the human spirit. The United
Nations, to the best of its capabilities, is helping to give it concrete shape.
Peace has won victories on several fronts. Many a people have been
released from the agonies of strife. The process is capable of extension to
other areas. New vistas are opening for States to work together in a manner
they did not do before. The earlier posture of aloofness and reserve towards
the Organization has been replaced by more ardent participation in its
endeavours. An era of law and justice may not be around the corner but the
United Nations has defined the direction. If dynamic efforts are made,
obstacles in the way may no longer prove insuperable. Today there are far
more solid grounds for hope than there are reasons for frustration and fear.
The hope arises both from the enduring relevance of the philosophy of the
Charter and from the vastly strengthened credentials of the Organization. My
credo is anchored in that philosophy and it will remain so. With its return
from the doldrums, and with its role no longer peripheral, the United Nations
has come nearer to the vision of its Charter. Everyone who contributed to the
process is entitled to a measure of exultation and I, for my part, to a
feeling of fulfilment. I profoundly appreciate the confidence placed in me
through this testing phase of international affairs. I close on that note of
faith and gratitude.
Javier PEREZ DE CUELLAR
Secretary-General