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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
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This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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01. Cable
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4/28/89
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Collection:
Record Group:
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 1, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
MARLIN FITZWATER
Mal
SUBJECT:
Public Appearances by the President on
Foreign Policy
The month of May promises to be a high visibility time for
foreign policy. Expectations for the foreign policy review are
extraordinarily high. We must be able to publicly demonstrate
that a coherent "world view" has emerged from this process.
We propose three Presidential addresses as follows:
1) May 12 -- Commencement Address at Texas A&M. The
President would deliver a "world view" address outlining the
broad results of his policy review process. The speech
could center on such concepts as the rise of democracy, the
failures of Communism, and the growing rise of free
enterprise in national economies. This speech should wrap
up the entire "review."
2) May 21 -- Boston University Commencement Address. The
President's address would focus on US-Soviet relations
including such points as an assessment of those relations,
where he expects that relationship to go and how he expects
to guide that relationship.
3) May 24 -- Coast Guard Commencement Address. This event
is scheduled two days prior to departure for the NATO
Summit. As a result, the President would focus on NATO, our
strong European ties, and the mutual US-European commitment
to defense and international affairs.
In addition to the above three scheduled events, we propose that
the President return directly to Washington, D.C. on June 2 in
order to deliver an Oval Office address to the nation. The
address would summarize his European trip and outline his
successes. We understand this may necessitate a scheduling
change for the President but we believe it is something that
should be considered. This is an important trip and it would be
wise to demonstrate Presidential leadership from the Oval Office.
It would give the President an opportunity to report on the
success of the policy review as demonstrated in the NATO meeting.
- 2 -
I would also like to call to your attention some of the
logistical problems the Press Office encounters on our foreign
trips. I understand that we will be scheduling a number of
arrival and departure statements by the President. It is also
necessary to schedule time for either on-the-record or background
readouts of these statements and of various Presidential meetings
by either Secretary Baker or General Scowcroft. It is incumbent,
therefore, that any scheduling leave either of these individuals
free time to address the traveling press corps in the filing
center. Both Secretary Baker and General Scowcroft should be
available for readouts on meetings towards the end of the
President's working schedule. The availability of the Secretary
or General is particularly crucial during the first day of the
NATO Summit.
Attachment
CC: Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Stephen Studdert
David F. Demarest, Jr.
EDITORIAL PAGE
by DAVID R. GERGEN
Editor at Large
A GLOBAL COMPACT
A
rare moment in history is at hand. The old
financial crisis in the early 1990s that could wreck
order is breaking up, and a new one is
the world economy.
emerging at breathtaking speed. Western Europe
A conference of Americans, Japanese and Euro-
is moving rapidly toward economic and political
peans, sponsored in mid-April by the American
integration. Japan, having achieved enormous eco-
Assembly in New York, concluded that the eco-
nomic muscle, is groping toward new global re-
nomic imbalances "are rooted in mistaken and
sponsibilities. And as the massive student demon-
often self-indulgent domestic policies of the indus-
strations in Beijing last week illustrated yet again,
trialized democracies. Responsibility for ensuring a
people in Communist nations are defiantly turning
healthy international economy now rests primarily
away from the failures of Marx and Lenin.
upon domestic policy changes in the United States,
For the United States, this should be a moment
Japan and Western Europe." To break the current
of triumph as well as opportunity. After all, it was
gridlock, the assembly said it was urgent that at the
a generous America that helped Europe and Ja-
economic summit this summer, the key govern-
pan recover and a stout America that contained
ments sign a "global compact." The U.S. would
Communism's outward reach until it
pledge to wipe out its budget deficit and
began crumbling from within. Fortu-
become more export-oriented. The Jap-
nately, George Bush recognizes that if
anese would take swifter steps to open
the U.S. and its allies work wisely and
their markets and triple economic assis-
in concert, they have a chance in the
tance to poorer countries. And Europe
1990s to build a much more stable and
would lower its current trade barriers
democratic world.
and accelerate its economic growth.
While the West has only limited in-
The idea of a global compact is
fluence behind the iron curtain, it can
sound, but it would not be easy to
be modestly helpful, as Bush showed
engineer. The resignation announce-
recently with his economic proposal to
ment of Japan's Prime Minister and the
assist Poland. Private citizens can also
panic that swept over the West German
serve as a human bridge. Prof. Rich-
government last week starkly revealed
ard Gardner of Columbia University points out
that the industrial democracies are entering the
that no one has ever written a book on how to
1990s with major weaknesses at the top. Charges of
convert a Communist economy to a free market,
corruption and cover-up in Japan are toppling not
but Moscow is now quietly turning to some
only Noboru Takeshita but at least a generation of
American economists for advice. The West must
other men in the line of succession; it will take a
not blow this possibility of ridding the world of
long while for that government to recover. In West
Communism, the worst idea of the 20th century.
Germany, centrist politics of the past are giving
Ironically, at a time of enormous potential, the
way to a polarization that threatens the govern-
Western democracies have problems of their own
ment of Helmut Kohl. To ward off potential ouster,
that demand attention. A White House aide put it
Kohl last week was pushing nuclear ideas that
this way recently: "I would like to go in and tell
reeked of capitulation to the left and could splinter
him, 'Mr. President, we have the best chance in 40
NATO Even that magnificent leader Margaret
years to undo Yalta. There's only one catch: We
Thatcher is in trouble from spiraling interest rates
can't afford it.' " Precisely. The United States is
As he enters his second hundred days, here then
now in the ludicrous position of proposing gener-
is a mission for President Bush: To recognize not
ous bailouts for debtor nations while it runs up the
only the opportunities but the dangers of the 1990s
biggest debts in its own history. America and its
and to rally the industrial democracies to meet
partners have allowed trade and other imbalances
them. The United States may no longer tower over
to build up for so many years that the internation-
other nations, but it remains primus inter pares.
al economic system is badly out of kilter. Unless
President Bush, more than anyone else, must lead
the imbalances are corrected, they could cause a
the West into the next decade.
U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 8, 1989
87
1.
West Germany. A compromise is possible.
are trying to pull together an overall strat-
dent, and no sign that his
"We want to modernize now and negotiate
egy to match Gorbachev's bold maneuver.
have
later; the Germans want to negotiate now
in Europe. One idea under consideration
what
and modernize later," says a U.S. diplomat
to counter the Soviet call for a "common"
in Bonn. "The two positions are bridge-
European home" by celebrating "common
able." But so far neither side shows signs of
Western values" and daring the Soviet
tcham
backing down.
leader to adopt them. Administration dffi-
At the NATO summit four weeks from
cials still have not settled, however, on spe
follow it.
now, Bush will have some explaining to do.
cific initiatives that might put some meat
As his drawn-out review of foreign-policy
on the thematic bones. So far, officials say
RUSSELL WATSON with JOHN BAR
and
MARGARET GARBARD WARNERIE hington,
options nears its conclusion, his advisers
they have no clear signals from the presi-
MICHAEL
and
bureau
reports
Receipt
Audaments tattereder
in simply not
Busi
portant as it once was The
culture
postwar order of Europe-the
of the gen-
West- is fast
now under way
and the in
and
procerve
and the
look outdated
the oth shent
Its Estill
nuclear wespons
that this percep
On the face of it. it's just'one
premature that
more of those NATO equalls
reforms in Europs
that spring up from time to
the Soviet Unied could be your
time and then blow. them
done by economic alure OF
selves out in gusts of oped
political
thoth
that
articles and eddies of procras
the West wouldt let
tination. But thisoneis differ-
down its because
ent. What the Germans are
the other the
telling and a mistake
white fing of persitrol. But
withshool in
to think that it all stems
in many quarters of Europe,
of great powers to their ten
from Helmut Kohl's political
atlent. that attitude in look-
dency to take on greater mill
Gard
for
problems back home-is that
inginer
tary commitments than their
the days of military buildup
If the General are right,
economiescan sustain: Infi
in Europe are over. And there
then thee
for
the
the real problem for the Unit
is a larger implication the
United States profound:
ed States in the next dec K
not
NATO alliance, although it's
For the last. (century
may well turn out to be not
matic
economic but political: it may
praisal, tobeper
be able to afford a huge mili-
matic For the
tory establishment, but that
have seized it
military muscle will not count
ward position ON
for 28 much. In a world less
side: It falls. to
worried about war, the owner
cans-and the BHU
of the arsenal cannot expect
thedreary
theolddeference.
them. The Amer
time influence: Western
right that it would be
Europe is now excited about
dy to negotiate with
the economic unification due
ets over short-rang
at the end of 1992. If by then
missiles before achievi
the importance of NATO is
jorcuts in conventions
thought to have diminished,
But the Germans a
1/242
what will be the United
that profound changesare the
States' point of influence over
der way in the world. and
8 revitalized continent? West
Washington had better have
Germany is pushing forward
some ideas of how to adjust to
with commercial projects in
them if America is to sustain
Berlin airlift, 1948
Poland and Hungary, the
itsinfluence.
18 NEWSWEEK MAY 8, 1989
Organization for Planning the President's Trips to Europe
Coordinating Group for the President's European Trips and Policy
Statements
General Scowcroft (chair)
STATE (Deputy Secretary Eagleburger)
DEFENSE (Deputy Secretary Atwood)
JCS (Vice Admiral Howe)
USIA (Deputy Director Stone)
White House Staff (Mr. Card, Mr. Fitzwater, Mr. Studdert)
NSC Staff
Steering Group for the President's European Trips and Policy
Statements
Ambassador Blackwill (chair)
STATE (Assistant Secretary Ridgway)
DEFENSE (Assistant Secretary Lehman)
JCS (Vice Admiral Howe)
USIA (Associate Director Schneider)
White House Staff (Office of the Chief of Staff, Advance Office,
and Press Office)
NSC Staff (Executive Secretary Hughes, Mr. Zelikow)
Working Groups:
One - The President's Trips to Europe and Related Policy Themes
for the Next 90 Days (Mr. Zelikow chair)
Two - Security Initiatives (Col. Mahley chair)
Three - The President's Schedule and Logistical Support
(Executive Secretary Hughes chair)
Four - Public Diplomacy (Mrs. Dyke chair)
Work Program (tentative, Working Group schedule and number of
meetings may vary depending on Group involved and work
requirements) :
Monday, May 1: Steering Group meets, sets organization and work
program
Tuesday, May 2: Working Groups (WGs) meet, work papers for
Steering Group consideration
Thursday, May 4: WGs meet, finalize papers
Friday afternoon, May 5: Steering Group meets, reviews next
steps
Saturday, May 6: Coordinating Group meets to review status of
work
Monday, May 8: WGs meet to discuss how and where to utilize
policy initiatives, coordination strategy with Allies, other
implementation issues
Tuesday, May 9: Steering Group meets, finalizes above-described
implementation strategy
Friday, May 12: WGs meet to review progress; draft briefing
books for May trip due from State
Monday, May 14: Steering Group meets
Tuesday, May 15: Coordinating Group meets
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
China
classfed
May 1, 1989
TO: David Demarest
FROM: STEPHEN M. STUDDERT sur
FYI
Appropriate Action
Let's Discuss
Per Our Conversation
Per Your Request
Please Return
COMMENTS:
Scene Setter for Rome, Italy visit
by the President
SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
It 06/14/23
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01. Cable
281606Z Apr 89 (8 pp.)
4/28/89
(b)(1)
S
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Speechwriting, White House Office of
Series:
Administrative Files
Subseries:
Alpha File, 1989-1993
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Classified Materials from Speechwriters Office [2]
Date Closed:
6/14/2023
OA/ID Number:
13907-014
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2005-0569-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
Deed of Gift Restrictions
(b)(1) National security classified information
C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
security information
agency
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
gift [formerly listed as only C]
information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
financial institutions
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
concerning wells
Chriss -
2 speeches by Gates on The
USSR. October speech was quite
"controversial" on subject of Gorbached's
tarh, etc.
For what they're worth,
P.S. I have siven M.Davis copies. Dar
Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page
Center for Strategic & International Studies Conference
The 1990s: Critical Change
1 April 1989
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Gorbachev and Critical Change in the Soviet Union:
Implications for the West
It is an honor to speak to this distinguished audience
examining critical change in the 1990s. I can think of no more
appropriate or timely topic, for we are in a truly extraordinary
period. Europe is moving steadily toward greater economic and
political integration in 1992. Authoritarian governments from the
Philippines and the Republic of Korea in the East to Latin America
in the West are giving way to democracy. China is in the midst of
a momentous reform program, and, in the Soviet Union, a revolution
from above has been launched, albeit with no assurance it will
succeed. Capitalism and democracy are ascendant; economic
statism and political despotism are in retreat.
1
There has been a remarkable change in the relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union over the past two
years, including the signing of the Treaty on Intermediate Range
Nuclear Forces. The Soviets have announced a first and important
step toward reducing their overwhelming conventional force
advantage in Europe. Conventional force reduction negotiations
opened last month and negotiations on strategic force reductions
will resume in the near future. A Sino-Soviet Summit is scheduled
for mid-May. The Soviets have withdrawn from Afghanistan, the
Vietnamese may be leaving Cambodia, and a settlement getting the
Cubans and South Africans out of Angola has been negotiated.
Exhausted, Iraq and Iran have agreed to and are, in the main,
observing a ceasefire. Structural change is reshaping international
economic relationships in dramatic ways.
Accordingly, critical change in the 1990s is a most appropriate
subject. It certainly is a subject with which the Bush Administration
has been preoccupied for the last two months. Resisting the siren
song of the quick fix and the big headline, we actually are trying to
think about the 1990s -- to absorb and understand the many
2
changes that have taken place in recent years, those that are still
underway, and those that are only just above the horizon of the
future. Our task, then, is to devise policies that look to the end of
the century and beyond. We are working to develop economic,
political, military and arms control strategies that are grounded in
reality and yet build upon opportunities for constructive, stabilizing
change. We see opportunities to expand freedom, to strengthen
both peace and security at lower levels of military forces, to
enhance economic growth and extend it, and to promote
international cooperation on such common problems as terrorism,
drugs, the environment, and the spread of chemical and biological
weapons and the means to deliver them.
Seizing such opportunities requires preparation and planning.
Too often the energies and time of senior officials are consumed
day in and day out by the crisis of the moment -- a diplomatic
demarche, a newspaper story, a Congressional hearing, a
bureaucratic dispute or a multitude of other short-term
preoccupations. We in government, as a rule, spend too little time
thinking about and planning for the future. We spend too little time
reflecting on history and experience; we neglect strategy for tactics.
3
The Bush Administration is trying to resist this. Accordingly, our
reviews of the international setting and our policies are focused on
the development of long range strategy. Failure to take stock, to
understand, to look ahead, and to plan would ensure failure to seize
the opportunities we see now and discern in the future.
This brings me to the Soviet Union. On this subject, more
than on any other, there has been speculation about the views of
the new administration and directions the President will take. We
have heard such nuanced and sophisticated questions as "Should
we help Gorbachev" - and we have resisted the temptation of
monosyllabic answers. I expect our Soviet review to be complete
very soon. This afternoon, rather than focus prematurely on
possible outcomes or specific policies, I want to share with you the
framework within which we approach the Soviet-American
relationship.
We do live in a time of dramatic change - change that now
has spread to the Soviet Union. The failure of a system of
government - economic, political, social and moral failure -- is a
powerful inducement to dramatic departures from the past, to
4
unprecedented distancing from many of the precepts that have
guided the system for so long. It is the self-evident failure of the
Soviet system, and the absolute imperative to change it, that form
Gorbachev's mandate, are his primary sources of political support,
shape his radicalism, and cause us all to wonder if the wheel of
history is at last about to turn for that vast empire. Regardless of
the substantial odds against him, we take seriously Gorbachev's
determination to modernize the Soviet economy. We applaud the
measures he has taken to increase openness in the press, to ease
restrictions on religion, to take the first faltering steps toward
democratization, and to contribute constructively to settling certain
international disputes. We welcome his commitment to reduce
Soviet conventional forces and to pursue a further relaxation of
tensions and arms control. These are all positive steps, and they
have led to widespread hope and optimism. We, too, are hopeful.
At the same time, long term policy must not be based on
hopes, but on past experience, present realities and future
probabilities - as well as possibilities. Just as I believe we must try
to look well into to the future in developing foreign policy, I also
advocate looking to the past - examining the historical record for
5
insights pertinent to the future. This is especially true with respect
to the Soviet Union, where Western views too often are shaped by
the latest leadership change, pronouncement or enticing proposal.
Looking back over one's shoulder with respect to the USSR is
not for the faint hearted. What we see, above all, is a system of
rule that over a seventy year period has brought to the peoples of
the old Russian empire suffering on a scale previously unknown in
human history. Mentioning this often elicits a reaction similar to a
display of bad manners at a dinner party or a dismissive gesture
suggesting the irrelevance of this past to our future. Commonly, the
horrors of Soviet history are blamed on Stalin, both within and
outside of the Soviet Union. Yet, I believe it essential for us today
to understand that this record is not confined to the Stalin era
alone, was not the doing of a single demented leader, but covers
the entirety of Soviet history, and is the product of the very nature
of the system itself.
Soviet history did not begin in the Spring of 1985. A brief
reminder of the record and of the cycles in that record are useful,
even for an audience as well informed as this one.
6
-- Under Lenin, 10 million people were killed in the civil war from
1918 to 1920, and another 5 million died in the War
Communism famine of 1921-22. In 1921, in the midst of
catastrophe, Lenin set a precedent for his successors by
retreating, falling back to tried and true methods of economic
growth -- private markets, small private business,
denationalization, and legalization of private trade. By 1923, 83
percent of retail trade had been privatized. Whether the New
Economic Policy and associated measures would have endured
had Lenin lived is one of those finally unanswerable questions.
Regardless, Lenin himself admitted, "We showed quite clearly
that we cannot run the economy." Truer and more prophetic
words were never spoken. While economic policy might have
turned out rather differently, I believe Lenin contemplated no
such flexibility in terms of politics -- the controlling monopoly
of the Communist party.
Meanwhile, in another precedent important for the future, as
early as 1920-21, facing disastrous internal problems, Lenin
turned to the West for help, signing trade treaties with Britain,
7
Norway, Italy and Sweden and obtaining a major loan from
France. By 1921, the American Relief Administration was
feeding nearly 10 million Soviet citizens.
--
Under Stalin, another 14 million people died from 1928 to 1937
- the war against the peasants. Countless more were killed in
the Great Terror, as Stalin first purged the Party and then the
military to eliminate opposition, both real and imagined. By
the late 1930s, some 12 million people were in forced labor
camps. Constant terror and periodic purges were
characteristic of the Soviet regime to the very end of Stalin's
life in 1953.
At the same time, Stalin eagerly and successfully sought
foreign assistance for the Soviet regime from the United States,
Britain, Germany, Italy and France. The majority of the largest
Soviet power plants before the war were built by the British
firm Metropolitan-Vickers; western companies designed, built
and equipped the industrial complexes at Magnitogorsk and
Kuznetsk as well as the Urals Machine Works, and many more.
The great Dnepr dam was built by the firm of Colonel Hugh
8
Cooper, an American hydraulic engineer. And, yet, during the
period before the war the Soviet Union intervened in the
Spanish Civil War, invaded Finland, and with Hitler's blessing
seized the Baltic States and carved up Poland. I need hardly
mention Soviet expansionism in Europe, Southwest Asia and
East Asia in the immediate post-war period.
-- Khrushchev, as described by the emigre historians Heller and
Nekrich, demonstrated that the system could forego mass
terror without altering the Stalinist socialist state. This more
selective terror stopped at the doors of the Central Committee
as Khrushchev released millions from Stalin's camps but soon
began refilling them. The means of intimidation became more
sophisticated with the use of psychiatric incarcerations and
other punishments.
Domestic reform again became the order of the day as
Khrushchev moved to decentralize and modernize the
economy, made management more flexible and eased
pressures on the rural population. Under Khrushchev, the
Soviet authorities declared their intention to increase
9
production of consumer goods and food. They again turned to
private plots in agriculture and espoused the need for material
relief of the people. He launched an anti-corruption campaign,
sought to have senior party officials elected by secret ballot to
limited terms of office, and tried to limit the privileges of senior
officials. And in 1962, the Liberman economic reforms were
begun with the central theme that profitability would be the
main criterion for gauging the economic performance of
enterprises.
Remember the "Thaw" of the 1950s -- the first and last time to
this day that a work of Alexander Solzenitsyn has been
published in the USSR? A new openness emerged as the
central newspapers published thousands of complaints about
the arbitrariness of local leaders and demands for legality.
And, of course, Khrushchev exposed many of the crimes of the
Stalin period.
Meanwhile the new Soviet leaders moved immediately to
normalize relations -- to establish a detente - with the United
States and the West. The Korean Armistice was signed in July
10
1953, a cease fire was quickly agreed in Indochina and in
1955, Soviet forces left Austria. Eisenhower and Khrushchev
met in Geneva and the Soviet leader visited the United States.
Khrushchev unilaterally reduced conventional military forces by
1.8 million men between 1955 and 1957. There was much talk
of the end of the cold war. Yet, during this period the Soviets
crushed revolts in East Germany and Hungary, built and
deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles for the first time,
sent some of those missiles to Cuba, precipitated several
dangerous crises in Berlin and built the Berlin Wall.
--
The popular impression of the Brezhnev period, reinforced by
Gorbachev, is one of doddering old men presiding ineffectively
and incompetently over a stagnating economy while pursuing
detente and arms control with the West. This is Western
historical amnesia and Soviet selectivity, if not disinformation.
In 1965, the Soviet leaders already knew their economy was in
serious difficulty. They ratified many of Khrushchev's
economic reforms, with the Liberman concepts at the core.
The leadership turned again to the law of supply and demand,
11
material incentives and broad autonomy. Premier Kosygin
tried to implement significant reforms, but plainly Brezhnev and
the rest of the Politburo had little interest in paying any
political, economic or social price to pursue reform. Then, as
now, they tried to reconcile the irreconcilable: to enlarge the
rights of individual enterprises and also restore the power of
the central economic ministries.
By the late sixties, twin crises enveloped the USSR -- a
political crisis reflecting the nationalities problem, and an
economic crisis as growth decreased sharply. Brezhnev
needed a breathing spell and, as so often in Soviet history,
outside assistance. The West was happy to oblige.
Relationships with Europe and the United States blossomed.
Tensions relaxed, warmer relationships were cultivated with
European countries, the Quadripartite Treaty on Berlin was
concluded, the first SALT Treaty and many narrower technical
agreements were signed with the US, and Western trade,
credits and technology flowed.
Yet, consider what Brezhnev was up to elsewhere during this
12
same period. His was the regime that invaded Czechoslovakia
in 1968 and crushed the Prague Spring. The Western
reaction? President Johnson said, "We hope - and we shall
strive - to make this setback a temporary one." The then
French Foreign Minister said it was "an unpleasant incident
along the road." The next year, the Soviets attacked China
along the Ussuri River and dropped heavy hints, including in
Washington, that a nuclear attack against China was under
consideration. Recklessly or intentionally, the Soviets helped
provoke the 1967 Middle East War. In the mid-1970s, they
supported Cuban surrogate forces in Angola and Ethiopia.
The same leaders toasted in the West provided the wherewithal
for North Vietnam's final conquest of the South, underwrote the
Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, and sold $12 billion worth
of weapons to Libya. In 1979, Brezhnev ordered the invasion
of Afghanistan. In 1980-81, this leadership forced the
imposition of martial law in Poland and the suppression of
Solidarity. And, all of this took place against the backdrop of
the greatest peacetime military buildup in history.
We also have too easily forgotten the wave of internal
13
repression inside the Soviet Union during this period. In 1965,
there were mass arrests of those involved in nationalist
movements in the Ukraine, Lithuania and the Transcaucasus.
The first show trials since Stalin convicted Sinyavsky and
Daniel in 1966 for slandering the Soviet state. Political trials
all over the USSR followed -- in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev,
Lvov, Gorky, Riga, Tashkent and Omsk. Remember Aleksandr
Ginzburg, Pavel Litvinov, Yuri Galanskov and all the others?
By the late 1970s, the KGB had destroyed the dissident and
human rights movements.
--
Finally, Andropov, as head of the KGB architect of the
suppression of dissent. His contribution as General Secretary
to solving the Soviet crisis? Tighter discipline, a call to arms
against "consumer instincts," squeezing the fat out of the
economy - but not a single substantial reform. During his
fifteen months in the top job, we saw wide scale arrests of
dissidents, Baptists, Jews and many others.
I offer this thumbnail sketch of Soviet history to underscore
that our view of the Soviet Union cannot be based on the
14
personality of one or another leader, but must be based on the
nature of the Soviet system itself. We face a deeply entrenched
philosophy and system of government that to date has depended
upon repression at home and promoted aggression beyond its
borders. It is the Soviet system itself, and the 70 year continuity we
see from leader to leader, from Lenin to Chernenko, and even
Gorbachev, that shapes our view of the USSR. Gorbachev is
challenging some aspects of this system but even he acknowledges
he has not yet significantly changed it. We cannot ignore Soviet
history or the apparent strength and durability of the system that
produced it. Nor can we ignore the cyclical turn to reform, "detente"
and foreign assistance each time the system has hovered on the
brink of catastrophe or fallen into it.
Le Monde has said, "One cannot minimize the scope of this
reform. By every available measure, it is without doubt of the first
importance It will have major consequences if it runs its course.
Gradually, the entire Soviet system of planning will be overturned."
Regrettably, those words were published in December 1964.
In important respects, Gorbachev has made quite clear he has
15
no intention of dismantling fundamental features of the system.
There will be no political party but the Communist Party, as
demonstrated by the prompt crushing of the Democratic Union. The
economy is, and will remain, governed by political decisions. Rights
are granted by the Party to the people. Glasnost is a grant,
possibly temporary, from Gorbachev to the Soviet people suited to
his own political needs and purposes. Indeed, it seems clear that
Gorbachev turned to political reform only because he concluded that
it had become necessary to achieve his economic objectives.
Moreover, we cannot make long-term decisions and devise
strategies affecting freedom and the future that depend on the
continued political (or even physical) survival of one man. Indeed,
not a leader in the West goes to bed unaware that he or she could
wake up to a new Soviet counterpart. Unlike any Western or other
modern state, politics at the highest level in the Kremlin today are
as hidden from public view as in generations past. Much has
changed, but more that is fundamental remains the same.
In sum, we proceed with care and prudence because we are
dealing with a system where the roots of oppression, aggression,
16
and secrecy are deep, because for seventy years we repeatedly
have seen a system in crisis proclaim reform and turn to the West
for help while the essential features of that system at the end of the
day remained unchanged.
Prudence, however, is not synonymous with inaction. Nor is
wariness to be equated with pessimism and cynicism. It would be
the worst sort of myopia not to recognize that profound changes are
underway in the Soviet Union. There is a degree of openness and
vigor of political debate in the USSR unknown since the days of the
first (or February) revolution in 1917. Indeed, we need only reflect
on the openness of debate at the Party Conference last summer or
the elections this last week. (Who could not be amazed at the
defeat of the Leningrad Party Chief, who ran unopposed, or the
demonstration of support for Boris Yeltsin?) In a number of areas --
Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, conventional force reductions,
various aspects of arms control, China -- we are seeing the Soviets
change their policies, abandon old positions, and remove
themselves from longstanding dead-ends. We do see "new thinking"
in some areas, although in others -- as in Central America and the
Middle East -- the old ways of thinking and behavior remain.
17
We are generally encouraged by what we see. Maybe this
time things will be different. The changes plainly offer opportunities
-- opportunities for further reducing tensions, for enhancing strategic
stability, for promoting human rights and democracy, for arms
control, and for cooperation on transnational issues such as the
environment, narcotics trafficking, and stopping the proliferation of
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
Ironically, given Gorbachev's priorities, the pace of some
aspects of political change is far outstripping economic
modernization and performance. Indeed, what Gorbachev has set in
motion represents a political earthquake. He is pulling all of the
levers of change in a society and culture that historically has
resisted change - and where change usually has been violent and
wrenching. He is a figure of enormous historical importance. The
forces he has unleashed are powerful but so are the people and
institutions he has antagonized - thus setting in motion a
tremendous power struggle and purge no less dramatic for the
absence of show trials and terror. The outcome is by no means
clear, and prolonged turbulence seems certain.
18
Gorbachev seeks a system in which some -- though certainly
not all -- elements of the Stalinist economic structure and
bureaucracy are eliminated thus opening the way to greater
flexibility and innovation and thereby to modernization and improved
performance. However, elections notwithstanding, Gorbachev's
Leninism still means the continued political monopoly of the
Communist Party. Gorbachev's dictatorship of the Communist Party
remains untouched and untouchable. He seeks still a system based
on the same Leninist political principles that guided his
predecessors. As he said in 1987, "We will not retreat an inch from
the path of socialism, of Marxism-Leninism."
Westerners for centuries have hoped repeatedly that Russian
economic modernization and political reform -- even revolution --
signaled an end to despotism. Repeatedly since 1917, the West has
hoped that domestic changes in the USSR would lead to changes in
Communist coercive rule at home and aggressiveness abroad.
These hopes, dashed time and again, have been revived by
Gorbachev's radical domestic agenda, innovative foreign policy and
personal style.
19
Enduring characteristics of Soviet governance at home and
policy abroad make it clear that - while the changes underway offer
opportunities for a relaxation of tensions and for cooperation in
many areas - Gorbachev intends improved Soviet economic
performance, greater political vitality at home, and more dynamic
diplomacy to make the USSR a more competitive and stronger
adversary in the years ahead.
What we seek is a Soviet Union that is pluralistic internally,
non-interventionist externally, observes basic human rights,
contributes to international stability and tranquility, and a Soviet
Union where these changes are more than an edict from the top
and are independent of the views, power and durability of a single
individual. We can hope for such change but all of Russian and
Soviet history tells us to be skeptical and cautious.
We cannot - and should not -- close our eyes to momentous
developments in the USSR. But we should not make concessions
based on hope and popular enthusiasms in the West or attractive
personalities in the USSR. We should, however, take advantage of
20
opportunities where the terms are favorable to us, where we can
solve problems to mutual advantage, or where we can bring about
desirable changes in Soviet policies -- whether to promote human
rights, freer emigration, solutions to Soviet generated problems such
as Afghanistan, reduce the military threat or even to expand
business ties (if there is no transfer of sensitive technology). Above
all, we must establish realistic criteria by which we can judge in the
coming months and years whether political or economic change in
the Soviet Union genuinely is reshaping the foundations of the
system - or whether the historically oppressive structure of the
Soviet Union, including the instruments of central control and
repression, endures discreetly in the shadows, available at the
beckon of Gorbachev's successor, or even for Gorbachev.
Gorbachev has spoken of a European home, from the Atlantic
to the Urals. But "Europe" and "the West" are not just geographic
terms. They represent a community and continuity of values, a
common historical experience reflected in this year's bicentennial
celebration of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the
inauguration of our First President under the Constitution. The
principles set forth in these two documents compared to the central
21
tenets of Leninism still held dear by Gorbachev mark the distance
that remains between us.
For all the changes underway, the Soviet Union philosophically
and politically still embodies the primacy of the State over the
individual. Because of this unbridgeable difference in values and
beliefs, whether Gorbachev succeeds, fails, or just survives, a still
long competition and struggle with the Soviet Union lie before us.
Preserving the peace and fostering an enduring relaxation of
tensions even as the competition continues depends upon seeing
this reality clearly. Keeping this long range perspective -- with keen
awareness of perhaps unprecedented opportunities as well as the
dangers -- will be an extraordinary challenge for the United States
and the Western democracies.
22
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN
THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND
CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS
SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN
THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME
RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.
IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE
UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS,
SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO
IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION
FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET
SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.
1
AFTER ALL OF THE TALK OF GLASNOST AND DEMOCRATIZATION,
STALIN WOULD HAVE BEEN PROUD OF THE SMOOTHLY ORCHESTRATED 44
MINUTE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION IN WHICH PEOPLE WERE FIRED,
RETIRED, DEMOTED AND PROMOTED WITH NO DISSENT OR EVEN
DISCUSSION AND 1500 DELEGATES VOTING AS ONE. THE SESSION WAS A
POWER PLAY IN THE GRAND AND TRADITIONAL SOVIET MANNER. WHILE
THE SESSION WAS TESTIMONY TO GORBACHEV'S POWER, THE NEED FOR IT
ALSO WAS A MARK OF HIS VULNERABILITY AND HIS FRUSTRATION AT THE
LACK OF PROGRESS, BUREAUCRATIC OBSTRUCTIONISM AND OPPOSITION IN
THE PARTY TO HIS PROGRAMS AND POLICIES -- AND OF THE DESPERATE
SITUATION FACING THE SOVIET UNION.
THIS MORNING I WOULD LIKE TO PUT ASIDE THE DISCUSSION OF
PERSONALITIES AND RECENT PROMOTIONS AND DEMOTIONS IN THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP AND FOCUS INSTEAD ON WHAT IS GENUINELY IMPORTANT
BOTH IN THE SOVIET UNION AND FOR THE WEST --- WHAT CHANGES
ACTUALLY ARE TAKING PLACE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW GORBACHEV
IS DOING IN IMPLEMENTING HIS PROGRAM.
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
-- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WAS AFFECTING THEIR MILITARY
POWER AND POSITION IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC
POWER AND RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE
SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY
WIDENING GAP WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN.
2
THESE TRENDS, AT A TIME OF WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION,
REMARKABLE TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AND DRAMATIC ECONOMIC GROWTH,
FORCED THE POLITBURO TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD
NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS.
THEY COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM
THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ALTERING THE
BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR COMMUNIST PARTY.
STRENGTHENING THE LEADERSHIP AND HIS POSITION
THERE HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY STRONG SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO
SINCE 1985 FOR MODERNIZATION OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY. THIS
REMAINS GORBACHEV'S GREATEST POLITICAL ASSET. EVEN SO, NEARLY
EVERY STEP GORBACHEV SEEKS TO TAKE TOWARD STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC
OR POLITICAL CHANGE IS A STRUGGLE AND SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO
FOR HIS INITIATIVES SHIFTS CONSTANTLY, FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE.
AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING TWO WEEKS AGO, GORBACHEV
SHOWED REAL POLITICAL MUSCLE IN ADVANCING SEVERAL PROTEGES AND
SUPPORTERS WHILE REMOVING MOST OF THE REMAINING BREZHNEV
HOLDOVERS. BUT EVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS CLASSIC POLITICAL
STROKE IN THE KREMLIN, THE LIMITS TO GORBACHEY'S POWER -- OR AT
LEAST THE DEGREE OF RISK HE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT -- ARE
APPARENT. TWO SENIOR POLITBURO MEMBERS WHO PURPORTEDLY HAVE
3
BEEN MAJOR OBSTACLES TO FAR-REACHING CHANGE -- SECOND SECRETARY
YEGOR LIGACHEV AND FORMER KGB CHIEF VIKTOR CHEBRIKOV -- REMAIN
ON THE POLITBURO AND IN POWERFUL POSITIONS, ALTHOUGH WITH
DIMINISHED CLOUT. MEANWHILE, GORBACHEV STILL HAS BEEN UNABLE
TO PROMOTE ONE OF HIS MOST IMPORTANT PROTEGES, PARTY SECRETARY
GEORGY RAZUMOVSKIY. GORBACHEV PROBABLY CAN COUNT ON ONLY 3 OR
4 OUT OF 12 POLITBURO MEMBERS AS BEING TOTALLY HIS MEN,
CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTIVE ACROSS THE BOARD. So, WHILE THIS SET
GOES TO GORBACHEV, THE MATCH IS FAR FROM OVER. IT IS CLEAR
THAT FOR THE LONG TERM THERE WILL BE A CONTINUING INTENSE
STRUGGLE OVER THE PACE AND SCOPE OF MODERNIZATION AND OVER
POLITICAL POWER.
THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE POLITBURO IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT
TO GORBACHEV BECAUSE THERE ARE POWERFUL CONSTITUENCIES OUTSIDE
THE POLITBURO THAT ARE RESISTANT TO CHANGE - ESPECIALLY THE
FAR-REACHING CHANGE HE SEEKS. SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ECONOMIC
BUREAUCRACY STAND TO LOSE THE MOST IF GORBACHEV MOVES TO
DECENTRALIZE THE SYSTEM AND ARE IMPORTANT OBSTACLES TO
IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS PROGRAM. WHILE MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACIES UNDERSTAND THE CONNECTION
BETWEEN A STRONG DEFENSE AND A HEALTHY ECONOMY, THEY ALSO ARE
UNHAPPY WITH THE IDEA OF GREATER CONSTRAINTS ON DEFENSE
SPENDING AND SKEPTICAL OF PROMISED BENEFITS. OTHERS, FOR
EXAMPLE THE KGB, ARE CONCERNED -- JUSTIFIABLY IT WOULD SEEM -
ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY IN THE SOVIET UNION AND IN
4
EASTERN EUROPE CREATED BY ANY RELAXATION OF POLITICAL
CONTROLS. (INDEED, WE HAVE COUNTED SOME 600 POPULAR
DISTURBANCES SINCE EARLY 1987, ABOUT HALF OF THEM RELATING TO
ETHNIC ISSUES. THERE HAVE BEEN MAJOR NATIONALIST
DEMONSTRATIONS IN 9 OF THE 15 SOVIET REPUBLICS SINCE LAST
JANUARY.) THE SOVIET POPULATION SEEMS TO BE PASSIVELY
SUPPORTIVE, BUT THEY HAVE SEEN CAMPAIGNS FOR CHANGE COME AND
GO. THEY ARE DEEPLY SKEPTICAL THAT GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS WILL
PRODUCE LASTING RESULTS OR EVEN IMMEDIATE PAYOFFS. THE
INTELLIGENTSIA ARE PROBABLY THE ONLY GROUP THAT COMES CLOSE TO
GIVING WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT --- A WEAK REED IN THE SOVIET UNION.
IT IS, HOWEVER, OPPOSITION WITHIN THE PARTY AND
PARTICULARLY IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARTY APPARATUS THAT
HAS BECOME THE PRINCIPAL AND CRITICAL PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV,
AND THE TARGET OF HIS POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. ONE OF THE MAIN
DEVELOPMENTS AT THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUNE, BEYOND APPROVAL
OF HIS PROGRAM, WAS HIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE PARTY ITSELF
IS THE CHIEF OBSTACLE TO MODERNIZATION AND REFORM. HE TACITLY
ADMITTED THAT HE HAS FAILED TO OVERCOME THAT OPPOSITION, AND
HIS STRATEGY NOW SEEMS TO BE TO CIRCUMVENT THE PARTY BY
STRENGTHENING THE SUPREME SOVIET AND ITS CHAIRMAN, TO TAKE THAT
POSITION HIMSELF, AND TO TRY TO FORCE THROUGH HIS ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL CHANGES. HE HAS SECURED APPROVAL FOR A TIMETABLE TO
DISMANTLE THE ECONOMIC APPARATUS OF THE PARTY AND THEREBY
SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKEN ITS CAPACITY TO INTERFERE IN THE DAY TO
DAY MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY.
5
IN SUM, GORBACHEV HAS DECLARED WAR ON THE PARTY APPARATUS
MUCH AS STALIN DID IN THE LATE 1920s AND 1930s. A MAJOR
DIFFERENCE IS THAT HIS ADVERSARIES WILL LOSE POWER, PRESTIGE
AND THEIR JOBS, BUT NOT THEIR LIVES. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN
WHETHER HE CAN so RADICALLY ALTER THE ROLE OF THE PARTY IN
SOVIET LIFE, WHETHER HE CAN DO so WITHOUT CREATING CHAOS, AND
WHETHER THE PARTY APPARAT WILL ALLOW ITSELF TO BE WEAKENED AND
EVEN DISMANTLED. AND NO MATTER HOW MANY PERSONNEL OR
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES GORBACHEV MAKES, IF HE CANNOT MAKE HIS
POLICIES WORK, IF HE CANNOT TURN AROUND THE ECONOMY, TODAY'S
SUPPORTERS WILL AT SOME POINT BECOME TOMORROW'S ADVERSARIES.
MODERNIZATION OF THE ECONOMY
GORBACHEV NOW ADMITS THAT WHEN HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY
HE UNDERESTIMATED THE SEVERITY OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
AFFLICTING THE SOVIET UNION. AS GORBACHEV HAS SEEN THE
DIMENSIONS OF THE CRISIS, HIS VIEWS OF WHAT IS NEEDED TO
CORRECT THESE PROBLEMS HAVE MOVED TOWARD MORE RADICAL PROPOSALS
FOR CHANGE.
TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE REFORM MEASURES PUT IN PLACE IN
GORBACHEV'S THREE YEAR TENURE ARE AN IMPRESSIVE PACKAGE.
NEVERTHELESS, THE REFORMS DO NOT GO NEARLY FAR ENOUGH. THE
6
REFORM PACKAGE AS NOW CONSTITUTED IS A SET OF HALF MEASURES
THAT LEAVES IN PLACE THE PILLARS OF SOCIALIST CENTRAL
PLANNING. THE POLITBURO SIMPLY IS UNWILLING TO LET GO OF THE
REINS GOVERNING THE ECONOMY. BECAUSE OF INTERNAL
CONTRADICTIONS AND THE RETENTION OF SO MANY ELEMENTS OF THE
PRESENT SYSTEM, THE REFORMS, EVEN IF FULLY IMPLEMENTED BY 1991
AS INTENDED, WILL NOT CREATE THE DYNAMIC ECONOMIC MECHANISM
THAT GORBACHEV SEEKS AS THE MEANS TO REDUCE OR CLOSE THE
TECHNOLOGICAL GAP WITH THE WEST. TO THE CONTRARY, AGGRESSIVE
IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS IS CAUSING SERIOUS DISRUPTIONS AND
TURBULENCE IN THE ECONOMY. SPECIFICALLY:
-- SOVIET GNP GROWTH FELL TO LESS THAN 1% IN 1987, DOWN
FROM ALMOST 4% IN 1986. GNP GROWTH WILL BE ABOUT 2-3%
THIS YEAR. GORBACHEV WOULD NEED NEARLY 8% GROWTH PER
YEAR IN 1989 AND 1990 TO MEET THE FIVE YEAR PLAN
TARGETS, A TARGET THAT IS FAR BEYOND REACH.
-- IMPLEMENTATION OF GORBACHEV'S QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAM
CAUSED MAJOR DISRUPTIONS IN PRODUCTION LAST YEAR,
FORCING THE REGIME TO BACK OFF ITS ENFORCEMENT.
-- NEW INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ARE
CREATING CONFUSION AND APPREHENSION IN SOME QUARTERS,
AND BUREAUCRATIC FOOT-DRAGGING AND OUTRIGHT RESISTANCE
IN OTHERS.
7
-- DESPITE CONSIDERABLE RHETORIC, WHAT HAS ACTUALLY BEEN
DONE so FAR HAS NOT GREATLY CHANGED THE SYSTEM OF
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES THAT DISCOURAGE MANAGEMENT
INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND PRIVATE
INITIATIVE.
-- TRYING TO RESHAPE THE ENTIRE STALINIST ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE GRADUALLY WHILE LEAVING KEY PROBLEMS OF PRICE
REFORM AND THE GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY OVER GOODS UNTIL
LAST IS LIKE A PHASED CHANGE FROM DRIVING ON THE RIGHT
HAND SIDE OF THE ROAD TO THE LEFT. THE RESULTS ARE
LIKELY TO BE SIMILAR. TO ILLUSTRATE JUST HOW TOTALLY
OUT OF KILTER THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS, CONSIDER THAT
RENTS FOR HOUSING --- WHICH IS GENERALLY AWFUL -- HAVE
NOT BEEN RAISED SINCE 1928; THE CURRENT PRICE OF BREAD
WAS SET IN 1954, AND MEAT PRICES IN 1962. STATE
SUBSIDIES ARE so HUGE THAT IT IS CHEAPER FOR A PEASANT
TO FEED HIS PIGS BREAD THAN TO GIVE THEM GRAIN.
-- UNDER GORBACHEV, THE DEFICIT IN THE SOVIET STATE BUDGET
HAS SOARED TO THE POINT THAT IT IS NOW EQUAL TO ABOUT
7% OF GNP, ABOUT 66 BILLION RUBLES. BY WAY OF
COMPARISON, THE COMBINED DEFICITS OF THE US STATE AND
FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS REACHED A HIGH OF 3 1/2% OF GNP TWO
YEARS AGO.
8
FINALLY, FOR A MODERNIZATION DRIVE THAT DEPENDS IN
SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE ON HARDER WORK, THERE ARE FEW REWARDS FOR
SUCH WORK. UNSATISFIED CONSUMER DEMAND IS REFLECTED IN EMPTY
SHELVES, LONG LINES IN STATE STORES, AND RISING PRICES IN
RETAIL MARKETS. INDEED, STAGNATION ON THE CONSUMER SCENE AND
RECOGNITION THAT PERESTROIKA CANNOT SUCCEED WITHOUT WORKER
SUPPORT HAS PROMPTED THE LEADERSHIP TO UNDERTAKE A SERIES OF
NEW POLICY INITIATIVES. TARGETS HAVE BEEN RAISED FOR SPENDING
ON HOUSING, EDUCATION, HEALTH, CONSUMER SERVICES, AND
INVESTMENT IN THE LIGHT AND FOOD INDUSTRIES. EVEN SO, THE
POPULATION WON'T SEE MUCH CHANGE IN ITS LIVING STANDARDS IN THE
SHORT TERM BECAUSE THESE INVESTMENTS WILL TAKE TIME TO SHOW
RESULTS AND THE SHORTAGES OF HOUSING AND DECENT HEALTH CARE ARE
SO LARGE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SHIFT TOWARD GREATER PRIORITY
FOR THE CONSUMER IN THE MIDDLE OF THE FIVE YEAR PLAN HAS BEEN
AT THE EXPENSE OF HEAVY INDUSTRY, MODERNIZATION OF WHICH IS THE
CRITICAL ENGINE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH.
THUS, WHILE IMPORTANT BATTLES HAVE BEEN WON IN PRINCIPLE,
THE WAR TO CHANGE FUNDAMENTALLY THE MAIN PILLARS OF THE
STALINIST ECONOMIC SYSTEM AT THIS POINT IS BEING LOST. AFTER
THREE YEARS OF REFORM, RESTRUCTURING AND TURMOIL, THERE HAS
BEEN LITTLE, IF ANY, SLOWING IN THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL OF THE
SOVIET ECONOMY. THE GAP BETWEEN PRONOUNCEMENT AND
IMPLEMENTATION IS HUGE, AND GROWING. IT IS THIS REALITY THAT
9
LED TO THE JUNE PARTY CONFERENCE AND THE DRAMATIC PERSONNEL
CHANGES TWO WEEKS AGO.
POLITICAL REFORM
AN IMPORTANT MILESTONE IN THE EVOLUTION OF GORBACHEV'S
VIEWS WAS RECOGNITION THAT THE REVITALIZATION OF SOCIETY AND
ECONOMY COULD SUCCEED ONLY IF THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN
THE POLITICAL ARENA AS WELL. THE REGIME APPEARS TO BE MOVING
ON AT LEAST THREE FRONTS TO CREATE THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IT
SEEKS:
-- THE FIRST IS IDEOLOGY. GORBACHEV IS FRUSTRATED WITH
THE STRAITJACKET OF INHERITED DOCTRINE THAT OPPONENTS
OF CHANGE HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPOSE ON HIM. HE SEEKS TO
EXPAND HIS ROOM TO MANEUVER BY AN INCREASINGLY OPEN
ATTACK ON STAGNATION IN IDEOLOGY AND BY DEPICTING HIS
OWN PROPOSALS AS AN EFFORT TO RETURN TO LENIN'S
ORIGINAL INTENT AND EXPAND THE BOUNDS OF WHAT IS
PERMISSABLE UNDER SOCIALISM. HIS VERBAL CONTORTIONS IN
EXPLAINING HOW GIVING PEASANTS A 50 YEAR FARM LEASE
DOES NOT REPRESENT A RETREAT FROM SOCIALISM HAVE BEEN,
AT THE LEAST, IMAGINATIVE.
10
-- THE SECOND FRONT IS DEMOCRATIZATION. GORBACHEV'S
CAMPAIGN FOR "DEMOCRATIZATION" IS DESIGNED TO
REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. THE
PARTY CONFERENCE WAS ITSELF AN EXTRAORDINARY POLITICAL
HAPPENING, WITH A FREEDOM OF DEBATE AND EXPRESSION NOT
SEEN IN THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE REVOLUTION.
MOREOVER, THE CONFERENCE APPROVED REMARKABLE PROPOSALS
INCLUDING LIMITING THE TERMS OF OFFICE FOR PARTY
OFFICIALS AND THE USE OF SECRET BALLOTS AND LISTING OF
MULTIPLE CANDIDATES IN ELECTIONS. GORBACHEV APPARENTLY
BELIEVES THAT WITHOUT SUCH REFORM, IT WILL BE
IMPOSSIBLE TO BREAK THE RESISTANCE WITHIN THE PARTY TO
HIS AGENDA. BY THE SAME TOKEN, AS HE DEMONSTRATED TWO
WEEKS AGO, THE OLD METHODS REMAIN AVAILABLE WHEN MORE
DEMOCRATIC MEANS SEEM UNLIKELY TO YIELD THE DESIRED
RESULTS.
-- THE THIRD FRONT IS GLASNOST, OR OPENNESS. TIGHT
CENTRAL CONTROLS OVER THE FLOW OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION
LIE AT THE HEART OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. REMARKS BY
GORBACHEV AND HIS KEY ALLIES INDICATE THAT THE NEW
LEADERSHIP BELIEVES THAT THIS APPROACH IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH AN INCREASINGLY WELL-EDUCATED SOCIETY, COMPLEX
ECONOMY AND THE POLITICAL NEEDS OF THE MOMENT. I SEE
OTHER MOTIVES AS WELL BEHIND GLASNOST, NOT LEAST OF
11
WHICH IS USE OF AN APPARENT LIBERALIZING FORCE TO
ACHIEVE SOME RATHER OLD-FASHIONED OBJECTIVES.
GLASNOST IS BEING USED TO CRITICIZE OFFICIALS
GORBACHEV SEES AS HOSTILE AND TO PRESSURE THEM TO
GET WITH THE PROGRAM.
IT IS BEING USED TO HIGHLIGHT PROBLEMS HE WANTS TO
ATTACK -- SUCH AS ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE,
STALIN'S LEGACY, AND BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA -- IN
ORDER TO MOBILIZE SOCIETY BEHIND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
HE HOPES TO USE THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER OPENNESS
TO COOPT INTELLECTUALS AND PARTICULARLY ENGINEERS
AND SCIENTISTS TO BE FULL PARTNERS IN THE ATTEMPT
TO MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY -- TO OVERCOME THEIR
CYNICISM.
IT ENABLES THE REGIME TO COMPETE WITH FOREIGN AND
OTHER UNOFFICIAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE
POPULATION WILL HEAR ABOUT RIOTING IN KAZAKHSTAN
AND ARMENIA AND THE DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL ANYWAY,
GORBACHEV BELIEVES IT IS BEST TO PRINT THE NEWS AND
PUT AN OFFICIAL SPIN ON IT.
12
FINALLY, HE INTENDS TO LEGITIMIZE BROADER
DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAN
PERMITTED HERETOFORE IN ORDER TO BREAK THE BACK OF
DOMESTIC RESISTANCE AND INCREASE HIS ROOM FOR
MANEUVER AT HOME.
TO KEEP GLASNOST IN PERSPECTIVE, THERE HAS BEEN
GROWING CRITICISM BY OTHERS IN THE POLITBURO THAT
"OPENNESS" HAS GONE TOO FAR. GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAS
CAUTIONED MEDIA OFFICIALS NOT TO GO TOO FAR LEST THEY
UNDERMINE SOCIALIST VALUES OR CREATE A CLIMATE OF
DISRESPECT FOR PARTY OFFICIALS. YET, GORBACHEV HAS SET
LOOSE FORCES THAT WILL BE IMMENSELY DIFFICULT AND
PAINFUL TO LEASH -- AS WE ARE SEEING IN ARMENIA,
AZERBAIJAN, ESTONIA, LATVIA AND EVEN IN MOSCOW.
IN SUM, WHILE GORBACHEV'S BOLD POLITICAL MOVES AND RADICAL
RHETORIC HAVE SHAKEN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, HE HAS NOT YET REALLY
CHANGED IT. THE ULTIMATE FATE OF HIS VISION OF REFORM WILL
DEPEND ON HOW SUCCESSFUL HE IS IN PUSHING AHEAD WITH ITS
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE FACE OF DESIGN FLAWS, ECONOMIC
DISRUPTION, TREMENDOUS OPPOSITION AND, WORSE, APATHY. AS ONE
RUSSIAN RECENTLY SAID, "THERE HAVE BEEN MANY BOOKS WRITTEN ON
THE TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO SOCIALISM BUT NOT ONE ON THE
TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM TO CAPITALISM." BUREAUCRATIC AS WELL
13
AS POPULAR HOSTILITY IS GROWING AS DISRUPTION AND DISLOCATION
BROUGHT ABOUT BY CHANGE RESULT IN ECONOMIC SETBACKS AND A
WORSENING SITUATION FOR THE CONSUMER. WHAT GORBACHEV IS
SUCCESSFULLY CHANGING IS THE OFFICIALDOM OF THE PARTY AND STATE
BUREAUCRACY. AS USUAL IN THE USSR, THE PURGE HAS BECOME THE
VEHICLE FOR CONSOLIDATING AND ENHANCING PERSONAL POWER, AS WELL
AS FOR IMPLEMENTING CHANGE.
IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN - I WOULD EVEN SAY IT IS
DOUBTFUL -- THAT GORBACHEV CAN IN THE END REJUVENATE THE
SYSTEM, BUT HE HAS DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO RISK HIS POWER
AND POSITION AND THE STABILITY OF THE SYSTEM ITSELF IN THE
EFFORT. AS MUCH AS ANYTHING, THIS INDICATES HOW DESPERATE HE
BELIEVES THE SOVIET PREDICAMENT REALLY IS. AND EVEN HE NOW
ADMITS THE STRUGGLE WILL LAST FOR DECADES.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND FOR US STRATEGY
THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE POLITBURO THAT,
FOR NOW, ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION REQUIRES A MORE PREDICTABLE, IF
NOT BENIGN, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN
POLICY THAT SPRING FROM DOMESTIC ECONOMIC WEAKNESS ARE A MIX OF
NEW INITIATIVES AND LONGSTANDING POLICIES. FIRST, GORBACHEV
WANTS TO ESTABLISH A NEW AND FAR-REACHING DETENTE FOR THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE TO OBTAIN TECHNOLOGY, ENCOURAGE INVESTMENT
14
AND TRADE, AND, ABOVE ALL, AVOID LARGE INCREASES IN MILITARY
EXPENDITURES WHILE THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS REVIVED. GORBACHEV
MUST SLOW OR STOP AMERICAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION THAT
THREATENS NOT ONLY SOVIET STRATEGIC GAINS OF THE LAST
GENERATION BUT WHICH ALSO, IF CONTINUED, WILL FORCE THE USSR TO
DEVOTE HUGE NEW RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY IN A HIGH TECHNOLOGY
COMPETITION FOR WHICH THEY ARE ILL-EQUIPPED.
SECOND, A LESS VISIBLE BUT ENDURING ELEMENT OF FOREIGN
POLICY -- EVEN UNDER GORBACHEV -- IS THE CONTINUING
EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE AND SWEEP OF SOVIET MILITARY MODERNIZATION
AND WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. AT THIS POINT WE SEE NO
SLACKENING OF SOVIET WEAPONS PRODUCTION OR PROGRAMS. SOVIET
RESEARCH ON NEW, EXOTIC WEAPONS CONTINUES APACE. VIRTUALLY ALL
OF THEIR PRINCIPAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS WILL BE REPLACED WITH NEW,
MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS BY THE MID-1990S, AND A NEW
STRATEGIC BOMBER IS BEING ADDED TO THEIR ARSENAL FOR THE FIRST
TIME IN DECADES. THEIR DEFENSES AGAINST US WEAPONS ARE BEING
STEADILY IMPROVED, AS ARE THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR WAR-FIGHTING.
AS THE RATE OF GROWTH OF OUR DEFENSE BUDGET DECLINES AGAIN,
THEIRS CONTINUES TO GROW, ALBEIT SLOWLY.
THE THIRD ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS
CONTINUED PURSUIT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND PROTECTION OF SOVIET
CLIENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD. UNDER GORBACHEV, THE SOVIETS AND
CUBANS PROVIDED NEARLY A BILLION DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC AND
15
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA IN 1987; MORE THAN TWO BILLION
DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SENT TO VIETNAM, LAOS
AND CAMBODIA LAST YEAR; AND MORE THAN ONE AND A HALF BILLION
DOLLARS IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SENT TO ANGOLA LAST YEAR --
TWICE THE 1985 LEVEL. AND, OF COURSE, CUBA GETS NEARLY SEVEN
BILLION DOLLARS IN SOVIET SUPPORT EACH YEAR. AT A TIME OF
ECONOMIC STRESS AT HOME, THESE COMMITMENTS SAY A GREAT DEAL
ABOUT SOVIET PRIORITIES.
AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIET UNION PLAINLY WOULD LIKE TO
EASE THIS BURDEN AND IS INTERESTED IN RESOLVING SOME OF THE
THIRD WORLD ISSUES THAT HAVE LED TO ADVERSE REACTIONS IN THE
WEST AND IN ASIA. THE SOVIET RECOGNITION OF DEFEAT IN
AFGHANISTAN IS THE MOST VIVID EXAMPLE. FACED WITH AN
UNWINNABLE WAR, THE KREMLIN LEADERSHIP REASSESSED THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS AND CONCLUDED THAT SOVIET INTERESTS AT HOME AND ABROAD
WERE BETTER SERVED BY LEAVING AFGHANISTAN. SIMILAR
CALCULATIONS ALSO EXPLAIN THE APPARENTLY MORE CONSTRUCTIVE
SOVIET APPROACH TOWARD CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS IN ANGOLA AND
CAMBODIA. THIS TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY IN MY VIEW REFLECTS
INCREASING POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION IN THE KREMLIN. EVEN SO,
SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE THIRD WORLD - AS DEMONSTRATED IN
GORBACHEV'S RECENT PROPOSAL TO TRADE CAM RANH BAY FOR OUR BASES
IN THE PHILIPPINES -- REMAIN ADVERSARIAL AND SEEK TO DIMINISH
US GLOBAL INFLUENCE AND REACH.
16
THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS NEW AND
DYNAMIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO WEAKEN TIES BETWEEN THE US
AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES, CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE THIRD WORLD; TO
PORTRAY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL AND
PEACE. WE CAN AND SHOULD EXPECT OTHER NEW AND BOLD
INITIATIVES, PERHAPS INCLUDING UNILATERAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE
REDUCTIONS THAT WILL SEVERELY TEST ALLIANCE COHESION.
SIMILARLY, NEW INITIATIVES HAVE BEEN TAKEN WITH CHINA THAT
LIKELY WILL LEAD TO A SUMMIT IN A MATTER OF MONTHS; OVERTURES
TO JAPAN ALSO SEEM LIKELY IN AN EFFORT TO OVERCOME BILATERAL
OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED RELATIONS.
IN THIS CONNECTION, I BELIEVE WE CAN ANTICIPATE FURTHER
SIGNIFICANT SOVIET INITIATIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL -- MOST OF THEM
AMBITIOUS AND UNREALISTIC, BUT VIRTUALLY ALL WITH ENORMOUS
GLOBAL POLITICAL APPEAL. GORBACHEV IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE --
AND, I THINK, REACH -- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS, BUT
PAST SOVIET PRACTICE SUGGESTS HE WILL SEEK AGREEMENTS THAT
PROTECT EXISTING SOVIET ADVANTAGES, LEAVE OPEN ALTERNATIVE
AVENUES OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, OFFER COMMENSURATE POLITICAL
GAIN, OR TAKE ADVANTAGE OF US UNILATERAL RESTRAINT OR
CONSTRAINTS (SUCH AS OUR UNWILLINGNESS IN THE 1970S TO COMPLETE
AND KEEP A PERMITTED LIMITED ABM).
FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS THE BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR
GORBACHEV, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ARE
17
PRIMARILY STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC. IN TERMS OF
POTENTIAL SAVINGS, STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ACCOUNT FOR ONLY
ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY BUDGET AND THE SOVIETS
ALREADY HAVE MADE THE INVESTMENT NECESSARY FOR PRODUCTION OF
THEIR STRATEGIC WEAPONS FORCE THROUGH THE MID-1990S. ONLY
THROUGH SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS COULD
GORBACHEV BEGIN TO REALIZE ANY MAJOR ECONOMIC BENEFIT AND, TO A
GREAT EXTENT, THIS WOULD BE YEARS IN THE FUTURE.
THE POLITICAL BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV ARE
EVIDENT. IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON
WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOW WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION,
WEAKEN RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD,
AND OPEN TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY
AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ARMS CONTROL GIVES CREDENCE TO SOVIET
CLAIMS OF THEIR BENIGN INTENTIONS AND MAKES THEM APPEAR TO BE A
FAR MORE ATTRACTIVE PARTNER TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN POLITICAL,
CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC ARENAS.
ARMS CONTROL IS AN ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION FROM GORBACHEV'S
POINT OF VIEW FOR ITS STRATEGIC IMPACT AS WELL -- AS LONG AS
ANY AGREEMENT INCORPORATES BASIC SOVIET POSITIONS: PERMITTING
CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS AND DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE
ICBMS, PREVENTING THE UNITED STATES FROM DEPLOYING AN EFFECTIVE
SPACE-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE, AND CONSTRAINING AIR AND SEA
LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. FROM THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE, DEEP
18
CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH THESE PROVISOS, OFFER
THE MEANS TO LIMIT THE GROWING NUMBER OF HARD-TARGET WEAPONS IN
THE US ARSENAL AND TO CONSTRAIN US PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES. WHILE START OBVIOUSLY WOULD
ALSO LIMIT SOVIET WEAPONS PROGRAMS, THEY PRESUMABLY BELIEVE
THAT AN AGREEMENT THAT ENCOMPASSED THEIR BOTTOM-LINE POSITIONS
WOULD, AT MINIMUM, NOT DEGRADE THEIR RELATIVE STRATEGIC POSTURE.
ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER NEW INITIATIVES ALSO ARE INTENDED TO
BREAK SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF LONGSTANDING TACTICAL
DEADENDS AND TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION A MORE EFFECTIVE,
FLEXIBLE AND VIGOROUS PLAYER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE RESULT
IS LIKELY TO BE A SOVIET POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO THE US ABROAD
THAT COULD POSE GREATER PROBLEMS FOR OUR INTERNATIONAL
POSITION, ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FUTURE THAN THE
HERETOFORE ONE DIMENSIONAL SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE.
CONCLUSIONS
WHILE ACTUAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY OF THE SOVIET UNION SO
FAR HAVE BEEN SMALL AND FREQUENTLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, WHAT
GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS SET IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL
EARTHQUAKE. HE IS PULLING ALL OF THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A
SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY HAS RESISTED CHANGE --
AND WHERE CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. HE IS
19
A FIGURE OF ENORMOUS HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE. THE FORCES HE HAS
UNLEASHED ARE POWERFUL BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS
HE HAS ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A TREMENDOUS POWER
STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE ABSENCE OF SHOW
TRIALS AND TERROR.
THE STRUGGLE IS ESSENTIALLY BETWEEN THOSE SEEKING TO
PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO -- AND THEIR POWER IN IT -- AND
GORBACHEV AND HIS ALLIES WHO SEEK TO REPLACE THOSE NOW IN POWER
AND, IRONICALLY, TO TURN THE CLOCK BACK, BACK BEFORE STALINISM
TO LENINISM. GORBACHEV SEEKS A SYSTEM IN WHICH SOME -- THOUGH
CERTAINLY NOT ALL - ELEMENTS OF THE STALINIST ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE AND BUREAUCRACY ARE ELIMINATED THUS OPENING THE WAY
TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND INNOVATION AND THEREBY TO
MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVED PERFORMANCE. HOWEVER, GORBACHEV'S
LENINISM STILL MEANS THE CONTINUED POLITICAL MONOPOLY OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY -- ALBEIT A REJUVENATED ONE, ITS ROLE AS SOLE
ARBITER OF THE NATIONAL AGENDA, ITS CONTROL OF ALL THE LEVERS
OF POWER, AND ITS ULTIMATE AUTHORITY OVER ALL ASPECTS OF
NATIONAL LIFE - INCLUDING THE LAW. THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY REMAINS UNTOUCHED AND UNTOUCHABLE.
WESTERNERS FOR CENTURIES HAVE HOPED REPEATEDLY THAT RUSSIAN
ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL REFORM - EVEN REVOLUTION
-- SIGNALED AN END TO DESPOTISM. REPEATEDLY SINCE 1917, THE
WEST HAS HOPED THAT DOMESTIC CHANGES IN THE USSR WOULD LEAD TO
20
CHANGES IN COMMUNIST COERCIVE RULE AT HOME AND AGGRESSIVENESS
ABROAD. THESE HOPES, DASHED TIME AND AGAIN, HAVE BEEN REVIVED
BY GORBACHEV'S AMBITIOUS DOMESTIC AGENDA, INNOVATIVE FOREIGN
POLICY AND PERSONAL STYLE.
ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET GOVERNANCE AT HOME AND
POLICY ABROAD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT -- WHILE THE CHANGES UNDERWAY
OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR A RELAXATION
OF TENSIONS - GORBACHEV INTENDS IMPROVED SOVIET ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, GREATER POLITICAL VITALITY AT HOME, AND MORE
DYNAMIC DIPLOMACY TO MAKE THE USSR A MORE COMPETITIVE AND
STRONGER ADVERSARY IN THE YEARS AHEAD.
THE QUESTION I AM MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED IS WHETHER IT IS IN
OUR INTEREST FOR GORBACHEV TO SUCCEED OR FAIL. THE FIRST THING
WE SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE IS THAT THERE IS LITTLE THAT THE UNITED
STATES CAN DO TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF THE STRUGGLE GOING ON
INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION. THAT SAID, WE SHOULD ASK OURSELVES IF
WE WANT THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION OF
THE HISTORICAL AND CURRENT SOVIET SYSTEM. I THINK NOT.
WHAT WE DO SEEK IS A SOVIET UNION THAT IS PLURALISTIC
INTERNALLY, NON-INTERVENTIONIST EXTERNALLY, OBSERVES BASIC
HUMAN RIGHTS, CONTRIBUTES TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND
TRANQUILLITY, AND A SOVIET UNION WHERE THESE CHANGES ARE MORE
THAN A TEMPORARY EDICT FROM THE TOP AND ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE
21
VIEWS, POWER AND DURABILITY OF A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL. WE CAN
HOPE FOR SUCH CHANGE BUT ALL OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET HISTORY
CAUTIONS US TO BE SKEPTICAL AND CAUTIOUS.
WE CANNOT -- AND SHOULD NOT -- CLOSE OUR EYES TO MOMENTOUS
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR, BUT WE SHOULD WATCH, WAIT, AND
EVALUATE. AS LONGTIME SOVIET-WATCHER WILLIAM ODOM HAS SAID, WE
SHOULD APPLAUD PERESTROIKA BUT NOT FINANCE IT. WE SHOULD NOT
MAKE CONCESSIONS BASED ON HOPE AND POPULAR ENTHUSIASMS HERE OR
PLEASING PERSONALITIES AND ATMOSPHERIC OR SUPERFICIAL CHANGES
THERE. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES
WHERE THE TERMS ARE FAVORABLE TO US OR WHERE WE CAN BRING ABOUT
DESIRABLE CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICIES -- WHETHER TO PROMOTE
HUMAN RIGHTS, FREER EMIGRATION, STRATEGIC STABILITY, SOLUTIONS
TO SOVIET GENERATED PROBLEMS SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN, OR EVEN
EXPANDED BUSINESS TIES (IF THERE IS NO TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE
TECHNOLOGY). ABOVE ALL, WE MUST ESTABLISH REALISTIC CRITERIA
BY WHICH WE CAN JUDGE IN THE COMING MONTHS AND YEARS WHETHER
POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION GENUINELY IS
RESHAPING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SYSTEM -- OR WHETHER THE
TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE
INSTRUMENTS OF CENTRAL CONTROL AND REPRESSION, ENDURES
DISCREETLY IN THE SHADOWS, AVAILABLE AT THE BECKON OF
GORBACHEV'S SUCCESSOR, OR EVEN FOR GORBACHEV.
22
THERE ARE MANY UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING THE SOVIET UNION
TODAY, BUT ONE FACT IS APPARENT: WHETHER GORBACHEV SUCCEEDS,
FAILS, OR JUST SURVIVES, A STILL LONG COMPETITION AND STRUGGLE
WITH THE SOVIET UNION LIE BEFORE US. PRESERVING THE PEACE AND
FOSTERING AN ENDURING RELAXATION OF TENSIONS DEPEND UPON SEEING
THIS REALITY CLEARLY. KEEPING THIS LONG RANGE PERSPECTIVE --
WITH KEEN AWARENESS OF THE OPPORTUNITIES AS WELL AS THE DANGERS
-- WILL BE AN EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND
THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS AHEAD.
23
Chriss
THE WHITE house
WASHINGTON
May 1, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW CARD
JOE HAGIN
DAVID DEMAREST
JOHN KELLER
MARLIN FITZWATER TIMOTHY MCBRIDE
SUSAN PORTER ROSE PATTY PRESOCK
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
STEPHEN M. STUDDERT sus
SUBJECT:
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
I have expressed our concurrence to Boston University of the
attached schedule proposal.
B.O. CATERNAL
IEL
Boston University
COMMENCEMENT EXCERCISE
Sunday, May 21, 1989
10:30 a.m.
Academic Procession begins. (Graduates, Faculty, Deans,
and Vice Presidents will file onto field. It will take
approximately 25 minutes for everyone to be seated.)
11:00 a.m.
Presidents Bush and Mitterrand, Mrs. Bush and President
Silber will be escorted to the platform on Nickerson Field.
11:05 a.m.
Dr. Metcalf, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Boston
University, will open the Commencement Exercise. The national
anthems will be played. Professor Elie Wiesel will deliver
the invocation. Thereafter, President Silber will
preside over the ceremonies.
11:10 a.m.
Dr. Silber will introduce the Senior Student Speaker whose
address will last not more than three minutes.
11:13 a.m.
Dr. Silber will introduce the faculty winners of the
Metcalf Cup and Prize for Excellence in Teaching. Two
prizes will be given and two citations read.
11:23 a.m.
Mrs. Barbara Bush will be escorted to the podium.
Her citation will be read and sha will be hooded.
She does not speak.
11:28 a.m.
President Mitterrand will be eacorted to the podium,
citation will be read and he will be hooded.
President Mitterrand will deliver address which will be
about ten minutes add an additional 10 minutes for trans-
lation.
11:53 a.m.
President Bush will be escorted to podium, citation will be
read and he will be hooded.
President Bush will deliver address which is expected to last
ten minutes.
12:08 p.m.
President Bush's address ends and he returns to his seat.
12:09 p.m.
Dr. Silber will present candidates for degrees. (en masse)
Each dean will announce from the microphone his or her
candidates (en masse).
12:29 p.m.
President Silber will then recognize the Class of 1939,
will make brief remarks to parents, thank Alumni Concert
Band and staff.
12:34 p.m.
Mrs. Nancy Joaquim will sing Clarissima, school song.
12:36 p.m.
Bernard Cardinal Law, Archbishop of Boston, will deliver
the benediction.
12:40 p.m.
Presidents Bush and Mitterrand, Mrs. Bush and President
Silber will depart the platform to the Case Center.
Note: We should allow an additional 10 minutes for movement back and forth by
platform party, applause and cheers from audience. I have not added that to
the schedule.
1150 Connecticut Avenue, Hally N.W.
VHA®
Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20036
202/822-9750
VOLUNTARY HOSPITALS OF AMERICA, INC.®
Office of Public Policy
April 28, 1989
David F. DeMarest, Jr.
Assistant to the President
for Communications
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. DeMarest:
Thank you for sending we President Bush's speech to the American
Newspaper Publishers Association in your memorandum to opinion
leaders. I appreciate being kept informed of the President's
messages and the Administration's initiatives. I look forward to
receiving further communications from your office.
Sincerely
Daniel P. Bourque
Corporate Seniór Vice President
0608S