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THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
INCOMING
CO 001-07
DATE RECEIVED: FEBRUARY 07, 1989
NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE MOST REV. BERNARD CARDINAL LAW
SUBJECT: FOLLOWS UP ON A MATTER SPOKEN OF PREVIOUSLY
"MIDDLE EAST ISSUES"
ACTION
DISPOSITION
ROUTE TO:
ACT
DATE
TYPE
C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY
(STAFF NAME)
CODE YY/MM/DD
RESP
D YY/MM/DD
JOHN SUNUNU
ORG 89/02/07
C 891021/4
C
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ /
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
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REFERRAL NOTE:
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REFERRAL NOTE:
COMMENTS: no response necessary. Governor spoke on phone
TR
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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75,OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
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#4759
CARDINAL'S RESIDENCE
2101 COMMONWEALTH AVENUE
BRIGHTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02135
AAAAA
TO LIVE IS CHRIST
January 30, 1989
you.
Mr. John Sununu
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear John:
This is the matter that I spoke to you about. I send it simply
for your information.
I spoke with Frank McNamara this morning and he told me that
later today he is announcing that he will offer his
resignation. I think this is good for all concerned. At the
same time, I am not at all convinced that there has not been an
effort to do him in that may need to be looked at carefully.
With warm personal regards and asking God to bless you, I am
Sincerely yours in Christ,
Archbishop of Boston
BCL/ac
DEPARTMENT
JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167
MEMO: Ray Helmick, S.J. to Cardinal Law -- January 16, 1989
On letter from Raymond Edde.
Yesterday I received the attached letter from Mr. Raymond Edde, the man
who would apparently be the choice of the great majority of the Lebanese legis-
lature if they were allowed freely to elect the next President of Lebanon. It
is occasioned by the letter on the Lebanese presidential election that I sent
late last year to Dr. Joseph LeBaron of the U.S. State Department, who has the
Lebanese desk in Mr. Richard Murphy's section. Copies of that letter went to
you, Cardinal O'Connor, Archbishop Laghi, Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, and Father
Moubarak, the assistant to Patriarch Sfeir who is Secretary General to the
Maronite Bishops' Conference and to the Conference of Catholic Patriarchs and
Bishops in the Middle East.
Mr. Eddé's letter is important, as he takes several quite distinct
stands, and evidently trusts that the content of this letter will be communicated
to the new U.S. administration. I have questions about the judiciousness of some
of these stands, and need some advice on how to judge and present them, as well
as some help in communicating them. I've done a typed transcription of the hand-
written letter and a translation, so it would be easier to assess.
You recall that, in my letter to Dr. LeBaron, I mentioned that the
position Mr. Edde was reported to have taken, that he would not accept the office
of President without a prior withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, was so
unrealistic that it would disqualify him if he insisted on it. It is very
striking that Mr. Eddé's letter drops that position entirely. But he does take
the position that a withdrawal of Israeli troops from the South of Lebanon is a
requirement before he would take up the office of President. My principal
question about the judiciousness of his stand is on this point, and I'd like to
expand on it a bit.
I've already learned, and had it confirmed by many competent observers
of the Lebanese scene, that the presence of the Israeli occupying army in the
South, what they call their "Security Zone," is massively destabilizing to any
Lebanese government. No President of Lebanon can ever have credibility with his
people so long as that army is in place, nor can the Lebanese Army. I have even
discussed this with an Israeli General who had a large degree of responsibility
for the occupying army in the "Security Zone," heard from him very feeble denials
of the interpretation that the army's presence was that destabilizing, and even-
tually his statement that there was nothing the Lebanese could do to dislodge
them, SO they could like it or lump it.
The Israelis have, of course, their reasons for being there, which our
U.S. officials have interpreted as a right of self-defense, to protect the upper
Galilee from attack from Lebanon. There is good reason to doubt the proportionality
of the threat they see to Galilee settlements to the fundamental harm being done
to the Lebanese state. Mr. Edde makes a comparison of the small number of Israeli
casualties in Galilee over the last 20 years with the enormous damage to Lebanon
in the two Israeli invasions (1978 and 1982) and the 30,000 Lebanese killed. But
I would think the more realistic measure, in terms of present damage, is in the
destabilisation I refer to, which makes the settlement of Lebanon's troubles truly
Memo on letter from Raymond Edde, Jan. 16, '89 -- 2
impossible so long as this Israeli occupation lasts.
My question was of the judiciousness of Mr. Edde's setting this condition
for his acceptance of the presidency (which it seems still clear that a large
majority of the authorised electors members of the legislature -- of all the
Lebanese confessional groups, want him to have), at a time when Syria and the
United States are still exercising a veto over his getting it. He asks the U.S.
to persuade its ally, Israel, to get out of his country when the U.S. still has
its doubts about him. I tend to conclude that he does make a fair proposition.
The questions that need resolving are: 1) whether Israel would in fact
be endangered by withdrawing its occupying troops from Lebanon; and 2) who would
be the true winners and losers in such a development.
As for danger to Israel, that would follow only if Israel actually came
under attack from Lebanon, even pin-prick attack. The forces from which Israel
could expect that are the Palestinians in Lebanon and the Hezbollah (Party of God)
Shi'ites. But the Palestinians under Chairman Arafat's control have been quite
faithful to the renunciation of terrorism made repeatedly recently. Even Israeli
General Shomron has acknowledged that they have made no attacks on Israel or the
Israeli Army since November. (Prime Minister Shamir was rather indignant at Shomron's
having acknowledged that, but had no argument that his assessment was untrue.) The
anti-Arafat "rejectionist" Palestinian groups are a far more manageable problem,
especially if Lebanese government forces and the UNIFIL troops were enabled to
act against them, as they are not able to do while the Israelis are there in
Southern Lebanon. As for those Lebanese, mainly Shi'ites of either the Hezbollah
faction or the more moderate Amal movement, there is plenty of motivation for them
to attack Israelis or their surrogate Lebanese force (the South Lebanon Army) so
long as they are in occupation of Lebanese territory, but little or no inclination
to attack across the Israeli border. Withdrawal of the Israeli troops from Lebanon
would make attack on Israeli territory by these factions even less likely, and
again controllable by Lebanese government forces, who would be quite determined
to prevent such incursions, and UNIFIL. Hence I would judge that danger of attack
on Galilee from Lebanon would be really illusory if the Israelis ended their
occupation.
As for winners and losers, it should be clear that a new Lebanese President
who had brought about the withdrawal of the Israelis from the South would have a
tremendous welcome from his people, and the real winners would be Lebanese of all
the confessional groups who would be helped, by this fact, to achieve practical
consensus for the reordering of their national life. The losers would be the
Hezbollah faction. They would be discredited and would lose out definitively in
their competition with Amal for the approval of the Shi'ite community. Hezbollah's
loss should be a real inducement to our U.S. government and to the Israelis to look
favorably on Mr. Edde's demand. The Israelis would have, in fact, genuine security
and stability on their Northern border. That should be welcome and a real induce-
ment to them unless what they really want is in fact the destabilisation of Lebanon,
and in that case they should receive no encouragement from the United States.
Mr. Edde not only makes his demand for Israeli withdrawal, but he also
wants to set up the means of dramatising his demand if he is elected. That is the
point of the two conditions he attaches to his candidacy (p. 4 of his hand-written
text). Many of his supporters have in fact urged him to return to Lebanon to seek
his election. He makes it clear that his remaining in Paris is calculated so that,
if elected while there, he can refuse to go to Lebanon to take up the post until the
Memo on letter from Raymond Edde, Jan. 16, '89 3
Israelis withdraw ( and until the U.S. government does whatever is necessary to
bring the Israelis to that point, which, as he observes, the U.S. can readily
do). It seems to me that this means of dramatisation is a separate issue from
the substance of the demand for withdrawal. It is not at all a wicked thing
for Mr. Eddé to envision. But if the U.S. government made the judgment, to my
mind the right one, that the Israelis should be induced to withdraw (a thing
that would be to their own benefit), it could arrange these matters without
having to suffer the indignities that Mr. Edde's dramatisation would bring on
both Israel and the U.S. I would think that assurances could be made that this
would be brought about, and Mr. Edde induced to relinguish this bit of theater.
Mr. Edde believes that the Israelis refuse to end their occupation for a
different reason: not any real fear for the security of Galilee, but instead an
intention to divert the water of Southern Lebanon to Israel's own use and perhaps
eventually the intention of annexing the territory South of the Litani river and
expelling its inhabitants, I know that there are a number of signs that the
Lebanese (not Mr. Edde alone but a vast number of Lebanese) take as indicating
such an intention. I see this suspicion as unproven, really unlikely under present
circumstances, and rather paranoid. That does not detract at all from the obser-
vation that the Israeli occupation is dreadfully destabilising to the Lebanese
state. But since the suspicions are so widely believed in Lebanon, I would think
it appropriate for the U.S. government to treat them as things that call for
serious and genuine refutation, so that these anxieties, however paranoid, will
be put to rest. There should be real assurances that no such thing will happen.
It may be expected that the Israelis, when this matter is brought up,
will want to make their withdrawal, if it is to be discussed at all, contingent
on a prior Syrian withdrawal. That is the route the U.S. went in the negotiations
of 1983, compounding the error at that time by forcing Lebanon into an agreement
with Israel to that effect without even consulting the Syrians themselves. That
experience ought to have shown the U.S. government that such a policy goes
nowhere. Israeli withdrawal should be an acceptance of legality, as well as a
recognition of Israel's own true interest, not a quid pro quo.
Mr. Edde points out, in this connection, Security Council resolutions
509 and 625, which demand the withdrawal of Israeli occupying troops from South
Lebanon. I would note the inconsistency at the top of p. 4 of his hand-written
letter where, in this context, he complains that the U.S. vetoes every Security
Council resolution favorable to Lebanon. Not so, of course, in the case of these
resolutions, which would not exist as Security Council resolutions if the U.S.
had vetoed them. But while mistakenin the supposition that the U.S. vetoes
anything good for Lebanon, he is right to expect that the U.S. seek implementation
of resolutions it has voted for, or has even allowed to pass by one of those
abstentions that are always so telling in the case of resolutions inconvenient
to Israeli policy.
I have been familiar for some years with Mr. Edde's position that the
legal situation in force between Lebanon and Israel is defined by the 1949 armistice
agreement, which he sees as violated by the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982, as
well as by the continued occupation ever since 1978. The Israelis, I know, see
the armistice situation as long since superceded by the attacks on Galilee across
the Lebanese border, and U.S. policy has tended to support this Israeli position.
Memo on letter from Raymond Edde, Jan. 16, '89 -- 4
The attacks have of course been the actions of Palestinians, not of the
Lebanese. The one way in which the Lebanese government has been involved has
been through the 1969 Cairo agreement, brought about by the sponsorship of then
Egyptian President Nasser, which the Lebanese government understood as a curb on
actions of the Palestinians that they had been unable to control, and the Palestinians
understood as licence for their operations against Israel. It should be understood
that the Cairo Agreement is now long since abrogated, and that Raymond Eddé, from
the beginning, always regarded it as wholly illegal, and something unfairly imposed
on Lebanon by yet another foreign intervention, in this case Egypt's. It should
not be seen as defining the legal situation now, and certainly not in the case
of an Edde presidency. So there is good reason for the parties to agree that the
armistice convention of 1949 defines the legal relation between Lebanon and Israel,
until such time as a more positive relation can genuinely be created.
As for the equally necessary withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon,
it should be recognised by the U.S. government that achieving the withdrawal of
Israeli troops would give Mr. Edde, as a new President, tremendous leverage,
especially with the diplomatic help he could expect from the U.S. and from all
of the Arab world, to bring about the Syrian withdrawal as well. In this case,
as in that of Israel, it could be shown conclusively to the Syrians that they
would not be the losers in such a transaction.
Mr. Edde bases his entire position on law, and on that basis finds the
action of the United States, in joining with Syria to designate and proscribe
candidates for the Lebanese presidency, shocking. He really is right in this,
and there is no way around it. I hope that can be brought to the attention of
our new President, Mr. Bush, and his Secretary of State. This whole policy
toward the Lebanese presidential election is a serious aberration, discrediting
to the U.S., and deserves another look by the new Administration. The excuses
and rationalizations that both you and I have heard from officials of the
outgoing Administration, and the claims that the policy is something other than
it really is, just don't hold up under examination. And I don't at all see that
this has contributed to the interest of the U.S.
I found as I read through Mr. Edde's letter that I was finding the
expression often grandiloquent and a bit alienating to me as an American reader.
When I reflected on this, I found that my reaction was unjust, because Mr. Edde
was thinking and expressing himself in terms of a language culture that is not
in fact French but Arabic, and his expression is true to that culture. Underlying
it, I find, is an honesty that deserves to be communicated to the highest officials
of our U.S. government. I am anxious that this should happen.
I will send along a copy of this memo to Archbishop Laghi, as I feel
I need his counsel in this whole matter.
Paris 1989
RAYMOND eddé
Revent Pine
Raymond 6. Helmick
Mov bire
Note ami 6 Fere Honbarak, sui
miazemis, is ya qualques four, who
de vote 20/1016 an 3? Joseph
LBazon, vient r 2e with all libon
fow frends possion I son post
d secietare general de l'assecuble
de Patriaches et Evefus Catholifes.
to sin paid under d'eminents services.
& frime abord, rous lize be
fen'ai forwars les un 10ftort aussi claiz
effrices, Inc la Litua tion altualle are
libar, for le viste.
moi, toutefor, de vous fairs
in refroche: is ext 40h elopical a wou
egain fivial has touth is qualitis at
l foureir the vous voulez bien wo tribuez.
uiamoins, use smile hualité
2
RAYMOND EDDÉ
dont for v'ai d'villeurs has l'excluvisite:
to suis we patriote convaince dont la
secule are bition est le liberes le
territore do sew pays.
to we seen Hi un libouo- syrien. in un
libano- brailier firm, tout scriptement,
un libouain. libaluais.
on we Document ) itic toh lijalist.
t l c'est feat its dis are couscil,
fre wou fire, lui itait lue fraud avout,
m a docine, l four oi f'ai obtanu
wa licence in droct: duzalex fed Lex!
Certes, four i Lowe politique an for seri
devenu, i cause de lai, le strict usfect de
la Coi n'itait has un her 6m Conseil.
Mon lefalesme us' a value d nombrex
enuemes.
rais l'encatice, see toul four case ilive
des live. finiles, west- is has, d avoir
la conseive tran wille?
Cela m' a percess & line la verite'
Route voix souvent, efolament, an detriment
de we partisans.
1w
RAYMOND eddé
Ainzi, fe froilame, for la libar,
fri a obtine son autonomic sam
l'ufile 0 Howan, est we 'tat
souverain, bei 4' a accume beon
à neevoir do la Syne, bei cickists,
Comers itat indificiant, the refers
1920 La lyne us free Considerer le
libar comme leve frovince Syricane
1a. n'o for à s' immiser daws 400
affairs interiences.
to frodams, autsi, the washington
n'aurait has du affrouve capinitiation
de Carmier synenne ees 1926, it D'arricier
a David four Isigner
un candidat i Co peritere r la
Refubliful libaraize.
low la wide der democrates friest
L.Amenique, - ast use comfortment
choquant.
Washerifton devrait for enice, exiger
be son allie Mailier, qui enarge,
annuellement as Calfet americain
for flu re 3 riclians do dollars
les involutions 625509
4
RAYMOND eddé
du cousiel le Leuri Co Cui edigent.
be what le son assure du Liban-Sat.
Golenver securent the a
consier do Licuzile und une resolution
favorable are libar, cen veto, lesuel,
american, in Tes vient.
Voila far estime devoire
fores wa cantilations a 6 pesilence
be l'accomptofnant le leas < entitions:
D'che ela, Tout u stant a savis,
Ca bee la Cours titu an Gbandia
for.
2-6- me utommer are Lilan, en
las a succes, qu avoir
oftinn le utrait & l asmes
Free i' aming
seale, feet exiger at obteniz.
Au moment on L' UR85 reture son
armici d' Hylaniston it Cuba retile 6
view '' Angela, is ast income fr. Lenble
'brail main tione son are folem
he Librar for 2000 fritole 90' is doit
sanvagates b Icenite de lo balicie
Tout 4 month , ait to 620ml a Co
5
RAYMOND eddé
plus forte as we're de lo zegion,
l'aviation la mind entraine at
lo Bombe ATOMIQUE !!
6'nt G Liban, que a its envathi, for
deux for, for ( asmes blaclienne
fuia Decarionne des digate four re is
midierd, at entraine la wort
plan de 30.000 Libancis
1 17ail fournait it wriguer le nombe
de vie times tombines en balilie refues
20 are?
alministration 122ail, w figure for we Litani?
hent-it frodame be Faces son
bris'occute des can't due have
Ne tient is has a exploiter les can
Liban - Sud?
Telle de est la veritable laison, four on la-
fuelle Li is en maintient vio la tion son de assure la convention
d'arvistice bon, Libano - brailienne, Tomfory
in vifuear, et du I roit interna -
tional.
!
RAYMOND eddé
lufin, 2, du Sad-liban
est du ai la ezainte de subir rs
, Hafues Venant du LiBAN, fourquei
r'offore-t-il a e'exécution de la
violution qui prevoit le deploiement
de ( UNIFEL (Res.587) jugu's à la
frontice libano insilierne?
Pere, excuses. heri d'avoir above de
vote bonte' it de vote fatience. tout
f. four tien tout ee free voes fails M us
a vous remercies de for coear
julu vous pain reasin ct i vous l in frie Uspect a 'ogiver
l liben.
forma l'extrenion a I won proport
Roy-6 us
Ravmond Eddé
Paris le 10 Janvier 1989
Reverend Pere
Raymond G. Helmick
Mon Pere
Notre ami, le Pere Moubarak, qui m'a remis, il y a quelques jours, copie
de votre rapport au Dr. Joseph LeBaron, vient de se rendre au Liban pour
prendre possession de son poste de Secrétaire Général de l'assemblée des
Patriarches et Eveques Catholiques. Je suis sûr qu'il rendra d'éminentes
services.
Je voudrai, de prime abord, vous dire que je n'ai jamais lu un rapport aussi
clair et précis, sur la situation actuelle au Liban, que le vôtre.
Permettez moi, toutefois, de vous faire unreproche: il est trop élogieux
a mon egard. Je n'ai pas toutes les qualités et la pouvoir que vous voulez
bien m'attribuer. Je me reconnais, néanmoins, une seule qualité dont je
2
n'ai d'ailleurs pas l'exclusivité: je suis un patriote convaincu dont la
seule ambition est de liberer la territoire de son pays.
Je ne suis ni un libano-Syrien, ni un libano-Israélien. Je suis, tout
simplement, un libanais-libanais!
On me reproche souvent d'être trop légaliste. Je le suis. C'est peut être
du au conseil, que mon père, qui était un grand avocat, m'a donné, le jour
ou j'ai obtenu ma licence en droit: Dura sed lex!
Certes, pour l'homme politique que je suis devenu, à cause de lui, le strict
respect de la loi n'était pas un tres bon conseil. Mon légalisme m'a valu
de nombreux ennemis.
Mais l'essentiel, surtout pour un élève des Pères Jesuites, n'est-il pas,
d'avoir la conscience tranquille?
Cela m'a permis de dire la verité a haute voix souvent, également, au detriment
de mes partisans.
3 Ainsi, je proclame, que le Liban, qui a obtenu son autonomie sous l'empire
ottoman, est un état souverain, qui n'a aucue leçon a recevoir de la Syrie,
qui n'existe, comme état indépendant, que depuis 1920. La Syrie ne peut
considerer le Liban comme une province Svrienne. Elle n'a pas à s'immiscer
dans nos affaires interieures.
Je proclame, aussi, que Washington n'aurait pas du approuver la pénétration
de l'armée Syrienne en 1976, et s'associer dernierement à Damas pour désigner
un candidat a la présidence de la Republique Libanais.
Letter of Raymond Edde to Raymond G. Helmick, 10 Jan '89, cont. 2
Pour la mere des democraties qu'est l'Amerique, c'est un comportement choquant.
Washington devrait, par contre, exiger de son allié Israélien, qui émarge,
annuellement, au budget americain pour plus de 3 Milliards de dollars, qu'il
execute les resolutions 625 et 509 du Conseil de Securité qui exigent le
4 retrait de son armée du Liban-Sud. Malheureusement, chaque fois que le
Conseli de Sécurité rend une résolution favorable au Liban, un veto, le seul,
americain, intervient.
Voilà pourquoi, j'ai estime devoir poser ma candidature à la presidence
en l'accompagnant de deux conditions:
1 D'être élu, tout en étant à Paris, ce que la Constitution
Libanais n'interdit pas.
2 De ne retourner au Liban, en cas de success, qu'après avoir
obtenue le retrait de l'armée Israélienne, que l'Amerique, seule,
peut exiger et obtenir.
Au moment où l'URSS retire sa armée d'Afghanistan et Cuba retire la sienne
d'Angola, il est incompréhensible qu'Israel maintienne son occupation du
Liban Sud sous prétexte qu'il doit sauvegarder la sécurité de la Galilée.
5 Tout le monde sait qu'Israél a la plus forte armée de la région, l'aviation
la mieux entrainée et la Bombe Atomique!!
C'est le Liban, qui a été envahi, par deux fois, par l'armée Israélienne
qui a occasionné des dégats des milliards, et entrainé la mort de plus de
30.000 Libanais.
Israel pourrait-el indiquer le nombre de victimes tombées en Galilee depuis
20 ans?
Israél, peut-il proclamer que dans son administration un figure pour un
département qui s'occupe des eaux du fleuve Litani?
Ne tient-il pas à exploiter les eaux du Liban-Sud?
Telle est la veritableraison pour laquelle il mainteint son armée au Liban,
enviolation de la convention d'armistice Libano-Israélienne, toujour en vigueur,
et du droit international.
6 Enfin, si l'occupation du Sud-Liban est dû à la crainte de subir des attaques
venant du Liban, pourquoi s'oppose-t-il à l'éxécution de la résolution qui
prevoit la deploiement de l'UNIFIL (Res. 587) jusqu'à la frontière libano-
israélienne?
Père, excusez-moi d'avoir abusé de vôtre bonté et de vôtre patience. Je tiens
à vous remercier de tout coeur pour tout ce que vous faites pour le Liban.
J'espere vous revoir à l'un de vos passages à Paris et vous prie d'agréer
l'expression de mon profond respect.
Raymond Eddé
Raymond Edde
Paris, Janury 10, 1989
Reverend Father
Raymond G. Helmick
Father
Our friend, Father Moubarak, who gave me, a few days ago, a copy of your
report to Dr. Joseph LeBaron, is returning to Lebanon to take possession
of his station a Secretary General of the Assembly of Catholic Patriarchs
and Bishops. I am sure he will render eminent services.
I would like, from the start, to tell you that I have never read a report
as clear and accurate, on the present situation in Lebanon, as yours.
Permit me, all the same, to make one criticism: it is too laudatory with
regard to me. I have not all the qualities and the power that you would like
to attribute to me. I acknowledge, nonethe less, a single quality to which
2 I have, moreover, no exclusive claim: I am a convinced patriot whose sole
ambition is to free the territory of his country.
I am neither a Lebanese-Syrian, nor a Lebanese-Israeli. I am, quite simply,
a Lebanese-Lebanese!
People often blame me for being too legalist. That I am. It is perhaps due
to the advice which my father, who was a great lawyer, gave me, the day that
I received my licentiate in law: Dura lex sed lex!
Surely, for the political man that I have become, because of him, strict
respect for the law was not very good advice. My legalism has won me numerous
enemies.
But the essential, above all for a student of the Jesuit Fathers, is it not
to have a tranquil conscience?
That has permitted me to speak the truth, often in a loud voice, even when it
was to the detriment of my partisans.
3 Thus, I declare, that Lebanon, which obtained its autonomy under the Ottoman
Empire, is a sovereign state, which has no lesson to learn from Syria, which
has not existed as an independant state except since 1920. Syria may not
consider Lebanon as a Syrian province. It has not to involve itself in our
internal affairs.
I declare, also, that Washington ought not to have approved the penetration of
the Syrian army in 1976, and to have associated itself recently with Damascus in
desibnating a candidate for the presidency of the Republic of Lebanon.
Letter of Raymond Edde to Raymond G. Helmick, 10 Jan. '89, cont. -- 2
For the mother of democracies, which America is, this is shocking behavior.
Washington ought, on the contrary, to have demanded from its Israeli ally, which
draws, annually, on the American budget for more than 3 billion dollars, that it
execute resolution 625 and 509 of the Security Council, which demand the withdrawal
4 of their army from South Lebanon. Unfortunately, every time that the Security
Council intervenes. passes a resolution favorable to Lebanon, a veto, the only one, American,
Here you see why I have judged that I should present my candidacy for the
presidency, accompanying it with two conditions:
1 - To be elected even though I am in Paris, which the Lebanese
Constitution does not forbid.
2 - That I not return to Lebanon, in the event of success, until
after having obtained the withdrawal of the Israeli army, which
America alone can demand and obtain.
At the moment when the USSR withdraws its army from Afghanistan and Cuba withdraws
hers from Angola, it is incomprehensible that Israel should maintain its occupation
of South Lebanon, on the pretext that it must safeguard the security of the Galilee.
5 The whole world knows that Israel has the strongest army in the region, the best
equipped air force, and the Atomic Bomb!!
It is Lebanon which has been invaded, twice, by the Israeli army, which has
occasioned damages measured in billions, et entailed the death of more than
30,000 Lebanese.
Can Israel tell us the number of victims fallen in Galilee over the last
20 years?
Can Israel declare a figure for the department in its administration which has
used the waters of the Litani river? (This sentence unclear.)
Does it not intend to exploit the waters of South Lebanon?
That is the real reason for which it keeps it army in Lebanon, in violation
of the Lebanese-Israeli Armistice Convention, always in force, and of
international law.
6 Finally, if the occupation of South Lebanon is due to fear of suffering attacks
which would come from Lebanon, why does it oppose the execution of the resolution
which provides for the deployment of UNIFIL (Res. 587) right up to the Lebanese-
Israeli border?
Father, excuse me for having abused your kindness and your patience. I would
like to thank you with all my heart for all that you have done for Lebanon.
I hope to see you again on one of your trips through Paris, and ask that you
accept the expression of my profound respect.
Raymond Edde
ARABIES N° 25 Janvie21989
Revue Mensuel du monde
Raymond Eddé, member of Parliament and former
arabe et de la Francophsnic
Minister, whom manv Lebanese of all confessions
- PARIS-
persist in regarding as the only candidate for
de sécurité - et a toujours
refusé. depuis plus de dix
President capable of reestablishing national
ans, d'appliquer la
unity and the sovereignty of their country,
résolution 425 de l'ONU
remains pessimistic after the decision of
demandant son retrait du
Sud-Liban. En cas
Washington "to enter into a substantial dialogue
d'annexion du Sud. les
with the P.L.O." Raymond Edde believes that "the
réactions internationales
International Conference cannot be held if Israel
seront aussi timides et
inopérantes.que lors de
opposes it. But I don't see Israel accepting the
l'annexion de Jérusalem et
new American approach to the P.L.O." The Lebanese
du Golan syrien précise
leader tells Arabies that, in the context of the
Raymond Eddé. qui
conclut : Si la paix venait
recovery by the Palestinians of their national
toutefois à être signée entre
rights in the occupied territories, "the Hebrew
les Palestiniens et Israël.
l'avantage qu'en retirerait
state could proceed to a new invasion of South
le Liban serait de voir les
Lebanon, up to the Litani river, on the pretext
Palestiniens se transformer
of 'historic right' (South Lebanon was once
de réfugiés en ressortissants
d'un Etat reconnu. ayant
attached to the Galilee) and of 'hydrauliç needs'.
les mêmes droits et
The some 250,000 Lebanese of Shi'ite confession
RAYMOND EDDÉ. député
obligations que tout
et ancien ministre. que de
living in that region would then be driven beyond
étranger se trouvant sur le
nombreux Libanais de
territoire libanais.
the Litani, and the conquered zone would be annexed
toutes confessions
It is," adds Raymond Eddé, "within such a perspectiv
persistent à considérer
comme le seul
that the Hebrew state has always refused the
présidentiable susceptible
deployment all along the Israeli-Lebanese border
de rétablir l'unité nationale
of the blue helmets of UNIFIL -- as resolution 587
et la souveraineté de leur
pays, demeure pessimiste
of the Security Council demands -- and has always
au lendemain de la décision
refused, for more than ten years, to apply
de Washington « d'engager
un dialogue substantiel
resolution 425 of the U.N. demanding its withdrawal
avec l'OLP ». Raymond
from South Lebanon. In the event of an annexation
Eddé estime que « la
of the South, international reactions would be as
Conférence internationale
ne pourra se tenir tant
timid and inoperative as in the case of the
qu Israëls opposera. Or
annexation of Jerusalem and the Syrian Golan,"
je ne vois pas Israël accepter
asserts Raymond Eddé, who concludes: "If peace
la nouvelle approche
américaine à l'égard de
would be signed once and for all between the
l'OLP ». Le leader libanais
Palestinians and Israel, the advantage which
affirme à Arabies que dans
Lebanon would draw from it would be to see the
le contexte d'une
récupération par les
Palestinians transformed from refugees into
Palestiniens de leurs droits
nationals of a recognised State, having the same
nationaux dans les
rights and obligations as every stranger finding
territoires occupés, « l'Etat
hébreu pourrait procéder à
himself on Lebanese territory."
une nouvelle invasion du
Sud-Liban. jusqu 'au fleuve
Litani. en prétextant des
" droits historiques (le
(This piece from the French-language
Sud-Liban était autrefois
rattaché à la Galilée) et des
monthly Arabies was enclosed in Raymond
" besoins hydrauliques
Edde's letter, with his notation of its
Les quelque 250 000
source. I clarifies somewhat his thinking
Libanais de confession
chiite habitant cette région
on Israeli intentions toward South Lebanon,
seraient alors repoussés
with which I have disagreed in my memo. But
au-delà du Litani, et la zone
more interesting is the opening passage,
conquise serait annexée.
C'est, ajoute Raymond
identifying Mr. Edde, which is another
Eddé, dans une telle
independant testimony to the breadth of
perspective que l'Etat
Mr. Edde's appeal, as candidate, to
hébreu a toujours refusé le
déploiement le long de la
Lebanese of all confessions.)
frontière israélo-libanaise
des casques bleus de la
FINUL -- comme l'exige la
résolution 589 du Conseil