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ID# 071728
THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
C0001-07
INCOMING
DATE RECEIVED: SEPTEMBER 12, 1989
NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE JAMES A. MALOOF
SUBJECT: ENCLOSES BOOKLET ON THE SITUATION IN THE
MIDDLE EAST
ACTION
DISPOSITION
ROUTE TO:
ACT DATE TYPE C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY
(STAFF NAME)
CODE YY/MM/DD RESP D YY/MM/DD
JOHN SUNUNU
ORG
89/09/12
NAN
C
89/09/19
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ /
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ /
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ /
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ /
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
COMMENTS:
ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS:
MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES:
CS MAIL
USER CODES: (A)
(B)
(C)
*ACTION CODES:
*DISPOSITION
*OUTGOING
K
K
K
*CORRESPONDENCE:
K
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION
*A-ANSWERED
TYPE RESP=INITIALS
K
*C-COMMENT/RECOM
*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL
K
OF SIGNER
K
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE
*C-COMPLETED
K
CODE = A
K
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET
*S-SUSPENDED
COMPLETED = DATE OF
K
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*
K
OUTGOING
K
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY K
K
<
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE
75
K
K
*X-INTERIM REPLY
K
K
K
REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75,0EOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.
71728
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
CITY OF
PEORIA
James A. Maloof
mayor
September 8, 1989
Mr. John Sununu
has THE seen CHIEF of STAFF
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear John:
I don't expect you to read this entire booklet, but
I do ask you to read the A Modest Proposal that
makes really good sense.
Each day that Syria or other Communist support
forces are allowed to stay in Lebanon, innocent
people area being slaughtered.
Your help is vital in stopping this.
Warmest regards,
Governor,
-
We are getting a
letter from Maloof weekly
James A. Maloof
(or biweekly). I can
Mayor
start keeping track and
acknowledge every third
JAM ab
or fourth letter.
1c
G
City Hall Building
419 Fulton Street
Peoria, Illinois 61602
309/672-8519
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ORM OPTICAL DISK NETWORK
ID# 07/728
Hardcopy pages are in poor condition (too light or too dark).
Remainder of case not scanned.
Oversize attachment not scanned.
Report not scanned.
Enclosure(s) not scanned.
Proclamation not scanned.
Incoming letter(s) not scanned.
Proposal not scanned.
Statement not scanned.
Duplicate letters attached - not scanned.
Only table of contents scanned.
No incoming letter attached.
Only tracking sheet scanned.
Photo(s) not scanned.
Bill not scanned.
Resolution not scanned.
Comments:
MA
NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF LEBANESE AMERICANS
"For a united Lebanon"
OFFICERS
Joseph L Soohaker
President
Edward Kahalley Sr.
Organizasonal V.P.
Philip Saade
Liaison V.P.
Toutic Nassd
Treasurer
Wald Maalouf
Secretary
Ehe Bassd
international Liaison
A MEMORANDUM ON LEBANON
By - JOSEPH L. BOOHAKER
PRESIDENT
NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF LEBANESE AMERICANS
(N.A.L.A.)
National office P.O. Box 28312 Washington, D.C. 20038
May 19, 1989
MEMORANDUM FROM: JOSEPH L. BOOHAKER
PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF
LEBANESE AMERICANS
TO: THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN & SOUTH ASIAN
AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES STATE DEPARTMENT
RE: UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN
FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON.
I. BACKGROUND
As I write this paper, I am aware, as are you, that the
Arab League sponsored cease fire has proved to be only a
"slow fire". On Saturday May 6, 1989, without warning,
while the people of East Beirut were out of the shelters
enjoying the 9th day of the "cease-fire", the Syrian army
opened up on the residential areas killing 20 and wounding
another 100 Lebanese. On May 12, 1989, Syrian gunners
targeted Bkirki, the residence of the Maronite Patriarch, a
man of peace and reconciliation, and wounded 8 of the
Patriarch's relatives. As of May 12, 1989 the casualty toll
since March 14 has been 359 killed and 1393 wounded (AP).
On May 16,1989 the Mufti of the Republic was callously
assassinated in Syrian occupied Beirut. All of these
attacks have been part of broader attacks that have taken
place since the Arab League announced a cease fire between
the Syrian and Lebanese Armed Forces on April 28, 1989.
I have the understanding that the Arab League operates
on a unanimous vote basis. With Syria as a member, I find
it difficult to understand why the U.S. has placed so much
confidence in the League's ability to negotiate the Syrians
out of West Beirut, much less out of the rest of Lebanon.
Nevertheless, we have reached the point where it would
appear that the Arab League effort, standing alone, will not
produce the desired results. As this latest experience has
shown, a cease-fire without a comprehensive withdrawal
schedule of Syrian and other occupying forces is only a
temporary pause in the violence being inflicted upon the
people of Beirut. There must be a coupling of an effective
cease fire with a withdrawal of Syrian forces, so as to
place all of Beirut beyond the range of Syrian artillary, as
an initial phase of a plan of withdrawal.
The Lebanese Army (LA) under the command of Gen. Michel
Aoun, has been mischaracterized as a Christian force.
Actually there is a substancial number of Muslims among the
troops as well as in the officer corp. Its actions, in
defense of its own population on Lebanese soil, is taken in
the oldest tradition of the sovereign right of a people to
resort to military means in self defense against a foreign
force.
-2-
The Syrian Armed Forces, on the other hand, are in
Lebanon without any legal basis. The former legal
justification for their presence, that being the request of
the Lebanese President made every six months to contine the
Syrian presence, has not been renewed since July of 1982.
The Syrian forces are acting clearly beyond any precept of
international law and civilized conduct by shelling the
residential Lebanese population; in arming the Druze
militia; and, in "encouraging", supporting and participating
in the armed attacks on the Lebanese Armed Forces.
Acknowledgement of these two legal fine points,
unfortunately, does not get the Syrian artillery tubes off
of the mountains overlooking Beirut. This is our immediate
interest. As President Bush told the delegation with which
he met on April 21, we in the American Lebanese community,
to be constructive, must be creative in arriving at
solutions for Lebanon which are pragmatic and can be
executed by the U.S. within the context of current U.S.
policy and which recognizes current U.S. priorities in the
region.
II. CURRENT U.S. POLICY AND PRIORITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST -
REFERENCE LEBANON.
The balance of this memorandum discusses U.S. policy,
U.S. priorities and possible avenues of U.S. action within
-3-
those parameters.
A. Current U.S. Policy. As I understand U.S. policy
toward Syria regarding Lebanon, the U.S. is still operating
under the policy initiated in the mid-70's. Under decisions
made over ten years ago, Syria is allowed to remain in
Lebanon as a "stabilizing force". Syria initially entered
Lebanon, ostensibly, at the request of the United States
Government and the Israelis to prevent the PLO from
successfully establishing a de facto state inside Lebanon.
At that time, the only serious resistance to a PLO tak over
in Lebanon was a then loose coalition of nationalist
militia. The LA was made ineffective by political
impotence in the central government. Under this SE : of
circumstances, with the consent of the United States and the
Israelis, the Syrians were allowed to operate in Lebanon
north of a demarcation line to control and contain the PLO
from waging further attacks on the Lebanese Republic, and
indirectly to lessen the ability of the PLO from waging a
terrorist war against Israel from its camps in Lebanon.
This policy has since evolved to encompass the reform
of the Lebanese constitution under Syrian tutelage. This
policy, both before the Israeli interlude of 1982-84, and
since, has adopted the Syrian demand that the Lebanese
conduct a constitutional convention and adopt the outcome of
&
such a convention as a precondition to Syria's withdrawal
from Lebanese territory. Since stated U.S. policy for
Lebanon is the restoration of an independent, free Lebanon,
with its unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity
restored, we can only assume that Syria has been entrusted
by the United States Government (USG) to execute these U.S.
objectives in Lebanon.
Under this policy construct, the militia, especially
those that contest the Syrian role in Lebanon are obstacles.
General Aoun, by openly challenging Syrian authority in
Lebanon is also an obstacle, in theory, to the process which
is dictated by the current policy construct.
In the same way, Lebanese nationalist demands for
reforms to be discussed and implemented only after
withdrawal of the occupying forces is accomplished is seen
as a ruse for a true intent by the Lebanese nationalists to
wrongfully assert dominance over the rest of the population.
The Syrians thus justify their continued presence as
necessary to protect one faction against dominance by the
other. The U.S. according to statements from Department
officials that have been cited in the media seems to accept
this justification. ( The Washington Post, Often Burned U.S.
Reluctant to Rejoin Lebanon Fray, April 29, 1989)
Thus, under this policy construct and its underlying
-5-
assumptions, General Aoun's action in closing the militia
ports in West Beirut is not viewed as an assertion of the
legitimate authority of the state over illegal activity, but
as the action of a megalomaniac Lebanese Christian (read
Nationalist) who has the gall to suppose that he can
challenge the Syrian security forces in Lebanon in a bid to
enhance his own personal power. Thus General Aoun is seen
as the dangerous destabilizing force, and the Syrians are
established as the stabilizing force that must bring the
unruly General to heel by conducting punitive artillery
strikes against civilian population centers that support
Aoun's actions. A siege of a population of approximately
1.5 million people is thus justified under the construct of
the current policy.
B. Operating Assumptions of Current U.S. Policy.
There are certain assumptions that one must make to
justify continuation of the current policy and if that
policy is to have any rational relation to the objective to
be served.
First, we must assume that the cause for the Syrian
entry into Lebanon remains unresolved. That is, there
-6-
continues to exist within Lebanon an external military
threat to the integrity of the Lebanese Government and
State. The PLO was the threat in 1976.
Since the Arafat led factions of the PLO have been
defeated by Syria and by Israel north of the demarcation
lines in Lebanon, and it is under Israeli control in the
South, we must assume that some other foreign force is in
Lebanon which Syria must contain and control so that it can
not threaten the Lebanese Government, or use Lebanon to wage
war against regional states. To justify the continuation of
a stabilizing force, there first must be a continuation of
instability.
Second, we must assume that under Syrian direction,
Lebanon will emerge from this crisis with a reformed
government which will reflect the collective will of the
Lebanese people, guaranteeing to them the blessings of
independence, freedom, security, democracy and the integrity
of its international frontiers. Historical precedent for a
policy of effecting reforms, which produce a democratic
outcome, in a country while it is occupied, include the
reforms implemented in Japan following the end of World War
II while under U.S. occupation, and in West Germany while
under Allied Occupation. We must assume that Syria will act
-7-
as the surrogate of the United States to bestow upon Lebanon
the same type of democratic reforms that the U.S. would
implement if we were directly involved in the process.
Third, we must assume that Syria has no extra-
territorial motives or independent Syrian national motives
in maintaining its 40,000 man force in Lebanon. We must
assume that Syria is strictly serving U.S. national
interests and acting in furtherance of U.S. regional
objectives by providing the man power for the U.S. policy of
achieving stability in Lebanon so that a settlement can be
achieved. Without this assumption, accomplishment of U.S.
objectives for Syria in Lebanon would not necessarily
trigger a withdrawal of Syrian troops. Rather, withdrawal
would be triggered only after accomplishment of Syrian
national objectives. Without this assumption, the Syrians
would have to create one destabilizing event after another
to justify continuation of its stabilizing presence in
Lebanon, thus prolonging accomplishment of its role in
Lebanon under U.S. policy until it has accomplished its
purposes in Lebanon in terms of Syrian national interests.
If Syrian national interests in Lebanon are at cross
purposes with U.S. interests for Lebanon, then continuation
with the current policy can become self defeating for the
United States if this assumption does not underlie our
policy.
-8-
If these assumptions have any basis in fact or
logic, then any person or group that opposes Syria in
Lebanon opposes the means of accomplishing U.S. objectives
for Lebanon. Under this set of assumptions, General Aoun is
acting against the accomplishment of U.S. objectives for
Lebanon by defying the Syrian presence there.
This is the policy and its operating assumptions which,
we are told, defines the range of actions that the USG is
willing to undertake to end the unrestricted shelling of the
citizens of Beirut by the Syrian army.
C. An Analysis of Current Empirical Facts with the
Operating Assumptions of Current Policy To
Determine Continued Validity of Current Operating
Policy.
Many of us in the American Lebanese community question
the validity of current policy and of its underlying
operating assumptions. Many feel that continued pursuit of
this policy will not only fail to achieve the stated
objective of the policy, but will actually produce the
opposite results for Lebanon.
Assumption: The circumstances that existed at the time of
the initiation of the current policy continue to exist in
Lebanon.
Facts: Chairman Arafat and his faction of the PLO no longer
pose a credible threat to Lebanese sovereignty north of the
-9-
demarcation lines in which Syria operates in Lebanon. The
principle faction of the PLO which remains militarily active
in Lebanon is the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). This faction is
headquartered in Damascus and is supported in Lebanon by the
Syrian regime. To the extent that the PSP and Amal militias
operate militarily in Lebanon, they are armed, directed and
funded by the Syrian regime, either directly or indirectly.
Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards are Iranian
supported, but permitted to operate out of bases inside the
Syrian occupation zone.
The Christian militia supports itself primarily from
taxes levied in their area of operation. Lately, they have
been the beneficiary of Iraqi arms shipments.
The Syrians have been the catalyst for the fomentation
of divisions among the Lebanese communities and within the
communities. Through Syrian manipulation, they have tried
to create inter as well as intra communal divisions.
Serious divisions among the Christians have been attempted
repeatedly. By the introduction of Hezbollah and the
Revolutionary Guards, they created divisions among the
Shiites. The Syrians have been in open war with the Sunni
of Tripoli by transplanting 40,000 Syrian Alawi nationals
-10-
into the Tripoli district. By keeping the major communities
of Lebanon divided within themselves and divided from each
other, Syria has institutionalized instability in Lebanon
and thus has been able to justify to the United States her
indefinite stay in Lebanon.
The lesson that the Syrian regime taught to the people
of Hamma, Syria in 1981 has not been lost on any of the
people or leaders of occupied Lebanon. To test or question
the actions of the Syrian regime, as did the political
opposition of Hamma, will invoke the most extreme punitive
measures from the Syrian Government.
The Syrian presence, rather than bringing stability and
acting as a surrogate military force for the Lebanese
Government, is actually having the opposite effect. With no
external force, such as the PLO, threatening the Lebanese
State, the Syrians are generating conflict and instability
where, but for Syrian intervention, there would be none. In
this latest round, the PSP, nominally the Lebanese faction
at war with the Lebanese Army, can not maintain the type of
siege that we have seen in Beirut by their own resources.
But for Syrian "encouragement", Syrian funding, Syrian
supplies and shells and Syrian direction, there would have
been no siege of Beirut in the spring of 1989.
The primary threat to the integrity of the Lebanese
-11-
State is, unsurprisingly, that state which never
acknowledged the existence of the Lebanese State from the
date of its independence. It is that state to which the
United States, ironically, entrusted the defense of Lebanese
independence and the integrity of Lebanese sovereignty. It
is Syria.
Assumption: The Republic of Lebanon can undergo reform of
its constitution with a democratic outcome while a major
portion of the State and its population is under Syrian
occupation.
Facts: If history has shown us anything, in this regard, it
is that reforms directed by an occupying force usually
result in the creation of a mirror image of the occupying
country in the occupied country. Also, with a state, such
as Alawi Syria, that is so fully aware of its national
interests and which pursues them so ruthlessly, the logical
expectation is that Syrian directed "reform" in Lebanon will
first have to pass the test of service to Syrian national
interests, with Lebanese national interests subordinated.
The Tripartite Accord of December 1985 stands in witness to
this point.
The United States, a democratic republic directed the
restructuring of the Japanese government and economic system
-12-
as the military occupier of Japan. The result is a Japan
with functioning democratic governmental institutions and a
market oriented economy.
Syria, on the other hand is a police state. The
minority Alawi faction rules the 80% Sunni majority by means
of a very active secret police and by intimidation of any
who would dissent with brutal displays of reprisals against
its own citizenry. The Syrian economy is a basket case
command economy that even the Soviets now acknowledge is a
nonfunctional model. Demographicly, Lebanon is not like
Syria. In Lebanon there is no one demographic group with
the type of overwhelming majority in the population as are
the Sunni of Syria. In Lebanon, no one demographic group
holds an absolute majority.
Without experience in pluralistic politics and systems
of government, we have nevertheless assumed that Syria can
oversee the creation of a reformed pluralistic system in
Lebanon. We can not assume that Syria will create or even
make possible in Lebanon the type of government and market
economy that it has not created for its own people. In fact
to do so in Lebanon would constitute a threat to the Syrian
regime.
Syria has historically harbored an abhorrence for the
political freedoms that the people of Lebanon have
-13-
traditionally enjoyed and has viewed such freedom in Lebanon
as a threat to the survival of which ever dictatorship was
then in power in Syria. President Assad came to power in
Syria via a military coup in 1970. It is not a coincidence
that Lebanon has been in turmoil during a great majority of
that time.
Assumption: Syria maintains a military presence in Lebanon
solely to serve the U.S. interest of maintaining stability
in Lebanon.
Facts: The Syrian presence in Lebanon serves both short
term and long term Syrian national interests, separate and
apart from their apparent willingness to assist the United
States to bring stability to Lebanon.
The Syrians are clearly using Lebanon to obtain
diplomatic leverage and to enhance their standing as an
indispensable party to the eventual Israeli/ Palestinian
settlement. President Assad clearly does not want to be
left out of the process, losing whatever chance he may yet
have to retrieve sovereignty over the Golan. He is prepared
to obstruct or sabotage any negotiation which does not serve
his ends. Witness his undoing of the May 17, 1983
Lebanese/Israeli Accord.
President Assad is chilled by the idea of an
-14-
Israeli/Arafat rapprochement, which could possibly include
Jordan, and exclude Syria. His strategy seems to be to use
the PFLP-GC and Ahmed Jabril, as well as other such
organizations which he supports in the Syrian occupied Bekaa
to make for naught Chairman Arafat's disavowal of terrorism
against the State of Israel as a means to achieve the
legitimate expression of Palestinian rights to self
determination. Arafat's inability to control Jabril and the
Syrian based PFLP-GC makes him a less desirable and less
serious negotiating partner for the Israelis. President
Assad, by this strategy, is seeking to establish himself as
the negotiating party with whom the Israelis must deal if
they wish to end the terrorist threat to their northern
settlements. Such negotiations will start if and when
President Assad decides and will conclude upon terms
acceptable to him. It is by achieving such leverage with
the Israelis that Assad hopes to win back the Golan.
However, this strategy can not work for Assad unless his
army can remain in control of the Bekaa. With Lebanese
territory denied to Assad as base camps and staging areas
for the terrorists groups that he supports, Assad would have
no avenue to logistically conduct such raids on Israeli
settlements. Also, Israeli reprisals for these raids have
taken place in the Bekaa, so Assad has been spared from
-15-
paying the political price in terms of Syrian assets
destroyed and Syrian civilian casualties. The Lebanese pay
this price and have been paying it for some years now. With
Lebanon denied to him, if the raids could be mounted from
Syria, Israeli reprisal raids would take place in Syria.
The price would, thus, be too high to pay both domestically
and internationally for Assad to pursue this strategy
without his controlling Lebanon.
By occupying West Beirut, Syria also holds the key to
the American hostages. To the extent that U.S. policy
options factor in the lives of the hostages, Assad retains a
certain degree of leverage over the degree and the type of
U.S. response to anti-U.S. activity on the part of Syria.
For example, Syria has participated in the bombings E the
U.S. Embassy and the Marine compound. Syria participated,
through support and sponsorship of Abu Nidal and Ahmed
Jabril in terrorist acts such as the bombing of Pan Am 103.
Syria participates in the drug trade of the Bekaa and the
shipment of the drugs from the illegal militia ports under
the control of its client militia in Lebanon.
All of this activity is possible in Lebanon with little
or no U.S. response because of Syrian leverage in the
Hostage issue and the perception that Syria has created of
its indispensability to a comprehensive regional settlement.
-16-
In the longer term, Syria seeks strategic and military
parity with Israel in the region. Assad also harbors dreams
of one day incorporating Lebanon, or at least a part of it,
into Syria. And then, without a Lebanese resistance holding
him down in Lebanon, seriously challenging Israel for
dominance in the region. Withdrawal from Lebanon, at this
point would not at all serve this long term Syrian national
interest.
In short, the weight of the evidence and the course of
even 3 indicate quite clearly that the underlying operating
assumptions of the current U.S. policy toward Syria
regarding Lebanon are clearly out of touch with reality.
Whil the ultimate stated objectives of U.S. policy are
shared by us all, the means of achieving those objectives
are eriously flawed and are not founded on assumptions that
find any basis in the facts or logical assuptions that flow
from the facts
Nevertheless, we are asked to develop ideas within the
context of this policy and to propose courses of action for
the USG, the implementation of which would not signal a
change of policy.
III. UNITED STATES PRIORITIES IN THE REGION.
The established priorities of U.S. policy for the
-17-
region has also been suggested to the community as a
parameter which will limit the range of options for U.S.
initiatives regarding Lebanon. Our understanding of U.S.
priorities is that our strategic ally in the region, Israel,
and its security holds the top priority. Since the
withdrawal of U.S. Marines from Beirut in 1984, we have
returned to a linkage of the Lebanon settlemen: to
settlement of the broader regional disputes.
Lebanon's priority, it would seem, has for the past few
years been directly linked to the extent to which it
contributes to settlement of the top priority item. If
Assad needs Lebanon to use as a bargaining chip to create in
him the incentive to negotiate, then we acquiesce. If
Israel needs Lebanon as a place to keep its "demographic
problem" of 800,000 displaced Palestinians while some
solution is worked out, then we acquiesce to this use as
well. If Arafat needs southern Lebanon to use as a point of
concentration for his supporters and his army so as to
create the "critical mass" necessary to make a credible
claim for the Palestinians as a people and as a nation in
exile, then in deference to our friends, the Saudis, we
acquiesce.
As the principle parties to the regional conflict, the
Israelis, the PLO and the Syrians, posture and delay,
-18-
Lebanon's priority has become that of a pawn or a doormat.
Lebanon and Lebanese lives are sacrificed at the altar of a
"broader regional settlement".
While a peaceful regional settlement is everyone's
common objective, we must question the logic of
destabilizing Israel's northern neighbor as a means of
achieving a stable regional settlement. There are better
ways to achieve peace for the region than to dismember
Lebanon. In fact current policy which is witnessing the
dismemberment of Lebanon will not bear the fruits of peace.
It will bear only the fruit of a wider regional war.
IV. PROPOSED OPTIONS FOR U.S. ACTION
A. Proceed with the Status Quo. Remaining with the
stat's quo in terms of policy and U.S. action regarding
Lebanon will mean that Syria will continue with its
unrestricted shelling of East Beirut and the Free Zones
until either they run out of money, shells or Lebanese to
kill, which ever occurs first. U.S total reliance on the
Arab League to stabilize the fighting, cause a withdrawal of
Syrian forces is reckless, to say the least, and acquiesce
in the liquidation of the Lebanese Republic at worst.
Staying this course will also mean that as Gen. Aoun
and the Lebanese have less and less to lose, and we are
-19-
quickly approaching that point, then the more likely it will
become that Aoun will measure the benefits outweighing the
costs of escalating his response to Syrian shelling by
employing his SCUD missiles against targets inside of Syria
proper, or by employing his infantry in an offensive thrust
out of his defense perimeter.
Anticipated Syrian response to such a challenge would
have to include a similar infantry thrust across the current
"red lines" or possibly use of the Syrian air force. The
threat of a Syrian ground assault into the free districts is
seen as so acute that the United States and British
Governments have urged their citizens in Lebanon to leave
immediately. (AP May 20, 1989). This alert coming only 48
hours after our meeting with NEA officers in which this
possibility was discounted as pessimistic thinking borders
on active deception regarding the truth of the situation.
A fierce blood letting in Lebanon with terrible loss of life
on all sides has become a probable consequence of staying
the current course.
The Israelis could be anticipated to respond to prevent
this final act of incorporation of Lebanon into Syria and
the liquidation of the Free Lebanon resistance. The Big
Pines operation of 1982 was, among other things, a response
to a real threat of the formalization of a Palestinian State
-20-
in Southern Lebanon. While chaos in Lebanon does not seem to
concern the Israelis much, the specter of a hostile neighbor
establishing itself there has drawn their attention.
Clearly, something beyond the status quo response is
called for.
Continued pursuit of a regional settlement under the
status quo option leaves Syria, the country over which we
have the least diplomatic and economic leverage, in the
drivers seat. It leaves Israel without any real domestic
pressure on its political leadership to deal seriously with
resolving the issue of final status for the people of the
West Bank and Gaza. And it leaves Arafat with all of the
trappings of a head of state while leaving his people
stateless.
B. A Modest Proposal. Within the parameters outlined
by the President, there is an alternative course of action
open to the United States which can be implemented within
the context of current U.S. policy and which will better
serve U.S. regional objectives of bringing about a regional
settl ment.
1. The United States should openly acknowledge in the
various international and national forums available the
undeniable fact that Syria is in serious violation of the
-21-
terms under which it maintains a military presence in
Lebanon. By its unrestricted shelling of the Lebanese
population and its direct challenge to the Lebanese Army on
Lebanese soil, Syria has placed itself clearly outside of
the law.
2. The United States should acknowlege the interim
Prime Ministership of Michel Aoun as the sole lawful
authority in Lebanon, until his mandate to arrange for the
meeting of Parliament to elect the next President of the
Republic, as provided under the Lebanese Constitution, has
been accomplished.
3. The United States should give political and
diplomatic support to Prime Minister Aoun's efforts to
terminate all shipment of the narcotics and other contraband
which are cultivated, manufactured and transshipped by Syria
in and through Lebanon by means of illegal ports along the
Lebanese coast.
4. In conjunction with the Soviet Union and the other
members of the UN Security Council, as well as through the
moderate Arab states who are members of the Arab League, the
United States must sanction and punish Syrian violation of
the trust placed in her by the United States and the world
community to bring order to Lebanon.
These first four steps are clearly within the context
-22-
of current U.S. policy. Without sanctions for overstepping
the scope of the mission in Lebanon, the Syrians would have
a carte blanche to take Lebanese life at will. The Syrians
must know that there are enforceable limits and bounds to
U.S. allowance of their presence in Lebanon.
Current U.S. policy supports the sovereignty of
Lebanon. It can not be outside of the context of U.S.
policy to refuse to acknowledge the lawful authority in
Lebanon, which authority is founded on the Lebanese
Constitution. To deny the authority of Michel Aoun is the
equivalent of denying the operation of the Lebanese
Constitution.
Since the United States has declared war against the
drug traffic, it surely can not be beyond the context of
U.S. policy to assist a sister republic, a member nation of
the UN, to stem the flow of illegal narcotics flowing from
his sovereign territory, even if most of that product,
reportedly is going to Western Europe.
5. As sanctions, the world community acting through
the UN and the regional community of states in the Arab
League, should agree to an economic and diplomatic boycott
of Syria, to include a military sales embargo, and a cutoff
of financial aid, a boycott of Syrian national airlines and
-23-
of the national airlines of any country that does not honor
the boycott. This boycott should contine until such time as
General Assad orders an immediate withdrawal of his troops
from Greater Beirut to Chtura, from the port of Tripoli and
agrees to a timetable for complete withdrawal of all forces.
6. Following the reuniting of Beirut, the reconvening
of Parliament, the election of a head of state and the
selection of a cabinet, the issues of South Lebanon must be
addressed. The Israelis have committed to turning security
duty in the South over to the LAF once a credible government
has been reestablished in Beirut and a credible legitimate
force can be put in place in the South.
Those brigades of the U.S. trained Lebanese Army that
have fought the Syrian Army have shown great valor in battle
and great staying power. Chairman Arafat has already stated
publicly that he will assist Gen. Aoun in any way in his
fight against the Syrians and he has committed that forces
under his command will no longer stage raids into Israel
from Lebanon. The only threats to the Lebanese lines in
south Lebanon would be from Syrian sponsored groups, whose
days would be numbered with the adoption of a timetable for
the withdrawal of Syrian forces from the Bekaa.
With the removal of all foreign forces, the militia
would be called upon to militarily stand down and to return
to competing with each other as political parties.
-24-
7. Only in the absence of all occupying forces on its
soil will the Lebanese - Christian, Moslem and Druze - be
ready willing and able to reactivate their parliamentary
government under the terms of the Lebanese Constitution.
This is the consensus. Any democratic reforms that the
elected representatives of the Lebanese people may deem
appropriate must be debated in freedom and implemented in
accordance with the Lebanese Constitution. The types of
reforms called for by the Syrians are by their nature
undemocratic, since they cannot be an expression of the
Lebanese people.
In order to insure that no Lebanese ethnic, religious
or political group operates under the active influence of
and outside power, Lebanon must be freed of all outside
parties and all outside assistance flowing to any particular
group, as an essential precondition to the type of
Parliamentary democratic process that will produce the
desired results of true democratic reforms, guaranteeing
freedom and security to all of the people of Lebanon,
C. Impact of this Modest Proposal on U.S. Priorities in the
Region.
U.S. officials have been quoted in the press as
opposing any substantive action against Syria for the
benefit of Lebanon out of apprehension that we may lose
-25-
whatever leverage we may have for dealing with Syria over
larger regional issues. (The Christian Science Monitor,
France, US Seek to End Shelling, April 21, 1989).
Since Secretary Baker has said that the U.S. has scant
influence over Syria (Senate Foreign Relations Committee
testimony April 18, 1989), it would seem that we fear losing
something that we do not even have.
Taking action in Lebanon as described herein, would in
all likelihood produce adverse results for President Assad
in Syria. If his army is forced by circumstances to
withdraw from Lebanon, this could destabilize his hold on
power in Syria. The question would then become would this
circumstance factor in adversely toward achieving the U.S.
objective of a regional settlement.
Since President Assad is attempting to establish
himself as the spoiler of a settlement and he is a party
over whom we have the least diplomatic and economic
leverage, bringing him down a notch in Lebanon may pave the
way for a settlement.
We must rethink the wisdom of placing the foundation
for a lasting regional settlement, which will require long
term commitments, on an agreement to which the current
Syrian regime would be a signatory. A regime which holds
power from the barrel of artillery emplacements in the hills
-26-
around Damascus and which depends on the illegal occupation
of its neighbor for diplomatic leverage is not a long term
stable proposition. We have the experience of the Shah of
Iran as our guide and as testimony to the folly of placing
reliance required in international agreements on governments
that rule without the benefit of the consent of the
governed.
If we learned anything from the Iran experience, it
should have been not to make the same mistake twice.
Regarding the effects of a Lebanon settlement as a
prelude to a regional settlement on the other principles, we
turn to the PLO. Chairman Arafat must now realize that the
"critical mass" necessary to give credibility to his claims
to a nation in need of a homeland is not the 800,000
refugees of Southern Lebanon, it is the 1,500,000
Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza who are fighting for
Palestinian self determination rights on the land which they
claim to be theirs.
Finally regarding the Israelis. For too long, the
Israelis have had a free ride, at the expense of the
Lebanese in dealing with their aboriginal population
dilemma. Just as the United States had to deal with the
people that occupied America before us, as have the
-27-
Australians and the South Africans, the Israelis must come
to terms with the people who lived on the land of Israel
before the Israelis came to occupy the land.
To indefinitely attempt to put off dealing with this
issue by using Lebanon as well as other regional Arab states
as refugee sites is no answer. Sooner or later, the
Israelis must come to terms with what has come to be
described in Israel as their "demographic problem". If the
Israelis think the problem will simply go away or can be
deported to Lebanon, they are only fooling themselves.
Under current birth rates we will see during our life time
an Israel that does not have a Jewish majority. When this
happens, what will become of Israeli democracy.
Israel does itself a disservice by not facing up to
this problem now. The Lebanon option is the choice to defer
an ultimate solution, it is not the ultimate solution.
Resolving Lebanon as a prelude to a regional settlement will
make the Israeli leadership have to deal with the
Palestinian issue now. This can only bode well for the
Israeli leadership to be under domestic political pressure
to negotiate some political accommodation with the
Palestinian Arab population.
V. CONCLUSION
We believe that the actions proposed in this statement
can clearly be accomplished within the framework of the
-28-
objectives of current U.S. policy on Lebanon. After
engaging the senior officials in the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs in a frank discussion of these options on May 18,
198), a determined resistance to these modest diplomatic and
economic measures was clearly conveyed.
We believe that the current policy which places the
United States on the sidelines as a passive spectator,
encouraging others, but not taking action herself, is giving
ambiguous signals to Assad, which are being interpreted in
Damascus as a green light from Washington to continue with
the effort to liquidate all resistance in the Free Districts
of Lebanon.
We believe that the current policy of abandonment of
the Free Lebanese Resistance will leave it dangerously
exposed to liquidation, which in turn will strengthen the
Syrian position in the region beyond anyone's control, and
risk triggering another regional war.
Accordingly, this document is being simultaneously
distributed to the majority and minority staffs of the
following committees of Congress:
The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs.
The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the
Middle East.
The House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control.
We will be demanding, as is our right, that any or all
-29-
of these Subcommittees exercise their oversight duties to
investigate the causes for the deafening silence and the
refusal of the United States to take action in response to
the gross violations of Lebanese Human Rights, and of United
States acquiesce in the gross violation of those rights by
the Syrian regime of Hafaz el Assad.
In light of the AP reports of MAY 20, 1989, we should
all consider this matter of the greatest urgency. I invite
your immediate written response to thiś proposal which is
the work product of the delegation with which you met on May
18. Should the response not be forthcomming or without
change from the responses that we received on May 18, then
we shall press for immediate action in the Subcommittees
listed to exercise their oversight duty with regard to the
default that is taking place in the Bureau.
ML
NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF LEBANESE AMERICANS
NATIONAL OFFICE
P.O. BOX 28312
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20038
-30
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