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This file includes notes by Dick Cheney.
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Rockefeller Commission Report - Final (2)
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1561496
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Rockefeller Commission Report - Final (2)
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This file includes notes by Dick Cheney.
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Richard B. Cheney Files
Richard Cheney's General Subject Files
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The original documents are located in Box 8, folder "Intelligence - Rockefeller Commission
Report - Final (2)" of the Richard B. Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
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copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
76
B. Control by the Congress
1. Congressional Committee Oversight
The armed services committees of Congress have exclusive legis-
jurisdiction over any bill, other than for appropriations, whose
primary focus is on the CIA. These committees, therefore, exercise
mary congressional policymaking control over the CIA. Each has
degated this authority over CIA matters to an intelligence subcom-
The House subcommittee has seven members (and the ap-
reximate equivalent of one and one-half full-time professional staff
embers). The Senate subcommittee has five members (with a staff of
milarsize).
Although not involved in the appropriation process, these subcom-
mittees also receive CIA budget information supplied to the appro-
nations subcommittees.
Since there has been no substantive CIA legislation since 1947, the
of these intelligence subcommittees has generally been to exert
policy-making influence informally through personal discussions with
Director of Central Intelligence.
The appropriations committees also examine CIA activities in re-
viewing CIA budget requests. Both appropriations committees rely
subcommittees to perform this task. The information submitted
ingressional oversight subcommittees on the CIA budget is identi-
to that submitted to OMB. It is considered in secret sessions of
the subcommittees (whose chairmen are also chairmen of the parent
mmmittees) but is not revealed to the full committee membership or
Congress as a whole.
There has been little further discussion in Congress (outside of the
oversight committees) of the CIA's budget or activities except when
they otherwise become matters of public discussion. After the CIA
ropriation is passed, the chairmen of the appropriations sub-
committees retain limited de facto fiscal control over the CIA. Before
any of its contingency reserve fund is spent, they are consulted. On the
her hand. the CIA is not required to notify Congress before shifting
propriated funds from one program to another.
Neither the members of the oversight committees nor other members
Congress have generally received detailed information on CIA
gerations. Public hearings are not held. Although secret hearings
17" held, they are confined by the scope of the information made
vailable. While it appears that the subcommittees or at least their
leaders and the leaders of Congress have been informed of major
77
1A activities,' the amount of information provided does not always
-pond with that available to Congress in other sensitive areas.
sum, congressional oversight of the CIA has been curtailed by
secrecy shrouding its activities and budget. At least until quite
catly. Congress has not sought substantial amounts of information
a sensitive nature. Correspondingly, the CIA has not generally
lunteered additional information.
Dere have been occasional efforts to extend congressional oversight
CIA activities. Since 1967, three members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee have been invited to attend intelligence briefings
to the Senate oversight subcommittees, but these briefings do
identify specific CIA operations.
In addition, certain members of Congress have proposed more in-
tensive congressional oversight over the CIA. These proposals have
usually been defeated.
In January 1955, Senator Mansfield (Democrat-Montana) intro-
dured a resolution to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelli-
it was defeated 50 to 27. In 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee proposed a Senate Committee on Intelligence Operations;
proposal was defeated 61 to 28. However, the Hughes Amendment
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 prohibits CIA expenditure
funds "for operations in foreign countries, other than intelligence
stivities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence" unless
President determines that it is "important to the national security"
reports the operation to the "appropriate committees of the Con-
including the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United
House of Representatives." Both the Senate and House re-
formed select committees with temporary charters to investi-
the activities of all intelligence agencies.
2.
General Accounting Office
The General Accounting Office (GAO) is responsible for making
ounting and auditing reports to the Congress. It studies the effi-
ney, propriety, and legality of executive agency operations and
inducts financial audits on its own initiative or at the request of a
abor or committee of Congress.
The CIA Act of 1949 authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence
make confidential (unvouchered) payments; these payments. con-
stituting approximately one half of total CIA spending, are beyond
compliation from CIA files of its contacts with Congress shows that over a five-year
period (1967-1972) the CIA averaged 26 briefings of congressional committees or subcom-
nittees per year and 81 briefings of individual members of Congress per year.
GERALD
78
G.AO's audit authority. The 1949 Act further protects CIA spend-
frussi GAO challenge by providing that:
*ums made payable to the Agency may be expended without regard to
provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government
For a time, GAO audited the nonconfidential expenditures of the
IA: however, after adoption of the 1949 Act, no challenges to the
ulity of any payments were made. Any questions about the lawful-
of CIA expenditures were instead referred to the CIA's
mptroller.
When GAO broadened its activities in 1959 to include studies of
agency efficiency, it included the CIA on a "trial basis." After two
the Comptroller General (who heads GAO) decided that be-
of statutory and security restrictions on GAO audits of CIA
anvities, GAO "did not have sufficient access to make comprehensive
reviews on a continuing basis which would produce evaluations help-
to the Congress."
GAO also concluded that it would not be worthwhile to continue
limited financial audits of the CIA. This decision to eliminate
10 andits of CIA activities was related to a CIA internal reorga-
which increased the scope of its internal comptroller and
operations. Since 1962, the GAO has not conducted any reviews
the CIA nor any reviews which focus specifically on CIA activities.
C. Control by the Courts
The CIA has only rarely been involved in litigation. In the CIA's
"ry. there have been only seven judicial decisions relating to it.
operated as a substantial check on the CIA's activities.
The CIA's actions are not readily challenged in the courts. Most
CIA activities relate to foreign intelligence and as a consequence are
reviewed by the courts. Moreover, since practically all of the CIA's
intions are covered by secrecy, few potential challengers are even
of activities that might otherwise be contested: nor can such
be easily discovered.
the CIA is also specifically freed from statutory requirements
h often constrain government activities and are enforced by
its. For instance, the 1947 Act authorizes the Director to discharge
employees whenever he deems "such termination necessary or advisable
interests of the United States." This discharge power has been
to be unreviewable. Accordingly, employees have rarely initiated
against the Agency for wrongful termination and have never
successfully done so.
79
D. The Effects of Publicity
Reports of CIA activities in newspapers and magazines and on tele-
are another form of external control on its activities.
1 nul recently, the secrecy which protected the CLA's activities ef-
factively limited the impact of this control. Recent events indicate that
CIA will be subject to more intensive scrutiny in the press, but as
practical matter the news media cannot effectively "police" CIA
tivities.
Publicity about the CIA tends to be an unrefined control mechanism.
The press can examine only what is leaked; it cannot consider all
relevant details; it may be inaccurate and incomplete; and it may
have unintended results on CIA operations.
E. Control by Special Commissions and Panels
Since the creation of the CIA in 1947, it has been reviewed by a
under of special panels, commissions and committees. Some were
created in response to particular issues, most notably in 1961 after the
of Pigs and in 1967 after disclosure that nonprofit institutions
been used to assist the CIA. The primary studies were:
1. Dulles, Jackson, Correa Report to the NSC on the CIA and
National Organization for Intelligence (January 1949) : A study
of the structure and organization of the CIA, existing CIA activ-
ities, and the relationship of those activities to those of other
departments and agencies.
2. Jackson Report (President's Committee on International In-
formation Activities) (June 1953) : A survey and evaluation of
the international policies and activities of the executive branch.
3. Doolittle Report (September 1954) : A report on covert oper-
ations of the CIA.
4. Clark Report (Task Force on Government Intelligence Ac-
tivities) (May 1955) : A survey of the CIA and intelligence
activities of the State and Defense Departments and the National
Security Council.
: Sprague Report (President's Committee on Information
Activities Abroad) (December 1960) : A review of the impact
of international actions of the United States government on world
public opinion and on other governments, with particular refer-
ence to the CIA.
C. Kirkpatrick Report (Joint Study Group Report on Foreign
Intelligence Activities of the U.S. Government) (December
1200) : A series of recommendations to assist the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence in coordinating foreign intelligence activities.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
80
7. Kirkpatrick, Schuyler, Coyne Report (April 1962) : A study
of the organization and activities of the CIA and its relationship
with other agencies in the intelligence community.
8. Katzenbach Report (March 1967) : A review of the relation-
ships between government agencies and educational and volun-
tary organizations which operate abroad.
9. Lindsay Report on Covert Operations of the U.S. Govern-
ment (December 1968) : A study of supervision by Congress and
within the CIA of covert operations.
10. OMB Report (Schlesinger Study of the Intelligence Com-
munity) (March 1971) : A study of the organization of the intel-
ligence community and its cost-effectiveness.
Most recommendations have focused on the organization of the intel-
nee community and were preludes to a reorganization. The Katz-
ach Report ended CIA funding of educational and voluntary or-
calizations. The issue of CIA activities within the United States was
given major attention by any other of these review panels.
Conclusions
morre improvement in the congressional oversight system would be
helpful. The problem of providing adequate oversight and control
while maintaining essential security is not easily resolved. Several
knowledgeable witnesses pointed to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy as an appropriate model for congressional oversight of the
Agency. That Committee has had an excellent record of providing
efective oversight while avoiding security leaks in a highly sensitive
One of the underlying causes of the problems confronting the CIA
out of the pervading atmosphere of secrecy in which its activi-
have been conducted in the past. One aspect of this has been the
secrecy of the budget.
1 new body is needed to provide oversight of CIA within the
Executive Branch. Because of the need to preserve security, the CIA
not subject to the usual constraints of audit, judicial review, un-
publicity. or open congressional budget review and oversight.
consequently. its operations require additional external control. The
Monty assigned the job of supervising the CIA must be given
sufficient power and significance to assure the public of effective
supervision.
De -ituation whereby the Agency determined whether its own em-
lovers would be prosecuted must not be permitted to recur.
GERALD R. FORD
81
Kecommendation (3)
The President should recommend to Congress the establishment
of a Joint Committee on Intelligence to assume the oversight role
currently played by the Armed Services Committees.3
Recommendation (4)
Congress should give careful consideration to the question
hether the budget of the CIA should not, at least to some extent,
be made public, particularly in view of the provisions of Article I,
Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution.4
Recommendation (5)
a
The functions of the President's Foreign Intelligence Ad-
isory Board should be expanded to include oversight of the CIA.
This expanded oversight board should be composed of distin-
guished citizens with varying backgrounds and experience. It
should be headed by a full-time chairman and should have a full-
time staff appropriate to its role. Its functions related to the CIA
hould include:
1. Assessing compliance by the CIA with its statutory au-
thority.
2. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence collection.
3. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence estimates.
4. Assessing the quality of the organization of the CIA.
5. Assessing the quality of the management of the CIA.
6. Making recommendations with respect to the above sub-
jects to the President and the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, and, where appropriate, the Attorney General.
emmissioner Griswold adds the following statement:
The assignment given to the Commission relates only to the domestic activities of the
CLA But the problems which have arisen in the domestic field cannot be fully understood
ovaluated unless they are viewed against the role which the CIA has undertaken to
outside the United States. Because of the secret nature of its operations, legal and
limitations may not always be kept in mind. In this situation, It should not be sur-
that personnel, when working in the United States, should not always feel that they
subject to ordinary restraints.
Congress should. In my opinion, decide by law whether and to what extent the CIA
, be an action organization. carrying out operations as distinguished from the gather-
and evaluation of intelligence. If action operations were limited, there would be a less-
need for secrecy, and the adverse effect which the activities of the CIA sometimes have
rpr libility of the United States would be modified.
une of the great strengths of this country is a deep and wide-flung capacity for goodwill.
who represent us, both at home and abroad, should recognize the potentiality of that
londwill and take extreme care not to undermine it, lest their efforts be in fact counter-
mive to the long-range security interests of the United States."
j
so money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made
by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
shall be published from time to time."
GERALD
82
h. The Board should have access to all information in the CIA.
II should be authorized to audit and investigate CIA expenditures
and activities on its own initiative.
c. The Inspector General of the CIA should be authorized to
report directly to the Board, after having notified the Director
of Central Intelligence, in cases he deems appropriate.
Krommendation (6)
The Department of Justice and the CIA should establish written
guidelines for the handling of reports of criminal violations by
employees of the Agency or relating to its affairs. These guide-
lines should require that the criminal investigation and the deci-
son whether to prosecute be made by the Department of Justice,
after consideration of Agency views regarding the impact of pros-
ecution on the national security. The Agency should be permitted
to conduct such investigations as it requires to determine whether
its operations have been jeopardized. The Agency should scrupu-
lously avoid exercise of the prosecutorial function.
GERALD
Chapter 8
Internal Controls
The CIA relies on internal controls to ensure that policy commands
followed, that resources are used properly and efficiently and that
tivities are consistent with statutory authority.
even major mechanisms, none of them peculiar to this intelligence
ncy. play a role: (1) The chain of authority; (2) requirements
coordination among various offices within the agency; (3) written
rnal regulations; (4) internal "watchdogs", including the legal
nsel. inspector general, and auditors; (5) resource controllers of
"", property, and personnel; (6) training courses; and (7) in-
methods of communication.
central feature of the CIA's organization is its "compartmenta-
n." For reasons of security, persons in one office are not informed
activities in other offices unless they have a "need to know." As a
equence, the number of persons who are in a position to comment
activities within the CIA is small.
Even persons whose function it is to oversee or inspect CIA activities
ometimes denied complete access to operational details.
OI the other hand, compartmentation results in high-level, detailed
proval of many activities-more so than in most government
ncies.
In addition, the secrecy of CIA activities creates additional prob-
for internal control. Individuals trained and accustomed to be
retive and to use unorthodox methods to perform their tasks may
tempted to employ this knowledge and experience to avoid close
113.
I he sensitive and sometimes dangerous nature of the work of the
1 demands high standards of personal discipline. dedication, and
triotism. The investigation indicates that virtually all of the Agency
tivities criticized in this Report were known to top management,
GERALD LIBRARY FORD
times as a result of complaints of impropriety from lower-ranking
mployees. This shows, among other things, that the Agency's system
ternal communication can operate.
(83)
84
A. Management and Administration
1. Chain of Authority
I he Director of Central Intelligence is the head of the CIA and at
top of its chain of authority. He is also the principal foreign intel-
grace officer of the government and has duties extending beyond the
11.
The Director's duties in administering the intelligence community,
lling relations with other components of the government, and
ing on broad questions of policy leave him little time for day-to-
supervision of the Agency.
chief assistant (since 1953, by statute) is the Deputy Director
Central Intelligence (DDCI). In recent years, this position has been
pied by a high-ranking military officer, with responsibilities for
ntaining liaison with the Department of Defense, fostering the
gency's relationship with the military services, and providing top
1.A management with necessary experience and skill in understand-
particular intelligence requirements of the military. Generally
king, the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence have not been
ily involved in administration of the CIA.
Each of the four major directorates within the CIA-Intelligence,
nations, Administration, and Science and Technology-is headed
deputy director. They report directly to the Director of Central
telligence.
The Directorate of Intelligence evaluates, correlates. and dissemi-
foreign intelligence. It also collects information by monitoring
gm radio broadcasts.
The Directorate of Operations (formerly called the Directorate for
n-) conducts the CIA's clandestine collection, covert operation, and
"erintelligence activities. Many of its employees work overseas,
it also operates an office that collects foreign intelligence from
Americans who volunteer information.
The Directorate of Science and Technology conducts research and
lopment projects related to devices used in intelligence collection
in counterintelligence. It also provides technical services and sup-
for operating portions of the CIA.
Directorate of Administration (formerly called the Directorate
apport) handles housekeeping chores for the CIA such as con-
ting, communications, medical services. personnel management.
irity, finance and computer support.
addition to these operating branches, the CIA has a number of
GERALD
offices, including a General Counsel, an Inspector General and a
ptroller. who report directly to the Director of Central
Intelligence.
85
The compartmented nature of CIA operations and the adherence to
ad-to-know" principles has restricted communication to lines of
thority within each directorate. One directorate generally does not
ire information with another. The Director of Central Intelligence
a consequence, the only person in a position to be familiar with
activities. Therefore he is the focal point for formal internal con-
1 of the CIA.
I he impact of compartmentation is sharpened by the occasional
tice of having lower echelon officers report directly to the Di-
tor of Central Intelligence. Such special reporting authority outside
the
normal chain of command existed both for the Office of Security
I the Special Operations Group of the Counterintelligence Staff.
This special reporting authority arose both from the need for tight
urity and the Director's interest in maintaining and continuing close
act with these sensitive activities.
Informal practices have the effect of expanding the information
within the CIA. Daily morning meetings are held by the Director
the deputy directors. Also present are the Inspector General,
nptroller, legal and legislative counsels and other top officials.
These weekday meetings include discussion of issues that otherwise
be handled only through the chain of authority. In addition,
CLA officials now meet regularly without the Director in the
ney Management Committee.
distinctive feature of the CIA is the absence of "outsiders" in top-
management. Unlike the typical executive agency, where not only
hief officer but also a group of top-level assistants are appointed
the outside, no such infusion occurs in the CIA. Almost all the
leadership for the past 28 years has been chosen from within the
zanization.
Coordination Requirements
The need for coordination has caused the CIA to supplement the
in of authority with requirements for consultation between offices.
CIA policies and certain types of operational activities are ap-
rured only after consultation among staff offices and sometimes sev-
directorates. The coordination required varies with the activity.
III regulations applicable to the entire agency must be reviewed by
directorates. the Inspector General and General Counsel before
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
"g approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. Whenever
an activity requires use of a new proprietary company, an adminis-
trative plan must be prepared by the operating component and ap-
proved both within the direct chain of authority and by the Offices
General Counsel, Finance, Comptroller, and Security, among others.
86
the extent that CIA activities involve agency-wide regulations
mprietaries, the compartmented nature of the Agency is somewhat
and by such coordination requirements.
Nonetheless, field operational details, although they often are ap-
through the chain of authority, are not normally cleared at
iquarters for logistic and financial support or legal authority.
ntralized control is designed to allow the CIA to operate secure-
feetively, and rapidly, though it sacrifices the opportunity for
mal checks.
Current requirements for coordination would not provide significant
rol over most of the CIA activities which are the subject of this
Report.
Written Directives
Written CIA regulations serve as an internal standard. The CIA
37'81 its basic policy direction by the 1947 National Security and
CIA acts. Directives of the National Security Council and of the
tor of Central Intelligence in his role as head of the intelligence
unity elaborate upon the basic guidance of Congress in setting
the CIA's duties and responsibilities. CIA regulations translate
broad intelligence directives into specifics. In addition, CIA
ations spell out the basic missions and functions of each office.
are readily available to all employees; as assignments and
lures change, amendments are made.
TA regulations are supplemented by official notices, which deal
policies of a transitory nature. Over 100 are issued each year.
lbooks give further details on administrative practices, security.
and benefits. travel. accounting, procurement and other items of
concern. In addition. each directorate and staff office pub-
its own written guidance for employees. Some particular offices
also supplied detailed written guidance setting limits on their
activities.
Agency directives do not, in general, however, spell out in detail
activities can or cannot be undertaken under the CIA's statute
policies. Agency-wide regulations rarely go beyond quoting the
National Security Act of 1947 prohibitions in describing the limita-
on CIA activities within the United States. A handbook of re-
.1 regulatory reading for all CIA employees similarly does not
beyond the barest outline. the 1947 Act's prohibitions on
vercise of police powers or internal security functions.
Some changes have recently been made to improve guidance pro-
GERALD
lad hr written directives. A number of notices have been issued
itically dealing with CIA activities within the United States and
fring office chiefs to prevent activities not authorized by the CIA's
87
arter. Notices have set strict limitations on certain testing programs,
reillance of Americans at home and abroad, assistance to local law
reement agencies, detailing of personnel to other agencies, and
waps, searches and seizures. Most are brief and relate to past incid-
that have been questioned. These notices have not yet been written
permanent regulations.
B. Staff Offices
Three staff offices are assigned responsibility to investigate activi-
throughout the CIA, respond to inquiries about their legality,
report their findings to the Director: the General Counsel, the
General and the Audit Staff.
The Office of General Counsel
The CLA's legal counsel performs a dual role. On the one hand,
upplies independent advice to the Director of Central Intelligence
propriety-under the Constitution, statutes, or regulations—
IA activities.
the other hand, because the legal counsel is also part of the
management that is responsible for carrying out assigned tasks,
subject to pressures to find legal techniques to facilitate proposed
absence of clear legal standards in the many unusual situations
come to him complicates his problem in maintaining profes-
independence of judgment.
The General Counsel and his staff of 14 lawyers are responsible for
roviding legal advice to the Director and all other officials of the
They also do miscellaneous legal tasks not involving legisla-
mison.
Two features of this legal office are distinctive. First, one person
as the General Counsel for 27 years, from the time the Agency
reated in 1947 until his retirement in 1974. Many particularly sen-
matters were handled by him personally. His successor has also
in the General Counsel's office for most of this period. Second,
exception. the staff has been recruited entirely from within
1.1.
T1. General Counsel is involved in policy-making. He has been
tive participant in drafting the basic delegations of responsibility
the CIA: the National Security Council Intelligence Directives
SCID's) and Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID's).
reviews all internal CIA regulations.
OERALD FORD LIBRARY
A fourth. the Office of Legislative Counsel. coordinates CIA relations with Congress and
re does not exercise a significant internal control function.
88
The General Counsel also participates in implementing CIA policy.
II office has been active in establishing proprietaries and other cover
for operations. He is consulted on CIA immigration cases and reviews
rocurement contracts, administrative and liquidation plans for pro-
pretary companies, and agreements between the CIA and non-govern-
mental organizations.
The General Counsel is sometimes asked by the Director and other
efficials within the CIA for formal or informal legal opinions on the
legality of CLA activities. The office maintains a collection of its legal
mions; they range over a wide assortment of topics from proper
of the confidential appropriated funds of the CIA to the authority
domestic activities in support of foreign intelligence.
The General Counsel does not review and comment on all activities
the CIA. He does not have authority to initiate inquiries; rather
responds to requests for legal advice. Most of the activities reviewed
this Report do not appear to have been the subject of a legal opinion
from the General Counsel until quite recently.
Absence of written opinions alone does not necessarily indicate
at the General Counsel was not consulted; consultation was at times
handled informally. The General Counsel and his staff have, however,
testified that they were unaware of most of the specific CIA activities
discussed in this Report.
2. The Inspector General
The Inspector General and his staff of five professionals report to
the
Director. They review employee grievances, supervise equal em-
doyment practices, investigate reports of wrongdoing, and perform
special management reviews of CIA activities. Under Directors with
Hering styles and management approaches, the Inspector General's
has varied.
The size of the Inspector General's staff reflects the Director's view
of the scope of appropriate oversight of the operating divisions and
of
the amount of reliance that management should place on the chain
of
command.
Until quite recently, the Inspector General conducted component
reviews of all CIA activities. Teams from the Inspector General's office
visited each component and sought to determine the propriety and
aeney with which it conducted its activities.
I he teams were also concerned with morale, security and supervisor-
ployer relationships.
The size of the Inspector General's staff has recently been reduced
from fourteen to five professionals. As a result, it no longer conducts
ponent reviews; instead, the Director relies on each deputy director
and his staff to ensure proper management in his directorate.
GERALD
89
Even when the Inspector General's office performed component re-
the ability of such reviews to discover information was re-
1541. The office could review each component only once every three
years. In performing such reviews, the Inspector General's staff
cometimes refused access to particularly sensitive CIA activities
which the Director granted a waiver from inspection. Even with
plete access, not all aspects of an office's activities could be ex-
Despite these limitations, the Inspector General frequently was
seare of many of the CIA activities discussed in this Report, and
ght them to the attention of the Director or other top manage-
The only program which was terminated as a result was one
1:423-involving experiments with behavior-modifying drugs on
inknowing persons.
The focus of the Inspector General component reviews was on oper-
offectiveness. Examination of the legality or propriety of CIA
activities was not normally a primary concern.
the last two years, the Inspector General has become a focal point
ollection of information on questionable CIA activities. In April
the Director of Central Intelligence asked the Inspector General
coordinate the CIA's internal investigation of possible involvement
Watergate matters. A May 9, 1973, memorandum from the Direc-
all CIA employees requested that they report to him any activi-
that may have been improper. Although most such reports were
through the chain of command, some came directly from employees of
rank. The obligation to report such activities to the Director or
Inspector General is now a standing order in the Agency.
The Audit Staff
While the Inspector General conducts general program reviews of
11 a tivities, more particular financial reviews are conducted by the
Staff. Although part of the Inspector General's office on the
11 table of organization, the Audit Staff operates separately. Its
has direct reporting responsibility to the Director. With a staff
few of whom have previously served elsewhere in the CIA, the
lit Statf conducts annual reviews of the financial records of all
11 tivities. Field offices are reviewed on a random rather than an
basis.
1:00 purpose of the audit is to ensure compliance with proper
wounting procedures consistent with CIA financial regulations. To
FO
is
extent possible, CIA regulations are similar to financial regula-
relied on generally in the federal government. Auditors
4/8-5 the standards of the American Institute of Certified Public
GERALD
intants.
90
In conducting a financial audit, the Audit Staff has available com-
terized information on all expenses of the office being audited. The
Adit Staff selects a few expenses of each office for particular exami-
Activities using unusual accounting procedures or requiring
sums of money other than payroll expenses will normally be
Although an auditor often is necessarily aware of the activities of an
during this financial compliance review, he does not usually learn
the activities in great detail; his focus is on their financial
Within the past year, at the urging of the General Account-
Office, the Audit Staff has begun to review programs in
addition to auditing for financial compliance. This is a limited project
about four program reviews per year and focuses on costly activ-
Program reviews concentrate on the success of activities in
having stated goals and on cost-effectiveness. They are not searches
illegal or improper conduct.
C. Control of Resources
I The Comptroller and the Budget Process
Preparation of the annual CIA budget is coordinated by the Comp-
goller. who reports to the Director. The Comptroller has a staff of
than twenty professionals, eight of whom are specifically as-
to review the budgets of the four directorates. Because these
reviewers usually are assigned to the Comptroller from direc-
and have not had budget experience, they serve as advocates
their directorates as well as comptrollers reviewing funding
Every division within the CIA prepares a budget which is reviewed
each directorate or staff office before being forwarded and com-
by the Comptroller. Detailed scrutiny of budgets is done pri-
within the directorates. The Comptroller focuses only on major
involving large sums of money, major new initiatives or activi-
of special concern to the Director.
eviewing the budget, the Comptroller's staff generally examines
ation of resources only if they exceed $30 million or employ over
Tsons. More limited activities would not be closely examined in
budget process at the Comptroller level. His focus is on questions
net and effectiveness. Rarely, if ever, has the propriety of an
been an issue for the Comptroller. unless some unusual fund-
GERALD
attern is involved.
he Comptroller presents the budget to the Director of Central
91
telligence for approval. It is then sent to the Office of Management
Budget for review before submission to Congress. After Congress
propriates funds, the Comptroller releases them to the directorates.
Lamp sums are given to each directorate, with instructions that the
Comptroller is to be notified only of any internal apportionments of
is that constitute substantial changes from the original budget.
The
Comptroller also provides fiscal guidance to the directorates,
luding instructions on when the Director is to be kept advised of
progress of certain activities.
Inc principal detailed budgetary control of specific CIA pro-
ams-apportionment of funds, evaluation of activities, and plan-
for the future-is performed outside the Comptroller's office.
Within the past two years, staff officers in each directorate have been
a "management-by-objectives" system that seeks to relate need
funds to the Director's program goals. Periodic reports are made
the
deputy directors and to the Director of Central Intelligence.
The Office of Finance
While the Comptroller prepares the budget and apportions funds
directorates, the Office of Finance handles actual payment of
expenses. Within the Directorate of Administration, this chief finan-
officer does not report directly to the Director of Central Intelli-
The Office of Finance's responsibilities include processing the
maintaining centralized financial records, auditing private
intractors, disbursing cash and purchasing foreign currencies. The
responsibility most closely related to internal control is the verification
all vouchers for expenditures.
Finance officers assigned to each office and station must approve
vouchers. They are responsible for preventing expenditure of
in violation of CIA regulations. Financial regulations do not,
explicitly describe what activities are prohibited by the
It's charter. Finance officers therefore rarely questioned the activi-
described in this Report.
3.
Property Controllers
\ number of the activities described in this Report require use of
particular types of property: wiretaps, for instance, require special
tronic devices. This property is maintained in various offices with-
CIA. Operating components needing to use this property must
it from the office that maintains an inventory. Inventory man-
ment controls exist in most offices, but they have not always been
oriented toward ensuring legitimate use of equipment.
New controls have been established (since 1972) over the loan of
DERALD FORD LIBRARY
wase materials and alias documents. Their use must now be ap-
92
proved by designated senior officials who can question the contem-
plated use; centralized, detailed records list their location and regula-
require their return when no longer needed.
1. Personnel Controllers
General personnel policies are formulated and personnel administra-
bon is conducted in the Office of Personnel in the Directorate of
Administration. The Office of Personnel has some contact with opera-
tional activities when it approves agreements with contract officers
and validates job ratings and salaries. In these capacities, although
the Office learns some operational details, it does not monitor the
activities.
Occasionally, activities whose propriety is questionable come to the
personnel office's attention. For example, the CIA's special Retirement
and Disability System is available only to certain employees who have
rved overseas or in "qualified" domestic activities; the Office has
forwarded information from employee applications for this program
the Inspector General's office for scrutiny when questionable domes.
activities were mentioned.
D. Other Information Channels
1. Training
The CIA's Office of Training, first established in 1951, has long
closely with the Directorate of Operations to train agents in
special skills necessary for clandestine operations.
In
recent years, the Office has expanded its curriculum and now
more than 60 courses on world affairs, management theories
techniques, foreign languages and intelligence evaluation and
pholuction. One course is required of all new professional CIA em-
ployees: the three-week introduction to International and World Af-
deals with the nature of intelligence work and the organization
the CIA. Although a brief introduction to the statutory framework
the
CIA is included in the course, detailed discussions of the
limitations on the CIA is not.
ommunication Outside the Chain of Authority
Management Advisory Group.-In 1969, the Executive
Comptroller (a position now vacant) established a Manage-
Advisory Group consisting of 14 mid-level officers (three from
FOR
directorate and two from the Director's staff) to discuss CIA
and activities with the Director of Central Intelligence. The
meets monthly with the Director and conducts inquiries into
GERALD
CIA practices. CIA employees are informed of the Group's existence
93
through notices and are encouraged to submit suggestions for areas
ling review.
The Group's focus has been on areas of improved personnel man-
ment. In 1970, however, it questioned the propriety of a number
CIA activities within the United States, particularly Operation
HAOS. The Group sought and received assurance that these domestic
invities had been properly approved.
Within the last two years, similar advisory groups have been created
each directorate.
Conclusions
In the final analysis, the proper functioning of the Agency must
Depend in large part on the character of the Director of Central
lligence.
The best assurance against misuse of the Agency lies in the appoint-
to that position of persons with the judgment, courage, and
pendence to resist improper pressure and importuning, whether
the White House, within the Agency or elsewhere.
Compartmentation within the Agency, although certainly appro-
for security reasons, has sometimes been carried to extremes
prevent proper supervision and control.
Agency must rely on the discipline and integrity of the men
women it employs. Many of the activities we have found to be
proper or unlawful were in fact questioned by lower-level employees.
Bringing such situations to the attention of upper levels of manage-
IS one of the purposes of a system of internal controls.
Recommendation (7)
a. Persons appointed to the position of Director of Central Intel-
zence should be individuals of stature, independence, and in-
crity. In making this appointment, consideration should be
even to individuals from outside the career service of the CIA,
though promotion from within should not be barred. Experience
intelligence service is not necessarily a prerequisite for the
position: management and administrative skills are at least as
portant as the technical expertise which can always be found
nanable deputy.
h. Although the Director serves at the pleasure of the President,
no Director should serve in that position for more than 10 years.
Recommendation (8)
a The Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence should
reconstituted to provide for two such deputies, in addition to
94
the four heads of the Agency's directorates. One deputy would
act as the administrative officer, freeing the Director from day-
today management duties. The other deputy should be a military
officer. serving the functions of fostering relations with the mili-
tury and providing the Agency with technical expertise on mili-
tary intelligence requirements.
b. The advice and consent of the Senate should be required for
the appointment of each Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
Recommendation (9)
a. The Inspector General should be upgraded to a status equiv-
alent to that of the deputy directors in charge of the four direc-
torates within the CIA.
b. The Office of Inspector General should be staffed by out-
standing, experienced officers from both inside and outside the
I.A. with ability to understand the various branches of the
Agency.
c. The Inspector General's duties with respect to domestic CIA
activities should include periodic reviews of all offices within the
United States. He should examine each office for compliance with
CIA authority and regulations as well as for the effectiveness of
their programs in implementing policy objectives.
d. The Inspector General should investigate all reports from
employees concerning possible violations of the CIA statute.
e. The Inspector General should be given complete access to all
information in the CIA relevant to his reviews.
1. An effective Inspector General's office will require a larger
staff, more frequent reviews, and highly qualified personnel.
g. Inspector General reports should be provided to the National
Security Council and the recommended executive oversight body.
I he Inspector General should have the authority, when he deems
it appropriate, after notifying the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, to consult with the executive oversight body on any CIA
activity (see Recommendation 5).
Recommendation (10)
she The Director should review the composition and operation of
the Office of General Counsel and the degree to which this office
is consulted to determine whether the Agency is receiving ade-
FO
quate legal assistance and representation in view of current
4
requirements.
h. Consideration should be given to measures which would
GERALD
strengthen the office's professional capabilities and resources
95
including, among other things, (1) occasionally departing from
the existing practice of hiring lawyers from within the Agency
to bring in seasoned lawyers from private practice as well as to
hire law school graduates without prior CIA experience; (2) occa-
sionally assigning Agency lawyers to serve a tour of duty else-
here in the government to expand their experience; (3) encour-
ging lawyers to participate in outside professional activities.
Recommendation (11)
To a degree consistent with the need for security, the CIA
should be encouraged to provide for increased lateral movement
of personnel among the directorates and to bring persons with
outside experience into the Agency at all levels.
Recommendation (12)
a. The Agency should issue detailed guidelines for its employees
further specifying those activities within the United States which
are permitted and those which are prohibited by statute, Execu-
the Orders, and NSC and DCI directives.
h. These guidelines should also set forth the standards which
govern CIA activities and the general types of activities which are
permitted and prohibited. They should, among other things,
apecify that:
-Clandestine collection of intelligence directed against
United States citizens is prohibited except as specifically per-
mitted by law or published Executive Order.
-Unlawful methods or activities are prohibited.
-Prior approval of the DCI shall be required for any ac-
tivities which may raise questions of compliance with the law
or with Agency regulations.
c. The guidelines should also provide that employees with in-
formation on possibly improper activities are to bring it promptly
to the attention of the Director of Central Intelligence or the
Inspector General.
&
GERALD
Part IV
Significant Areas of
Investigation
BERALD R.FO
Introduction
This
Commission was charged with determining whether any activi-
the CIA within the United States exceeded its statutory au-
We have, therefore, extensively inquired into the CIA's do-
activities and related matters over the years.
next 11 Chapters of this Report detail our findings and analyze
activities that bear special scrutiny.
Commission met weekly, beginning on January 13, 1975, to
testimony from witnesses familiar with CIA domestic activities.
Commission heard 51 witnesses, including the four living former
lots of Central Intelligence, the current Director, 28 other cur-
former CIA employees, the Director of the FBI, Secretary
Henry A. Kissinger, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk:
former Presidential Advisers for National Security Affairs,
Bundy, Walt W. Rostow and Gordon Gray; and five experts
vidual liberties and privacy. A transcript of all testimony by
witnesses was made. More than 2,900 pages of sworn testimony
illected.
ddition to testimony before the Commission, many additional
were questioned under oath by the Commission staff, or sign-
affidavits.
statf was divided into four teams for purposes of the investiga-
Three two-man teams conducted the factual investigation. The
team researched the legislative history and other Constitutional
stistery limitations on the CIA and investigated its internal
sternal controls.
four teams presented the most important evidence through
who appeared before the Commission. They also made
the to the Commission summaries of all interviews and docu-
evidence that they discovered.
Commission's investigation attempted, within the limits of time
ronnel. to discover all pertinent witnesses and documents dis-
the nature of the CIA's domestic activities.
of the staff spent weeks at the CIA and elsewhere inter-
personnel, and reviewing files, computer systems and written
memoranda on activities within the United States.
(98)
FORD is LABRA 07V830
99
The Commission was given access to all CIA files that the Commis-
ascertained could be pertinent to a full investigation. Some files
reviewed in their entirety; others were sampled at random. The
mentary holdings of the CIA were much too large for an investi-
or examination of all papers. Nevertheless, we believe that this
tigation covered all areas of the CIA likely to have been in-
and in domestic activities, and examined closely those witnesses
documents most likely to contain pertinent information on such
ities.
GERALD
Chapter 9
The CIA's Mail Intercepts
During the early 1950's, at the height of the so-called cold war,
the
CIA initiated the first of a series of programs to examine the
between the United States and Communist countries for pur-
of gathering intelligence. During the years since that time,
interception and examination ¹ of the mails for intelligence purposes
arried out at various times by the CIA at four different locations
the United States, until the last project was terminated in 1973.
in intercept project in New York City was the most extensive
CIA mail operations, and lasted for twenty years.
Three Postmasters General and one Attorney General were in-
of the project to varying degrees. The CIA, the record dis-
was aware of the law making mail openings illegal, but appar-
considered the intelligence value of the mail operations to be
persmount.
The stated purpose of the New York mail intercept project was
described in the report of the Chief of Counterintelligence
presented to Director James R. Schlesinger in 1973 when termination
the project was being considered. The report stated:
The mail intercept project is a basic counterintelligence asset designed to
United States intelligence agencies insight into Soviet intelligence activities
interests."
Three other mail projects carried out by the Agency during the same
occurred in San Francisco, Hawaii and New Orleans. The
terrept in San Francisco took place during four separate periods
month or less in 1969, 1970 and 1971. The one in Hawaii occurred
1954 and early 1955; and the New Orleans intercept lasted
about three weeks, in 1957.
"all Intercepts or mail openings involve the opening and examination of the contents of
is
FOR
Mall cover operations involve only examination and copying information on the
or covers of letters.
Among these Soviet activities was mail censorship. Presumably all mall to and from the
eag " rensored by the Soviets.
GERALD
(101)
102
In addition, the Office of Security, acting alone over a 24-year
J, ran over 91 separate mail cover operations and conducted
out 12 mail openings relating to particular individuals within the
ted States. Most of the cases involved CIA employees under
tigation, although some of the activity was directed against
reign nationals and some against citizens who had no connection
th the CIA.
I.ns chapter discusses and analyzes these projects, concludes that
interceptions were illegal and improper, and recommends steps to
vent their reinstitution.
A. East Coast Mail Intercept
1. Inception of the Project
ring 1952, interception of mail was perceived by the CIA as a
ntial source of intelligence. The Agency concluded that it was
to devote the technical personnel and resources that would
quired to carry such an operation into effect. Nevertheless, the
11 recognized the necessity for caution in approaching the subject
the postal authorities. The Chief of the Special Security Divi-
said in a planning memorandum dated July 1, 1952, "I believe
sould make contact in the Post Office Department at a very high
pleading relative ignorance of the situation and asking that we,
their cooperation, make a thorough study of the volume of such
the channels through which it passes and particularly the bottle-
within the United States in which we might place our survey
I he Post Office Department was initially to be approached with
quest that the CIA be allowed to examine only the outside or cov-
of the mail. The actual ultimate intent of the CIA was, however,
clear in the last paragraph of the July 1, 1952, memorandum:
our unit was in position, its activities and influence could be extended
'ually, so as to secure from this source every drop of potential information
able. At the outset, however, as far as the Post Office is concerned, our
target could be the securing of names and addresses for investigation and
In further contact.
memorandum also outlined the possible benefits of such a pro-
It would allow determination of the nature and point of origin
mmunications from the Soviet Union. Technical analysis of the
might also reveal secret communication methods.
Br September 30, 1952, the Office of Security of the CIA had deter-
eud, through its investigation of the mails in the United States,
GERALD
volume of mail flow from the Soviet Union. Security had also
rmined from the FBI that the Bureau then maintained no records
103
of correspondence between United States and Soviet citizens except
that which was uncovered incidentally in investigation of internal
security or espionage cases. The Security Office requested the Deputy
Director for Plans to inform the Director of Central Intelligence that
Security planned to undertake activities to accumulate information
on all letter envelopes, or covers, passing through New York City,
originating in the Soviet Union or destined for the Soviet Union.
Security noted that the Operation would require the cooperation of
the United States Post Office Department and the FBI. The sensitivity
of the operation was deemed "patently obvious."
On November 6, 1952, the CIA wrote to the Chief Postal Inspector
and asked that arrangements be made for one or two designated CIA
employees to work with a Postal Inspector in securing certain in-
formation from the mails. The expressed intention was to examine the
outside of envelopes only.
Arrangements were made on December 8, 1952, with the Chief
Postal Inspector to survey all mail to and from the Soviet Union
passing through New York City, and to provide for selective photo-
graphing of the envelopes or covers. The mail was removed in bulk
from the regular Post Office channels for purposes of examination,
and by December 18 the Office of Security had completed the survey
of how all mail passing to and from the Soviet Union was handled
through New York.
By September 1953, the mail operation had been in progress for
about a year. Analysis by the Agency of the materials examined
showed that the CIA had gained both substantive and technical intelli-
gence. This was deemed sufficiently valuable to warrant expansion of
the project and the photographing of all the mail covers passing
through the New York Post Office to and from the Soviet Union.
On December 23, 1953, Security reported to the CIA's Director of
Operations that it was ready to install the photography equipment at
the Post Office and that the Post Office would cooperate by making the
mail available to the CIA agents. Both sides of all first class mail were
to be photographed. The December 23 memorandum closed by suggest-
ing that the support of Allen Dulles. then Director of Central Intelli-
gence, be solicited for securing Post Office approval of this second step
of the venture. Agency documents show that by this time (and prob-
ably as early as February 1953) selected items of the mail were already
FORD
being opened and the contents analyzed by the CIA.
ERALD
2. Initial Contact with the Postmaster General
In a memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence dated
January 4, 1954, the Director of Security explained that the Postal
Inspectors were unwilling to go forward without higher authorization
from within the Post Office Department. Security suggested to the
104
DCI that arrangements be made for a meeting between the DCI and
the Postmaster General, who had already been briefed generally on
the project by the Chief Postal Inspector and was waiting for the
Director's call. The Director of Security said that in his meeting with
the Postal Inspectors, no mention was made of informing the FBI.
In fact, the FBI apparently did not become aware of the mail project
until four years later, in February of 1958.
On May 17, 1954, Allen Dulles and Richard Helms, the latter then
Chief of Operations in the Plans Directorate, met with Postmaster
General Arthur Summerfield and three of Summerfield's assistants.
According to Helms' contemporaneous memorandum of the meeting,
Dulles described the importance of the mail program and asked that
it be allowed to continue. No mention appears to have been made of
covert mail opening. Summerfield made no specific comment but,
according to Helms' memorandum, it was clear that he was in favor
of giving the CIA any assistance he could. Helms' memorandum
pointed out that Director Dulles, during the conference, did not men-
tion the potential for passing material on internal security matters to
the FBI and thought it would be better to leave that until a later date.
3. Formal Counterintelligence Proposal
By late 1955, the Office of Security had eight full-time employees
and several others on a part-time basis engaged in opening the mail.
The project was ready to be expanded. The Chief of Counterintelli-
gence asked Helms, by memorandum dated November 21, 1955, for
formal approval of a new counterintelligence program in conjunction
with the mail project.
The Counterintelligence Staff, which had previously not been in-
volved with the project, proposed that the CIA expand the operation
and "gain access to all mail traffic to and from the USSR which enters,
departs or transits the United States." Counterintelligence further
suggested that the "raw information acquired be recorded, indexed,
analyzed and that various components of the Agency be furnished
items of information." According to the November 21 memorandum,
the only added function that would be performed by the Office of
Security was that "more letters will be opened." "They are presently
able to open only a very limited number."
The project description which accompanied the November 21 memo-
randum noted that the mail opening did not have the express or tacit
&
FORD
approval of the postal authorities. It also recognized that "there is no
overt, authorized or legal censorship or monitoring of first-class mails
GERALD
which enter, depart, or transit the United States at the present time."
It could be assumed, therefore, the proposal said, that foreign espio-
nage agents used the mail as a means of communication, relying upon
the policy of the government against any monitoring of mail. Because
105
of this, policy, however, it was conceded that any disclosure of the mail
project would probably cause "serious public reaction in the United
States, perhaps leading to a congressional inquiry." But, the project
description said, "it is believed that any problem arising could be
satisfactorily handled."
The proposed counterintelligence project was approved by the
Deputy Director for Plans and the Director of Security in January
1956, but difficulties in organization delayed commencement of opera-
tions until approximately November 1956.
4. FBI Liaison with the Mail Project
In January 1958, the FBI approached the Post Office Department
for the purpose of instituting similar coverage of mail to and from
the Soviet Union. The Post Office Department brought the Bureau's
request to the Agency's attention, and shortly thereafter CIA repre-
sentatives told the FBI of the Agency's ongoing mail project. Up to
that time, the CIA had avoided telling the FBI of the mail project-
and no materials derived from the project were disseminated to the
BI.
Discussions between Agency and Bureau representatives in February
1958 resulted in an agreement that the CIA would send to the FBI
mail project items which were of internal security interest. The FBI,
in turn, would provide the Agency with watch lists of particular per-
sons or matters in which the Bureau was interested. The Bureau agreed
with the CIA's suggestion that the project should be handled by the
CIA alone. Eventually, the FBI would become, by far, the principal
recipient of mail project materials outside of the CIA's Counterintel-
ligence Staff.
5. The Mail Project in Full Operation
The mail opening project, which started in the early months of the
operation with only a few letters, had expanded by 1959 to include the
opening of over 13,000 letters a year. By 1961, the CIA had installed a
small laboratory for technical examination of letters to uncover for-
eign espionage techniques of communication.
The physical scanning of the mail was performed by CIA officers
in a facility located at the New York intercept. The envelopes of let-
ters selected during the scanning process were photographed, opened
and the contents photographed. The letters were then resealed. Tech-
nical testing of some of the letters and their contents was also accom-
plished at a CIA facility in the region. Copies of letters were analyzed
in CIA headquarters.
Individuals or organizations of particular intelligence interest were
pecified in watch lists provided to the mail project by the Counter-
ntelligence Staff, by other CIA components, and by the FBI. The total
106
number of names on the watch list varied, from time to time, but on
the average, the list included approximately 300 names including
about 100 furnished by the FBI. The watch list included the names
of foreigners and of United States citizens. Operation CHAOS (see
Chapter 11), in an effort to focus the mail project upon communica-
tions of dissidents, provided the mail project with a watch list of 41
American citizens.
Dissemination of the information derived from the mail intercept
was made to those CIA departments which filed watch lists. The prin-
cipal user of the information within the CIA was the Counterintelli-
gence Staff. Information of an internal security nature derived from
the intercept was forwarded to the FBI.
6. Second Briefing of a Postmaster General
With the inauguration of the Kennedy Administration in 1961 and
the appointment of a new Postmaster General, consideration was again
given in the CIA to briefing high postal officials on the program. The
Deputy Chief of Counterintelligence pointed out in a January 27,
1961, memorandum that "there is no record in any conversation with
ny official of the Post Office Department that we have admitted open-
50 mail." The memorandum continued that although "all conversa-
tions have involved examination of exteriors," it nevertheless seemed
"quite apparent that they must feel sure that we are opening mail."
No further explanation was given to support the last remark.
Counterintelligence suggested to Richard Helms, then the Deputy
Director for Plans, who was about to meet with J. Edward Day, the
new Postmaster General, that " if the Postmaster General asks if
we open any mail, we confirm that some mail is opened. He should be
informed, however, that no other person in the Post Office has been
so informed."
Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, accompanied by
Helms and another CIA officer met with Postmaster General Day on
February 15, 1961. According to Helms' memorandum for the record
made the following day, the CIA representative told Day "the back-
ground, development and current status (of the mail project), with-
holding no relevant details." The Postmaster General, according to
Helms' memorandum, ended the February 15 meeting by "expressing
the opinion that the project should be allowed to continue and that
he did not want to be informed in any greater detail on its handling."
Whether the "relevant details" told to Day included the fact of
mail openings is not entirely clear.
Day testified on May 7, 1975, before the House Committee on the
FORD it LIBRARY GERALD
Post Office and Civil Service that, when Dulles came to visit on Feb-
ruary 15, 1961, and said he had something "very secret" to talk about,
107
Day responded that he would rather not know about the secret, and so
Dulles did not tell him about it.
Helms stressed in his testimony that, while he could not recall the
specific conversation, his memorandum of February 15, 1961, states
that no information was withheld. An August 1971 note on the sub-
ject, apparently written by the chief of the mail project, tends to
point the other way. In any event, the mail project continued.
7. Consideration of "Flap Potential" and Cover Stories
Concern over the "flap potential" of the mail project appears to
have been constant. Even the CIA's Inspector General, after a review
of the Office of Security in 1960, had recommended preparation of an
"emergency plan" and "cover story" if the mail project were some-
how revealed. Despite general realization in the Agency of the dan-
gers involved, the Inspector General in the 1960 review did not sug-
gest termination of the project or raise the issue of its legality.³
Detailed consideration of the "flap" problem was set forth in a
memorandum sent by the Deputy Chief of Counterintelligence to the
Director of Security on February 1, 1962. This memorandum warrants
attention. It conceded that everyone realized from the outset of the
mail project that a flap would put us [the project] out of busi-
ness immediately and give rise to grave charges of criminal misuse of
the mail by government agencies." It had been decided, however, that
"the effort was worth the risk." It was assumed that any compromise
of the project would "unavoidably be in the form of a charge of vio-
lations of the mails." The memorandum continued:
Since no good purpose can be served by an official admission of the violation,
and existing Federal Statutes preclude the concoction of any legal excuse for
the violation, it must be recognized that no cover story is available to any govern-
ment agency.
*
Unless the charge is supported by the presentation of interior items from the
project, it should be relatively easy to "hush up" the entire affair, or to explain
that it consists of legal mail cover activities conducted by the Post Office at the
request of authorized Federal Agencies. Under the most unfavorable circum-
stances, including the support of charges with interior items from the project
it might become necessary, after the matter has cooled off during an extended
period of investigation, to find a scapegoat to blame for unauthorized tampering
with the mails.
The response of the CIA to this Commission's inquiries on the mail
project was the opposite of that suggested in the memorandum. All
CIA files and personnel connected with the mail project appear to have
a A July 1969 Inspector General review of the Counterintelligence Staff. however, did
recommend that the Deputy Director of Plans discuss with the Director of Central Intelli-
gence the transfer of the mail operation to the FBI or in the alternative that the project be
cancelled. The recommendation was not followed.
108
been made available to the Commission staff, and a detailed, accurate
description of the project was provided to the Commission by the for-
mer Chief of Counterintelligence. The 1962 memorandum is, however,
significant because it shows the thought processes of those involved
and illustrates the need for a method of periodic review of CIA opera-
tions by objective persons.
A further indication that the CIA was aware of the possible crim-
inality of the mail project exists in a September 26, 1963, memorandum
by the officer in charge of the mail project to an officer in the CIA's
Operations Division. That memorandum states "there is no legal basis
for monitoring postal communication in the United States except dur-
ing time of war or national emergency " The Commission staff
found nothing in the CIA records indicating that the Agency's legal
counsel was asked to give an opinion on the mail intercept prior to its
inception. As previously noted, the Inspector General, in looking into
the project in 1960, simply proposed that an adequate "cover story"
be developed.
Substantial consideration was given again to the possible efforts of
exposure of the operation, after testimony before a Senate subcom-
mittee in April 1965 had apparently indicated that governmental
agencies were "snooping into the mail." According to a contempo-
raneous memorandum of an April 25, 1965, conference which included
the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, Thomas Karamessines, con-
sideration was given to suspending the mail project pending the con-
clusion of the Senate hearings. The idea was rejected because the
project was deemed sufficiently secure and the project's facilities at
the post office could be dismantled and removed on an hour's notice.
Consideration was given during the April 25 meeting to briefing
Postmaster General Gronouski about the project because no officials
then in the Post Office Department had been briefed. This was rejected
because of testimony which Mr. Gronouski had given before the Sen-
ate subcommittee. The Assistant Deputy Director for Plans instead
gave instructions that "steps be taken to arrange to pass this informa-
tion through McGeorge Bundy to the President" after the subcom-
mittee investigation was completed. No evidence could be found to
confirm that President Johnson was ever advised of the project.
8. The Appointment of William Cotter, a Former CIA Officer, as
Chief Postal Inspector
On April 7, 1969, William J. Cotter, previously a security officer in
the Plans Directorate, was sworn in as Chief Postal Inspector of the
United States Post Office Department. Cotter was recommended for
the position by Richard Helms, who, along with the heads of other
governmental components, had been asked by Postmaster General
Blount for suggestions as to persons who might fill the Chief Inspec-
109
tor's job. Cotter was considered the best qualified among three or four
persons suggested to Helms by the CIA's Director of Security.
Cotter had been with the Agency since 1951, and from 1952 through
1955 he had served as deputy head of the CIA field office which coordi-
nated the East Coast mail intercept. Cotter knew of the project from
its outset and he was aware that letters were opened surreptitiously.
Although Cotter had no direct contact with the mail intercept project
from 1956 to 1969, when he was appointed Chief Postal Inspector, he
knew that it was still in operation.
As Cotter left the CIA headquarters on April 8, 1969, to be sworn
in as Chief Postal Inspector, he coincidentally met an officer in the
Counterintelligence Staff. A CIA memorandum for the record of the
same date sets forth the substance of the conversation which ensued.
According to that memorandum, Cotter was concerned that circum-
stances in his new position might compel him to reveal the existence
of the mail project. If he were asked about mail intercepts under
oath, Cotter-unlike his predecessor-could not truthfully state he
thought the project involved only mail "covers." Further, because of
his CIA background, he would be in a particularly precarious position
if the project were compromised.
According to the April 8 memorandum, Cotter said he planned to
enter his new job without making inquiries about the project, and he
planned to do nothing about the project unless it was mentioned to
him. Cotter said that eventually he would probably inspect the mail
intercept facility and might find it necessary to brief Postmaster
General Blount. But, according to the memorandum, Cotter assured
the counterintelligence officer that he would not take any action with-
out consulting first with the CIA.
9. Cotter's Dilemma About the Mail Project
In January 1971. Cotter, as Chief Postal Inspector, received a letter
from an association of American scientists inquiring about possible
Post Office acquiescence in opening first-class mail. Cotter apparently
forwarded a copy of the letter to the CIA. A CIA memorandum in
March 1971 indicates that Cotter also was concerned that the impend-
ing alteration of the Post Office Department from a governmental
agency to a corporation in mid-1971 might cause organizational
changes which would result in revelation of the mail project. Before
this Commission, Cotter testified that the reorganization was not of
major concern to him in this respect.
In any event, Director Helms convened a meeting of his associates
on May 19, 1971, to discuss the mail project. The May 19 meeting was
attended by the Deputy Director for Plans, the Director of Security,
the Chief and the Deputy Chief of Counterintelligence, and the ofli-
LIBRAST GERALD P. FORD
cer in charge of the mail project. According to a memorandum made
110
after the meeting, the discussion in part concerned the extent of
knowledge of the project outside the CIA and the likelihood of ex-
posure. Thomas Karamessines, now Deputy Director for Plans, was
particularly concerned about compromise of the project because it
would cause the CIA "the worst possible publicity and embarrass-
ment." Cotter's "dilemma" was evident. While he was presumably
loyal to the CIA, he could not deny knowledge of the project under
oath and, furthermore, in his new job his loalty belonged to the Post-
master General.
Karamessines suggested during the meeting that the mail project be
handled by the FBI. As he said, "they could better withstand such
publicity, inasmuch as it is a type of domestic surveillance."
The Counterintelligence Chief responded that his staff regarded the
operation as foreign surveillance-and that the FBI did not have the
facilities or trained personnel to take care of the operation. The Chief
of Counterintelligence also contended that the CIA could live with the
known risks and should continue the project.
Director Helms decided to discuss the matter with Cotter and deter-
mine whether Postmaster General Blount should be informed. Helms
then met with Cotter, and it was agreed that higher level approval in
the Post Office Department for the mail project was necessary. Helms
said he would first talk with the Attorney General.
10. Helms Briefs the Attorney General and the Postmaster Gen-
eral on the Mail Project
The Director met with Attorney General Mitchell on June 1 and with
Postmaster General Blount on June 2, 1971, to discuss the mail project.
Helms reported on June 3, 1971, to the Deputy Director for Plans, the
Director of Security, and the Counterintelligence Chief that Attorney
General Mitchell had fully concurred in the value of the operation and
had no "hang-ups" concerning it. Mitchell also reportedly encouraged
Helms to brief the Postmaster General.
Helms said he met with Postmaster General Blount and showed him
selected items derived from the project and explained Cotter's situa-
tion. Blount, according to Helms, was "entirely positive regarding the
operation and its continuation." Further, Blount felt "nothing needed
to be done" and rejected a "momentarily held thought" to have some-
one review the legality of the project because to do SO would widen
the circle of knowledgeable persons. The project was therefore con-
tinued with Director Helm's admonition that if there were even a sus-
picion of a leak, the project was to be stopped; investigation could be
made later.
"In a telephone interview with the Commission staff, Mr. Blount said he could not
recall the specifics of his conversation with Helms. Mr. Mitchell's attorney, in response
to a staff inquiry. said that Mitchell could recall the conversation with Helms but thought
they had only discussed mail covers.
DERALD s
111
11.' Termination of the East Coast Mail Project
Postmaster General Blount resigned his cabinet post later in 1971
and Attorney General Mitchell resigned at the end of February 1972,
leaving Cotter as once again the senior governmental official outside the
CIA with knowledge of the mail project. Cotter expressed his mis-
givings about the propriety of the project and his continuing concern
about the conflict in his loyalties in a conversation with Mr. Karames-
sines and the Chief of the Office of Security. Finally, in early 1973,
Cotter said that unless the CIA obtained higher level approval for the
project by February 15, 1973, it would have to be terminated.
This ultimatum was brought to the attention of James R. Schles-
inger, who was then Director of Central Intelligence. The Counter-
intelligence Staff forwarded a memorandum to the Director arguing
the importance to both the CIA and the FBI of continuing the project.
The correspondence was reviewed at a meeting on February 15, 1973,
between Schlesinger and William Colby, who was the CIA Executive
Director-Comptroller. Schlesinger determined at the meeting that the
project should be turned over to the FBI and that he was not convinced
that "the product to the CIA [from the mail project] was worth the
risk of CIA involvement."
As a result of another meeting shortly thereafter, with both Colby
and the Counterintelligence Chief, Schlesinger decided that Cotter
should be asked to defer termination of the project while the CIA took
it to a "very high level." But Cotter refused the request for delay,
stating that the project should be shut down now and could be renewed
once appropriate authority was obtained. The New York mail project
was therefore terminated by the Agency on February 15, 1973.
There is no record to indicate that the CIA attempted to obtain
President Nixon's approval of the project in 1973. Indeed, although
CIA files reflect suggestions made in January 1954 (Eisenhower Ad-
ministration) and in April 1965 (Johnson Administration) that the
President be advised of the mail project, no evidence could be found
that any briefing of any President occurred.
12. Evaluating the Mail Project
Statistics gathered by the CIA show that in the last full year of
its operation, the New York mail intercept handled approximately
4,350,000 items of mail and examined the outside of over 2,300,000 of
those items. Photographs were taken of the exteriors of approximately
33,000 items. Some 8,700 items were opened and the contents analyzed.
Selections for opening were made on the basis of a watch list given
to the crew and upon various other intelligence factors. During the
last year, approximately 5,000 of the selections were made on the basis
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
of the watch list.
112
In the last year, the program made over 3,800 separate dissemina-
tions of information derived from the project within the Agency and
sent some 1,400 separate items of information to the FBI. At the end
of 1972, the active watch list of names totaled approximately 600.
The number of names watch-listed varied from month to month as
they were supplied by CIA components and the FBI.
Although only mail coming into the United States was intercepted
in the early years of the project, both outgoing and incoming mail
were involved during most of the project's operation. CIA personnel
estimate that, overall, approximately 30 percent of the mail inter-
cepted was outgoing.
The project not only disseminated current information but provided
file data back to 1955 in a compartmented, computerized machine
record system containing almost 2,000,000 entries. Institutional and
organizational files were also maintained for reference and analytical
purposes.
The intelligence value of the mail project is not easy to assess. While
the Commission staff examined materials derived from the mail
intercept, it is difficult to judge their significance without knowing a
great deal about the cases to which the materials may relate.
All components of the Agency seemed to agree that the project was
ful as a source of technical communications intelligence on such
tters as secret writing, censorship techniques and the like.
There are also indications that the FBI found the mail project
valuable in internal security matters.
The Counterintelligence Staff regarded the mail project as a unique
source of intelligence of strategic importance. It was, they said, a
source of counterintelligence leads and of confirmation of otherwise
questionable information.
During his 1973 review of the project, however, Director Schlesinger
was not convinced that the intelligence derived from the mail inter-
cept was worth the risk of continued CIA involvement.
B. West Coast Mail Intercept
An August 26, 1969, two CIA officers from the technical division
of the Plans Directorate spoke with the Deputy Chief Postal Inspector
for the United States about commencing a CIA mail cover operation
on the West Coast. The proposed operation was to encompass inter-
national mail from the Far East. According to a contemporaneous
CLA memorandum, the Agency officers said during the August 26
meeting that the proposed activity would not involve opening the
mail; rather, the Agency wanted only to analyze the exteriors of
113
relevant envelopes. The postal official stated that he wanted to look
further into the matter.
The same CIA officers met with the Deputy Chief Postal Inspector
on September 12, 1969, to make arrangements for a survey on the
West Coast of the mail flow from the designated communist-con-
trolled areas overseas. The postal official agreed to the proposed survey.
A CIA memorandum made shortly after the September 12 meeting
indicates that "the key factor" in the official's decision to permit the
survey was "the fact that no envelopes would be opened."
Several days after the meeting on September 12, the two CIA
officials visited a postal facility in the San Francisco area. They con-
ducted a week-long survey of the incoming mail from the Far East.
In all, over 1500 envelopes were reviewed. No indication could be found
that any mail was opened during this survey.
CIA records do not show that any high level approval was re-
quested or obtained within the Agency for the September 1969 mail
survey. The CIA officers who undertook the survey apparently did
so in order to determine the feasibility of the mail project before
they sought approval for it.
On October 6, 1969, the two officers who had conducted the survey
convinced the chief of their division in the Plans Directorate that
the project was feasible and that approval should be sought for it.
The proposal was also discussed on October 23, 1969, with the Direc-
tor of Security, who agreed with it but said that the approval of
Director Helms had to be obtained. The Director of Security also
suggested during this meeting that, in view of the obvious sensitivity
of the proposal, all CIA personnel should "avoid preparing or ex-
changing any formal communications on the project." (No such com-
munications were located, but hand-written notes made by one CIA
officer detailed the events occuring throughout the formative stages of
the project.)
Thomas Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, orally
approved the project on November 4, 1969. He had secured Director
Helms' approval for the project the prior week. Karamessines testi-
fied that he approved of the project because it was the only way to
obtain intelligence vital to the safety of agents involved in certain
ongoing operations.
Later in November 1969, the CIA Director of Security explained
the project to Chief Postal Inspector Cotter, who gave his approval.
Cotter, of course, was familiar with the New York mail intercept
project. He said he wanted the West Coast project "to go slow and
develop gradually."
Neither Cotter nor any other postal official appears to have been told
that the West Coast project would involve opening mail. CIA
is
FORD
records indicate that the Agency representatives ostensibly agreed
GERALD
114
with the Post Office instructions that no mail was to be removed
from Post Office premises or opened. Nevertheless, the CIA's plan from
the outset was to open the mail, if possible, without informing postal
authorities.
The CIA officers involved in the West Coast project were aware
that questions might be raised as to its propriety under United States
laws, but they believed the likely intelligence potential from the proj-
ect was worth the risk. The successful operation of the mail project
in New York over the prior 16 years also played a part in the decision
to proceed with the West Coast project.
The first formal operation of the San Francisco project occurred in
early 1970, and another operation was run later that year. A third
effort was made in 1971. Each of the operations lasted for approxi-
mately two or three weeks and followed the same pattern: Late in the
evening, CIA personnel went to the postal facility, where a special
official met them and opened the relevant bags of mail. The postal offi-
cial remained present while the CIA representatives performed tests
on the outside of envelopes. During virtually every session, the CIA
officers, apparently without the knowledge of the postal official, con-
cealed selected pieces of mail in an equipment case or a handbag. The
selected items were then taken surreptitiously from the post office fa-
cility, opened, photographed, analyzed, resealed and returned to the
mail flow during the next visit to the facility.
CIA records indicate that a great majority of the mail examined
had originated outside the United States, although, on at least one
occasion, a bag of outgoing mail was opened for the CIA officers. The
primary objective of the San Francisco mail intercept, unlike the East
Coast mail project, was to obtain technical intelligence concerning for-
eign censorship, secret writing and the like. Agency records indicate
the San Francisco project was highly successful in meeting this
objective.
C. Hawaiian Mail Intercept
An intercept of mail from the Far East was carried out in the
territory of Hawaii from late 1954 until the end of 1955, when the
intercept was terminated. The project was initiated by a single CIA
officer, who photographed, opened and analyzed selected items of
mail.
CIA Headquarters was not informed of the one-man Hawaiian oper-
ation prior to its beginning, nor was express approval ever granted
for it. Tacit approval of the project may nevertheless be implied from
the favorable response given to the operation report submitted by the
j
FORD
officer in charge of the project. The Hawaiian intercept appears to
have been successful in producing technical postal intelligence.
GERALD
115
D. New Orleans Mail Intercept
A fourth mail intercept was conducted in New Orleans for approxi-
mately three weeks in August 1957 as a counterintelligence operation.
Approximately 25 sacks of international surface mail were examined
each day. The mail examined did not originate in the United States,
nor was it destined for delivery in the United States; it was simply
in transit. Approximately 200 items were opened and photographed,
but no substantive intelligence was gained and the project was ter-
minated.
Conclusions
While in operation, the CIA's domestic mail opening programs
were unlawful. United States statutes specifically forbid opening the
mail.
The mail openings also raise Constitutional questions under the
Fourth Amendment guarantees against unreasonable search, and the
scope of the New York project poses possible difficulties with the First
Amendment rights of free speech and press.
Mail cover operations (examining and copying of envelopes only)
are legal when carried out in compliance with postal regulations on a
limited and selective basis involving matters of national security. The
New York mail intercept did not meet these criteria.
The nature and degree of assistance given by the CIA to the FBI
in the New York mail project indicate that the primary purpose event-
ually became participation with the FBI in internal security func-
tions. Accordingly, the CIA's participation was prohibited under the
National Security Act.
Recommendation (13)
a. The President should instruct the Director of Central Intelli-
gence that the CIA is not to engage again in domestic mail open-
ings except with express statutory authority in time of war. (See
also Recommendation 23.)
b. The President should instruct the Director of Central In-
telligence that mail cover examinations are to be in compliance
with postal regulations; they are to be undertaken only in fur-
therance of the CIA's legitimate activities and then only on a
limited and selected basis clearly involving matters of national
security.
FOI
is
GERALD
Chapter 10
Intelligence Community Coordination
Introduction
In the late 1960's and continuing into the early 1970's, widespread
violence and civil disorder arose in many cities and on many campuses
across the country.
President Johnson and later President Nixon acted on a number
of fronts to organize the resources of the Federal government to
determine the facts about those responsible for the turmoil. Both
Presidents persistently demanded to know whether this violence and
disorder was in any way supported or directed by foreign elements.
Inevitably, the CIA became a major factor in these undertakings,
with action including:
(1) Participation in coordinated intelligence community ef-
forts to deal with the disturbances;
(2) Creation of a Special Operations Group ("Operation
CHAOS") to investigate and analyze any foreign connections of
domestic dissident groups (Chapter 11) ; and,
(3) Efforts of CIA's Office of Security to protect CIA's in-
stallations and campus recruiters from potentially violent dissent
activity. (Chapter 12).
A. Summary
In 1967, the Justice Department under Attorney General Ramsey
Clark established the first in a series of secret units designed to col-
late and evaluate information concerning the growing domestic dis-
order and violence.
The Justice Department's initial effort failed to produce the desired
intelligence results.
The CIA was consulted for advice on intelligence evaluation, and
the Department of Justice under Attorney General John Mitchell
(116)
FRRDO i LIBRARY GERALD
117
created another unit in 1969. This effort, too, failed to produce re-
sults satisfactory to the Administration.
Therefore, in June of 1970, President Nixon instructed the direc-
tors of four principal intelligence agencies to develop a plan for
increased coordination and evaluation of domestic intelligence. This
led the Nixon Administration in December of 1970 to create an inter-
agency committee and staff, including representatives from the CIA
the FBI, and other principal intelligence agencies, for coordination
and evaluation of intelligence related to domestic dissidence. This
joint committee produced reports for President Nixon and certain
other top governmental officials from February 1971 through May
1973.
All these efforts resulted from a realization in both the Johnson
and the Nixon administrations that the Government of the United
States had no effective capacity for evaluating intelligence concerning
domestic events. The FBI, as an investigative agency, produced raw
data but did not produce evaluated intelligence. The CIA produced
intelligence evaluations, but its jurisdiction was limited to foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence. The problem was further compli-
cated by the FBI's refusal during one period to cooperate fully with
other components of the intelligence community.
This realization appears to have caused the White House to pressure
the CIA into expanding the Agency's own activities related to domestic
dissidence (see Chapter 11). The White House evidently also concluded
that without some formal interagency coordination, it would not have
an adequate source of domestic intelligence evaluations or estimates
upon which to rely in attempting to deal with domestic disturbances.
The CIA's participation in these joint efforts warrants particular
attention. Any involvement of the Agency in activities of the Depart-
ment of Justice or in a domestic intelligence evaluation group could,
at least on the surface, raise a question of impropriety, under 50 USC
sec. 403 (d), which prohibits the CIA from having law enforce-
ment powers or internal security functions."
B. The "Interdivision Information Unit"
In early fall, 1967, Attorney General Clark asked John Doar, Assist-
ant Attorney General for Civil Rights, to report on the Department's
facilities for organizing information on individuals involved in civil
is
disorders. On September 27, 1967, Doar recommended establishment
GERALD
118
of a "single intelligence unit to analyze the FBI information we receive
about certain persons and groups who make the urban ghetto their
base of operation."
The FBI was to constitute only one source of information for the
proposed unit. As additional sources, Doar suggested federal poverty
programs, Labor Department programs, and neighborhood legal serv-
ices. Doar recognized the "sensitivity" of using such additional sources,
but he nevertheless thought these sources would have access to relevant
facts. Other sources of dissident information suggested by Doar in-
cluded the intelligence unit of the Internal Revenue Service and per-
haps the Post Office Department. The CIA was not among the proposed
sources.
Attorney General Clark, by memorandum dated November 9, 1967,
approved Doar's recommendation. Clark found it "imperative" that
the Justice Department obtain "the most comprehensive intelligence
possible regarding organized or other purposeful stimulation of domes-
tic dissension, civil disorders and riots." He appointed a committee of
four Assistant Attorneys General to make recommendations concerning
the organization and functioning of the proposed unit. "Planning and
creation of the unit must be kept in strictest confidence," Clark's
memorandum stated.
On December 6, 1967, the committee recommended in part that
the new unit, in addition to analyzing FBI information, should de-
velop contacts with other intelligence agencies, including the CIA,
as possible sources of information. Following his committee's rec-
ommendation, Attorney General Clark on December 18, 1967, directed
the organization of the Interdivision Information Unit ("IDIU").
Objectives of the new Unit were:
reviewing and reducing to quickly retrievable form all information that
may come to this Department relating to organizations and individuals through-
out the country who may play a role, whether purposefully or not, either in
instigating or spreading civil disorders or in preventing or checking them.
After its establishment, the IDIU commenced collecting, collating,
and computerizing information on antiwar activists and other dissi-
dents. The IDIU produced daily and weekly reports on dissident
occurrences and attempted to predict significant future dissident
activities.
C. Development of Justice Department-CIA Liaison
Problems of domestic dissidence were of immediate concern to the
Nixon Administration when it took office.
Attorney General John Mitchell met with Director Helms of the
ERALD
119
CIA on May 14, 1969, to discuss problems arising from domestic un-
rest and, more specifically, to discuss where within the government
the entire question of domestic dissident intelligence could be handled.
The Attorney General explained that he felt the FBI was not ac-
quiring the necessary intelligence concerning domestic unrest, although
Mitchell also was of the opinion that the IDIU was improving in that
regard. Helms offered to have a CIA liaison established with the
Department of Justice to provide advice on the Department's intelli-
gence efforts; but, because of the "political implications" involved,
Helms rejected the Attorney General's suggestion that CIA person-
nel be assigned to the Justice Department unit.
Helms then asked the Chief of CIA's Special Operations Group,
which ran Operation CHAOS,¹ to establish the liaison with the Jus-
tice Department. He was to make contact with Jerris Leonard, the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division, and
James Devine, another member of the Justice Department. Leonard
coordinated the Department's efforts concerning civil disorders, and
Devine, under Leonard, headed the IDIU.
The Chief of the CIA Special Operations Group met with Leonard
on May 19 and with Leonard and Devine on May 27, 1969. According
to notes taken at those meetings by the CIA officer, the Justice De-
partment representatives explained that they and their units were re-
sponsible for receiving and evaluating information used to advise the
Attorney General and the President as to when federal aid would be
needed in civil disorders. The IDIU was the unit which received and
indexed the information. Coordination and evaluation of that infor-
mation was supposed to be the responsibility of a relatively inactive
entity known as the Intelligence Evaluation Committee ("IEC"),
which was composed of representatives from the Department of Jus-
tice, the Department of Defense and the Secret Service.
Conceding their ignorance of matters relating to intelligence evalua-
tion, Leonard and Devine requested the CIA's assistance and advice in
processing intelligence on civil disorders. Leonard also pressed the
CIA officer to sit as a member of the IEC which, Leonard explained,
was an informal group and would therefore permit any CIA role in
it to remain hidden. The officer declined, saying that the CIA had no
domestic jurisdiction and that Helms was reluctant to "have the
Agency appear to be too deeply involved in domestic matters." How-
ever, the officer suggested that the CIA could probably be of assistance
in supplying information on the foreign travel and contacts of indi-
viduals of interest, as well as in providing advice relating to the orga-
nization and evaluation of intelligence information.
1 The activities of the CIA through Operation CHAOS are discussed fully in Chapter 11.
120
When the CIA officer reported to Helms on these meetings, the Di-
rector agreed with his position on the nature of the liaison and con-
firmed that there should be no formal participation by the CIA on
the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. Helms also instructed the offi-
cer not to inform anyone else in the CIA of the newly established
liaison. The Director suggested that, perhaps, the Chief of Counter-
intelligence, the liaison officer's immediate supervisor, might be told
at a later date-depending on developments. As a matter of fact, no
one in the CIA other than Helms, his Executive Assistant and the
liaison officer himself knew of the CIA's liaison with the Justice De-
partment during the following year.
D. Exchange of the IDIU Computer Listing
On June 18, 1969, Devine briefed the CIA liaison officer on the IDIU
machine records system. Devine explained that the IDIU had often
been unsuccessful in providing advance warning of incipient civil dis-
orders because information concerning the disorders was not avail-
able far enough in advance. It was agreed that Devine would furnish
the IDIU computer listing to the CIA for checking against the for-
eign travel records of dissidents, as held by Operation CHAOS, and
to allow the CIA's analysts the opportunity to suggest how the Justice
Department might use its list more effectively.
The IDIU listing apparently contained the names of approximately
10,000 to 12,000 individuals, as well as brief narratives about their
dissident activities.² The head of Operation CHAOS found that the
IDIU listing consisted principally of information derived from FBI
reports. He concluded that any meaningful comparison with Opera-
tion CHAOS records was not reasonably feasible.
In September of 1969, the officer asked Devine for a duplicate of
the actual IDIU computer tape and program. The idea was that, by
matching the duplicate IDIU tape with the computer tape maintained
by Operation CHAOS, it could possibly be determined whether the
CIA had indexed information which the FBI had not already pro-
vided to the IDIU.
The duplicate IDIU computer tape and program were delivered to
the Chief of Operations CHAOS and held by him personally in his
private safe. Only the Chief, Director Helms, and a CHAOS
computer programmer knew of the CIA's possession of the Justice
The evidence reviewed by the Commission indicates that the listing of 10,000-12,000
names held by the IDIU and the compilation of 7,200 personality files held by Operation
CHAOS (see Chapter 11) were developed independently of one another.
121
Department materials. Subsequently, the Chief and the computer
programmer attempted to match the Department of Justice tape with
the Operation CHAOS computer system, but concluded that the
matching would require too much time and effort. None of the informa-
tion contained in the IDIU tapes was used by Operation CHAOS or
incorporated into the CIA records. The IDIU materials were finally
destroyed when Operation CHAOS was terminated in March 1974.
E. The "Civil Disturbance Group"
In a further attempt to coordinate the efforts of the Department of
Justice to control civil disorders, Attorney General Mitchell, on
July 22, 1969, established the "Civil Disturbance Group" (CDG).
Both the IDIU and the IEC were placed under the jurisdiction of the
Civil Disturbance Group, which was instructed to coordinate intelli-
gence, policy, and action within the Department of Justice concerning
domestic civil disturbances.
Although the plan establishing the CDG made no mention of the
CIA, Helms was told of the plan almost immediately. On July 25,
1969, three days after the plan had been put into effect, the Attorney
General met with Helms. According to handwritten notes made by
Helms during that meeting, Attorney General Mitchell explained that
the CDG had been created because the FBI could not provide the
needed analysis of intelligence on civil disturbances. The FBI, the At-
torney General noted, was an "investigative not [an] intelligence
outfit." Mitchell asked Helms to have the CIA investigate the ade-
quacy of the FBI's collection efforts in dissident matters and to per-
suade the FBI to turn over its material to the CDG. Apparently the
Attorney General was experiencing some difficulty in obtaining coop-
eration within his own Department.
The CIA connection with the Civil Disturbance Group appears to
have been minimal. Shortly after the CDG was established in July
1969, the Chief of Operation CHAOS, acting as the CIA liaison,
assisted Jerris Leonard, as Chief of Staff for the CDG, and other
Justice Department officials in establishing relationships with the
military intelligence departments. In November 1969, the CIA liaison
officer took part in a series of meetings with Leonard concerning prep-
arations for handling an antiwar rally scheduled to take place in
Washington, D.C. Intermittent contacts between the liaison officer and
other Justice Department officers also occurred over the following two
or three months.
FORD
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122
F. The "Interagency Committee on Intelligence
(Ad Hoc)"
The CDG did not satisfy the government's requirements for coordi-
nated and evaluated intelligence on domestic upheaval. Both the At-
torney General and the White House continued to receive only raw,
unevaluated data from the FBI. In addition, cooperation within the
intelligence community upon intelligence matters deteriorated sub-
stantially during late 1969 and early 1970. In late February 1970, J.
Edgar Hoover forbade the Bureau to engage in anything but formal,
written liaison with the CIA, because Helms had refused to compel a
CIA officer to disclose to Hoover the name of an FBI agent who had
given the officer certain FBI information late in 1969.
President Richard M. Nixon called a meeting at the White House
on June 5, 1970, of the directors and officers from four of the major
components of the intelligence community. Those attending included
J. Edgar Hoover for the FBI, Richard Helms for the CIA, Vice
Admiral Gayler for the National Security Agency and Lt. General
Bennett for the Defense Intelligence Agency. The purpose of the
meeting was to discuss problems relating to domestic disorders.
The President directed those present to make greater efforts to
cover the activities of dissidents in the United States. He made it
plain that he was dissatisfied with the quality of intelligence concern-
ing the extent of any foreign connections with domestic dissidence.
The possible relationship of Black radicalism in the Caribbean to
Black militancy in the United States was discussed, and the President
directed that a study on the subject be prepared.³ Finally, the Presi-
dent said that Mr. Hoover was to organize the group to draft a plan
for coordination of domestic intelligence.
Four days later, on June 9, 1970, the "Interagency Committee on
Intelligence (Ad Hoc)" ("ICI") held its first meeting. The com-
mittee was composed of the directors of the FBI, CIA, NSA, and
DIA. Simultaneously, a subcommittee of representatives from the
same agencies was established to accomplish the drafting of the ICI
report. The CIA Counterintelligence Chief was designated as the
CIA's representative on the subcommittee, and the Chief of Operation
CHAOS served as an "observer" in the group. The subcommittee was
officially constituted within the United States Intelligence Board, but
this appears to have been done simply to provide an organizational
cover for the activities of the subcommittee. Minutes of the subcom-
mittee's meetings show that, in fact, the subcommittee was "an inde-
8 Operation CHAOS eventually did prepare such a study. It was delivered over the signa-
&
FOR
ture of Director Richard Helms to Tom Huston on July 6, 1970, for handing to
the President.
GERALD
123
pendent, ad hoc, inter-agency group with a specific mandate," and
that the "scope and direction of the review [conducted by the sub-
committee] will be determined by the White House."
Two of the stated objectives for the ICI were: (1) to assure a
"higher priority by all intelligence agencies on internal security col-
lection efforts" and (2) to assure "maximum use of all special investi-
gative techniques, including increased agent and informant penetra-
tion by both the FBI and CIA." An unstated objective was to effect
greater cooperation and evaluation of data by the FBI. Charles
Huston, the White House liaison on the ICI, stated the problem dur-
ing the first meeting of the Committee: "The President receives un-
coordinated information which he has to put together," or, as Helms
told the CIA's observer later in June 1970, "the heart of the matter"
was to "get the FBI to do what it was not doing."
Huston made it clear at the initial ICI meeting that President Nixon
wanted the Committee to assume that all methods of gathering intelli-
gence were valid. The President, Huston said, wanted the Committee,
in reviewing matters which "obstructed" intelligence gathering, to
consider that "everything is valid, everything is possible." All re-
strictions on methods were to be listed, according to Huston, so that
the President could make a final decision on which methods would
be employed.
A forty-three page "Special Report" was issued by the ICI on
June 25, 1970. The Report assessed the internal security threat posed
by the major domestic dissident groups as well as by foreign organiza-
tions. The CIA's contribution to this section of the Report was entitled,
"Definition of Internal Security Threat-Foreign," and encompassed
only the foreign aspects of the problem.
The ICI's Report also considered the effect of legal restraints and
constitutional safeguards limiting the methods which the government
could employ in the collection of domestic intelligence. The enumer-
ated methods which were subject to "restraints" included electronic
surveillance, mail coverage, surreptitious entry and development of
campus sources. Covert mail coverage and surreptitious entry were
specifically described as illegal. The Special Report listed the benefits
or detriments to be derived from employing such methods but did
not expressly recommend their use: instead, it specified possible alter-
natives concerning each of them. The FBI expressed opposition to any
change in existing procedures.
Finally, the ICI's Report concluded that:
There is currently no operational body or mechanism specifically charged with
the overall analysis, coordination and continuing evaluation of practices and
policies governing the aequisition and dissemination of Intelligence. the pooling
DERALD R.FORD LIBRARY
of resources and the correlation of operational activities in the domestic field.
124
The ICI recommended establishment of an interagency group for
evaluation and coordination of domestic intelligence, a proposal which
the CIA representatives had supported throughout the Committee's
meetings. Director Hoover opposed the recommendation.
On July 9, 1970, Huston advised Director Helms that all com-
munications to the White House on domestic intelligence or internal
security matters were thereafter to be addressed to Huston's exclusive
attention. At approximately the same time, Huston recommended to
the President, through H. R. Haldeman, that almost all the restraints
on methods of intelligence collection discussed in the ICI's Special
Report should be relaxed. Haldeman advised Huston on July 14, 1970,
that the President had approved Huston's recommendations.
By memorandum dated July 23, 1970, Huston informed Helms and
the other members of the ICI of the President's decision. Under the
"Huston. Plan," prohibitions against covert mail coverage, surrepti-
tious entry and electronic surveillance were to be relaxed or removed.
Huston further advised the ICI members that a committee composed
of representatives from the FBI, the CIA, the NSA and the DIA
was to be constituted effective August 1, 1970, to provide domestic
intelligence evaluations.
Apparently Attorney General Mitchell was not aware of the June 5,
1970, meeting between the President and the heads of the intelli-
gence community or of the course of meetings and events leading up
to the President's decision and direction on the Huston Plan. Attorney
General Mitchell told Helms on July 27, 1970. that he had not heard
of the Huston Plan until earlier that same day, when Hoover had
complained to him about Huston's July 23 memorandum. In a memo-
randum he made of their meeting, Helms said Mitchell had been
"frank" in stating that no action should be taken on Huston's directive
until Mitchell had spoken with the President. Subsequently, Mitchell
expressed his opposition to the Huston Plan. apparently with success.
The next day, July 28, the White House asked Helms to return his copy
of Huston's July 23 memorandum. Soon thereafter. in late August or
early September, John Dean was assigned White House responsibility
for domestic intelligence on internal security matters.
Sometime during this same period. the Attorney General discussed
with Director Helms the continuing lack of evaluated domestic intel-
ligence and the absence of coordination on that matter within the in-
telligence community. Mitchell said that he was considering the pos-
sibility of a small unit within the Department of Justice for the
assembling and evaluation of domestic intelligence. A luncheon for the
Attorney General was arranged at the CIA Headquarters on Septem-
ber 17, 1970, to discuss this possibility.
GER A&D
125
In addition to Mitchell and Helms, the Deputy Director for Plans,
the Chief of Counterintelligence, and the Chief of Operation CHAOS
were present for the discussion on September 17. According to notes
made at the luncheon meeting, the group discussed problems of the
existing domestic intelligence procedures. Specificallly, it was again
emphasized that the FBI did not have any "organization for evalua-
tion of domestic intelligence." Further, the Justice Department's
IDIU was characterized as "useless" for evaluation purposes because
the unit often did not receive information until after the events hap-
pened. The luncheon group proposed that a unit be established within
the Justice Department to "provide evaluated intelligence from all
sources" and "allow preventive action" to be taken in time.
One of the options discussed was the revival within the Justice De-
partment of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. The revived IEC
would include the CIA and perhaps a White House representative, and
it would be charged with the responsibility of coordination and evalu-
ation. To avoid duplication of effort, the new IEC would draw upon
the files and indices maintained by the participating agencies, rather
than setting up its own files.
Shortly after the September 17, 1970, luncheon, Attorney General
Mitchell met with John Dean to discuss the prompt organization of
the new domestic intelligence unit. It was Dean's suggestion that an
interagency domestic intelligence unit be used for both operational
and evaluation purposes. Dean further suggested that, while initially
there would be no blanket removal of the restrictions on the methods
of intelligence collection, eventually restraints could be removed as far
as necessary to obtain intelligence on a particular subject. Dean also
thought that the existing but inactive IDIU would provide an "ap-
propriate Justice Department cover" and eliminate the chance of
public discovery of a new intelligence operation within the Depart-
ment of Justice.
G. The "Intelligence Evaluation Committee"
The Administration thus decided to revise and reactivate the mori-
bund Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC) of the Department
of Justice. The initial meeting of the reconstituted IEC occurred on
December 3. 1970, in John Dean's office in the Old Executive Office
Building. Several other meetings of an organizational nature were
FO
held from time to time through February 1971.
the
The Committee was composed of representatives from the Depart-
ment of Justice, the FBI, the CIA, the Department of Defense, the
GERAL
126
Secret Service and the National Security Agency. A representative of
the Treasury Department was invited to participate in the last two
IEC meetings. The Chief of Counterintelligence was the CIA repre-
sentative on the IEC, and the Chief of Operation CHAOS was his
alternate.
Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General for the Internal
Security Division, was technically Chairman of the IEC, while John
Dean served as the White House representative. The ultimate author-
ity over the Committee was somewhat fuzzy; both Mardian and Dean
stated requirements and made assignments to the Committee.
The IEC was not established by Executive Order. In fact, according
to minutes of the IEC meeting on February 1, 1971, Dean said he
favored avoiding any written directive concerning the IEC because
a directive "might create problems of Congressional oversight and dis-
closure." Several attempts were nevertheless made to draft a charter
for the Committee, although none appears to have been accepted by all
of the IEC members. The last draft which could be located, dated
February 10, 1971, specified the "authority" for the IEC as "the Inter-
departmental Actional Plan for Civil Disturbances," something which
had been issued in April 1969 as the result of an agreement between
the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense. Dean thought it
was sufficient just to say that the IEC existed "by authority of the
President."
Revitalization of the IEC in December 1970 appears clearly to have
sprung from the suggestions of the ICI's Special Report. Helms testi-
fied that he understood that the IEC had been organized to focus and
coordinate intelligence on domestic dissidence. Handwritten notes
made by the CIA Counterintelligence Chief during an IEC meeting
on January 25, 1971. indicate that the IEC was in part an "imple-
mentation of the ad hoc committee report." But, because Hoover had
objected so strongly to the ICI's report, no reference was to be made
to it during the IEC meetings.
The Counterintelligence Chief's notes also reflect that the operation
of the IEC was to be "done with the tools we now have." This Commis-
sion's staff did not find any indication that the IEC attempted to
adopt the suggestions in the Huston Plan for ignoring legal restric-
tions on intelligence gathering in the United States.
The January 25. 1971. meeting of the IEC also concerned recruit-
ing a staff for the Committee. Mardian suggested that each of the par-
ticipating agencies should contribute an individual to work on the
staff, although Hoover had already made it clear the FBI would
refuse either to contribute to the IEC budget or to provide personnel
for the staff.
127
H. The "Intelligence Evaluation Staff"
A staff for the IEC was organized by the end of January 1971.
That group, called the Intelligence Evaluation Staff ("IES"), held
its first meeting on January 29, 1971. Unlike the Committee, which
was intended to function as a "think tank," the Staff was to do the
work of coordination, evaluation and preparation of estimates for is-
suance by the Committee.
The Chief of Operation CHAOS was the CIA representative on
the IES. He attended such IES meetings as were called, and he
coordinated the CIA's contributions to the IES evaluations and esti-
mates. The Operation Chief was not assigned to the IES on a full-time
basis. Representatives of the NSA, the Secret Service and the military
intelligence services also served on the IES. Finally, in May 1971,
the FBI also assigned a representative to aid the staff.
Although the Department of Justice's IDIU was not actually in-
volved in the work of the IES, the IES was "attached to [the IDIU]
for cover purposes."
The Intelligence Evaluation Committee met on only seven occasions;
the last occasion was in July 1971. The Intelligence Evaluation Staff,
on the other hand, met a total of one hundred and seventeen times be-
tween January 29, 1971, and May 4, 1973.
The IES prepared an aggregate of approximately thirty studies
or evaluations for dissemination. It also published a total of fifty-five
summaries called intelligence calendars of significant events. The
preparation of these studies, estimates or calendars was directed by
John Dean from the White House or by Robert Mardian as Chair-
man of the IEC.
The initial studies related to the "May Day" demonstrations held
in 1971. and later reports concerned other proposed antiwar demon-
strations, racial protests or planned violence. From January to
August 1972, the IEC/IES issued, and regularly revised, reports cov-
ering the potential for disruptions at both the 1972 Republican and
Democratic National Conventions.
Many of the IEC reports contained information having both domes-
tic and international aspects. The CIA made a number of contribu-
tions to the IEC/IES publications. Those contributions were prepared
by Operation CHAOS personnel (see Chapter 11). However, the con-
tributions appear to have been a by-product of ongoing activities
abroad. Review of all the contributions reveals that the CIA re-
ported, with only minor exceptions, on matters relating strictly to
foreign or international events or organizations.
It appears the only participation by the CHAOS Chief in the IES,
GERALD
128
aside from serving as the CIA liaison in preparing the Agency's con-
tributions, was to edit drafts of the Staff's reports. Mardian himself
did ask the Chief to use the CIA's computer index for name traces in
connection with the March 1971 Capitol bombing incident, the
"Pentagon Papers" case and the Berrigan Brothers case.³ But no
evidence was found that the CIA was asked by either the IEC or
the IES to collect domestic intelligence.
The agents run by the CIA's Operation CHAOS appear on only one
occasion to have been directed to collect information domestically
which was used for IEC/IES purposes. That was the use of one
agent during the 1971 May Day demonstrations in Washington, D.C.,
which is described more fully in Chapter 11. CHAOS forwarded the
information supplied by that agent to the FBI, and some of the in-
formation ultimately may have been incorporated in IEC publications
concerning the May Day demonstrations.
Director Helms told the CIA liaison officer during a meeting on
December 5, 1972, that the Agency "should minimize its contribu-
tions to the IEC, with the expectation that eventually the or-
ganization may disappear." Helms in his testimony was unable to
recall the basis for this instruction. By then, however, the fact that
Attorney General Mitchell and Robert Mardian had long since re-
signed to work on President Nixon's reelection campaign, plus the
substantial decline in the incidence of civil disorder, all contributed
to the lapse in IEC/IES activity.
The IEC and IES were terminated in July 1973 by Assistant
Attorney General Henry Petersen.
Conclusions
The CIA's liaison with the Department of Justice and the Agency's
participation in interagency intelligence groups resulted from at-
tempts to utilize the CIA's expertise in intelligence evaluation and
its collection of intelligence abroad having a bearing upon domestic
dissidence.
This attempted use occurred because two Administrations believed
the government of the United States lacked an effective capacity
to coordinate and evaluate intelligence on matters affecting internal
security.
The available evidence indicates that the CIA's participation in
meetings of the IES was limited to providing advice on foreign in-
telligence and evaluation techniques and to editing reports. The
3 This appears to have been a short cut of the general procedure In the Justice Department
to make requests for name checks by the CIA through the FBI.
GERALD,
129
Agency's substantive contributions to the IES were restricted to for-
eign aspects, if any, of the relevant problems.
The statutory prohibition on internal security functions does not
preclude the CIA from providing foreign intelligence or advice on
evaluation techniques to interdepartmental intelligence evaluation
organizations having some domestic aspects.
The attendance of the CIA liaison officer at over 100 meetings of
the Intelligence Evaluation Staff, some of them concerned wholly
with domestic matters, nevertheless created at least the appearance
of impropriety. The Director of Central Intelligence was well advised
to approach such participation reluctantly.
The liaison officer acted improperly in the one instance in which
he directed an agent to gather domestic information within the United
States which was reported to the Intelligence Evaluation Staff
Recommendation (14)
a. A capability should be developed within the FBI, or else-
where in the Department of Justice, to evaluate, analyze, and
coordinate intelligence and counterintelligence collected by the
FBI concerning espionage, terrorism, and other related matters
of internal security.
b. The CIA should restrict its participation in any joint intelli-
gence committees to foreign intelligence matters.
c. The FBI should be encouraged to continue to look to the CIA
for such foreign intelligence and counterintelligence as is relevant
to FBI needs.
FORD
is
075830
Chapter 11
Special Operations Group-
"Operation CHAOS"
Responding to Presidential requests to determine the extent of for-
eign influence on domestic dissidence, the CIA, upon the instruction
of the Director of Central Intelligence, established within the Counter-
intelligence Staff a Special Operations Group in August 1967, to
collect, coordinate, evaluate and report on foreign contacts with
American dissidents.
The Group's activities, which later came to be known as Operation
CHAOS; led the CIA to collect information on dissident Americans
from its overseas stations and from the FBI.
Although the stated purpose of the Operation was to determine
whether there were any foreign contacts with American dissident
groups, it resulted in the accumulation of considerable material on
domestic dissidents and their activities.
During six years, the Operation compiled some 13,000 different files,
including files on 7,200 American citizens. The documents in these
files and related materials included the names of more than 300,000
persons and organizations, which were entered into a computerized
index.
This information was kept closely guarded within the CIA to pre-
vent its use by anyone other than the personnel of the Special Opera-
tions Group. Utilizing this information, personnel of the Group pre-
pared 3,500 memoranda for internal use; 3,000 memoranda for dis-
semination to the FBI; and 37 memoranda for distribution to high
officials.
The Operation ultimately had a staff of 52, who were isolated from
any substantial review even by the Counterintelligence Staff of which
they were technically a part.
Beginning in late 1969, Operation CHAOS used a number of agents
(130)
R. FORD
131
to collect intelligence abroad on any foreign connections with Ameri-
can dissident groups In order to have sufficient "cover" for these
agents, the Operation recruited persons from domestic dissident
groups or recruited others and instructed them to associate with such
groups in this country.
Most of these recruits were not directed to collect information
domestically on American dissidents. On a number of occasions, how-
ever, such information was reported by the recruits while they were
developing dissident credentials in the United States, and the infor-
mation was retained in the files of the Operation. On three occasions,
agents of the Operation were specifically used to collect domestic
intelligence.
Part of the reason for these transgressions was inherent in the
nature of the task assigned to the Group: to determine the extent of
any foreign influence on domestic dissident activities. That task neces-
sarily partook of both domestic and foreign aspects. The question
could not be answered adequately without gathering information on
the identities and relationships of the American citizens involved in
the activities. Accordingly, any effort by the CIA in this area was
bound, from the outset, to raise problems as to whether the Agency
was looking into internal security matters and therefore exceeding its
legislative authority.
The Presidential demands upon the CIA appear to have caused the
Agency to forego, to some extent, the caution with which it might
otherwise have approached the subject.
Two Presidents and their staffs made continuing and insistent re-
quests of the CIA for detailed evaluation of possible foreign involve-
ment in the domestic dissident scene. The Agency's repeated conclu-
sion in its reports-that it could find no significant foreign connec-
tion with domestic disorder-led to further White House demands
that the CIA account for any gaps in the Agency's investigation and
that it remedy any lack of resources for gathering information.
The cumulative effect of these repeated demands was the addition
of more and more resources, including agents, to Operation CHAOS-
as the Agency attempted to support and to confirm the validity of its
conclusion. These White House demands also seem to have encouraged
top CIA management to stretch and, on some occasions, to exceed the
legislative restrictions.
The excessive secrecy surrounding Operation CHAOS, its isola-
tion within the CIA. and its removal from the normal chain of
command prevented any effective supervision and review of its activ-
ities by officers not directly involved in the project.
4
GERALD
132
A. Origins of Operation CHAOS-August 1967
In the wake of racial violence and civil disturbances, President
Johnson on July 2, 1967, formed the National Commission on Civil
Disorders (the Kerner Commission) and directed it to investigate
and make recommendations with respect to the origins of the dis-
orders. At the same time, the President instructed all other depart-
ments and agencies of government to assist the Kerner Commission
by supplying information to it.
On August 15, 1967, Thomas Karamessines, Deputy Director for
Plans, issued a directive to the Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff
instructing him to establish an operation for overseas coverage of
subversive student activities and related matters. This memorandum
relayed instructions from Director Richard Helms, who, according to
Helms' testimony, acted in response to continuing, substantial pressure
from the President to determine the extent of any foreign connections
with domestic dissident events. Helms' testimony is corroborated by
a contemporaneous FBI memorandum which states:
The White House recently informed Richard Helms, Director, CIA, that the
Agency should exert every possible effort to collect information concerning U.S.
racial agitators who might travel abroad
***
because
of
the
pressure
placed
upon Helms, a new desk has been created at the Agency for the explicit purpose
of collecting information coming into the Agency and having any significant
bearing on possible racial disturbances in the U.S.
The question of foreign involvement in domestic dissidence com-
bined matters over which the FBI had jurisdiction (domestic dis-
order) and matters which were the concern of the CIA (possible for-
eign connection). The FBI, unlike the CIA, generally did not pro-
duce finished, evaluated intelligence. Apparently for these reasons, the
President looked to the Director of Central Intelligence to produce a
coordinated evaluation of intelligence bearing upon the question of
dissidence.
When the Kerner Commission's Executive Director wrote to Helms
on August 29, 1967, requesting CIA information on civil disorders.
Helms offered to supply only information on foreign connections with
domestic disorder. Ultimately, the CIA furnished 26 reports to the
Kerner Commission, some of which related largely to domestic
dissident activities.
B. Evolution of Operation CHAOS-The November 1967
Study
The officer selected to head what became the Special Operations
Group was a person already involved in a counterintelligence effort
133
in connection with an article in Ramparts magazine on CIA associ-
ations with American youth overseas. In connection with his research
and analysis, the officer had organized the beginnings of a computer
system for storage and retrievai of information on persons involved
in the "New Left."
By October 1967, this officer had begun to establish his operation
concerning foreign connections with the domestic dissident scene.
In a memorandum for the record on October 31, 1967, he indicated
that the CIA was to prepare a study on the "International Connec-
tions of the United States Peace Movement."
The CIA immediately set about collecting all the available govern-
ment information on dissident groups. All field stations of the CIA
clandestine service were polled for any information they had on the
subject of the study. Every branch of the intelligence community
was called upon to submit whatever information it had on the peace
movement to the Special Operations Group for cataloging and storage.
Most of the information was supplied by the FBI.
All information collected by the Special Operations Group was
see
forwarded to the CIA Office of Current Intelligence, which com-
everyinge?
pleted the study by mid-November. Director Helms personally de-
livered the study to President Johnson on November 15, 1967, with
a covering note stating that "this is the study on the United States
Peace Movement you requested."
The study showed that there was little evidence of foreign involve-
ment and no evidence of any significant foreign financial support
of the peace activities within the United States. As a result of the
information gathered for the study, however, the Special Operations
Group gained an extensive amount of data for its later operations.
On November 20, 1967, a new study was launched by the CIA at
the request of the Director of Central Intelligence. This study was
titled "Demonstration Techniques." The scope of the study was
world-wide, and it concentrated on antiwar demonstrations in the
United States and abroad. The procedure used on the earlier study
was also employed to gather information for this new project.
The CIA sent an updated version of the Peace Movement Study
to the President on December 22, 1967, and on January 5, 1968, Direc-
tor Helms delivered to the White House a paper entitled "Student
Dissent and Its Techniques in the United States." Helms' covering
letter to the President described the January 5 study as "part of our
continuing examination of this general matter."
Again, the information bank of the Special Operations Group was
increased by the intelligence gathered for these studies.
FORD LIBRARY is OERALD
134
C. Evolution of Operation CHAOS-Domestic Unrest in
1968
Continuing antiwar demonstrations in 1968 led to growing White
House demands for greater coverage of such groups' activities abroad.
As disorders occurred in Europe in the summer of 1968, the CIA,
with concurrence from the FBI, sought to engage European liaison
services in monitoring United States citizens overseas in order to
produce evidence of foreign guidance, control or financial support.
In mid-1968, the CIA moved to consolidate its efforts concerning
foreign connections with domestic dissidence and to restrict further
the dissemination of the information used by the Special Operations
Group. The Group was given a cryptonym, "CHAOS." The CIA
sent cables to all its field stations in July 1968, directing that all
information concerning dissident groups be sent through a single
restricted channel on an "Eyes Only" basis to the Chief of Opera-
tion CHAOS. No other dissemination of the information was to
occur.
Some time in 1968, Director Helms, in response to the President's
continued concern about student revolutionary movements around
the world, commissioned the preparation of a new analytic paper
which was eventually entitled "Restless Youth." Like its predecessor,
"Restless Youth" concluded that the motivations underlying student
radicalism arose from social and political alienation at home and not
from conspiratorial activity masterminded from abroad.
"Restless Youth" was produced in two versions. The first version
contained a section on domestic involvements, again raising a question
as to the propriety of the CIA's having prepared it. This version was
delivered initially only to President Johnson and to Walt W. Rostow,
the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.
Helms' covering memorandum. dated September 4, 1968, stated. "You
will, of course, be aware of the peculiar sensitivity which attaches
to the fact that CIA has prepared a report on student activities both
here and abroad."
Another copy of the first version of "Restless Youth" was delivered
on February 18, 1969, after the change in Administrations, to Henry
A. Kissinger. then Assistant to President Nixon for National Security
Affairs. Director Helms' covering memorandum of February 18
specifically pointed out the impropriety of the CIA's involvement
in the study. It stated:
In an effort to round-out our discussion of this subject. we have included
a section on American students. This is an area not within the charter of this
Agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper.
Should anyone learn of its existence it would prove most embarrassing for
all concerned.
GEBALD FORD VIBRARY
135
A second version of "Restless Youth" with the section on domestic
activities deleted was later given a somewhat wider distribution in
the intelligence community.
The CHAOS group did not participate in the initial drafting of
the "Restless Youth" paper, although it did review the paper at some
point before any of its versions were disseminated. Intelligence
derived from the paper was, of course, available to the group.
E. The June 1969 White House Demands
On June 20, 1969, Tom Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to Presi-
dent Nixon, wrote to the CIA that the President had directed prepara-
tion of a report on foreign communist support of revolutionary pro-
test movements in this country.
Huston suggested that previous reports indicated inadequacy of
intelligence collection capabilities within the protest movement area.
(Helms testified that this accurately reflected the President's attitude.)
According to Huston's letter, the President wanted to know:
-What resources were presently targeted toward monitoring
foreign communist support of revolutionary youth activities in
this country;
-How effective the resources were;
-What gaps existed because of inadequate resources or low
priority of attention: and,
-What steps could be taken to provide maximum possible
coverage of the activities.
Huston said that he was particularly interested in the CIA's
ability to collect information of this type. A ten-day deadline was
set for the CIA's reply.
The Agency responded on June 30, 1969, with a report entitled,
"Foreign Communist Support to Revolutionary Protest Movements in
the United States." The report concluded that while the communists en-
couraged such movements through propaganda and exploitation of
international conferences, there was very little evidence of communist
funding and training of such movements and no evidence of communist
direction and control.
The CIA's covering memorandum, which accompanied the June 30
report. pointed out that since the summer of 1967, the Agency had
attempted to determine through its sources abroad what significant
communist assistance or control was given to domestic revolutionary
protests. It stated that close cooperation also existed with the FBI
and that "new sources were being sought through independent means."
&
FORD
The memorandum also said that the "Katzenbach guidelines" of 1967
GERALD
136
had inhibited access to persons who might have information on efforts
by communist intelligence services to exploit revolutionary groups in
the United States.¹
E. CHAOS in Full-Scale Operation-Mid-1969
By mid-1969, Operation CHAOS took on the organizational form
which would continue for the following three years. Its staff had in-
creased to 36. (Eventually it totaled 52.) In June 1969, a Deputy Chief
was assigned to the Operation to assist in administrative matters and to
assume some of the responsibilities of handling the tightly-held com-
munications. There was a further delegation of responsibility with
the appointment of three branch chiefs in the operation.
The increase in size and activity of the Operation was accompanied
by further isolation and protective measures. The group had already
been physically located in a vaulted basement area, and tighter security
measures were adopted in connection with communications of the
Operation. These measures were extreme, even by normally strict CIA
standards. An exclusive channel for communication with the FBI
was also established which severely restricted dissemination both to
and from the Bureau of CHAOS-related matters.
On September 6, 1969, Director Helms distributed an internal
memorandum to the head of each of the directorates within CIA, in-
structing that support was to be given to the activities of Operation
CHAOS. Both the distribution of the memorandum and the nature
of the directives contained in it were most unusual. These served to
underscore the importance of its substance.
Helms confirmed in the September 6 memorandum that the CHAOS
group had the principal operational responsibilities for conducting
the Agency's activities in the "radical milieu." Helms expected that
each division of the Agency would cooperate "both in exploiting
existing sources and in developing new ones, and that [the Special
Operations Group] will have the necessary access to such sources and
operational assets."
Helms further stated in the memorandum that he believed the
CIA had "the proper approach in discharging this sensitive respon-
sibility while strictly observing the statutory and de fucto proscrip-
tion on Agency domestic involvements."
The September 6 memorandum, prepared after discussions with
1 In 1967 President Johnson appointed a committee including Nicholas Katzenbach, John
Gardner, and Richard Ilelms to Investigate charges that the CIA was funding the National
Student Association. The charges were substantiated, and the Katzenbach Committee's
recommendation that the government refrain from covert financial support of private
educational organizations was adopted as government policy.
&
GERALD
137
the Chief of the Operation, among others, served at least three impor-
tant functions: First, it confirmed, beyond question, the importance
which Operation CHAOS had attained in terms of Agency objectives.
Second, it replied to dissent which had been voiced within the CIA
concerning the Operation. Third, it ensured that CHAOS would re-
ceive whatever support it needed, including personnel.
F. Agent Operations Relating to Operation CHAOS
Within a month after Helms' memorandum of September 6, an
operations or "case" officer was assigned from another division to
Operation CHAOS. The Operation thus gained the capacity to man-
age its own agents. A full understanding of the Operation's use of
agents, however, requires some appreciation of similar proposals
previously developed by other components of the CIA.
1. "Project 1"
In February 1968, the CIA's Office of Security and a division in
its Plans Directorate jointly drafted a proposal for "Project 1," which
was initially entitled "An Effort
in Acquiring Assets in the
'Peace' and 'Black Power' Movements in the United States." The
project was to involve recruitment of agents who would penetrate
some of the prominent dissident groups in the United States and re-
port information on the communications, contacts, travel and plans of
individuals or groups having a connection with a certain foreign
area. The proposal was rejected by Director Helms in March 1968
on the ground that it "would appear to be" beyond the Agency's juris-
diction and would cause widespread criticism when it became public
knowledge, as he believed it eventually would.
Shortly thereafter, the proposed Project was modified to include
a prohibition against domestic penetration of dissident groups by
agents recruited by CIA. Any contact with domestic groups would be
incidental to the overall objective of gaining access overseas to informa-
tion on foreign contacts and control.
This modification was consistent with Helms' instruction that the
Agency was not to engage in domestic operational activity directed
against dissident groups. The modified plan was approved by the
Deputy Director of Plans, subject to conditions to ensure his tight
supervision and control over its activities, but no evidence could be
found that the project ever became operational.
The history of Project 1 clearly reflected the CIA's awareness
that statutory limitations applied to the use of agents on the domestic
138
dissident scene. "Penctration" of dissident groups in the United States
to gain information on their domestic activities was prohibited.
2. "Project 2"
A second program, "Project 2," was initiated in late 1969 by the
same office in the CIA's Plans Directorate which had developed Proj-
ect 1. Under Project 2, individuals without existing dissident affilia-
tion would be recruited and, after recruitment, would acquire the
theory and jargon and make acquaintances in the "New Left" while
attending school in the United States. Following this "reddening"
or "sheepdipping" process (as one CIA officer described it), the agent
would be sent to a foreign country on a specific intelligence mission.
Project 2 was approved on April 14, 1970, by the Assistant Deputy
Director for Plans, who stated that no Project 2 agent was to be
directed to acquire information concerning domestic dissident activi-
ties. Only if such information was acquired incidentally by the
agents during the domestic "coloration" process would it be passed
to Operation CHAOS for forwarding to the FBI.2
Renewals of Project 2 were approved annually during 1971-1973
by the Deputy Director for Plans. The Project was also reviewed and
approved in the fall of 1973 by William E. Colby, by then Director of
Central Intelligence. In granting his approval on September 5, 1973,
Director Colby, in language which paraphrased the original Project
1 guidelines, stated that:
Care will be taken that, during the training period of [Project 2] agents
within the United States, they will not be operated by CIA against domestic
targets.
During the period 1970-1974 a total of 23 agents were recruited
for the project, of which 11 completed the prescribed development
process in the United States. Each agent was met and debriefed on
a regular schedule in this country by Project 2 case officers. The agents
were told repeatedly of the limitations on their activities in the United
States.
The Project 2 case officers used debriefing sessions as one method
of assessing an agent's etfectiveness in reporting facts precisely and
accurately, obviously an essential skill to any intelligence agent.
"Contact reports" were prepared after the sessions. Although the re-
ports contained a substantial amount of information on agents' obser-
vations of domestic activities, no evidence was found that Project 2
itself opened any files based upon any of the information.
s Prior to the April 14 approval of Project 2, Operation CHAOS personnel had requested
that a proviso be added to the Project that Operation CHAOS would coordinate Project 2
recruits during the "coloration" process in the United States. The proviso was rejected.
139
Copies of all contact reports with Project 2 agents, however, were
provided to Operation CHAOS, and that Operation made a detailed
review of the information contained in the reports. Information on
both individuals and activities which was contained in the reports and
which was deemed significant by CHAOS was incorporated into the
raw data files of the operation and indexed into its computer sys-
tem. Depending upon the nature of the information, it might even-
tually be furnished by Operation CHAOS to the FBI.
Thus, while Project 2 agents were not assigned collection missions
in the United States, the tandem operation of CHAOS with Project
2 nevertheless did result in collection and dissemination by the CIA
of a limited quantity of intelligence on domestic dissident activities.
Director Helms testified that he was not aware of this collection and
dissemination.
Furthermore, despite efforts by Project 2 case officers to have their
agent trainees avoid taking an activist role in domestic dissident
groups, that did occur upon occasion. One of the agents became an
officer in such a group, and on at least one occasion the agent pro-
vided Project 2 with copies of minutes of the group's meetings.
A Project 2 agent also became involved as an adviser in a United
States congressional campaign and, for a limited period, furnished
reports to CHAOS of behind-the-scenes activities in the campaign.
3. CHAOS Agents
During the first two years of its existence, Operation CHAOS
gathered the bulk of its information from reports issued by other
governmental agencies or received from CIA field stations abroad.
By October 1969, this approach had changed almost completely.
Operation CHAOS' new case officer was beginning to contact, recruit,
and run agents directly for the operation. This reversal of approach
appears to be attributable primarily to three factors:
-First, and most important, an increasing amount of White
House pressure (for example, the June 20, 1969, letter from Tom
Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to the President) was brought
to bear on the CIA to provide more extensive and detailed re-
porting on the role of foreign connections with American dis-
sident activities;
-Second, Operation CHAOS had been relatively unsuccessful
in obtaining meaningful information through agents associated
DERMLO & FORD LIBRARY
with other agencies;
-Third, the tempo of dissident activities had increased sub-
stantially in the United States.
The extent of CHAOS agent operations was limited to fewer than
140
30 agents. Although records of the Operation indicate that reporting
was received from over 100 other agent sources, those sources appear
to have been directed abroad either by other governmental agencies
or by other components of the CIA. The information which these
sources reported to Operation CHAOS was simply a by-product of
other missions.
Operation CHAOS personnel contacted a total of approximately 40
potential agents from October 1969 to July 1972, after which no new
agent recruitments were made. (The case officer left the Operation
on July 12, 1972.) Approximately one-half of these individuals were
referred to the Operation by the FBI, and the remainder were devel-
oped through various CIA components.
All contact, briefing and debriefing reports prepared by the case
officer concerning all potential and actual agents, from whatever
source, became part of the records of the Operation. These reports,
often highly detailed, were carefully reviewed by CHAOS personnel;
all names, organizations and significant events were then indexed in
the Operation's computer. Upon occasion, the information would be
passed to the FBI.
The individuals referred to Operation CHAOS by the FBI were
past or present FBI informants who either were interested in a foreign
assignment or had planned a trip abroad. Eighteen of the referrals
were recruited. Only one was used on more than one assignment. In
each instance the Operation's case officer briefed the individual on
the CHAOS "requirements" before his trip and debriefed him upon
his return. After debriefing, the agents once again became the respon-
sibility of the FBI.
In one instance, the FBI turned an individual over to Operation
CHAOS for its continued use abroad. Before going overseas, that
agent was met by the Operation's case officer on a number of occasions
in the United States and did report for several months upon certain
domestic contacts.
Seventeen agents were referred to Operation CHAOS by other CIA
components. Ten were dropped by the Operation for various reasons
FO
after an initial assessment. Four were used for brief trips abroad, with
reporting procedures which essentially paralleled those used for the
FBI referrals.
The remaining three individuals had an entree into anti-war. radical
GERALD
left. or black militant groups before they were recruited by the Oper-
ation. They were used over an extended period abroad, and they
were met and debriefed on numerous occasions in the United States.
One of the three agents travelled a substantial distance in late
1969 to participate in and report on major demonstrations then
141
occurring in one arca of the country. The CHAOS case officer met
and questioned the agent at length concerning individuals and organ-
izations involved in the demonstrations. Detailed contact reports were
prepared after each debriefing session. The contact reports, in turn,
provided the basis for 47 separate disseminations to the FBI, the bulk
of which related solely to domestic matters and were disseminated
under titles such as: "Plans for Future Anti-War Activities on the
West Coast."
The second of these agents regularly provided detailed information
on the activities and views of high-level leadership in another of the
dissident groups within the United States. Although a substantial
amount of this agent's reporting concerned the relationship of the dis-
sident group with individuals and organizations abroad, information
was also obtained and disseminated on the organization's purely domes-
tic activities.
The third agent was formally recruited in April 1971, having
been initially contacted by Operation CHAOS in October 1970. Dur-
ing the intervening months the CIA had asked the agent questions
posed by the FBI concerning domestic dissident matters and fur-
nished the responses to the Bureau.
Two days after the official recruitment, the agent was asked to travel
to Washington, D.C. to work on an interim basis; the mission was to
"get as close as possible" and perhaps become an assistant to certain
prominent radical leaders who were coordinators of the imminent
"May Day" demonstrations. The agent was to infiltrate any secret
groups operating behind the scenes and report on their plans. The
agent was also asked to report any information on planned violence
toward government officials or buildings or foreign embassies.
This third agent travelled to Washington as requested. and was met
two or three times a week by the CHAOS case officer. After each of
these meetings, the case officer, in accordance with the standard pro-
cedure, prepared contact reports including all information obtained
from the agent. These reports, many of which were typed late at night
or over weekends, were passed immediately to the Chief of Operation
CHAOS. And when the information obtained from the agent was sig-
nificant, it was immediately passed by the Chief to an FBI repre-
sentative, generally orally.
The Operation's use of these three agents was contrary to guide-
lines established after Director Helms rejected the initial proposal
Fl
for Project 1 in March 1968. Helms testified that he was not aware of
&
the domestic use of these agents.
The Commission found no evidence that any of the agents or
CIA officers involved with any of the dissident operations em-
GERALD
142
ployed or directed the domestic use of any personal or electronic
surveillance, wiretaps or unauthorized entries against any dissident
group or individual. Any reporting by CHAOS agents in the United
States was based upon information gained as a result of their personal
observations and acquaintances.
G. Collection, Indexing, and Filing of Information by
Operation CHAOS
The volume of information passing through the CHAOS group
by mid-1969 was great. As Director Helms pointed out in his Sep-
tember 6, 1969, memorandum to the Directorates, the Operation's
main problem was a backlog of undigested raw information which
required analysis and indexing.
Not only was the Agency receiving FBI reports on antiwar activi-
'ties, but with the rise of international conferences against the war,
and student and radical travel abroad, information flowed in from
the Agency's overseas stations as well.
The Operation had gathered all the information it could from the
Agency's central registry. According to the Chief of the Operation,
that information for the most part consisted of raw data gathered
on individuals by the FBI which had not been analyzed by the Agen-
cy because the information contained nothing of foreign intelligence
value.
CHAOS also availed itself of the information gained through the
CIA's New York mail intercept. The Operation supplied a watch
list of United States citizens to be monitored by the staff of the mail
intercept. The number of mail items intercepted and sent to CHAOS
during its operation were sufficient in number to have filled two draw-
ers. in a filing cabinet. All of these items were letters or similar mate-
rial between the United States and the Soviet Union.
In addition. Operation CHAOS received materials from an in-
ternational communications activity of another agency of the gov-
ernment. The Operation furnished a watch list of names to the other
agency and received a total of approximately 1100 pages of materials
overall. The program to furnish the Operation with these materials
is
was not terminated until CHAOS went out of existence. All such mate-
rials were returned to the originating agency by the CIA in Novem-
ber 1974 because a review of the materials had apparently raised a
GERALD
question as to the legality of their being held by CIA. The materials
concerned for the most part anti-war activities, travel to international
peace conferences and movements of members of various dissident
143
groups. The communications passed between the United States and
foreign countries. None was purely domestic.
During one period, Operation CHAOS also appears to have re-
ceived copies of booking slips for calls made between points in the
United States and abroad. The slips did not record the substance
of the calls, but rather showed the identities of the caller and the
receiver, and the date and time of the call. The slips also indicated
whether the call went through.
Most of the officers assigned to the Operation were analysts who
read the materials received by it and extracted names and other in-
formation for indexing in the computer system used by the Operation
and for inclusion in the Operation's many files. It appears that, because
of the great volume of materials received by Operation CHAOS and
the time pressures on the Operation, little judgment could be, or was,
exercised in this process. The absense of such judgment led, in turn,
to the inclusion of a substantial amount of data in the records of
the Operation having little, if anything, bearing upon its foreign in-
telligence objective.
The names of all persons mentioned in intelligence source reports
received by Operation CHAOS were computer-indexed. The computer
printout on a person or organization or subject would contain refer-
ences to all documents, files or communications traffic where the name
appeared. Eventually, approximately 300.000 names of American citi-
zens and organizations were thus stored in the CHAOS computer
system.
The computerized information was streamed or categorized on a
"need to know" basis, progressing from the least sensitive to the most
sensitive. A special computer "password" was required in order to
gain access to each stream. (This multistream characteristic of the
computer index caused it to be dubbed the "Hydra" system.) The
computer system was used much like a library card index to locate in-
telligence reports stored in the CHAOS library of files.
The files. like the computer index, were also divided into different
levels of security. A "201," or personality, file would be opened on an
individual when enough information had been collected to warrant a
file or when the individual was of interest to another government
agency that looked to the CIA for information. The regular 201 file
generally contained information such as place of birth. family. occupa-
tion and organizational affiliation. In addition. a "sensitive" file might
also be maintained on that same person. The sensitive file generally
encompassed matters which were potentially embarrassing to the
Agency or matters obtained from sources or by methods which the
ERALD FORD LIBRAGA
144
Agency sought to protect. Operation CHAOS also maintained nearly
1000 "subject" files on numerous organizations.³
Random samplings of the Operation's files show that in great part,
the files consisted of undigested FBI reports or overt materials such
as new clippings on the particular subject.
An extreme example of the extent to which collection could go once
a file was opened is contained in the Grove Press, Inc., file. The file
apparently was opened because the company had published a book by
Kim Philby, the British intelligence officer who turned out to be a
Soviet agent. The name Grove Press was thus listed as having in-
telligence interest, and the CHAOS analysts collected all available
information on the company. Grove Press, in its business endeavors,
had also produced the sex-oriented motion picture, "I Am Curious
Yellow" and so the Operation's analysts dutifully clipped and filmed
cinema critics' commentaries upon the film.
From among the 300,000 names in the CHAOS computer index, a
total of approximately 7,200 separate personality files were developed
on citizens of the United States.
In addition, information of on-going intelligence value was digested
in summary memoranda for the internal use of the Operation. Nearly
3,500 such memoranda were developed during the history of CHAOS.
Over 3,000 memoranda on digested information were disseminated,
where appropriate, to the FBI. A total of 37 highly sensitive memo-
randa originated by Operation CHAOS were sent over the signature
of the Director of Central Intelligence to the White House, to the
Secretary of State, to the Director of the FBI or to the Secret Service.
H. Preparation of Reports for Interagency Groups
Commencing in mid-1970. Operation CHAOS produced reports
for the interagency groups discussed in the previous chapter. One such
3 The organizations, to name a few, included
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) ;
Young Communist Workers Liberation League (YCWLL) ;
National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam
Women's Strike for Peace
Freedomways Magazine and Freedomways Associated. Inc. ;
American Indian Movement (AIM) :
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) ;
Draft Resistance Groups (U.S.) :
Cross World Books and Periodicals. Inc. :
U.S. Committee to Aid the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam ;
Grove Press, Inc. :
Nation of Islam ;
Youth International Party (YIP) :
Women's Liberation Movement :
Black Panther Party (BPP) :
Venceremos Brigade:
Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
145
report was prepared by the Operation in June 1970. Unlike the June
1969 study, which was limited to CIA sources, the 1970 study took into
account all available intelligence sources. In the 1970 analysis, entitled,
"Definition of Existing Internal Security Threat-Foreign," the
Agency concluded that there was no evidence, based on available in-
formation and sources, that foreign governments and intelligence
services controlled domestic dissident movements or were then capable
of directing the groups. The June 1970 Report was expanded and re-
published in January 1971. It reached the same conclusions.
I. Relationship of Operation CHAOS to
Other CIA Components
Substantial measures were taken from the inception of Operation
CHAOS to ensure that it was highly compartmented. Knowledge of
its activities was restricted to those individuals who had a definite
"need to know" of it.
The two or three week formal training period for the operation's
agents was subject to heavy insulation. According to a memorandum in
July 1971, such training was to be carried out with "extreme caution"
and the number of people who knew of the training was to be kept to
"an absolute minimum." The Office of Training was instructed to re-
turn all communications relating to training of CHAOS agents to the
Operation.
The Operation was isolated or compartmented even within the
Counterintelligence Staff which. itself. was already a highly com-
partmented component of the CIA. The Operation was physically re-
moved from the Counterintelligence Staff. Knowledge within the
Counterintelligence Staff of proposed CHAOS operations was re-
stricted to the Chief of the Staff and his immediate assistants.
The Counterintelligence Chief was technically responsible in the
chain of command for Operation CHAOS. and requests for budget-
ing and agent recruitment had to be approved through his office. But
the available evidence indicates that the Chief of Counterintelligence
had little connection with the actual operations of CHAOS. Accord-
ing to a CIA memorandum in May 1969, Director Helms specifically
instructed the Chief of the Operation to refrain from disclosing part
of his activities to the Counterintelligence Chief.
The Counterintelligence and the CHAOS Chiefs both agree that,
because of the compartmentation and secrecy of CHAOS, the actual
supervisory responsibility for the Operation was vested in the Director
of Central Intelligence. This was particularly so beginning in mid-
146
1969. In fact, the Chief of CHAOS, later in history of his Opera-
tion, sought unsuccessfully to have his office attached directly to that
of the Director.
Director Helms testified that he could recall no specific directions he
gave to the CHAOS Group Chief to report directly to him. To the
contrary, Helms said, he expected the Chief to report to the Chief of
Counterintelligence, who in turn would report to the Deputy Director
for Plans and then to the Director.
The sensitivity of the Operation was deemed so great that, during
one field survey in November 1972 even the staff of the CIA's
Inspector General was precluded from reviewing CHAOS files or
discussing its specific operations. (This incident, however, led to a
review of the Operation by the CIA Executive Director-Comptroller
in December 1972.)
On another occasion, an inspection team from the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget was intentionally not informed of the Operation's
activity during an OMB survey of CIA field operations.
There is no indication that the CIA's General Counsel was ever
consulted about the propriety of Operation CHAOS activities.
It further appears that, unlike most programs within the CIA
clandestine service, Operation CHAOS was not subjected to an
annual review and approval procedure. Nor does there appear to have
been any formal review of the Operation's annual budget. Such review
as occurred seems to have been limited to requests for authority to
assess or recruit an American citizen as an agent.
The result of the compartmentation, secrecy and isolation which
did occur seems clear now. The Operation was not effectively super-
vised and reviewed by anyone in the CIA who was not operationally
involved in it.
Witnesses testified consistently that the extreme secrecy and se-
curity measures of Operation CHAOS derived from two considera-
tions: First, the Operation sought to protect the privacy of the Ameri-
can citizens whose names appeared in its files by restricting access to
those names as severely as possible. Second. CHAOS personnel were
concerned that the operation would be misunderstood by others within
the CIA if they learned only bits of information concerning it with-
out being briefed on the entire project.
It is safe to say that the CIA's top leadership wished to avoid even
the appearance of participation in internal security matters and were
cognizant that the Operation. at least in part, was close to being
a proscribed activity and would generate adverse public reaction if
revealed.
Despite the substantial efforts to maintain the secrecy of Operation
CHAOS, over six hundred persons within the CIA were formally
147
briefed on the Operation. A considerable number of CIA officers had
to know of the Operation in order to handle its cable traffic abroad.
Enough information concerning CHAOS was known within the
CIA so that a middle level management group of 14 officers (organized
to discuss and develop possible solutions to various CIA problems)
was in a position to write two memoranda in 1971 raising questions
as to the propriety of the project. Although only one of the authors
had been briefed on CHAOS activities, several others in the group
apparently had enough knowledge of it to concur in the preparation of
the memoranda.
Opposition to, or at least skepticism about, the CHAOS activities
was also expressed by senior officers in the field and at headquarters.
Some area division chiefs were unwilling to share the authority for
collection of intelligence from their areas with the Operation and
were reluctant to turn over the information for exclusive handling
and processing by the Operation. When CHAOS undertook the place-
ment of agents in the field, some operations people resented this in-
trusion by a staff organization into their jurisdiction.
In addition, some of the negativism toward CHAOS was expressed
on philosophic grounds. One witness, for example, described the atti-
tude of his division toward the Operation as "total negativeness."
A May 1971 memorandum confirms that this division wanted "nothing
to do" with CHAOS. This was principally because the division per-
sonnel thought that the domestic activities of the Operation were
more properly the function of the FBI. As a result, this division sup-
plied the Operation with only a single lead to a potential agent, and
its personnel has little to do with the on-going. CHAOS activities.
Apparently the feelings against Operation CHAOS were strong
enough that Director Helms' September 6, 1969 memorandum was
required to support the Operation. That memorandum, sent to all
deputy directors in the CIA, assured them that the Operation was
within the statutory authority of the Agency, and directed their
support.
Director Helms' attitude toward the views of some CIA officers
toward Operation CHAOS was further summarized in a memorandum
for the record on December 5, 1972, which stated:
CHAOS is a legitimate counterintelligence function of the Agency and can-
not be stopped simply because some members of the organization do not like
this activity.
J. Winding Down Operation CHAOS
By 1972, with the ending of the American involvement in the
Vietnam War and the subsequent lower level of protest activities at
GERAL
148
home, the activities of Operation CHAOS began to lag. The com-
munications traffic decreased, and official apprehension about foreign
influence also abated. By mid-1972, the Special Operations Group
began to shift its attention to other foreign intelligence matters.
At the end of August 1973, William E. Colby, the new CIA Di-
rector, in memoranda dealing with various "questionable" activi-
ties by the Agency, ordered all its directorates to take specific ac-
tion to ensure that CIA activities remained within the Agency's leg-
islative authority. In one such memorandum, the Director stated that
Operation CHAOS was to be "restricted to the collection abroad of
information on foreign activities related to domestic matters.
Further, the CIA will focus clearly on the foreign organizations
and individuals involved and only incidentally on their American
contacts."
The Colby memorandum also specified that the CIA was not to be
directly engaged in surveillance or other action against an Amer-
ican abroad and could act only as a communications channel between
the FBI and foreign services, thus altering the policy in this regard
set in 1968 and reaffirmed in 1969 by Director Helms.
By August 1973, when the foregoing Colby memorandum was writ-
ten, the paper trail left by Operation CHAOS included somewhere
in the area of 13,000 files on subjects and individuals (including ap-
proximately 7,200 personality or "201" files) ; over 11,000 memo-
randa, reports and letters from the FBI; over 3,000 disseminations
to the FBI; and almost 3,500 memoranda for internal use by the
Operation. In addition, the CHAOS group had generated, or caused
the generation of, over 12.000 cables of various types, as well as a
handful of memoranda to high-level government officials.
On top of this veritable mountain of material was a computer sys-
tem containing an index of over 300,000 names and organizations
which, with few exceptions, were of United States citizens and orga-
nizations apparently unconnected with espionage.
K. Operation CHAOS Terminated
On March 15, 1974, the Agency terminated Operation CHAOS.
Directions were issued to all CIA field stations that. as a matter of
future policy, when information was uncovered as a byproduct of a
foreign intelligence activity indicating that a United States citizen
abroad was suspect for security or counterintelligence reasons, the in-
formation was to be reported to the FBI.
FORD
A CIA statistical evaluation of the files indicates that nearly 65 percent of them were
opened to handle FBI information or FBI requests.
GERALD
149
According to the CHAOS termination cable, no unilateral action
against the suspect was to be taken by the CIA without the specific
direction of the Deputy Director for Operations and only after re-
ceipt of a written request from the FBI and with the knowledge of
the Director of Central Intelligence.
The files and computerized index are still intact and are being held
by the Agency pending completion of the current investigations. Ac-
cording to the group chief who is custodian of the files, many of the
files have little, if any, value to ongoing intelligence operations. The
CIA has made an examination of each of the CHAOS personality
files and has categorized those portions which should be eliminated.
Final disposition of those files, as noted, awaits the completion of the
current investigations.
Conclusions
Some domestic activities of Operation CHAOS unlawfully ex-
ceeded the CIA's statutory authority, even though the declared mis-
sion of gathering intelligence abroad as to foreign influence on domes-
tic dissident activities was proper.
Most significantly, the Operation became a repository for large
quantities of information on the domestic activities of American citi-
zens. This information was derived principally from FBI reports or
from overt sources and not from clandestine collection by the CIA.
Much of the information was not directly related to the question of
the existence of foreign connections with domestic dissidence.
It was probably necessary for the CIA to accumulate an informa-
tion base on domestic dissident activities in order to assess fairly
whether the activities had foreign connections. The FBI would collect
information but would not evaluate it. But the accumulation of domes-
tic data in the Operation exceeded what was reasonably required to
make such an assessment and was thus improper.
The use of agents of the Operation on three occasions to gather
information within the United States on strictly domestic matters
was beyond the CIA's authority. In addition the intelligence dissemi-
nations and those portions of a major study prepared by the Agency
which dealt with purely domestic matters were improper.
The isolation of Operation CHAOS within the CIA and its inde-
pendence from supervision by the regular chain of command within
the clandestine service made it possible for the activities of the Opera-
tion to stray over the bounds of the Agency's authority without the
knowledge of senior officials. The absence of any regular review of
these activities prevented timely correction of such missteps as did
occur.
150
Recommendation (5)
a. Presidents should refrain from directing the CIA to perform
what are essentially internal security tasks.
b. The CIA should resist any efforts, whatever their origin, to
involve it again in such improper activities.
c. The Agency should guard against allowing any component
(like the Special Operations Group) to become so self-contained
and isolated from top leadership that regular supervision and
review are lost.
d. The files of the CHAOS project which have no foreign intel-
ligence value should be destroyed by the Agency at the conclusion
of the current congressional investigations, or as soon thereafter
as permitted by law.
DERALD the FORD LIBRARY