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This file contains materials relating to conditions in Lebanon and the possible evacuation of American citizens.
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Lebanon Crisis
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1561507
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Lebanon Crisis
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This file contains materials relating to conditions in Lebanon and the possible evacuation of American citizens.
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Richard B. Cheney Files
Richard Cheney's General Subject Files
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Lebanon
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The original documents are located in Box 9, folder "Lebanon Crisis" of the Richard B.
Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 9 of the Richard B. Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
DOCUMENT
1. Chart
Helicopter Lift Capability (1 p.)
Undated
A
₫
22. Chart
Aircraft Embarked or the USS America (1 p.)
Undated
A
3. Chart
Potential Evacuation Population (1 p.)
6/12/76
A
opened
6/30/00
4. Map
Bastern Mediterranean (1 p.)
6/16/76
A
KBH
5. Chart
Non-Combatant Evacuation from Lebanon (1 p.)
6/16/76
A
6. Schedule
Evacuation Schedule (2 pp.)
6/17-21/76
A
sunitized KBH 6/30/00
FILE LOCATION
Cheney Files
General Subject File
Lebanon Evacuation
Box 9
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
WHM, 5/28/75
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
GSA FORM 7122 (REV. 5-82)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET (GDS)
MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
LEBANON
Wednesday, April 7, 1976
2:30 p.m.
The Cabinet Room
From: Brent Scówcroft
I. PURPOSE
To review the current situation in Lebanon and its potential
impact upon broader United States interests in the Middle
East: a possible renewal of major Arab-Israeli hostilities
should Syrian and Israeli troops both enter Lebanon; a possible
reversal of the moderate Arab trend we have successfully
fostered over the past two years should Syrian efforts in
Lebanon fail; and possible strongly negative Arab reactions
against the United States should our current efforts fail to
bring a political solution.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: In early March, Syria, acting at the request
of Lebanese President Frangie, sent into Lebanon units
of the Palestine Liberation Army in an effort to stop the
fighting by Lebanese left-wing forces, (led by Kemal
Jumblatt and other lesser leaders) supported by the PLO
and rejectionist Palestinians. These forces were refusing to
accept the ceasefire and political agreement reached with
Syrian help on January 22, and were demanding the immediate
resignation of President Frangie. Within a week, it was
Subject to GDS of EO 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
SECRET (GDS)
Year Intervals and Declassified on
DAD, 6/27/85
GERALDA
December 31, 1984
SECRET (GDS)
- 2 -
only the resistance of the PLA and Saiqa a Palestinian
organization loyal to Syria--which prevented the Presi-
dential Palace from being occupied and Frangie overthrown
by force.
At this point, Syria asked our advice on deploying regular
Syrian army units to separate the combatants and bring
about an orderly transfer of power from President Frangie
to a new government. We strongly advised Syria against
any direct intervention and urged other governments, in-
cluding Jordan and Saudi Arabia, to warn the Syrians against
such a move. We immediately asked Israel what its response
would be to a Syrian intervention and urged them to remain
calm while the situation was being clarified. Israel replied
that it would move into South Lebanon if Syrian regulars
intervened. In the face of our negative reactions, Syria
turned to a renewed major effort to bring about a cease-
fire and legal governmental succession by political means,
while reinforcing somewhat its irregular military presence
in the form of Saiqa and PLA units incorporating some
regular troops. This has included closing the Syrian border
and key Lebanese ports and airfields to arms supply for
leftist forces. Israel has not indicated any intention of
moving into Lebanon, despite its awareness of a sizeable
irregular Syrian presence.
To reinforce our serious concern at the continued fighting
and our support for an orderly political solution, we sent
Dean Brown to take charge of our Embassy in Beirut, to
analyze the situation at first hand and to consult with the
various Lebanese parties. Units of the Sixth Fleet were
moved closer to Lebanon to be available should the evacuation
of American citizens appear necessary, as well as to show
our serious concern. Our efforts, together with those of
Syria, have produced a ten-day ceasefire during which
the Lebanese hope to agree upon the succession to Presi-
dent Frangie. The Lebanese Parliament may meet on
April 8 to tackle this problem. If it fails, the ceasefire
is most unlikely to hold past April 12.
SECRET (GDS)
SECRET (GDS)
- 3 -
Should the ceasefire break down again, we could be faced
with any of several extremely difficult scenarios: 1) tacitly
accepting intervention by Syrian regular army units
(probably at leas: a division) and making every possible
effort to prevent an Israeli counter-intervention in South
Lebanon; 2) making every effort to prevent further Syrian
action with the likelihood that this would not only mean
more bloody fighting and eventual leftist domination in
Lebanon, but could very well mean the collapse of the moderate
Syrian regime of Hafez Asad and its replacement by radical
elements; or 3) witnessing military intervention by both
Israel and Syria with the likelihood that this would produce
a closing of Arab ranks and renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities
on a major scale. The first choice could offer hope of
protecting our substantial investment in the peace process
and better bilateral relations with the Arab states but it
would be the toughest for us to carry out successfully, given the
very strong Israeli hatred and distrust of Syria, and would
be hard to explain in this country. The second choice could
spell the end of present hopes for the peace process, and
would over time be seriously damaging to our relations with such
key Arab states as Jordan, Egypt and Saudia Arabia who would
tend to see us as having exposed to them a rising tide of Arab
radicalism. The third choice could produce a much more
rapid negative Arab reaction against the United States as
well as killing hopes for the peace process. It could also
produce full-scale hostilities, with all that implies for the
US-Soviet relationship in the Middle East, and another oil
embargo.
Our objective is to generate an array of moderate Lebanese
forces which, together with our support and that of the Syrians
and other moderate Arabs, can move the political process
ahead through the Presidential succession to needed reforms
in the social, economic and political fields.
In parallel with our diplomatic efforts, we have under-
taken an urgent review of our contingency planning in the
event there should be another eruption of major hostilities
in Lebanon or on an even broader scale. Existing plans
SECRET (GDS)
SECRET (GDS)
- 4 -
in the following fields have been reviewed and are being
updated: political/diplomatic contingencies; military
readiness of United States units for either evacuation of
United States citizens or to meet foreign threats; economic
contingencies (oil and financial); and improved. intelligence
collection and dissemination.
B. Participants: List at Tab A
C. Press Arrangements: The meeting but not the subject will
be announced. White House photo only.
III. TALKING POINTS
1. I have been following developments in Lebanon very
closely. We have been in close touch with all other
governments in the particularly Israel and Syria--
and other interested powers to try to prevent outside inter-
vention, stop the fighting and see what can be done to
move toward a satisfactory political outcome.
2. The situation is extremely dangerous since failure to end
the fighting and find a moderate political solution could
confront us either with an early renewel of Arab-Israeli
hostilities or a serious setback for the peace process and
the forces of Arab moderation in which we have invested
SO much.
3.
We have sent Dean Brown to survey the situation first
hand and be available to the various parties. He has
already met with a wide spectrum of key Lebanese
leaders. We have also moved some units of the Sixth
Fleet to where they would be in position to evacuate
American citizens should that become necessary and
to demonstrate our concern.
4. We consider President Asad's behaviour in the Lebanese
situation to be moderate and responsible and we are
working closely with him.
5. Henry, will you discuss this situation in more detail?
SEGRET (GDS)
SECRET (GDS)
- 5 -
6. [At the conclusion of the meeting]I want us all to work closely
together in this dangerous period. I would like the WSAG to
remain abreast of the situation. We must make every effort
to help the parties directly concerned find a peaceful,
moderate solution.
SECRET (GDS)
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (a)
MR 98-9,#6 DOD ltr. 3/17/00
By KBH NARA, Date 6/27/00
SECRET
DATE
TIME
EVACUATION SCHEDULE FOR FLUID DRIVE
(Wash./Beirut)
(Wash./Beirut)
June
Send a message to American Embassy Beirut announcing the evacuation
decision and providing detailed evacuation guidance. Information copies
of the same message should be sent to
Using
Alert
June
Meet with
Arrange for
6
Despatch
98-11-0068
2PM
SECRET
-2-
DATE
TIME
EVACUATION SCHEDULE FOR FLUID DRIVE (cont'd)
(Wash./Beirut)
(Wash./Beirut)
June
Also using
Release press guidance in the U.S. and to wire services for worldwide
distribution announcing our decision to evacuate and the reasons behind
decision.
June
Task Force leaves station
June
Launch
June
arrives at U.S. Embassy.
Broadcast on an hourly basis for six hours instructions to anyone left
behind in evacuation
June
Evacuees arrive at safehaven.
P. 6/16/76 Labonon
HAK, VP, Buch, Scowerft, Cleants, chy -
-
1
Camb + staffer apparants dead-
delate
1
P.- send commercial revel close to
Being - posible emergency evoust
also and military faces - Sundresnd-et
TO gradual 12 has away from 24 his. away -
HAR notify soviets of movents -
Sand Dear Brownout
Press statement
Q+A's
and Brown to Lebanor
get and to prole strong statement conding
the entivity
BERALD
A
5:30 p. m., Thursday, June 17, 1976
Meeting with the President, re Lebanon
Evacuation
Oval Office
Save
Mr. Cheney
3511
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET (GDS)
MEETING ON LEBANON SITUATION
Thursday, June 17, 1976
5:30 p.m.
The Cabinet Room
From: Brent Scowcroft
BD
I. PURPOSE
To review the current situation in Lebanon and to determine
the need for an evacuation of American citizens, including the
options for conducting an evacuation.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: The general security situation in Lebanon and
particularly in Beirut, remains much the same as yesterday.
Sporadic fighting between Syrian and leftist/Moslem forces
has continued through the day, but the Syrian blockade of
Beirut has been partially lifted to permit some gasoline
and foodstuffs to enter the city and there are reports that
Beirut Airport might reopen in a day or two. The Ameri-
can Embassy in Beirut reports, moreover, that the shock
of Ambassador Meloy's and Robert Waring's murder may
in fact have helped the security situation in the short run.
Nevertheless, there is no definitive break in the political
situation sufficient to permit optimism that a country-wide
improvement will occur shortly, and if the present political
maneuvering between Lebanese factions, the Palestinians,
Arab League members and Syria leads to another deadlock,
it is very possible that fighting will resume on a broad-
scale, further imperiling the lives of Americans, particu-
larly in the capital city.
In addition to this possibility, there are other factors which
will further reduce the incentives for members of the Ameri-
can community to stay. These include the strong possibility
SECRET (GDS)
GERALD R. FORD
DAO 6/27/85
SECRET (GDS)
- 2 -
that Ambassador Meloy was specifically targeted for execution
by a Lebanese or Palestinian splinter group, and that killings
of other Americans may occur; and the evacuation of members
of other foreign communities from Beirut, particularly the
French, UN and British (HMG announced this morning that
British subjects should depart Beirut, and the British Embassy
is arranging for the departure of a convoy of evacuees to drive
overland to Damascus tomorrow). Under these circumstances,
pressures for at least the partial evacuation from Beirut of
remaining American citizens is high, and a basic decision on
whether or not the US should announce an evacuation is now
needed.
To a certain extent such a decision will depend on the current
security situation in Beirut and the means available for the
large-scale departure of Americans from the city. In essence,
these break down into two general categories--evacuation by
non-military means or the use of military assets to try to
bring out those US citizens who wish to leave. Various possible
options under each of these categories are described at Tab A.
It is important that no option is risk-free and all involve one
degree or another of hazard:
All of the non-military options require the cooperation of
one or more Lebanese or Palestinian groups, and in the case
of overland evacuation to Damascus, of Syrian authorities.
Even granted such cooperation, however, certain options
could expose evacuees to hostile fire by one side or another
or to individual snipers. It is also possible that an overland
evacuation could stall at mid-point creating further
complication.
The various military options would to one degree or another
provide US control over the evacuation operation. At the same
time, they raise the strong risk of reactive fire from snipers
or larger groups and of hostile reaction to those Americans
who must remain within the country. Moreover any US military
operation which saw Arabs killed by American weapons could
have broad-scale implications for the United States in the
Middle East.
SECRET (GDS)
GERALO
SECRET (GDS)
-3-
Whatever the circumstance, there will be certain specific
consequences of any decision, whether it is to evacuate or
not. If the former, it will raise the perception that the US
is reacting precipitously to Ambassador Meloy's murder.
If, on the other hand, the US does not at least provide the
means for Americans to leave Beirut if they so wish, as
other nations have done for their communities, American
lives could be later lost as a result.
Finally, there will be consequences flowing from the choice
of non-military or military options if a decision to evacuate
is made. The loss of civilian life in connection with a diffi-
cult overland convoy would be seen as the result of an error
of decision in not using military protection. On the other
hand, a decision to use US military capabilities which drew
fire on civilian evacuees could be seen as one which was an
overreaction which needlessly imperiled American lives.
B. Participants: Secretary Kissinger, Mr. Clements, Director
Bush, Mr. Marsh, Mr. Cheney, Brent Scowcroft, General
Brown
SECRET (GDS)
SECRET (GDS)
LEBANON EVACUATION - OPTIONS
Options
These alternatives consist of:
I.
OVERLAND:
A. Evacuation by road to Damascus. The French Embassy on
Tuesday and the UN yesterday successfully evacuated a number
of their personnel using a route that went south of Beirut, then in
major part through Syrian-controlled Lebanese territory to
Damascus. The British are planning a small convoy on this
route tomorrow, Friday, which may contain some Americans
and which will probably include the remains of Ambassador Meloy
and Robert Waring. Depending on the success of this convoy,
other British-sponsored convoys will be moved to Syria. Our
Beirut Embassy is currently exploring the possibility of includ-
ing Americans in a Saturday convoy with the British, but is rely-
ing on the British Embassy to negotiate safe passage.
-- This is considered generally safe and non-provocative; but
if convoys are blocked or attached, the evacuees are vulner-
able; military support would have to come from the Sixth
Fleet gunships or aircraft;
B. Overland Northward to Jounieh Bay, thence by sea. This route
is short -- less than 15 miles to Jounieh port -- and is the one
recommended by Syrian Chief of Staff Shihabi to Ambassador
Murphy yesterday. Nevertheless, it involves crossing the
Moslem/Christian lines and several very dangerous areas near
the port, and could expose evacuees to hostile fire.
-- Our Beirut Embassy considers departure by this route very
risky.
II.
AIR/FIXEDWING
Use of Beirut Airport, when it reopens. Shihabi specifically warned
against the use of Beirut Airport in view of the threat of SA-7 missiles
against U.S. aircraft involved in evacuation aircraft. Nevertheless,
our Beirut Embassy views the reopening of the airport to commercial
aircraft during the next several days as a real possibility, probably
SECRET (GDS)
DAO, 6/27/85
SECRET (GDS)
2
under some sort of joint Syrian-Palestinian or other multilateral
arrangement, and believes that the threat of hostile fire on civilian
flights is smaller than Shihabi stated. The Embassy further believes
that some Americans might want to hold out until the airport reopens.
The road to the airport is dangerous; waiting for it to reopen may be
hazardous.
III. SEALIFT
Evacuation over the Beaches: either the Western part of Beirut (Bain Mili
taire) or Bain Jamal near the Embassy; for example, an LCU could
carry up to 400 people; This option would assume a permissive
environment, in view of the exposure of ships moving to and from
Beirut to possible hostile fire from high-rise buildings and other
locations in the near vicinity.
Of the above options, evacuation by road to Damascus appears to be the
most practicable and least risky at this time. Preferably, it would be an
international operation, involving British or other evacuees, and have UN
or Red Cross cover. It would necessarily mean coordination with Lebanese
Moslem leftist groups and Palestinians as well as Syrians, although contact
with Palestinian organizations could be handled indirectly, through the
British for example.
State and the Embassy tend to favor the road evacuation to Damascus option
in the absence of better alternatives, each of the other options involving
greater risk or practical problems (such as whether the Beirut Airport will
in fact open at all during the next several weeks).
Our Beirut Embassy, which is in the best position to judge the local security
situation, has stated that while it does not like this option, it judges the
risks to be tolerable in the absence of viable alternatives.
IV.
MILITARY OPTION (FLUID DRIVE)
General Brown will brief on the options for evacuation that involve
possible hostilities. Basically the operation is: the landing of heli-
copters at the American University to bring out the American com-
munity.
$ECRET (GDS)
SECRET (GDS)
3
The least exposure to risk, involves the lowest number of people
engaged in the operation, and is, in effect, the lowest profile
military option available.
-- Under optimum conditions, 1,000 could be evacuated in one
hour; it invites harrassing fire, and firefights. If fighting
occurs, then if Embassy remains, it will be under great risk.
SECRET
(GDS)
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
NMCC
AMERICAN EMBASSY
BRITISH EMBASSY
Port Area
RAS BEIRUT
LEBANON SITUATION
MEDITERRANEAN
SEA
BEIRUT
INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT
NAUTICAL MILES
0
1
0
1
KILOMETERS
DECLASSIFIED
45
EO 12058 Sec. 3.6
MR-28-9 3/0/90
EAST MED
NMCC
by 6/27/00
B L
BEACK
S&A
A
Istanbul
40°
AMERICA (CARRIER)
Izmir
YARNELL (CRUISER)
10:
Athens
Musadasi
VOGE (FRIGATE)
Mikonos
CONNOLE (FRIGATE)
Iškenderun
Kithira
Rhodes
(788)
GUADALCANAL (AMPHIB)
Souda Bay
4 HH 53
CRETE
(538)
RALEIGH (AMPHIB)
35°
CYPRUS
3 HC 130
Akrotiri
(173)
CHARLESTON (AMPHIB)
ESTHER
Beirut
(269)
BARNSTABLE CTY [AMPHIB]
MOINESTER (FRIGATE)
Haifa
(148)
SPIEGEL GROVE (AMPHIB)
KOELSCH (FRIGATE)
CONYNGHAM (DEST)
MCCLOY (FRIGATE)
Alexandria
Port Said
TOTAL 1916
SOURCE: NCSC MOVREP
0
150
300
Suez
20°
161200Z JUN 76
Aqaba
NM
45°
25°
30°
35°
40°
CONFIDENTIAL
TF 61/62 SHIPBOARD CAPACITY FOR EVACUEES
NORMAL EMERGENCY CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
SHORT SEA TRIP
USS GUADALCANAL (LPH - 71
400
6,000
USS RALEIGH (LPD - 1)
200
1,600
USS CHARLESTON (LKA - 113)
60
300
USS SPIEGEL GROVE (LSD - 32)
100
600
USS BARNSTABLE COUNTY ILST - 1197)
140
700
TOTAL
900
9,200
EVACUEE NUMBERS ARE APPROXIMATE
TF 61/62 SHIPBOARD CAPACITY FOR EVACUEES
NORMAL
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
SHORT SEA TRIP
USS GUADALCANAL (LPH - 71
400
6,000
USS RALEIGH (LPD - 1)
200
1,600
USS CHARLESTON (LKA - 113)
60
300
USS SPIEGEL GROVE (LSD - 321
100
600
USS BARNSTABLE COUNTY ILST - 11971
140
700
TOTAL
900
9,200
EVACUEE NUMBERS ARE APPROXIMATE
CONFIDENTIAL
AIRCRAFT EMBARKED ON THE USS AMERICA
VF-142
12 F-14A
VF-143
12 F-14A
VFP-63
3 RF-8G
VA-15
10 A-7E
VA-87
9 A-7E
VA-176
9 A-6E, 4 KA-6D
VAW-124
4 E-2C
VAQ-137
4 EA-6B
HS-15
8 SH-3H
1 C-1A
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
MR 98-9 #2 DOD Hr. 3/17/00
CONFIDENTIAL
By KBH NARA, Date 6/27/00
SECRET
POTENTIAL EVACUATION POPULATION LEBANON
APPROXIMATE
BEIRUT N/LEBANON S/LEBANON BEKAA
DOD
18
18
0
0
0
DOD DEP
0
0
0
0
O
USG
35
35
0
O
0
USG DEP
0
0
0
0
0
US RESIDENTS 1575
1450
30
45
50
OTHER
700
700
0
0
0
THIRD COUNTRY
NATIONALS
4000
4000
0
0
0
TOTALS 6328
6203
30
45
50
SOURCE: AMEMB BEIRUT
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
121528Z JUN 76
MR 98-9, #3 DOD ltr. 7/17/00
SECRET
By KBH NARA, Date 6/27/00
DECLASSIFIED
NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION FROM LEBANON
NMCC
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
(FLUID DRIVE)
MR 98-9, #5 soo ltr. 3/17/00
By KBH NARA, Date 6/27/00
RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
1. 6th FLEET
FLAGSHIP
LOCATION
*
RESPONSE TIME
TF 61/62
GUADALCANAL
AT SEA
21 HRS
TG 60.1
SARATOGA
AT SEA
79 HRS
TG 60.2
AMERICA
AT SEA
24 HRS
RESPONSE TIME INDICATES ELAPSED TIME FROM NOTIFICATION TO ON STATION
2. MSC-CONTROLLED SHIPPING
/
US FLAG MERCHANTMEN
WITHIN 72 HRS - - O
WITHIN 72 HRS - - 9
3. MAC ASSETS WITHIN 12 HRS - 21 C-141, 5 C-5, 32 C-130E, 0 COMMERCIAL
SOURCE: NCSC/AFOC
161200Z JUN 76
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
COMBINED FORCE
HELICOPTER LIFT CAPABILITY
PASSENGERS PER AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT
LOCATION
TYPE
NORMAL EMERGENCY
POSSESSED
GUADALCANAL CH-46D
21
23
10
CH-53D
35
52
4
UH-1N
13
13
2
AKROTIRI
HH-53
35
55
4
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
SECRET
MR 98-9,# / DOD ltr. 3/17/00
By KBH NARA, Date 6/27/00
MSC CONTROLLED SHIPPING AS OF 161200z JUN 76
NAME
TYPE
DISTANCE FROM LEBANON COULD ARRIVE REMARKS
MSC CONTROLLED SHIPPING
1004
070839
NE
U.S. FLAG OTHER THAN MSC CONTROLLED
EXPORT DIPLOMAT
DRY CARGO
ENR ISTANBUL
2 DAYS
20 KNOTS
LASH ITALIA
LASH
1189 NM NAPLES
2-3 DAYS
22.5 KNOTS
EXPORT AIDE
DRY CARGO
ENR SUEZ
1 DAY
18.5 KNOTS
ELIZABETH LYKES
DRY CARGO
340 NM ALEXANDRIA
1 DAY
20 KNOTS
LOUISE LYKES
DRY CARGO
340 NM ALEXANDRIA
1 DAY
20 KNOTS
LASH TURKIYE
LASH
ENR IZMIR
2 DAYS
22.5 KNOTS
GREEN ISLAND
LASH
ENR PORT SAID
1 DAY
22.0 KNOTS
SAM HOUSTON
LASH
315 NM SUEZ
1-2 DAYS
22.0 KNOTS
JOHN PENN
DRY CARGO
ENR PORT SAID
3 DAYS
20.0 KNOTS
NMCC EUROCEAN DESK
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
NMCC
AMERICAN EMBASSY
BRITISH EMBASSY
Port Area
RAS BEIRUT
LEBANON SITUATION
MEDITERRANEAN
SEA
BEIRUT
INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT
NAUTICAL MILES
0
0
1
KILOMETERS
Chopper Option - boat optin
1.)
Libelihood of drawing fire
2.
Reartion - carmelties on both rides
3.
Have leave ambersy in there
4.
Carab opposition
5.)
Other nations will make pullic their
opposition if we hit a smog.
1
6) What if only a hand for show up
Wive waited this long - why not
wait longer-
What not of circumstances requires
such a high rish option
Compain of peanful consuation
of Freends, British + UN personnel
Man an The rene - what does he think -
coast allows gind reaction time
Why not road compay - class to the
to trouble -
Eerry to Cypons
SERALD
$
16 June 1976 10:00 a.m.
The State Department has released the following statement
to the press:
We can confirm that our Ambassador in Beirut, Francis E. Meloy,
Jr., and the Economic Counselor of the Embass y Robert O. Waring,
have been missing since late Wednesday morning Beirut time June 16.
The two men were travelling by car to make an appointment with
President-elect Sarkis but failed to reach their destination. We are
making every effort to locate the two men and are in touch with
governments in the area. We have no further information to provide
at this time.