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Rockefeller Commission Report - Final (3)
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Rockefeller Commission Report - Final (3)
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This file includes notes by Dick Cheney.
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Richard B. Cheney Files
Richard Cheney's General Subject Files
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The original documents are located in Box 8, folder "Intelligence - Rockefeller Commission
Report - Final (3)" of the Richard B. Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 8 of the Richard B. Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Chapter 12
Protection of the Agency Against
Threats of Violence-Office
of Security
During the period of widespread domestic disorder from 1965 to
1972, the CIA, along with other government departments, was subject
to threats of violence and disruption by demonstrators and self-styled
revolutionary groups.
In the fall of 1968, a bomb destroyed a CIA recruiting office in Ann
Arbor, Michigan. Bomb threats required the evacuation of other
Agency buildings on several occasions. Agency recruiters on college
harassed and occasionally endangered. Protesters held
massive demonstrations, sometimes with the announced purpose of
preventing operation of the government.
Throughout this period, the government was determined not to per-
mit such activities to disrupt its functioning. The Office of Security of
the CIA was charged with the responsibility of ensuring the safety
of CIA buildings, employees, and activities and their continued
functioning.
Three programs to accomplish this mission are of particular concern
to our inquiry
-Assistance to recruiters on college campuses.
-Infiltration of dissident groups in the Washington, D.C., area.
-Research and analysis of dissident activity.
&
A. Assistance to Recruiters
In light of the increasingly hostile atmosphere on many college
campuses, the CIA's Deputy Director for Support (now Administra-
tion) directed the Office of Security in February of 1967 to institute
a program of rendering assistance to Agency recruiters.
CIA field offices made contacts with college and university officials
to determine the general level of dissident activity on each campus-
and the nature and extent of activity directed against the CIA in par-
(151)
152
ticular. The Office of Security then advised the recruiter scheduled to
visit a particular campus of its findings and recommendations.
We found nothing to indicate that the CIA collected this informa-
tion by any means other than openly published materials and conver-
sations with law enforcement and other authorities.
If a recruiter elected to visit a campus where there were indications
of trouble, the Office of Security would provide him with monitoring
and communications support.
If trouble arose while the recruiting interviews were in process,
appropriate warnings were communicated to the recruiter, law en-
forcement agencies in the vicinity were alerted, and arrangements were
made for terminating the interviews and leaving the campus. The
Agency had a clearly-expressed policy of avoiding confrontations.
If the recruiter elected not to conduct interviews on a college or
university campus, the Office of Security would arrange for alternative
interviewing space in off-campus facilities, if possible. Where nec-
essary, similar monitoring and communications support was provided
at the off-campus site. In some instances, the campus atmosphere was
so hostile that scheduled recruitment visits were simply cancelled.
The program of assistance to recruiters was discontinued in 1970.
By that time, revisions in the Agency's recruitment program
eliminated the need for such security precautions.
B. Infiltration of Dissident Groups in the Washington,
D.C., Area
A second program conducted by the Office of Security involving
dissident activity was aimed at providing timely advance notice of
impending demonstrations in the Washington, D.C., area in order to
protect the facilities, employees and operations of the Agency. The
Director of Central Intelligence knew of this program and approved
its initial scope and purpose.
This project began in February 1967.1 It was initially aimed at
monitoring 2 public demonstrations which might develop into picket-
ing of Agency buildings. Almost from the outset, however, it became
a project for placing "assets" in suitable organizations in order to
obtain information concerning intended demonstrations directed at
1 There was testimony from one Agency employee that he had been asked as early as 1964
to monitor certain groups. If such monitoring did occur, it appears to have been confined to
one or two men operating on their off-duty hours.
2 According to Director Helms, to "monitor" a group is merely to attend its public meet-
ings and hear what any citizen present would hear; to "infiltrate" a group is to join it as
a member and appear to support its purposes in general ; to "penetrate" a group is to gain
a position of leadership and influence or direct its policies and actions.
153
CIA properties. ("Asset" is a term used by the CIA to refer to agents
and informants other than employees.)
A small number of persons employed by the CIA, either directly or
through an Office of Security proprietary, and several of their rela-
tives were recruited to work on this project on a part-time basis. In
the early phase of the project, only four or five such part-time "assets"
were involved. They were instructed to mingle with others at demon-
strations and meetings open to the public, to listen for information
and pick up literature, and to report promptly on any indications of
activities directed against Government installations, particularly CIA
installations.
By April 1967, four specific organizations in the Washington
metropolitan area had been designated for infiltration-the Women's
Strike for Peace, the Washington Peace Center, the Student Non-
Violent Coordinating Committee and the Congress of Racial Equality.
The part-time agents were instructed to attend meetings of these
organizations, to show an interest in their purposes, and to make
modest financial contributions, but not to exercise any leadership,
initiative or direction. The Agency provided funds for their suggested
financial contributions.
They were also directed to report how many persons attended the
meetings 01 demonstrations, who the speakers and leaders were, what
they said and what activities were conducted and planned.
These "assets" reported regularly, usually in longhand. The reports
were not confined to matters relating to intended demonstrations at
Government installations. They included details of the size and make-
up of the groups and the names and attitudes of their leaders and
speakers.
By late June 1967, the Agency sought to obtain whatever informa-
tion it could regarding the sources and amounts of income of each of
the infiltrated organizations.
One infiltrator was sent to dissident rallies in New York, Philadel-
phia and Baltimore. One was called upon to maintain a continu-
ous check on the movements and activities of certain prominent dis-
sident leaders whenever they arrived in Washington, D.C. Infiltrators
were charged from time to time with obtaining specific information on
individuals, groups or planned demonstrations.
In some instances, the Agency identified leaders or speakers at a
meeting by photographing their automobiles and checking registra-
tion records. In other cases, it followed them home in order to identify
them through the city directory. Photographs were also taken at sev-
eral major demonstrations in the Washington area and at protest
activities in the vicinity of the White House.
154
In September 1967, the National Mobilization Committee to End
the War was added to the list of monitored organizations in anticipa-
tion of large demonstrations planned for the Washington, D.C., area in
the following month. The assets were instructed to gather biographical
data on its leaders and participants, and information regarding the
location of the organization's office, the source of its funds, and the
identity of other organizations which would participate in that
demonstration.
In mid-August 1968, additional organizations were added to the
list for monitoring: the Southern Christian Leadership Conference,
School of Afro-American Thought, Washington Ethical Society,
American Humanist Association, Black Panthers, War Resisters'
League, Black United Front, Washington Mobilization for Peace,
Washington Urban League, Black Muslims and Niggers, Inc.
Assets were instructed to include within their reports the details of
meetings attended, including the names of the speakers and the gist
of their speeches, any threatening remarks against United States gov-
ernment leaders, and an evaluation of attitudes, trends, and possible
developments within the organization.
Funds and personnel adequate to carry out the program in full were
never made available. There are strong indications in the CIA's files,
and there was testimony before the Commission, that some of the
named organizations were never monitored at all. On the other hand,
some of them had already been infiltrated before August 1968.
On one occasion, in the course of infiltrating one of the dissident
organizations, an asset learned that the organization was receiving
financial support from a foreign source. The Director of Central In-
telligence and the President were informed of this development. Con-
cerned that further investigation of this matter might involve the
Agency in forbidden domestic activity, the Director made immediate
arrangements to turn the information and the asset over to the FBI.
From that point forward, the asset engaged in no further activity on
behalf of the CIA.
Information gathered in the course of this program was regularly
supplied to Operation CHAOS. Indeed, both testimony and circum-
stantial evidence indicate that the broad sweep of the information
collected was in part a result of requests levied on the Office of Secu-
rity by that Operation.
By the latter part of 1968, the Washington Metropolitan Police De-
partment had developed its own capability to collect information on
dissident groups in the area, and the Office of Security phased out its
project. In his testimony, Director Helms confirmed that these two
events were related. The Office of Security has continued to maintain
liaison with police departments in the Washington area.
155
During the period of the operation of this program (February 1967
to December 1968), the maximum number of agents employed at any
one time appears to have been twelve. None of them was a professional-
ly-trained intelligence gatherer. All were residents of the Washington
metropolitan area. Most of them were manual laborers. They were paid
nominal salaries by the CIA, in most cases $100 per month or less. Ex-
cept for several housewives who were otherwise unemployed, all of
these assets had full-time jobs unconnected with dissident groups or
activities. During major demonstrations in the Washington metro-
politan area, some of them were called upon to put in long hours on
evenings and weekends, and for this extra service they received com-
pensation on a modest hourly basis. The primary motive of these assets
appears to have been patriotism rather than pay.
C. Research and Analysis on Dissident Activity
In 1966 and 1967, the Deputy Director for Support ordered the
Office of Security to prepare several studies relating to dissidents and
dissident groups. One of the studies centered on the individuals and
groups who were charging the CIA with involvement in the assassina-
tion of Malcolm X, the Black Muslim leader. The study provided
background information relating to those accusing the CIA.³
Shortly thereafter, the Deputy Director for Support ordered a
further study on dissidents in general. Such a study was prepared,
relying primarily upon public news sources.
In December 1967, the Office of Security launched a program under
which it was to maintain for several years a continuing study of dis-
sident activity throughout the United States. The stated purposes of
this project were to identify threats to CIA personnel, projects and
installations, and to determine whether there was foreign sponsorship
or ties to any such groups.
All field offices were directed to forward to headquarters whatever
relevant information they might find in their respective geographic
areas. Such information was to be obtained from willing sources and
from newspapers and similar publications. No penetrations, infiltra-
tions or monitoring of dissident groups was ordered or expected.
A substantial flow of material, primarily newspaper clippings, began
arriving at headquarters in early 1968. At that point, there was only
one employee in the Office of Security charged with the responsibility
of studying and evaluating such incoming material. In short order,
the arriving material inundated him.
3 No evidence was found which would support such a charge.
156
The Office soon created a special branch to handle the task. The
branch began operation in May 1968. Its staff varied slightly in size
from time to time, normally consisting of four or five persons.
One of the jobs of this branch was to organize and study the material
from the field offices. It also gathered relevant information from a
variety of other sources, including:
--Newspapers of general circulation in Washington, D.C., New
York and Chicago;
-Underground newspapers such as the Los Angeles Free Press
and the Berkeley Barb;
-The communist press, such as The Worker and People's
World;
-Organizational publications, such as the Black Panther;
-All college papers the branch could get and had time to read;
-Any relevant newspaper clippings it found;
-News magazines; and
-Books and articles in general.
These materials dealt with activities and plans of dissident groups,
the names and travels of their leaders and speakers, and the attitudes
and intentions of such figures.
The branch had little or no input from the separate element within
the Office of Security engaged in monitoring dissident groups in the
Washington metropolitan area during 1007 and 1008. It used no infl-
trators, penetrators, or monitors.
Occasionally, the branch asked local police department intelligence
officers for information on dissident activities, and it always received
cooperation. It also received the minutes of meetings of police depart-
ment intelligence officers from the Washington metropolitan area held
from time to time to plan for the handling of demonstrations and po-
tential riots. Finally, it received continuing reports from the FBI
relating to activities of dissidents and dissident groups.
The end products of this branch were weekly and special reports
called "Situation Information Reports" (SIR). These SIR's usually
consisted of two sections: one an analytical approach to events which
had been occurring; the other a calendar of forthcoming events. For
the most part, the SIR's were published weekly. The only regular
recipient of the full SIR's outside the Office of Security was the Chief
of Operation CHAOS. A United States Secret Service agent regularly
came to the Agency to pick up a copy of the calendar of forthcoming
events. Branch personnel and the Secret Service agent also conferred
whenever their information conflicted on the times and dates of forth-
coming events.
The SIR's were not furnished to the FBI. Neither were copies fur-
157
nished to local police departments. They were never released to the
press or otherwise made public.
In addition to providing information from which to prepare the
SIR's, the materials received from the field and studied by the special
branch were used for several other related purposes:
(1) The Office of Security developed some insight into dissidents
and dissident groups. It could identify certain individuals whose par-
ticipation in an event would suggest the possibility of violence. It ana-
lyzed the relationships between some of the individuals and groups
and noted the frequent alterations and reorganizations of some of the
groups.
(2) It developed files on dissident groups and their leaders for ref-
erence purposes. These files were intended, in part, for use in making
security clearance determinations on applicants for employment by the
Agency. (According to those in charge of security clearance evalua-
tions, participation in the activities of a dissident organization, even
one that was prone to violence, did not necessarily disqualify an ap-
plicant for employment with the Agency, although it was considered
relevant to his objectivity and willingness to accept Agency security
discipline.)
(3) The Office of Security obtained information which helped it
assess risks posed to CIA offices, recruiters, agents and contractors by
upcoming demonstrations and other dissident activity.
Although estimates varied somewhat, approximately 500 to 800 files
were created on dissenting organizations and on individuals related in
various ways to dissident activity. The chief of the special branch
"guessed" that somewhere between 12,000 and 16,000 names were in-
dexed to these files.
The great majority of individuals and organizations indexed, or on
whom files were opened, were dissidents and dissident groups. This
was not true in all cases. Exceptions included Dr. S. I. Hayakawa of
San Francisco State College and Father Theodore M. Hesburgh of
Notre Dame University, because they were publicly involved in cop-
ing with dissident activities.
Few if any of the files opened during this project were destroyed
before the commencement of the Commission's work. The Agency
intends to retain these files until the current investigations are con-
cluded, when it will destroy them as permitted by law.
In January 1971 the field offices were directed to limit their activi-
ties in support of this project to sending in newspaper clippings and
the literature of dissident organizations. In late 1972, publication of
the Situation Information Reports was discontinued because dissi-
dent activity had tapered off markedly. In June 1973, the entire proj-
ect relating to dissident individuals and groups was discontinued.
158
During the lifetime of this project (late 1967 to mid-1973), several
incidental uses were made of it by the Office of Security:
(1) Branch personnel prepared a special report evaluating risks
that dissidents would interfere with CIA contract projects at about
twenty universities.
(2) On at least one occasion, a branch officer briefed the police
departments of Arlington and Fairfax Counties, Virginia, on what
to expect from large demonstrations planned for the Washington
metropolitan area.
(3) A branch officer delivered a briefing to security officers of the
Atomic Energy Commission on the subject of dissident groups in
connection with a training program on home-made bombs.
(4) Branch personnel served at the Command Center operated by
the Office of Security during several large demonstrations in order to
provide continuing analyses of developments and an assessment of
risks to Agency personnel and installations.
During the same period of time, the FBI maintained its own pro-
gram of reporting on dissident activity. CIA officials testified, how-
ever, that the FBI reports concentrated primarily on whether the
person or organization was subversive, whereas the needs of the Office
of Security extended beyond loyalty or subversion. This was SO in
connection with screening employment applications and in assessing
the degree of risk to Agency facilities and operations by any particular
organization or combination of organizations. Knowledgeable FBI
officials did not dispute these observations, which were offered to ex-
plain why CIA mounted its own effort rather than using FBI
reports.
Conclusions
The program under which the Office of Security rendered assistance
to Agency recruiters on college campuses was justified as an exer-
cise of the Agency's responsibility to protect its own personnel and
operations. Such support activities were not undertaken for the pur-
pose of protecting the facilities or operations of other governmental
agencies, or to maintain public order or enforce laws.
The Agency should not infiltrate a dissident group for security
purposes unless there is a clear danger to Agency installations, opera-
tions or personnel, and investigative coverage of the threat by the
FBI and local law enforcement authorities is inadequate. The Agency's
infiltration of dissident groups in the Washington area went far be-
yond steps necessary to protect the Agency's own facilities, personnel
and operations, and therefore exceeded the CIA's statutory authority.
159
In addition, the Agency undertook to protect other Government de-
partments and agencies-a police function prohibited to it by statute.
Intelligence activity directed toward learning from what sources a
domestic dissident group receives its financial support within the
United States, and how much income it has, is no part of the authorized
security operations of the Agency. Neither is it the function of the
Agency to compile records on who attends peaceful meetings of such
dissident groups, or what each speaker has to say (unless it relates to
disruptive or violent activity which may be directed against the
Agency).
The Agency's actions in contributing funds, photographing people,
activities and cars, and following people home were unreasonable
under the circumstances and therefore exceeded the CIA's authority.
With certain exceptions, the program under which the Office of
Security (without infiltration) gathered, organized and analyzed
information about dissident groups for purposes of security was
within the CIA's authority.
The accumulation of reference files on dissident organizations and
their leaders was appropriate both to evaluate the risks posed to the
Agency and to develop an understanding of dissident groups and
their differences for security clearance purposes. But the accumula-
tion of information on domestic activities went beyond what was
required by the Agency's legitimate security needs and therefore
exceeded the CIA's authority.
Recommendation (16)
The CIA should not infiltrate dissident groups or other organi-
zations of Americans in the absence of a written determination
by the Director of Central Intelligence that such action is neces-
sary to meet a clear danger to Agency facilities, operations, or
personnel and that adequate coverage by law enforcement agen-
cies is unavailable.
Recommendation (17)
All files on individuals accumulated by the Office of Security in
the program relating to dissidents should be identified, and, ex-
cept where necessary for a legitimate foreign intelligence activity,
be destroyed at the conclusion of the current congressional in-
vestigations, or as soon thereafter as permitted by law.
Chapter 13
Other Investigations by the Office of
Security
The Office of Security is responsible, on a world-wide basis, for en-
suring proper security of CIA facilities, operations and personnel.
The protection of classified material from unauthorized disclosure
is prominent among the responsibilities of the Office.
The Office also administers the Agency's security clearance pro-
gram and investigates breaches or suspected breaches of security by
persons affiliated with the Agency. Occasionally it has investigated
persons with no connection with the Agency, for various reasons re-
lated to the protection of classified material.
The Office is also responsible for providing proper security for per-
sons who have defected to the United States from other nations.
In the course of conducting investigations, the Office has, on in-
frequent occasions, engaged in wiretaps, buggings, surreptitious en-
tries and other improper conduct. Some of these activities were clearly
illegal at the time they were conducted. Others might have been
lawful at the time, but would be prohibited under current legal stand-
ards.
A. Security Clearance Investigations of Prospective
Employees and Operatives
The Office of Security conducts security investigations of all pro-
spective Agency employees and operatives, and of the employees of
private contractors doing business with the Agency on classified proj-
ects. Employees are subject to reinvestigation at five-year intervals.
Such investigations are undertaken to ensure that persons likely
to be security risks are not hired or retained by the Agency and are
not used by private companies on sensitive jobs for the Agency. Proper
security investigations of prospective Agency employees and opera-
atives are essential. All such investigations begin with routine name
(160)
RALD
161
checks with other agencies to determine if there are any recent investi-
gations of the subject on file. If no satisfactory recent investigation
has been conducted, the Office of Security conducts its own investi-
gation, which includes making contact with friends, neighbors and
business associates of the prospective employee or operative.
Although the Commission has not attempted to review the thou-
sands of files compiled during the course of security investigations,
testimony before it has not given any reason to suspect that the
Office of Security has abused its authority in this regard or made
improper use of information SO gathered.
Charges have been made implying that, on one occasion in 1968,
the Johnson Administration improperly used the Agency to investi-
gate a member of the Nixon campaign staff. The individual involved
had received some unclassified materials from the Agency, and the
Agency contemplated furnishing him with classified materials as well.
A routine security investigation was begun.
When the Agency learned that this individual had been asked by
Mr. Nixon to work on his campaign, it immediately curtailed its
investigation, restricting further inquiry to name checks from other
agencies. The Commission finds no basis for criticizing the Agency's
actions in this instance.
Conclusions
The CIA has properly performed the necessary function of screening
persons to whom it will make available classified information. The
Office of Security's activities in this regard help fulfill the Director of
Central Intelligence's statutory duty to protect sources and methods of
intelligence from unauthorized disclosure.
B. Investigations of Possible Breaches of Security
Aside from routine security clearance investigations and reinvesti-
gations, the Office of Security has conducted other investigations with-
in the United States in response to specific allegations of jeopardy to
intelligence sources and methods. Most of these allegations have been
resolved through routine investigative techniques such as name checks
or interviews.
In a relatively small number of cases, more intrusive methods
(physical and electronic surveillance, unauthorized entry, mail covers
and intercepts, and reviews of individuals' tax returns)-euphemistic-
ally known in the Office of Security as "special coverage"-were used.
While the Commission cannot be certain that it has found every
162
instance of "special coverage" within the United States during the
last 28 years, it believes most of the significant operations have been
discovered.
Two questions are involved in the analysis of these investigations:
1. Was it proper for the CIA to conduct the investigation of the
particular subject by any means? .
2. Were lawful investigative techniques employed?
1. Persons Investigated
a. Persons Affiliated with the CIA 1
By far the largest category of investigations involved the Agency's
own employees or former employees. We found a total of 76
investigations, involving 90 persons, in which some form of
"special coverage" was used. Almost all of the persons involved were
United States citizens.
Approximately one-fourth of the investigations of Agency employees
and former employees resulted from information obtained from de-
fectors to the United States that several employees of the Agency
might be working for foreign intelligence services.
Almost all of the remaining investigations were the result of the
discovery of suspicious activities on the part of employees with access
to sensitive classified information.
For example, vestigations were undertaken concerning employees
associating with known or suspected foreign intelligence agents;
employees spending beyond their means; and employees suspected of
engaging in conduct which might subject them to blackmail or
compromise.
A few investigations directed against valued employees with many
years of service to the Agency were initiated as much to clear up
suspicions concerning the employee as to ensure the Agency that the
employee was not a security risk.2
All Agency employees are fully informed by the Office of Security,
when they first seek employment, of the possibility that their activities
might be closely scrutinized if they should be suspected of being a
security risk.
The next largest category of cases involved the investigation of
1 If a person affiliated with the Agency who was investigated also falls into another
category of subjects investigated, he has been included in the category with persons affi-
liated for purposes of the Commission's analysis. Significantly different issues, however, are
raised by investigations falling within the various groups.
2 Under the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence has the
absolute right to discharge any employee without explanation where an employee is sus-
pected of being a security risk. The Director would thus be justified in requesting and
receiving that employee's resignation. One of the stated purposes for having undertaken an
investigation of suspected employees was to permit innocent employees to continue their
work with the Agency without knowing that they were suspected of having been disloyal.
163
49 foreign nationals living in this country. Of these, 38 were Agency
operatives and 11 were defectors. In almost all of these cases, the Office
of Security investigated the foreign national at the request of one of
the operational arms of the Agency. The reasons varied from case to
case. Examples include:
-Determining whether the subject was controlled by a foreign
intelligence service;
-Verifying the subject's sources of information;
-Ascertaining the bona fides of a defector;3
-Determining the propriety of using the subject for opera-
tional purposes in the future.
In a few cases, special coverage was initiated in order to protect
a CIA case officer if trouble arose, or to provide a record of conversa-
tions for later evaluation.
In many instances, the employee or operative under investigation
was surveilled for only one or two days, or his telephone was tapped
SO as to overhear only one or two specific telephone conversations. In
some other instances, the investigations were more extensive.
One investigation by the Office of Security spanned approximately
eight years in the late 1940's and early 1950's. The employee involved
was alleged to have engaged in Communist Party activities in the
1930's and was suspected of still being in contact with Communist
sympathizers. A combination of physical surveillance, wiretaps and
bugging were used from time to time. The apartment occupied by the
subject was entered surreptitiously on two separate occasions. The
Director of Central Intelligence closely followed this particular in-
vestigation. The investigation led eventually to termination of the
subject's employment.
An extreme example of how far an investigation can go occurred in
the late 1960's. A CIA employee who attended meetings of a group
which the Agency suspected of foreign left-wing support, had been
privy to extremely sensitive classified information. Physical surveil-
lance of the employee was conducted for almost one year. A surrepti-
tious entry was made into the employee's apartment by cutting through
the walls from an adjacent apartment SO that microphones could be
installed. Seven microphones were placed so that conversations could
be overheard in every room of the apartment. A cover was placed on
the employee's mail for two months during one period and five months
during another. Several of the subject's tax returns were also reviewed.
This investigation yielded no evidence of disloyalty.
The investigations of Agency employees and operatives were con-
ducted pursuant to a general understanding with the FBI. The Bureau
Several American citizens working with, but not employees of, the Agency have been
surveilled to determine their bona fides or the validity of their sources of information, in
the same manner as foreign nationals in similar positions.
GERALD
164
was unwilling (partly due to a lack of sufficient manpower) to under-
take every investigation of a breach of security involving employees
or operatives of the CIA or other intelligence departments and agen-
cies. It expected those departments and agencies to conduct any neces-
sary preliminary investigation and would enter the case itself only
when hard evidence of espionage was discovered.
Further, each member agency of the United States intelligence
community had been given primary responsibility by the National
Security Council for protecting intelligence sources and methods
within its own organization.
b. Newsmen
The Commission found two cases in which telephones of three news-
men were tapped in an effort to identify their sources of sensitive
intelligence information. The first such instance took place in 1959.
The other occurred in 1962, apparently with the knowledge and con-
sent of Attorney General Kennedy.
Three additional investigations were found in which reporters were
followed in an effort to identify their sources. These activities took
place in 1967, 1971 and 1972.
Presidential concern was continually voiced, during every admin-
istration since the establishment of the CIA, that the sources of news
leabs be determined and the leaks themselves stopped-by whatever
means. In addition, the committee of the United States Intelligence
Board charged with investigating news leaks has historically taken
no definitive action to solve the problem.4
The attitude of the FBI during the 1960's and early 1970's also
remained unwavering. The Bureau would not handle leak cases unless
directed to do so by the Attorney General. The Bureau's procedure in
such cases was to submit a request for investigation to the Attorney
General for a prosecutive opinion and not to proceed unless the
Attorney General issued a favorable opinion and a directive to
investigate.
Faced with this set of circumstances, the CIA chose to conduct its
own investigations of "leak" cases by physically and electronically
surveilling newsmen to learn their sources of information.
c. Other Persons Not Affiliated With the CIA
On several occasions, the Office of Security placed "special cover-
age" on other persons with no relationship to the Agency. In 1971,
six United States citizens and one alien were followed for a period
of some three months as the result of a report that they intended to
The Chairman of the USIB Security Committee during the early 1970's, when several
surveillances were initiated against newsmen by the Office of Security, was also the CIA's
Director of Security. At several Security Committee meetings he stated that surveillance of
newsmen (which had been suggested at the meetings) was improper. At the same time, be
carried out such surveillance at the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence.
165
assassinate the Director of Central Intelligence and kidnap the Vice
President. This investigation was conducted in close cooperation with
the FBI and the Secret Service.
On two occasions, investigations were directed against employees
of other government agencies with access to sensitive intelligence
material.5 Significant breaches of security were suspected in both
cases.
On at least one occasion, physical surveillance was placed on a citizen
who had approached an Agency employee under circumstances sug-
gesting that he might be attempting to penetrate the Agency. Several
investigations of Americans have been initiated for other reasons
directly associated with suspected security violations at the CIA.
In addition, on approximately eleven occasions, investigations of
employees or former employees of the CIA have resulted in some type
of coverage of other United States citizens with whom those employees
had contacts.
The Commission discovered no evidence suggesting that any of these
investigations were directed at any congressman, judge, or other pub-
lic official.
Conclusions
Investigations of allegations against Agency employees and oper-
atives are a reasonable exercise of the Director's statutory duty to
protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure,
provided they are lawfully conducted. Such investigations also assist
the Director in the exercise of his unreviewable authority to terminate
the employment of any Agency employee.
Although such investigations may take on aspects of domestic-coun-
terintelligence or enforcement of domestic laws, they are proper unless
their principal purpose becomes law-enforcement or the maintenance
of internal security. Whenever an investigation develops substantial
evidence of espionage or other criminal activity, it should be coordi-
nated with the FBI.
Investigation of the bona fides of alleged defectors is an important
function, lawfully assigned to the CIA by the National Security
Council.
The Director's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and
methods, however, cannot be read SO broadly as to permit investiga-
Two additional cases involved investigations of military officers temporarily assigned
to the Agency. These have been included in the figures for investigations of persons affiliated
with the Agency.
GERALD
166
tions of persons having no relationship whatever with the Agency.
The CIA has no authority to investigate newsmen simply because
they have published leaked classified information. Investigations by
the CIA should be limited to persons presently or formerly affiliated
with the Agency, directly or indirectly.
Where an employee or other person under investigation has suspi-
cious contacts with an unknown individual, sufficient investigation
may be conducted to identify that person. Further investigation of
the contacts of persons properly under investigation should be left to
the FBI or other appropriate law enforcement agencies.
The investigation directed against several persons allegedly threat-
ening to assassinate the Director of Central Intelligence and kidnap
the Vice President was probably an exception to the general rule
restricting CIA investigations to persons with some relationship to
the Agency. The circumstances were obviously extreme, the threats
involved the Agency's director, and the investigation was undertaken
with the full knowledge and consent of both the FBI and the Secret
Service.
Recommendation (18)
a. The Director of Central Intelligence should issue clear guide-
lines setting forth the situations in which the CIA is justified in
conducting its own investigation of individuals presently or for-
merly affiliated with it.
b. The guidelines should permit the CIA to conduct investiga-
tions of such persons only when the Director of Central Intel-
ligence first determines that the investigation is necessary to
protect intelligence sources and methods the disclosure of which
might endanger the national security.
c. Such investigations must be coordinated with the FBI when-
ever substantial evidence suggesting espionage or violation of a
federal criminal statute is discovered.
Recommendation (19)
a. In cases involving serious or continuing security violations,
as determined by the Security Committee of the United States
Intelligence Board, the Committee should be authorized to recom-
mend in writing to the Director of Central Intelligence (with a
copy to the National Security Council) that the case be referred
to the FBI for further investigation, under procedures to be
developed by the Attorney General.
b. These procedures should include a requirement that the FBI
accept such referrals without regard to whether a favorable
prosecutive opinion is issued by the Justice Department. The CIA
is
should not engage in such further investigations.
167
Recommendation (20)
The CIA and other components and agencies of the intelligence
community should conduct periodic reviews of all classified mate-
rial originating within that department or agency, with a view to
declassifying as much of that material as possible. The purpose
of such a review would be to assure the public that it has access to
all information that should properly be disclosed.
Recommendation (21)
The Commission endorses legislation, drafted with appropriate
safeguards of the constitutional rights of all affected individuals,
which would make it a criminal offense for employees or former
employees of the CIA willfully to divulge to any unauthorized
person classified information pertaining to foreign intelligence
or the collection thereof obtained during the course of their
employment.
2. Investigative Techniques Used
Direction of some investigations at proper subjects does not mean
that all the investigative techniques used were proper.
A great many of the cases (directed at 96 persons) involved physi-
cal surveillance-that is, observation of the public comings and goings
of an individual. Some of the cases were trivial. In one case, an Agency
employee was suspected of working at his private business establish-
ment when he should have been working for the Agency. Employees
of the Office of Security went to his place of private business and
established that he was in fact there when he should have been at the
CIA.
Other cases of physical surveillance were more extensive, involving
dawn-to-dusk coverage for a period of months. The last case of physical
surveillance by the Agency was in 1973. Current directives prohibit
surveillance off Agency property.
Our investigation also disclosed thirty-two wiretaps, thirty-two in-
stances of bugging,6 and twelve unauthorized entries. The last wiretap
used by the CIA was in 1965; the last bug in 1968; and the last unau-
thorized entry was in 1971.
These figures do not include cases in which the cavesdropping was done with the con-
sent of one or both parties. Such instances were done for convenience in making a record
of a conversation, such as the debriefing of a defector or a recruitment interview. Approx-
imately thirty-four such instances were discovered. In addition, a technical log (for
recording Office of Security wiretaps and buggings) for the period from December 1961
notil March 1967, showing eleven telephone taps and sixty-five "mike and wire" operations
conducted during that period, suggests that there may actually have been more "mike and
wire" operations than the Commission has otherwise been able to document. Witnesses
before the Commission testified that most of those installations were used where one or
both parties were aware that their conversation was being recorded. In all cases where
FORD
doubt existed as to whether the CIA had subjected an individual to any questionable inves-
tigation, the benefit of that doubt was not given to the Agency, and the investigation has
been included in the above figures.
168
None of these activities was conducted pursuant to a search warrant,
and only in connection with the 1965 wiretap did the Agency obtain
the prior written approval of the Attorney General.
In at least fourteen instances, involving sixteen people, the CIA
obtained access to information on individual Federal income tax re-
turns. The Agency was apparently seeking information which would
indicate possible connections between the subject and foreign groups.
Ninety-one mail covers were used in 63 investigations. Only 12 occa-
sions, mail was actually opened and photographs were taken of the
contents.
Conclusions
Physical surveillance, while not itself unlawful, may become SO if it
reaches the point of harassment. The possible invasions of privacy by
physical surveillance and the proximity of that activity to proscribed
law enforcement functions indicate that it should be undertaken only
after high level authorization within the Agency. Such authoriza-
tion would include a finding that the proposed surveillance is neces-
sary to protect intelligence sources and methods. When a legitimate
CIA investigation reaches the point that a search or some form of
electronic eavesdropping is appropriate, the case should be turned
over to the FBI or other law enforcement agencies.
The unauthorized entries into the homes and offices of American
citizens were illegal when they were conducted and would be illegal
if done today.
Because the law as to electronic eavesdropping has been evolving,
the Commission has not attempted to delineate specifically which of
the CIA's investigations over the years utilizing eavesdropping were
unconstitutional under then-announced standards. Some of those in-
vestigations within the United States were proper under the constitu-
tional standards of the time, but many others were not. Under con-
stitutional standards applied today, it is doubtful whether any of
those investigations would have been proper, with the possible excep-
tion of the one wiretap installed in 1965 where prior written approval
of the Attorney General was sought and obtained.
Today, eavesdropping would at a minimum require the prior writ-
ten approval of the Attorney General, based on a showing that the
national security was involved and that the circumstances included a
significant connection with a foreign power. The Supreme Court has
left open the question whether such approval would be sufficient or
whether a judicial search warrant would be required.
The execution of a search warrant involves the exercise of a law-
enforcement power of a type expressly forbidden to the CIA. If the
approval of the Attorney General is an adequate substitute for a war-
rant in some cases, similar problems may arise in conducting searches
or eavesdropping under that authority.
169
Under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, no person has
access, without special authorization, to any information supplied by
a
taxpayer pursuant to a requirement of the tax law relating to income
and other taxes.⁷
Formal procedures for obtaining the necessary authorization have
been in effect for some time. They require the applicant (here the
Director of Central Intelligence) to make written application to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue for each tax return desired, setting
forth the reason why the return is needed.8
The Commission has found no evidence that this procedure was ever
followed by CIA personnel.
Mail covers are not unlawful if they are conducted in compliance
with postal regulations and do not reasonably delay the mail. The
opening of mail, however, violated specific statutes prohibiting such
conduct and was unlawful (see chapter 9).
In many instances the Agency's files do not clearly indicate the
nature of an investigation, the specific evidence suggesting that the
person investigated was a security risk and thus a proper subject of
investigation, the authority giving approval for special coverage, the
reasons underlying the decision to investigate, or the results of the
investigation.
Several past Directors of Central Intelligence testified that they be-
lieve they authorized all investigations in which wiretaps, bugs or
unauthorized entries were utilized. Yet, in over half of the investi-
gative records, a clear showing of the authorizing official is missing.
Investigative files should contain documentation showing the basis
and authority for undertaking each investigation. This will assure that
such investigations are authorized and have a lawful basis.
Recommendation (22)
The CIA should not undertake physical surveillance (defined as
systematic observation) of Agency employees, contractors or re-
lated personnel within the United States without first obtaining
written approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Recommendation (23)
In the United States and its possessions, the CIA should not in-
tercept wire or oral communications or otherwise engage in ac-
tivities that would require a warrant if conducted by a law en-
forcement agency. Responsibility for such activities belongs with
the FBI.
1 25 U.S.C. sec. 610 (a) and (b).
. 26 C.F.R. sec. 301.6103(a).
FORD
$ As defined in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. secs. 2510-20.
0768
170
Recommendation (24)
The CIA should strictly adhere to established legal procedures
governing access to federal income tax information.
Recommendation (25)
CIA investigative records should show that the investigation
was duly authorized, and by whom, and should clearly set forth
the factual basis for undertaking the investigation and the results
of the investigation.
C. Handling of Defectors
Investigation of defectors is the responsibility of the CIA under a
National Security Council Intelligence Directive, assigning this duty
to the Agency as a "service of common concern" to the intelligence
community as a whole.
Within the CIA, the Office of Security is charged with providing
proper security for the handling of persons who have defected to the
United States from other nations. A careful procedure has been devel-
oped for such handling.
Generally a defector can be processed in a few months' time. In one
instance, however, a defector was involuntarily confined to a CIA in-
stallation for approximately three years. For much of this time, the
defector was held in solitary confinement under extremely spartan liv-
ing conditions. The defector was apparently not physically abused.
The justification given by the CIA for the lengthy confinement arose
out of a substantial concern regarding the defector's bona fides. When
the issue was finally resolved, the defector was given total freedom and
became a United States citizen.
The confinement of the defector was approved by the Director of
Central Intelligence on the written advice of the General Counsel. The
FBI, the Attorney General, the United States Intelligence Board, and
selected Members of Congress were all aware to some extent of the
continued confinement.
In one other case, a defector was physically abused, although not
seriously injured. The Director of Central Intelligence discharged the
employee involved.
Conclusions
Such treatment of individuals by an agency of the United States
is unlawful. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Inspector
General must be alert to prevent repetitions.
171
D. Other Activities of the Office of Security
The Commission has examined other domestic activities of the Office
of Security, including its cover operations, its use of the polygraph as
an aid in security investigations, its use of informants among employees
or contractor employees to assist in preventing sabotage of its premises
or penetrations of its organization, its use of recording systems in
certain CIA offices, and its efforts to test the physical security sys-
tems of certain private corporations under contract to the Agency.
No violations of the CIA's charter have been found in connection
with such activities.
Chapter 14
Involvement of the CIA in Improper
Activities for the White House
During 1971, the CIA, at the request of members of the White
House staff, provided alias documents and disguise materials, a tape
recorder, camera, film and film processing to E. Howard Hunt. It also
complied with a request to prepare a psychological profile of Daniel
Ellsberg.
This assistance was requested by various members of the White
House staff and some of the materials provided were later used in
connection with improper activities, including the break-in into the
office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Ellsberg's psychiatrist.
President Nixon and his staff also insisted in this period that the
CIA turn over to the President highly classified files relating to the
Lebanon landings, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, and
the Vietnam war. The request was made on the stated ground that
these files were needed by the President in the performance of his
duties, but was in fact made to serve the President's personal political
ends.
The Commission's staff has investigated the facts and circumstances
surrounding these events.1 On the basis of this investigation, the
1 Documentation supporting this chapter is contained in the statement of information in
Hearings before House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 803 (Impeachment of President
Nixon) Book VII (May-June 1974) ; transcript of trial testimony in United States V.
Ehrlichman et al., No. 74-116 (June 28-July 9, 1974) ; transcript of testimony before
House Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of the Armed Services Committee (May 1973-
July 1974) ; transcripts of Executive Session Testimony before the Senate Select Committee
on Presidential Campaign Activities (Watergate Hearings), principally between Decem-
ber 17, 1973, and March 8, 1974 the testimony and affidavits of witnesses examined by
the Commission and its staff : and the files and records of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The Commission also requested permission to examine relevant papers of President
Nixon's administration which are currently in the custody of the General Services
Administration under the terms of an interim order of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. The provisions of that order permit counsel for the former
President to object to such requests and he in fact did so, threatening to seek sanctions
from the court to prevent such an examination. With the limited period of time available
to complete the Commission's work, It was not possible to obtain a determination by the
court of the validity of the request.
(172)
173
Commission concludes that the CIA neither participated in nor knew
in advance of the Fielding or Watergate break-ins. The Agency pro-
vided certain assistance to the White House staff because the staff
(and, in the case of the production of certain sensitive files, the Presi-
dent) insisted that it do so, but it appears to have provided that
assistance without actual knowledge that the White House staff was
engaging in illegal activities.
The Agency knew, however, that some of the demands made on
it by the White House, such as the demand for a psychological profile
of Dr. Ellsberg, were of doubtful propriety, and it is subject to
criticism for having at times failed to make sufficient efforts to resist
those demands. Nevertheless, the principal responsibility for drawing
the Agency into these activities falls on the White House staff.
Once it became known, however, following the arrest of the Water-
gate burglars, that some of the activities under investigation involved
persons with past or present CIA connections, the Agency's leaders
should have undertaken a thorough inquiry and should have disclosed
all relevant information to investigating agencies. The Commission
considers the Agency's delay of nearly a year in instituting such an
investigation, the Agency's failure promptly to disclose relevant
information in its possession, and the Agency's destruction of some
materials which may have contained relevant information to reflect
poor judgment and to be subject to criticism.
The evidence bearing on these matters is discussed in this chapter.
A. Employment of E. Howard Hunt by Robert R. Mullen
and Company
In April 1970, E. Howard Hunt retired from the Central Intelligence
Agency after having served in it for over twenty years. With the
help of the Agency's External Employment Affairs Branch, he ob-
tained a job with Robert R. Mullen and Company, a Washington, D.C..
public relations firm. The Mullen Company itself had for years co-
operated with the Agency by providing cover abroad for Agency of-
ficers, carrying them as ostensible employees of its offices overseas.
Hunt, while employed by Mullen, orchestrated and led the Fielding
and Watergate break-ins and participated in other questionable ac-
tivities. The Mullen Company had tangential associations with some
activities of the White House staff.
These circumstances have led to suspicions and allegations of CIA
involvement in or advance knowledge of some of Hunt's improper
activities. In this section we review the circumstances of Hunt's em-
174
ployment and the nature of the Hunt-Mullen-CIA relationship in the
light of these allegations.
Hunt retired from the Agency in April 1970 after having held a
number of responsible positions in the Directorate for Plans (now the
Directorate of Operations). After initial service in Europe, Hunt
served in various Western Hemisphere stations. In the early 1960s he
supervised a group of Cubans forming a skeleton government-in-exile
in connection with the Bay of Pigs operation and subsequently was
responsible for certain foreign publishing activities conducted under
cover by the Agency. Hunt retired on his own volition and in good
standing with the Agency.
In the course of looking for post-retirement employment, Hunt con-
tacted the Agency's External Employment Assistance Branch, which
among other things helps retirees find positions. One of its officers,
Frank O'Malley, had known both Hunt and Mullen from his earlier
work on the Agency's cover staff. In view of Hunt's interest in the
public relations field, O'Malley, with the help of the CIA case officer
assigned to Mullen, contacted Mullen for help in placing Hunt. Mullen,
who had known Hunt at a time after World War II when both had
served in the European Cooperation Administration in Paris, arranged
several interviews for Hunt during March 1970, none of which pro-
duced results.
Meanwhile, Mullen decided to expand the operations of his com-
pany, and about April 10, 1970, offered Hunt a job which he accepted.
Although in early testimony Mullen had claimed that Director Helms
or others in the Agency had put pressure on him to hire Hunt, he
later acknowledged that this was not correct and that he had hired
Hunt on his own initiative. There does not appear to be support for
the position taken by Mullen in his early testimony. While Helms
had given Hunt permission to list Helms' name as a reference on
Hunt's resume, and had written a letter of recommendation to a
friend at another company (a copy of which Mullen might have seen).
there is no evidence that he either wrote or communicated with Mullen
about Hunt, or took part in Mullen's hiring of Hunt. Helms' testi-
mony is that he did not even know Mullen. Within the Agency,
Mullen's hiring of Hunt was in fact considered undesirable because
it could attract attention to the existing cover relationship between
Mullen and the Agency.
The Mullen Company was a legitimate public relations firm with
a number of clients having no known relationship to the CIA. Robert
Mullen had, however, for many years cooperated with the CIA by
making some of his overseas offices available at different times as a
cover for Agency employees operating abroad. The existence of
Mullens' relationship with the CIA was, of course, kept secret to
175
protect the secrecy of the cover arrangements and this led to com-
plications when, after Watergate, the Mullen Company came under
investigation.
The existence of the cover arrangements did not involve the Mullen
Company in the collection or transmission of intelligence itself. Its
only involvement was in the administrative arrangements for operat-
ing the offices in which an Agency employee worked during various
periods of time, maintaining the appearance of public relations activ-
ity by the employee, and handling in secret the related administra-
tive details. The necessary transactions were generally handled be-
tween the CIA's case officer and Mullen's bookkeeper who was a
retired CIA accountant.
After Hunt came to work for Mullen he was told, with CIA's con-
sent, of the existing cover arrangement so that he could deal with
administrative matters when necessary during Mullen's frequent
absences from Washington. To this end his security clearance was
extended by the Agency in October 1970. The record, however, dis-
closes only two instances of Hunt's involvement in these cover
arrangements. On one occasion he suggested a new arrangement
which the Agency declined; on another, he successfully urged the
Agency not to terminate an existing arrangement.
There is no evidence of other significant contacts between Hunt
and the Agency from the time of his joining Mullen until July 1971
when he became a White House consultant. The only documented
contacts were inconsequential in nature. Hunt corresponded with the
Agency's General Counsel in an unsuccessful effort to change his
election of survivorship benefits under the Agency's retirement pro-
gram. In the fall of 1970. he was asked by the Agency to prepare
a citation for a Civil Service award. And some time during this
period, Hunt repaid a loan made to him by the employee's association
to pay medical expenses incurred on behalf of his children.
Eight months after Hunt was hired by the Mullen Company, Robert
Bennett joined the company. Bennett, the son of Senator Wallace
Bennett (R-Utah), had been active in Republican Party affairs and
served as Congressional relations officer of the Department of Trans-
portation until January 1971 when he came to the Mullen firm. His
political connections led him to be involved in some of Hunt's later
activities, discussed below.
Mullen, who was planning to retire, had invited Bennett to become
president of the firm and purchase it. This was a disappointment to
Hunt who had himself expected to become president and owner of the
business. Attempts by Hunt to negotiate a joint ownership arrange-
ment with Bennett failed and Hunt began to think of leaving the firm.
There is no evidence of Bennett's having had prior CIA contacts. He
176
stated that he learned of the Mullen-CIA arrangement in February
1971 when he was examining Mullen's books preliminary to negotiating
a purchase price for the company. At that time, he first met the CIA
case officer and was briefed; occasional meetings followed from time
to time to discuss the cover arrangements.
Bennett brought Hughes Tool Company (now Summa Corpora-
tion) as a client to Mullen. He had met Hughes representatives while
at the Department of Transportation. Later in 1971, he introduced
Hunt to representatives of Hughes and various contacts occurred
which are discussed further below.
Conclusions
The investigation disclosed no participation by Hunt after his
retirement in any operation of the CIA, other than as described. Nor
has this investigation disclosed evidence of participation by the
Mullen Company or its employees during the period following Hunt's
employment in any operations of the CIA other than those described.
There is evidence that various companies who were clients of the
Mullen firm may in turn have had relationships with the CIA, but no
evidence has been found that either the Mullen firm or any of its em-
ployees participated in those relationships.
Those activities of Hunt which culminated in the Fielding and
Watergate break-ins, for some of which he sought CIA support, were,
so far as the record shows, conducted independently of his Mullen em-
ployment. No evidence has been found that the Mullen Company or its
employees were either involved in those activities or that they served
as a vehicle for CIA involvement in them. These matters are discussed
in greater detail in later sections.
B. CIA Assistance to Hunt
In July 1971 the CIA, at the request of Hunt, who had been hired
as a White House consultant, provided him with personal disguise
materials and alias identification. Within the next month the CIA
provided Hunt with additional assistance, including a tape recorder
and concealed camera, and disguise materials and alias identification
for G. Gordon Liddy. Some of these materials were used by Hunt and
Liddy in preparing for and carrying out the entry into the office of
Dr. Fielding, Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. In particular, the CIA
at Hunt's request developed pictures taken by him of that office in
the course of his reconnaissance for the break-in.
177
These circumstances have led to suspicions and allegations of CIA
involvement in or knowledge of Hunt's unlawful activities. In this
section we review the record concerning CIA's assistance to Hunt.
Early in July 1971, Charles W. Colson, Counselor to President
Nixon, invited Hunt to become a part-time consultant for the White
House. Colson and Hunt were acquainted and had occasionally met
for lunch. Hunt had expressed interest in Colson's White House
work. Colson was looking for someone to become familiar with the
Pentagon Papers and to coordinate White House efforts resulting
from their recent publication by the New York Times. Colson intro-
duced Hunt to John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President, either
immediately before or just after he was hired.
Shortly after Hunt started to work at the White House, Bennett
told him of an acquaintance, Clifford de Mott, who claimed to have
derogatory information about the Kennedy family. Bennett knew
and had approved of Hunt's White House job and thought de Mott
might be of interest to the White House. Hunt and Colson agreed
that de Mott should be interviewed. Hunt felt, however, that his
identity as a White House staff member should be concealed and pro-
posed to obtain a disguise from the CIA.
At Hunt's request, relayed by Colson, Ehrlichman called General
Robert E. Cushman, Jr., then Deputy Director of the CIA, on July 7,
1971. According to notes of the conversation taken by Cushman's
secretary, Ehrlichman alerted him that Hunt had been asked by
the President to do some special consulting work on security prob-
lems, that he may be contacting Cushman, and that Cushman should
consider "he has pretty much carte blanche." Ehrlichman has testi-
fied that he does not recall having called Cushman about Hunt and
that he does not believe he did.
Cushman routinely reported the news about Hunt's White House
employment at the Agency's July 8, 1971, Senior Staff meeting
attended by Helms. He also advised the Agency's Director of Security
of Hunt's assignment since it related to security, and the Director
in turn may have called Hunt's office to establish contact.
On July 22, 1971, Hunt met Cushman at the Agency by appoint-
ment. Hunt, who had known Cushman during his service as an Agency
employee, asked to speak to Cushman alone. Hidden equipment in
Cushman's office recorded the conversation. Such recordings were
made by Cushman on occasion, but he was not able to explain why
this particular conversation was recorded.
Hunt explained that he had been charged with a "highly sensitive
mission" by the White House and needed a physical disguise and
some identification cards for what he described as a "one time opera-
tion-in and out." Cushman has stated that he did not consider this
178
request as something to be concerned about inasmuch as the request
was made by an experienced ex-CIA officer with the endorse-
ment of high-ranking White House staff. Cushman also stated that
he assumed that the Agency's technical staff would require an appro-
priate accounting of materials given to Hunt. Moreover, materials
of the sort requested by Hunt were considered by Agency personnel
as being useful for disguising one's identity, not as implements for
an unauthorized entry. And, indeed, Hunt's purpose when asking
for these materials was simply to conceal his White House's connec-
tion while interviewing de Mott.
Cushman has testified (and a contemporaneous memorandum by his
executive assistant confirms) that he reported this request to Helms
routinely a few days after he had given authority to proceed, and that
there was no discussion about it. Helms, however, did not recall having
learned of Hunt's requests for technical assistance until later in
August, either in connection with Hunt's subsequent request for secre-
tarial assistance or in connection with the decision to terminate further
assistance to him.
It was during this same period of time that Helms, at the request of
David R. Young of the White House, authorized preparation of a
psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg, discussed in a later section of
this chapter. The Commission has found no evidence indicating that
Helms then knew that Hunt had a part in the profile project. Nor has
it found evidence indicating Cushman knew of the request for prepara-
tion of the profile.
In any event, Cushman directed that his executive assistant handle
Hunt's request for technical assistance. Since the materials requested
would be provided by the Technical Services Division (TSD) of the
Directorate for Plans, the executive assistant advised the office of the
Deputy Director for Plans of the request and then contacted the Acting
Chief of TSD. Hunt, at his request, was identified to TSD only as
"Mr. Edward", not by his true name, but TSD was told that the request
came from the White House. The materials were prepared and on the
following day, July 23, 1971, a TSD technician met Hunt at a Wash-
ington apartment maintained by the Agency for clandestine meetings
(where all subsequent meetings were also held) and supplied him with
a wig, a pair of glasses, a speech-altering device, a driver's license and
miscellaneous identification cards (not including credit cards). On his
return, the technician briefed the Acting Chief on the meeting with
Hunt. Hunt and the technician met again at Hunt's request about a
week later to adjust Hunt's glasses.
Hunt used the disguise to interview de Mott in Rhode Island. There
is no evidence that he disclosed to the Agency any information beyond
the fact that he needed assistance to conduct an interview in disguise.
179
The Agency's regulations required the execution of authentication
forms by an authorized officer before the issuance of technical assist-
ance. In this manner the purposes for which assistance was required
had to be disclosed and the material received had to be accounted for,
either by its subsequent destruction or return. In the case of the assist-
ance supplied to Hunt, the Acting Chief assumed, from the manner in
which the request was given to him, that normal accounting procedures
were to be dispensed with; he drew that conclusion from the fact that
Hunt was identified to him only by an alias and that the entire request
was treated as particularly sensitive. The Acting Chief and the tech-
nician did, however, continually request that Hunt promptly return
the materials. According to the Acting Chief, it was Hunt's continuing
evasion of these requests that eventually led him to express his concern
to the executive assistant later in August.
Additional requests by Hunt for assistance followed. On August 18,
1971, he called the executive assistant requesting that a particular
Agency secretary, then stationed in Paris, be detailed to him tempo-
rarily for a "highly sensitive assignment." After discussion with Cush-
man, the executive assistant turned Hunt down, offering him other
qualified secretarial assistance available at Headquarters which Hunt,
however, declined.
On August 20, 1971, Hunt again met with the technician and asked
him for alias business cards. He also requested a tape recorder to
record conversations in a noisy environment. TSD's Acting Chief
approved these requests as being within the scope of the initial request.
About this time, Hunt also requested a so-called backstopped New
York telephone number and a backstopped driver's license and credit
cards. Backstopping requires arrangements such as a telephone an-
swering service and cooperation with the issuing authority for pro-
viding independent vertification for the alias identification. The Act-
ing Chief advised the technician that this request would not be met
without the Director's approval. He did, however. ask one of his elec-
tronic technicians to find out what would be required to provide this
service, and the technician appears to have asked TSD what informa-
tion would be needed to provide a backstopped telephone number. A
typewritten note from another officer to the technician specified some
of the needed information that would have to be obtained from Hunt.
It is not known what was done with that note. but on August 26 or 27,
1971, Hunt's secretary telephoned certain of this information to the
technician who typed a memorandum recording it. There is no evi-
dence, however, that steps were taken within the Agency (beyond this
gathering of information) to provide backstopped service; in any
event, as discussed below, by August 27, 1971, instructions were issued
cutting off all further assistance to Hunt.
180
Another meeting between the technician and Hunt had taken place
on August 25, 1971, at which time the business cards and tape recorder
were delivered to him. Hunt had brought Liddy-identified only as
George-to this meeting and requested disguise materials for him as
well as a concealed camera. These were provided by the technician
later that day after approval had been given by TSD's Acting Chief.
Hunt renewed his request for a backstopped telephone number. In
the course of the meeting the technician heard Hunt and Liddy speak
of being engaged in narcotics-related activities and of catching a
plane that evening. In fact, Hunt and Liddy were about to fly to
Beverly Hills for a reconnaissance of the office of Dr. Fielding, Ells-
berg's psychiatrist, but the Commission has found no evidence that
anyone at the Agency had knowledge of this plan.
On the evening of the next day, August 26, 1971, Hunt called the
technician from Los Angeles and asked him to meet him at Dulles
Airport at 6:00 a.m. the next morning (August 27). Having first
cleared with his Acting Chief, the technician met Hunt and received
the concealed camera and a cartridge of film to be developed. Hunt
asked that the pictures be delivered to him as soon as possible. The
technician took the film to the CIA laboratory and then returned
to his office.
Meanwhile, TSD's Acting Chief became concerned over Hunt's
failure to return the alias materials which had been issued with the
understanding that they would be for a "one time operation", coupled
with the introduction of an unknown person (Liddy) and his re-
quests for a concealed camera and backstopped alias materials. He
instructed the technician to tell Hunt that no additional support
would be given without further authorization from the Director. He
then called Cushman's executive assistant on August 26, 1971, to report
and express his concern. The executive assistant instructed that no
further assistance should be provided to Hunt and directed him to
get the camera and additional disguises back as soon as possible. The
executive assistant also wrote a memorandum to Cushman expressing
his concern over the assistance being requested by Hunt and noting
that "there was also the question of its use in domestic clandestine
activity." He recommended that all further requests be cleared in
advance with the Deputy Director's office and that assurance be ob-
tained from Ehrlichman that "Hunt's latest caper is OK." On the
morning of August 27, 1971, after receipt of this memorandum,
Cushman telephoned Ehrlichman and advised him that the Agency
could not properly meet Hunt's requests and Ehrlichman agreed that
he "would call a halt to this." Cushman passed the memoranda re-
flecting these communications to Helms who saw them several days
later and noted his approval of the cutoff of assistance to Hunt.
181
By this time, the films which Hunt had delivered to the technician
early on August 27, 1971, had been developed and printed. The labora-
tory made no extra copies of the prints, apparently because the matter
was regarded as sensitive. When they were finished, the technician,
prior to delivering them to Hunt, showed them to the Acting Chief
who directed that xerox copies be made and retained in a file. He and
the technician reviewed them briefly; their testimony is that they
could not identify the subject of the pictures but speculated that it
might be a California medical building having some connection with
a narcotics training exercise, Liddy having previously mentioned
narcotics. Through an enlarger they could make out the names "Dr.
Fielding" and "Dr. Rothenberg" on the side of the building and the
technician wrote the names on the xerox copies. The Acting Chief
placed the xerox copies, along with other notes and papers related to
the dealings with Hunt, in a folder labeled "Mr. Edward" (Hunt's
alias) and the pictures were delivered to Hunt by the technician who
advised him of the cut off of assistance.
Later that day the executive assistant, with Cushman also on the
phone, called the Acting Chief and confirmed that Hunt was to receive
no more assistance. They spoke briefly about the pictures. The Acting
Chief has testified that they speculated that the pictures showed a
medical building in Southern California, possibly involved in a nar-
cotics exercise, but made no attempt to ascertain what they showed.
On August 31, 1971, Hunt called the technician once again to renew
his request for a backstopped telephone number but was turned down.
The disguise materials were not returned to the Agency and were
eventually found in the possession of some of the men arrested at the
Watergate in June 1972. Copies of the pictures taken with the CIA
camera were turned over by the Agency to the Justice Department dur-
ing the Watergate investigation in January 1973.
Conclusions
The providing of assistance to Hunt and Liddy was not within the
Agency's authorized foreign intelligence functions. The Commission
has found no evidence, however. indicating that the Agency was aware
that Hunt's request would involve it in unauthorized activities, at least
until request was made for a concealed camera and backstopped tele-
phone number at which time prompt action was taken to terminate
further support.
Nor has the investigation disclosed facts indicating that the CIA
knew or had reason to believe that the assistance it provided to Hunt
and Liddy would be used in connection with the planning of an illegal
182
entry. Indeed, as will be discussed below, when Hunt made his first
request to Cushman, the plan for the Fielding break-in had not yet
been formulated.
The responsibility for involvement of the Agency in providing
support ultimately used for illegal activities must rest primarily on
the White House staff. It is to some extent understandable that the
Agency would want to accommodate high-level White House requests
which on their face do not appear to be improper. Nevertheless, the
Agency is subject to criticism for having used insufficient care in
controlling the use of the materials it supplied. Inasmuch as the as-
sistance provided in this case differed from the foreign intelligence
services normally provided by the CIA to the White House, the respon-
sible Agency officials would have been well advised to insist on com-
pliance with the normal procedures for control of materials of this
kind, notwithstanding (or perhaps particularly because of) the air
of mystery that surrounded Hunt's request. Those procedures would at
least have required disclosure of where and when the materials were
to be used and might have served to deter the request. The Agency
should also use particular care in accommodating requests by or on
behalf of former employees or contractors.
C. The Ellsberg Psychological Profile
In July 1971, at the request of David R. Young of the White House
staff, the CIA prepared a psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg,
then under indictment for theft of the Pentagon Papers. Various
materials, including FBI reports, were provided for this purpose
by the White House staff to the Agency's psychiatric staff. In Novem-
ber 1971, a second profile was prepared at the request of the White
House on the basis of additional materials supplied by it to the
Agency.
Daniel Ellsberg was a patient of Dr. Lewis Fielding, a Beverly
Hills psychiatrist. In September 1971, Hunt and Liddy, after having
received CIA support, engineered a break-in into his office in an
attempt to obtain material on Ellsberg for use in the preparation of
the second profile.
These circumstances have given rise to suspicions and allegations
of Agency involvement in or prior knowledge of the Ellsberg break-in.
In this section, we review the circumstances surrounding the prepara-
tion of the profile in the light of these allegations.
The publication of the Pentagon Papers, coming on top of a series
of unauthorized disclosures of classified materials, caused consterna-
tion in the White House. It led to the creation in July 1971, at the
183
President's direction, of the Special Investigative Unit, headed by
David Young and Egil Krogh. This group, which later became popu-
larly known as the White House Plumbers, reported to Ehrlichman.
Its principal purposes were to induce action by various Executive
agencies to prevent unauthorized disclosures, to review classification
and security practices and procedures, and to ensure thorough investi-
gation of all aspects of the case against Daniel Ellsberg, who by then
had been indicted.
On July 28, 1971, Hunt submitted a written proposal to Colson
for a series of overt and covert operations to assemble a file on Daniel
Ellsberg that would help "to destroy his public image and credibility."
Among other things, he proposed that the CIA prepare a "covert
psychological assessment-evaluation" and that Ellsberg's file be ob-
tained from his psychiatrist.
Colson passed the proposal to Young and Krogh and, with
Ehrlichman's approval, Young in July 1971 contacted the CIA's Di-
rector of Security with the request that such a profile be prepared.
Young had previously been in contact with Helms in connection with
White House projects to review classification and security procedures
and Helms had authorized him to deal directly with the Director
of Security.
Young told the Director of Security that the White House wanted a
personality assessment on Ellsberg similar to others previously done
by the Agency on foreign leaders to assist in determining the motiva-
tion for an implication of the theft of the papers, and that Ehrlichman
had a personal interest in this project. The Security Director expressed
his concern to Young and stated that he would have to take it up with
the Director. A few days later, he discussed the request with Helms.
The Director approved it, stating that he believed that since the request
dealt with a major security leak, providing assistance would fall
within his obligation to protect intelligence methods and sources. A
CIA study had found that release of the Pentagon Papers disclosed
the identity of certain CIA operations and connections. In addition,
shortly before the decision was made, the Director had received a
report that a full set of the Pentagon Papers had come into the
possession of a major foreign embassy, and this report may have
influenced his decision. Nevertheless, the approval had been given
reluctantly. As Young later put it in a memorandum to Ehrlichman
reporting on CIA's preparation of the profile:
CIA has been understandably reluctant to involve itself in the domestic area,
but, responsive to the President's wishes, has done SO. (Memorandum of
August 20, 1971, p. 7)
On July 29, 1971, the Director of Security directed the Agency's
Chief of Medical Services to prepare the profile, and he in turn as-
signed the task to the Chief of the Psychiatric Staff, who had had prior
184
experience along these lines. The latter called in a staff psychiatrist to
prepare a first draft. All three doctors had reservations about the
project as being outside the Agency's charter since it involved an
American citiezn. They were also disturbed that the order came from
the Director of Security instead of their superior, the Deputy Director
for Support. Nevertheless, when copies of FBI reports, newspaper and
magazine clippings, and State Department security and evaluation re-
ports arrived from the White House in a few days, a draft profile was
prepared for the Director of Security, who sent it to Young on Au-
gust 11, 1971.
Young, Hunt and Liddy reviewed the profile and considered it
inadequate. On August 12, 1971, they met with the Chief of the
Psychiatric Staff to discuss what could be done to improve it. He
stated that the information given to him was insufficient. Liddy said
that Ellsberg had been under the care of a psychiatrist named
Dr. Fielding and that more information was available, but he did
not specify what it was. Young and Liddy made the suggestion,
rejected by the CIA psychiatrist, that the Agency could interview
Ellsberg's former wife. Liddy and Hunt also stated that they wished
to "try Dr. Ellsberg in public."
The Agency psychiatrist had known Hunt when he was with the
Agency and had rendered services to his family. At the end of the
meeting, Hunt took him aside and asked him not to tell anyone at the
Agency of his presence. Later, the psychiatrist telephoned Hunt to
say he could not conceal his presence, and he subsequently discussed
it, as well as the substance of the meeting, with the other doctors
involved.
It was after the meeting with the psychiatrist that Hunt, Liddy,
Young and Krogh decided that an effort should be made to obtain
Dr. Fielding's file on Ellsberg. This led to the Fielding break-in of
September 3, 1971, discussed in the following section.
Meanwhile, also on August 12, 1971, Ehrlichman and Young met
with Helms and the Director of Security apparently to impress on
them the importance of the Pentagon Papers investigation and the
problem of leaks, as well as the status of Young as Ehrlichman's
representative.
The Agency shortly received additional materials of the same
nature from Hunt; there is no evidence, however, that they included
any psychiatric reports. On August 20, 1971, the doctors met with
the Deputy Director of Support to discuss this project. They concluded
that the new material did not assist in preparing a personality assess-
ment, that Ellsberg's former wife should not be interviewed, that
the prospective use of the study as well as Hunt's participation were
matters of concern, and that these matters should be taken up with
the Director of Central Intelligence. The doctors hoped, however, that
185
inasmuch as no significant new material had been received, the matter
would simply come to an end at this point.
On August 23, 1971, the psychiatrist called Young to acknowledge
receipt of the material. Young told him Hunt would contact him. No
further work was done on the profile.
On September 30, 1971, however (some few weeks after the break-in
at Dr. Fielding's office), Young called to reactivate the project and
set up a meeting with the psychiatrist. On October 12, 1971, additional
materials of the same kind as before were received from Hunt. They
did not include, so far as could be ascertained, any psychiatric reports.
On October 27, 1971, the psychiatrist met with Young, Liddy and
Hunt and was asked to prepare a new profile incorporating the addi-
tional information supplied.
A second profile was then prepared. The doctors were still con-
cerned that the Agency might be exceeding its charter but believed
that the question had been considered and resolved by the Director.
On November 8, 1971, the profile was sent to Helms who reviewed it.
On November 9, 1971, Helms wrote to Young:
I have seen the two papers which [the psychiatrist] prepared for you. We
are, of course, glad to be of assistance. I do wish to underline the point that
our involvement in this matter should not be revealed in any context, formal or
informal. I am sure that you appreciate our concern.
The psychiatrist himself delivered the profile to Young's office on
November 12, 1971. Young, Hunt and Liddy were all present to receive
it and a brief discussion of its contents was held.
At this point, the CIA's activities in connection with the psychologi-
cal profile appear to have ended. Only after the Fielding break-in was
disclosed by testimony to the Watergate Grand Jury in April 1973
did these activities come to light.
Conclusions
The preparation of a psychological profile of an American citizen
who is not involved in foreign intelligence activities is not within the
Agency's statutory authority. Although Ellsberg, by leaking the
Pentagon Papers, may have jeopardized sources and methods of in-
telligence for which the Director is responsible, no evidence appears
to have been presented to the Agency that the profile was desired for
the purpose of protecting intelligence sources and methods. Indeed,
by the time the second profile was prepared, at least one of the CIA
doctors had reason to believe it might be leaked to the public-a
highly improper activity and one not connected with the CIA's proper
area of responsibility.
186
The Agency was induced to accept this assignment by pressure from
the White House in the name of the President and purported na-
tional security. This request came from Young, who had previously
served as the National Security Council's liaison to the Agency, but
all of the CIA officers involved knew that it was of doubtful propriety.
However, the investigation has disclosed no evidence indicating that
the Agency had prior knowledge of the break-in into Dr. Fielding's
office or generally of efforts to secure additional information on Ells-
berg by unlawful means. As a result of the Agency's normal practice
of compartmentation, i.e., restricting knowledge of an activity to
those participating in it-evidently followed with particular care in
the case of the White House projects because they were regarded as
sensitive-there apparently was no communication between the two
Directorates with which Hunt was dealing during the period. While
the Directorate of Support was preparing the profile, the Operations
Directorate was giving Hunt assistance, and neither seems to have
known what the other was doing.
Only Director Helms appears to have had some knowledge of both
activities, but the evidence indicates that his information was general
and fragmentary and that he knew neither of Hunt's involvement in
the profile project nor of the photographs of Fielding's office produced
as a result of the technical support given Hunt. Although it would
seem inappropriate to place responsibility on the Director on the
hosis of hindsight for failing to connect two seemingly unrelated series
of events, it is clear to the Commission that procedures should be es-
tablished which would allow sufficient information about White House
requests to be gathered together at one point SO that, in the future, the
propriety of Agency participation can be judged with the benefit of
all of the relevant facts.
In any event, the Commission concludes that the Agency is subject
to criticism for proceeding with the preparation of a project con-
sidered to be of doubtful authority without consultation with its
own counsel and other responsible White House officials. Moreover,
the Agency's medical officers, in spite of their repeatedly expressed
reservations, were negligent in failing to insist that those reservations
(and all underlying facts) be presented to the Director, particularly
after learning of the purpose to use the profile to try Ellsberg in
public.
The Commission realizes that requests such as that for the profile
confront the Director with a dilemma between his obligation to serve
the President and compliance with his understanding of the Agency's
statutory limitations; at times, as hereafter discussed, a Director may
well have to conclude that he has no alternative but to submit his resig-
nation. They also confront Agency staff with a similar dilemma
187
between obeying orders and acting within what they understand to be
the Agency's authority. At the very least, the staff must make certain
that their superiors have all the facts and considerations before them
before they make their final decision.
D. The Break-in of Dr. Fielding's Office
On September 3, 1971, three Cuban emigres, under the command
of Hunt and Liddy, broke into the office of Dr. Fielding, Ellsberg's
psychiatrist. One of the Cubans was at the time a paid informer of
the CIA in Miami; another had served the CIA as a contract agent
for several years until 1966. Hunt and Liddy had previously recon-
noitered the Fielding office, using the CIA-supplied camera and dis-
guises. Their objective was to obtain psychiatric information useful
in the preparation of the profile which the CIA had been asked to pre-
pare.
Suspicions have arisen from these circumstances and charges have
been made that the CIA was involved in the Fielding break-in or at
least acquired prior knowledge of it. The relevant facts are reviewed
in this section.
Following receipt of the first Ellsberg profile, which they regarded
as unsatisfactory, Young and Krogh, in a memorandum to Ehrlich-
man, proposed an operation to obtain Ellsberg's psychiatric file. Hunt
and Liddy made the reconnaissance of Dr. Fielding's office on August
26, 1971, referred to above. After their return, a so-called "covert
operation" to obtain the file was authorized by Ehrlichman. Hunt
went to Miami and recruited Bernard Barker and he in turn recruited
Rolando Martinez and Felipe de Diego for the operation.
Both Barker and Martinez had a long history of association with the
Agency. Barker was an American citizen who had lived in Cuba. He
had joined the Cuban police force in the 1950's as a result of which he
lost his American citizenship. While in the Cuban police, he was re-
cruited by the Agency which helped him escape to the United States
in 1959. Barker worked for Hunt during the Bay of Pigs period
helping to organize a Cuban government-in-exile. He continued to
serve in various CIA operations relating to Cuba until 1966, when the
Agency no longer needed him and terminated his contract. Barker had
entered the real estate business in Miami but made it clear to the
Agency that he would be willing at any time to return to its service.
There is, however, no record of any contacts or connections between
Barker and the Agency after 1966.
Martinez was recruited by the Agency in Miami in 1961. Until 1969,
he participated in a large number of maritime operations relating to
GERALD
188
Cuba and compiled what the CIA considered a distinguished record.
When these operations ended, Martinez obtained a real estate license
and went to work for Barker. The Agency, in recognition of his serv-
ices, had continued his contract payments until early 1970. At that
time, the Agency had planned to terminate him but agreed to pay him
$100 per month for a year to help him make the transition to civilian
life. In return he was required to report monthly to a CIA case officer
in Miami on developments in the Cuban community. In July 1971 it
was agreed that the retainer would be continued for one more year
because of Martinez' ability to report illegal attempts by Cuban exiles
to infiltrate Cuba, but it was intended that it should end in July 1972.
There is no record that Felipe de Diego, the third participant, ever
had a CIA connection of any kind.
In April 1971, Hunt, on the occasion of a business trip to Miami, had
renewed his acquaintance with Barker. Barker introduced Hunt to
Martinez and de Diego and together they attended the tenth anniver-
sary commemoration of the Bay of Pigs in Miami on April 17, 1971.
In August 1971 Hunt contacted Barker and asked him to recruit a
crew to undertake what he described as an important security opera-
tion.
On September 3, 1971, Barker, Martinez and de Diego broke into Dr.
Fielding's office in Beverly Hills. Hunt and Liddy supervised the op-
eration. The file cabinets in the office were pried open but, although the
testimony has been conflicting, it appears that no files on Ellsberg were
found. The office was left in a shambles to cover the group's tracks by
making it appear that someone looking for drugs had broken in. That
night the Cubans returned to Miami; Hunt and Liddy left Los Angeles
the next morning.
Shortly after the break-in, the Los Angeles police picked up one
Elmer Davis who was wanted on several charges. In return for the
dismissal of other charges, he pleaded guilty to the Fielding burglary,
although there is no evidence he had had any part in it, and the police
file on it was thereafter closed. As a result, the burglary received no
publicity, and it was not until John Dean and Hunt testified before the
Watergate Grand Jury in April 1973 that the facts of this operation
came to light.
The Agency, of course, had in its files xerox copies of the pictures
taken by Hunt in August which showed Dr. Fielding's office building
with his name on the wall above his parking space. Those copies had
been placed in a folder in the safe of the Acting Chief of the Technical
Services Division on August 27, 1971, and appear to have been exam-
ined only by him and his technician. The medical staff working on the
Ellsberg profile evidently was not aware of them. The pictures were
discovered after the Watergate break-in and turned over to the De-
189
partment of Justice in January 1973. There is no evidence that anyone
in the Agency was aware of their significance until the Fielding
break-in was disclosed to the Watergate Grand Jury in April 1973.
In addition, personnel in the Agency had certain contacts, described
below, with participants in the break-in after it took place, but there
is no evidence that as a result the Agency received any information
about it.
Hunt, of course, had contacts with the CIA psychiatrist in October
and November in connection with the preparation of the final version
of the profile (discussed above). Hunt also met the Deputy Director
for Plans for lunch in October 1971 to ask him to continue the existing
cover arrangement with Mullen Company in Europe. In preparation
for the lunch, the Deputy Director for Plans was briefed on the tech-
nical support which had been given Hunt in July and August by the
Technical Services Division and was briefly shown the xerox copies
of the Hunt photographs in the files.
He and the Chief of TSD glanced at the pictures which, according
to their testimony, meant nothing to them. At the lunch, the conversa-
tion was confined to the Mullen matter. Hunt did not talk about his
other activities. Shortly thereafter, Hunt asked an officer in the Euro-
pean Division for some unclassified information concerning a French
security leak in 1954, which was supplied. There is no evidence of
further Agency contacts with Hunt during the period immediately
following the break-in.
served as a paid informer of the Agency's Miami Station
during the period both before and after the break-in. Although he
saw his case officer about once a month, there is no evidence that he
ever disclosed anything about his activities for Hunt. Martinez testified
that late in 1971 he casually mentioned to his case officer that Hunt
had been in Miami and was working for the White House. The case
officer later told him that he had run a name check on Hunt at the
Station (as indeed he had) and that there was no information respect-
ing Hunt's being employed by the White House. Martinez took that
response to mean that Hunt was on a secret CIA mission of which the
Miami Station was not to know. On the strength of his past experience
with maintaining the secrecy of CIA operations, he therefore disclosed
none of the Hunt-related activities to his case officer.
Conclusions
The investigation has disclosed no evidence to suggest that the
Agency knew or suspected that Hunt had participated in a burglary
or other illegal operations in the period in which the Fielding break-in
occurred.
190
As discussed above, only Director Helms knew that the Agency was
preparing the Ellsberg profile at the time when it was also providing
certain technical support to Hunt. The Commission has found no
evidence, however, that either the Director or any other Agency em-
ployee had knowledge of facts sufficient to disclose the plans for or
the carrying out of the Fielding break-in.
E. White House Efforts to Declassify CIA Files
During 1971, a major effort was undertaken by the White House
staff on instructions from the President to declassify documents and
files of historical interest. Within the White House, the declassifica-
tion campaign, although inherently legitimate, was also sought to be
used for political purposes by providing materials embarrassing
to critics of the administration. The White House staff at first, and
finally President Nixon, brought pressure to bear on the CIA to turn
over to the President highly sensitive materials ostensibly for legiti-
mate government purposes, but in fact for the President's personal
political ends. These events, which took place during the same time
period in which CIA support for Hunt was sought and the Ellsberg
profile was ordered, and which involved the same group of White
House aides, are reviewed in this section.
During 1971, the White House staff, largely through David Young,
conducted a major campaign to bring about the declassification of the
many files and documents of historical interest which no longer re-
quired classification. A parallel effort was made to improve the security
of those government papers requiring continued classification.
With the publication of the Pentagon Papers in June 1971, these
activities gained added significance and urgency. While the Adminis-
tration was concerned over the breach of security caused by the leak
of the Pentagon Papers, it was also concerned over what it considered
to be an unfairly selective disclosure of embarrassing historical data.
By declassifying additional sensitive files relating to prior events—
mainly the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, and the fall of the
Diem Government in South Vietnam-it sought to obtain material
helpful in neutralizing critics of the Administration's policies and
particularly Senator Edward Kennedy, who in 1971 was regarded as
Nixon's principal challenger. Beginning in June 1971, Colson and
Young urged on Haldeman and Ehrlichman a campaign in which
disclosures embarrassing to past administrations would be used for
the political advantage of the Nixon Administration. That program
involved the use of the Pentagon Papers as well as the declassification
of other files.
191
Colson set Hunt to work examining the Pentagon Papers and other
"overtly printed documentation
[to determine] the most useful
in demonstrating the collective bad judgment of the Kennedy Admin-
istration and/or a number of its high-level appointees." The State
Department was directed to turn over various files and cables, includ-
ing those dealing with the fall of the Diem Government. Hunt and
Colson interviewed Lucien Conein, a retired CIA employee formerly
stationed in Vietnam, whom the Pentagon Papers identified as active
in dealings with Vietnamese officials at the time of the overthrow and
death of President Diem.
On September 20, 1971, Ehrlichman, Young, and Krogh met to
review the program of obtaining previously classified CIA materials
on the fall of the Diem Government, the Bay of Pigs, and the Cuban
Missile Crisis. The agenda for that meeting describes the materials
and the "exposure" to be given them through "briefing of selected
newsmen," "Senate Foreign Relations Committee inquiry" and "other
Congressional investigations." It states, opposite various listed items
under each of the three subject heads, that Ehrlichman was to see
Helms to obtain materials not previously turned over by CIA. A
handwritten notation states that Young was to see Helms to "set up
appointment for tomorrow."
On September 22, 1971, Ehrlichman met with Helms, advised him
that the President wanted to declassify the documents relating to
Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis and the Lebanon
landings and asked to have the CIA's files on these matters turned
over to him. Helms directed an internal review of these papers to
make an assessment of the impact of their possible declassification.
Meanwhile on September 24, 1971, Colson sent a memorandum to
Ehrlichman entitled, "Rekindling the Pentagon Papers Issue". Colson
suggested various strategies in Congress to keep the Pentagon Papers
issue alive and "each day hopefully creating some minor embarrass-
ment for the Democrats." He also recommended other steps including
"program| Lucien Conein to write a letter to Senator Mathias
complaining that he has been muzzled by the CIA, was paid money
to get out of town and instructed to talk to no one." He concludes by
urging that "we should very soon release declassified documents re-
lating to the Lebanon crisis, the Cuban missile crisis and perhaps one
or two others. Releasing of declassified documents will keep press
interest alive in the whole issue. We should start doing it soon to
avoid the charge of election year politicking."
On October 1, 1971, Ehrlichman again met with Helms at the
Agency. Helms showed Ehrlichman the files which he proposed to
turn over in response to the earlier requests and asked that they be
returned as soon as possible. He declined, however, to release the files
192
relating to Vietnam. The other files were delivered to Ehrlichman that
day.
On October 8, 1971, Helms was called to a meeting at the White
House with the President and Ehrlichman, apparently because he had
declined to release the Vietnam file. A contemporaneous CIA memo-
randum states that Nixon and Ehrlichman assured Helms that the
President was interested in helping the CIA and had no intention
of releasing CIA papers, but needed to know the specific background
of these matters to meet possible press questions and to handle further
Soviet negotiations that might touch on agreements reached during
the Cuban Missile Crisis. Both Ehrlichman and Helms have testified
that Helms was not told of the President's intention to use the infor-
mation in these files for political purposes. The memorandum states
that Helms replied that he worked for only one President at a time
and that any papers in this possession were at the President's disposal.
He then handed the requested Vietnam file to Nixon who slipped it
into his desk drawer.
On November 16, 1971, Ehrlichman lunched with William Colby,
who had become the CIA's Executive Director-Comptroller, and re-
affirmed the President's desire to declassify documents on these subjects.
Nothing more came of the program, however, and no action was taken
on declassification of these files. So far as is known, none of the
information in the documents was disclosed by the White House.
Conclusions
The White House demand for sensitive CIA files-cloaked in what
appear to be at least in part false representations that they were
needed for valid government purposes when, in fact, they were wanted
to discredit critics of the administration-as thoroughly reprehen-
sible. It represents another serious instance of misuse of the Agency by
the White House.
So far as the Agency knew, the demand was for a proper purpose-
there is no evidence that it had notice of the intentions revealed in
later-discovered White House documents. Senior officials of the Agency
did, however, consider the surrender of these files to be a highly sensi-
tive matter, giving it great concern. The most sensitive of these files
was turned over by the Director only upon direct request from the
President.
The Commission recognizes that the Director cannot be expected to
disobey a direct request or order from the President without being
prepared to resign. The instances in which resignation may be called
for cannot be specified in advance and must be left to the Director's
judgment.
193
The Commission believes that in the final analysis the proper
functioning of the Agency must depend in large part on the judg-
ment, ability and integrity of its Director. The best assurance against
misuse of the Agency lies in the appointment to that position of
persons of such stature, maturity and integrity that they will be able
to resist outside pressure and importuning. The Director should be
able not only to manage the Agency, but also to reassure the public
that he will do so properly.
F. CIA's Relation to Events Preceding the
Watergate Break-in
The origins of Watergate go back to a program for political es-
pionage in connection with the 1972 Presidential campaign on which
Hunt and Liddy began to work early that year. That program had
various facets of which espionage directed against the headquarters
of the Democratic National Committee was one.
This investigation has disclosed no evidence that the Agency pro-
vided support for the espionage program which culminated in the
Watergate break-in.
As has been discussed, however, four of the participants in the
break-in-Hunt, Martinez, Barker and McCord-had ties to the
Agencv. Martinez on the CIA payroil as an informer until
after his arrest. Hunt had dealings with the Agency in the summer
and fall of 1971 in connection with the White House projects pre-
viously discussed. And he continued to be employed by Mullen, which
had a CIA relationship, and to be associated with Bennett in several
projects with political or espionage overtones.
These and connected circumstances have led to suspicions and allega-
tions of CIA involvement in or prior knowledge of the Watergate
break-in. In this section we review the relevant facts in the light of
these charges.
1. Hunt's Contacts with the CIA
Hunt's contacts with the Agency in connection with his request for
a disguise and related support and with the Ellsberg profile have
been discussed above. The Commission has found no evidence to indi-
cate that the Agency acquired notice in the course of these contacts
that Hunt was engaged in or planning illegal activities.
These contacts ended in November 1971, and thereafter Hunt had
what appear to have been only a few sporadic and insignificant con-
tacts with Agency personnel.
Hunt called the Agency's External Employment Affairs Branch
194
on a few occasions to ask them to refer him to persons having certain
qualifications needed for his projects. At one time Hunt asked to be
referred to a firm qualified to locate possible hostile electronic listening
devices. On another occasion he asked to be referred to an electronics
expert. The Agency referred a man named Thomas Amato, experi-
enced both in electronics and picking locks-the record is not clear
whether Hunt had requested the latter capability. In any event, the
Agency employee who routinely made the referral was not told by
Hunt of his purpose, and he has stated that he did not consider that
any illegal activity was contemplated.
Hunt, at the suggestion of Barker and Martinez, interviewed a
Cuban refugee who had been close to Castro, using Martinez' tape
recorder. He believes that he may have sent a transcript gratuitously
to the Agency, but it has no record of it.
Hunt frequently played tennis with a long-time friend who was a
CIA officer and may have had other occasional social contacts with
CIA employees. There is no record, however, of any communications
between him and the Agency disclosing facts which might have indi-
cated that he was planning or pursuing illegal activities.
Hunt, of course, had been in contact with Martinez in connection
with the Fielding break-in and, later, the two Watergate break-ins.
As previously discussed, Martinez reported to his case officer in Miami
on an average of once a month. Although he had mentioned Hunt in
passing on two occasions in 1971, for reasons discussed, Martinez chose
not to disclose Hunt's activities.
Nonetheless, the case officer's superior, the Miami Chief of Station,
had been disturbed when he later learned that the case officer had not
promptly reported the reference to Hunt's name, a name that meant
nothing to the case officer. The Chief felt that he should be advised of
the presence of any former CIA officers in his territory. His lingering
and undefined concern over Hunt was evidently in his mind in March
1972, when he met Martinez in connection with another intelligence
requirement. In the course of that conversation, Martinez again men-
tioned that Hunt had been in and out of Miami on a foreign business
deal. Separately, he asked the Chief of Station whether he was certain
that he was aware of all CIA activity in the Miami area.
These repeated references to Hunt, in whom the station chief from
past experience had limited confidence, and Martinez' unusual question
led the station chief to contact his superior at CIA Headquarters. He
cabled that Martinez had reported that Hunt had been in the Miami
area twice recently contacting old friends and although "on the surface
Hunt seems to be trying to promote business deals of one sort or
another," he had indicated that he was a White House counsellor "try-
ing to create the impression that this could be of importance to his
195
Cuban friends." The cable asked that Hunt's White House employ-
ment be checked out.
On receipt of this cable it was discussed with the Associate Deputy
Director for Plans who stated that he had previously learned from the
Deputy Director for Plans that Hunt was a White House consultant
supposedly engaged in domestic activities having nothing to do with
foreign intelligence and that it was neither necessary nor proper for
CIA to check into Hunt's activities since domestic activities were
involved.
As a result of this advice from the Associate Deputy Director, pre-
mised not only on concern that the Agency should not become involved
in domestic political activity but also on his estimate of Hunt's erratic
judgment, a strongly worded letter was sent to the Miami Chief of
Station advising that Hunt "undoubtedly is on domestic White House
business, no interest to us, in essence, cool it." Neither the Associate
Director nor the parties to these communications apparently knew of
the prior support to Hunt or of the Ellsberg profile.
After receipt of this letter, the station chief, through the case
officer, asked Martinez to write up for him in Spanish a summary of
his contacts with Hunt. Martinez was disturbed but complied when
the case officer told him to write something that he would not be
afraid to have shown to him later. The station chief placed it in the file.
The summary failed to disclose anything beyond what Martinez had
previously reported and gave no hint of any questionable activities.
Martinez met his case officer again in May and on June 6, hut said
nothing further relating to Hunt's activities.
The station chief testified that while he had been distressed over
the blunt response from Headquarters, and uneasy over Martinez'
question respecting his knowledge of CIA activities, he had no reason
to suspect Hunt of unlawful activities. His basic concern was that he
should know what a former Agency employee was doing in his terri-
tory. He did not suspect that Martinez, of whom he thought as a boat
captain, was engaged in domestic espionage activities. As for the
officers in Headquarters, their overriding concern appeared to have
been not to become involved in a domestic investigation and, in par-
ticular, not to cross paths with the White House.
Although Martinez was the one person in regular contact with the
CIA who had knowledge of Hunt's improper activities, the Commis-
sion has found no evidence to indicate that he provided the Agency
with information about those activities.
2. Bennett's Contacts with Hunt and the CIA
During the period preceding Watergate, Hunt continued to be em-
ployed by Mullen Co. and was in regular contact with Robert Bennett,
196.
its president. Mullen continued to provide cover for CIA officers
abroad and Bennett and Hunt had a few meetings with the case offi-
cer respecting these arrangements.
Bennett learned of several of Hunt's planned or executed political
activities in this period, not including, however, the Fielding or
Watergate operations. By June 1972, Bennett had come to doubt
Hunt's reliability and judgment and had determined that Hunt
should eventually leave Mullen, but he decided to take no action
until after the election. According to Bennett, nothing had come to his
attention that he considered sufficiently serious to jusify the risk of
White House displeasure should he discharge Hunt. There is no evi-
dence that he learned anything that gave him notice of Hunt's illegal
activities until they became public knowledge.
The following paragraphs summarize Bennett's relevant contacts
with Hunt during this period.
At Colson's request, Hunt interviewed Dita Beard, public relations
representative of ITT Corp., in her Denver hospital room in
March 1972. A memorandum attributed to Beard had been published
indicating that ITT had offered a large contribution to the Republican
Party if the 1972 convention were to utilize the Sheraton Hotel facili-
ties in San Diego. Bennett had received a tip from the Hughes organi-
zation that the memorandum might be a forgery and passed it to Hunt
or Colson. Hunt, using the wig furnished by the CIA in August,
interrogated Beard, attempting to establish that the memorandum
was a forgery. On his return he gave a statement to Colson. Arrange-
ments were made in the Senate for the release of a statement in a form
useful to the media. Beard's lawyer called on Bennett, who himself
had had no prior participation in this matter, to assist in its prepara-
tion. There is no evidence of any CIA knowledge of or involvement
in these events.
At one time Hunt approached Bennett with a proposal to obtain
the assistance of the Hughes organization for a burglary in Las Vegas
to secure purported information about Senator Muskie. Bennett, at
Hunt's request, introduced Hunt to a Hughes organization employee,
but later learned that Hunt's proposal had been rejected. It was ap-
parently in this connection that Hunt had called the Agency's Exter-
nal Employment Affairs Branch for referral of a technician. It was
also this proposal which first gave Bennett concern with respect to
Hunt's judgment; he assumed, however, that Hunt, being attached to
the White House staff, would be adequately supervised and controlled.
There is no evidence that CIA had knowledge of or any part in this
plan.
During this period Bennett was asked by Hughes' attorneys to get
a bid for surveillance of Clifford Irving, who was then writing a book
197
describing his earlier preparation of the fraudulent Hughes biogra-
phy. Hunt got an estimate from James McCord and gave it to Bennett
who passed it to the attorneys. They rejected it as too high. There is
no evidence that the CIA had knowledge or was involved.
Bennett, active in Republican politics, participated in the reelec-
tion campaign and assisted in the formation of a number of commit-
tees to receive contributions. Neither Hunt nor Liddy evidently had
any part in this effort; Bennett merely delivered Hughes' campaign
contribution to Liddy. There is no evidence that the CIA had knowl-
edge of or was involved in this activity.
Bennett's nephew, Fletcher, wanted a summer job and he referred
him to Hunt. Hunt sought to recruit him to serve as a spy at Muskie
Headquarters. Fletcher turned him down but referred Hunt to a
friend, Tom Gregory, who took the job. Gregory was not related to
Bennett but did visit Bennett and Fletcher occasionally and told them
generally of his activities. According to Bennett, however, he was not
told of any illegal activity until June 14, two days before Watergate,
when Gregory told Bennett that Hunt had asked him to bug the office
of Frank Mankiewicz in McGovern Headquarters. Gregory declined
and went home. This plan evidently was not carried out. There is no
evidence that Bennett (or the CIA) learned of the first Watergate
break-in which had taken place in May 1972 or of the plans for the
second Watergate operation until it became public knowledge.
Bennett's contacts with the C1A during the pre-Watergate period
apparently were confined to the Mullen Company cover arrangements.
There is no evidence that Bennett personally performed services for
the CIA or had other operational contacts with the Agency. His com-
munications with the case officer prior to Watergate evidently were
limited to matters relating to the cover arrangements. There is no
evidence that Bennett discussed Hunt with the case officer prior to the
Watergate break-in.
In the days immediately following Watergate, a number of com-
munications passed among Hunt, Liddy, and Bennett. Among other
things, Hunt asked Bennett for help in finding him a lawyer. Liddy
called Bennett to locate Hunt and pass messages to him. Nothing has
been found in these communications suggesting Bennett's involvement
in the Watergate operation.
Shortly after Watergate, the office of the United States Attorney
questioned Bennett, and the evidence indicates that he responded
truthfully to the questions, including disclosing the firm's relation-
ship to the CIA. When he later appeared before the grand jury, he
was asked few questions by the prosecutor. Having previously dis-
closed the facts concerning the CIA relationship, he did not vol-
unteer them either to the grand jury or to the FBI when he was later
198
interviewed by it. These events, which occurred within the three weeks
following Watergate, along with other comments and observations by
Bennett, were reported by the CIA case officer to his superiors after
he met with Bennett on July 10, 1972. A copy of the handwritten re-
port was sent to the Director. At this time, the CIA was gravely con-
cerned over the impact of the Watergate investigation on the security
of the Mullen cover and the information received from Bennett was
considered important for that reason. The case officer's report reflects
that at the time the Agency was also concerned over the disclosures
being made by an ex-employee named Philip Agee which threatened
the Mullen cover, among other things. This development was treated
as highly classified by the Agency and had not been disclosed to Ben-
nett. It was referred to as the "WH flap" for the reason that Agee's
disclosures dealt mostly with the Agency's Western Hemisphere oper-
ations. All of these matters were then being reviewed within the
Agency in connection with the question whether the cover arrange-
ments with Mullen should be terminated as no longer secure.
This investigation has disclosed no evidence indicating that the
Agency, through Bennett, was implicated in the Watergate break-in.
3. Miscellaneous Contacts and Relations
Various miscellaneous contacts and relationships have been men-
tioned as giving rise to suspicion of CIA involvement or advance
notice of the Watergate break-in.
One of these is the fact that James McCord, another retired CIA
employee, participated in the break-in. McCord had retired in Janu-
ary 1970 to form his own security firm and had become Director of
Security of the Committee to Reelect the President early in 1972. He
also had been in contact with the External Employment Affairs Branch
for referrals to qualified ex-employees. In April 1972, he began to work
with Hunt on plans for the break-in. There is no evidence that the
Agency participated in or gained advance knowledge of the Water-
gate break-in through McCord.
Another concerns alleged telephone calls to and from the Agency
immediately after the arrests of the burglars. The Watergate burglars
were arrested at 2:30 A.M. on June 17, 1972. The first contact with the
Agency, according to its records, occurred at 5 P.M. that day when an
inquiry about the arrested men was received from a Washington Post
reporter. That call was followed by calls from the Secret Service for a
check on the aliases and from the FBI advising of the identification of
McCord and Hunt, two ex-employees. This news was relayed to the
Acting Director of Security who promptly called the Director of Se-
curity at 8:45 P.M. The Director returned to the Agency and then
199
called Helms at 10 P.M. to report that-former Agency employees (Mc-
Cord and Hunt) were involved in the burglary.
There is no evidence in the communications by Agency personnel
immediately following the break-in to suggest that any Agency em-
ployee had advance knowledge of the break-in.
Conclusions
The Commission concludes, on the basis of this investigation, that
there is no evidence either that the CIA was a participant in the
planning or execution of the Watergate break-in or that it had advance
knowledge of it.
G. The Agency's Response to the Post-Watergate
Investigations
Within hours of the arrest of the Watergate burglars on June 17,
1972, it became known that McCord, Martinez and Barker had con-
nections with the Agency. Hunt's connection was disclosed not long
afterward. Inasmuch as the burglary had occurred within the District
of Columbia, it fell within the jurisdiction of the FBI, and the FBI's
attention soon focused on the CIA and its possible involvement in the
Watergate operation. The Agency also became an object of White
House efforts to inhibit the FBI investigation and to keep the arrested
burglars silent. And eventually, the CIA came under the scrutiny of
the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
(under Senator Ervin).
The manner in which the Agency responded to these investigations,
its failure to make timely disclosure of information in its possession,
and its destruction of certain tapes, has led to suspicions and allega-
tions concerning its involvement in the Watergate operation or the
subsequent cover-up. In this section, we examine the relevant events
in the light of these charges.
1. CIA Attempts to Limit the Scope of the FBI Investigation
From the outset of the post-Watergate investigation, the Director
took the position that insmuch as the CIA had not been involved in
Watergate, it should not become involved in the investigation. He has
testified that he was particularly concerned over disclosing information
to FBI field offices because leaks had occurred there immediately after
Watergate, and he was concerned over the failure of the FBI to dis-
close the purposes for which it sought information from CIA.
200
Within the first ten days after the break-in, the Agency nevertheless
responded to certain requests from the FBI field office in Alexandria,
Virginia. Helms, however, attempted to handle such requests directly
with Acting FBI Director, L. Patrick Gray, and confine them as much
as possible. In a memorandum dated June 28, 1972, he reported having
urged Gray that this should be done because the CIA was not involved
in Watergate and requested that the FBI "confine themselves to the
personalities already arrested or directly under suspicion and that they
desist from expanding this investigation into other areas which may
well, eventually, run afoul of our operations."
There is no clear explanation why Helms wrote this memorandum.
There is no evidence that he in fact made that request to Gray. Accord-
ing to Gray and Helms, Gray had called Helms on June 22, 1972, to
inquire about possible CIA involvement in the Watergate operation.
Helms simply told him that although the CIA knew the people who
had been arrested, it was not involved in the operation.
On June 23, 1972, Helms and Lt. General Vernon A. Walters, the
Agency's Deputy Director, were called to the White House to meet
with Ehrlichman and H. R. Haldeman, the President's Chief of
Staff. At this meeting, Haldeman suggested that the CIA ask the
FBI to limit its investigation on the grounds that it might jeopardize
the security of CIA operations. Helms, however, stated that he knew
of no CIA operations that might be affected, and that he had SO
informed Grav on the preceding day. Haldeman, nevertheless,
directed Walters to call on Gray with the suggestion that further
investigation of activities in Mexico involving moneys found on the
Watergate burglars would endanger CIA operations. Walters then
saw Gray and, after referring to Helms' call to him of the preceding
day, passed on that suggestion. Walters has testified that he considered
this to have been a reasonable request, assuming, in the light of his
own past experience, that it must have been intended to protect highly
sensitive operations presumably known only to the White House.
Walters was not asked at the meeting to have the FBI restrict its
investigation in other ways.
During the following days, Walters had several meetings with
John Dean, Counsel to the President, who, at the direction of Ehrlich-
man and Haldeman, suggested the possibility that the FBI investiga-
tion might expose CIA operations and asked what could be done about
it. He also asked whether the CIA could pay the salaries and bail of the
jailed burglars. Walters firmly rebuffed the suggestions implied in
the questions. Helms had a further telephone conversation with Gray
in which he advised him that the CIA had no interest in the Mexicans
the FBI was then investigating.
On June 28 Helms left on a three week trip out of the country,
201
leaving the memorandum previously quoted. During his absence, in-
formation continued to be transmitted to the FBI through Walters.
William E. Colby, then the Executive Director, handled the in-house
coordination of the responses to the investigation.
During October and November 1972, the United States Attorney
requested information concerning the CIA's connection with various
activities of the Watergate defendants in order to prepare for the
coming trial. Inquiries on this subject had earlier been made by the
FBI. The United States Attorney was particularly concerned that
the defendants might claim that they were acting on orders of the
CIA. The Agency provided information in response to specific in-
quiries but sought to restrict it to the Attorney General and the
Assistant Attorney General. Eventually, information respecting
Hunt's request for support in July and August 1971 and the Agency's
response was supplied to the United States Attorney.
The Agency, however, volunteered no information and withheld
some appearing to have a bearing on these matters. For example,
in July 1972 and again in December 1972 and January 1973, the
Agency received letters from McCord relating to the attempts to
involve the CIA in the defense of the Watergate burglars at their
forthcoming trial. The letters reflected McCord's efforts to resist pro-
posals that the Watergate burglars should implicate the CIA in order
to bolster their defense. Helms obtained advice from the CIA's Gen-
oral Counsel that he was under no obligation voluntarily to turn the
letters over to the FBI (which did not know of them) and on the
strength of that advice, retained them in the Agency's files.
In July 1972, xerox copies of Hunt's pictures of Fielding's office, as
well as of the alias identification given Hunt (contained in TSD's
"Mr. Edward" file) were turned over to Helms and Colby. In spite of
the well publicized fact that the originals of some of these alias mate-
rials had been found on the arrested Watergate burglars, and in spite
of requests from the Assistant Attorney General for information about
Agency support to Hunt, the Agency apparently did not deliver these
materials to the Department of Justice until January 1973. Other
material held by the Agency's management and not disclosed or deliv-
ered until 1973 included the tape of the Cushman-Hunt conversation
of July 22, 1971.
Not only did the Agency continue to hold material relevant to the
investigation, but it undertook no comprehensive in-house investiga-
tion of its own into its connections with the activities of the men who
were coming to trial. No general effort was made until May, 1973,
to collect all relevant information and documents from Agency
employees.
On December 15, 1972, Helms and Colby went to the White House to
202
report to Ehrlichman and Dean on the status of the FBI and Depart-
ment of Justice investigations. Colby's memorandum of the meeting
records the CIA's efforts "to respond [to inquiries] at the highest level
only". It also reports on the United States Attorney's efforts to learn
the name of the person who authorized Hunt's request for support in
July 1971, and states that Colby sought to avoid answering these ques-
tions but was eventually compelled to disclose Ehrlichman's name.
Colby and Helms also showed Dean the package of information (pos-
sibly containing the xerox copies of the Hunt photos and alias mate-
rials) which had been prepared for delivery to the Assistant Attorney
General. The memorandum states: "It was agreed that these would
be held up." It was also agreed that Cushman would be asked to call
Ehrlichman to discuss his recollection of who had made the July 1971
phone call to him.
In January 1973, this package of information was finally turned
over to the Department of Justice.
Conclusions
While the Agency has a legitimate concern to protect sensitive III-
formation against disclosure, its response to the investigation of the
Watergate burglary cannot be justified by any requirements for
secrecy. The Agency failed to turn over to the Department of Justice
information in its possession which it should have known could be
relevant to the ongoing investigation and preparation for the first
Watergate trial in January 1973. Much of the information requested
could have been provided with little, if any, risk to the security of
Agency activities. Some of it was eventually provided, but only after
some delay. The Agency is subject to serious criticism for this conduct.
The basis for the Agency's action appears to have been the Director's
opinion that since the Agency was not involved in Watergate, it should
not become involved in the Watergate investigation. The Commission
considers this to be no justification for the Agency's failure to aid an
investigation of possible violations of law by employees or ex-em-
ployees with whom it had had recent contacts. The provision of the
Agency's charter barring it from exercising "police, subpoena [and]
law enforcement powers" does not excuse that failure.
The Commission has found no evidence, however, that leads it to
believe that officers of the Agency actively joined in the cover-up con-
spiracy formed by the White House staff in June 1972. There is no
evidence that the Agency sought to block the FBI investigation. Gen-
eral Walters' statement to Gray concerned only the investigation in
Mexico, and he has stated that it was based on his belief, supported
203
by prior experience, that the White House had knowledge of some
highly classified activity in Mexico not known to others. Subsequent
cover-up overtures by the White House were firmly rejected by him.
Later reluctance of Agency management to disclose the identity of
White House personnel and provide materials to the Department of
Justice are subject to the criticism previously made. The evidence does
not indicate, however, that Agency personnel ever knew of or partici-
pated in a plan of the White House staff to abort or impede investi-
gation into possible violations of law by members of that staff.
2. Destruction of Helms' Tapes and Transcripts
About January 17, 1973, seven months after the Watergate break-in
Director Helms received a letter from Senator Mansfield, dated Janu-
ary 16, 1973, requesting that the Agency retain "any records or docu-
ments which have a bearing on the Senate's forthcoming investigation
into the Watergate break-in, political sabotage and espionage, and
practices of agencies in investigating such activities." At the time the
letter arrived, Helms and his secretary were in the process of cleaning
out his files preparatory to his departure from the Agency.
Approximately a week after receipt of this letter, Helms' secretary
asked him what should be done about the voluminous tapes and tran-
scripts which in The tanes were produced hv a
recording system installed in the offices of the Director, the Deputy
Director and what was then an adjoining conference room (the
French Room). This system had been installed some ten years earlier.
It was removed from the Deputy Director's office in February 1972
and from the office of the Director in January and February 1973.
The taping system permitted the recording of telephone calls and
of room conversations on activation by the occupant of the office. Helms
used it occasionally, apparently considering it as an efficient way to
prepare a memorandum to assist his recollection. Cushman used it
only rarely and Walters, who followed him, not at all.
The tapes were transcribed routinely and the transcripts were
retained by the respective secretary. Prior to January 1973, tapes
were from time to time erased or, if worn out, destroyed.
About January 24, 1973, Helms, in response to his secretary's ques-
tion, told her to destroy his remaining tapes and transcripts and she
so instructed the technicians in charge of the system. At that time
there were approximately three file drawers of transcripts covering
his years as Director. Both Helms and his secretary made a cursory
review of them and recalled none to have related to Watergate. They
were then destroyed. Along with the tapes and transcripts the logs
identifying them were also destroyed. No tapes were erased.
204
Director Helms has testified that he considered this destruction of
what he regarded as his personal notes to be a routine part of vacating
his office. He said that he felt that the Agency had produced whatever
Watergate-related materials it had and that these tapes and tran-
scripts had nothing to do with anything he considered relevant to
Watergate. He also stated that he assumed that anything of per-
manent value had been transferred from the tapes to the Agency's rec-
ords, and he felt obligated that records of confidential conversations
between him and others should not become part of Agency files.
Conclusions
It must be recalled that in January 1973 the Watergate affair had
not yet assumed the dimensions which subsequent revelations gave it.
Neither the activities of the Plumbers nor the extent of the White
House involvement in the cover-up had come to light. Accordingly,
destruction of Helms' personal office records cannot be judged with
the benefit of hindsight, derived from subsequent revelations.
For the same reasons, however, Helms stated interpretation of
what was Watergate-related presumably was narrower than it would
have been after all the facts disclosed to the Watergate Grand Jury
in April, 1973, and other information had come to light. Hence, no
comfort can be derived from Helms' assurances that no Waternate-
related material was destroyed, since what was destroyed had not been
reviewed for relevance in light of the later disclosures.
The destruction of the tapes and transcripts, coming immediately
after Senator Mansfield's request not to destroy materials bearing on
the Watergate investigation, reflected poor judgment. It cannot be
justified on the ground that the Agency produced its Watergate-
related papers from other files; there is no way in which it can ever
be established whether relevant evidence has been destroyed. When
taken together with the Agency's general non-responsiveness to the
ongoing investigation, it reflects a serious lack of comprehension of
the obligation of any citizen to produce for investigating authorities
evidence in his possession of possible relevance to criminal conduct.
3. Miscellaneous Matters Concerning the Investigation
a. Pennington
In the foregoing sections we have discussed the response to the
Watergate investigation at the level of the Director's office. A separate
failure to respond properly occurred within the Office of Security.
In August 1972, the FBI's Alexandria field office, in the course of
205
its Watergate investigation, asked for information about one Penning-
ton, said to have been an employee who may have been McCord's
supervisor a number of years ago. The inquiry was received by an of-
ficer of the Office of Security who customarily dealt with the FBI.
The officer had personnel files checked and furnished the FBI with
information concerning one Cecil B. Pennington, a retired employee
of the Office of Security who had had no connection with McCord. The
FBI shortly thereafter advised that this was not the person in whom
it had an interest.
Meanwhile, officers in the Office of Security knew that one Lee Pen-
nington was a long-time friend of the McCords who, shortly after
the Watergate arrests, had helped Mrs. McCord burn some of Mc-
Cord's papers and effects at his house, probably including McCord's
retirement records which showed his past Agency employment.
In addition, some members of the Security Research Staff within
the Office of Security also knew that Lee Pennington had for years
been a secret informer of that staff who was paid $250 per month to
supply clippings, legislative developments and other miscellaneous
information. Whether this fact was then known to the Director of
Security or his Deputy is disputed.
The undisputed fact, however, is that information in the Office of
Security on Lee Pennington was treated as "sensitive" and was delib-
erately withheld from the FBI when the inquiry about Pennington
was received. That information did not come to light until January,
1974, when a proposed response to a Senate inquiry was passed through
the Office of Security. That response stated that all information con-
cerning Watergate had been disclosed. Officers who had handled the
prior Watergate investigation advised the Inspector General's office
of the Pennington file and the facts were then disclosed to the Senate
Select Committee.
Investigation has not disclosed any link between Pennington's burn-
ing of McCord's papers and the Agency. So far as can be determined,
no one at the Agency either directed this action or knew of it in
advance. Pennington was not acting for the Agency or with its knowl-
edge or consent but rather seems to have acted simply to help Mrs.
McCord dispose of papers which McCord said he considered to be
both personal and a fire hazard. McCord had received several bomb
threats and was also concerned about his papers and effects falling into
the hands of newspapers. The Commission has found no evidence to
justify inferring from these events that the CIA was involved in the
destruction of files of McCord having possible relevance to Watergate.
206'
b. Payment of Bennett's Attorney's Fees
About June 1973, Robert Bennett, President of the Mullen Com-
pany, was again called before the grand jury in connection with ques-
tions raised by the recent revelations. Bennett felt that the security
problems raised by the Mullen-CIA cover relationship made it neces-
sary for him to obtain the assistance of counsel. When he received a
bill for some $800, he asked the Agency to pay half of it, and it agreed.
The investigation has disclosed no evidence of any motive or purpose
by the Agency in this connection to withhold information from the
grand jury. Nor does the evidence of this transaction indicate any
involvement of the CIA or Bennett in Watergate.
Conclusions
The failure to provide information about Pennington to the FBI
was in this case the responsibility of officers at the operational level,
apparently acting without direction from above. For the reasons dis-
cussed in connection with the preceding sections, their conduct was
unjustified and subject to criticism.
At the same time, however, there is no evidence that this decision
was intended to cover-up any possible connection between the CIA and
Watergate-no evidence of such connection has been found.
The Commission concludes that there is no evidence indicating that
the CIA either had advance knowledge of or participated in the break-
ins into Dr. Fielding's office or the Democratic National Committee at
the Watergate.
The Commission also concludes that in providing the disguise and
alias materials, tape recorder, and camera to Hunt, as well as in pro-
viding the Ellsberg profile, the Agency acted in excess of its authorized
foreign intelligence functions and failed to comply with its own in-
ternal control procedures.
The Agency provided these materials in response to demands from
highly-placed members of the White House staff and, except in the
case of the Ellsberg profile, without knowledge that they were in-
tended for improper purposes. Those demands reflect a pattern of
actual and attempted misuse to which the CIA was subjected by the
Nixon administration.
Finally, the Commission concludes that the Agency was delinquent
when it failed, after public disclosure of the improper White House
activities, to undertake a thorough investigation of its own and to
207
respond promptly and fully to the Investigations conducted by other
departments of the government.
Recommendation (26)
a. A single and exclusive high-level channel should be estab-
lished for transmission of all White House staff requests to the
CIA. This channel should run between an officer of the National
Security Council staff designated by the President and the office
of the Director or his Deputy.
b. All Agency officers and employees should be instructed that
any direction or request reaching them directly and outside of
regularly established channels should be immediately reported
to the Director of Central Intelligence.
Chapter 15
Domestic Activities of the
Directorate of Operations
The Directorate of Operations is the CIA component with primary
responsibility for the collection of foreign intelligence overseas and
for the conduct of other covert operations outside of the United States.
In support of these missions, the Directorate engages in a variety
of activities within the United States. The major domestic activities
of the Directorate, including those which raise questions of compliance
with the Agency's legislative authority, are discussed in the following
sections.
This chapter does not describe all of the Directorate's domestic
activities which the Commission has investigated. The national
cov in the continued effectiveness of the CIA in the foreign intelligence
field requires that a number of those activities be protected from dis-
closure. Our investigation of these activities has produced no evidence
(other than that described in this report) that these activities exceeded
the Agency's authority. Very few of these activities continue. To the
extent that they do, the Commission is satisfied that they are subject
to adequate controls.
Nor does the Commission report include detailed information on
the activities of the CIA's Miami Station which, commencing in the
early 1960's, conducted a broad range of clandestine foreign intelli-
gence, counterintelligence and operational activities directed at areas
outside the United States. Many such activities were conducted with
the United States as a base, but the CIA contends, and the Commission
has found no evidence to the contrary, that these activities were not
directed against American citizens. Since 1966, the scope of the sta-
tion's activities and the number of its personnel have been gradually
reduced and by 1972, except for some collection of foreign intelligence,
these activities had been discontinued. Since the Miami operations
were the result of a particular series of events not likely to be repeated,
and since they have been largely discontinued, the Commission con-
(208)
209
cluded that its resources were better utilized in investigating and
analyzing other activities.
A. Overt Collection of Foreign Intelligence within the
United States
While the importance of clandestine collection should not be under-
estimated, many of the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle which is "finished
foreign intelligence" can be overtly collected by a well-organized
information gathering system. Analysis of intelligence failures dur-
ing World War II demonstrated that a significant volume of this
information was available from the American public and could have
been collected by overt methods within the United States. At that
time, however, numerous agencies were engaged in domestic collection
of foreign intelligence. Their activities were largely uncoordinated.
With the formation of the CIA in 1947, responsibility for the overt
collection of foreign intelligence within the United States was cen-
tralized in the Agency as a service of common concern to the entire
intelligence community. This responsibility is presently discharged
by a separate division of the Agency. Through officers stationed in
various locations throughout the United States, this division collects
foreign intelligence information from United States residents, busi-
ness firms and other organizations willing to assist the Agency. Con-
tacts with potential sources of foreign intelligence information are
overt and officers identify themselves by true name as CIA employees.
Only in a few instances have officers of the division used alias creden-
tials for personal protection when responding to unsolicited offers of
assistance from foreign nationals or other unknown persons.
Although its collection activities are openly conducted, this division
attempts to operate discreetly. Each of its facilities is listed in the
local telephone directory, but the offices themselves often do not bear
a CIA designation. In addition, the division goes to substantial lengths
to protect the fact that an individual or organization is contributing
intelligence to the CIA and to protect proprietary interests in any
information which is provided.
Generally, the division's procedure consists of contacting United
States residents with whom it has an established relationship to seek
out available information on specific subjects for which the division
has had requests from other components of the Agency. A typical
example is the debriefing of an American citizen who has traveled
abroad and who, because of a particular expertise or itinerary, could
have acquired significant foreign intelligence information.
210
Most of the United States residents contacted by this component of
the Agency are American citizens. Division regulations prohibit con-
tacts with certain categories of individuals including Fulbright Schol-
ars, past or present Peace Corps (ACTION) members, United
Nations employees or contractors or representatives of foreign govern-
ments. Although not prohibited from doing so, the division will not
approach American or foreign students but will interview them if they
initiate the contact.
The success of the CIA in collecting such information is entirely
dependent upon the voluntary cooperation of the American public.
The CIA contends, and the Commission has found no evidence to the
contrary, that it neither exerts any pressure to elicit cooperation nor
promises or grants favors in return for information. Sources of in-
formation are not compensated, but on rare occasions the Agency will
pay a portion of a proven source's travel expenses to an area where
his presence might fulfill intelligence requirements.
The collection of intelligence within the United States requires that
the CIA maintain various records with respect to the individuals and
organizations that have provided information or are promising sources.
In addition to a master index of approximately 150,000 names, division
headquarters presently maintains approximately 50,000 active files.
Many of these files reflect relationships with prominent Americans who
have voluntarily assisted the Agency. including past. and present
Members of Congress. A substantial sampling of these files indicates
that their contents are limited to: (1) copies of correspondence relat-
ing to the individual or organizational source's relationship with the
division; (2) intelligence reports contributed by the source; (3) in
the case of an organization, a summary of its relationship with the
division including any stipulations or limitations imposed by the or-
ganization's committing official; and (4) the results of a federal
agency name check obtained through the CIA's Office of Security in
the event CIA representatives wish to discuss classified matters or con-
template a continuing relationship with a contact. If such a name check
produces derogatory information, the Agency may terminate the rela-
tionship but it takes no further action. However, a copy of the report in
such a case is retained in the individual's contact file.
The CIA asserts that this division's domestic collection efforts are
devoted entirely to the collection of foreign economic, political, mili-
tary and operational information, directly related to the United States
foreign intelligence effort. In general, this appears to be true. How-
ever, this investigation has disclosed several instances in the past where
the division provided other components of the CIA with information
about activities of American citizens within the United States.
211
1. American Dissidents
The first and most significant instance began in March 1969, when the
division established a new file or "case" entitled "Activities of United
States Black Militants." Field offices were instructed to forward to
headquarters, by memorandum, information which came to their at-
tention "concerning the activities of United States Black Militants
either in the United States or abroad."
A contemporaneous CIA memorandum indicates that this case was
opened to establish a formal procedure for processing and transmitting
to the FBI the increasing volume of unsolicited information received
by the field offices with respect to militant activities. In written in-
structions, the Director of the division informed all field offices that
he did not intend that such information be actively collected, "since
this is primarily an FBI responsibility." Investigation indicates that
field offices did not actively seek such information. The very few re-
ports which were filed contained information received primarily from
"call-ins" who found the division's offices in local telephone direc-
tories.
Initially, the case with respect to militant activities had no relation-
ship to Operation CHAOS, which had already been initiated by the
Counterintelligence Staff's Special Operations Group. However, the
division's reports were disseminated to an Operation CHAOS repre-
sentative who quickly recognized the division's capacity to provide
useful information with respect to a broader range of dissident or
militant groups. Accordingly, in December 1969, the Special Opera-
tions Group requested that the division broaden its base to include the
activities of "radical student and youth groups, radical under-
ground press and draft evasion/deserter support movements and
groups." An Operation CHAOS officer briefed division field chiefs on
the Special Operations Group's interest on this information. A memo-
randum of that meeting explained that
CI's interest is primarily to ascertain the details of foreign involvement/sup-
port/guidance/training/funding or exploitation of the above groups or move-
ments, particularly through coverage of the foreign travel, contacts and activities
of the Americans involved.
Although the emphasis was clearly on information establishing a
foreign link with these groups, the division's field officers were also re-
quested to report-for background purposes-on the purely domestic
activities of these groups and their members. The Operation CHAOS
representative explained that this purely domestic information was
necessary to compile a data base essential to full understanding of pos-
sible connections between these groups and hostile elements abroad.
Shortly after the briefing, the Director of the division again cau-
212
tioned all field chiefs that collection of this type of information is an
FBI responsibility and should be undertaken only "when these sub-
jects are surfaced
during the course of your other activities."
This admonition was repeated in virtually all of the Director's memo-
randa to field offices with respect to this case. The reports made avail-
able for the Commission's examination appear to have been obtained
by field officers primarily in the course of fulfilling other intelligence
requirements. However, there are some indications to the contrary.
During 1970, officers of the Special Operations Group and the divi-
sion conferred on a number of occasions to discuss what one memo-
randum described as "over-aggressive positive actions" by the
division's personnel in the collection of CHAOS information. The
possibility of active collection of CHAOS information was succinctly
stated by a field officer in a memorandum dated June 26, 1970:
To be sure, this case, as originally conceived, was to be only a passive effort
on the part of the field, but there is a natural tendency when an interesting re-
port is received to request additional details, then the actions begin. At that
point, we are put in the position of investigating or reporting, if you like, the
activities of United States citizens in the United States that are inimical to the
national security interests of this Country. But that is clearly the function of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, not of CIA.
A number of other officers began to question the propriety of the
division's efforts with respect to dissident groups-particularily the
collection of purely domestic information about United States citizens.
These expressions of concern prompted the Director of the division
to prepare a memorandum for the field officers in which he described
the dilemma this requirement posed-and the division's rationalization
for its collection of purely domestic information. That draft memo-
randum dated June 6, 1971, reads in part as follows:
The second type of information concerns the activities of United States radical
groups, but does not contain any obvious foreign implications. Such information
is considered of primary interest to the FBI under its domestic security charter.
However, the division has been directed to collect both types of information,
with the emphasis on that pertaining to foreign involvement.
We also accept the second type of information when it is offered, because its
acquisition is essential to our understanding of the entire radical movement
(including the involvement of foreign governments). We do not actively solicit
this information, however, since active collection against United States citizens
is incompatible with CIA's charter. In addition, information of a purely domestic
nature is of secondary interest to our consumers in CI Staff.
We recognize that CIA's deliberate acceptance and use of such information
(even for background purposes) may seriously be questioned. Several thought-
ful
[division] officers in the field and in Headquarters have already voiced
uneasiness over this aspect of the case. We have concluded, however, that our
activity is logically justified in that it provides essential support to the Agency's
legitimate mission of overseas counterintelligence.
213
Before the memorandum was distributed, a copy was provided for
review by Operation CHAOS personnel who objected to a written
discussion of their oral requests for this type of information. Unable
to obtain the Special Operations Group's approval of such a memo-
randum, the division informed all field officers on March 23, 1971, that
thereafter collection of information was to be "focused exclusively
upon the collection of information suggesting foreign involvement in
United States radical "activities" as well as the identification of persons
who could be enlisted by the Operation CHAOS group for penetration
of related dissident groups overseas. Field officers were instructed to
refer information or sources with information which is "purely domes-
tic in its implications" to the local FBI office and not to forward such
information to CIA headquarters.
The division's collection efforts with respect to dissidents ceased for
all practical purposes in 1973 and the case was formally closed in
August 1974. The Commission was provided access to files which, ac-
cording to the division, contain all of its reports with respect to dissi-
dents. In all, these files contain approximately 400 reports, copies of
which were furnished to the Special Operations Group. Many of the
reports merely transmit a newspaper clipping or other publication.
2. Foreign Telephone Call Information
The Commission's investigation has disclosed only one other in-
stance where the division has collected information on activities of
American citizens for use by the CIA. During 1972 and 1973, the di-
vision obtained and transmitted to other components of the Agency
certain information about telephone calls between the Western Hem-
isphere (including the United States) and two other foreign countries.
Some of the calls involved American citizens within the United States.
The information obtained by the division was limited to the names,
telephone numbers and locations of the caller and the recipient. The
contents of the calls were not indicated. Shortly after the program
commenced, the Office of the General Counsel issued a brief memo-
randum stating that receipt of this information did not appear to vio-
late applicable statutory provisions.
The Commission could not determine any specific purpose for the
initiation or continuance of the program. Although the Agency con-
tends that no use was ever made of the data, a March 25, 1972, memo-
randum indicates that the names of the Americans participating in
such calls were at least checked against other CIA records to deter-
mine if they were of "possible operational interest." The memorandum
states:
A review of the parties in the United States involved in these calls discloses
that those of possible operational interest are primarily in the CHAOS field,
214
i.e., persons connected with such groups as Black Panthers, Revolutionary
Union, Committee for Concerned Asian Scholars, Committee for a New China
Policy, etc.
Collection of this material by the division was terminated in May
1973, and the CIA claims that all information obtained by the Agency
has been destroyed.
The Commission has discovered no other evidence that the division
attempts to collect intelligence information with respect to United
States citizens or their activities, through surveillance or otherwise.
However, such information is occasionally reported to field officers in
the course of normal collection activities. For example, established
sources or one of numerous "call-ins" periodically report the identities
of United States citizens allegedly involved in espionage, drug traf-
ficking or other criminal activity. Written regulations require that
the source or a report of the information be promptly referred to the
FBI, or other appropriate law enforcement agency. No further action
is taken by the division or other components of CIA. Nor is a copy of
the information retained in Agency files unless directly related to the
function of the Office of Security, in which case it is transmitted to
that Office.
Conclusions
The CLA's efforts to collect foreign intelligence from residents of
the United States willing to assist CIA are a valid and necessary ele-
ment of its responsibility. Not only do these persons provide a large
reservoir of foreign intelligence; they are by far the most accessible
source of such information.
The division's files on American citizens and firms representing ac-
tual or potential sources of information constitute a necessary part of
its legitimate intelligence activities. They do not appear to be vehicles
for the collection or communication of derogatory, embarrassing or
sensitive information about American citizens.
The division's efforts, with few exceptions, have been confined to
legitimate topics. The collection of information with respect to Amer-
ican dissident groups exceeded legitimate foreign intelligence collec-
tion and was beyond the proper scope of CIA activity. This impro-
priety was recognized in some of the division's own internal memo-
randa.
The Commission was unable to discover any specific purpose for the
collection of telephone toll call information, or any use of that informa-
tion by the Agency. In the absence of a valid purpose, such collection
is improper.
215
B. Provision and Control of Cover for CIA Personnel
Many CIA activities-like those of every foreign intelligence serv-
ice-are clandestine in nature. Involved CIA personnel cannot travel,
live, or perform their duties openly as CIA employees. Even in coun-
tries where the CIA works closely with cooperative foreign intelligence
services, Agency personnel are often required by their hosts to conceal
their CIA status.
Accordingly, virtually all CIA personnel serving abroad and many
of the Agency's professional personnel in the United States assume a
"cover." Their employment by the CIA is disguised and, to persons
other than their families and coworkers, they are held out as employees
of another government agency or of a commercial enterprise.
Cover arrangements frequently have substantial domestic aspects.
These include the participation of other United States government
agencies, business firms, and private citizens and creation and man-
agement of a variety of domestic commercial entities. Most CIA em-
ployees in need of cover are assigned "official cover" with another
component of the federal government pursuant to formal agreements
between the CIA and the "covering" departments or agencies. Where
official cover is unavailable or otherwise inappropriate, CIA officers or
contract employees are assigned "nonofficial" cover, which usually
consists or an ostensible position with CIA-created and controlled
business entities known as "proprietary companies" or "devised facili-
ties." On occasion, nonofficial cover is provided for a CIA officer by a
bona fide privately owned American business firm.
So-called "proprietary companies" and "devised facilities" are legal-
ly constituted corporations, partnerships, or sole proprietorships,
owned by the Agency and operated by CIA personnel or contract
employees.
Proprietary companies generally are commercial entities with actual
assets. These not only provide cover for employees but also for activities
or operations required to be performed by the Agency.
Devised facilities are created for cover purposes only, involve no
investment of operating funds, and engage in no substantial economic
activity.
A separate office of the Agency is charged with responsibility for
ensuring that proprietaries and devised facilities comply in all respects
with the laws of the state, county, or other jurisdiction under which
they are organized.
The CIA utilizes the services of United States citizens with security
clearances who are willing to assist with the necessary paperwork
and serve as officers and directors of proprietaries and devised facili-
ties. Citizens rendering professional services are paid their ordinary
216,
fees, and all cooperating citizens are fully aware that their assist-
ance is being rendered to the CIA.
Other than administrative activities necessary to maintain cover
and the activities of the operating proprietaries discussed below,
United States commercial entities formed by the Agency engage in
no significant domestic activities. They do not engage in any meaning-
ful economic activity in competition with privately-owned United
States firms. Most CIA officers under nonofficial cover are stationed
abroad.
Another aspect of the Agency's cover activities involves arrange-
ments by which activities of the Agency are attributed to some com-
mercial entity wholly unrelated to the Agency. Activities of this kind
are funded and carried out in the same manner as many other Agency
activities, and a high degree of security is maintained. The Commis-
sion's investigation in this area has disclosed no improper activities
by the Agency.1
The functions of the office responsible for all CIA cover arrange-
ments were substantially enlarged in 1973, in order to provide effective
centralized control and supervision. That office operates pursuant to
written regulations which restrict the use of certain agencies, depart-
ments or other organizations for operational purposes; these restric-
tions are applied also to the use of those organizations for "cover"
purposes.
Among other restrictions are prohibitions on "cover" arrangements
with the FBI, Secret Service, Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), state and local police and other law enforcement bodies.
The Agency also is bound by restrictions on the operational use of
members of ACTION, Fulbright Scholars and employees of certain
foundations and of private detective agencies. The Agency interprets
these as generally prohibiting the use of foundations and charitable
and student organizations. In addition, approval of the Deputy Di-
rector for Operations is required for the use of certain other categories
of individuals deemed sensitive.
One salutary effect of the recent enlargement of responsibilities has
been the centralization and tightening of control over the issuance and
use of alias documentation of the type provided by the Agency to
1 Among the suspected cover operations investigated by the Commission was the alleged
operation by the Agency of the vessel, Glomar Explorer. A number of allegations have been
published concerning this matter, including allegations of possible violations of Federal
securities and tax laws. Since these matters are currently under investigation by appropri-
ate regulatory bodies, the Commission has not investigated them.
217
E. Howard Hunt. Use of U.S. alias documentation, such as driver's
licenses and credit cards, has been severely limited and requires ap-
proval of senior officers under the overall control of the Agency.
Alias documentation may be issued to other agencies only with ap-
proval of the Deputy Director of Operations. All such documentation
must be accounted for every six months.
In 1969 the statement of functions of the office responsible for cover
arrangements was revised to eliminate the authority, formerly held, to
use charitable organizations and individuals for inserting funds into
organizations and programs supported by the Agency.
Finally, the occasional provision of cover to other agencies has been
terminated.
Growing public familiarity with the Agency's use of cover has led
to a tendency to identify many government and some private activities
with the CIA-frequently without justification.
This has had an unfortunate tendency to impair the usefulness of
some non-Agency related government activities. In addition, it has
progressively tended to narrow available cover arrangements for the
Agency.
Conclusions
CIA's arrangements are essential tn the CTA's performance
of its foreign intelligence mission. The investigation has disclosed no
instances in which domestic aspects of the CIA's cover arrangements
involved any violations of law.
By definition, however, cover necessitates an element of deception
which must be practiced within the United States as well as within
foreign countries. This creates a risk of conflict with various regu-
latory statutes and other legal requirements. The Agency recognizes
this risk. It has installed controls under which cover arrangements
are closely supervised to attempt to ensure compliance with applicable
laws.
C. Operating Proprietary Companies
In addition to the proprietary companies created solely to provide
cover for individual CIA officers, CIA has used proprietary com-
panies for a variety of operational purposes. These include "cover"
and support for covert operations and the performance of adminis-
trative tasks without attribution to the Agency.
It has been charged that certain of these Agency-owned business
entities have used government funds to engage in large-scale com-
218
mercial operations, often in competition with American private enter-
prise. There was a limited factual basis for these allegations in the
past, but the investigation has disclosed that the Agency has liquidated
or sold most of its large operating proprietaries. The remainder en-
gage in activities of limited economic significance, providing little if
any competition to private enterprise.
By far the largest part of the Agency's proprietary activity consisted
of a complex of aviation companies, including Air America, Southern
Air Transport, and Intermountain Aviation, Inc. These companies,
which at one time owned assets in excess of $50 million, provided
operational and logistic support as well as "cover" for the Agency's
foreign covert operations, primarily in Southeast Asia.
The investigation has disclosed that some of the services provided
by the air proprietaries were competitive with services of privately
owned firms, both at home and abroad. However, most of the aviation
companies have been liquidated or sold and the rest are expected to
be disposed of shortly. This will end the Agency's commercial involve-
ment in the aviation field. Proceeds of these liquidations and sales
are not used by the Agency; they are returned to the United States
Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.
Another major proprietary activity consisted of the operation of
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which bearned broadcasts to
Eastern Europe. These stations, originally owned and operated by
the CIA, provided both facilities and "cover" for the CIA's educa-
tional and cultural activities.
Although these stations were funded by the CIA, they appealed
for contributions to the public without disclosing their CIA connection.
However, ownership and control of these stations was turned over
to the State Department, which operates them today without conceal-
ing the government connection.
The major remaining proprietary activity of the Agency involves
a complex of financial companies. These companies enable the Agency
to administer certain sensitive trusts, annuities, escrows, insurance
arrangements, and other benefits and payments provided to officers
or contract employees without attribution to the CIA. Their assets
presently total approximately $20 million, but the financial holdings
of the companies are being reduced.
Most of these funds are invested abroad in time deposits and other
interest-bearing securities. Less than 5 percent of these funds are
invested in securities publicly traded in the United States, but these
investments are being liquidated and the proceeds returned to the
Treasury. At no time has one or any combination of these companies
owned a controlling interest in any firm with publicly traded securi-
219
ties. The investigation has disclosed no evidence of any violations of
law by the CIA in connection with the making or management of
these investments.
The Agency continues to maintain a limited number of small pro-
prietaries as well. Their purpose is primarily to provide cover for
the activities of certain officers, agents, and contractors and to make
nonattributable purchases of equipment and services. These compa-
nies are distinct from the so-called devised facilities in that they are
engaged in actual commercial or professional activities, although of
modest proportions. Generally, they have fewer than 10 employees.
The Agency also provides small amounts of subsidies and opera-
tional investments to firms engaged in activities abroad useful to its
missions.
With few exceptions, the CIA's operating proprietaries have been
unprofitable and have required continuing budgetary support. Reve-
nues derived from operations have been offset against operating
costs. Only two proprietaries are reported to have generated signifi-
cant profits: Air America in the performance of United States gov-
ernment contracts in Southeast Asia, and several of the financial
companies in return on investment. In both cases, profits were, in
the past, retained for use by the proprietary companies pursuant to
the General Counsel's opinion that these funds need not be returned
to the Treasury.
The creation, operation and liquidation of operating proprietaries
is closely controlled by high Agency officials. All such projects must
have the approval of the Deputy Director of Operations or his assist-
ant. Sensitive or substantial cases must be approved by the Director
of Central Intelligence. Each requires an administrative plan which
must have the concurrence of the Deputy Director of Operations,
the Office of General Counsel, the Office of Finance and certain other
senior officers. Expenditures or reimbursements must be approved by
responsible senior operating and finance officers. All projects are sub-
ject to annual review as a part of the budget process and regular
audits are made.
A related activity of the Agency has been to support foundations,
principally the Asia Foundation, which also served as both a vehicle
and cover for educational and cultural activities abroad. The Agency's
connection with that foundation has been terminated.
The Agency in the past has also provided a lesser measure of sup-
port to other foundations and associations thought to be helpful to
its mission. A prime example was the National Student Association,
which sponsored American students who participated in international
meetings and activities. Until 1967, when Ramparts magazine re-
vealed the fact, CIA offered some support to that activity. A resulting
220
report by a committee under then Deputy Attorney General Nicholas
DeB. Katzenbach led to directions to CIA to terminate support of
American foundations and voluntary associations. So far as the Com-
mission has been able to determine, the Agency has complied.
Conclusions
Except as discussed in connection with the Office of Security (see
Chapters 12 and 13), the Commission has found no evidence that any
proprietaries have been used for operations against American citizens
or investigation of their activities. All of them appear to be subject
to close supervision and multiple financial controls within the Agency.
D. Development of Contacts With Foreign
Nationals
Another significant domestic activity of the CIA consists of efforts
to develop contacts with foreign nationals who are temporarily within
the United States. This activity is within the United States, and its
primary purpose is to develop sources of fat as the
Commission can determine, coercive methods, such as blackmail or
compromise, have not been used.
The CIA enlists the voluntary assistance of American citizens in
its efforts to meet and develop contacts with foreign nationals. These
citizens are not compensated for their services, but may be reimbursed
for any expenses they incur. They are fully aware that they are assist-
ing or contributing information to the CIA. At all times, they are free
to refuse or terminate their cooperation.
Prior to requesting the aid of an American citizen in this manner,
the Agency occasionally obtains a name check through its Office of
Security, but does not otherwise investigate such persons. In most
cases it will maintain a file on such an individual containing biographi-
cal information and a brief history of the person's cooperation with
the division. No records are kept by this division with respect to
persons who decline to assist the Agency.
Under a written agreement with the FBI, any information of an
internal security or counterintelligence nature which comes to the
division's attention in the course of these activities is immediately re-
ferred to the Bureau.
The Commission's investigation has disclosed no evidence that the
division in question has been used to collect information about Amer-
ican citizens or their activities at home or abroad.
221
Until recently, the Agency component with responsibility for de-
veloping contacts with foreign nationals was known as the Do-
mestic Operations Division. The Commission has made an investiga-
tion of recent press allegations that, during the late 1960's, the New
York office of the Domestic Operations Division conducted covert
activities against emigré and dissident groups, including wiretapping,
break-ins, surveillance, infiltration and preparation of psychological
profiles. The investigation has disclosed no evidence to support these
allegations nor any evidence that the division engaged in such activi-
ties elsewhere.
Conclusions
These activities appear to be directed entirely to the production
of foreign intelligence and to be within the authority of the CIA. We
found no evidence that any of these activities have been directed
against American citizens.
E. Assistance in Narcotics Control
Through the Directorate of Operations, CIA provides foreign in-
telligence support to the government's affort tn control the flow of
narcotics and other dangerous drugs into this country.
Inasmuch as arrest and prosecution of traffickers, including Ameri-
can citizens, is a necessary element of narcotics control, concern has
been expressed that CIA's participation in the control effort involves
the Agency in domestic enforcement activities expressly excluded
from the CIA's authority.
The Commission's investigation has disclosed that the CIA has at-
tempted to insure that it does not thus become involved in the exercise
of police or law enforcement powers or in other activities directed
against American citizens, either within the United States or overseas.
CIA's involvement in the narcotics field began in October 1969
with President Nixon's formation of the White House Task Force on
Narcotics Control. The Task Force was given the mission of formu-
lating and implementing a program to stem the increasing flow of
heroin and opium into the United States. The Director of Central
Intelligence was appointed to the Task Force and CIA was requested
to use its existing intelligence gathering apparatus-to the maxi-
mum extent possible-to provide narcotics-related intelligence to other
agencies who in turn were involved in diplomatic, enforcement and
treatment initiatives coordinated by the Task Force.
In September 1971, President Nixon elevated narcotics control to a
222
higher priority, establishing the Cabinet Committee on International
Narcotics Control (CCINC) to succeed the Task Force. The CCINC
was charged with responsibility for properly coordinating all United
States diplomatic, intelligence and enforcement activities aimed at
curtailing the flow of illegal narcotics and dangerous drugs into the
country. The Director of Central Intelligence was appointed as a mem-
ber, and the Agency was promptly delegated responsibility for coordi-
nating all United States clandestine foreign intelligence gathering
with respect to narcotics.
In addition to coordinating clandestine collection, the CIA provided
the other components of the CCINC with a wide range of foreign intel-
ligence information directed at two basic objectives:
To convince foreign nations to curtail production and trafficking; and
To provide foreign and domestic law enforcement agencies with the
identities and methods of operation of the major foreign drug traffickers.
To this end, the CIA cooperated with the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration in the establishment of the Major International Narcotics
Traffickers (MINT) Register, a list of major foreign traffickers, and
a related system for collating intelligence information about them.
The Commission's investigation disclosed that, from the outset of
the Agency's involvement in the narcotics control program, the Direc-
tor and other CIA officials instructed involved personnel to collect
only
foreign
intelligence
and
to
make
no
attempt-either
within
the
United States or abroad-to gather information on American citizens
allegedly trafficking in narcotics.
These instructions appear to have been respected. Indeed, at CIA
insistence, the names of American citizens are excluded from the
MINT Register. However, the identities of Americans allegedly
trafficking in narcotics or information with domestic law enforcement
implications is unavoidably obtained by CIA in the course of its
foreign intelligence activities. The Agency has established written
procedures for the prompt dissemination of this information to the
appropriate law enforcement agencies at the local level. The informa-
tion is not retained in CIA files.
For a period of approximately six months, commencing in the fall
of 1973, the Directorate monitored telephone conversations between
the United States and Latin America in an effort to identify foreign
drug traffickers.
The intercept was undertaken at the request of the National Secu-
rity Agency and was not conducted by the CIA component with re-
sponsibility for narcotics intelligence collection.
A CIA intercept crew stationed at an East Coast site monitored
calls to and from certain Latin American telephone numbers con-
223
tained on a "watch-list" provided by. NSA. Magnetic tapes of nar-
cotics-related conversations were then furnished to NSA. While the
intercept was focused on foreign nationals, it is clear that American
citizens were parties to many of the monitored calls.
The General Counsel of CIA was not consulted until approxi-
mately three months after the program was commenced. He promptly
issued an opinion that CIA's conducting the monitoring program
was illegal, and the program was immediately terminated.
All of the CIA's clandestine collection with respect to narcotics is
conducted overseas. A limited amount of overt collection of this in-
formation is conducted within the United States, focusing primarily on
economic, agricultural and scientific information, most of which is
obtained from legal drug manufacturers.
In addition to the gathering of foreign intelligence, the CIA has
provided a limited amount of technical or other operational assist-
ance to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). On frequent
occasions, and in response to requests from this agency, the CIA
has provided various types of electronic and photographic equipment,
alias documentation, and loans of "flash money" for use by enforce-
ment agents to establish bona fides with narcotics dealers. The CIA has
also conducted a very limited number of training sessions for federal
narcotics agents covering such subjects as the use of intelligence and
operational techniques for clandestine collection.
The Agency has adopted and apparently adhered to strict controls
on the rendering of technical assistance or issuance of alias documenta-
tion to DEA. Such materials are issued only for use in investigation
of illicit narcotics activities overseas, and DEA is required to con-
form to all CIA regulations governing requests for and use of such
items. All requests for alias documentation must be approved by the
Deputy Director for Operations and both DEA headquarters and the
user of the documents must sign receipts. The CIA requires that both
equipment and alias documentation be promptly returned. In most
cases, DEA requests for assistance have been made and honored over-
seas where DEA has lacked the necessary facilities and technical ex-
pertise. The number of these requests has decreased sharply as DEA
has developed its own technical capabilities.
Conclusions
Concerns that the CIA's narcotics-related intelligence activities
may involve the Agency in law enforcement or other actions directed
against American citizens appear unwarranted.
The monitoring of telephone calls, while a source of valuable in-
224
formation for enforcement officials, was a violation of a statute of the
United States. The fact that before the operation was halted it was con-
ducted for over three months without the knowledge of the Office of
the General Counsel demonstrates the need for improved internal
consultation. (See Recommendation 10).