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Rockefeller Commission Report - Final (4)
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Rockefeller Commission Report - Final (4)
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The original documents are located in Box 8, folder "Intelligence - Rockefeller Commission
Report - Final (4)" of the Richard B. Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
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copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 8 of the Richard B. Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Chapter 16
Domestic Activities of the Directorate
of Science and Technology
In the past two decades, the CIA has placed increasing emphasis
upon gathering foreign intelligence through technical and scientific
means.
In 1963, Director John McCone sought to coordinate the scientific
development of intelligence devices and systems by creating the
Science and Technology Directorate within the CIA. Most of the
scientific and technological endeavors had been previously under-
taken by the Plans (now Operations) Directorate.
The Science and Technology Directorate is presently responsible
for all of the research and development engaged in by the CIA in
all fields of science and technology. Projects range from complex
satellite systems to the development of miniature cameras and
concealed listening devices.
The Directorate also is engaged in developing countermeasures to
neutralize new scientific and technological devices developed by for-
eign intelligence services.
Private industry provides much of the research and development
of new intelligence gathering devices on a contractual basis.
In addition to engaging in research and development, some branches
of the Science and Technology Directorate provide operational sup-
port in the field for use of intelligence gathering devices developed by
the Directorate.
Other branches of the Directorate themselves engage in the task
of foreign intelligence-gathering abroad, utilizing technical intel-
ligence gathering devices not developed for use by operations agents.
The Commission investigated a number of projects of the Science and
Technology Directorate which have affected persons living within
the United States.
Most such activities were lawful and proper, although there have
been scattered improprieties described below.
(225)
it
FORD
DENALD
226
A. The Testing of Scientific and Technological Develop-
ments Within the United States
While the research and development of new CIA scientific and
technical devices is naturally undertaken within the United States,
the evidence before this Commission shows that with a few excep-
tions, the actual devices and systems developed have not been used
operationally within this country.1
However, the Agency has tested some of its new scientific and
technological developments in the United States. One such program
included the testing of certain behavior-influencing drugs. Several
others involved the testing of equipment for monitoring conversations.
In all of the programs described, some tests were directed against un-
suspecting subjects, most of whom were U.S. citizens.
1. The Testing of Behavior-Influencing Drugs on Unsuspecting
Subjects Within the United States
In the late 1940's, the CIA began to study the properties of certain
behavior-influencing drugs (such as LSD) and how such drugs might
be put to intelligence use. This interest was prompted by reports that
the Soviet Union was experimenting with such drugs and by specu-
lation that the confessions introduced during trials in the Soviet
Union and other Soviet Bloc countries during the late 1940's might
have been elicited by the use of drugs or hypnosis. Great concern
over Soviet and North Korean techniques in "brainwashing" con-
tinued to be manifested into the early 1950's.
The drug program was part of a much larger CIA program to
study possible means for controlling human behavior. Other studies
explored the effects of radiation, electric-shock, psychology, psychi-
atry, sociology and harassment substances.
The primary purpose of the drug program was to counter the use
of behavior-influencing drugs clandestinely administered by an
enemy, although several operational uses outside the United States
were also considered.
Unfortunately, only limited records of the testing conducted in
these drug programs are now available. All the records concerning
the program were ordered destroyed in 1973, including a total of
152 separate files.
In addition, all persons directly involved in the early phases of
the program were either out of the country and not available for
1 A few audio-surveillance devices developed by the Science and Technology Directorate
have been used by the Office of Security in the course of investigations of persons within the
United States. In addition, several devices developed by the Agency have been used by other
federal agencies in operations conducted within the United States.
227
interview, or were decreased. Nevertheless, the Commission learned
some of the details surrounding several tests of LSD conducted on
unsuspecting subjects between 1953 and 1963.
The possibility, and the importance, of testing potential behavior-
influencing drugs (including LSD) on human subjects was first sug-
gested in 1953. It was also suggested at that time that Agency train-
ees might be utilized as test subjects. Any such testing was to be
carefully supervised and conducted only in the presence of a quali-
fied physician.
Following laboratory testing of LSD and other potential behavior-
influencing substances, a few tests were run on voluntary participants.
Commencing in 1955, under an informal arrangement with the Fed-
eral Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, tests were begun on unsuspecting
subjects in normal social situations. Testing was originally con-
ducted on the West Coast. In 1961, a similar testing program was
initiated on the East Coast.
In 1963, the Agency's Inspector General learned of this program
and questioned the propriety of testing on unsuspecting subjects. The
Inspector General reported that in a number of instances, test sub-
jects became ill for hours or days following the application of a
drug. There was one reported incident of hospitalization, the details
of which could not be learned by the Commission because of the de-
struction of the records and the unavailability of witnesses
The Commission did learn, however, that on one occasion during
the early phases of this program (in 1953), LSD was administered
to an employee of the Department of the Army without his knowl-
edge while he was attending a meeting with CIA personnel work-
ing on the drug project.
Prior to receiving the LSD, the subject had participated in discus-
sions where the testing of such substances on unsuspecting subjects was
agreed to in principle. However, this individual was not made aware
that he had been given LSD until about 20 minutes after it had been
administered. He developed serious side effects and was sent to New
York with a CIA escort for psychiatric treatment. Several days later,
he jumped from a tenth floor window of his room and died as a
result.²
The General Counsel ruled that the death resulted from "circum-
stances arising out of an experiment undertaken in the course of his
official duties for the United States Government," thus ensuring his
survivors of receiving certain death benefits. Reprimands were issued
by the Director of Central Intelligence to two CIA employees respon-
sible for the incident.
2 There are indications in the few remaining Agency records that this individual may have
had a history of emotional instability.
228
As a result of the Inspector General's study of this drug program in
1963, the Agency devised new criteria for testing substances on human
subjects. All further testing of potentially dangerous substances on
unsuspecting subjects was prohibited. Between 1963 and 1967, some
testing of drugs continued, but only on voluntary subjects, primarily
inmate volunteers at various correctional institutions. In 1967, all
projects involving behavior-influencing drugs were terminated.
It is presently the policy at CIA not to test any substance on unsus-
pecting persons. Current practice in all experimentation is to adhere
strictly to Department of Health, Education and Welfare guidelines
concerning the use of human subjects, and all current CIA contracts
carry language to that effect.
2. The Testing of Communications Intercept Systems Within the
United States
Monitoring of foreign conversations is an important aspect of
modern intelligence collection. Several new systems developed
by the Agency for use overseas have been tested in the United
States. In the process of this testing, private communications, presum-
ably between United States citizens, have sometimes been overheard.
In many cases conversations were overheard but not recorded. In
other cases, conversations were recorded for evaluation purposes but
the recordings were kept only until the testing was concluded, at which
time they were destroyed.
No evidence was found that any such tests were ever directed against
persons for the purpose of learning the content of any communication.
In most instances, the speakers were never identified. Nor was any
evidence found that the Agency disseminated or ever attempted to
exploit the contents of any intercepted or recorded conversations.
3. Other Testing Within the United States
Various branches of the Science and Technology Directorate are
involved in the testing of other new devices and procedures such as
chemical warfare detection equipment, new means of measuring physi-
ological responses in humans and photographic interpretation systems.
Conclusions
It was clearly illegal to test potentially dangerous drugs on unsus-
pecting United States citizens.
The testing of equipment for monitoring conversations should
not be directed against unsuspecting persons in the United States.
Most of the testing undertaken by the Agency could easily have
229
been performed using only Agency personnel and with their full
knowledge.
Recommendation (27)
In accordance with its present guidelines, the CIA should not
again engage in the testing of drugs on unsuspecting persons.
Recommendation (28)
Testing of equipment for monitoring conservations should not
involve unsuspecting persons living within the United States.
B. Other Selected Activities of the Science and
Technology Directorate
1. The Manufacture and Use of Documents
The Agency maintains a capability for producing and providing to
its agents and operatives a wide range of "alias" credentials. Most such
documents purport to be of foreign origin. Some, however, are docu-
ments ordinarily issued by other branches of the U.S. government or
by private United States businesses and organizations.
Among the United States "alias" documents furnished from time
to time to Agency personnel and operatives are Social Security cards.
bank cards, professional cards, club cards, alumni association cards
and library cards. The Agency has recently stopped producing alias
driver's licenses, credit cards and birth certificates, unless needed in
a particularly sensitive operation and approved in advance by the
Deputy Director of Operations.
While the Agency does not produce false United States passports,
it has in the past altered a few by the addition of entries to evidence
travel which had not actually occurred.
The purpose of alias documents is to facilitate cover during CIA
operations. These documents are not "backstopped," i.e., manufac-
tured with the consent and knowledge of the company or organiza-
tion whose card is being manufactured. They are useful only as flash
identification. Only the Social Security Administration has been told
that the Agency is manufacturing its cards.
The Commission found no evidence that any Agency employee has
ever used false documentation of this kind to his personal advantage.
Conclusions
Alias credentials are necessary to facilitate CIA covert operations
overseas, but the strictest controls and accountability must be main-
230
tained over the use of such documents; recent guidelines established
by the Deputy Director for Operations appear adequate to prevent
abuse in the future.
2. Overhead Photography of the United States
In 1966, the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Tech-
nology commenced a formal study on the use of aerial intelligence
photography for civilian purposes. This study was commenced with
the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and in coopera-
tion with the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, the
Agency for International Development and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.
In 1967 the study resulted in the establishment of a steering commit-
tee in the office of the President's Science Adviser, with membership
from the United States Geological survey, the Department of Com-
merce, the Department of Agriculture, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration and other interested civilian agencies. This
committee was designed to act as an interface, by which the intelli-
gence community could assure the public that it was not involved in
selecting or determining the end use of its aerial photographs of
domestic areas.
The Director of Central Intelligence agreed to provide photography
to civilian agencies pursuant to the steering committee's request, pro-
vided there would be no interference with intelligence needs nor any
significant cost increase.³
The photographs of the United States actually turned over to
civilian agencies were taken primarily for military mapping purposes.
Since that time, aerial photography systems have been used for
such diverse civilian projects as mapping, assessing natural disasters
such as hurricane and tornado damage and the Santa Barbara, Cali-
fornia, oil spill, conducting route surveys for the Alaska pipeline,
conducting national forest inventories, determining the extent of snow
cover in the Sierras to facilitate the forecast of runoff and detecting
crop blight in the Plains States. Limited equipment testing and per-
formance evaluation is also conducted, using photographs taken of
areas within the United States.
In 1973, the Office of the President's Science Adviser was abolished,
and the special steering committee controlling the civilian use of
aerial photography ceased to exist. Efforts are underway to establish a
new committee to undertake this activity. In the meantime, the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence has entered into agreements with several
While the Agency engineered and developed most of the operational aerial photography
systems, it is no longer responsible for the operational aspects of those systems.
4 The President has recently announced his intention to reestablish the Office of the
President's Science Adviser.
231
federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency,
which permits them access to classified overhead photography.
Conclusions
The Commission can find no impropriety in permitting civilian
use of aerial photography systems.5 The economy of operating a
single aerial photography program dictates the use of these photo-
graphs for appropriate civilian purposes.
Recommendation (29)
A civilian agency committee should be reestablished to oversee
the civilian uses of aerial intelligence photography in order to
avoid any concerns over the improper domestic use of a CIA-
developed system.
5 It is arguable that at least one present use of aerial photography is law enforcement
in nature and outside the scope of proper CIA activity. This use involves photography with
infrared sensors to detect areas of high concentrations of industrial pollutants in the air
and in various bodies of water. Data obtained from this activity could conceivably be used
as the basis for a criminal action brought under environmental legislation. The Commission
believes, however, that the legislators, when they prohibited the CIA from engaging in law
enforcement activities in their 1947 enactment of the National Security Act, could not have
contemplated the systems presently in use. It should be noted that the CIA did turn down
a request from the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Unit of the Treasury Department to help
locate stills in the North Carolina mountains using infrared photography, on the
ground that such activity was law enforcement in nature.
Chapter 17
CIA Relationships with Other
Federal, State and Local Agencies
Because of its practice of occasionally lending assistance to various
federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, questions have been
raised as to whether the CIA has engaged in internal security func-
tions or exercised police or law enforcement powers contrary to the
restrictions of the National Security Act.
Like other arms of the government, the CIA frequently has occasion
either to give assistance to or receive assistance from other federal,
state and local agencies.
For example, in gathering foreign intelligence, the Agency might
gain access to information concerning international drug traffic which
would be of interest to the Drug Enforcement Administration. Or it
might receive information of interest to the FBI and the local police
concerning the security of government installations. CIA operations
touch the interests of many other agencies as well.
This Chapter will explore some of the relationships between the
CIA and other agencies over the years-in order to determine
whether the CIA has exceeded its authority in connection with-those
relationships.
A. Relationships With Other Federal Agencies
1. Federal Bureau of Investigation
Many counterintelligence operations undertaken by the FBI also
have positive foreign intelligence ramifications. Likewise, legitimate
domestic CIA activities occasionally cross the path of ongoing FBI
investigations. Consequently, regular daily liaison has customarily
been maintained between the CIA and the FBI to coordinate the
activities of these two federal agencies.
As a part of such liaison, the CIA furnishes to the FBI much routine
information obtained by the CIA in the course of its legitimate foreign
(232)
233
intelligence gathering activities. Included is information concerning
suspected criminal activities within the United States and information
relevant to the country's internal security. Likewise, the FBI furnishes
information to the CIA relating to foreign intelligence matters. From
time to time, the CIA and the FBI have cooperated in joint operations
touching on both agencies' areas of interest.
The relationship between the CIA and the FBI over the years has
not been uniformly satisfactory. At the policy-making level, it has
ranged from workable, at its best, to almost nonexistent at its worst.
In February 1970, following a seemingly insignificant incident in
Denver, all formal liaison between the two agencies was completely
severed by the FBI. Formal liaison at the policy level was not restored
until November 1972-though a working relationship at lower levels
was always maintained.
The Commission is informed that the relationship between the CIA
and the FBI has improved considerably in the last few years. Never-
theless, the relationship needs to be clarified and outlined in detail in
order to ensure that the needs of national security are met without
creating conflicts or gaps of jurisdiction. A better exchange of ideas
and more effort by each agency to understand the problems facing the
other are essential if the responsibilities of both agencies are to be met.
Recommendation (30)
The Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the
FBI should prepare and submit for approval by the National
Security Council a detailed agreement setting forth the jurisdic-
tion of each agency and providing for effective liaison with respect
to all matters of mutual concern. This agreement should be con-
sistent with the provisions of law and with other applicable rec-
ommendations of this Report.
2. Narcotics Law Enforcement Agencies
The CIA, through a field office in Virginia, carried on at least one
domestic operation as a cooperative effort with the Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) (now the Drug Enforcement
Administration). The operation was an attempt to help BNDD pre-
vent corruption within its ranks by developing sources of information
within the Bureau.
The operation began in late 1970 when the Director of BNDD asked
the Director of Central Intelligence for assistance in building a "coun-
terintelligence" capacity within BNDD. The request was apparently
supported by Attorney General Mitchell.
BNDD stated that it was vitally concerned that some of its em-
ployees might have been corrupted by drug traffickers. According to
234
the CIA officer in charge of the Agency's field office involved, BNDD
reported that it did not have the "know-how" to set up a covert opera-
tion or to establish a counterintelligence unit. It therefore turned to
the CIA for assistance.
The CIA recruited officers for BNDD through a proprietary cor-
poration. The CIA officer in charge performed the contact and inter-
view work. He screened applicants by telling them that a corporate
client engaged in the field of law enforcement wanted people to work
as research consultants. If the applicants were interested and met the
physical requirements for age and size, they were then subjected to
further screening. If they passed the security checks and evaluations
and were still interested, then the recruits were introduced to the
Chief of the Office of Inspections of BNDD. They then learned, for
the first time, what job was to be offered to them.
If the applicant was acceptable to BNDD, the CIA provided a short
course in clandestine trade crafts and the employee was turned over
to BNDD. The CIA relinquished all control over and contact with
the employee once he entered upon his duties with BNDD.
The CIA recruited a total of 19 agents for BNDD in the period
between December 1970 and July 1973, when Director Colby termi-
nated the CIA's participation.
In addition to recruiting an internal security unit for BNDD, the
CIA also assigned two of its agents, working under cover of a com-
mercial corporation, to operate for BNDD between January 1972 and
the termination of the project in July 1973. They were directed by
BNDD and were not under the operational control of the CIA. The
CIA did, however, provide for the salary and administrative require-
ments of the agents, for which the CIA was reimbursed by BNDD.
These activities violated the 1947 Act which prohibits the CIA's
participation in law enforcement activities. The Commission there-
fore concludes that Director Colby was correct in his written directive
terminating the project. The Director and the Inspector General
should be alert to prevent involvement of the Agency in similar enter-
prises in the future.
3. The Department of State
For over 20 years, the CIA conducted a training school for foreign
police and security officers. The school, operated within the United
States under cover of a private commercial corporation, trained for-
eign police in highly specialized areas of law enforcement. The CIA
school offered training in fingerprinting, security, criminal investiga-
tion, instruction methods and patrol operations, among others.
The Agency training operation began in 1952 with courses taught
in the United States for foreign security personnel. The school was
BERALD
235
not very extensive in nature and operated out of a farmhouse in
Virginia.
In addition, in 1960 the State Department, operating in coopera-
tion with the CIA, opened a school in the Panama Canal Zone for
Latin American police officers. The CIA supplied the faculty while
the other costs of the school were borne by the State Department and
the Agency for International Development's Office of Public Safety.
The school concentrated on teaching security methods and modern
techniques of crime solving.
In 1963, the State Department closed its Canal Zone police training
school, and the activities carried on there were transferred to the
United States. A commercial contractual arrangement for the training
service was established with a domestic private corporation which was
a CIA front. The relationship between the CIA and the private cor-
poration was unknown to the Administrator of the AID, although
the person in charge of the Office of Public Safety apparently knew
he was dealing with a CIA proprietary. The school was shut down
and the cover corporation disbanded in 1973.
In addition to operating the foreign police school, the CIA provided
the faculty for special courses on countermeasures against terrorists—
also in cooperation with the AID Office of Public Safety. During the
20-year period of its operation of the police training school and par-
ticipation in the special courses, the CIA graduated a total or about
5,000 foreign student police officers.
The CIA proprietary corporation was also a licensed firearms and
police equipment dealer. The records of the corporation show that its
gross sales of police equipment to foreign police officers and police de-
partments varied from between a low of about $6,000 in one year to a
high of $48,000 in another year. Most of the sales, according to the
CIA officer in charge of the program, were to the students enrolled in
the course who purchased police equipment upon completing their
training.
The Commission has concluded that providing educational programs
for foreign police was not improper under the Agency's statute. Al-
though the schools were conducted within the United States through a
CIA proprietary, they had no other significant domestic impact.
Engaging in the firearms business was a questionable activity for a
government intelligence agency. It should not be repeated.
4. Funding Requests from Other Federal Agencies
On at least one occasion, the CIA was requested to fund a project
having no intelligence relationship, apparently because its inclusion
in the CIA's secret budget provided an opportunity to hide the
expenditures.
236
In the spring of 1970, the CIA was requested by members of the
White House staff to contribute funds for payment of stationery and
postage for replies to persons who wrote President Nixon after he ini-
tiated the invasion of Cambodia. Although CIA officials at first ex-
pressed reluctance to use CIA funds for this purpose, the Agency
eventually forwarded two checks totaling $33,655.68 to the White
House to reimburse its costs. Because of the unique CIA budgetary
scheme, no one other than the CIA's internal Audit Staff ever re-
viewed this unusual expenditure.
This use of CIA funds for a purpose unrelated to intelligence is im-
proper. Steps should be taken to ensure against repetition of this
incident.
B. State and Local Police
The primary point of contact between the CIA and state and local
law enforcement agencies is, and historically has been, through the
Office of Security. Personnel security matters, such as the arrest of
Agency employees for criminal offenses, the involvement of employees
in automobile accidents, and police assistance requested by employees
to resolve such personal problems as burglaries of their belongings,
provide the most frequent reasons for CIA dealings with police
agencies.
The Agency's closest contacts have been with police departments in
the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area-particularly with the Wash-
ington Metropolitan Police Department, because of the wide range of
CIA activities carried on in Washington-and the Fairfax County,
Virginia, Police Department, because of the physical presence of
CIA Headquarters within that county. Liaison with other surrounding
suburban police departments has been maintained to a lesser extent.
Morever, CIA historically has maintained limited contacts with a
large number of state and local police departments throughout the
country, some on an ad hoc basis and others on a continuing basis.
In addition to its ordinary liaison activities, the CIA has on occasion
provided other assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies.
It has also received significant assistance from such agencies. The
following are examples.
1. Assistance Given to State and Local Police
Since 1966, the Office of Security has conducted or arranged for a
number of briefings, demonstrations, seminars and training courses
for representatives of various police departments throughout the
United States. These sessions were generally conducted at facilities
operated by the Agency in the Washington, D.C., area. Most of the
237
courses lasted a day or two and covered such subjects as declassifica-
tion of materials, foreign weapons, counter-audio measures, explo-
sive devices and detection techniques, basic theories of intelligence
and clandestine collection methodology. However, one course in lock-
picking, photography (including covert photography, telephotog-
raphy and photoanalysis) and positive surveillance (both physical
and audio) lasted approximately three weeks. This course was given
on at least four separate occasions in 1968 and 1969.
Director Helms supported and approved all of these training pro-
grams. All, however, were terminated in 1973 upon the passage of an
amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, which
prohibits CIA assistance to the Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration and evidences congressional disapproval of direct CIA
assistance to state and local police departments in general.
Since its inception, the CIA has had a policy against providing
assistance in the form of Agency personnel to state and local law en-
forcement agencies for police-related activities. However, there have
been some deviations from that general rule.
On at least three occasions between 1969 and 1971,1 the Office of
Security provided several men and radio-equipped vehicles to the
Washington Metropolitan Police Department to assist the police in
monitoring crowds during anti-war demonstrations. Such assistance
was rendered at the request of an officer of the police department.
In December of 1970, CIA was asked to provide (and did provide)
on Arabic interpreter to the Fairfax County Police Department in
connection with a homicide investigation. In addition to interpreting,
this CIA officer agreed to assist in the actual investigation by pretend-
ing to be another police officer in the hope that he might overhear con-
versations in Arabic carried on by prospective witnesses being con-
fronted by the police. He was provided police identification, including
a badge and service revolver, to aid in this investigation.
In 1972, the CIA assisted the Washington Metropolitan Police De-
partment on an actual police surveillance. In the course of a surveil-
lance training exercise for Metropolitan Police personnel, a police in-
former suspected by the Washington police of having engaged in
improper activities was surveilled without her knowledge. Nine CIA
agents and six Agency automobiles were utilized in the operation.
The Commission has discovered no other instances where the CIA
has provided manpower to any state or local police departments to
assist in operations which were of a law-enforcement nature.
The Office of Security has sometimes loaned electronics gear and
other equipment (including photographic and riot control equipment)
1 The 1969 Presidential Inauguration, the anti-war moratorium demonstrations in No-
vember 1969, and the 1971 May Day Demonstrations.
238
to police departments for training or for use in police operations. In
addition, the CIA has, on at least one occasion, assisted local police in
installing an electronic listening device for use in an actual police oper-
ation. Once in the late 1960's, small quantities of explosives were given
to the Fairfax County Police Department for use in training dogs to
locate explosives.
Other miscellaneous assistance rendered by the CIA to state and local
law enforcement agencies includes providing police with technical
advice, alias documentation, laboratory assistance, and access to certain
CIA facilities for highly sensitive police operations. Further details
appear in Appendix VII.
2. Assistance Received from State and Local Police
The CIA receives a great deal of routine assistance from state and
local law enforcement agencies, primarily from police departments in
the Washington metropolitan area. Examples of such assistance in-
clude name checks to determine whether CIA applicants for employ-
ment have criminal records, checks to determine the registered owners
of vehicles with known license tags, forwarding information concern-
ing planned activities or demonstrations directed against CIA facili-
ties, and providing police protection for CIA facilities located within
a local police department's jurisdiction. The CIA has received this
type of assistance for many years. It is generally the same assistance
that state and local police give to all government agencies.
Because of the extraordinary security precautions exercised by the
CIA, it has also made arrangements with state and local police, in all
areas of the country where it maintains facilities, to be notified of the
arrest of any CIA employee. The CIA uses this information only for
preventing breaches of security; there is no evidence suggesting that
CIA has ever attempted to intervene in a police investigation con-
cerning one of its own employees.
Only one instance has been discovered where local police actively
participated in a CIA operation. In 1971, three police officers from
the Fairfax City Police Department accompanied Office of Security
personnel while they surreptitiously entered a business establishment
in Fairfax, at night, without a warrant, to photograph some papers.
(This investigation is among those discussed in Chapter 13.)
The CIA has sometimes received permission from local police au-
thorities to use their facilities or personnel in activities not related to
actual CIA operations. For example, between 1951 and 1955, the CIA
received some assistance-in the form of manpower-from a number
of state police departments. Since the CIA was rapidly expanding at
that time, and since it was therefore unable to conduct all of the neces-
sary security background investigations of prospective CIA personnel,
GERALD
239
the police from several states agreed to conduct these investigations for
the Agency. The state police forces of Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio and
Washington conducted approximately 341 investigations during this
period.
In 1969, arrangements were made with the Washington Metro-
politan Police Department to allow the CIA to conduct certain train-
ing exercises using police facilities and personnel. These exercises in-
volved the contrived "arrest" of CIA trainees by a Washington police
officer and the lengthy interrogation of those trainees at Washington
Police Headquarters by Office of Security personnel. The object of the
training was to determine whether CIA trainees, scheduled for covert
assignments overseas, would "break" when placed under such pres-
sures-and to give them experiences similar to those which they might
be expected to encounter on their assignments.
Approximately four such training exercises-each involving four
or five trainees-were conducted through 1974. On at least one occa-
sion several years ago, a similar training exercise was conducted in
cooperation with the Fairfax County Police Department.
The CIA has occasionally obtained badges and other identification
from local police for the purpose of maintaining cover during CIA
operations. Such "cover" has been obtained from police departments
in Washington, D.C., Fairfax County (Virginia), and New York
City, among others. The evidence before this Commission has shown
that the CIA's use of "police cover" has been extremely limited, and
we have found no evidence of abuse. (For more detail, see Appendix
VII.)
Except for the one occasion when some local police assisted the
CIA in an unauthorized entry, the assistance received by the CIA
from state and local law enforcement authorities was proper.
The use of police identification as a means of providing cover, while
not strictly speaking a violation of the Agency's statutory authority
as long as no police function is performed, is a practice subject to
misunderstanding and should be avoided.
3. Gifts and Gratuities Given to Local Police Officials
For several years, it has been the practice of the Office of Security
to offer gratuities to police officials who have been of particular as-
sistance to the CIA. Gratuities have ranged from candy, liquor and
twenty-five dollar gift certificates at Christmas, to providing free
transportation for vacationing police officials at costs up to eight hun-
dred dollars.
In 1971 the Office of Security made a gift to the police department
of Lewes, Delaware, of some radios, flashlights, mace, ammunition
and other items in recognition of police assistance to Director Helms,
240
a summer resident of Lewes, whose life was believed to be in danger at
the time. In addition, the Office has on several occasions given retire-
ment gifts to local police officials who have been particularly helpful
to the Agency. On several occasions, police officials have been flown
to a CIA training facility in southern Virginia for an all expenses
paid weekend of relaxation and entertainment.
Most of the gifts and gratuities given to local police officials by the
Office of Security were paid for out of a confidential fund made avail-
able to the Director of Security for his own miscellaneous use. Ex-
penditures from this fund did not require the approval of any higher
authority.
The primary purpose of such "courtesies" to officials of state and
local police departments was to recognize the cooperation which those
officials or their departments had given the CIA. There is no evidence
that any gratuities given to local police officials and paid for out of
CIA funds were conditioned upon the recipient's providing the Of-
fice of Security with any particular assistance.
Conclusions
In general, the coordination and cooperation between state and local
law enforcement agencies and the CIA (primarily the Office of Secu
rity) has been excellent. Both the Agency and local police officials
have given assistance to each other in a spirit of cooperation based
upon a desire to facilitate their respective legitimate aims and goals.
Most of the assistance rendered to state and local law enforcement
agencies by the CIA has been no more than an effort to share with
law enforcement authorities the benefits of new methods, techniques
and equipment developed or used by the Agency. In compliance with
the spirit of a recent act of Congress, the CIA, in 1973, terminated
all but routine assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies.
In view of these recent statutory changes, assistance is now being
provided to state and local agencies by the FBI. There is no impro-
priety in the CIA's furnishing information concerning new techniques
and developments to the FBI.
On a few occasions, the Agency has allowed its employees to become
involved in actual police investigations. In spite of these lapses, how-
ever, the Agency has generally been careful to avoid operations which
might be considered police or law enforcement activities.
The assistance received by the CIA from state and local law en-
forcement authorities did not involve the Agency in any improprieties.
However, any practice of giving gratuities to cooperative police
officials should be terminated.
Chapter 18
Indices and Files on American
Citizens
The collection of information about people is a major function of
the CIA. Biographical information is collected not only in response
to specific requirements but also to accumulate background of likely
relevance to be drawn on when needed. The collection of this informa-
tion is incidental to the CIA's normal activities, and the inclusion of
information about persons who may be American citizens is largely
incidental to collecting information about people generally.
For these reasons, biographical information is stored by a number
of components throughout the Agency. The nature of the indices and
files varies with the missions and capabilities of those maintaining
The Operations Directorate maintains a central index of names
and certain biographical and subject files in connection with the
intelligence collection activities of its various divisions and staffs. In
addition, separate project and case files are maintained by these divi-
sions and staffs.
The other major source of biographical files is in the Administra-
tion Directorate, where files are maintained by the Office of Security
and by other administrative branches such as the personnel and medi-
cal offices.
Biographical files also are maintained in the Intelligence Direc-
torate, but few, if any, names of Americans are believed to be in them.
Finally, miscellaneous files on Americans may be found in the
offices of the General Counsel and the Legislative Counsel and in
other offices which handle dealings with Americans.
The following sections describe the types of files maintained by the
CIA which are most likely to contain information on American
citizens.
(241)
242
A. Indices and Files of the Operations Directorate
Biographical files are generated by the Directorate of Operations
as a result of the indexing of names of persons appearing in docu-
ments and communications received by the Directorate. Generally,
those documents and communications relate to persons who are of
intelligence or counterintelligence interest to the Agency, either be-
cause of their actual or possible association with foreign intelligence
activities, or because they are actual or potential sources or operatives.
The names of United States citizens have been indexed along with
the names of others, based on these criteria. The fact that such names
are included does not appear to reflect an effort to conduct surveil-
lance or other investigations of Americans; rather it appears to be
the normal result of the Agency's foreign intelligence activities.
Names from Operation CHAOS files have not been included in the
central index.
The first step in the process of keeping the biographical index and
files involves the indexing of incoming documents.
The Operations Directorate maintains a central index and file of
documents received, most of which are in the normal course routed
through the central index and file. Certain sensitive documents, how-
ever, may not be indexed centrally. Each document received is reviewed
and names of intelligence interest are entered into the biographical
index.
The criteria for indexing a name have changed over the years. In the
early years of the Agency, virtually every name in a document was
indexed. Eventually the Agency accumulated some 15 million bio-
graphical references in its index.
Since the early 1960's, however, the criteria have limited indexing
to persons of counterintelligence interest (i.e. those suspected of work-
ing on behalf of a hostile intelligence service) and persons of interest
as actual or potential sources of information or assistance.
The number of references has since that time been progressively re-
duced to its present level of about 7,500,000 names (including an in-
determinate number of duplicates). Of these, an estimated 115,000
names are of persons who are either known or believed to be United
States citizens.
The fact that a name has been entered into the index does not mean
that a file exists on that person. Files are opened only at the direction
of a division or staff and only when it appears that the person will
be of continuing intelligence interest. In that case, a so-called per-
sonality (or 201) file is opened; i.e., a manila folder is prepared to
hold relevant documents accumulating on that person.
243
The Operations Directorate has a total of some 750,000 personality
files. Of these, the Agency estimates that 57,000 files are of American
citizens and an additional 15,000 are of persons who may be Ameri-
can citizens.
No file-by-file review has been made to determine how many of these
files contain what might be regarded as derogatory information. How-
ever, an analysis by the Agency of a group of files opened on American
citizens in 1974, as reported to the Commission's staff, showed that
seventy percent of these files were opened on persons who were sources
of information or assistance to the Agency, nineteen percent related to
Americans of possible use to the Agency, and eleven percent related to
Americans who were of foreign counterintelligence interest.
Until 1974, the indexing process made no distinction between United
States citizens and others. At that time, regulations were issued re-
stricting the indexing of United States citizens to those involved in
"foreign activity detrimental to the national security interests of the
United States" such as "espionage, counterintelligence, sabotage, sub-
version, covert propaganda, psychological or unconventional warfare
or paramilitary operations," "terrorist activity and narcotics traffick-
ing," participation in the "illegal apparatus of foreign communist
parties," or "other international clandestine activity."
The indexing is done by clerks who determine whether to index
a name on the basis of directions contained in the document, supplied
by either its originator or its recipient. These persons are expected to
comply with the indexing criteria.
In the past, a major source of index references to United States
citizens was FBI reports. Whenever an FBI field office felt a report
on an individual might be of counterintelligence interest, a copy was
routinely furnished the Agency. Many of the names appearing in these
raw reports were indexed with relatively little attempt to determine
their potential relevance to the CIA. Thus a large number of generally
unevaluated index references to Americans were placed in the system.
FBI reports are no longer indexed without a prior determination
by an appropriate division or staff that indexing criteria are in fact
met. In addition, efforts are being made to work out a procedure under
which only reports meeting specified criteria will be sent by the FBI
to the CIA.
Names of Americans are also contained in the communications traf-
fic from overseas CIA stations to Headquarters which passes through
the indexing process. The information developed by the Commission
indicates that in large part these references are to Americans who are
actual or potential sources of information or assistance to the Agency.
Of course, names of Americans might turn up in other documents as
well. Frequently, the citizenship of a person is not known or disclosed
244
in the document, so that it is impossible to determine whether the name
indexed is that of an American.
An index reference on a person contains a limited amount of bio-
graphical data along with references to the filed documents from
which it was derived. It may also contain a very brief summary of
some of these documents.
Four years ago, the entire index was computerized, and today the
information contained in it is accessible by computer. Access is re-
stricted, however, to those officers in the Operations Directorate who
are specially authorized for that purpose.
Many of the Agency's files on Americans were opened because a
security clearance was required or because the person was involved
directly or indirectly in some Agency operation. For example, it is
estimated that there are more than ten thousand files on American
employees or contractors involved in the Agency's airline operations,
which are now being phased out. The Agency believes that many more
of these files on Americans are of persons who have had some tangen-
tial relationships with the Agency or whose utilization may at one
time have been considered by the Operations Directorate but never
became a fact.
Most of the files on Americans appear to be inactive. In 1974, only
some 250 of these files were on loan to one or another of the divisions or
staffs of the Directorate which hold files of active intelligence interest.
Under present regulations, no file may is opened On all American
citizen without the written approval of one of the three top ranking
officers of a division or staff. In addition, each division and staff is
required to make a monthly report to the Deputy Director of Opera-
tions on all files opened on Americans.
All of the existing files on Americans are now undergoing review
by the divisions and staff responsible for the particular file. Material
which does not meet current criteria is placed in sealed envelopes with
the announced intention that the envelopes are to be destroyed at the
end of the current investigations.
The Directorate also maintains certain specialized indices and files
which may contain the names of persons who happen to be American
citizens. It has in its index references to documents of the CIA's pred-
ecessor agencies. It also has separate files on persons suspected of
affiliation with Soviet and other foreign intelligence services, persons
engaged in certain kinds of international travel, and persons who by
reason of particular affiliations may be potential foreign intelligence
sources.
Finally, other components of the Directorate maintain files on
American citizens working with those components.
245
B. Indices and Files of the Administration Directorate
The Administration Directorate maintains biographical files on a
large number of U.S. citizens and foreigners living within the United
States who have knowingly entered into some type of relationship
with the Agency.
The vast majority of these files concern employees, former employees
and applicants for employment. Records on these persons must neces-
sarily be maintained, as in any other government agency or private
business.
In addition, because of the special nature of its activities, the CIA
maintains contact with (and therefore records concerning) many other
persons and business firms throughout the country who provide the
Agency with needed assistance.
Due to the security restrictions under which the Agency operates,
a wide variety of security files must also be maintained on all persons
working with or for the Agency who may come into contact with
classified information. Some of these persons are aware of the Agency's
interest in them; others are not. All files relating to security matters
are compiled and maintained by the Office of Security; the others are
maintained elsewhere within the Administration Directorate.
The following is a description of the types and kinds of files main-
tained by the Administration Directorate on persons living within the
United States:
1. Indices and Files Outside the Office of Security
Administration Directorate files on CIA employees, former em-
ployees and applicants for employment include applicant records
(many of which contain considerable biographical data in the form
of voluntary personal history statements) ; personnel files such as
records of job assignments, performance assessments, insurance rec-
ords, commendations and retirement records; financial files such as
payroll and travel records; training files; medical files; and other mis-
cellaneous files.
These files are generally maintained in the office primarily responsi-
ble for the function involved. In addition, master folders containing
pertinent papers from all of the other offices needed to manage each
employee properly are maintained by the particular component to
which each employee is assigned.
In addition to its relationship with its own employees, the CIA
maintains relationships with numerous other individuals who render
assistance to the Agency. These include agents, informers, consultants,
and persons temporarily assigned to duty with the Agency from other
government agencies.
246
The Agency also maintains relationships with businesses and other
governmental and educational institutions (and their representatives)
who have contracts or other dealings with the Agency. Files and
indices documenting these relationships are maintained by various
components of the Administration Directorate for accounting and
record-keeping purposes.
2. Indices and Files of the Office of Security
Office of Security files are maintained primarily to record actions
taken by the Office in granting or denying security clearances to those
persons whose relationship with the Agency gives them access to
classified information. The files of the Office of Security are organized
on the basis of "subjects." All individuals, organizations, businesses
and projects are deemed "subjects" if security files exist on them.
The bulk of the files maintained by the Office of Security consist of
approximately 900,000 security files, each relating to the security
investigation of a specific "subject" of interest to the Agency.1 About
one-third of these files are retired. About 90 percent of the security
files relate to individuals, a majority of whom are United States citi-
zens. The remaining 10 percent relate to impersonal "subjects" such
as business firms, organizations and projects.
Security files are maintained on applicants for employment, Agency
employees, former Agency employees, independent contractors doing
business with the Agency, persons supplying the Agency with positive
intelligence information, consultants, non-Agency employees who
work on Agency premises, and other individuals and business entities
whose relationship with the Agency gives them access to classified
information. Among the persons on whom such files are established
are numerous past and present Senators, Congressmen, judges and
other prominent public officials. For example, the Agency presently
maintains security files on 75 sitting Members of Congress.
A few security files are maintained on persons unaware that they
have any relationship to the Agency. For example, the employees of
an independent contractor doing business with the Agency may know
that they are working on a secret government contract (and, in fact,
that they have been investigated for a security clearance), but not that
they are of interest to the CIA. Records of security clearances on those
employees would nonetheless be maintained by the Office of Security.
Likewise, clearance information may be maintained by the Office of
Security on persons whom the Agency is thinking of contacting, or
foreign nationals of potential operational use, even if the Agency sub-
1 A few security files are "multiple subject" files, containing information on two or more
subjects in a single file folder. It was estimated by a responsible Agency official that less
than five percent of all security file folders are "multiple subject" security files.
247
sequently decides not to contact the individual, or contacts him and he
refuses to assist the Agency.
Security files are established upon the request of any of numerous
officers within the Office of Security. As a practical matter, 95 percent
of all requests to establish new files are routine and are undertaken at
the request of the Clearance Division of the Office of Security, which
ensures that a security clearance is approved before access is granted to
classified Agency information. No centralized control exists for screen-
ing non-routine requests to determine their propriety.
A security file is most frequently created on an individual when, for
any of a variety of reasons, it becomes desirable to give that individual
access to classified Agency material. Security files on individuals ordi-
narily contain the following types of materials: (1) requests that
an investigation be conducted; (2) biographical data on the subject,
ranging from a few lines on one page to lengthy personal history
statements filled out by certain applicants for employment; (3) au-
thorizations for the release of high school and college transcripts and
copies of those transcripts; (4) investigative coverage and reports of
those investigations; (5) appraisal summaries reflecting the rationale
for granting or refusing to grant a security clearance; (6) documenta-
tion of the final action taken by the Office of Security concerning any
given investigation; (7) secrecy agreements and notices of termina-
tion of such agreements; (8) documentation of subsequent actions such
as the granting cr refusing of special clearances, approvals for assign-
ment overseas, notations that polygraph or other special interviews
were performed, notices of transfers and changes in cover assign-
ments; memoranda concerning security violations, and notices of
termination of affiliation with the Agency; and (9) miscellaneous
documents which might bear on the question whether the individual
should have a security clearance.
The reasons for creating security files on "impersonal" subjects
such as business firms and organizations differ widely. Most of these
files are created at a time when the CIA first contemplates developing
with the business entity or organization a relationship which might
give it access to classified or sensitive information. The files contain
such items as (1) security surveys of a business's premises if it is
contemplated that classified activities will be carried on there, or (2)
lists of persons from a business or organization assisting the Agency
who are cleared to receive classified information or have access to
CIA installations.
Some security files have been compiled on organizations and in-
dividuals thought to pose a threat to Agency personnel, installations
or operations. For example, during the peak of the racial and anti-
war disturbances in Washington between 1965 and 1972, security files
248
were accumulated on many dissident groups and their leaders. Other
"impersonal" files were maintained on communist publications and
suspected communist front organizations.
A relatively small number of "impersonal" security files deal with
specific Office of Security projects. These projects range from a
project to provide security during the construction of CIA Head-
quarters at Langley, Virginia, to investigations conducted of Agency
employees or operatives thought to have been security risks. Security
files of this type include descriptions of the project or investigation
involved, assignments to the field, information collected during the
course of the project or investigation, and (some times) the end result
of the project or investigation.
The security files maintained by the Office of Security serve a
variety of purposes.
In order to protect classified information, the Agency must main-
tain a substantial body of knowledge about persons who might be
assigned to sensitive positions.
The files are also used for periodic reviews of persons who occupy
sensitive positions or hold special clearances.
Reports of investigations are occasionally furnished to other gov-
ernment agencies with a legitimate need for the information contained
therein.
All pertinent subjects and references identified in security files have
been card indexed. Approximately 900,000 of these indices are "sub
ject" indices referencing the subject of a. particular security folder
bearing the name of the individual, business, organization or group on
which the file is maintained.
An additional 950,000 indices are "reference" indices recording
names which appear in documents stored in one of the folders in-
dexed to a subject. An index reference is created when note-worthy
information concerning the referenced individual is developed in
connection with another case, or when it is learned that the referenced
individual is connected with some company, organization or project
which is of interest to the Agency.
Over the years, there have been changing criteria concerning the
type of information which is placed in security files and indices. At
one time, files were established simply to hold a collection of reference
index cards when the total on a given individual had reached a cer-
tain number.
In about 1972, efforts were begun to purge the reference index and
"impersonal" files of information which was of no current value.
Many security files of dubious value or propriety were destroyed.
These purging efforts have been suspended pending completion of
the investigations by this Commission and the Congress.
249
The head of the division within the Office of Security responsible
for maintaining all security files recently prepared a list of those ma-
terials which should properly be retained in active security files. All
materials to be filed are now reviewed by a senior clerk for propriety.
As of March, 1974, the head of that division has, for the first time,
been given the authority to challenge any input into the index system
of the Office of Security if he deems the material to be improper. The
criteria for indexing names have also been drastically restricted.
Security files on employees and others are very tightly held within
the Agency. Only a few Office of Security personnel have access to
these files, and then only on a need-to-know basis. No employee-not
even the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of Security-
is ever permitted access to his own security file. This precaution is
taken to protect confidential sources of information, who are assured
at the time they are interviewed about a prospective employee that
whatever they say will never be divulged to the subject of the investi-
gation. Agency officials evidence a very high level of commitment to
honoring those assurances.
Even more tightly held are the records of polygraph examinations
of employees and prospective employees. While polygraph examina-
tions are a routine part of every security investigation conducted by
the Office of Security, the reports are separately and securely main-
tained because of their potential for embarrassment.
Other relatively voluminous Office of Security files which contain
biographical data on American citizens include records of individuals
holding special and compartmentalized access approvals to various
CIA material, records of persons holding building badges and other
credentials issued under Agency cognizance to employees and other in-
dividuals, and visitor records on approximately 500,000 persons who
have visited Agency installations.
Miscellaneous files maintained by the Office of Security include lists
of individuals with known or suspected foreign intelligence connec-
tions, files associated with the handling of defectors (some of whom
may now be U.S. citizens), lists of individuals from whom crank calls
have been received by the Agency, and lists of persons previously
charged with security violations. The Office of Security formerly
maintained extensive computer lists of approximately 300,000 persons
who had been arrested for offenses related to homosexuality, but these
lists were destroyed in 1973.
No effort was made by the Commission or its staff to personally re-
view all of the thousands of security files and indices maintained on
United States citizens; spot checking was undertaken, however, on a
random basis.
250
C. Office of Legislative Counsel
The Office of Legislative Counsel maintains congressional files for
use in its legislative liaison duties.
These files are reestablished at the beginning of each new session of
Congress; files on retired or defeated members are transferred to the
CIA record center. After five years, they are selectively purged.
Generally, the files contain the following types of documents: corre-
spondence between the member and the CIA, excerpts from the Con-
gressional Record dealing with the member, constituent employment
or personnel requests forwarded to the Agency by the member, short
biographies and political descriptions of the member, and copies of all
foreign cables containing the name of the member.
Conclusions
Although maintenance of most of the indices, files, and records of
the Agency has been necessary and proper, the standards applied by
the Agency at some points during its history have permitted the ac-
cumulation and indexing of materials not needed for legitimate intel-
ligence or security purposes. Included in this category are many of the
files related to Operation CHAOS and the activities of the Office of
Security concerning dissident groups.
Constant vigilance by the Agency is essential to prevent the col-
lection of information on United States citizens which is not needed
for proper intelligence activities. The Executive Order recommended
by the Commission (Recommendation 2) will ensure purging of non-
essential or improper materials from Agency files.
Further, the Office of Security should establish (i) centralized re-
sponsibility to control the opening of new security files not routine
in nature and (ii) specific criteria controlling the nature of materials
to be collected.
Chapter 19
Allegations Concerning the
Assassination of President Kennedy
Allegations have been made that the CIA participated in the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas, Texas, on
November 22, 1963. Two different theories have been advanced in
support of those allegations. One theory is that E. Howard Hunt and
Frank Sturgis, on behalf of the CIA, personally participated in the
assassination. The other is that the CIA had connections with Lee
Harvey Oswald or Jack Ruby, or both of them, and that those
connections somehow led to the assassination. The Commission staff
has investigated these allegations.
Neither the staff nor the Commission undertook a full review of
the Report of the Warren Commission. Such a. task would have been
outside the scope of the Executive Order establishing this Commis-
sion, and would have diverted the time of the Commission from its
proper function. The investigation was limited to determining
whether there was any credible evidence pointing to CIA involvement
in the assassination of President Kennedy.
A. The Theory That Hunt and Sturgis Participated in the
Assassination
The first of the theories involves charges that E. Howard Hunt and
Frank Sturgis, both convicted of burglarizing the Democratic Na-
tional Committee headquarters at the Watergate in 1972, were CIA
employees or agents at the time of the assassination of the President in
1963. It is further alleged that they were together in Dallas on the day
of the assassination and that shortly after the assassination they were
found in a railroad boxcar situated behind the "grassy knoll," an area
located to the right front of the Presidential car at the time of the
assassination.
(251)
252
Under this theory, Hunt and Sturgis were allegedly in Dallas on
November 22, 1963, and were' taken into custody by the police, but
were mysteriously released without being booked, photographed or
fingerprinted by the police-although they were allegedly photo-
graphed by press photographers while they were being accompanied
to the Dallas County Sheriff's office.
It is further contended that the persons shown in these press photo-
graphs bear "striking resemblances" to photographs taken of Hunt
and Sturgis in 1972. Portions of two amateur motion picture films of
the assassination (Zapruder and Nix) are alleged to reveal the pres-
ence of several riflemen in the area of the grassy knoll.
The Hunt-Sturgis theory also rests on the assumption that at least
one of the shots that struck President Kennedy was fired from the area
of the grassy knoll, where Hunt and Sturgis were alleged to be present.
The direction from which the shots came is claimed to be shown by
the backward and leftward movement of President Kennedy's body
almost immediately after being struck by that bullet. Taken together,
these purported facts are cited as the basis for a possible conclusion
that CIA personnel participated in the assassination of President
Kennedy, and, at least inferentially, that the CIA itself was involved.
The Commission staff investigated the several elements of this
theory to the extent deemed necessary to assess fairly the allegation
of CIA participation in the assassination. The findings of that investi-
gation follow.
Findings
1. The Allegation that Hunt and Sturgis Were CIA Employees or
Agents in 1963
E. Howard Hunt was an employee of the CIA in November 1963.
He had been an employee of the CIA for many years before that, and
he continued to be associated with the CIA until his retirement in 1970.
Throughout 1963 he was assigned to duty in Washington, D.C., per-
forming work relating to propaganda operations in foreign countries.
His duties included travel to several other cities in the United States,
but not to any place in the South or Southwest. He lived with his
family in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area throughout that
year, and his children attended school there.
Frank Sturgis was not an employee or agent of the CIA either in
1963 or at any other time. He SO testified under oath himself, and a
search of CIA records failed to discover any evidence that he had
ever been employed by the CIA or had ever served it as an agent, in-
formant or other operative. Sturgis testified that he had been engaged
in various "adventures" relating to Cuba which he believed to have
been organized and financed by the CIA. He testified that he had given
253
information, directly and indirectly, to federal government officials,
who, he believed, were acting for the CIA. He further testified, how-
ever, that at no time did he engage in any activity having to do with
the assassination of President Kennedy, on behalf of the CIA or
otherwise.
2. The Allegation That Hunt and Sturgis Were Together in
Dallas on the Day of the Assassination
Hunt and Sturgis testified under oath to members of the Commis-
sion staff. They both denied that they were in Dallas on the day of the
assassination. Hunt testified that he was in the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area throughout that day, and his testimony was sup-
ported by two of his children and a former domestic employee of the
Hunt family. Sturgis testified that he was in Miami, Florida, through-
out the day of the assassination, and his testimony was supported by
that of his wife and a nephew of his wife. The nephew, who was then
living with the Sturgis family, is now a practicing attorney in the
Midwest.
With the exception of the domestic employee of the Hunt family,
all witnesses directly supporting the presence of Hunt and Sturgis
in Washington, D.C., and Miami, Florida, on the day of the assassi-
nation are family members or relatives. Less weight can be assigned
to the testimony of such interested witnesses if there is substantial
evidence to the contrary. In the absence of substantial conflicting evi-
dence, however, the testimony of family members cannot be disre-
garded.
Hunt testifies that he had never met Frank Sturgis before they were
introduced by Bernard Barker in Miami in 1972. Sturgis testified to
the same effect, except that he did not recall whether the introduc-
tion had taken place in late 1971 or early 1972. Sturgis further testi-
fied that while he had often heard of "Eduardo," a CIA political
officer who had been active in the work of the Cuban Revolutionary
Council in Miami prior to the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961,
he had never met him and did not know until 1971 or 1972 that
"Eduardo" was E. Howard Hunt. Sturgis had also been active in
anti-Castro groups in the Miami area before, during and after Hunt's
assignment on the political aspects of the Bay of Pigs project in 1960
and early 1961.
Other testimony linked Hunt to Sturgis at a date earlier than
1971. One witness asserted that Sturgis is a pseudonym; that his
name is Frank Fiorini; and that he took the name Sturgis from a
fictional character (Hank Sturgis) in a novel written by Hunt in
1 A son who was nine years old at the time could not recall whether his parents were
present or absent that day ; the fourth (and youngest) Hunt child was not born then. Mrs.
Hunt is now deceased.
254
1949. (Bimini Run). Sturgis testified that his name at birth was Frank
Angelo Fiorini; that his mother's maiden name was Mary Vona; that
his father's name was Angelo Anthony Fiorini; that his parents were
divorced when he was a child; that his mother subsequently remarried
a man named Ralph Sturgis; and that at his mother's urging he
legally changed his name in Norfolk, Virginia, sometime in the 1950's,
to take the last name of his stepfather.
A search of the relevant court records disclosed that a petition was
filed on September 23, 1952, in the Circuit Court of the City of Nor-
folk (Virginia) pursuant to which a Frank Angelo Fiorino petitioned
to change his name to Frank Anthony Sturgis. The petition recited
that his mother had divorced his father about 15 years previously and
had married one Ralph Sturgis, that he had been living with his
mother all of his life, that his mother was known as Mary Sturgis,
and that his stepfather also desired him to change his name to Stur-
gis. An order of the Court was entered on September 23, 1952 (the
same date as the petition) changing his name to Frank Anthony Stur-
gis. The order appears in the records of the Circuit Court of the City
of Norfolk, Virginia. In the petition and the order relating to the
change of name, Fiorini was misspelled as Fiorino.
In the light of this documentary evidence, no weight can be given
to the claim that Sturgis took his present name from a character in
a Hunt novel-or that the name change was associated in any way
with Sturgis' knowing Hunt before 1971 or 1972.
The personnel, payroll and travel records of the CIA were checked
with respect to E. Howard Hunt. Daily attendance records for the
period are no longer available because they are destroyed in the ordi-
nary course of the Agency's records disposal system three years after
completion of the audit for each year. What records remain, including
annual leave, sick leave, and travel records, disclose that Hunt had
no out-of-town travel associated with his employment in the month
of November 1963. He used no annual leave and eleven hours of sick
leave in the two-week pay period ending November 23, 1963. The
exact date or dates on which the sick leave was taken could not be
ascertained. There is some indication, however, that some of these
eleven hours of sick leave may have been taken by Hunt on Novem-
ber 22, 1963. He testified that, on the afternoon of that day, he was
in the company of his wife and family in the Washington, D.C., area,
rather than at his employment duties. That was a Friday, and there-
fore a working day for employees at the CIA. Hunt could not recall
whether he was on duty with the CIA on the morning of that day.
Because Sturgis was never an agent or employee of the CIA, the
Agency has no personnel, payroll, leave or travel records relating to
him.
255
In examining the charge that Hunt and Sturgis were together in
Dallas on the day of the assassination, the investigators were handi-
capped by the fact that the allegation was first made in 1974, more than
ten years after the assassination. Evidence which might have been
available at an earlier time was no longer available. Contacts with
relatives, friends, neighbors or fellow employees (who might have
known of the whereabouts of Hunt and Sturgis on that particular day)
could not be recalled. Some of these persons are now dead. Finally,
records which might have been the source of relevant information no
longer exist.
It cannot be determined with certainty where Hunt and Sturgis
actually were on the day of the assassination. However, no credible evi-
dence was found which would contradict their testimony that they were
in Washington, D.C., and Miami, Florida, respectively.
3. The Allegation That Hunt and Sturgis Were Found Near the
Scene of the Assassination and Taken to the Dallas County
Sheriff's Office
This allegation is based upon a purported resemblance between Hunt
and Sturgis, on the one hand, and two persons who were briefly taken
into custody in Dallas following the assassination.
The shooting of President Kennedy occurred at about 12:30 p.m.,
Dallas time, on November " 1963 while the Presidential motorcade
was passing Dealey Plaza as it headed generally westward on Elm
Street. Witnesses to the shooting gave the police varying accounts of
where they thought the shots had come from. On the basis of the sound
of the shots, some believed that they had come from the Texas School
Book Depository building (TSBD), which was behind and slightly to
the right of President Kennedy when he was hit. Others thought the
shots had come from other directions. Law enforcement officials under-
standably conducted a widespread search for evidence relating to the
assassination.
Several hours after the shooting, officers of the Dallas Police De-
partment checked all railroad freight cars situated on tracks anywhere
in the vicinity of Dealey Plaza. About six or eight persons, referred
to as "derelicts," were found in or near the freight cars. These persons
were taken either to the nearby Dallas County Sheriff's office, or to the
Dallas Police Department, for questioning. All were released without
any arrest record being made, or any fingerprinting or photographing
being done by the authorities.
Among the six or eight "derelicts" found in the vicinity of the
freight cars were three men who, according to the arresting officers,
were found in a boxcar about one-half mile south of the scene of the
assassination. They were taken to the Sheriff's office by the Dallas
256
police officers, who walked northward along the railroad tracks to a
point west of the Texas School Book Depository, then north to
Houston Street and back south to the Sheriff's office. This somewhat
circuitous route was actually the most convenient one available, ac-
cording to the Dallas policemen. As the police and the "derelicts"
passed the TSBD building and headed for the Sheriff's office, they
were photographed by several press photographers on the scene.
Copies of five of the photographs showing the "derelicts" were sub-
mitted to the Commission's staff as evidence.
A witness who volunteered his testimony stated on the basis of
hearsay that the three "derelicts" in question were found in a box-
car situated to the near northwest of the assassination scene, which
would have been to the right front of the Presidential car at the time
of the shooting. Between the area in which that boxcar was claimed
by this witness to be located and that part of Elm Street where the
assassination occurred was a "grassy knoll."
It was alleged by other witnesses (who were associated with the
first witness and who also volunteered testimony) that a bullet fired
from the area of that "grassy knoll" struck President Kennedy in the
head. It was also claimed by the same witnesses that one of the three
photographed "derelicts" bears a "striking" facial resemblance to E.
Howard Hunt and that another of them bears a "striking" facial
resemblance to Frank Sturgis. Finally, it was alleged that if those two
"derelicts" were, in fact, Hunt and Sturgis, and if the President was
in fact struck by a bullet fired from his right front, the CIA would
be shown to be implicated in the killing of President Kennedy.
The photographs of the "derelicts" in Dallas have been compared
with numerous known photographs of Hunt and Sturgis taken both
before and after November 22, 1963. Even to non-experts it appeared
that there was, at best, only a superficial resemblance between the
Dallas "derelicts" and Hunt and Sturgis. The "derelict" allegedly
resembling Hunt appeared to be substantially older and smaller than
Hunt. The "derelict" allegedly resembling Sturgis appeared to be
thinner than Sturgis and to have facial features and hair markedly
different from those of Sturgis.
The witnesses who testified to the "striking resemblance" between
the "derelicts" and Hunt and Sturgis were not shown to have any
qualifications in photo identification beyond that possessed by the
average layman. Their testimony appears to have been based on a
comparison of the 1963 photographs of the "derelicts" with a single
1972 photograph of Sturgis and two 1972 photographs of Hunt.
Over fifty photographs taken of Hunt and Sturgis both before and
after November 22, 1963, were submitted to the FBI photographic
laboratory for a comparison with all known photographs of the "der-
elicts." (The FBI assembled a complete set of all photographs of
257
the "derelicts" taken by the three photographers known to have
photographed them.) The comparison was made by FBI Agent
Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt, a nationally-recognized expert in photo identi-
fication and photo analysis.
The report of Agent Shaneyfelt, embodied in a Report of the FBI
Laboratory, dated April 21, 1975, and signed by Clarence M. Kelley,
Director of the FBI, concluded that "neither E. Howard Hunt nor
Frank Sturgis appear as any of the three 'derelicts' arrested in
Dallas, Texas, as shown in the photographs submitted."
With respect to Hunt, it was found that he had a much younger
appearance, a smooth and tightly contoured chin, and a more angular
or pointed chin, compared with the "derelict" in question. The latter
was much older, had a chin with protruding pouches and a more
bulbous nose.
With respect to Sturgis, even more distinguishing characteristics
were observed. Sturgis looked like a Latin, whereas the "derelict"
had the general appearance of a Nordic. Sturgis had very black, wavy
hair-and the "derelict" had light or blond and straighter hair.
Sturgis had a rather round face with square chin lines; the "derelict"
had an oval face with a more rounded chin. Sturgis and the "dere-
lict" had markedly different ratios between the length of their noses
and the height of their foreheads. They also had different ear and
nose contours.
Hunt is approximately five feet nine inches tall, and Sturgis is ap-
proximately five feet eleven inches tall. The FBI laboratory made an
on-site study in Dallas, using the cameras with which the photographs
of the "derelicts" were originally taken; it concluded from the study
that the "derelict" allegedly resembling Hunt was about five feet, seven
inches tall, and that the "derelict" allegedly resembling Sturgis was
about six feet two inches tall, with a one inch margin for error in each
direction. The difference between the height of the two "derelicts"
was therefore about seven inches, while the difference between Hunt's
height and that of Sturgis is only about two inches.
The photographs of the "derelicts" in Dallas have been displayed
in various newspapers in the United States, on national television
programs, and in the April 28, 1975, issue of Newsweek magazine. But
no witnesses have provided testimony that either of the "derelicts"
was personally known to be Hunt or Sturgis-and no qualified expert
was offered to make such an identification.
4. The Allegation That President Kennedy Was Struck in the
Head by a Bullet Fired From His Right Front
The witnesses who presented evidence they believed sufficient to
implicate the CIA in the assassination of President Kennedy placed
258
much stress upon the movements of the President's body associated
with the head wound that killed the President. Particular attention
was called to the Zapruder film, and especially Frame 312 and the
succeeding frames of that film. It was urged that the movements of
the President's head and body immediately following the head wound
evidenced in Frame 313 established that the President was struck
by a bullet fired from the right front of the Presidential car-the
direction of the grassy knoll and the freight car in which "Hunt"
and "Sturgis" were allegedly found.
By Frame 312 of the Zapruder film, President Kennedy had already
been wounded by a bullet which had struck him in the region of his
neck. His body is shown to be facing generally toward the front of
the Presidential car. He is leaning toward the left. His head is turned
somewhat toward the left front, and it is facing downward toward
the floor in the rear portion of the car. His chin appears to be close
to his chest.
At Frame 313 of the Zapruder film, the President has been struck
by the bullet that killed him, and his head has moved forward notice-
ably. At Frame 314 (which is about 1/18 of a second later) his head
is already moving backward. Succeeding frames of the film show a
rapid backward movement of the President's head and upper body,
and at the same time his head and body are shown to be turning
toward his left. Still later frames show the President's body collapsing
onto the back seat of the car.
The evidence presented is the Warren Commission revealed that
the speed of the Zapruder motion picture camera was 18.3 frames per
second. If the film is projected at that speed, the forward movement
of the President's head from Frame 312 to Frame 313 is not readily
perceived. On the other hand, such forward movement is evident
upon careful measurement of still projections of the relevant frames.
It is very short, both in distance and duration. The backward move-
ment and the turning of the President's head toward the left are rapid,
pronounced and readily apparent during a running of the film at
either normal or slow speed.
It was claimed that the movement of the President's head and body
backward and to the left is consistent only with a shot having come
from the right front of the Presidential car-that is, from the direc-
tion of the grassy knoll.
Medical and ballistics experts were consulted. Also considered were
(1) the autopsy report on the body of President Kennedy, and (2)
the report of a panel of medical experts who, in February 1968, at
the request of Attorney General Ramsey Clark, reviewed the autopsy
report and the autopsy photographs, x-ray films, motion picture
259
films of the assassination, the clothing worn by President Kennedy
and other relevant materials.
The autopsy report of James J. Humes, M.D., J. Thornton Boswell,
M.D., and Pierre A. Finck, M.D., described the President's head
wounds as follows:
The fatal wound entered the skull above and to the right of the external occipi-
tal protuberance. A portion of the projectile traversed the cranial cavity in a
posterior-anterior direction (see lateral skull roentgenograms) depositing minute
particles along its path. A portion of the projectile made its exit through the
parietal bone on the right carrying with it portions of the cerebrum, skull and
scalp. The two wounds of the skull combined with the force of the missile pro-
duced extensive fragmentation of the skull, laceration of the superior sagittal
sinus, and of the right cerebral hemisphere.
In February 1968, a panel of physicians met in Washington, D.C.,
at the request of Attorney General Ramsey Clark, to examine the
autopsy report, the autopsy photographs and x-rays, the Zapruder, Nix
and Muchmore motion picture films of the assassination, and various
other evidence pertaining to the death of President Kennedy. Each of
the four physicians constituting the panel had been nominated by a
prominent person who was not in the employment of the federal gov-
ernment. They were:
William H. Carnes, M.D., Professor of Pathology, University
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah; Member of Medical Examiner's
Commission, State of Utah. Nominated by Dr. J. E. Wallace
Sterling, President of Stanford University.
Russel S. Fisher, M.D., Professor of Forensic Pathology, Uni-
versity of Maryland; and Chief Medical Examiner of the State
of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland. Nominated by Dr. Oscar B.
Hunter, Jr., President of the College of American Pathologists.
Russel H. Morgan, M.D., Professor of Radiology, School of
Medicine, and Professor of Radiological Science, School of
Hygiene and Public Health, The Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland. Nominated by Dr. Lincoln Gordon, Presi-
dent of The Johns Hopkins University.
Alan R. Moritz, M.D., Professor of Pathology, Case Western
Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio; and former Professor of
Forensic Medicine, Harvard University. Nominated by Dr. John
A. Hannah, President of Michigan State University.
After reviewing the autopsy photographs, and making their find-
ings concerning them, the Panel said in its report:
These findings indicate that the back of the head was struck by a single bullet
traveling at high velocity, the major portion of which passed through the right
cerebral hemisphere, and which produced an explosive type of fragmentation
of the skull and laceration of the scalp. The appearance of the entrance wound
GERALD
260
in the scalp is consistent with its having been produced by a bullet similar to
that of Exhibit CE 399.2
After a review of the autopsy x-rays, the Panel's report states:
The foregoing observations indicate that the decedent's head was struck from
behind by a single projectile. It entered the occipital region 25 mm. to the right
of the midline and 100 mm. above the external occipital protuberance. The pro-
jectile fragmented on entering the skull, one major section leaving a trail of
fine metallic debris as it passed forward and laterally to explosively fracture
the right frontal and parietal bones as it emerged from the head.
The Panel discussed its findings as follows:
The decedent was wounded by two bullets both of which entered his body
from behind.
One bullet struck the back of the decedent's head well above the external oc-
cipital protuberance. Based upon the observation that he was leaning forward
with his head turned obliquely to the left when this bullet struck. the photo-
graphs and x-rays indicate that it came from a site above and slightly to his
right.
The absence of metallic fragments in the left cerebral hemisphere or below the
level of the frontal fosse on the right side together with the absence of any holes
in the skull to the left of the midline or in its base and the absence of any pene-
trating injury of the left hemisphere eliminate with reasonable certainty the
possibility of a projectile having passed through the head in any direction other
than from back to front as described in preceding sections of this report.
Certain other evidence relating to the source of the bullets that
struck President Kennedy was noted. This included the following:
a. The bullet fragments found in the Presidential car which
were large enough to bear ballistics marks were determined by the
FBI to have been fired by the Oswald rifle found on the sixth floor
of the Texas School Book Depository building, and not from any
other weapon. CE 399 was also fired from that rifle.
b. No physical evidence, such as a rifle, shell casings, bullets, or
damage to the Presidential car, was ever found which would
support a theory that one or more shots were fired from a direc-
tion other than from behind and above the President.
c. Most eyewitnesses testified that three shots were fired. Three
shell casings were found near the window at the southeast corner
of the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository building,
and all of them were determined by the FBI to have been fired
by the Oswald rifle to the exclusion of any other weapon. That
window was also the one in which a man firing a rifle was seen
by witnesses who testified before the Warren Commission. The
2 CE 399 was Warren Commission Exhibit 399, a nearly whole bullet found in Parkland
Memorial Hospital in Dallas on the day of the assassination. It was established by
ballistics experts as having been fired by the rifle found on the sixth floor of the TSBD
building and found by the Warren Commission to have belonged to Lee Harvey Oswald. The
Warren Commission determined that bullet passed through President Kennedy's neck and
then struck Governor Connally, who was sitting directly in front of President Kennedy, and
who was taken to Parkland Hospital.
GERALD
261
Oswald rifle was found on the sixth floor of the TSBD building
within an hour after the assassination.
d. No witness at the scene was found who saw any other assassin,
or who saw anyone firing, or disposing of a weapon in any other
location, or who heard the bolt of a rifle being operated at any
other location. Three TSBD employees testified before the Warren
Commission that they had been watching the motorcade from open
windows near the southeast corner of the fifth floor of the TSBD
building. One of them testified that he heard not only the three
shots, but also the sound above him of a rifle bolt in action and
the sound of empty shells hitting the floor. All three of them testi-
fied that "debris" fell down from above them at the time of the
shots, and that they talked to each other at that time about the
shots having come from above them.
e. A shot fired from the direct front of the Presidential car
can be ruled out. Such a bullet would have had to pass through
the windshield of the car unless fired from above the overpass
just ahead of the Presidential car. There were no holes in the
windshield, and the overpass was guarded by two policemen in
the presence of some fifteen railroad employees. None of them
saw or heard any shooting take place from the overpass.
Nonetheless, a re-examination was made of the question whether
the movements of the President's head and body following the fatal
shot are consistent with the President being struck from (a) the
rear, (b) the right front, or (c) both the rear and the right front.
The Zapruder, Nix and Muchmore films, a set of all relevant color
slides of the Zapruder film, the autopsy photographs and x-rays, the
President's clothing and back brace, the bullet and bullet fragments
recovered, and various other materials, were reviewed at the request
of the Commission staff by a panel of experts consisting of
Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. McMeekin, MC, USA; Chief,
Division of Aerospace Pathology, Armed Forces Institute of
Pathology, Washington, D.C.
Richard Lindenberg, M.D., Director of Neuropathology &
Legal Medicine, Department of Mental Health, State of Mary-
land, Baltimore, Maryland.
Werner U. Spitz, M.D., Chief Medical Examiner, Wayne
County, Detroit, Michigan.
Fred J. Hodges III, M.D., Professor of Radiology, The Johns
Hopkins School of Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland.
GERALD
262
Alfred G. Olivier, V.M.D., Director, Department of Biophysics,
Biomedical Laboratories, Edgewood Arsenal, Aberdeen Proving
Grounds, Maryland.³
The Panel members separately submitted their respective con-
clusions. They were unanimous in finding that the President was
struck by only two bullets, both of which were fired from the rear,
and that there is no medical evidence to support a contention that the
President was struck by any bullet coming from any other direction.
They were also unanimous in finding that the violent backward and
leftward motion of the President's upper body following the head shot
was not caused by the impact of a bullet coming from the front or right
front.
Drs. Spitz, Lindenberg and Hodges reported that such a motion
would be caused by a violent straightening and stiffening of the entire
body as a result of a seizure-like neuromuscular reaction to major dam-
age inflicted to nerve centers in the brain.
Dr. Olivier reported that experiments which have been conducted
at Edgewood Arsenal disclosed that goats shot through the brain evi-
denced just such a violent neuromuscular reaction. There was a con-
vulsive stiffening and extension of their legs to front and rear, com-
mencing forty milliseconds (1/25 of a second) after the bullet entered
the brain. In the past two decades, Dr. Olivier and his associates have
conducted extensive tests on the effects of high velocity bullets fired
into live animals, using high speed photography to record the results.
Dr. Olivier reported that the violent motions of the President's body
following the head shot could not possibly have been caused by the
impact of the bullet. He attributed the popular misconception on this
subject to the dramatic effects employed in television and motion pic-
ture productions. The impact of such a bullet, he explained, can cause
some immediate movement of the head in the direction of the bullet,
but it would not produce any significant movement of the body. He also
explained that a head wound such as that sustained by President Ken-
nedy produces an "explosion" of tissue at the area where the bullet
exits from the head, causing a "jet effect" which almost instantly moves
the head back in the direction from which the bullet came.
3 Dr. McMeekin is a forensic pathologist who has done extensive studies in the field of
accident reconstruction, utilizing computer-assisted analysis of the reactions of human body
components to the application of various forces. Dr. Lindenberg is a prominent authority
in the field of neuropathology, i.e., the pathology of the brain and nervous system. Dr. Spitz
is a forensic pathologist who has had extensive experience with gunshot wounds and is an
editor of a textbook on forensic pathology. Dr. Hodges is a specialist in radiology and
surgery associated with the brain and nervous system. In 1973-1974 he served as President
of the American Society of Neuroradiology. Dr. Olivier has conducted numerous experiments
to study the effects on animals and humans of penetrating wounds from high velocity
bullets. Drs. Spitz, Lindenberg and Hodges hold faculty positions in the Medical Schools
of Wayne State University, the University of Maryland, and The Johns Hopkins University,
respectively.
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263
Drs. Olivier and McMeekin, utilizing enlargement of the film and an
accurate measuring device, made measurements of the movement of the
President's head associated with the head shot. They found that in the
interval between Zapruder Frames 312 and 313, the President's head
moved forward significantly; at Frame 314 (1/18 of a second later) it
was already moving backward and it continued to move backward in
the succeeding frames.
Dr. Olivier was of the opinion that the start of the backward move-
ment resulted from both a neuromuscular reaction and a "jet effect"
from the explosion at the right front of the head where the bullet
exited. Thereafter, the violent backward and leftward movement of the
upper body, he believes, was a continuing result of the neuromuscular
reaction. Dr. McMeekin's report to the Commission contained no ref-
erence to the subject of a "jet effect."
Dr. Olivier credited Dr. Luis Alvarez with originating studies into
the "jet effect" produced by high velocity bullets fired into the head.
Dr. Alvarez is a Nobel Prize-winning physicist at the Lawrence Ber-
keley Laboratories, University of California at Berkeley. An article
describing his experiments is soon to be published.
Dr. John K. Lattimer of New York and Dr. Cyril H. Wecht of Pitts-
burgh were also interviewed. Each of them has studied in detail the
autopsy photographs, x-rays, and other materials, as well as the mo-
tion pictures of the assassination, and has published the results of his
findings.
Dr. Lattimer testified that there was no medical evidence to
support a theory that the President had been hit by a bullet from
any direction other than from the rear and above. The medical evi-
dence showed that the President had not been hit from the front or
right front. Had a second and nearly simultaneous bullet from the
front or right front hit the President's head after Frame 313 of the
Zapruder film, it would either have encountered no skull (in which
case it would have passed through the brain and exited elsewhere) or it
would have struck the skull. In either case, it would have left evidence
which would be revealed by the autopsy photographs and x-rays.
Dr. Lattimer also testified that he has performed experiments
to test both the damage effects of a bullet fired into the rear of the
head (in the precise area where the President was hit) and the prin-
ciple of the "jet effect." He utilized a Mannlicher-Carcand 6.5 milli-
meter rifle of the same model as the one found by the Warren Commis-
sion to belong to Lee Harvey Oswald, and ammunition from the same
manufacturer and lot number as that found to have been used by
Oswald. The results, he said, confirmed both the head injuries shown
in the autopsy photographs and x-rays and the principle of the "jet-
effect." Dr. Lattimer presented to the Commission staff as evidence a
264,
motion picture film and still photographs showing the results of his
experiments.
Dr. Wecht testified that the available evidence all points to the
President being struck only by two bullets coming from his rear, and
that no support can be found for theories which postulate gunmen to
the front or right front of the Presidential car.
In a 1974 article written by Dr. Wecht and an associate, an article
which was made an exhibit to his testimony, Dr. Wecht stated that "if
any other bullet struck the President's head, whether before, after, or
simultaneously with the known shot, there is no evidence for it in the
available autopsy materials." He testified that on the autopsy photo-
graphs of the back of the President's head, there was something above
the hairline which he could not identify at all, and he thought it was
possible that this was an exit wound. He stated that the other autopsy
photographs and the autopsy x-rays provided no support to that pos-
sibility, but he thought it was possible that the physicians who per-
formed the autopsy could have missed finding such a wound.
Dr. Wecht said that there was some question about the backward and
leftward movement of the President's head and upper body after
Frame 313, but he also said that a neuromuscular reaction could occur
within about one-tenth of a second.
The Commission staff also interviewed by telephone Dr. E. Forrest
Chapman of Michigan, the only other physician who is known is have
studied the autopsy photographs and x-rays. Dr. Chapman declared
that if there were any assassins firing at the President from the
grassy knoll, "they must have been very poor shots because they
didn't hit anything."
No witness who urged the view that the Zapruder and other motion
picture films proved that President Kennedy was struck by a bullet
fired from his right front was shown to possess any professional or
other special qualifications on the subject.
On the basis of the investigation conducted by its staff, the Com-
mission believes that there is no evidence to support the claim that
President Kennedy was struck by a bullet fired from either the
grassy knoll or any other position to his front, right front or right
side, and that the motions of the President's head and body, following
the shot that struck him in the head, are fully consistent with that
shot having come from a point to his rear, above him and slightly to
his right.
5. The Allegation That Assassins (Allegedly Including "Hunt"
and "Sturgis") Are Revealed by the Zapruder and Nix Films
To Be Present in the Area of the Grassy Knoll
In further support of his contention that shots were fired at Presi-
dent Kennedy from the grassy knoll-and inferentially by "Hunt"
265
and "Sturgis"-a witness called attention to certain frames of motion
picture films taken at the time of the assassination. He asserted that
these frames, including Frames 413 and 454-478 of the Zapruder film,
reveal the presence of other "assassins" bearing rifles in the area of the
grassy knoll.
The Zapruder and Nix films have been carefully reviewed. Frames
alleged to reveal the presence of assassins in the area of the grassy
knoll have received particularly close attention, together with those
frames immediately preceding them and immediately following them.
In addition, the Commission has had the benefit of a study of these
films by the photographic laboratory of the FBI, and a report on that
study.
The Commission staff members who reviewed the films were of
the opinion that the images allegedly representing assassins are far
too vague to be identifiable even as human beings. For example,
Zapruder Frames 412, 413, and 414, which have tree foliage in the
foreground, show combinations of light and shadow along their lower
margins which are varyingly shaped somewhat in the form of a
rain hat or a German army helmet of World War II vintage. In
Frames 411 and 415, however, the contours of the shadows are
markedly different and bear no resemblance to a human head-
with or without a rain hat or helmet.
Since each frame of the film is only about 1/18 of a second removed
in time from its adjacent frame, it was not believed reasonable to postu-
late that an assassin's head would come into view, and then disappear,
directly in front of the Zapruder camera, in the space of about 1/4 of
a second (the elapsed time between Frames 411 and 415), or that the
shape of a head would change SO rapidly and markedly.
The conclusion was that the alleged assassin's head was merely the
momentary image produced by sunlight, shadows, and leaves within
or beyond the foliage. The same was true of the "rifle" allegedly in
evidence in Frame 413. Even to make out the rough image of a rifle
in that frame required imagination-and in the adjacent frames, it
is nowhere in evidence.
From the extensive photographic work done in connection with the
Warren Commission investigation, the FBI has a substantial library
of both its own photographs and copies of the photographs and motion
pictures of others taken at the assassination scene.
The place where Abraham Zapruder was standing when he took
his famous motion picture has been established. (He was stand-
ing on a concrete wall elevated approximately four feet, two inches
above the ground to his front.) Based upon an analysis of the
direction in which the Zapruder camera was facing at Frame 413,
the FBI Laboratory was able to identify from other photographs
266
the exact tree shown in that frame. With the aid of reports from the
FBI Laboratory, it was concluded that (1) The tree was between 6
feet and 61/2 feet high; (2) it was barren of any branches or leaves to a
height of about 4 feet to 41/2 feet above the ground; (3) its foliage
was about 2 feet high and 4 feet wide; (4) the near side of its foliage
was about five feet directly in front of Mr. Zapruder's legs; (5) its
trunk was only a few inches in diameter; (6) only the top of the tree
came within view of the Zapruder camera; (7) it was the only tree
in the immediate vicinity; (8) a human head (even without a helmet)
5 feet in front of Mr. Zapruder would have occupied about one-half
of the total area of Frame 413 (many times as much as is occupied
by the image of the alleged assassin's head) ; and (9) it is not
reasonable to postulate an assassin in or behind that tree.
An assassin would be unlikely to hide himself behind the barren.
trunk of a tree only a few inches in diameter, with only his head and
shoulders behind the foliage, and with his whole person almost within
arm's length in front of a spectator taking movies of the motorcade.
Neither would such an assassin go unseen and undiscovered, able to
make his escape over open ground with a rifle in hand, again unseen
by anyone among the numerous motorcade police, spectators and Secret
Service personnel present.
A clear photograph of the tree in question, taken on May 24, 1964
(about six months after the assassination), was made a part of the
FBI Laboratory Report. It was marked to show the place where
Zapruder was standing as he took his motion picture.
The FBI photography laboratory was also able to identify the tree
in question on some of the frames of the Nix film, which was also being
taken at the time of the assassination. An examination of those frames
of the Nix film reveals that there was nobody in or behind that tree.
Also made a part of the FBI Laboratory Report was a series of frames
from the Nix film, with the tree in question, Mr. Zapruder, and the
alleged positions of "assassins" separately marked.
A similar examination was made by the FBI photography labora-
tory of other frames of the Zapruder and Nix films alleged to reveal
assassins in the area of the grassy knoll. Frames 454 through 478 of
the Zapruder film were found to reveal no formation "identifiable as
a human being or an assassin with a rifle or other weapon." With
respect to the Nix film, the FBI reported that "no figure of a human
being could be found in the area" of another alleged rifleman, which
was determined to be "approximately nineteen feet to the right of
where Mr. Zapruder was standing and clearly visible to him." The
FBI concluded that the configuration described as a rifleman was ac-
tually produced by some "clump type shrubbery" in the background.
On the basis of its staff investigation, the Commission believes that
there is no credible basis in fact for the claim that any of the known
267
motion pictures relating to the assassination of President Kennedy
reveals the presence of an assassin or assassins in the area of the
grassy knoll.
B. The Theory That the CIA Had Relationships With
Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby
The second theory advanced in support of allegations of CIA par-
ticipation in the assassination of President Kennedy is that various
links existed between the CIA, Oswald and Ruby. Lee Harvey Oswald
was found by the Warren Commission to be the person who assassi-
nated the President. Jack Ruby shot and killed Oswald two days after
the President's assassination.
There is no credible evidence that either Lee Harvey Oswald or
Jack Ruby was ever employed by the CIA or ever acted for the CIA
in any capacity whatever, either directly or indirectly.
Testimony was offered purporting to show CIA relationships with
Oswald and Ruby. It was stated, for example, that E. Howard Hunt,
as an employee of the CIA, engaged in political activity with elements
of the anti-Castro Cuban community in the United States on behalf of
the CIA prior to the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961. In connec-
tion with those duties, it was further alleged that Hunt was instru-
mental in organizing the Cuban Revolutionary Council and that the
Cuban Revolutionary Council had an office in New Orleans. Finally,
it was claimed that Lee Harvey Oswald lived in New Orleans from
April to September 1963, and that a pamphlet prepared and distrib-
uted by Oswald on behalf of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee dur-
ing that period indicated that the office of the Fair Play for Cuba Com-
mittee was situated in a building which was also the address of the
New Orleans office of the Cuban Revolutionary Council.
It was therefore implied that Hunt could have had contact with
Lee Harvey Oswald in New Orleans during the spring or summer of
1963. No evidence was presented that Hunt ever met Oswald, or that
he was ever in New Orleans in 1963, or that he had any contact with
any New Orleans office of the Cuban Revolutionary Council.
Hunt's employment record with the CIA indicated that he had
no duties involving contacts with Cuban exile elements or organiza-
4 Each of these statements is substantially true, but many other relevant facts disclosed
in the Warren Commission Report are omitted. It is not mentioned, for example, that Oswald
made up the Fair Play for Cuba Committee pamphlets ; that the address he stamped on the
pamphlets was never an office of that Committee; that he fabricated a non-existent New
Orleans Chapter of the Committee, a non-existent President of that Committee, and a non-
existent office for it ; that the building in question was a former office, rather than a current
office, of an anti-Castro organization when Oswald made up his pamphlets, and that Oswald
had tried to infiltrate the anti-Castro organization.
R.VOR
GIVE
268
tions inside or outside the United States after the early months of
1961. This was more than two years before Oswald went to New Or-
leans in April 1963 and more than a year before Oswald returned to
the United States from the Soviet Union, where he had lived for
almost three years.
An example of the testimony relating to an alleged relationship
between the CIA and Jack Ruby consisted of a statement that Frank
Sturgis was engaged in a series of revolutionary activities among
Cuban exiles in the United States in the 1950's and 1960's and that the
CIA also sponsored and organized anti-Castro activities among Cuban
exiles in the United States in 1959 and the early 1960's.
It was further stated that someone once reported to the FBI that
Jack Ruby had engaged in supplying arms to persons in Cuba in the
early 1950's in association with a former Cuban President, Carlos Prio,
and that Frank Sturgis also had connections with Carlos Prio during
the 1950's and 1960's.
In addition, it was alleged that Frank Sturgis was at one time (be-
fore he escaped from Cuba in June 1959) a director of gambling and
gaming establishments in Havana for the Castro government, and
that in August or September, 1959, Jack Ruby made a trip to Havana
at the invitation of a friend who had interests in gambling establish-
ments in Cuba and the United States.
Moreover, both Sturgis and Ruby were alleged to have had connec-
tions with underground figures who had interests in the United States
and Cuba.
From this group of allegations, the witness inferred that Sturgis
and Ruby could have met and known each other-although no actual
evidence was presented to show that Ruby or Sturgis ever met each
other.
Even if the individual items contained in the foregoing recitations
were assumed to be true, it was concluded that the inferences drawn
must be considered farfetched speculation insofar as they purport to
show a connection between the CIA and either Oswald or Ruby.
Even in the absence of denials by living persons that such connec-
tions existed, no weight could be assigned to such testimony. Moreover,
Sturgis was never an employee or agent of the CIA.
A witness, a telephone caller, and a mail correspondent tendered
additional information of the same nature. None of it was more than
a strained effort to draw inferences of conspiracy from facts which
would not fairly support the inferences. A CIA involvement in the
assassination was implied by the witness, for example, from the fact
that the Mayor of Dallas at that time was a brother of a CIA official
who had been involved in the planning of the Bay of Pigs operation
269
in Cuba several years previously, and from the fact that President
Kennedy reportedly blamed the CIA for the Bay of Pigs failure.
The same witness testified that E. Howard Hunt was Acting Chief
of a CIA station in Mexico City in 1963, implying that he could have
had contact with Oswald when Oswald visited Mexico City in Sep-
tember 1963. Hunt's service in Mexico City, however, was twelve
years earlier-in 1950 and 1951-and his only other CIA duty in
Mexico covered only a few weeks in 1960. At no time was he ever the
Chief, or Acting Chief, of a CIA station in Mexico City.
Hunt and Sturgis categorically denied that they had ever met or
known Oswald or Ruby. They further denied that they ever had any
connection whatever with either Oswald or Ruby.
Conclusions
Numerous allegations have been made that the CIA participated
in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The Commission
staff investigated these allegations. On the basis of the staff's investi-
gation, the Commission concluded there was no credible evidence of any
CIA involvement.
is
GERALD
Blank
Appendix I
Executive Order
ESTABLISHING A COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
The Central Intelligence Agency as created by the National Security
Act of 1947 fulfills intelligence functions vital to the security of our
nation, and many of its activities must necessarily be carried out in
secrecy. Such activities are nevertheless subject to statutory limita-
tions. I have determined that in order to ensure scrupulous compliance
with these statutory limitations, while fully recognizing the statutory
missions of the Agency, it is advisable to establish a Commission on
CIA Activities Within the United States.
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by
the Constitution and statutes of the United States, and as President of
the United States, I hereby order as follows:
SECTION 1. Establishment of the Commission. There is hereby estab-
lished a Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States
(hereinafter referred to as the "Commission"), to be composed of a
Chairman and other members to be appointed by the President:
SECTION 2. Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall:
(a) Ascertain and evaluate any facts relating to activities conducted
within the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency which
give rise to questions of compliance with the provisions of 50 U.S.C.
403;
(b) Determine whether existing safeguards are adequate to pre-
vent any activities which violate the provisions of 50 U.S.C. 403;
(c) Make such recommendations to the President and to the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence as the Commission deems appropriate.
SECTION 3. Cooperation by and with Executive Departments and
Agencies. The Commission is authorized to request, at the direction of
the Chairman, from any executive department or agency, any infor-
mation and assistance deemed necessary to carry out its functions
(271)
FORD
272
under this order. Each department or agency shall furnish such infor-
mation and assistance to the Commission, to the extent permitted by
law. The Commission shall furnish to the Attorney General any evi-
dence found by the Commission which may relate to offenses under
the statutes of the United States.
SECTION. 4. Compensation, Personnel and Finance.
(a) Each member of the Commission may receive compensation for
each day he or she is engaged upon the work of the Commission at
not to exceed the daily rate now or hereafter prescribed by law for
persons and positions in GS-18, as authorized by law and may also
receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as
authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5703) for persons in the government
service intermittently employed.
(b) The Commission shall have an Executive Director who shall be
designated by the President and shall receive such compensation as
may hereafter be specified. The Commission is authorized to appoint
and fix the compensation of such other personnel as may be necessary
to enable it to carry out its functions, and is authorized to obtain
services in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 3109.
(c) All necessary expenses incurred in connection with the work
of the Commission shall be paid from the appropriation for "Unan-
ticipated Personnel Needs" P.L. 93-331, 88 Stat. 617, or from such
other funds as may be available.
SECTION 5. Administrative Services. The General Services Admin-
istration shall provide administrative services for the Commission on
a reimbursable basis.
SECTION 6. Report and Termination. The Commission shall present
its final report to the President not later than three months from the
date of this order. It shall terminate within one month after present-
ing its final report.
GERALD R. FORD.
THE WHITE HOUSE, January 4, 1975.
Appendix II
Statement by the President
January 4, 1975
I have today established a Commission to ascertain and evaluate any
facts relating to activities conducted within the United States by the
Central Intelligence Agency that give rise to questions as to whether
the Agency has exceeded its statutory authority. I will soon be naming
a distinguished group of members to serve on this "Blue Ribbon"
Panel.
In the world in which we live, beset by continuing threats to our
national security, it is vital that we maintain an effective intelligence
and counterintelligence capability. This capability is fundamental in
providing the safeguards that protect our national interests and help
avert armed conflict. The Central Intelligence Agency has had a
notable record of many successes in this field, but by nature of its
operations, such successes and achievements cannot be divulged
publicly.
It is essential in this Republic that we meet our security require-
ments and at the time time avoid impairing our democratic institu-
tions and fundamental freedoms. Intelligence activities must be con-
ducted consistently with both objectives.
To that end, in addition to asking the panel to determine whether
the CIA has exceeded its statutory authority, I have asked the panel
to determine whether existing safeguards are adequate to preclude
Agency activities that might go beyond its authority and to make
appropriate recommendations. The Commission will immediately
have the benefit of the report already furnished to me by Director
W. E. Colby of the CIA. The Justice Department is, of course, also
looking into such aspects of the matter as are within its jurisdiction.
I am aware of current plans of various Committees of the Con-
gress to hold hearings on matters similar to those which will be
addressed by the Commission. Whether hearings are undertaken by
existing oversight Committees, or should the Congress deem a joint
House-Senate Committee to be the best approach to avoid a prolifera
(273)
274
tion of hearings, it is my strong hope that the Committee consider
the findings and recommendations of the Commission.
I am confident that through the cooperative efforts of the Executive
Branch, particularly by the new Commission, and of the Congress, the
results will be beneficial both to our national security and to the
traditions and institutions of this Republic.
Moreover, I am writing to those Department and Agency heads who
are responsible for the overall intelligence activities of the United
States as related to our national security and to the conduct of our
foreign policy, for the purpose of emphasizing that they are at all
times to conduct their activities within the scope of their respective
statutory authorities.
Appendix III
National Security Act of 1947,
as amended
Title 1-Coordination for National Security
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECTION 101. (a) There is established a council to be known as the
National Security Council (hereinafter in this section referred to as
the "Council").
The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of
the Council : Provided, That in his absence he may designate a member
of the Council to preside in his place.
The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with
respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies
relating to the national security SO as to enable the military services
and the other departments and agencies of the Government to co-
operate more effectively in matters involving the national security.
The Council shall be composed of-
(1) the President;
(2) the Vice President;
(3) the Secretary of State;
(4) the Secretary of Defense;
(5) the Director for Mutual Security [now abolished] ;
(6) the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board
[now abolished] ;
(7) the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive
departments and of the military departments, the Chairman of
the Munitions Board [now abolished] ; and the Chairman of the
Research and Development Board [now abolished] ; when ap-
pointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, to serve at his pleasure.
(275)
276
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 102. (a) There is established under the National Security
Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central
Intelligence who shall be the head thereof, and with a Deputy Di-
rector of Central Intelligence who shall act for, and exercise the
powers of, the Director during his absence or disability. The Director
and the Deputy Director shall be appointed by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the commis-
sioned officers of the armed services, whether in an active or retired
status, or from among individuals in civilian life: Provided, however,
That at no time shall the two positions of the Director and Deputy
Director be occupied simultaneously by commissioned officers of the
armed services, whether in an active or retired status.
(b) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed
as Director, or Deputy Director, then-
(A) in the performance of his duties as Director, or Deputy
Director, he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction,
or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be opera-
tive with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected
with the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
the Department of the Air Force, or the armed services or any
component thereof; and
(B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control,
powers or functions (other than such as he possesses, or is au-
thorized or directed to exercise, as Director, or Deputy Director)
with respect to the armed services or any component thereof, the
Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, or the Depart-
ment of the Air Force, or any branch, bureau, unit, or division
thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or
civilian) of any of the foregoing.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection, the
appointment of the office of Director, or Deputy Director, of a com-
missioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance of and
service in such office, shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or
grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolument,
perquisite, right privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of
any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer
shall, while serving in the office of Director, or Deputy Director, con-
tinue to hold rank and grade not lower than that in which serving at
the time of his appointment and to receive the military pay and allow-
ances (active or retired, as the case may be, including personal money
allowance) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length
of service for which the appropriate department shall be reimbursed
from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Central In-
telligence Agency. He also shall be paid by the Central Intelligence
277
Agency from such funds an annual compensation at a rate equal to
the amount by which the compensation established for such position
exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and allowances.
(3) The rank or grade of any such commissioned officer shall, during
the period in which such commisioned officer occupies the office of
Director of Central Intelligence, or Deputy Director of Central Intel-
ligence, be in addition to the numbers and percentages otherwise
authorized and appropriated for the armed service of which he is a
member.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 652 [now 7501] of
Title 5, or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central
Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any
officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termi-
nation necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but
such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee
to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the
Government if declared eligible for such employment by the United
States Civil Service Commission.
(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of
the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of
national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direc-
tion of the National Security Council-
(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters con-
cerning such intelligence activities of the Government depart-
ments and agencies in relate to national security
(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council
for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the depart-
ments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national
security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the na-
tional security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of
such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate
existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall
have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-
security functions: Provided further, That the departments and
other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evalu-
ate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: And
provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall
be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agen-
cies, such additional services of common concern as the Na-
tional Securtiy Council determines can be more efficiently accom-
plished centrally;
278
(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to
intelligence affecting the national security as the National Secu-
rity Council may from time to time direct.
(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council
and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments
and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relat-
ing to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the
Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to
the national security and is possessed by such departments and other
agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be
made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation,
evaluation, and dissemination: Provided, however, That upon the
written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the
Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation,
evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national
security.
(f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection
(a) of this section has taken office-
(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337,
1339, February 5, 1946) shall cease to exist; and
(2) the personnel, property, and records of the Central Intel-
ligence Group are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency,
and such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of
appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or authorized
to be made available for such Group shall be available and shall
be authorized to be made available in like manner for expendi-
ture by the Agency.
Appendix IV
Biographical Information and
Acknowledgements
Members of Commission
The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller, Vice President of the United
States, was graduated from Dartmouth College with a B.A. degree
in 1930, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. Vice President
Rockefeller was elected Governor of New York in 1958 and was re-
elected in 1962, 1966 and 1970. In 1973, he resigned to organize the
Commission on Critical Choices for Americans and to serve as its
Chairman. From 1940-44, he served as Coordinator of Inter-Ameri-
can Affairs. He was Assistant Secretary of State for American Re-
public Affairs from 1911 to 1015; served as Chairman of the Develop-
ment Advisory Board (Point 4 Program) from 1950-51 and as Under
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare from 1953 to 1954. He
also served as Special Assistant to President Dwight D. Eisenhower
from 1954 to 1955.
The Honorable John T. Connor received his A.B. degree (magna
cum laude) from Syracuse University in 1936, where he was elected
to Phi Beta Kappa, and his J.D. degree from Harvard Law School
in 1939. He served as U.S. Secretary of Commerce from 1965 to 1967.
After practicing law in New York City from 1939 to 1942 with the
firm now known as Cravath, Swaine and Moore, he served the federal
government from 1942 to 1947 as General Counsel of the Office of
Scientific Research and Development; Air Combat Intelligence Of-
ficer, U.S. Marine Corps; Counsel, Office of Naval Research; and
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. Mr. Connor joined
Merck & Co., Inc. in 1947 as General Attorney and became President
and Chief Executive Officer in 1955. He is presently Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of Allied Chemical Corporation.
The Honorable C. Douglas Dillon received his B.A. degree from
Harvard University (magna cum laude) in 1931. He served as Secre-
tary of the Treasury from 1961 to 1965. In 1953 Mr. Dillon was ap-
(279)
280
pointed as Ambassador to France where he served until 1957 when
he became Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs,
which office was raised to the Under Secretary level in 1958. From
1959 to 1961 he served as Under Secretary of State. During 1968 and
1969 he was a member of the General Advisory Committee on U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament. Mr. Dillon served as Chairman of
the Board of Dillon, Read & Co., Inc., of New York City from
1946-53, and is presently a Managing Director of that firm.
The Honorable Erwin N. Griswold received his A.B. and A.M.
degrees from Oberlin College in 1925, where he was elected to Phi
Beta Kappa, and his LL.B. degree from Harvard Law School in 1928
and his S.J.D. in 1929. From 1967 to 1972 he was Solicitor General
of the United States, after having served as Assistant Professor of
Law at Harvard Law School from 1934-35, Professor of Law from
1935-46 and Dean of the Harvard Law School from 1946-67. He was
an attorney in the Office of the Solicitor General and Special Assistant
to the Attorney General from 1929 to 1934, and he was a member of
the United States Civil Rights Commission from 1961 to 1967. He
is now a partner in the Washington, D.C. firm, Jones, Day, Reavis
and Poague.
Lane Kirkland was graduated from the United States Merchant
Marine Academy in 1942 and served as a licensed deck officer aboard
various merchant ships. He received a B.S. degree from Georgetown
University School of Foreign Service in 1948. Since 1909 he has
served as Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO, with which he has
been associated in various positions since 1948, serving as Executive
Assistant to the President of the AFL-CIO from 1961 to 1969.
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer served as the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962, when he became NATO's Supreme
Allied Commander in Europe, serving in that capacity until his retire-
ment in 1969. General Lemnitzer is a 1920 graduate of the United States
Military Academy and during World War II served on the staffs of
General Eisenhower, General Mark Clark and Field Marshal Alexan-
der. He was Commander-in-Chief of the Far East and United Nations
Commands from 1955 to 1957. From 1959 to 1960 General Lemnitzer
served as Army Chief of Staff.
The Honorable Ronald Reagan received his A.B. degree from Eu-
reka College, Illinois, in 1932. He served as Governor of the State of
California from 1966 until the completion of his second term in 1974.
Governor Reagan was a motion picture and television actor from 1937
to 1966, except for service as an officer in the United States Air Force
from 1942 to 1945. He was the President of the Screen Actors Guild
from 1947 to 1952 and again in 1959, and served two terms as Presi-
281
dent of the Motion Picture Industry Council which was composed of
all labor and management groups in the Motion Picture Industry.
Dr. Edgar F. Shannon received his A.B. degree in 1939 from Wash-
ington & Lee University, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa, and
received an A.M. degree from Duke University in 1941 and from Har-
vard University in 1947. He received his Ph.D. degree from Oxford
University, England, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. He was a mem-
ber of the Harvard University faculty from 1950 to 1956, when he
joined the faculty of the University of Virginia, where he is presently
Commonwealth Professor of English. From 1959 until 1974 he served
as President of the University of Virginia and was President of the
National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges
in 1966. He served in World War II from 1941 to 1946 as an officer in
the Naval Reserve and is a Captain, USNR (Ret.). He was a member
of the Board of Visitors of the United States Naval Academy from
1962-1964 and of the Board of Visitors of the United States Air Force
Academy from 1965 to 1967.
Executive Director
David W. Belin is a graduate of the University of Michigan where
in six years he earned A.B. (1951), M.Bus. Adm. (1953) and J.D.
(1954) degrees-all with high distinction. He is a member of the Des
Moines, Iowa, law firm of Herrick, Langdon, Belin, Harris, Langdon
and Helmick, where he has practiced since 1954. From the University
of Michigan Law School he received the Henry M. Bates Memorial
Award, made to each of the "two most outstanding seniors in the law
school" and is a member of the Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of the
Coif. In 1953-54 he was Associate Editor of the Michigan Law Re-
view. In 1964 he served as Assistant Counsel with the President's
Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Warren
Commission).
Senior Counsel
Harold A. Baker is a graduate of the University of Illinois (A.B.
1951) and the University of Illinois Law School (J.D. 1956). Mr.
Baker is a partner in the Champaign, Illinois, law firm of Hatch and
Baker, where he has practiced law since 1956. He also is a lecturer
in Advocacy at the University of Illinois Law School. Mr. Baker is
a member of the Order of the Coif and he is a Fellow of the American
College of Trial Lawyers.
Ernest Gellhorn was graduated with a B.A. degree from the Uni-
versity of Minnesota (1956) and was graduated magna cum laude
282
from the University of Minnesota Law School with a J.D. degree
(1962). He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of the
Coif and was Note Editor of the Minnesota Law Review in 1961-1962.
After practicing law in Cleveland, Ohio, he entered the teaching pro-
fession and since 1970 he has been Professor of Law at the University
of Virginia Law School.
Robert B. Olsen was graduated from the University of Michigan
(A.B. 1953) and from the University of Michigan Law School (J.D.
1955), where he served as Editor-in-Chief of the Michigan Law Re-
view. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of the Coif.
He has practiced law in Kansas City, Missouri, since 1955 and he is
a member of the law firm of Olsen, Talpers and Welte.
William W Schwarzer was graduated cum laude from the Univer-
sity of Southern California (A.B. 1948) and cum laude from Harvard
Law School (LL.B. 1951), where he was a teaching fellow until 1952.
He then entered the practice of law in San Francisco and is a member
of the law firm of McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen. Mr. Schwarzer
is a Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers.
Counsel
Marvin J. Gray, .Tr was graduated from Princeton University
(A.B. 1966) and Harvard Law School magna cum laude (J.D.
1969), where he was Articles Editor of the Harvard Law Review.
From 1969-70 he served as Law Clerk to Judge Henry J. Friendly
and 1970-71 he served as Law Clerk to Mr. Justice John M. Harlan of
the United States Supreme Court. He is an Assistant United States
Attorney, Seattle, Washington.
George A. Manfredi was graduated from Brown University cum
laude (A.B. 1966) and New York University Law School (LL.B.
1969), where he was Managing Editor of the New York University
Law Review. From 1969-1974 he was associated with the law firm of
O'Melveny and Myers and he is presently a partner in the Los An-
geles law firm of Costello, Manfredi & Thorpe.
James N. Roethe graduated from the University of Wisconsin
(A.B. 1964) and the University of Wisconsin Law School (J.D.
1967) where he was Editor-in-Chief of the Wisconsin Law Review.
He is a member of the Order of the Coif. Since 1967 he has practiced
law in San Francisco, where he is associated with the law firm of Pills-
bury, Madison and Sutro.
James Burton Weidner is a graduate of Bowdoin College (A.B.
1964) and the Cornell Law School (J.D. 1967) where he won the first
and second year Moot Court Competitions and was a finalist in the
283
third year Moot Court Competition. He has practiced law in New
York City since 1967 with the firm of Rogers & Wells, where he is a
partner.
Special Counsel
Ronald J. Greene was graduated from Harvard College (A.B.
1964 magna cum laude) where he was a member of Phi Beta Kappa,
and the Harvard Law School (LL.B. 1968, summa cum laude) where
he received the Fay Diploma and Sears Prize for ranking first in his
class. He served as Note Editor of the Harvard Law Review from
1967-68. He was a Law Clerk to Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall of the
U.S. Supreme Court from 1968-69 and he is associated with the
Washington, D.C., law firm of Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering.
Staff Members
R. Mason Cargill was graduated from the Georgia Institute of
Technology (B.S. 1970, with highest honor) and the Harvard Law
School (J.D. 1973, magna cum laude), where he was a member of the
Board of Student Advisers. After graduation, he entered active duty
as a reserve officer with the United States Navv. assigned to the
staff of Assistant Secretary of Defense Terence E. McClary. Pursuant
to the request of the Commission, he was temporarily assigned to its
staff.
Peter R. Clapper was graduated from Princeton University (A.B.
1949) and spent thirteen years as a news correspondent for The
Washington Post, CBS, ABC and Westinghouse Broadcasting. He
has been a Public Affairs Officer with the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency since 1972, and prior to that he was a
Public Affairs Officer with the Agency for International Development
for four years. Pursuant to the request of the Commission, Mr. Clap-
per was temporarily assigned as a Public Affairs Officer for the
Commission.
Timothy S. Hardy was graduated from Amherst College (B.A.
1969, magna cum laude), where he was a member of Phi Beta Kappa,
and was graduated from the Yale Law School (J.D. 1972) where he
was an editor of the Yale Law Journal. After serving as a Law Clerk
for Judge Max Rosenn of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, he entered active duty as a reserve officer with the
United States Navy, assigned to the staff of Assistant Secretary of
Defense Terence E. McClary. Pursuant to the request of the Commis-
sion, he was temporarily assigned to its staff.
284
Acknowledgments
The Commission wishes to thank Sol Neil Corbin, Special Counsel
to the Vice President; Peter J. Wallison, Counsel to the Vice President
and Hugh Morrow, Assistant to the Vice President, for their assist-
ance and contributions to the preparation of this Report.
The Commission also wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Frank
R. Pagnotta, Assistant to the Vice President for Administration, who
helped expedite SO many matters ranging from the remodeling of fa-
cilities at 712 Jackson Place to accommodate the Commission staff, to
securing personnel, equipment and supplies.
In addition, the Commission wishes to thank the following secre-
taries and support personnel for their unstinting efforts on behalf of
the Commission:
Secretaries and Support Personnel
Kathryn Baker
Ruth V. Johnson
Carolyn Bazarnick
Roxanne Marsh
Donna L. Carroll
Mona A. Meier
Donald Connor
Sammie L. Newman
Marie Dene
Ramona Overton
Donald Harner
V. Modene Reed
Ruth E. Johnson
Barbara Rose
&
FORD
ERALD
APPENDIX V
Highlights of Civil Disturbances and
Other Disorders in the United
States-January
1966
through
January 1973
This Appendix reviews major social and political unrest, disturb-
ances, disorder and violence in the United States during the late 1960's
and early 1970's.
It is offered by way of perspective on the Presidential initiatives
that influenced activities of the Central Intelligency Agency during
that period with respect to dissidents and dissident groups.
The chronology that follows covers representative items from the
period between January 1966 and the end of direct United States
military involvement in the Vietnam War in January 1973. That peri-
od was preceded by other episodes of disorder and violence earlier
in the 1960's. In 1963 and 1964, civil rights disturbances occurred
in Birmingham, Savannah, Cambridge (Maryland), Chicago and
Philadelphia. Early in 1965, serious disorder took place in Selma,
Alabama, and in August of 1965 the Watts section of Los Angeles
became the scene of massive rioting and destruction. By 1966, news
coverage of domestic turmoil had almost become a part of everyday
life in the United States.
1966
Jan. 31
The resumption of United States bombing raids
against North Vietnam after a 37-day pause brought
a series of demonstrations across the country.
Apr. 9
The Berkeley, California, headquarters of the anti-war
Vietnam Day Committee was blown up.
May 14
Student protests against draft procedures broke out
at several universities, and in some cases students
seized their school's administration buildings.
May 15
A demonstration for peace in Vietnam brought 8,000-
11,000 demonstrators to Washington.
(285)
286
June 6
James H. Meredith, who had integrated the University
of Mississippi in 1962, was shot from ambush. Ral-
lies and demonstrations followed.
June 29
The bombing of oil installations on the outskirts of
Hanoi and Haiphong set off a series of protests in
the United States.
July
Destruction and widespread rioting swept Omaha's
Near North Side, Chicago's West Side, the Brook-
lyn neighborhood known as East New York, and the
Cleveland neighborhood of Hough.
Aug. 6
Anti-Vietnam war protests were staged across the
country.
Aug. 16-19
At least 50 persons were arrested for disorderly con-
duct at hearings held in Washington by the House
Un-American Activities Committee. The Committee
was investigating Americans who aided the Viet
Cong in Vietnam.
September
Rioting swept sections of Atlanta, Dayton and San
Francisco.
1967
Jan. 21
About 2,000 people marched in front of the White
House in Washington, demanding a halt to the bomb-
ing of North Vietnam and a de-escalation of the
ground war in South Vietnam.
Mar. 8
A bill declaring Congress' intention of supporting
United States Armed Forces in Vietnam, of support-
honorably. and of prevent-
ing its expansion was passed by both Houses and was
signed by the President on March 16.
Apr. 15
Massive demonstrations and parades were held in New
York and San Francisco to protest United States
policy in Vietnam.
May 13
A parade in support of United States troops in Vietnam
was held in New York. The New York Times esti-
mated that there were about 70,000 participants. The
parade was organized to counter anti-war demon-
strations.
May 16-17
Police and students exchanged rifle fire at Texas
Southern University. 486 students were arrested.
May 19
United States jets bombed the center of Hanoi for the
first time.
Summer of 1967
The summer of 1967 was marked by the worst racial
disturbances in the history of the United States. The
Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee on
November 1 made public these statistics on riots
in 1967 :
Number of riots
75
Persons killed
83
Persons injured
1, 897
Number arrested
16, 389
Number convicted
2, 157
Estimated cost (in millions)
$664. 5
GERALD
287
Although severe racial rioting had occurred in United
States cities in previous summers, it never had been
as widespread or as intense as it became in 1967.
In the two cities hardest hit, Newark (26 dead) and
Detroit (43 dead), conditions of near-insurrection
developed in ghetto areas, and police and National
Guardsmen with weapons fire.
Stokely Carmichael, the former Chairman of the Stu-
dent Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, and H.
Rap Brown, the Chairman of the SNCC, called for
"guerrilla warfare" in urban ghettos.
June
Violence and rioting broke out in Tampa, Dayton, Bos-
ton, Cincinnati and Buffalo.
June 21
Sixteen alleged members of the Revolutionary Action
Movement (RAM), were arrested on charges of plot-
ting to murder moderate civil rights leaders.
July
Rioting swept sections of Los Angeles, Detroit, New-
ark, Plainfield, New York, Rochester and Cambridge.
In Detroit the disturbances brought the first use of
Federal troops to quell civil strife in 24 years.
July 27
A Special Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders was
appointed by President Johnson to "investigate the
origins of the recent disorders in our cities." The
President said that the Nation had "endured a week
such as no nation should live through; a time of
violence and tragedy."
Aug. 1
Arson, vandalism and looting occured in northwest
Washington D.C.
Aug. 3
President Johnson announced plans to send an addi-
tional 45,000 to 50,000 troops to Vietnam by July
1968.
Aug. 6
SNCC Chairman R. Rap Brown told a rally in New
York that the summer's racial riots were only "dress
rehearsals for revolution."
Aug. 11
United States planes launched an intensified air offen-
sive against North Vietnam.
Aug. 15
Martin Luther King, Jr. called for a campaign of
massive civil disobedience in Northern United States
cities.
April-August
Among other cities and communities around the
country where racial rioting was reported (in order
of date) :
Nashville (8-10 April) ; Cleveland (16 April) ; Jack-
son, Mississippi; Lansing, Michigan (14-15 June) ;
Kansas City, Missouri (9 July) ; Waterloo, Iowa (9
July) ; Erie, Pennsylvania (11-12 July and 18 July) ;
Fresno, California (16-17 July) ; Des Moines, Iowa
(16 July) ; Nyack, New York (19 July) ; Birming-
ham, Alabama (22 July) ; Youngstown, Ohio (22
July) ; New Britain, Connecticut (22-23 July) ;
Toledo, Ohio (24-26 July) ; Mount Vernon, New
York (24-28 July) ; Phoenix, Arizona (25-26 July)
GERALD
288
April-August-Continued
Saginaw, Michigan (25-26 July) ; South Bend, In-
diana (25-28 July) ; Peekskill, New York (27-28
July) ; San Francisco, California (27-28 July) ;
Long Beach, California (28 July) ; Marin City, Cali-
fornia (28 July) ; Memphis, Tennessee (28 July) ;
Wilmington, Delaware (28-29 July) ; Newburgh,
New York (29-30 July) ; New Castle, Pennsylvania
(29-30 July) ; Rockford, Illinois (29-30 July) ;
West Palm Beach, Florida (30 July) ; Portland,
Oregon (30-31 July) ; San Bernardino, California
(30-31 July) ; Riviera Beach, Florida (31 July) ;
Wichita, Kansas (31 July, 3-5 August) ; Peoria,
Illinois (2 August) ; Wyandanch, New York (2-4
August).
Aug. 25
George Lincoln Rockwell of the American Nazi Party
was shot to death in Arlington, Virginia.
Aug. 27
SNCC Chairman H. Rap Brown told a cheering crowd
in riot-stricken Detroit : "You did a good job here."
But he said the riots in Detroit would "look like a
pienic" when blacks united to "take their due."
Aug. 28
The Reverend James E. Groppi led a series of daily
open-housing demonstrations in Milwaukee. The
drive was frequently marked by violence.
Sept. 20
About 500 members of the Women's Strike for Peace
clashed with Washington police in front of the
White House.
Oct. 16-21
Demonstrations against the draft were held through
the United States by opponents of United States
policy in Vietnam.
October
A massive demonstration took place in Washington,
D.C. in a protest against United States policy in
Vietnam. Many demonstrators at the Pentagon were
arrested after clashing with United States Army
troops and Federal Marshals. Demonstrations sup-
porting United States troops in Vietnam were held
in the New York area and other parts of the United
States. Demonstrations occurred in various parts
of the country in 1967 to protest job recruitment by
Dow Chemical Company, which manufactured na-
palm used in Vietnam. The protests reached their
peak in October.
Oct. 27
FBI agents in Baltimore arrested three persons, in-
cluding a Roman Catholic clergyman, for pouring
duck blood on records at the city's Selective Service
headquarters.
Nov. 12
President Johnson cancelled plans to attend the an-
nual meeting on November 13 of the National Grange
in Syracuse, New York, to avoid a threatened anti-
war demonstration.
Nov. 14
Hundreds of anti-war demonstrators clashed with
police in New York during a rally in protest against
Secretary of State Rusk, who was attending a din-
ner there.
GERALO
289
Dec. 4
Martin Luther King announced plans in Atlanta for
a massive civil disobedience campaign to disrupt
federal activities in Washington in April, 1968.
Dec. 4-8
A coalition of about 40 anti-war organizations staged
"Stop the Draft Week" demonstrations throughout
the United States. The marchers sought to disrupt
United States Armed Forces induction centers.
Dec.
The build-up of United States forces in Vietnam
reached approximately 500,000 men by the end of
1967. In an overview of the situation in December
1967, the FBI reported :
"One of the most significant features of the Amer-
ican scene of the 1960's is the evolution and growth
of what has become known as the 'new left.' This
movement of rebellious youth, involving and influ-
encing an estimated 100,000 to 300,000 college stu-
dents, is having a jarring impact upon contemporary
society and portends serious trouble for this coun-
try.
*
*
1968
Apr. 4
Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., followed by
widespread rioting.
Apr. 26
Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford announces estab-
lishment of Riot Control Center at the Pentagon.
June 5
Senator Robert F. Kennedy shot in Los Angeles and
dies the following day.
June 19
More than 50,000 persons demonstrate in Washington,
D.C. in Poor People's Compaign Resurrection City
set up near Lincoln Memorial.
July
By the middle of July serious racial disorders had
occurred in 211 cities.
Aug. 26-29
Widespread disorder in Chicago, concurrent with
Democratic National Convention.
Sept. 29
CIA Recruiting Office in Ann Arbor, Michigan, de-
stroyed by bomb.
Nov.
Dozens of United States college campuses explode with
violence.
Nov. 20
CIA recruiter routed from South Bend, Indiana, in
connection with recruiting at Notre Dame Univer-
sity.
1969
January
Extensive disturbances at San Francisco State College.
February
Rioting at University of Wisconsin and Duke Univer-
sity.
Apr. 2
21 Black Panther Party members charged with plot-
ting to bomb New York City stores.
Apr. 9
Harvard University students seize University Hall.
Apr. 20
Students from Cornell University seize University
Building, carrying rifles and shotguns.
May 15
Rioting at University of California in Berkeley.
Oct. 15
Massive observances of anti-war moratorium through-
out the United States.
290
Nov. 13
46,000 persons engage in "March Against Death" past
the White House.
Nov. 15
More than 250,000 persons stage peaceful march and
rally against war in Washington, D.C.
During 15-month period from 1 January 1969 to
15 April 1970 United States experienced 4,330 bomb-
ings, 1,475 unsuccessful bombing attempts, and
35,129 threatened bombings. Included were a number
of bomb threats at CIA buildings.
1970
Feb. 26
Governor Reagan declares state of emergency in Santa
Barbara after student rioting and bombing of a bank.
Mar. 6
Greenwich Village townhouse demolished by explo-
sions-thought to be bomb factory for Weatherman
faction of SDS.
May 4
Four students killed and others wounder at Kent State
University in clash with National Guardsmen.
May 9
A crowd of 100,000 in Washington, D.C. protest United
States actions in Cambodia.
May 10
448 United States universities and colleges on strike
or closed over Cambodia action protest.
May 15
Two youths killed by police fire during demonstration
at Jackson, Mississippi, State College.
June 13
President Nixon names nine-member commission to
explore campus violence and student grievances.
Aug. 7
California Judge Harold Haley and his three kidnap-
pers killed in escape attempt at San Rafael Court-
house. Warrant later issued for arrest of Angela
Davis.
Aug. 24
Research Building at University of Wisconsin de-
stroyed by bomb.
Sept. 11
President Nixon orders use of Federal armed guards
on overseas flights of United States airlines, follow-
ing numerous skyjacking incidents.
Oct. 3
United States Commission on Campus Unrest issues
report warning of growing crisis.
1971
Jan. 12
Father Berrigan and five others charged with con-
spiracy to kidnap Dr. Kissinger and to blow up heat-
ing systems of Federal Buildings in Washington.
Mar. 1
Powerful bomb explodes in Senate Wing of the Capitol.
Mar. 8
Break-in at FBI Office at Media, Pennsylvania, result-
ing in theft of numerous sensitive documents.
Apr. 8
Administration Building at Santa Cruz campus of
University of California destroyed by arsonists.
There followed fires and fire bombs at Tufts Univer-
sity of Hawaii, and Cornell University.
Apr. 22
110 demonstrating veterans arrested at Supreme Court
Building.
291
Apr. 24
Massive, but peaceful, anti-war rallies held in Wash-
ington crowd at 200,000, San Francisco crowd at
150,000.
May 3-5
Thousands of anti-war protesters arrested in Wash-
ington, D.C. in connection with attempts to disrupt
traffic and immobilize Government.
June 13
New York Times begins publication of Pentagon
Papers.
Aug. 21-22
25 persons arrested in raids on Selective Service Offices
in Buffalo, New York, and Camden, New Jersey.
1972
Apr. 10
United States begins deep penetration raids into North
Vietnam for the first time since November 1967,
provoking new wave of protests.
May 8
President Nixon announces mining of North Viet-
namese harbors, touching off another intense wave
of anti-war protests and widespread violent clashes
with police.
May 19
Bomb explodes in the Pentagon Building.
May 21-22
More than 400 protesters arrested in Washington,
D.C., during battles with police.
Aug. 12
Last United States combat troops leave South Viet-
nam. Heavy air raids conducted over North Vietnam.
July and August
Democratic and Republican National Conventions
take place in Miami Beach with only minor inci-
Aonts
1973
January 23 and 27
President Nixon announces signing of agreement in
Paris to end the war in Vietnam.
Appendix VI
Proposed Amendments to Statute
In Recommendation (1), the Commission proposes that 50 U.S.C.
Section 403 (d) be amended to read (Additions are italicized; deletions
are marked through) :
(d) For the purpose of coordinating the foreign intelligence activi-
ties of the several government departments and agencies in the interest
of national security, it shall be the duty of the [Central Intelligence]
Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council-
(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters con-
cerning such foreign intelligence activities of the government de-
partments and agencies as relate to national security;
(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Coun-
cil for the coordination of such foreign intelligence activities of
the departments and agencies of the government as relate to the
national security;
(3) to collect, correlate and evaluate foreign intelligence relat-
ing to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dis-
semination of such foreign intelligence within the government
using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities:
Provided, that except as specified by the President in a pub-
lished Executive Order, in collecting foreign intelligence from
United States citizens in the United States or its possessions, the
Agency must disclose to such citizens that such intelligence is
being collected by the Agency.
Provided further, that the Agency shall have no police, sub-
poena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions:
Provided further, that the departments and other agencies of
the government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and
disseminate departmental intelligence:
And provided further, that the Director of Central Intelligence
shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and meth-
ods from unauthorized disclosure;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence
agencies, such additional foreign intelligence services of common
(292)
293
concern as the National Security Council determines can be more
efficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to for-
eign intelligence affecting the national security as the National
Security Council may from time to time direct.
(6) to be responsible for protecting sources and methods of
foreign intelligence from unauthorized disclosure. Within the
United States, this responsibility shall be limited (a) to lawful
means used to protect against disclosure by (i) present or former
employees, agents or sources of the Agency or (ii) persons, or
employees of persons or organizations, presently or formerly un-
der contract with the Agency or affiliated with it, and (b) to
providing guidance and technical assistance to other government
departments and agencies performing intelligence activities.
Appendix VII
Assistance To and From
Federal, State and Local Agencies
The following information is provided as a supplement to that
material set forth in Chapter 17, Section B, involving CIA assistance
to and from state and local law enforcement agencies. Its purpose is
to provide additional detail and identify some additional contacts
between the CIA and state and local police authorities not referred
to in the chapter. As specific Agency files on relations with state and
local law enforcement agencies were not established as such until 1970,
this summary does not purport to be an exhaustive description of all
such activities.
A. Other Assistance Given to State and Local Police
Among those police departments sending representatives to Agency
training courses referred to in Chapter 17 were the Washington Metro-
politan Police Department, most Washington suburban police depart-
ments, the Maryland and Virginia State Police, and the police of
Los Angeles, Miami, and Chicago. CIA records show that in 1968 and
1969, four three-week training programs in lockpicking and positive
audio surveillance were given to an aggregate of 24 police officials
from in and around the Washington, D.C., area. In July and August
of 1972, two one-week courses in lockpicking were presented to Wash-
ington area police. In September 1972, twelve representatives from
the New York Police Department attended a seminar on clandestine
collection methodology, the basic theories of intelligence, and the
Office of Security's role in the intelligence effort. Other shorter
briefings, seminars and demonstrations-on a wide variety of topics-
have been sponsored by the Agency.
In 1970 the Office of Security, with the approval of the Director of
Central Intelligence, provided six men to the Law Enforcement
(294)
295
Assistance Administration to brief police and local officials on a "trace
metal detecting technique" developed by the Agency. These six men,
operating as Law Enforcement Assistance Administration consultants,
conducted a number of briefings on the technique in different locations
throughout the country.
For several years training in explosives detection and disarmament
has been given to local police representatives at an isolated Agency
facility in North Carolina. That facility was established to provide
the Agency with a capability for detecting, handling and disarming all
types of explosive devices. Police departments from all over the coun-
try have funneled information concerning new types of explosive
devices to this CIA facility, which in turn has studied the information
and attempted to ascertain the most appropriate methods of detecting
and disarming each type of explosive device studied. In turn, the CIA
has periodically brought representatives to the facility from local law
enforcement agencies to share with them the knowledge it has learned
concerning new devices.
Just before the Presidential Inauguration in January of 1969, a
representative of the Washington Metropolitan Police Department's
Intelligence Division asked the Office of Security to provide the police
with several radio-equipped automobiles to assist the Department in
monitoring the large groups expected to congregate during the in-
auguration ceremonies. The purpose of obtaining the CIA equipment
was iv provide the police department with an additional assigned radio
frequency for use in connection with the planned activities during the
inauguration, and to open up the Department's own radio frequency
for ordinary police communications. Other agencies normally able to
assist were fully utilizing their radio equipment during this period.
From six to nine radio-equipped automobiles-some privately owned
and others Agency owned-were furnished the Department by the
CIA under the condition that these vehicles remain totally under the
control of Office of Security employees.
The police agreed to this condition and both the vehicles and drivers
were provided by the Office of Security. Command posts for monitor-
ing intelligence reports were established at both the headquarters
building of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Di-
vision headquarters of the police department. The CIA also provided
footmen radios for other police officers to utilize while on the street,
enabling them to communicate with the CIA vehicles or either com-
mand post. Similar assistance was rendered by CIA to the Metropoli-
tan Police Department on at least two other occasions (the antiwar
moratorium demonstrations in November 1969 and the May Day
demonstrations in 1971) and possibly a third.
296
As is discussed in Chapter 17, the Office of Security has occasionally
loaned electronics equipment to police departments for training or for
use in police operations. Some equipment has been given outright.
Technical assistance on the proper use of such equipment has also
been given on occasion. As a general rule, the Office of Security has
restricted the availability of this electronics equipment to police de-
partments in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area (primarily to
the Montgomery County and Metropolitan Police Departments).
However, in isolated incidents, electronics equipment has also been
loaned to the New York and San Francisco police departments. In-
cluded in the type of electronic equipment loaned or given to police
were transmitters, telephonic decoders, touchtone dial recorders, tun-
able receivers, Kelcom SK-7 audio devices (for use in audio sur-
veillance), amplifiers, transmitter beacons, and receivers. In addition,
some nonelectronic equipment, including cameras and photographic
gear, gas masks, tear gas grenades, and protective flack jackets has been
furnished to Washington metropolitan area police departments, pri-
marily for use during the period when the dissident groups were at
their peak of activity from 1967 through 1971.
The CIA has on at least one occasion provided some technical assist-
ance in an actual police operation being carried out by the Metro-
politan Police Department. In late 1968 or early 1969, CIA was asked
to provide the Department with transmitters which could be planted
in several lamps to be placed in the apartment of a police informer
who frequently met with members of dissident groups. CIA agreed
to provide the requested equipment. The lamps were provided to
CIA and the transmitter devices were installed in the lamps by
personnel from the Office of Security. The lamps were then placed
back in the police informer's apartment by the police. The police
informer was aware that the apartment was being bugged and con-
sented to the operation.
In early 1973 the CIA permitted the Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment to use one of its safe houses in the Washington metropolitan area
during the course of a police investigation. The safe house was used
on a part-time basis in an attempt to purchase an extremely large
quantity of heroin from out-of-town interests. This use of the safe
house was approved by the Director of Security and continued until
June of 1973.
On one other occasion the Office of Security made special arrange-
ments to allow three policemen to use an Office of Technical Services
photography facility to develop some police film taken during an
operational police assignment. The film was considered to be so sensi-
tive that the normal police facilities could not be used without the
possibility of compromising the entire police investigation.
297
On at least three separate occasions, alias documents (including
social security and draft cards) were provided to police officers repre-
senting police departments in Washington, Miami, and Baltimore.
The purpose of providing this documentation was to permit the
recipients to engage in undercover police work. The alias documenta-
tion given to the Metropolitan Police Department was never used and
has been turned over to, and been made a part of the record of, this
Commission. It is not known whether the documentation provided
to the Miami and Baltimore Police Departments was ever utilized.
In 1968, the Office of Security provided copies of a reference docu-
ment entitled "Where's What" to a number of local police departments.
"Where's What" is a publication compiled by a CIA Office of Security
employee during the period of March 1965 to March 1966, as the recip-
ient of a Brookings Institution Federal Executive Fellowship. It is
a comprehensive reference work designed as a guide for the federal
investigator and is classified "confidential." The Office of Security
distributed 1,000 copies of the book, the majority going to various
federal agencies. Records reflect, however, that five copies each were
given to the Arlington and Fairfax County Police; two copies to
the Maryland State Police; and a total of 32 copies to the Washington
Metropolitan Police Department. Although a request was made in
1970 by the Law Enforcement Assistant Administration to republish
a second unclassified edition of this booklet, the suggestion was rejected
since the CIA felt that it would not be proper for it to publish law
enforcement material for general usage and unclassified purposes.
B. Other Assistance From State and Local Police
In 1966, CIA contracted with a private company to undertake an
extensive study on the use of polygraph machines as a tool in person-
nel investigations. The purpose of the study was to determine what
kind of individuals could "beat the polygraph." During the period of
the study (1966-1967), CIA's contractor drew upon the resources of
the San Mateo County, California, sheriff's office to find subjects for
the study. Various inmates of the San Mateo County jail were used
in connection with this experiment.
Police cover in the form of badges and other identification has, on
several occasions, been obtained from local police departments. In
1960, nine CIA officers attached to the New York Field Office of the
Office of Security were provided with New York Police Department
badges in connection with assignments directed against several foreign
intelligence targets in New York City.
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In connection with the surreptitious entry of a business establish-
ment in Fairfax County, CIA officers were provided with a metal
badge obtained from the Fairfax City Police Department for use as
"flash" identification in the event that any one should question their
activities. It never became necessary for the officers engaged in the
operation to use the badge for identification purposes.
During the 1971 May Day demonstrations in Washington, D.C.,
the CIA was provided with approximately twenty Metropolitan Po-
lice Department identification cards for use while monitoring the
crowds in cooperation with Washington police officers. The purpose
of obtaining these identification cards was to permit CIA agents to
cross police lines during the anti-war demonstrations. The credentials
were subsequently destroyed.
In September of 1971 a representative of the Office of Security's
Washington Field Office approached the Fairfax County Police De-
partment and requested the use of several sets of identification (in-
cluding badges and identification cards) for "national security" pur-
poses. These badges were, in fact, requested to facilitate a CIA surveil-
lance then underway within Fairfax County of a former Agency
employee threatening to make a public allegedly classified material.
It was thought that any questionable activity on the part of those
conducting the surveillance could be alleviated by showing the police
badges to any concerned citizen. After some delay, the request was
approved by the Chief of the Fairfax County Police Department.
Nine patrolmen's and one sergeant's badge were delivered to CIA.
In fact, these badges were never used in any CIA operation and were
returned to the Fairfax County police in early 1973.
While no evidence of additional use of police credentials by CIA
officers has been found, it is the opinion of a former director of the
Office of Security that additional police credentials may have been
obtained from time to time from police departments in cities where
the Office of Security maintains field offices.
C. Gifts and Gratuities Given to Local Police Officials
In addition to the items covered in Chapter 17, the Commission has
learned of the following instances in which gifts or gratuities were
given by the Office of Security to state or local police officials for their
cooperative attitude towards CIA.
On two occasions CIA furnished transportation to police officials
while those officials were vacationing. In one instance, a rental vehicle
was made available to a particularly cooperative police official while
he was vacationing in the Los Angeles area. The bill for the rental of
that vehicle came to approximately $800 and was paid from CIA
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funds. The second instance involved the furnishing of a rental car to
the Chief of that police department while he was vacationing in Puerto
Rico. This car was used for approximately two days and was sub-
sequently returned as the Chief obtained access to other transporta-
tion. The amount expended by the Office of Security for this vehicle
is unknown.
In about 1965 or 1966, the Office of Security sponsored dinners hon-
oring two retiring inspectors of the Washington Metropolitan Police
Department who had been particularly helpful in providing assistance
to CIA. Several contemporaries of the two inspectors from local police
departments were invited guests. On each occasion the honoree was
presented with a service revolver valued at about $75 or $80 as a gift
from the Office of Security. In 1970 or 1971, a similar dinner was spon-
sored by the Office of Security for a captain of the Fairfax County
Police Department. On this occasion, the captain was presented with a
gift from the Office of Security of a watch valued at about $150. One
retiree from the Metropolitan Police Department who desired to safe-
guard certain files in his home was also given a four drawer combina-
tion safe to facilitate the storage of these materials.
In about 1969 or 1970 an inspector from another police department
was given the use, free of charge, of a safe house maintained by the
Office of Security in Miami, Florida, for about one week while he was
on vacation there. The inspector had been helpful to the Agency in
making personnel investigations and in other respects.