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1554418
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Second Debate: Briefing Materials - Miscellaneous
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1554418
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Second Debate: Briefing Materials - Miscellaneous
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White House Special Files Unit Files
Ford - Carter Debates Files
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Soviet Union
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Presidential campaign, 1976
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1976-10-31
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1976
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1976-10-01
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10
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1976
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The original documents are located in Box 1, folder "Second Debate: Briefing Materials - Miscellaneous" of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Copyright Notice The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Digitized from Box 1 of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN DRAFT SPEECH TREAT AS SECRET UNTIL CLEARED GEBALD A Determined to be an Administrative Marking By pc NARA, Date 3/16/84 A long time ago Percy Bysshe Shelley wrote Ode to Ozymandias. It begins: "I met a traveler from an antique land who said 'two vast and trunkless legs of stone stand in the desert 11 To me those words have always conjured up an image of Central Asia - perhaps Samarkand, or perhaps Russia itself; images of remote and impossible mountains and locomotives hurtling through endless snow. Mixed with those vivid scenes is Dr. Zhivago, the Red Army, revolution, and countless millions dead from collectivization, purges, and war. But at heart, we say to ourselves, all of Russia is really a giant potato patch of no great concern to us. Through the wonders of modern technology, travel takes a different form now. I have seen that vast and antique land. Let me tell you about it, because the romantic image of early Russia doesn't quite fit any more. The real change began in 1964, when the mercurial Nikita Khrushchev was replaced by Leonid Brezhnev. It seemed like just another administrative shakeup at the time, nothing more. But the events set in motion by Technocrat Brezhnev - an engineer and a determined man -- now cast an enormous and ominous shadow. In 1964 the Soviet Navy was primarily a coastal defense force. Since then they have built 1300 new ships, giving them a first- class blue-water navy. In 1964 the Soviets had several dozen primitive submarine ballistic missile launch tubes. Today, they have amassed over 800 launch. tubes and are deploying new, modern Delta class ballistic missile firing submarines. In 1964 the Soviet Rocket Force had a few primitive ICBMs standing on gantry-type launch towers exposed to the elements and to attack. Today they have over 1400 hardened underground silos housing high-technology ICBMs with a steadily-growing throw weight advantage over the U.S. Since 1964 the Soviets have added nearly 2,000 tactical air- craft and a million men to their armed forces. The Soviet armed forces are not the only thing changing. Since World War II the Soviets have built hundreds of new communities dispersed from the old cities of European Russia. Since Brezhnev's' arrival in 1964, about two-thirds of all new Soviet industry has been dispersed to medium or smaller towns. In addition to dispersal, those industries are being built to withstand nuclear blast; the towns have a civil defense program employing a total of 72,000 people full time. Hardening against nuclear effects can be seen everywhere. The Soviet government has built a vast network of hardened civil command posts. They have built dozens of VIP shelters to protect thousands of bureaucrats and party elite. They have built thousands of hardened military command posts, communications antennas, and associated control facilities - including systems to control the Soviet missile firing submarines. They have built dozens of underground grain and petroleum storage bunkers. There are hundreds of nuclear weapons storage sites and dozens of nuclear production facilities. And then there are the ICBM silos. 2 In the late sixties the Soviets deployed SS-9, -11, and -13 systems into first generation missile silos with a hardness of a few hundred PSI. Today the Soviets are deploying three new systems, the SS-17, -18, and -19. We also believe deployment of a fourth new system -- the SS-16 -- is imminent. As these new weapons enter the Soviet Rocket Force the silos are also being improved - doubled and tripled in their hardness to nuclear blast. Such a hardening program alone would cost $20B in U.S. equivalent. Over 300 of these silos are dedicated to the gigantic SS-18, larger than anything in the U.S. missile inventory. The SS-18s are "cold launched" in canisters which pop up out of the silos. The missiles ignite only after leaving the silos, pre- venting damage to the launcher. Result -- the silos can be re- loaded in a day or so to fire again if not destroyed by a U.S. re- taliatory attack. The Congressional Budget Office, very much an arm of the Congress and independent of the Administration, recently reviewed the Soviet defense effort. In July they described the Soviet missile buildup as "an unprecedented modernization program of the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile force. They then concluded that "earlier estimates (of Soviet defense spending) may have been off by nearly 100% (This buildup) clearly raises questions concerning the ultimate intentions of the present regime." That gets to the heart of Mr. Brezhnev's contribution to modern Russia. The Soviets have never accepted parity as either permanent or even desirable. Quite the contrary. And now, under Brezhnev, there is every indication that they are driving for 3 strategic superiority by the early eighties. SIBRARY Since 1964, when Mr. Brezhnev came to power, the USAF has suffered grievously in size and resources. Since 1964 our aircraft inventory is down by a third. Even worse, our budget is down 40% in real purchasing power. Fortunately, we have extricated ourselves from the distractions of Southeast Asia. Our President - in bipartisan partnership with the Senate and House Armed Services Committees - has set about modernizing our strategic forces. Upon assuming office in August of 1974, President Ford endorsed and adopted a full Trident submarine program. The full production decision was made in October. In April of this year, the keel of the first boat was laid in Groton, Conn. In 1975 the President decided to include funds for B-1 bomber production in his fiscal 77 budget request. He fought the program through an obstinate Congress that repeatedly tried to vote wasteful diversions and dangerous delays. Last week he signed the resulting defense appropriation bill containing all of the funds requested - over one billion dollars - to initiate production of the B-1. And now the President is coming to grips with the need to modernize our ICBM force: ICBMs We are proceeding with several important ICBM modernization efforts. 1. For the near term, we are improving the survivability of our deployed missiles by upgrading the hardness of our silos against blast, shock, and electromagnetic pulse. We plan to complete this program by 1979. 4 2. To improve the responsiveness and flexibility of the Minuteman III Missile, we are adding Command Data Buffer equipment. This will allow us to rapidly retarget them in response to real time informa- tion. Further, it will widen the options available to the President during crises and contingencies. This project will be complete next summer, in August of 1977. 3. We also are upgrading Minuteman III guidance system accuracy through changes in computer software. These accuracy improvements should be completed by 1978. Those immediate fixes are not enough. j. This year the President convinced Congress to maintain oùr only ICBM production line in operation and to appropriate funds for a higher-yield Minuteman warhead more capable of retaliation against that underground Soviet military machine. 5. We are beginning serious studies of a mobile Minuteman ICBM force. We expect to learn a great deal about the problems and advantages of transporting, operating, and maintaining a complex weapon system in a mobile mode. This may allow us to deploy the system quickly if necessary; it will certainly provide valuable ex- perience for an advanced mobile ICBM system. 6. For the longer term, we have been considering a follow- on ICBM for the 1980s. Activities in support of this planning have concentrated on studies and component developments grouped under the heading of Advanced ICBM Technology. However, the determined Soviet attempt to achieve strategic dominance means we must now move beyond basic technology. It is now time to fully modernize our ICBM force. U.S. 5 advances in technology over the past ten years will allow a significant increase in missile payload, improvement in accuracy, and gain in survivability under attack. In my judgment, the Air Force should begin full scale development of such a modernized ICBM -- called the M-X -- next year if we are to even start redressing the growing Soviet advantage in ICBM size and payload. I am confident that the President will have a plan for the modernization of our ICBM force in his budgetary presentation to Congress next January. In making these plans, however, it is important to remember how the Soviets view this world. They are not interested in simply defending mother Russia. The recently deceased Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Grechko, said, "The historic purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces is not limited to. Defending our Motherland. The Soviet state actively and purposefully supports the national liberation struggles in whatever distant region of our planet they may occur. " They do not treat nuclear war as an unthinkable armageddon, either. With adequate evacuation of their cities, the Soviets really believe they can limit casualties to 3-4% of their population in a nuclear exchange. Whether that is true or not is beside the point. If they believe it, if they believe their losses would be only half of WW II, they might be tempted to gamble, to push, to conduct themselves differently in another Cuban missile crisis. For that reason, if for no other, we must maintain a credible and invincible deterrent posture. We need not match the Soviets man-for-man, gun-for-gun. We are not advocating a militaristic society on a wartime footing. 6 Our way of life will ultimately prevail in the world if we give ourselves at least an even chance. That chance requires three things: An unflagging confidence in the principles that have guided our nation for two hundred years; a willingness to recognize this long-term struggle and see it through; and a reasonable commitment to an adequate defense posture. Recent history speaks for itself. For the past thirty years we have avoided nuclear war and coercion -- not by depending upon the good intentions of the Soviet state -- but by maintaining our strength. Continuing support of President Ford's defense program -- which this year reversed a steady decline in defense purchasing power -- is essential if we are to give ourselves that even chance. Earlier this month, on the other side of the world, Lieutenant Ivanovick Belenko took off from his base in Siberia and flew his MIG-25 to freedom. His act is only the latest testimonial to the internal stresses in the Soviet system. His defection will mean more intensified political indoctrination for the Soviet troops, and a whole new wave of controls by the KGB. Ozymandias -- and the image of the ruined statue to his glory -- still intrigues us. Do you remember how the story ends? It goes as follows: On the pedestal these words appear -- "My name is Ozymandias, king of kings; Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair!" Nothing besides remains. Round the decay Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare The lone and level sands stretch far away. 7 Ozymandias -- who does he remind you of? Lenin? Brezhnev? Or the Statue of Liberty, out there across Battery Park in New York harbor? The answer depends very much on all of us. Our way of life can survive. We can witness the inevitable correction of the Soviet excesses if we have the will and determination to remain strong and free. 8 PATRICK Dick - - I think The President would fund BUCHANAN this worth reading. THE specialfectures- Mike The New York Times, 229 West 43d Street, New York, N.Y. 10036; (212) 556-1721 DIVIDING Special Features is a subsidiary of The New York Times Company. It selects, edits and offers material that may not necessarily be published in The Times. LINE To arrange for use of this material, or for cost and other information, please contact Special Features directly by calling (212) 556-1721 collect. NYT) THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN FOR RELEASE: Tuesday, Oct. 5, 1976 and thereafter A GAME PLAN FOR SUPER BOWL II STATE 1082 By PATRICK J. BUCHANAN MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT: The old Woody Hays strategy, "Four yards in a cloud of statistics," carried the day in the first Debate. It won't work in Super Bowl II. The Carter crowd is neither dogmatic nor dumb. They know where their mistakes came: too many statistics, not enough memorable lines, insuf- ficiently sharp and aggressive. The Ford offense in the second debate must be more versatile. Since foreign and defense policy should be the President's turf, some suggested areas of Carter vulnerability: A) With Americans favoring a strong defense, Carter's proposal to chop $5 to $7 billion out of defense---larger cuts than the entire defense budget of Japan and most European countries--- should be exploited. With the Soviets outspending us 50 per cent on defense and 100 per cent on weapons, Carter's proposal is naive, silly, dangerous. B) As "Professor" Moynihan demonstrated, Americans enjoy nothing better than a liberal application of the bull-hide whip to Third World loud-mouths who hog the microphones at the UN. Carter's platform contains a Santa Claus-bagful of foreign aid goodies for this crowd. Further, he recommends "commodity arrangements" whereby U.S. consumers would pay higher bills so that some of the strutting field marshals and El Supremos of the Third World could enrich themselves. (more) Buchanan - 10/5/76 -- 2 LISEARY BERALD 2020 C) Carter has several times termed the U.S. war effort in Vietnam "racist" a slander on the 2.5 million men who served there, the 55,000 who died there. He should be pressed to apologize publicly to the U.S. armed forces. D) Both Carter and his platform call for a pullout of U.S. troops and tactical nukes from Korea. This is an invitation to the poor man's Mao who runs the North to launch Korean War II. The first Korean War, one recalls, started after Secretary Acheson publicly placed South Korea outside the perimeter of nations the U.S. would help defend. E) Mondale: Carter's choice for Vice President has a voting record on defense issues and weapons systems which would leave the U.S. army in Europe equipped basically with cross-bows and 14-ounce gloves. It is not unfair to characterize Mondale's as the least responsible voting record on national security in the U.S. Congress, excepting possibly that of Bella Abzug. Carter will be on the offensive. If he denounces the U.S. for "secrecy" in the conduct of foreign policy, ask him how else we get Middle East agreements or China openings. If he attacks CIA intervention in Chile, remind him that most of the CIA assassination plots came in the Kennedy-Johnson years; and it is time the U.S. security agencies, CIA, NSA and FBI, were left alone by Congressional demagogues damaging U.S. interests around the world. If he rips into U.S. arms sales abroad, remind him that much of this aid goes to Israel, that it is better to sell arms than to send American soldiers to fight overseas-- as every single Democratic President in the 20th Century has done. (more) Buchanan - 10/5/16 , If he attacks U.S. multinationals for bribing overseas, tell him Gerald Ford is no more responsible for the ethics of Lockheed officials in Tokyo than is Jimmy Carter responsible for the antics of Wilbur Mills at the Tidal Basin. If he claims there are more admirals and generals now than during World War II (is this true?) blame it on Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, 1970-1974, Carter's friend and Democratic candidate for the Senate from Virginia. Finally, full blame for the existence of a pro-Soviet Marxist state in Angola should be foisted upon the Democratic Congress, which abandoned the anti-Communists and with whom Mr. Carter is running in happy harness. The primary threat comes from a Carter sweep around the Ford right end. Should Jimmy Carter accuse the U.S. of getting taken by the Russians on the wheat deal, of being snookered at SALT I and Vladivostok, of selling out Eastern Europe at Helsinki and with the amoral Sonnenfeldt Doctrine, of snubbing Solzenhitsyn- then, Mr. President, you've got problems. And should there be a Ford announcement that in SALT II the U.S. will allow the Russians to build the Backfire bomber, while we will scuttle our long-range cruise missile, the sound you hear at the debate's end will be thunder on the right. And it won't just be the "Register Kissinger, Not Guns," crowd joining in. Well, that's it: Go Michigan. -0- (c) 1976 Patrick J. Buchanan Special Features