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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder "Second Debate: Carter of Foreign
Policy - Briefing Book (1)" of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R.
Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 2 of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
CARTER ON FOREIGN POLICY
DEBATE BRIEFING BOOK
October 6, 1976
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
...
Foreign Policy
FORD
CARTER ON CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY
1. General Criticisms of The Ford Administration:
Carter has a long litany of criticisms of the
Ford Administration in foreign policy. Among them:
-- Lack of Presidential leadership; drift at the
top;
-- Excessive secrecy by HAK -- calls him "the
Long Lone Ranger.' Cites Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile,
Angola, CIA abuses as fruits of secrecy;
-- Failure to consult either the Congress or the
people on major foreign policy issues;
-- Lack of idealism in policy; policies amoral;
-- Failure to bargain toughly with the Soviets;
-- Neglect of European and Japanese allies (mostly
aimed at Nixon-Ford) ;
-- Paternalism toward developing nations;
-- Excessive interference in the internal affairs
of other nations;
-- Failure to curb nuclear weapons or to curb
excessive foreign arms sales.
2. What Carter Would Do: Carter talks more in general-
ties than specifics about his own plans. His "basic
principles, he says, are to make our policies more
open and honest, to treat the people of other nations
"as individuals (sic), to restore the moral content to
foreign policy, and to aim policies at building a
"just and peaceful world order." What specifics there
are -- e.g., creating stronger relations with developing
nations can be bound in subsequent sections.
3. View of Kissinger: In 1973 and 1974, before he was
a serious contender for the Democratic nomination, Carter
spoke very highly of Kissinger, supported his approach
to foreign policy, and even called him a close friend
according to a Wisconsin newspaper. Today, Carter is
harsh in his criticisms, says he would not keep HAK as
Secretary, but adds that he might call on him for
special assignments. Carter promises that he himself
would be much more actively involved in foreign policy
decisions.
- 2 -
4. Foreign Policy as Key 1976 Issue: In January
of this year, Carter foresaw foreign policy --- not
domestic policy -- as the key issue between himself
and the President during the election.
5. Kissinger Sees Carter Policy as "Compatible:"
Note that in an interview this summer, Kissinger was
quoted as saying that Carter's foreign policy views
were " fairly consistent" and "compatible" with those
of the Administration.
FORD
LIBRARY
CARTER'S BASIC ATTACK
FORD
General
ANYBRIT
There are substantial differences between my concept of foreign
policy and the Kissinger-Nixon-Ford approach.
-- I favor an open evolution of foreign policy, with the American
people and Congress more involved in the decisions.
-- Too often decisions are made behind closed doors, and then
Kissinger speaks without the knowledge or support of the American people.
- - I would follow the example of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshal
Plan. Truman appointed strong advisers, listened closely and then took the
issue to the American people.
- - We must take this more open approach, because major inter-
national decisions greatly affect the daily lives of the American people --
energy, commodity shortages, as well as foreign crises.
The Nixon-Kissinger-Ford policy is covert, manipulative, and
deceptive in style. It runs against the basic principles of this country,
because Kissinger is obsessed with power blocs, with spheres of influence.
This is a policy without focus. It is not understood by the people or the
Congress.
The President is not really in charge. Our policies are Kissinger's
ideas and his goals, which are often derived in secret.
The results have been disastrous. Our allies see no consistency or
reliability in the United States. Our neighbors in Latin America feel
neglected. Our policy toward the developing countries is peripheral and
- 2 -
unplanned. The world's richest country ranks 12th in foreign assistance,
and most of this goes to countries that are fairly well off. We can no
longer tax the poor people of America to aid the rich people of foreign
countries.
What we need are clear and consistent goals, that are-understood and
supported by the American people. We must strengthen our bilateral
relations with friendly countries and stop treating them as power blocs.
We must reorient our foreign assistance to help the world's poor. In
FORD
accordance with our own principles we must be tolerant of diversity
in the world.
LIBRARY
I would have these priorities:
First, to restore stability and cooperation in our relations with our
European Allies and Japan. We must be more predictable, and consult
them before making decisions. Increased cooperation can help avoid a
repetition of the disastrous world recession of 1972-1973.
Second, I would work for a reform in the international system which
would emphasize greater cooperation between North and South, and try
to enlist the new nations in a cooperative effort. In doing so, we would
have to be responsive to their concerns, both economically and politically.
Failure to do this resulting in the damaging handling of the Angolan conflict,
and created openings for the Soviet Union.
We are increasingly dependent on raw materials from developing
nations. Unless we cooperate with the developing nations, we face a
- 3 -
disaster by the end of the century.
Third, I would be a tougher bargainer with the USSR.
-- We want detente, nuclear arms control, but we also have to stand
up for human rights and freer emigration.
- - Each time we give something to the Soviets we should get a
commensurate return.
-- They need our machinery, our technology, and our grain. In
return I would ask for such things as: (1) help in solving the Middle East,
rather than stoking the fires of war; (2) help in avoiding oil embargoes,
(3) help in restraining North Korea, and work for peace in that area;
(4) concessions on controversial issues in strategic arms limitation;
(5) reducing nuclear testing.
Detente was oversold:
-- At Helsinki we endorsed Soviet domination of East Europe; also in
the Sonnenfeldt doctrine we conceded Eastern European freedoms to the
Soviets.
-- We should either not have gone at all to Helsinki, or drove a harder
bargain. The Soviets have not lived up to the promises on free movement
of people.
I favor maximum exchanges of tourists, students, professors.
ON CHINA: Recognition is inevitable, but we should not be in any hurry;
we must have assurances that Taiwan will be settled peacefully, and
that people on Taiwan are assured of relative independence; I would repeat
- 4 -
our commitments to them.
ON THE MIDDLE EAST: Step-by-step diplomacy was right at the time, but
it is no longer adequate; we need to be more active in permitting peaceful
settlements.
ON NATO: It is time for an in-depth review of military forces strategy;
the Allies can take a greater burden. We cannot alow the Alliance to
become anachronistic.
ON TRADE: We can work to lower trade barriers and make a major
effort to provide increased support for international agencies that make
capital available to the Third World. Support the International Fund for
Agricultural Development; under the World Bank, we might seek a "World
Development Budget"; it is also time for the Soviet Union to act more
generously toward global economic development.
ON ARMS SALES: This is a unsavory business. How can we be both the
world's leading champion of peace and the world's leading supplier of the
weapons of war. I will work with our allies and the Soviet Union to increase
the emphasis on peace and reduce the commerce in weapons of war.
ON AFRICA: I agree with Secretary Kissinger's efforts but this is a long-
delayed interest. We may have waited too late.
*******
- 5 -
I believe the American people do not understand our foreign policy
and they do not support it. Some in-depth public opinion polls point out
the grounds for considerable public apprehension. The American people
have a negative evaluation of our handling of relations with the Soviet
Union. Moreover, almost 7 out of 10 Americans believe these relations will
get worse. Almost half of the public believes we have stood still or even
lost ground in reducing international tensions. There is rising public
concern about the danger of the US becoming involved in a major war
within the next few years. It is little wonder that more than 6 out of 10
Americans feel the overall situation we face today in the world leaves much
to be desired. Only one percent believe the situation is excellent. And
over 60 percent believe it is poor or only fair.
I believe all of this indicates we must reexamine our foreign policy.
We must bring it into line with the aspirations of our people. Every major
mistake we have made has been because the American people have been ex-
cluded from the decision. When I am President the American people will
understand our goals because these goals will reflect what is good and decent
in the American people and therefore they will support our foreign policy.
CARTER QUOTES ON CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY
Carter's General Criticisms: Our recent foreign policy
I am afraid, has been predicated on a belief that our
national and international strength is invitably de-
teriorating. I do not accept this premise.
The prime responsibility of any president is to guaran-
tee the security of our nation, with a tough, muscular,
well-organized and effective fighting force. We must
have the ability to avoid the threat of successful
attack or blackmail and we must always be strong enough
to carry out our legitimate foreign policy. This is a
prerequisite to peace.
Our foreign policy today is in greater disarray than at
any time in recent history.
Our Secretary of State simply does not trust the judgment
of the American people, but constantly conducts foreign
policy exclusively, personally and in secret. This
creates in our country the very divisions which he has
lately deplored. Longstanding traditions of a bi-partisan
policy and close consultation between the President and
Congress have been seriously damaged.
We are losing a tremendous opportunity to reassert our
leadership in working with other nations in the cause
of peace and progress. The good will our country once
enjoyed, based on what we stood for and the willingness
of others to follow our example, has been dissipated.
Negotiations with the Soviets on strategic arms are at
dead center, while the costly and dangerous buildup of
nuclear weapons continues.
The policy of detente, which holds real possibilities
for peace, has been conducted in a way that has eroded
the public confidence it must have.
The moral heart of our international appeal--as a country
which stands for self-determination and free choice --
has been weakened. It is obviously un-American to
interfere in the free political processes of another
nation. It is also un-American to engage in assassina-
tions in time of peace in any country.
The people of other nations have learned, in recent
years, that they can sometimes neither trust what our
government says not predict what it will do. They have
been hurt and disappointed so many times that they no
- 2 -
longer know what to believe about the United States.
They want to respect us. They like our people. But
our people do not seem to be running our government.
Every time we have made a serious mistake in recent
years in our dealings with other nations, the American
people have been excluded from the process of evolving
and consummating our foreign policy. Unnecessary
secrecy surrounds the inner workings of our own govern-
ment, and we have sometimes been deliberately misled
by our leaders.
For many nations, we have two policies: one announced
in public, another pursued in secret. In the case of
China, we even seem to have two Presidents.
No longer do our leaders talk to the people of the world
with the vision, compassion and practical idealsm of
men like Woodrow Wilson and John Kennedy and Adlai
Stevenson.
Our foreign policy is being evolved in secret, and
in its full details and nuances, it is probably known
to one man only. That man is skilled at negotiation
with leaders of outer countries but far less concerned
with consulting the American people of their repre-
sentatives in Congress, and far less skilled in
marshalling the support of a nation behind an effective
foreign policy. Because we have let our foreign policy
be made for us, we have lost something crucial in the
way we talk and the way we act toward other peoples of
the world.
When our President and Secretary of State speak to the
world without the understanding of support of the Ameri-
can people, they speak with an obviously hollow voice.
All of this is a cause of sorrow and pain to Americans,
as well as to those who wish us well and look to us for
leadership. We ought to be leading the way toward
economic progress and social justice and a stronger, more
stable international order. They are the principles on
which this nation was founded two hundred years ago, by
men who believed with Thomas Paine that the "cause of
America is the cause of all mankind."
- 3 -
Every successful foreign policy we have had -- whether
it was the Good Neighbor Policy of President Franklin
Roosevelt, The Point Four of President Truman or the
Peace Corps and Trade Reform of President Kennedy --
was successful because it reflected the best that was
in us.
And in every foreign venture that has failed -- whether
it was Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile, Angola or in the
excesses of the CIA -- our government forged ahead
without consulting the American people, and did things
that were contrary to our basic character.
The lesson we draw from recent history is that public
understanding and support are now as vital to a success-
ful foreign policy as they are to any domestic program.
NO one can make our foreign policy for us as well as
we can make it ourselves.
JCPC - Address at the Council
on Foreign Relations, Chicago
March 15, 1976
Q. In your Chicago speech on March 15, you said that
this nation's foreign policy has never been in greater
disarray than it is at present. What did you mean?
A. The foreign policy of a country derives its strength
ultimately from the people of the country; their under-
standing of it, their evolution of it, their role in the
consummation of it. Our foreign policy is without
focus. It is not understood by the people, by the Con-
gress or by foreign nations.
It is primarily comprised of Mr. Kissinger's own ideas,
his own goals, most often derived and maintained in
secrecy. I don't think the President plays any sub-
stantial role in the evolution of our foreign policy.
Kissinger has tended to neglect our natural allies and
friends in consultation on major policy decisions. Our
neighbors in this hemisphere feel that they've been
neglected; the Japanese feel that we've ignored their
interests; the European nations feel that our commitment
to them is suspect; plus there's no attitude of respect
or natural purpose toward the developing nations.
Our participation with developing nations is peripheral
and unplanned. We have treated them almost with con-
tempt. A small amount of investment and genuine interest
would pay rich dividends. I think the small nations are
- 4 -
hungry for a more predictable and mutually advan-
tageous relationship with our country.
Time
May 10, 1976
Under the Nixon-Ford Administration, there has evolved
a kind of secretive "Long Ranger" foreign policy --
a one-man policy of international aventure. This is
not an appropriate policy for America.
We have sometimes tried to play other nations, one
against another, instead of organizing free nations
to share world responsibility in collective action.
We have made highly publicized efforts to WOO the
major communist powers while neglecting our natural
friends and allies. A foreign policy based on secrecy
inherently has had to be closely guarded and amoral,
and we have had to forego openness, consultation and a
constant adherence to fundamental principles and high
moral standards.
What we seek is for our nation to have a foreign policy
that reflects the decency and generosity and common
sense of our own people.
We had such a policy more than a hundred years ago and,
in our own lifetimes, in the years following the Second
World War.
The United Nations, The Marshall Plan, the Bretton
Woods Agreement, NATO, Point Four, The OECD, The
Japanese Peace Treaty -- these were among the historic
achievements of a foreign policy directed by courageous
presidents, endorsed by bipartisan majorities in Con-
gress, and supported by the American people.
JCPC - JC Address
Relations Between the World's
Democracies to the Foreign
Policy Association
New York City
June 23, 1976
-6-
Carter Critisisms Continued
We have an inevitable role of leadership to play.
Even if countries don't trust us and don't respect us
at this moment, because we're considered to be war-
like, we're considered to be disrespectful of them,
they still recognize that because of our innate
political strength, the size of our country, our
economic strength, our military strength, that we
are going to be a major voice in the world, and we
ought to assume that position. We can't withdraw
from participation in the United Nations or its
ancillary organizations, because that's where
decisions are made which affect the lives of every-
one who lives in Georgia, or Kentucky, or Iowa.
In food, population, freedom of the seas, international
trade, stable monetary systems, environmental quality,
access to commodities and energy and so forth, we've
got to be part of it. But our foreign policy ought
not to be based on military might nor political power
nor economic pressure. It ought to be based on the
fact that we are right and decent and honest and
truthful and predictable and respectful; in other
words, that our foreign policy itself accurately
represents the character and the ideals of the
American people. But it doesn't. We have set a
different standard of ethics and morality as a nation
than we have in our own private lives as individuals
who comprise the nation. And that ought to be
changed. The President ought to be the spokesman
for this country, not the Secretary of State. And
when the President speaks, he ought to try to
represent as accurately as he can what our people
are. And that's the basis, I believe, on which a
successful foreign policy can be based, to correct
some of the defects we know about and to restore
us once again as a nation that is loved, respected,
and which has friends around the world.
We've done a lot in this country in the last 20 years
to end racial discrimination within our own borders;
but we still have a gross, I think unconscionable,
attitude of racial discrimination in international
affairs. I don't believe, for instance, that we would
have ever bombed or strafed villages in France or
Germany as we did in Vietnam; and this kind of attitude,
of concentrating our own emphasis in foreign policy on
the white-skinned people, is felt throughout the world.
And I think we ought to end that.
Democratic Louisville Forum
November 23, 1975
-6-
I hope we've learned some lessons (in recent years).
One lesson is that we should cease trying to intervene
militarily in the internal affairs of other countries
unless our own nation is endangered. If it were possible
for us to establish democracy all over the world by
military force, you might arouse an argument for it.
But the attempt to do that is counterproductive. We've
seen that vividly in South Korea and also in South
Vietnam. The Soviet Union, with the exception of
street skirmishes in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, hasn't
lost a single soldier in combat since the Second World
War. We lost 34,000 in South Korea and 50,000 in South
Vietnam, basically trying to tell other people what
kind of government they ought to have, what kind of
leader they should have -- and it doesn't work. Either
you have a repressive government taking away liberty
from their people, as is the case in South Korea, to
stay in office, and kicking us in the shins to
demonstrate some superficial independence of us, or,
as was the case in South Vietnam, a constant overthrow
of governments as they became acknowledged to be Ameri-
can puppets. When we go into a country and put our
arms around somebody and say "This is the leader who
we want to be your President or your Prime Minister,"
no matter how popular they might be at the time, we
put the political kiss of death on them. And the
proud people who live in that country automatically
react against a puppet. Had we spent another 50,000
lives and had we spent another $150 billion in South
Vietnam and had we dropped the atomic bomb on North
Vietnam, we still could not have propped up the
governments of Thieu or Ky.
In the last two or three years, I've traveled as an
official visitor to 11 foreign countries, in the Far
East, the Mid East, South America, Central America,
and Europe, and met with leaders there, and talked
to them at length. I've also been in our embassies.
And I think in the recent administrations, there has
been a vivid demonstration of our attitude toward
other people and our lack of respect for them in the
quality of diplomatic officials appointed. When I go
into an embassy in South America or Central America
or Europe and see sitting as our ambassador, our
representative there, a fat, bloated, ignorant, rich
major contributor to a presidential campaign who can't
even speak the language of the country in which he
serves, and who knows even less about our own country
and our consciousness and our ideals and our motivation,
it's an insult to me and to the people of America and
to the people of that country.
Democratic Forum Louisville
November 23, 1975
-7-
When challenged by columnist Robert Novak to name
any ambassador who fit that "ugly American" cari-
cature, Carter said he "wouldn't want to name any."
Boise Idaho Statesman
April 2, 1976
"You don't plot murder and I don't plot murder, SO
why should our government plot murder against some
foreign leader?"
The Atlantic
July 1976
"In Angola, we clung to the Portuguese to the last
moment
The Cuban government, on the other hand,
had learned the people's language, formed friend-
ships and studied their politics
Our reaction was
to send in weapons and let the people kill each
other."
"I think we can find a better ambassador to send
to Africa than Shirley Temple."
The Atlantic
July 1976
Carter criticized the delayed signing of a Russian-
American nuclear test limitations agreement, a
recent veto of a foreign aid bill, and administration
uncertainty on the Rhodesian chrome import issue as
"increasing signs that our nation's foreign policy
has become hostage to Republican Party politics.-
There is not one good reason in the world why Gov.
Reagan should hold a veto voer U.S. foreign policy."
Washington Post
May 15, 1976
Under Kissinger "our foreign policy has consisted
almost entirely of maneuvers and manipulation, based
on the assumption that the world is a jungle of
competing national antagonisms where military supre-
macy and economic muscle are the only things that
matter.
Atlanta Constitution
March 21, 1976
-8-
What I do have is a strong sense that this country
is drifting and must have new leadership and new
direction. The time has come for a new thrust of
creativity in foreign policy equal to that of the
years following the Second World War. The old
international institutions no longer suffice. The
time has come for a new architectural effort, with
creative initiative by our own nation, with growing
cooperation among the industrial democracies its
cornerstones, and with peace and justice its
constant goal.
JCPC - JC Address
Foreign Policy Association
New York
June 23, 1976
-9-
What Carter Would Do
There are certain basic principles I believe should
guide whatever is done in foreign lands in the name
of the United States of America.
First, our policies should be as open and honest
and decent and compassionate as the American people
themselves are. Our policies should be shaped with
the participation of Congress, from the outset, on
a bi-partisan basis. And they should emerge from
broad and well-informed public debate and partici-
pation.
Second, our policies should treat the people of
other nations as individuals, with the same dignity
and respect as we demand for ourselves. No matter
where they live, no matter who they are, the people
of other lands are just as concerned with the struggles
of daily life as you and I. They work hard, they
have families whom they love, they have hopes and
dreams and a great deal of pride. And they want to
live in peace. Their basic personal motives are the
same as ours.
Third, it must be the responsibility of the President
to restore the moral authority of this country in its
conduct of foreign policy. We should work for peace
and the control of arms in everything we do. We
should support the humanitarian aspirations of the
world's people. Policies that strengthen dictators
or create refugees, policies that prolong suffering
or postpone racial justice weaken that authority.
Policies that encourage economic progress and social
justice promote it. In an age when almost all of the
world's people are tied together by instant communi-
cation, the image of a country, as seen through its
policies, has a great deal to do with what it can
accomplish through the traditional channels of
diplomacy.
Fourth, our policies should be aimed at building a
just and peaceful world order, in which every nation
can have a constructive role. For too long, our
foreign policy has consisted almost entirely of
maneuver and manipulation, based on the assumption
that the world is a jungle of competing national
antagonisms, where military supremacy and economic
muscle are the only things that work and where rival
powers are balanced against each other to keep the
peace.
-10-
Exclusive reliance on this strategy is not in
keeping with the character of the American people,
or with the world as it is today. Balance of
power politics may have worked in 1815, or even
1945, but it has a much less significant role
in today's world.
JCPC/Address by Jimmy Carter
to the Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 15, 1976
-11-
Interdependence among nations is an unavoidable
and increasing factor in our individual lives. We
know that even a nation with an economy as strong
as ours is affected by errors such as the excessive
sale of wheat to Russia in 1973, by commodity boy-
cotts, and by the ebb and tide of economic events
in the rest of the world. Our own temporary embargo
of soybeans and other oil seeds was a damaging
mistake to ourselves and to our friends like Japan.
Such mistakes can be avoided in the future only by
a commitment to consultation, as exemplified by the
Trilateral Commission relationship among North
America, Western Europe, and Japan.
JCPC/Jimmy Carter Address on
Foreign Policy to Members of
the American Chamber of Commerce
Tokyo, Japan
March 28, 1975
We must never again keep secret the evolution of
our foreign policy from the Congress and the American
people. They should never again be misled about
our options, our commitments, our progress, or our
failures. If the President sets the policy openly,
reaching agreement among the officers of the govern-
ment, if the President involves the Congress and the
leaders of both parties rather than letting a handful
of people plot the policy behind closed doors, then
we will avoid costly mistakes and have the support
of our citizens in our dealings with other nations.
Our commitments will be stronger; abrupt changes
will be fewer.
Secretaries of State and Defense and other Cabinet
officers should regularly appear before Congress,
hopefully in televised sessions, to answer hard
questions and to give straight answers. No equivo-
cation nor unwarranted secrecy should be permitted.
JCPC/Jimmy Carter Address on
Foreign Policy to Members of
the American Chamber of Commerce
Tokyo, Japan
March 28, 1975
-12-
The time has come for us to seek a partnership
between North America, Western Europe and Japan.
Our three regions share economic, political and
security concerns that make it logical that we
should seek ever-increasing unity and understanding.
JCPC/Jimmy Carter Address on
Relations Between the world's
Democracies to the Foreign
Policy Association
New York, N.Y.
June 23, 1976
In addition to cooperation between North America,
Japan and Western Europe, there is an equal need for
increased unity and consultation between ourselves
and such democratic societies as Israel, Australia,
New Zealand, and other nations, such as those in
this hemisphere, that share our democratic values,
as well as many of our political and economic
concerns.
Jimmy Carter Address on
Relations Between the World's
Democracies to the Foreign
Policy Association
New York, N.Y.
June 23, 1976
I would move away from power-bloc confrontation
and would pursue much more singular bilateral
relationships with the countries of the world.
I would consult much more closely and continually
with our natural allies and friends in Europe,
this hemisphere and Japan. There would be much
less keeping secrets from them about basic changes
in our orientation toward the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China.
Newsweek (European Edition)
May 10, 1976
-13-
I would never again see our nation become militarily
involved in the internal affairs of another country
unless our own security is directly threatened.
But it is absolutely imperative that the world
knows that we will meet obligations and commitments
to allies and that we will always keep our nation
strong. We must also remember that excessive
foreign commitments can overtax our national ability."
American Legion Convention
Seattle
August 24, 1976
The candidate says the U.S. should never get involved
in foreign wars "unless our own nation is endangered."
Wall Street Journal
April 2, 1976
"I don't claim to be an expert on foreign affairs,
(but) I've got excellent advisers."
Chicago Sun Times
October 19, 1975
Foreign policy is not Carter's strong suit. A New
Hampshire speech that was billed as a "major address"
was largely platitudinous: If the U.S. loves the
rest of the world, he seemed to say, the rest of the
world will love the U.S.
Time
March 8, 1976
A stable world order cannot become a reality when
people of many nations of the world suffer mass
starvation, when the countries with capital and
technology belligerently confront other nations
for the control of raw materials and energy sources,
when open and non-discriminatory trade has become
the exception rather than the rule; when there are
no established arrangements for supplying the world's
food and energy, nor for governing control and devel-
opment of the seas, and when there are no effective
-14-
efforts to deal with population explosions or
environmental quality. The intensity to these
interrelated problems is rapidly increasing and
better mechanisms for consultation on these problems
that affect everyone on this planet must be estab-
lished and utilized.
For it is likely that in the future, the issues of
war and peace will be more a function of economic
and social problems than of the military security
problems which have dominated international relations
since 1945.
JCPC/Jimmy Carter Address to the
Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations
March 15, 1976
-15-
Carter's Personal Appraoch to Foreign Policy
Q. Would you press for a summit conference with other
leaders soon after you took office?
A. "I think that a summit conference after the election
would be important, but I would prefer that leaders of
other countries come here."
U.S. News and World Report
September 13, 1976
"I think a crucial prerequisite of an effective foreign
policy is to restore the confidence and morale and
commitment of our people in their own domestic affairs.
So I would not use foreign affairs or foreign trips as
an escape mechanism to avoid responsibilities on the
domestic scene."
"The main thing that's missing now is confidence by
the Secretary of State in the sound judgment, common
sense and integrity of the American people."
Q. Would your Secretary of State be there to make
foreign policy or to carry out the foreign policy that
you make?
A. Both. I would retain the responsibility of making
the final decisions. I would insist on being clearly
informed. And I would retain the role of being spokes-
man for this country. But I would consider the Secretary
of State to be a partner with me, an adviser, and admin-
istrator of the complex foreign affairs mechanism that
falls within the responsibility of the Secretary of
State. But I would be the ultimate one to make the
decisions."
National Journal
July 17, 1976
"I remember when I first became interested in foreign
affairs, when Harry Truman was in office. He always
had Sen. (Arthur) Vandenberg, a great Republican senator,
and Senator Walter George, a great Democrat senator from
Georgia, and they always consulted with him in setting
up
The Marshall Plan, the United Nations, aid to
Turkey and Greece and the establishment of Israel as a
nation. It was a working relationship between the White
House and the Congress. We haven't had that lately and
I intend to restore it."
-16-
Carter noted that he has not had "a great deal of
experience" in foreign affairs but said that a
foreign policy "that would make us proud again"
could be based largely on "sound judgment and
common sense and intelligence and openness. "
Washington Post
June 29, 1976
He said he would constantly consult with Congress
on the formulation of policy, but would also "make
every reasonable attempt to preserve the prerogatives
and authority of the president."
Carter said he would be the nation's "spokesman" but
not his own Secretary of State. While coordination
"would be my responsibility, I would like to let
the Cabinet officers run their own departments."
"We must replace balance-of-power politics with world-
order politics
:
New York Times
July 7, 1976
Q. Can you conceive of a situation in the Third World --
Latin America, Asia, and Africa -- where you would send
American combat forces?
A. "If the altercation was internal, a struggle for
control of the government, I can't envision any circum-
stances under which I would send troops. If there as a
war begun between countries and I felt that our own
national security interests were directly endangered,
I would certainly consider sending troops."
New York Times
July 7, 1976
-17-
Carter & The Secretary -f State
"He's (Kissinger) a remarkable man and a very
good friend of mine. He's the kind of person
who has a tremendous sense of humor and who,
I think, is preserving the character of his
nation in a superlative way during the times
that are so trying to us all."
Speech, B'nai B'rith
April 20, 1974
Carter supported Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger's approach to Foreign Policy, calling
Kissinger a close friend with whom he met
frequently for discussions.
Capital Times, Wisconsin
February 8, 1975
"I think Dr. Kissinger deserves the gratitude
of the American people for having concluded
these very difficult negotiations and I want
to congratulate them in a wonderful achievement."
Atlanta Journal
January 24, 1976
"There is no way I would keep Kissinger as
Secretary of State, but as a personal diplomat,
in a particular circumstance, I would certainly
call on Kissinger either for a confrontation
or perhaps as a negotiator."
Chicago Tribune
May 8, 1976
-18-
Q. What type of qualities would you look for in
a Secretary of State? What type of back-
ground and personal characteristics? Would
you like to have someone who came out of
the foreign policy "establishment" and had
been involved in foreign affairs over the
years? Or someone who had been watching it
in a more detached way?
A. That's something I haven't yet decided, nor
have I had to decide it. I would probably
depend more upon my confidence in the intel-
ligence and judgment and moral commitment
of the person, than I would on the particular
environment that has shaped that person's
knowledge of foreign affairs. I've got
about 15 or 20 people in whom I have placed
a lot of responsibility, and among that group
I would seek advice before I made a final
decision on Secretary of State. The main
thing that's missing now is confidence by
the Secretary of State in the sound judgment,
common sense and integrity of the American
people.
Q. Do you see a model in any of the recent
Secretaries of State -- William Rogers, who
was sort of a sword carrier, Henry Kissinger
the policy maker, or perhaps Dean Acheson,
who seemed to do it fairly cooperatively
with the President?
A. I think Dean Acheson, George Marshall would
be two who did a superb job, in my opinion.
I don't think there was every any doubt in
the minds of the American people about who
was responsible ultimately. Even when those
two very strong Secretaries of State were
in office, it was the President. They were
men of conviction, of sensitivity, of com-
petence and authority. And they worked har-
moniously with the President. And they
carried out the responsiblities specifically
designated to them by the President, on an
individual basis of agreement. So I think
those two would be the kinds of persons that
I would admire very much.
National Journal
July 17, 1976
-19-
Q. Do you intend to be primarily your own
Secretary of State?
A. "Not as far as the administration of our
foreign policy is concerned. But I would
want to have a Secretary of State and heads
of other departments of the government who
are capable of performing their functions
independently, reporting to me and keeping
me conversant with what their overall
policies might be."
"As far as the evolution of foreign affairs
and policies are concerned, I would not want
to have a White House staff in effect super-
ior to the Secretary of State. Now I believe
in putting into office the most competent
and qualified people as administrators of
that department and letting them perform their
functions without interference from me, but
responsible always to me. I really prefer
to be the spokesman for the nation in the
area of foreign affairs and on matters of
major policy and let the American people
look to me as the one to represent our
country in that respect. "
New York Times
July 7, 1976
"I would probably stay in this country most of
the time and not travel so much abroad. But
I would encourage them to come to visit me.
And I've got a fairly large family. I would
put them on the road, especially in Latin
America. All of them speak some Spanish."
Newsweek (European Edition)
May 10, 1976
-20-
Carter also wants to give the NSC, an impor-
tant arm of the White House, a much broader
charter which would involve it for the first
time in traditionally domestic concerns. The
altered role that he is comtemplating for the
NSC would make a major change in a key presi-
dential instrument for dealing with the nation's
most vital foreign policy, defense and intelli-
gence matters.
"I think that the economic strength, the trans-
portation system, energy policies and the prior-
ities in how tax revenues are spent are all impor-
tant elements in the security of the country."
While he wants the council to encompass economic
and social questions in its dealings, Carter
said he has not yet worked out in his mind
precisely what form such an expanded body should
take."
Atlanta Constitution
August 8, 1976
Kissinger, in Carter's view, is a "brilliant
man, and a superb negotiator," but he could
never be Carter's Secretary of State because
he "does not trust the American people."
New York Times
February 11, 1976
Kissinger professes to find Carter's views
"fairly consistent" and "compatible" with those
of the Ford Administration.
"The difference is that what the present adminis-
tration says it is doing -- although it is not
doing it -- would actually be Carter's policy.
Kissinger has made an expedient change of langu-
age and rhetoric. He has discovered morality,
the importance of fundamentals, the virtues of
openness. But it's all a bunch of rhetoric. No
one should be deceived.
*A Carter foreign policy adviser
Los Angeles Times
July 18, 1976
-21-
1976 ELECTION AND FOREIGN POLICY
"I think that following the convention this year,
perhaps as much at any time in recent history, the
debate, if I'm successful, will be between myself
and President Ford on foreign policy. I think
domestic issues will be much less significant than
the debate on basic foreign policy."
Capital Times (Wis.)
March 29, 1976
"Jimmy Carter on the issues"
Carter warned foreign countries to "stay out of our
election campaign," called "inappropriate" for them
to inject themselves into U.S. domestic politics or
to suggest that they could. He called it a "detri-
ment" to the campaign.
even if nominated, he would not meet with foreign
representatives "without prior consultation with the
secretary of state."
The former Georgia governor said he had requested
and held one meeting in Miami with the Israeli
ambassador earlier this year to ask him some questions
about the Israeli-occupied West Bank of the Jordan
River--"I wanted to understand what was going on,
Carter said.
N.Y. Daily News
May 14, 1976
"I plan to spend five or six hours at the first
(CIA briefing) session just letting the CIA educate
me about current and unpublished relationships between
our country and other countries around the world,
particularly those that might be of some threat to
peace. I want to make sure that during the campaign
itself that I'm as well informed as possible SO that
I don't make a statement inadvertently that would
contravene the purposes of our country or might be
some disruption in the search for peace or good
relationships with other countries."
AP
Hershey, Pa.
July 6, 1976
CARTER ON RELATIONS WITH MAJOR ALLIES
1. Trilateralism: Carter consistently argues that
under the Nixon-Ford Administrations, "we have made
highly publicized efforts to WOO the major communist
powers while neglecting our natural friends and allies."
He says that he would place far more emphasis upon
U.S. alliances and less emphasis on relationships with
the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. To underscore his point,
he has called for a new "creative partnership" between
North America, Western Europe and Japan that would deal
with problems such as the arms race, world poverty and
the allocation of natural resources.
Commentators point out that Carter's views seem to stem
from his membership on the Trilateral Commission and that
some of his advisers (e.g., Brezinski) are the leaders
of the commission. Other commentators point out that
Carter's criticisms of U.S. policy toward Europe and Japan
were better aimed at the Nixon Administration; under
Ford, they say, far more attention has been paid to the
allies and the era of "diplomatic shocks" has ended.
2. Goals for the Industrial Democracies: Carter's
most complete statement on the aims of a new trilateral
relationship camein a Foreign Policy Association speech
in New York City on June 23, when he set forth three
areas in which the industrial democracies must make
greater progress:
-- Greater economic and political cooperation aimed
at lowering trade barriers, better coordination of econo-
mic policies, sharing of ideas on health care, transpor-
tation, etc., and promotion of human rights;
-- Greater cooperation on mutual security issues
(See NATO, other defense sections) ;
-- Greater cooperation on North-South issues.
Carter wants to widen North-South consultations, give
more effective assistance, and limit the flow of arms
into the developing world.
3. Expansive Rhetoric: Carter does not have many specifics
but he uses very grand rhetoric to describe the new rela-
tionships he foresees: "The time has come for a new
thrust of creativity in foreign policy equal to that of
the years following World War II. The old international
- 2 -
institutions no longer suffice. The time has come
for a new architectural effort, with creative initia-
tive by our own nation, with growing cooperation among
the industrial democracies its cornerstone, and with
peace and justice its constant goal."
New York City
June 23, 1976
4, Communism in Europe: While Carter has constantly
opposed communist gains in Europe, he has also said
that it is shortsighted for the U.S. to work with
Brezhnev but not become acquainted with communist
leaders in NATO. Specifically, Carter said "we should
not close the doors to communist leaders in Italy for
a friendship with us." This remark came before the
Italian election, and was regarded as a gaffe by con-
servatives in the U.S.
CARTER QUOTES ON RELATIONS WITH ALLIES
To the maximum extent possible, our dealings with the
communist powers should reflect the combined views of
the democracies, and thereby avoid suspicions by our
allies that we may be disregarding their interests.
We seek not a condominium of the powerful but community
of the free.
JCPC JC Address - Relations
Between the World Democracies
to the Foreign Policy Association
New York City
June 23, 1976
There are at least three areas in which the democratic
nations can benefit from closer and more creative
relations.
First, there are our economic and political affairs.
In the realm of economics, our basic purpose must be to
keep open the international system in which the exchange
of goods, capital, and ideas among nations can continue
to expand.
Increased coordination among the industrialized de-
mocracies can help avoid the repetition of such episodes
as the inflation of 1972-73 and the more recent recessions.
Both were made more severe by an excess of expansionist
zeal and then of deflationary reaction in North America
Japan and Europe.
Though each country must make its own economic decisions,
we need to know more about one another's interests and
intentions. We must avoid unilateral acts and we must
try not to work at cross-purposes in the pursuit of the
same ends. We need not agree on all matters, but we
should agree to discuss all matters.
JCPC JC Address - Relations
Between the World Democracies
to the Foreign Policy Association
New York City
June 23, 1976
- 2 -
The second area of increased cooperation among the
democracies is that of mutual security. Here, how-
ever, we must recognize that the Atlantic and Pacific
regions have quite different needs and different
political sensitivities.
Since the United States is both an Atlantic and a
Pacific power, our commitments to the security of
Western Europe and Japan are inseparable from our own
security. Without these commitments, and our firm
dedication to them, the political fabric of Atlantic
and Pacific cooperation would be seriously weakened,
and world peace endangered.
East-West relations will be both cooperative and
competitive for a long time to come. We want the
competition to be peaceful, and we want the coopera-
tion to increase. But we will never seek accommodation
at the expense of our own national interests or the
interests of our allies.
Our democracies must also work together more closely
in a joint effort to help the hundreds of millions of
people on this planet who are living in poverty and
despair.
We have all seen the growth of North-South tensions in
world affairs, tensions that are often based on legiti-
mate economic grievances. We have seen in the Middle
East the juncture of East-West and North-South conflicts
and the resultant threat to world peace.
The democratic nations must respond to the challenge
of human need on three levels.
First, by widening the opportunities for genuine North-
South consultations.
Secondly, by assisting those nations that are in direst
need.
Third, we and our allies must work together to limit
the flow of arms into the developing world.
Address, Foreign Policy
Association
New York City
June 23, 1976
- 3 -
We and our allies, in a creative partnership, can take
the lead in establishing and promoting basic global
standards of human rights. We respect the independence
of all nations, but by our example, by our utterances,
and by the various forms of economic and political
persuasion available to us, we can quite surely lessen
the injustice in this world.
Address, Foreign
Policy Association
New York City
June 23, 1976
Carter claims that the United States has "neglected
our natural allies like France, England, Mexico and
Japan.
=
Capital Times
Madison, Wisconsin
March 25, 1976
"I should think it is shortsighted of us to deal openly
with Brezhnev and leaders of the Soviet Union and refuse
to understand and become acquainted with leaders in a
NATO country who are communist. I believe we should
support strongly the democratic forces in Italy, but
still we should not close the doors to communist leaders
in Italy for friendship with us. It may be that we
would be better off having an Italian government that
might be comprised at least partially of communists
tied in with the Western world rather than driven
into the Soviet orbit irrevocably."
Newsweek
May 10, 1976
(European Edition)
In reference to the election held in Italy, Carter
said: "We must respect the results of democratic
elections and the right of countries to make their
own free choice if we are to remain faithful to
our own basic needs."
St. Louis Post-Dispatch
June 24, 1976
Carter told a Frensh television interviewer he doesn't
believe France will go communist. But he said he's
not going to tell the French how to vote.
- 4 -
"I think the French people themselves believe that
communism could be a threat to justice and freedom,
and I beleive the average feeling of the French tends
toward a more democratic government. But in any event
the French know how to vote, and I am not going to
tell them how to do it."
AP
July 13, 1976
"I see no reason why we should go to Russia and meet
with Brezhnev and not also get to know the attitudes
and hopes and strengths and reason for the strengths
of these communist partieis in the European countries."
"If we decide the other, more competitive democratic
parties would be better for world peace," then the
United States should encourage those parties through
diplomatic means, trade negotiations and statements
in NATO.
"But we ought not to freeze out the American people's
knowledge of the communist parties."
Capital Times
Madison, Wisconsin
March 25, 1976
We may not welcome these changes: we will certainly
not encourage them. But we must repect the results
of democratic elections and the right of countries to
make their own free choice if we are to remain faith-
ful to our own basic ideals. We must learn to live
with diversity, and we can continue to cooperate, SO
long as such political parties respect the democratic
process, upholding existing international commitments,
and are not subservient to external political direction.
The democratic concert of nations should exclude only
those who exclude themselves by the rejection of
democracy itself.
JCPC JC Address - Relations
Between the World's Democracies
the Foreign Policy Association
New York City
June 23, 1976
- 5 -
"I really believe that the situation in Italy is not
as serious as it was a year ago when Italy was on the
verge of absolute, total bankruptcy and when many
people who were quite conservative and even leaders
of some of the major corporations felt that the com-
munists would do a better job of managing the nation's
affairs than the present leaders. I think the situa-
tion has improved. I would certainly hate to see Italy
go communist. I think we ought to do everything we
can within reasonable and open bounds through NATO,
through our strengthening of the position of the more
democratic leaders, to prevent it if it becomes
obvious that the present government is incapable of
leadership and the communists are the choice of the
people of Italy then I don't think we ought to
intervene militarily or by any sort of covert means.
That would include assassinations, for instance, I
don't think that would be right."
National Democratic Issues
Conference
Louisville, Kentucky
November 23, 1976
Nations
Developing
Deve
CARTER ON DEVELOPING NATIONS
1. Criticisms of Current Policy: A consistent
theme in Carter's foreign policy pronouncements
has been his view that the Nixon-Ford Adminis-
trations have either ignored the developing
nations or treated them like pawns in a big
power chess game. This "traditional paternalism"
reflects, he says, a sense of superiority --
a form a racism. Many of his comments came
before HAK's most recent venture to southern
Africa but after his trip to Latin America.
2. Vague Program: Carter promises to be both
more solicitous and tough-minded in dealing
with the developing nations, but the only specifics
he has put forward are:
-- Greater cooperation among the industrial
democracies (see below);
-- A desire for more commodity agreements
in such items as tin, coffee and sugar;
-- Redirection of international aid "so
that it meets the minimum human needs of the
greatest number of people. This means an emphasis
on food, jobs, education, and public health --
including access to family planning." A favorite
Carter line: "The time has come to stop taxing
poor people in rich countries for the benefit of
rich people in poor countries."
-- He has indicated that U.S. foreign aid
should amount to about one-half of one percent
of GNP. (Foreign aid for FY 1977 is just over
$5 billion, which is less than one-half of one
percent of GNP. Under Carter's proposal, foreign
aid in FY 1977 would be about $8.4 billion. Double
checking this.)
-- He also wants to persuade OPEC and the
USSR to participate more fully in aid programs.
-- He has indicated an interest in revitalizing
international monetary institutions, but he hasn't
said how.
-2-
3. International Cooperation: As part of
creating stronger relationships with the
developing nations, Carter wants to solicit
their cooperation in limiting nuclear weapons,
controlling the flow of narcotics, and com-
batting terrorism. Without their help, he
says, such efforts will fail. He thinks U.S.
aid can be used as a lever to reduce repression
in other nations.
4. Latin America: Carter has said he would
make use of members of his family as emissaries
to Latin America. He himself speaks Spanish
(he is reportedly learning the language by
reading a Spanish Bible), and he has shown a
special affection for Latin America -- but
again no programs.
5. Africa: Carter has consistently supported
U.S. efforts to achieve racial peace in southern
Africa, though he hasn't said much lately.
6. Resolving the North-South Conflicts: Carter
says that in order to overcome growing tensions
between North and South, the industrial demo-
cracies must unite for a three-fold purpose: to
widen North-South consultations, to improve aid
programs, and to limit the flow of weapons
to developing nations.
CARTER QUOTES ON DEVELOPING NATIONS
Our policies toward the developing countries
also need revision. For years, we have either
ignored them or treated them as pawns in the big
power chess game. Both approaches were deeply
offensive to their people. The oil embargo
taught us that even the least developed nation
will eventually have control over its own natural
resources and that those countries which, alone
or together, can control necessary commodities
are a force that can neither be ignored or manip-
ulated.
An attitude of neglect and disrespect toward
the developing nations of the world is predicated
in part on a sense of-superiority toward others --
a form a racism. This is incompatible with the
character of American people.
We need to enlist the cooperation of the developing
nations, for when we speak of the tasks of a stable
world order, we include preventing the spread of
nuclear weapons, policing the world's environment,
controlling the flow of narcotics and establishing
international protection against acts of terror.
If three-quarters of the people of the world do
not join in these arrangements, they will not
succeed.
Our policies toward the developing world must
be tough-minded in the pursuit of our legitimate
interests. At the same time these policies
must be patient in the recognition of their legi-
timate interests which have too often been cast
aside.
The developing world has, of course, a few leaders
who are implacably hostile to anything the United
States does. But the majority of its leaders are
moderate men and women who are prepared to work
with us. When we ignore the Third World, as we have
for so long, the extremists will usually have their
way. But if we offer programs based on common
interests, we can make common cause with most of
their leadership.
-2-
Our program of international aid to developing
nations should be redirected so that it meets
the minimum human needs of the greatest number
of people. This means an emphasis on food, jobs,
education, and public health -- including access
to family planning. The emphasis in aid should
be on those countries with a proven ability to
help themselves, instead of those that continue
to allow enormous discrepancies in living stan-
dards among their people. The time has come to
stop taxing poor people in rich counties for the
benefit of rich people in poor counties.
In trade relations with these nations we should
join commodity agreements in such items as tin,
coffee and sugar which will assure adequate supplies
to consumers, protect our people from inflation,
and at the same time stop the fluctuation in prices
that can cause such hardship and uncertainty in
single-commodity countires.
The burden of economic development is going to
be a heavy one. There are many countries which
ought to share it not only in Europe and Asia
but in the Mideast. Today, a greater proportion
of royalties from oil can be channelled to the
Third World by internationsl institutions. Tomor-
row, they can receive a part of the profits from
the mining of the seas. The purpose of such
development is not to level the economic lot of
every person on earth. It is to inject the health-
creating process into countries that are now stag-
nant; it is to help developing counties to act in
what is their own best interest as well as ours --
produce more food, limit population growth, and
expand markets, supplies and materials. It is
simply to give every country a sufficient take in
the international order so that it feels no need
to act as an outlaw. It is to advance the cause
of human dignity.
JCPC/Address by Jimmy Carter
to the Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 15, 1976
-3-
There is no question that both Africa and
Latin America have been ignored since the
presidencies of John Kennedy and Lyndon
Johnson. These areas should become, and
indeed will become, increasingly important
in the next decade. Our relationships with
these must abandon traditional paternalism.
The United States-Brazilian agreement, signed
recently by Secretary of State Kissinger on
his trip to Latin America, is a good example
of our present policy at its worst. Kissinger's
remarks during his visit that "there are no
two people whose concern for human dignities
and for the basic values of man is more pro-
found in day-to-day life than Brazil and the
United States" can only be taken as a gratui-
tous slap in the face of all those Americans
who want a foreign policy that embodies our
ideals, not subverts them.
JCPC/Address by Jimmy Carter
to the Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 15, 1976
The other nations of the world who think we
ought to be leaders have lost respect for us.
They don't think we tell the truth. We're not
predictable. We don't respect them. And we've
lost their respect for us. That hurts me
personally, and it hurts our country -- to know
that the more weak, or embryonic, or dark-skinned
a nation is, the less likely it is to say "I
want my destiny to be tied to, I want my future
to be connected with, that of the people of the
United States." They don't say that. They say,
"as a last resort I put my eggs in the Soviet
Union's basket, or I put my eggs in the basket
of China." It has to be a mutual thing.
Lousiville Forum
November 23, 1975
-4-
Q. Beyond improving the process of consulta-
tion with developing countries, what else
would you do? Would you increase foreign
economic aid?
A. I don't think gifts are the major need for
the establishment of good relationships.
We need trade agreements, and maybe a foreign
aid expenditure equivalent to one-half of
1% of our gross national product, plus a
reorientation of the ultimate beneficiaries
of that foreign aid. One of my advisers
has said that we should no longer tax the
poor people of a rich country to give aid
to the rich people in the poor countries.
I think that's what we have been doing.
We also have very little predictability
with respect to foreign aid. We lack openly
expressed and clearly understood goals.
The American people are not part of the
process. The Congress is not part of the
process. We've lost our very precious
bipartisan support that involved both
Congress and the Executive.
Time
May 10, 1976
In the future, we must turn our attention
increasingly towards these common problems of
food, energy, environment, and trade. A stable
world order cannot become a reality when people
of many nations of the world suffer mass starva-
tion or when there are no established arrange-
ments to deal with population growth or environ-
mental quality. The intensity of these inter-
related problems is rapidly increasing and
better mechanisms for consultation on these
problems that affect averyone on this planet
must be established and utilized.
Address to the Chicago Council
on Foreign Relations
March 15, 1976
-5-
"I would like to get as much as possible
the OPEC countries and the Soviet Union, for
instance, to join with the developed demo-
cracies of the world to share the responsi-
bility for the less developed nation."
National Journal
July 17, 1976
Carter and his aides have indicated U.S. aid
would be used as a lever to fight repression
in such countries as South Korea, Chile and
Brazil. This would put him in a touchy posi-
tion on Jewish emigration from the Soviet
Union, because his stated intention is to
increase trade with that nation.
Chicago Tribune
July 30, 1976
"I think in the recent administrations, there
has been a vivid demonstration of our attitude
toward other people and our lack of respect for
them in the quality of diplomatic officials
appointed. When I go into an embassy and see
sitting as our ambassador, our representative
a fat, bloated, ignorant, rich, major contributor
to a Presidential campaign who can't even speak
the language of the country in which he serves,
and who knows even less about our own country
and our consciousness and our ideals and our
motivations, it's an insult to me and to the
people of America and to the people of that
country."
"I doubt if you would find any diplomats in
Washington who don't speak English. But you
go into a small country that's embryonic or
weak or dark-skinned, and you very seldom find
a diplomat who can even speak their languages
"
National Democratic Issues
Conference
Louisville, Kentucky
November 23, 1975
-6-
Africa
Q. What should be the U.S. stance toward
Africa? Kissinger this week has seemed
to be tilting U.S. policy toward Black
Africa states. What is your reaction
to his initiative?
A. I've been gratified by it. I agree with
what Kissinger has done in the last
week. I favor majority rule in Rhodesia.
Newseek (European Edition)
May 10, 1976
Jimmy Carter, urging a greater foreign policy
focus on developing nations in general and Africa
in particular, said today the United States could
use its experience in race relations and its
private investment to help bring majority black
rule to southern Africa.
Reaffirming his previous support for majority
rule in South Africa and Rhodesia, Carter said
he had no quick, easy answers to the problem
but added: "I think our country has estab-
lished through our own experience in race rela-
tionships, and particularly in the South, an
understanding of this very sensitive issue of
black and white people within the same community.
with that special knowledge in our country,
I think we might be help in Africa."
Urging that the United States "continue constraining
our relationship with South Africa to encourage
a move toward majority rule," the former Georgia
governor noted that moves toward equality in
the American South were slow to come until the
business community became involved.
"Obviously, the heavy investments that we now
have by the private sector in industrial oppor-
tunities and banking (in white-ruled Africa), for
instance, is a possible mechanism that we might
use jointly with government to bring about that
kind of persuasion," Carter added.
Washington Post
July 30, 1976
-7-
Resolving North-South Conflicts
Our democracies must also work together more
closely in a joint effort to help the hundreds
of millions of people on this planet who are
living in poverty and despair.
We have all seen the growth of North-South ten-
sions in world affairs, tensions that are often
based on legitimate economic grievances. We
have seen in the Middle East the juncture of
East-West and North-South conflicts and the
resultant threat to world peace.
The democratic nations must repond to the chal-
lenge of human need on three levels.
First, by widening the opportunities for genuine
North-South consultations. The developing
nations must not only be the objects of policy,
but must participate in shaping it. Without
wider consultations we will have sharper con-
frontations. A good start has been made with
the conference in international economic coopera-
tion which should be strengthened and widened.
Secondly, by assisting those nations that are
in direst need.
There are many ways the democracies can unite
to help shape a more stable and just world order.
We can work to lower trade barriers and make
a major effort to provide increased support to
the international agencies that now make capital
available to the Third World.
This will require help from Europe, Japan,
North America, and the wealthier members of
OPEC for the World Bank's soft-loan affiliate,
the International Development Association. The
wealthier countries should also support such
specialized funds as the new International Fund
for Agricultural Development, which will put
resources from the oil exporting and devel-
oped countries to work in increasing food pro-
duction in poor countries. We might also seek
to institutionalize, under the World Bank, a
"World Development Budget", in order to rationalize
and coordinate these and other similar efforts.
-8-
It is also time for the Soviet Union, which
donates only about one-tenth of one percent of
its GNP to foreign aid -- and mostly for
policical ends -- to act more generously
toward global economic development.
I might add, on the subject of foreign aid,
that while we are a generous nation we are not
a foolish nation, and our people will expect
recipient nations to undertake needed reforms
to promote their own development. Moreover,
all nations must recognize that the North-South
relationship is not made easier by one-sided
self-righteousness, by the exercise of auto-
matic majorities in world bodies, nor by intoler-
ance for the views or the very existence of
other nations,
Third, we and our allies must work together
to limit. the flow of arms into the developing
world.
The North-South conflict is in part a security
problem. As long as the more powerful nations
exploit the less powerful, they will be repaid
by terrorism, hatred, and potential violence.
Insofar as our policies are selfish, or cynical,
or shortsighted, there will inevitably be a
day of reckoning.
Speech, Foreign Policy
Association
New York City
June 23, 1976
CARTER ON THE MIDDLE EAST
1. General Position: Carter promises a more agres-
sive policy of achieving an overall peace settlement
in the Middle East. He has been contradictory about
the way he would pursue negotiations and has shown
a certain haziness about the participants, but he
has been fairly consistent about the elements of a
final settlement and about his strong support for Israel.
2. Essentials for a Settlement: Carter endorses U.N.
Resolution 242 as the basis of a settlement and inter-
prets it to mean that there are two essentials for
peace:
-- A basic change in Arab attitudes so that
they would recognize the right of Israel to exist as a
Jewish state. He thinks the change in attitude should
be reflected in several concrete actions:
-- Recognition of Israel;
-- Diplomatic regognition of Israel;
-- Peace treaty with Isreal;
-- Open frontiers with Israel's neighbors;
-- End to embargo and official hostile
propaganda against Israel.
--A second essential beyond the change of atti-
tude would be a withdrawal of Israel to basically the
1967 borders; while Carter thinks that final borders
must be determined in direct negotiations between the
parties, he has said on several occasions that he
would be inclined to let the Israelis keep the Golan
Heights and holy places in Jerusalem.
3. Process of Negotiations: Carter said in New Hamp-
shire early this year that U.S. mediation efforts
"have been fruitful and I think well-advised"; he
also told the Boston Herald Examiner in July that the
Sinai agreement was "a good step forward". But of
late, as the political campaign has sharpened up,
he has indicated unhappiness with the pace of negotia-
tions; he would be more agressive, he says. He has
been unclear just how he would proceed. On some occa-
sions, he has endorsed general negotiations, perhaps
Geneva; on other occasions, he has endorsed step-by-
step negotiations -- at least as an interim measure.
So his differences with the Administration on the nego-
tiations seem more cosmetic than real.
-2-
4. The Palestinians: Carter has said that the
Palentinian interests must be taken account of in a
final settlement after they have recognized Israel.
He has not been very specific.
5. Soviet Participation: Carter has also said that
the U.S. must seek Soviet participation in achieving
a peace settlement. On one occasion, he indicated
that the U.S. and the Soviets should enter into
non-publicized negotiations to arrive at a general
solution which they could then publicly propose to
the parties.
6. U.S. Support for Israel: Carter says that U.S.
support for Israel must be constant and unequivocal.
This is a moral imperative of U.S. policy. He wants
U.S. economic and military aid to be "adequate" to
Israel's needs, recognizing that Israeli resources
are being drained off for defense purposes. He does
not want to send U.S. troops to Israel. But he has
also said that he would be willing to consider
assigning U.S. troops to the area to guarantee a
settlement -- although he thinks that is not the most
desirable solution.
7. Relations with Arabs: Carter has professed much
less friendship for the Arabs than the Israelis. He
opposes sales of offensive weapons to them and thinks
that European arms sales to them have been excessive.
He wants to maintain a strong trade and economic rela-
tionship with the Arab states, but he has also promised
much stiffer enforcement of anti-Arab boycott legisla-
tion (he has not publicly commited himself on the
Ribicoff anti-boycott efforts). He has also promised
stiff economic sanctions against the Arabs in the
event of another oil embargo.
8. Israel as a Fulfullment of Biblical Prophecy: One
special feature of Carter's ties to the Israelis is
his belief that the existence of Israel as a Jewish
state would represent a fulfillment of Biblical prophecy.
Some commentators think that because of his religious
background, Carter would make recognition of Israel a
prime personal objective of his Administration.
FOND
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
-3-
9. Movement of Israeli Capital: The Democratic
platform supports the transfer of the capital from
Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Carter has specifically
reserved judgment on that.
CARTER QUOTES ON THE MIDDLE EAST
General
The Middle East is a key testing area for our
capacity to construct a more cooperative inter-
national system. I believe deeply that a
Middle East peace settlement is essential to
American interests, to Israel's long-range
survival and to international cooperation.
Without a settlement, the region will become
increasing open to Soviet influence and more
susceptible to radical violence. I believe
that the United States should insure Israel's
security while at the same time encourage both
sides to address themselves to the substance
of a genuine settlement.
Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations
March 15, 1976
Peace in the Middle East depends more than
anything else on a basic change of attitude.
To be specific, on Arab recognition of the
right of Israel to exist as a Jewish state.
Now this change of attitude on the part of
the Arab states must be reflected in tangible
and concrete actions including first of all
the recognition of Israel, which they have not
yet done; secondly, diplomatic relations with
Israel; third, a peace treaty with Israel;
fourth, open frontiers by Israel's neighbors;
last, an end to embargo and official hostile
propaganda against the State of Israel.
The other principle of the United Nations Reso-
lution 242 calls for, and again I quote, "with-
drawal of Israel's armed forces from territories
occupied in the recent conflict." This language
-2-
leaves open the door for changes in the
pre-1967 lines by mutual agreement.
Final borders between Israel and her neigh-
bors should be determined in direct nego-
tiations between the parties and they should
not be imposed from outside.
Address in Elizabeth, N.J.
June 6, 1976
Achieving a Settlement
Our constant and unswerving goal must be the
survival of Israel as a Jewish State, and the
achievement for all people of a just and lasting
settlement. As long as there is no such settle-
ment, there can be no peace. There will only
be periods of uneasy truce punctuated by border
raids and terrorism while each side builds up
forces preparing for another conflict.
A real peace must be based on absolute assurance
of Israel's survival and security. As President,
I would never yield on that point. The survival
of Israel is not just a political issue, it
is a moral imperative. That is my deeply held
belief and it is the belief that is shared by
the vast majority of American people.
Ours was the first nation to recognize the
State of Israel when it was formed and we must
remain the first nation to which Israel can
turn in time of need.
Just as we must be clear about our commitment
for the preservation and well-being of Israel,
we must also be clear about our commitment to
meaningful and productive Arab-Israeli negoatia-
tions.
Only face-to-face communication can build a
trust and insure the accommodations that will be
needed. By insisting on these kinds of talks,
-3-
by demonstrating the seriousness of our
commitment to a real peace, we can use our
influence to prepare all sides for the best
way out of this tragic conflict.
I favor early movement toward discussion of the
outline of an eventual overall settlement. I
discussed this particular subject with Mrs.
Golda Meir within the last few weeks - an early
movement towards discussion of the outline
of an eventual overall settlement. A limited
settlement, as we have seen in the past, still
leaves unresolved the underlying threat to
Israel - on which will end the conflict between
Israel and its neighbors once and for all.
Now the guide to a general settlement is to be
found in United Nations Resolution 242 which has
been accepted by Israel and all her neighboring
governments. It sets forth two main principles.
Address on the Middle East
Elizabeth, New Jersey
June 6, 1976
I would not send troops to Israel. I have
never met an Israeli leader, president or pre-
vious prime minister, or any defense leaders
or foreign executives who ever advocated under
any circumstances, the sending of American
troops to Israel.
I think that we should pursue aggressively
the general provisions of the United Nations
Resolution 242 and I think we ought to use
whatever influence we have through the Soviet
Union and directly, (on) Arab nations through
our own friendship with them, through trade
agreements, and through other means to get
them to recognize Israel's right to exist and
to be willing to declare a non-belligerency
status against Israel.
-4-
The resolution calls for the Arab nations to
negotiate with Israel directly and I think that
would be a matter that we should seek. In the
absence of that willingness on the part of
the Arab nations, we should offer our services
as an equal third party as was the case in the
Sinai agreement which I thought was a good
step forward.
Ultimately, of course, Israel will have to
withdraw from major portions of territory cap-
tured by them in the '67 war. That should be
done on a quid pro quo basis. There are some
exceptions that I would personally recognize.
One is, I don't think that Israel is going to
relinquish to the Syrians direct control of the
Golan Heights. I would not. And I think that
Israel is going to be reluctant, and I would
support their reluctance, to relinquish control
of the Christian and Jewish holy places in Old
Jerusalem.
The legitimate interest of Palestinians is
probably the most importanct aspect of the Middle
East settlement. They ought to be recognized.
There ought to be territories ceded for the use
of the Palestinians. I think they should be
part of Jordan and be administered by Jordan.
I think half the people in Jordan are Pales-
tinians themselves. And that would be my own
preference.
We ought to be constantly probing for some
mutuality of purpose there. I would not be
adverse to a step-by-step approach if it was
the only alternative. I think overall, though,
a better possibility would be a comprehensive
approach.
I think that the Geneva conference might possibly
be reconvened in the future, if all other pos-
sibilities break down. The major possibility
is participation by the Palestinians, which Israel
objects to very strongly. I think the Arab
countries ought to make that a requisite. Also,
the Soviet Union ought to be a party to the conference.
Boston Sunday Herald Examiner
July 25, 1976
-5-
"I favor early movement toward discussion of
the outline of an eventual overall settlement,
Limited settlements, as we have seen in the
past, leave unresolved the underlying threat
to Israel. A general settlement is needed,
one which will end the conflict between Israel
and its neighbors once and for all."
Statement by Carter
June 5, 1976
We want no clash with the Soviets, but we
could not accept the intervention of its
combat forces into any Arab-Israel conflict.
I do not believe that the road to peace can be
found by U.S.-Soviet imposition of a settlement.
Statement by Carter
June 5, 1976
"It may be that some time in the future, after
unpublicized negotiations between us and the
Soviet Union, we might jointly make a public
proposal of a solution to the Middle East. In
the meantime, the step-by-step approach is a
reasonable approach. I think Jordan might be
the next possibility for some rapprochement
with Israel. If the Lebanese can resolve
their problems they might come next. The
Soviet Union is going to have to participate
in a forceful way before Syria will be amenable
to any productive negotiations with Israel.
Ultimately the interests of the Palestinians
are going to have to be recognized. I would
not negotiate with the PLO, nor would I try
to force Israel to do that, until I was con-
vinced that the Palestinians do recognize
Israel's right to exist in peace in the Middle
East
One possibility would be to grant
GEBALO FORD LIBRARY
-6-
territory to the Palestinians in which to
live, possibly the West Bank of the Jordan.
My personal preference, and I'm sure that of
the Israelis, would be for that to be under the
Kingdom of Jordan. It would be premature for
me to say under what circumstances a Pales-
tinian state independent of Jordan would be
acceptable.'
Newsweek
May 10, 1976 (European Editition)
In a speech to New Jersey Jewish leaders
Carter proposed a solution to the Middle East
which, in the words to a reporter, it would
"make the United States' commitment to the
survival of Israel so solid and so unequivocal
that the Israelis would have the confidence to
relinquish occupied Arab territory."
New York Times
June 9, 1976
"I do think that the Palestinian people do
have to be recognized
...
their legitimate
interest and their right to exist and perhaps
to choose their own leaders, but that is some-
thing that I think would be better left to
future negotiations."
WETA "Candidate on the Line"
February 16, 1976
Mr. Carter said that if he were the Prime
Minister of Israel he would not be in favor
of giving up the contested Golan Heights to
Syria and that he would also be inclined to
retain control of "Jewish and Christian holy
places" in the City of Jerusalem.
-7-
He spoke of suggestions made by others that
"might possibly give access to Moslem Places"
in Jerusalem for Moslems. He also said, "I
do think Moslems should have access to their
own holy places."
New York Times
July 2, 1976
U.S. mediation efforts so far "have been
fruitful and I think well-advised."
Concord, N.H. Monitor
January 27, 1976
Quoted by Common Cause
How They Stand, May, 1976
Relations with Israel
Carter told a group of Jewish leaders today that the
Mideast stituation had been aggravated by recent
uncertainty over American policy, and he promised that
his administration would give Israel "undeviating,
unequivocal" support.
"One of the things that has aggravated the Mideast
situation is the uncertainty lately about where our
nation stands that makes the leaders of Israel and the
people of Israel uneasy and that builds up false hopes
in those countries that are probing for weaknesses in
Israel or weaknesses in our commitment to Israel."
Carter, fielding audience questions, said: "This is
not just a political statement. As a Christian myself,
I think that the fulfillment of Israel, the coming of
that nation, is a fulfillment of Biblical prophecy."
Carter said that the U.S. "must insist -- in an aggres-
sive way -- that Arab countries recognize Israel's
existence and its right to exist as a Jewish state."
He pledged that he would support "whatever military
and economic aid that is necessary to let Israel defend
itself."
He also said that any settlement of the Palestinian
question must "recognize that the Israelis did not
cause the Palestinian problem." That assertion drew
enthusiastic applause.
N.Y. Daily News
August 31, 1976
Carter has reaffirmed his "unequivocal" commitment to
Israel. "I would never waiver on that commitment.'
He said that the United States should provide Israel
"with adequate military and economic aid so they could
defend themselves, perserve (their) existence and identify
as a Jewish state and hopefully be strong enough to deter
any potential aggressor against Israel.'
Stuart Eizenstat, issues coordinator, says that Carter
believes "Israel has made enough concessions, and it is
time that the Arabs made some. " He said Carter "comes
at the Israel issue from two points of view. First of
- 2 -
all there are the conventional geopolitical concerns
which all politicians would share. Secondly, he sees
Israel's future as a moral and religious matter of
deep personal concern. The Governor believes in the
Bible. He believes that Israel is not just supposed
to exist, but that it must exist as a Jewish state."
The Mideast Review
July 28, 1976
Carter said he would continue economic and military
aid indefinitely, although he would make "an annual
judgment on the amount of aid that was absolutely
necessary."
New York Times
July 7, 1976
Even in the absence of a peace settlement, "I would
continue the economic and military aid to Israel
indefinitely," and that he might consider using American
forces to help guarantee a territorial settlement but
would prefer not to.
New York Times
July 7, 1976
"If there was a mutual agreement between Israel and
all her neighbors the only basis on which they could
declare nonbelligerency and recognize the existence
of Israel permanently and resolve the Palestinian
question and leave Israel in a defendable posture and
carve out a permanent peace through the temporary
presence of American forces in certain areas within
the territory, I might consider it (use of U.S. forces
to guarantee peace). But I would prefer that those
forces be United Nations forces or multinational
forces and not American forces.
New York Times
July 7, 1976
Carter won strong applause when he reaffirmed the U.S.
commitment to Israel, said the Israelis were not to
blame for the plight of the Palestinians and pledged
to use economic sanctions against any Mideast Arab
nations that attempt to repeat of the 1973 oil embargo.
- 3 -
Carter promised to take "aggressive and open action"
against any nations that discriminate against U.S.
firms because they have Jews in management or owner-
ship positions.
Washington Post
September 1, 1976
"
I think the establishment of Israel is a ful-
fillment of Bibical prophecy. I think God wants the
Jews to have a place to live."
Newsweek
April 5, 1976
Carter called Israel "an oasis of democracy and
freedom in the Middle East." He also backed Israel
against the criticism that they are imperialistic.
Washington Star News
May 29, 1976
Jimmy Carter said that "survival of Israel is not a
political issue, it is a moral imperative."
At the Teitz Jewish Educational Center here, the
former Georgia Governor, wearing a yarmulke, drew
sustained applause of nearly 1,000 persons that he
rejected "utterly the charge that Zionism is a form
of racism."
In addition, he said: "Surely the Jewish people
are entitled to one place on this earth where they
can have their own state, on soil given them by God
from time immemorial."
Chicago Sun Times
June 7, 1976
Q. On the Middle East, should the United States under-
write the security of Israel as a way of bringing about
a final settlement?
A. "Not a commitment to send troops, no. But I would
let it be known to the world, and particularly the
people of Israel, that our backing for Israel in
economic and military aid is aboslute, that this would
be a national commitment of ours. Most Americans would
agree with this: to give the Israelis whatever military
or economic aid they need to protect the integrity of
their country, their right to exist in peace.
- 4 -
"I would also play a more aggressive role in
searching for some degree of compatibility among
Middle East nations. The situation there is fluid.
The relationship, for instance, among Israel,
Lebanon and Syria has changed in the last few months.
"The framework of United Nations resolution 242 is
a general one that everybody has adopted But I
think
the recognition of Israel as a permanent entity in the
Middle East is important; the willingness of Israel
to cede back to other countries major portions of land
acquired in the 1967 war is an inevitable requirement.
Some resolution of the Palestinian question is certainly
inevitable."
U.S. News and World Report
September 13, 1976
"One that I recall offhand is the commitment of the
Democratic Party platform immediately to move the
Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. I have said I
will consider this but I have never committed myself
to this in any manner. I would reserve that right
until I can assess the diplomatic consequences and
the hope that I might have for achieving an overall
Mideastern settlement that might be delayed by that
very quick move.
Carter Press Conference
Indianapolis
September 16, 1976
Relations with Arab Countries
"I intend to be friendly to Arab countries, but I
will let them know our commitment to Israel is
constant and unshakeable."
Atlanta Constitution
May 14, 1976
"I do not believe arms sales buy lasting friends.
I am concerned with the way in which our country,
as well as the Soviet Union, Britain and France,
have poured arms into certain Arab countries far
beyond their legitimate needs for defense -- five
or six times more than Israel receives."
"
it would not be wise at this time to supply
strike weapons to Egypt
Investment in Egypt's
economic development is an investment in peace--
FORD
and this country should willingly make it."
Speech to Jewish Leaders
New York City
BEERED
LIBRARY
April 1, 1976
I said two months ago that I do not favor supplying
offensive weapons to Egypt and I still hold to that
view. We should help Egypt obtain housing and jobs
and health care for its people, not such offensive
weapons as tanks and attack planes and missiles.
Investing in Egypt's economic development is an invest-
ment in peace.
We have already developed close ties of investment
and economic aid with many Arab countries. This shows
that economic interdependence can also be a foundation
of peace, that Arab people are no less tired of war
than Israel, no less weary of its burden and waste,
and no less mournful of their dead. Some Arab states
have set goals for economic development and education
which are worthy of great respect as well as our aid
and participation. But their dreams, like the dreams
of Israel, will come true only if there is a lasting
peace in the Middle East.
Unless there is peace the Arab countries will inevit-
ably become radicalized, more militant, and more sus-
ceptible to Soviet re-entry, both politically and militar-
ily. If that happens, Israel will be confronted with an
even greater threat than she faces today.
Address in Elizabeth, New Jersey
June 6, 1976
- 2 -
Carter spoke out strongly against bribes made by
American companies abroad and Arab boycotts against
some companies who have Jewish citizens in their
employ.
Carter said he found that he called "tertiary boycotts" --
whereby Arab governments and indiviudals boycott firms
doing business with firms that have Jews in their
managements, as well as boycotting firms with the
Jewish managers themselves -- to be "morally obnoxious."
He pledged to fight them more vigorously than the
Ford Administration had.
Los Angeles Times
August 19, 1976
Moreover, Carter defined the issue as one of "human
rights.' In fact, administration officials say
the principal object of the Arabs' anti-Israel boy-
cott, based on the state of belligerency between
Israel and the Arabs, is to prohibit any Arab
benefits to Israel growing out of Arab trade with the
United States.
A footnote: A partial explanation of the Ribicoff-
Carter strategy is found in the latest Harris survey,
showing only 48 percent of the Jewish vote now backing
Carter -- far below normal for a Democratic presidential
nominee.
Washington Post (Evans and Novak)
September 11, 1976
Palestine
He called for "humane settlement" of the Palestinian
refugee problem, as he has before, but then went out
of his way today to stipulate that any settlement
should absolve Israel of blame for the problem.
Washington Post
August 31, 1976
"I would not personally favor recognition of the PLO
or other government entities representing the Pales-
tinians until after they have convinced me that they
recognize Israel right to exist in peace.
U.S. News and World Report
May 24, 1976
"
An integral part of an ultimate settlement has
got to be the recognition of the Palestinians as a
people, as a nation, with a place to live and a right
to choose their own people, as a nation, with a place
to the Palestine Liberation Organization or Yasser
Arafat as the spokesman after Arafat agrees that
Israel has a right to
exist."
Boise Idaho Statesman
April 2, 1976
Embargo
Carter stated the U.S. should consider an "economic
declaration of war" against the Arab-oil producing
countries if they try imposing another oil embargo.
He said that the U.S. should cut off all food, arms,
oil drilling equipment and other products.
Bangor Daily News
December 1, 1975
"
as long as I am president, the American people
will never sacrifice the security of survival of
Israel for barrels of oil. Even if every other
nation were forced by thirst for oil to desert
Israel, we in this country, with our resources, our
power, and our sense of decency can and will stand
fast."
Speech to Jewish Leaders
New York City
April 1, 1976
EASTERN EUROPE
CARTER ON EASTERN EUROPE
Carter has played a delicate game on Eastern Europe,
flailing at the Administration for the Sonnenfeldt
doctrine and insensitivity toward human rights in
that region, suggesting that Eastern Europe must
eventually become independent, but carefully avoiding
any invitations to roll back the Iron Curtain. Other
than promising tougher bargaining with the Soviets
on human freedoms, Carter has promised little in the
way of specifics.
LIBRARY
CARTER QUOTES ON EASTERN EUROPE
We also regret our government's continuing failure
to oppose the denial of human freedom in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union.
The Republican Administration, with the Sonnenfeldt
statement, has shown a lack of sensitivity to the
craving of the Eastern European people for greater
independence. That is unacceptable.
Only 13 months ago, President Ford and Henry Kissinger
travelled to Helsinki to sign the treaty of comprehen-
sive security and cooperation in Europe. It was
supposed to lead to greater personal freedom for the
peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, including
greater freedom to travel, to marry, and to emigrate.
But since that elaborate signing ceremony in Finland,
the Russians have all but ignored their pledge -- and
the Ford Administration has looked the other way.
B'nai B'rith Speech
Washington, D.C.
September 8, 1976
"We should remember that Eastern Europe is not an
area of stability and it will not become such until
the Eastern European countries regain their indepen-
dence and become part of a larger cooperative European
framework. I am concerned over the long-range pros-
pects for Romanian and Yugoslavian independence, and
I deplore the recent infliction upon Poland of a
constitution that ratifies its status as a Soviet
satellite. We must reiterate to the Soviets that an
enduring American-Soviet detente cannot ignore the
legitimate aspirations of other nations. We must
likewise insist that the Soviet Union and other
countries recognize the human rights of all citizens
who live within their boundaries, whether they be blacks
in Rhodesia, Asians in Uganda, or Jews in the Soviet
Union."
Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 15, 1976
- 2 -
"At Helsinki, we signed an agreement approving the
takeover of Eastern Europe. I would be very much
tougher in the following years (in negotiations)
with the Soviet Union."
UPI
March 11, 1976
"When we've had negotiations at Helsinki, we approved
Russia's takeover of Eastern Europe.
Speech
Youngstown, Ohio
May 28, 1976
CARTER ON RELATIONS WITH THE USSR
1. His General Position: The NY Times summarizes
Carter's views on US-Soviet relations as three-
pronged:
-- First, he would de-emphasize the impor-
tance of Soviet relations and upgrade rela-
tions with major allies;
-- Second, he supports the "objectives of
detente" and would "continue our friendly
relationship with Russia."
-- But, third, he charges that the Ford
Administration is giving up too much and asking
too little of Moscow.
2. Out-traded by Soviets: Carter charges that
the U.S. has been out-traded by the Soviets on
several fronts:
-- 1972 wheat deal;
-- Helsinki;
-- Vladivostok;
-- 1975 space flights.
3. What he Seeks From the Soviets: Carter says
that he would be a tougher bargainer with the
Soviets and would seek their help in obtaining:
-- A Salt II agreement that lowers nuclear
amrs celings;
-- Nuclear pact banning all peaceful as
well as military nuclear explosions;
-- Assistance toward reaching a permanent
settlement in the Middle East;
-- Restraint of North Korea;
-2-
-- Reduction in sales of conventional
weapons;
-- Assistance toward preventing future
oil embargoes.
Carter doesn't say how or why he would expect
to achieve such Soviet cooperation.
5. The Jackson Amendment: Carter has generally
been critical of the Jackson amendment, saying
that the U.S. would resent such actions by the
Soviet government and that it was counterproductive.
CARTER QUOTES ON THE USSR
Q. Do you believe that the policy of detente
has been in the best interest of the
United States?
A. I approve of the concept of detente. I
don't think we'll have a permanent settlement
in the Middle East without the full coopera-
tion of the Soviet Union. Our interests
are best served by strengthening cultural
exchanges, promoting trade agreements,
tourism, student exchange with the Soviet
Union. But I would be a tough bargainer.
Whenever the Soviet Union derived a benefit
from negotiations, I would want to derive
an equivalent benefit.
Time
May 10, 1976
Q. Do you feel that we should adopt a tougher
approach in pursuing detente with the Soviet
Union?
A. "Yes, I think SO. The Soviets would respect
that approach. I would also make our commit-
ments much more public. I think that the
stature of our nation in international councils
is damaged when the President and the Secretary
of State speak just as two people, when there's
no bipartisan assessment or support derived
from the Congress, and when it's obvious
that the American people don't know what is
going on."
U.S. News and World Report
September 13, 1976
FORD LIBRARY 078830
-2-
Q.
In what way would you be tougher toward
the Soviet Union?
A. We should have been much more aggressive
when we attended the Helsinki Conference --
or should have been absent in the first place.
We how have in Eastern Europe at least a
tentative endorsement by our country of the
domination of the region by the Soviet Union.
They didn't have that before the Helsinki
accords. It was a very great diplomatic
achievement for the Soviets to have our
promise not to interfere in their control
over Eastern Europe.
In response to our yielding on that point,
there was an agreement on the Soviet Union's
part that they would liberalize their poli-
cies toward human rights. They have not
fulfilled those commitments.
As we sell the Russians things that they
must have -- food in their drought years,
electronics equipment, heavy machinery --
we ought to get a quid pro quo from the
Soviets.
I think it was a mistake, personally, to
attach the Jewish-migration question to
the trade bill: You can't have the legis-
lative body of a sovereign nation requiring
publicly that another sovereign nation
accede to a certain demand in order to get
a very slight favor. But freedom for Jews
to leave Russia would be a legitimate and a
very strong commitment of mine as President.
As we negotiate with the Soviets, they should
know that if they could yield on that point
it would greatly improve our relationships.
I think we could ask them to help to resolve
the Middle Eastern question, not let them
stoke the fires; to help us avoid a future
-3-
oil embargo; to try to give us stronger
assurances that they would restrain Northern
Korea from any possible attack on South
Korea; to yield on controversial points
in the Salt II talks.
There are a lot of things that we need
and would like to have from the Soviet
Union to insure peace around the world,
and there are a lot of materials we have
that they would need more of.
U.S. News and World Report
Spetember 13, 1976
I think that following the convention this year,
perhaps as much at any time in recent history,
the debate, if I'm successful, will be between
myself and President Ford on foreign policy. I
think domestic issues will be much less signi-
ficant than the debate on basic foreign policy.
If detente means a search for peace, maximum
communication, maximum trade, maximum inter-
change of diplomatic knowledge and students
and cultural knowledge and so forth with the
Soviet Union, it's very good.
If detente means a mutual search with the Soviet
Union for a solution to the Middle Eastern
problem, restraint on North Korea when it's
attacking South Korea, a mutual disarmament,
particularly of nuclear weapons, then I'm for
detente.
I think there are two very serious problems
that have been created and in one instance it's
different from what Reagan has pointed out.
One is that we have neglected our natural allies
and friends, like France, England, Canada, Mexico
and Japan. They feel as though they've been
relegated to a position of secondary importance
by the Secretary and also by the Presidents under
whom Kissinger has served. That's a very serious
defect, in my opinion, in our foreign policy.
-4-
Another serious defect is that we have always
treated the developing nations of the world as of
secondary or tertiary importance, which in my
opinion is a form of racism. We ought to be
learning about nations like Angola and Mozam-
bique and Ghana and working very closely with
them on a feeling of mutual respect and friend-
ship and concern so they can trust us for a
change. That's a very important absence in
the achievements of our foreign policy.
Another thing is that Kissinger tends to act
unilaterally, to exclude the American people,
to exclude Congress, he's destroyed the biparti-
san nature of legislative support for executive
decisions in the field of foreign policy.
That's a very serious mistake too.
And I think the other thing is that Kissinger
has equiated his own personal popularity with
highly publicized successes under the broad
umbrella of detente. He's tried to make us
think we won a victory in Helsinki. I think we
lost in Helsinki. We ratified the takeover of
Eastern Europe. We got practically nothing in
return. The things we did derive on paper in
return, we have let Russia ignore. In the Vlad-
ivostok agreement on nuclear arms, I think we
came out second best. In the wheat deal in
1972, we obviously came out second best. Even
in the highly publicized space flight last April,
we gave Russia a lot of our space flight tech-
nology secrets; we paid most of the cost of
the excursion; we got very little in return.
Capital Times, Wisconsin
March 29, 1976
Jimmy Carter on the Issues
"I would certainly favor the continuation of any
effort to be friendly with Russia, to increase
communications, trade, tourism, student exchange.
And the same with the People's Republic of China.
But I think in the past that Nixon and Ford and
-5-
Kissinger have been too much inclined to over-
emphasize the so-called advantages of detente,
the successes of negotiations with Russia.
I do think we were out-traded in the wheat
deal of 1972. I think in Helsinki, for the
agreement we signed with the Soviet Union
we got very little in return. Even in the
space flight last spring we put most of the
money into the project, we let Russia have
many of our secrets in technology. I think
we ought to be tougher and more competitive
with Russia. Another thing that concerns me
about detente is that we overemphasize the
importance of visits and negotiations with
Russian and China to the exclusion of our own
natural allies and sometimes neighbors.
I
would like to repair the damages done."
Washington Star
January 25, 1976
We want no clash with the Soviets, but we
cannot accept the intervention of its combat
forces into any Arab-Israeli conflict. Our
navel and air presence in the eastern Medi-
terranean should make this clear. Mutual
non-intervention by the super-powers serves
these powers' interests and also the interest
of all states in the area.
By the same token, I do not believe that the
road to peace can be found by U.S.-Soviet
imposition of a settlement. It would, however,
be desirable to attain Soviet agreement and
support for any settlement, since we do not want
to give the Soviet Union any reason or excuse
to subvert or undermine that settlement. We
seek the support of the Soviet Government in
the search for peace, but we will continue that
search with or without her support.
JCPC, Jimmy Carter Address
on the Middle East
Elizabeth, New Jersey
June 6, 1976
-6-
"I would move away from powerbloc confron-
tation and would pursue much more singular
bilateral relationships with the counties of
the world. I would consult much more closely
and continually with our natural allies and
friends in Europe, this hemisphere, and Japan.
There would be much less keeping secrets from
them about basic changes in our orientation toward
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of
China."
"We would seek relations with (the other nations
of) the world on an equal basis with ourselves,
with greater respect to them and with much closer
attention paid to the best interests of their
citizens. I would probably stay in this country
most of the time and not travel so much abroad.
But I would encourage them to come to visit me."
Chicago Tribune
May 8, 1976
Carter told the platform committee: "I reject
the strident and belligerent voices of those
who would have this country return to the days
of the Cold War with the Soviet Union
We
myst pay more attention to China and to Eastern
Europe. It is in our interest and in the interest
of wold peace to promote a more pluralistic
communist world.'
Philadelphia Inquirer
June 20, 1976
"Henry Kissinger does not trust the American
people. I would be a tough negotiator with the
Soviet Union. Detente under Henry Kissinger
has meant we have yielded too much. We have
neglected our friends and our natural allies."
Indianapolis Star
April 7, 1976
-7-
"Russia is always probing for our weaknesses,"
said Carter. "They'll move in and take our
place, not militarily, but economically."
Omaha World Herald
May 29, 1976
Carter said the U.S. should "continue our
friendly relationships with Russia -- maximum
communications and understandings with one
another -- because it would be very difficult
for us to have an ultimate settlement in the
Middle East or in the Korean area or a substantial
reduction in atomic weapons or conventional
weapons without the cooperation of the Soviet
Union and the People's Republic of China." But,
Carter continued, the Soviet Union "is highly
unlikely to change to a democratic society.
Their government will always be imcompatible
with ours, and if we ever appear to be vulner-
able in any area of the world, my belief is that
the Soviet Union would naturally take advantage
of our vulnerability or weakness."
Associated Press
January 26, 1976
We should make it clear that the Soviets, as
well as the U.S. refrain from irresponsible
intervention in other countries. The Russians
have no more business in Angola than we have.'
Boise Idaho Statesman
April 2, 1976
Carter wants the same things from the Soviets
that Kissinger has tried to get, only more.
He wants a new arms control agreement, increased
trade, and broadened political ties. Carter
doesn't explain how he would force these con-
cessions from the Soviets, and in fact his strength
in international haggling remains to be proven.
Chicago Tribune
July 30, 1976
- -8-
Through peaceful means they (Soviets) would
continue "to pursue their ultimate goal to
communism which is to prevail throughout the
world and to probe for possibilities for the
expansion of their system
I think we ought
to recognize it and be prepared for it." "
Washington Post
March 21, 1976
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE JACKSON AMENDMENT
We should continually remind the Soviet Union, by word
and conduct, of its commitments in Helskinki to the free
flow of people and ideas and of how offensive we and other
free peoples find its violations of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights.
Democratic Platform
Congressional Record
July 2, 1976
"I would like to see every pressure maintained on Russia
to liberalize its emigration policies toward Jews. I
think that can best be accomplished through private
negotiations."
Business Week
May 3, 1976
"
the so-called 'Jackson Amendment' was ill-advised
and I think in the long run proved to be exactly counter-
productive."
National Democratic Issues
Conference
Louisville, Kentucky
November 23, 1975
Carter rejects requiring the Soviets to permit immigration
of Jews and dissidents in return for "most favored nation"
trade treatment.
Idaho Statesman
April 2, 1976
The continued U.S.S.R. military dominance of many Eastern
European countries remains a source of oppression for the
peoples of those nations, an oppression we do not accept
and to which we are morally opposed. Any attempt by the
Soviet Union similarly to dominate other parts of Europe --
such as Yugoslavia -- would be an action posing a grave
threat to peace. Eastern Europe will not truly be an area
of stability until these countries regain their independence
and become part of a large European framework.
Democratic Platform
Congressional Record
July 2, 1976
Trade Relations
"Emergency food aid should not be used as a diplomatic
tool. However, in trade discussions, like with the
Russians, we should strive to obtain some diplomatic
concessions in return."
Common Cause
Edition I
Issue Profile Number 10
February 1976
Carter said he would be "cautious about using food as
a so-called weapon" in diplomacy. When asked to clarify
the comment, he said he would not "single out food as
a bargaining tool." Carter refused to answer when
asked if he would use food as one of several bargaining
tools.
Capital Times
Madison, Wisconsin
March 25, 1976
There cannot be a stable world order "when people of
many nations of the world suffer mass starvation" and
there are no international arrangements to supply the
world food and energy needs.
Common Cause
Edition I
Issue Profile Number 10
February 1976
Where bilateral trade arrangements with the U.S.S.R.
are to our economic advantage, we should pursue them,
but our watchwords would be tough bargaining and con-
crete economic, political or other benefits for the
United States. We should also press the Soviet Union
to take a greater share of responsibility in multi-
laterial solutions to such problems as creating adequate
world grain reserves.
Democratic Platform
Congressional Record
July 2, 1976
Soviet Relations with Carter
Soviet officials had sought to meet with him (Carter)
to discuss his foreign policy positions, but he
rejected the overtures as "inappropriate."
He said he will not meet with any foreign officials
until after the Democratic National Convention, and
then only under controlled circumstances and after
careful consideration of the implications.
Asked if the Russians' approach was an attempt to
influence the election, Carter said, "It is inappro-
priate for them (the Soviets) to inject themselves
into our political scene."
It would be wrong, the former Governor said, "if any
foreign nation insinuated they were helping. or
hurting a candidate. The best thing they can do is
stay out of the election process."
Carter said officials of "10 or 12" nations had
approached his staff seeking meetings.
Washington Post
May 14, 1976
The official Soviet news agency gently chided Jimmy
Carter today for what it said were "contradictory"
aspects of his position on foreign policy.
Tass seemend pleased with the "positive view" the
Democratic presidential contender expressed about
U.S. Soviet efforts to limit the arms race but was
clearly disappointed with his statements about using
economic leverage in dealing with the Soviets.
"He disregarded the fact that this constitutes attempts
to interfere in other countries' internal affairs."
The article went on: "It should be noted, however, that
Jimmy Carter did not support the U.S. Congressional
decision on the discriminatory Jackson amendment to the
trade bill." The amendment requires communist countries
to liberalize emigration in return for most favored
nation trade status with the U.S.
- 2 -
Tass said Carter agreed "there are some circumstances"
in which he would use military force aborad but, on
the other hand, he opposed using American troops in
the Middle East in order to reach a settlement there.
AP
July 8, 1976
By most reports, Moscow feels more comfortable with
Mr. Kissinger, a man they think they know, than with
the uncertainties of Mr. Carter. But even the
Russians have been diligently finding out what Mr.
Carter believes, speculating on Mr. Kissinger's
successors, looking to the future.
The New York Times
Leslie H. Gelb
August 15, 1976
CARTER ON RELATIONS WITH
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Carter favors eventual normalization of
relations with the People's Republic of
China, but says he does not want to reach
that goal until he has full assurances that
Taiwan will be "free of military persuasion
or domination". Carter has urged that the
U.S. examine the Japanese formula -- diplo-
matic ties with Peking, trade ties with
Taiwan. On at least one occasion, he has
said that he would explore stronger U.S. -
PRC ties more aggressively than the Adminis-
tration.
LIBRARY
CARTER QUOTES ON CHINA
Q. So far as relations with China go,
would you take the next step and send
an ambassador there?
A. Yes, I would. But how soon it happened
would depend on the attitudes of the
Chinese Government. I would be cautious
about it. We have an obligation to the
government of Taiwan not to abandon it.
Japan is taking an approach with heavy
trade mission commitments in Taiwan but
with relationships being established with
the Chinese Government. Whether we would
want to go that far I do not know, but
a natural friendship does exist between
the Chinese people and our own. There has
always been, in my mind, a subconscious
feeling that the Chinese are our friends.
I don't know the latest attitude of the
Chinese Government toward us, but if I
found out that the friendship was recip-
rocal, then I think that would be the
basis upon which we could predicate more
progress.
Newsweek (European Edition)
May 10, 1976
Q. Would you envisage moving quickly to
normalize relations with Peking -- perhaps
involving recognition?
A. No. I don't envision that. It's an ultimate
goal that's good for us to maintain.
Eventually we're going to have to recognize
the existent of the People's Republic of
China. But I would want to have an assurance
in some way, to my satisfaction, that there
would not be a military attack on Taiwan
and that the Taiwanese people would be rela-
tively independent and our commitment to them
respected.
U.S. News and World Report
September 13, 1976
-2-
"Our relations with China are important
to world peace and they directly affect the
world balance. The United States has a
great stake in a nationally independent,
secure, and friendly China. The present
turmoil in Chinese domestic politics could
be exploited by the Soviets to promote
a Sino-Soviet reconciliation which might
be inimical to international stability and
to American interests. I believe that we
should explore more actively the possibility
of widening American-Chinese trade relations
and of further consolidating our political
relationships."
Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations
March 15, 1976
"It is important to continue to seek agree-
ments with the Russians and the Chinese,
especially in the control of weapons.
Success there could mean life instead of
death for millions of people. But the divi-
sions between us are deep. The differences
of history and ideology will not go away.
It is too much to expect that we can do much
more in these relationships than reduce the
areas of irritation and conflict and lessen
the dangers of war. "
Chicago Council on Foerign
Relations
March 15, 1976
"For many nations, we have two policies:
One announced in public, another pursued in
secret. In the case of China, we even seem
to have two Presidents."
He accused Kissinger of "slapping in the face
all those Americans who want a foreign policy
that embodies our ideals, not subverts them. "
Chicago Tribune
May 16, 1976
-3-
"At the present time
our ambassador is
in Taiwan. We have a trade officer in the
People's Republic of China. That's the way
I would prefer to keep it at least for the
time being
I would like to see us in
the long run establish full relationship
with China itself."
Speech, Akron, Ohio
June 3, 1976
On relations with China, he wants "normal-
ization" or full diplomatic relations with
Peking, as does Kissinger. Carter urges
the "Japan formula" - diplomatic relations
with Peking while maintaining trade rela-
tions with Taiwan.
Los Angeles Times
July 18, 1976
Asked how soon he would move to full recog-
nition of Communist China: "That is an ulti-
mate goal, but the time is undefined. I
would like assurances that the people of
Taiwan -- the Republic of China - or what-
ever it might be called -- be free of
military persuasion or domination from
mainland China. That may not be a possibility;
if it is not, then I would be reluctant
to give up our relationship with the Republic
of China."
Time
August 2, 1976