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    "title": "Second Debate: Rumsfeld Suggestions and Comments",
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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 3, folder \"Second Debate: Rumsfeld Suggestions\nand Comments\" of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford\nPresidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nTMENT OF DEFENSE DE\nNEWS RELEASE\nOFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nWASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301\nPLEASE NOTE DATE\nNO. 461-76\nOXford 7-3189 (Copies)\nIMMEDIATE RELEASE\nOXford 7-5131 (Info.)\nSTATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD H. RUMSFELD\nThe House Armed Services Committee yesterday (September 28)\nkilled the President's $1.6 billion shipbuilding request, virtually\neliminating the possibility of action on this urgently needed program\nthis year.\nThe American people have been poorly served by this damaging\nand short-sighted action.\nLast January in submitting the national defense budget,\nPresident Ford requested $6.3 billion for shipbuilding in FY 77.\nThat request provided for 16 new ships. He included a cautionary\nstatement that an increase might be requested when a review --\nthen underway in the National Security Council -- of the nation's\nmaritime strategy and naval requirements was complete. In May,\nwith significant results of the study in hand, the President\nrequested an additional $1.2 billion for five additional ships and\nlong lead funding for a sixth ship. These six ships would have\nadded systems and capabilities clearly needed to maintain freedom\nof the seas in the decades immediately ahead.\nThat supplemental request was, in effect, rejected yesterday.\nAlthough the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services\nCommittee strongly supported the building of the Strike Cruiser,\nthe Aegis destroyer and four additional frigates, the House Committee\nrejected it on a close, split vote. Under the budget ceiling imposed\nby the Second Concurrent Resolution, there was room for an expanded\nshipbuilding program.\nThe real loss as a result of the dilatory handling of a vital\nnational security budget request will be in America's confidence in\nthe capability of our Navy to maintain freedom of the seas\nfreedom upon which the nation's economy and security have always\ndepended, and will continue to depend.\nMORE\nDigitized from Box 3 of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\n2\nFurther, the Congress has acted unwisely in its failure to pass\na variety of cost saving initiatives that would have saved the\ngovernment hundreds of millions of dollars in 1977 alone and billions\nof dollars over the next ten years in civilian manpower, reduced\ntraining costs, and other operational efficiencies.\nFinally, the Congress failed to take action on bills which\nwould have authorized additional sales of excess quantities of\nstockpile materials, such as industrial diamonds, silver, tin and\nantimony, which are beyond our national security requirements. The\nAdministration reviewed the national strategic stockpile require-\nments and determined that it would be in the national interest to\nsell certain quantities of such excess commodities, without adversely\naffecting the markets. The receipts, totaling about $746 million,\nthen would have been available to offset national defense expenditures\nin the President's FY 77 budget request.\nThe President's budget for FY 1977 included these economies and\nothers. The need was clear. The failure of the Congress to approve\nthese efficiencies means that roughly $1.4 billion needed for\nessential defense programs will not be available.\nHad the Congress passed these restraints, the savings could have\npaid for the major portion of the urgently needed shipbuilding pro-\ngram as proposed by the President.\n- END-\nRemarks by\nSecretary of Defense\nTHE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN\nDonald H. Rumsfeld\nto Illinois Associated Press Broadcasters\nLake Bloomington, Illinois\nSaturday, September 11, 1976\nThis morning in Peoria I spoke with the Chamber of Commerce and I\nplan to go back to Washington this afternoon. Let me just say three or\nfour, five things real quickly.\nFirst, we're at \"peace,\" And that's important. We tend to forget\nit.\nThe second point I would make, again an obvious point, but one\nworth mentioning, is that we cherish freedom; that freedom of the press,\nfreedom of assembly, freedom of religion and our free political institutions\nare what we are about. Unfortunately, they're not the norm in the\nworld. They're not universal, indeed we're in the minority, and the\npercentage of people who subscribe to our convictions with respect to\nfreedom are fewer today than in previous years. The world is not a\nperfectly warm and friendly place for those who do believe in freedom.\nA third point: we've always subscribed to the idea that we should\nbe independent, and believed in self-determination for ourselves and for\nothers. We know that -- while we believe in self-determination, there\nare others in the world who do not.\nA fourth point -- to bring it down more specifically to the Defense\nestablishment -- our Armed Forces today are, in fact. capable of per-\nforming their assigned missions, OUR orces today are, in fact, capable of\nperforming their assigned missions. That's not unrelated to the fact\nthat we're at peace. Indeed it's very directly connected. Throughout\nhistory some nations have allowed themselves to become weak because they\nwere at peace, because there was reasonable stability. They soon found\nthat weakness was in fact provocative, enticing others into adventures\nthey otherwise would have avoided. The fact that our Armed Forces can\nperform their assigned missions today has contributed and is contributing\nto the fact that we are at peace.\nMore importantly -- or at least equally important -- are the trends\nwhich have been adverse to the United States for the past ten to fifteen\nyears. Whether you measure level of effort in dollars or rubles; whether\nyou measure percentages of GNP; whether you measure production rates or\nthe numbers of weapons, ships, guns, planes, tanks, etc.; whether you\nmeasure the expansion of an institutional capability to produce additional\nweapons of increasing sophistication --- regardless of which measure you\nselect, reasonable people know that the trends have been adverse to the\nUnited States.\nIf those trends are allowed to continue, the United States will, in\nfact, move into a position of inferiority.\nThe effect of that however would be to inject a fundamental instability\ninto the world and, in my judgment, jeopardize peace and stability. It\nwould have an effect exactly opposite of what those of us in this country\nwould wish.\nThe President of the United States made a judgment that such a\ndevelopment was unacceptable and has proposed measures to the Congress\nof the United States that will act to reverse the trends.\nSome people ask me, \"How we got where we are? How did it happen\nthat this country, which was in a position of overwhelming military\nsuperiority in the post World War II period, could allow itself to slide\nto a position of approximate rough equivalence today and set itself on a\npath of the adverse trends?\"\nThe answer is that free people, during time of peace and relative\nstability, have tended to relax and think, \"Well, nothing bad can happen,\nit's relatively pleasant, we don't have to worry about things. \" They\nlater found, to their great loss, that that wasn't the case at all.\nAlso, some people have found it fashionable to say, \"I'm for a\nstrong national defense, but \" It's right after the \"but\" that you\nhave to be careful. For example, some will say, \"I'm for a strong\nnational defense but we're at peace and there's no great, immediate\nthreat and why should we be concerned?\" The implication being that we\nshould ignore history.\nOthers will say, \"I'm for a strong national defense but there's all\nthat waste in the Pentagon.\" The implication being that because there\nis some waste in the Pentagon -- and indeed there is -- that we should\ncut the budget. Through some magic, THE there's SAY, an inexhaustible mother\nlode of billions of dollars that are going to enable the American people\nto have a strong national defense at no additional cost to the taxpayer.\nThis is utter nonsense. There's no free lunch. It happens there is\nsome inefficiency in the Pentagon in part because human beings work\nthere and all humans are fallible. It also happens that there's less\ninefficiency in the Department of Defense than in other departments of\ngovernment. If one looks at cost overruns- and they are of terrible\nconcern to me-those in the military establishment are less than the\ncost overruns on the John Hancock Building, or the Bay Area Transit in\nSan Francisco, or the Washington Metro, or the Federal Housing Admini-\nstration, or in the private sector, or other government agencies.\nAre we ever going to eliminate all waste and inefficiency in the\nDepartment of Defense? I'd like to be able to do it. We're working\nlike the dickens to try to do it, but it's not going to happen. The\nimplication that we can do what Congress has done for the last 10 years --\n$48 billion in cuts in the last 10 years; billion in the last six\nyears; $7 billion last year alone -- the idea that we can continue going\ndown that path, and through some magic wand we're still going to provide\nfor our national defense, is a disservice to the American people. It's\njust not SO.\nSome people say, \"I'm for a strong national defense but we can't\nafford it.\" That's just plain baloney. We're spending a smaller percentage\nof our gross national product, a smaller percentage of our labor force,\na smaller percentage of our federal budget, a smaller percentage of net\npublic spending than at any time before the Korean War or Pearl Harbor,\ndepending on which statistic you look at. Now, that's a fact. In any\ncase, the simple fact is that this country can clearly afford that which\nis necessary to provide for peace and stability in the world.\nWith that I'll stop and I'll be happy to answer questions.\nQ: How would you characterize the defense posture of Jimmy Carter?\nA: Carefully. This is in view of the President's rèquest that I\nnot get involved in the political campaign. He indicated that he felt\nthat State and Defense and Justice ought not to be engaged in the partisan\npart of the campaign.\nBut to look at the matters, I really don't know what his views are\non Defense. I've had the impression that they have varied from month.\nEarlier this year, he was talking about $15 billion in cuts from the\nDefense Budget. More recently he was talking about $7 to $8 billion in\ncuts and most recently $5 to $7 billion of cuts from the Defense Budget.\nI don't know which one he believes, but in any case the net effect is\nthat he would certainly fit in that category of those who continuously\nwant to cut the Defense Budget and who in fact have brought us to the\npoint of these dangerous adverse trends.\nAs a matter of fact, we can't have it both ways. He says we can go\nahead and cut back of defense, whether it's $5, $7, $8, $15 billion --\ntake your pick -- and it's not going to hurt us. He believes there's a\nmagic way of doing it without any pain, without any costs. There just\nisn't. There just plain isn't.\nThere have been various specific proposals he's suggested. One is\na vague rumination about the Defense Department doing things that civilian\nagencies ought to be doing. The implication being that's where he'd cut\nthe Defense Budget. If you keep the program but just transfer it, the\nmove might make some of his anti-Defense people happy that he's reduced\nthe Defense Budget, but he hasn't changed anything from the standpoint\nof the taxpayer. He is only continuing a function in a different place.\nThe other thing I've seen reference to involves saving the taxpayers\nmoney by bringing troops home overseas. On the one hand he wants to\nhave a good relationship with our allies and on the other hand he wants\nto bring troops home from overseas. This is kind of a contradiction.\nBut the implication that there is any saving to be realized there is\nwrong. There isn't any saving. After you bring troops home from overseas,\nthey still cost money here. It's not like you're not going to stop\npaying them, or housing them, or providing medical care for them.\nIf he wants to bring them home and put them out of the Service,\nthen he's suggesting we should go below the 2.1 million force level.\nThis is the lowest level of men and women in the Armed Forces since the\nKorean War. I hope he is not saying that. We should in fact continue\nthe slide from 3.5 million of a few years ago to 2.1 million today and\ncontinue cutting more and more people out of the Army, Navy and Air\nForce. He hasn't proposed that, but only by lowering the total number\nof troops can you save any money from withdrawing troops from Europe or\nAsia.\nQ: What have been your major accomplishments as Secretary of\nDefense?\nA: I'll have to put on my modesty hat now. I've been Secretary of\nDefense for ten months. When the history of this first year is written\nand people look back three or four years from now I would submit that\nthey will point and say, \"Interestingly, in our Bicentennial Year the\nAmerican people convinced their representatives in Washington to provide\nfor the first time in five to ten years real increases in Defense spending.\n1976 will prove to be the year that we've turned the corner and stopped\nsliding down that slope.\nThe American people are not stupid, they're not going to allow\ntheir Congressmen and Senators to continue to allow this country to\nslide down that slope to a position of inferiority. It's unacceptable\nto the American people. It ought to be unacceptable to the Congress.\nQ: Can you talk about Congressional actions and waste in the\nPentagon?\nA:\nWE\n've reduced troops over the last ten years from 1968,\nthe Vietnam War high, of 3.5 million down to 2.1 million. Obviously,\nwith that kind of reduction you need to adjust your base structure. The\nCongress has been inhibiting us from doing this. So there are savings\nthat can be achieved, but in many instances they require legislative\naction and the Congress has so far resisted them.\nA second point on waste. There are always areas that can be improved.\nWe've been doing it. We've been reducing the numbers of generals and\nadmirals, we've been improving the support to combat ratio. We've been\nimproving the teacher-to-student ratio with respect to education.\nBut, when you look at the last ten years it's basically been the\napproach Mr. Carter's Now Wing: \"I'm for a strong national defense,\nbut you can save this money over here. You can have a strong national\ndefense, but it's not going to cost anything.\"\nThat's really not being straightforward with the American people.\nThe truth of the matter is there's waste in everything; there's waste in\nthe civilian side, in business, in labor, in the press, and your offices\njust as there is in the Pentagon.\nStill, are we going to cut down on waste? Yes. Do I think we can\nimprove it? Yes. Do I think we're going to be able to find some in-\nexhaustible motherlode of billions of dollars that will enable us to\nhave a strong national defense at no cost to the taxpayers? Of course\nnot. And anyone who tells you they can do it is plain not giving it to\nyou straight.\nQ: Could you elaborate briefly on the contribution the presence of\nAmerican troops in South Korea makes on national security? This is\nsomething of an issue in the campaign.\nA: It's an important question because , as I understand it, Mr.\nCarter has proposed to cut troops overseas in order to save money. Now,\nin point of fact, it wouldn't save any money, as I've already explained.\nThe way you would save money would be to bring them home from\noverseas and put them out of the military. Now, I've NOT detected that he's\nsuggesting that. If he is suggesting that, that means that we should go\nbelow the 2.1 million in our armed forces that we have today, which is\nthe lowest level since before the Korean War.\nIt's interesting to me that if you look at what's happened in\nrecent history, every time there's been a Democratic Administration, the\nnumber of troops overseas has gone up, principally because we've been in\na war. Every time there's been a Republican Administration, the number\nof troops overseas has gone down. It's just a fact. From 1960 to 1969,\nthe troops overseas went from 700, overseas to 1.2 million. Since\n1969 they've been reduced down to 434,000 today.\nThe number of U.S. troops in Korea has been reduced over a period\nof years, as you know. The situation there has been stable, for more\nthan two decades. While there has been an absence of war, the situation\nthere is not safe. Obviously there's continuing pressure and threats of\naggression from North Korea that are repeated weekly. As recently as\ntwo weeks ago, of course, two Americans were killed there.\nOur goal is peace and stability. To inject stability there by pre-\nmaturely or abruptly withdrawing troops is not wise. We've been succes-\nsful in Europe since World War II. As a nation we've been successful in\nNortheast Asia, since the Korean War, in having peace, in having stability\nand in effectively deterring aggression.\nThere are always people who look for ways to get something for\nnothing. I find in life you tend not to get something for nothing. The\nfree lunch went out in Chicago about 1930, as I recall.\nMEMORANDUM\nOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY\nMr. President -\nAs we disussed\nMonday - Dr.R\nHer\nOF DETAILS\nOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nWASHINGTON, D. C. 20301\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nSeptember 9, 1976\nTHE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY\nSUBJECT: Separate Roads to Communism\nIn light of Euro-Communism now, it is interesting to look back at the\nstatements of Communist leaders in Eastern Europe after World War II.\nSuch statements are filled with protestations about independence from\nthe Soviet Union and the Party's adherence to the principles of democracy,\nindependence, and sovereignty. The parallel with claims from Italian\n(and even French) Communist leaders today is striking.\nBelow are examples of such statements made in the late 1940s. I have\nmany more, if you are interested in using such material either in a\nspeech, private talks with NATO PermReps, or whatever.\nBulgaria. \"It is not true that the Communists want to have a single\nparty government\nThis [coalition government] will not be a Soviet\npower, but there will be\na\nregime of the people's democratic forces,\nconstruction and development of our country, and the guaranteeing of our\nnational independence and our state sovereignty.\"\n-- November 1945, Bulgaria's Communist hero and former Secretary\nGeneral of the Comintern, Georgi Dimitrov.\nCzechoslovakia. \"The Communist Party seeks to attain socialism, but we\nare of the opinion that the Soviet system is not the only road to socialism\nI believe that not only are we capable of attaining socialism by a route\ndifferent from that of the Soviet example, but that we have already em-\nbarked in that direction\nWe seek at present to make certain that our\nnew democratic parliamentary methods, comprising the system called\npeople's democracy, be expressed in constitutional law. If you want the\nview of the Communists, I can only say that they will be the strictist\nguardians of the new constitution.\"\n-- January 1947, Chairman of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and\nPremier of the Czechoslovak Republic, Klement Gottwald.\nEast Germany. \"We take the view that the method of imposing the Soviet\nsystem on Germany would be wrong, since this method does not correspond\nto present day conditions of development in Germany. We take the view\nrather that the overriding interests of the German people in their\npresent-day situation prescribe a different method for Germany, namely\nthe method of establishing a democratic anti-Fascist regime, a parliamentary\ndemocratic republic with full democratic rights and liberties for the\npeople.'\nJune 1945, \"Inaugural Proclamation\" of E. German Communist\nParty.\nREVOLUTION\nAMERICAN\nBICENTENNIAL\n1776-1976\n2\nHungary. \"The Communist Party does not approve of the idea of a one-\nparty system. Let the other parties operate and organize as well There\nare certain Communists who, casting their eyes to the Soviet Union,\nthink that the issue in Hungary is to develop socialism. This is not\nthe standpoint of the Hungarian Communist Party. Our conviction is\nthat, with united force, we have to create an independence, democratic,\nand people's Hungary.\"\n-- November 1944, later Hungarian Party First Secretary Erno Gero.\nPoland. \"We completely reject the accusation made against us by the\nreactionaries that we will impose a one-party system. We do not want a\none-party system, and we are not moving toward it.\" \"In Poland there is\na division of functions, and state power is based on parliamentary\ndemocracy. The dictatorship of the proletariat or of a single party is\nnot essential. Poland can proceed and is proceeding along her own\npath.\"\n-- December 1945 and January 1946, Party Leader Wladyslaw Gomulka.\nKen\nKenneth L. Adelman\nAssistant to the Secretary of Defense\nTHE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nSeptember 29, 1976\nMr. President:\nAttached is the transcript of Secretary Rumsfeld's\npress conference which we discussed this morning.\nI have underlined some of the more significant\npassages and added paper clips by those you may\nfind most interesting.\nYou will note on pages 8-9 that the press reacted\nrather sharply to the statement that missile deploy-\nment was higher than we expected and that they\nlargely succeeded in getting a retraction of that\nstatement.\nA\nBrent\nNEWS CONFERENCE\nBY\nSECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD\nAT THE PENTAGON\nMONDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1976\nFor a number of weeks there have been questions by members of the press\nasking us to provide an update on Soviet ballistic missile programs and\nparticularly MIRV programs with respect to events that have taken place and\nI guess since the Defense Report for all practical purposes. I indicated that\nI'd try to do that. I am available to do that today if that is your desire.\nBefore I do, I might make a couple of other comments.\nFirst with respect to the shipbuilding program, as you know the Bennett\nSeapower Subcommittee unanimously reported out a major portion of what the\nPresident requested, a $1.1 billion program involving four additional frigates,\nstrike cruiser and the aegis destroyer. Needless to say, President Ford and I\nand the United States Navy are hopeful that when that issue comes up tomorrow --\nand it's scheduled for consideration of the full House Armed Services Committee\ntomorrow, I am told -- that the Committee will support that because we are\nconvinced that the United States Navy does need modernization and that this is\ncertainly a sensible approach towards modernizing our Navy this year. And it's\nneeded.\nThe second is the subject of the main battle tank. As you know, there's\nbeen testimony over the last month on the subject. I was down in Norfolk the\nday I was asked to testify, volunteered to testify later in the week, but the\nhearings were closed and there is a possibility at least there will be some\nconsideration of that during this final week of the Congress. I'd like to\njust make several points about it. We've been working with the committee;\nthere have been a great many witnesses up there. Our goal obviously is to have\na main battle tank promptly, and certainly as the bids come in, anything that\nwill affect in a significant way cost, schedule, capability of the tank certainly\nwould become a very important part of the decision-making process.\nThere has been a lot of talk about a possible six-month delay. A year's delay,\npossibily up to two years' delay. And lest there be any doubt, that clearly is not\nour intention in the Defense Department. Our goal is to get moving with the\nprogram and to have a good tank.\nThe report of the two-man panel of course raised a number of questions.\nThe report indicates, I believe, some misunderstandings as to some of the actions\ntaken, the objective of the actions, the potential effect of the actions. In\nshort, what we've done is this. We've deferred making source selection by up\nto 120 days. We intend to make the source selection between Chrysler and General\nMotors and to decide upon the configuration of the XM-1 tank not later than\n17 November.\nMORE\n2.\nDesign decisions could affect costs, schedule and capability. That could\nhappen anyway, but in any event, we won't know to what extent, if at all, until\nthe information is in and we've had a chance to evaluate it between now and\nNovember 17. The approach was designed to obtain proposals from the contractors\nwhile in a competitive environment, focusing on the same basic tank and\ndeveloping configuration options which would not otherwise have been available.\nOr, if they were to be available, they would have had to have been made\navailable in a non-competitive environment. So the whole purpose of our\ndecision of withholding the source selection was to get the additional\nconfiguration options in a competitive environment. As you know, the background was\nthat on July 20, the Secretary of the Army presented to Secretary Clements and the\nmembers of the DSARC the Army's recommendations that the contractor be selected\nthen, and as desired, request bids for quotations on a sole source, non-competitive\nbasis for various possible configurations of the tank. In contrast, the\nrecommendation made by Secretary Clements and the members of the DSARC must have\nthe Army continue both contractors for a short period of time, solicit quotations\nin a competitive environment for the configuration alternatives of interest,\nquotations which I understand Mr. Clements had anticipated would be available on\nJuly 20 but which were not.\nIn considering the differing views, I concurred with the unanimous recom-\nmendations of Mr. Clements and the members of the DSARC. The two-man panel heard\ntestimony on the potential for increases in the costs of the tank program. Unfor-\ntunately the line of questioning tended to drive towards a single large cost\nfigure rather than towards an analysis of how costs might change with the various\noptions; and the fact of the matter is, I've indicated earlier is, that we really\ncan't know, if at all, cost of the XM program might change until that information\nis available.\nThe only thing I'd say is that we believe that we've taken the step of\nwithholding source selection in the XM program for sound reasons to get compe-\ntitive rather than sole source bids. Our actions we feel are prudent and consistent\nand I certainly for one are proud of the progress that we're making on the new\ntank and feel that any attempt to redirect this effort could be detrimental to\nour goal of having a main battle tank program soon. That is all I have to say\non the tank.\nI guess, Jim (James P. Wade, Director of Department of Defense SALT Task\nForce), do you want to put up that first one there and we can talk about the strategic\nsystems.\nJim (James Wade) and I have prepared a statement here which talks about the\nballistic missile program and MIRV programs. We tried to put down some of the\nthings that are taking place and include those which have occurred since the\nDefense Report.\nThe first point I make there is that the Soviet Union today is clearly\nmilitarily stronger and busier than in any other period of its history. They\ndevote more resources to defense than any other nation in the world.\nMORE\n3.\nThe Soviets continue to press ahead with aggressive development programs,\nfor both land-based ballistic missiles (ICBMs and IRBMs) and SLBM systems. The\nscope of these programs is unprecedented, either in the Soviet Union or in the\nU.S. While recent developments were not unexpected, they nevertheless\nreinforce one's concern about the purposes behind their energetic activities.\nWe continue to expect that the Soviets will eventually deploy close to\nthe 1320 MIRVed missiles permitted under the Vladivostok understanding, assuming\na SALT II agreement is reached.\nWe remain uncertain, however, as to the eventual mix the Soviets will\nselect between MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs.\nTo the best of our knowledge no MIRVed SLBMs have been deployed to date, but\nthey are expected to begin deployment over the next few years. Soviet efforts\ncontinue to be concentrated on the MIRVing of their ICBM force.\nThe first chart here it simply shows on the left the U.S. land-based ICBMs\nand on the right the Soviet Union's land-based ICBMs, indicating in the second\nrow, I believe, maximum number of warheads (Let me see what that says, I can't\nsee it from here.) The bottom line shows the number of potential MIRVed war-\nheads. The next to the bottom line shows the model number of that particular\nmissile.\nSince I last commented here on this subject, the Soviets have continued to\ndeploy three new ICBMs -- the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 - all of which have been\ntested with MIRVs.\nTesting is thought to be near completion on a fourth ICBM, the smaller\nSS-X-16, and a companion missile to the 16, the SS-X-20, which is not an ICBM,\nwhich I'll get to in a moment.\nThe SS-X-20 is a two-stage derivative the SS-X-16 which is believed to\nhave been designed to replace aging Imtermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)\nsystems (SS-4 and -5). We have no firm evidence, as I indicated the other day\nthat the SS-X-20 has actually been deployed, nor do we have any firm evidence\nthat the 16 has.\nAll five of these systems, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, have a post-boost vehicle\nwhich usually implies a MIRV capability, and all except the SS-X-16 have been\ntested with a MIRV payload.\nThe SS-17 is one of two new missiles designed to replace the older SS-11. It\nutilizes an advanced, two-stage, liquid-propellant booster and carries a four-\nreentry vehicle (RV) MIRV payload. The missile first entered the Soviet inventory\nin mid-1975 and, to date, approximately thirty missiles are operationally\ndeployed in silos.\nThe SS-19 was also designed to replace the SS-11 and, like the SS-17: It is\na two-stage liquid-propellant missile, and carries a six-RV MIRV payload. The\nSS-19 first entered the Soviet inventory in late 1974, and, at the present time, at\nleast 100 of these missiles are believed to have been operationally deployed.\nMORE\n4.\nDuring the last year both the SS-17 and SS-19 have also been tested with\nsingle RVs.\nThe SS-18 is a two-stage, liquid propellant missile which is designed to\nreplace the SS-9 heavy ICBM. It has been tested with both single RV and MIRVed pay-\nloads since the beginning of the program. Approximately forty SS-18s have been\ndeployed since it first became operational in late 1974. It is believed that\nthese missiles are of the single RV version, which completed flight testing first,\nand that deployment of the MIRVed version, with eight RVs, will begin in the near\nfuture. Over three hundred SS-18s are expected to be deployed when this program is\ncompleted,\nThe SS-X-16 is a three-stage, solid propellant missile which is believed to\nhave been designed as a replacement for the older SS-13 and possibly for use in\na new land-mobile ICBM system. To date, it has been tested only with single\nRV payloads, but the missile does incorporate a post-boost vehicle, suggesting\na possible MIRV role in the future. Although no evidence exists at this date\nthat any SS-X-16 missiles have been operationally deployed, they could be\ndeployed at any time, either in silos or on mobile launchers.\nThe SS-X-20 uses the first two stages of the SS-X-16, has a post-boost\nvehicle, and has been tested with three MIRVs. This missile is believed to have\nbeen designed as a replacement for the SS-4 and SS-5 IRBM systems. To date, it\nhas been observed to have been tested only to IRBM ranges. Although no evidence\nexists at this date that any SS-X-20 missiles have been operationally deployed,\ninitial deployment on mobile launchers is expected at any time.\nAs far as the SLBM programs, again the bottom line shows the number of\nwarheads, the next to bottom line the MOD number.\nIn addition to the land-based ballistic missile programs, two new SLBMs\nare currently under development as probable follow-on's to the SS-N-6 and SS-N-8\nmissiles presently deployed. Both are in the flight test stage of a development\nprogram which is expected to last at least another year.\nThe missile we have designated the SS-NX-17 is the first Soviet solid\npropellant SLBM. Although it utilizes a post-boost vehicle, it has so far been\nobserved with only a single reentry vehicle. The presence of the post-boost\nvehicle, however, could allow it to carry a MIRV package. This missile is\nbelieved to be a follow-on replacement for the SS-N-6 in a modified YANKEE-\nclass nuclear-powered submarine.\nThe SS-NX-18 is being developed as a follow-on to the 4200 nm range\nSS-N-8 SLBM and will probably be deployed on a variant of the DELTA-class\nballistic missile submarine. The SS-NX-18 is a liquid propellant missile and\nis the first Soviet SLBM to be MIRVed. We believe that this missile may be\ncapable of carrying as many as three reentry vehicles.\nSince the SS-NX-17 and SS-NX-18 are both in the early phases of the flight test\nprogram, we do not expect either system to be deployed operationally for several\nyears.\nMORE\n5.\nIn short, over the past fifteen years, the Soviets have concentrated primarily\non quantitative improvements to their strategic missile forces. They now have\nmore than 1500 ICBMs and more than 800 SLBMs operationally deployed.\nHaving surpassed the U.S. in both of those two categories -- obviously\nnot with respect to our strategic bomber capability -- the Soviets turned their\nefforts to qualitative improvements.\nThe new ICBMs, currently being deployed, have substantially greater throw-\nweight and are significantly more accurate than their predecessors.\nCurrent trends indicate that, by the early 1980's, all of most of the\nSoviet's existing ICBMs could be replaced with the new generation of missiles.\nThe SLBMs, which are still in the test phase, are believed to have sub-\nstantially improved accuracy, better range capability, and better payload\nflexibility than existing Soviet SLCMs. It is estimated that all or most of\nthe current generation SLBMs could be replaced by the late 1980's.\nIn short, the Soviets appear to be on a steady building program which\ncould carry them toward a capability in excess of that needed merely to deter\nnuclear war.\nMORE\n6.\nIs there one more chart, oh, you've got it up. That's kind of a sum-\nmary description. (I don't know that those were passed out, were they?\nA: Yes.) I guess the only thing that was not passed out is this little\ngouge that I made myself which is that the 18 is intended to replace the\n9; the 17 and 18 to replace 11 in large part; the 16 to replace the 13,\nand the 20 to replace or augment the 4s and the 5s.\nQ: Do you know why they're using so many SS-18s with a single warhead?\nA: Well, I think that what the Soviet Union will have to do is what\nothers would have to do as to make judgments when they look at their total\ncapability as it evolves over a period of time, to make judgments as to\nwhether its to their advantage with respect to their targeting and their\ntotal capabilities to have a system MIRVed or with a single RV. It seems\nto me that that's kind of out in the future as to how that will evolve.\nQ: Surely the Soviet Union was aware what they were doing when they\nput a single RV on SS-18s, about 25 to 30 megatons. What would be the\npurpose of 40 of those missiles?\nA: Let me see if this is a response to it. It seems to me that a\ndecision to do that is a decision to develop a capability that will thereby\nevolve from that and that clearly is a substantial capability to deal with\ncertain types of targets.\nQ: What kind of targets would those be?\nA: If you use a single RV?\nQ: Yes.\nA: They'd be targets that you want them to destroy and you needed a\ngood capability to do it.\nQ: (Inaudible)\nA: To a lesser extent.\nQ: How do we know, do we have a technique of knowing without getting\ninside a missile that it's single as opposed to a MIRV?\nA: I guess the correct answer is through national technical means.\nThe United States can make judgments as to whether a system has been tested\nin a MIRVed as well as a single RV mode.\nQ: We're talking about deployment, though, not just testing. Is this\na foolproof technique that would hold up under SALT? Have we confirmed\nwhether its our MIRV or a single RV?\nA: I don't want to get into the specifics of our national technical\nmeans, but the answer is yes, we do have the ability to make those kinds\nof judgments as to -- pardon me?\nVOICE: May I answer that? One point is that the flight test program\nwith the SS 18 with the single RV commenced much earlier than the program\nwith multiple RV's, and therefore we have seen that flight test develop-\nment program basically be completed, so we expect initial deployment to be\nwith single RV's.\nNow, if we say multiple RV's deployment is commencing now, we still in the\nout years have a difficulty in being able to distinguish one versus the\nother as far as international means are concerned. And this gives us a\nconcern as far as SALT is concerned.\nMORE\nQ: We're talking about 40 missiles, how do we know with any certainty\nthat they're just single RV's?\nVOICE: Well, as I said before, the developmental program with the\nsingle RV's is basically completed, so we expect, as we said, that this\ninitial deployment of the single RV's. Follow on MIRV deployment is now\ncommencing now.\nQ: I'm still talking about these 40 missiles. They've also tested them\nwith MIRVed warheads.\nVOICE: That's right.\nQ: Well is that completed, not completed?\nMR. RUMSFELD: I think what Jim is saying is if you take the time\nsequence, that the single RV testing preceded by a substantial period of\ntime the MIRV testing, and that that is the reason why the conclusion on\nour part is that the forty that are deployed, are single.\nQ: Mr. Secretary, what does this mean in the way of a threat to the\nUnited States?\nA: Well, from a factual standpoint it means what it says, that these\nvarious systems, in the numbers set forth, and the throw weights that\nare involved, and the numbers of RV's that are involved, and the accuracies\nthat are involved, constitute the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear capabil-\nity. And that what that means is not a function only of what they have,\nbut it is a function also of what we do and what our behavior is in the\nUnited States. The goal, obviously, is to see that the strategic nuclear\ndeterrent is healthy, that the deterrent is in effect, functioning, and\nso as you see this kind of development program sequentially from really\nquantitative focus and attention over a period of years, to qualitative\nattention and focus more recently, it means that the United States has to\nsee that our behavior pattern is such that that strategic nuclear deterrent\nstays in balance.\nAnd the programs that we have put forward to the Congress -- as I recall\nthe date was in 1974 - with repsect to prospective modernization of our\nSLBM force, more recently with prospective modernization of our manned\nbomber force, the proposals for a follow on to the B-52 and prospectively\nwith respect to some modernization of our land-based ICBM force, that it is\nimportant for the United States to continuously assess and evaluate that\nbalance, see that the deterrent that we have is healthy and effective.\nQ: Mr. Secretary, does it matter that the SS-16 has not been tested\nwith more than a single RV since the SSX20 has? Isn't testing for the SSX20\nessentially testing for the SS-16?\nA: It is a fact. It does not necessarily have a great deal of meaning.\nYou're right. In other words the fact that the 16 has a post boost vehicle,\nthe fact that the 20 has been tested in the MIRV manner, does suggest that\nthe 16 could be, but it hasn't been.\nQ: What I'm trying to lead up to is the possibility that the SSX20\nbecomes a convertible item that could give you an ICBM capability. I don't\nknow how long it takes to turn one of these things around, but that it's\na potential vehicle for cheating or for giving you an instant capability, if\nyou ever get in trouble.\nA: Well, obviously one has to look at systems apart from those systems\nthat are specifically described as intercontinental in capability. One has\nMORE\n8.\nto look at other systems and ask that question, is it possible for there to\nbe a utilization in a variety of different ways that would in fact place\nthem in a category of ICBM capability.\nAt the present time the SSX20 has not been tested to intercontinental ranges.\nWe do categorize it, as I said, as an IRBM. But that's true with a number\nof things, what you're asking, and I don't know that I could answer it con-\nclusively except to say obviously we're attentive to that.\nQ: The 20 is not a potential instant 16 in any kind of crisis situation,\nor overnight 16?\nA: I guess I'm comfortable with my answer. That's something that we\nhave to be attentive to and assure ourselves on. As we proceed with the\nSALT negotiations that deals with the subjects of intercontinental systems,\none does have to look at those systems that are off the edge of that defini-\ntion, as we're doing with respect to several systems that have been widely\ndebated in the press. Obviously the 20 is another that needs to be addressed.\nQ: Mr. Secretary, is there anything different in what you went through\ntoday than what you went through in your posture statement in January, and\nif so where is the difference and what should we do about it?\nA: Well, I apologize. I did not go back to my posture statement and\nanalyze the specific events that have occurred since, and I was afraid you'd\nask the question. Let me put it this way. What I've presented today is not\nin any way inconsistent with the posture statement.\nIt is rather a projection of events that the posture statement either said\nhad occurred or would occur, but in no case is anything I've presented today\ncontrary to any of the prognostications that were in the posture statement.\nThe major differences in terms of events that have occurred, as I recall,\nare in the SLBM area, since the January day. Do you want to cite any\nspecifics that were not anticipated or were not speculated about in the\nposture statement?\nQ: The point is, sir, is that you have voiced concern about the latent\nprojection in the future of these programs, and what we're saying is con-\nsistent with what you said in the posture statement.\nQ: What are the surprises?\nQ: Are there any surprises since January?\nVOICE: Not any major surprises. We see a slightly higher deployment rate\nof these new missile systems than perhaps we expected since January.\nThat pertains to concern -- I believe the Secretary said, we questioned\nthe progammatic direction of what the Soviets are up to.\nQ: Our original query, and it's been repeated here several times was,\nto get the June 30th rundown of the ICBM's and other missiles, the SLBMs,\ncompared with your forecast in January of where we will be in June, or where\nthe Russians would be in June. We don't have that. Essentially we can\ncompare it either in warheads or in individual missiles.\nMR. RUMSFELD: Oh, sure you do. You've got the posture statement and\nwe have this written document plus the copies of these --\nQ: As of the 30th of\nMORE\ny.\nA: I don;t think anything's changed in the last month, but it's\nbasically as of a month ago or right about now.\nQ: Mr. Secretary, are the rates higher than you expected? At this\nrate it would take them 20 years to reach the level we now have. You're\ndeploying MIRV missiles at the rate of 60 a year.\nQ: That's the point I want to get to.\nQ: They're two years now, into their deployment and they've only deployed\n130 MIRVed missiles. It'd take them 20 years to reach more than 1000.\nWe're talking about the early eighties before they get even.\nVOICE: Well, the statement said here (inaudible) the total missile\nforce in the Soviet Union will be turned over.\nQ: But you've got 100 SS-19's deployed, it would take you 10 to 11\nyears to replace all the SS-11's. You've only got 40 SS-18's, apprently\nthey are to replace, you said, about three or 400 of those. It would take\nyou about 10 years. Fifteen months ago the former Defense Secretary\nSchlesinger said that the Soviets were expected to deploy about 200 to .220\nICBM's a year. And 15 months ago he had almost 100 missiles deployed. I\ndon't see that we've deployed over 100 for instance in the last year.\nVOICE: I think the major point here is their MIRV development programs\nhave now been completed and we see the start up of the MIRV deployments.\nAs the statement indicated, we expect by late 1979-1980 time period, that\nthis total new generation missile force can be turned over, as far as the\nICBMs are concerned. We see now the SLBM force as far as the follow on to\nthe Yankee Six and the Delta Eight. We expect that that program can be\nturned around by the mid-1980s. We are now seeing the turn on the Soviet\nand MIRV deployments.\nA: Well, as you go through a development program and complete your\ntesting and start your deployments, you're not going to deploy all of them\ninstantaneously but you obviously are going to be deploying once that work's\ndone at a more rapid rate, obviously than you did did previously.\nQ: 130 missiles in two years is not a crash program by any means. When\nhad you expected it, was it higher than you had expected?\nA: As I say I didn't say it was higher than I'd expected. Jim did.\nVOICE: I thought it was slightly higher than that expected six months\nago, but just slightly higher. Again, I think the key point is we're saying\n1979, 1980 that we see the Soviet full deployment in these new missiles be\nin the field. Again, that's three years from now, that's not 10 years.\nA: The point I was making in my statement is that the Defense Posture\nStatement indicated that there had been effort quantitatively over a period\nof time, and that the focus the Soviets was on qualitative improvement;\nthat they did have a variety, as you saw from the first chart, of new\nmissiles coming along, the 16, 17, 18 and 19, and that as those testing programs\nwere completed they would be modernizing their forces. The fact is they now are\nmodernizing their forces, and it strikes me it would not be a prudent estimate\nMORE\n10.\nto do as one questioner did and multiply the number deployed in the initial\ntime frame by years and speculate that the modernization would not be com-\npleted for a decade. As Jim suggests, we anticpate that the modernization.\nQ: When do you expect that they will equal us in MIRV missiles?\nA: Well, if Jim is correct, as I suspect he is, when he indicates that\nin the early eighties the bulk of this modernization program would be com-\npleted, that they would be very likely moving up towards the 1320 in that time\nframe. I wouldn't want to pick a specific year, but that's assuming the 1320\nthat was discussed at Vladivostok gets pounded down into an agreement.\nQ: Mr. Secretary, you indicate the first 40 SS-18s are single warheads.\nDoes that mean you're ready to change the counting rules under SALT II.\ncount some 18s or 19s as single warheads and some as MIRV's?\nA: No, definitely we have no intention of changing that carrying rule has\nbeen discussed.\nQ: So you would keep the.\nA: Count it as a MIRV.\nQ: You would count 40 that you believe to be single warheads as MIRVS,\nif SALT II.\nA: At the point where you've fit within that rule and your testing\nprogram, yes.\nQ: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you to complete a thought that has\nleft us dangling at the end of your formal statement. You say it appears\nthe Soviets are building toward a capability in excess of that needed\nmerely to deter nuclear war. What sort of capability do you think the\nSoviets are building woard?\nA: Well, it seems to me that a reasonable person can look at the effort\nthat the Soviet Union has applied and the product of that effort and conclude\nthat they're clearly striving to not be on the losing side in the event those\nweapons are used. That, I think, is clear from the numbers and the types and\nthe improvements, as well as their civil defense activities. That is to say,\nput a slightly different way that they appear, I think, to people who observe\nthis, to be interesting themselves in seeing that -- obviously that they have\nhave the deterrent that they need, but also that in the event there is an\nexchange that they're not on the losing side.\nQ: Are you saying they're working for a war-winning capability?\nA: Well, you know, you start getting into those code words and all of that.\nI guess people have to make their own judgments on that. I think I can state,\nassert what I've asserted here very comfortably, that the pattern of, as I've\ndescribed, suggests that they're undertaking programs that reflect a concern\non their part as to which side would prevail at the end of a conflict, using\nthese weapons.\nMORE\n11.\nQ: Is that different from the U.S. policy in missile. forces?\nA: I think that our emphasis, if one looks at our numbers and our\ncapabilities and our relative inattention to things like civil defense, it could be\nmore precisely characterized as being determined to see that we have a strong,\nhealthy, strategic nuclear deterrent.\nQ: Anything that you see --\nA: Just a minute. Jim, do you want to amplify on that at all? It's\nobviously a question that's an important question and people can have somewhat\ndifferent ways of saying it. As a person I've always tended to walk away from\nhot bottom phrases and words and try to describe things in, oh, words that can\nbe heard and read to mean what I want them to mean, rather than adding a whole\nlot of meanings that people have in their heads from previous debates and\ndiscussions on the subject.\nVoice: I'd make one comment here. The capacity of the U.S. programs\nhave been aimed at preventing a war from occurring; namely, the maintenance\nof peace, and thus our purpose has been on preventing a war from occurring, and\nas far as that part of the deterrent equation, talks about war fighting or\nwar fighting capabilities, we have tended to try to minimize them. We foxus\nour attention on preventing a war from going on. The Soviets in the past, par-\nticularly with the capabilities of these new systems, they're emphasizing to a great\nextent the capability of their missile forces to attack more military targets than\nperhaps we believe necessary as far as mutual deterrence is concerned.\nOur attention on civil defense is certainly consistent to that, and therefore\nit just brings to our mind the question that generally the Soviets consistent\nwith out objective as far as preventing war is concerned, or do they have something\nelse in mind with these resources. That question is still in mind.\nQ: How do you feel about that, Mr. Rumsfeld? Do you have any fears? One\nof the concerns that you're mentioning, that in the first sentence you say they\nnevertheless reinforce one's concern about the purposes behind their energetic\nactivities. Could there be an offense purpose behind this?\nA: Well, as you know, ever since I've been in this post I've tried to avoid\npretending that I could climb in each of the Soviet individuals who could\nconceivably contribute to decisions in this area and pretend that I could determine\nintent, let alone intent over a sustained period of time.\nWhat I have to do is look at capabilities. I've tried to describe them,\nhere in an unclassified version, to the extent that's possible, and my concern,\nand my interest, obviously, is seeing that the United States of America, in the\nface of these quantitative and qualitative improvements, makes no mistake about\nwhat we have to do as a country to see that that deterrent is healthy and strong.\nIt's the interaction of what they're doing and what we're doing that will determine\nwhat that strategic nuclear deterrent will in fact be one, two, three, four, five\nyears from now in the period that Dr. Wade is discussing in the early 1980s.\nMORE\n12.\nAnd it strikes me that our program that is before the Congress is a sensible\nprogram and a sound program, and to the extent that there is a proper response\nto the proposals that the President of the United States has put forward, obviously,\nany concern I might have as a future problem is lessened.\nQ: Mr. Secretary, once this entire Soviet deployment pattern is complete,\nwill these missiles be as good as the existing missiles not employed by the\nUnited States, and if not, what do you intend to do to balance the trends?\nA: I' could answer that, but it wouldn't give a sufficiently balanced\nresponse to your question because I think when one talks about the strategic\nnuclear balance or deterrent they have to look at more than just the missiles.\nBecause our capability includes a very healthy strategic bomber force. Therefore,\nin evaluating the balance, or the deterrent, we can't simply look at SLBMs,\ntheirs against ours, or ICBM ours against theirs, we have to add in our strategic\nbomber capability and some other factors, as you of course well know, so that\nwe know what that balance will be.\nMy concern is to see that the strategic nuclear triad progresses and is\nmodernized at a rate that in fact at the time they have completed modernization\nof their strategic nuclear capability, that that deterrent is healthy and strong.\nSo the answer to your question is obviously at that point where they've\ncompleted their modernization, assuming we did nothing, and if you exclude our\nbomber capability, they would, as I indicated, be ahead in ICBMs and SLBMs. But\nthat is not enough of an answer.\nQ: Can I follow that? Is a single, say MIRV SX-17 as good as a single\nMinuteman III in terms of --\nA: I see what you're asking.\nQ: --- in terms of accuracy and capabilities, that kind of thing?\nA: In the first place, I don't believe it's an accurate way to achieve a\nnet assessment to take one missile against one missile, because that isn't the\nway the potential exchanges is evaluated. But you can look at different\nmissiles and in the earlier chart and you can see how many RV's they have,\nand we know what their progress is with respect to accuracy relative to ours,\nand you can come up with answers, missile for missile, but I don't know once\nyou have that answer on a specific missile against another specific missile\nthat you have very much.\nQ: Well, are you confident, for example, that the accuracy figures that you\nare able to determine can give the Soviets confidence that they can in fact attempt\nto attack military targets?\nA: If I were to try to set forth how I would describe their accuracies,\nI would say, (a) they're behind where we are in accuracy; (b) they obviously\nare attentive to the importance of accuracy, and the intelligence community,\nneedless to say, interests itself in their progress with respect to accuracy\nimprovement, and that the estimate is that in the late seventies, early eighties,\nthey will be achieving improvements in their accuracies something like the\nimprovements we've been achieving in our accuracies some years past.\nMORE\n13.\nWhen the intelligence community does this, they obviously come up with\nhigh estimates, low estimates and bust estimates. So it's a range.\nThe kinds of improvements that we've experienced which have worked to our\nadvantage we anticipate from the information we have, they will be experiencing\nsomething approximating those in the early 1980s.\nQ: They'11 be catching up with us in the early 1980s, is that --\nA: I wouldn't want to --\nQ: -- while we move further ahead.\nA: Well, Jim, expand on this if you want to, but the kinds of improvements\nthat we've had are likely to be -- something approximating that we're likely to\nsee the Soviets have. We're not likely to achieve the kind of major improvements\nwe had previously during the coming period, if that's what you're asking. Nor\nare they likely to achieve them.\nQ: They're going to (inaudible)\nA: Oh, now wait a minute. Oh my. Oh, my.\nQ: Mr. Secretary, as Secretary of Defense -- all right.\nA: I'm sorry, but let me really underline and emphasize this because what\nwe're dealing with here is an important subject and communications is not always\nperfect between human beings. When one looks at this I caution everybody about\ntaking a single statistic or a single trend or a single system. We have to look\nat accuracy, we have to look at throw-weight, we have to look at the numbers of\nweapons, we have to look at various other things that gogether comprise a total\nstrategic nuclear capability. And to extract one, like accuracy, or RVs or\nthrow weight or something else, and suggest that the balance turns on that, isn't\naccurate. We have to be concerned about significant assymetries with respect\nto any of them, obviously. But it's the total capability that one assesses.\nQ: Mr. Secretary, as Secretary of Defense, does this tenor or general profile\nof the Soviet effort, namely as you put it, not to be on the losing side, make\nsense, or is it just a waste of money? If it makes sense, should we do likewise,\nlike embark on a big, new civil defense program? Or, if it's just a waste of\nmoney are we comfortable where we stand and therefore there's nothing to worry\nabout?\nA: You mean does it make sense from our standpoint?\nQ: Yes, in other words, does it make sense to you for the Soviets to\npursue getting on the winning side of the nuclear exchange and therefore if to\nyou it does make sense we have to do even more than we are doing, namely perhaps\nbeef up our nuclear force or our ICBM protection, or is it just a losing game\nwe're on and as far as you're concerned, we're doing fine and they're wasting their\nmoney?\nA: Well, it's clearly not the latter and let me see if I can refine a little bit\nof what you suggested with respect to the former. What the Soviets are doing is\na fact, it's a reality. That is to say, they've gone from where they were to\nwhere they are now and prospectively we anticipate where they're going as we've\nsuggested. We have to deal with that, that is to say, theyre going to have\n\"x\" numbers of SLBMs, ICBMs, and other strategic nuclear systems.\nMORE\n14.\nWe have to look at that, we have to then go through the process of\nmaking an assessment as to what that interaction with our capabilities\nwould be. To the extent that assymetries look like they're occurring in a\nsignificant way we have to see that we're developing our force so that that\nstrategic nuclear balance is healthy.\nAnd that means that what we do between now and then is important. Now,\nyou're asking could we just ignore what they're doing, and the answer is\nclearly no, we can't ignore what they're doing.\nQ: What I'm asking, I think, by telescope of this, should we try\nand build a force to win a nuclear war?\nA: It seems to me what we should try to do is to see that the strategic\nnuclear deterrent stays healthy, and that we achieve the kinds of force\nmodernizations which will be necessary in the period between now and mid-\neighties, so that in fact there is an acceptable strategic nuclear balance.\nThat is why the proposals are before the Congress with respect to the SLBM\nforce, and the bomber force; it's why we have been doing various research\nand development with respect to the ICBM force.\nQ: Secretary Reed said we should begin full scale engineering develop-\nment of a new land base missile in 1978. In light of your remarks today,\ndo you support that, will you recommend that to the President?\nA: As I've testified repeatedly, we have to see that each of the\nelements of our strategic nuclear triad is modernized as we proceed through\ntime, and it's clear that as the Soviet accuracies improve it does affect\nthe survivability of our land based ICBM forces. And that means that we\nhave to, obviously in the period ahead, without getting into what month\nor what year recommendations will be made, or who will make them to whom,\nwe have to see that that force is modernized. And that's why we've been\ndoing research and development in that connection.\nQ: Have you seen anything since your Posture Statement in January\nin the pace of Soviet development, of the nature of Soviet development,\nwhich would impel you to accelerate your various programs which have been\nbefore the Congress for some time, as well as the situation in SALT?\nA: If I had to characterize it I would say that the Soviet Union's\nprogress with respect to their strategic nuclear capability has been\nreasonably consistent with what we forecast in January.\nNumber two, that obviously as we go through the fiscal '78 budget\nprocess which we're now doing, we have additional information that was not\navailable when we went through the fiscal '77 budget process. And therefore\nour proposals for fiscal '78 will reflect what is. There has not been\nanything that has been sufficiently different from that which was anticipated\nin the strategic nuclear area that it called for us to go into the Congress\nwith a supplemental mid-year, with the single exception in the strategic\nnuclear area of the decision with respect to keeping open the Minuteman III\nline. And that was not so much related to the rate of progress of the Soviet\nstrategic nuclear modernization program, but rather it was connected with\nMORE\n15.\nthe fact that the SALT II agreement had not been completed and the\nMinuteman III line was our only land based ICBM line, and we did not want\nto allow that capability to erode during a period when SALT was still\nbeing negotiated.\nIn answer to the second part of your question, no, there's been nothing\nthat has taken place with respect to SALT that has been of a overriding\nnature that has led us to go in with a supplemental either, other than the\nMinuteman III line which I've described. Yes.\nQ: You referred earlier to the gray areas in SALT talks, you alluded\nto backfire and cruise missiles, you then said that the SS 20 is a problem\nwhich needs to be addressed. Does that mean that you figure that the SS 20\nnow needs to be added as consideration of the SALT II talks?\nA: No, no, our intelligence community figures on that, as I just\nindicated, still indicated that that's not been tested in ICBM mode. It has\nbeen tested in IRBM mode.\nSo it's not something that, given what we know of it at the present\ntime, would fit formally in a SALT negotiation.\nIf in SALT you're dealing with systems that are agreed to be of an ICBM\ncapability, intercontinental capability, we know that just outside that\nthere are systems that are not of an intercontinental capability. In negotiat-\ning those things you negotiate in SALT, one does it without blinders on, that\nis to say one negotiates those things that have an intercontinental capability\nwith an awareness of those things that do not have an intercontinental\ncapability but are just short of that.\nThat doesn't mean they become part of the negotiation, but they are\nobviously are part of your peripheral vision as you proceed. And in some\ncases those systems can be sufficiently close in capability that you have\nto be fairly sensitive to them in your peripheral vision.\nBecause looking at a mix of capabilities, they in fact, such as the SS 20,\nit in fact exists, and as it's deployed provides certain capabilities.\nQ: Well, what's the Pentagon's official position on the backfire bomber,\nis it strategic or is it - in a grey area?\nA: We've not changed our intelligence understanding on that, and our\njudgment is what it has been. At the present time --\nMORE\n16.\nQ: (Inaudible) 3,000 miles and just this past week one of your leaders\nhere in the building said 5,000 miles.\nA: We have not changed o ur agreed intelligence position that the\nbackfire bomber operated in certain modes does in fact have an intercon-\ntinental capability. That's exactly what it's been. That's what I've testi-\nfied to, that's what everyone's testified to. The Soviets don't agree with\nthat, you understand, okay.\nQ: Do you share Dr. Ikle's point of view that in future SALT consider-\nations one should allow for what you call the peripheral vision of these\nsystems, in other words, the total strategic capability of both countries,\nequal security as a standard be brought into play, or are you satisfied with\nthe present, limited areas that are being pursued? Ikle in his report and\nin a recent speech indicated that from an accurate point of view, it would\nbe desireable to broaden the scope of SALT to include regional missiles.\nA: I guess I haven't read everything Fred said on it, so let me describe\nwhat I think, rather than answering whether I agree with some sentence in a\nspeech he made. My view is that those who suggest that you can't do anything\nuntil you can do everything are counseling, of course, which means that\nnothing will get done. Conversely, to suggest that you can proceed doing\nsome things and ignore those things that are just off to the side is ob-\nviously foolhardy. And I don't know that there's any disagreement between\nFred or me or anyone else in the administration. The fact of the matter is\nthat one has to recognize that there are certain systems that both of us can\nagree are intercontinental. There may be some that we don't agree, one thinks\nis and the other doesn't, or vice versa. And there may be some systems that\nboth of us agree are not of an intercontinental range, but that cannot be\nignored, at least in the minds of the respective parties as they're nego-\ntiating their intercontinental systems. Now, I guess rephrasing your question,\ndo I think the Grey area are important and ought not to be ignored certainly,\nbut I think everyone does. I don't know if any disagreement with respect to\nthat.\nQ: Mr. Secretary, is the Pentagon going to help in any way in preparing\nthe President for the debate that's coming up? Are you going to be doing\nanything special, what's the plan, are you going to help him bone up for\nthis?\nA: I really don't know; we've not been asked to participate in any way.\nI meet with him several times a week and we talk about defense issues, but\nthat's been going on for years, apart from the fact that there was a debate.\nSo I don't anticpate anything.\nWe supply the State and NSC and other interested parties with our\nconsultation and contribution with respect to questions and answers for\nPresidential press conferences, just like State gives us how they're dealing\nwith State issues and we tell them how we're dealing with Defense issues.\nI've not been asked to do anything particular.\nAs a member of the Defense Appropriations Committee for so many years,\nhe's so knowledgeable about these issues, and as I've indicated previously\nwith respect to the budget last year, he's so deeply involved inwhat we're\ndoing that I would question that his preparation would have to be very exten-\nsive from the Defense part.\nMORE\n17.\nQ: From the Defense Department's point of view, from the Admin-\nistration's point of view, what would you want the measage to be that\nnight on Defense?\nA: Obviously, exactly what I've been saying. Would you like a few\ncomments on the trends? No, you wouldn't.\nQ: What do you think the American people should learn from that?\nA: I think the important thing, regardless of where the subject of defense\nis discussed or debated, whether by Presidents, Senators, Congressmen,\nGovernors, Citizens, that the truth is what's important, and the truth is that\nthe United States of America is living in a world that is not perfectly\nfriendly; that we are a nation that for good or ill can't look for someone\nelse to take care of us and do the job for us, we have to do it ourselves.\nThat weakness historically tends to prove to be provocative and create\ninstabilities and wars and conflicts, and that strength on our part will\ncontribute to peace and stability in the world, and that we can't have it\non the cheap and that people who run around saying we can, through some magic\nwand, have strong national defense and not have it cost very much, just plain\naren't giving it to people straight.\nQ: Mr. Secretary, for your planning -- can I ask you if you're planning\npurposes realisitically. I know the President has said that if you can get a\ngood SALT deal he will go through whether there's been an election or not.\nBut as you\nA: He's felt that way all along.\nQ: But looking at the Soviets, given that it's so late in the year, do\nyou think the Soviets have simply decided to wait until after the election?\nA: Goodness, the President's answered this question, the Secretary of\nState's answered it, I don't know that there's anything I can contribute on\nthe subject. I just don't know. The President's position has been that he\nfavors a SALT II Agreement, one that is consistent with our national security\ninterests. He has been working for it, he intends to keep working for it.\nTo what extent the events of the next six weeks affect that, I suppose you're\nas good a judg as I am.\nQ: Do you think there's a good chance of getting a new SALT Agreement\nbefore the i nterim pact expires in October of '77?\nA: Well, you know, obviously that's our goal. Our goal is to face the\nreality that the interim agreement expires October '77 and that we would like\nto achieve an agreement, a SALT II Agreement, that would be consistent with\nour national security interests.\nWhen you're dealing with a country such as the Soviet Union that has\ninterests that differ from ours, I think the important thing is to decide\nwhat you want to negotiate, try to negotiate it, and don't prejudge whether\nor not it's possible, because it's really up to them whether or not it's\npossible. I don't know whether or not it's possible.\nMORE\n18.\nQ: Mr. Secretary, you said you're concerned about Soviets building\ntoward a capability in excess of that needed to deter nuclear war. If you\nget SALT II Agreement with the limits agreed to at Vladivostok, will that\nconcern disappear, will it be gone?\nA: If you've got a SALT II Agreement with the limits agreed to at Vladivostok,\nyou would have just that, you would have a SALT II Agreement at 2400 1320 with\nfreedom of mix and certain other rules. To the extent that within those agreed\nSALT II arrangements one side proceeded to improve and strengthen and modernize\nand develop and the other didn't, obviouslythat would not in and of itself\nprovide a balance. The purpose of SALT is not to solve very problem in the\nstrategic nuclear arms race. There are some elements of the problem that\nlend themselves to arms control solutions, there are other elements of the\nequation that require a behavior pattern on our part within that SALT II\nAgreement, hypothetically, that assures that that balance is there. And ob-\nviously, to take one example, our proposals for modernization of the strategic\nbomber force would continue quite apart from any agreement with respect to\nSALT II. Were we to do anything else we would be sitting with a situation\nwhere the B-52 ages and pretty soon goes out of business. So even though\nyou've got a SALT II Agreement you're going to have to keep the capabilities\nwithin these levels that assure an adequate deterrent. One last question.\nQ: On land warfare, you said in your letter to the XM panel that the first\ntwo years production of the XM-1 would be with the 105 cannon rather than the\n120. Would it be with the modified terret that would allow the retrofitting\nwith the 120?\nA: The precise configuration, those kinds of decisions would be made\nafter the companies come in and provide the cost data and schedule data and\ncapability data with respect to the various options that are continaed within\nthe parameters of those proposals, or requests for proposals. The intention\nwould be to obviously avoid things that would adversely affect either cost,\nschedule, or capability. With respect to specifically the gun, for example,\nthere is no one I know who has any intention of putting a 120 millimeter gun\non any tank until it's been tested and certified. And knowing when that would\nbe is something that would require a ball to speculate through, because we\nwon't know that until it's actually been achieved.\nThank you, very much.\nQ: Thank you.\n- END- -"
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