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The original documents are located in Box 3, folder "Second Debate: Suggestions from White House Staff" of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Copyright Notice The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Digitized from Box 3 of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library THE PRESIPPOT HAS SEEN September 30, 1976 TO: Dick Cheney Bob Teeter FROM: Doug Bailey SUBJECT: Foreign & Defense Policy Debate. The President's major opportunity to win the election is in this debate. Accordingly, while the "presidential" character of the first debate should be maintained, it will be important (and appropriate) for the President to be aggressive from the opening bell. 1. Basic Strategy. There is peace. And Carter has no experience. Those two points, repeated over and over, can generally destroy any Carter argument. e.g.: "This debate is between a man without two minutes experience in formulating or executing foreign and defense policy and the first President since Eisenhower to be able to say this country is at peace." e.g.: "Mr. Carter's call for U. S. troop reductions in Europe and Korea shows his inexperience. Those steps must be the result of negotiations with our allies in which their commitments are sought to match our troop cutback. Mr. Carter has naively played all his chips before even getting to the table." If e.g.: "I will keep Secretary Kissinger. The people know my team. Because Mr. Carter has had no experience at all, I hope he will tell the people in this debate who his Secretary of State will be, who his Secretary of Defense will be. The people have the right to know who will be running the country's foreign policy." (This is my nominee for the lead statement, putting Carter on the defensive from the outset. The President must be prepared to comment on his choices if he names them: Brzezinski -- no government experience; George Ball -- of the Rusk, Bundy, Rostow group; Henry Jackson -- does he want a $7 billion defense cut?) e.g. "Mr. Carter last July proudly said he had never met an American President. Now he has. But has he ever met a Secretary of State? Or a Secretary of Defense? Or, more important, a foreign Secretary of an ally -- or a head of State, friend or foe?" - 2 -- e.g.: "Mr. Carter in our first debate said he couldn't think of anything I've done. Well, quite aside from 4,000,000 jobs and cutting inflation in half and restoring trust to the White House, I would hope Mr. Carter has noticed that this country is at peace. To suggest that that is not an accomplishment simply underscores his lack of experience in this area." 2. Other points to hit hard on. a. 5-7 billion budget cut. "It's misleading to promise to re-organize government but not say how. It's irresponsible to promise to reform taxes but not say how. But it's truly dangerous for an inexperienced man to promise to cut $7 billion from the defense budget but not say how." b. B-1 bomber. "Mr. Carter's indecision on the B-1 bomber reflects either his inexperience or evasion or both. I think it's important for Mr. Carter to make up his mind and tell the people where he stands. There's no button in the Oval Office marked 'maybe'." C. Radio Free Europe. "Mr. Carter is quite proud of having written the Democratic Party Platform. Why did he omit any mention of Radio Free Europe? I assume it isn't indifference to the people of Eastern Europe? Or is it lack of experience again?" d. Grain Sale Embargo. "The Humphrey-Hawkins Bill, which Mr. Carter supports, would restrict the right of the American farmer to sell abroad. I oppose any such restriction. Because I insisted on a U.S./Soviet agreement I now cannot foresee any circumstance in which an embargo on trade would be justified." 3. Some strategy reminders. a. Avoid the Republican VS. Democrat language. Even the fact that each of the last 4 wars began under Democartic Presidents is better said by naming the Presidents rather than their Party. b. Avoid citing "Congressional experience." Rather: "It's been my responsibility for 25 years to know the details of the nation's defense budget." C. Henry Kissinger is unpopular only on the far extremes. And a heavy attack on him can always be thwarted by asking Carter who he would appoint, given his own inexperience. - 3 - d. "Open diplomacy" does not have a broad constituency. "It shows Mr. Carter's naivete and inexperience to think that national security treaties can be negotiated publicly.' e. Peace is the answer to any criticism. "Mr. Carter's criticism makes it sound as if this country is at war rather than at peace. As far as I am concerned, peace with freedom is the only valid test of a nation's policy. That's exactly what we have." f. Even in the foreign area, it is unwise to claim credit for the last 8 years -- only the last two. If we claim credit in one area, we may have to accept blame in other areas. 4. A Clincher Point. At any point in the debate, when Mr. Carter mis-states facts or policy or seems vague, an effective comment might be: "Mr. Carter may wish to revise what he just said. I think it's important that both of us realize that in addition to the 100,000,000 Americans watching tonight, 200,000,000 more people are watching throughout the world, including many foreign leaders. I'm sure Mr. Carter would not wish the Kremlin to think that he is uncertain whether America needs the B-1 bomber." (Or: "I'm sure Mr. Carter would not wish our allies to think we would withdraw troops without discussing the subject with them carefully.") THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON October 5, 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT THROUGH: DICK CHENEY FROM: JIM CAVANAUGH SUBJECT: Memorandum to Commerce Implementing Certain Procedures Relating to Arab Boycott of U.S. Firms Attached is a memorandum for your signature. It has been reviewed and approved by Ed Schmults, Jim Cannon, Jim Lynn and Bill Gorog. Bill Hyland has okayed it subject to Brent Scowcroft's review in San Francisco. The memorandum has been cleared with Commerce. An accompanying fact sheet indicating previous actions the President has taken in the matter has been supplied to Ron Nessen with the recommendation that it be released at the time that the President's memorandum is released. We urge that this be signed and released tonight so that we can make a midnight deadline in some important papers. Attachment THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE Would you please assure that the Department of Commerce takes steps to permit the public inspection and copying of boycott-related reports to be filed in the future with the Department of Commerce. Only business proprietary information regarding such things as quantity and type of goods exported, the release of which could place reporting firms at a competitive disadvantage, should not be made available to the public. During the past year, there has been a growing interest in and awareness of the impact of the Arab boycott on American business. Disclosure of boycott-related reports will enable the American public to assess for itself the nature and impact of the Arab boycott and to monitor the conduct of American companies. I have concluded that this public disclosure will strengthen existing policy against the Arab boycott of Israel without jeopardizing our vital interests in the Middle East. The action I am directing today should serve as a reaffirmation of our national policy of opposition to boycott actions against nations friendly to us. To provide adequate notice to American exporters of this new policy, these inspection procedures should be placed in effect for reports filed after December, 1976. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON Mr. President: Attached for your consideration is a draft concluding statement for the debate. B Brent WAS For the past two years I have been charged with responsibility for the foreign policy and national security of the United States. This period has marked a major turning point for our country and for the world. Today, America is strong, secure from threats or attacks. Today, for the first time since President Eisenhower, a President running for election can say we are at peace. I consider that my finest achievement and, as we conclude this debate, I want to leave you with a clear statement of my goals, and priorities to keep it that way over the next four years. First, I will assure that the strength of our Armed Forces remains unsurpassed. It is the only sure way to preserve peace. It is the necessary foundation of our diplomacy. No one will respect a weak America. Second, I will give the fullest attention to the strength of our alliances. Our NATO and Asian allies share the total burden of our security, strengthen our deterrent and reinforce our diplomacy. Third, I will continue efforts to reduce tension with adversaries. Always mindful of our deep and abiding differences I believe it is none- theless essential in the nuclear age to keep differences from erupting into military confrontation. In this context I will continue our dialogue with the Soviet Union and with the People's Republic of China, always dealing from strength and, as a result, always able to insist on terms which serve U.S. interests. - 2 - Fourth, in this spirit I will apply the enormous talent and tech- nology of America to consolidating peace in such troubled areas as the Middle East and in Africa. Beyond this, we must eliminate the root causes of turmoil and conflict around the world: hunger, disease, food and energy shortages, the environment, and nuclear proliferation. We can solve these problems. Finally, and most important, peace will be empty if we cannot make progress in the defense of our principles. I will insure that the American ideals of freedom for all peoples and races, the dignity and security of every man and woman, and the sanctity of law, are reflected in our international as well as our national policies. In the United Nations and in other forums we will speak out for the principle of fairness that is the heritage of America. This nation cannot be pressured or blackmailed. My message to the world is that there is much to be accomplished with us through cooperation; nothing through coercion. We face a compelling mandate from mankind. Let's get on with it. MIKE DUVAL THE WHITE HOUSE FYI WASHINGTON go October 3, 1976 10/3/76 MEMORANDUM FOR: DAVE GERGEN FROM: AGNES WALDRON SUBJECT: Max Frankel and Henry Trewitt I talked to Bob McCloskey about both of these men. He said Max Frankel is first rate, one of the finest persons he has ever worked with. He is a superb analyst and is held in high regard by Secretaries Rusk, Rogers and Kissinger. Frankel was born in Germany in 1930. His parents were refugees from Nazi Germany and came to the U.S. in 1940. Frankel became a naturalized citizen in 1948. He received an A.B. in Political Science from Columbia University in 1952. In 1953 he received an M.A. from the same University, also in Political Science. Frankel has been a member of the staff of the New York Times since 1952. He has covered the White House and the State Department. In 1968, he became chief of the Washington bureau and later was promoted to associate editor where he has responsibility for the Sunday edition. I am unable to find much biographical information on Henry Trewitt. He is from Tennessee and worked on a Tennessee newspaper. He joined the Baltimore Sun and for a long time was their correspondent in Bonn. Later he left the Sun for Newsweek but he returned to the Sun. Ambassador McCloskey said Trewitt does not waste his time worrying about marginal stuff, he is a serious journalist and not a "personality." Trewitt is particularly interested in Western Europe, NATO and Strategic Arms and is most knowledgeable about all of these subjects. Frankel is especially knowledgeable about the above subjects and because of his background is concerned about Israel and attendent Middle Eastern problems. Attached is an article by Trewitt, appraising HAK. It is a balanced appraisal of HAK's African effort. Attachment The Rhodesia deal was more than luck Baltimore Sun 10-3-76 By HENRY L TREWHITT be real. But if it does hold, Rhodesia Kissinger himself says cheerfully that control 16 million blacks, is at different will make a peaceful transition to black his "personal charm" tipped the bal- matter. Even most blacks concede the majority government. The lessons there ance. He meant the remark lightly, one vested interests of the whites there. will be applied to Namibia-or South- assumes, but neither is a frivolous though not their assumed right to die- West Africa-where South Africa rules point. Being in the right place at the tate: Washington. in defiance of world opinion. Eventual- right time is a critical judgment of di- From time to time, black Africa has If it is Henry A. Kissinger's final ly, they inevitably will be applied plomacy. Personal charm, translated become a public playground for the grand pirouette on the global stage, no against the white government in South into persuasiveness and cold-eyed ex- perpowers, as in the Congo in the mid- one can complain about the last act. It Africa itself. And the Russians will ploitation of interests, is one of its tools. 1960's. More often, their competition still is a bit early to bring down the cur- have been maneuvered into impotence For what is happening in Southern for influence has been quieter The So- tain. There may be time for another in a strategic area. Africa now is more than anything else a viet Union by no means has fared badly. arms control treaty with the Russians, In human terms, the blood already calculated, in some cases agonized, despite its diplomatic ham-handedness. even if the voters expel Mr. Ford. But running will stop. Given the vast pre- reappraisal of interests. The motives of Its position in the horn of the Northeast for high drama, with thousands of lives ponderance of blacks over whites, and some leaders are clear, of others ob-' is strong. It has established influence in and superpower strategy at stake, few thus certainty of the eventual outcome, scure. The drama has few elements of some of the states now arrayed against performances can equal that of the Sec- only racists of both sides could wish romance. It is a tale of survival and Rhodesia. retary of State in Southern Africa. otherwise. Yet, Rhodesia, where 270,- power. His fragile deal between Rhodesia's 000 whites dictate to 6 million blacks, The historical setting is important. Late last year and early this year white minority government and its had held out through a generation of In the generation since World War II Angola became the greatest Soviet tro- black neighbors may not hold. By its change in most of Africa. Why did the white colonial powers yielded grad- phy in Africa. Russian money and guns, very nature, there will be moments of Prime Minister Ian D. Smith yield now, ually to black rule. For most of that and the proxy fighting of Cuban troops, apparent collapse, and one of them may and why through Mr. Kissinger? Some generation, white Rhodesia survived as installed the Socialist government of critics argue that the secretary this an anomaly, having declared its inde- Agostinho Neto after Portugal aban- Heary L. Trewhitt reports on diplomat- doned the last important colonial time merely happened to be in the right pendence of Great Britain 11 years ago, te affairs for The Sun. place in the right circumstances. Mr. South Africa, where 4 million whites See RHODESIA, K2, CoL1 shaky but viable accord RHODESIA, from KI more nationalist than ideologue, willing guarantee some of the things Mr. Smith to take help from anyone as long as no specified. Nor could Mr. Kissinger strongholds The United rattached States due Kissinger's guarantee absolutelyten end to United all wanted Rhodesist Nations sanctions especially If the belated support for Mr. Neto's rivals white government to yield quickly and Russians object-of congressional ap- collapsed against congressional opposi- bloodlessly. R was by no means certain, proval of several handred million dol- tion and Communist power. it however, that they could agree among lars in United States aid and indemnity But Angola, to understate it, held themselves on Rhodesia's future or on funds for Rhodesia. All are elements of Mr. Kissinger's attention on Africa. the allotment of power among Rhode- the complex settlement package. Above all else, lie takes the long view, sia's fragmented revolutionary move- backward and forward. He could envi- Actually, U Sofficials said, they had ments. received general approval of the ap- sion Southerm:Africa, with its wast re- In that light, the threatened blood- proach from the black leaders, not de- sources, falling totally under Soviet in- bath in Rhodesia also contained risks tailed acceptance, as Mr. Smith seemed fluence as.it made . bloody transition for other leaders, white and black, to believe. Taken all together, the evi- to black government. throughout the area. Confusion and divi- dence suggested that Mr. Kissinger al- Mc Those resources are important in a sion n black Africa. Chaos in South AP lowed some impressions to develop un- world cingishortages South Africa al- rica, as militant white volunteers warranted momentum, to put It charit- so overlooks crowded sea-lanes, histori- surged across the border to help their ably. In turn, the white Rhodesians and cally a prime element in strategic posi- neighbors. Increasing manipulation by their black neighbors put their own in- tion. Administration planners could the great powers, with the danger of terpretation, each according to his po- sense domestic Implications in the de- confrontation. litical needs, on each element of the veloping conflict as well. American Enter Mr. Kissinger, talking of a package. blacks would sympathize with Southern peaceful solution. For once he was on Africa's blacks, creating turmoil at Those who advocate higher morality the side of the angels at home and he home-especially if the United States and less secrecy in foreign affairs may was prepared to exploit all of the wound up in the familiar position of not approve. But it is not an unfamiliar changes in the area. The domestic judg- seeming to support elite capitalism pattern in negotiations. The end result ment of his effort still is by no means fl- over the masses. American interests often, as in this case, is that the negotia- nal. But be went with the blessing of were obvious, if how to serve them was tors find themselves further down a white liberals and most American not. long road than they might otherwise. blacks. Even conservative criticism has Mr. Kissinger's reaction was histor- been muted. Apparently, he persuaded For the Russians, the'development is ic. He moved to pre-empt the Soviet many conservatives that support for a severe political embarrassment. role, approaching Africans under the Africa's whites was politically impossi- Their assault on Mr. Kissinoer's diplo- maxim: If you can't beat 'em, join 'em. ble, and that orderly transition in fact macy has been unusually strident. For As it turned out, the response was hap- was the only way to protect American one thing, they see it as an effort to pier than he might have expected. The interest. preserve American interests and the se- reason, apparently. was that reassess- What followedwas, in most respects, curity of white Africans, which it is. ments were under way in other capitals vintage Kissinger. First be appealed to For another, they have labeled it as a at the same time. Mr. Vorster's need for time. Mr. Vors- disguised campaign to preserve white For South Africa, the message of An- ter, in turn, threatened to shut off vital rule, which it is not. gola-- reflected in the rioting of economic channels to Rhodesia. Left South Africa's own blacks-foretold the The whole delicate structure could with nowhere to turn, Mr. Smith made future: White rule had been left naked break down at any time on any of sever- the critical decision he had avoided be- by Portugal's departure. Prime Minis- al issues. No doubt, there will be crises fore-to begin concrete steps toward ter John Vorster did not have the ulti- in negotiations, including interruptions. majority rule. mate answers for his own racial transi- But the dynamics of change are now The tactical details available so far tion. But one thing he needed was time. running, as Mr. Kissinger recognized, suggest Mr. Kissinger took many short Orderly transition in Rhodesia might ready for further exploitation. In that cuts, not a rarity in diplomacy. Mr. buy time for South Africa. As principal regard, he has achieved a breakthrough. Smith for example, said in his address supplier and supporter for Rhodesia, He was, indeed, in the right place at the of capitulation that Mr. Kissinger had South Africa in effect could decide Rho- right time. But it is more complicated promised an end to economic sanctions than that. desia's future if not its own. and terrorism with the first steps to In the so-called frontline black ward transition. He set out the black- states-Zambia, Tansents, Mozam- white division of power in detail. blgue, Botswans and "Who? Us?" the black leaders an weire certain of their goals, cheestain of swered in effect. They wanted negotia execution and consequences. In outlook, tions, but without preconditions Some- they range from the militance of Mr. how the principals appeared to be sad Neto and Mozambique's Samora died with promises they were not aware Machel to the moderation of Zambia's they had made. Kenneth Kaunda. Tanzania's exquisite- by intellectual Julius Nyerere exempli- As a practical matter, the black fies the Socialist third world leader, leaders of government were unable to A shaky but viable accord RHODESIA, from KI more nationalist than ideologue, willing guarantee some of the things Mr. Smith to take help from anyone as long as no specified. Nor could Mr. Kissinger stronghold on the continent. The United strings are attached. guarantee absolutely an end to United States was humiliated. Mr. Kissinger's Obviously all wanted Rhodesia's Nations sanctions-especially if the belated support for Mr. Neto's rivals white government to yield quickly and Russians object-or congressional ap- collapsed against congressional opposi- bloodlessly. It was by no means certain, proval of several hundred million dol- tion and Communist power. however, that they could agree among lars in United States aid and indemnity But Angola, to understate it, held themselves on Rhodesia's future or on funds for Rhodesia. All are elements of Mr. Kissinger's attention on Africa. the allotment of power among Rhode- the complex settlement package. Above all else, he takes the long view, sia's fragmented revolutionary move- backward and forward. He could envi- Actually, U.S. officials said, they had ments. sion Southern Africa, with its vast re- received general approval of the ap- In that light, the threatened blood- proach from the black leaders, not de- sources, falling totally under Soviet in- bath in Rhodesia also contained risks fluence as it made a bloody transition tailed acceptance, as Mr. Smith seemed for other leaders, white and black, to black government. to believe. Taken all together, the evi- throughout the area. Confusion and divi- dence suggested that Mr. Kissinger al- Those resources are important in a sion in black Africa. Chaos in South Af- lowed some impressions to develop un- world facing shortages. South Africa al- rica, as militant white volunteers warranted momentum, to put it charit- so overlooks crowded sea-lanes, histori- surged across the border to help their ably. In turn, the white Rhodesians and cally a prime element in strategic posi- neighbors. Increasing manipulation by their black neighbors put their own in- tion. Administration planners could the great powers, with the danger of terpretation, each according to his po- sense domestic implications in the de- confrontation. litical needs, on each element of the veloping conflict as well. American Enter Mr. Kissinger, talking of a package. blacks would sympathize with Southern peaceful solution. For once he was on Africa's blacks, creating turmoil at Those who advocate higher morality the side of the angèls at home and he home-especially if the United States and less secrecy in foreign affairs may was prepared to exploit all of the wound up in the familiar position of not approve. But it is not an unfamiliar changes in the area. The domestic judg- seeming to support elite capitalism pattern in negotiations. The end result ment of his effort still is by no means fi- over the masses. American interests often, as in this case, is that the negotia- nal. But he went with the blessing of were obvious, if how to serve them was tors find themselves further down a white liberals and most American not. long road than they might otherwise. blacks. Even conservative criticism has Mr. Kissinger's reaction was histor- been muted. Apparently, he persuaded For the Russians, the development is ic. He moved to pre-empt the Soviet many conservatives that support for a severe political embarrassment. role, approaching Africans under the Africa's whites was politically impossi- Their assault on Mr. Kissinoer's diplo- maxim: If you can't beat 'em, join 'em. ble, and that orderly transition in fact macy has been unusually strident. For As it turned out, the response was hap- was the only way to protect American one thing, they see it as an effort to pier than he might have expected. The interest. preserve American interests and the se- reason, apparently, was that reassess- What followedwas, in most respects, curity of white Africans, which it is. ments were under way in other capitals vintage Kissinger. First, he appealed to For another, they have labeled it as a at the same time. Mr. Vorster's need for time. Mr. Vors- disguised campaign to preserve white For South Africa, the message of An- ter, in turn, threatened to shut off vital rule, which it is not. gola-now reflected in the rioting of economic channels to Rhodesia. Left South Africa's own blacks-foretold the The whole delicate structure could with nowhere to turn, Mr. Smith made future. White rule had been left naked break down at any time on any of sever- the critical decision he had avoided be- by Portugal's departure. Prime Minis- al issues. No doubt, there will be crises fore-to begin concrete steps toward ter John Vorster did not have the ulti- in negotiations, including interruptions. majority rule. mate answers for his own racial transi- But the dynamics of change are now The tactical details available so far tion. But one thing he needed was time. running, as Mr. Kissinger recognized, suggest Mr. Kissinger took many short Orderly transition in Rhodesia might ready for further exploitation. In that cuts, not a rarity in diplomacy. Mr. buy time for South Africa. As principal regard, he has achieved a breakthrough. Smith for example, said in his address supplier and supporter for Rhodesia, He was, indeed, in the right place at the of capitulation that Mr. Kissinger had South Africa in effect could decide Rho- right time. But it is more complicated promised an end to economic sanctions desia's future if not its own. than that. and terrorism with the first steps to- In the so-called frontline black ward transition. He set out the black- states-Zambia, Tanzania, Mozam- white division of power in detail. bique, Botswana and Angola-leaders "Who? Us?" the black leaders an. were certain of their goals. uncertain of swered in effect. They wanted negotia- execution and consequences. In outlook, tions, but without preconditions. Some- they range from the militance of Mr. how the principals appeared to be sad- Neto and Mozambique's Samora died with promises they were not aware Machel to the moderation of Zambia's they had made. Kenneth Kaunda. Tanzania's exquisite- by intellectual Julius Nyerere exempli- As a practical matter, the black fies the Socialist third world leader. leaders of government were unable to

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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 3, folder \"Second Debate: Suggestions from\nWhite House Staff\" of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford\nPresidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 3 of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nTHE PRESIPPOT HAS SEEN\nSeptember 30, 1976\nTO: Dick Cheney\nBob Teeter\nFROM: Doug Bailey\nSUBJECT: Foreign & Defense Policy Debate.\nThe President's major opportunity to win the election is in this\ndebate. Accordingly, while the \"presidential\" character of the first\ndebate should be maintained, it will be important (and appropriate)\nfor the President to be aggressive from the opening bell.\n1.\nBasic Strategy. There is peace. And Carter has no\nexperience. Those two points, repeated over and over,\ncan generally destroy any Carter argument.\ne.g.: \"This debate is between a man without two minutes\nexperience in formulating or executing foreign and\ndefense policy and the first President since\nEisenhower to be able to say this country is at\npeace.\"\ne.g.: \"Mr. Carter's call for U. S. troop reductions in\nEurope and Korea shows his inexperience. Those\nsteps must be the result of negotiations with\nour allies in which their commitments are sought\nto match our troop cutback. Mr. Carter has naively\nplayed all his chips before even getting to the table.\" If\ne.g.:\n\"I will keep Secretary Kissinger. The people know\nmy team. Because Mr. Carter has had no experience\nat all, I hope he will tell the people in this\ndebate who his Secretary of State will be, who his\nSecretary of Defense will be. The people have the\nright to know who will be running the country's\nforeign policy.\"\n(This is my nominee for the lead statement, putting\nCarter on the defensive from the outset. The\nPresident must be prepared to comment on his choices\nif he names them: Brzezinski -- no government\nexperience; George Ball -- of the Rusk, Bundy,\nRostow group; Henry Jackson -- does he want a\n$7 billion defense cut?)\ne.g. \"Mr. Carter last July proudly said he had never met\nan American President. Now he has. But has he\never met a Secretary of State? Or a Secretary of\nDefense? Or, more important, a foreign Secretary\nof an ally -- or a head of State, friend or foe?\"\n- 2 --\ne.g.: \"Mr. Carter in our first debate said he couldn't\nthink of anything I've done. Well, quite aside\nfrom 4,000,000 jobs and cutting inflation in half\nand restoring trust to the White House, I would\nhope Mr. Carter has noticed that this country is\nat peace. To suggest that that is not an\naccomplishment simply underscores his lack of\nexperience in this area.\"\n2. Other points to hit hard on.\na.\n5-7 billion budget cut. \"It's misleading to promise\nto re-organize government but not say how. It's\nirresponsible to promise to reform taxes but not say\nhow. But it's truly dangerous for an inexperienced\nman to promise to cut $7 billion from the defense\nbudget but not say how.\"\nb.\nB-1 bomber. \"Mr. Carter's indecision on the B-1\nbomber reflects either his inexperience or evasion\nor both. I think it's important for Mr. Carter to\nmake up his mind and tell the people where he stands.\nThere's no button in the Oval Office marked 'maybe'.\"\nC.\nRadio Free Europe. \"Mr. Carter is quite proud of\nhaving written the Democratic Party Platform. Why did\nhe omit any mention of Radio Free Europe? I assume\nit isn't indifference to the people of Eastern Europe?\nOr is it lack of experience again?\"\nd.\nGrain Sale Embargo. \"The Humphrey-Hawkins Bill, which\nMr. Carter supports, would restrict the right of the\nAmerican farmer to sell abroad. I oppose any such\nrestriction. Because I insisted on a U.S./Soviet\nagreement I now cannot foresee any circumstance in\nwhich an embargo on trade would be justified.\"\n3.\nSome strategy reminders.\na. Avoid the Republican VS. Democrat language. Even the fact\nthat each of the last 4 wars began under Democartic\nPresidents is better said by naming the Presidents\nrather than their Party.\nb. Avoid citing \"Congressional experience.\" Rather: \"It's\nbeen my responsibility for 25 years to know the details\nof the nation's defense budget.\"\nC. Henry Kissinger is unpopular only on the far extremes.\nAnd a heavy attack on him can always be thwarted by\nasking Carter who he would appoint, given his own\ninexperience.\n- 3 -\nd.\n\"Open diplomacy\" does not have a broad constituency.\n\"It shows Mr. Carter's naivete and inexperience to\nthink that national security treaties can be\nnegotiated publicly.'\ne.\nPeace is the answer to any criticism. \"Mr. Carter's\ncriticism makes it sound as if this country is at war\nrather than at peace. As far as I am concerned, peace\nwith freedom is the only valid test of a nation's\npolicy. That's exactly what we have.\"\nf.\nEven in the foreign area, it is unwise to claim credit\nfor the last 8 years -- only the last two. If we\nclaim credit in one area, we may have to accept blame\nin other areas.\n4.\nA Clincher Point. At any point in the debate, when Mr.\nCarter mis-states facts or policy or seems vague, an\neffective comment might be: \"Mr. Carter may wish to\nrevise what he just said. I think it's important that\nboth of us realize that in addition to the 100,000,000\nAmericans watching tonight, 200,000,000 more people are\nwatching throughout the world, including many foreign\nleaders. I'm sure Mr. Carter would not wish the Kremlin\nto think that he is uncertain whether America needs the\nB-1 bomber.\" (Or: \"I'm sure Mr. Carter would not wish\nour allies to think we would withdraw troops without\ndiscussing the subject with them carefully.\")\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nOctober 5, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT\nTHROUGH:\nDICK CHENEY\nFROM:\nJIM CAVANAUGH\nSUBJECT:\nMemorandum to Commerce Implementing\nCertain Procedures Relating to Arab\nBoycott of U.S. Firms\nAttached is a memorandum for your signature. It has been\nreviewed and approved by Ed Schmults, Jim Cannon, Jim Lynn\nand Bill Gorog. Bill Hyland has okayed it subject to Brent\nScowcroft's review in San Francisco.\nThe memorandum has been cleared with Commerce. An\naccompanying fact sheet indicating previous actions the\nPresident has taken in the matter has been supplied to\nRon Nessen with the recommendation that it be released\nat the time that the President's memorandum is released.\nWe urge that this be signed and released tonight so that we\ncan make a midnight deadline in some important papers.\nAttachment\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nTHE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE\nWould you please assure that the Department of Commerce\ntakes steps to permit the public inspection and copying of\nboycott-related reports to be filed in the future with the\nDepartment of Commerce. Only business proprietary\ninformation regarding such things as quantity and type of\ngoods exported, the release of which could place reporting\nfirms at a competitive disadvantage, should not be made\navailable to the public.\nDuring the past year, there has been a growing interest in\nand awareness of the impact of the Arab boycott on American\nbusiness. Disclosure of boycott-related reports will enable\nthe American public to assess for itself the nature and impact\nof the Arab boycott and to monitor the conduct of American\ncompanies.\nI have concluded that this public disclosure will strengthen\nexisting policy against the Arab boycott of Israel without\njeopardizing our vital interests in the Middle East. The\naction I am directing today should serve as a reaffirmation\nof our national policy of opposition to boycott actions against\nnations friendly to us.\nTo provide adequate notice to American exporters of this new\npolicy, these inspection procedures should be placed in effect\nfor reports filed after December, 1976.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMr. President:\nAttached for your consideration is a\ndraft concluding statement for the\ndebate.\nB\nBrent\nWAS\nFor the past two years I have been charged with responsibility\nfor the foreign policy and national security of the United States. This\nperiod has marked a major turning point for our country and for the\nworld. Today, America is strong, secure from threats or attacks.\nToday, for the first time since President Eisenhower, a President\nrunning for election can say we are at peace. I consider that my finest\nachievement and, as we conclude this debate, I want to leave you with a\nclear statement of my goals, and priorities to keep it that way over the\nnext four years.\nFirst, I will assure that the strength of our Armed Forces\nremains unsurpassed. It is the only sure way to preserve peace. It\nis the necessary foundation of our diplomacy. No one will respect a\nweak America.\nSecond, I will give the fullest attention to the strength of our alliances.\nOur NATO and Asian allies share the total burden of our security, strengthen\nour deterrent and reinforce our diplomacy.\nThird, I will continue efforts to reduce tension with adversaries.\nAlways mindful of our deep and abiding differences I believe it is none-\ntheless essential in the nuclear age to keep differences from erupting\ninto military confrontation. In this context I will continue our dialogue\nwith the Soviet Union and with the People's Republic of China, always\ndealing from strength and, as a result, always able to insist on terms\nwhich serve U.S. interests.\n- 2 -\nFourth, in this spirit I will apply the enormous talent and tech-\nnology of America to consolidating peace in such troubled areas as the\nMiddle East and in Africa. Beyond this, we must eliminate the root\ncauses of turmoil and conflict around the world: hunger, disease, food\nand energy shortages, the environment, and nuclear proliferation. We\ncan solve these problems.\nFinally, and most important, peace will be empty if we cannot\nmake progress in the defense of our principles. I will insure that the\nAmerican ideals of freedom for all peoples and races, the dignity and\nsecurity of every man and woman, and the sanctity of law, are reflected\nin our international as well as our national policies. In the United Nations\nand in other forums we will speak out for the principle of fairness that is\nthe heritage of America. This nation cannot be pressured or blackmailed.\nMy message to the world is that there is much to be accomplished with us\nthrough cooperation; nothing through coercion. We face a compelling\nmandate from mankind. Let's get on with it.\nMIKE DUVAL\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nFYI\nWASHINGTON\ngo\nOctober 3, 1976\n10/3/76\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nDAVE GERGEN\nFROM:\nAGNES WALDRON\nSUBJECT:\nMax Frankel and Henry Trewitt\nI talked to Bob McCloskey about both of these men. He said\nMax Frankel is first rate, one of the finest persons he has\never worked with. He is a superb analyst and is held in\nhigh regard by Secretaries Rusk, Rogers and Kissinger.\nFrankel was born in Germany in 1930. His parents were\nrefugees from Nazi Germany and came to the U.S. in 1940.\nFrankel became a naturalized citizen in 1948. He received\nan A.B. in Political Science from Columbia University in\n1952. In 1953 he received an M.A. from the same University,\nalso in Political Science.\nFrankel has been a member of the staff of the New York Times\nsince 1952. He has covered the White House and the State\nDepartment. In 1968, he became chief of the Washington bureau\nand later was promoted to associate editor where he has\nresponsibility for the Sunday edition.\nI am unable to find much biographical information on Henry Trewitt.\nHe is from Tennessee and worked on a Tennessee newspaper. He joined\nthe Baltimore Sun and for a long time was their correspondent\nin Bonn. Later he left the Sun for Newsweek but he returned to the\nSun. Ambassador McCloskey said Trewitt does not waste his time\nworrying about marginal stuff, he is a serious journalist and\nnot a \"personality.\" Trewitt is particularly interested in\nWestern Europe, NATO and Strategic Arms and is most knowledgeable\nabout all of these subjects.\nFrankel is especially knowledgeable about the above subjects\nand because of his background is concerned about Israel and\nattendent Middle Eastern problems.\nAttached is an article by Trewitt, appraising HAK. It is a\nbalanced appraisal of HAK's African effort.\nAttachment\nThe Rhodesia deal was more than luck\nBaltimore Sun 10-3-76\nBy HENRY L TREWHITT\nbe real. But if it does hold, Rhodesia\nKissinger himself says cheerfully that\ncontrol 16 million blacks, is at different\nwill make a peaceful transition to black\nhis \"personal charm\" tipped the bal-\nmatter. Even most blacks concede the\nmajority government. The lessons there\nance. He meant the remark lightly, one\nvested interests of the whites there.\nwill be applied to Namibia-or South-\nassumes, but neither is a frivolous\nthough not their assumed right to die-\nWest Africa-where South Africa rules\npoint. Being in the right place at the\ntate:\nWashington.\nin defiance of world opinion. Eventual-\nright time is a critical judgment of di-\nFrom time to time, black Africa has\nIf it is Henry A. Kissinger's final\nly, they inevitably will be applied\nplomacy. Personal charm, translated\nbecome a public playground for the\ngrand pirouette on the global stage, no\nagainst the white government in South\ninto persuasiveness and cold-eyed ex-\nperpowers, as in the Congo in the mid-\none can complain about the last act. It\nAfrica itself. And the Russians will\nploitation of interests, is one of its tools.\n1960's. More often, their competition\nstill is a bit early to bring down the cur-\nhave been maneuvered into impotence\nFor what is happening in Southern\nfor influence has been quieter The So-\ntain. There may be time for another\nin a strategic area.\nAfrica now is more than anything else a\nviet Union by no means has fared badly.\narms control treaty with the Russians,\nIn human terms, the blood already\ncalculated, in some cases agonized,\ndespite its diplomatic ham-handedness.\neven if the voters expel Mr. Ford. But\nrunning will stop. Given the vast pre-\nreappraisal of interests. The motives of\nIts position in the horn of the Northeast\nfor high drama, with thousands of lives\nponderance of blacks over whites, and\nsome leaders are clear, of others ob-'\nis strong. It has established influence in\nand superpower strategy at stake, few\nthus certainty of the eventual outcome,\nscure. The drama has few elements of\nsome of the states now arrayed against\nperformances can equal that of the Sec-\nonly racists of both sides could wish\nromance. It is a tale of survival and\nRhodesia.\nretary of State in Southern Africa.\notherwise. Yet, Rhodesia, where 270,-\npower.\nHis fragile deal between Rhodesia's\n000 whites dictate to 6 million blacks,\nThe historical setting is important.\nLate last year and early this year\nwhite minority government and its\nhad held out through a generation of\nIn the generation since World War II\nAngola became the greatest Soviet tro-\nblack neighbors may not hold. By its\nchange in most of Africa. Why did\nthe white colonial powers yielded grad-\nphy in Africa. Russian money and guns,\nvery nature, there will be moments of\nPrime Minister Ian D. Smith yield now,\nually to black rule. For most of that\nand the proxy fighting of Cuban troops,\napparent collapse, and one of them may\nand why through Mr. Kissinger? Some\ngeneration, white Rhodesia survived as\ninstalled the Socialist government of\ncritics argue that the secretary this\nan anomaly, having declared its inde-\nAgostinho Neto after Portugal aban-\nHeary L. Trewhitt reports on diplomat-\ndoned the last important colonial\ntime merely happened to be in the right\npendence of Great Britain 11 years ago,\nte affairs for The Sun.\nplace in the right circumstances. Mr.\nSouth Africa, where 4 million whites\nSee RHODESIA, K2, CoL1\nshaky but viable accord\nRHODESIA, from KI\nmore nationalist than ideologue, willing\nguarantee some of the things Mr. Smith\nto take help from anyone as long as no\nspecified. Nor could Mr. Kissinger\nstrongholds The United\nrattached\nStates due Kissinger's\nguarantee absolutelyten end to United\nall wanted Rhodesist\nNations sanctions especially If the\nbelated support for Mr. Neto's rivals\nwhite government to yield quickly and\nRussians object-of congressional ap-\ncollapsed against congressional opposi-\nbloodlessly. R was by no means certain,\nproval of several handred million dol-\ntion and Communist power.\nit\nhowever, that they could agree among\nlars in United States aid and indemnity\nBut Angola, to understate it, held\nthemselves on Rhodesia's future or on\nfunds for Rhodesia. All are elements of\nMr. Kissinger's attention on Africa.\nthe allotment of power among Rhode-\nthe complex settlement package.\nAbove all else, lie takes the long view,\nsia's fragmented revolutionary move-\nbackward and forward. He could envi-\nActually, U Sofficials said, they had\nments.\nreceived general approval of the ap-\nsion Southerm:Africa, with its wast re-\nIn that light, the threatened blood-\nproach from the black leaders, not de-\nsources, falling totally under Soviet in-\nbath in Rhodesia also contained risks\ntailed acceptance, as Mr. Smith seemed\nfluence as.it made . bloody transition\nfor other leaders, white and black,\nto believe. Taken all together, the evi-\nto black government.\nthroughout the area. Confusion and divi-\ndence suggested that Mr. Kissinger al-\nMc\nThose resources are important in a\nsion n black Africa. Chaos in South AP\nlowed some impressions to develop un-\nworld cingishortages South Africa al-\nrica, as militant white volunteers\nwarranted momentum, to put It charit-\nso overlooks crowded sea-lanes, histori-\nsurged across the border to help their\nably. In turn, the white Rhodesians and\ncally a prime element in strategic posi-\nneighbors. Increasing manipulation by\ntheir black neighbors put their own in-\ntion. Administration planners could\nthe great powers, with the danger of\nterpretation, each according to his po-\nsense domestic Implications in the de-\nconfrontation.\nlitical needs, on each element of the\nveloping conflict as well. American\nEnter Mr. Kissinger, talking of a\npackage.\nblacks would sympathize with Southern\npeaceful solution. For once he was on\nAfrica's blacks, creating turmoil at\nThose who advocate higher morality\nthe side of the angels at home and he\nhome-especially if the United States\nand less secrecy in foreign affairs may\nwas prepared to exploit all of the\nwound up in the familiar position of\nnot approve. But it is not an unfamiliar\nchanges in the area. The domestic judg-\nseeming to support elite capitalism\npattern in negotiations. The end result\nment of his effort still is by no means fl-\nover the masses. American interests\noften, as in this case, is that the negotia-\nnal. But be went with the blessing of\nwere obvious, if how to serve them was\ntors find themselves further down a\nwhite liberals and most American\nnot.\nlong road than they might otherwise.\nblacks. Even conservative criticism has\nMr. Kissinger's reaction was histor-\nbeen muted. Apparently, he persuaded\nFor the Russians, the'development is\nic. He moved to pre-empt the Soviet\nmany conservatives that support for\na severe political embarrassment.\nrole, approaching Africans under the\nAfrica's whites was politically impossi-\nTheir assault on Mr. Kissinoer's diplo-\nmaxim: If you can't beat 'em, join 'em.\nble, and that orderly transition in fact\nmacy has been unusually strident. For\nAs it turned out, the response was hap-\nwas the only way to protect American\none thing, they see it as an effort to\npier than he might have expected. The\ninterest.\npreserve American interests and the se-\nreason, apparently. was that reassess-\nWhat followedwas, in most respects,\ncurity of white Africans, which it is.\nments were under way in other capitals\nvintage Kissinger. First be appealed to\nFor another, they have labeled it as a\nat the same time.\nMr. Vorster's need for time. Mr. Vors-\ndisguised campaign to preserve white\nFor South Africa, the message of An-\nter, in turn, threatened to shut off vital\nrule, which it is not.\ngola-- reflected in the rioting of\neconomic channels to Rhodesia. Left\nSouth Africa's own blacks-foretold the\nThe whole delicate structure could\nwith nowhere to turn, Mr. Smith made\nfuture: White rule had been left naked\nbreak down at any time on any of sever-\nthe critical decision he had avoided be-\nby Portugal's departure. Prime Minis-\nal issues. No doubt, there will be crises\nfore-to begin concrete steps toward\nter John Vorster did not have the ulti-\nin negotiations, including interruptions.\nmajority rule.\nmate answers for his own racial transi-\nBut the dynamics of change are now\nThe tactical details available so far\ntion. But one thing he needed was time.\nrunning, as Mr. Kissinger recognized,\nsuggest Mr. Kissinger took many short\nOrderly transition in Rhodesia might\nready for further exploitation. In that\ncuts, not a rarity in diplomacy. Mr.\nbuy time for South Africa. As principal\nregard, he has achieved a breakthrough.\nSmith for example, said in his address\nsupplier and supporter for Rhodesia,\nHe was, indeed, in the right place at the\nof capitulation that Mr. Kissinger had\nSouth Africa in effect could decide Rho-\nright time. But it is more complicated\npromised an end to economic sanctions\nthan that.\ndesia's future if not its own.\nand terrorism with the first steps to\nIn the so-called frontline black\nward transition. He set out the black-\nstates-Zambia, Tansents, Mozam-\nwhite division of power in detail.\nblgue, Botswans and\n\"Who? Us?\" the black leaders an\nweire certain of their goals, cheestain of\nswered in effect. They wanted negotia\nexecution and consequences. In outlook,\ntions, but without preconditions Some-\nthey range from the militance of Mr.\nhow the principals appeared to be sad\nNeto and Mozambique's Samora\ndied with promises they were not aware\nMachel to the moderation of Zambia's\nthey had made.\nKenneth Kaunda. Tanzania's exquisite-\nby intellectual Julius Nyerere exempli-\nAs a practical matter, the black\nfies the Socialist third world leader,\nleaders of government were unable to\nA shaky but viable accord\nRHODESIA, from KI\nmore nationalist than ideologue, willing\nguarantee some of the things Mr. Smith\nto take help from anyone as long as no\nspecified. Nor could Mr. Kissinger\nstronghold on the continent. The United\nstrings are attached.\nguarantee absolutely an end to United\nStates was humiliated. Mr. Kissinger's\nObviously all wanted Rhodesia's\nNations sanctions-especially if the\nbelated support for Mr. Neto's rivals\nwhite government to yield quickly and\nRussians object-or congressional ap-\ncollapsed against congressional opposi-\nbloodlessly. It was by no means certain,\nproval of several hundred million dol-\ntion and Communist power.\nhowever, that they could agree among\nlars in United States aid and indemnity\nBut Angola, to understate it, held\nthemselves on Rhodesia's future or on\nfunds for Rhodesia. All are elements of\nMr. Kissinger's attention on Africa.\nthe allotment of power among Rhode-\nthe complex settlement package.\nAbove all else, he takes the long view,\nsia's fragmented revolutionary move-\nbackward and forward. He could envi-\nActually, U.S. officials said, they had\nments.\nsion Southern Africa, with its vast re-\nreceived general approval of the ap-\nIn that light, the threatened blood-\nproach from the black leaders, not de-\nsources, falling totally under Soviet in-\nbath in Rhodesia also contained risks\nfluence as it made a bloody transition\ntailed acceptance, as Mr. Smith seemed\nfor other leaders, white and black,\nto black government.\nto believe. Taken all together, the evi-\nthroughout the area. Confusion and divi-\ndence suggested that Mr. Kissinger al-\nThose resources are important in a\nsion in black Africa. Chaos in South Af-\nlowed some impressions to develop un-\nworld facing shortages. South Africa al-\nrica, as militant white volunteers\nwarranted momentum, to put it charit-\nso overlooks crowded sea-lanes, histori-\nsurged across the border to help their\nably. In turn, the white Rhodesians and\ncally a prime element in strategic posi-\nneighbors. Increasing manipulation by\ntheir black neighbors put their own in-\ntion. Administration planners could\nthe great powers, with the danger of\nterpretation, each according to his po-\nsense domestic implications in the de-\nconfrontation.\nlitical needs, on each element of the\nveloping conflict as well. American\nEnter Mr. Kissinger, talking of a\npackage.\nblacks would sympathize with Southern\npeaceful solution. For once he was on\nAfrica's blacks, creating turmoil at\nThose who advocate higher morality\nthe side of the angèls at home and he\nhome-especially if the United States\nand less secrecy in foreign affairs may\nwas prepared to exploit all of the\nwound up in the familiar position of\nnot approve. But it is not an unfamiliar\nchanges in the area. The domestic judg-\nseeming to support elite capitalism\npattern in negotiations. The end result\nment of his effort still is by no means fi-\nover the masses. American interests\noften, as in this case, is that the negotia-\nnal. But he went with the blessing of\nwere obvious, if how to serve them was\ntors find themselves further down a\nwhite liberals and most American\nnot.\nlong road than they might otherwise.\nblacks. Even conservative criticism has\nMr. Kissinger's reaction was histor-\nbeen muted. Apparently, he persuaded\nFor the Russians, the development is\nic. He moved to pre-empt the Soviet\nmany conservatives that support for\na severe political embarrassment.\nrole, approaching Africans under the\nAfrica's whites was politically impossi-\nTheir assault on Mr. Kissinoer's diplo-\nmaxim: If you can't beat 'em, join 'em.\nble, and that orderly transition in fact\nmacy has been unusually strident. For\nAs it turned out, the response was hap-\nwas the only way to protect American\none thing, they see it as an effort to\npier than he might have expected. The\ninterest.\npreserve American interests and the se-\nreason, apparently, was that reassess-\nWhat followedwas, in most respects,\ncurity of white Africans, which it is.\nments were under way in other capitals\nvintage Kissinger. First, he appealed to\nFor another, they have labeled it as a\nat the same time.\nMr. Vorster's need for time. Mr. Vors-\ndisguised campaign to preserve white\nFor South Africa, the message of An-\nter, in turn, threatened to shut off vital\nrule, which it is not.\ngola-now reflected in the rioting of\neconomic channels to Rhodesia. Left\nSouth Africa's own blacks-foretold the\nThe whole delicate structure could\nwith nowhere to turn, Mr. Smith made\nfuture. White rule had been left naked\nbreak down at any time on any of sever-\nthe critical decision he had avoided be-\nby Portugal's departure. Prime Minis-\nal issues. No doubt, there will be crises\nfore-to begin concrete steps toward\nter John Vorster did not have the ulti-\nin negotiations, including interruptions.\nmajority rule.\nmate answers for his own racial transi-\nBut the dynamics of change are now\nThe tactical details available so far\ntion. But one thing he needed was time.\nrunning, as Mr. Kissinger recognized,\nsuggest Mr. Kissinger took many short\nOrderly transition in Rhodesia might\nready for further exploitation. In that\ncuts, not a rarity in diplomacy. Mr.\nbuy time for South Africa. As principal\nregard, he has achieved a breakthrough.\nSmith for example, said in his address\nsupplier and supporter for Rhodesia,\nHe was, indeed, in the right place at the\nof capitulation that Mr. Kissinger had\nSouth Africa in effect could decide Rho-\nright time. But it is more complicated\npromised an end to economic sanctions\ndesia's future if not its own.\nthan that.\nand terrorism with the first steps to-\nIn the so-called frontline black\nward transition. He set out the black-\nstates-Zambia, Tanzania, Mozam-\nwhite division of power in detail.\nbique, Botswana and Angola-leaders\n\"Who? Us?\" the black leaders an.\nwere certain of their goals. uncertain of\nswered in effect. They wanted negotia-\nexecution and consequences. In outlook,\ntions, but without preconditions. Some-\nthey range from the militance of Mr.\nhow the principals appeared to be sad-\nNeto and Mozambique's Samora\ndied with promises they were not aware\nMachel to the moderation of Zambia's\nthey had made.\nKenneth Kaunda. Tanzania's exquisite-\nby intellectual Julius Nyerere exempli-\nAs a practical matter, the black\nfies the Socialist third world leader.\nleaders of government were unable to"
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