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Second Debate: Carter on Foreign Policy - Briefing Book (2)
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Second Debate: Carter on Foreign Policy - Briefing Book (2)
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Ford - Carter Debates Files
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China
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United Nations
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Presidential campaign, 1976
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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder "Second Debate: Carter of Foreign
Policy - Briefing Book (2)" of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R.
Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 2 of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
UNITED NATIONS
CARTER ON THE UNITED NATIONS
Consistent with his call for a "new world order,"
Carter expresses strong support for a strengthened
U.N. The organization has suffered, he says,
because of drift and because it has been relegated to
the status of a debating society. "We should make a
major effort at reforming and structuring the U.N.
systems. "
Among his suggestions:
-- Cost-benefit analysis of all U.N. organiza-
tions to determine appropriate U.S. funding levels;
-- Appointment of a high-level U.S. representa-
tive who "spoke for me as president;"
-- Strengthening of America's bilateral relations
with developing nations in U.N.; he says our poor
relations with them are reflected in U.N. voting;
-- World Energy Conference under U.N. auspices.
FORD VIBRAST
CARTER QUOTES ON THE UNITED NATIONS
"If our aim is to construct an international order,
we must also work through the international bodies
that now exist. On many of these issues, they are the
only places where nations regularly come together.
We have all been deeply disturbed by the drift of the
United Nations and the other international organizations,
and by the acrimony and cliquishness that seems to have
taken hold. But it would be a mistake to give up on
the United Nations.
"In the future, we should make multilateral diplomacy
a major part of our efforts so that other countries
know in advance the importance the United States
attaches to their behavior in the United Nations and
other international organizations. We should make a
major effort at reforming and restructuring the U.N.
systems.
"We should undertake a systematic political and
economic cost-benefit analysis of existing inter-
national institutions in the United Nations systems
and outside, with a view to determining the appropriate
level of United States support."
Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 15, 1976
FORD LIBRARY
"I think we have treated the United Nations as a
debating society and therefore, in our treatment of
it in that respect, that is all it is. I would make
a major effort as president to elevate the importance
of the United Nations, still retaining, of course, a
veto power within the Security Council to make sure
they didn't carry out any actions that were contrary
to the best interests of our country."
Boston Advertiser
July 25, 1976
"Contrasting the present function of the United Nations
with its original concept in 1946, it has not measured
up to expectations
it has deteriorated into a debating
society
The Security Council is almost entirely a nega-
tive entity where vetoes prevent decisions from being
- 2 -
consummated. I have a strong belief that the United
Nations should be continued, that we should give it
our support, that if it were not there it would be
advisable to create a similar organization from
scratch under Moynihan we saw vividly the possible
use of the United Nations as a forum to express our
ideas."
"I would, first of all, put the person that I thought
was the best diplomatic official in the United Nations.
I would like to have someone that I thought would have
a worldwide acceptance as being a superb spokesman for
our country. I would also make sure that the world
would know that our U.N. Ambassador spoke for me as
president and for the Secretary of State so there would
be no semblance of doubt that this was the voice of
the United States when a major statement was made."
Boston Advertiser
July 25, 1976
"I would strengthen our relationship with the other
members of the United Nations by dealing bilaterally
with the smaller and developing nations of the world.
We have neglected the Third World nations and arrived
at a point where, on a showdown vote on a controversial
issue, we can't get much more than 20 or 25 percent
support."
Boston Advertiser
July 25, 1976
"Let us hold a World Energy Conference under the
auspices of the United Nations to help all nations
cope with common energy problems -- eliminating energy
waste, and increasing energy efficiency; reconciling
energy needs with environmental quality goals; and
shifting away from almost total reliance upon dwindling
sources of non-renewable energy to the greatest feasible
relaince on renewable sources."
New York Times
May 14, 1976
"I deplore the actions taken recently in the United
Nations. I reject utterly the charge that Zionism is
a form of racism."
- 3 -
"For years the vision of Israel has embodied the
dream that there could be at least one place on
earth where racism could never exist. Now that
dream has come true
America has a special
responsibility, not only to oppose this baseless
charge wherever it appears, but to keep that dream
alive."
Speech in New Jersey
June 6, 1976
TERRORISM
CARTER ON TERRORISM
Carter has spoken out strongly against international
terrorism, says that he will solicit the aid of the
developing nations in curbing it but has offered few
other specifics. He has also praised the Israelis
for their anti-terrorist actions and has indicated
disinclination for U.S. intervention to solve terrorist
problems in the Middle East.
Carter Quotes on Terrorism
The issue of international terrorism must be a
priority item for the entire international community.
If I become president, I intend to recommend strong
multinational sanctions against guilty nations as a
necessary and productive means for crushing this
intolerable threat to international law and peace.
International terrorism must be stopped once and for
all!
American Legion Speech
Seattle, Washington
August 24, 1976
"The foremost responsibility of any president is to
guarantee the security of our nation -- a guarantee
of freedom from the threat of successful attack or
blackmail and the ability with our allies to maintain
peace.
"But peace is not the mere absence of war. Peace is
action to stamp out international terrorism. Peace
is the unceasing effort to preserve human rights.
Peace is a combined demonstration of strength and
good will. We will pray for peace and we will work
for peace until we have removed from all nations the
threat of nuclear destruction."
Acceptance Speech
Washington Post
July 16, 1976
"Recently at Entebbe, the Israelis reaffirmed courage-
ously the old principle that every state has the right
to defend its citizens against brutal and arbitrary
violence. Violence, that in this case, was even based
on collusion and cooperation between the terrorists
and the government of the nation. The international
terrorism must be a priority item for all nations.
American Legion Convention
Seattle, Washington
August 24, 1976
- 2 -
The United States should neither send troops to
Lebanon nor interfere in Lebanese investigations
of the "very regrettable deaths of the American
officials there," Carter said.
"I am sure the (Lebanese) government did not encourage
it, and they regret it very much themselves. I don't
think that our own government ought to get more deeply
involved than Lebanon's."
"I think it would be a mistake for us to get involved
militarily."
"Almost invariably," the solution of terrorist attacks
in the Mideast civil wars is best left to the govern-
ments there."
Altanta Constitution
June 17, 1976
"I think the Israelis took the right action (at
Entebbe)" he said. "I think it was a good move
I think their opposition to appeasing terrorists is
a good deterrent to terrorism."
AP
Hershey, Pennsylvania
July 6, 1976
GERALD LIBRATY
NUCLEAR POLICY
CARTER ON NUCLEAR POLICY
SALT Negotiations: Carter has frequently
criticized the Vladivostok agreement, charging
that the U.S. was out-traded and that Vladivostok--
along with other agreements -- has only converted a
"quantitative" arms race into a "qualitative"
one. He has made two proposals in this area:
Mondals, Kennely 86/7
(1) He proposes that the U.S. and the USSR
move beyond an agreement on ceilings to negotiations
on actual reductions in strategic weapons and
forces -- "the centerpiece of SALT" as he calls it.
He has not given any specifics. The ultimate goal,
he says, is zero nuclear weapons.
(2) Carter proposes that the U.S. and USSR
conclude a comprehensive treaty banning all
nuclear explosions -- military and peaceful -- for
a period of five years and encourage other
nations to join the pact. Carter says that
national vertification techniques have advanced
to the point where this would be safe.
Nuclear Profliferation Issue: Twice in the last
six months, Carter has given major speeches on
the dangers of nuclear proliferation and he
clearly plans to make it an issue during the
remainder of the campaign.
Addressing a special gathering at the U.N. this
May, Carter said that "nuclear energy must be
at the very top of the list of global challenges
that call for new forms of international action.
Higher prices and dwindling supplies of fossil
fuels, he argued, are making many nations much
more dependent on nuclear energy. There are
many obvious dangers: nuclear accidents, improper
disposal of radioactive wastes, terrorism, and
the spread of nuclear weapons. By the year 2000,
he says, the world will have enough plutonium to
build 100, 000 Hiroshima-sized bombs a year -- and
half of that capacity will lie outside the U.S.
Carter called for a three-part program of inter-
national action:
GETALE FORD CIBRARY
- 2 -
(1) International action to help developing
nations meet their energy needs while also limiting
their reliance on nuclear energy. He says too
many countries are making a premature commitment to
nuclear energy because they have no apparent alter-
natives, and as in the case of India, that commitment
can lead to the development of nuclear weapons capacity.
Carter would call a World Energy Conference under the
UN auspices (similar to the food conference) and seek
to stimulate more research and better energy plans
for the developing world. Eventually, he would like
the developing nations to rely heavily upon renewable
energy resources such as solar hearing, wind, cooling
and "bioconversion." This would reduce their reliance
on nuclear weapons.
(2) International action to limit the spread
of nuclear weapons. Carter says that the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, which took effect in 1970,
was a good beginning and 95 nations have joined, but
the developing nations have not fully lived up to
their obligations under the treaty: they haven't
done enough to share nuclear power benefits with
the developing nations, as promised, and they haven't
lived up to their pleadge to limit and then reduce
nuclear weapons. His proposals: a comprehensive
five-year agreement between the U.S. and USSR to ban
all nuclear explosions, peaceful and military, and
a new SALT agreement actually reducing the number
of nuclear weapons held by each.
(3) International action to limit the spread
of dangerous nuclear processing plants. The danger,
says Carter, arises not from the sale of nuclear
reactors to other nations (nuclear reactor fuel by
itself is not directly suitable for weapons) but from
the sale of facilities for the enrighment of uranium
and facilities for the processing of spent reactor
fuel -- both of these plants produce materials that
can be used to produce nuclear weapons. In this
general area, Carter proposes:
-- A voluntary moratorium among both sellers
and buyers banning the sale of uranium enrichment
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-3-
plants and reprocessing plants. The U. S. has
consistently refused to engage in such sales,
but West Germany and France have recently
agreed to sales and the U. S. should have exercised
more influence to stop the sales, says Carter. A
moratorium would serve that purpose.
-- So that devloping nations will have an
assurance of enriched uranium after the moratorium
takes hold, Carter proposes that serious considera-
tion be given to developing centralized multinational
enrichment facilities that would provide fuel to
more than one country. This would not only be more
economical but much easier to safeguard.
-- He also proposes that the U. S. initiate
a multinational program to develop technology for
plutonium recovery and recycle. If the need for
plutonium reprocessing is demonstrated, the first
U. S. reprocessing plant nearing completion in
Barnwell, South Carolina, could become the first
multinational reprocessing facility under the
auspieces of the International Atomic Energy Agency
in Vienna.
-- The U. S., he says, should also fulfill
its decade-old promise to put its peaceful nuclear
facilities under international safeguards of the
IAEA. This would bolster the world's safeguard
system.
-- Finally, he proposes that the U. S. step
up its program for dealing with radioactive waste
materials.
GERALE R.FOND (TBRARY
* *
This past Saturday in San Diego, Carter expanded
upon the themes and points he made in the UN speech,
accusing the Administration in more forceful terms
of inattention to the dangers of nuclear prolifera-
tion. He also made two new proposals:
-- He pledged to embargo American nuclear
technology to countries that insist on achieving
the capacity to make nuclear fuel suitable for
explosive weapons or otherwise forego nuclear
weapons development.
- -4-
-- He also said that the voluntary moratorium
on sales of uranium enrichment plants and reprocessing
plants should be applied retroactively to agreements
already made by West Germany (to sell such facilities
to Brazil) and by France (sale to Pakistan).
GERALD
FORD is LIBRARY
THE NEW YORK TIMES
September 26, 1976
CARTER VOWS A CURB
ON NUCLEAR EXPORTS
"Voluntary Moratorium' on Plants
He also appeared to make one of his
May proposals in stronger form. Mr. Cart-
TO BAR ARMS SPREAD
er said today that, should be reach the
White House, the would call on all nations
to accept a "voluntary moratorium" on
the sale or purchase of nuclear fuel en-
HE SAYS FORD FAILS TO LEAD
richment or reprocessing plants, which
can be used to produce explosive nuclear
weapons fuel.
Mr. Carter said that such a moratorium
Urges That Sales Be Halted Unless
"should apply retroactively" to agree-
ments already made by West Germany,
a Nation Agrees to Restrictions
to seil such facilities to Brazil, and
France, to supply Pakistan with such
on Weapons and Fuel Plants
technology. "The contracts have been
signed, but the deliveries need not be
made." Mr. Carter said.
By CHARLES MOHR
Special to The New York Times
Last May Mr. Carter did not mention
SAN DIEGO. Sept. 25-Jimmy Carter
any nation specifically in this regard, and
said today that. if elected President, he
said only that he "hoped" such a morato-
would halt further sales of nuclear power
rium could apply to "recently completed
technology and nuclear reactor fuel to
agreements."
any nation that refused to forgo nuclear.
Suggests Complacency Peril
weapons development or insisted on
Mr. Carter's address today was a com-
building its own national plant for re-
plex and at times technical discussion
processing reactor fuel.
of nuclear questions, but he managed to
Mr. Carter said that the United States
give it an emotional, human tone by sug-
should provide vigorous leadership in at-
gesting that a dangerous complacency
tempting to achieve international safe-
about the nuclear era had overtaken the
guards against nuclear weapons prolifera-
world.
tion. He accused President Ford of failing
People, he suggested, had become ac-
to exert such leadership and said, "We
customed to the nuclear threat, had for-
ought not to accept the timid, cowardly
getten the devastation of Nagasaki and
and cynical assumption that we have no
responsibility."
Continued on Page 32, Column 4
In an address to the San Diego City
Club this morning, the Democratic Presi-
dential candidate repeated a number of
proposals and arguments he made in at
speech on nuclear proliferation May 13
in New York, but the pledge to embargo
American nuclear technology to countries
that insist on achieving the capacity to
make nuclear fuel suitable for explosive
weapons or devices appeared to be a new
proposal by Mr. Carter.
The New York Times
September 29, 1976
2
Carter Vows Nuclear-Export Curb
To Prevent Arms Spread Abroad
Continued From Page 1
said, should submit its own nuclear facili-
ties to international control.
Hiroshima and talked blandly "about
-That renegotiation be sought of exist-
megatons and overkill."
ing agreements the United States has
"It is time to readdress the question
made to supply nuclear fuel and technolo-
of atomic war," Mr. Carter said, depart-
gy that were entered into "before we
ing extemporaneously from his prepared
began insisting on reprocessing safe-
text.
guards and which are now inadequate."
The former. Georgia Governor suggest-
-That an "international conference on
ed, as he did last spring, that he would
energy" be called, which could discuss
urge the Soviet Union to join the United
both efforts to prevent nuclear prolifera-
States in agreeing to a "total ban" on
tion and to explore "nonnuclear methods
all nuclear explosions, including so-called
of meeting energy needs so that no state
peaceful devices, for five years. He fur-
is forced into a. premature commitment
ther said he would "follow through" on
to atomic power."
his belief that a "comprehensive" test ban
U.S. Policy Criticized
treaty should be negotiated, which
presumably would include the under-
Mr. Carter was critical of what he de-
ground tests now permitted by treaty.
scribed as a failure by American officials
to deal more vigorously with such nations
Other Suggestions
25 India, which. has refused to sign the
Among other suggestions made by Mr.
treaty against nuclear weapons proiifera-
Carter were the following:
tion and has developed a nuclear device.
That th eUnited States should expand
He said that the mcre countries that
I
its own facilities for producing enriched
possessed such capabilities "the greater
uranium so that this fuel could be sup-
the risk that nuclear warfare can erupt
e
plied to American reactors and develop-
in local conflicts." He added an assertion
ing nations rather than plutonium, which
that the United States had failed to pur-
h
can more readily be made into weapons
sue adequately its own stated objectives
1.
fuel.
in the field, saying, "we find only the
-That Mr. Carter would "explore"
faint footsteps of secret diplomacy, the
proposals that all reprocessing of reactor
constant yielding" to what Mr. Carter
a
t
fuel be done in carefully safeguarded in-
called those who say that proliferation
,
ternational installations. and not in na-
and increased production of dangerous
a
tional facilities. The United States, he
nuclear fuel sare mevitable.
CARTER QUOTES ON SALT
Unfortunately, the agreements reached to date
have succeeded largely in changing the buildup
in strategic arms from a "quantitative" to a
"qualitative" arms race. It is time, in the
SALT talks, that we complete the stage of
agreeing on ceilings and get down to the
centerpiece of SALT -- the actual negotiation
of reductions in strategic forces and measures
effectively halting the race in strategic wea-
pons technology. The world is waiting, but
not necessarily for long. The longer effective
arms reduction is postponed, the more likely it
is that other nations will be encouraged to develop
their own nuclear capability.
There is one step that can be taken at once. The
United States and the Soviet Union should con-
clude an agreement prohibiting all nuclear explo-
sions for a period of five years, whether they
be weapons tests or so-called "peaceful" nuclear
explosions, and encourage all other countries to
join. At the end of the five year period the
agreement can be continued if it serves the
interests of the parties.
I am aware of the Soviet objections to a compre-
hensive treaty that does not allow peaceful nuclear
explosions. I also remember, during the Kennedy
Administration, when the roles were reversed.
Name
Then the U.S. had a similar proposal that per-
mitted large-scale peaceful explosions. However,
in order to reach an accord, we withdrew our
proposal. Similarly, today, if the U.S. really
pushed a comprehensive test ban treaty, I believe
the United States and the world community could
persuade the USSR to dispose of this issue and
accept a comprehensive test ban.
The non-proliferation significance of the super-
GREEALO FOAD LIBRARY
powers' decision to ban peaceful nuclear explosions
would be very great because of its effect on
countries who have resisted the Non-Proliferation
Treaty's prohibition of "peaceful" nuclear explo-
sives, even though they are indistinguishable
from bombs.
-2-
A comprehensive test ban would also signal to
the world the determination of the signatory
states to call a halt to the further develop-
ment of nuclear weaponry. It has been more
than a decade since the Limited Test Ban Treaty
entered into force, and well over 100 nations
are now parties to that agreement.
It now appears that the United States and the
Soviet Union are close to an agreement that
would prohibit underground nuclear tests above
150 kilotons. This so-called threshold test
ban treaty represents a wholly adequate step
beyond the limited test ban. We can and would
do more. Our national verification capabilities
in the last twenty years have advanced to the
point where we no longer have to rely on on-
site inspection to distinguish between earth-
quakes and even very small weapons tests.
Finally, such a treaty would not only be a
demonstration on the part of the superpowers
to agree to limit their own weapons development.
As President Kennedy foresaw in 1973, the most
important objective of a comprehensive treaty
of universal application would be its inhibiting
effect on the spread of nuclear weapons by pro-
hibiting tests by every signatory state.
Address on Nuclear Energy
and World Order at the U.N.
May 13, 1976
"I stand by my proposal
if elected president
I am going to propose to the Russians that a
five-year moratorium be placed on all peaceful
nuclear testing. I feel a deep sense of commit-
ment. The moratorium on peaceful testing is
something which would lead to complete control,
then reduction and finally complete elimination
of all nuclear weapons.'
United Press International
May 20, 1976
-3-
The recent arms agreement (Vladivostok)
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is a
"ridiculous commitment which almost encour-
ages and puts a burden on us to continue a
nuclear escalation. "
New York Times
December 13, 1976
Carter said he favors the passage of legis-
lation which would give the President "almost
unlimited authority to restrain" the sale of
American technological products. The restraints
would be used as a bargaining tool for restriction
of nuclear weapons, if not total disarmament,
he said, adding that he favors disarmament.
Atlanta Constitution
November 14, 1974
"I think also that in the Vladivostok agreement,
on nuclear arms control, the Soviet Union simply
out-traded us."
Chicago Tribune
May 8, 1976
"Negotiations with the Soviets on strategic
arms are at dead center, while the costly and
dangerous buildup of nuclear weapons continues."
Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations
March 15, 1976
-4-
"We should negotiate to reduce the present
SALT ceilings on offensive weapons."
Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations
March 15, 1976
"It is important to continue to seek agree-
ments with the Russians and the Chinese,
especially in the control of weapons. Success
there could mean life instead of death for
millions of people. But the divisions between
us are deep. The differences of history and
ideology will not go away. It is too much to
expect that we can do much more in these
relationships than reduce the areas of irri-
tation and conflict and lessen the danger of
"
war.
Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations
March 15, 1976
Questioned in Chicago, Mr. Carter said the
Soviet Union had benefitted by exploiting the
Vladivostok accords, the tentative outline on
nuclear arms control reached by U.S. and Soviet
negotiators in 1974. When he cited details,
however, Mr. Carter appeared to be talking about
an earlier treaty, somewhat diluting his response.
Baltimore Sun
Henry L. Trewhitt
March 12, 1976
- 5 -
His declared goal is an "alliance for survival"
where "balance of power politics must be supple-
mented by world order politics."
He contends that the main business of the strategic
arms talks between Washington and Moscow should be
"the reduction in strategic forces. The world is
waiting, but not necessarily for long. The longer
effective arms reduction is postponed, the more
likely it is that other nations will be encouraged
to develop their own nuclear capability."
"Of one thing I am certain -- the hour is too late
for business as usual, for politics as usual, or
for diplomacy as usual."
New York Times
May 14, 1976
"The biggest waste and danger of all is the unneces-
sary proliferation of atomic weapons throughout the
world. Our ultimate goal should be the elimination
of nuclear weapon capability among all nations. In
the meantime, simple, careful and firm proposals to
implement this mutual arms reduction should be pur-
sued as a prime purpose in all our negotiations with
nuclear powers present or potential."
National Press Club Speech
December 12, 1975
Our nation must adopt as a firm and ultimate goal
the reduction of nuclear weapons to zero for all
nations. We can marshal worldwide public opinion
to force all other countries to join us in a step-
by-step mutual nuclear disarmament.'
Undated Solicitation Letter
For Funds From Jimmy Carter
"I would pursue on a private and public basis
fairly drastic reductions in nuclear weapons. I
think this nation ought to have as its ultimate
goal zero nuclear weapons for any nation in the
world."
Meet the Press
December 15, 1974
- 6 -
The "dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons"
is the biggest waste of all, and he promises to
work towards the ultimate goal of complete elimina-
tion of nuclear weapons throughout the world."
Atlanta Constitution
March 7, 1976
Asked about possible Soviet advantages in certain
strategic areas, he answered, "I think that the
overwhelming capability of both nations to wreak
havoc on the other nation is such an overwhelming
consideration compared to whether or not one nation
has a slight disadvantage in a subjective analysis,
to me removes that as a major consideration."
On the use of force generally -- "If the altercation
was international, a struggle for the control of the
government, I can't envision any circumstance under
which I would send troops,' but he would use force
where "national security interests were directly
endangered, to evacuate American citizens, or if
the Russians invaded a country like Costa Rica.
New York Times
July 7, 1976
"I think this rough equivalency is a very good posture
to maintain. The inability of either nation to de-
fend itself against a first strike is probably the
greatest deterrent to nuclear war and so I don't feel
concerned about it."
Q. We spent over $6 billion developing ABM, supposedly
with a view toward using the development as a way of
getting the Soviets to limit ABMs. Do you think that
is an effective and sensible way to bargain on strategic
arms?
A. Well, anyone who thinks that the ABM construction
effort was well advised -- looking at it in retrospect --
to me is foolish. So my answer is no, I don't think
that is an advisable procedure."
New York Times
July 7, 1976
- 7 -
He wants to eliminate nuclear weapons all over the
world but says it is a goal that probably cannot be
realized in his lifetime.
New York Times
February 11, 1976
The Russians didn't want to build as many ABMs as we
did. We wanted to build 12, I think it was, finally
we agreed to build two, finally we built one, $6
billion worth, now we are disassembling it. So there
are a lot of things our country can do to hold down
on atomic weapons races which we are not presently
doing in a very tangible, very effective way.
Louisville Forum
November 23, 1976
CHARY
CARTER QUOTES ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
A. Reducing Reliance on Nuclear Energy
We need new international action to help meet the
energy needs of all countries while limiting re-
liance on nuclear energy.
In recent years, we have had major United Nations
conferences on environment, population, food, the
oceans and the role of women -- with habitat, water,
deserts, and science and technology on the schedule
for the months and years immediately ahead. These
are tentative first steps to deal with global prob-
lems on a global basis.
Critics have been disappointed with the lack of
immediate results. But they miss an important point:
a new world agenda is emerging from this process --
an agenda of priority problems on which nations must
cooperate or abdicate the right to plan a future for
the human condition.
The time has come to put the world energy problem on
that new agenda. Let us hold a World Energy Conference
under the auspices of the United Nations to help all
nations cope with common energy problems -- elimina-
ting energy waste and increasing energy efficiency;
reconciling energy needs with environmental quality
goals; and shifting away from almost total reliance
upon dwindling sources of non-renewable energy to
the greatest feasible reliance on renewable sources.
In other words, we must move from living off our
limited energy capital to living within our energy
income.
A World Energy Conference should not simply be a
dramatic meeting to highlight a problem which is
then forgotten. Rather, it should lead to the
creation of new or strengthened institutions to
perform the following tasks:
-- improving the collection and analysis of
worldwide energy information;
-- stimulating and coordinating a network of
worldwide energy research centers;
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-- advising countries, particularly in the
developing world, on the development of sound
national energy policies;
-- providing technical assistance to train
energy planners and badly needed energy technicians;
-- increasing the flow of investment capital
from private and public sources into new energy
development;
-- accelerating research and information
exchange on energy conservation.
Such a worldwide effort must also provide practical
alternatives to the nuclear option. Many countries,
particularly in the developing world, are being
forced into a premature nuclear commitment because
they do not have the knowledge and the means to explore
other possibilities. The world's research and develop-
ment efforts are now focused either on nuclear energy
or on the development of a diminishing supply of
fossil fuels.
More should be done to help the developing countries
develop their oil, gas, and coal resources. But a
special effort should be made in the development of
small-scale technology that can use renewable sources
of energy that are abundant in the developing world --
solar heating and cooling, wind energy, and "biocon-
version" -- an indirect form of solar energy that
harnesses the sunlight captured by living plants.
Using local labor and materials, developing countries
can be helped to produce usable fuel from human and
animal wastes, otherwise wasted wood, fast growing
plants, and even ocean kelp and algae.
Such measures would be a practical way to help the
poorest segment of humanity whose emancipation from
grinding poverty must be our continuing concern.
And all countries could reap benefits from worldwide
energy cooperation. The costs to any one country
would be small if they were shared among nations; the
benefits to each of us from a breakthrough to a new
- 3 -
energy source anywhere in the world would be
great. We have tried international cooperation
in food research and it has paid handsome divi-
dends in high-yielding varieties of corn, wheat,
rice and sorghum. We could expect similar bene-
fits from worldwide energy cooperation.
The exact institutional formula for coping with
energy effectively on a world level will require
the most careful consideration. The IAEA is
neither equipped nor staffed to be an adviser on
energy across the board; nor would it be desirable
to add additional functions that might interfere
with its vitally important work on nuclear safe-
guards and safety.
One possibility to be considered at a World Energy
Conference would be the creation of a new World
Energy Agency to work side by side with the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. A strengthened
International Atomic Energy Agency could focus on
assistance and safeguards for nuclear energy; the
new agency on research and development of non-nuclear,
particularly renewable, sources.
Speech at the United Nations
May 13, 1976
LISRARY
- 4 -
B. Limiting Spread of Nuclear Weapons
We need new international action to limit the spread
of nuclear weapons.
In the past, public attention has been focused on the
problem of controlling the escalation of the strategic
nuclear arms race among the superpowers. Far less
attention has been given to that of controlling the
proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities among
an increasing number of nations.
And yet the danger to world peace may be as great,
if not greater, if this second effort of control
should fail. The more countries that possess nuclear
weapons, the greater the risk that nuclear warfare
might erupt in local conflicts, and the greater the
danger that these could trigger a major nuclear war.
To date, the principal instrument of control has been
the Non-Proliferation Treaty which entered into
force in 1970. By 1976 ninety-five non-weapons
states had ratified the Treaty, including the advanced
industrial states of Western Europe, and prospectively
of Japan. In so doing, these nations agreed not to
develop nuclear weapons or explosives. In addition
they agreed to accept international safeguards on
all their peaceful nuclear activities, developed by
themselves or with outside assistance, under agree-
ments negotiated with the International Atomic Energy
Agency -- a little appreciated, but an unprecedented
step forward, in the development of international
law.
Important as this achievement is, it cannot be a source
of complacency, particularly under present circumstances.
There are still a dozen or more important countries
with active nuclear power programs which have not joined
the Treaty. Hopefully, some of these may decide to
become members; but in the case of several of them,
this is unlikely until the underlying tensions behind
their decision to maintain a nuclear weapons option
are resolved.
The NPT was not conceived of as a one-way street.
Under the Treaty, in return for the commitments of the
non-weapons states, a major undertaking of the nuclear
- 5 -
weapons states (and other nuclear suppliers in a
position to do so) was to provide special nuclear
suppliers in a position to do so) was to provide
special nuclear power benefits to treaty members,
particularly to developing countries.
The advanced countries have not done nearly enough
in providing such peaceful benefits to convince the
member states that they are better off inside the
Treaty than outside.
In fact, recent commercial transactions by some of
the supplier countries have conferred special bene-
fits on non-treaty members, thereby largely removing
any incentive for such recipients to join the Treaty.
They consider themselves better off outside. Further-
more, while individual facilities in these non-treaty
countries may be subject to international safeguards,
others may not be, and India has demonstrated that
such facilities may provide the capability to pro-
duce nuclear weapons.
As a further part of the two-way street, there is
an obligation by the nuclear weapons states, under
the Treaty, to pursue negotiations in good faith to
reach agreement to control and reduce the nuclear
arms race.
We Americans must be honest about the problems of
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Our nuclear
deterrent remains an essential element of world order
in this era. Nevertheless, by enjoining sovereign
nations to forego nuclear weapons, we are asking for
a form of self-denial that we have not been able to
accept ourselves.
I believe we have little right to ask others to deny
themselves such weapons for the indefinite future
unless we demonstrate meaningful progress toward the
goal of control, then reduction, and ultimately,
elimination of nuclear arsenals.
Unfortunately, the agreements reached to date have
succeeded largely in changing the buildup in strategic
arms from a "quantitative" to a "qualitative" arms
GERALD LIBRARY
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race. It is time, in the SALT talks, that we
complete the stage of agreeing on ceilings and
get down to the centerpiece of SALT -- the actual
negotiation of reductions in strategic forces and
measures effectively halting the race in strategic
weapons technology.
There is one step that can be taken at once. The
United States and the Soviet Union should conclude
an agreement prohibiting all nuclear explosions
for a period of five years, whether they be weapons
tests for so-called "peaceful" nuclear explosions,
and encourage all other countries to join. At the
end of the five-year period the agreement can be
continued if it serves the interests of the parties.
United Nations Speech
May 13, 1976
We had the first atomic capability and on us falls
a tremendous additional responsibility to control
and to limit the spread of atomic weapons, but in
the last two years we have had a complete absence
of leadership in this major field. Our non-nuclear
proliferation policy has consisted of faith, foot-
steps and secret diplomacy and a constant yielding
to the manufacturers of atomic products. And to
those who very cynically say to this whole wide
control, the spread of nuclear capabilities we have
failed miserably, we don't have any clear policy of
our own for the control of reprocessing, for the
shortage of atomic waste or for the control of the
enrichment of uranium. Our security has been weak.
The recent report of the General Accounting Office
to Congress said that we have lost one hundred
thousand pounds of atomic matter, six thousand
pounds of weapons quality.
Two-thirds of all our research and development
money has gone into atomic power -- most of this for
the Breader reactor. Now we have failed to place
our own peaceful atomic plant on international
safe guard.
- 7 -
President Ford has held the non-proliferation
treaty hostage in his insistence that private
industry should take over reproduction or
increased production of, at least, uranium. We
have fought all non-proliferation efforts. And
it's been a tragic retreat for us to remember
the progress that our nation made under the
Kennedy and Johnson years. We refuse to increase
our government capacity to produce enriched uranium
that can provide peaceful atomic power. And there's
little emphasis, as you well know, for research
development of America's skill for solar energy,
geothermal supplies, a clean burning or safe
instructions of coal.
San Diego Speech
September 27, 1976
Of one thing I am certain -- the hour is too late
for business as usual, for politics as usual, or
for diplomacy as usual. An alliance for survival
is needed -- transcending regions and ideologies --
if we are to assure mankind a safe passage to the
twenty-first century
United Nations Speech
September 13, 1976
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C. Limiting the Spread of Nuclear Facilities
We need new international action to make the
spread of peaceful nuclear power less dangerous.
The danger is not SO much in the spread of nuclear
reactors themselves, for nuclear reactor fuel is not
suitable for use directly in the production of nuclear
weapons. The far greater danger lies in the spread
of facilities for the enrichment of uranium and the
reprocessing of spent reactor fuel -- because highly
enriched uranium can be used to produce weapons; and
because plutonium, when separated from the remainder
of the spent fuel, can also be used to produce
nuclear weapons. Even at the present early stage in
the development of the nuclear power industry, enough
materials are produced for at least a thousand bombs
each year.
Under present international arrangments, peaceful
nuclear facilities are sought to be safeguarded against
diversion and theft of nuclear materials by the
International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. As
far as reactors are concerned, the international
safeguards -- which include materials accountancy,
surveillance and inspection -- provide some assurance
that the diversion of a significant amount of
fissionable material would be detected, and therefore
help to deter diversion.
The United States should fulfill its decade-old
promise to put its peaceful nuclear facilities under
international safeguards to demonstrate that we too
are prepared to accept the same arrangments as the
non-weapon states.
That would place substantial additional demands on
the safeguards system of the IAEA, and the United
States should bear its fair share of the costs of
this expansion. It is a price we cannot afford not to
pay.
But in the field of enrichment and reprocessing,
where the primary danger lies, the present inter-
national safeguards system cannot provide adequate
assurance against the possibility that national
enrichment and reprocessing facilities will be mis-
FORD
used for military purposes.
- 9 -
The fact is that a reprocessing plant separating
the plutonium from spent fuel literally provides
a country with direct access to nuclear explosive
material.
It has therefore been the consistent policy of the
United States over the course of several administrations,
not to authorize the sale of either enrichment or
reprocessing plants, even with safeguards. Recently,
however, some of the other principal suppliers of nuclear
equipment have begun to make such sales.
In my judgment, it is absolutely essential to halt
the sale of such plants.
Considerations of commercial profit cannot be allowed
to prevail over the paramount objective of limiting
the spread of nuclear weapons. The heads of govern-
ment of all the principal supplier nations hopefully
will recognize this danger and share this view.
I am not seeking to place any restrictions on the
sale of nuclear power reactors which sell for as
much as $1 billion per reactor. I believe that all
supplier countries are entitled to a fair share of
the reactor market. What we must prevent, however,
is the sale of small pilot reprocessing plants which
sell for only a few million dollars, have no commercial
use at present, and can only spread nuclear explosives
around the world.
The International Atomic Energy Agency itself,
pursuant to the recommendations of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty review conference of 1975, is currently engaged
in an intensive feasibility study of multinational fuel
centers as one way of promoting the safe development
of nuclear power by the nations of the world, with
enhanced control resulting from multinational participation.
The Agency is also considering other ways to strengthen
the protection of explosive material involved in the
nuclear fuel cycle. This includes use of the Agency's
hitherto unused authority under its charter to establish
highly secure repositories for the separated plutonium
from non-military facilities, following reprocessing
and pending its fabrication into mixed oxide fuel elements
as supplementary fuel.
- 10 -
Until such studies are completed, I call on all
nations of the world to adopt a voluntary moratorium
on the national purchase or sale of enrichment or
reprocessing plants. I would hope this moratorium
would apply to recently completed agreements.
I do not underestimate the political obstacles in
negotiating such a moratorium, but they might be
overcome if we do what should have been done many
months ago--bring this matter to the attention of
the highest political authorities of the supplying
countries.
Acceptance of a moratorium would deprive no
nation of the ability to meet its nuclear power
needs through the purchase of current reactors
with guarantees of a long-range supply of enriched
uranium. Such assurances must be provided now
by those supplier countries possessing the highly
expensive facilities currently required for this
purpose.
To assure the developing countries of an assured
supply of enriched uranium to meet their nuclear
power needs without the need for reprocessing,
the United States should, in cooperation with other
countries, assure an adequate supply of enriched
uranium.
We should also give the most serious consideration
to the establishment of centralized multinational
enrichment facilities involving developing countries'
investment participation, in order to provide the
assured supply of enriched uranium. And, if one
day as their nuclear programs economically justify
use of plutonium as a supplementary fuel, similar
centralized multinational reprocessing services
could equally provide for an assured supply of
mixed oxide fuel elements.
It makes no economic sense to locate national
reprocessing facilities in a number of different
countries. In view of economies of scale, a single
commercial reprocessing facility and a fuel fabrica-
tion plant will provide services for about fifty
large power reactors. From an economic point of
view, multinational facilities serving many countries
are obviously desirable. And the co-location of
reprocessing, fuel fabrication and fuel storage
facilities would reduce the risk of weapons pro-
liferation, theft of plutonium during transport,
and environmental contamination.
- 11 -
There is considerable doubt within the United
States about the necessity of reprocessing now
for plutonium recycle. Furthermore, the licensing
of plutonium for such use is currently withheld
pending a full scale review by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission of the economic, environmental,
and safeguards issues. And there is a further
question to be asked: If the United States does
not want the developing countries to have commercial
plutonium, why should we be permitted to have it
under our sovereign control?
Surely this whole matter of plutonium recycle
should be examined on an international basis.
Since our nation has more experience than others
in fuel reprocessing, we should initiate a new
multinational program designed to develop experi-
mentally the technology, economics, regulations and
safeguards to be associated with plutonium recovery
and recycle. The program could be developed by the
U. S. in cooperation with the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
If the need for plutonium reprocessing is eventually
demonstrated--and if mutually satisfactory ground
rules for management and operation can be worked out,
the first U. S. reprocessing plant which is now nearing
completion in Barnwell, South Carolina, could become
the first multinational reprocessing facility under
the auspices of the International Atomic Energy
Agency. Separated plutonium might ultimately be made
available to all nations on a reliable, cheap, and
non-discriminatory basis after blending with natural
uranium to form a low-enriched fuel that is unsuitable
for weapons making.
Since the immediate need for plutonium recycle has
not yet been demonstrated, the start-up of the plant
should certainly be delayed to allow time for the
installation of the next generation of materials
accounting and physical security equipment which
is now under development.
One final observation in this area: We need to
cut through the indecision and debate about the
long-term storage of radioactive wastes and start
doing something about it. The United States could
begin by preparing all high-level radioactive wastes
currently produced from our military programs for
permanent disposal. Waste disposal is a matter on
which sound international arrangements will clearly
be necessary.
UN Speech
May 13, 1976
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We should refuse to sell nuclear power plants and
fuels to nations who do not sign the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty or who will not agree to
adhere to S trict provisions regarding international
control of atomic wastes. The establishment of
additional nuclear free zones in the world must
also be encouraged.
American Chamber of Commerce
Toyko
May 28, 1975
Under Johnson, Kennedy before him, this thrust
(toward limiting nuclear proliferation) was a major
effort of our future. Under Nixon and Ford, that
thrust has been forgotten. As a matter of fact,
as indicated by the Indian situation, we have
really favored the countries that have refused to
sign the Non-proliferation Treaty in preference
to those who've actually signed it. This Republican
indifference is serious to all of us and to the
world.
San Diego Speech
September 27, 1976
DEFENSE POLICY
CARTER ON DEFENSE ISSUES
1. Differences with the Administration: Carter's
most obvious differences with Administration policy
are these:
-- He would cut the defense budget by $5-7
billion;
-- He is against construction of the B-1,
although he favors continued R&D for the aircraft;
-- He would undertake a phased withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Korea (while assuring absolute pro-
tection to Japan) and would consider replacing some
U.S. troops in Europe with European troops;
-- He does not consider limited nuclear war to
be a realistic possiblity so that he would expect --
and plan -- for a massive nuclear exchange;
-- He would also seek great reductions in the
sales of U.S. weapons abroad.
2. Cutting the Defense Budget: In March of 1975,
Carter said the Ford defense budget could be cut by
$15 billion without endangering national security.
In November of 1975, he said it could be cut by
$7-8 billion. Today, he says the budget could be
cut by $5-7 billion.
Carter does not specify exactly how all the money
would be saved, but he has indicated where he thinks
money is being wasted:
-- Too many bases overseas;
-- Top heavy with military brass;
LIBRARY
-- Too many instructors per pupil in training
schools;
-- Cost overruns;
-- Too many transfers of service personnel;
Evans and Novak have recently asserted that many of
Carter's assumptions about savings, borrowed from
- 2 -
Brookings, are wildly optimistic. Excerpts from
article are included in quotes material that
follows.
3. Rough Equivalency in Military Strength: Carter
agrees with the Defense Department's view that the
U.S. has a "rough equivalency" with Soviet military
strength. We are far behind, he says, in land-based
missiles, roughly equivalent at sea, and ahead in
manned bombers. He wants to maintain general equiva-
lency, but he rejects the idea that the U.S. must
keep up with or exceed the Soviets in every weapons
system.
In specific areas, Carter:
-- Would not cut the Navy budget because he
believes that Naval equality or superiority is
essential for the U.S.;
-- Would continue the Trident program, but he
has vacillated on how many he would build each year;
-- Would give priority to building smaller,
less vulnerable ships;
-- Would not proceed with the B-1 bomber, but
says he may change his mind after he knows more
classified information; he would maintain R&D for
the B-1,
-- Would reduce ratio of officers to enlisted
and of support troops to combat troops
4. Development of Forces: Carter has raised many
eyebrows by his frequent statements that he would
withdraw most U.S. combat troops from Korea on a
phased basis -- over three, four or five years.
He would also withdraw U.S. atomic weapons.
Carter cautions that he would want to ensure Japan
were protected, that air cover would remain, and
that the South Koreans be able to defend themselves.
But he has still caused concern, and he knows it.
Before conservative audiences likely to be offended,
FORL
GERALD
- 3 -
Carter disguises his policy: "I do not believe
we should withdraw Americans from Korea except
on a phased basis." Sometimes he gets away with
the artful rephrasing.
Carter has also said that he would accommodate
requests from the Philippines and Thailand to
withdraw whatever U.S. troops they want out of
their countries.
As to Europe, Carter has said that he would like
NATO to assume more and more responsibility for
the defense of Western Europe but any withdrawal
would be slow and very careful. He promises a
review of NATO strategy, greater standardization
in the NATO arsenal, more accurate air defense
and anti-tank weapons, and an effort to agree upon
stockpile arrangements. Carter is also committed
to a strong American military presence in the
Eastern Mediterranean.
5. Use of Strategic Weapons: Carter says that he
would have to consider using atomic weapons if
there were a threat to the security of the U.S. or
to the security of a nation with whom we have "a
binding alliance." He would use a pre-emptive first
strike only if the security of the U.S. itself were
threatened.
Carter raised questions in Europe with a fuzzy
interview with the Boston Sunday Herald Advertiser
on July 25, 1976 when he said that he would not con-
template using atomic weapons in Europe without
prior agreement with nations that might be hit by
the Soviets. "I certainly couldn't imagine us using
nuclear weapons in Europe without Germany and
Austria and perhaps France approving their use. "
Two questions: what sort of approval is he talking
about? And Austria?
Carter has also raised questions among nuclear
strategists with his views that a limited nuclear
war is unlikely to occur. His own interpretations
of Soviet intentions is that that would quickly move
to an all-out war, and thus we must be prepared for
- 4 -
such. For many observers, Carter's statements
revive memories of "massive retaliation" of
John Foster Dulles. Europeans also wonder where
the massive retaliation approach would leave them.
6. Foreign Arms Sales: Carter has been a persistent
critic of foreign arms sales by the U.S. and its
allies. He promises to work with both allies and
the Soviets to reduce the commerce in weapons of
war. When he is careful, he adds that he would
not cut off any vital flows of arms to countries
such as Israel.
GERALD FORD LEBRARY
CARTER'S RECOMMENDED DEFENSE SPENDING
Carter said McGovern's advocacy of reduced spending
is "a radical departure" from America's 200-year
old desire "to be able to defend itself."
Atlanta Constitution
June 2, 1972
Carter said he thinks the Ford defense budget could
be reduced by about 15 billion without sacrificing
national security.
Beverly Hills News Conference
Los Angeles Times
March 20, 1975
"I would not agree that we need a cut in the major
expenditures for our defense below a figure such as
$7 or $8 billion. The cuts that are made ought to
leave us with a tough, muscular, simply organized,
effective fighting force able to defend our country
instantly if we are attacked. I don't think we've
got that now. What we have is kind of a bloated
bureaucracy in the Pentagon, too many troops overseas,
too many military bases oversees, too many support
troops per combat troop, too many major military
officers and generals, Selective Service system still
intact, the Corps of Engineers building dams we don't
need, excessive levels of bureaucracy, and no control
from the White House."
National Democratic Issues
Conference, Louisville, Kentucky
November 23, 1975
Carter wants to trim Pentagon waste but accelerate
naval spending. His aides say that it must be
recognized that in the long run the defense budget
must increase or else it will be eroded by higher
costs including those for the volunteer army.
Washington Post
April 12, 1976
Responding to questions as to how defense spending
under a Carter administration would compare with the
present defense budget under the Ford administration,
Carter stated, "Well. I would say about the same,
maybe 5 percent less. We've got too many military
bases overseas. We've got too many support troops
per combat troop.'
Washington Post
March 21, 1976
- 2 -
Carter and his running mate, Senator Mondale,
were briefed here by defense policy experts.
During a break in the briefing, the Democratic
nominee met with reporters, and also edged away
from his commitment to lower defense spending by
$5 billion to $7 billion.
Monday, in answer to two separate questions on
whether this later commitment still held, Carter
refrained from saying that it did.
Instead, he simply said that his "belief has been
that compared to a given defense budget, for in-
stance this year, that through more effective
analysis of management techniques and a limitation
on the broad range of responsibilities of the
Defense Department that a $5 to $7 billion decrease
in the defense budget could be realized."
Los Angeles Times
July 27, 1976
Carter is on record as favoring a 5 to 7 percent
reduction of defense spending. The pledge has
brought some important liberals to his campaign.
The possibility of another technical truth: Carter
has never identified the base figure for the cuts;
as president, he could cut 5 to 7 percent from the
Ford trendline budget for 1978. Spending could
rise by billions, but Carter could insist he kept
his word. Not the spirit perhaps, but the words.
New Times (Robert Shrum)
1976
Brookings, a prestigious Washington think-tank which
has housed a liberal Democratic government-in-exile
since 1969, is clearly calling the tune on Carter
defense policy.
Despite his U.S. Naval Academy education and early
career as a regular Navy officer, national security
is his weakest area of expertise; his experience with
nuclear submarines two decades ago scarcely equips
him to wrestle with global military policy.
- 3 -
Nor did he have time to immerse himself in defense
complexities while beginning his amazing run for
the presidential nomination. Consequently, his
proposed $5-7 billion defense spending cut was not
based on careful budget analysis but seemed a good,
round figure somewhere between McGovern and Reagan.
When pressed to specify defense cuts, Carter would
reply that the experts at Brookings called a $5-7
billion reduction reasonable.
Largely overlooked sections of the Seattle speech
proposed, first, saving $400 million a year by
increasing the average military tour of duty by two
months and, second, saving $1 billion a year by
raising the military teacher-pupil ratio from 1.5:1
to 3:1. Then Carter exploded his bombshell by
implying he could save $10.7 billion in cost over-
runs during the next five years.
The staff work was obviously hurried. An extra two
months on duty tours, the principle of which is
included in current Pentagon reforms, would save
not $400 million but $180 million. The present
teacher-pupil ratio is not 1.5:1 but 5:1. Total
cost overruns on 45 weapons systems now being developed
are $13.4 billion, not $10.7 billion. But that re-
presents an annual overrun rate of 3 percent which
compares favorably with acquisition programs in
private industry and elsewhere in government.
Some Democratic defense experts on Capital Hill feel
Carter erred basically in swallowing old Brookings
schemes.
Carter can get an immediate $5-7 billion cut only by
major manpower reductions, which could change the
world balance of power, or by radically reducing pay
benefits and closing bases, areas where congressional
consent is both necessary and unattainable.
Washington Post (Evans and Novak)
September 6, 1976
- 4 -
Carter said the respect for the nation's armed
forces must be rebuilt and that the words,
"national security" must again be spoken with
respect. "Too often those words are now viewed
with scorn, because they have been misused by
political leaders to hide a multitude of sins, and
because they have been used to justify inefficiency
and waste in our defense establishment."
Military training programs are inefficient, and an
estimated $1 billion could be saved each year by
moving to a ratio of 3 students for each instructor
instead of the present 1.5 to one.
He has not proposed absolute reductions in defense
spending. His call for 5 to 7 percent cut in the
Pentagon's proposed $115 billion budget, according
to his aides, would still allow a modest increase
in military outlays over last year.
New York Times
July 7, 1976
"I don't believe that our basic strategic interests
have been reassessed since 1950. That needs to be
done in a long-range fashion. We need to have a simpli-
fication of the purposes of the military. The mili-
tary duplicates. There's an unbelievable bureau-
cratic hierarchy that's been established since the
Second World War. Some management improvements, I
think, would restore to a great degree the confidence
of our people in the military. I think these manage-
ment-improvement efforts would result in roughly a
5 to 7 billion dollar decrease in the defense budget. "
U.S. News and World Report
May 24, 1976
Asked if he would have to spend more than the Ford
Administration is asking for defense, or less, or
about the same, he said "I would say about the same,
maybe 5 percent less
I would like to see our
Defense Department changed into a much more effec-
tive fighting force within the present
LIBRARY
- 5 -
budgetary limits. We're wasting enormous quantities
of money. We've got too many military bases overseas:
about 2,000. We've got too many support troops per
combat troop -- about twice as many as the Soviet
Union. We've got too top-heavy a layer of personnel
assignments. We've got more admirals and generals
than we had at the end of the Second World War."
Washington Post
March 21, 1976
Strict management and budgetary control over the
Pentagon should reduce the ratio of officers to men
and of support forces to combat troops. I see no
reason why the Chief of Naval Operations needs more
Navy captains on his staff that we have serving on
ships!
"Misdirected efforts such as the construction of
unnecessary pork-barrel projects by the Corps of
Engineers must be terminated."
National Press Club
December 12, 1974
(Carter Campaign Issues
Reference Book - March 15, 1976)
"We haven't had a president who actually tried to
supervise closely and manage a defense budgetary
process in a long time."
National Democratic Issues
Conference, Louisville, Kentucky
November 23, 1975
The President has got to be the one to stand with
the American people against the unwarranted influence
of the so-called military industrial complex, which
has gotten out of control, because an average Congress-
man, if he or she disagrees with the military budget,
finds it very hard to prevail, even in his home district,
against the joint commitment of the President and the
Pentagon. So I think the President once again has
to reassert authority over it. But I would not favor
CARTER QUOTES ON DEFENSE
Excerpts from Recent Seattle Speech
Including my time at the U.S. Naval Academy, I
spent 11 years in the Navy, most of my sea duty in
submarines. I had the good fortune to serve under
Admiral Rickover on the development of one of the
first atomic submarines, and I have tried to carry
over into my business career and my political life
the high standards of dedication and competence that
I learned from that remarkable military leader.
We must maintain adequate military strength compared
to that of our potential adversaries. This relative
strength can be assured:
-- by a commitment to necessary military
expenditures;
-- by elimination of waste, duplication among
forces, excessive personnel costs, unnecessary new
weapons systems, inefficient contracting procedures;
-- and by a mutual search for peace so that
armament levels can be reduced among nations, because
the most important single factor in avoiding nuclear
war is the mutual desire for peace among the superpowers.
We seek friendship with the unaligned and
developing nations of the world. Many of them
are weak and vulnerable and they need allies who
can contribute to their peace, security and pros-
perity. Yet we must remember that excessive foreign
commitments can overtax our national ability. We
must therefore be cautious in making commitments,
but firm in honoring them.
I have spoken recently with many experts in national
defense matters, and I believe we have, overall
adequate ability to defend ourselves, to meet
obligations to our allies, and to carry out a legiti-
mate foreign policy. But we must be constantly
vigilant to recognize and correct adverse trends.
GERALD R.FORD
-2-
Our total American ground combat forces are less
than half those of the Soviet Union, and the number
of men under arms in that country has increased by
a million while ours have decreased by 1-1/2 million
since 1968. During the same period the number of
U.S. ships has been cut in half. For every tank we
have, the Soviets have at least eight. Because of
our greatly improved anti-tank weapons, this heavy
Soviet investment in tanks may prove to have been
an unwise investment.
Of course there are counterbalancing factors of
strength such as superior quality of our weapons,
the relative security of our own borders, our more
ready access to the sea, and the trustworthiness
and military capability of our allies.
There is now, in my opinion, an overall rough equiva-
lency in direct military strength. This balance
must be maintained.
In any given annual budget, now or in the future,
there is a limited amount of money available for
national defense. When any resources are wasted,
our nation's security is weakened. We now have an
excessive drain on defense funding from waste and
unnecessary expenditures.
We must recognize that our military personnel are
transferred too much. At any given moment, about
one out of seven of those personnel is in the pro-
cess of moving or away from their family on temporary
training duty. This year $2.5 billion will go simply
to move service personnel, their families, television
sets and furniture from one base to another. Such
frequent moves not only eat up money, they undermine
morale. If we extend the average tour of duty by
just two months, we could save $400 million per
year.
-3-
Cost overruns have become chronic. The Pentagon
itself estimates that the total current cost of
overruns on the 45 weapons systems now in the pro-
cess of development in the three services -- exclusive
of inflation -- is $10.7 billion. Over the next five
years that would approximate the cost of the proposed
B-1 bomber program over the same period.
We need sound, tough management of the Pentagon not
only to eliminate waste, but to ensure that force
structures are correlated with foreign policy objec-
tives. Tough management will mean that overlaps
are eliminated between Pentagon programs and similar
programs of civilian agencies. It will mean that
we cooperate closely with our allies in our mutual
defense, that our weapons systems are integrated
with each other, technically and strategically,
and that we put a stop to the dubious practice of
arms giveaway programs for potential adversaries.
Ever since I was Governor of Georgia, when I
attended National Guard training sessions every
summer, I have been concerned that our reserve forces,
both the regular reserve and the National Guard, do
not play a strong enough role in our military prepared-
ness. We need to shift toward a highly trained,
combat-worthy reserve, well equipped and closely
coordinated with regular forces -- always capable of
playing a crucial role in the nation's defense.
If we can get the flab out of the Pentagon's budget,
I believe that the public will evaluate questions
about weapons systems and force levels on their
merits in a calm and rational manner. Our people will
support an adequate defense establishment without
complaint, so long as they know that their tax dollars
are not being wasted.
Remarks to American Legion - Seattle
August 24, 1976
-4-
CARTER QUOTES ON MILITARY STRENGTH
Q. On defense, Governor, would you make any
fundamental changes in our military structure?
A. Possibly. I do favor the continuation of
our three delivery systems for atomic weapons
until we can negotiate some over-all reduction
of weapons with the Soviet Union.
We are inferior to the Soviets in our land-based
intercontinental missiles--greatly inferior.
We have a rough equivalency at sea, and we are
strongly superior in manned bombers. I think
in general we have what is called rough equivalency.
I certainly want to maintain that. But I don't
think we could give up any of those three elements
of international strategic defense.
As far as redeployment of forces is concerned,
I don't think we have had a substantive reassess-
ment of strategic deployment since President
Truman's time. In the past, a basic presumption
has been that we had to be prepared for a major
land war in the Far East and in the Western
Pacific. I'm not sure that that's still a good
supposition.
I don't want to be more specific, but I think a
reassessment of our strategic deployment of non-
nuclear weapons and delivery systems is needed
now.
U.S. News & World Report
September 13, 1976
"I don't think we're second-best militarily.
As you know, we've got some areas wherein we are
second best. The total amount of throw-weight
for atomic weapons is one area where the Soviet
Union is superior to our own. Ground forces,
the total number of personnel and total number
of tanks is superior with the Soviet Union.
"We are superior, I think in the deployment of
strategic weapons at sea. We have much higher
accuracy per weapon. We're much further advanced
in the MIRV (Multiple Independently Targeted
Reentry Vehicle) missiles. We also have cruise
missile capabilities that the Soviet Union does
not have. We are far superior to them in manned
bomber fleets, primarily B-52s.
-5-
"So the overall statement is that we do have rough
equivalancy and in some areas we're superior and
in some areas they are superior."
Los Angeles Times
July 27, 1976
"I think the cumulative strength of our own
military forces, plus those of NATO and others,
are still superior to the Soviet Union. I think
that our vast economic capabilities in agricultural
production, electronics and so forth gives us a
decided edge and will for the next 15 years.
"I think that we're still superior to Russia even
in the Navy
"
I think that ability to control the seas in
a benevolent way is very important.
"We're still predicating our plans that the next
war is going to be in the Far East. I think
that's a mistake in basic premise.'
Washington Post
March 21, 1976
Carter said that a general concern had also been
expressed about "the ineffectiveness of reserve
forces. There is very little correlation among
the reserve forces with each other or with the
regular forces. The readiness of reserve forces
is doubtful.
New York Times
July 28, 1976
-6-
Carter closeted himself with eight defense experts
in Plains and later said they unanimously concurred
with his opinion that the United States has not
become a "second rate" military power. He said
the defense panel, including several former
Johnson administration Defense Department executives
that the United States has a "rough equivalency" in
strategic weapons with the Soviet Union and that
the defense budget should seek to maintain that level.
"As long as we understand and the Russians understand
that the right equivalency is there, and that nuclear
war would be a holocaust we have the chance of
avoiding that tragedy."
Washington Post
July 27, 1976
He believes the nation should have weapons systems
sufficient "to meet the strategic needs of our
country and to meet our legitimate obligations
to our allies. But he rejects the notion that the
United States need keep up with or exceed the Soviets
in all weapons systems.
Washington Post
July 18, 1976
Carter said Mondale favors a strong defense, is eager
to end waste in the budget and voted against some
weapons systems he felt were inadvisable or improper
on the list of priorities. Carter termed this "my
same position. "
UPI (Pippert)
July 8, 1976
-7-
Naval Spending
"I'm afraid if we have a confrontation with
Russia in the maintenance of open sea lanes
to effectuate our peaceful purposes of trade
and purchase in a showdown, the Russian Navy
might very well prevail today."
Manchester Union Leader
February 14, 1975
Carter declared the only trend in U.S.-Soviet
military balance "that concerns me is in the
naval strength. I think that we're still
superior to Russia even in the Navy."
Washington Post
March 16, 1976
"I have a deep belief that our most important
strategic element in the entire defense mechanism
of our country is nuclear-powered submarines.
They are almost completely invulnerable to missile
attack and their deterrent value is superb. "
Boston Advertiser
July 25, 1976
Carter says he favors current plans to build 11
highly advanced Trident submarines at the rate
of 3 every 2 years.
Chicago Sun Times
July 27, 1976
- 8 -
I would try to build about one Trident submarine
per year. I think we are getting into a dangerous
position with respect to the Soviet Union on naval
strength.
They have had a rapid escalation in the strength
of their navy. It is basically a landlocked nation
and to perform a certain function in naval control
they require more ships than we do for coverage of
the world's seas. I don't think we are in (a)
vulnerable position now.
The Soviet Union does have superior ship-to-ship
missiles and they are beginning to challenge us
now by putting out their first aircraft carriers.
I have a deep belief that our most important strategic
element in the entire defense mechanism of our
country is nuclear-powered submarines. They are
almost completely invulnerable to missile attack
and their deterrent value is superb.
With the MIRV missiles we have now we have a
vast security strength to the Soviet Union.
They'are overcoming that superiority by their own
missiles.
Boston Sunday Herald Advertiser
July 25, 1976
Carter supports the Trident submarine because it
was a pet project of Admiral Hyman Rickover whom
Carter has ties with; because missiles on the
Trident are made by Lockheed; aerospace company
which flew Governor Carter in 1972 to Latin America
and on whose behalf Carter tried to sell some of
its transport planes; and when he was Governor,
Carter encouraged the idea that Georgia might become
a Trident base.
New York Village Voice
April 19, 1976
- 9 -
Carter has promised a stronger maritime fleet.
Baltimore Sun
July 1, 1976
Carter said that as President he would favor
"an aggressive shipbuilding program."
New York Times
June 6, 1976
Carter on the B-1 Bomber
"We don't need the B-1 bomber, more Trident submarines
or two more divisions."
Wisconsin State Journal
February 9, 1975
Carter stated that "the B-1 bomber may or may not be
justified."
The Oregonian
April 7, 1975
Carter wants to cut spending. He feels that defense
could stand a healthy going-over. He wants to scrap
the B-1 bomber, cut foreign troop commitments (Carter
did think defense cutbacks a dangerous course when
McGovern advocated them, but he never supported the
war in Vietnam).
Nation Magazine
May 17, 1975
Regarding the B-1 bomber, Carter Said, "I would not
favor it."
WETA Candidates on the
Line
February 16, 1976
Addressing the Democratic Governors Conference in
Washington, D. C. on December 2, 1975, Carter told the
State Executivies that "I believe we should cancel the
B-1 bomber. It's too expensive and it's an unnecessary
new system."
Address to the Democratic
Governors Conference,
Washington, D. C.
December 2, 1975
"Exotic weapons which serve no real function do not
contribute to the defense of this country. The B-1
bomber is an example of a proposed system which should
not be funded and would be wasteful of taxpayers' dollars."
Carter's Platform
Page 35
-2-
However, Carter has also announced that he
would continue research and development of the
plane, because "it might be after I become
President I would change my mind." Carter's shift
to continuing development of the B-1 was hardly
accidental, made as it was in Omaha, Nebraska,
headquarters of the Strategic Air Command, and a
city whose population and economy are highly dependent
upon the Air Force.
Quoted by Mary McGrory
Washington Star News
May 10, 1976
"I don't favor the construction of the B-1 bomber at this
point. I will keep the project alive in the research and
development stage, but I would not finance it at this
point. I might change my mind when I am completely
acquainted with the secret information that I don't have.
I would try to build about one Trident submarine per year.
I think we are getting into a dangerous position with
respect to the Soviet Union on naval strength."
Boston Advertiser
July 25, 1976
Carter Quotes on Conventional Forces
"We can reduce the ratio of officers to men and of
support forces to combat troops.
We should put more stress on new sensors and armaments,
and give priority to a navy consisting of a greater
number of smaller and less vulnerable vessels.
Modern, well-equipped and highly mobile land forces are
more important than large numbers of sparsely-equipped
infantry divisions."
Democratic Platform
July 2, 1976
Congressional Record
Carter said it might be necessary to reinstitute the
military draft, "but I don't anticipate that necessity." "
He said that as President he would meet with the nation's
governors to discuss increasing strength in national
guard units and would consider offering regular military
enlistments of a year or less to maintain manpower.
UPI
August 24, 1976
Carter said he would consult the Commerce Department and local,
state or city agencies about relocating Federal operations
into areas hit by unemployment because of military base
closures. But he said he would not keep bases open just
to maintain employment, even in such areas of military
concentration as New Jersey.
UPI (William Cotterell)
July 13, 1976
CARTER QUOTES ON DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES
Deployment in Asia
On the subject of requests by Thailand and the Philippines
that the U. S. remove or reduce troops in their countries,
Carter said: "I would certainly accommodate their requests
and, in carefully staged withdrawals, would remove most
of our troops from South Korea. "
"We still have too many military bases and too many troops
overseas.' "
Common Cause
Edition I
Issue Profile Number 10
February 1976
"I would remove all atomic weapons from Korea. "
"I cannot see any circumstances imaginable under which
we need or would use atomic weapons in the Korean area. "
"But I would not be rash about the withdrawal of troops
from South Korea
I'd make sure the Japanese knew
what we were doing
I would make sure that in the
four or five years when we get our troops in Korea
substantially removed that Korea would still be able to
defend itself against North Korea."
(Note: He would have air support)
Washington Post
March 21, 1976
"I think Park is much too autocratic and has very little
concern about human freedoms and human rights. Our
commitment is not to Park. Our long-standing commitment
has been to the people of South Korea. I think that to
reduce our land forces in South Korea gradually over a
period of years would be an appropriate action to take.
The South Koreans would have a competitive force with that
of the north."
Newsweek
May 10, 1976
-2-
"We have a commitment made by the Congress, the President,
the people and the United Nations in South Korea. I
would prefer to withdraw all of our troops and land forces
from South Korea over a period of years -- three, four
years, whatever. But, obviously, we're already committed
in Japan. We're committed in Germany."
Los Angeles Times
May 16, 1976
(Moyers Interview)
"It will be possible to withdraw US forces from South
Korea over a time span to be determined after consultations
with both South Korea and Japan, but the United States should
make clear that "internal oppression" in South Korea is
"repugnant to our people."
AP
June 23, 1976
Pointing out the way that Carter shades meanings to fit
audience Time reported that Carter has told conservative
audiences:
"I do not believe we should withdraw Americans from Korea
except on a phased basis." He had not actually misstated his
position -- he favors a US withdrawal from South Korea over
a period of 5 years -- but he stated it in such a way that
his audience could easily have gained a different impression.
Indeed, at least one reporter came away thinking that Carter
had said he wanted the US military to remain in Korea.
(The NY Times has also reported this.)
Time
May 31, 1976
Carter and his aides have indicated US aid would be
used as a lever to fight repression in such countries
as South Korea, Chile, and Brazil. This would put him in
a touchy position on Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union,
because his stated intention is to increase trade with that
nation.
Chicago Tribune
July 30, 1976
-3-
"
we do anticipate substantial reductions in
defense expenditures as we withdraw our troops
back to this country, both from Europe and
from Vietnam, but we must maintain a viable,
progressive, ever changing defense capability."
Testimony before Democratic
Platform Committee Hearing
June 9, 1972
Carter advocated withdrawing all U. S. troops from
Thailand, Taiwan, and South Korea. However, maintaining
a military presence in Japan and Western Europe.
Wisconsin State Journal
February 9, 1975
"We've got too many military bases overseas, too
many troops overseas The Defense Department now
overlaps many functions of civilian agencies with a
great waste of money
=
Speech, Terre Haute, Indiana
May 2, 1976
Protecting the Security of Japan
"With regard to our primary Pacific ally, Japan, we
will maintain our existing security arrangements, so
long as that continues to be the wish of the Japanese
people and government.
I believe it will be possible to withdraw our ground
forces from South Korea on a phased basis over a time
span to be determined after consultation with both
South Korea and Japan. At the same time, it should be
made clear to the South Korean Government that its internal
oppression is repugnant to our people and undermines the
support for our commitment there.'
JCPC , Address, "Relations
Between the World's Democracies
given to the Foreign Policy
Association, New York, New
York, June 23, 1976
"The relationship between Japan and the United States is
based on both firm pillars of interest -- our mutual
security and our great economic relationship.
The security of Japan is vital to the United States and
we will maintain our commitment to Japan's defense. The
sensitive question of the level and deployment of military
forces here will, of course, be shaped in a continuing
dialogue with Japan."
JCPC, Address, on Foreign
Policy, to the American
Chamber of Commerce, Tokyo,
Japan, May 28, 1975
Q: Would you support an increase in Japan's ability to
defend itself?
A: "Yes, but I don't want to quantify it. I think one of
the main concerns about Korea is to make sure that Japan
does not equate a lessening of our military presence in
Korea with a lessening of our commitment to Japan. I would
make sure that that did not happen because I feel very
strongly committed to Japan."
Newsweek May 10, 1976
European Deployment
"I would like to see the NATO countries assume more and
more responsibility for the defense of Western Europe.
But I would not make an immediate withdrawal of troops.
It would be a slow, very careful change in relative strength."
Newsweek (European Edition)
May 10, 1976
Carter has said several times he favors keeping a strong
U. S. Naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranian.
Washington Star
July 7, 1976
Carter said he would be "very, very cautious" in approaching
any question of troop withdrawals from Europe, tied only to
equivalent replacement by European forces, which he said was
not likely now.
Washington Post
March 17, 1976
"There is, in short, a pressing need for us and our allies
to undertake a review of NATO's forces and its strategies
in light of the changing military environment."
National Observer
July 3, 1976
"The Soviet Union has in recent years strengthened its
forces in Central Europe. The Warsaw Pact forces facing
NATO today are substantially composed of Soviet combat
troops, and these troops have been modernized and
reinforced. In the event of war, they are postured for
an all-out conflict of short duration and great intensity.
NATO's ground combat forces are largely European. The U.S.
provides about one-fifth of the combat element, as well as
the strategic umbrella, and without this American commitment
Western Europe could not defend itself successfully.
Unfortunately, NATO's arsenal suffers from a lack of
standardization, which needlessly increases the cost of
NATO, and its strategy too often seems wedded to past
plans and concepts. We must not allow our alliance to
become an anachronism.
There is, in short, a pressing need for us and our
allies to undertake a review of NATO's forces and its
strategies in light of the changing military environment.
A comprehensive program to develop, procure, and equip
NATO with the more accurate air defense and anti-tank
weapons made possible by new technology is needed to
increase NATO's defensive power. Agreement on stockpiles
and on the prospective length of any potential conflict
is necessary. We should also review the structure of NATO
reserve forces so they can be committed to combat sooner.
In all of this a major European and joint effort will be
required. Our people will not support unilateral
American contributions in what must be a truly mutual
defense effort."
JCPC, Address, "Relations
Between the World's
Democracies " to the Foreign
Policy Association, New York,
June 23, 1976
-2-
"Where the hell does Jimmy Carter think a President gets
the authority to take troops out of NATO?" he (Gene McCarthy)
asks. "They are there as part of a national commitment
sustained by treaty. "
The New Republic
July 3 & 10, 1976
CARTER QUOTES ON STRATEGIC POLICY
Carter said Monday that if he becomes President and
the security of the United States or a treaty ally
is threatened, the U.S. government "would have to
consider using atomic weapons."
He told reporters it would be a "serious mistake"
to indicate under what conditions the United
States might choose to use nuclear weapons.
"But I felt that the security of our own nation
or the security of a nation with whom we had a
binding alliance was threatened, under those
circumstances, I think we would have to consider
using atomic weapons.'
Carter has said he would authorize a "preemptive"
nuclear strike only if he were convinced the
security or existence of the United States
were threatened.
He said he believes the Soviet Union's position is
that the use of tactical nuclear weapons on a
battlefield would lead to "all out war. And
the presumption on my part is that that would
lead to strategic warfare (the firing of inter-
continental nuclear ballistic missiles) he
said.
Chicago Sun Times
July 27, 1976
Mr. Smith: On the subject of foreign policy which
relates to nuclear weapons, under what circumstances
would you, as President, order the use of strategic
nuclear weapons?
Do you think that the United States should, if necessary,
risk its own nuclear destruction to save Western Europe
from Soviet military conquest?
Do you foresee any circumstances in which we would
be justified in resorting to a first strike with
nuclear weapons, strategic or tactical?
- 2 -
Governor Carter: I don't know the answer to
those questions. I think it would be inappropriate
to spell out precisely what circumstances might
prevail that would cause me to use atomic weapons.
The only general response I can give is that if I
was convinced that the security or existence of
our own nation was threatened, under those
circumstances I would use atomic weapons.
The agreements that we have in Europe are binding
on us. The use of atomic weapons in Europe
would certainly not be contemplated by me without
agreement of the nations who would be most directly
affected by retaliatory nuclear actions against
the Soviet Union.
I certainly couldn't imagine us using nuclear
weapons in Europe without Germany and Austria and
perhaps France approving their use.
We are committed, along with European nations,
to the balance of power being maintained with
nuclear weapons as a major factor. We can't equal
the Soviet Union now in the number of troops or
tanks or airplanes in Europe, and we never have
since the second world war was over. The stand-
off nuclear strength between us and the Soviet Union,
where both of us have substantial overkill capabilities,
is a major deterrent to war in Europe.
If there was a massive invasion in Europe by the
Soviet Union, I think the likelihood would be that
atomic weapons would be used. My own belief is
that limited nuclear war would be unlikely. I
have read some of the statements made by Soviet
leaders, and I think their commitment to limited
nuclear war is very doubtful.
We have predicated a lot of our new weaponry
acquisition on the premise that we need to have
both first-strike and retaliatory capability with
a presumption that massive strategic attacks on
population centers would not follow. That
certainly is a possibility, but I think a doubtful
one.
- 3 -
Pre-emptive strike, again, would only be used,
to keep my answer deliberately in very general
terms, if I was convinced that the existence or
the security of our nation was threatened.
Boston Sunday Herald Advertiser
July 25, 1976
Most Americans, he said, "tend to forget the
unbelievable destruction of human beings in any
sort of nuclear war." In reply to questions,
he said he believed that there was no possibility
of nuclear "first strike" without "unbelievable
destruction on the originator of the attack." He
said he would seek a "mutual commitment" with the
Soviet Union to avoid any use of atomic weapons.
New York Times
July 28, 1976
The candidate also disassociated himself from the
position of Nitze and former Defense Secretary
James Schlesinger that limited and selective
nuclear strikes could be conducted without
necessarily leading to all-out thermonuclear war.
Washington Post
August 11, 1976
Carter said if he was President a "pre-emptive"
nuclear strike would only be used if he were
convinced the security or existence of the United
States was threatened.
New York Times
July 26, 1976
"I would never again get militarily involved in the
internal affairs of another country. Unless our own
security is directly threatened.
Los Angeles Times
(Moyers Interview)
May 16, 1976
GERALE
CARTER QUOTES ON FOREIGN ARMS SALES
"The fact is that we cannot have it both ways.
Can we be both the world's leading champion of
peace and the world's leading supplier of the
weapons of war? If I become President, I will
work with our allies, some of whom are also selling
arms, and also seek to work with the Soviets, to
increase the emphasis on peace and to reduce the
commerce in weapons of war.'
Los Angeles Times
July 18, 1976
"I think that our country is best served by minimizing
as much as possible our dependence on military
exports for stabilizing our economy and balancing
the trade relationships. And in every instance, as
President I would minimize those sales. There are
some cases where we can't make a flat statement
about that. We obviously have a commitment which
I think has been maintained and shared by the
American people throughout the last 30 years or
SO to insure, for instance, that Israel has the
military strength to exist in peace.
National Democratic Issues
Conference
Louisville, Kentucky
November 23, 1975
Carter has promised to reduce U.S. arms sales
abroad which run at a level now of about $10 billion
a year, as well as to urge Western Europeans and
Soviets to cut down their sales.
"Can we be both the world's leading champion of
peace and the world's leading supplier of the
weapons of war?"
Chicago Tribune
July 30, 1976
CARTER QUOTES ON A CARTER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
"I would want one committed to the proposition of
peace. I would want one to share my commitment
that we should not become militarily involved in
the internal affairs of another country unless
our security was directly threatened. I would
want one who could withstand the pressures
from special interest groups, including munitions
manufacturers. I would want one who is an out-
standing administrator, recognizing the complexities
of the Defense Department organizational structure.
I would want one who could reduce the involvement
of the Defense Department in matters that can be
equally well addressed by the civilian agencies
of government, to remove the overlapping functions
and singly address the Defense Department toward
the capability to fight. I would want one who was
willing to reduce waste in personnel allocations
and also in unnecessary weapons systems that don't
corollate with the long-range purposes of our own
security and foreign policy. And one who could work
harmoniously with the other Cabinet members. Those
are some of the characteristics that come to mind
at this moment."
National Journal
July 17, 1976
CARTER QUOTES ON TERRORISM
"The foremost responsibility of any President is
to guarantee the security of our nation--a
guarantee of freedom from the threat of successful
attack or blackmail and the ability with our allies
to maintain peace.
"But peace is not the mere absence of war. Peace
is action to stamp out international terrorism.
Peace is the unceasing effort to preserve human
rights. Peace is a combined demonstration of
strength and good will. We will pray for peace and
we will work for peace until we have removed from
all nations the threat of nuclear destruction."
Acceptance Speech
Washington Post
July 16, 1976
CARTER ON THE VIETNAM WAR
The evolution in Carter's views on the Vietnam
war has raised a number of questions in the press
about his credibility. Carter was an early
and persistent supporter of the war, but on the
1976 campaign trail he has said it was a "racist"
war and that we should never have gotten into it.
The "racist" slur has not been appreciated in every
quarter.
The press has also raised questions about
Carter's views on William Calley, saying that he
once supported him but has since backed away.
Our records do not sustain that charge.
While the flap in the press on both subjects
has died down, it may be resurrected in the
debates. Here is a short summary of the back-
ground.
1. Carter on the Vietnam War" According to the
NY Times (May 21, 1976), "Mr. Carter's support of
the war was one of the most prolonged and per-
sistent of any major political figure. He attempted
to dissuade fellow governors from condeming Ameri-
can involvement in the conflict and told journalists
as late as 1974 that he favored continued Adminis-
tration requests for more appropriations for the
war."
There are not a great number of Carter quotes
to sustain this view, but there are several
scraps of evidence to show his early support for
the war:
-- On August 8, 1971, as governor, Carter
wrote a column for a small Georgia newspaper
which justified the original decision to inter-
vene in Vietnam to fight "Communist aggression".
It added that "since we are not going to do what
it takes to win, it is time to come home." "
Evans and Novak, July 7, 1976, point out that this
was the hawkish Southern position supported by
others such as George Wallace
GERALE TOND LIBRARY
-2-
-- In June 0f 1971, Carter offered a
resolution to the Democratic Governors Con-
ference which opposed making the war an issue
in the 1972 Presidential campaign. A watered-
version was adopted.
-- When President Nixon ordered the bombing
of North Vietnam and the mining of its harbors,
Carter supported these steps but expressed
fear "we are heading for a major defeat in South
Vietnam." Two days later, he asked people to
suport RN whether or not they agreed with him.
Evans and Novak, July 7, 1976.
-- Reviewing the record, the Atlanta Con-
stitution on May 26, 1976, reported that "close
associates of Carter during the war said that
he supported the war effort 'very vigorously'. II
The paper also reported that as early as October,
1969, Carter was on record supporting RN's handling
of the war while also saying that he would like
the earliest possible end to the war.
Given this history, the question is why Carter
on the campaign trail has often been quoted as
condemning the racist nature of the war:
-- He began down this path at the National
Democratic Issues Conference in Louisville on
November 23, 1975, when he said that the U.S. showed
"unconscionable
...
racial discrimination in
international affairs. I don't believe, for
instance, that we would have ever bombed or strafed
villages in France or Germany as we did in Vietnam;
and this kind of attitude, of concentrating our
emphasis in foreign policy on the white-skinned
people, is felt throughout the world."
-- In Indianapolis in May of 1976, speaking
in a black church, Carter expanded upon the theme,
saying that the war was indeed "racist." He spoke
of the daily spectacle on the TV screen of American
bombers going out to "firebomb villages and killing
every man, woman and child in the village to save
it." He went on: "We did not think it was racist
(at the time), but it was." Apparently, his speech
was a great success. NY Times, May 21, 1976.
-3-
-- On
, the Baltimore Sun reported
Carter said he had believed "for a long time"
that the war was racist, but he conceded he
never said SO publicly until six months after
it had ended. Said the newspaper: "Mr. Carter
repeated previous statements that he first
called for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam shortly
after becoming Governor in 1971. He added the
only time he had backed additonal U.S. aid was
to protect American troops during the 1975 pull-
out and said 'it was a bad war and I think we
should never have become involved in it'."
How does Carter explain his evolution? He
doesn't. He says "I have never made any apology"
for my views. Concludes Evans and Novak, (July 7,
1976): "Put bluntly, Carter on Vietnam has aban-
doned old positons without apologizing for them
or, indeed, even admitting he ever held them
...
Jimmy Carter, far from acknowledging any conver-
sion, edits the past
"
2. Carter on Calley: Critics have charged that
Carter showed a similar shifting on the Calley
case, but the record at hand does not support
that charge. On the heels of Calley's conviction,
Carter proclaimed American Fighting Man's Day
in Georgia and said the conviction was "a blow
to troop morale". But Carter's point then and
now is that Calley was a "scapegoat" and that his
superiors should have received similar treatment.
He says today that he never felt anything but
"abhorence" toward Calley, that Calley should be
punished, but that it was not right to equate
what Calley did with the actions of other American
servicemen. There is nothing in our records to
contradict this view.
GERALD LIBRARY
Carter Credibility Issue:
Calley and Vietnam War
By CHARLES MOHR
Special in The New York Times
LAS VEGAS, Nev., May 20- here, and it illustrates a prob-
At the time of the war in Viet- Iem that has been dogging him
nam, Jimmy Carter was a
in his quest for the Presidency:
strong supporter of the Amer-
his credibility and whether he is
ican involvement there. Earlier
evasive on the issues.
this month, at a black church
The question aross today
in Indianapolis, he character-
when Hank Greenspun, editor
zed the war as "racist." say-
of The Las Vegas Sun, pub-
DE that because the skins of
lished a signed front-page edi-
Vietnanfese were yellow "we
torial asserting that Mr. Carter
did not regret their deaths RS
had "organized a day in honor
much" as if they bad been
white.
Continued on Page A 16, Col.
-
In April 1971, on the heels
of the conviction of First Lieut.
William L. Calley Jr. by a mili-
tary court for the murder of 22
Vietnamese civilians in the
hamlet of My Lei, Mr. Carter,
then the Governor of Georgia,
proclaimed 'American Fighting
Men's Day in Georgia and de-
scribed the lieutenant as a
"scapegost." Lieutenant Cal-
ley's conviction, he said, was
blow to troop morale."
Today, at a news conference
here, Mr. Carter denied that he
had ever supported Lieutenant
Calley or condoned his actions.
Mr. Certer, the front-runner
for the Democratic Presidential
nomination, says these positions
are not contradictory. He says
that he "never thought Calley
was anything but guilty" but
that "it was not right to equate
what Calley did with what
other American servicemen
were doing in Vietnam."
But the question of whether
his positions are contradictory
emerged today In his campaign
LIBRARY
Carter Credibility Issue: Calley and the Wa
Continued From Page A1, Col. 7
reported, said he had directed
At the time of Lieutenant
what other American service-
his subordinates to switch all
Calley's conviction, Mr. Carter
men were doing in Vietnail
of Lieut. William Calley."
telephone calls about the Calley
Mr. Carter, who was in
never explicitly or implicitly
"There was an attempt that
case to him personally. He
Nevada to campaign for the
was impressed by the "respon-
condemned Lieutenant Calley
was made by Calley's support-
ers-by some of the public of-
state's Presidential primary elec-
sible attitude taken by Geor-
or his actions.
ficials who went down to Co-
tion next Tuesday, appeared
gians," Mr. Carter said. Be-
When Mr. Carter spoke to
lumbus [Ge.] to have massive
this morning at the Las Vegas
cause of the "overwhelming
the black audience in the Sec-
demonstrations for Calley-
campus of the University of
unanimity of belief" expressed.
and Christian Church in In-
that he was a typical service-
Nevada. Mr. Greenspun's edi-
he said, he could assure Amer-
ican servicemen "they do have
disnapolis earlier this month,
man, in what he did, which was
torial suggested that students
should ask Mr. Carter "whether
our complete backing."
he talked of the need for a
appalling." he said.
However, Mr. Carter said, the
William Calley should be hon-
Mr. Carter spoke of those
competent, honest, responsive
Calley trial had been a "de-
ered for one of the most bar-
"both within this country and
and moral government. He said
parture from our nation's long-
barous acts ever committed by
without who would use these
the Federal Government had
standing policy in military
Americans."
events to further their own am-
slipped away from the control
justice. In military trials in
No student or other member
bition, to cheapen and shame
of the governed.
Germany after World War II
of the audience asked the ques-
the reputation of American
The American people did
the country "never punished
tion, but Mr. Carter raised it
servicemen and to shake the
not make a decision to go into
the lleutenants to the exclusion
himself, saying the editorial
faith of Americans in their
the war in Vietnam and Cam-
of the captains and coloneis
had "maintained falsely" that
country," according to The
bodia and spend 50,000 Ameri-
and generals."
be bad "proclaimed a William
Constitution.
can lives and 150 billion dol-
1 don't see any Incompata-
Calley Day in Georgia."
Lieutenant Calley was
Mr. Carter likes to say,
bility at all in the statements,
"That is something I never
"scapegoat," Mr. Carter said,
it happened."
he said.
considered," said Mr. Carter, "I
adding that his
superiors
In
Indianapolis, however, he
Mr. Carter spoke at length,
would not do it."
should have received the
same
expanded
the theme. He spoke
in a quiet, somber tone, the
Saying that more conserva-
treatment.
the
daily spectacle on
inequalities of sacrifice borne
tive Southern politicians than
He proclaimed the following
American
television screens of
by American classes in Vist-
he had organized mass demon-
Monday to be "American Fight-
American
bombers going out to
nam.
strutions in support of Lieuten-
ing Men's Day. He asked the
"firebomb
villages" and killing
ant Calley, Mr. Carter said the
citizens of the state to display
Heroes Because They Went'
"every
man.
woman and child
Beutenant "was guilty of mur-
the American flag and to drive
in
the to save it."
He said, "I think the most
der." He said that he had
with their headlights on to
We did not "think it was
heroic young people we've ever
"tried to draw a distinction be-
show their "complete support
racist. but it was," said Mr.
seen were those, in a way, who
tween what Calley did and
for our servicemen, concern
Carter.
went to Vietnam thinking or
what American service people
for our country and rededica-
The appearance was, in al-
knowing the war was wrong
in Vietnam did
the average
tion to the principles which
most every aspect, a tremen-
but because of their ignorance,
American service person in
have made our country great.
dous success.
because of their lack of educa-
Vietnam did not have an in-
Mr. Carter's support of the
The church's pastor, the Rev.
tion, because of their lack of
clination to murder women and
war was one of the most pro-
T. Garret Benjamin, said that
prestige, because they didn't
children in cold blood."
longed and persistent of any
his private conversation with
know where Sweden was, or
On April 2, 1971, The Atlanta
major political figure. He at-
Mr. Carter, "I felt in some ways
didn't want to go to Canada,
Constitution reported that Gov-
tempted to dissuade fellow
1 had been in church. I am glad
or didn't have enough money
ernor Carter had called a news
governors from condemning
when a man steps outside tradi-
to hide in college-they went."
conference, smid a storm of
American involvement in the
tional politics and begins to talk
"I've always felt." he contin-
local protest after the convic-
conflict and told journalists as
from a spiritual base."
ued, "and of course my think.
tion of Lieutenant Calley by a
late as 1974 that he favored
"Jimmy Carter," he said, "has
ing changes over a period of
military court at Fort Benning
continued Administration re-
got
soul."
years as I see things from a
in Georgia.
quests for more appropriations
different perspective, now run-
Mr. Carter, the newspaperfor the war.
'Abhorrence' of Calley
ning for President 1 never
Mr. Carter was asked the
thought I would in those days.
other day to discuss the state-
But even then there was always
made five years apart.
a very deep sense of apprecia-
Did
the
remarks to the black
tion in my mind of the young
audience represent an
people who were in
Vintmem,
evolution
in his thinking about
who were castigated at home.
the
war?
who were desplaed because
Mr. Carter said he had spoken
they went, who went because
the
"Einge
of
recism"
in
the
they were obeying the law, who
Vietnam war to general audi-
went because they didn't want
ences in Louisville and Chicago
to
in recent months.
"It's hard for me," he said,
obvious to me back
"to
day that this was
which exists among the Amer-
Carter said.
ican people, which 'If certainly
never thought Calley was any-
mirrored in my own feelings,
thing but guilty. I never felt
about the war. don't know
attitude toward Calley ex-
how to rationalize R further."
expt
And thought
A few minutes later, shortly
u
should
be punished and still
before parting from his
inter-
never expressed any con-
rogator. Mr. Carter siso
sald,
opinion
hard
for
the
country
BUT be added that he had
understand. especielly, the
Telt #t the time of Calley's
che character the
South-
trial.
which
was
held
emerg the kind of secres
sharen.
Georgia, that it was not right
the
searching
ESP
redress
equate what Calley did
CARTER ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The question, I think, is whether in recent years
our highest officials have not been too pragmatic,
even cynical, and as a consequence have ignored
those moral values that had often distinguished
our country from the other great nations of the
world.
We must move away from making policies in secret;
without the knowledge and approval of the American
people.
Over the years, our greatest source of strength has
come from those basic, priceless values which are
embodied in our Declaration of Independence, our
Constitution and our Bill of Rights, our belief
in freedom of religion -- our belief in freedom
of expression -- our belief in human dignity.
These principles have made us great, and unless
our foreign policy relects them, we make a mockery
of all those values that we have celebrated in this
bicentennial year.
Still in recent years, we have had reason to be
troubled. Often there has been a gap between the
values we have proclaimed and the policies we have
pursued. We have often been overextended, and
deeply entangled in the internal affairs of distant
nations. Our government has pursued dubious tac-
tics, and "national security" has sometimes been
a cover-up for unnecessary secrecy and national
scandal.
We stumbled into the quagmires of Cambodia and
Vietnam, and carried out heavy-handed efforts to
destroy an elected government in Chile. In Cyprus,
we let expediency triumph over fairness, and lost
both ways.
We responded inadquately to human suffering in
Bangledesh, Burundi, the Sahel, and other under-
developed nations.
We lessened the prestige of our foreign service by
sending abroad ambassadors who were distinguished
only by the size of their political contributions.
GERALD
- 2 -
We have allowed virtually unlimited sales of U.S.
arms to countries around the world -- a policy as
cynical as it is dangerous.
I find it unacceptable that we have in effect con-
doned the effort of some Arab countries to tell
American businesses that in order to trade with
one country or company, they must observe certain
restrictions based on race or religion. Those
so-called "Arab boycotts" violate our standards
of freedom and morality.
I regret that a senior official of the Ford Adminis-
tration, and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,
last week told Congress that efforts should not
be made to address this basic issue of human rights.
Moreover, according to a recent House subcommittee
report, the Department of Commerce has shut its
eyes to the boycott by failing to collect informa-
tion on alleged offenses, and failing to carry out
a firm policy against the boycott.
If I become President, all laws concerning these
boycotts will be vigorously enforced.
We also regret our government's continuing failure
to oppose the denial of human freedom in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union.
Similarly, the American government has failed to
make serious efforts to get the Russians to permit
greater numbers of people to emigrate freely to
countries of their choice, and I commend those
members of Congress and others who have demonstrated
a strong personal concern and commitment to that
goal.
Despite our deep desire for successful negotiation
on strategic arms and nuclear proliferation, we
cannot pass over in silence the deprivation of
GERALD ?
human rights in the Soviet Union. The list of
Soviet prisoners is long and includes both Christians
and Jews. I will speak only of two: Valadimar
Bukovsky and Vladimir Slepak. Bukovsky, a young
scientist, has been imprisoned most of the last 13
years for criticisms of the Soviet regime. Slepak,
a radio engineer in Moscow, applied for an exit visa
for Israel in April of 1970. The visa was denied
and since 1972, he has been denied the right to
hold a job.
- 3 -
I ask why such people must be deprived of their
basic rights, a year after Helsinki. And if I become
President, the fate of men like Bukovsky and
Slepak will be very much on my mind as I negoti-
ate with the Soviet Union.
There are those regimes, such as South Korea,
which openly violate human rights, although they
themselves are under threat from Communist
regimes which represent an even greater level of
repression.
Even in such cases, however, we should not condone
repression or the denial of freedom. On the con-
trary, we should use our influence to increase
freedom in those countries that depend on us for
their very survival.
I do not say to you that these are simple issues.
I do not say that we can remake the world in our
own image. I recognize the limits on our power,
and I do not wish to see us swing from one
extreme of cynical manipulation to the other ex-
treme of moralistic zeal, which can be just as
dangerous.
But the present administration has been so obsessed
with balance of power politics that it has often
ignored basic American values and a proper concern
for human rights. The leaders of this administra-
tion have rationalized that there is little room
for morality in foreign affairs, and that we must
put self-interest above principle.
Let me suggest some actions our government should
take in the area of human rights.
First, we can support the principle of self-deter-
mination by refraining from intervention in the
domestic politics of other countries, but obviously,
we are going to protect our interests and advance
our beliefs in other nations.
We should not behave abroad in ways that violate our
own laws or moral standards. You and I would not
plot murder, but in recent years officials of our
government have plotted murder, and that is wrong
and unacceptable.
- 4 -
In giving trade advantages or economic assistance
to other governments, we should make sure that
such aid is used to benefit the people of that
country. There will be times when we will want to
help those who must live under a repressive govern-
ment, yet wish to provide food, health care, or
other humanitarian assistance directly to the
people.
The United States should lend more vigorous support
to the United Nations and other public and private
international bodies in order to attract world
attention, to the denial of freedom. These bodies
are limited in power, but they can serve as the
conscience of the world community, and they deserve
far more support than our government has given
them in recent years.
Insofar as they comply with our own Constitution
and laws, we should move toward Senate ratification
of several important treaties drafted in the United
Nations for the protection of human rights. These
include the Genocide Convention that was prepared
more than 25 years ago, the Convention against
racial discrimination that was signed during the
Johnson administration, and the covenants on
political and civil rights, and on economic and
social rights. Until we ratify these covenants,
we cannot participate with other nations in inter-
national discussions of specific cases involving
freedom and human rights.
We should quit being timid and join Israel and other
nations in moving to stamp out international terrorism!
Excerpts from B'nai B'rith Speech
September 8, 1976
MISCELLANEOUS
CARTER QUOTES ON THE CIA
Carter says he has not decided whether he would
replace George Bush as CIA director if he is
elected.
Although Bush previously has been involved in
Republican politics, he has "brought the CIA a
good background as former United Nations
ambassador and U.S. representative to China." He
added that his choice for CIA head would be a
person "with stature with the American people,
whose integrity was beyond doubt and with some
analytical ability."
AP
July 28, 1976
President from now on should accept direct responsi-
bility for CIA activities. The President "has got.
to say to the American people that the CIA functioned
legally and properly and guarantee that that's the
case. "
U.S. News and World Report
September 22, 1975
"I will assume personal responsibility for the
intelligence activities of our government," he said.
New York Times
February 12, 1976
Carter says he has no objection to Congress "monitoring"
the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.
But the real answer to its abuses is for him as Presi-
dent "to take on my own shoulders the responsibility
for telling you (the public) when something has gone
wrong, who did it and how I intend to correct it. You
can hold me responsible for it, not some committee."
Washington Post (Broder)
May 2, 1976
CARTER QUOTES ON CYPRUS
The Democratic nominee received a standing ovation
from about two dozen Greek-American leaders after
reading a statement that criticized the Ford
Administration for "tilting away from Greece and
Cyprus" and called for an end to the impasse over
that Mediterranean Island.
Baltimore Sun
September 17, 1976
Speaking on the Turkey-Greece-Cyprus issue, Carter
said: "There should be a constant pressure upon
our own government to reduce that encroachment on
Cyprus itself. I would favor the retaining of some
bases in Turkey if worked out mutually with Turkey
"
Portland, Oregon
May 21, 1976
CARTER QUOTES ON THE PANAMA CANAL
I would try to work out some arrangement within
these two limitations: First of all, I would
not be in favor of relinquishing actual control
of the Panama Canal or its use to any other
nation, including Panama. I think we've got to
retain that actual practical control. On the
other hand, I think there are several things that
can be done to assuage the feeling among the
Panamanians that they 've been excluded or perhaps
even out-traded back in the 1903 period. So I
would be glad to yield part of the sovereignty
over the Panama Canal Zone to Panama. I would
certainly be willing to renegotiate the payment
terms to Panama and I would also be willing to
remove the word "perpetuity" from the present
agreement.
Democratic Forum
Louisville, Kentucky
November 23, 1975
CARTER QUOTES ON EMBARGOES
"I decided
to go to the White House: to stop
embargoes once and for all
It's not my idea of
a fair shake when the government promotes foreign
sales, and then cuts them off for political con-
venience
Agricultural international trade is
the gas and oil for the United States
Every
time Nixon, Ford and Butz have imposed a new
export embargo it has caused permanent damage
to our export market."
Speech at Iowa State Fair
August 25, 1976
Q. Governor, in connection with this, you said
the Arabs should not be permitted to embargo
future shipments of oil. Now how would you pro-
pose to enforce that? Military intervention,
or something like that?
A. No, not military intervention
I would let
the Arab countries know that we want to be their
friends, that we are heavily dependent upon oil
being imported from them, that if they declare
an embargo against us, we would consider it, not
a military, but an economic declaration of war,
and that we would respond instantly and without
further debate in a similar fashion, that we
would not ship them any food, no weapons, no
spare parts for weapons, no oil drilling rigs,
no oil pipes. Not to be belligerent against
us again. We yielded to it in 1973. I don't
think this country ought to yield to an embargo
again. And I think this would be the best way
to avoid it, rather than to wait until after it
occurs, and then flounder around trying to
decide what we should do in retrospect.
Face the Nation
November 30, 1975
Q. In the case of the Soviet Union doing things
like intervening in Angola, would you favor using
our economic leverage and urging our allies to
use their economic leverage to try to get the
Russians to cease and desist?
A. Yes I would.
- 2 -
Q. Would that include the cancellation of grain
sales?
A. Well, obviously the earlier that you can have
a leverage applying, the better your chances are
of success. If you wait until a commitment by
Russia is already confirmed it makes it very
difficult if not impossible for them to withdraw
that commitment because of any detectable pressure
from us
If we want to put economic pressure on
another nation under any circumstances, to use
it as a lever by withholding our products, I would
not single out food as a singular product. It
would be a total withholding of trade.
Q. Then you would put them on notice in advance?
A. Yes
Once you wait until the situation gets
in extremis, it is almost impossible to resolve
it, short of force.
Interview with New York Times
July 7, 1976
MISCELLANEOUS QUOTES FROM CARTER
Excerpts from Playboy Interview
Q. We are asking not so much about hindsight as
about being fallible. Aren't there any
examples of things you did that weren't abso-
lutely right?
A. I don't mind repeating myself. There are a lot
of those in my life. Not speaking out for
the cessation of the war in Vietnam. The fact
that I didn't crusade at a very early stage
for civil rights in the South, for the one-
man, one-vote ruling. It might be that now
I should drop my campaign for President and
start a crusade for black-majority rule in
South Africa or Rhodesia. It might be that
later on we'll discover there were opportuni-
ties in our lives to do wonderful things and
we didn't take advantage of them.
The fact that in 1954 I sat back and required
the Warren Court to make this ruling without
having crusaded myself -- that was obviously a
mistake on my part. But there are things you
have to judge under the circumstances that pre-
vailed when the decisions were being made. Back
then, the Congress, the President, the news-
paper editors, the civil libertarians all said
that separate-but-equal facilities were adequate.
There are opportunities overlooked, or maybe
they could be characterized as absence of courage.
Detente
Q. In some reports, your foreign policy seems
similar to that established by Kissinger, Nixon
and Ford. In fact, Kissinger stated that he
didn't think your differences were substantial.
-2-
How, precisely, does your view differ from
theirs?
A. As I've said in my speeches, I feel the policy
of detente has given up too much to the Russians
and gotten too little in return. I also feel
Kissinger has equated his own popularity with
the so-called advantages of detente. As I've
traveled and spoken with world leaders -- Helmut
Schmidt of West Germany, Yitzhak Rabin of Israel,
various leaders in Japan -- I discerned a deep
concern on their part that the United States has
abandoned a long-standing principle: to consult
mutually, to share responsibility for problems.
This has been a damaging thing. In addition,
I believe we should have stronger bilateral rela-
tions with developing nations.
Q. What do you mean when you say we've given up
too much to the Russians?
A. One example I've mentioned often is the Helsinki
agreement. I never saw any reason we should be
involved in the Helsinki meetings at all. We
added the stature of our presence and signature
to an agreement that, in effect, ratified the
takeover of eastern Europe by the Soviet Union.
We got very little, if anything in return. The
Russians promised they would honor democratic
principles and permit the free movement of their
citizens, including those who want to emigrate.
The Soviet Union has not lived up to those pro-
mises and Mr. Brezhnev was able to celebrate the
major achievement of his diplomatic life.
Q. Are you charging that Kissinger was too soft
on the Russians?
A. Kissinger has been in the position of being
almost uniquely a spokesman for our nation. I
think that is a legitimate role and a proper
responsibility of the President himself. Kis-
singer has had a kind of Lone Ranger, secret
foreign policy attitude, which almost ensures
-3-
that there cannot be adequate consultation
with our allies; there cannot be a long-
range commitment to exchanging principles;
there cannot be a coherent evolution on for-
eign policy; there cannot be a bipartisan
approach with support and advice from Congress.
This is what I would avoid as President and
is one of the major defects in the Nixon-Ford
foreign policy as expressed by Kissinger.
Vietnam/Kissinger
Q. Then what about the administration that ended
that war? Don't you have to give credit to
Kissinger, the Secretary of State of a Repub-
lican President, for ending a war that a Demo-
cratic President escalated?
A. I think the statistics show that more bombs
were dropped in Vietnam and Camobdia under
Nixon and Kissinger than under Johnson. Both
administrations were at fault, but I don't
think the end came about as a result of Kis-
singer's superior diplomacy. It was the result
of several factors that built up in an inexorable
way; the demonstrated strength of the Viet
Cong, the tremendous pressure to withdraw that
came from the American people and an aroused
Congress. I think Nixon and Kissinger did the
proper thing in starting a phased withdrawal,
but I don't consider that to be a notable dip-
lomatic achievement by Kissinger. As we've now
learned, he promised the Vietnamese things that
cannot be delivered -- reparations, payments,
economic advantages, and so forth. Getting
out of Vietnam was very good, but whether Kis-
singer deserved substantial diplomatic credit
for it is something I doubt.
-4-
Foreign Intervention
Q. Anyway, you said earlier that your foreign
policy would exemplify your moral and ethi-
cal standards. Isn't there as much danger
in an overly moralistic policy as in the
kind that is too pragmatic?
A. I've said I don't think we should intervene
militarily, but I see no reason not to
express our approval, at least verbally, with
those nations that develop democratically.
When Kissinger says, as he did recently in
a speech, that Brazil is the sort of govern-
ment that is most compatible with ours --
well, that's the kind of thing we want to
change. Brazil is not a democratic govern-
ment; it's a military dictatorship. In
many instances, it's highly repressive to
political prisoners. Our Government should
justify the character and moral principles of
the American people, and our foreign policy
should not short circuit that for temporary
advantage. I think in every instance we've
done that it's been counterproductive. When
the CIA undertakes covert activities that
might be justified if they were peaceful,
we always suffer when they're revealed --
it always seems as if we're trying to tell
other people how to act. When Kissinger
and Ford warned Italy she would be excluded
from NATO if the Communists assumed power,
that was the best way to make sure Communists
were elected. The Italian voters resent
it. A proper posture for our country in this
sort of situation is to show, through demon-
stration, that our own Government works pro-
perly, that democracy is advantageous, and let
the Italian people make their own decision.
-5-
Q. And what if the Communists in Italy had been
elected in greater numbers than they were?
What if they had actually become a key part
of the Italian government?
A. I think it would be a mechanism for subversion
of the strength of NATO and the cohesiveness
that ought to band European countries together.
The proper posture was the one taken by Helmut
Schmidt, who said that German aid to Italy
would be endangered.
Q. Don't you think that constitutes a form of
intervention in the democratic processes of
another nation?
A. No, I don't. I think that when the democratic
nations of the world express themselves frankly
and forcefully and openly, that's a proper
exertion of influence. We did the same thing
in Portugal. Instead of going in through
surreptitious means and trying to overthrow
the government when it looked like the minority
Communist Party was going to assume power the
NATO countries as a group made it clear to
Portugal what it would lose in the way of
friendship, trade opportunities, and so forth.
And the Portuguese people, recognizing that
possibility, decided that the Communists should
not lead their government. Well, that was legi-
timate exertion of influence, in my opinion.
It was done openly and it was a clear statement
of fact.
-6-
Q. You used the word subversion referring to
communism. Hasn't the world changed since
we used to throw words like that around?
Aren't the west European Communist parties
more independent of Moscow and more willing
to respect democracy?
A. Yes, the world's changed. In my speeches,
I've made it clear that as far as Communist
leaders in such countries as Italy, France
and Portugal are concerned, I would not want
to close the doors of communications, con-
sultation and friendship to them. That would
be an almost automatic forcing of the Communist
leaders into the Soviet sphere of influence.
I also think we should keep open our oppor-
tunities for the east European nations -- even
those that are completely Communist -- in trade
with us, understand us, have tourist exchange
and give them an option from complete domination
by the Soviet Union.
But again, I don't think you could expect West
Germany to lend Poland two billion dollars --
which was the figure in the case of Italy --
when Poland is part of the Soviet government's
satellite and supportive-nation group. So I
think the best way to minimize totalitarian
influence within the governments of Europe
is to make sure the democratic forces perform
properly. The major shift toward the Com-
munists in Italy was in the local election, when
the Christian Democrats destroyed their reputation
by graft and corruption. If we can make our
own Government work, if we can avoid future
Watergates and avoid the activities of the CIA
that have been revealed, if we can minimize the
joblessness and inflation, this will be a good
way to lessen the inclination of people in other
countries to turn away from our form of
government.
-7-
Q. What about Chile? Would you agree that
that was a case of the United States,
through the CIA, intervening improperly?
A. Yes. There's no doubt about it. Sure.
Q. And you would stop that sort of thing?
A. Absolutely. Yes, sir.
Q. What about economic sanctions? Do you
feel we should have punished the Allende
government the way we did?
A. That's a complicated question, because
we don't know what caused the fall of the
Allende government, the murder of perhaps
thousands of people, the incarceration of
many others. I don't have any facts as to
how deeply involved we were, but my impres-
sion is that we were involved quite deeply.
As I said, I wouldn't have done that if I
were President. But as to whether or not
we ought to have an option on the terms of our
loans, repayment schedules, interest charges,
the kinds of materials we sell to them -- those
are options I would retain depending upon the
compatibility of a foreign government with our
own.
-8-
Q. In preparing for this interview, we spoke
with your mother, your son Chip and your
sister Gloria. We asked them what single
action would most disappoint them in a Carter
Presidency. They all replied that it would
be if you ever sent troops to intervene in
a foreign war. In fact, Miss Lillian said
she would picket the White House.
A. They share my views completely.
Q. Then would you summarize your position on foreign
intervention?
A. I would never intervene for the purpose of over-
throwing a government. If enough were at stake
for out national interest, I would use prestige,
legitimate diplomatic leverage, trade mechanisms.
But it would be the sort of effort that would not
be embarrassing to this nation if revealed com-
pletely. I don't ever want to do anything as
President that would be a contravention of the
moral and ethical standards that I would exemplify
in my own life as an individual or that would vio-
late the principles or character of the American
people.
Mayaguez
Q. What about more limited military action. Would
you have handled the Mayaguez incident the same
way President Ford did?
A. Let me assess that in retrospect. It's obvious
we didn't have adequate intelligence; we attacked
an island when the Mayaquez crew was no longer
there. There was a desire, I think, on the part
of President Ford to extract maximum publicity
from our effort, SO that about 23 minutes after
our crew was released, we went ahead and bombed
the island airport. I hope I would have been
-9-
capable of getting adequate intelligence, sur-
rounded the island more quickly and isolated the
crew so we wouldn't have had to attack the air-
port after the crew was released. There are
some of the differences in the way I would have
done it.
Q. So it's a matter of degree; you would have inter-
vened militarily, too.
A. I would have done everything necessary to keep
the crew from being taken to the mainland, yes.
Carter's Foreign Policy Advisers
Q. Do you feel it's fair criticism that you seem to
be going back to some familiar faces -- such as
Paul Warnke and Cyrus Vance -- for foreign policy
advice? Isn't there a danger of history's repeating
itself when you seek out those who were involved
in our Vietnam decisions?
A. I haven't heard that criticism. If you're raising
it, then I respond to the new critic. These
people contribute to foreign-affairs journals,
they individually explore different concepts of
foreign policy. I have 15 or 20 people who work
with me very closely on foreign affairs. Their
views are quite divergent. The fact that they
may or may not have been involved in foreign-
policy decisions in the past is certainly no
detriment to their ability to help me now.
- 10 -
VIETNAM
Q. You mentioned Vietnam. Do you feel you spoke
out out at an early enough stage against the war?
A. No, I did not. I never spoke out publicly
about withdrawing completely from Vietnam until
March of 1971.
Q. Why?
A. It was the first time anybody had asked me
about it. I was a farmer before then and wasn't
asked about the war until I took office. There
was a general feeling in this country that we
ought not to be in Vietnam to start with. The
American people were tremendously misled about
the immediate prospects for victory, about the
level of our involvement, about the relative
cost in American lives. If I had known in the
Sixties what I knew in the early Seventies, I
think I would have spoken out more strongly.
I was not in public office. When I took office
as governor in 1970, I began to speak out about
complete withdrawal. It was late compared with
what many others had done, but I think it's
accurate to say that the Congress and the people --
with the exception of very small numbers of
people -- shared the belief that we were protecting
our democratic allies.
Q. Even without holding office you must have had
some feelings about the war. When do you recall
first feeling it was wrong?
A. There was an accepted feeling by me and
everybody else that we ought not to be there, that
we should never have gotten involved, we ought to
get out.
Q. You felt that way all through the Sixties?
A. Yeah, that's right and I might hasten to say
that it was the same feeling expressed by Senators
Russel and Talmadge -- very conservative Southern
political figures. They thought it was a serious
mistake to be in Vietnam.
- 11 -
Q. Your son Jack fought in that war. Did you
have any qualms about it at the time?
A. Well, yes, I had problems about my son fighting
in the war period. But I never make my son's
decisions for them. Jack went to war feeling it
was foolish, a waste of time, much more deeply than
I did. He also felt it would have been grossly
unfair for him not to go when other poorer kids
had to.
Q. You were in favor of allocating funds for the
South Vietnamese in 1975 as the war was coming to
a close, weren't you?
A. That was when we were getting ready to evacu-
ate our troops. The purpose of the money was to
get our people out and maintain harmony between
us and our Vietnamese allies, who had fought with
us for 25 years. And I said yes. I would do that.
But it was not a permanent thing, not to continue
the way but to let us get our troops out in an
orderly fashion.
Q. How do you respond to the argument that it was
the Democrats, not the Republicans, who got us into
the Vietnam war?
A. I think it started originally, maybe with
Eisenhower, then Kennedy, Johnson and then Nixon.
It's not a partisan matter. I think Eisenhower
probably first got us in there thinking that since
France had failed, our country might slip in there
and succeed. Kennedy thought he could escalate
involvement by going beyond the mere advisory
role. I guess if there was one President who
made the most determined effort, conceivably, to
end the war by massive force, it was certainly
Johnson. And Nixon went into Cambodia and bombed
it, and so forth.
It's not partisan -- it's just a matter that
evolved as a habit over several administrations
There was a governmental consciousness to deal
in secrecy, to exclude the American people, to
mislead them with false statements and sometimes
outright lies. Had the American people been told
the facts from the beginning by Eisenhower,
Kennedy, MacNamara, Johnson, Kissinger and Nixon,
I think there would have been different decisions
made in our government.
- 12 -
At the Democratic Convention you praised Johnson
as a President who had vastly extended human
rights. Were you simply omitting any mention of
Vietnam?
A. It was obviously the factor that destroyed
his political career and damaged his whole life.
But as far as what I said at the convention, there
hasn't been another President in our history --
with the possible exception of Abraham Lincoln --
who did so much to advance the cause of human
rights.
Q. Except for the human rights of the Vietnamese
and the Americans who fought there.
A. Well, I really believe that Johnson's motives
were good. I think he tried to end the war even
while the fighting was going on and he was speaking
about massive rehabilitation efforts financed by
our government to help people. I don't think he
ever had any desire for permanent entrenchment of
our forces in Vietnam. I think he had a mistaken
notion that he was defending democracy and that
what he was doing was compatible with the desires
of the South Vietnamese.
Interview - Playboy Magazine
October 1976
ARTICLES
Tom Braden
Carter and Kissinger:
Similar Views
If you look closely at Gov. Carter's
The same is true of Carter's criticism
speech about what our foreign policy
that our policy has been conducted too
should be, you come up with the grati-
secretly. In his days as Richard Nixon's
fying conclusion that Carter thinks our
errand boy, Kissinger was guilty of
present foreign policy is pretty good.
some swift end runs around Congress
This is gratifying for two reasons:
and the press. Since Gerald Ford as-
First, it means that during the cam-
sumed office, he has not been guilty.
paign ahead we shall be spared non-
In any event, as Carter undoubtedly
sensical debates, such as that in which
knows, pledges of openness in foreign
Richard Nixon and John Kennedy en-
policy are subject to common sense,
gaged over Quemoy and Matsu or in
and common sense dictates that nego-
which Ronald Reagan and Gerald Ford
tiations must often be kept secret:
are now engaged over the Panama Can-
"Open covenants openly arrived at
al.
was intended to ban secret national alli-
Second, it means that Carter does not
ances. It was not intended to suggest
intend to play the role of the saber-rat-
that the bargaining process could be
tler. He knows that the world exists be-
conducted by popular vote.
cause the United States and the Soviet
On the Middle East, Carter came out
Union permit it to exist, that either is
strongly for an overall settlement,
capable of destroying it and that there-
which is what Secretary William Rog.
fore the relations between the two are
of first priority.
This makes sense to most Americans.
It makes sense to Henry Kissinger, and
"Since the departure of
it is the policy we have been following,
implicitly, since John Foster Dulles; ex-
Richard Nixon,
plicitly, since Kissinger gave the policy
the name, detente.
No candidate who represents the
Kissinger has been
"outs" can afford to say that he fully
agrees with the "ins," and so Carter has
consulting regularly
couched his foreign policy views in
such a manner as to suggest that he will
with our allies on every
offer something new. The two new
planks he offers are, first, cooperation
major and even some of
between the United States, Japan and
Western Europe; and, second, an end to
our minor steps in
secrecy in foreign policy.
Both points are more rhetoric than
reality. Since the departure of Richard
foreign policy.
Nixon, Kissinger has been consulting
regularly with our allies on every ma-
jor and even some of our minor steps in
foreign policy. It would be hard to find
ers tried to do before it became appar-
a past Secretary of State who has done
ent that it wouldn't work and that the
more consulting than he. Carter sug-
step-by-step approach was the only
gests that Kissinger talk to our allies
thing that would work. Kissinger would
first and to the Russians second. But in
surely agree with Carter that the time
view of the world power situation,
for an overall settlement is again at
would Carter really reverse the order?
band.
Let us suppose, for example, a crisis
And on Africa, Carter said frankly
in the Middle East. Do we go first to the
that he agreed with the stance which
British, the French or the Germans? Or
Kissinger has now adopted. He is surely
do we deal directly and immediately
right in saying that the stance was too
with the only world power whose ac-
long delayed.
tions could possibly control our own?
In sum, as Jimmy Carter has laid out
Consultation with allies is partly a
his foreign policy, he has no major
matter of nuance and partly a matter
quarrels with Henry Kissinger. So
of appearance. Carter's criticism seems
there will be no foreign policy debates
to hit home only if we go back to the
in the forthcoming campaign unless
eΓa of the Nixon shocks and to John
the Republicans nominate Ronald Rea.
Connally's machismo. It is not really
gan. In that event, it is possible to ima-
relevant to the manner in which our
gine Kissinger's coming down on Cart-
foreign policy has been conducted
er's side.
since Nixon ceased to conduct it.
C
1978
The Washington Post, March 27, 1976
Clayton Fritchey WP 3/27/76
And on Detente and Diplomacy
After meeting Jimmy Carter for the
international failures under recent ad-
ratorially, entered into furtively, and
ular consensus behind his foreign initi-
first time recently, Clark Clifford, for-
ministrations, Democratic as well as
executed deviously.
atives before putting them into effect.
mer Secretary of Defense, and an ad-
Republican.
In contrast, as Carter notes, "Every
As historian William McNeill recently
viser to several Presidents, remarked
These failures, in Carter's view, are
successful foreign policy we have had
noted, Roosevelt "often left the im-
to the press that he had found the for-
merely the consequences of an, under-
-- whether it was the Good Neighbor
pression of being indecisive and dila-
mer Georgia governor "well-informed
lying policy that is not only misguided,
Policy of Franklin Roosevelt, the Point
tory, but when the crisis came, he had
on foreign policy and perceptive."
Four of President Truman or the
but violates the American democratic
the support of the overwhelming ma-
A careful reading of the full text of
Peace Corps and Trade Reform of
tradition of openness. This is the way
jority of the American people." Car-
Carter's first major foreign affairs
President Kennedy - was successful
the Georgian puts his finger on it:
ter's crities complain of ambiguities in
speech, made in Chicago the day be-
because it reflected the best that was
his stand on some domestic issues, but
"Every time we have made a serious
fore the Illinois primary, bears out
in us."
there is nothing ambiguous about his
mistake in recent years in our dealings
Clifford's judicious appraisal. On bal-
Nevertheless, former President
position on the conduct of foreign pol-
with other nations, the American pco-
ance, it may be the most perceptive
Nixon in his latest foreign deposition
icy. His Chicago speech is not overly
ple have been excluded from the pro-
speech on U.S. policy made this year
still argues that secrecy is best. He be-
distingushed by style, but it is plain-
cess of evolving and consummating our
by any of the presidential candidates
littles Woodrow Wilson's policy of
spoken to the point of bluntness.
foreign policy. Unnecessary secrecy
"open covenants openly arrived at" as
of either party.
surrounds the inner workings of our
"wrong" and "naive." Well, there was
It is hard to remember when a candi-
Because of the avalanche of political
government, and we have sometimes
nothing wrong or naive about the
ate has SO unqualifiedly committed
news inspired by the Illinois primary
been deliberately misled by our lead-
greatest open convenants (NATO and
himself to forthright standards of di-
(won big by Carter), the reporting of
ers."
the Marshall Plan) of the postwar era.
plomacy. If elected, Carter is never go-
his address to the Chicago World Af-
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,
Both were openly adopted after the
ing to be free to practice sleight-of-
fairs Council was inevitably brief and
Carter says, "simply does not trust the
most open public and congressional de-
hand policy without cating many of his
sketchy, and some reports gave the im-
judgment of the American people, but
bate, which is why they are still a mat-
Chicago words.
pression that it was mostly just an-
constantly conducts foreign policy ex-
ter of national pride.
"When our President and Sceretary
other attack on detente.
clusively, personally and in secret." Se-
Carter is really harking back to FDR
of State," he says, "speak to the
Actually, while he does have reserva-
crecy is the key word, the root of one
when he says "the lesson we draw
world without the understanding or
tions about some aspects of detente,
failure after another: Vietnam, Cambo-
from recent history is that public un-
support of the American people, they
he's still a strong backer of that ap-
dia, Laos, Chile, Angola and, carlier,
derstanding and support are now as vi-
speak with an obviously hollow voice."
proach to J.S.-Sovict relations. But
the Bay of Pigs disaster and the inva-
tal to a successful foreign policy as
That's a good thing to remember
those thoughts were incidental to his
sion of the Dominican Republic, to say
they are to any domestic program."
whether Carter or somebody else is
main theme, which was a conscientious
nothing of long years of covert CIA op-
Few remember today what lengths
the next President.
effort to get at the real cause of our
erations. All of them conceived conspi-
Roosevelt went to in mobilizing a pop-
1976. Los Angeles Times
The New York Times
June 24, 1976
Carter and Kissinger
Democrat Moves Step Closer to Making
Secretary's Style an Issue in Campaign
By LESLE K. GELB
Former Governor Jimmy Car-
they make a mockery of the
ter. fleshing out his key theme
very concept of détente."
of promoting closer cooperation
But then Mr. Carter went on
among industrial democracies,
to say that he opposed the AJ-
invited comparison yesterda.
ministration's proposed new
with Secretary of State Henry
arms sales to Kenya and Zaire
A. Kissinger. To
as "both fueling the East-West
emphasize his
arms race in Africa even while
News
promise of an open
supplanting our own allie:-
Analysis
administration, Mr.
Britain and France-in their N.A
Carter moved a
lations with these African
'step closer to mak-
states."
ing the Secretary a campaign
Members of the Carter camp
issue. Without citing Mr. Kis-
are aware that their candidate's
singer by name, he refused
problem on foreign policy is to
to a "secretive Lone Ranger
show how his proposals differ
foreign policy."
In attempting to amplify his
from what Mr. Kissinger is now
substantive proposals and con-
doing.
trast them with Mr. Kinsinger's,
Mr. Kissinger has taken pains
Mr. Carter pledged to
make
in the last year or so to shore
lations among the United States,
up relations with Western Eu-
Western Europe and Japan. and
rope and Japan to overcome
not Soviet-American relations,
resentments from his past prac-
the principal focus of his for-
tice of proceeding unilaterally
eign policy.
with the Russians. He has re-
Although Mr. Carter's speech,
portedly been successful in
delivered yesterday in New
these recent efforts.
York, sounded much like re-
As Mr. Kissinger begins to
cent comments of Mr. Kissinger,
phase out of his responsibilities
there was an indication that
and as Mr. Carter starts to
their attitudes and policies
plan his campaign, the two men
might not be that similar.
seem almost to be in a race to
Where both men call for
promise a new spirit of coop-
more consultations and new in-
eration with traditional allies.
stitutions for the industrial
According to members of the
democracies. Mr. Carter adds
Carter camp, the former Gov-
the idea of a "new architectural
ernor wants to make his mark
effort" reminiscent of the Tru-
in foreign policy. to sound
man Administration. He gave
Presidential. To do this, Mr.
no details.
Carter's strategy seems to be
Where both are concerned
combination of attacking Mr.
even alarmed. by the growing
Kissinger's style and adopting
strength of Communist parties
some of his expressed ideas.
in Western Europe, Mr.
Carter
With respect to policies, Mr.
appears more willing to adjust
Carter said he wanted Western
to the freely expressed will
of
Europe and Japan to play a big-
other democracies.
He
ger role in shaping a new inter-
"We must learn to
live
with
national order. He also stated
diversity. and we can
continue
that
"they are prepared to play"
to cooperate, so long as
such a role, which might prove
political parties respect the
to be a dubious judgment in the
democratic process,
unhold
light of Mr. Kissinger's numer-
isting internation
commit
our attempts in this direction.
ments, and are
Mr.
Carter also told his au-
external political
that he would seek closer
Where Mr. Carter
and
Mr
coordination with the other in-
Kissinger share a
dustrial
democracies in internal
about possible moves
reconómic
policies, in helping
Soviet Union to extend
Infla
the
paper
nations, in reducing
once in the develo
trade
berriers and in avoiding
the filely Democral
inctuations in monetary
nonunee appears
rates, In these vents-
termined
to
avoid
Mr.
Kissinger and Mr.
that might lead to
Services
Carter
are at one.
American confrontation
Carter, however, never
This Mr. Carter
endorsed any of these ree
warred
efforts.
even
pay
ware
called
for
Angele
"may
be
harmony - the for
dangerous
American foreign,
disagreements,
New York Daily News, Tuesday, August 31, 1976
Do we want a
MACNELY
GOP
STRATEGY
disarming VP?
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
W
ASHINGTON-For 45 seconds the Le
gionnaires hooted and booed Jimmy
Carter. The Democratic candidate had just
told them of his "blanket pardons" for the draft
dodgers who fled to Canada and Sweden, while
other young Americans lost limbs and lives in an
Asian conflict Jimmy Carter suddenly discovered
was a "racist" war waged by the United States.
Mr. Carter, however, is fortunate the Legionnaires
were unaware of the rest of his platform. He would
have needed beefed-up Secret Service protection.
The Democratic platform denounces U.S. bombing
of enemy sanctuaries which saved American soldiers
by the thousands along the Cambodian frontier. It
hails Congress' choking off of military aid to the pro-
Western Angolan rebels, thereby guaranteeing victory
to a Cuban-supported Marxist gang which celebrated
its success with the public execution of Daniel Gear-
So
conceding the South to Carter, and assuming the big Industrial states go Democrat
that leaves us
hart, a Catholic Vietnam veteran from Kensington,
Russell, Kansas, and downtown Grand Rapids
Maryland.
With the Soviets outspending the U.S. by 50% on
defense, more on weapons, Carter-Mondale want the
Still, Mr. Carter wants deeper cuts; and he has
glc equality in future negotiations with the Soviets,
U.S. defense budget slashed $5 to $7 billion - a.cut
chosen as running mate a man whose record is as
Mondale said no.
larger than the entire defense budget of Japan. The
follows:
He voted against the C5A transport planes which
Democrats refuse to say where and how the cuts will
Mondale voted against building a missile defense;
helped save Israel in the Your Kippur war, against
be made. The reason is obvious. Cuts of that magni-
then he voted to tear it down.
developing the cruise missile which would help regain
tude cannot now be made without imperiling the se-
He voted against research and development of a
U.S. strategic parity with the Russians. He voted
curity of the United States.
against letting the Navy build a fueling station on
new bomber to replace the B-52. He voted against R
Diego Garcia to protect the sea lanes through which
new nuclear carrier, against the Trident submarine.
passes the oil on which Japan, Europe, and, increas-
This is not simply the concern of Ronald Reagan,
With the Soviet build-up in Europe mounting, he
ingly, the United States depend.
Barry Goldwater or Henvy Jackson. One of Mr. Cart-
voted to pull half the American troops out of the
Mr. Mondale's voting record is that of a unilaterial
er's principal advisors, Paul Nitze. as well as the
NATO lines.
disarmer. He is the most radical antimilitary politician
Democratic candidate for senator from Virginia,
When the administration asked for funds to un-
to be S0 close to the U.S. presidency since Vice Presi-
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, are both known to be deeply
grade the accuracy and effectiveness of our strategic
dent Henry Wallace, from 1941 to 1945.
concerned that the Russians may be on the threshold
missile force, Mondále said no. When Henry Jackson,
This is the man Jimmy Carter wants a heartbeat
of achieving first-strike capability.
a Democract, proposed the U.S. insist on strate-
away from the Oval Office.
The New York Times
May 14, 1976
CARTERGIVESPLAN
FOR NUCLEAR CURB
new york Joines
5/14/76
He Calls for Moratorium
in the Transfer of Fuel
Processing Plants
By KATHLEEN TELTSCH
Special to The New York Times
UNITED NATIONS, N. Y.,
May 13-Jimmy Carter called
today for a voluntary morator-
ium by all nations on the pur-
chase or sale of nuclear fuel
enrichment and reprocessing
plants as a means of curbing
the spread of nuclear weapons.
Speaking here at a privately
sponsored conference on nu-
clear energy and international
Excerpts from Carter talk
are printed on page A12.
order, the former Georgia Gov-
ernor, who is seeking the Dem-
ocratic Presidential nomina-
tion, declared:
"An alliance for survival is
needed, transcending regions
and ideologies, if we are to as-
sure mankind a safe passage to
the 21st century."
Mr. Carter described as
"wholly inadequate" the So-
viet-American treaty initialed
Continued on Page A13, Col. 1
Carter Asks Halt in Nuclear Fuel-Plant Transfers
Continued From Page 1A, Col. 2
sales might have been headed
number of inspectors and was
off if President Ford had raised
incapable of seeking out clan-
yesterday limiting the size of
the matter "as should have been
destine nuclear plants.
Mr. Iklé made the criticism
underground nuclear explosions
done many months ago" at the
in a statemnt issued in Wash-
for peaceful purposes.
highest political level, meaning
ington and delivered at a con-
Saying, "We can and should
with President Valéry Giscard
ference on nuclear energy and
do more," he urged the United
d'Estaing of France and Chan-
world order in the United Na-
cellor Helmut Schmidt of West
States and Soviet Union to
tions building, following Jimmy
Germany.
conclude at once an agreement
Carter, the Democratic Presi-
The former Georgia Governor
to prohibit all nuclear tests for
dential aspirant, and other
made it plain that he was not
five years and make it subject
speakers. His main concern
trying to interfere with the
to renewal.
was the prevention of the
competitive market in reactors,
The Carter address, delivered
spread of nuclear weapons.
which sell for up to $1 billion
before about 200 people in a
and use a nuclear fuel that can-
technology.
United Nations conference
"With some technologists,"
not be employed directly to pro-
room, had been prepared, ac-
he said, "the potential for ca-
duce weapons.
cording to close associates,
Rather, he said, he is calling
tastrophe is deadly certain."
with a panel of advisers as a
for a halt in sales of small re-
He suggested that one such
reoly to campaign critics that
processing plants selling for
development was the high-
this position on issues was
much less that sometimes are
temperature gas-cooled reactor
"Puzzy." Speeches on other
called "bomb factories" because
developed by one United States
concern and manufactured in
topics are to follow, the as-
they can be used directly to
West Germany. Mr. Iklé said
sociates added.
produce them.
Nuclear Expertise
"I believe that all supplier
this type of reactor was fueled
countries are entitled to a fair
with highly enriched uranium
They said Mr. Carter chose
that could also be used to make
share of the reactor market,
to devote his first detailed
nuclear bombs.
Mr. Carter declared. "What we
policy statement to the issue
must prevent, however, is the
He was particularly critical
of nuclear power in part be-
of the rush of several countries
sale of small pilot reprocessing
to construct nuclear fuel-re-
cause he could claim some
plants which sell for only a few
expertise as a former nuclear
million dollars, have no com-
cycling plants. He said the re-
engineer in the Navy.
mercial use at present, and can
processed materials could re-
The conference was organ-
only spread nuclear explosives
place at most only one-third
zed by Richard N. Gardner,
around the world."
of the fuel required.
Mr. Iklé said this meant "re-
professor of law at Columbia
Ford Administration aides
and one of Mr. Carter's advis-
dealing with reactor sales ques-
cycling would not bring inde-
pendence from imported fuel,"
ers. It was sponsored by the
tions have acknowledged that
and added:
Institute on Man and Science of
the United States expressed un-
"As to economics, at present
Rensselaerville, N.Y., the Aspen
happiness over the West Ger-
the costs of separating plutoni-
Institute for Humanistic Stud-
man and French deals but did
um for recycling would actual-
ies, the Overseas Development
not firmly oppose them. How-
The New York Times
ly exceed the value of plu-
Council and the Charles F.
ever, there were responses in
Kettering Foundation.
Jimmy Carter arriving at,
tonium as a fuel."
Congress including a new move
He further contended that
Professor Gardner was among
United Nations yesterday.
by Senator Stuart Symington
the new fuel cycles would
the Carter advisers who helped
of Missouri to amend pending
make plutonium, the stuff of
prepare the speech.
because they lack access to
foreign aid legislation to deny
atomic weapons, "far more ac-
Among those listening to it
American assistance to coun-
were United Nations delegates
other sources.
cessible for diversion to weap-
tries acquiring plants that give
ons manufacture."
who are also participating in a
He also suggested that such
them a weapons capacity.
Mr. Iklé said the Internation-
weekend conference on food
a conference might lead to a
al Atomic Energy Agency,
and energy at Rensselaerville,
new agency for research and
Ikle Criticizes
though weak, was "one of the
south of Albany, under the
development of nonnuclear
best organized and technically
chairmanship of Professor
sources working side by side
A high-ranking Administra-
competent international organ-
Gardner and the sponsorship of
with the International Atomic
tion official criticized the In-
izations existing today."
the same four organizations.
Energy Agency, which could
ternational Atomic Energy
The United States, he went
In his speech, Mr. Carter
then focus on improved safe-
Agency yesterday as an institu-
on, is attempting to strengthen
stressed that the United States
guards, and on aid in the nu-
with "a split personality"-
the agency by seeking to ob-
dependence on nuclear power
clear field.
administering nuclear safe-
tain approval of an internation-
should be kept to the minimum
In calling for a moratorium
guards on the one hand and
all convention on physical se-
to "meet its needs and that
on the national purchase or
spreading nuclear technology
curity of nuclear materials
energy conservation should be
sale of uranium enrichment and
on the other.
against theft and sabotage.
maintained along with efforts
plutonium reprocessing plants,
The official, Fred C. Iklé,
to derive increasing amounts
Mr. Carter said this halt in trad-
who is director of the Arms
Washington Star Head
from inexhaustible sources
ing should apply to recently
Control and Disarmament
WASHINGTON, May 12 (AP)
such as the sun.
completed agreements - mean-
Agency, said that the agency
-Richard S. Stakes has been
He urged holding a World
ing West Germany's sale of a
had "no physical control" over
named president and chief ex-
Energy Conference under
reactor to Brazil, with plu-
nuclear materials of the 106
ecutive officer of The Washing-
United Nations auspices that
tonium technology offered as
member countries adding that
ton Star by the publisher, Joe
would help countries eliminate
well, and France's sale of a re-
it was "a burglar alarm but
L. Allbritton. Mr. Stakes was
waste and increase efficiency,
processing plant to Pakistan.
not a lock."
head of the newspaper's radio-
and to emphasize alternative
There are also prospects of a
He said further that the agen-
TV division. Mr. Allbritton
sources for developing coun-
multibillion-dollar West Ger-
cy was not keeping pace with
named James J. Daly, The Star's
tries that are making a "pre-
man sale to Iran.
new devlopments in nuclear
vice president, as executive
mature nuclear commitment"
Mr. Carter declared that such
technology, lacked an adequate
vice president.
Detroit News July 7, 1976
Clarter A-arm News stand held unrealistic
By ROCHE
weapons became a capital-intensive substi-
That 4.5 tremor on the Richter scale
tute for troops. And whether we admitted it
about a week ago did not signify another
or not, a tactical nuclear first strike was
earthquake in China - it represented a
the only conceivable response to a Warsaw
shudder in the NATO chancelleries over
Pact blitz into Western Europe.
Jimmy Carter's latest ramblings on limited
To quiet Soviet fears, we went in for
nuclear war.
miniaturization and extraordinary accu-
Right after the convention, the candidate
racy. The theory was that if Soviet party
met with the Hearst task force and delivered
chief Leonid Brezhnev knew our nukes
some remarkable musings on the subject of
were small, clean and accurate and only
American reliance on the nuclear deter-
targeted on military installations, he would
rent. To the extent they were intelligible,
genially accept the military symmetry.
they marked-as Inoted-a pure "Back to
His response, however, was to update his
Dulles" approach.
large, dirty and relatively inaccurate short-
range and intermediate-range ballistic mis-
SINCE HIS VIEWS went largely unre-
siles.
orted in the summer doldrums, let me
(Contrary to recent speculation, the evi-
again summarize them:
dence indicates their SRBM's and IRBM's
First, he said he would use atomic weap-
have not been mirved: Moscow is just get-
one if he was "convinced the security or
ting more resonance for the ruble.)
ce of our own nation was threat-
Immediately readers in Tokyo,
GIVEN BREZHNEV'S understandable
Seoul and Western Europe went on red
refusal to play by our rules (they have
alert
"our own nation.'
JOHN P. ROCHE
another manual, by Lenin, out of Clause-
Second, he got into the European situa-
witz, which emphasizes that war is not a
tion, though hardly in a reassuring fashion:
Finally, he seemed to believe we still
ballet), only a lunatic would put his money
"The use of atomic weapons in Europe
have a "preemptive strike" capacity
on a limited war staying limited.
would certainly not be contemplated by me
against the Soviets, that we could take out
Jimmy Carter clearly does not fall into
without agreement of the nations who
their retaliatory capabilities in one sudden
this category but instead of advocating the
would be most directly affected by retalia-
salvo.
only reasonable alternative - a conven-
tory actions against the Soviet Union
I
The root of Carter's problem is his belief
tional buildup - he has again, in an inter-
certainly couldn't imagine us using nuclear
that limited nuclear war is a fake option. I
view with C.L. Sulzberger of the New York
weapons in Europe without Germany and
completely agree. Since Secretary of State
Times, gone drifting off into strategic no-
Austria and perhaps France approving
Henry Kissinger first surfaced the concept
man's-land.
their use."
in 1958 (later backing off), I have inveighed
"The Russians," he said, "have always
What on earth did this mean? In the
against it in season and out, particularly
gone all out in their planning (for a tactical,
event of a crisis, would he call a conference
when it almost became part of our national
not limited nuclear war) but make the dis-
and take a vote? How do- the neutral Aus-
policy disguised as the multilateral nuclear
tinction that they would exclude direct
trians fit into the picture? Finally, where
force (MLF).
attacks by them on the U.S.A. and direct
would the meeting be held in safety? Ice-
Indeed, I like to think I had a hand in
attacks by us (on them).
land?
President Johnson's decision, immediately
"For them, a tactical war would be
Then came another thump on Dulles'
after the 1964 election, to scuttle MLF. I
limited to Europe - West and East - and
bass drum:
asked if he really thought Moscow would
it would be horrible. But it is a false hope to
"The standoff nuclear strength between
take seriously a statement that the views
exclude the two superpowers from that."
us and the Soviet Union, where both of us
expressed by an MLF nuke hitting Kiev
He then advocated a limitation on the
have substantial overkill capacities, is a
were not necessarily those' of the govern-
spread of nuclear weapons!
major deterrent to war in Europe."
ment of the United States?
Is it any wonder NATO powers are sur-
"Massive retaliation," Dulles' phrase,
In the post-Vietnam rundown of Ameri-
reptitiously checking the fire escape?
rides again.
can conventional forces, tactical nuclear
Distributed by King Features Syndicate