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Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations: April 17, 1976 (3)
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Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations: April 17, 1976 (3)
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White House Special Files Unit Files
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The original documents are located in Box 6, folder "Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations:
April 17, 1976 (3)" of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 6 of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Statements by Americans in Support of the Negotiations
President Johnson made a statement on the Panama Canal in
December of 1964 in which he proposed to Panama the negotiation of
a new treaty regarding the Panama Canal (as well as moving forward
to plan for a new sea level canal). He said, "These two steps are
needed now -- for the protection and promotion of peaceful trade -- for
the welfare of the hemisphere in the true interest of the United States --
and in fairness and justice to all. " "These changes are necessary
not because of failure but because of success; not because of backwardness
but because of progress
This new age requires new arrangements. "
"The strength of our American system is that we have always tried
to understand and meet the needs of the future. We have been at our
best when we have been both bold and prudent in moving forward. The
planning of a new canal, and the negotiation of a new treaty, are just such
bold and prudent steps. 11
In November 1975, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States
issued a press release announcing its support for the Administration's
efforts to renegotiate the Panama Canal Treaty based on the 1974
Principles. The Chamber said "Terms of the 1903 Treaty do not reflect
changes in Panamanian-U.S. relations which have occurred in the last
72 years, and no longer serve U.S. national interests as well as a
modernized treaty which would be based on the concept of partnership;"
The Administrative Board of the United States Catholic Conference
issued a statement on Panama-United States Relations on February, 1975
which said, "It is a moral imperative a matter of elemental social
justice -- that a new and a more just treaty be negotiated. "
"Not only the rest of the Americas, but the whole world will be watching.
The fundamental rights of the people of Panama, as well as the high ideals
and long-range interests of the United States require a new and just
treaty. It can become a sign of and a significant contribution toward
world peace based upon justice and fraternity between peoples. 11
The Council of the Americas in its President's Letter to the
Members said, "Successful conclusion of these negotiations, where
interests of all concerned are satisfactorily served, are critical to
future relationships, not only for the U.S. business community in
Panama, but for trade and business in all of Latin America. Indeed,
7
2
if negotiations on this emotionally-loaded issue throughout the southern
part of our hemisphere are concluded on an unsatisfactory note, the
negative impact could adversely affect all relations between the two
Americas. 11
Senator Goldwater, formerly an opponent of a new treaty, in an
interview in December of 1975 said he had done a lot of thinking about
this whole thing, " and expressed the view that the United States must
retain control over the Panama Canal for the present but there is peril
in refusing to look ahead to eventual relinquishment.
A Report of a Special Study Mission to Panama in November of 1975
to the House Committee on International Relations submitted by Congress-
man Lee Hamilton lists among its conclusions the following:
"A new treaty is the most practical way of protecting American
interests. The greatest danger to the national interests of the United
States would be a continuation of the present treaty. If there is not a
new treaty, we run grave risks, including damage to the Canal or even
closure of it and harm to broad American political and economic interests. 11
-- A new treaty arrangement between the United States and Panama
for the defense and operation of the Panama Canal is required if the
United States is to have good relations in Latin America since Latin
American countries see a new treaty as a test of our attitudes toward
the entire hemisphere.
-- A new treaty is also required for the continued operation of an
open, safe, efficient Canal.
-- While the Panama Canal is not as important strategically as it
once was, it remains a valuable economic and military asset to the
United States.
In a letter to Senator Strom Thurmond, General George Brown said,
"We anticipate that Panama will, at some time in the future, participate
in the operation of the Canal to our mutual benefit, and in the defense
of the Canal against any who would threaten it. According to those who
know Panama and the Panamanian people, such a cooperative and friendly
relationship is unlikely as long as certain terms of the present treaty,
which exclude these participants, remain in effect. 11
3
"I see our national security interests in Panama best served
by continuing the negotiations toward a satisfactory treaty with the
Republic of Panama. 11
X
all
Statements of Latin American Support
For a New Panama Canal Treaty
President Echeverria, leader of our good neighbor to the south,
Mexico, said last July 4 "Latin America eagerly awaits the solution of the
Panama Canal problem and the establishment of new standards of justice
and reciprocal respect. Of the Canal question, he remarked "our historical
experience moves us to solidarity with Panama. The greatness of a country
is not measured by its military but by its moral strength."
Secretary General Orfila of the OAS commented last year on
United States TV that failure in the Canal negotiations would produce
a strongly negative reaction "from Mexico to Argentina". He added
during his "Meet the Press" interview, "I would hope there won't be
violence, but, believe me, we would set back the relations between the
countries, the US and Latin America, many, many years. II Speaking
more recently in Washington on April on the negotiations he remarked,
"This is one of the things that would either put us closer together or
would put us apart and let me say frankly that I see an Administration
that is very honest and very efficient and in my opinion tackling this
problem within the parameters and within the limitations that the issue
of Panama has in this country. If
Last year in the Declaration of Panama the Presidents of Colombia,
Costa Rica, and Venezuela reaffirmed "the full support of their respective
Peoples and Governments for the just Panamanian aspirations on the Panama
Canal Question
"
Last year also the foreign ministers of all the Latin American
countries attending the fifth General Assembly of the Organization of
American States unanimously expressed hope for a "prompt and successful
conclusion" of the Canal negotiations.
In a meeting with visiting US newsmen on November 28, 1975,
Venezuela's President Perez commented with regard to the negotiations
that a fair solution to the Canal problem, "would be a great triumph for
United States democracy and a tribute to the founders of the free nation
in its Bicentennial year" if the Canal Zone problem were solved with
justice and the danger of frustration or the betrayal of democratic
principles was avoided. "The worst thing the United States could do
would be to separate its words from its deeds. If
2
During last year's United Nations General Assembly, Bolivia's
President Banzar Suarez remarked "we fervently hope that in keeping
with the mutual interests of both countries, the United States and Panama,
the Panamanian Canal problem will be settled in favor of the rights of
sovereignty and the Panamanian people. If
9
-14-
palatable, we are told this might help us learn the fate of
be men still listed as Missing in Action.
There is no doubt our government has an obligation to end
the agony of parents, wives and children who have lived SO long
with uncertainty. But, this should have been one of our first
demands of Hanci's patron saint, the Soviet Union, if detente
had any meaning at all. To present it now as a reason for
friendship with those who have already violated their promise to
provide such information is hypocrisy.
In the last few days, Mr. Ford and Dr. Kissinger have taken
us from hinting
ridicul
one (
FORD
Governor Reagan's Television Address
is
Wednesday, March 31, 1976
The:
trade
d
in cultural
Plorida
primary election, Mr. Ford went to Florida, called Castro an
outlaw and said he'd never recognize him. But he hasn't asked our
Latin American neighbors to reimpose a single sanction, nor has
he taken any action himself. Meanwhile, Castro continues to
export revolution to Puerto Rico, to Angola, and who knows where
else?
As I talk to you tonight, negotiations with another dictator
go forward. Negotiations aimed at giving up our ownership of the
-15-
anama Canal Zone. Apparently, everyone knows about this except
the rightful owners of the Canal Zone--you, the people of the
United States.
General Omar Torrijos, the dictator of Panama, seized power
eight years ago by ousting the duly-elected government. There
have been no elections since. No civil liberties. The press
is censored. Torrijos is a friend and ally of Castro and, like
him, is pro-communist. He threatens sabotage and guerrilla
attacks on our installations if we don't yield to his demands.
His foreign minister openly claims that we have already agreed
in principle to giving up the Canal Zone.
The Canal Zone is not a colonial possession. It is not
a long-term lease. It is sovereign U.S. Territory every bit
the same as Alaska and all the states that were carved from the
Louisiana Purchase. We should end those negotiations and tell
the General: We bought it, we paid for it, we built it and we
intend to keep it.
Mr. Ford says detente will be replaced by "peace through
strength. 11 Well, now that slogan has a nice ring to it, but
neither Mr. Ford nor his new Secretary of Defense will say that
our strength is superior to all others.
In one of the dark hours of the Great Depression, F.D.R.
said, "It is time to speak the truth frankly and boldly. " I
believe former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was trying
) speak the truth frankly and boldly to his fellow citizens.
And that's why he is no longer Secretary of Defense.
Strategic eview
PANAMA CANAL:
FOCUS OF POWER POLITICS
DR. JAMES P. LUCIER
THE AUTHOR: Dr. James P. Lucier is Chief Legislative
Assistant to U.S. Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina.
Dr. Lucier obtained his A.B. from the University of Detro/
and his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan. In 1956
he was named Editor of the monthly, Great Lakes-
St. Lawrence Seaway. In 1961 he joined the editorial
board of the Richmond (Va.) News Leader as Associate
Editor. In 1967 he became Research Assistant to Senator
Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, specializing in
national security and international security affairs. He has
long been interested in the Panama Canal, scoring a
national news beat during the January 1964 riots at the
border of the Canal Zone. He has since continued his
research into all aspects of Canal problems, combining
scholarly study with on-site investigation.
IN BRIEF
On February 7, 1974, the Secretary of State initialed at Panama City a Statement of Principles to
govern the negotiation of now treaty relationships for the U.S. Canal Zone. These principles were
essentially a restatement of the guiding principles announced by President Johnson in 1965 which
led to the aborted treaty drafts of 1967. They would terminate U.S. sovereignty in the Canal Zone
and provide for joint U.S.-Panama operation and defense of the Canal in a period to be determined,
after which the Republic of Panama would assume full control of Canal operation with continuing
U.S. defense assistance. The adduced justification for this proposed new relationship is that termi-
nating U.S. sovereignty would remove a cause of friction and allow improved U.S. relations with
Panama and Latin America. But sovereignty conveys ultimate control so that other treaty provisions
could be abrogated by Panama after it was vested with sovereignty and the Canal operation could be
assumed by Panama or transferred to a third party. Marxist cadres which have in the past incited
mobs to violence would be encouraged to intensify their efforts to evict the United States from the
Canal operation. The vital interests of the United States, commercial as well as national defense,
prohibit such transfer of control over this lifeline to others. U.S. interests and obligations require the
the continuation of U.S. sovereignty in the Canal Zone in perpetuity, as provided in the Treaty of
1903.
O
n February 7, 1974, U.S. Secretary of
The Secretary offered more than the usual
State Henry A. Kissinger arrived in
gesture of diplomatic optimism. The prestige
Panama City with a company of news-
of his personal visit was put behind a full-scale
men, State Department officials, and Members
commitment to withdraw the United States as
of Congress. He was there to "initial" a Joint
the sovereign power in the Canal Zone. He
Statement of Principles for negotiations on a
spoke of the new canal arrangements in the
new Panama Canal Treaty.
context of worldwide international develop-
34
2
and of the exercise of power by the
treaties relating to it.
This was an open
L
States-on United States territory-as
reference to the chief demand of Panama, the
though it were something less than proper.
abrogation of United States sovereignty in the
Zone.
The Past As Prologue
By September 1964, President Johnson an-
The program which Secretary Kissinger
nounced that formal negotiations were indeed
promised in Panama is not new. It is similar
to be opened, and that they were to be premised
to the program drafted for President Lyndon
upon abrogation of the 1903 treaty. These
Johnson when world power relationships were
negotiations, conducted by Ambassador Ander-
dramatically different and some spoke of the
son, continued until September 24, 1965, when
Panama Canal as though it were expendable.
President Johnson issued a progress report
The passage of a tumultuous decade has proved
which defined broad areas of agreement that
the wisdom of those who insisted that the
had been reached.
Panama Canal is essential to our nationhood
The areas of agreement reached are the fol-
and who found in the political imagination
lowing:
which created the Canal Zone an excellence to
match the technological achievement of build-
One: The 1903 Treaty will be abrogated.
ing the Canal.
Two: The new treaty will effectively recog-
The basic concepts of the Joint Statement of
nize Panama's sovereignty over the areas
Principles were laid down almost a decade ago
of the present Canal Zone.
by President Johnson, following the Communist-
Three: The new treaty will terminate after
inspired Panama riots of January 1964. What
a specified number of years or on the date
was then offered as a panicky response to a
manipulated crisis is now presented as a perma-
of the opening of the sea level canal which-
ever occurs first.
nent solution. Yet the global and strategic pos-
tt
the United States has been profoundly
Four: A primary objective of the new
a
by events of the past decade.
treaty will be to provide for an appropriate
In the summer of 1973, Ambassador-at-Large
political, economic and social integration
Ellsworth Bunker was appointed as head of the
of the area used in the canal operation
U.S. negotiating team, supplanting Ambassador
with the rest of the Republic of Panama.
Robert B. Anderson. The Principles were nego-
Both countries recognize there is need for
tiated by Ambassador Bunker during trips to
an orderly transition to avoid abrupt and
Panama in December 1973, and January 1974.
possibly harmful dislocations. We also
These dates are significant because Ambassador
recognize that certain changes should be
Bunker was simultaneously negotiating in Jeru-
made over a period of time. The new
salem the Middle East peace agreement and the
administration will be empowered to
reopening of the Suez Canal. He accomplished
such changes in accordance with
both missions by commuting back and forth
lines in the new treaty.
between Panama City and Jerusalem.
Five: Both countries recognize the impor-
Ambassador Bunker was not unfamiliar with
tant responsibility they have to be fair and
the Panama problem. As the U.S. representative
helpful to the employees of all nationalities
to the Organization of American States in 1964,
who are serving so efficiently and well in
he played a major role in formulating and
the operation of the canal. Appropriate
articulating U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Republic of
arrangements will made to ensure that
Panama. It was in this forum that Panama
the rights and inter of these employees
brought charges of U.S. aggression during the
will be safeguarded.
1964 riots. The charges were never substanti-
ated, and Ambassador Bunker denied them
In 1967, the Johnson Administration com-
forthrightly. But he also announced at the OAS
pleted the drafts of three treaties, one transfer-
meeting that the United States stood ready for
ring the administration of the Canal to an "in-
"I
ideration of all issues-may I repeat, all
ternational entity" bilaterally operated by the
Is
between the two countries-including
United States and the Republic of Panama: a
those arising from the Canal and from the
second concerning defense; and a third laying
35
down principles for construction of a new canal
determined by relative strength. Today
of so-called sea level design at an undetermined
have come together in an act of concil
date. The drafts of these treaties were never
tion.
signed. Two of them were published by the
Chicago Tribune, and the third was read into
The unreality of this statement speaks to
the Congressional Record by U.S. Senator Strom
itself. The notion that power is unrelated to
Thurmond. The reaction in Congress, led by
sponsibility is contrary to the simple realiti.
Thurmond and by Congressman Dan Flood of
of life. The implication that an unequal IC
Pennsylvania, made it inexpedient to submit
tionship is incompatible with justice is diffic:
the drafts of the treaties to the Senate.
to understand. We have been more than fa
Meanwhile, the treaties also became involved
to Panama, granting concessions not require
in the Panamanian election campaigns of Presi-
by considerations of equity.
dent Marco Robles and Arnulfo Arias. Arias
The ceremony in Panama City involved a
won, but eleven days after his election, he was
official visit with the "initialing" of a "Joir
swept out of office by a military junta led by the
Statement of Principles" for negotiations on
present chief of state, General Omar Torrijos.
new Panama Canal Treaty. Such initialin
This coup gave Panama its fifty-ninth govern-
ceremonics are usually reserved for the actu:
ment in seventy years.
treaty draft. Here the Secretary gave the ritu:
These failures of the sixties brought no new
trappings of a treaty to something which we
approach for the seventies. The Joint State-
not constitutionally a treaty, and which wou)
ment of Principles initialed by the Secretary of
not have to be sent to the Senate for advice an.
State at Panama City in 1974 is based on the
consent.
same assumptions about the nature of the prob-
The formality with which the Principles wer
lem. State Department policy adheres to the
handled tends to pre-empt further negotiation
premise that a surrender of U.S. sovereignty in
on essential points. Once such points are COD
the Canal Zone is necessary to the improvement
ceded, the details of surrendering U.S. juris
of relations with the Republic of Panama and
diction, to be worked out in the treaty, are un
with Latin America.
important. The design of this act is to commi
the country to new relationships without CODE
The Joint Statement of Principles
gressional approval, then to offer a treaty for
The philosophy of the Joint Statement of
routine approval. The treaty, when and if it
Principles is suggested by these words of Secre-
achieved, will be a mere appendage to the Join.
tary Kissinger at Panama City:
Statement of Principles.
The eight Principles of the Joint Statement
Seventy years ago, when the Panama
are worth examining one by one:
Canal was begun, strength and influence
remained the foundation of world order.
1. The treaty of 1903 and its amendments will
Today we live in a profoundly trans-
be abrogated by the conclusion of an entirely
new interoceanic cana) treaty.
formed environment. Among the many
revolutions of our time, none is more sig-
Although the Statement of Principles does
nificant than the change in the nature of
not mention sovereignty, it is indeed U.S. SOV-
the world order. Power has grown so mon-
ereignty over the Canal Zone which the pro-
strous that it defies calculation; the quest
posed negotiations are designed to terminate.
for justice has become universal. A stable
The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903 is the
world order cannot be imposed by power;
instrument by which the Republic of Panama
it must derive from consensus. Mankind
"grants to the United States all the rights, power
can achieve community only on the basis
and authority within the zone
which the
of shared aspirations.
United States would possess and exercise as il
That is why the meeting today between
it were the sovereign of the territory within
representatives of the most powerful na-
which said lands and waters are located to the
tion of the Western Hemisphere and one
entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic
of the smallest holds great significance. In
of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power,
the past, our negotiation would have been
or authority." The language of this treaty is
36
Panama Canal
sui noneris. It establishes the United States as
transfer was accomplished by "grant", a word
t
wful sovereign in every respect, to the
which signifies the transfer of title in fee
ei.
exclusion of any exercise of sovereignty
simple, a fact confirmed by the United States
by Panama. Without this clause the Panama
Supreme Court.3 There is no more reason to
Canal would never have been built; and with-
give this territory to Panama than to give the
out it, the United States could not successfully
Louisiana Purchase back to France, or Alaska
maintain control of the Canal. The 1903 treaty
back to the Soviet Union. The United States
has been amended twice by the treaties of 1936
paid Panama $10 million as "the price or com-
and 1955, yet the sovereignty and perpetuity
pensation", plus $250,000 annually, the latter
clauses have never been touched.
representing the annual fee formerly paid to
Panama's only interest in the Canal Zone is
Colombia by the Panama Railroad (a privately
that of "titular sovereignty", a phrase which
owned venture, bought out by the United
leaves Panama with the right of a residuary
States).
legatee, i.e., if the United States chose to with-
In addition, private claims were extinguished
draw from the Canal Zone, the territory would
by a U.S.-Panama Joint Commission which pur-
revert to Panama and not to some other coun-
chased the titles from the private owners at fair
try.
market value under eminent domain. In all,
2. The concept of perpetuity will be eliminated.
the United States has invested nearly $163.7
The new treaty concerning the lock canal shall
million in acquiring the Canal Zone, excluding
have a fixed termination date.
construction and protection, making it the most
The concept of perpetuity is a necessary con-
expensive territorial purchase in United States
comitant of sovereignty and of the nature of
history.4 Including defense, the Panama Canal
the project for which sovereignty was acquired.
represents an investment of about $6 billion.
The Spooner Act of 1902, which authorized
Since 1904, the United States has exercised
negotiations with Colombia for the Canal route,
all the rights of sovereignty in the territory.
!
ited the President to obtain "perpetual
Congress has set up a Federal Court in the Zone
c
J" of the necessary territory. The Hay-
and established the Canal Zone Code. The
Herran Treaty of 1903, never ratified by Co-
United States effectively controls the territory
Iombia, specified a concession of one hundred
and the inhabitants, conducts defense and for-
years, renewable at the sole discretion of the
eign relations, and performs all acts which are
United States. When the internal operations
recognized in international law as the acts of
of Colombian politics threatened to deprive the
a sovereign.
residents of Panama of the prospective canal-
4. The Panamanian territory in which the canal
the Spooner Act also mandated the President
is situated shall be returned to the jurisdiction
to negotiate with Nicaragua if the Colombian
of the Republic of Panama. The Republic of
negotiations failed-the Panamanians revolted.
Panama, in its capacity as territorial sovereign,
The Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty, with its perpe-
shall grant to the United States of America, for
tuity clause, was the inducement offered by the
the duration of the new interoceanic canal treaty
new Republic to prevent construction of the
and in accordance with what that treaty states,
interoceanic canal in Nicaragua.
the right to use the lands, waters, and airspace
which may be necessary for the operation, main-
3. Termination of United States jurisdiction over
tenance, protection and defense of the canal and
Panamanian territory shall take place promptly
the transit of ships.
in accordance with terms specified in the treaty.
At the present time, the United States has no
The Canal is not situated in Panamanian
jurisdiction over Panamanian territory and the
territory. It is situated in United States terri-
Republic of Panama has no jurisdiction over
tory. If sovereignty were transferred to the Re-
U.S. territory. Responsibility is clearly delin-
public of Panama, the United States would be-
eated. The metes and bounds of the Canal
come only a leaseholder, even though it had an
Zone described by the Price-LeFevre Boundary
agreement to operate, maintain, and defend the
C
ntion of 1914 define what is indisputably
Canal. At best, the United States would be in
ry of the United States. Mistakenly re-
a position analogous to that of a status-of-
ferred to sometimes as a "lease", the territorial
forces agreement, such as we have for military
37
bases abroad. The number of these bases is
graphic position but more importantly from the
rapidly diminishing. Such agreements are not
U.S. investment, engineerin genius and
very durable, no matter how strong our friend-
agement capability which made the Cam
ship with an ally seems to be.
sible. The United States bought this geo
As the recognized sovereign in the Canal
paying for it a handsome price which no
Zone, the United States now has the unques-
country was then prepared to pay. This
tioned right to take any action it deems neces-
source is now dedicated to the service of world
sary to operate and defend the Canal. If the
commerce.
United States were merely the guest of a' host
6. The Republic of Panama shall participate to
country, the power of the sovereign to evict it
the administration of the canal, in accordance
from the Canal would invite international pres-
with a procedure to be agreed upon in the treats.
sures to that end. The times being what they
The treaty shall also provide that Panama will
are, military defense of the U.S. rights would
assume total responsibility for the operation
draw condemnation by the world community.
the canal upon the termination of the treaty
The Republic of Panama shall grant to the
5. The Republic of Panama shall have a just and
United States of America the rights necessary
equitable share of the benefits derived from the
regulate the transit of ships through the canal
operation of the canal and its territory. It is rec-
to operate, maintain, protect, and defend the
ognized that the geographic position of its terri-
canal, and to undertake any other specific activ-
ory constitutes the principal resource of the
ity related to those ends, as may be agreed upon
Republic of Panama.
in the treaty.
The Republic of Panama already enjoys a
Divided administration is not conducive to
just and equitable share of the benefits derived
harmony nor efficiency. It can be artued that
from the operation of the Canal, even though
the Canal has been run efficiently because the
it is operated in United States territory. The
United States has had sole responsibility for
$250,000 annual payment was raised to $430,-
administration. Although an incre
000 when the dollar went off the gold standard
ber of Panamanians are serving in
in the thirties. This sum is paid from tolls. In
tive and executive positions throughout the
1955, an additional $1.5 million was added,
Canal organization, they so as individuals,
paid from U.S. State Department contingency
and not as representative of the Panamanian
funds.
government. To subject administrative deci-
The United States, by contrast, does not take
sions to the judgments of two powers could
a penny from tolls. By law the Panama Canal
cause confusion or paralysis in Canal opera-
Company must operate on a self-sustaining
tions.
basis; the small surplus has been plowed back
into capital improvements.
7. The Republic of Panama shall participate
But the benefits to Panama from tolls do not
with the United States of America in the protec-
tion defense of the canal in accordance with
represent its chief benefits. Panama benefits
what is agreed upon in the new treaty.
also from the $65.5 million payroll paid to
Panamanian citizens, from the skills and busi-
The extent to which Panama can participate
ness organization taught the employees of the
in the protection and defense of the Canal is
Canal Company, and from the research projects
unclear. If this participation is to be meaning-
on tropical diseases and sanitation that still
ful, the defense of the Canal would be subject
continue. Panama is the highest per capita
to differences arising between the two coun-
recipient of U.S. AID programs, and is pre-
tries. Previous proposals to share defense
eminent among Latin American economies. In
range from a cumbersome and inoperable
recent years it has become the international
mixed commission for emergency decision-
banking center of Latin America, with a total of
making-proposed in the draft 1967 treaties-
fifty-eight banks in Panama City today. This
to Panama's more recent demands that no
economic development would suffer without the
United States troops remain on the Isthmus for
stability and security of the U.S. presence in
any purpose. Since the future course of Pana-
the Zone.
manian leadership or the influence of external
Panama benefits not alone from her geo-
powers cannot be foreseen, the United States
38
Panama Canal
1022
conceivably be put in the position of
was no less vulnerable because of its deeper cut
g to defend the Canal against a sovereign
through the mountains.
GERALD
Panama, or to withdraw.
In 1964, the United States was unchallenged
8. The United States of America and the Repub-
at the height of its power. To some it may have
seemed that the United States could thus make
lic of Panama, recognizing the important services
rendered by the interoceanic Panama Canal to in-
cheaply a magnanimous gesture. But for the
ternational maritime traffic, and bearing in mind
more farsighted, the Canal retained a funda-
the possibility that the present canal could
mental role in the destiny of the United States.
become inadequate for said traffic, shall agree
Since 1964, the United States has suffered
bilaterally on provisions for new projects which
a sizeable fiscal and emotional drain in the Viet-
will enlarge canal capacity. Such provisions will
nam war, with concomitant lowering of world
be incorporated in the new treaty in accord with
confidence in American leadership. Our once
the concepts established in Principle 2.
unshakeable ally, Australia, feels emboldened
The only viable proposal for expansion of
to warn the United States against establishing
canal capacity is the Terminal Lake-Third
a vitally needed naval base at Diego Garcia in
Locks Plan developed within the canal orga-
the Indian Ocean.
nization during World War II, estimated to cost
The Soviet Union, in a massive drive since
$1 billion. It is still the cheapest and most
1965, has surpassed us in the number of stra-
effective plan. This proposal would not change
tegic weapons and the throw weight of deliver-
the alignment of the present canal, and there-
able nuclear power. During this time, the
fore would not require a change in the bounda-
Soviets have built from scratch a modern navy
ries of the Canal Zone nor new treaty authority.
that challenges our own declining navy for the
The plan itself has been endorsed by experi-
supremacy of the seas and control of the nar-
enced canal experts, shipping interests, engi-
row waterways of the world.
navigators, and ecological groups, and
It is estimated that the Soviets increase
1
before Congress.
the effectiveness of their modern navy in the
only alternative to receive serious con-
Indian Ocean by one-third with the opening of
sideration is the proposal for a sea level canal
the Suez Canal, giving their land-locked bases
conventionally excavated in an area a few miles
in the Black Sea a short route to open water.
west of the present channel. This sea level
This is because the shorter steaming time and
canal, proposed in 1970 by the Atlantic-Pacific
the direct route enable a smaller number of
Interoceanic Canal Study Commission, carried
vessels in transit to sustain a given number of
a $3 billion price tag and has never been seri-
vessels on station.
ously advanced because of the cost, the eco-
It is not surprising, therefore, that the So-
logical hazards, and the uncertainty of the
viets, in an impressive display of crisis man-
treaty negotiations. Moreover, it is doubtful
agement, equipped, trained, and supplied the
that Congress would authorize construction and
Arabs in the Yom Kippur War. As a product
appropriate the necessary funds for a canal
of that conflict, it now appears probable that
project with a fixed termination date.
the first stage of the Arab-Israch settlement will
result in the reopening of the Suez Canal.
Strategic Implications
Fate has again linked the two canals. It is
perhaps ironic that as U.S. diplomacy strives
In the 1950s, debates raged over whether or
to open the Suez Canal to Soviet warships, in
not the Canal retained strategic importance.
Panama it seeks to create the conditions which
Naval strategy was then closely allied to giant
led to the closing at Suez. In consequence, the
carriers which were too large to pass through
Soviet navy will be greatly increased in effi-
the locks. Defense planning was premised on
ciency while the U.S. navy may well be faced
a "two-ocean navy" which was not dependent
with the barrier of an inoperative canal at
on the canal as a vital link, but only as one of
Panama.
convenience. The lock canal was criticized by
If the Panama Canal were to be closed, it
se
11 canal advocates as vulnerable to nu-
would profoundly affect the economies of the
cle
ttack; while advocates of lock canal
Western nations, including Japan. The effects
modernization pointed out that a sea level canal
would be more severe than those of the Suez
39
closing because of the diversity of Panama
tonnage through the Canal. But for the coun-
cargoes. Suez traffic was chiefly in oil. Petro-
tries involved, any interference with that trade
leum and petroleum products constitute the
would seriously interfere with the standard of
largest single category of cargoes through the
living of the people. All have a vital interest
Panama Canal; but they only account for 18.2
in the continued efficient and economical oper-
per cent of total cargo movement. Grains and
ation of the Canal.
soybeans account for 15.8 per cent; coal and
Suddenly, an era of scarcity has dramatically
coke for 11.1 per cent; iron and steel manu-
altered patterns of international trade. When
factures, 7.7 per cent; nitrates, phosphates, and
the Soviets unexpectedly purchased vast
potash, 6.3 per cent: lumber, 5.7 per cent, and
amounts of U.S. grain, the railroads could not
so on. The list is incredibly diverse: fish, ba-
find enough cars to move the grain to ports.
nanas, dairy products, motorcycles, automo-
When the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
biles, nails, wire, borax, salt, sulphur, cocoa,
Countries (OPEC) applied the oil embargo to
cotton, molasses, skin, hides, sugar, bricks,
supporters of Israeli policy, and boosted prices.
liquor, paper, tallow, tobacco, oats, corn and
worldwide, the economics of oil production and
barley. The trade of the world goes through the
shipment changed. All at once it becomes de-
Panama Canal.
sirable, even urgent, to have a modern, larger
While the percentage of Japan's trade
Isthmian canal that can take 80,000 ton LNG
through the Panama Canal is only 10.7 per
ships and medium-sized tankers to supply the
cent, its loss could nevertheless be extremely
East Coast from Valdez and Irkutsk. The Alas-
disruptive. Japan's coal and coke shipped from
kan North Slope will have a far greater produc-
Hampton Roads through the Canal is used to
tion than can be absorbed by refineries on the
make steel, which in turn is used to build auto-
West Coast for several years; and if it cannot
mobiles and ships which are then sent back
be shipped to refineries on the East Coast and
through the Canal to East Coast and European
Puerto Rico, that surplus will go to Japan and
ports.
other foreign customers.
Similarly, only 16.8 per cent of United States
Thus, a new "strategic" significance develops
trade goes through the Canal. But a different
when the new realities of the 1970s are con-
picture emerges when statistics reveal that a
sidered. International trade becomes critical to
constant average, down through the years, of
the survival of a nation. A huge capacity for
about seventy per cent of all cargo through the
food production-and the capacity to ship it
Canal is bound either from or to a U.S. port.
anywhere at will-becomes a major instrument
About 40 per cent originates in the U.S. and 28
of foreign policy and a powerful lever for as-
per cent is destined to the U.S. When these
serting national interests.
cargoes are viewed in terms of specific markets
"Strategic" in the narrower military sense in-
-the coal industry in West Virginia, the grain
volves the rapid deployment of the fleets; and
belt in the Midwest, crude and residual oil for
with pared-down military budgets, the effective-
the Northeast-it becomes clear that disloca-
of warships is diminished when they are
tions in the U.S. economy could take place if
stretched out around Cape Horn. The modern
the Canal were closed by accident or design.
Navy emphasizes smaller ships, greater speed,
As far as the Latin American countries are
nuclear power, and independent missile capa-
concerned, their trade dependency upon ship-
bility. During the Vietnam war, use of the
ments through the Panama Canal is of great
Canal by U.S. warships increased sharply. In
significance. For Chile, 34.3 per cent of her
1965, 284 U.S. government vessels made the
trade goes through the Canal; for Colombia,
transit, a normal amount. But in 1966, it was
32.5 per cent; for Costa Rica, per cent;
591; in 1967, 879; in 1968, 1,504; in 1969,
for Ecuador, 51.4 per cent; for N Salvador,
1,376; in 1970, 1,068; in 1971, back to 503.
66.4 per cent; for Guatemala, 30.9 per cent;
Setting aside the possibility of all-out nuclear
for Nicaragua, 76.8 per cent; for Peru, 41.3 per
war, in which the Canal may not be a decisive
cent; for Venezuela, 7.4 per cent. Panama it-
factor, the Panama Canal will continue to play
self has 29.4 per cent of its trade go through
a major role both tactically and strategically,
the Canal. In some of these cases the tonnage
as our Navy keeps the sea lanes open.
involved is small when compared to overall
But all of this assumes that the United States
40
MY
2170
1839
2227
2112
0
101
1107
C
1
GULF OF MEXICO
STATE
-
Organds
CARIBREAN TEA THE SEA in
-
J300
STA
CENTRAL ANERICA
-
Panama Canal
Ocean Traffic Through the Panama Canal
(Width of shaded lines In proportion to net register tonnage.)
FORD
has the Panama Canal under its control. De-
banks had broken the neutrality of the Canal.
spite "guarantees" that are to be written into
The Suez Canal has remained closed ever since.
the proposed treaty, the United States in its
It provides a case record of a vital waterway
Joint Statement agreed in principle to an ar-
in possession of a sovereign unable to provide
rangement whereby our control rests not on
security for the facility.
our sovereignty, but on treaty-a treaty that
If the principles agreed to in Panama City
could be abrogated at any time by Panama in
are put into effect, the United States will be
assertion of her sovereignty. While, logically, it
the sole owner of a canal company that exists
would appear at the present time to be counter
under the sovereignty of a small nation subject
to Panama's interests to expel the United States,
to influence by outside pressures. Just as the
the pattern of revolutionary turmoil in Panama
Convention of Constantinople failed to keep the
gives scant prospect that a Panamanian govern-
Suez Canal open, a new treaty with Panama
ment, now or in the future, would be resistant
could be a poor guarantee of unimpeded pas-
to pressures to terminate the U.S. lease on the
sage. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty incorpo-
Canal.
rates the principles of the Convention of Con-
The role of sovereignty is well illustrated in
stantinople by reference to the Hay-Pauncefote
the history of Suez. De Lesseps was granted
Treaty of 1901 with Great Britain; but those
the building concession for the Suez Canal in
principles could lapse when they are no longer
1854, and began work five years later. The
secured by U.S. sovereignty.
Canal opened in 1869, and in 1875, Ismail
The Suez Canal was closed because Great
Pasha of Egypt sold his shares in the French
Britain had overeign status in Suez. The
Suez Canal Company, 44 per cent of the total,
Panama Can: has succeeded because the
to the British government for four million
United States made sovereign in the Canal
pounds sterling. In 1888, the Convention of
Zone and could guarantee unimpeded passage
Constantinople declared the Canal open to ves-
through the Canal.
sels of all nations.
Thus began the anomaly of an ostensibly
Claimed Benefits
private company, with British Government par-
ticipation, operating under the sovereignty of
We have noted that the Statement of Prin-
another country. When Egypt regained its in-
ciples offered by the Secretary of State was
dependence, the Canal Company became sub-
represented as the beginning of a new relation-
ject to Egyptian expropriation, even though the
ship with our Latin neighbors. We are asked
British retained the right to protect their prop-
to believe that the transfer of U.S. sovereignty
erty. In 1956, after forcing the withdrawal of
in the Canal Zone to the Republic of Panama
British forces, President Nasser of Egypt na-
would remove a cause of friction and open the
tionalized the Suez Canal; and by October the
door to improved relations with our sister
Canal was closed because of the Israeli invasion
republics.
of Egypt. The British rights to British property,
These hopes seem ill-conceived. A surrender
and the right of passage supposedly guaranteed
of U.S. sovereignty would spell a great victory
by the Convention of Constantinople were of
for the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary cadres
no avail. No treaty can stand against the will
which have in the past incited mobs to violence.
of the sovereign except by the intervention of
Far from being appeased, they would be en-
superior external force.
couraged to intensify revolutionary efforts to
In April 1957, Egypt reopened the Canal
achieve their ultimate goal of forcing total U.S.
under the Egyptian Suez Canal Authority. For
withdrawal from the Canal operation. With the
a decade the Canal operated under the Au-
Government of Panama holding sovereign
thority with assistance from the United Nations
power to denounce the treaties and expel the
and the World Bank. But in 1967, the Canal
United States, these elements would for the first
again became a pawn in international power
time have the attainment of their goal within
politics. Egypt denied that Israel was a legiti-
reach. It is not to be expected that their zea
mate successor to the signatories of the Con-
would diminish in the face of such a prospect
stantinople Convention and asserted, in any
The United States has dallied too long OVC
case, that Israel's invasion up to the Canal
futile hopes of accommodating ideological hos
42
Panama Canal
till
e can have the respect of our neighbors
Secretary of State Hughes recognized that
onl,
nen we show a proper regard for our own
the acquired U.S. sovereignty was essential to
rights and interests and a steadfastness in pro-
operation of the Canal and must endure as long
viding the service to world commerce which we
as the Canal endures. His policy is the right
have undertaken in Panama.
policy today, as it was then.
As our Latin neighbors are governed by rea-
The United States came to this strategic part
sonable men, it does not impose too heavy a
of the world not for gold or conquest, as the
burden on United States diplomacy to ask that
conquistadores had come before them. The
it sustain the reasonable premise that U.S. sov-
United States came only to do a job where
ereignty in the Canal Zone is essential to the
others had failed. The French had tried to build
continuing operation of the Canal. The inter-
another Suez with little understanding that the
ests of all our neighbors, including Panama,
problem was entirely different. They left be-
and of more distant countries are thereby best
hind a record of bankruptcy and failure. The
served.
United States, with the vigor of a rising young
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes had
nation that had just finished spanning its twin
this in mind when on December 15, 1923 the
coasts with railroad track, had the vision and
Panamanian Ambassador raised the issue of
the genius to put together the diplomatic, engi-
sovereignty. The Secretary informed the Am-
neering, financial, and organizational resources
bassador that, "Our country would never recede
necessary to overcome all obstacles.
from the position which it had taken in the
In short, the United-States has made the
note of Secretary Hay in 1904. This Govern-
Panama Canal, with its protective frame of the
ment could not, and would not, enter into any
Canal Zone, a symbol of its achievement. It is
discussion affecting its full right to deal with
part of the great heritage of our nation. It is
the Canal Zone and to the exclusion of any
representative of the "can-do" psychology that
SOV'
1 rights or authority on the part of
sustains our national consciousness and under-
Par
It was an absolute futility for the
pins the national morale. It is a lifeline of trade
Panamanian Government to expect any Ameri-
and of national security.
can administration, no matter what it was, any
If we hand over this territory in response to
President or any Secretary of State, ever to sur-
unreasonable demands at Panama and the
render any part of these rights which the
clamor of our Marxist enemies, we will pass a
United States had acquired under the Treaty
watershed in our history. One more turning
of 1903."⁵
point will mark the decline of a great nation.
NOTES
1. Department of State Bulletin, February 24, 1964,
1867 Alaska Purchase
7,200,000
P. 302.
1904 Canal Zone
163,718,571
2. Statement by the President on the Progress of
The Canal Zone purchase breaks down as follows:
Treaty Negotiations with Panama, The White House,
September 24, 1965.
Republic of Panama:
3. Wilson U. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24, 1907, at 31, 32, 33:
Original Payment, 1904 (1903
"This new republic [Panama] has by treaty granted to
Treaty)
$ 10,000,000
the United States rights, territorial and otherwise.
Annuity, 1913-73 (1903, 1936,
A treaty with It [Panama] ceding the Canal Zone, was
1955 Treaties)
49,300,000
duly ratified.
Congress has passed several acts
Property transfers:
based upon the title of the United States, among them
Property in Panama City and
one to provide a temporary government
It is hyper-
Colon (1943)
11,759,956
critical to contend that the title of the United States
Water system in Panama City
is imperfect, and that the territory described does not
and Colon
669,226
belong to this nation, because of the omission of some
1955 Treaty transfers
22,260,500
of the technical terms used in ordinary conveyances
of real estate."
Sub-total Panama
$ 93,989,682
4. The major territorial acquisitions of the United
Colombia (1922)
25,000,000
States are as follows:
Compagnie Nouvelle du Canal de
Louisiana Purchase
$ 15,000,000
Panama (1904)
40,000,000
Florida Purchase
6,674,000
Private titles, stocks and claims
4,728,889
Mexican Cession,
Total
$163,718,571
including California
15,000,000
1853 Gadsden Purchase
10,000,000
5. Foreign Relations, 1923, Vol. III, p. 684.
43
AMERICANISM EDUCATIONA - LEAGUE
For further information call
A PATRIOTIC PUBLIC SERVICE FOUNDATION ESTABLISHED 1927
EDWARD S. RANKIN
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SPECIAL FEATURE ARTICLE
From Americanism Educational League
OUR PANAMA CANAL: A VITAL ASSET
By Phillip Harman
(Editor's note: Phillip Harman is a grandson-in-law of Jose
Augustin Arango, known as the "George Washington" of the
Republic of Panama. Born in Seattle, Mr. Harman spent many
years in business in Panama and is an acknowledged authority
on the situation there.)
Today the American people are being subjected to a barrage of information,
misinformation, claims, counter-claims, half-truths, myths and plain hogwash on
a seemingly complex and completely vital subject: our Panama Canal Zone, the
public" of Panama, and present relations between the two.
Let's look at the clear-cut facts in this emotion-charged situation:
(1) In 1903, the United States purchased the Canal Zone territory and
rights from the new Republic of Panama, and bought from individual owners their
land holdings within the 647 square-mile Zone.
(2) We built and have maintained the Canal at a cost of $7 billion, and
we have operated it since 1914 as a lifeline of trade benefitting the entire world.
(3) Panama receives an annuity, now $2,328,000 each year, to compensate
for loss of the annual franchise payment for the Panama Railroad when the Canal
was built. This annuity is not a "lease" payment or rent
we own the Zone!
(4) Total payments to Panama during 1974 in direct benefits from the Canal
Zone came to $234,584,000, a huge sum for a tiny country of 1.5 million people.
(5) Ownership and control of the Panama Canal is vital. to our national
urity, because it is the indispensable pathway for our Navy ships between oceans.
(6) The Canal is also vital to our trade and commerce. Some 71% of Canal
traffic originates or terminates in U.S. ports. If the Canal fell into unfriendly
-2-
hands, toll rates could be drastically raised, causing a new wave of inflation and
increased living costs for every American.
(7) On October 11, 1968, leftist officers of the Panama National Guard deposed
the popular, duly-elected President -- Arnulfo Arias -- and seized the nation at gun-
point. They continue in absolute power because they control the arms of the country
and the 6,000-man National Guard.
(8) After consolidating its leftist military dictatorship, the regime began a
pressure campaign to rescind the 1903 sale of the Canal Zone and to take over this
vital American asset. Russia, Cuba, Libya, Red China and Yugoslavia all Communist
countries are aiding the Panamanians in this campaign.
(9) On February 7, 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signed an 8-point
Statement of Principles in which he "acknowledges" that the Canal Zone is Panamanian
territory! But Kissinger's Statement of Principles is not binding, Constitutional
lawyers point out, because only the United States Senate is empowered by our Con-
stitution to cede American territory to foreign governments.
The above background facts are basically not subject to reasonable challenge,
no matter how the proponents of "surrendering the Canal" may rationalize or twist
t
ruth.
And it is a matter of history too that when the National Guard military junta
seized control of the country, 11 articles of the Constitution were suspended, con-
cerning such rights as freedom from arrest, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly,
freedom to travel, inviolability of the domicile. The president, most of his cabinet,
and many Legislators fled the country in terror, and have remained in exile. The
National Assembly was dissolved and political parties declared "extinct."
The Communist Party of Panama has now been recognized.
There have been charges also that the National Guard shares in profits of
houses of prostitution in Panama City and Colon
that Father Hector Gallego,
an anti-Communist priest, was thrown on June 9, 1971, from an airplane into the
Pacific Ocean on orders of the dictatorship
that two high Panamanian officials
smuggled narcotics from their country into the United States
and that the
present regime is actually a front for the real rulers of the nation, the 7-man
Directorate of the Communist Party of Panama!
It is hardly the hallmark of diplomatic genius to consider surrendering our
Canal lifeline -- vital for our national defense and economic health -- to the
specious claims of an unstable, totalitarian government closely tied to history's
most dangerous tyranny!
#######
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SPECIAL FEATURE ARTICLE
ANSWERS TO ELLSWORTH BUNKER
By Phillip Harman
(Editor's note: Ellsworth Bunker, previously American Ambassador to South
Vietnam, has since 1973 been chief U.S. negotiator in treaty talks with Panama,
which may end United States ownership and operation of the Panama Canal and
Canal Zone. In a public address on December 2, 1975 in the Los Angeles area,
Ambassador Bunker attempted to explain and justify the State Department's
position on this issue. Here his 8 main points are examined by Phillip Harman,
grandson-in-law of Jose Agustin Arango, founder of the Panama Republic. Mr.
Harman is internationally recognized as an authority on Panama.)
Bunker:
"No effort to improve our policy concerning the Canal can succeed without
the full understanding and support of Congress and the American people. "
Harman:
This is true
and it's true too that the State Department's "giveaway"
policy on Panama is not the policy of the American public. In a nationwide
survey by Opinion Research Corp., 2 out of every 3 Americans favor
continued U.S. ownership of the Canal.
Bunker:
"For many years Panama has considered the Treaty to be heavily weighted™
in our favor. As a result, the level of Panama's consent has steadily
declined. "
Harman:
The key point that Ambassador Bunker chooses to ignore here is that the
present government of Panama is Communist-oriented and cannot be ex-
pected to welcome an open, democratic society as a neighbor. The people
of Panama have nothing to say about our presence in the area, because they
are the gagged populace of a police state. But they know that if the U.S. A.
ever surrenders its sovereignty over the Canal Zone, the military junta
would nationalize it at once; the Canal Zone would become part of a Russian
satellite, like Cuba.
Bunker:
"Our Latin American neighbors see in our handling of the Panama nego-
tiations a test of our political intentions in the hemisphere. "
Harman:
This particular bogey-man is largely illusory. Many realistic Latin
American leaders know very well that stable operation of the Canal at fair
toll rates depends on our continued control of it, and that the Canal is also
their lifeline to world trade. We must recognize too that there are nearly
a dozen left-wing, anti-American military dictatorships controlling various
Central and South American countries. Nothing the U. S. does is going to
please them. Our Ambassadors in friendly or uncommitted capitals should
explain our Treaty rights and point out that since 1903 we have used our
sovereignty of the Zone in trusteeship for the world.
(over, please)
-2-
Bunker:
"Some form of conflict in Panama would seem virtually certain, and it would
be the kind of conflict which would be costly for all concerned. "
Harman:
The United States has defended the Canal through four wars plus the 1964
Red-engineered mob attack and riots. The Canal Zone is a major military
complex and it is defendable. Threats of sabotage to it are simply black-
mail. We've never gained anything from submitting to Communist coercion
from large or small adversaries.
Bunker:
"And clearly, an international relationship of this nature negotiated more
than 70 years ago cannot be expected to last forever without adjustment. "
Harman:
A good faith agreement made in perpetuity between honest parties should
last forever! And the words "without adjustment" are farcical: what the
State Department recommends is a complete abrogation of the 1903 Treaty
and full surrender of our Canal to the Republic of Pauama
certainly
far more than "an adjustment"!
Bunker:
"The United States does not own the Panama Canal Zone
the $10 million
we gave Panama in 1903 was in return for rights, not territory. 11 (On page
3, lines 1 and 2, of Mr. Bunker's address, he specifically states that these
rights were ceded to the United States in perpetuity.)
Harman:
The U.S. not only bought the rights but the power and authority in perpetuity
as well. The U.S. Supreme Court examined our title closely and on January
7, 1907, upheld our ownership and the entire 1903 Treaty. And since even
the State Department acknowledges that we acquired the rights in perpetuity,
why should these rights end now
or ever?
Bunker:
"From as early as 1905, U.S. officials have acknowledged repeatedly that
Panama retains at least titular sovereignty over the Zone."
Harman:
Titular sovereignty means that if the U.S. ever abandoned the Zone, the
property would revert to Panama. Secretary of State John Hay said in
1904 that he deemed this reversionary interest "at best, a barren scepter. 11
And the use of this argument now, by the State Department, is "at best, a
weak rationalization. 11
Bunker:
"The 1936 Treaty with Panama actually refers to the Zone as 'territory of
the Republic of Panama under the jurisdiction of the U.S. !!"
Harman:
This erroneous statement formed the premise for unwise decisions by
Presidents Johnson, Nixon and Ford. The above reference was taken out
of context from paragraph 5 of Article 3 of the 1936 Treaty. The actual
paragraph says, 11 to use and enjoy the dockage and other facilities of
said ports for the purpose of receiving and disembarking passengers to or
from the territory of Panama under the jurisdiction of the United States of
America, and of loading and unloading cargoes
"
The fact is that this phrase "territory of the Republic of Panama under the
jurisdiction of the U.S. of America", refers only to parcels of Panamanian
territory which were under the jurisdiction of the U.S. at the time of the
1936 revision and were returned to Panama by the 1955 Treaty. It does not
in any way refer to or affect the status of the Canal Zone.
It is incredible that, from this one sentence stated out of context, with its
meaning totally distorted, three Presidents have been led by internation-
alists in the State Department to believe that the United States has no perpetual
claim to the Canal Zone and therefore should turn over our property to Panama!
########
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10
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GENE SNYDER, MEMBER OF CONGRESS
FOURTH DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY, APRIL 13, 1976 on
THE FUTURE OF THE CANAL ZONE AND THE PANAMA CANAL
It is incumbent upon President Ford to immediately try to explain to the
American people the validity of whatever reasons he has for directing the De-
partment of State to surrender the Canal Zone and the Panama Canal to a for-
eign power in the relatively near future.
I make this statement on the basis of State Department testimony before
the Panama Canal Subcommittee of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Com-
mittee last Thursday, April 8th. The bulk of that testimony was in closed
session, with Mrs. Leonor K. Suflivan, the full Committee Chairman, presiding.
The Subcommittee, however, agreed unanimously that my line of questions and
the answers to them would be on the record unless the Department witnesses
specifically wanted them off. No such request was forthcoming from those wit-
nesses regarding what I state here or any other question of mine.
Those of us in Congress opposed to this giveaway which has absolutely no
Congressional mandate, long have been critical of the State Department for its
intention. We have, however, not been at all clear as to the President's ul-
timate thinking or decision when a treaty would be drawn.
As of last Thursday, there is no more question. Ambassador Ellsworth
Bunker, Chief U.S. Negotiator with the Republic of Panama, in answer to my
direct questions, flatly declared that President Ford has directed the Sec-
retary of State and the negotiators to come up with a treaty with the Republic
of Panama by which we will give up the Canal Zone entirely after a period of
time, and the Canal over a longer period of time.' My further questions dis-
closed that the directions are in writing, over President Ford's signature.
Later, the Subcommittee requested that it be supplied the documents.
The following brief exchange is quoted directly from the record:
Mr. Snyder. On whose specific authorization is the State
Department pursuing its stated goal of yielding the Canal
and the Zone to the Republic of Panama?
Ambassador Bunker. Negotiations are being carried out on
the authorization of the President.
Mr. Snyder. Madam Chairman, at this point I would like to
ask unanimous consent to include all of the newspaper article
from the Chicago Tribune of July 8, 1967. I will not read it
all, but its story is headlined "New treaty perils canal: Ford.
The item is sub-titled "Terms found shocking by GOP leader."
And the headline on the carry-over story on another page:
"Canal treaty terms to shock U.S. public Representative Ford
warns.
"
Now, the article is consistent with the headlines if not
more SO.
In my opinion a comparison of the proposed 1967 treaty as
printed in the Chicago Tribune on July 15, 1967, and the eight
points Secretary Kissinger agreed to February 7, 1974, con-
vinces me that the current proposal envisions a more complete
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surrender of the Zone than did the 1967 draft.
In view of then Congressman Ford's very vehement oppo-
sition to President Johnson's treaty, what directive or
directives has the Department of State received from Presi-
dent Ford saying he desires you to negotiate turning over
to Panama the Canal, or supporting the Department seeking
this end purpose, within some period of time?
Ambassador Bunker. Mr. Congressman, we are proceeding to
negotiate under guidelines established by the President, both
by President Nixon and President Ford.
Mr. Snyder. I do not think that is responsive to my question.
I want to know what directive or directives the State De-
partment has received from President Ford to do this?
Ambassador Bunker. We have been directed to proceed with
the negotiations on the basis of the guidelines--
Mr. Snyder. To give it up? To give up the Canal Zone over
a period of time?
Ambassador Bunker. To give up the Canal Zone after a period
of time, that is correct.
Mr. Snyder. And the Canal over a longer period of time?
Ambassador Bunker. Longer period of time
Mr. Snyder. Longer period of time/
And what are the directives? Are they written memo-
randums?
Ambassador Bunker. The directives are in written memorandum.
Mr. Snyder. Signed by the President?
Ambassador Bunker. Signed by the President.
Mr. Snyder. Under what date?
Ambassador Bunker. Varying -- various dates.
The time periods involved in this giveaway are not way off in the future.
The press in this country and in Panama has already reported that we would
abolish the Canal Zone government probably some six months after treaty rati-
fication, and give up all jurisdiciton over the Zone within three years. The
surrender of the Canal and its operation would take place probably during a
twenty five to fifty year period, a term still not agreed upon by the nego-
tiators.
I am shocked that Mr. Ford as President, now is not only going along with,
but is actually directing an even more shocking settlement than the one he
opposed as House Minority Leader. In that same 1967 news story, Mr. Ford was
further quoted in these words:
With Cuba under control of the Soviet Union via Castro and
increased communist subversion in Latin America, a communist
threat to the canal is a real danger. Any action on our
part to meet a threat involving the national security of the
United States should not be ham-strung by the need for time-
consuming consultation with a government that might be reluc-
tant to cooperate in the defense, or possibly be in opposition
to our best interests.
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The situation in the Caribbean is far worse today than when Mr. Ford
made those remarks in 1967. The soft underbelly of the United States from
Texas to Florida, the East Coast, and, in fact, the whole country east of the
Mississippi, is threatened by nuclear armed Soviet U-boats that berth in Cuban
submarine pens less than 100 miles from our border.
Some 12,000 to 15,000 Cuban troops have received actual combat training
under fire in Angola.
Cuban schools of subversion have trained thousands of students from every
Latin American country and our own, in guerrilla and sabotage techniques, as
well as in all aspects of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, agitation and propagan-
da.
Panamanian dictator, General Omar Torrijos, who recently exiled nearly
a
dozen top Panamanian business leaders whose opposition he feared, has been
playing footsie with Castro for several years. Castro promised Torrijos when
he visited Havana in January, to give him every help to gain control of the
Canal Zone. Torrijos himself has boasted repeatedly he would lead an assault
on the Zone, if necessary, to gain that control, if we did not surrender it.
In my opinion, the President has the immediate responsibility to make a
clean breast of his intentions regarding the Canal Zone. The Nation has the
right to know the full truth.
Our citizen-taxpayers to date have invested some $7 billion in the out-
right purchase of this unincorporated territory of the United States; in the
excavation of the canal linking the Caribbean and the Pacific; and in the
civil and military installations vital for its continued operation, mainte-
nance and defense. And all of this has benefited, not only ourselves, but
Panama and the entire world for some 62 years.
There is nothing to prevent Torrijos, should he gain control of the
Canal Zone, from inviting the Soviet Union in to protect it.
There is no way in the world he could defend it -- or his own country,
for that matter against a Cuban conquest, even without Moscow supporting
Castro in such an attack.
In either event, Soviet submarines, missiles and bombers would soon be
in place, capable of striking at our heartland from another outpost, which,
unless the American people force Mr. Ford to reverse his position, will soon
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be within our enemy's grasp instead of remaining our own.
Neither Ambassador Bunker nor his aides were able to substantiate in
the slightest degree the claim they have been making around the country in
public speeches that a phrase in Article III of the 1936 treaty of friendship
with Panama refers to the Canal Zone as "territory of the Republic of Panama
under the jurisdiction of the United States.' They have cited this to support
their argument that we do not have sovereignty over the Zone. Deputy Nego-
tiator Morey Bell did so in a letter to me last December.
Under my insistent questioning seeking substantiation, the claim -- which
the American Law Division of the Library of Congress had already reported to
me was refuted by Article XI of the same treaty -- was merely repeated.
I feel obligated by my office to further demand that President Ford pub-
licly substantiate this State Department claim -- which I consider to be ab-
solutely without legal grounds, and totally false -- or order the Department
publicly to immediately retract the claim and to desist from using it.
To my knowledge, President Ford has not made the claim of which I speak.
He may not even realize the State Department is making it in order to promote
the Canal Zone giveaway among the American people.
He is now on notice, however, and has the duty to thoroughly explore the
matter. The Supreme Court has declared the Canal Zone belongs to the United
States, specifically stating it had been ceded to us by Panama in a duly rati-
fied treaty.
The President and the State Department have a right to argue their case
on its merits.
To lie to the American people is nothing less than malfeasance in office.
The President cannot allow this serious business of the Canal Zone's fu-
ture to be decided without the support of the American people whose very se-
curity is involved.
Neither can he allow falsehoods to play a role in trying to secure that
support in spite of their better judgment.
I hope Mr. Ford will publicly come to grips with this entire question
in the very near future.