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Nixon Pardon - Hungate Subcommittee Ford Testimony (2)
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Nixon Pardon - Hungate Subcommittee Ford Testimony (2)
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The original documents are located in Box 33, folder "Nixon Pardon - Hungate
Subcommittee: Ford Testimony (2)" of the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Exact duplicates within this folder were not digitized.
Digitized from Box 33 of the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
(Pulled,
October 14, 1974
(second draft)
DRAFT TEXT OF OPENING STATEMENT
We meet here today to review the facts and circumstances that
of
were the basis for my pardon former President Nixon on September 8,
1974.
I want very much to have those facts and circumstances known. The
American people want to know them. And members of the Congress want
to know them. The two Congressional resolutions of inquiry now before
this Committee serve those purposes. That is why I have volunteered
to appear before you this morning, and I welcome and thank you for this
opportunity to speak to the questions raised by the resolutions.
My appearance at this hearing of your distinguished Subcommittee
of the House Committee on the Judiciary has been looked upon as an
unusual historic event -- one that has no firm precedent in the whole
history of Presidential relations with the Congress. Yet, I am here
not to make history, but to report on history.
The history you are interested in covers so recent a period that
your
it is still not well understood. If, with assistance, I can make for
better understanding of the pardon of our former President, then we
can help to achieve the purpose I had for granting the pardon when I did.
That purpose was to change our national focus. I wanted to do all
I could to shift our attentions from pursuit of a fallen President to
pursuit of the urgent needs of a rising nation. Our nation is under the
FORD : LIBRARY 07V839
-3-
afterwards to recall. II (The Federalist, No. 74) Other times it has
been applied to one person as "an act of grace which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflects for a crime he has committed." (Marshall, C.J., in
United States V. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150, 160-161.) When a pardon is
granted, it also represents "the determination of the ultimate
authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting
less than what the judgment fixed." (Biddle V. Perovich, 247 U.S. 480,
486) However, the Constitution does not limit the pardon power to
cases of convicted offenders or even indicted offenders (Burdick V.
United States, 236 U.S. 480). Thus, I am firm in my conviction that
as President I did have the authority to proclaim a pardon for the
former President when I did.
Yet, I can also understand why people are moved to question my
action. Some may still question my authority, but I find much of
the disagreement turns on whether I should have acted when I did.
Even then many people have concluded as I did that the pardon was in
the best interests of the country because it came at a time when it
would best serve the purpose I have stated.
I come to this hearing in a spirit of cooperation to respond to
your inquiries. I do so with the understanding that the subjects
to be covered are defined and limited by the questions as they appear
in the resolutions before you. But even then we may not mutually agree
on what information falls within the proper scope of inquiry by the
Congress.
1 GERALD LIBRARY FORD
-4-
I feel a responsibility as you do that each separate branch of our
government must preserve a degree of confidentiality for its internal
communications. Congress, for its part, has seen the wisdom of assuring
that members be permitted to work under conditions of confidentiality.
Indeed, earlier this year the United States Senate passed a resolution
which reads in part as follows:
* * *
= no evidence under the control and in the possession
of the Senate of the United States can, by the mandate of
process of the ordinary courts of justice, be taken from
such control or possession, but by its permission." (S. Res.
338, passed June 12, 1974)
In United States V. Nixon,
U.S.
(1974),
42 U.S.L.W. 5237, 5244 (decided July 24, 1974), the Supreme Court
unanimously recognized a rightful sphere of confidentiality within the
Executive Branch which the Court determined could only be invaded for
overriding Constitutional reasons.
As I have stated before, my own view is that the right of Executive
Privilege is to be exercised with caution and restraint. When I was a
Member of Congress, I did not hesitate to question the right of the
Executive Branch to claim a privilege against supplying information to the
Congress if I thought the claim of privilege was being abused. Yet, I
did then, and I do now, respect the right of Executive Privilege when it
protects advice given to a President in the expectation that it will not
be disclosed. Otherwise, no President could any longer count on receiving
free and frank views from people designated to help him reach his
official decisions.
GERALD FORD JAVARY
-5-
Also, it is certainly not my intention or even within my
authority to detract on this occasion or in any other instance from
the generally recognized rights of the President to preserve the
confidentiality of internal discussions or communications whenever
it is properly within his Constitutional responsibility to do so. These
rights are within the authority of any President while he is in office,
and I believe may be exercised as well by a past President if the
information sought pertains to his official functions while he was serving
in office.
I bring up these important points before going into the balance of
my statement so there can be no doubt that I remain mindful of the rights
of confidentiality which a President may and ought to exercise in appro-
priate situations. However, I do not regard my answers as I have prepared
them for purposes of this inquiry to be prejudicial to those rights in the
present circumstances or to constitute a precedent for responding to
Congressional inquiries different in nature or scope or under different
circumstances.
Accordingly, I shall proceed to explain as fully as I can in my present
answers the facts and circumstances covered by the resolutions of inquiry.
I shall start with an explanation of these events which were the first to
occur in the period covered by the inquiry, before I became President.
Then I will respond to the separate questions as they are numbered in
H. Res. 1367 and as they specifically relate to the period after I became
President.
FORD is STUDIO
October 14, 1974
-6-
(second draft)
DRAFT NARRATIVE RESPONSE TO H. RES. 1367
(after introductory remarks)
H. Res. 1367 (Tab A) before this Subcommittee asks for information
about certain conversations that may have occurred over a period that
includes when I was a Member of Congress or the Vice President. In
that entire period no references or discussions on a possible
pardon for then President Nixon occurred until August 1 and 2, 1974.
You will recall that since the beginning of the Watergate investigations,
I had consistently made statements and speeches about President Nixon's
innocence in either planning the break-in or participating in the
cover-up. I sincerely believed he was innocent.
Even in the closing months before the President resigned, I made public
statements that in my opinion the adverse revelations so far did not
constitute an impeachable offense.
I was coming under increasing criticism for such public statements, but
I still believed them to be true based on the facts as I knew them.
In the early morning of Thursday, August 1, 1974, I had a meeting
in my Vice Presidential office, with Alexander H. Haig, Jr., Chief of
Staff for President Nixon. At this meeting, I was told in a general
way about fears arising because of additional tape evidence scheduled
for delivery to Judge Sirica on Monday, August 5, 1974. I was told that
there could be evidence which, when disclosed to the House of
Representatives, would likely tip the vote in favor of impeachment
GERALD FORD VIERARY
-7-
However, I was given no indication that this development would lead
to any change in President Nixon's plans to oppose the impeachment vote.
Then shortly after noon, General Haig requested another appointment
as promptly as possible. He came to my office about 3:30 for a meeting
that was to last for approximately three-quarters of an hour. Only
then did I learn of the damaging nature of a conversation on June 23,
1972, in one of the tapes which was due to go to Judge Sirica.
I describe this meeting because at one point it did include
references to a possible pardon for Mr. Nixon, to which the third and
fourth questions in H. Res. 1367 are directed. However, nearly the
entire meeting covered other subjects, all dealing with the totally new
situation resulting from the critical evidence on the tape of June 23,
1972. General Haig told me he had been told of the new and damaging
evidence by lawyers on the White House staff who had first-hand knowledge
of what was on the tape. The substance of his conversation was that the
new disclosure would be devastating, even catastrophic, insofar as President
Nixon was concerned. Based on what he could tell me of the conversation
on the tape, he wanted to know whether I was prepared to assume the
Presidency within a very short time, and whether I would be willing to
make recommendations to the President as to what course he should
now follow.
I cannot really express adequately in words how shocked and stunned
I was by this unbelievable revelation. First, was the sudden awareness I
was to become President under these most unusual conditions; and secondly,
the realization these new disclosures ran completely counter to the
position I had taken for months, that I believed the President was not-
FORD
guilty of any impeachable offense.
LIBRARY
-8-
General Haig in his conversation at my office went on to tell me
of discussions in the White House among those who knew of this new evidence.
General Haig asked for my assessment of the whole situation. He
wanted my thoughts about the timing of a resignation if that decision
was made and about how to do it and accomplish an orderly change of
administration. We discussed what scheduling problems there might be
and what the early organizational problems would be.
General Haig outlined for me President Nixon's situation as he
saw it and the different views in the White House as to the courses of
action that might be available, and which were being advanced by various
people around him on the White House staff. As I recall there were
different major courses being considered:
(1) Some suggested "riding it out" by letting the impeachment
take its course through the House and the Senate trial, fighting all
the way against conviction.
(2) Others were urging resignation sooner or later.
I was told some people backed the first course and other people a
resignation but not with the same views as to how and when it should
take place.
On the resignation issue, there were put forth a number of options
which General Haig reviewed with me. As I recall his conversation,
various possible options being considered included:
(1) The President temporarily step aside under the 25th Amendment.
(2) Delaying resignation until further down the impeachment process.
(3) Trying first to settle for a censure vote as a means of avoiding
FORD
either impeachment or a need to resign.
LIBRARY
-9-
(4) The question of whether the President could pardon himself.
(5) Pardoning various Watergate defendants, then himself,
followed by resignation.
(6) A pardon to the President, should he resign.
The rush of events placed an urgency on what was to be done. It
became even more critical in view of a prolonged impeachment
trial which was expected to last possibly four months or longer.
The impact of the Senate trial on the country, the handling of possible
international crises, the economic situation here at home, and the
marked slowdown in developing needed new programs by the federal
government were all factors to be considered, and were discussed.
General Haig wanted my views on the various courses of action as
well as my attitude on the options of resignation. However, he indicated
he was not advocating any of the options. I inquired as to what was the
President's pardon power, and he answered that it was his understanding
from a White House lawyer that a President did have the authority to
grant a pardon even before any criminal action had been taken against
an individual, but obviously, he was in no position to have any opinion
on a matter of law.
As I saw it, at this point the question clearly before me was,
under the circumstances, what course of action should I recommend that
would be in the best interest of the country.
I told General Haig I had to have time to think. Further, that I
wanted to talk to James St. Clair. I also said I wanted to talk to my
wife before giving any response. I had consistently and firmly held the
FORD & 07883
-10-
view while I was Vice President that in no way whatsoever could I
recommend either publicly or privately any step by the President
that might cause a change in my status. As the man who would
become President if a vacancy occurred for any reason in that office,
a Vice President, I believed, ought never to do or say anything which
might affect his President's tenure in office. Therefore, I certainly
was not ready even under these new circumstances to make any recom-
mendations about resignation without having adequate time to consider
further what I should properly do.
Shortly after 8:00 the next morning James St. Clair came to my
office. Although he did not spell out in detail the new evidence, there
was no question in my mind that he considered these revelations to be
so damaging that impeachment in the House was a certainty and conviction
in the Senate a high probability. When I asked Mr. St. Clair if he
knew of any other new and damaging evidence besides that on the
June 23, 1972, tape, he said "no." When I pointed out to him the
various options mentioned to me by General Haig, he told me he had not
been the source of any opinion about Presidential pardon power.
After further thought on the matter, I was determined not to make
any recommendations to President Nixon on his resignation. I had
not given any advice or recommendations in my conversations with his
representatives, but I also did not want anyone who might talk to
the President to suggest that I had some intention to do so.
For that reason I decided I should call General Haig the
FORD
afternoon of August 2nd. I did make the call late that afternoon and
LIBRARY
-11-
told him I wanted him to understand that I had no intention of
recommending what President Nixon should do about resigning or not
resigning, and that nothing we had talked about the previous afternoon should
be given any consideration in whatever decision the President might
make. General Haig told me he was in full agreement with this
position.
My travel schedule called for me to make appearances in
Mississippi and Louisiana over Saturday, Sunday, and part of Monday,
August 3, 4, and 5. In the previous eight months I had repeatedly
stated my opinion that the President would not be found guilty of an
impeachable offense. Any change from my stated views, or even refusal
to comment further, I feared, would lead in the press to conclusions
that I had learned of new evidence and now wanted to see the President
resign to avoid an impeachment vote in the House and probable conviction
vote in the Senate. For that reason I remained firm in my answers to
press questions during my trip and repeated my belief in the President's
innocence of an impeachable offense.
Not until I returned to Washington did I learn that President Nixon
had released the new evidence late on Monday, August 5, 1974. Then he
and I met with the Cabinet Members on Tuesday morning, August 6, 1974.
At that meeting in the Cabinet Room, I said I was making no recommendations
to the President as to what he should do in the light of the new evidence.
And I made no recommendations to him either at the meeting or at any
time after that.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-12-
The first question of H. Res. 1367 asks whether I or my representa-
tive had "specific knowledge of any formal criminal charges pending
against Richard M. Nixon." The answer is: "no."
I had known, of course, that the Grand Jury investigating
the Watergate break-in and cover-up had wanted to name
President Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator in the cover-up. Also,
I knew that an extensive report had been prepared by the Watergate
Special Prosecution Force for the Grand Jury and had been sent to the
House Committee on the Judiciary, where, I believe, it served the staff
and members of the Committee in the development of its report on the
proposed articles of impeachment. Beyond what was disclosed in the
publications of the Judiciary Committee on the subject and additional
evidence released by President Nixon on August 5, 1974, I saw on or
shortly after September 4th a copy of a memorandum prepared for
Special Prosecutor Jaworski by the Deputy Special Prosecutor,
Henry Ruth. (Tab B) Copy of this memorandum had been furnished by Mr. Jaworski
to my Counsel and was later made public during a press briefing at the
White House on September 10, 1974.
I have supplied the Committee with a copy of this memorandum. The
memorandum lists matters still under investigation which "may prove
to have some direct connection to activities in which Mr. Nixon is
personally involved." The Watergate cover-up is not included in this
list; and the alleged cover-up is mentioned only as being the subject
&
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
-13-
of a separate memorandum not ever furnished to me. Of those matters
which are listed in the memorandum, it is stated that none of them
"at the moment rises to the level of our ability to prove even a
probable criminal violation by Mr. Nixon."
This is all the information I had which related even to the
possibility of "formal criminal charges" involving the former President
while he had been in office.
The second question in the Resolution asks whether Alexander Haig
referred to or discussed a pardon with Richard M. Nixon or his
representatives at any time during the week of August 4, 1974, or any
subsequent time. My answer to that question is: not to my knowledge.
If any such discussions did occur, because I was not aware of them,
they could not have been a factor in my decision to grant the pardon
when I did.
Questions three and four of H. Res. 1367 deal with the first and
all subsequent references to, or discussions of, a pardon for Richard M.
Nixon, with him or any of his representatives or aides. I have already
described at length what discussions took place on August 1 and 2, 1974,
and how these discussions brought no recommendations or commitments
whatsoever on my part.
FORD & UNIVED LIBRARY
-14-
At no time after I became President on August 9, 1974, was the
subject of a pardon for Richard M. Nixon raised by the former
President or by anyone representing him. Also, no one on my staff
brought up the subject until just before my first press conference on
August 28, 1974. At that time, I was advised that questions on the
subject might be raised by media reporters at the press conference.
As the press conference proceeded, the first question asked
involved the subject, as did other later questions. In my answers to
the questions, I took a position that while I was the final authority
on this matter I expected to make no commitment one way or the other
depending on what the Special Prosecutor and courts would do.
However, I also stated that I believed the general view of the American
people was to spare the former President from a criminal trial.
Shortly afterwards I became greatly concerned that if the
prosecution and trial were prolonged, the passions generated over a
long period of time would seriously disrupt the healing of our country
from the wounds of the past. I could see that the new Administration
could not be effective if it had to operate in the atmosphere of having
a former President under prosecution and criminal trial. Each step
along the way way, I was deeply concerned, would become a public spectacle
and the topic of wide public debate and controversy.
As I have before stated publicly, these concerns led me to ask
from my own legal counsel what my full right of pardon was under the
Constitution in this situation and from the Special Prosecutor what
criminal actions, if any, were likely to be brought against the
former President, and how long any prosecution would take.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-15-
As soon as I had been given this information, I authorized my
Counsel, Philip Buchen, to tell Herbert J. Miller, as attorney for
Richard M. Nixon, of my pending decision to grant a pardon for the
former President. I was advised that the disclosure was made on
September 4, 1974, when Mr. Buchen, accompanied by Benton Becker,
met with Mr. Miller. Mr. Becker had been asked, with my concurrence,
to take on a temporary special assignment to assist Mr. Buchen,
at a time when no one else of my selection had yet been appointed
to the legal staff of the White House.
The fourth question in the resolution also asks about "negotiations"
with Mr. Nixon or his representatives on the subject of a pardon for
the former President. The pardon under consideration was not,
so far as I was concerned, a matter of negotiation. I realized that
unless Mr. Nixon actually accepted the pardon I was preparing to grant,
it probably would not be effective. So I certainly had no intention
to proceed without knowing if it would be accepted. Otherwise, I put
no conditions on my granting of a pardon which required any negotiations.
Although negotiations had been started earlier and were conducted through
September 6th concerning White House records of the prior administration,
I did not make any agreement on that subject a condition of the pardon.
The circumstances leading to an initial agreement on Presidential
records are not covered by the Resolutions before this Subcommittee.
BERALD FORD LIBRAST
-16-
Therefore, I have mentioned discussions on that subject with Mr. Nixon's
attorney only to show they were related in time to the pardon dis-
cussions but were not a basis for my decision to grant a pardon to
the former President.
The fifth, sixth, and seventh questions of H. Res. 1367 ask whether
I consulted with certain persons before making my pardon decision.
I did not consult at all with Attorney General Saxbe on the
subject of a pardon for Mr. Nixon. My only conversation on the subject
with Vice Presidential nominee Nelson Rockefeller was to report to
him on September 6, 1974, that I was planning to grant the pardon.
Special Prosecutor Jaworski was contacted on my instructions by
my Counsel, Philip Buchen. One purpose of their discussions was to
seek the information I wanted on what possible criminal charges might be
brought against Mr. Nixon. The result of that inquiry was a copy of
the memorandum I have already referred to and have furnished to this
Subcommittee. The only other purpose was to find out the opinion of
the Special Prosecutor as to how long a delay would follow, in the
event of Mr. Nixon's indictment, before a trial could be started and
concluded.
At a White House press briefing on September 8, 1974, the principal
portions of Mr. Jaworski's opinion were made public. In this opinion,
Mr. Jaworski wrote that selection of a jury for the trial of the
FORD = BERALD LIBRARY A
-17-
former President, if he were indicted, would require a delay "of a
period from nine months to a year, and perhaps even longer." On
the question of how long it would take to conduct such a trial, he
noted that the complexities of the jury selection made it difficult
to estimate the time. Copy of the full text of his opinion dated
September 4, 1974, I have now furnished to this Subcommittee. (Tab C)
I did consult with my Counsel Philip Buchen, with Benton Becker,
and with my Counsellor John Marsh, who is also an attorney. Outside
of these men, serving at the time on my immediate staff, I consulted
with no other attorneys or professors of law for facts or legal
authorities bearing on my decision to grant a pardon to the former
President.
Questions eight and nine of H. Res. 1367 deal with the circumstances
of any statement requested or received from Mr. Nixon. I asked for
no confession or statement of guilt; only a statement in acceptance of
the pardon when it was granted. No language was suggested or requested
by anyone acting for me to my knowledge. My Counsel advised me that
he had told the attorney for Mr. Nixon that he believed the statement
should be one expressing contrition, and in this respect, I was told
Mr. Miller concurred. Before I announced the pardon, I saw a preliminary
draft of a proposed statement from Mr. Nixon, but I did not regard
the language of the statement as subsequently issued to be subject to
approval by me or my representatives.
FORD & CERALD LIBRA
-18-
The tenth question covers any report to me on Mr. Nixon's health
by a physician or psychiatrist, which led to my pardon decision.
I received no such report. Whatever information was generally
known to me at the time of my pardon decision was based on my own
observations of his condition at the time he resigned as President
and observations reported to me after that from others who had
afterwards seen or talked with him. No such reports were by people
qualified to evaluate medically the condition of Mr. Nixon's health,
and so they were not a controlling factor in my decision. However,
I believed and still do, that prosecution and trial of the former
President would have proved a serious threat to his health, as I
stated in my message on September 8, 1974.
H. Res. 1370 (Tab D) is the other resolution of inquiry before this
Subcommittee. It presents no questions but asks for the full and
complete facts upon which was based my decision to grant a pardon to
Richard M. Nixon.
I know of no such facts that are not covered by my answers to the
questions in H. Res. 1367. Also:
Subparagraphs (1) and (4): There were no representations made
by me or for me and none by Mr. Nixon or for him on which my pardon
decision was based.
BERRLO FORD LIBERTY
-19-
Subparagraph (2) The health issue is dealt with by me in answer
to earlier question ten of the earlier resolution.
Subparagraph (3): Information available to me about possible
offenses in which Mr. Nixon might have been involved is covered in my
answer to the first question of the earlier resolution.
In addition, in an unnumbered paragraph at the end, H. Res. 1370
seeks information on possible pardons for Watergate-related offenses
which others may have committed. I have decided that all persons
requesting consideration of pardon requests should submit them through
the appropriate procedures of the Department of Justice.
Only when I receive information on any request duly filed and
considered first by the Pardon Attorney at the Department of Justice
would I consider the matter. As yet no such information has been
received, and if it does I will act or decline to act according to the
particular circumstances presented, and not on the basis of the
unique circumstances, as I saw them, of former President Nixon.
FORD : GERALD LIBRARY
October 14, 1974
DRAFT TEXT OF OPENING STATEMENT
We meet here today to review the facts and circumstances that
were the basis for my pardon of former President Nixon on September 8, 1974.
I want very much to have those facts and circumstances known. The
American people want to know them. And members of the Congress want
to know them. The two Congressional resolutions of inquiry now before
this Committee serve those purposes. That is why I have volunteered
to appear before you this morning, and I welcome and thank you for this
opportunity to speak to the questions raised by the resolutions.
My appearance at this hearing of your distinguished Subcommittee
of the House Committee on the Judiciary has been looked upon as an unusual
historic event -- one that has no firm precedent in the whole history of
Yet,
Presidential relations with the Congress. /I am here not to make history, but
to repurter record history.
The history you and I are interested in covers so recent a period that
it is still not well understood, If, with your assistance, I can make for
better understanding of the pa rdon of our former President, then we can
help to achieve the purpose I had for granting the pardon when I did.
That purpose was to change our national focus. I wanted to do all I
could to shift our attentions from pursuit of a fallen President to pursuit
GERALD FORD LIBRAS
-2-
of the urgent needs of a rising nation. Our nation is under the severest
of challenges now to employ its full energies and efforts in the pursuit
of a sound and growing economy at home and a stable and peaceful world
around us.
We would needlessly be diverted from meeting those challenges if
we as a people were to remain sharply divided over whether to prosecute,
try in court and punish a former President, who already is condemned to
suffer long and deeply in the shame and disgrace brought upon the office he
held. Surely, we are not a revengeful people. We have demonstrated a
readiness to feel compassion and to act out of mercy by our long record as
a people of forgiving even though those who have been our country's most
destructive foes. Yet, to forgive is not to forget the lessons of evil however
it has worked against us. And certainly the pardon granted the former
President will not cause us to forget the evils of Watergatë-type offenses
and the lessons we have learned from them that a government which
deceives its supporters and treats its opponents as enemies must never more
be tolerated.
The pardon power entrusted to the President under the Constitution
of the United States has a long history and rests on precedents going back
centuries before our Constitution was drafted and adopted. The power has been
used sometimes as Alexander Hamilton saw its purpose: "In seasons of insur-
rection,
when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels
may restore
GERALD FORD LIBRERT
-3-
the tranquility of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass
unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards to recall. " (The
Federalist, No. 74) Other times it has been applied to one person as
"an act of grace. which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed,
from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. "
(Marshall, C.J., in United States V. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150, 160-161.) When a
pardon is granted, it also represents "the determination of the ultimate
authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less
than what the judgment fixed. 11 (Biddle V. Perovich, 247 U.S. 480, 486)
However, the Constitution does not limit the pardon power to cases of
convicted offenders or even indicted offenders (Burdick V. United States,
236 U.S. 480). Thus, I am firm in my conviction that as President I did
have the authority to proclaim a pardon for the former President when I did,
Yet, I can also understand why people are moved to question my
action. Some may still question my authority, but I find much of the
disagreement turns on whether I should have acted when I did. Even
then many people have concluded as I did that the pardon was in the best
interests of the country because it came at a time when it would best serve
the purpose I have stated.
ERALD FORD LIBRAR
-4- -
I come to this hearing in a spirit of cooperation to respond to
your inquiries. I do so with the understanding that the subjects to be
covered are defined and limited by the questions as they appear in the
resolutions before you. But even with questions carefully drawn in
advance as these have been, we may not mutually agree on what
information falls within the proper scope of inquiry by the Congress.
I feel a responsibility as you do that each separate branch of our
government must preserve a degree of confidentiality for its internal
communications. Congress, for its part, has seen the wisdom of assuring
that members be permitted to work under conditions of confidentiality.
Indeed, earlier this year the United States Senate passed a resolution
which read in part that:
* * *
"
no evidence under the control and in the possession
of the Senate of the United States can, by the mandate of process of
the ordinary courts of justice, be taken from such control or
possession, but by its permission. " (S. Res. 338, passed
June 12, 1974)
In United States V. Nixon,
U.S.
(1974), 42 U.S. L. W. 5237
5244 (decided July 24, 1974), the Supreme Court unanimously recognized
the existence of a similar constitutionally based sphere of confidentiality
within the Executive Branch.
FORD & LIBRAX GLUBLD
-5-
As I have stated in the past, my own view of this concept of
confidentiality within Executive offices is rather limited. When I was
a Member of Congress, I did not hesitate to question the right of the
Executive Branch to assert a privilege of declining to provide information
to Congress if I thought the right was being abused. Yet, I did then, and
do now, respect this right whenever it protects advice given to any official of
government in the expectation that it will not be disclosed.
FORD is LIBRAR 076839
[ca. 10/14/74]
my authority syone to proclam a pordon,
I acted not for myself but for all
who believe that the interests
of the nation would ore be best H served
, f-do-mat by not pursuang prolonging
toking US the bringing a former
President to trial and punishment
We will would contribute nothing to only oodlessly
be diverted from meeting those
chillenges if we continuo to
We as 2 people remoin are concerned
whether or not
over Dranging 12 toprosecute and , it criminally ibdeed
a former President who has
Quilty, topunish
2 Lroady suffered and will long
suffer deeply were to uncortainsned
we 25 2 people. remainedivided over
how to deal with 2 former President
who has strady WITH sutter tong and
already 15 condomnectto
deeply from the shame and disgrace
brought upon the shome and disgraco
high 0 theo he hold. Surely to food
we are not a rovengeful people. We our readiness
to fool
have too long and demons troted by
andact compassion out
D long his tury of forgiving even
with of
Hose who have bearyisour Country's
FBRD mony
our most destructive toes against OUT country
Yet to forgive IS not to forget
LIBRARY
the lessons wo learn from the of evil
PWB corrected copy
October 14, 1974
DRAFT TEXT OF OPENING STATEMENT
We meet here today to review the facts and circumstances that
were the basis for my pardon for former President Nixon on September 8,
1974.
I want very much to have those. facts and circumstances known. The
American people want to know them. And members of the Congress want
to know them. The two Congressional resolutions of inquiry now before
this Committee serve those purposes. That is why I have volunteered
to appear before you this morning, and I welcome and thank you for this
opportunity to speak to the questions raised by the resolutions.
My appearance at this hearing of your distinguished Subcommittee
of the House Committee on the Judiciary has been looked upon as an
unusual historic event -- one that has no firm precedent in the whole
history of Presidential relations with the Congress. Yet, I am here
not to make history, but to report on history.
The history you are interested in covers so recent a period that
your
it is still not well understood. If, with ^ assistance, I can make for
better understanding of the pardon of our former President, then we
can help to achieve the purpose I had for granting the pardon when I did.
That purpose was to change our national focus. I wanted to do all
I could to shift our attentions from pursuit of a fallen President to
pursuit of the urgent needs of a rising nation. Our nation is under the
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
-2-
severest of challanges now to employ its full energies and efforts in
the pursuit of a sound and growing economy at home and a stable and
peaceful world around us.
We would needlessly be diverted from meeting those challenges if
we as a people were to remain sharply divided over whether to indict,
bring to trial, and punish a former President, who already is condemned
to suffer long and deeply in the shame and disgrace brought upon the
office he held. Surely, we are not a revengeful people. We have
often demonstrated a readiness to feel compassion and to act out of
mercy. As a people we have a long record of forgiving even those
who have been our country's most destructive foes.
Yet, to forgive is not to forget the lessons of evil in whatever
ways evil has operated against us. And certainly the pardon granted
the former President will not cause us to forget the evils of
Watergate-type offenses or to forget the lessons we have learned
that a government which deceives its supporters and treats its opponents
as enemies must never, never be tolerated.
The pardon power entrusted to the President under the Constitution
of the United States has a long history and rests on precedents going
back centuries before our Constitution was drafted and adopted. The
power has been used sometimes as Alexander Hamilton saw its purpose:
"In
seasons
of
insurrection
when a well-timed offer of pardon to the
insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth;
and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-3-
afterwards to recall." (The_Federalist, No. 74) Other times it has
been applied to one person as "an act of grace which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflects for a crime he has committed." (Marshall, C.J., in
United States V. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150, 160-161.) When a pardon is
granted, it also represents "the determination of the ultimate
authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting
less than what the judgment fixed." (Biddle V. Perovich, 247 U.S. 480,
486) However, the Constitution does not limit the pardon power to
cases of convicted offenders or even indicted offenders (Burdick V.
United States, 236 U.S. 480). Thus, I am firm in my conviction that
as President I did have the authority to proclaim a pardon for the
former President when I did.
Yet, I can also understand why people are moved to question my
action. Some may still question my authority, but I find much of
the disagreement turns on whether I should have acted when I did.
Even then many people have concluded as I did that the pardon was in
the best interests of the country because it came at a time when it
would best serve the purpose I have stated.
I come to this hearing in a spirit of cooperation to respond to
your inquiries. I do so with the understanding that the subjects
to be covered are defined and limited by the questions as they appear
in the resolutions before you. But even then we may not mutually agree
on what information falls within the proper scope of inquiry by the
Congress.
GERALD FORD
-4-
I feel a responsibility as you do that each separate branch of our
government must preserve a degree of confidentiality for its internal
communications. Congress, for its part, has seen the wisdom of assuring
that members be permitted to work under conditions of confidentiality.
Indeed, earlier this year the United States Senate passed a resolution
which reads in part as follows:
*
II
no evidence under the control and in the possession
of the Senate of the United States can, by the mandate of
process of the ordinary courts of justice, be taken from
such control or possession, but by its permission." (S. Res.
338, passed June 12, 1974)
In United States V. Nixon,
U.S.
(1974),
42 U.S.L.W. 5237, 5244 (decided July 24, 1974), the Supreme Court
unanimously recognized a rightful sphere of confidentiality within the
which the Court determined could only be invaded TOP override rg
Executive Branch R based on Constitutional grounds. reasons,
As I have stated before, my own view is that the right of Executive
Privilege is to exercise with caution and restraint. When I was a
Member of Congress, I did not hesitate to question the right of the
Executive Branch to claim a privilege against supplying information to the
Congress if I thought the claim of privilege was being abused. Yet, I
did then, and I do now, respect the right of Executive Privilege when it
a President
protects advice given to any official of government in the expectation
NTO Presidents
that it will not be disclosed. Otherwise, officials could no longer
designated
count on receiving free and frank views from the people employed to help
him
his
them reach the official decisions,
FORD is LIBRARY GENALD
-5-
Also, it is certainly not my intention or even within my
authority to detract on this occasion or in any other instance from
the generally recognized rights of the President to preserve the
confidentiality of internal discussions or communications whenever
it is properly in the Constitutional responsibility interest h to do so. These rights are
within his
within the authority of any President while he is in office, and I believe
may be exercised as well by a past President if the information sought
pertains to his official functions while he was serving in office.
I bring up these important points before going into the balance of
my statement so there can be no doubt that I remain mindful of the
rights of confidentiality which a President may and ought to exercise in
appropriate situations. However, I do not regard my answers as I have prepar
them for purposes of this inquiry to be prejudicial to those rights in the
present circumstances or to constitute a precedent for responding to W
inquiries
Congressional inquiry different in nature or scope or under different
circumstances.
Accordingly, I shall proceed to explain as fully as I can in my present
answers the facts and circumstances covered by the resolutions of inquiry.
I shall start with an explanation of these events which were the first to
occur in the period covered by the inquiry, before I became President.
Then I will respond to the separate questions as they are numbered in
H. Res. 1367 and as they specifically relate to the period after Ibecame
President.
FORD i LIBRARY 070830
STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD
STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
ONiEaJUDAR
Subcommi@teeben C7jm1024 Justice
October 17, 1974
We meet here today to review the facts and circumstances that were
beebaby pardon of former President Nixon on September 8, 1974.
I want very much to have those facts and circumstances known.
The American people want to know them. And members of the Congress
want to know them. The two Congressional resolutions of inquiry now
before this Committee serve those purposes. That is why I have
volunteered to appear before you this morning, and I welcome and
thank you for this opportunity to speak to the questions raised by
the resolutions.
My appearance at this hearing of your distinguished Subcommittee
of the House Committee on the Judiciary has been looked upon as an
unusual historic event -- one that has no firm precedent in the whole
history of Presidential relations with the Congress. Yet, I am here
not to make history, but to report on history.
The history you are interested in covers so recent a period that
it is still not well understood. If, with your assistance, I can make
for better understanding of the pardon of our former President, then
we can help to achieve the purpose I had for granting the pardon
when I did.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
-2-
That purpose was to change our national focus. I wanted to do all
I could to shift our attentions from the pursuit of a fallen President
to the pursuit of the urgent needs of a rising nation. Our nation
is under the severest of challenges now to employ its full energies
and efforts in the pursuit of a sound and growing economy at home
and a stable and peaceful world around us.
We would needlessly be diverted from meeting those challenges
if we as a people were to remain sharply divided over whether to indict,
bring to trial, and punish a former President, who already is condemned
to suffer long and deeply in the shame and disgrace brought upon the
office he held. Surely, we are not a revengeful people. We have
often demonstrated a readiness to feel compassion and to act out of
mercy. As a people we have a long record of forgiving even those who
have been our country's most destructive foes.
Yet, to forgive is not to forget the lessons of evil in whatever
ways evil has operated against us. And certainly the pardon granted
the former President will not cause us to forget the evils of
Watergate-type offenses or to forget the lessons we have learned
that a government which deceives its supporters and treats its
opponents as enemies must never, never be tolerated.
The pardon power entrusted to the President under the Constitution
of the United States has a long history and rests on precedents going
back centuries before our Constitution was drafted and adopted the
GENALD FORD LIBRARY
-3-
power has been used sometimes as Alexander Hamilton saw its purpose:
"In
seasons
of
insurrection
when a well-timed offer of pardon to the
insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth;
and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible
afterwards to recall Other times it has been applied to one person
as "an act of grace which exempts the individual, on whom it is
bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. 2/2/ When a pardon is granted, it also represents "the
determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will
be better served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed.3/
However, the Constitution does not limit the pardon power to cases
of convicted offenders or even indicted offenders. Thus, I am firm
in my conviction that as President I did have the authority to proclaim
a pardon for the former President when I did.
Yet, I can also understand why people are moved to question my
action. Some may still question my authority, but I find much of the
disagreement turns on whether I should have acted when I did. Even
then many people have concluded as I did that the pardon was in the
best interests of the country because it came at a time when it would
best setereshe purpbeecduhavg beaaude it came at a time when it would
best serve the purpose I have stated.
I come to this hearing in a spiri of cooperation to respond to
your inquiries. I do so with the understanding that the subjects to be
1. The Federalist No. 74, at 79 (Central Law Journal ed. 1914) (A. Hami-1 tong
2. Marshall, C.J., in United States V. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
150, 160 (1833).
3. Biddle V. Perovich, 247 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
LIUKARY
4. Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380 (1867); Burdick V. United States
236 U.S. 79 (1915).
-4-
I come to this hearing in a spirit of cooperation to respond to
your inquiries. I do so with the understanding that the subjects
to be covered are defined and limited by the questions as they appear
in the resolutions before you. But even then we may not mutually
agree on what information falls within the proper scope of inquiry by
the Congress.
I feel a responsibility as you do that each separate branch of
our government must preserve a degree of confidentiality for its
internal communications. Congress, for its part, has seen the wisdom
of assuring that members be permitted to work under conditions of
confidentiality. Indeed, earlier this year the United States Senate
passed a resolution which reads in part as follows:
* * *
"...no evidence under the control and in the possession
of the Senate of the United States can, by the mandate of
process of the ordinary courts of justice, be taken from
such control or possession, but by its permission."
(S. Res. 338, passed June 12, 1974)
In United States V. Nixon, 42 U.S.L.W. 5237, 5244 (U.S. July 24, 1974),
the Supreme Court unanimously recognized a rightful sphere of confiden-
tiality within the Executive Branch, which the Court determined could
only be invaded for overriding reasons of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
to the Constitution.
As I have stated before, my own view is that the right of Executive
Privilege is to be exercised with caution and restraint. When I was
a Member of Congress, I did not hesitate to question the right of the
Execu
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
-5-
Executive Branch to claim a privilege against supplying information
to the Congress if I thought the claim of privilege was being abused.
Yet, I did then, and I do now, respect the right of Executive
Privilege when it protects advice given to a President in the
expectation that it will not be disclosed. Otherwise, no President
could any longer count on receiving free and frank views from people
designated to help him reach his official decisions.
Also, it is certainly not my intention or even iwthin my
authority to detract on this occasion or in any other instance from
the generally recognized rights of the President to preserve the
confidentiality of internal discussions or communications whenever
it is properly within his Constitutional responsibility to do so.
These rights are within the authority of any President while he is in
office, and I believe may be exercised as well by a past President if
the information sought pertains to his official functions when he was
serving in office.
I bring up these important points before going into the balance of
my statement, so there can be no doubt that I remain mindful of the
rights of confidentiality which a President may and ought to exercise
in appropriate situations. However, I do not regard my answers as I
have prepared them for purposes of this inquiry to be prejudicial to
those rights in the present circumstances or to constitute a precedent
for responding to Congressional inquiries different in nature or scope
or under different circumstances.
FORD
LIBRARY
-6-
Accordingly, I shall proceed to explain as fully as I can in my
present answers the facts and circumstances covered by the present
resolutions of inquiry. I shall start with an explanation of these
events which were the first to occur in the period dovered by the
inquiry, before I became President. Then I will respond to the
separate questions as they are numbered in H. Res. 1367 and as they
specifically relate to the period after I became President.
H. Res. 1367* before this Subcommittee asks for information
about certain conversations that may have occurred over a period that
includes when I was a Member of Congress or the Vice President.
In that entire period no references or discussions on a possible
pardon for thenPPeesident Nixon occurred until August 1 and 2, 1974.
You will recall that since the beginning of the Watergate
investigations, I had consistently made statements and speeches
about President Nixon's innocence of either planning the break-in or of
participating in the cover-up. I sincerely believed he was innocent.
of participating in the cover
Even in the closing months before the President resigned, I made
public statements that in my opinion the adverse revelations so far
did not constitute an impeachable offense. I was coming under
increasing criticism for such public statements, but I still believed
them to be true based on the facts as I knew them.
is
FORD
Tob Nattorhed. Tal
LIBRARY
-7-
increasing criticism for such public statements, but I still believed
them to be true based on the facts as I knew them.
In the early morning of Thursday, August 1, 1974, I had a
meeting in my Vice Presidential office, with Alexander H. Haig, Jr.,
Chief of Staff for President Nixon. At this meeting, I was told in
a general way about fears arising because of additional tape evidence
scheduled for delivery to Judge Sirica on Monday, August 5, 1974.
I was told that there could be evidence which, when disclosed to
the House of Representatives, would likely tip the vote in favor of
impeachment. However, I was given no indication that this development
would lead to any change in President Nixon's plans to oppose the
impeachment vote.
Then shortly after noon, General Haig requested another appointment
as promptly as possible. He came to my office about 3:30 P.M. for a
meeting that was to last for approximately three-quarters of an hour.
Only then did I learn of the damaging nature of a conversation on
June 23, 1972, in one of the tapes which was due to go to Judge Sirica
the following Monday.
I describe this meeting because at one point it did include
references to a possible pardon for Mr. Nixon, to which the third and
fourth questions in H. Res. 1367 are directed. However, nearly the
entire meeting covered other subjects, all dealing with the totally
new situation resulting from the critical evidence on the tape of
RES : FORD LIBRART
-8-
June 23, 1972. General Haig told me he had been told of the new and
damaging evidence by lawyers on the White House staff who had
first-hand knowledge of what was on the tape. The substance of
his conversation was that the new disclosure would be devastating,
even catastrophic, insofar as President Nixon was concerned. Based
on what he had learned of the conversation on the tape, he wanted
to know whether I was prepared to assume the Presidency within a
very short time, and whether I would be willing to make recommendations
to the President as to what course he should now follow.
I cannot really express adequately in words how shocked and
stunned I was by this unbelievable revelation. First, was the sudden
awareness I was likely to become President under these most troubled
circumstances; and secondly, the realization these new disclosures
ran completely counter to the position I had taken for months, in
that I believed the President was not guilty of any impeachable offense.
General Haig in his conversation at my office went on to tell me
of discussions in the White House among those who knew of this new
evidence.
General Haig asked for my assessment of the whole situation. He
wanted my thoughts about the timing of a resignation, if that decision
were
was made, and about how to do it and accomplish an orderly change of
administration. We discussed what scheduling problems there might be
and what the early organizational problems would be.
FORD & 076839 LIBRARY
-9-
General Haig outlined for me President Nixon's situation as he
saw it and the different views in the White House as to the courses
of action that might be available, and which were being advanced by
various people around him on the White House staff. As I recall there were
there were different major courses being considered:
(1) Some suggested "riding it out" by letting the impeachment
take its course through the House and the Senate trial, fighting all
the way against conviction.
(2) Others were urging resignation sooner or later.
I was told some people backed the first course and other people a
resignation but not with the same views as to how and when it should
take place.
On the resignation issue, there were put forth a number of options
which General Haig reviewed with me. As I recall his conversation,
various possible options being considered included:
(1) The President temporarily step aside under the 25th Amendment.
(2) Delaying resignation until further along the impeachment
process.
(3) Trying first to settle for a censure vote as a means of
avoiding either impeachment or a need to regign.
(4) The question of whether the President could pardon himself.
(5) Pardoning verious Watergate defendants, then himself,
followed by resignation.
(6) A pardon to the President, should he resign.
LIBRARY GERALD ? FORD
-10-
The rush of events placed an urgency on what was to be done.
It became even more critical in view of a prolonged impeachment trial
which was expected to last possibly four months or longer.
The impact of the Senate trial on the country, the handling of
possible international crises, the economic situation here at home,
and the marked slowdown in the decision-making process within the
federal government were all factors to be considered, and were
discussed.
General Haig wanted my views on the various courses of action
as well as my attitude on the options of regignation. However, he
indicated he was not advocating any of the options. I inquired as
to what was the President's pardon power, and he answered that it was
his understanding from a White House lawyer that a President did have
the authority to grant a pardon even before any criminal action had
been taken against an individual, but obviously, he was in no
position to have any opinion on a matter of law.
As I saw it, at this point the question clearly before me was,
under the circumstances, what course of action should I recommend
that would be in the best interest of the country.
I told General Haig I had to have time to think. Further, that
I wanted to talk to James St. Clair. I also said I wanted to talk
to my wife before giving any response. I had consistently and firmly
held the view previously that in no way whatsoever could I recommend
FORD LIBRARY
-11-
either publicly or privately any step by the President that might
cause a change in my status as Vice President. As the person who
would become President if a vacancy occurred for any reason in that
office, A Vice President, I believed, should endeavor not to do or
say anything which might affect his President's tenure in office.
Therefore, I certainly was not ready even under these new circumstances
to make any recommendations about resignation without having adequate
time to consider further what I should properly do.
Shortly after 8:00 o'clock the next morning James St. Clair
came to my office. Although he did not spell out in detail the new
evidence, there was no question in my mind that he considered these
revelations to be so damaging that impeachment in the House was a
certainty and conviction in the Senate a high probability. When I
asked Mr. St. Clair if he knew of any other new and damaging evidence
besides that on the June 23, 1972, tape, he said "no." When I pointed
out to him the various options mentioned to me by General Haig, he
told me he had not been the source of any opinion about Presidential
pardon power.
After furber thought on the matter, I was determined not to
make any recommendations to President Nixon on his resignation.
I had not given any advice or recommendations in my conversations
with his aides, but I also did not want anyone who might talk to
the President to suggest that I had some intention to do SO.
FORD LIBRARY
-12-
For that reason I decided I should call General Haig the
afternoon of August 2nd. I did make the call late that afternoon
and told him I wanted him to understand that I had no intention of
recommending what President Nixon should do about resigning or not
resigning, and that nothing we had talked about the previous
afternoon should be given any consideration in whatever decision
the President might make. General Haig told me he was in full
agreement with this position.
My travel schedule called for me to make appearances in
Mississippi and Louisiana over Saturday, Sunday, and part of Monday,
August 3, 4, and 5. In the previous eight months, I had repeatedly
stated my opinion that the President would not be found guilty of an
impeachable offense. Any change from my stated views, or even refusal
to comment further, I feared, would lead in the press to conslusions
that I now wanted to see the President resign to avoid an impeachment
vote in the House and probable conviction vote in the Senate. For
that reason I remained firm in my answers to press questions during
my trip and repeated my belief in the President's innocence of an
impeachable offense. Not until I returned to Washington did I learn
that President Nixon was to release the new evidence late on Monday,
August 5, 1974.
At about the same time I was notified that the President had
called a Cabinet meeting for Tuesday morning, August 6, 1974.
FUNDO i GENATE LIBRARY
-13-
At that meeting in the Cabinet Room, I announced that I was making
no recommendations to the President as to what he should do in the
light of the new evidence. And I made no recommendations to him
either at the meeting or at any time after that.
In summary, I assure you that there never was at any time
any promise by me, express or implied, nor any agreement whatsoever
sure To become
concerning a pardon to Mr. Nixon if he were to resign and I became
President.
The first question of H. Res. 1367 asks whether I or my
representative had "specific knowledge of any formal criminal
charges pending against Richard M. Nixon." The answer is: "no."
I had known, of course, that the Grand Jury investigating the
Watergate break-in and cover-up had wanted to name President Nixon
as an unindicted co-conspirator in the cover-up. Also, I knew
that an extensive report had been prepared by the Watergate Special
Prosecution Force for the Grand Jury and had been sent to the
House Committee on the Judiciary, where, I believe, it served the
staff and members of the Committee in the development of its report
on the proposed articles of impeachment. Beyond what was disclosed
in the publications of the Judiciary Committee on the subject and
GENALD FORD LIBRARY
-14-
additional evidence released by President Nixon on August 5, 1974,
I saw on or shortly after September 4th a copy of a memorandum
prepared for Special Prosecutor Jaworski by the Deputy Special
Prosecutor, Henry Ruth.* Copy of this memorandum had been furnished
by Mr. Jaworski to my Counsel and was later made public during a
press briefing at the White House on September 10, 1974.
I have supplied the Subcommittee with a copy of this memorandum.
The memorandum lists matters still under investigation which "may
prove to have some direct connection to activities in which Mr. Nixon
is personally involved." The watergate cover-up is not included in
this list; and the alleged cover-up is mentioned only as being the
subject of a separate memorandum not furnished to me. Of those
matters which are listed in the memorandum, it is stated that none
of them "at the moment rises to the level of our ability to prove
even a probable criminal violation by Mr. Nixon."
This is all the information I had which related even to the
possibility of "formal criminal charges" involving the former President
while he had been in office.
* Tab B attached.
FORD
LIBRARY
-15-
The second question in the Resolution asks whether Alexander Haig
referred to or discussed a pardon with Richard M. Nixon or his
representatives at any time during the week of August 4, 1974, or
any subsequent time. My answer to that question is: not to my
knowledge. If any such discussions did occur, they could not have
been a fator in my decision to grant the pardon when I did because I
was not aware of them.
Questions three and four
Question three and
of H. Res. 1367 deal with the first and
all subsequent references to, or discussions of, a pardon for
Richard M. Nixon, with him or any of his representatives or aides.
I have already described at length what discussions took place on
August 1 and 2, 1974, and how these discussions brought no
recommendations or commitments whatsoever on my part. These were
the only discussions related to questions three and four before I
became President, but question four relates also to subsequent
discussions.
At no time after I became President on August 9, 1974, was the
subject of a pardon for Richard M. Nixon raised by the former
President or by anyone representing him. Also, no one on my staff
brought up the subject until the day before my first press conference
FORD
LIBRARY
-16-
on August 28, 1974. At that time, I was advised that questions
on the subject might be raised by media reporters at the press
conference.
As the press conference proceeded, the first question asked
involved the subject, as did other later questions. In my answers
to these questions, I took a position that, while I was the final
authority on this matter, I expected to make no commitment one way
or the other depending on what the Special Prosecutor and courts
would do. However, I also stated that I believed the general view
of the American people was to spare the former President from a
criminal trial.
Shortly afterwards I became greatly concerned that if Mr. Nixon's
prosecution and trial were prolonged, the passions generated over
a long period of time would seriously disrupt the healing of our
country from the wounds of the past. I could see that the new
Administration could not be effective if it had to operate in the
atmosphere of having a former President under prosecution and criminal
trial. Each step along the way, I was deeply concerned, would become
a public spectacle and the topic of wide public debate and controversy.
As I have before stated publicly, these conserns led me to
ask from my own legal counsel what my full right of pardon was under
situation and
the Constitution in this ituationand from the Special Prosecutor
what criminal actions, if any, were likely to be brought against the
former President, and how long his prosecution and trial would take.
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As soon as I had been given this information, I authorized my
Counsel, Philip Buchen, to tell Herbert J. Miller, as attorney for
Richard M. Nixon, of my pending decision to grant a pardon for the
former President. I was advised that the disclosure was made on
September 4, 1974, when Mr. Buchen, accompanied by Benton Becker,
met with Mr. Miller. Mr. Becker had been asked, with my concurrence,
to take on a temporary special assignment to assist Mr. Buchen,
at a time when no one else of my selection had yet been appointed
to the legal staff of the White House.
The fourth question in the resolution also asks about "negotiations"
with Mr. Nixon or his representatives on the subject of a pardon for
the former President. The pardon under consideration was not, so far as I was
as I was concerned, a matter of negotiation. I realized that unless
Mr. Nixon actually accepted the pardon I was preparing to grant,
it probably would not be effective.
it would
So I certainly had no intention
to proceed without knowing if it would be accepted. Otherwise, I put
no conditions on my granting of a pardon which required any negotiations.
Although negotiations had been started earlier and were conducted
through September 6th concerning White House records of the prior
administration, I did not make any agreement on that subject a condition
BERALD
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of the pardon. The circumstances leading to an initial agreement
on Presidential records are not covered by the Resolutions before
this Subcommittee. Therefore, I have mentioned discussions on that
subject with Mr. Nixon's attorney only to show they were related
in time to the pardon disaassions but were not a basis for my
decision to grant a pardon to the former President.
The fifth, sixth, and seventh questions of H. Res. 1367 ask
whether I consulted with certain persons before making my pardon
décision.
I did not consult at all with Attorney General Saxbe on the
subject of a pardon for Mr. Nixon. My only conversation on the
subject with Vice Presidential nominee Nelson Rockefeller was to
inform him
report to him on September 6, 1974, that I was planning to grant
the pardon.
Special Prosecutor Jaworski was contacted on my instructions by
my Counsel, Philip Buchen. One purpose of their discussions was to
seek the information I wanted on what possible criminal charges might
be brought against Mr. Nixon. The result of that inquiry was a copy
of the memorandum I have already referred to and have furnished to
this Subcommittee. The only other purpose was to find out the opinion
of the Special Prosecutor as to how long a delay would follow,
FORD : LIBERTY
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in the event of Mr. Nixon's indictment, before a trial could be
started and concluded.
At a White House press briefing on September 8, 1974, the
principal portions of Mr. Jaworski's opinion were made public. In
this opinion, Mr. Jaworski wrote that selection of a jury for the
trial of the former President, if he were indicted, would require a
delay "of a period from nine months to a year, and perhaps even
longer." On the question of how long it would take to conduct such
a trial, he noted that the complexities of the jury selection made
it difficult to estimate the time. Copy of the full text of his
me
opinion dated September 4, 1974, I have now furnished to this
This
Subcommittee.*
/
I did consult with my Counsel, Philip Buchen, with Benton Becker,
and with my Counsellor, John Marsh, who is also an attorney. Outside
of these men, serving at the time on my immediate staff, I consulted
with no ather attorneys or professors of law for facts or legal
authorities bearing on my decision to grant a pardon to the former
President.
President.
Questions eight and nine of H. Res. 1367 deal with the circumstances
of any statement requested or received from Mr. Nixon. I asked for no
* Tab C attached.
LIBRER BERALD R. FORD
1.
-20-
confession or statement of guilt; only a statement in acceptance of
the pardon when it was granted. No language was suggested or
requested by anyone acting for me to my knowledge. My Counsel
advised me that he had told the attorney for Mr. Nixon that he
believed the statement should be one expressing contrition, and
in this respect, I was told Mr. Miller concurred. Before I announced
preliminary
the pardon, I saw a relimina draft of a proposed statement from
Mr. Nixon, but I did not regard the language of the statement as
subsequently issued to be subject to approval by me or my representatives.
\
The tenth question covers any report to me on Mr. Nixon's
health by a physician or psychiatrist, which led to my pardon decision.
I received no such report. Whatever information was generally
known to me at the time of my pardon decision was based on my own
observations of his condition at the time he resigned as President and
observations reported to me after that from others who had later seen
or talked with him. No such reports were by people qualified to
evaluate medically the condition of Mr. Nixon's health, and so they
were not a controlling factor in my decision. However, I believed
and still do, that prosecution and trial of the former President
would have proved a serious threat to his health, as I stated in my
message on September 8, 1974.
GERALD FORG
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H. Res. 1370* is the other resolution of inquiry before this
Subcommittee. It presents no questions but asks for the full and
complete facts upon which was based my decision to grant a pardon
to Richard M. Nixon.
answers
I know of no such facts that are not covered by my anser to
the questions in H. Res. 1367. Also:
Subparagraphs (1) and (4): There were no representations made
by me or for me and none by Mr. Nixon or for him on which my pardon
decision was based.
Subparagraph (2): The health issue is dealt with by me in answer
to question ten of the previous resolution.
Subparagraph (3): Information available to me about possible
offenses in which Mr. Nixon might have been involved is covered in
my answer to the first question of the earlier resolution.
In addition, in an unnumbered paragraph at the end, H. Res. 1370
seeks information on possible pardons for Watergate-related offenses
which others may have committed. I have decided that all persons
requesting consideration of pardon requests should submit them
through the Department of Justice.
Only when I receive information on any request duly filed and
considered first by the Pardon Attorney at the Department of Justice
would I consider the matter. As yet no such information has been
* Tab D attached.
&
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received, and if it does I will act or decline to act according
to the particular circumstances presented, and not on the basis of
the unique circumstances, as I saw them, of former President Nixon.
By these responses to the resolutions of inquiry, I believe
I have fully and fairly presented the facts and circumstances
preceding my pardon of former President Nixon. In this way, I hope
I have contributed to a much better understanding by the American
people of the action I took to grant the pardon when I did. For
having afforded me this opportunity, I do express my appreciation
to you, Mr. Chairman, and to Mr. Smith, the Ranking Minority Member,
and to all the other distinguished members of this Subcommittee;
and to all the other distinguished Members of this Subcommittee;
also to Chairman Rodino of the Committee on the Judiciary, to
Mr. Hutchinson, the Ranking Minority Member of the full Committee,
other
and to the distinguished Members of the full Committee who are
and to other distinguished Members of the full Committee who are
present.
present.
In closing, I would like to re-emphasize that I acted solely for
the reasons I stated in my proclamation of September 8, 1974, and
and that I acted out of my concern to serve
my accompanying message, and that
the best interests of my country. As I stated then: "My concern is
the immediate future of this great country. My conscience tells me
it is my duty, not merely to proclaim domestic tranquility, but to
use every means that I have to insure it."
is
FORD
ERALO
LISEARY
LIBR
STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT GERALD FORD
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice
October 17, 1974
We meet here today to review the facts and circumstances that
were the basis for my pardon of former President Nixon on September 8,
1974.
I want very much to have those facts and circumstances known. The
American people want to know them. And members of the Congress want
to know them. The two Congressional resolutions of inquiry now before
this Committee serve those purposes. That is why I have volunteered
to appear before you this morning, and I welcome and thank you for this
opportunity to speak to the questions raised by the resolutions.
My appearance at this hearing of your distinguished Subcommittee
of the House Committee on the Judiciary has been looked upon as an
unusual historic event -- one that has no firm precedent in the whole
history of Presidential relations with the Congress. Yet, I am here
not to make history, but to report on history.
The history you are interested in covers so recent a period that
it is still not well understood. If, with your assistance, I can make for
better understanding of the pardon of our former President, then we
can help to achieve the purpose I had for granting the pardon when I did.
That purpose was to change our national focus. I wanted to do all I
could to shift our attentions from the pursuit of a fallen President to the
pursuit of the urgent needs of a rising nation. Our nation is under the
BERALD FORD LIBEARY
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severest of challenges now to employ its full energies and efforts in
the pursuit of a sound and growing economy at home and a stable and
peaceful world around us.
We would needlessly be diverted from meeting those challenges if
we as a people were to remain sharply divided over whether to indict,
bring to trial, and punish a former President, who already is condemned
to suffer long and deeply in the shame and disgrace brought upon the
office he held. Surely, we are not a revengeful people. We have
often demonstrated a readiness to feel compassion and to act out of
mercy. As a people we have a long record of forgiving even those
who have been our country's most destructive foes.
Yet, to forgive is not to forget the lessons of evil in whatever
ways evil has operated against us. And certainly the pardon granted
the former President will not cause us to forget the evils of
Watergate-type offenses or to forget the lessons we have learned
that a government which deceives its supporters and treats its opponents
as enemies must never, never be tolerated.
The pardon power entrusted to the President under the Constitution
of the United States has a long history and rests on precedents going
back centuries before our Constitution was drafted and adopted. The
power has been used sometimes as Alexander Hamilton saw its purpose:
"In seasons of insurrection when a well-timed offer of pardon to the
insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth;
and which, if purrered suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible
FORD 0766-0 LIBRAR
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"
afterwards to recall Other times it has been applied to one person
as "an act of grace which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed,
from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.
When a' pardon is granted, it also represents "the determination of the
ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflict-
ing less than what the judgment fixed. However, the Constitution does
not limit the pardon power to cases of convicted offenders or even indicted
offenders Thus, I am firm in my conviction that as President I did
have the authority to proclaim a pardon for the former President when I did.
Yet, I can also understand why people are moved to question my
action. Some may still question my authority, but I find much of
the disagreement turns on whether I should have acted when I did.
Even then many people have concluded as I did that the pardon was in the
best interests of the country because it came at a time when it would
best serve the purpose I have stated.
I come to this hearing in a spirit of cooperation to respond to
your inquiries. I do so with the understanding that the subjects
to be covered are defined and limited by the questions as they appear
in the resolutions before you. But even then we may not mutually agree
on what information falls within the proper scope of, inquiry by the
Congress.
1. The Federalist No. 74, at 79 (Central Law Journal ed. 1914) (A. Hamilton).
2. Marshall, C.J., in United States V. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
150, 160 (1833).
3. Biddle V. Perovich, 247 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
4. Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380 (1867); Burdick V. United States
236 U.S. 79 (1915).
BERALD
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I feel a responsibility as you do that each separate branch of our
government must preserve a degree of confidentiality for its internal
communications. Congress, for its part, has seen the wisdom of assuring
that members be permitted to work under conditions of confidentiality.
Indeed, earlier this year the United States Senate passed a resolution
which reads in part as follows:
* * *
"...no evidence under the control and in the possession
of the Senate of the United States can, by the mandate of
process of the ordinary courts of justice, be taken from
such control or possession, but by its permission." (S. Res.
338, passed June 12, 1974)
In United States V. Nixon, 42 U.S.L.W. 5237, 5244 (U.S. July 24, 1974),
the Supreme Court unanimously recognized a rightful sphere of confiden-
tiality within the Executive Branch, which the Court determined could only
be invaded for overriding reasons of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the
Constitution.
As I have stated before, my own view is that the right of Executive
Privilege is to be exercised with caution and restraint. When I was a
Member of Congress, I did not hesitate to question the right of the
Executive Branch to claim a privilege against supplying information to the
Congress⁹ if I thought the claim of privilege was being abused. Yet, I
did then, and I do now, respect the right of Executive Privilege when it
protects advice given to a President in the expectation that it will not
be disclosed. Otherwise, no President could any longer count on receiving
free and frank views from people designated to help him reach his
official decisions.
BCRALD B. FORD FIBRARY
-5-
Also, it is certainly not my intention or even within my
authority to detract on this occasion or in any other instance from
the generally recognized rights of the President to preserve the
confidentiality of internal discussions or communications whenever
it is properly within his Constitutional responsibility to do so. These
rights are within the authority of any President while he is in office,
and I believe may be exercised as well by a past President if the
information sought pertains to his official functions while he was serving
in office.
I bring up these important points before going into the balance of
my statement, so there can be no doubt that I remain mindful of the rights
of confidentiality which a President may and ought to exercise in appro-
cuarmitances
priate situations. However, I do not regard my answers as I have prepared
them for purposes of this inquiry to be prejudicial to those rights in the
present circumstances or to constitute a precedent for responding to
Congressional inquiries different in nature or scope or under different
circumstances.
Accordingly, I shall proceed to explain as fully as I can in my present
answers the facts and circumstances covered by the present resolutions of
inquiry. I shall start with an explanation of these events which were
the first to occur in the period covered by the inquiry, before I became
President. Then I will respond to the separate questions as they are
numbered in H. Res. 1367 and as they specifically relate to the period
after I became President.
BERALD FORD LIBIARY
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H. Res. 1367* before this Subcommittee asks for information
about certain conversations that may have occurred over a period that
includes when I was a Member of Congress or the Vice President. In
that entire period no references or discussions on a possible
pardon for then President Nixon occurred until August 1 and 2, 1974.
You will recall that since the beginning of the Watergate
investigations, I had consistently made statements and speeches about
President Nixon's innocence of either planning the break-in or of
participating in the cover-up. I sincerely believed he was innocent.
Even in the closing months before the President resigned, I made
public statements that in my opinion the adverse revelations so far
did not constitute an impeachable offense. I was coming under increasing
criticism for such public statements, but I still believed them to be
true based on the facts as I knew them.
In the early morning of Thursday, August 1, 1974, I had a meeting
in my Vice Presidential office, with Alexander M Haig, Jr., Chief of
Staff for President Nixon. At this meeting, I was told in a general
way about fears arising because of additional tape evidence scheduled
for delivery to Judge Sirica on Monday, August 5, 1974. I was told that
there could be evidence which, when disclosed to the House of
Representatives, would likely tip the vote in favor of impeachment.
* Tab A Attached.
FORD is LIBRARY BERALD
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However, I was given no indication that this development would lead
to any change in President Nixon's plans to oppose the impeachment vote.
Then shortly after noon, General Haig requested another appointment
as promptly as possible. He came to my office about 3:30 P.M. for a meeting
that was to last for approximately three-quarters of an hour. Only
then did I learn of the damaging nature of a conversation on June 23,
1972, in one of the tapes which was due to go to Judge Sirica the following
Monday.
I describe this meeting because at one point it did include
references to a possible pardon for Mr. Nixon, to which the third and
fourth questions in H. Res. (1367 are directed. However, nearly the
entire meeting covered other subjects, all dealing with the totally new
situation resulting from the critical evidence on the tape of June 23,
1972. General Haig told me he had been told of the new and damaging
evidence by lawyers on the White House staff who had first-hand knowledge
of what was on the tape. The substance of his conversation was that the
new disclosure would be devastating, even catastrophic, insofar as
President Nixon was concerned. Based on what he had learned of the
conversation on the tape, he wanted to know whether of I was prepared to
assume the Presidency within a very short time, and whether I would be
willing to make recommendations to the President as to what course he
should now follow.
I cannot really express adequately in words how shocked and stunned
I was by this unbelievable revelation. First, was the sudden awareness I
was likely to become President under these most troubled circumstances;
FORD : DERALD LIBRARY
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and secondly, the realization these new disclosures ran completely
counter to the position I had taken for months, in that I believed the
President was not guilty of any impeachable offense.
General Haig in his conversation at my office went on to tell me
of discussions in the White House among those who knew of this new evidence.
General Haig asked for my assessment of the whole situation. He
wanted my thoughts about the timing of a resignation, if that decision
were
was made, and about how to do it and accomplish an orderly change of
administration. We discussed what scheduling problems there might be
and what the early organizational problems would be.
General Haig outlined for me President Nixon's situation as he
saw it and the different views in the White House as to the courses of
action that might be available, and which were being advanced by various
people around him on the White House staff. As I recall there were
different major courses being considered:
(1) Some suggested "riding it out" by letting the impeachment
take its course through the House and the Senate trial, fighting all
the way against conviction.
(2) Others were urging resignation sooner or later.
I was told some people backed the first course and other people a
resignation but not with the same views as to how and when it should
take place.
On the resignation issue, there were put forth a number of options
which General Haig reviewed with me. As I recall his conversation,
various possible options being considered included:
FORD : LIBRARY 076830
-9-
(1) The President temporarily step aside under the 25th Amendment.
(2) Delaying resignation until further along the impeachment process.
(3) Trying first to settle for a censure vote as a means of avoiding
either impeachment or a need to resign.
(4) The question of whether the President could pardon himself.
(5) Pardoning various Watergate defendants, then himself,
followed by resignation.
(6) A pardon to the President, should he resign.
The rush of events placed an urgency on what was to be done. It
became even more critical in view of a prolonged impeachment trial which
was expected to last possibly four months or longer.
The impact of the Senate trial on the country, the handling of possible
international crises, the economic situation here at home, and the marked
slowdown in the decision-making process within the federal government
were all factors to be considered, and were discussed.
General Haig wanted my views on the various courses of action as
well as my attitude on the options of resignation. However, he indicated
he was not advocating any of the options. I inquired as to what was the
President's pardon power, and he answered that it was his understanding
from a White House lawyer that a President did have the authority to
grant a pardon even before any criminal action had been taken against
an individual, but obviously, he was in no position to have any opinion
on a matter of law.
As I saw it, at this point the question clearly before me was,
FORD is BERALD LIBRARY
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under the circumstances, what course of action should I recommend that
would be in the best interest of the country.
I told General Haig I had to have time to think. Further, that I
wanted to talk to James St. Clair. I also said I, wanted to talk to my
wife before giving any response. I had consistently and firmly held the
view previously that in no way whatsoever could I recommend either
publicly or privately any step by the President that might cause a
change in my status as Vice President. As the person who would become
President if a vacancy occurred for any reason in that office, a Vice
President, I believed, should never to do or say anything which might
affect his President's tenure in office. Therefore, I certainly
was not ready even under these new circumstances to make any recom-
mendations about resignation without having adequate time to consider
further what I should properly do.
Shortly after 8:00 o'clock the next morning James St. Clair came to my
office. Although he did not spell out in detail the new evidence, there
was no question in my mind that he considered these revelations to be
so damaging that impeachment in the House was a certainty and conviction
in the Senate a high probability. When I asked Mr. St. Clair if he
knew of any other new and damaging evidence besides that on the
June 23, 1972, tape, he said "no." When I pointed out to him the
various options mentioned to me by General Haig, he told me he had not
been the source of any opinion about Presidential pardon power.
After further thought on the matter, I was determined not to make
any recommendations to President Nixon on his resignation. I had
FORD is GERALD LIBRARY
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not given any advice or recommendations in my conversations with his
representatives, but I also did not want anyone who might talk to
the President to suggest that I had some intention to do so.
For that reason I decided I should call General Haig the
afternoon of August 2nd. I did make the call late that afternoon and
told him I wanted him to understand that I had no intention of
recommending what President Nixon should do about resigning or not
resigning, and that nothing we had talked about the previous afternoon should
be given any consideration in whatever decision the President might
make. General Haig told me he was in full agreement with this
position.
My travel schedule called for me to make appearances in
Mississippi and Louisiana over Saturday, Sunday, and part of Monday,
August 3, 4, and 5. In the previous eight months I had repeatedly
stated my opinion that the President would not be found guilty of any
impeachable offense. Any change from my stated views, or even refusal
to comment further, I feared, would lead in the press to conclusions
that I now wanted to see the President resign to avoid an impeachment
vote in the House and probable conviction vote in the Senate. For
that reason I remained firm in my answers to press questions during my
trip and repeated my belief in the President's innocence of an
impeachable offense. Not until I returned to Washington did I learn
that President Nixon was to release the new evidence late on Monday,
August 5, 1974.
BERALD : FORD
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At about the same time I was notified that the President had
called a Cabinet meeting for Tuesday morning, August 6, 1974. At that
meeting in the Cabinet Room, I announced that I was making no recom-
mendations to the President as to what he should do in the light of
the new evidence. And I made no recommendations to him either at the
meeting or at any time after that.
The first question of H. Res. 1367 asks whether I or my representa-
tive had "specific knowledge of any formal criminal charges pending
against Richard M. Nixon." The answer is: "no."
I had known, of course, that the Grand Jury investigating
the Watergate break-in and cover-up had wanted to name President
Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator in the cover-up. Also,
I knew that an extensive report had been prepared by the Watergate
Special Prosecution Force for the Grand Jury and had been sent to the
House Committee on the Judiciary, where, I believe, it served the staff
and members of the Committee in the development of its report on the
proposed articles of impeachment. Beyond what was disclosed in the
publications of the Judiciary Committee on the subject and additional
evidence released by President Nixon on August 5, 1974, I saw on or
shortly after September 4th a copy of a memorandum prepared for
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
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Special Prosecutor Jaworski by the Deputy Special Prosecutor,
Henry Ruth.* Copy of this memorandum had been furnished by Mr. Jaworski
to my Counsel and was later made public during a press briefing at the
White House on September 10, 1974.
I have supplied the Subcommittee with a copy of this memorandum. The
memorandum lists matters still under investigation which "may prove
to have some direct connection to activities in which Mr. Nixon is
personally involved." The Watergate cover-up is not included in this
list; and the alleged cover-up is mentioned only as being the subject
of a separate memorandum not furnished to me. Of those matters
which are listed in the memorandum, it is stated that none of them
"at the moment rises to the level of our ability to prove even a
probable criminal violation by Mr. Nixon."
This is all the information I had which related even to the
possibility of "formal criminal charges" involving the former President
while he had been in office.
The second question in the Resolution asks whether Alexander Haig
referred to or discussed a pardon with Richard M. Nixon or his
representatives at any time during the week of August 4, 1974, or any
* Tab B attached.
FORD : GERALD TBRAN,
-14-
subsequent time. My answer to that question is: not to my knowledge.
If any such discussions did occur, they could not have been a factor
in my decision to grant the pardon when I did because I was not
aware of them.
Questions three and four of H. Res. 1367 deal with the first and
all subsequent references to, or discussions of, a pardon for Richard M.
Nixon, with him or any of his representatives or aides. I have already
described at length what discussions took place on August 1 and 2, 1974,
and how these discussions brought no recommendations or commitments
whatsoever on my part. These were the only discussions related to
questions three and four before I became President, but question four
relates also to subsequent discussions.
At no time after I became President on August 9, 1974, was the
subject of a pardon for Richard M. Nixon raised by the former
President or by anyone representing him. Also, no one on my staff
brought up the subject until the day before my first press conference on
August 28, 1974. At that time, I was advised that questions on the
subject might be raised by media reporters at the press conference.
As the press conference proceeded, the first question asked
involved the subject, as did other later questions. In my answers to
these questions, I took a position that, while I was the final authority
DERALO R. FORD
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on this matter, I expected to make no commitment one way or the other
depending on what the Special Prosecutor and courts would do.
However, I also stated that I believed the general view of the American
people was to spare the former President from a criminal trial.
Shortly afterwards I became greatly concerned that if Mr. Nixon's
prosecution and trial were prolonged, the passions generated over a
long period of time would seriously disrupt the healing of our country
from the wounds of the past. I could see that the new Administration
could not be effective if it had to operate in the atmosphere of having
a former President under prosecution and criminal trial. Each step
along the way, I was deeply concerned, would become a public spectacle
and the topic of wide public debate and controversy.
As I have before stated publicly, these concerns led me to ask
from my own legal counsel what my full right of pardon was under the
Constitution in this situation and from the Special Prosecutor what
criminal actions, if any, were likely to be brought against the
former President, and how long his prosecution and trial would take.
As soon as I had been given this information, I authorized my
Counsel, Philip Buchen, to tell Herbert J. Miller, as attorney for
Richard M. Nixon, of my pending decision to grant a pardon for the
former President. I was advised that the disclosure was made on
September 4, 1974, when Mr. Buchen, accompanied by Benton Becker,
met with Mr. Miller. Mr. Becker had been asked, with my concurrence,
to take on a temporary special assignment to assist Mr. Buchen,
&
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chorre
at a time when no one else of my selection had yet been appointed
to the legal staff of the White House.
The fourth question in the resolution also asks about "negotiations"
with Mr. Nixon or his representatives on the subject of a pardon for
the former President. The pardon under consideration was not,
so far as I was concerned, a matter of negotiation. I realized that
unless Mr. Nixon actually accepted the pardon I was preparing to grant,
it probably would not be effective. So I certainly had no intention
to proceed without knowing if it would be accepted. Otherwise, I put
no conditions on my granting of a pardon which required any negotiations.
Although negotiations had been started earlier and were conducted through
September 6th concerning White House records of the prior administration,
I did not make any agreement on that subject a condition of the pardon.
The circumstances leading to an initial agreement on Presidential
records are not covered by the Resolutions before this Subcommittee.
Therefore, I have mentioned discussions on that subject with Mr. Nixon's
attorney only to show they were related in time to the pardon dis-
cussions but were not a basis for my decision to grant a pardon to
the former President.
&
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The fifth, sixth, and seventh questions of H. Res. 1367 ask whether
I consulted with certain persons before making my pardon decision.
I did not consult at all with Attorney General Saxbe on the
subject of a pardon for Mr. Nixon. My only conversation on the subject
with Vice Presidential nominee Nelson Rockefeller was to report to
him on September 6, 1974, that I was planning to grant the pardon.
Special Prosecutor Jaworski was contacted on my instructions by
my Counsel, Philip Buchen. One purpose of their discussions was to
seek the information I wanted on what possible criminal charges might be
brought against Mr. Nixon. The result of that inquiry was a copy of
the memorandum I have already referred to' and have furnished to this
Subcommittee. The only other purpose was to find out the opinion of
the Special Prosecutor as to how long a delay would follow, in the
event of Mr. Nixon's indictment, before a trial could be started and
concluded.
At a White House press briefing on September 8, 1974, the principal
portions of Mr. Jaworski's opinion were made public. In this opinion,
Mr. Jaworski wrote that selection of a jury for the trial of the
former President, if he were indicted, would require a delay "of a
period from nine months to a year, and perhaps even longer." On
the question of how long it would take to conduct such a trial, he
noted that the complexities of the jury selection made it difficult
to estimate the time. Copy of the full text of his opinion dated
September 4, 1974, I have now furnished to this Subcommittee.*
* Tab C attached.
LIBRAÇA GERALD : FORD
-18-
I did consult with my Counsel Philip Buchen, with Benton Becker,
and with my Counsellor John Marsh, who is also an attorney. Outside
of these men, serving at the time on my immediate staff, I consulted
with no other attorneys or professors of law for facts or legal
authorities bearing on my decision to grant a pardon to the former
President.
Questions eight and nine of H. Res. 1367 deal with the circumstances
of any statement requested or received from Mr. Nixon. I asked for
no confession or statement of guilt; only a statement in acceptance of
the pardon when it was granted. No language was suggested or requested
by anyone acting for me to my knowledge. My Counsel advised me that
he had told the attorney for Mr. Nixon that he believed the statement
should be one expressing contrition, and in this respect, I was told
Mr. Miller concurred. Before I announced the pardon, I saw a preliminary
draft of a proposed statement from Mr. Nixon, but I did not regard
the language of the statement as subsequently issued to be subject to
approval by me or my representatives.
The tenth question covers any report to me on Mr. Nixon's health
by a physician or psychiatrist, which led to my pardon decision.
LIBRARY GERALD R. and
-19-
I received no such report. Whatever information was generally
known to me at the time of my pardon decision was based on my own
observations of his condition at the time he resigned as President
and observations reported to me after that from others who had
later seen or talked with him. No such reports were by people
qualified to evaluate medically the condition of Mr. Nixon's health,
and so they were not a controlling factor in my decision. However,
I believed and still do, that prosecution and trial of the former
President would have proved a serious threat to his health, as I
stated in my message on September 8, 1974.
H. Res. 1370* is the other resolution of inquiry before this
Subcommittee. It presents no questions but asks for the full and
complete facts upon which was based my decision to grant a pardon to
Richard M. Nixon.
I know of no such facts that are not covered by my answers to the
questions in H. Res. 1367. Also:
Subparagraphs (1) and (4): There were no representations made
by me or for me and none by Mr. Nixon or for him on which my pardon
decision was based.
* Tab D attached.
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Subparagraph (2): The health issue is dealt with by me in answer
to question ten of the previous resolution.
Subparagraph (3): Information available to me about possible
offenses in which Mr. Nixon might have been involved is covered in my
answer to the first question of the earlier resolution.
In addition, in an unnumbered paragraph at the end, H. Res. 1370
seeks information on possible pardons for Watergate-related offenses
which others may have committed. I have decided that all persons
requesting consideration of pardon requests should submit them through
the Department of Justice.
Only when I receive information on any request duly filed and
considered first by the Pardon Attorney at the Department of Justice
would I consider the matter. As yet no such information has been
received, and if it does I will act or decline to act according to the
particular circumstances presented, and not on the basis of the
unique circumstances, as I saw them, of former President Nixon.
By these responses to the resolutions of inquiry, I believe I
have fully and fairly presented the facts and circumstances preceding
my pardon of former President Nixon. In this way, I hope I have
contributed to a much better understanding by the American people
is
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of the action I took to grant the pardon when I did. For having
afforded me this opportunity, I do express my appreciation to you,
Mr. Chairman, and to Mr. Smith, the Ranking Minority Member, and to
all the other distinguished members of this Subcommittee; also to
Chairman Rodino of the Committee on the Judiciary, and to Mr.
Hutchinson, the Ranking Minority Member of the full Committee.
In closing, I would like to re-emphasize that I acted solely for
the reasons I stated in my proclamation of September 8, 1974, and
my accompanying message and that I acted out of my concern to serve
the best interests of my country. As I stated then: "My concern is
the immediate future of this great country...My conscience tells me
it is my duty, not merely to proclaim domestic tranquility, but to
use every means that I have to insure it."
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THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO
THE VALUABLE DOCUMENTS FILE.
Lusa Tobin
Ford librury
August 16,9988
October 14, 1974
DRAFT NARRATIVE RESPONSE TO H. RES. 1367
(after introductory remarks)
H. Res. 1367 before this Subcommittee asks for information about
certain conversations that may have occurred over a period that
includes when I was a Member of Congress or the Vice President. In
that entire period no references or discussions on a possible
pardon for then President Nixon occurred until August 1 and 2, 1974.
You will recall that since the beginning of the Watergate episode,
I had consistently made statements and speeches about President Nixon's
innocence in either planning the break-in or participating in the
cover-up. I sincerely believed he was innocent.
Even in the closing months before he resigned, I made public
statements that in my opinion the adverse revelations so far did not
constitute an impeachable offense.
I was coming under increasing criticism for such statements but
I still believed them to be true.
In the early morning of Thursday, August 1, 1974, I had a meeting
in my Vice Presidential office, with Alexander H. Haig, Jr., Chief of
Staff for President Nixon. At this meeting, I was told in a general
way about fears arising because of additional tape evidence scheduled
for delivery to Judge Sirica on Monday, August 5, 1974. I was told that
there could be evidence which, when disclosed to the House of
Representatives, would likely tip the vote in favor of impeachment.
SPECIAL ORIGINAL RETIRED to FILE
GENALD FORD
However, I was given no indication that this development would lead
to any change in President Nixon's plans to oppose the impeachment vote.
Then shortly after noon, General Haig requested another appointment
as promptly as possible. He came to my office about 3:30 for a meeting
that was to last for approximately three-quarters of an hour. Only
then did I learn of the damaging nature of a conversation on June 23,
1972, in one of the tapes which was due to go to Judge Sirica.
I describe this meeting because at one point it did include
references to a possible pardon for Mr. Nixon, to which the third and
fourth questions in H. Res. 1367 are directed. However, nearly the
entire meeting covered other subjects, all dealing with the totally new
situation resulting from the critical evidence on the tape of June 23,
1972. General Haig told me he had been told of the evidence by lawyers
on the White House staff who had first-hand knowledge of what was on
the tape. The substance of his conversation was that the new disclosure
would be devastating, even catastrophic, insofar as President Nixon
was concerned; and based on what he could tell me of the conversation
on the tape, he wanted to know whether I was prepared to assume the
Presidency within a very short time, and whether I would be willing to
make recommendations to the President as to what course he should
now follow.
I cannot really express adequately in words how shocked and stunned
I was by this revelation. First, was the sudden awareness I. was to
become President under these conditions; and secondly, the realization
these new disclosures ran counter to the position I had taken for
months, which was the President was not guilty of any impeachable offense.
FORD
SPECIAL ORIGINAL Dec
General Haig in his conversation went on to tell me of discussions
in the White House among those who knew of this new evidence.
General Haig asked for my assessment of the whole situation. He
wanted my thoughts about the timing of a resignation if that decision
was made and about how to do it and accomplish an orderly change of
administration. We discussed what scheduling problems there might be
and what the early organizational problems would be.
General Haig outlined for me President Nixon's situation as he
saw it and the different views as to the courses of action that might
be available, and which were being advanced by various people around him.
As I recall there were different major courses being considered:
(1) Some suggested "riding it out" by letting the impeachment
take its course through the House and the Senate trial, fighting all
the way against conviction.
(2) Others were urging resignation sooner or later.
I was told some people backed the first course and other people a
resignation but not with the same views as to how and when it should
take place.
On the resignation issue, there were put forth a number of options
which General Haig reviewed with me. As I recall his conversation,
various possible options being considered included:
(1) The President temporarily step aside under the 25th Amendment.
(2) Delaying resignation until further down the impeachment road.
(3) Resorting first to censure to preclude either impeachment or
resignation.
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(4) The question of whether the President could pardon himself.
(5) Pardoning various Watergate defendants, then himself,
followed by resignation.
(6) A pardon to the President, should he resign.
The rush of events placed an urgency on what was to be done. It
became even more critical when you viewed a prolonged impeachment
trial which was expected to last possibly four months or longer.
The impact of the trial on the country, the handling of possible
international crises, the economic situation here at Home, and the
marked slowdown in developing needed new programs by the federal
government were all factors to be considered, and were discussed.
General Haig wanted my views on the various courses of action as
well as my attitude on the options of resignation. However, he indicated
he was not advocating any of the options. I inquired as to what was the
President's pardon power, and he answered that it was his understanding
from a White House lawyer that a President did have the authority to
grant a pardon even before any criminal action had been taken against
an individual, but obviously, he was in no position to have any opinion
on a matter of law.
As I saw it, at this point the question clearly before me was,
under the circumstances, what course of action should I recommend that
would be in the best interest of the country.
I told General Haig I had to have time to think. Further, that I
wanted to talk to James St. Clair. I also said I wanted to talk to my
wife before giving any response. I had consistently and firmly held the
GERIAD FORD
view while I was Vice President that in no way whatsoever could I
recommend either publicly or privately any step by the President
that might cause a change in my status. As the man who would
become President if a vacancy occurred for any reason in that office,
a Vice President, I believed, ought never to do or say anything which
might affect his President's tenure in office. Therefore, I certainly
was not ready even under these new circumstances to make any recom-
mendations about resignation without having adequate time to consider
further what I should properly do.
Shortly after 8:00 the next morning James St. Clair came to my
office. Although he did not spell out in detail the new evidence, there
was no question in my mind that he considered these revelations to be
so damaging that impeachment in the House was a certainty and conviction
in the Senate a high probability. When I asked Mr. St. Clair if he
knew of any other new and damaging evidence besides that on the
June 23, 1972, tape, he said "no." When I pointed out to him the
various options mentioned to me by General Haig, he told me he had not
been the source of any opinion about Presidential pardon power.
After further thought on the matter, I was determined not to make
any recommendations to President Nixon on his resignation. I had
not given any advice or recommendations in my conversations with his
representatives, but I also did not want anyone who might talk to
the President to suggest that I had some intention to do SO.
For that reason I decided I had better call General Haig the
afternoon of August 2nd. I did make the call late that afternoon and
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ORIGINAL PUMENTS TO FILE
SPECIAL
told him I wanted him to understand that I had no intention of
recommending what President Nixon should do about resigning or not
resigning, and that nothing we had talked about the day before should
be given any consideration in whatever decision the President might
make. General Haig told me he was in full agreement with this
position.
My travel schedule called for me to make appearances in
Mississippi and Louisiana over Saturday, Sunday, and part of Monday,
August 3, 4, and 5. In the previous eight months I had repeatedly
stated my opinion that the President would not be found guilty of an
impeachable offense. Any change from my stated views, or even refusal
to comment further, I feared, would lead in the press to conclusions
that I had learned of new evidence and now wanted to see the President
resign to avoid an impeachment vote in the House and probable conviction
vote in the Senate. For that reason I remained firm in my answers to
press questions during my trip and repeated my belief in the President's
innocence of an impeachable offense.
After President Nixon did release the new evidence late on Monday,
August 5, 1974, he and I met with the Cabinet Members on August'6, 1974.
Tuesday mommy
mothe Cabinet Room
1
the President
At that meeting, I said I was making no recommendations to him as to
what he should do, in the light of the new evidence, and that I did not
expect a recommendation from any of the others at the meeting.
mul
As I have stated publicly before: "There was no understanding,
no deal between me and the former President, nor between my staff and
the staff of the former President, none whatsoever."
it
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GERALD
LIBRARY
The first question of H. Res. 1367 asks whether I or my representa-
tive had "specific knowledge of any formal criminal charges pending
against Richard M. Nixon." The answer is: "no."
I had known, of course, that the original Grand Jury investigating
the Watergate break-in and cover-up had originally wanted to name
President Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator in the cover-up. Also,
I knew that an extensive report had been prepared by the Watergate
Special Prosecution Force for the Grand Jury and had been sent to the
House Committee on the Judiciary, where, I believe, it served the staff
and members of the Committee in the development of its report on the
proposed articles of impeachment. Beyond what was disclosed in the
publications of the Judiciary Committee on the subject and additional
evidence released by President Nixon on August 5, 1974, I saw on or
shortly after September 4th a copy of a memorandum prepared for
Special Prosecutor Jaworski by the Deputy Special Prosecutor,
Henry Ruth. Copy of this memorandum had been furnished by Mr. Jaworski
to my Counsel and was later made public during a press briefing at the
White House on September 10, 1974.
I have supplied the Committee with a copy of this memorandum. The
memorandum lists matters still under investigation which "may prove
to have some direct connection to activities in which Mr. Nixon is
personally involved." The Watergate cover-up is not included in this
list; and the alleged cover-up is mentioned only as being the subject
FORD is GERATED LIBRARY
of a separate memorandum not ever furnished to me. Of those matters
which are listed in the memorandum, it is stated that none of them
"at the moment rises to the level of our ability to prove even a
probable criminal violation by Mr. Nixon."
This is all the information I had which related even to the
possibility of "formal criminal charges" involving the former President
while he had been in office.
The second question in the Resolution asks whether Alexander Haig
referred to or discussed a pardon with Richard M. Nixon or his
representatives at any time during the week of August 4, 1974, or any
subsequent time. My answer to that question is: not to my knowledge.
If any such discussions did occur, because I was not aware of them,
they could not have been a factor in my decision to grant the pardon
when I did.
Questions three and four of H. Res. 1367 deal with the first and
all subsequent references to, or discussions of, a pardon for Richard M.
Nixon, with him or any of his representatives or aides. I have already
described at length what discussions took place on August 1 and 2, 1974,
and how these discussions brought no recommendations or commitments
whatsoever on my part.
CERALO FORD LIBRAGIT
At no time after I became President on August 9, 1974, was the
subject of a pardon for Richard M. Nixon raised by the former
President or by anyone representing him. Also, no one on my staff
brought up the subject until just before my first press conference on
August 28, 1974. At that time, I was advised that questions on the
subject might be raised by media reporters at the press conference.
As the press conference proceeded, the first question asked
involved the subject, as did other later questions. In my answers to
the questions, I took a position that while I was the final authority
on this matter I expected to make no commitment one way or the other
depending on what the Special Prosecutor and courts would do.
However, I also stated that I believed the general view of the American
people was to spare the former President from a criminal trial.
Shortly afterwards I became greatly concerned that if the
prosecution and trial were prolonged, the passion generated over a
long period of time would seriously disrupt the healing of our country
from the wounds of the past. I could see that the new Administration
could not be effective if it had to operate in the atmosphere of having
a former President under prosecution and criminal trial. Each step
along the way I was afraid would become a public spectacle and the
deeply concerned
topic of wide public debate and contraversy.
ash
As I have before stated publicly, these concerns led me to find
out from my own Legal counsel what my full right of pardon was under the
Constitution in this situation and from the Special Prosecutor what
criminal actions, if any, were likely to be brought against the uku
former President, and how long any prosecution would take
CERALD
LIBRARY
As soon as I had been given this information, I authorized my
Counsel, Philip Buchen, to tell Herbert J. Miller, as attorney for
Richard M. Nixon, of my pending decision to grant a pardon for the
former President. I was advised that the disclosure was made on
September 4, 1974, when Mr. Buchen, accompanied by Benton Becker,
met with Mr. Miller. Mr. Becker had been asked, with my concurrence,
to take on a temporary special assignment to assist Mr. Buchen,
at a time when no one else of my selection had yet been appointed
to the legal staff of the White House.
The fourth question in the resolution also asks about "negotiations"
with Mr. Nixon or his representatives on the subject of a pardon for
the former President. The pardon which I was considering was not,
so far as I was concerned, a matter of negotiation. I realized that
unless Mr. Nixon actually accepted the pardon I was preparing to grant,
it probably would not be effective. So I certainly had no intention
to proceed without knowing if it would be accepted. Otherwise, I put
no conditions on my granting of a pardon which required any negotiations.
Although negotiations were conducted at this same time through
September 6th concerning White House records of the prior administration,
I did not make any agreement on that subject a condition of the pardon.
The circumstances leading to an initial agreement on Presidential
records are not covered by the Resolutions before this Subcommittee.
FORD
CERALD
LIBRARY
Therefore, I have mentioned discussions on that subject with Mr. Nixon's
attorney only to show they were related in time to the pardon dis-
cussions but were not a basis for my decision to grant a pardon to
the former President.
The fifth, sixth, and seventh questions of H. Res. 1367 ask whether
I consulted with certain persons before making my pardon decision.
I did not consult at all with Attorney General Saxbe on the
subject of a pardon for Mr. Nixon. My only conversation on the subject
with Vice Presidential nominee Nelson Rockefeller was to report to
him on September 6, 1974, that I was planning to grant the pardon.
Special Prosecutor Jaworski was contacted on my instructions by
my Counsel, Philip Buchen. One purpose of their discussions was to
seek the information I wanted on what possible criminal charges might be
brought against Mr. Nixon. The result of that inquiry was a copy of
the memorandum I have already referred to and have furnished to this
Subcommittee. The only other purpose was to find out the opinion of
the Special Prosecutor as to how long a delay would follow, in the
event of Mr. Nixon's indictment, before a trial could be started and
concluded.
At a White House press briefing on September 8, 1974, the principal
portions of Mr. Jaworski's opinion were made public. In this opinion,
Mr. Jaworski wrote that selection of a jury for the trial of the
FORD LIDRARY
former President, if he were indicted, would require a delay "of a
period from nine months to a year, and perhaps even longer." On
the question of how long it would take to conduct such a trial, he
noted that the complexities of the jury selection made it difficult
to estimate the time. Copy of the full text of his opinion dated
September 4, 1974, I have now furnished to this Subcommittee.
I did consult with my Counsel Philip Buchen, with Benton Becker,
and with my Counsellor John Marsh, who is also an attorney. Outside
of these men, serving at the time on my immediate staff, I consulted
with no other attorneys or professors of law for facts or legal
authorities bearing on my decision to grant a pardon to the former
President.
Questions eight and nine of H. Res. 1367 deal with the circumstances
of any statement requested or received from Mr. Nixon. I asked for
no confession or statement of guilt; only a statement in acceptance of
the pardon when it was granted. No language was suggested or requested
by anyone acting for me to my knowledge. My Counsel advised me that
he had told the attorney for Mr. Nixon that he believed the statement
should be one expressing contrition, and in this respect, I was told
Mr. Miller concurred. Before I announced the pardon, I saw a preliminary
draft of a proposed statement from Mr. Nixon, but I did not regard
the language of the statement as subsequently issued to be subject too
approval by me or my representatives.
LIBRARY
The tenth question covers any report to me on Mr. Nixon's health
by a physician or psychiatrist, which led to my pardon decision.
I received no such report. Whatever information was generally
known to me at the time of my pardon decision was based on my own
observations of his condition at the time he resigned as President
and observations reported to me after that from others who had
afterwards seen or talked with him. No such reports were by people
qualified to evaluate medically the condition of Mr. Nixon's health,
and so they were not a controlling factor in my decision. However,
I believed and still do, that prosecution and trial of the former
President would have proved a serious threat to his health, as I
stated in my message on September 8, 1974.
H. Res. 1370 is the other resolution of inquiry before this
Subcommittee. It presents no questions but asks for the full and
complete facts upon which was based my decision to grant a pardon to
Richard M. Nixon.
I know of no such facts that are not covered by my answers to the
questions in H. Res. 1367. Also:
Subparagraphs (1) and (4): There were no representations made
by me or for me and none by Mr. Nixon or for him on which my pardon
decision was based.
GENALD FORD LIBRARY
Subparagraph (2): The health issue is dealt with by me in answer
to earlier question ten of the earlier resolution.
Subparagraph (3): Information available to me about possible
offenses in which Mr. Nixon might have been involved is covered in my
answer to the first question of the earlier resolution.
In addition, in an unnumbered paragraph at the end, H. Res. 1370
seeks information on possible pardons for Watergate-related offenses
which others may have committed. I have decided that all persons
requesting consideration of pardon requests should submit them through
the appropriate procedures of the Department of Justice.
Only when I receive information on any request duly filed and
considered first by the Pardon Attorney at the Department of Justice
would I consider the matter. As yet no such information has been
received, and if it does I will act or decline to act according to the
particular circumstances presented, and not on the basis of the
unique circumstances, as I saw them, of former President Nixon.
FORDO is LIBRAL