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This file contains besides documents concerning national security matters, this file contains sensitive documents concerning other topics, especially personnel matters.
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National Security Chronological File (4)
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National Security Chronological File (4)
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This file contains besides documents concerning national security matters, this file contains sensitive documents concerning other topics, especially personnel matters.
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Philip W. Buchen Files
Philip Buchen's General Subject Files
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Department of Homeland Security. U.S. Secret Service. (2003 - )
Intelligence
National security
Governmental investigations
Presidential appointments
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The original documents are located in Box 26, folder "National Security Chronological File
(4)" of the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 26 of the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
9
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 09-01: #1
THE WHITE HOUSE
NSC letter 3/19/12
WASHINGTON
By dal NARA, Date 5/29/12
September 2, 1975
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
PHILIP W. BUCHEN P.W.B.
SUBJECT:
Documents Subpoenaed by the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Activities
I. BACKGROUND
The Committee on August 12 subpoenaed me to produce on August 25
(later postponed to August 27) all materials held by the White House,
including those within the Nixon Presidential materials, on:
A. Activities during the period September 1 to November 3, 1970,
directed toward preventing Salvador Allende from assuming the
office of President of Chile, including minutes of Forty Com-
mittee meetings;
B. Activities during the period April 1 - December 31, 1970,
relating to the so-called Huston Plan and the Intelligence
Evaluation Committee.
Certain of the materials subpoenaed are not covered by the
Court restraining order, because they exist in NSC institutional
files rather than in the Nixon Presidential materials. Among
them are Forty Committee minutes and supporting documents
which I could have produced on August 27 if it had not been
that:
A. Brent Scowcroft urged me to decline to do so on the grounds
that Forty Committee materials constitute a record of
confidential deliberations and recommendations to the
President and fall clearly within the doctrine of
Executive Privilege, and I agreed;
THE
GREAT
-2-
B. ,You on the morning of August 27, when Brent and I met
with you, concurred that I should refuse to provide such
documents.
II. MY MEETING WITH THE COMMITTEE
When I met with the Committee later the morning of August 27,
I made these points:
1.
The Forty Committee materials did not relate to "Track II"
which was the covert operation for bringing about a military
coup that resulted in the attempted kidnapping and the death
on October 22, 1970, of Chilean General Schneider, who was
opposed to perpetrating a coup, and, therefore, they could
not be relevant to the Committee's inquiry into that event;
2.
You had agreed to have all materials relating to alleged
assassination plots furnished to the Committee (even
though the materials may have involved confidential
advice to a President) but the Schneider death did not
involve an assassination plot and, even if it did, it was
the result of an operation not approved by the Forty Com-
mittee;
3.
Outside of materials involving an assassination plot or
other alleged wrongdoing, you were not willing to have
documents furnished to the Committee which revealed
confidential advise to a President and, therefore, the
Forty Committee minutes covered by the subpoena would
not be furnished.
To my surprise, Chairman Church was able to represent to me
that HAK when he testified before the Committee on August 12,
1975, had said the Forty Committee minutes did have a bearing
on Track II. I had to admit I had no knowledge of what HAK may
have said in that regard and I would have to check with him when
he returned from the Mideast. I stated that whatever he had said
might lead to reconsideration of the decision to decline furnishing
copies to the Committee.
-3- -
Not until afterwards did I find that Brent had received a transcript
of HAK's testimony before the Committee, and he has since given
it to me. My reading of this testimony now indicates that the
position I took before the Committee, which I said was by your
authority, had been undercut way in advance by HAK in his sworn
testimony to the Committee on August 12.
III. TESTIMONY OF HAK
HAK in his testimony started out by making the points that the
Chilean effort in 1970 was "not an assassination effort" (p. 5)
and later that "no plot was generated that even indirectly aimed
at Allende" (p. 32). However, he did make these points:
1. The meeting of September 15, 1970, (when President Nixon
in the presence of HAK, John Mitchell, and Helms instituted
Track II to be conducted without informing the State Depart-
ment or DoD) "has to be seen in the context of two previous
meetings of the Forty Committee on September 8th and 14th
in which the Forty Committee was to look at the pros and
cons and the problems and prospects of a Chilean military
coup to be organized with the United States assistance. "
2. When asked if he could assist in obtaining for the Senate
Committee the Forty Committee minutes, he said "I leave
that decision entirely to the individuals at the White House
who have been designated as your contacts. I never advised
them as to what to turn over or not to turn over, and I abide
totally by their decisions. I personally have no objection to
your receiving the minutes
of these meetings, and I have
no objection to your saying this to Mr. Hills. "
In general HAK argued that the policy of instigating a military coup
was consistent with Forty Committee policy, that implementing this
policy was the purpose of Track II, that the tactics of implementation
-4-
as devised by the CIA were not approved by higher authority but
the CIA could reasonably have assumed it had the authority for
its 'actions and, if specific approval had been sought for what
actually was done, it probably would have been given by HAK.
The Committee also questioned HAK about the Nixon "Special
Files" which, of course, are covered by the Court restraining
order. He denied knowledge of them but, when responding to a
comment about the Committee's need for access to them, he
said: "It would be at least an interesting reflection of what was
considered special by the people who established the files. " (p. 47).
He also indicated he would not resist having the NSC staff determine
how meaningful the Nixon special files might be to the Committee
and would advise the Committee if it could be done (p. 47-48).
IV. MATTERS FOR YOUR DECISION
On the Huston plan documents, all of which are in the Nixon
collection, and on those materials related to Chile which are likewise
in the Nixon collection, we can continue maintaining that until the
trial court in the Nixon documents case authorizes our search, we
are unable to respond to the subpoena for these materials. However,
I am close to working out an accommodation with the former
President's counsel to provide so much of these materials as may be
readily located. This step would avoid further delays and the neces-
sity, if the court rules to authorize a search, of having to make an
exhaustive, time-consuming search. I recommend your authorizing
me to present to the Select Committee whatever helpful arrangements I
can work out in this regard.
Approve
Disapprove
On the matter of furnishing Forty Committee minutes and supporting
documents related to Chile in the period September 1 to November 3,
1970, I recommend the second of the following two options:
Option #1: To abide by your view of August 27, 1975, that the
Forty Committee minutes and supporting documents relating to
Chile in 1970 should not be turned over to the Senate Committee.
5 -
Pros
It would be consistent with a policy of not waiving Executive
Privilege for any similar documents in other connections, except
when substantial charges of wrongdoing are involved.
Cons
The charge will be made that you are protecting the Nixon
Administration even though you were willing to furnish minutes
of comparable meetings during the Kennedy Administration which
related to Cuba when, as part of the planning against Castro,
assassination possibilities were discussed and led to actual but
unsuccessful plotting.
The charge will be made that you are being more restrictive than
HAK has stated to the Committee is necessary when he is a
national security and foreign affairs expert and was himself involved.
I will continue to be exposed to enforcement of the subpoena, and in
these unique circumstances a court may reject our reason for not
furnishing those particular documents.
Approve
Disapprove
Option #2: To furnish the minutes and supporting documents
relating to Chile and advise the Committee that we are doing so
only because certain members of the Committee see a resemblance
between events in Chile under the Nixon Administration and alleged
plots to assassinate foreign leaders occurring in earlier administra-
tions, and that similar confidential documents will not ordinarily be
given in other circumstances no matter which President was involved.
Pros
The charges of your favoring former President Nixon and my risks
under the subpoena will be avoided.
Senators Tower and Goldwat er will have a better chance of
convincing other Committee members that the Chile operation in
1970 did not involve an assassination plot and should not be dealt
with in the Committee report on that subject. The fact that the full
documentation is before the Committee will eliminate any arguable
suspicions that assassination-plotting might have been part of the
U. S. policy toward Chile in 1970.
-6-
Cons
It will probably become more difficult in the future to resist
furnishing confidential NSC and Forty Committee minutes under
other circumstances.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
E.O. Sec. 3.6
MR 94-155, #12 CIA Hr. 6/17/98
EYES ONLY
9 September 1970
By KBH NARA, Date 7/22/98
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 8 September 1970
PRESENT: Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Packard, Mr. Johnson,
Admiral Moorer, and Mr. Helms
Mr. Charles A. Meyer, Mr. Viron P. Vaky, Mr. William McAfee,
Mr. Thomas Karamessines, and Mr. William Broe were also
present.
Chile
a.
The Chairman opened the meeting with a reference to Ambassador
Korry's excellent cable of 7 September 1970 and asked for an analysis of
where prospects now stand for taking any kind of action which might
successfully preclude Allende assuming the presidency of Chile following
his garnering of a plurality of the popular vote in the elections on
4 September.
b. Mr. Broe summarized the situation and highlighted some of the
points in Ambassador Korry's cable. He noted that Korry is attempting
to maintain flexibility and that there is some, but not much, fluidity
in the situation. He pointed out that Frei is an essential eog to
success in any action, congressional or military, to frustrate an Allende
take-over and that Ambassador Korry is very pessimistic about the pros-
pects of Frei doing much more-than deploring Allende's electoral victory
He concluded that it is still too early to decide on a given course of
action and suggested that the Embassy and CIA field elements be requested
during the next week to probe all possible aspects or feasible actions
and forward recommendations as to what might be done.
C. In the lively discussion which followed, there was general
agreement that more time to assess the situation was essential. It was
also agreed that there is-now little likelihood of success in the previ-
ously proposed operation to influence the 24 October congressional run-off
election against Allende.
d. Mr. Helms, noting that congressional action against Allende was
not likely to succeed, offered his personal observation that once Allende
is in office it is predictable that the Chilean opposition to him will
disintegrate and collapse rapidly. He expressed the view that Allende
will quickly neutralize the military and police after which there will
be. no effective rallying point for opposition against him. Without
advocating it as a course of action, he observed that a military golpe
EYES ONLY
-2-
against Allende would have little chance of success unless undertaken
soon. He stated that even then there is no positive assurance of success
because of the apolitical history of the military in Chile and the pres-
ence of Allende supporters in various military elements
e. Mr. Packard was also strongly of the view that any effective
military action to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency would
have to occur in the very near future. He expressed the hope that the
Chilean military leaders would undertake such action soon on their own
initiative.
f.
Messrs.-Johnson-and-Meyer pointed out that if Allende's
election is frustrated by a military take-over, there is a strong likeli-
hood that his supporters would take to the streets and plunge the country
into full-scale civil war. They felt that Allende was possibly the lesser
of two evils. They suggested that Frei should be strongly counseled to
start immediately building an effective political opposition for the
future before important individuals who would constitute that opposition
might decide to leave the country.
g. The Chairman and Mr. Mitchell expressed considerable skepticism
that once Allende is in the presidency there will be anyone capable of
organizing any real counterforce against him.
h. In accord with the agreement of those present, the Chairman
directed that the Embassy be immediately requested for a cold-blooded
assessment of:
(1)
the pros and cons and problems and prospects involved
should a Chilean military coup be organized now with
U.S. assistance, and
(2)
the pros and cons and problems and prospects involved
in organizing an effective future Chilean opposition
to Allende.
i.
The Chairman stated that these assessments and recommendations
should be available in time for 40 Committee consideration in a meeting
to- be convened. on 14 September.
Frank M. M.Chapin
Frank M. Chapin
Distribution
Mr. Mitchell
Mr. Packard
Mr. Johnson
Admiral Moorer
Mr. Helms
EYES ONLY
22 October 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: 40 Committee Decisions
Due to the illness of the Executive Secretary and the absence of detailed
minutes, the following decisions are hereby recorded for the official record:
Meeting: 14 September 1970
Present: Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Packard, Mr. Johnson, Admiral Moorer
and Mr. Helms.
Messrs. Charles A. Meyer, William McAfee, Viron P. Vaky, Thomas
Karamessines, and William Broe were also present.
Subjects: (1) Chile - Review of Political and Military Options in Chilean
Electoral Situation
The 40 Committee approved $250,000 for use at Ambassador
Korry's discretion in supporting President Frei and the PDC
and other sympathetic elements.
(2) See Special Minute for additional item.
Meeting: 21 September 1970
Present: Executive Secretary did not attend.
Subject: Chile - Discussion regarding Chile elections.
Meeting: 24 September 1970
Present: Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Packard, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Helms.
Mr. William Broe was present for Item 1.
Mr. Marshall Green, Mr. William Nelson, and Mr. James Wilson were
present for Item 2.
Mr. Thomas Karamessines was present for both items.
Subjects: (1) Chile - Conversation between Chilean President Eduardo Frei
and Jorge SiIva; Director of El Mercurio, on 22 September
DECLASSIFIED
Group discussion
E.O.
Sec. 3.6
MR 94-155, # 13 CIA Itr 6/17/98
By KBH NARA, Date 7/22/98
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 8, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
PHILIP BUCHEN
P.W.B.
After learning that Jack and his friend would be
going to the Superior National Forest in Minnesota
and talking with you, I contacted Stu Knight. He
and I first contacted John R. McGuire, Chief of
the Forest Service, and he referred us to
James Torrence who is Superintendent of the Superior
National Forest and whose office is in Duluth,
Minnesota (218-727-6692). He indicated that he
would be sure the Ranger Station at Ely, Minnesota
did obtain Jack's trip plans and that the informa-
tion would be made available to the Secret Service
Office in Minnesota with a copy to the Washington
Office.
He also said that the Rangers along Jack's route
would be able to make casual contact with him on
each day unless Jack should deviate from the route.
Each contact would be reported back to me and if
on any day no contact could be made, I would be
so advised.
The Forest Service was advised to keep Jack's
presence in the Forest confidential and not to
make it apparent to Jack that the Rangers were
checking on his progress.
We will also be notified if the press in the area
picks up the story of Jack's presence or if there
are any inquiries from newsmen. However, the fact
that he is in the area may now become known because
he stopped in Cocotte, Minnesota this afternoon to
cash a check and a call came to the Secret Service
- 2 -
here to verify his identity. I will keep you advised
of further developments.
To confirm the schedule I gave you, Jack plans to be
back in the vicinity of Ely, Minnesota on September 16.
He will drive to Minneapolis on the 17th to return the
car he borrowed from Steve Bloomer and will be returning
to Washington on a NorthWest Airlines flight that night
which arrives in Washington about 8:09 p.m.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
class Chrm
September 8, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
PHILIP BUCHEN
P.W.B.
SUBJECT:
Requirements of Section 662 (a)
The Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as Amended, Concerning
Expenditures for Certain CIA
Operations
1. The Statutory Provision
Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
Amended (22 U.S.C.A., Sec. 2422) reads in its entirety
as follows:
(a) No funds appropriated under the authority of
this chapter or any other Act may be expended
by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence
Agency for operations in foreign countries,
other than activities intended solely for
obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and
until the President finds that each such
operation is important to the national security
of the United States and reports, in a timely
fashion, a description and scope of such
operation to the appropriate committees of the
Congress, including the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the United States Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United
States House of Representatives.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section
shall not apply during military operations
initiated by the United States under a declara-
tion of war approved by the Congress or an
exercise of powers by the President under the
War Powers Resolution.
SEAL FORD FIBRARY
- 2 -
The required finding by the President
(a) When it must be made
The statute makes a finding by the President a
condition precedent to the expenditure of funds
for an operation that is covered by the statute.
Therefore, no funds should be expended until
after the President has made his finding.
(b) What the finding should be
The President must find for each operation that
it is "important to the national security of
the United States."
(c) How the finding should be made
As a matter of good practice, it should be in
writing, signed by the President and should be
supported by documents which the President has
reviewed and which give a description and scope
of the proposed operation and give a basis for
determining that the proposed operation is
important to the national security of the
United States.
(d) Dissemination of finding
There appears to be no requirement under Section
662 (a) that the President's written finding
must be furnished to the appropriate Committees
of the Congress; only that "a description and
scope" of the operation covered by the finding
be reported to such Committees. Before Section
662 was added to the Act in 1974, there was a
more general provision about Presidential findings,
namely Section 654 (22 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2414). It
relates only to cases where the "President is
required to make a report ... concerning any
finding or determination" under the Act. Then
the following provision appears in Subsection
(c) in respect to such a Presidential finding.
"[It] shall be published in the Federal
Register as soon as practicable after it
has been reduced to writing and signed
by the President. In any case in which
the President concludes that such publi-
cation would be harmful to the national
of
STATE
FORD
- 3 -
security of the United States, only a
statement that a determination or
finding has been made by the President,
including the name and section of the
Act under which it was made, shall be
published."
This section was tailored to the situation
where the finding itself was to be reported to
Congress, and it does not cover the situation
under Section 662 where the reporting require-
ments deal not with the finding itself or the
basis on which it has been made, but with a
description of the operation which follows
from the finding.
Moreover, in the case of findings under the new
Section 662 even a public disclosure that a
finding was made under that section would itself
be harmful to the national security and would
vitiate the President's authority to have the
CIA carry out covert operations. Public notice
that a finding has been made in the context of
known developments or events within a particular
country would inevitably allow inferences as to
the location and purpose of the planned covert
operation, even though the published notice did
not by itself disclose such information.
It is evident from the legislative history of
Section 662 that it was a sui generis provision,
that it was conceived and adopted without
consideration of any other provisions in the
Act, that its purpose was to provide information
for only the jurisdictional committees concerned
with CIA operations and the respective Senate
and House Committees on Foreign Relations and
on Foreign Affairs, and that even for the parti-
cular committees to be involved "the quality or
the detail or the minutia" of the report would
be up to the President (Congressional Record of
October 2, 1974, p. S.18063-5; House Conference
Report 93-1610 of December 17, 1974. on S. 3394
at pp. 42-3). In the Conference Report, it was
stated:
SEAL
FORD
LIVERA
"The committee of conference agreed that
strict measures should be taken to insure
maximum security of the information
submitted to the Congress pursuant to
this provision."
Such measures would be in vain if the existence
of a covert operation became known through a
publication requirement of any kind as provided
in Section 654.
Therefore, it is concluded that the purpose and
effect of Section 654 conflicts with Section 662,
with the intent of Congress when it enacted the
latter section, and with the right and authority
of the President in the protection of national
security and the conduct of foreign affairs.
Consequently, there exists no dissemination or
publication requirement for a finding by the
President under Section 662.
3. The required reports by the President to the appropriate
Committees of the Congress
(a) When they must be made
Section 662 was added in 1974 to the Foreign
Assistance Act. The attached memorandum from the
CIA makes a convincing argument for interpreting
the words "reports, in a timely fashion" to mean
that the act of reporting is not a condition
precedent to expenditure of funds. It deals with
the ambiguity created by the works "unless and
until" which precede the verb "finds" and the
verb "reports" but which cannot apply to both
verbs without rendering nugatory the next words
"in timely fashion.' It resolves this ambiguity
by concluding that the words "in timely fashion"
give to the reporting requirement a status
different from the finding requirement so as to
allow reports to be made after the start of
expenditures. This is certainly a valid inter-
pretation, and it allows for reasonable time to
include all the appropriate committees as
recipients of the required reports. For purposes
of demonstrating good faith compliance with these
reporting requirements, the report of each operation
should be made with due and deliberate speed.
The Chairman of each Committee should be notified
of a finding by the President as soon as secure
communication to him is possible, along with
information as to the nature and location of the
operation sufficient to permit the Chairman to
judge how quickly he may want the "description
and scope" to be reported. This method should
satisfy the "timely fashion" requirement for
each intended recipient of such a report, with-
out in any way conceding that the report must
precede the initiation of expenditures.
(b) The recipients of the reports
The language in Section 662 which specifies the
recipients of reports is: "appropriate
committees of the Congress, including the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the United
States Senate and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the United States House of Represen-
tatives.' The history of the legislation
indicates that beyond the two committees
expressly included, the other committees (or
subcommittees) were at the time of enactment
intended to be "the present Armed Services
Committees and the present Subcommittees
handling the oversight of matters of intelli-
gence and the CIA," the latter being subcom-
mittees of the respective Senate and House
Appropriations Committees (Congressional Record
of October 2, 1974, p.5, S.18064). Since then
the Senate and House have each created Select
Committees with authority which includes investi-
gation of the extent of, and necessity for,
covert intelligence activities in foreign
countries. However, these are committees of
limited duration which have not supplanted in
oversight of intelligence matters the previously
established and continuing committees serving
this purpose. While the Select Committees may
be entitled to the same information, this parti-
cular statute does not appear to require their
inclusion as recipient of timely reports on
each new operation covered by Section 662.
(c) Who is to report
Section 662 requires the President to report,
but there is nothing to prevent him from
delegating his authority and responsibility
in that regard, as he has done, to the
Director of CIA. It may be better practice
in the future to have the President, when
he makes a written finding, delegate in
writing to the Director the authority and
responsibility to make the required reports.
(d) Form and content of reports
The reports have to provide "a description
and scope" of each operation. According to
the legislative history, and as has been
accepted in practice, the reports may be
oral. Also, in the process of the Congres-
sional debates the words "detailed descrip-
tion of the nature and scope" were deliber-
ately changed to allow latitude on the part
of the President. (See Congressional Record
of October 2, 1974 at S.18063-4).
(e) Record of reports
Apart from whatever record each recipient
committee may make of each report, it will be
good practice for the Director of CIA to
provide a full record for the President of
the time, nature and scope of each preliminary
approach and ultimate report made pursuant to
Section 662.
CC:
William Colby
Jim Lynn
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Legislative History Surrounding Reporting Requirement
for Covert Action Expenditures (P. L. 93-559, Section 32)
Question: Is the reporting to appropriate committees of the
Congress of the Presidential finding a condition precedent to the
expenditure of funds?
Answer: No. To interpret new Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as amended, in this fashion would require that no force or
effect be given to the adverbial phrase, "in a timely fashion, 11 which
modifies the verb "reports" in the legislation. Various versions of
the provision during its legislative processing in the Congress clearly
established a condition precedent requirement in one case relating to
the Presidential finding and in the other case relating to both the finding
and the report, yet the conferees chose to reject such formulations with res-
pect; to the reporting requirement imposed in the provision, as outlined
below:
A. Senate Version - Made the finding and the
reporting both a condition precedent to the expenditure
for funds for covert actions by using the phrase, "if,
but not before, " as the full modifier. (See attachment A)
B. House Committee - Such expenditures were
prohibited "unless" there was a Presidential finding to
be reported "in a timely fashion. " In giving any meaningful
reading to these words, one must conclude that the word
"unless" modifies the finding requirement and the phrase
"in a timely fashion" modifies the reporting requirement.
Clearly, the House Committee version no longer has a
single modifier as the earlier Senate version,
(See attachment B)
C. House Floor.
1) There was some concern that the
word "unless" did not impose a condition precedent
of the Presidential finding before covert action
funds could be expended. This led to the adoption
of an amendment so that the modifier applying to
the Presidential finding became "unless and until. "
2) In a colloquy designed to bring out the
meaning of the provision, the provision was:
a) Characterized as "restraining
certain operations of CIA to those "important
to the national security and in a timely
fashion they are obliged to bring to the
notice of Congress any activities in which
the CIA may be engaged in.
"
(Emphasis added)
b) Was further characterized as carrying
out and providing a further statutory basis for
an understanding between the Secretary of
State, the Director of Central Intelligence and
the committee reporting the provision to report
to that committee actions in which the Agency
was engaged. Such a report was not a condition
precedent to engage in such activities but to
keep the committee informed of intelligence
activities relating to foreign policy. (A similar
requirement was subsequently approved as a
special oversight function of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs.) (See attachment C)
D. Conference - There were several versions
of language before the conferees:
1) The Senate version clearly established
Presidential finding and reporting as a condition
precedent to the expenditure of funds.
2
2) The House version clearly imposed by
the words "unless and until" such a condition
precedent only with respect to the finding, not
with respect to the reporting, if we are to follow
rules of statutory construction designed to give
meaning to words used, i. e., "reports, in a
timely fashion. 11
3) Finally, the House conferees were
aware that the reporting requirement was similar
to a procedure worked out by the committee reporting
the legislation and Executive Branch officials which
in itself had been recently incorporated into the new
rules of the House of Representatives. There is no
evidence that these procedures or rules contemplated
any reporting to the committee prior to the under-
taking of action. In fact, the colloquy referred to
above indicates the opposite to be the understanding.
E. Procedures After Enactment - The six
committees of Congress receiving reporting under this
provision of law realize that they are getting reporting
after the fact but in a "timely fashion. 11 One of the
members of these committees has introduced a bill
which among other things makes it clear that the
reporting must be accomplished prior to the commence-
ment of the activities, in recognition that the current law
does not so provide. (See attachment D)
3
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
chron
September 10, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JEANNE DAVIS
FROM:
PHILIP BUCHEN
T.W.B.
SUBJECT:
FOIA Appeal by Mr. William Beecher
In response to your memorandum of August 28, 1975, concerning
Mr. William Beecher's FOIA appeal for documents concerning
himself, we have conferred with the Office of Legal Counsel at
the Department of Justice. Your withholding of the internal
memorandum (at Tab F) containing the recommendations of an
NSC staff member is proper under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5). With
respect to NSSM3 placed in Mr. Beecher's file by DOD, we
agree with you that it does not appear to be relevant. However,
you should indicate in your response that a classified document
which neither directly or indirectly refers to him was forwarded
to the NSC by DOD, and because it is not relevant, you have not
reviewed it for FOIA purposes.
With respect to the memorandum at Tab D, there is no basis
to claim that this document sent to you by DOD falls under the
court order in Nixon V. Sampson, et al. However, we do believe
that there is a basis for withholding this document apart from
the matter of its classification. This memorandum represents
communications between the President and his close personal
advisers, and as such, is not subject to the FOIA (see House
Report No. 93-1380, 93d Congress, 2d Session, p. 15). Moreover,
the nature of the document is such that we believe it is exempt
from disclosure in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5). On the
basis of its internal nature, we recommend that this type of
document generally not be released.
If you have any additional questions in this regard, please do not
hesitate to contact me.
a
FOR
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
5520
SECRET ATTACHMENTS
August 28, 1975
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT APPEAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
PHILIP W. BUCHEN
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davis
SUBJECT:
Mr. William Beecher Request
for Information on Himself
In early July the NSC received a request from Mr. William Beecher
(Tab A) for information in NSC files concerning him. In response
to this request we reviewed the NSC files and also the papers from
President Nixon's files in the second floor vault for any NSC papers
which might refer to Beecher.
Because Beecher was involved in the public disclosure of the U.S.
position at the SALT negotiations, which resulted in an extensive
investigation within the Executive Branch, we knew that we had
files relating to him and the newspaper articles he had written.
Until we had located and examined the documents, however, we
didn't know whether the documents were NSC papers or papers
from the White House Office of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. After we reviewed the materials we had
collected and were able to determine that almost all of them were
White House documents, we addressed our review of Mr. Beecher's
FOIA request to the documents properly a part of the NSC files.
While Mr. Beecher's request of July 1 was under consideration, we
received from the Department of Defense a referral (Tab B)
containing NSC/WH documents they had retrieved from their files
in response to an FOIA request Beecher had directed to them.
Defense asked that we review the documents and respond directly
to Beecher.
One of the documents retrieved in Beecher's file by Defense is
National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 3 (Tab C) concerning
SECRET ATTACHMENTS
SECRET ATTACHMENTS
2
U.S. Military Posture and in no way refers to Beecher, by name
or otherwise. The second document is a Secret/Eyes Only November
1969 memorandum from Mr. Kissinger to the Secretaries of State
and Defense (Tab D) conveying the President's order of an embargo
on discussions of U.S. troop withdrawals. Clearly, it is a document
which emanated from the White House, is not contained in NSC
files, and should be categorized as being among the Nixon materials
subject to the order of the Court.
In my letter of August 1, 1975 to Mr. Beecher (Tab E) I indicated
that we had located in NSC files and reviewed two documents which
referred to a meeting he had with an NSC Staff member one of which
we released to him. The other document (Tab F) is a memorandum
from the NSC Staff member to Mr. Kissinger recommending further
action on Mr. Beecher's request for information on strategic planning.
This document contains nothing more than the personal advice of one
of our staff members and we informed Mr. Beecher that it was being
withheld under 5 U.S. C. 552 (b)(5). At that time I also informed
Mr. Beecher that we had identified other materials which refer to
him but that these records are part of President Nixon's papers and
are not subject to review in response to a request under the FOIA.
Mr. Beecher has now appealed (Tab G) the NSC Staff decision to
withhold one of the NSC documents we reviewed in response to his
request and Secretary Kissinger must respond to this appeal by
September 10.
Before we forward this appeal, along with the NSC Staff recom-
mendations, to Mr. Kissinger for review we would like your guidance
on three points relating to this request:
1.
Although there is no substantive objection to the release
of the memorandum (Tab F) containing the recommendations
of an NSC Staff member, we are reluctant to set a
precedent of releasing such internal communications and
thus would like to know if this document has properly been
and should continue to be withheld under 5 U.S. C. 552 (b)(5).
2.
NSSM 3 (Tab C) in no way refers to Mr. Beecher although
it was referred by Defense as one of the documents they
have in their file on Beecher. Because Defense believes
it pertains to Beecher, does the NSC Staff have to review
the NSSM for release and so inform Beecher, or may we
declare that it does not fall under his request since it
does not refer to him?
SECRET ATTACHMENTS
SECRET ATTACHMENTS
3
3.
Under the FOIA, must we review a document
referred from another agency when the same document
would have been excluded from our own review,
specifically in the case of the memorandum at Tab D
which is a record from the Nixon Administration?
We would appreciate your thoughts on these matters and your
recommendations on how we should handle the Beecher appeal.
SECRET ATTACHMENTS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 16, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
T.W.B.
FROM:
PHILIP BUCHEN
Attached is a "Top Secret/Sensitive" document
from Attorney General Levi to the President.
Kindly see that this is staffed to the appropri-
ate parties so it can go to the President for
action with the necessary comments.
In view of the urgency for changing our
procedures in this respect, I urge quick action.
Attachment
UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 18, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
PHILIP BUCHEN
T.W.B.
Henry A. Berliner, Jr., Chairman of the Commission on
Judicial Disabilities and Tenure, reported to me this
morning that the Commission will have its written
evaluation concerning Superior Court Judge Charles W.
Halleck ready for delivery to me in your behalf about
the middle of Friday afternoon, September 19. Shortly
thereafter, the Commission wants to give a copy to
Judge Halleck and to announce to the press that the
Commission determines this candidate for reappointment
to be qualified for another term.
If the Tenure Commission were to have found that the
candidate was exceptionally well-qualified or well-
qualified, then his term would be automatically extended.
In the case of an unqualified determination, he would
not have been eligible for reappointment.
However, in the case at hand, you have the option of
whether or not to nominate the incumbent for reappoint-
ment, and if you do so, his nomination will be subject
to consent of the Senate.
The candidate's term expires on October 20, 1975, and
you should make your decision on the question of
whether to nominate or not before that date. A prompt
decision should be made, however, on whether to release
to the press a copy of the Commission's submission to
you. I understand it will be about four pages and
will state wherein the Commission has found the candidate
to have performed competently but will also relate
instances where he appears to have violated the judicial
canons of ethics.
- 2 -
Mr. Berliner recommends that we release copies of
this submission promptly. He points out that other-
wise the candidate himself may issue copies and in
any event Members of the Commission may very well
talk about its contents in a fragmented way to the
press.
As you know, this Commission is not a Presidential
Commission inasmuch as you appointed only one of
seven members; although, your appointee was elected
Chairman.
On balance, I would concur in Chairman Berliner's
recommendation for immediate release of the submis-
sion to you.
APPROVE RELEASE
HOLD UNTIL MY RETURN FOR
SUBSEQUENT DECISION
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
classified
WASHINGTON
September 24, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
PHILIP BUCHEN
T.W.B.
SUBJECT:
Phillips Petroleum Contributions
Phillips Petroleum's report on illegal corporate contributions
will probably be presented to the SEC either this Friday or next
Monday. Included in the report will be a listing of Congressmen
and Senators receiving cash contributions in 1970 and 1972. This
listing has already been turned over to the Special Prosecutor and
IRS, who have both apparently advised Phillips that they intend to
take no further action. The report will indicate that Carstens
Slack, Phillips' Washington Vice President, had no knowledge that
corporate funds were used.
Therefore, the only question raised is what happened to the con-
tributions to you in 1970 and 1972. Jack Mills advises that Slack
recalls personally giving you a sealed envelope containing $1, 000
cash and his card in both of these years. Jack advises that the
1972 contribution apparently was made prior to April 7, the effective
date of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), which
required public disclosure of contributions in excess of $100. We
cannot identify the 1972 contribution in the 1972 FECA reports,
probably because it came before April 7, 1972) and cannot identify
from your Michigan reports the contribution for either 1970 or 1972
because it did not go directly to a Michigan Committee).
After discussing this separately with Jack Mills and Benton Becker,
it appears likely that you sent the money either to your D. C.
Committee, the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee or
the Boosters Club. A fourth possibility, but one which Benton feels
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
is less likely, is that you sent it directly to another candidate's
campaign. Benton notes that your practice was to personally
accept contributions only when your schedule permitted, and
that you would then turn them over to Frank Meyer for disposition.
Reports by the Boosters Club and the Congressional Campaign
Committee prior to April 7, 1972, were destroyed by the Clerk of
the House after two years, and we were unable to find any copies
still in existence. We could not identify this contribution in their
1972 FECA reports.
Your D. C. Committee was not required to disclose its contributors
and their records have since been destroyed. The Senate Rules
Committee report on your confirmation, apparently on the basis of
deposit slips, states that the D. C. Committee received several
cash contributions in both 1970 and 1972, in amounts equal to or
greater than $1,000. However, the Rules Committee was unable to
identify the contributors. For your information, in 1970 the D. C.
Committee apparently raised $15, 900, all of which was expended
between August 27, 1970, and April 8, 1971. In 1972, the D. C.
Committee expended $49, 855, of which $38, 216. 61 was transferred on
April 6, 1972, to the Ford for Congress Committee. The D. C. Committee
ceased operations prior to April 7 and was therefore not subject to
the FECA.
Should any inquiries be made to Ron Nessen on this matter, I
recommend that he make the following comments:
1.
The entire matter of your campaign financing was
thoroughly explored and satisfactorily resolved in the
course of the confirmation hearings.
2. He has discussed this with you and you indicated that
as Minority Leader you received many contributions
which, when not needed for your election efforts, were
used to benefit other Congressional candidates, and
were transferred to the Republican Congressional
Campaign Committee, the Republican Boosters Club
and the like. This has been a traditional practice of
Congressional leaders in both parties. While you don't
recall the specifics, this is probably what occurred here.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 27, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DON RUMSFELD
FROM:
PHIL BUCHEN
The only reason that the Halleck matter was taken
up directly by me with the President (through two
memos of mine to the President which were sent to
you) was because the President had personally called
me about certain sensitive aspects of this matter
and because this was an unusual situation where an
outside Commission was making a report to the
President.
All other Presidential appointment matters we, of
course, do handle with Doug Bennett's office and
our relationships have been good.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 26, 1975
MEMORANDUM
FOR:
PHIL BUCHEN
FROM:
DON RUMSFELD
As people come to you on personnel matters, I hope that,
rather than dealing with the President or other people
on the staff on those matters directly, you will see that
they straight to Doug Bennett's office so that the
President can deal with these things in an orderly
way through the Personnel Shop as he desires.
The reason I mention this is because, apparently there
was some confusion over the Halleck question.
of
Fay
THE
October 4, 1975
List of Lawyers for Appointment Consideration
Executive Office of the President (EOP)
Cal Collier
Mike Duval
Jim Falk
Judy Hope
Charlie Leppert
Peter McPherson
Pat O'Donnell
Dick Parsons
Russ Rourke
Robin West
Departments
Bob Aders
Under Secretary of Labor
Dick Albrecht
General Counsel, Treasury
Greg Austin
Interior Dept. candidate for GC
Jim Baker
Under Secretary of Commerce
John Barnum
Deputy Secretary of Transportation
Bob Bork
Solicitor General
Bob Elliot
General Counsel, HUD
Lew Engman
Chairman, FTC
Kent Frizzell
Interior candidate for Under Secretary
Ed Hidalgo
Commerce candidate for GC
Thomas Kauper
Assistant Attorney General
William Kilberg
Solicitor, Labor Dept.
Monroe Leigh
General Counsel, State
David Macdonald
Assistant Secretary of Treasury
Nino Scalia
Assistant Attorney General
Ed Schmults
Under Secretary of Treasury
William Taft
Secretary's Office - HEW
Richard Wiley
DOD candidate for GC
Outside
William Baxter
*
Charles Meyers
Ray Clevenger
*
Jim Mitchell
William Condrell
Jack Pettit - formerly GC, FCC
Hayden Crawford
*
Sam Pierce
David Gunning
*
David Place
Marc Leland
Resumes attached
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 9, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DON RUMSFELD
THROUGH:
PHIL BUCHEN
FROM:
KEN LAZARUS
SUBJECT:
Statement by the President on
Attempted Assassination in
San Francisco
Attached is a statement which was developed on the bases of
the President's recorded remarks which you forwarded to
Mr. Buchen under date of September 25, and relevant excerpts
from Secret Service reports.
The President should review the document as soon as practicable
and, assuming it is complete and accurate, sign the statement
and return it to the writer for distribution to the Criminal
Division, FBI and Secret Service in accordance with their
joint request.
Thank you.
Attachment
STATEMENT OF
PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD
I, Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States
of America, pursuant to the joint request of the Criminal
Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the
Department of Justice, submit the following:
1. During the afternoon of September 22, 1975, I
was in the St. Francis Hotel, San Francisco, California.
2. At approximately 3:30 p. m., I left the hotel
through the Post Street entrance.
3. I walked directly toward my limousine which was
parked on the south side of Post Street adjacent to the hotel.
4. As I came within two or three feet of the limousine,
I stopped momentarily, waiting for the door of the limousine
to be opened by a Secret Service agent.
5. As the door of the limousine was being opened, I
looked across to the north side of Post Street and waved to the
crowd gathered there.
6. As I waved, I heard a noise which sounded like a
gun shot. Almost instantaneously, several people pushed me
down to the sidewalk.
SERIOA
- 2 -
7. At the direction of the Secret Service, I crawled
the few feet into the limousine.
8. Two Secret Service agents, Ron Pontius and
Jack Mechant, and my assistant, Donald Rumsfeld, crawled
into the limousine on top of me. We all remained below
window level.
9. I was immediately driven away from the scene in
an easterly direction on Post Street and taken directly to
San Francisco International Airport.
10. This is a complete and accurate statement of my
recollections of the incident described above.
GERALD R. FORD
The White House
Washington, D. C.
October
, 1975
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 9, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DOUG BENNETT
FROM:
PHIL BUCHEN
T.W.B.
SUBJECT:
C. Sutton Mullen, Jr.
Board of Directors, National
Institute of Building Sciences
This office cannot concur in the nomination of Mr. Mullen because
of his wife's holding in a business that is specifically barred by
statute for members of this Board.
Mrs. Mullen owns an interest in Jones Newby Supply Company which
installs air conditioning systems in private homes. It is an interest
in a family business that she would not be willing to dispose of for
the sake of her husband's participation on the Board of the National
Institute of Building Sciences. Section 809(c)(1)(B) of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, P.L. 93-383, provides that
the category of Board members for which Mr. Mullen is being
considered --
"shall hold no financial interest or membership
in nor be employed by, or receive other compensation
from any company, association, or other group
associated with the manufacture, distribution,
installation, or maintenance of specialized building
products, equipment, systems, subsystems, or
other construction materials and techniques for
which there are available substitutes. 11
Since this interest falls squarely within the category of interest
prohibited by the statute, Mr. Mullen is disqualified from member-
ship on the Board.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 9, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DOUG BENNETT
FROM:
PHIL BUCHEN T.W.B.
SUBJECT:
Jack Eckerd/Conflicts Review
The attached letter should be sent to Jack Eckerd when you announce
his nomination.
The only matter of potential embarrassment of which we are aware
stems from Mr. Eckerd's unsuccessful campaign for Governor
against Claude Kirk in 1970.
Two allegations may be made. One is that his total campaign
expenses exceeded the statutory limit of $350,000. A suit was
brought against Eckerd on the basis of this allegation but was
dismissed as moot when he lost the election. Unfortunately,
Mr. Eckerd failed to advise us of the litigation in response to our
questionnaire and we only learned of it through our interview with
him and the FBI file, which has delayed our final action. We have
reviewed the file which appears to bear out his contention that there
was no violation of the spending limit because the law was enacted
in the middle of the campaign and was not intended to have retro-
active effect. The alleged excess expenditures were based on
cumulating expenses prior to the effective date of the act with those
made afterward. This does not appear to be a problem.
The second allegation appears to have more substance. During
that campaign, his campaign manager, without his knowledge,
commissioned a book that was highly derogatory to Claude Kirk.
When Eckerd learned of it, and read the book, he barred its sale
at all of his drug stores. The problem arises from the failure to
-2-
report its cost as a campaign expense. Eckerd's campaign manager
took the position that the book was an investment rather than a
campaign expense and therefore did not report it as a campaign
expenditure. Eckerd, himself, signed the statement of expenses --
presumably after he knew of the book -- apparently on the same
theory. (We have not had a chance to discuss this with him because
of his vacation.)
There is some conflict between the FBI interviews and the facts as
related by Eckerd's lawyer, Norman Stallings, as to the precise
amount of money that came from each of the different sources that
financed the book. It appears undisputed, however, that the total
cost of the book was financed in part by an anonymous person who
treated it as an investment and did in fact recover his principal,
but no profit, from the revenues of the book. Additional funds were
supplied by the campaign manager, without Eckerd's knowledge,
from Eckerd's private campaign fund which the manager was
authorized to draw upon. Part, but not all, of the investment from
Eckerd's own funds was recovered from revenues. The fund itself
appears to have been entirely legal under Florida law. The failure
to report the expense of the book as a campaign expenditure, however --
on the theory that it was an investment -- appears highly questionable.
The statute of limitations has run on any offense that might arise
from this reporting failure, but the subject has obviously potential
for embarrassment during the hearings. Kirk has indicated his
intention to raise the issue.
I suggest you discuss this with Eckerd. You should also mention to
the President the controversial religious ad in his 1974 Senate
campaign, which will undoubtedly receive some publicity.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 9, 1975
Dear Mr. Eckerd:
The following will confirm our oral advice to you during our meeting
of October 1, 1975 as to the actions you should take to avoid actual
or apparent conflicts of interest in the performance of your duties
as Administrator of the General Services Administration.
(1) Resign as Chairman of the Board, Director and consultant
to the Jack Eckerd Corporation.
(2) Resign as Director of Southeast Banking Corporation.
(3) Resign as Director of the Jack Eckerd Corporation employee
pension and profit sharing plan.
(4) Except for your holdings in the Jack Eckerd Corporation,
place your personally held stocks, bonds and notes in a
blind trust.
(5) Except for her Jack Eckerd Corporation holdings, place
your wife's stocks and bonds in a blind trust.
(6) Resign as trustee of the Jack Eckerd Trust, the Nancy
Eckerd Trust, the Kennedy Richard Eckerd Trust, and
the J. Milton Eckerd Trust, and instruct the professional
trustee to tell you nothing about the assets of these trusts
just as if it were a blind trust for your own benefit.
(7) Once in office, you should disqualify yourself from any
matters coming before you that could impact on:
(a) the Jack Eckerd Corporation;
(b) your real estate holdings;
(c) the holders of your outstanding notes;
(d) the persons whose notes you hold;
(e) the Jack and Ruth Eckerd Foundation.
(f) Eckerd College
October 9, 1975
Page Two
This can be accomplished by a memorandum to a deputy specifying
all such interests and instructing him to act in your place with
respect to them. This memorandum can be drawn up by the GSA
General Counsel. In addition, you should consult with the General
Counsel prior to any changes in your investments once you are in
office.
If either my staff or I can be of further assistance to you, please
do not hesitate to call upon us.
With best wishes.
Sincerely,
Phil
Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President
Mr. Jack M. Eckerd
Jack Eckerd Corporation
2120 U. S. Highway 19 South
Clearwater, Florida 33518
MEMORANDUM
6469
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
nse
October 17, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR PHILIP BUCHEN
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davi
ms
SUBJECT:
Correspondence on Rudolf Hess
Mr. Merrel Frazer, a U.S. attorney, has written the President
asking him to help obtain Rudolph Hess' release from Spandau
Prison (Tab B).
We have received the attached proposed reply prepared by the
Department of State, in which we concur, for Roland Elliott's
signature to Mr. Frazer. Because of the considerations of
law involved, I would appreciate your concurrence in the pro-
posed reply.
*
Concur
As amended
October 20, 1975
*Note: Mr. Frazer asked in the last paragraph of
his letter to have the reply sent to him
at several points throughout Europe rather
than his home in Austin, Texas. Also,
rather than have the letter go out over
Roland Elliott's signature, I recommend
that it go out over General Scowcroft's
signature.
P.W.B.
Philip Buchen
Mr. Merrel Frazer, Jr, JD
Attorney and Counselor at Law
P.O. Box 5302
Austin, TX 78763
Dear Mr. Frazer:
The President has asked me to reply to your letter of
September 20 concerning the continued imprisonment of Rudolf
Hess.
As you point out in your letter, the United States,
France and Great Britain would be willing to free Mr. Hess on
humanitarian grounds. This has been the view of the Western
Allies for a number of years, and the United States position
on the release of Mr. Hess, who is over 80 and in failing
health, has not changed. Nonetheless, the Three Western
Powers are not free to release Mr. Hess without the consent
of the Soviet Union.
Mr. Hess was tried and convicted by an international
tribunal in which the United States was represented, and
sentenced to life imprisonment. The United States continues
to hold that the sentences imposed by the tribunal were
reached in accordance with due process under its rules. The
United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France
were jointly charged by the international tribunal with the
responsibility of seeing that Mr. Hess' sentence was carried
out. Under the terms of his imprisonment, Mr. Hess can be
released only if all four powers agree.
The Three Western Allies have approached the Soviet
Union on this subject on a number of occasions over the past
decade. However, the Soviet government has consistently
is
refused to agree to Mr. Hess' release. The Soviets claim
THE
that an early termination of Mr. Hess' sentence, who rep-
resents for them a symbol of the acts and crimes of Nazism,
would be misunderstood by the Soviet people and by many
people and countries around the world as signifying an amnesty
for Nazi war crimes. We have no reason to believe that a
further approach to them on this subject would be productive.
In view of four power responsibilities for Mr. Hess, I
cannot agree that the Three Western Allies have the right to
unilaterally release him from custody. Even in the unlikely
event that France and the United Kingdom would agree to
terminate Mr. Hess' imprisonment on this basis, it would not
be in the interest of the United States to breach its four
power obligations in this way, which would undoubtedly evoke
a strong Soviet reaction and perhaps put in question four
power rights and responsibilities for Berlin on which much of
the Allied legal position concerning the city rests.
-2-
Perhaps I can reassure you on the question of American
taxpayers bearing a financial burden as a result of Mr. Hess'
imprisonment. Under the arrangements made for the occupation
of Germany and Berlin after World War II, the Federal
Republic of Germany bears the entire operating cost of Spandau
Prison. No operational costs at the prison are borne by the
United States government.
The United States guard contingent at Spandau Prison,
which serves in rotation with guard contingents of the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom and France, is drawn from United
States forces stationed in Berlin. These troops perform a
variety of other duties in Berlin in addition to guarding the
prison. Consequently, there are no special salary or other
costs for American personnel directly related to the prison
guard duty which they perform.
Sincerely,
CC: Mr. Frazer
c/o American Embassy, Paris
c/o United States Mission, Berlin
c/o American Consulate General, Munich
6469
MERRELL FRAZER, JR., J.D.
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
P. 0. BOX 5302
AUSTIN. TEXAS 78763
PHONE 512/478-9916
20. IX. 75.
HK
THE HONORABLE GERALD FORD
of
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FRALD
TORAD
THE WHITE HOUSE , 1600 PENNSYLVANIA AVE.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
LIDRARY
PERSONAL, PLEASE
Re: The Case of Rudolph Hess
My Dear Mr. President:
As an attorney and a duly qualified member of the State Bar of Tex
I shall leave this country very shortly on a legal mission of extr
importance to the integrity and honor of our Anglo-American system
of jurisprudence.
My mission is to assist Herr Wolf Rüdiger Hess of Munich, Germany
to secure the release of his aging father, former Deputy Führer
Rudolph Hess, from Spandau prison where he has been incarcerated S
the Nurember Military War Crimes Trial of 1945-46. Herr Hess has,
in fact, been a prisoner since May 10, 1941 when he flew to Great
Britain.
What concerns me most as an international attorney is that this 81
year old unintelligible man has been held prisoner in the most int
of conditions - illegally - since he was released as a prisoner of
in 1945. Moreover, the records of his case are replete with do.cume
evidence that this prisoner suffered badly of mental disorders and
would never have been convicted in any free society's legal syster
Herr Hess is the only man in the history of mankind to have been (
victed of "crimes against peace" and there was never any precedent
international law under which to try and to convict him. For many
years now, as you know, the three great Allied powers, Great Brit:
France and the United States have been willing to free or to pard
Herr Hess; only the Soviet veto has blocked his release.
As a matter of international law, the very reasons for the existe
of Spandau Prison evaporated in 1966 when the last of the Nazi wa:
criminals were released, Albert Speer and Baldur von Schirach.
It is a blight on this land and upon our judicial system to conti
hold this helpless aged prisoner at Spandau when he could spend h
few remaining years (or months) with his wife and son. Further, I
reliably informed that the cost to this government each year for
taining this one prisoner in a fortress designed to hold 600 inma
exceeds $250,000.00. What a total waste upon the taxpayers of thi
land.
TABLE
PAGE 2 - 20. IX. 75.
In years past, three other convicted Nazi war criminals, Grossadmiral
Erik Rader, Walthur Funk and Konstantine von Neurath, had their sentences
commuted because of their ill and failing health. Herr Hess has spent much
of the last 10 years in the hospital within the British Zone of West Berlin
Mr. President, as we here in the United States are about the embark upon
our third century as a Nation, do you not think that we owe it to our
legal dogma and to the great legal principles upon which our nation was
founded, to achieve some dignity in what has become a landmark case of
tragedy for our legal system.
Time after time, both while a prisoner in England and again during the
Nuremberg war crimes trial, Herr Hess was examined and found to be sufferin
from illusions of grandeur, schizophrenia, paranoia, amnesia and other ment:
aberrations any one of which would have, and in fact did, prevent him from
being able to properly defend himself. He was without adequate counsel and
as we won the war and the hatred of the enemy was rampant at that time, we
tossed away our legal integrity and allowed the Russians to pressure us into
sending what has amounted to a non-compos-mentis case to a life of exile
in a cold and gloomy prison. The political implications are well known and
as President you most assuredly are cognizant of the reasons the Soviet
Union will not allow Hess to be released; it gives them vital access to
West Berlin with their military troops every four months.
I presently am in route to meet with Herr Wolf Rüdiger Hess concerning his
father's case. We shall propose two things: 1) that Herr Hess be released
for purely humanitarian reasons as were three of his co-defendants; and,
2) that some quid-pro-quo be made with the Soviet Union to gain their conser
to release the prisoner Hess. We shall ask that the Soviet Union agree to
the release of Herr Hess and will call an international news conference in
both Munich and Berlin within the next few days to call attention to the
illegality of the Hess incarceration.
As the American attorney who has been asked to assist his son in this case,
I am asking you, Mr. President, to call upon your Secretary of State, Mr.
Henry Kissinger, to ascertain some suitable agreement with the Soviet Union
in a true spirit of détente as we begin this, our third century as a free
nation. Certainly, if Russia is at all in any way sincere with its avowed
determination to create and foster better understanding among our nations,
they could best show their sincerity by acquiesing to the release of this
pitifully aged and mentally retarded victim of military hostility.
While in Germany, I shall again confer with former Nazi Minister of Arma-
ments and Production, Herr Albert Speer, and the former Grossadmiral of the
Germany Navy, Herr Karl Dönitz who, as you know, succeeded Adolph Hitler as
the last Chancellor of Nazi Germany. These men previously have served their
complete Nuremberg sentences to the exact hour and they are quite anxious
that this blight on the international law as excercised by the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg be forever removed.
As President of this great nation whose fundemental legal concepts were
based upon equal justice under law, I ask you Sir to take some positive
course of action to see that Herr Hess is released. I believe the United
States, together with Great Britain and France have the right to summarily
release Hess and close Spandau Prison, notwithstanding the initial agreement
to which we were a signatory in the London Accords of 1945 which established
he International Military War Crimes Tribunal.
At this particular era in our international relations with the Soviet Union you
government is especially and vitally engaged in negotiations concerning the Sa
of American grain, an agreement on hydrocarbons and petrochemicals, respective
spheres of influence in the middle east, the total balance of power picture
throughout the free world as well as the S.A.L.T. conferences. Only a few weeks
ago you attended the Helsinki world conference where with other leaders you opi
for a closer understanding among all nations.
Certainly, if we can take any Soviet gesture upon its face value, and in an eve
more humanitarian effort as we bury the past three decades and embark upon a ne
era of détente between our two great nations, the Soviets should have impresse
upon them that this aged and near-senile man serves the purpose of no prior
hostility by being locked in a prison cell while his final hours upon this
earth expire.
While not a churchgoer, Herr Hess has always professed a faith in God and in th
triumph of justice as we here in this nation perceive it to be. The eminent
British wartime leader and perhaps this century's greatest statesman, Sir Wins1
Churchill, stated after the war that Hess should be tried, not as a war criming
but as a sick man who came of his own volition to help initiate peace between
Germany and England. Hess's mental aberrations were well known to the British.
His subsequent incarceration at Nuremberg, his denial of adequate psychiatric
examination and treatment, and his total inability to adequately participate in
his own defense are contrary to the highest principals of legal defense for
defendants of a retarded mental nature within the entire World system of juris-
prudence.
I am, therefore, Mr. President, asking that you take immediate steps to instru
your government to initiate serious negotiation with the Soviet Union for the
release of Herr Hess and to advise both the U.S. Ambassador in Germany and the
Chief of the U.S. Mission in Berlin that I shall soon call upon them asking for
their assistance in the legal representation of this defendant. I further ask
you instruct your Secretary of State to immediately make contact with proper
Soviet officials and to seek their approval to have this prisoner released to ]
family before he dies if for no other reason than for the most humane reasons
decency and honor.
I know that you are a fair man, Mr. President, and despite the political over-
tones with which this case has been staged during the past three decades, I be:
eve with concrete conviction that you will not place a political label on the
handling of this case. You must remember, Sir, that Hess was not in Germany du:
the atrocities charged to the German Nazi government, nor was he convicted of
such act. His only crime was to have been a part of a government that committe
such crimes and then lost the war. We, as victors, served as prosecutor, judge
and jury. Not since the Biblical days of King David has such perfidy been uni-
laterally committed in the legal processes.
By way of appellate procedure in advance, I am asking that you take immediate
steps to initiate legal, diplomatic and vigorous action to resolve this stigma
upon our legal system. You may answer this letter either to the U.S. Consulate
in Munich, Germany, the U.S. Mission in Berlin, or to the U.S. Embassy in Pari
France where my good friend, the former Ambassador to Germany, The Honorable
Kenneth Rush now serves as U.S. Ambassador to France.
in
SECTION
FORD
Thank you for your time, consideration and assistance in this case.
Most respected yours
FRAZER, JR
MF:sf
lass
MEMORANDUM
6469
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Chron
October 17, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR PHILIP BUCHEN
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davis
MD
SUBJECT:
Correspondence on Rudolf Hess
Mr. Merrel Frazer, a U.S. attorney, has written the President
asking him to help obtain Rudolph Hess' release from Spandau
Prison (Tab B).
We have received the attached proposed reply prepared by the
Department of State, in which we concur, for Roland Elliott's
signature to Mr. Frazer. Because of the considerations of
law involved, I would appreciate your concurrence in the pro-
posed reply.
*
Concur
As amended
October 20, 1975
*Note: Mr. Frazer asked in the last paragraph of
his letter to have the reply sent to him
at several points throughout Europe rather
than his home in Austin, Texas. Also,
rather than have the letter go out over
Roland Elliott's signature, I recommend
that it go out over General Scowcroft's
signature.
P.W.B.
Philip Buchen
THE WHITE HOUSE
day.
WASHINGTON
their
October 22, 1975
Dear Mrs. Van Dyk:
This will acknowledge your letter to President Ford of July 28,
1975, concerning your outstanding claim against Mr. Robert
Mead. Please excuse the delay in response.
We have questioned both Mr. Mead and his lawyers concerning
the status of his claim which he is presently unable to pay.
Since his failure to pay does not represent a voluntary refusal
to pay, this cannot be viewed as a violation of either the letter
or spirit of our regulations.
Sincerely,
Unity Chapman
Dudley Chapman
Associate Counsel
Mrs. Robert F. Van Dyk
Qtrs. 2328 Stryker Avenue
Ft. Lewis, Washington 98433
TERMS N. FORD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 23, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JEANNE W. DAVIS
P.W.B.
THROUGH:
PHILIP W. BUCHEN
FROM:
JAY T. FRENCH
50
SUBJECT:
FOIA Request for NSC File Index
(Bennett)
You have requested the White House Counsel's guidance in your
consideration of a Freedom of Information Act appeal of your
decision to deny release of certain indices to NSC documents,
minutes and policy decisions. The initial request from Mr.
Jonathan Bennett was denied primarily because the indices
were not considered "records" for purposes of the FOIA.
The NSC's determination that indices are not records subject to
the FOIA was apparently based on the legal analysis of the State
Department in replying to a similar request for indices from
Mr. Bennett. However, our discussions with Mr. Robert
Saloschin of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel
(and Freedom of Information Committee) indicate that such a
legal rationale is not defensible. Accordingly, you should not
rely upon such grounds in denying Mr. Bennett's appeal.
It would be proper for the NSC to withhold these indices if they
are specifically authorized to be kept secret by Executive order
and have been properly classified pursuant to such Executive
order. In that regard, it was helpful that your memo recalled
the current litigation involving Morton Halperin's request for
certain other indices to NSC documents. Presently, the Justice
Department is defending the NSC's denial of Mr. Halperin's
request on grounds that indices taken as a whole can be classified
even though specific titles listed in those indices cannot be
classified standing alone. As long as the Department is in
in
FORD
-2-
litigation defending this position, the NSC may continue to rely
upon it as grounds for denying the release of other indices, such
as those requested by Mr. Bennett.
In relying upon such a defense, however, it is important to keep
in mind that Mr. Bennett is requesting indices for 1953 and earlier,
while Mr. Halperin is requesting indices for 1969 until the present.
This time difference is a material distinction between the Halperin
and Bennett requests. Consequently, it is my advice in this instance
that you reluctantly and sparingly apply the legal reasoning of the
Halperin defense and release as many portions of the requested
indices as may be segregated from those which are properly
classified.
This reply has been approved by the Freedom of Information
Committee at the Justice Department in accordance with the
requirements in 28 C.F.R. § 50.9.
SEAL
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 24, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JEANNE W. DAVIS
FROM:
PHILIP W. BUCHEN T.W.B.
This memorandum is in response to your note dated October 22
requesting my comments on a proposed Presidential memorandum
to the Secretary of Defense concerning the use of riot control
agents (RCAs). The materials which you forwarded (Tab A)
indicate that the Secretary is requesting authorization to use
RCAs to recover or protect nuclear weapons. Such authority
is required because Executive Order 11850 (Tab B) prohibited
the use of RCAs without prior Presidential approval.
The Secretary's request is for authority to use RCAs in war and
peacetime. However, Executive Order 11850 only prohibited the
use of RCAs in war. There are no restrictions on the use of RCAs
in peacetime. Therefore, it is appropriate only for the President
to authorize such use in war. If the Secretary wants to clarify,
for the benefit of local commanders, the use of RCAs in peacetime
to protect nuclear weapons, he may presumably do SO.
The suggested memo for the President's signature (Tab A) recites
that the President is acting, "Pursuant to your [the Secretary's]
request of August 13, 1975
"
Since David Elliott has pointed
out that the Secretary's request unnecessarily requested authority
to use RCAs in peacetime, it might be best not to reference this
memo in the President's memo. Also, the President's action is
actually pursuant to Section 1 of Executive Order 11850.
As a result of the foregoing considerations, it is recommended that
Secretary Kissinger forward a differently worded memorandum for
the President's signature (Tab C).
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950 Sec. 3.6
SECRET
MR94-152, #14, 9/8/98
By ht NABA, Date 6/6/00
NEWKEY
- -2-
Additionally, you might wish to consider the following collateral
questions:
1. Should the protection and recovery of other
weapons in war (e.g., chemical warfare
weapons) be included in this authorization?
2. Should advance written authority for the use
of RCAs as set forth in the examples described
in the preamble to the operative language of
Executive Order 11850 be included in this
authorization?
1.
FORD
SECRET
4
Claimied
chron
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 24, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: CAPT. L. S. KOLLMORGEN
FROM:
PHILIP W. BUCHEN P.W.B.
SUBJECT:
White House Emergency
Actions Officer
The Counsel's office has no objections to your
proposed memorandum to the President as set
forth in your secret memorandum of October 3,
1975.
Justice
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 24, 1975
Dear Mr. Thornburgh:
In accordance with your conversation with a
member of my staff, enclosed is a copy of the
subpoena directed to the President with respect
to United States V. Fromme, E. D. Cal.,
CR. No. S-75-451, for appropriate handling.
Sincerely,
Philip W. Buchen Buchen
Counsel to the President
The Honorable Richard Thornburgh
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530
Enclosure
your
From
10/24/75
Form No, USM-52 (Rev. 6-1-65)
SUBPOENA TICKET
District Court of the United States
Eastern
DISTRICT OF California
Gerald R. Ford, President
of The United States
Washington, D .C.
To
BY VIRTUE OF A SUBPOENA issued out of the District Court of the United States, you are re-
quired to be and appear before the said Court at
at
o'clock
m., on the
day of
, 19
then and there to testify on behalf of the
in the case of
United States of America
VS. Lynette Alice Fromme
CR. No. S-75-451
exaduse
YOU ARE HEREBY REQUIRED TO APPEAR AT A LOCATION TO BE
DETERMINED BY YOU AT ANY TIME CONVENIENT TO YOU ON OR BEFORE
OCTOBER 31, 1975, TO TESTIFY IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE BY WAY
OF A VIDEO TAPED DEPOSITION.
and not to depart without leave. If you fail to obey such subpoens, you may be fined and imprisoned,
as the Court may direct.
George K. McKinney
U.S. Murshal.
John E. Virga
Attorney for defendant
721 11th St.
1.
Sacramento, California 95814
SPALB
FORD
Tel: (916) 444-6595
LIBRARY
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1971 0 449-004
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 24, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
PHIL BUCHEN
FROM:
DONALD L.PRUMSFELD
I have read your memo to Brent Scowcroft of October 20
concerning gifts to U. S. Government Officials. It seems
to me that what you ought to do is sit down with Brent and
Henry and lay down the law. I don't see any need for a
meeting unless that doesn't work.
Called Brent
11/7/75
THE WHITE HOUSE
classic
WASHINGTON
October 20, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
PHILIP BUCHEN T.
SUBJECT:
Gifts to U. S. Government
Officials
In view of the information being disclosed to the
House Select Committee involving the Barzani gifts
and the discussions we had last evening, I attach
the following:
(1) A copy of the statute on foreign gifts
and decorations (5 USCA, Section 7342).
(2) Regulations issued from the State Depart-
ment on acceptance of gifts and
decorations from foreign governments
(22 CFR, part 3).
(3) Procedures adopted for processing of
gifts received by or on behalf of the
President which are from foreign
sources.
(4) Page 4 of the Standards of Conduct for
the White House staff with possibly
relevant subparagraphs marked.
If the gifts in question were from an "official agent
or representative" of a foreign government, the statute
and the regulations would apply and the use or the
disposition thereof would be controlled by Section 3.6
of the regulation. If the gifts are not from such an
official agent or representative, they are then subject
to the Standards of Conduct for the White House staff
as shown in the attached excerpt.
- 2 -
This excerpt comes from the current Standards of
Conduct, but the same provisions appeared in the
Standards of Conduct which were in effect under
President Nixon. I do not have copies of the
State Department's standards of conduct, but I
assume they contain similar provisions.
I am very fearful that unless there is compliance
with the procedural requirements imposed by either
the foreign gifts regulation or the standards of
conduct, the Committee may use the information
supplied to make telling charges of non-compliance.
It is also likely that the Committee may use this
opportunity to investigate the whole story of
gifts involving persons in the service of the
State Department, CIA, and the White House insofar
as gifts or other favors have come from governments,
organizations, or persons benefiting from covert
activities or other intelligence related functions
of the U. S. government.
The urgency of this situation, I believe, requires
that a meeting be held promptly which should
include Jack Marsh and Don Rumsfeld or someone from
Don's office.
Attachments
CC: Jack Marsh
Don Rumsfeld
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
last
October 25, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
PHILIP BUCHEN
When I talked to you Thursday evening about the
Judge's action in the Fromme case to authorize
your being subpoened for a deposition, I indicated
that the Justice Department was concerned that the
Judge had not properly addressed the various legal
issues raised by the defendant's request to have
you be a witness. However, the next day the Judge
did issue an opinion, copy of which is attached.
As you can see from the opinion, the Judge now has
carefully addressed the various legal issues and
although one might argue against certain of his
conclusions, he appears not to have misused his
discretionary authority in your matter.
Of further interest to you may be the attached
article which appeared recently in the University
of Illinois Law Forum and which has just come to
my attention.
Attachments
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SCHEDULE REQUEST
Date: October 25, 1975
From: Philip W. Buchen
Put
Via : Jerry Jones : !
MEETING:
Deposition of the President by John E.
Verga, Attorney for Lynette Alice Fromme.
DATE:
On or before October 31, 1975 (although
it could be slipped to November 1, 1975,
provided I know by Tuesday, October 28).
PURPOSE:
To comply with the attached subpoena,
issued pursuant to opinion of the U. S.
District Court for the Eastern District
of California on October 24, 1975.
FORMAT:
- location: Counsel's Office (West Wing)
(subject to approval by WHCA
that facilities here would
be appropriate)
- participants:
The President; a Judge
of the U. S. District
Court for the District
of Columbia (to be
designated) ; Dwayne Keyes,
a U.S. Attorney for the
Eastern District of
California; an attorney
from the Department of
Justice in Washington;
Philip W. Buchen; a court
reporter (to be designated) ;
and WHCA personnel as
needed for video taping.
- expected
Probably not more than
length of
one-half hour but
participation:
allowance should be made
for possible extension.
- 2 -
OTHER
PARTICIPATION:
None
PREPARATORY
MATERIAL:
Copy of President's written
statement to the FBI which he
gave on October 2, 1975.
PRESS
COVERAGE:
None (except that the Press Office
on the day of the event should
probably make an announcement that
the deposition is to be taken).
STAFF:
Philip W. Buchen
APPROVAL
FOR
AT
O'clock
oi
FREE
10/24/75
Form No, USM-52 (337. 6-1-65)
SUBPOENA TICKET
District Court of the United States
Eastern
DISTRICT OF California
Gerald R. Ford, President
of The United States
Washington, D .C. .
To
BY VIRTUE OF A SUBPOENA issued out of the District Court of the United States, you are Te-
quired to be and appear before the said Court at
et
o'clock
m., on the
day oi
, 19
then and there to testify on behalf of the
in the case of
United States of America
VSA
Lynette Alice Fromme
CR. No. S-75-451
YOU ARE HORELY REQUIRED TO APPEAR AT 1 LOCATION TO BE
DESCRVING BY YOU AT ANY TIME CONVENIENT TO YOU ON OR PEFORE
OCTOPER 31, 1975, TO TESTIFY III THE ABOVE ENTIMIED CASE bY WAY
OF A VIDEO-TAPED DEPOSITION.
and not to depart without leave. If you fail to obey such subpoens, you may be fined and imprisoned,
33 the Court may direct.
6
George 1. McKinney
U.S. Marshed.
John E. Virga
Mitorney for defendant
11th 3-.
1.
3acTaBecTo, California 95814
DEPARTMENT
FORD
Tel: (916) 1,1.1, 6595
U. S. COVERNMENT PROTTING OFFICE: : 1371 0
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 31, 1975
THE PRESIDENT'S DEPOSITION
Saturday, November 1, 1975
10:00 a.m. (30 minutes)
Room 345-EOB
From: Philip W. Buchen P.W.B.
I. PURPOSE
To comply with the subpoena issued by the District
Court of the United States for the Eastern District
of California in the case of United States of
America V. Lynette Alice Fromme.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN
A. Background: A subpoena was issued on October 24,
1975, requesting you to testify by way of a
video taped deposition in lieu of your appearing
as a witness called by the defense in the Fromme
case which is to be tried starting November 4.
Background paper prepared by the Justice
Department is attached at TAB A.
In addition, U. S. Attorney Dwayne Keyes will
meet with you late on Friday, October 31 for
approximately 15 minutes to provide further
background.
B. Participants: (See attached list, TAB B.)
C. Press Plan: Event is to be announced, but there
is to be no press coverage. If Judge MacBride
agrees, we will have Dave Kennerly take
photographs of the setting and the participants
in place prior to the start of the deposition.
These photographs would be for Archival purposes
only and would not be released for publication
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFRI 101.11.5
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Richard L. Thornburgh
TO
:
DATE:
OCT 31 1975
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
FROM
D. Dwayne Keyes
United States Attorney
Eastern District of California
SUBJECT:
LYNETTE ALICE FROMME
The defendant, Lynette Alice Fromme, has been indicted
for attempting to assassinate Gerald R. Ford, President of
the United States.
Her trial is presently scheduled to commence on
November 4, 1975, before the Honorable Thomas J. MacBride,
Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California.
There were 20 to 25 known persons at the scene who saw
various portions of the alleged attempt on the life of the
President or who heard various statements attributed to the
defendant.
There were numerous others in the immediate vicinity
who neither saw nor heard anything.
The defense has stated they wish to inquire further
into the President's recollection concerning the click of
the handgun and statements attributed to the defendant. It
can also be expected that the President will be asked about
the appearance or demeanor of the defendant when she pointed
the gun at him.
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
5010.110
PARTICIPANTS
Judge Thomas J. MacBride
District Court of the United States
for the Eastern District of California
Mr. Richard Thornburgh
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
Mr. Dwayne Keyes
U. S. Attorney for the Eastern District
of California
Mr. John E. Virga
Attorney for Lynette S. Fromme (The Defendant)
Mr. Richard Fong
Court Reporter from Judge MacBride's
Court
Technical personnel from the Navy
Photo Center and from White House
Communications Agency