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Philip W. Buchen Files
Philip Buchen's General Subject Files
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The original documents are located in Box 17, folder "Foreign Assistance Act" of the Philip
Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 17 of the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
May 5, 1976
Mr. Buchan
I would appreciate your comments on the
attached draft I am preparing for Brent to
send to the President.
I particularly need a legal opinion on the
proposal in subpara (a) on page three. Does this
remove the constitutional objections to the bill if
such a waiver authority can remove the force of
law from the concurrent resolution? Is this a
fig leaf that will work?
Thanks.
for
Les Janka
offer m his 5/7/76
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Security Assistance Legislation
Future Options
Your veto of S. 2662 has negated the authorization of appropriations
for the following accounts: Security Supporting Assistance, Middle East
Special Requirements Fund, Military Assistance Program, International
Military Education and Training, Foreign Credit Sales, International
Narcotics Control and the Contingency Fund. The authorization for TQ
funds was also eliminated. All other foreign aid appropriations have
been authorized in legislation other than S. 2662.
There are essentially four options for continuing our foreign aid pro-
grams in FY 1976 and 1977:
1. An amended Continuing Resolution for all accounts or, as a variation,
an appropriation for all accounts authorized in other legislation and
continuance of S. 2662 accounts in an amended Continuing Resolution.
This option is only feasible if the Continuing Resolution is amended
to provide special funding levels for key programs such as Security
Supporting Assistance and Foreign Military Credit Sales. Such amend-
ments would amount (in essence) to an appropriation bill and appear to
be the remedy Congress is most likely to turn to in order to fund these
programs. However, it is also likely that Congress will only amend the
CRA to provide relief for the Middle East accounts and perhaps only to
cover Israel.
-2-
2. Use H. R. 12203, the regular appropriation act, to appropriate all
programs by waiving authorization requirements for accounts authorized
in S. 2662.
Chairman Passman is reportedly considering this approach, but he
would have to obtain a special rule permitting amendments to the Con-
ference Report on H. R. 12203. This is an unlikely route given the
reluctance of the authorizing committees to forego their bills, and even
if it succeeded, your veto threat over the TQ funding contained in this
bill would remain.
3. Repass a "clean" FY 76 authorization bill.
It is very unlikely that the two committees would, or could, even
report such a bill, given the considerable dismay and even some outrage
your veto of the bill has caused on the Hill.
4. A combined FY 76 and FY 77 authorization bill.
Chairman Morgan is already considering the possibility of such a
bill with some of the more objectionable features of S. 2662 removed.
Such a bill would have the advantage of avoiding similar restrictive
amendments in the FY 77 legislation and would defer to a new Congress
the debate over these issues.
I believe you are in a good position to
extract significant concessions from Congress. Your veto of the bill has
caused considerable dismay and even some outrage on the Hill. Members
who had supported the bill are, understandably, very disappointed that their
efforts in your support have been to no avail. Other members, however,
particularly in the House, seem to recognize that they had gone too far in
adopting legislative encroachments on your ability to conduct foreign relations.
Additional factors enhance the mood for compromise:
Congress would like to avoid a prolonged struggle over security
assistance in an election year. We understand that Chairman Morgan
in particular would support an effort to achieve a compromise bill
without the most objectionable provisions.
Congress is under intense pressure to provide support for Israel.
Israeli military purchases this year have already exceeded, by about
$450 million, the $300 million FMS authorized under the Continuing
Resolution, even though DOD has so far managed to avoid holding up
deliveries. In addition to the funding needs for current deliveries,
a compromise on your threatened veto of Transition Quarter funds
for Israel is also a high priority for Israel's supporters.
-3-
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
Pro-Israeli members of both houses are also key supporters of many of
the restrictive amendments (e.g., Solarz and Binglam in the House,
Humphrey, Case and Javits in the Senate). In many cases, the desire
of these individuals to ensure assistance for Israel may outweight their
support for restrictions on your authority.
These circumstances suggest a number of possibilities for a compromise
that go beyond resort to an amended CRA or a rapid repassage of a cleaned-
up FY 76 authorization bill.
Transition Quarter funding for the Middle East could be a sufficient incentive
to allow the leadership to push through a more acceptable two-year authori-
zation bill with broad support and crucial help from Israel's supporters. In
exchange for Congressional agreement to expedite passage of a combined
FY 76 and FY 77 authorization bill without restrictive amendments, the
Administration would need to agree to additional FMS funding for Israel in the
Transition Quarter. Because ten dollars of FMS guaranteed credit requires
only one dollar of outlay, a $250 million TQ Israeli FMS program could be
supported by the $25 million requested in your budget for the TQ, but now
excess to our requirements.
The question of maintaining balance in the Middle East package could be eased
to some extent by simply restoring in the TQ the supporting assistance funds
cut from your FY 1976 budget request. This would provide an additional
$55 million for Egypt and Israel, $5.0 million for Jordan, and $10 million for
Syria -- still not a balanced package but more acceptable to the Arabs -- with-
out any increase in NOA over your original budget levels.
A new two-year authorization bill would be based upon S.2662 to provide
some face-saving for the Congress, but the Committees would be asked to
report a bill with the following changes:
(a)
Addition of a section authorizing you to waive any legislative veto
by concurrent resolution. (This would retain procedures for
Congressional participation in decisions on major sales, but would
leave final decision with you, thus removing the constitutional
objections.)
(b)
Elimination of the prohibition against restrictions on trade with
Vietnam.
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS
KR 8/3/88
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS
-4-
(c)
Retention of anti-discrimination policy provisions consistent with
your announcement of November 20, 1975, but with the sanctions
removed.
(d)
Elimination of $9.0 billion annual ceiling on arms sales.
In addition to these essential changes, we could also ask for, but be prepared
to compromise more liberally on the following issues, in recognition that the
Human Rights provision for example has inordinate symbolic and political
significance in both Houses:
(e)
Modification of the human rights provisions to avoid question of
legality of assistance and providing waiver provisions.
(f)
Retention of the phaseout for grant military assistance and advisory
groups "except as specifically authorized" but with the understanding
that there would in fact be specific authorizations for essential country
programs.
(g)
Inclusion of funding for FY 1977 programs at the levels you have
requested.
A compromise along the foregoing lines would provide the authority and
funds necessary to carry out your program while retaining some facesaving
features for the supporters of S.2662. In particular, the prompt enactment
of authorizing legislation for FY 1976 and FY 1977 would provide us with
authority to resume FMS sales to Turkey, which could not be achieved
through an amendment to continuing resolution funding for the remainder
of this fiscal year. Also, an expedited two-year bill could avoid a renewed
fight over objectionable amendments to the FY 1977 legislation and defer
until a new Congress the debate over these issues. Finally, an accommodation
on security assistance legislation would help clear the air for subsequent
Greece consideration of the Spanish Treaty and the base agreements with Turkey,
and the Philippines.
On the other hand, such a compromise has some negative aspects for
Your strong stand in opposition to assistance to Israel in the TQ has been us.
effective in bringing home to both Israel and the Congress that we cannot
debt go on funding excessive Israeli military procurement or the burgeoning
while which results; providing funds in the TQ will weaken that
is increasing still further Israeli outyear debt. On the other message hand, there
evidence that your message has already struck home and that the Israelis
now realize that whatever the outcome of the TQ issue they can no longer
military procurement plans.
count on virtually unlimited U.S. assistance to fund their most ambitious
-5-
If you are willing to consider such a compromise, we believe that the Israeli
lobby could be persuaded to support you on the Hill by delivering crucial
votes and pressuring members to keep the bill free from amendments which
could result in a second veto. In addition to the votes of those who have
supported you throughout the authorization process, we might be able to
add those Republicans who supported restrictive amendments but may now
be reluctant to undercut a Republican President in an election year, and
those anxious to end the protracted debate on this issue. Therefore, we
believe a majority in both Houses in favor of a clean two-year authorization
is attainable.
With ill-feeling among some key members at your veto, a compromise will
be difficult to sell. We cannot count on some supporters we would normally
look to for backing. We would have to use with skill and toughness the
leverage we now have while at the same time be prepared to offer consider-
able opportunity for conciliation and facesaving. Such a proposal will not
receive ready acceptance in all quarters, but on balance, a compromise
along the lines discussed would be extremely beneficial if it could be
achieved. If you agree, I suggest that you authorize us to explore the
possibility with key Congressional leaders and arrange a meeting with
them for you to work out such an agreement.
Agree
Disagree
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS
INFORMATION
April 20, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JAMES T. LYNN
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Follow-up Issues on the Israeli Transition
Quarter Problems
The attached papers provide follow-up analyses on the five issues you
raised at our Friday meeting:
Tab A. Summary of the troublesome provisions of the Foreign
Assistance Authorization Bill emphasizing the encroachments on
Presidential prerogatives.
Tab B. Analysis of the Congressional cuts in the MAP program
indicating the impact and outlining the steps necessary to get an
increase over the authorization and appropriation level.
Tab C. Evaluation of the impact of the continuing resolution on
foreign aid programs identifying the steps necessary to live with
the continuing resolution through the Transition Quarter and the
priority of these steps.
Tab D. Analysis of the impact on the Israeli balance of payments
from a continuation of current high levels of military imports
suggesting that Israeli orders must be substantially reduced in
1977 and beyond.
Tab E. Analysis of the quid pro quo on base agreements for Spain,
Turkey, and Greece.
Subject to GDS of E.O. 11652
Automatically Declassified
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS
December 31, 1982.
KR 8/3/88
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS
-2-
The net of these papers is that there are no apparent trade-offs on the
Transition Quarter. A veto and going to a CRA brings no immediate relief
and creates additional problems. Further the opportunities for restoration
of funds for key countries are SO limited as to not warrant relenting on the
principle of no budget increases in the TQ.
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS
DRAFT 4/20/76
Tab A
Analysis of Fiscal 1976 and Transition Quarter Authorization Bill
A.
Amounts Authorized to be Appropriated
(Millions of dollars)
1976
Transition Quarter
Admin.
Conference
Admin.
Confere
Request
Report
Request
Report
Grant Military Assistance
(MAP)
394.5
228.7
27.2
1/
57.2
Foreign Military Credit
Sales (FMS)
1,065.0
1,039.0
30.0
259.8
(Program)
(2,374.7)
(2,374.7)
(55.5)
(593.7)
Security Supporting
Assistance (SSA)
1,848.3
1,766.2
28.2
441.6
Middle East Special
Requirement Fund
50.0
50.0
10.0
12.5
Other
107.5
83.0
30.0
20.7
Total
3,465.3
3,166.9
125.4
791.8
1/ Excludes amounts requested for Spain which will be authorized
separately.
Except for the 1976 grant MAP authorization, the amounts
authorized for appropriation do not significantly constrain
Administration
flexibility. The effects of the reduced
MAP authorization are softened by separating provisions for
major recipients (Greece, Turkey, the Philippines) in proposed
base agreements. (The MAP problem is discussed separately at
Tab B.)
2
B.
Major Policy Problems
Concurrent Resolutions. The conference report retains
provisions whereby Congress by concurrent resolution can within
30 calendar days forbid any sale of defense articles over $25
million or any sale over $7.0 million of "major defense equipment".
This extends the existing Nelson-Bingham authority (which prohibits
FMS transactions) to include the commercial transactions and
significant sales under $25 million. The President can exempt
a sale from Congressional veto by certifying in the notification
that an "emergency" exists that makes such a sale in the national
interest. Congress can also use concurrent resolutions to
terminate assistance to any country that violates the human rights
of its citizens, as discussed below.
Nr
Human Rights. The legislation increases Congressional over-
sight of human rights: it establishes a yearly reporting procedure
on the human rights situation in all countries receiving security
assistance, and allows Congress to ask for more detailed reports
on particular countries. (Language requiring the Secretary of
PASS
State to apss judgment on the human rights practices of these
countries has been deleted.) The legislation also creates the
position of Coordinator for Human Rights within the Department
of State as a Presidential appointment requiring Senate confirmation.
The Coordinator is subordinate to the Secretary. Finally, the
legislation allows Congress, within 90 days of receiving a
Department of State report on human rights in a particular country,
to terminate or restrict assistance to that country by concurrent
resolution. No waiver authority is provided.
3
$9.0 Billion Arms Sales Ceiling. The Conference Report incorporates
a worldwide $9.0 billion beiling on arms sales (FMS and commercial)
beginning in FY 1977. The ceiling would be computed according
to contract price of equipment actually delivered in the fiscal
year; thus the full value of long-term contracts signed in FY 1977
will not be counted against the ceiling in that year, but incremental
in out years as deliveries are made. (This eases somewhat the
pressure of the ceiling in FY 1977, but increases the problem
in subsequent years.) The ceiling is to be automatically recomputed
to account for inflation. There is a Presidential waiver
which requires only that the President determine a particular sale
above the ceiling to be in the national interest. Since arm
sales must already fulfill this criterion, the waiver provision
is intentionally lenient. While the ceiling as now constructed
is largely symbolic and will have no significant effect on
our arms sales activity, it does set a precedent and, depending
on future Congressional predilections could either wither away
or become a means of tight control as loopholes are closed.
Termination of Grant MAP and MAAGs. he Conference Report mandates
the termination of the grant military assistance program (MAP)
and of military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) afer fiscal
year 1977, except as specifically authroized by Congress for each
country. In short, if this bill becomes law, the traditionally
worldwide MAP will have been converted into anumber of small
programs, individually justified against a presumption that all
such activity should be phased out as soon as possible.
Anti-discrimination. The Conference Report embodies a Case
Amendment mandating the cut-off of a particular FMS project if
a U.S. citizen is
5
in defense articles and services to Turkey during the
balance of fiscal 1976 and the transition quarter, a
softening of the present total prohibition on grants or
Other IRRitants.
-- For Chile, the bill permits only cash sales through
September 30, 1976.
-- With respect to agent fees, the bill (1) mandates
reports to the Congress; (2) instructs the Secretary
of State to establish record keeping and reporting
requirements for the private sector; and (3). provides
for punishment of private individuals not complying
with these regulations. These provisions are considered
onerous by some corporations but should not affect the
President directly.
-- The bill suspends the President's authority to restrict
trade with Vietnam for 180 days in the hope the
Vietnamese will be more forthcoming in accounting for
MIAs and returning remains of American war dead.
-- The bill requires the President to submit an annual
report including an arms control impact statement pre-
pared by the Director of ACDA for each purchasing
country which addresses the impact of such sales on our
arms control efforts with that country and their impa
on the stability of the region in which the country
located. In addition to being bureaucratically
some, the statements will probably be politici
6
used as a vehicle to oppose military assistance
to certain countries.
Conclusion
NSC and OMB believe the President should sign the legisla-
tion when it is finally passed and append a strong signing
statement establishing a record for future efforts to remove
the most objectionable provisions. All of the Departments and
agencies concerned are expected to concur in this approach.
TAB B
Possible MAP Add-Back
(millions of dollars)
1976
1976
Budget
Congress
1/
China (Taiwan)
.9
.9
Indonesia
19.4
14.3
Korea
74.0
60.5
Philippines
19.6
18.7
Thailand
28.3
17.6
Jordan
100.0
55.0
Tunisia
.2
.2
Yemen
1.5
1.5
Greece
50.0
34.1
Turkey
75.0
--
Portugal
.3
.3
Spain
.2
.2
Ethiopia
11.6
6.6
Latin America
4.6
2.9
General Costs
37.1
32.0
Unallocated balance
--
8.52/
Total Program
422.8
253.3
Less Financing
-28.3
-28.3
Budget Authority
394.5
225.02/
1/ Illustrative allocation of expected appropriations under country
ceiling provisions and other limitations of conference report.
2/ This amount could not be obligated if the various country
limitations in the authorization conference report become law.
Inasmuch as it will probably not be possible to obligate grant MAP
funds for Turkey, the effective cut in the balance of the country programs
requested by the Administration is $103 million in 1976. A reduction of
this amount may result in some political disappointment, but it should
not have a significant impact on the force goals of recipients since
alternative financing should be available.
2
This 1976 reduction could be partially offset by seeking an additional
appropriation of $30 million in the transition quarter if the conference
report provision authorizing one-quarter of the 1976 amount in the transi-
tion quarter becomes law. Since the country ceilings would also apply on
a one-fourth basis, the Jordan program, for example, could be raised by
only $12.5 million in the transition quarter even if the full additional
$30 millions were appropriated.
Under a CRA, theoretically, none of the conference report ceilings
would apply, but the Congress is likely to respond to a veto by incorporating
similar ceilings in any CRA. Thus, the situation under a CRA is not
likely to differ greatly from that described above under the conference
report.
Conclusion
Given that the 1976 MAP reductions are not severe except for Turkey,
and Turkey will not be eligible for grant MAP because of Section 620 (x)
prohibition, efforts to restore either the 1976 levels or obtain a larger
transition quarter appropriation are probably not warranted.
TAB C
Continuing Resolution Problems
If the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act were not enacted into
law, funding for foreign aid programs would be provided by the
continuing resolution authority (CRA) which has recently been extended
through September 30. In most cases, the CR would provide considerably
less funding than had been provided for in the appropriations conference
committee (see attachment). The following is a listing of the major
problems, by account, which would exist by operating under the CR.
The list identifies the major special provisions which would be required
if the programs were to continue under continuous resolution in order
of priority.
- The amount available for foreign military credit sales
would finance a program of $1,063 million, compared with a
request of $2,550 million. The most immediate impact would
be in Israel, which would have to default on payments for
military supply deliveries.
- Israel would also be the first victim of a CR level in the
Security Supporting Assistance account, where there would
be $824 million available against a request of $1,865 million.
The flow of U.S. financed civilian imports to Israel would be
halted resulting in drastically reduced levels of domestic
consumption. Program delays would occur in Egypt, Jordan
and Syria, though the economic damage to those countries
would be less serious than to Israel. Financing for Israel,
however, would politically require that funds also be sought
2
for Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, but Congress may not be
willing to provide additional funding for these countries
under CRA.
- The continuing resolution rate would seriously reduce the
funds available for disaster relief for Guatemala, Cyprus,
and worldwide relief, and would cause the U.S. to renege
on funds pledged to assist victims of the recent Guatemala
earthquakes.
- No funds could be given to the International Development
Association (IDA) on whose fourth replenishment the U.S.
is already two years behind. By the end of this fiscal
year, IDA will have committed more than $1 billion against
U.S. pledges, none of which has yet been paid.
- While the Continuing Resolution technically provides funds
for the grant military assistance program (MAP) in excess
of the levels requested, in practical terms a limit is
imposed by the appropriations conference level of $253
million in 1976 and $22 million in the TQ (see Tab B).
- Funds for bilateral development assistance would be $266
million below the amounts requested, resulting in a
deferral or cancellation of almost one-quarter of the
programs planned for this fiscal year.
- Voluntary contributions to the UN, the OAS and the Indus
Basin Development Fund would be reduced by $80 million from
the requested levels, causing serious problems for the UN
development Programme, which is already in a financial crisis,
and other important multilateral development programs.
3
- Reacting strongly to a veto -- OMB and NSC believe that
Congress is not likely to make special provisions for any
of these needs, except Israel. Therefore, a strategy of
relying on a continuing resolution through the TQ runs high
risks of even greater program disruption.
Foreign Assistance Funds Available for the 1976-TQ Period
(Program in $ millions)
Administration
Appropriate
Continuing
Request
Conference
Resolution
(House)
(Senate)
Security Assistance
Foreign Military Credit Sales
2,550.2
(2,550.2)
(2,805.2)
1,062.9
Security Supporting Assistance
1,864.6
(1,719.0)
(2,111.7)
824.0
Military Assistance Program
470.0
285.5
728.6
Military Training
39.0
28.8
Middle East Special Requirements
60.0
60.0
60.0
Total - Security Assistance
4,983.8
(4,643.5)
(5,291.2)
2,675.5
Development Assistance
Bilateral Assistance (AID)
Functional Assistance
1,138.6
924.8
871.8
Disaster Relief (Includes Cyprus Relief)
70.0
70.0
51.2
Other
311.5
307.8
297.5
Multilateral Assistance
IDA
375.0
320.0
Asian Development Bank
170.6
145.6
170.6
Inter-American Development Bank
275.0
225.0
225.0
International Organization and Programs
253.5
218.4
174.3
Total - Development Assistance
2,594.2
2,211.4
1,790.4
Other Foreign Assistance
233.0
253.0
224.5
Total - Foreign Assistance
7,811.0
(7,107.9)
(7,755.6)
4,690.4
4/16/76
Impact on Israeli Balance of Continued Military Imports
For purposes of illustrating the balance of payments impact of continuing
military orders at the "current level, II we have assumed that the 1976 level
of $2.0 billion in orders of new major items will be repeated in 1977 and
1978. This level of new orders, of course, is well above that considered
necessary by the U.S. Government.
Because Israeli estimates of the follow-on and commercial orders of spare
parts and other items substantially exceed DOD estimates, two alternative
payment deficits are presented. Both assume a $2.0 billion level on major
new orders. The first deficit is based on a lower level of follow-on orders
assumed by DOD, while the second shows the higher level assumed by the
Israelis. Table II shows the overall balance of payments deficits taking into
account civil as well as military imports and all sources of financing.
Overall Balance of Payments
(millions of dollars)
CY 1976
CY 1977
CY 1978
Deficit based on Defense
estimates 1/
-209
- 845
- 872
Deficit based on Israeli
estimates 2/
-761
-1269
-1415
There are still several areas of uncertainty about the estimates which are
being worked out between U.S. and Israeli technicians (e.g., possible double
dounting of Israeli military imports and economic assumptions).
The table shows that continuation of the current high level of military imports
will push Israel into a serious balance of payments deficit position which will
be magnified if Israeli FMS purchases of follow-on supply items and commercial
military orders are not constrained.
Conclusion
Israeli military orders must be substantially reduced below the 1976 level if
payments requirements are to be brought into line with projected FMS credit
levels and large Israeli balance of payments deficits are to be avoided. The
problem of excessive Israeli military imports would be exacerbated by additional
TQ funding as it would reduce their incentives to restrain purchases.
TABLE II
ISRAELI BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
($ in Millions
1976
1977
1978
A. Financing Requirements
Civilian Imports
-5,850
-6,450
-7,100
Indirect Military Imports
...
-525
-500
-500
Direct Military Imports
(from U.S.)
-1,895
-2,119
-2,291
Third country and other
military imports
-300
-300
-300
External debt maturities
.....
-660
-800
-900
TOTAL
-9,230
-10,169
-11,091
B. Financing Available
Export earnings
+4,455
+5,290
+6,085
Non-U.S. Government transfers
+2,100
+2,200
+2,300
U. S. Economic Aid
+755
+834
+834
U. S. Military Aid
+1,711
+1,000
+1,000
TOTAL
+9,021
9,324
+10,219
C. Deficit using Department of
Defense estimates
-209
-845
-872
D. Deficit if GOI military
estimates used
-761
-1,269
-1,415
4/20/76
I
Direct Military Imports from U.S.
($ Millions)
FY 76
TQ
FY 77
FY 78
FY 79
Existing Cases
1,897
132
591
100
63
New Major Item
Procurement
FY 76
40
202
892
500
366
FY 77
-
-
242
892
500
FY 78
242
892
FY 79
242
Follow-on
Supply Support
-
80
360
450
550
Total Payments
Due
1,937
414
2,085
2,184
2,613
Funds Available
2,429
492
1,078
1,000
1,000
Carry Over
492
78
Deficit
(1,007)
(1,184)
(1,613)
Additional payments
due if use GOI
estimates
321
139
368
591
400
Total Payments
due
2,258
553
2,453
2,775
3,013
Funds Available
2,429
171
1,000
1,000
1,000
Carry over
171
Deficit
(382)
(1,453)
(1,775)
(2,013)
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 01399
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Report(s)
TITLE
Quid Pro Quo for the Mediterranean
DESCRIPTION
base aggreements for Spain, Turkey and
Greece.
CREATION DATE
04/1976?
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
001900208
COLLECTION TITLE
Philip W. Buchen Files
BOX NUMBER
17
FOLDER TITLE
Foreign Assistance Act
DATE WITHDRAWN
08/12/1988
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 23, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR PHIL AREEDA
Is Evans the Ryan and Novak Amendment today clearly that was constitutional? referred to in P.Aulde
Or is there a question?
DONALD RUMSFELD
532 S of 74 Freyn And Bill
FORD & LIBRARY CERALD
amenting $662 S
Carry at CIA; Leigh at State.
DATE
STATE - A.I.D. - USIA
1/27/75
ROUTING SLIP
TO:
Organ.
Initials
Date
Name or Title
Symbol
Room No. Bldg.
1.
Phillip Areeda
White House
2.
3.
4.
5.
Approval
For Your Information
Note and Return
As Requested
Initial for Clearance
Per Conversation
Comment
Investigate
Prepare Reply
File
Justify
See Me
For Correction
Necessary Action
Signature
REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING
Per telcon Saturday.
File with on to cupy Rydn Americant
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
FROM: (Name and Org. Symbol)
ROOM NO. & BLDG.
PHONE NO.
Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Dept. of
State
FORM
3 68
JF-29 (Formerly Forms DS-10, AID-5-50 & IA-68)
warnern 143-6111
mr Leigh
93D CONGRESS
2d Session
}
{
REPORT
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
No. 93-1610
CONFERENCE REPORT
ON
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1974
S. 3394
TO AMEND THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
DECEMBER 17, 1974
LIBRARY GERALD P. FORD
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
38-006
WASHINGTON : 1974
12
"(2) to any contract entered into prior to the date of enactment
of this section with any person, organization, or agency of the
United States Government to provide personnel to conduct, or
assist in conducting, any such program.
Notwithstanding clause (2), subsection (a) shall apply to any re-
newal or extension of any contract referred to in such paragraph
entered into on or after such date of enactment."
(b) Section 112 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is repealed.
REIMBURSABLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
SEC. 32. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding
at the end of part III the following new section:
"SEC. 661. Reimbursable Development Programs.-The President
is authorized to use up to $1,000,000 of the funds made available for
the purposes of this Act in each of the fiscal years 1975 and 1976 to
work with friendly countries, especially those in which United States
development programs have been concluded or those not receiving
assistance under part I of this Act, in (1) facilitating open and fair
access to natural resources of interest to the United States and (2)
stimulation of reimbursable aid programs consistent with part I of
this Act. Any funds used for purposes of this section may be used
notwithstanding any other provision of this Act."
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND EXCHANGES OF MATERIALS
SEC. 32. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding
at the end of part III the following пего sections:
"SEC. 662. Limitation on Intelligence Activities.-(a) No funds ap-
propriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be
expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for
operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely
for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the President
finds that each such operation is important to the national security
of the United States and reports. in a timely fashion, a description
and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of the Con-
gress, including the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United
States Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United
States House of Representatives.
"(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply
during military operations initiated by the United States under a
declaration of war approved by the Congress or an exercise of powers
by the President under the War Powers Resolution.
"Sec.663. Exchanges of Certain Materials.-(a) Notwithstand-
ing any other provision of law, whenever the President determines
it is in the United States national interest, he shall furnish assistance
under this Act or shall furnish defense articles or services under the
Foreign Military Sales Act pursuant to an agreement with the recipient
of such assistance, articles, or services which provides that such re-
cipient may only obtain such assistance, articles, or services in ex-
change for any necessary or strategic raw material controlled by such
recipient. For the purposes of this section, the term 'necessary or
strategic raw material' includes petroleum, other fossil fuels, metals,
FORD & LIBRA
13
minerals, or any other natural substance which the President deter-
mines is in short supply in the United States.
'(b) The President shall allocate any necessary or strategic raw
material transferred to the United States under this section to any
appropriate agency of the United States Government for stockpiling,
sale, transfer, disposal, or any other purpose authorized by law.
'(c) Funds received from any disposal of materials under subsection
(b) shàll be deposited as miscellaneous receipts in the United States
Treasury."
WAIVER OF PROHIBITION AGAINST ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES ENGAGING
IN CERTAIN TRADE
SEC. 33. Chapter 3 of part III of the Foreign Asistance Act of 1961
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
"SEC. 664. Wairer of Prohibition Against Assistance to Coun-
tries Engaging in Certain Trade.-Any provision of this Act which
prohibits assistance to a country because that country is engaging in
trade with a designated country, or because that country permits ships
or aircraft under its registry to transport any equipment, materials, or
commodities to or from such designated country, may be waived by
the President if he determines that such waiver is in the national
interest and reports such determination to the Congress."
POLICY WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA
Sec. 34. (a) The Congress finds that the cease-fire provided for in
the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in
Vietnam has not been observed by any of the Vietnamese parties to
the conflict. Military operations of an offensive and defensive nature
continue throughout South Vietnam. In Cambodia, the civil war
between insurgent forces and the Lon Nol government has intensified,
resulting in widespread human suffering and the virtual destruction
of the Cambodian economy.
(b) The Congress further finds that continuation of the military
struggles in South Vietnam and Cambodia are not in the interest of
the parties directly engaged in the conflicts, the people of Indochina
or world peace. In order to lessen the human suffering in Indochina
and to bring about a genuine peace there, the Congress urges and
requests the President and the Secretary of State to undertake the
following measures:
(1) to initiate negotiations with representatives of the Soviet
Union. and the People's Republic of China to arrange a mutually
agreed-upon and rapid de-escalation of military assistance on the
part of the three principal suppliers of arms and material to all
Vietnamese and Cambodian parties engaged in conflict;
(2) to urge by all available means that the Government of the
Khmer Republic enter in negotiations with representatives of the
Khmer Government of National Union for the purpose of ar-
ranging an immediate cease-fire and political settlement of the
conflict; and to use all available means to establish contact with
the Khmer Government of National Union, and to urge them to
participate in such negotiations. The United States should urge
all Cambodian parties to use the good offices of the United Nations
H. Rept. 1610 o 74 3
BRALD LIBRARY P. FORD
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CENTRAL AGENCY OFFICE
Office of Legislative Counsel
Washington, D. C. 20505
Telephone: 351-6121 (Code 143-6121)
STATES
OF
28 January 1975
TO:
Mr. Philip Areeda
Legal Counsel Staff
White Phil House
Per our conversation, attached is an
excerpt of the Foreign Assistance Act amendments
of 1974 containing the provision on intelligence
activities.
George George IQ Cary
Legislative Counsel
goes pumpled with on Rydn with Amendment DERALD R. FORD LIBRARY
CORM
1533
OBSOLETE
(40)
$
PREVIOUS
FAA
Pub. Law 93-559
- 10 -
December 30, 1974
88 STAT. 1804
22 USC 2420.
"SEC. 660. Prohibiting Police Training.-(a) On and after July 1,
1975, none of the funds made available to carry out this Act, and
none of the local currencies generated under this Act, shall be used to
provide training or advice, or provide any financial support, for
police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign gov-
ernment or any program of internal intelligence or surveillance on
behalf of any foreign government within the United States or abroad.
"(b) Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply-
"(1) with respect to assistance rendered under section 515 (c)
42 USC 3763.
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, with
respect to any authority of the Drug Enforcement Administration
or the Federal Bureau of Investigation which relates to crimes of
the nature which are unlawful under the laws of the United
States, or with respect to assistance authorized under section
22 USC 229la.
482 of this Act; or
(2) to any contract entered into prior to the date of enactment
of this section with any person, organization, or agency of the
United States Government to provide personnel to conduct, or
assist in conducting, any such program.
Notwithstanding clause (2), subsection (a) shall apply to any
renewal or extension of any contract referred to in such paragraph
entered into on or after such date of enactment."
Repeal.
(b) Section 112 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is repealed.
22 USC 2151J.
REIMBURSABLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
SEC. 31. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding
at the end of part III the following new section:
22 USC 2421.
"SEC. 661. Reimbursable Development Programs.-The President
is authorized to use up to $1,000,000 of the funds made available for
the purposes of this Act in each of the fiscal years 1975 and 1976 to
work with friendly countries, especially those in which United States
development programs have been concluded or those not receiving
22 USC 2151.
assistance under part I of this Act, in (1) facilitating open and fair
access to natural resources of interest to the United States and (2)
stimulation of reimbursable aid programs consistent with part I of
this Act. Any funds used for purposes of this section may be used
nótwithstanding any other provision of this Act."
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND EXCHANGES OF MATERIALS
SEC. 32. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding
at the end of part III the following new sections:
22 USC 2422.
"SEC. 662. Limitation on Intelligence Activities.-(a) No funds
appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be
expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for
operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely
for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the President
finds that each such operation is important to the national security
Presidential
of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description
FORD
report to
and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of the Con-
Congress.
gress, including the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United
States Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United
States House of Representatives.
LIBRARY
"(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply
during military operations initiated by the United States under a
declaration of war approved by the Congress or an exercise of powers
50 USC 1541
by the President under the War Powers Resolution.
note,
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
PHIL BUCHEN
T.
SUBJECT:
List of Principal Questionable Provisions in
Conference Bill on International Security Assistance
Arms Export Control Act of 1976
1)
Congressional power by concurrent resolution:
a)
To block an FMS sale of over $25 million (in current act)
b)
To block commercial sale of defense articles over $25 million.
c)
To block an FMS or commercial sale of major defense equipment
over $7.0 million.
d)
To terminate or restrict military assistance for a country which
Congress determines to be in violation of internationally
recognized human rights.
e)
To disapprove transfer to third countries of defense articles
provided under this and prior foreign assistance legislation.
f)
To terminate military assistance for a country which the Congress
finds has violated any condition of the assistance.
2)
Detailed mechanism for annual general reports and for country reports
on human rights practices of recipient countries, on the basis of which
Congress may terminate or restrict assistance.
3)
$9.0 billion arms sales ceiling.
4)
Restrictions imposed to impact on civil rights practices of foreign
governments, including lack of flexibility by reason of too restrictive
waiver authority.
5)
Termination of grant MAP and MAAGs unless specifically authorized by
Congress.
FORD is LIBRARY OERALD
Bachent Pres
Listot principal questionable provisions in Con forence Bill on
International Security Absistance Arms Export Control Actot 1976
1) Congrossional vate power by concurrent resolution:
to block
a) an FM5 sale of over $ 25 million (incurrent
act)
b) n commercial 52/0 of defense articlos
To block
over $25 million
c) Toblock inFM5 or commercia not major
salo
defense equipment over $ 7 million
d) To terminate or restrict military assistance
for = country which Congress determines to be
in violatio n of internationally recognized humanrights
e) To disapprove trans for to third countries
of defense articles provided under this
and prior foreign assistance legislation
f) To ferminate military assistance for 2
country which the Congress finds has
violated any condition of the assistance,
2) Detoiled For mechanism for annual general reports
and country reports on human rights practices
of recipient countries, on therbasis of which
Congress may terminate or restrict 2 ssistance.
3) $9 billion a rms sales ceiling.
4) Restrictions mposed to impact on CIVIL rights
protices of foreign governments, including
FORDO i LIBRARY
lack ot flexibility by eason of too restrictive
waiver authority.
5) Termination of Grant MAP and MAAGs unless
specifically authorized by Congress,
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
5/4/76
TO:
Mr. Buchen
Mr. Marsh
Mr. Janka
Mr. Linder
FROM: Mr. Ogilvie
Proposed final version.
Please phone any comments to
Bob Linder this morning.
Attachment
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
Draft-5/4/76
TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
I am returning, without my approval, S. 2662, a bill
that would seriously obstruct the exercise of the President's
constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of foreign
affairs. In addition to raising fundamental constitutional
problems, this bill includes a number of unwise restrictions
that would seriously inhibit my ability to implement a co-
herent and consistent foreign policy:
By removing my restrictions on trade with North
and South Vietnam, S. 2662 undercuts any incentive
the North Vietnamese may have to provide an ac-
counting for our MIAs.
FORD LIBRARY
By imposing an arbitrary arms sale ceiling, it
limits our ability to respond to the legitimate
defense needs of our friends and obstructs U.S.
industry from competing fairly with foreign
suppliers.
By requiring compliance by recipient countries
with visa practices or human rights standards
set by our Congress as a condition for continued
U.S. assistance, the bill ignores the many other
complex factors which should govern our rela-
tionships with those countries; and it impairs
our ability to deal by more appropriate means
with objectionable practices of other nations.
By mandating a termination of grant military
assistance and military assistance advisory
groups after fiscal year 1977 unless specifically
authorized by Congress, the bill vitiates two
important tools which enable us to respond to the
needs of many countries and maintain vital controls
over military sales programs.
- 2 -
The bill also contains several provisions which violate
the constitutional separation of executive and legislative
powers. By a concurrent resolution passed by a majority of
both Houses, programs authorized by the Congress can be later
reviewed, further restricted, or even terminated. Such
frustration of the ability of the Executive to make opera-
tional decisions violates the President's constitutional
authority to conduct our relations with other nations.
While I encourage increased Congressional involvement in
the formulation of foreign policy, the pattern of unprecedented
restrictions contained in this bill requires that I reject such
Congressional encroachment on the Executive Branch's con-
stitutional authority to implement that policy.
Constitutional Objections
"S. 2662 contains an array of constitutionally objectionable"
[etc. - - no change in attached pages 1A, 2-5]
FORD LIBRARY
1=A
defense needs of our friends, and at the same time would create
obstacles to U.S. industry competing fairly with foreign suppliers.
In disregard of the many complex factors of our relationships
with other countries, the bill imposes strict provisions for terminating
U.S. assistance to countries where discriminatory visa practices or
human rights violations do not meet standards desired by Congress.
Such provisions not only may disrupt relationships important to our
interest, but can actually impair our ability to seek modification of
such practices.
-- It mandates a termination of grant military assistance and
military assistance advisory groups after fiscal year 1977 unless
specifically authorized by Congress, and this eliminates two important
tools which enable us to respond to the needs of many countries and at
the same time maintain vital controls over military sales programs.
While I encourage increased Congressional involvement in the
formulation of foreign policy, the pattern of unprecedented restrictions
contained in this bill requires that I reject such Congressional encroach-
ment on the Executive Branch's constitutional authority to implement that
policy.
Constitutional Objections
S. 2662 contains an array of constitutionally objectionable
requirements whereby virtually all significant arms transfer
decisions would be subjected on a case-by-case basis to a
period of delay for Congressional review and possible dis-
approval by concurrent resolution of the Congress. These
provisions are incompatible with the express provision in
the Constitution that a resolution having the force and effect
of law must be presented to the President and, if disapproved,
repassed by a two-thirds majority in the Senate and the House
of Representatives. They extend to the Congress the power to
prohibit specific transactions authorized by law without
changing the law -- and without following the constitutional
process such a change would require. Moreover, they would
involve the Congress directly in the performance of Executive
functions in disregard of the fundamental principle of sepa-
LIBRARY
ration of powers. Congress can, by duly adopted legislation,
authorize or prohibit such actions as the execution of
contracts or the issuance of export licenses; but Congress
2
cannot itself participate in the Executive functions of
deciding whether to enter into a lawful contract or issue
a lawful license, either directly or through the disapproval
procedures contemplated in this bill.
The erosion of the basic distinction between legislative
and Executive functions which would result from the enactment
of S. 2662, displays itself in an increasing volume of similar
legislation which this Congress has passed or is considering.
Such legislation would pose a serious threat to our system of
government, and would forge impermissible shackles on the
President's ability to carry out the laws and conduct the
foreign relations of the United States. The President cannot
function effectively in domestic matters, and speak for the
nation authoritatively in foreign affairs, if his decisions
under authority previously conferred can be reversed by a
bare majority of the Congress. Also, the attempt of Congress
to become a virtual co-administrator in operational decisions
would seriously distract it from its proper legislative role.
Inefficiency, delay, and uncertainty in the management of our
nation's foreign affairs would eventually follow.
Apart from these basic constitutional deficiencies
which appear in six sections of the bill, S. 2662 is faulty
legislation, containing numerous unwise restrictions.
Trade with Vietnam
The bill would suspend for 180 days the President's
authority to control certain trade with North and South
Vietnam, thereby removing a vital bargaining instrument
for the settlement of a number of differences between the
United States and these countries. I have the deepest
sympathy for the intent of this provision, which is to
obtain an accounting for Americans missing in action in
Vietnam. However, the enactment of this legislation would
not provide any real assurances that the Vietnamese would
now fulfill their long-standing obligation to provide usuch
3
an accounting. Indeed, the establishment of a direct
linkage between trade and accounting for those missing in
action might well only perpetuate Vietnamese demands for
greater and greater concessions.
This Administration is prepared to be responsive to
Vietnamese action on the question of Americans missing in
action. Nevertheless, the delicate process of negotiations
with the Vietnamese cannot be replaced by a legislative
mandate that would open up trade for a specified number of
days and then terminate that trade as a way to achieve our
diplomatic objectives. This mandate represents an unacceptable
attempt by Congress to manage the diplomatic relations of the
United States.
Annual Ceiling on Arms Sales
A further objectionable feature of S. 2662 is an annual
ceiling of $9.0 billion on the total of government sales and
commercial exports of military equipment and services. In
our search to negotiate mutual restraints in the prolifera-
tion of conventional weapons, this self-imposed ceiling would
be an impediment to our efforts to obtain the cooperation of
other arms-supplying nations. Such an arbitrary ceiling
would also require individual transactions to be evaluated,
not on their own merits, but on the basis of their relation-
ship to the volume of other, unrelated transactions. This
provision would establish an arbitrary, overall limitation
as a substitute for case-by-case analyses and decisions based
on foreign policy priorities and the legitimate security
needs of our allies and friends.
Discrimination and Human Rights
This bill also contains well-intended but misguided
provisions to require the termination of military coopera-
tion with countries which engage in practices that dis-
criminate against United States citizens or practices
constituting a consistent pattern of gross human rights
FORD
4
violations. This Administration is fully committed to a
policy of actively opposing and seeking the elimination of
discrimination by foreign governments against United States
citizens on the basis of their race, religion, national
origin or sex, just as the Administration is fully supportive
of internationally recognized human rights as a standard for
all nations to respect. The use of the proposed sanctions
against sovereign nations is, however, an awkward and in-
effective device for the promotion of those policies. These
provisions of the bill represent further attempts to ignore
important and complex policy considerations by requiring
simple legalistic tests to measure the conduct of sovereign
foreign governments. If Congress finds such conduct deficient,
specific actions by the United States to terminate or limit
our cooperation with the government concerned would be man-
dated. By making any single factor the effective determinant
of relationships which must take into account other considera-
tions, such provisions would add a new element of uncertainty
to our security assistance programs and would cast doubt upon
the reliability of the United States in its dealings with
other countries. Moreover, such restrictions would most
likely be counterproductive as a means for eliminating
discriminatory practices and promoting human rights. The
likely result would be a selective disassociation of the
United States from governments unpopular with the Congress,
thereby diminishing our ability to advance the cause of
human rights through diplomatic means.
Termination of Grant Military Assistance and
Advisory Groups
The legislation would terminate grant military assis-
tance and military assistance advisory groups after fiscal
year 1977 except where specifically authorized by Congress,
thus creating a presumption against such programs and
missions. Such a step would have a severe impact on our
relations with other nations whose security and well-being
FORD
5
are important to our own national interests. In the case of
grant assistance, it would limit our flexibility to assist
countries whose national security is important to us but which
are not themselves able to bear the full cost of their own
defense. In the case of advisory groups, termination of
missions by legislative fiat would impair close and long-
standing military relationships with important allies.
Moreover, such termination is inconsistent with increasing
Congressional demands for the kind of information about and
control over arms sales which these groups now provide.
Such provisions would insert Congress deeply into the
details of specific country programs, a role which Congress
has neither the information nor the organizational GERALD structure
to play.
LIBRATY
*****
I particularly regret that, notwithstanding the spirit
of genuine cooperation between the Legislative and Executive
Branches that has characterized the deliberations on this
legislation, we have been unable to overcome the major
policy differences that exist.
In disapproving this bill, I act as any President would,
and must, to retain the ability to function as the foreign
policy leader and spokesman of the Nation. In world affairs
today, America can have only one foreign policy. Moreover,
that foreign policy must be certain, clear and consistent.
Foreign governments must know that they can treat with the
President on foreign policy matters, and that when he speaks
within his authority, they can rely upon his words.
Accordingly, I must veto the bill.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Inilitary
assistance
Tuesday 5/4/76
11:25 Norman Kravitz is in town from Grand Rapids for a
conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.
They have been discussing two bills which the President
is supposed to be acting on today or tomorrow --
1. Foreign aid authorization bill
2. Appropriations bill for transition
funding on foreign aid
His only purpose is to express a certain concern with
regard to what the President may or may not do.
If they are vetoed (which the President has already threatened
to do), they will have a big effect on the state of Israel,
which is what he's concerned about.
Didn't know where to call but called here because he is
from Grand Rapids.
Talked to
Russ Rourke abot
this
B
DRAFT 4/30/76
nr
has
To the Senate
assistance
I am returning, without my approval, S. 2662, a bill that
would make unacceptable encroachments upon the consti-
tutional responsibilities of the President for the
conduct of foreign affairs and do serious harm to the
long-term foreign policy interests of the United States.
This legislation authorizes appropriations for security
assistance programs for fiscal year 1976. These programs
are of great importance to our efforts to promote a more
stable and secure world in which constructive interna-
tional cooperation can flourish. However, the numerous
restrictions and cumbersome procedures contained in the
bill would seriously impair the ability of the Executive
Branch to perform its proper functions.
Constitutional Objections
FORD i LIBRAR 07683
S. 2662 contains an array of constituionally obj estionable
requirements whereby virtually all significant arms trans-
fer decisions would be subjected on a case-by-case basis
to a period of delay for Congressional review and possible
disapproval by concurrent resolution of the Congress.
These provisions are incompatible with the express pro-
vision in the Constitution that a resolution having the
force and effect of law must be presented to the President
- 2 -
and, if disapproved, repassed by a two-thirds majority
in the Senate and the House of Representatives. They
extend to the Congress the power to change the law to
prohibit specific transactions through a process not
permitted under the Constitution for amending the law.
Moreover, they would involve the Congress directly in
the performance of Executive functions in disregard
of the fundamental principle of separation of powers.
Congress can, by duly adopted legislation, authorize
or prohibit such actions as the execution of contracts
or the issuance of export licenses; but Congress cannot
itself participate in the Executive functions of en-
tering into a contract or issuing a license, either
directly or through the disapproval procedures con-
templated in this bill.
The erosion of the basic distinction between legis-
lative and Executive functions that would result from
the enactment of S. 2662 would pose a serious threat
to our system of government, and would forge impermis
GERALD FORD LIBRART
sible shackles on the President's ability to carry out
the laws and conduct the foreign relations of the
United Seates. The President cannot speak for the
nation under circumstances where his operational
- 3 -
decisions can be frustrated by Congress. Also, the
attempt of Congress to become a virtual co-administrator
in operational decisions would seriously distract it
from its proper legislative role. Inefficiency, delay,
and uncertainty in the management of our nation's
foreign affairs would eventually follow.
Apart from these basic constitutional objections to this
bill, S. 2662 is faulty legislation, containing numerous
unwise restrictions.
Trade with Vietnam
The bill would suspend for 180 days the President's
authority to control certain trade with North and South
Vietnam, thereby removing a vital bargaining instrument
for the settlement of a number of differences between
FORD
the United States and these countries. I have the
deepest sympathy for the intent of this provision,
LIBRARY
which is to obtain an accounting for Americans missing
in action in Vietnam. However, the enactment of this
legislation would not provide any real assurances that
the Vietnamese would now fulfill their long standing
obligation to provide such an accounting. Indeed, the
establishment of a direct linkage between trade and
missing in action might well only perpetuate Vietnamese
demands for greater and greater concessions.
- 4 -
This Administration is prepared to be responsive to
Vietnamese action on the question of Americans missing
in action. Nevertheless, the delicate process of nego-
tiations with the Vietnamese cannot be replaced by a
legislative mandate that would open up trade for a
specified number of days and then terminate that trade
as a way to achieve our diplomatic objectives. This
mandate represents an unacceptable attempt by Congress
to manage the diplomatic relations of the United
States.
Annual Ceiling on Arms Sales
A further objectionable feature of S. 2662 is an annual
ceiling of $9.0 billion on the total of government sales
and commercial exports of military equipment and services.
In our search to negotiate mutual restraints in the
proliferation of conventional weapons this self-imposed
ceiling would be an impediment to our efforts to obtain
the cooperation of other arms-supplying nations. Such
an arbitrary ceiling would also require individual trans-
FORD is 07VN3 LIBRARY
actions to be evaluated, not on their own merits, but on
the basis of their relationship to the volume of other,
unrelated transactions. This provision would establish
an arbitrary, overall limitation as a substitute for
- 5 -
case by case analyses and decisions based on foreign
policy priorities.
Discrimination and Human Rights
This bill also contains well intended but misguided
provisions to require the termination of military
cooperation with countries which engage in practices that
discriminate against United States citizens or practices
constituting a consistent pattern of gross human rights
violations. This Administration is fully committed to a
policy of actively opposing and seeking the elimination
of discrimination by foreign governments against United
States citizens on the basis of their race, religion,
national origin or sex, just as the Administration is fully
supportive of internationally recognized human rights as
a standard for all nations to respect. The use of auto-
matic sanctions against sovereign States is, however,
an awkward and ineffective device for the promotion
of those policies. These provisions of the bill repre-
sent further attempts to ignore important and complex
policy considerations by requiring simple legalistic
GENATO FORD LIBRARY
tests to measure the conduct of sovereign foreign
governments. If Congress finds such conduct deficient,
specific actions by the United States to terminate or
- 6 -
limit our cooperation with the government concerned
would be mandated. By making any single factor the
effective determinant of relationships which must
take into account other considerations, such provisions
would add a new element of uncertainty to our security
assistance programs and would cast doubt upon the
reliability of the United States in its dealings with
other countries. Moreover, such restrictions would
most likely be counterproductive as a means for elimi-
nating discriminatory practices and promoting human
rights. The likely result of such actions will be a
selective disassociation of the U.S. with governments
unpopular with the Congress, thereby diminishing the ability
of the U.S. to advance the cause of human rights through
diplomatic means.
Termination of Grant Military Assistance and
Advisory Groups
The legislation would terminate grant military assist
ance and military assistance advisory groups after
FORD is GREATO LIBRARY
fiscal year 1977 except where specifically authorized
a
by Congress, thus creating /presumption against such
programs and missions. In the case of grant assist-
ance, this would limit our flexibility to assist
countries whose national security is important to us
- 7 -
but which are not themselves able to bear the full
cost of their own defense. In the case of advisory
groups, termination of missions by legislative fiat
would undo close and long standing military relation-
ships with important allies. Moreover, such termination
is inconsistent with increasing Congressional demands for
the kind of information about and control over arms sales
which these groups now provide. Such provisions would
insert Congress deeply into the details of specific
country programs, a role which Congress has neither the
information nor the organizational structure to play.
*******
I particularly regret that, notwithstanding the spirit
of genuine cooperation between the Legislative and
Executive Branches that has characterized the delibera-
tions on this legislation, we have been unable to over-
come the major policy differences that exist.
FORD
In disapproving this bill, I act as any President would,
LIBRARY
and must, to retain the ability to function as the
foreign policy leader and spokesman of the Nation. In
world affairs today, America can have only one foreign
- 8 -
policy. Moreover, that foreign policy must be certain,
clear and consistent. Foreign governments must know
that they can treat with the President on foreign policy
matters, and that when he speaks within his authority, they
can rely upon his words.
Accordingly, I must veto the bill.
The White House
April , 1976
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
MEMORANDUM
military
assistance
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
4/27/76
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
PHIL BUCHEN
SUBJECT:
List of Principal Questionable Provisions in
Conference Bill on International Security Assistance
Arms Export Control Act of 1976
1)
Congressional power by concurrent resolution:
a)
To block an FMS sale of over $25 million (in current act).
b)
To block commercial sale of defense articles over $25 million.
c)
To block an FMS or commercial sale of major defense equipment
over $7.0 million.
d)
To terminate or restrict military assistance for a country which
Congress determines to be in violation of internationally
recognized human rights.
e)
To disapprove transfer to third countries of defense articles
provided under this and prior foreign assistance legislation.
f)
To terminate military assistance for a country which the Congress
finds has violated any condition of the assistance.
2)
Detailed mechanism for annual general reports and for country
LIBRARY retorts
on human rights practices of recipient countries, on the basis of which
Congress may terminate or restrict assistance.
3)
$9.0 billion arms sales ceiling.
4)
Restrictions imposed to impact on civil rights practices of foreign
governments, including lack of flexibility by reason of too restrictive
waiver authority.
5)
Termination of grant MAP and MAAGs unless specifically authorized by
Congress.
FOR IMMEDIATE PELEASE
MAY 7, 1976
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
REMARKS OF THE PPESIDENT
UPON VETOING
S. 2662
THE CABINET ROOM
11:24 A.M. EDT
I am returning herewith without my approval S. 2662,
which authorizes foreign aid for the fiscal year because
the bill would seriously obstruct the exercise of the
President's constitutional responsibilities for the
conduct of foreign affairs.
In addition to raising fundamental constitutional
problems, this bill includes a number of unwise restrictions
that would seriously inhibit ry ability to implement a
coherent and consistent foreign policy. While I encourage
increased Congressional involvement in the formulation of
foreign policy, the pattern of unprecedented restrictions
contained in this bill requires that I reject such Congress-
ional encrorchment on the Executive Branch's constitutional
authority to implement that policy.
Thank you very much.
END
(AT 11:25 A.M. EDT)
FORD is LIBRARY 0ERALD
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
MAY 7, 1976
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:
I am returning, without my approval, S. 2662, a bill
that would seriously obstruct the exercise of the President's
constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of foreign
affairs. In addition to raising fundamental constitutional
problems, this bill includes a number of unwise restrictions
that would seriously inhibit my ability to implement a
coherent and consistent foreign policy:
By imposing an arbitrary arms sale ceiling, it
limits our ability to respond to the legitimate
defense needs of our friends and obstructs U.S.
industry from competing fairly with foreign
suppliers.
By requiring compliance by recipient countries
with visa practices or human rights standards set
by our Congress as a condition for continued U.S.
assistance, the bill ignores the many other complex
factors which should govern our relationships with
those countries; and it impairs our ability to deal
by more appropriate means with objectionable
practices of other nations.
By removing my restrictions on trade with North
and South Vietnam, S. 2662 undercuts any incentive
the North Vietnamese may have to provide an
accounting for our MIAs.
By mandating a termination of grant military
assistance and military assistance advisory groups
after fiscal year 1977 unless specifically authorized
by Congress, the bill vitiates two important tools
which enable us to respond to the needs of many
countries and maintain vital controls over military
sales programs.
The bill also contains several provisions which violate
the constitutional separation of executive and legislative
powers. By a concurrent resolution passed by a majority of
both Houses, programs authorized by the Congress can be later
reviewed, further restricted, or even terminated. Such frus-
tration of the ability of the Executive to make operational
decisions violates the President's constitutional authority
to conduct our relations with other nations.
While I encourage increased Congressional involvement in
the formulation of foreign policy, the pattern of unprecedented
restrictions contained in this bill requires that I reject such
Congressional encroachment on the Executive Branch's constitu-
tional authority to implement that policy.
more
DERALD FORD LIBRARY
2
Constitutional Objections
With regard to the Constitutional issues posed by S.2662,
this bill contains an array of objectionable requirements
whereby virtually all significant arms transfer decisions
would be subjected on a case-by-case basis to a period of
delay for Congressional review and possible disapproval by
concurrent resolution of the Congress. These provisions are
incompatible with the express provision in the Constitution
that a resolution having the force and effect of law must be
presented to the President and, if disapproved, repassed by
a two-thirds majority in the Senate and the House of
Representatives. They extend to the Congress the power to
prohibit specific transactions authorized by law without
changing the law -- and without following the constitutional
process such a change would require. Moreover, they would
involve the Congress directly in the performance of Executive
functions in disregard of the fundamental principle of sepa-
ration of powers. Congress can, by duly adopted legislation,
authorize or prohibit such actions as the execution of
contracts or the issuance of export licenses, but Congress
cannot itself participate in the Executive functions of
deciding whether to enter into a lawful contract or issue
a lawful license, either directly or through the disapproval
procedures contemplated in this bill.
The erosion of the basic distinction between legislative
and Executive functions which would result from the enactment
of S. 2662, displays itself in an increasing volume of similar
legislation which this Congress has passed or is considering.
Such legislation would pose a serious threat to our system of
government, and would forge impermissible shackles on the
President's ability to carry out the laws and conduct the
foreign relations of the United States. The President cannot
function effectively in domestic matters, and speak for the
nation authoritatively in foreign affairs, if his decisions
under authority previously conferred can be reversed by a
bare majority of the Congress. Also, the attempt of Congress
to become a virtual co-administrator in operational decisions
would seriously distract it from its proper legislative role.
Inefficiency, delay, and uncertainty in the management of our
nation's foreign affairs would eventually follow.
Apart from these basic constitutional deficiencies
which appear in six sections of the bill, S. 2662 is faulty
legislation, containing numerous unwise restrictions.
Annual Ceiling on Arms Sales
A further objectionable feature of S. 2662 is an annual
ceiling of $9.0 billion on the total of government sales and
commercial exports of military equipment and services. In
our search to negotiate mutual restraints in the prolifera-
tion of conventional weapons, this self-imposed ceiling would
be an impediment to our efforts to obtain the cooperation of
other arms-supplying nations. Such an arbitrary ceiling
would also require individual transactions to be evaluated,
not on their own merits, but on the basis of their relation-
ship to the volume of other, unrelated transactions. This
provision would establish an arbitrary, overall limitation
as a substitute for case-by-case analyses and decisions based
on foreign policy priorities and the legitimate security
needs of our allies and friends.
more
3
Discrimination and Human Rights
This bill also contains well-intended but misguided
provisions to require the termination of military coopera-
tion with countries which engage in practices that dis-
criminate against United States citizens or practices
constituting a consistent pattern of gross human rights
violations. This Administration is fully committed to a
policy of not only actively opposing but also seeking
the elimination of discrimination by foreign governments
against United States citizens on the basis of their race,
religion, national origin or sex, just as the Administration
is fully supportive of internationally recognized human rights
as a standard for all nations to respect. The use of the
proposed sanctions against sovereign nations is, however, an
awkward and ineffective device for the promotion of those policies.
These provisions of the bill represent further attempts to ignore
important and complex policy considerations by requiring
simple legalistic tests to measure the conduct of sovereign
foreign governments. If Congress finds such conduct deficient,
specific actions by the United States to terminate or limit
our cooperation with the government concerned would be man-
dated. By making any single factor the effective determinant
of relationships which must take into account other considera-
tions, such provisions would add a new element of uncertainty
to our security assistance programs and would cast doubt upon
the reliability of the United States in its dealings with
other countries. Moreover, such restrictions would most
likely be counterproductive as a means for eliminating
discriminatory practices and promoting human rights. The
likely result would be a selective disassociation of the
United States from governments unpopular with the Congress,
thereby diminishing our ability to advance the cause of
human rights through diplomatic means.
Trade with Vietnam
The bill would suspend for 180 days the President's
authority to control certain trade with North and South
Vietnam, thereby removing a vital bargaining instrument
for the settlement of a number of differences between the
United States and these countries. I have the deepest
sympathy for the intent of this provision, which is to
obtain an accounting for Americans missing in action in
Vietnam. However, the enactment of this legislation would
not provide any real assurances that the Vietnamese would
now fulfill their long-standing obligation to provide such
an accounting. Indeed, the establishment of a direct
linkage between trade and accounting for those missing in
action might well only perpetuate Vietnamese demands for
greater and greater concessions.
This Administration is prepared to be responsive to
Vietnamese action on the question of Americans missing in
action. Nevertheless, the delicate process of negotiations
with the Vietnamese cannot be replaced by a legislative
mandate that would open up trade for a specified number of
days and then terminate that trade as a way to achieve our
diplomatic objectives. This mandate represents an unacceptable
attempt by Congress to manage the diplomatic relations of the
United States.
more
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
4
Termination of Grant Military Assistance and
Advisory Groups
The legislation would terminate grant military assis-
tance and military assistance advisory groups after fiscal
year 1977 except where specifically authorized by Congress,
thus creating a presumption against such programs and
missions. Such a step would have a severe impact on our
relations with other nations whose security and well-being
are important to our own national interests. In the case of
grant assistance, it would limit our flexibility to assist
countries whose national security is important to us but which
are not themselves able to bear the full cost of their own
defense. In the case of advisory groups, termination of
missions by legislative fiat would impair close and long-
standing military relationships with important allies.
Moreover, such termination is inconsistent with increasing
Congressional demands for the kind of information about and
control over arms sales which these groups now provide.
Such provisions would insert Congress deeply into the
details of specific country programs, a role which Congress
has neither the information nor the organizational structure
to play.
*****
I particularly regret that, notwithstanding the spirit
of genuine cooperation between the Legislative and Executive
Branches that has characterized the deliberations on this
legislation, we have been unable to overcome the major
policy differences that exist.
In disapproving this bill, I act as any President would,
and must, to retain the ability to function as the foreign
policy leader and spokesman of the Nation. In world affairs
today, America can have only one foreign policy. Moreover,
that foreign policy must be certain, clear and consistent.
Foreign governments must know that they can treat with the
President on foreign policy matters, and that when he speaks
within his authority, they can rely upon his words.
Accordingly, I must veto the bill.
GERALD R. FORD
THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 7, 1976.
#####
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 14, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
LES JANKA
FROM:
MAX FRIEDERSDORF m ,6.
SUBJECT:
Security Assistance Bill
We are in a position of strength at this time because of the
T. Q. for Israel.
I believe it would be better to send up our objections to the
new House and Senate bills with indication that no discussion
of the T. Q. can occur, and certainly no agreement reached
until we have an acceptable authorization.
Rather than contact Morgan and Humphrey, I think we should
first consult the minority.
Also, no T. Q. discussion should be initiated without honoring
the commitment to discuss any proposed compromise with
Passman.
CC: Jack Marsh
Phil Buchen
James Lynn
GERALD LIBRARY R. FORD