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Nixon Pardon - Hungate Subcommittee Ford Testimony (1)
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Nixon Pardon - Hungate Subcommittee Ford Testimony (1)
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The original documents are located in Box 33, folder "Nixon Pardon - Hungate
Subcommittee: Ford Testimony (1)" of the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Exact duplicates within this folder were not digitized.
Digitized from Box 33 of the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
DRAFT NARRATIVE RESPONSE TO H. RES. 1367
(after introductory remarks)
The resolutions before this Subcommittee call for me to report about
certain incidents that may have occurred before--even long before--my
decision to grant a pardon to former President Nixon on September 8.
Before I Became President
The time covered by this part of my response includes when I was a
Congressman and then Vice President. In that entire period i-can think of
no references or discussions on a possible pardon for then President Nixon 6 corral
until August 1 and 2, 1974. That was in the week which followed the delivery ?
?
group
to Judge Sirica of the second batch of Watergate tapes.
Unlike the first
group batch of original tapes these additional ones had not been transcribed, I had
been told, and the precise conversations were not known iu lawyers for then
President Nixon until July 31, 1974, when tape duplicates retained in the
White House had been transcribed.
In the early morning of Thursday, August 1, 1974, I had a meeting,
in my Vice Presidential office, with Alexander H. Haig, Jr., Chief of Staff
for President Nixon. It dealt with no subjects of an extraordinary nature but
involved a report like those made periodically to me about developments
Shortly
in the White House. However, near 2:30 in the afternoon, General Haig
requested another appointment as promptly as possible. We met in my office
3:30
starting about 3:00 p.m. and lasting for about 45 minutes. Only then did I
learn of the damaging nature of a conversation on June 23, 1972, in one
the tapes which had gone to Judge Sirica.
LIQUARY GERALD P.
no member of this consulte
It would lee hard for onyone less
to my reaction to this divelopment.
this information shorled and stemed
me because of the pointing 5 had
repeatedely taken that Pres. N had no
your knowledge 3.come the -p and my
registed public atatements he was, in my
opinion, invocent of an injurable
offerse
-2-
I describe this meeting because at one point it did include references to
a possible pardon for Mr. Nixon, to which the third and fourth questions
in H. Res. 1367 are directed. Almost the entire meeting covered other
resulting from the
subjects, all dealing with the new situation since the day before when
snitied evidence on the 23 June tape.
President Nixon's legal counsel had become aware of the critical evidence
in the tape of June 23, 1972
General Haig told me he had, after our first
by mavidual who had knowledge 3 what contants was in the
meeting that day been told of the evidence by James St. Clair, but he had
no transcript with him and did not relate the specific conversations Based
on what he could tell me of the tapes, he wanted to know whether I was
prepared to assume the Presidency within a very short time. I need not
for this purpose tell you how shocked I was, and I cannot say that I fully
realized what all this meant to my family and me and to our future and,
more important, what it meant to the Country and the critical times ahead,
both in the hours and days just ahead and in the longer run.
General Haig in his conversation went on to tell me conditions and
this new cirdin -
discussions in the White House among those who knew of the recently
found evidence and how confused the situation was. He related to me a
discusse
number of options being talked about. They included an early resignation
by the President, but at the same time as additional suggestions even a
pardon of himself, along with Watergate defendants, or pardons just for
the defendants, or a pardon running to him after resignation. Out of
bewilderment I questioned how pardons like this could even be possible.
LIBRARY GERALD P. FORD
are option were grant of
the contingung planning
aethor he wanted the Rus.
to resign he was not advirating
how , or under what condition
be alimal resign
-3-
General Haig answered that this was all contingency planning based on what
a White House lawyer said was theoretically possible in the case of an act by
Mr. Nixon for himself but workable based on legal precedents for other possible
pardons, although certainly none was being considered seriously by General Haig
or anyone else. General Haig made it clear that he was advocating none any of
NO
the options he mentioned. The only serious options, he told me, were first to
fight impeachment until final vote in-the Senate, even after the new evidence
became public, or secondly for the President to resign sooner or later.
He
said the White House senior staff was considering that the decision should await
the effects of the new evidence, either by disclosing it to just a few Congressmen
in private or by a broad public test through releasing news copies of the
transcribed evidence.
General Haig asked for my assessment of the whole situation. He wanted
my thoughts about the timing of a resignation if that decision was made and about
move
how to do it and accomplish an orderly change of administration. We discussed
UP.
what scheduling problems there might be and what the early organizational
problems would be. I said that I, of course, had to discuss the whole matter
of my position with my wife, to whom the surprise and shock would be just as
great. I also proposed and General Haig agreed that I talk to James St. Clair
because he had personally listened to the tapes.
I recall further a telephone call back to me late that night from General
Haig to tell me that he wanted me to be sure I understood that the President
had arrived at no decision to resign and that the nature of the evidenc
07839
given
MURARY
to the Court was not to be disclosed.
7
Not until the next morning, on August 2 at about 9,30, was I able to meet
4
with Mr. St. Clair. At that meeting I got even a stronger impression
that the evidence in the June 23, 1972, tapes would make an impeachment
vote by the House inevitable and that a trial in the Senate would probably
result in a conviction, When I asked Mr. St. Clair if he knew of any
besides that on the June 23, 1973 tope
other new and damaging evidence he said "no. "VI discussed with him
When Pointed outh
knowt
the various options mentioned to me by General Haig, but than he told me
he had not been the source of any opinion about Presidential pardon power.
In the afternoon of August 2, I called General Haig and declined to make
any recommendations as to what President Nixon should do. I made clear
to him that I was opposed to any consideration by Mr. Nixon, or by anyone
advising him, of a pardon or my promise of a pardon as a precondition
and inducement for a resignation. General Haig told me he was in full
agreement with this position, which was also the President's view.
My travel schedule called for me to make appearances in Louisiana
and MISSISSIPPINET Saturday and Sunday, August 3 and 4. On many other
occasions I had repeatedly stated my opinion that the President would not be
change frommyprevous
found guilty of an impeachable offense. Any seeming departure from this
statements,
may move
view, I feared, would lead in the press to conclusions that I had learned
of new evidence and now wanted to see the President resign. This was
most likely to happen because the fact I had met with General Haig on the
morning of August 1 was known generally For that reason I remained firm
FORD
in my answers to press questions and repeated my belief in the President's
still instruction mainture
innocence of an impeachable offense. 1 recognize that I did not treat
LIBRARY
100 feltom my own mind that the President
should be free without any an change in my stated p inions
5
to look to the Senate to make a decision on
fairly with the press and public at that time and I regret feeling compelled
whstever charges the House might vote in
in my own mind to mislead them away from the new and damaging evidence
In mpeach ment rosolution. And believed
until President Nixon had decided to make it public
Then After President Nixon did release the evidence on Monday, August 5, 1974,
and followed his state ment of that day by a meet. 19
I was not informed of any decision by him to resign until August 6, 1974, at
about
pm. When he and I met earlier with the Cabinet Members
on August 6, 1974, in the White House before his decision was made, I said
that meeting
the President
I was making no recommendations to him as to what he should do, in the
light of the new evidence, and that I did not expect a recommendation from
any of the others at the meeting.
As I have already ^ stated publicly: "There was no understanding, no deal between
me and the former President, nor between my staff and the staff of the
former President, none whatsoever. "
After I Became President
At my Press Conference of August 28, 1974, I was asked by the
reporters whether I would use my pardon authority to grant immunity from
prosecution to former President Nixon for the offenses against the United
States. In my answer I took a position that, while I had the final authority on
this matter, I expected to make no commitment one way or the other depending
upon what the Special Prosecutor and Courts would do. However, I also
R. FORD
stated that I thought the general view of the American people was to spare
the former President from a criminal trial.
-6-
Shortly afterwards I became greatly concerned that if the prosecution
and trial were prolonged, the passion generated over a long period of time
would seriously disrupt the healing of our country from the wounds of the
past. I could see that the new Administration could not be effective if it had
to operate in the atmosphere of having a former President under prosecution
and criminal trial. Each step along the way I was afraid would become a
public spectacle and the topic of wide public debate.
Consequently I asked for reports as to the Special Prosecutor's opinion
on how long a delay there would be for trial of Mr. Nixen, and what, if any, charges
beyond the Watergate cover-up were under consideration involving Mr. Nixon.
Also, I wanted to find from my own Counsel about the scope of the President's
pardon' power. Then I directed discussions by my Counsel with Mr. Herbert J.
Miller which took place on September 4 and 5, 1974, to explain my pending
decision to pardon Mr. Nixon. These discussions were participated in by the
two attorneys, Messrs. Buchen and Miller, and by Benton Becker, who had
earlier assisted Mr. Buchen to research legal questions relating to a possible
pardon for the former President.
FORD LIBRARY is GERALD
At no time after I became President on August 9, 1974, was the
subject of a pardon for Richard M. Nixon raised by the former
President or by anyone representing him. Also, no one on my staff
brought up the subject until the day before my first press conference
on August 28, 1974. At that time, I was advised that questions on
the subject might be raised by media reporters at the press conference.
As the press conference proceeded, the first question asked
involved the subject and it came up a total of four questions. In my
answers to the questions, I took a position that while I had the final
authority on this matter I expected to make no commitment one way
or the other depending on what the Special Prosecutor and courts
would do. However, I also stated that the general view of the American
people was to spare the former President from a criminal trial.
Shortly afterwards I became greatly concerned that if the prosecution
and trial were prolonged, the passion generated over a long period of
time would seriously disrupt the healing of our country from the wounds
of the past. I could see that the new Administration could not be
effective if it had to operate in the atmosphere of having a former
President under prosecution and criminal trial. Each step along the
way I was afraid would become a public spectacle and the topic of wide
public debate.
FORD LIBRARY
The first question of H. Res. 1367 asked whether I or my repre-
sentative had "specific knowledge of any formal criminal charges
pending against Richard M. Nixon. 11 The answer is: no. I had known,
of course, that the original Grand Jury investigating the Watergate
break-in and cover-up had originally wanted to name President Nixon
as an unindicted co-conspirator in the cover-up. Also, I knew that
an extensive report had been prepared by the Watergate Special
Prosecution Force for the Grand Jury and had been sent to the House
Judiciary Committee, where, I believe, it served the staff and
members of the Committee in the development of its report on the
proposed articles of impeachment. Beyond what was disclosed in the
publication of the House Judiciary Committee on the subject and
additional evidence released by President Nixon on August 5, 1974, I
learned on or shortly after September 4th of a memorandum prepared
for Special Prosecutor Jaworski by the Deputy Special Prosecutor,
Henry Ruth. This memorandum was made public by my Counsel
following receipt of a letter at the White House on September 10, 1974.
I have supplied the Committee with a copy of both the letter and the
memorandum.
The second question in the Resolution asked whether Alexander
Haig referred to or discussed a pardon with Richard M. Nixon or
his representatives at any time during the week of August
GERALD RIST4, LIBRARY
9
or any subsequent time. My answer to that question is: not to my
knowledge. If any such discussions did occur, because I was not
aware of any, they were not a factor in my decision to grant the pardon.
FORD MOTHER'S is LIBRARY
Marsh' redraft
DRAFT NARRATIVE RESPONSE TO H. RES. 1367
of 10/7/74
(after introductory remarks)
The resolutions before this Subcommittee call for me to report about
certain incidents that may have occurred before--even long before--my
decision to grant a pardon to former President Nixon on September 8.
Before I Became President
The time covered by this part of my response includes when I was a
Congressman, Minority Leader, and then Vice President. In that entire
period no references or discussions on a possible pardon for then President
Nixon occurred until August 1 and 2, 1974. That was in the week which
followed the delivery to Judge Sirica of the second group of Watergate
tapes.
You will recall that since the beginning of the Watergate episode, I
had consistently made statements and speeches about President Nixon's
innocence in either planning the break-in or participating in the cover-up.
I sincerely believed he was innocent.
Even in the closing months before he resigned, I made public
statements that in my opinion the adverse revelations so far did not
constitute an impeachable offense.
I was coming under increasing criticism for such statements but I
still believed them to be true.
ERALD LIBRA ? FORD
In the early morning of Thursday, August 1, 1974, I had a meeting
in my Vice Presidential office, with Alexander H. Haig, Jr., Chief of Staff
-2-
for President Nixon. It dealt with no subjects of an extraordinary nature but
involved a report like those made periodically to me about developments in
the White House. However, shortly after noon, General Haig requested
another appointment as promptly as possible. We met in my office starting
about 3:30 p.m. and lasting for about 45 minutes. Only then did I learn
of the damaging nature of a conversation on June 23, 1972, in one of the
tapes which had gone to Judge Sirica.
I describe this meeting because at one point it did include references to
a possible pardon for Mr. Nixon, to which the third and fourth questions in
H. Res. 1367 are directed. Almost the entire meeting covered other
subjects, all dealing with the totally new situation resulting from the
critical evidence on the tape of June 23, 1972. General Haig told me he had
been told of the evidence by individuals who had knowledge of what was on
the tape. The substance of his conversation was that the new disclosure
would be devastating, even catastrophic, insofar as President Nixon was con-
cerned; and based on what he could tell me of the conversation on the tape,
he wanted to know whether I was prepared to assume the Presidency
within a very short time.
No one can imagine how shocked and stunned I was by this revelation.
First, that I was likely to become President under these conditions; and
secondly, the realization that this ran counter to my own position that I'Ad
stated for months, that in my view the President was not guilty of any
impeachable offense.
General Haig in his conversation went on to tell me of discussions in
the White House among those who knew of this new evidence.
-3-
General Haig asked for my assessment of the whole situation. He wanted
my thoughts about the timing of a resignation if that decision was made and about
how to do it and accomplish an orderly change of administration. We discussed
what scheduling problems there might be and what the early organizational
problems would be.
A1 outlined for me President Nixon's situation as he saw it and the
different views as to the courses of action that might be available, and which
were being advanced by various people around him. As I recall there were
different major courses being considered:
(1) Some suggested "riding it out" by letting the impeachment take
its course through the House and the Senate trial, fighting all the way against
conviction.
(2) Others were urging resignation.
Although I have portrayed separate courses of action, I assume various
people backed one course and may have been proponents of one or more of
the other courses.
However, on the resignation issue, there were put forth a number of
options which General Haig reviewed with me.
As I recall his conversation, various possible options being considered
included:
(1) The President temporarily step aside under the 25th Amendment.
(2) Delaying resignation until further down the impeachment road.
FORD is LIBRARY ORRALD
(3) Resorting first to censure to preclude either impeachment or
resignation.
(4) The question of whether the President could pardon himself.
(5) Pardoning various Watergate defendants, then himself, followed
by resignation.
(6) A pardon to the President, should he resign.
The rush of events placed an urgency on what was to be done. It became
even more critical when you viewed a prolonged impeachment trial which
was expected to last possibly four months or longer.
The impact of the trial on the country -- the handling of possible
international crises such as Cyprus and the Middle East -- the economic
situation here at home and -- the growing paralysis of the federal government,
were all factors to be considered, and were discussed.
Al wanted my views on the various courses of action as well as my
attitude on the options of resignation. However, he indicated he was not
advocating any of the options. I inquired as to what was the President's
pardon power, and he answered it was his understanding that I did have the
authority to grant a pardon even before any legal action had been taken against
President Nixon, but that was based on information which he had learned
from others.
As I saw it, at this point the question clearly before me was, under the
circumstances, what was the course of action that would be in the best
interest of the country.
FORD
I told him I had to have time to think. Further, that I wanted to talk to
Jim St. Clair. I also said I wanted to talk to my wife before giving a
response. I did not agree to any proposal that required action on my behalf.
-5-
Early the next morning Jim St. Clair came to my office and although he
did not spell out in detail the new evidence, there was no question in my mind
that he considered these revelations to be so damaging that impeachment in
the House was a certainty and conviction in the Senate a high probability.
In order to be certain of my own thinking, I discussed what I have outlined
to you with several persons, none of whom were on President Nixon's staff.
I wanted their thoughts before making what I felt might have been a snap
judgment on a situation that was one of the gravest I ever encountered.
This I did during the course of the next day. The views I received reinforced
the response I was to give.
Consequently in the afternoon, probably 24 hours after the matter had been
first brought up, I called General Haig to advise him that I could not agree
to the possibility of pardon as a pre-condition or inducement for President
Nixon's resignation. I might add, Gen. Haig concurred in my decision, which
I understood was President Nixon's view.
FORD LIBRARY
October 12, 1974
DRAFT NARRATIVE RESPONSE TO H. RES. 1367
(after introductory remarks)
The resolutions before this Subcommittee call for me to report
about certain incidents that may have occurred before- - even long
before--my decision to grant a pardon to former President Nixon
on September 8.
The time covered by this part of my response includes when I
was a Congressman, Minority Leader, and then Vice President.
In that entire period no references or discussions on a possible
pardon for then President Nixon occurred until August 1 and 2, 1974.
You will recall that since the beginning of the Watergate episode,
I had consistently made statements and speeches about President Nixon's
innocence in either planning the break-in or participating in the
cover-up. I sincerely believed he was innocent.
Even in the closing months before he resigned, I made public
statements that in my opinion the adverse revelations SO far did not
constitute an impeachable offense.
I was coming under increasing criticism for such statements but
I still believed them to be true.
In the early morning of Thursday, August 1, 1974, I had a meeting
in my Vice Presidential office, with Alexander H. Haig, Jr., Chief of
Staff for President Nixon. At this meeting, I was told in a general way
is
FORD
LIBRARY
about fears arising because of additional tape evidence scheduled for
delivery to Judge Sirica on Monday, August 5, 1974. I was told that
there could be evidence which, when disclosed to the House of
Representatives, would likely tip the vote in favor of impeachment.
However, I was given no indication that this development would
lead to any change in President Nixon's plans to oppose the
impeachment vote.
Then shortly after noon, General Haig requested another
appointment as promptly as possible. He came to my office about
3:30 for a meeting that was to last for approximately three-quarters
of an hour. Only then did I learn of the damaging nature of a con-
3
versation on June 23, 1972, in one of the tapes which was due to go
to Judge Sirica.
I describe this meeting because at one point it did include references
to a possible pardon for Mr. Nixon, to which the third and fourth
questions in H. Res. 1367 are directed. However, nearly the entire
meeting covered other subjects, all dealing with the totally new
situation resulting from the critical evidence on the tape of June 23, 1972.
General Haig told me he had been told of the evidence by lawyers on
the White House staff who had first-hand knowledge of what was on
the tape. The substance of his conversation was that the new disclosure
would be devastating, even catastrophic, insofar as President Nixon
BERALD B. FORD LIBRARY
3
was concerned; and based on what he could tell me of the conversation
on the tape, he wanted to know whether I was prepared to assume the
Presidency within a very short time, and whether I would be willing to
make recommendations to the President as to what course he should
now follow.
I cannot really express adequately in words how shocked and
stunned I was by this revelation. First, was the sudden awareness I was to
become President under these conditions; and secondly, the realization
these new disclosures ran counter to the position I had taken for months,
which was the President was not guilty of any impeachable offense.
General Haig in his conversation went on to tell me of discussions
in the White House among those who knew of this new evidence.
General Haig asked for my assessment of the whole situation. He
wanted my thoughts about the timing of a resignation if that decision
was made and about how to do it and accomplish an orderly change of
administration. We discussed what scheduling problems there might be
and what the early organizational problems would be.
General Haig outlined for me President Nixon's situation as he saw it and
the different views as to the courses of action that might be available, and
which were being advanced by various people around him. As I recall
there were different major courses being considered:
(1) Some suggested "riding it out" by letting the impeachment take
its course through the House and the Senate trial, fighting all the way
against conviction.
BERALD FORD
(2) Others were urging resignation sooner or later.
I was told some people backed the first course and other people a
resignation but not with the same views as to how and when it should
take place.
On the resignation issue, there were put forth a number of options
which General Haig reviewed with me. As I recall his conversation,
various possible options being considered included:
(1) The President temporarily step aside under the 25th Amendment.
(2) Delaying resignation until further down the impeachment road.
(3) Resorting first to censure to preclude either impeachment or
resignation.
(4) The question of whether the President could pardon himself.
(5) Pardoning various Watergate defendants, then himself, followed
by resignation.
(6) A pardon to the President, should he resign.
The rush of events placed an urgency on what was to be done. It
became even more critical when you viewed a prolonged impeachment
trial which was expected to last possibly four months or longer.
The impact of the trial on the country, the handling of possible
international crises, the economic situation here at home, and the
marked slowdown in developing needed new programs by the federal
government were all factors to be considered, and were discussed.
BERALD FORD LIBRANT
General Haig wanted my views on the various courses of action as
well as my attitude on the options of resignation. However, he indicated
he was not advocating any of the options. I inquired as to what was the
President's pardon power, and he answered that it was his understanding
from White House lawyers that a President did have the authority to
grant a pardon even before any criminal action had been taken against
an individual, but obviously, he was in no position to have any opinion
on a matter of law.
As I saw it, at this point the question clearly before me was, under
the circumstances, what was the course of action that would be in the
best interest of the country.
I told General Haig I had to have time to think. Further, that I
wanted to talk to James St. Clair. I also said I wanted to talk to my
wife before giving a response. I had consistently and firmly held the
view while I was Vice President that in no way whatsoever could I
recommend either publicly or privately any step by the President
that might cause a change in my status. As the man who would
become President if a vacancy occurred for any reason in that office,
a Vice President, I believed, ought never to do or say anything which
might affect his President's tenure in office. Therefore, I certainly
was not ready even under these new circumstances to make any
recommendations about resignation without having adequate time to
consider further what I should properly do.
FORD is LIBRARI 0ERV70
Shortly after 8:00 the next morning James St. Clair came to my
office. Although he did not spell out in detail the new evidence, there
was no question in my mind that he considered these revelations to be
so damaging that impeachment in the House was a certainty and
conviction in the Senate a high probability. When I asked Mr. St, Clair
if he knew of any other new and damaging evidence besides that on the
June 23, 1972, tape, he said "no." When I pointed out to him the various
options mentioned to me by General Haig, he told me he had not been
the source of any opinion about Presidential pardon power.
After further thought on the matter, I was determined not to make
any recommendations to President Nixon on his resignation. I had
not given any advice or recommendations in my conversations with
his representatives, but I also did not want anyone who might talk to
the President to suggest that I had some intention to do so.
For that reason I decided I had better call General Haig the
afternoon of August 2. I did make the call late that afternoon and told
him I wanted him to understand that I had no intention of recommending
what President Nixon should do about resigning or not resigning,
and that nothing we had talked about the day before should be given
any consideration in whatever decision the President might make.
General Haig told me he was in full agreement with this position.
FORD is LUBRARY MERALD
7
At no time after I became President on August 9, 1974, was the
subject of a pardon for Richard M. Nixon raised by the former
President or by anyone representing him. Also, no one on my staff
brought up the subject until the day before my first press conference
on August 28, 1974. At that time, I was advised that questions on
the subject might be raised by media reporters at the press conference.
As the press conference proceeded, the first question asked
involved the subject and it came up a total of four questions. In my
answers to the questions, I took a position that while I had the final
authority on this matter I expected to make no commitment one way
or the other depending on what the Special Prosecutor and courts
would do. However, I also stated that the general view of the American
people was to spare the former President from a criminal trial.
Shortly afterwards I became greatly concerned that if the prosecution
and trial were prolonged, the passion generated over a long period of
time would seriously disrupt the healing of our country from the wounds
of the past. I could see that the new Administration could not be
effective if it had to operate in the atmosphere of having a former
President under prosecution and criminal trial. Each step along the
way I was afraid would become a public spectacle and the topic of wide
public debate.
GERALD LIQUEDA ? FORD
The first question of H. Res. 1367 asked whether I or my repre-
sentative had "specific knowledge of any formal criminal charges
pending against Richard M. Nixon. The answer is: no. I had known,
of course, that the original Grand Jury investigating the Watergate
break-in and cover-up had originally wanted to name President Nixon
as an unindicted co-conspirator in the cover-up. Also, I knew that
an extensive report had been prepared by the Watergate Special
Prosecution Force for the Grand Jury and had been sent to the House
Judiciary Committee, where, I believe, it served the staff and
members of the Committee in the development of its report on the
proposed articles of impeachment. Beyond what was disclosed in the
publication of the House Judiciary Committee on the subject and
additional evidence released by President Nixon on August 5, 1974, I
learned on or shortly after September 4th of a memorandum prepared
for Special Prosecutor Jaworski by the Deputy Special Prosecutor,
Henry Ruth. This memorandum was made public by my Counsel
following receipt of a letter at the White House on September 10, 1974.
I have supplied the Committee with a copy of both the letter and the
memorandum.
The second question in the Resolution asked whether Alexander
Haig referred to or discussed a pardon with Richard M. Nixon or
his representatives at any time during the week of August 4, 1974,
9
or any subsequent time. My answer to that question is: not to my
knowledge. If any such discussions did occur, because I was not
aware of any, they were not a factor in my decision to grant the pardon.
FORD : 038400
Insert for oldgi4
After further thought on the motter,
rocommend ations to the President
I was do termined not to make any
Nixon on his resignation. I had
not the given any advice or recommendations
in my conversations with # his
representatives, but I also
did not want Go anyone who might
talk to the President to suggest
that I was still thinking of
had some intention to do 6U.
#
For that resson I decided I
had better coll Gen. Hoig the
afternoon ot August 2. I did
make the coll late that atternoon
and told him II wanted him
to understand that I had no
intention of recommending tother
the President Nixon any what President Nixon
be should do bout resigning or
not resigning OF of having smything
and that nothing
the daybetore
none of the we had tal ked about should
bear our be given any cons ideration IN tever decision position
the President mightmake. General Haig
my
to Idme he was in full agreement with
thot
this position
FORD
be
utely
H
1987
ets
mduce
recionation
My resignation
Inverts. 4
Eff. on the 25th
and ,Frimly hold the wiew
I had consistently taken the position
while I was Vico President that in no
way whatsoever could my I recommend
either publicly or privately any step
by the President that might cause I change
in my status. That IS simply no turbot
As the man on whom the who would
become Prosident if to vacancy occurred
for any reason in thatoffice, 2 night V/co President, I believed,
ought never to do orsoy ^ anything which affact
his President's tenure In office. Therefore,
I certainly was not ready even under
those now circumstances to make any
recommendations about resignation
without having Idequato time to
consider further n my responsib the what I should properlydo.
FORD & LIBRAR, GERAL
THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO
THE VALUABLE DOCUMENTS FILE.
Leesa Iobin
August 16, 16,1988
Gord library
October 14, 1974
(second draft)
DRAFT TEXT OF OPENING STATEMENT
We meet here today to review the facts and circumstances that
of
were the basis for my pardon
former President Nixon on September 8,
1974.
I want very much to have those facts and circumstances known. The
American people want to know them. And members of the Congress want
to know them. The two Congressional resolutions of inquiry now before
this Committee serve those purposes. That is why I have volunteered
to appear before you this morning, and I welcome and thank you for this
opportunity to speak to the questions raised by the resolutions.
My appearance at this hearing of your distinguished Subcommittee
of the House Committee on the Judiciary has been looked upon as an
unusual historic event -- one that has no firm precedent in the whole
history of Presidential relations with the Congress. Yet, I am here
not to make history, but to report on history.
The history you are interested in covers so recent a period that
your
it is still not well understood. If, with assistance, I can make for
better understanding of the pardon of our former President, then we
can help to achieve the purpose I had for granting the pardon when I did.
That purpose was to change our national focus. I wanted to do all
I could to shift our attentions from pursuit of a fallen President to
pursuit of the urgent needs of a rising nation. Our nation is. under the
FORD is LIBRARY UERALD
ORIGINAL RETIRED TO
SPECIAL DO CUMENTS FILE
-2-
severest of challenges now to employ its full energies and efforts in
the pursuit of a sound and growing economy at home and a stable and
peaceful world around us.
We would needlessly be diverted from meeting those challenges if
we as a people were to remain sharply divided over whether to indict,
bring to trial, and punish a former President, who already is condemned
to suffer long and deeply in the shame and disgrace brought upon the
office he held. Surely, we are not a revengeful people. We have
often demonstrated a readiness to feel compassion and to act out of
mercy. As a people we have a long record of forgiving even those
who have been our country's most destructive foes.
Yet, to forgive is not to forget the lessons of evil in whatever
ways evil has operated against us. And certainly the pardon granted
the former President will not cause us to forget the evils of
Watergate-type offenses or to forget the lessons we have learned
that a government which deceives its supporters and treats its opponents
as enemies must never, never be tolerated.
The pardon power entrusted to the President under the Constitution
of the United States has a long history and rests on precedents going
back centuries before our Constitution was drafted and adopted. The
power has been used sometimes as Alexander Hamilton saw its purpose:
"In seasons of insurrection when a well-timed offer of pardon to the
insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth;
and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible
ORIGINAL RETIRED TO
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LIBRARY GERALD 8. FORD
-3-
afterwards to recall. II (The Federalist, No. 74) Other times it has
been applied to one person as "an act of grace which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflects for a crime he has committed." (Marshall, C.J., in
United States V. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150, 160-161.) When a pardon is
granted, it also represents "the determination of the ultimate
authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting
less than what the judgment fixed." (Biddle V. Perovich, 247 U.S. 480,
486) However, the Constitution does not limit the pardon power to
cases of convicted offenders or even indicted offenders (Burdick V.
United States, 236 U.S. 480). Thus, I am firm in my conviction that
as President I did have the authority to proclaim a pardon for the
former President when I did.
Yet, I can also understand why people are moved to question my
action. Some may still question my authority, but I find much of
the disagreement turns on whether I should have acted when I did.
Even then many people have concluded as I did that the pardon was in
the best interests of the country because it came at a time when it
would best serve the purpose I have stated.
I come to this hearing in a spirit of cooperation to respond to
your inquiries. I do so with the understanding that the subjects
to be covered are defined and limited by the questions as they appear
in the resolutions before you. But even then we may not mutually agree
on what information falls within the proper scope of inquiry by the
Congress.
GENAL FORD VIBRARY
-4-
I feel a responsibility as you do that each separate branch of our
government must preserve a degree of confidentiality for its internal
communications. Congress, for its part, has seen the wisdom of assuring
that members be permitted to work under conditions of confidentiality.
Indeed, earlier this year the United States Senate passed a resolution
which reads in part as follows:
* * *
11 no evidence under the control and in the possession
of the Senate of the United States can, by the mandate of
process of the ordinary courts of justice, be taken from
such control or possession, but by its permission." (S. Res.
338, passed June 12, 1974)
In United States V. Nixon,
U.S.
(1974),
42 U.S.L.W. 5237, 5244 (decided July 24, 1974), the Supreme Court
unanimously recognized a rightful sphere of confidentiality within the
Executive Branch which the Court determined could only be invaded for
overriding Constitutional reasons.
As I have stated before, my own view is that the right of Executive
Privilege is to be exercised with caution and restraint. When I was a
Member of Congress, I did not hesitate to question the right of the
Executive Branch to claim a privilege against supplying information to the
Congress if I thought the claim of privilege was being abused. Yet, I
did then, and I do now, respect the right of Executive Privilege when it
protects advice given to a President in the expectation that it will not
be disclosed. Otherwise, no President could any longer count on receiving
free and frank views from people designated to help him reach his
official decisions.
FORD CIGNARY
-5-
Also, it is certainly not my intention or even within my
authority to detract on this occasion or in any other instance from
the generally recognized rights of the President to preserve the
confidentiality of internal discussions or communications whenever
it is properly within his Constitutional responsibility to do SO. These
rights are within the authority of any President while he is in office,
and I believe may be exercised as well by a past President if the
information sought pertains to his official functions while he was serving
in office.
I bring up these important points before going into the balance of
my statement so there can be no doubt that I remain mindful of the rights
of confidentiality which a President may and ought to exercise in appro-
priate situations. However, I do not regard my answers as I have prepared
them for purposes of this inquiry to be prejudicial to those rights in the
present circumstances or to constitute a precedent for responding to
Congressional inquiries different in nature or scope or under different
circumstances.
Accordingly, I shall proceed to explain as fully as I can in my present
answers the facts and circumstances covered by the resolutions of inquiry.
I shall start with an explanation of these events which were the first to
occur in the period covered by the inquiry, before I became President.
Then I will respond to the separate questions as they are numbered in
H. Res. 1367 and as they specifically relate to the period after I became
President.
is
FURD
GERALD
October 14, 1974
-6-
(second draft)
DRAFT NARRATIVE RESPONSE TO H. RES. 1367
(after introductory remarks)
H. Res. 1367 (Tab A) before this Subcommittee asks for information
about certain conversations that may have occurred over a period that
includes when I was a Member of Congress or the Vice President. In
that entire period no references or discussions on a possible
pardon for then President Nixon occurred until August 1 and 2, 1974.
You will recall that since the beginning of the Watergate investigations,
I had consistently made statements and speeches about President Nixon's
innocence in either planning the break-in or participating in the
cover-up. I sincerely believed he was innocent.
Even in the closing months before the President resigned, I made public
statements that in my opinion the adverse revelations so far did not
constitute an impeachable offense.
I was coming under increasing criticism for such public statements, but
I still believed them to be true. based on the facts as I knew them.
In the early morning of Thursday, August 1, 1974, I had a meeting
in my Vice Presidential office, with Alexander H. Haig, Jr., Chief of
Staff for President Nixon. At this meeting, I was told in a general
way about fears arising because of additional tape evidence scheduled
for delivery to Judge Sirica on Monday, August 5, 1974. I was told that
there could be evidence which, when disclosed to the House of
Representatives, would likely tip the vote in favor of impeachment.
FORD & GREATO LIBRARY
-7-
However, I was given no indication that this development would lead
to any change in President Nixon's plans to oppose the impeachment vote.
Then shortly after noon, General Haig requested another appointment
as promptly as possible. He came to my office about 3:30 for a meeting.
that was to last for approximately three-quarters of an hour. Only
then did I learn of the damaging nature of a conversation on June 23,
1972, in one of the tapes which was due to go to Judge Sirica.
I describe this meeting because at one point it did include
references to a possible pardon for Mr. Nixon, to which the third and
fourth questions in H. Res. 1367 are directed. However, nearly the
entire meeting covered other subjects, all dealing with the totally new
situation resulting from the critical evidence on the tape of June 23,
1972. General Haig told me he had been told of the new and damaging
evidence by lawyers on the White House staff who had first-hand knowledge
of what was on the tape. The substance of his conversation was that the
new disclosure would be devastating, even catastrophic, insofar as President
Nixon was concerned. Based on what he could tell me of the conversation
on the tape, he wanted to know whether I was prepared to assume the
Presidency within a very short time, and whether I would be willing to
make recommendations to the President as to what course he should
now follow.
I cannot really express adequately in words how shocked and stunned
I was by this unbelievable revelation. First, was the sudden awareness I
was to become President under these most unusual conditions; and secondly,
the realization these new disclosures ran completely counter to the
position I had taken for months, that I believed the President was FORD
guilty of any impeachable offense.
GERAL
LOBRARY
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-8-
General Haig in his conversation at my office went on to tell me
of discussions in the White House among those who knew of this new evidence.
General Haig asked for my assessment of the whole situation. He
wanted my thoughts about the timing of a resignation if that decision
was made and about how to do it and accomplish an orderly change of
administration. We discussed what scheduling problems there might be
and what the early organizational problems would be.
General Haig outlined for me President Nixon's situation as he
saw it and the different views in the White House as to the courses of
action that might be available, and which were being advanced by various
people around him on the White House staff. As I recall there were
different major courses being considered:
(1) Some suggested "riding it out" by letting the impeachment
take its course through the House and the Senate trial, fighting all
the way against conviction.
(2) Others were urging resignation sooner or later.
I was told some people backed the first course and other people a
resignation but not with the same views as to how and when it should
take place.
On the resignation issue, there were put forth a number of options
which General Haig reviewed with me. As I recall his conversation,
various possible options being considered included:
(1) The President temporarily step aside under the 25th Amendment.
(2) Delaying resignation until further down the impeachment process.
(3) Trying first to settle for a censure vote as a means of avoiding
either impeachment or a need to resign.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-9-
(4) The question of whether the President could pardon himself.
(5) Pardoning various Watergate defendants, then himself,
followed by resignation.
(6) A pardon to the President, should he resign.
The rush of events placed an urgency on what was to be done. It
became even more critical in view of a prolonged impeachment
trial which was expected to last possibly four months or longer.
The impact of the Senate trial on the country, the handling of possible
international crises, the economic situation here at home, and the
marked slowdown in developing needed new programs by the federal
government were all factors to be considered, and were discussed.
General Haig wanted my views on the various courses of action as
well as my attitude on the options of resignation. However, he indicated
he was not advocating any of the options. I inquired as to what was the
President's pardon power, and he answered that it was his understanding
from a White House lawyer that a President did have the authority to
grant a pardon even before any criminal action had been taken against
an individual, but obviously, he was in no position to have any opinion
on a matter of law.
As I saw it, at this point the question clearly before me was,
under the circumstances, what course of action should I recommend that
would be in the best interest of the country.
I told General Haig I had to have time to think. Further, that I
wanted to talk to James St. Clair. I also said I wanted to talk to my
wife before giving any response. I had consistently and firmly held the
-10-
view while I was Vice President that in no way whatsoever could I
recommend either publicly or privately any step by the President
that might cause a change in my status. As the man who would
become President if a vacancy occurred for any reason in that office,
a Vice President, I believed, ought never to do or say anything which
might affect his President's tenure in office. Therefore, I certainly
was not ready even under these new circumstances to make any recom-
mendations about resignation without having adequate time to consider
further what I should properly do.
Shortly after 8:00 the next morning James St. Clair came to my
office. Although he did not spell out in detail the new evidence, there
was no question in my mind that he considered these revelations to be
so damaging that impeachment in the House was a certainty and conviction
in the Senate a high probability. When I asked Mr. St. Clair if he
knew of any other new and damaging evidence besides that on the
June 23, 1972, tape, he said "no." When I pointed out to him the
various options mentioned to me by General Haig, he told me he had not
been the source of any opinion about Presidential pardon power.
After further thought on the matter, I was determined not to make
any recommendations to President Nixon on his resignation. I had
not given any advice or recommendations in my conversations with his
representatives, but I also did not want anyone who might talk to
the President to suggest that I had some intention to do SO.
For that reason I decided I should call General Haig the
afternoon of August 2nd. I did make the call late that afternoon and
FORD VISRARY
-11-
told him I wanted him to understand that I had no intention of
recommending what President Nixon should do about resigning or not
resigning, and that nothing we had talked about the previous afternoon should
be given any consideration in whatever decision the President might
make. General Haig told me he was in full agreement with this
position.
My travel schedule called for me to make appearances in
Mississippi and Louisiana over Saturday, Sunday, and part of Monday,
August 3, 4, and 5. In the previous eight months I had repeatedly
stated my opinion that the President would not be found guilty of an
impeachable offense. Any change from my stated views, or even refusal
to comment further, I feared, would lead in the press to conclusions
that I had learned of new evidence and now wanted to see the President
resign to avoid an impeachment vote in the House and probable conviction
vote in the Senate. For that reason I remained firm in my answers to
press questions during my trip and repeated my belief in the President's
innocence of an impeachable offense.
Not until I returned to Washington did I learn that President Nixon
wasts melenal
# Lite that afterm 2 was The
informed
Pris
he
had released the new evidence late on Monday, August 5, 1974. Then he
called
n
and I met with the Cabinet Members on Tuesday morning, August 6, 1974. cabruet
named
mutor The
At that meeting in the Cabinet Room, I said I was making no recommendations
having for Th
51
to the President as to what he should do in the light of the new evidence. my
And I made no recommendations to him either at the meeting or at any
time after that.
FORD & LIBRARY OF
-12-
The first question of H. Res. 1367 asks whether I or my representa-
tive had "specific knowledge of any formal criminal charges pending
against Richard M. Nixon." The answer is: "no."
I had known, of course, that the Grand Jury investigating
the Watergate break-in and cover-up had wanted to name
President Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator in the cover-up. Also,
I knew that an extensive report had been prepared by the Watergate
Special Prosecution Force for the Grand Jury and had been sent to the
House Committee on the Judiciary, where, I believe, it served the staff
and members of the Committee in the development of its report on the
proposed articles of impeachment. Beyond what was disclosed in the
publications of the Judiciary Committee on the subject and additional
evidence released by President Nixon on August 5, 1974, I saw on or
shortly after September 4th a copy of a memorandum prepared for
Special Prosecutor Jaworski by the Deputy Special Prosecutor,
Henry Ruth. (Tab B) Copy of this memorandum had been furnished by Mr. Jaworski
to my Counsel and was later made public during a press briefing at the
White House on September 10, 1974.
sub-
I have supplied the Committee with a copy of this memorandum. The
memorandum lists matters still under investigation which "may prove
to have some direct connection to activities in which Mr. Nixon is
personally involved." The Watergate cover-up is not included in this
list; and the alleged cover-up is mentioned only as being the subject
FORD is LIBRARY
-13-
of a separate memorandum not ever furnished to me. Of those matters
which are listed in the memorandum, it is stated that none of them
"at the moment rises to the level of our ability to prove even a
probable criminal violation by Mr. Nixon."
This is all the information I had which related even to the
possibility of "formal criminal charges" involving the former President
while he had been in office.
The second question in the Resolution asks whether Alexander Haig
referred to or discussed a pardon with Richard M. Nixon or his
representatives at any time during the week of August 4, 1974, or any
subsequent time. My answer to that question is: not to my knowledge.
If any such discussions did occur, because I was not aware of them,
they could not have been a factor in my decision to grant the pardon
when I did.
Questions three and four of H. Res. 1367 deal with the first and
all subsequent references to, or discussions of, a pardon for Richard M.
Nixon, with him or any of his representatives or aides. I have already
described at length what discussions took place on August 1 and 2, 1974,
and how these discussions brought no recommendations or commi tments FORD
whatsoever on my part.
CERALD
LIBRARY
ORIGINAL RETIRED TO
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-14-
At no time after I became President on August 9, 1974, was the
subject of a pardon for Richard M. Nixon raised by the former
President or by anyone representing him. Also, no one on my staff
brought up the subject until just before my first press conference on
the day
August 28, 1974. At that time, I was advised that questions on the
subject might be raised by media reporters at the press conference.
As the press conference proceeded, the first question asked
involved the subject, as did other later questions. In my answers to
These the questions, I took a position that while I was the final authority
on this matter I expected to make no commitment one way or the other
depending on what the Special Prosecutor and courts would do.
However, I also stated that I believed the general view of the American
people was to spare the former President from a criminal trial.
Shortly afterwards I became greatly concerned that if the Mr Numn
prosecution and trial were prolonged, the passions generated over a
long period of time would seriously disrupt the healing of our country
from the wounds of the past. I could see that the new Administration
could not be effective if it had to operate in the atmosphere of having
a former President under prosecution and criminal trial. Each step
along the way way, I was deeply concerned, would become a public spectacle
and the topic of wide public debate and controversy.
As I have before stated publicly, these concerns led me to ask
from my own legal counsel what my full right of pardon was under the
Constitution in this situation and from the Special Prosecutor what
criminal actions, if any, were likely to be brought against the
former President, and how long any his prosecution would take.
a trial
GERALD 8. FORD
-15-
As soon as I had been given this information, I authorized my
Counsel, Philip Buchen, to tell Herbert J. Miller, as attorney for
Richard M. Nixon, of my pending decision to grant a pardon for the
former President. I was advised that the disclosure was made on
September 4, 1974, when Mr. Buchen, accompanied by Benton Becker,
met with Mr. Miller. Mr. Becker had been asked, with my concurrence,
to take on a temporary special assignment to assist Mr. Buchen,
at a time when no one else of my selection had yet been appointed
to the legal staff of the White House.
The fourth question in the resolution also asks about "negotiations"
with Mr. Nixon or his representatives on the subject of a pardon for
the former President. The pardon under consideration was not,
so far as I was concerned, a matter of negotiation. I realized that
unless Mr. Nixon actually accepted the pardon I was preparing to grant,
it probably would not be effective. So I certainly had no intention
to proceed without knowing if it would be accepted. Otherwise, I put
no conditions on my granting of a pardon which required any negotiations.
Although negotiations had been started earlier and were conducted through
September 6th concerning White House records of the prior administration,
I did not make any agreement on that subject a condition of the pardon.
The circumstances leading to an initial agreement on Presidential
is
FORD
records are not covered by the Resolutions before this Subcommitted
CERALD
LIBRARY
-16-
Therefore, I have mentioned discussions on that subject with Mr. Nixon's
attorney only to show they were related in time to the pardon dis-
cussions but were not a basis for my decision to grant a pardon to
the former President.
The fifth, sixth, and seventh questions of H. Res. 1367 ask whether
I consulted with certain persons before making my pardon decision.
I did not consult at all with Attorney General Saxbe on the
subject of a pardon for Mr. Nixon. My only conversation on the subject
with Vice Presidential nominee Nelson Rockefeller was to report to
him on September 6, 1974, that I was planning to grant the pardon.
Special Prosecutor Jaworski was contacted on my instructions by
my Counsel, Philip Buchen. One purpose of their discussions was to
seek the information I wanted on what possible criminal charges might be
brought against Mr. Nixon. The result of that inquiry was a copy of
the memorandum I have already referred to and have furnished to this
Subcommittee. The only other purpose was to find out the opinion of
the Special Prosecutor as to how long a delay would follow, in the
event of Mr. Nixon's indictment, before a trial could be started and
concluded.
At a White House press briefing on September 8, 1974, the principal
portions of Mr. Jaworski's opinion were made public. In this opinion,
Mr. Jaworski wrote that selection of a jury for the trial of the
FORD i LIBRARY DERALD
-17-
former President, if he were indicted, would require a delay "of a
period from nine months to a year, and perhaps even longer." On
the question of how long it would take to conduct such a trial, he
noted that the complexities of the jury selection made it difficult
to estimate the time. Copy of the full text of his opinion dated
September 4, 1974, I have now furnished to this Subcommittee. (Tab C)
I did consult with my Counsel Philip Buchen, with Benton Becker,
and with my Counsellor John Marsh, who is also an attorney. Outside
of these men, serving at the time on my immediate staff, I consulted
with no other attorneys or professors of law for facts or legal
authorities bearing on my decision to grant a pardon to the former
President.
Questions eight and nine of H. Res. 1367 deal with the circumstances
of any statement requested or received from Mr. Nixon. I asked for
no confession or statement of guilt; only a statement in acceptance of
the pardon when it was granted. No language was suggested or requested
by anyone acting for me to my knowledge. My Counsel advised me that
he had told the attorney for Mr. Nixon that he believed the statement
should be one expressing contrition, and in this respect, I was told
Mr. Miller concurred. Before I announced the pardon, I saw a preliminary
draft of a proposed statement from Mr. Nixon, but I did not regard
the language of the statement as subsequently issued to be subject to
approval by me or my representatives.
FORD is GERALD LIBRARY
-18-
The tenth question covers any report to me on Mr. Nixon's health
by a physician or psychiatrist, which led to my pardon decision.
I received no such report. Whatever information was generally
known to me at the time of my pardon decision was based on my own
observations of his condition at the time he resigned as President
and observations reported to me after that from others who had
later
afterwards seen or talked with him. No such reports were by people
qualified to evaluate medically the condition of Mr. Nixon's health,
and so they were not a controlling factor in my decision. However,
I believed and still do, that prosecution and trial of the former
President would have proved a serious threat to his health, as I
stated in my message on September 8, 1974.
H. Res. 1370 (Tab D) is the other resolution of inquiry before this
Subcommittee. It presents no questions but asks for the full and
complete facts upon which was based my decision to grant a pardon to
Richard M. Nixon.
I know of no such facts that are not covered by my answers to the
questions in H. Res. 1367. Also:
Subparagraphs (1) and (4): There were no representations made
by me or for me and none by Mr. Nixon or for him on which my pardon
decision was based.
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
-19-
Subparagraph (2): The health issue is dealt with by me in answer
to earlier question ten of the polume earlier resolution.
Subparagraph (3): Information available to me about possible
offenses in which Mr. Nixon might have been involved is covered in my
answer to the first question of the earlier resolution.
In addition, in an unnumbered paragraph at the end, H. Res. 1370
seeks information on possible pardons for Watergate-related offenses
which others may have committed. I have decided that all persons
requesting consideration of pardon requests should submit them through
the appropriate procedures of the Department of Justice.
Only when I receive information on any request duly filed and
considered first by the Pardon Attorney at the Department of Justice
would I consider the matter. As yet no such information has been
received, and if it does I will act or decline to act according to the
particular circumstances presented, and not on the basis of the
unique circumstances, as I saw them, of former President Nixon.
FUAD
CERALD
LIBRARY
-3-
afterwards to recall. (The Federalist, No. 74) Other times it has
been applied to one person as "an act of grace which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflects for a crime he has committed. (Marshall, C.J., in
32
149
United States V. Hilson, 7 Pet. 150, / 160.461 When a pardon is
granted, it also represents "the determination of the ultimate
authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting
less than what the judgment fixed. (Biddle V. Perovich, 247 U.S. 480,
3
/
486) However, the Constitution does not limit the pardon power to
Ex Parte Gorla
cases of convicted offenders or even indicted offenders. Burdick V.
United States, 236 U.S. 480 Thus, I am firm in my conviction that
as President I did have the authority to proclaim a pardon for the
former President when I did.
Yet, I can also understand why people are moved to question my
action. Some may still question my authority, but I find much of
the disagreement turns on whether I should have acted when I did.
Even then many people have concluded as I did that the pardon was in
the best interests of the country because it came at a time when it
would best serve the purpose I have stated.
I come to this hearing in a spirit of cooperation to respond to
your inquiries. I do so with the understanding that the subjects
to be covered are defined and limited by the questions as they appear
in the resolutions before you. But even then we may not mutually agree
on what information falls within the proper scope of inquiry by the
1. The Federalisty No. THe Alexander (A. (1788)
Congress. T != No.74, at 454
FORD LIBRARY
(183
2. Morshall, C.J., in United States V. Wilson, 320.5. (7 Pet.) 50, 160
4 Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380 (1867) Burdick V. United Stat
236 U.S. (1915).
-3, Biddle V. Perovich, 247 U.S. 480, 486 DOCUMENTS TO FILE
ORIGINAL RETIRED
-2-
severest of challenges now to employ its full energies and efforts in
the pursuit of a sound and growing economy at home and a stable and
peaceful world around us.
We would needlessly be diverted from meeting those challenges if
we as a people were to remain sharply divided over whether to indict,
bring to trial, and punish a former President, who already is condemned
to suffer long and deeply in the shame and disgrace brought upon the
office he held. Surely, we are not a revengeful people. We have
often demonstrated a readiness to feel compassion and to act out of
mercy. As a people we have a long record of forgiving even those
who have been our country's most destructive foes.
Yet, to forgive is not to forget the lessons of evil in whatever
ways evil has operated against us. And certainly the pardon granted
the former President will not cause us to forget the evils of
Watergate-type offenses or to forget the lessons we have learned
that a government which deceives its supporters and treats its opponents
as enemies must never, never be tolerated.
The pardon power entrusted to the President under the Constitution
of the United States has a long history and rests on precedents going
back centuries before our Constitution was drafted and adopted. The
power has been used sometimes as Alexander Hamilton saw its purpose:
In seasons of insurrection
when a well-timed offer of pardon to the
insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth;
and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible
RAZO 2. FORD
THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO
THE VALUABLE DOCUMENTS FILE.
October 12, 1974
DRAFT NARRATIVE RESPONSE TO H. RES. 1367
(after introductory remarks)
The resolutions before this Subcommittee call for me to report
about certain incidents that may have occurred before--even long
before--my decision to grant a pardon to former President Nixon
on September 8.
The time covered by this part of my response includes when I
was a Congressman, Minority Leader, and then Vice President.
In that entire period no references or discussions on a possible
pardon for then President Nixon occurred until August 1 and 2, 1974.
You will recall that since the beginning of the Watergate episode,
I had consistently made statements and speeches about President Nixon's
innocence in either planning the break-in or participating in the
cover-up. I sincerely believed he was innocent.
Even in the closing months before he resigned, I made public
statements that in my opinion the adverse revelations so far did not
constitute an impeachable offense.
public
I was coming under increasing criticism for such statements but
I still believed them to be true. based on the facts as 2 knew Them.
In the early morning of Thursday, August 1, 1974, I had a meeting
in my Vice Presidential office, with Alexander H. Haig, Jr., Chief of
Staff for President Nixon. At this meeting, I was told in a general way
FORDO : LIBRARY GERALD t
about fears arising because of additional tape evidence scheduled for
delivery to Judge Sirica on Monday, August 5, 1974. I was told that
there could be evidence which, when disclosed to the House of
Representatives, would likely tip the vote in favor of impeachment.
However, I was given no indication that this development would
lead to any change in President Nixon's plans to oppose the
impeachment vote.
Then shortly after noon, General Haig requested another
appointment as promptly as possible. He came to my office about
3:30 for a meeting that was to last for approximately three-quarters
of an hour. Only then did I learn of the damaging nature of a con-
versation on June 23, 1972, in one of the tapes which was due to go
to Judge Sirica.
I describe this meeting because at one point it did include references
to a possible pardon for Mr. Nixon, to which the third and fourth
questions in H. Res. 1367 are directed. However, nearly the entire
meeting covered other subjects, all dealing with the totally new
3
situation resulting from the critical evidence on the tape of June 23, 1972.
new and damaging
General Haig told me he had been told of the evidence by lawyers on
the White House staff who had first-hand knowledge of what was on
the tape. The substance of his conversation was that the new disclosure
would be devastating, even catastrophic, insofar as President Nixon
GERALO FORD SIGNARY
3
was concerned; and based on what he could tell me of the conversation
on the tape, he wanted to know whether I was prepared to assume the
Presidency within a very short time, and whether I would be willing to
make recommendations to the President as to what course he should
now follow.
I cannot really express adequately in words how shocked and
unbileeveable
stunned I was by this revelation. First, was the sudden awareness I was to
most unusual
become President under these conditions; and secondly, the realization
completely
these new disclosures ran counter to the position I had taken for months,
which was the President was not guilty of any impeachable offense.
in my offer
General Haig in his conversation went on to tell me of discussions
in the White House among those who knew of this new evidence.
General Haig asked for my assessment of the whole situation. He
wanted my thoughts about the timing of a resignation if that decision
was made and about how to do it and accomplish an orderly change of
administration. We discussed what scheduling problems there might be
and what the early organizational problems would be.
General Haig outlined for me President Nixon's situation as he saw it and
with White House
the different views as to the courses of action that might be available, and
an The White How staff
which were being advanced by various people around him. As I recall
there were different major courses being considered:
(1) Some suggested "riding it out" by letting the impeachment take
its course through the House and the Senate trial, fighting all the way
against conviction.
FORD & LIBRARY OF
(2) Others were urging resignation sooner or later.
I was told some people backed the first course and other people a
resignation but not with the same views as to how and when it should
take place.
On the resignation issue, there were put forth a number of options
which General Haig reviewed with me. As I recall his conversation,
various possible options being considered included:
(1) The President temporarily step aside under the 25th Amendment.
(2) Delaying resignation until further down the impeachment road. prochs
(3) Resorting first to censure to preclude either impeachment or
resignation.
(4) The question of whether the President could pardon himself.
(5) Pardoning various Watergate defendants, then himself, followed
by resignation.
(6) A pardon to the President, should he resign.
The rush of events placed an urgency on what was to be done. It
became even more critical when you viewed a prolonged impeachment
trial which was expected to last possibly four months or longer.
Senate
The impact of the trial on the country, the handling of possible
international crises, the economic situation here at home, and the
marked slowdown in developing needed new programs by the federal
government were all factors to be considered, and were discussed.
CERATO TOND LIBRAST
General Haig wanted my views on the various courses of action as
well as my attitude on the options of resignation. However, he indicated
he was not advocating any of the options. I inquired as to what was the
President's pardon power, and he answered that it was his understanding
from White House lawyers that a President did have the authority to
grant a pardon even before any criminal action had been taken against
an individual, but obviously, he was in no position to have any opinion
on a matter of law.
As I saw it, at this point the question clearly before me was, under
the circumstances, what was the course of action that would be in the
best interest of the country.
I told General Haig I had to have time to think. Further, that I
wanted to talk to James St. Clair. I also said I wanted to talk to my
wife before giving a response. I had consistently and firmly held the
view while I was Vice President that in no way whatsoever could I
recommend either publicly or privately any step by the President
that might cause a change in my status. As the man who would
become President if a vacancy occurred for any reason in that office,
a Vice President, I believed, ought never to do or say anything which
might affect his President's tenure in office. Therefore, I certainly
was not ready even under these new circumstances to make any
recommendations about resignation without having adequate time to
consider further what I should properly do.
FORD TEIBRARY
Shortly after 8:00 the next morning James St. Clair came to my
office. Although he did not spell out in detail the new evidence, there
was no question in my mind that he considered these revelations to be
so damaging that impeachment in the House was a certainty and
conviction in the Senate a high probability. When I asked Mr. St, Clair
if he knew of any other new and damaging evidence besides that on the
3
June 23, 1972, tape, he said "no." When I pointed out to him the various
options mentioned to me by General Haig, he told me he had not been
the source of any opinion about Presidential pardon power.
After further thought on the matter, I was determined not to make
any recommendations to President Nixon on his resignation. I had
not given any advice or recommendations in my conversations with
his representatives, but I also did not want anyone who might talk to
the President to suggest that I had some intention to do so.
should
For that reason I decided I had better call General Haig the
afternoon of August 2. I did make the call late that afternoon and told
him I wanted him to understand that I had no intention of recommending
what President Nixon should do about resigning or not resigning,
previous afternoon
and that nothing we had talked about the day before should be given
any consideration in whatever decision the President might make.
General Haig told me he was in full agreement with this position.
CERALD 3
of
STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT GERALD FORD
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice
October 17,1974
STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT GERALD FORD
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
Subcommittee on Criminal- Justice
October 17, 1974
FORD & LIBRARY
10/15
sype
the
October 14, 1974
See heading
(second draft)
DRAFT TEXT OF OPENING STATEMENT
We meet here today to review the facts and circumstances that
of
were the basis for my pardon former President Nixon on September 8,
1974.
I want very much to have those facts and circumstances known. The
American people want to know them. And members of the Congress want
to know them. The two Congressional resolutions of inquiry now before
this Committee serve those purposes. That is why I have volunteered
to appear before you this morning, and I welcome and thank you for this
opportunity to speak to the questions raised by the resolutions.
My appearance at this hearing of your distinguished Subcommittee
of the House Committee on the Judiciary has been looked upon as an
unusual historic event -- one that has no firm precedent in the whole
history of Presidential relations with the Congress. Yet, I am here
not to make history, but to report on history.
The history you are interested in covers so recent a period that
your
it is still not well understood. If, with assistance, I can make for
better understanding of the pardon of our former President, then we
can help to achieve the purpose I had for granting the pardon when I did.
That purpose was to change our national focus. I wanted to do all
I could to shift our attentions from the N pursuit of a fallen President to the
pursuit of the urgent needs of a rising nation. Our nation is. under the
FORD d LIBRARY 076839
-2-
severest of challenges now to employ its full energies and efforts in
the pursuit of a sound and growing economy at home and a stable and
peaceful world around us.
We would needlessly be diverted from meeting those challenges if
we as a people were to remain sharply divided over whether to indict,
bring to trial, and punish a former President, who already is condemned
to suffer long and deeply in the shame and disgrace brought upon the
office he held. Surely, we are not a revengeful people. We have
often demonstrated a readiness to feel compassion and to act out of
mercy. As a people we have a long record of forgiving even those
who have been our country's most destructive foes.
Yet, to forgive is not to forget the lessons of evil in whatever
ways evil has operated against us. And certainly the pardon granted
the former President will not cause us to forget the evils of
Watergate-type offenses or to forget the lessons we have learned
that a government which deceives its supporters and treats its opponents
as enemies must never, never be tolerated.
The pardon power entrusted to the President under the Constitution
of the United States has a long history and rests on precedents going
back centuries before our Constitution was drafted and adopted. The
power has been used sometimes as Alexander Hamilton saw its purpose:
"In seasons of insurrection when a well-timed offer of pardon to the
insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth;
and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible
DERALD FORD LIBRARY
-3-
afterwards to recall. (The Federalist No. 74) Other times it has
been applied to one person as "an act of grace which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflects for a crime he has committed. 11?/ (Marshall, C.J., in
32
1119
United States V. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150 1 160 1015) When a pardon is
satyped
granted, it also represents "the determination of the ultimate
authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting
less than what the judgment fixed. (Biddle V. Perovich, 247 U.S. 480, 3
486) However, the Constitution does not limit the pardon power to
Ex Parte Gorla
cases of convicted offenders or even indicted offenders Burdick V.
United States, 236 U.S 480 Thus, I am firm in my conviction that
as President I did have the authority to proclaim a pardon for the
former President when I did.
Yet, I can also understand why people are moved to question my
action. Some may still question my authority, but I find much of
the disagreement turns on whether I should have acted when I did.
Even then many people have concluded as I did that the pardon was in
the best interests of the country because it came at a time when it
would best serve the purpose I have stated.
I come to this hearing in a spirit of cooperation to respond to
your inquiries. I do so with the understanding that the subjects
to be covered are defined and limited by the questions as they appear
in the resolutions before you. But even then we may not mutually agree
on what information falls within the proper scope of inquiry by the
Congress.
(A.
LIBRARY CERALD FORD
The
Feder
No.
74,
Alexinder
Hamilto
)
20
Marshall, C.J., in United States V. Wilson, 320.5, (7 Peto)150, 160 (1833)
Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380 (1867); Burdick V. United States,
236 U.S. 79 (1915).
3.
Biddle V. Perovis, 247 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
-4-
I feel a responsibility as you do that each separate branch of our
government must preserve a degree of confidentiality for its internal
communications. Congress, for its part, has seen the wisdom of assuring
that members be permitted to work under conditions of confidentiality.
Indeed, earlier this year the United States Senate passed a resolution
which reads in part as follows:.
* *
II no evidence under the control and in the possession
of the Senate of the United States can, by the mandate of
process of the ordinary courts of justice, be taken from
such control or possession, but by its permission." (S. Res.
338, passed June 12, 1974)
In United States V. Nixon,
U.S
(U.S. July 24, 1974),
42 U.S.L.W. 5237, 5244 (decided July 24, 1974) the Supreme Court
styped
unanimously recognized a rightful sphere of confidentiality within the
Executive Branch, which the Court determined could only be invaded for
overriding Constitutional reasons of the Fifth and
to the
As I have stated before, my own view is that the right of Executive
Privilege is to be exercised with caution and restraint. When I was a
Member of Congress, I did not hesitate to question the right of the
Executive Branch to claim a privilege against supplying information to the
Congress if I thought the claim of privilege was being abused. Yet, I
did then, and I do now, respect the right of Executive Privilege when it
protects advice given to a President in the expectation that it will not
be disclosed. Otherwise, no President could any longer count on receiving
free and frank views from people designated to help him reach his
official decisions.
-5-
Also, it is certainly not my intention or even within my
authority to detract on this occasion or in any other instance from
the generally recognized rights of the President to preserve the
confidentiality of internal discussions or communications whenever
it is properly within his Constitutional responsibility to do so. These
rights are within the authority of any President while he is in officè,
and I believe may be exercised as well by a past President if the
information sought pertains to his official functions while he was serving
in office.
I bring up these important points before going into the balance of
my statement so there can be no doubt that I remain mindful of the rights
of confidentiality which a President may and ought to exercise in appro-
priate situations. However, I do not regard my answers as I have prepared
them for purposes of this inquiry to be prejudicial to those rights in the
present circumstances or to constitute a precedent for responding to
Congressional inquiries different in nature or scope or under different
circumstances.
Accordingly, I shall proceed to explain as fully as I can in my present
answers the facts and circumstances covered by the present a resolutions of inquiry.
I shall start with an explanation of these events which were the first to
occur in the period covered by the inquiry, before I became President.
Then I will respond to the separate questions as they are numbered in
H. Res. 1367 and as they specifically relate to the period after I became
President.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
October 14, 1974
-6-
second draft
DRAFT NARRATIVE (after introductory RESPONSE TO remarks) H. RES.
1367
H. Res. 1367 (Tab A) before this Subcommittee asks for information
about certain conversations that may have occurred over a period that
includes when I was a Member of Congress or the Vice President. In
that entire period no references or discussions on a possible
pardon for then President Nixon occurred until August 1 and 2, 1974.
You will recall that since the beginning of the Watergate investigations,
I had consistently made statements and speeches about President Nixon's
innocence either planning the break-in or, of participating in the
of
cover-up. I sincerely believed he was innocent.
Even in the closing months before the President resigned, I made public
statements that in my opinion the adverse revelations so far did not
constitute an impeachable offense.
I was coming under increasing criticism for such public statements, but
I still believed them to be true based on the facts as I knew them.
In the early morning of Thursday, August 1, 1974, I had a meeting
in my Vice Presidential office, with Alexander H. Haig, Jr., Chief of
Staff for President Nixon. At this meeting, I was told in a general
way about fears arising because of additional tape evidence scheduled
for delivery to Judge Sirica on Monday, August 5, 1974. I was told that
there could be evidence which, when disclosed to the House of
Representatives, would likely tip the vote in favor of impeachment.
Tab A attached,
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-7-
However, I was given no indication that this development would lead
to any change in President Nixon's plans to oppose the impeachment vote.
Then shortly after noon, General Haig requested another appointment
as promptly as possible. He came to my office about 3:30 P.M. M for a meeting
that was to last for approximately three-quarters of an hour. Only
then did I learn of the damaging nature of a conversation on June 23,
1972, in one of the tapes which was due to go to Judge Siricathe the llow Monday,
non
I describe this meeting because at one point it did include
references to a possible pardon for Mr. Nixon, to which the third and
fourth questions in H. Res. 1367 are directed. However, nearly the
entire meeting covered other subjects, all dealing with the totally new
situation resulting from the critical evidence on the tape of June 23,
1972. General Haig. told me he had been told of the new and damaging
evidence by lawyers on the White House staff who had first-hand knowledge
of what was on the tape. The substance of his conversation was that the
new disclosure would be devastating, even catastrophic, insofar as President
Nixon was concerned. Based on what he could tell me of the conversation
had learned
on the tape, he wanted to know whether I was prepared to assume the
Presidency within a very short time, and whether I would be willing to
make recommendations to the President as to what course he should
now follow.
I cannot really express adequately in words how shocked and stunned
I was by this unbelievable revelation. First, was the sudden awareness I
was to become President under these most unusual conditions, and secondly,
circumsta,
the realization these new disclosures ran completely counter to the
FORD
position I had taken for months, that I believed the President
was
GERALD
not
guilty of any impeachable offense.
LIBRAR,
-8-
General Haig in his conversation at my office went on to tell me
of discussions in the White House among those who knew of this new evidence.
General Haig asked for my assessment of the whole situation. He
wanted my thoughts about the timing of a resignation, if that decision
was made and about how to do it and accomplish an orderly change of
administration. We discussed what scheduling problems there might be
and what the early organizational problems would be.
General Haig outlined for me President Nixon's situation as he
saw it and the different views in the White House as to the courses of
action that might be available, and which were being advanced by various
people around him on the White House staff. As I recall there were
different major courses being considered:
(1) Some suggested "riding it out" by letting the impeachment
take its course through the House and the Senate trial, fighting all
the way against conviction.
(2) Others were urging resignation sooner or later.
I was told some people backed the first course and other people a
resignation but not with the same views as to how and when it should
take place.
On the resignation issue, there were put forth a number of options
which General Haig reviewed with me. As I recall his conversation,
various possible options being considered included:
(1) The President temporarily step aside under the 25th Amendment.
(2) Delaying resignation until further along down the impeachment process.
(3) Trying first to settle for a censure vote as a means of avoiding
either impeachment or a need to resign.
FORD
GRALD
LIBRARY
-9-
(4) The question of whether the President could pardon himself.
(5) Pardoning various Watergate defendants, then himself,
followed by resignation.
(6) A pardon to the President, should he resign.
The rush of events placed an urgency on what was to be done. It
became even more critical in view of a prolonged impeachment
trial which was expected to last possibly four months or longer.
The impact of the Senate trial on the country, the handling of possible
international crises, the economic situation here at home, and the
marked slowdown in developing needed new programs by the federal
the decision-msking process within
government were all factors to be considered, and were discussed.
General Haig wanted my views on the various courses of action as
well as my attitude on the options of resignation. However, he indicated
he was not advocating any of the options. I inquired as to what was the
President's pardon power, and he answered that it was his understanding
from a White House lawyer that a President did have the authority to
grant a pardon even before any criminal action had been taken against
an individual, but obviously, he was in no position to have any opinion
on a matter of law.
As I saw it, at this point the question clearly before me was,
under the circumstances, what course of action should I recommend that
would be in the best interest of the country.
I told General Haig I had to have time to think. Further, that I
wanted to talk to James St. Clair. I also said I wanted to talk to my
wife before giving any response. I had consistently and firmly held Theord
LIBRAR ALD.
-10-
view while previously I was Vice President that in no way whatsoever could I
recommend either publicly or privately any step by the President
25 Vrce President.
that might cause a change in my status As the man-who would
ersor
become President if a vacancy occurred for any reason in that office,
a Vice President, I believed, should ought never to do or say anything which
might affect his President's tenure in office. Therefore, I certainly
was not ready even under these new circumstances to make any recom-
mendations about resignation without having adequate time to consider
further what I should properly do.
oclock
Shortly after 8:00 the next morning James St. Clair came to my
office. Although he did not spell out in detail the new evidence, there
was no question in my mind that he considered these revelations to be
so damaging that impeachment in the House was a certainty and conviction
in the Senate a high probability. When I asked Mr. St. Clair if he
knew of any other new and damaging evidence besides that on the
June 23, 1972, tape, he said "no." When I pointed out to him the
various options mentioned to me by General Haig, he told me he had not
been the source of any opinion about Presidential pardon power.
After further thought on the matter, I was determined not to make
any recommendations to President Nixon on his resignation. I had
not given any advice or recommendations in my conversations with his
representatives, but I also did not want anyone who might talk to
the President to suggest that I had some intention to do so.
For that reason I decided I should call General Haig the
afternoon of August 2nd. I did make the call late that afternoon and
FORD LIBRAR
-11-
told him I wanted him to understand that I had no intention of
recommending what President Nixon should do about resigning or not
resigning, and that nothing we had talked about the previous afternoon should
be given any consideration in whatever decision the President might
make. General Haig told me he was in full agreement with this
position.
My travel schedule called for me to make appearances in
Mississippi and Louisiana over Saturday, Sunday, and part of Monday,
August 3, 4, and 5. In the previous eight months I had repeatedly
stated my opinion that the President would not be found guilty of an
impeachable offense. Any change from my stated views, or even refusal
to comment further, I feared, would lead in the press to conclusions
that I had learned of new evidence and now wanted to see the President
resign to avoid an impeachment vote in the House and probable conviction
vote in the Senate. For that reason I remained firm in my answers to
press questions during my trip and repeated my belief in the President's
innocence of an impeachable offense.
retyped
Not until I returned to Washington did I learn that President Nixon
was to releas
At about the
had released the new evidence late on Monday, August 5, 1974. Then
he
same
time
was
and I met with the Cabinet Members on Tuesday morning, August 6, 1974.
notified
announced that
that the
At that meeting in the Cabinet Room, I said I was making no recommendations President
to the President as to what he should do in the light of the new evidence. called had
And I made no recommendations to him either at the meeting or at any
Cabinet
time after that.
meeting mee for
FORD i LIBRARI
-12-
The first question of H. Res. 1367 asks whether I or my representa-
tive had "specific knowledge of any formal criminal charges pending
against Richard M. Nixon." The answer is: "no."
I had known, of course, that the Grand Jury investigating
the Watergate break-in and cover-up had wanted to name
President Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator in the cover-up. Also,
I knew that an extensive report had been prepared by the Watergate
Special Prosecution Force for the Grand Jury and had been sent to the
House Committee on the Judiciary, where, I believe, it served the staff
and members of the Committee in the development of its report on the
proposed articles of impeachment. Beyond what was disclosed in the
publications of the Judiciary Committee on the subject and additional
evidence released by President Nixon on August 5, 1974, I saw on or
shortly after September 4th a copy of a memorandum prepared for
Special Prosecutor Jaworski by the Deputy Special Prosecutor,
*
Henry Ruth. (Tab B) Copy of this memorandum had been furnished by Mr. Jaworski
to my Counsel and was later made public during a press briefing at the
White House on September 10, 1974.
Suba
I have supplied the Committee with a copy of this memorandum. The
memorandum lists matters still under investigation which "may prove
to have some direct connection to activities in which Mr. Nixon is
personally involved." The Watergate cover-up is not included in this
list; and the alleged cover-up is mentioned only as being the subject
*Tab B ttached,
FORD is LIBRAR
-13-
of a separate memorandum not ever furnished to me. Of those matters
which are listed in the memorandum, it is stated that none of them
"at the moment rises to the level of our ability to prove even a
probable criminal violation by Mr. Nixon."
This is all the information I had which related even to the
possibility of "formal criminal charges" involving the former President
while he had been in office.
The second question in the Resolution asks whether Alexander Haig
referred to or discussed a pardon with Richard M. Nixon or his
representatives at any time during the week of August 4, 1974, or any
subsequent time. My answer to that question is: not to my knowledge.
If any such discussions did occur, because I was not aware of them,
they could not have been a factor in my decision to grant the pardon
when I did decause I wasnot sware of them,
Questions three and four of H. Res. 1367 deal with the first and
all subsequent references to, or discussions of, a pardon for Richard M.
Nixon, with him or any of his representatives or aides. I have already
described at length what discussions took place on August 1 and 2, 1974,
and how these discussions brought no recommendations or commitments
whatsoever on my part. Those wereithconly discussions related FORD
tolquestions hrse and four before I become President,
but question four relates 5/50 to subsequent discussions
-14-
At no time after I became President on August 9, 1974, was the
subject of a pardon for Richard M. Nixon raised by the former
President or by anyone representing him. Also, no one on my staff
brought up the subject until just before my first press conference on
the day
August 28, 1974. At that time, I was advised that questions on the
subject might be raised by media reporters at the press conference.
As the press conference proceeded, the first question asked
involved the subject, as did other later questions. In my answers to
those
the questions, I took a position that while I was the final authority
on this matter, I expected to make no commitment one way or the other
depending on what the Special Prosecutor and courts would do.
However, I also stated that I believed the general view of the American
people was to spare the former President from a criminal trial.
Shortly afterwards I became greatly concerned that if the Mr. Nixon
prosecution and trial were prolonged, the passions generated over a
long period of time would seriously disrupt the healing of our country
from the wounds of the past. I could see that the new Administration
could not be effective if it had to operate in the atmosphere of having
a former President under prosecution and criminal trial. Each step
along the way way, I was deeply concerned, would become a public spectacle
and the topic of wide public debate and controversy.
As I have before stated publicly, these concerns led me to ask
from my own legal counsel what my full right of pardon was under the
Constitution in this situation and from the Special Prosecutor what
criminal actions, if any, were likely to be brought against the
former President, and how long his any prosecution and would take.
BERALD FORD LIBRART
-15-
As soon as I had been given this information, I authorized my
Counsel, Philip Buchen, to tell Herbert J. Miller, as attorney for
Richard M. Nixon, of my pending decision to grant a pardon for the
former President. I was advised that the disclosure was made on
September 4, 1974, when Mr. Buchen, accompanied by Benton Becker,
met with Mr. Miller. Mr. Becker had been asked, with my concurrence,
to take on a temporary special assignment to assist Mr. Buchen,
at a time when no one else of my selection had yet been appointed
to the legal staff of the White House.
The fourth question in the resolution also asks about "negotiations"
with Mr. Nixon or his representatives on the subject of a pardon for
the former President. The pardon under consideration was not,
so far as I was concerned, a matter of negotiation. I realized that
unless Mr. Nixon actually accepted the pardon I was preparing to grant,
it probably would not be effective. So I certainly had no intention
to proceed without knowing if it would be accepted. Otherwise, I put
no conditions on my granting of a pardon which required any negotiations.
Although negotiations had been started earlier and were conducted through
September 6th concerning White House records of the prior administration,
I did not make any agreement on that subject a condition of the pardon.
The circumstances leading to an initial agreement on Presidential
records are not covered by the Resolutions before this Subcommittee.
ALD B. FORD
-16-
Therefore, I have mentioned discussions on that subject with Mr. Nixon's
attorney only to show they were related in time to the pardon dis-
cussions but were not a basis for my decision to grant a pardon to
the former President.
The fifth, sixth, and seventh questions of H. Res. 1367 ask whether
I consulted with certain persons before making my pardon decision.
I did not consult at all with Attorney General Saxbe on the
subject of a pardon for Mr. Nixon. My only conversation on the subject
with Vice Presidential nominee Nelson Rockefeller was to report to
him on September 6, 1974, that I was planning to grant the pardon.
Special Prosecutor Jaworski was contacted on my instructions by
my Counsel, Philip Buchen. One purpose of their discussions was to
seek the information I wanted on what possible criminal charges might be
brought against Mr. Nixon. The result of that inquiry was a copy of
the memorandum I have already referred to and have furnished to this
Subcommittee. The only other purpose was to find out the opinion of
the Special Prosecutor as to how long a delay would follow, in the
event of Mr. Nixon's indictment, before a trial could be started and
concluded.
At a White House press briefing on September 8, 1974, the principal
portions of Mr. Jaworski's opinion were made public. In this opinion,
Mr. Jaworski wrote that selection of a jury for the trial of the
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
-17-
former President, if he were indicted, would require a delay "of a
period from nine months to a year, and perhaps even longer." On
the question of how long it would take to conduct such a trial, he
noted that the complexities of the jury selection made it difficult
to estimate the time. Copy of the full text of his opinion dated
September 4, 1974, I have now furnished to this Subcommittee. (Tab G)
I did consult with my Counsel Philip Buchen, with Benton Becker,
and with my Counsellor John Marsh, who is also an attorney. Outside
of these men, serving at the time on my immediate staff, I consulted
with no other attorneys or professors of law for facts or legal
authorities bearing on my decision to grant a pardon to the former
President.
Questions eight and nine of H. Res. 1367 deal with the circumstances
of any statement requested or received from Mr. Nixon. I asked for
no confession or statement of guilt; only a statement in acceptance of
the pardon when it was granted. No language was suggested or requested
by anyone acting for me to my knowledge. My Counsel advised me that
he had told the attorney for Mr. Nixon that he believed the statement
should be one expressing contrition, and in this respect, I was told
Mr. Miller concurred. Before I announced the pardon, I saw a preliminary
draft of a proposed statement from Mr. Nixon, but I did not regard
the language of the statement as subsequently issued to be subject to
approval by me or my representatives.
BLANLD tund LIBRARY
*Tab C attached.
-18-
The tenth question covers any report to me on Mr. Nixon's health
by a physician or psychiatrist, which led to my pardon decision.
I received no such report. Whatever information was generally
known to me at the time of my pardon decision was based on my own
observations of his condition at the time he resigned as President
and observations reported to me after that from others who had
afterwards later seen or talked with him. No such reports were by people
qualified to evaluate medically the condition of Mr. Nixon's health,
and so they were not a controlling factor in my decision. However,
I believed and still do, that prosecution and trial of the former
President would have proved a serious threat to his health, as I
stated in my message on September 8, 1974.
H. Res. 1370 (Tab D) is the other resolution of inquiry before this
Subcommittee. It presents no questions but asks for the full and
complete facts upon which was based my decision to grant a pardon to
Richard M. Nixon.
I know of no such facts that are not covered by my answers to the
questions in H. Res. 1367. Also:
Subparagraphs (1) and (4): There were no representations made
by me or for me and none by Mr. Nixon or for him on which my pardon
decision was based.
Tab D attached
-19-
Subparagraph (2): The health issue is dealt with by me in answer
to earlier question ten of the previous earlier resolution.
Subparagraph (3): Information available to me about possible
offenses in which Mr. Nixon might have been involved is covered in my
answer to the first question of the earlier resolution.
In addition, in an unnumbered paragraph at the end, H. Res. 1370
seeks information on possible pardons for Watergate-related offenses
which others may have committed. I have decided that all persons
requesting consideration of pardon requests should submit them through
the appropriate procedures of the Department of Justice.
Only when I receive information on any request duly filed and
considered first by the Pardon Attorney at the Department of Justice
would I consider the matter. As yet no such information has been
received, and if it does I will act or decline to act according to the
particular circumstances presented, and not on the basis of the
unique circumstances, as I saw them, of former President Nixon.
LIBRARY CENALD B. FORD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
For Edna togo
stand of Cresident's
statement
T.
line
By these responses to the resolutions of inquiry, I believe I
have fully and fairly presented the facts and circumstances
preceding my pardon of former President Nixon. In this way, I hope
I have contributed to a much better understanding by the American
people of the action I took to grant the pardon when I did. For having
afforded me this opportunity, I do express my appreciation to you,
and
the Ranking Minority Member,and to/
Mr. Chairman, to Mr. Smith, all the other-members distinguished of thes
Subcommittee; also to Chairman Rodino of the Committee on the
Judiciary, and to Mr. Hutchinson, the Ranking Mindild Minority member of the
F11 full Committee.
In closing, I would like to reemphasize that I acted solely for the
reasons I stated in my proclamation of September 8, 1974, and my
accompanying message and that I acted out of my concern to serve the
best interests of my country. As I stated then:
fishot the fate of Richard Nixen that
concerns me, though surely it froubles every
decent and compossionate person. "Myconcern
is the immediate futuro of this groat
is country my duty, not merely to proclaim domestic that
My conscience tells me it
I hove to insure it."
tranquility, but to use overy means
FORD LIBRARY