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Protection - Responsibilities of the Secret Service and EPS (2)
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Protection - Responsibilities of the Secret Service and EPS (2)
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Philip W. Buchen Files
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Department of Homeland Security. U.S. Secret Service. (2003 - )
Presidential protection
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The original documents are located in Box 58, folder "Protection - Responsibilities of the
Secret Service and EPS (2)" of the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 58 of the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 2, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Ina Garten
FROM:
Bill Casselman
16
Referencing your request for comments on Treasury's letter re
H.R. 15505 and H.R. 15979 which would require reimbursement
of state and local law enforcement agencies for assistance provided
at the request of the Secret Service, my office has no objection to
this letter.
It is quite clear that while these two bills as well as H.R. 11499
deal with the general issue of reimbursement by the Secret Service,
the issues are in fact totally different. With respect to reimbursement
by the Secret Service to other Federal agencies, this is merely a
bookkeeping issue that does not involve increased Federal expenditures.
On the other hand, reimbursement to state and local agencies would reflect
new Federal expenditures, as well as a departure from longstanding
Federal policy that there be no direct reimbursement for such police
and related services. At least in certain instances LEAA grants would
be available to assist local governments that continually are faced with
requests from the Secret Service.
It is recommended that the major thrust of the Administration's position
be based on the primary role of state and local governments in the
protection of persons as well as property, and on the essential difference
between reimbursement at the Federal level and at state and local levels.
To the extent Treasury can continue to backup these arguments with
hard numbers, their position will be enhanced.
CC: Phil Buchen
Phil Areeda
Ken Lazarus
GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY
Thursday 1/9/75
9:35 When we started receiving copies of EPS Security Reports
of violations, I checked with Skip Williams (9/30) and asked
if something should be done in connection therewith.
He said they just keep them in a file .. nothing to be done
unless it is a continuing thing with an individual.
I checked with Barry this morning to see if this procedure
is still effective, and he suggested it would probably be in
Jay's area -- and perhaps I could send our file on this to
Jay.
If you agree, I will do so. That way he can keep a check
on anything that should come to your attention.
THE LIBRARY
Protection
EPS
Thursday 1/9/75
11:00 Jay called concerning the EPS protection for the Jackson
Place home of the CIA Commission.
He has talked with the Legal Counsel of the Secrat Service
and he (the Legal Counsel) after further review --- [without
any pressure whatsoever from Jay, he says] volunteered
the fact that because this is going to be the Vice President's
office he has informed Mr. Knight that it is absolutely
permissible for EPS to protect the building.
So, Jay is informing everyone to get the place prepared for
the first meeting on Monday morning.
Wanted you to know that we (the Counsel's office) is directing
this but only because EPS and Secret Service lawyer feels
confident that they have the right to do it.
(((for background, he told me that we were all prepared to
tell EPS to get over and prepare the thing; Secret Service
has some problems. They don't feel they have authority to
do it.
Jay has looked at it from several different ways.
Secret Service has done a complete turnaround ----
they now conclude after looking over the history, Congressional
statutes, etc., that they could and should be there to protect
the Vice President since he is the Chairman of the Commission. )))
12:50
Jay called back to ask if you had any comment on the above
message -- has already got things in motion.
SEALE 1. FORD LIBRARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 13, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
PHILIP W. BUCHEN
FROM:
THE PRESIDENT
You are requested to inform the Chief of the Executive Protective
Service that he (or the person acting in that capacity) or, in his
absence, the senior officer of the Executive Protective Service on
duty, is hereby designated as the person lawfully in charge of the
Executive Mansion and grounds, and any other building in which
the White House offices are located, for the purposes of Section 3102
of Title 22 of the Code of Laws of the District of Columbia.
Herld R. For
Proj i DISEASE GIVEN
Secret
Service
January 22, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Robert R. Snow
Special Agent in Charge
Technical Security Division
The White House
In order to facilitate delivery of papers coming
from the Justice Department so that they can be
delivered directly to my office, I would like to
have Alan Cary Stancil cleared to come into the
White House as the need arises.
Attached is a completed form, which was filled
out by the office of Carla Hills, Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Division, Department of Justice.
Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President
Attachment
EDaughtrey
BLAND 1. FORD LIBRARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
11/14/74
wa
Pal our conversation,
attached are 55 security
fam to be filled our
by Hr. Stancil & returned
to secut Service.
thank you
2345
Katnaz
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
DOCUMENT
RESTRICTION
The following item is restricted upon
rereview under NARA IG 1600-1:
Personnel
U.S. Secret Service Techical Security
ND
Document
Division (1 p)
FILE LOCATION
Phillip Buchen Files; Box 58
Protection - Responsibilities of the Secret Service & EPS (2)
dal 1/7/02
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(c) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
Thursday 11/14/74
3:30 Beverly Posey in Carla Hills' office called to clear a messenger
to bring an envelope to Mr. Buchen. Asked if there might be
a way they could get a clearance and use the same messenger
so he could bring the material into the White House rather
than drop the material at the S. W. gate and have a messenger
go down to pick it up.
Talked with Jane Dannenhauer; she will send the form 55 to be
filled out and sent to the Secret Service.
Suggests we get the form filled out by the messenger (ourier)
and then Mr. Buchen should write a.memo (just a short one)
saying that we need to save time and get the papers delivered
directly -- and would like to have this courier cleared to deliver
those pa pers directly to Mr. Buchen.
Memo to be written to Mr. Snow in Rm. 23 EOB.
Alan Stancil is the courier -- Dept. of Justice ID 9699 -- issued 7/26/63.
Form completed by Carla Hills' office.
FORD LIBRANT
Policy
THE WHITE HOUSE
EPS
WASHINGTON
January 23, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR
Mr. Clinton T. Hill, Assistant Director
Protective Forces
1. By this memorandum I approve the existing procedures for
handling petitions presented at entrances to the White House
complex, as set forth in the attached memorandum from you
to Chief Quimby, dated January 15, 1973.
2. In the event these procedures are exhausted without success,
you are requested to contact the White House Counsel's office
to discuss the advisability of having a member of this staff
accept the petition.
P.W.B.
Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President
Enclosure
TORD AMERICA
U.S. SECRET SERVICE
Memorandum
600.0 (EPS)
TO
:
Chief Quimby - Executive Protective Service DATE: January 15, 1973
FROM :
AD Hill - Protective Forces
SUBJECT:
Petitions Presented at Entrances to White House Complex
Effective immediately, the following procedures, in the order
indicated, should be followed concerning any person(s) appearing
at entrances to the White House Complex and attempting to present
a petition to the President, First Family, members of the staff,
etc. :
1. Send the person(s) to the White House Mailroom with
petition or ask them to mail it to the White House.
2. If the above procedure is not followed by person(s)
presenting petition, accept petition and advise
person(s) that it will be forwarded to the appropriate
official.
3. Furnish Intelligence Division with details of activity
of person (s) presenting petition and if a petition
was received, determine if Intelligence Division wants
\
the petition or desires it to be furnished to the
White House Mailroom.
4. One copy of the petition will be furnished to Mr. John
Dean's office, Room 106, OEOB, for information purposes.
Date and time petition was received will be indicated
on Mr. Dean's copy.
clien I Hid Clinton J. Hillsm
Assistant Director
Protective Forces
CC: AD Kelley - PI
SAIC Towns - ID
SAIC Sims - TSD
SAIC McLeod - Liaison
SAIC Taylor - PPD
SAIC Sulliman - VPPO
Buy U.S. Submits Bonds Revularly IN in Payroll Scrimes DI...
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 21, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
PHILIP W. BUCHEN
FROM:
JAY T. FRENCH
SUBJECT:
PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING
PETITIONS
The Secret Service has asked for your comments concerning existing
guidelines (see attached memos in Tab A) for handling petitions pre-
sented at entrances to the White House complex.
Presently two steps are followed in sequence:
(a) Petitioners are requested to leave the document at
the White House mailroom in the O.E.O.B., and if
they refuse to do this,
(b) EPS officers at the gate may accept the petition.
The memorandums do not state a third course of action which has
been followed when (a) and (b) are exhausted: An attorney on the
Counsel's staff has accepted the petition.
I recommend that you approve these present guidelines and formalize
the third course of action as an alternative by forwarding the attached
memorandum in Tab B.
in
LICEASE
600.0
September 13, 1974
MEMORANDUM
To
:
Honorable Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President
The White House
From
:
Mr. Clinton J. Hill
Assistant Director
Protective Forces
Subject
:
Petitions Presented at Entrance to the
White House Complex
In order to update our files regarding procedures pursuant to
petitions presented at Entrances to the White House Complex,
I have attached a copy of said procedures for your information.
Your concurrence and/or comments regarding this matter is
requested with the name of the appropriate individual assigned
to your office where delivery of a copy of this petition may
be effected. Your ccoperation in this matter is solicited in
order to insure prompt and efficient handling of the matter
should 10 arise.
Clentan John
Clinton J. Hill
Attachment: a/s
CJH:JS:jd
CC: Mr. Jay French
(Sent 1/14/75
GENELA FORD LIBRARY
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
U.S. SECRET SERVICE
Memorandum
600.0 (EPS)
upd
TO
:
Chief Quimby - Executive Protective Service & DATE: January 15, 1973
FROM :
AD Hill - Protective Forces
a
SUBJECT:
Petitions Presented at Entrances to White House Complex
Effective immediately, the following procedures, in the order
indicated, should be followed concerning any person(s) appearing
at entrances to the White House Complex and attempting to present
a petition to the President, First Family, members of the staff,
etc.:
1. Send the person(s) to the White House Mailroom with
petition or ask them to mail it to the White House.
2. If the above procedure is not followed by person(s)
presenting petition, accept petition and advise
person(s) that it will be forwarded to the appropriate
official.
3. Furnish Intelligence Division with details of activity
of person (s) presenting petition and if a petition
was received, determine if Intelligence Division wants --
the petition or desires it to be furnished to the
White House Mailroom.
4. One copy of the petition will be furnished to Mr. John
Dean's office, Room 106, 0EOB, for information purposes.
Date and time petition was received will be indicated
on Mr. Dean's copy.
cliting.Hid Clinton J. Hillon
Assistant Director
Protective Forces
CC: AD Kelley - PI
SAIC Towns - ID
SAIC Sims - TSD
SAIC McLeod - Liaison
SEALTH FORD LIBRARY
SAIC Taylor - PPD
SAIC Sulliman - VPPD
B..., U.S. Savings Bonds Resularly on the Powerall Coniner DI
EXECUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE 600.0
MEMO: TO THE FORCE
SUBJECT: Petitions Presented at
(White House Division)
Entrances to White House
Complex
June 20, 1973 - No. 73-11
Effective immediately, the following procedures, in the order indicated,
should be followed concerning any person( appearing at entrances to the
White House Complex attempting to present a petition to the President,
First Family, members of the Staff, etc.:
1. Send the pèrson to the White House Mailroom with the peti-
tion or ask them to mail it to the White House. (The Watch
Commander will be notified of this action or any activity
surrounding the presentation of any petition.)
2. If the above procedure is not followed by person present-
ing the petition, accept petition and advise person(s) that
it will be forwarded to the appropriate official. If the
petition is accepted, the Watch Commander will be notified
and will make the following distribution of the petition:
a. Send copy to President's Legal Counsel.
b. Send copy to the Chief, EPS.
c. Send the original petition to the Mailroom.
d. Send copy to the Inspector, White House Division.
The date and time the petition was received will be indi-
cated on all copies of the petition.
3. The Watch Commander will furnish the Secret Service Intelli-
gence Division (ID) with detailed activity reports by phone
of person presenting petition and if a petition was received,
he will determine if the Intelligence Division wants the peti-
tion or a copy, or desires that the original petition be fur-
nished to the White House Mailroom.
THIS MEMORANDUM CANCELS PERMANENT MEMORANDUM NO. 73-02, DATED 1-16-73.
DISTRIBUTION
4
CHIEF
RANGE
D/C OPERATIONS
SUPPLY
D/C ADMIN. & SVCS
TEMP. BCOX WH
INSD WH DIV
TEMP. POOK . FM
FORD
RISP. FM DIV
TEMP. BOOK EQ311
ADMIN
NFOB
SERVICES
D-1
LIBRARY
WATCH CHER WH
G2
Earl L. Drescher
WATCH CMDR FM
T'A SECTION
AD (PF)
G.9
Chief
SAIC EPS
CONTROL CENTER WHI
Executive Protective Service
18KG. DIV 2
POSIS 6-8-A-4
ELD:CWH:tlt
subject
THE WHITE HOUSE
service
WASHINGTON
February 6, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
PHILIP BUCHEN
FROM:
JAY FRENCH
You inquired whether GAO is legally correct in concluding that
Secretary Simon is not authorized by law to have Secret Service
protection of his person. See attached news article in Tab A.
There is no statutory authority for such protection. See 18 U.S.C.A.
8 3056 in Tab B. However, there is constitutional authority that the
President may direct protection when a danger exists. Also, the
Secretary of the Treasury has directed protection missions under his
executive management authority as a department head.
Section 3, Article 2, of the Constitution provides that the President
"shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 11 The U.S.
Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase as authority for the
President to direct protection for a Federal official in certain
instances. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890). In that case the Court
upheld a Presidential order, under this broad constitutional authority,
directing a Federal marshal to protect a judge, who, while in the
discharge of his duties was personally threatened and assaulted.
There is no showing that the President has directed protection for
Secretary Simon.
The Treasury Department has taken the position that the Secretary
may direct the deployment of the Secret Service as an executive
management function because the Service is a part of the Department.
See page 7 of Tab C. In support of this position, the Department
cites Section 301 of 5 U.S.C. which provides, in part, that "the head
of an Executive department or military department may prescribe
regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its
employees, the distribution and performance of its business
11
It is under this authority that the Secretary has directed protection
for the Secretaries of State and Treasury, and the Deputy Secretary
of the Treasury.
FORD
OF
LIBRARY
- 2 -
As a pratical matter the Congress has sometimes acquiesced in
protection of a non-statutory protectee and on other occasions
demanded termination of such protection. The cases of Senator
Kennedy and former Vice President Agnew are good examples.
My only conclusion is that if Secretary Simon is in no greater
danger than other members of the Cabinet, it might be difficult
to justify protection on any theory.
Considerations
1.
What would be the legal consequences if a Secret Service
agent killed someone while protecting the Secretary? In
Neagle the marshal was charged with murder upon the
theory that he was improperly assigned. The U. S. Supreme
Court prevented a trial by its decision.
2. Is protection being provided Secretary Simon's family?
3. What special facilities, at a cost of $5, 400, are being
readied at Secretary Simon's residence?
4. Is protection still being provided to the Deputy Secretary
of the Treasury?
FORDO
-
TAB A
LIBRARY
FORD
PENNIS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 6, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
PHILIP BUCHEN
FROM:
JAY FRENCH Day
You inquired whether GAO is legally correct in concluding that
Secretary Simon is not authorized by law to ha ve Secret Service
protection of his person. See attached news article in Tab A.
There is no statutory authority for such protection. See 18 U.S.C.A.
3056 in Tab B.
Historically, Secret Service protection has been given to Treasury
Secretaries Morgenthau and Schultz by direction of the President.
The article in Tab A relates that the President has not directed
protection for Secretary Simon.
The authority for a President to direct such protection is in the
Constitution. Section 3, Article 2, declares that the President
"shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." The U.S.
Supreme Court has applied this interpretation in In Re Neagle,
135 U.S. 1 (1890). In that case the Court upheld a Presidential
order under this broad constitutional authority, directing a Federal
Marshal to protect a judge, who, while in the discharge of his duties
was personally threatened. There is one glaring difference between
the facts of Neagle and the facts surrounding protection of Secretary
Simon. Justice Field, in Neagle had been assaulted once and threatened
on several occasions when protection was finally ordered. Secretary
Simon does not appear to be in any greater danger than other members
of the Cabinet, who have no Secret Service protection.
A second, weaker argument has been advanced to legitimatize Secret
Service protection of non-statutory protectees. Under this theory the
President notifies the Congress (or appropriate committee) of his
action, and if the Congress remain silent it is deemed to have ratified
the act.
FOR
- 2 -
Considerations
1. What would be the legal consequences if a Secret Service agent
killed someone while protecting the Secretary? In Neagle the
the marshal was charged with murder upon the theory that he
was improperly assigned.
2. Is protection being provided Secretary Simon's family?
3. What special facilities, at a cost of $5, 400, are being readied
at Secretary Simon's residence?
CANALE
the In the police middle radio. There d been
pulled out.
and trying to get the of parade all this, there was call shooting on at
But holdups then became a regular occurrence so
helping the was back at the Beecher economy. in started. Junior
runas aut
he said
for all Americans
"I will walk the extra mile and give an
S)
Secret Service
akers do not approve his ant
lion deficit-could swell to
The President warned-that
ending of $1 billion a week
The figure includes record
ar
guard for Simon
ilmost $1 billion a day"
y he will ask Congress to spe
WASHINGTON President
reduce dY pure Idn used
IS questioned
to
By SETH KANTOR
News Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON A detail of Secret Service
agents, acting under orders from Treasury
Secretary William E. Simon, has been providing
Simon and his family personal bodyguard
Fo
protection at a cost to the public of more than
$500,000 a year:
But a report by the General Accounting Office
(GAO) says Simon is not authorized by law to
102nd YEAR NO. 164
have the special unit from the Secret Service,
which is a branch of the Treasury Department.
The report shows $504,000 a year is spent on
salaries alone for agents posted at the Simon
home and for those who travel with him on trips.
vai Page uo Details
In addition, Treasury officials have told the
GAO that $5,400 is being spent to establish spe-
Cloudy
cial facilities for the Secret Service at Simon's
home.
-AP Wirephoto
Spokesmen for Simon and the Secret Service
WILLIAM SIMON
Weather
refused to tell. The News what those facilities
Guard is questioned
are or how many agents are being used to serve
Simon personally
FEBRUARY
$
Never can you get that kind of information,"
said one spokesman. "It would tell people inter-
Today's
2
8
ested in blowing him (Simon) up how many men
9 10 11 12 13 14
there are to fight.
index
16171819202122
A Treasury spokesman said Simon is "not
2324252627.28
necessarily getting any more threats than other
members of the Cabinet who are not given spe-
cial Secret Service guards
Accent
1-200
Homes, Gardens 1 2M
Rep. John E. Moss, D-Calif., who asked for
Art-Books
2F
Horoscope
10K
the GAO study, charged that Simon's actions
Classified 1-115 I-9K;
Lively Arts
1-8F
are an "example of the security syndrome'
1-7L
Movie Guide
5F
characterizing the Nixon-Ford regimes, which,
Real Estater: 3-T2M
Obituaries
190
rather than serving the people, fears them and
Contact 10
1B
Death Notices
19D
shows it by such inexcusable expenditures."
Crossword
ITI
Outdoors
6E
David R. Macdonale assistant Treasury
Editorial
8G
Sports
1-8E
secretary for enforcement, compared the
Feature Page
78
Travel
1-8H
atmosphere surrounding today's Treasury
FORD
Finance
I-10G
Radio
secretary with the dangers of World IF
LIBRARY
Detroit, February 2, 1975-THE SUNDAY NEWS- 13-A
Secret Service bodyguards
for Simon are questioned
Continued from Page One
sonal protection force, another $26,400 has been
when then-Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. was
set aside to pay for the travel costs of agents as-
given Secret Service bodyguards.
signed to Simon in 1975.
Macdonald said that given the present na
But the GAO
that
tional environment and evidence of specific
ice appropriations for the Simon assignment are
risks, it seems reasonable that (Simon) also be
being misused, since they "are not available for
assigned Secret Service agents who have been
this purpose."
trained to provide personal protection."
The GAO told Moss that special authorization
Federal laws have been enacted since the
from Congress would be required for Simon to
Morgenthau-era which specify those entitled to
have the bodyguards.
Secret Service guards, and the GAO has told
Simon does have routine use of a uniformed
Moss that "the secretary of the Treasury is not
component of the Secret Service, trained to prom
among them. is
tect "life and property. at the Treasury Depart-
Entitled to protection are the president, vice
ment, and provide the secretary security at cer-
president and their immediate families, as well
tain functions, such as press conferences.
as major presidential and vice-presidential
candidates, and visiting heads of state.
Presidents can order Secret Service protec-
tion for a Cabinet member, as has been done for
3rd atom particle found
several secretaries of state, including Henry A
STANFORD, Calif. (UPI) - Scientists ex-
Kissinger.
ploring the subnuclear frontier have discovered
But President Ford has not ordered such
what could be a third new fundamental particle.
protection for Simon, the GAO told Moss.
A team of physics research scientists/from
Simon, therefore, cannot order the Secret
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center and the
Service
to protect him, any more than he
University of California's Berkeley Laboratory
could order it to use its funds to protect any
announced the new find Friday night.
other official not within the purview of (the
The discovery came as the physicists
law)," the GAO reported.
analyzed last year's date using information pro-
Macdonald told GAO investigators that in
vided in studies of the first two particles-
addition to $504,000 in salaries for Simon's per-
labeled "PS13105" and "PS13700."
FORD LIBRARY
e
sale
TAB B
18 § 3053
CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
nor section 570 of Title 28 granting air
ties to make warrantless arrests for spec-
marshals right to exercise the same pow-
ified offenses, power to take reasonable
ers which a sheriff of the state may
law enforcement steps short of, but
exercise provides authority for provision
which may lead to, an arrest can be fair-
that an air marshal may search without
ly implied from the grant of arrest pow-
probable cause. People V. Sortino. N.Y.
ers. U. S. V. Riggs, C.A.N.Y.1973, 474 F.
1971, 325 N.Y.S.2d 472, 68 Misc.2d 151.
2d 699, certiorari denied 94 S.Ct. 115, 414
2. Arrest
U.S. 820, 38 L.Ed.2d 53.
Under this section authorizing the
United States marshals and their depu-
§ 3054. Officers' powers involving animals and birds
Any employee authorized by the Secretary of the Interior to enforce
sections 42, 43, and 44 of this title, and any officer of the customs, may
arrest any person who violates section 42 or 44, or who such employee
or officer of the customs has probable cause to believe is knowingly and
willfully violating section 43, in his presence or view, and may execute
any warrant or other process issued by an officer or court of competent
jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of said sections.
As amended Dec. 5, 1969, Pub.L. 91-135, § 7(b), 83 Stat. 281.
1969 Amendment. Pub.L. 91-135 pro-
Effective Date of 1969 Amendment.
vided for enforcement of section 42 of
Amendment by Pub.L. 91-135 effective
this title and substituted "any person
180 days after Dec. 5, 1969, see section 11
who violates section 42 or 44, or who
of Pub.L. 91-135, set out as a note under
such employee or officer of the customs
section 668ec-1 of Title 16, Conservation.
has probable cause to believe is know-
Legislative History. For legislative
ingly and willfully violating section 43."
history and purpose of Pub.L. 91-135, see
for "any person violating said sections".
1969 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p.
1413.
§ 3056. Secret Service powers
(a) Subject to the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, the United
States Secret Service, Treasury Department, is authorized to protect the
person of the esident of the United States, the members of his finme-
diate fami the President-elect, the Vice President or other officer next
in the order of succession to the office of President and the Vice Predi
dent-elect; protect the person of a former President and his wife during
his lifetime, the person of the widow of a former President until her death
or remarriage, and minor children of a former President until they reach
sixteen years of age, unless such protection is declined; protect the per-
son of a visiting head of a foreign state or foreign government and, at
the direction of the President, other distinguished foreign visitors to the
United States and official representatives of the United States performing
special missions abroad; detect and arrest any person committing any
offense against the laws of the United States relating to coins, obliga-
tions, and securities of the United States and of foreign governments;
detect and arrest any person violating any of the provisions of sections
508, 509, and 871 of this title and, insofar as the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, Federal land banks, joint-stock land banks and Federal
land bank associations are concerned, of sections 218, 221, 433, 493, 657,
709, 1006, 1007, 1011, 1013, 1014, 1907, and 1909 of this title; execute
warrants issued under the authority of the United States; carry fire-
arms; offer and pay rewards for services or information looking toward
the apprehension of criminals; and perform such other functions and
duties as are authorized by law. In the performance of their duties un-
der this section, the Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Directors, As-
sistants to the Director, inspectors, and agents of the Secret Service are
authorized to make arrests without warrant for any offense against the
United States committed in their presence, or for any felony cognizable
under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable grounds to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing
such felony. Moneys expended from Secret Service appropriations for the
purchase of counterfeits and subsequently recovered shall be reimbursed
to the appropriation current at the time of deposit.
(b) Whoever knowingly and willfully obstructs, resists, or interferes
with an agent of the United States Secret Service engaged in the per-
formance of the protective functions authorized by this section, by the
24
SERVICE FORD FIBRARY
CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
18 § 3057
Act of June 6, 1968 (82 Stat. 170), or by section 1752 of title 18, United
States Code, shall be fined not more than $300 or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both.
As amended Jan. 2, 1971, Pub.L. 91-644, Title V, 5 19, 84 Stat. 1892;
Jan. 5, 1971, Pub.L. 91-651, § 4, 84 Stat. 1941.
References in Text. The Act of June
2d 779, rehearing denied 89 S.Ct. 1303,
6, 1968 (82 Stat. 211), referred to in subsec.
394 U.S. 967, 22 L.Ed.2d 570.
(b), is set out as "Major Presidential or
5. Informers
Vice Presidential Candidates; Personal
Where informant had provided Secret
Protection" note under this section.
Service agents with reliable information
1971 Amendments. Subsec. (a). Pub.L.
in the past, and informant correctly
91-651 authorized the Secret Service to
stated that defendant would be at air-
protect the person of a visiting head
port at particular time and would be
of a foreign state or foreign govern-
carrying counterfieit money, and infor-
ment and, at the direction of the Pres-
mant after conversing with defendant
ident, other distinguished foreign vis-
notified agent that defendant possessed
ite
itors to the United States and official
the contraband and agent relayed infor-
representatives of the United States per-
mation to arresting officer who observed
forming special missions abroad, and
brown sack bulging from defendant's
substituted "Director, Deputy Director,
pocket, officer had probable cause for
Assistant Directors, Assistants to the
arrest notwithstanding his inability to
Director" for "Chief, Deputy Chief, As-
identify currency as counterfeit prior to
sistant Chief".
arrest, and search and seizure were valid
Subsec. (b). Pub.L. 91-644 designated
as incident to lawful arrest. Holt v. U.
11
existing provisions as subsec. (a) and
S., C.A.Okl.1968, 404 F.2d 914, certiorari
added subsec. (b).
denied 89 S.Ct. 872, 393 U.S. 1086, 21 L.
Applicability of 1950 Reorg. Plan No. 26.
Ed.2d 779, rehearing denied 89 S.Ct. 1303,
Section 5 of Pub.L. 91-651 provided that:
394 U.S. 967, 22 L.Ed.2d 570.
"Section 3056 of title 18, United States
7. Children of deceased President, pro-
Code, as amended by section 4 of this Act
tection of
p.
[this section]. shall be subject to Reor-
Photographer would be enjoined from
ganization Plan Numbered 26 of 1950 (64
interfering with secret service agents' du-
Stat.1280) [set out in the Appendix to Ti-
ties of protecting children of deceased
tle 5, Government Organization and Em-
president and would not be permitted to
ployees.]'
enter the children's schools or play areas,
Legislative History. For legislative
to engage in action calculated to or rea-
history and purpose of Pub.L. 91-614,
sonably foreseen to place their safety or
see 1970 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News. p.
well-being in jeopardy, would not be per-
5804. See, also, Pub.L. 91-651, 1970 U.S.
mitted to harass, alarm or frighten chil-
Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 5903.
dren and would not be permitted to ap.
proach within 30 feet of the children.
Galella V. Onassis, C.A.N.Y.1973, 487 F.2d
Supplementary Index to Notes
986.
United States was entitled to injunction
Children of deceased President, protection
against activity of photographer who al-
of T
legedly harassed children of deceased
Presidential safety and security 8
President under protection of secret serv-
ice agents, either under common-law
principles or this section relating to se-
cret service powers, on showing that pho-
4. Arrest without warrant-Generally
tographer impaired objective of secret
Secret service agents, who made war-
service function and impaired means by
rantless arrest of defendant, charged
which agents went about achieving objec-
ny
with passing counterfeit federal reserve
tive. Galella V. Onassis, D.C.N.Y.1972, 353
notes, were not required, at moment of
F.Supp. 196, affirmed in part, reversed in
arrest, to possess knowledge of facts and
part on other grounds 487 F.2d 986.
circumstances comprising probable cause
8. Presidential safety and security
as
for such arrest, but rather probable
In class action against various state
cause was to be determined on objective
and federal law enforcement officers on
IT-
facts available for consideration by agen-
behalf of United States citizens who were
cies or officers participating in arrest.
excluded from general presence of Presi-
U. S. V. Stratton, C.A.Mo.1971, 453 F.2d
dent of the United States at public gath-
36, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 1515, 405 U.S.
erings in North Carolina involving well-
1069, 31 L.Ed.2d 800.
known religious figure, evidence failed to
Secret Service is empowered to effec-
establish that actions of the defendants,
tuate lawful arrest without warrant only
although done as federal agents and 08-
if there is reasonable ground to believe
tensibly under color of federal authority,
that person to be arrested has committed
were justified upon basis of necessity for
or is committing a felony. Holt V. U. S.
presidential safety or security. Sparrow
C.A.Ok1.1968, 404 F.2d 914, certiorari de-
V. Goodman, D.C.N.C.1973, 361 F.Supp.
nied 89 S.Ct. 872, 393 U.S. 1086, 21 L.Ed.
566.
§ 3057. Bankruptcy investigations
1. Dismissal of Indictment
Defendant charged with fraudulently
the United States Attorney. "if it appears
concealing and transferring assets of a
probable that any such offense has been
bankrupt corporation, and with conspir-
committed, shall without delay, present
acy, was not entitled to dismissal of in-
the matter to the grand jury,' does not
dictment on grounds that the Government
on its face confer any procedural rights
failed to comply with provisions of this
upon a defendant in a bankruptcy fraud
section relating to bankruptcy investiga-
prosecution. U. S. v. Filiberti, D.C.
tions, where this section, directing that
Conn.1973, 353 F.Supp. 252.
49 U.S.C.A.-2½₂
1974 P.P.
25
FORD
LIBRAR
February 6, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
PHILIP BUCHEN
FROM:
JAY FRENCH
You inquired whether GAO is legally correct in concluding that
Secretary Simon is not authorized by law to have Secret Service
protection of his person. See attached news article in Tab A.
There is no statutory authority for such protection. See 18 U.S.C.A.
I 3056 in Tab B.
Historically, Secret Service protection has been given to Treasury
Secretaries Morgenthau and Schultz by direction of the President.
The article in Tab A relates that the President has not directed
protection for Secretary Simon.
The authority for a President to direct such protection is in the
Constitution. Section 3, Article 2, declares that the President
"shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." The U.S.
Supreme Court has applied this interpretation in In Re Neagle,
135 U.S. 1 (1890). In that case the Court upheld a Presidential
order under this broad constitutional authority, directing a Federal
Marshal to protect a judge, who, while in the discharge of his dutles
was personally threatened. There is one glaring difference between
the Eacts of Neagle and the facts surrounding protection of Secretary
Simon. Justice Field, in Neagle had been assaulted once and threatened
on several occasions when protection was finally ordered. Secretary
Simon does not appear to be in any greater danger than other members
of the Cabinet, who have no Secret Service protection.
A second, weaker argument has been advanced to legitimatize Secret
Service protection of non-statutory protectees. Under this theory the
President notifies the Congress (or appropriate committee) of his
action, and If the Congress remain silent It is deemed to have ratified
the act.
FORD
- 2 -
Considerations
1. What would be the legal consequences If a Secret Service agent
killed someone while protecting the Secretary? In Neagle the
the marshal was charged with murder upon the theory that he
was improperly assigned.
2. Is protection being provided Secretary Simon's family?
3. What special facilities, at a cost of $5,400, are being readied
at Secretary Simon's residence?
JF:pk
BENAU 1. FORD LIBI
TAB C
DEPARTMENT OF THE
THE 1789 TREASURY
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220
September 16, 1974
Dear Phil:
In view of the fact that we will be discussing the
matter of Secret Service protection on future occasions,
I thought that it would be appropriate to send you a
copy of a memorandum which I prepared as General Counsel
of this Department. The memorandum discusses situations
during which protection has been authorized where it was
not specifically authorized under the protective statute,
18 U.S.C. 3056 (a).
With kind regards,
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Schmults
The Honorable
Philip Buchen
Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Enclosure
..,
REPRESENTATIVE
THE
THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE TREASURY
THE
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20220
1784
MAR 19 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary Shultz
FROM:
Edward C. Schmults ECS
SUBJECT:
The Authority of the Secret Service to Provide Protection
in Circumstances Not Specified in 18 U.S.C. 3056(a)
Following your appearance before the Senate Appropriations Committee on
February 27th, you asked me to prepare a memorandum on the authority of the
Secret Service to provide protection in circumstances not specified in the
basic protective statute, 18 U.S.C. 3056(a). This document is provided in
response to that request.
In 1865 the Secret Service was established as a division of the Treasury
Department to suppress counterfeiting, but before the turn of the century it
was engaged, in an ad hoc, stop-gap way, in protecting the President.
Although the Secret Service began full-time protection of the President in
1902, four years passed before specific legislative sanction and funds were
provided for such protection. It was not until 1951 that the basic protective
statute was enacted authorizing permanent protection for the President. This
statute, 18 U.S.C. 3056(a), has been amended several times to enlarge the
number of persons to be protected. Thus, the evolution of the Secret Service
protective mission has been an on-going process. The history and nature of
that mission make it imperative, in Treasury's view, that the protective
statute not be regarded as preventing the Secret Service from protecting
persons not specifically covered by the statute in circumstances where the
risk of harm and the public interest justify protection.
- 2 -
The basic statute now authorizes the Secret Service, subject to the
direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, to protect the President and his
immediate family; the President-elect; the Vice President or other officer
next in succession to the President; the Vice President-elect; major
Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates; former Presidents and
their wives; the widows of former Presidents until death or remarriage;
minor children of former Presidentsuntil they reach the age of sixteen;
visiting heads of state and of foreign governments; and, at the direction
of the President, other distinguished foreign visitors and official repre-
sentatives of the United States performing special missions abroad
2/
Consistent with the evolution of the Secret Service's protective mission,
the Treasury Department has over the years taken the position that this
statutory enumeration does not preclude the Secret Service from affording
protection to individuals who do not fall within the specific categories
set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3056(a) if there are circumstances present which make
such protection reasonable as a matter of both law and public policy. Be-
cause of the nature of what is in issue, i.e., the protection of persons
whose lives are considered to be in danger, we have not regarded Congress'
1/ The responsibility to protect Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates
stems from P.L. 90-331 (1968). This authority is noted in a footnote to
18 U.S.C. 3056.
2/ The protective statute has been considerably broadened since 1951 when
it only authorized protection of the President and his immediate family,
the Vice President and the President-elect. Persons in several of the
new categories of protectees added by the Congress had already been
receiving protection at the direction of the President prior to the
Congress' specific authorization.
is
FORD
- 3 -
enumeration of specific classes of persons to be protected as intended to
preclude protection which is in the public interest when ordered by the
President on a temporary basis or protection for which there is other
authority, as discussed below.
****
The Treasury Department has operated for many years under the general
presumption that there is Presidential authority to order protective details
in cases not expressly covered by the protective statute but which are in
the public interest. This ability provides a necessary flexibility,
particularly in emergency situations, to cover important situations not
foreseen by the Congress and not dealt with in 18 U.S.C. 3056(a). In a
present day environment where terrorism and kidnapping are being increasingly
utilized in attempts to secure social and economic demands, this capability
appears to be a necessity.
The Treasury, as an agency of the Executive branch of the government,
is not in a position to express authoritative conclusions as to the basis
for the President's inherent power to order Secret Service protection of a
specific individual. That is a determination to be made in the first instance
by Counsel to the President. But, in the absence of an authoritative expression
to the contrary, the Treasury believes that in cases where the President deter-
mines that the risk of harm and the public interest justify Secret Service
protection, his directive to furnish such protection is, as a matter of law,
presumptively valid.
FORD
- 4 -
Inherent executive authority has been utilized on a number of past
occasions by many Presidents to order protection in a variety of circumstances
For example, during World War II protection was afforded to Queen Wilhelmina
of the Netherlands, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and other official
foreign visitors to the United States. President Truman and his successors
sent Secret Service details to Latin America to provide protection for
Secretaries of State. Governor Rockefeller was protected by the Secret
Service on an official trip to Latin America during a time when extensive
rioting was taking place. Former Vice President Humphrey received protection
for six months in 1969 after leaving office. Although he was not a candidate
for the Presidency, Senator Edward M. Kennedy was protected subsequent to
the assassination attempt against Governor Wallace during the 1972 Campaign.
Finally, we would point out that if the statute is read literally, protection
for Vice President-designate Ford was not expressly authorized during the
time period from his nomination by the President until his confirmation by
the Congress, since he was neither a "candidate" for the Vice Presidency for
whom protection was recommended by the advisory committee prescribed in
P.L. 90-331, nor an official next in succession to the Presidency, nor a
"Vice President-elect."
3/ With two exceptions, those situations where protection has been ordered
by the President have involved the protection of individuals in
circumstances akin to, but not within, the specific parameters set
forth in 18 U.S.C. 3056(a). These exceptions concern the protection of
foreign officials visiting the United States and protection of U.S.
officials on missions abroad before the statute was amended in 1971
to specifically cover both types of situations.
- 5 -
The Congress has been informed of past instances where the Secret Service
has provided protection for persons not within the specific categories listed
in 18 U.S.C. 3056(a) To our knowledge, no significant objections have
4/ In 1950 testimony before the Labor-Federal Security Appropriations Sub-
committee of the House Appropriations Committee indicated that, although
it was not at the time prescribed by the Secret Service's statute, the
Vice President and certain foreign dignitaries were receiving Secret Service
protection. (Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Labor-Federal
Security Appropriations on the Second Supplemental Appropriations Bill
for 1951, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., P. 175 (1950).) Although Mr. Truman
had a Secret Service detail as Vice President and Vice President Wallace
was guarded on a few occasions, the statute was not amended to specifically
authorize the Secret Service to protect the Vice President until 1951.
In September 1972 it was formally reported to the Treasury subcommittee
of the House Appropriations Committee that Secret Service protection was
being provided to Senator Edward Kennedy, although he was not a candidate
in the 1972 Presidential Campaign, "by direction of the President, pursuant
to the inherent powers of the President." (Hearings before the House
Subcommittee on the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government
Appropriations on the Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1973, 92nd Cong.,
2nd Sess., P. 1058 (1972).) In March, 1971, it was reported to the same
subcommittee that, "at the direction of the President," the Secret Service
had during 1970, prior to enactment of legislation authorizing such, pro-
tected numerous visiting foreign dignitaries. (Hearings before the House
Subcommittee on the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government
Appropriations on Appropriations for 1972, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., PP. 222,
224 (1971).) The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee with responsibility
for the Treasury Department was also apprised of both of these protective
assignments. (Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on the Treasury,
U.S. Postal Service and General Government Appropriations on H.R. 9590,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess., P. 462 (1973); and, Hearings before the Senate
Subcommittee on the Treasury, U.S. Postal Service and General Government
Appropriations on H.R. 9271, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., PP. 475-476 (1971).)
In 1969 the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Deficiencies and
Supplementals heard testimony that the President, with no specific
legislative authority, had ordered Secret Service protection for Governor
Rockefeller during an official trip to Latin America. (Hearings before
the Senate Subcommittee on Deficiencies and Supplemental Appropriations
on H.R. 11400, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., P. 1125 (1968).)
- 6 -
ever been raised in connection with any protective mission other than that
involving former Vice President Agnew in the recent past. In pertinent
situations lack of Congressional objection to a long-standing practice of the
Executive has been interpreted as supporting the proposition that such
practice is impliedly authorized. United States V. Midwest Oil Company, 236
U.S. 459 (1915).
Although no statute specifically authorizing such conduct was in
existence, the Supreme Court recognized the authority of the President to
assign a deputy Federal marshal to protect a U.S. Supreme Court Justice whose
life had been threatened as part of the Executive's constitutional duty to
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed", (U.S. Const. Art. II, $3)
In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890). We believe that such inherent Presidential
authority to direct Federal officers to provide protection where it is in
the public interest supports the view that the statute enumerating the
general powers of the Secret Service was not intended to be exclusive.
5/ The issue of whether, and under what circumstances, the Secret Service
has legal authority to provide protection beyond that specifically set
forth in 18 U.S.C. 3056(a) has never been considered by any court of
the United States. In fact, before the Comptroller General set forth
his recent opinion with respect to former Vice President Agnew's
protection, an opinion which limited itself only to the case of
Mr. Agnew and expressed no other conclusions, no views, to Treasury's
knowledge, had ever been expressed formally by any agency of the
United States that Secret Service protection in circumstances other
than those specifically set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3056(a) might be with-
out authority of law.
- 7 -
Such an assignment of Executive branch personnel should, because of the
necessity to implement protection in certain situations, be viewed as
analogous to other unspecified Presidential powers, such as that to remove
Executive officials upheld by the Supreme Court in Myers V. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
****
There is a second type of situation, namely that in which Secret
Service protection has been afforded without Presidential directive,
generally on the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, to individuals
not within those categories specifically set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3056(a).
In accordance with the comments made at the Senate Appropriations Committee
hearing on February 27th, we are discussing in this section of the memorandum
only the protection being accorded to the Secretary and the current Deputy
Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of State.
The deployment of security personnel is an executive function essential
to the management of a department and the performance of its business. Thus,
it is reasonable that, if considered necessary in view of demonstrable
evidence of risk, the Secretary and the current Deputy Secretary of the
Treasury be assigned an appropriate number of professionally trained Secret
Service agents. Section 301 of 5 U.S.C. provides, in part, that of "the head
of an Executive department or military department may prescribe regulations
for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the
distribution and performance of its business.
"
/
Reorganization
Plan
26
of 1950 (5 U.S.C. App., P. 544) transferred all duties and functions OF FORD
- 8 -
employees of the Department of the Treasury, including those of the Secret
Service, to the
Secretary. Accordingly, the Secretary is empowered by law
to supervise and direct the activities of Secret Service officers. Such
officers, like all other Treasury personnel, could be assigned to render him
direct assistance to carry out any Treasury responsibilities. In the past,
in response to a White House request, the Secretary has deployed Secret Service
officers as sky marshals to protect commercial aircraft against hijacking.
The Secret Service has trained security personnel from other departments so
that they could protect their own department heads. 8/ The Secret Service
also at times conducts investigations for Treasury bureaus which do not
have their own investigative capabilities. None of these functions are
specifically set out in 18 U.S.C. 3056(a). Each activity has been discussed
in appropriation hearings before Congress and none has been criticized as
beyond the Service's authority as set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3056(a).
During World War II Secretary Morgenthau was supplied a Secret Service
detail to insure his personal safety. Given the present national environment
and evidence of specific risks, it seems reasonable to the Treasury
6/ See also section 5 of P.L. 91-651 (1971) in which Congress specifically
made 18 U.S.C. 3056, as amended, subject to Reorganization Plan 26.
71 Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Treasury, Post Office and
General Appropriations on Appropriations for 1972, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.,
PP. 223, 262-263 (1971).
8/ Hearings before the House Subcommittee on the Treasury, Postal Service,
and General Government Appropriations on Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1974, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Part I, p. 392 (1973).
Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Treasury - Post Office Departments
Appropriations on Appropriations for 1958, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., PP. 533-534
(1957) (personnel investigations for the Bureau of Engraving and Printing,
Bureau of the Mint, Bureau of Public Debt, etc.).
GERALD
- 9 -
that the Secretary and the current Deputy Secretary of the Department also
be assigned Secret Service agents who have been trained to provide personal
protection.
Finally, in addition to authorizing Secret Service protection for the
two senior officials in the Treasury Department, the Secretary of the Treasury
has, in response to a request from Secretary of State Kissinger, directed the
Secret Service to protect him. Such action is justified under the Economy
Act of 1932, as amended, 31 U.S.C. 686. The Department of State is authorized
under 22 U.S.C. 2666 to provide protective services for the Secretary of
State, and funds have been appropriated for that purpose. Government
agencies are authorized under 31 U.S.C. 686 to use available funds to procure
services from other government agencies. Pursuant to this authority, the
Department of State has determined that it is in the interest of the govern-
ment to utilize the Secret Service to provide protection, on a partially
reimbursable basis, for the Secretary of State.
****
For the reasons stated above, the Treasury believes that the basic
protective statute is not exclusive and that additional Secret Service pro-
tection may be directed in cases not specifically covered by the statute
where the risk of harm and the public interest justify such protection.
Recently this proposition has been questioned with respect to at least
one protective detail not covered by the statute. It may be desirable to
STATE
- 10 -
consider again broadening the protective statute to cover additional
situations where protection is warranted. If this view is accepted,
further consideration will be given to this matter by the Treasury with a
view to developing specific legislative proposals.
Defiling
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 19, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DICK CHENEY
FROM:
DUDLEY CHAPMAN
DC
SUBJECT:
Steve Klein Investigation
The Secret Service is looking into this because the charge involves
counterfeiting. Bob Snow of the Service told me yesterday that
Klein has been contacted and further investigation is in progress.
He could not yet provide any specifics.
cc: David Kennerly
bcc: Phil Buchen
/
Tuesday 2/4/75
9:30 Called Dave Kennerly's secretary to ask for a copy
of a letter from Steve Kline (Alaska) on the subject
of frauds being practiced in the making and sale
of gold coins.
Phone numbers for Mr. Kline
(907) 333-7019 home
272-8561 off.
(till end of week)
Dave's secritary the
doesn't find will
STATE N. FORD
letter check with when
he
him wheternd.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Steve Kline
907/333-7019 home
272-8561 ofc.
BR til and of wh
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Phil A:
Do you know
this man?
R
No Emper / her not
2
De
one of Im. net of It
of ther ower the
Ohnt jum
dhs can ford PA.
Sheils Regan 33 V.S Saxbo
Mrs.Dolly
Alexaudra,
ez
N6NY zint
KNOM
МУКИЗМОДОЙ
THE MHILE HOUSE
OF
STATES THE 1789 TREASURY
THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
March 8, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE PHILIP W. BUCHEN
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
David R. Macdonald
Assistant Secretary (Enforcement,
Operations, and Tariff Affairs)
SUBJECT:
Testimony on Secret Service
Protective Intelligence File
As part of our coordination effort
regarding submissions to Congress relating
to the intelligence activities of govern-
mental agencies, I enclose my proposed
testimony to be given before Congresswoman
Abzug's Subcommittee on Government Information
and Individual Rights of the Committee on
Government Operations. This testimony must
be distributed to the Subcommittee on Monday
afternoon.
Enclosure
File to Pres. librarus!
Protect functions p.5
GERATE 1. FORD LIBRARY
OF
DEPARTMENT THE TREASURY
THE
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
1789
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
March 8, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE PHILIP W. BUCHEN
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
7s/David R. Macdonald
FROM:
David R. Macdonald
Assistant Secretary (Enforcement,
Operations, and Tariff Affairs)
SUBJECT:
Testimony on Secret Service
Protective Intelligence File
As part of our coordination effort
regarding submissions to Congress relating
to the intelligence activities of govern-
mental agencies, I enclose my proposed
testimony to be given before Congresswoman
Abzug's Subcommittee on Government Information
and Individual Rights of the Committee on
Government Operations. This testimony must
be distributed to the Subcommittee on Monday
afternoon.
Enclosure
SEAL . FORD LIBRARY
FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY 9:00 A.M. THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 1975
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID R. MACDONALD
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENFORCEMENT, OPERATIONS
AND TARIFF AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
BEFORE
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
ON
THE PROTECTIVE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
MARCH 13, 1975
9:00 A.M.
Madame Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to appear before this subcommittee today to discuss
the protective intelligence mission of the United States Secret Service
and to address myself particularly to those records maintained by the
Secret Service which are necessary to the accomplishment of its protective
role, not only of the President and his family, but of other protectees
of the Service, including the Vice President and "major" Presidential
candidates.
I have with me today, and would like to introduce to you, two other
gentlemen who can be of assistance in discussing the protective intelligence
operations of the Secret Service: Mr. J. Robert McBrien, Special Assistant
for Special Legislation and Projects, of my office and Mr. Thomas J. Kelley,
Assistant Director for Protective Intelligence, United States Secret Service.
I. History of Development of Threat Criteria
Following the assassination of President Kennedy, the Warren Commission
reviewed the Secret Service procedures and found them to be inadequate. The
Secret Service, the FBI and other agencies were criticized for insufficient
exchange of information and for having too narrow an interpretation of the
term "threat." The Service was also faulted for its lack of an adequate
investigative staff, its inability to process large amounts of data, and its
failure to provide other agencies with specific descriptions of the kind of
information it sought.
GREAT
-2-
Based on these inadequacies, the Warren Commission recommended the
complete overhaul of protective intelligence, stating:
"(a) The Secret Service should develop as quickly as
possible more useful and precise criteria defining those
potential threats to the President which should be brought
to its attention by other agencies. The criteria should,
among other additions, provide for prompt notice to the
Secret Service of all returned defectors.
(b) The Secret Service should expedite its current
plans to utilize the most efficient data-processing
techniques.
(c) Once the Secret Service has formulated new criteria
delineating the information it desires, it should enter
into agreement with each Federal agency to insure its
receipt of such information." 1
Addressing itself then to the criteria for defining "threats" to the
Presidency, the Warren Commission at the same time recognized both the
need for a "threat profile" and the difficulties in developing criteria
for such a profile:
"Since the assassination, both the Secret Service and the FBI
have recognized that the protective files can no longer be limited
largely to persons communicating actual threats to the President
The FBI has circulated additional instructions to all its agents,
specifying criteria for information to be furnished to the Secret
Service in addition to that covered by the former standard, which
was the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of
the President. The new instructions require FBI agents to report
immediately information concerning:
Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists (a)
possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior,
(b) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials
or employees of Federal, state or local government or
officials of a foreign government, (c) who express or have
Report of The President's Commission on the Assassination of
President Kennedy ("Warren Commission Report") p.26 (1964).
NO
CERTAB
-3-
expressed strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who
have been involved in bombing or bomb-making or whose
past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and
(d) whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for
violence and hatred against organized government
"In June 1964, the Secret Service sent to a number of Federal
law enforcement and intelligence agencies guidelines for an
experimental program to develop more detailed criteria. The
new tentative criteria are useful in making clear that the
interest of the Secret Service goes beyond information on
individuals or groups threatening to cause harm or embarrassment
to the President. Information is requested also concerning
individuals or groups who have demonstrated an interest in
the President or 'other high government officials in the nature
of a complaint coupled with an expressed or implied determina-
tion to use a means, other than legal or peaceful, to satisfy
any grievance, real or imagined.' Under these criteria,
whether the case should be referred to the Secret Service
depends on the existence of a previous history of mental
instability, propensity toward violent action, or some similar
characteristic, coupled with some evaluation of the capability
of the individual or group to further the intention to satisfy
a grievance by unlawful means
11
The Warren Commission then concluded:
"While these tentative criteria are a step in the right direction,
they seem unduly restrictive in continuing to require some
manifestation of animus against a Government official. It is
questionable whether such criteria would have resulted in the
referral of Oswald to the Secret Service."
Examining these new efforts to broaden the areas of protective inquiry
while more selectively sencifying the indicators of potential threats, the
Warren Commission determined:
"It is apparent that a good deal of further consideration and
experimentation will be required before adequate criteria can
be framed. The Commission recognizes that no set of meaningful
criteria will yield the names of all potential assassins.
Charles J. Guiteau, Leon F. Czolgosz, John Schrank, and
Guiseppe Zangara -- four assassins or would-be assassins --
were all men who acted alone in their criminal acts against
our leaders. None had a serious record of prior violence. Each
of them was a failure in his work and in his relations with
-4-
others, a victim of delusions and fancies which led to the
conviction that society and its leaders had combined to thwart
him. It will require every available resource of our Government
to devise a practical system which has any reasonable possibility
of revealing such malcontents."
The history of the protective mission since the Warren Commission
report has been a series of attempts to define further the characteristics
of potential threats to its protectees. Under the aegis of the President's
Office of Science and Technology continuing efforts to define criteria have
been attempted. The assistance of the best minds in the field of behavioral
science has been sought and received.
The Secret Service's present and past practices of maintaining intelli-
gence files have been reviewed by these scientists in an effort to provide
an objective scientific basis for the decision-making responsibilities placed
upon the Secret Service in this area of prediction. Most recently, a study
made by an independent company in 1969, concluded that the Secret Service
should not remain preoccupied with a search for a fixed set of what might be
termed "criteria for all seasons;" since such criteria do not exist in any
authentic sense.
Nevertheless, an examination of identified assassins has revealed that
they do possess some traits in common, although many other persons who are
apparently harmless possess these same traits. One of the principal threads
that runs through assassins of Presidents or other protectees is a history
of mental instability; but, of course, it cannot be stated that all persons
who have had a history of mental illness are potential assassins. History
also shows that these unstable individuals are accurately characterized,
for lack of a better term, as "losers in life" who fail in their work and
in their interpersonal relationships. Yet we also know that not all such
persons are potential assassins or otherwise of protective interest.
A third characteristic which I must draw to the attention of this sub-
committee is that virtually every prior presidential assassin has a history
of political activities which might be termed "radical" for lack of a better
definition. In your letter requesting our appearance today, Madame Chairwoman,
you referred to the alleged maintenance of files on individuals "whose
political activities, not their potential threat to the lives of government
officials" have caused their inclusion. We can honestly assert that the
protective intelligence files of the Secret Service are not created to list
political dissidents nor are political dissidents included in it simply
because they are political dissidents. Unfortunately, however, it is a reason-
able and accurate conclusion that, among other criteria, political activities
may be significant in determining whether an individual is of protective
interest.
-5-
Despite his probable mental imbalances, John Wilkes Booth was definitely
seeking to achieve political aims when he shot President Lincoln. The mental
instability of President McKinley's killer was real but it manifested itself
through his radical political belief in anarchism and the virtue of removing
an "enemy of the people." The man who killed Mayor Cermak of Chicago while
attempting to assassinate President Franklin D. Roosevelt, was also character-
ized by his political activities and anarchistic beliefs.
In 1950, when two members of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
attempted to shoot their way into Blair House to kill President Truman, their
acts were politically motivated. Again, when five members of Congress were
gunned down on the floor of the House in 1954, the four gunmen were political
activists seeking Puerto Rican independence.
Lee Harvey Oswald was another assassin characterized by some mingling
of his emotional instability with extreme political beliefs. Sirhan Sirhan
was also a nationalistic political zealot with mental problems.
The point is that among the other criteria used for determining real
threats to the Presidency, a propensity to self help through radical political
action can be significant as a determinant of the Secret Service's protective
interest. Moreover, I should make clear to this subcommittee that we consider
the Secret Service protective mission to include the protection of the func-
tioning of the President in his official duties as well as the protection of
his life and physical safety. Thus, persons who lie down in the White House
or make an unannounced, inpromptu speech at a formal State dinner attacking a
visiting foreign Chief of State might well be included in the list of persons
who interfere with the Office of the Presidency and should therefore be screened
from gatherings of this sort. This is analogous to the task of the Capitol
Police in attempting to screen from the Galleries of the two Houses of Congress
those persons who are likely to create disturbances or wave flags. The Secret
Service has also, in good faith, considered that the Presidency should be pro-
tected against the obloquy of unintentional association at speakers' tables or
elsewhere with organized crime figures or other figures, where he may be held
up to hatred, ridicule or contempt. To a
limited degree the Secret Service
has
traditionally attempted to keep the President and other protectees from
being associated in the public mind with this category of person, and thus,
degrading the office which the protectee holds.
demeaning
II. Safeguarding Protective Files
The information analyses made by the Secret Service screen out around 90%
of those persons submitted for inclusion in the protective list. The regular
reviews of the established files, to be discussed below, further contribute to
the elimination of names included in the list.
-6-
Moreover, as to the protective list itself, presently including about
47,000 persons of some protective interest, safeguards have been established
that we believe protect the public interest. The subcommittee should under-
stand that approximately 111 calls and letters per month are directed at
the White House alone which might be characterized as beyond the level of
rational criticism and containing personal invective and menacing or
abusive statements.
A. Access to Information from Protective Intelligence Files
The protective intelligence files of the Secret Service are
maintained to assist the Service in protecting the lives of the
President and other protectees, such as Presidential candidates and
foreign Chiefs of State, and in providing them with a secure environment
in which to carry out the offices they hold. This is the only use of
these files.
They are not mingled with other files such as ordinary criminal
histories. There is no access to these files by any agency for
criminal investigating or other purposes. They are not part of any
multi-agency computer system and cannot be queried by either the
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) of the FBI or Treasury's own
Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS). Within the Secret
Service itself, access is strictly controlled by personnel of the
Protective Intelligence Division.
I believe it is important to note that these tight restrictions
apply equally to the input of data into the files of the Secret
Service. Input, like retrieval, is now the exclusive domain of the
Protective Intelligence Division of the Secret Service.
While the Secret Service carefully safeguards the confidentiality
of its protective intelligence files, it still cooperates with the
FBI or other agencies responsible for investigating or preventing the
implementation of threats against officials who are not protectees of
the Service. When, as a result of a threat by an individual, another
government agency identifies a potential assailant, protective intelli-
gence information derived from the Secret Service's files will be made
available, providing that the Secret Service is satisfied that the
request is genuine. Certainly, it would be unconscionable for the
Secret Service to refuse to provide information to another security
or investigative agency when such information might help prevent the
carrying out of a threat. In such circumstances, the potential harm
to the threatened person and society is exponentially greater than the
perceived invasion of the personal privacy of the file subject.
-7-
The Secret Service does not allow access to its protective intelli-
gence files by the subjects of those records. For those who are listed
because of terroristic or other illegal "political" activities, access
would help them learn the nature and extent of the Secret Service's
knowledge about them. In many cases, it would be injurious to the
protective mission if the existence of files on them were acknowledged.
For both the criminal and the unstable person, access would necessarily
lead to knowledge of the sources of the Secret Service's information,
thus endangering other enforcement and intelligence operations and
confidential sources including co-workers, friends and relatives.
Generally, mentally imbalanced persons of protective interest
are aware of the Secret Service's interest in them because of personal
interviews conducted. Where a person makes an overt threat in
violation of Section 871, Title 18, USC, criminal prosecution may
follow and the courts can ensure that the defendant has the necessary
information to defend against the charge.
This limitation on access to the files of the Secret Service
is crucial in preserving the usefulness of the intelligence files
and in safeguarding the protective mission. Without such denial of
access, the protective intelligence system will suffer in the poor
quality of information available, in compromised confidential sources,
in the inability to keep track of persons of protective interest, and
from interference with its intelligence system by individuals claiming
access to the protective intelligence files. Most of the persons
carried in the Intelligence Division files have a mental aberration.
Knowledge of their condition, their progress, etc., come from hospital
authorities, family members and witnesses to their actions Many times
this is as a result of two-party conversations where it is impossible
to hide the identity of informants. Sources of information must be d
developed, questions asked and answers recorded. Trust must be extended
and confidence must be maintained. Allowing access to information of
this kind may well lead to a tragic event such as the mentally disturbed
individual attacking the informant.
B. Updating & Purging
The second protective safeguard employed by the Secret Service
is the criteria for updating and purging files.
Following the assassination of President Kennedy, the Protective
Research Section was reorganized and renamed the Intelligence Division.
-8-
One of the first projects was a complete review of the files and the
master index in the division. All files which did not contain
investigative reports were destroyed as were all index cards relating
to that file. At the same time all files were recalled from the
Federal Records Center and were reviewed, using the same criteria.
By 1965, the initial review was completed and the master index was
reduced to approximately half of its 1963 volume of 500,000 index
cards.
In 1966, two special reviews were conducted. All files were
recalled from the Truman Library (approximately 8,000) and reviewed.
Approximately 1,000 of those files were reactivated and 7,000
destroyed. Also, the Kennedy assassination file was reviewed. This
file included some 5,000 subjects whose names had been recorded as a
result of the extensive federal investigation of the case. Most of
these names were found to have no connection with the assassination,
and the names were deleted from Secret Service indices.
Although Secret Service reviews since the assassination in
1963 have enabled them to destroy a large number of cases, during
this same period they were establishing many cases as a result of
the receipt of telephoned and mailed threats received at the White
House, and the increased amount of material sent by other agencies,
principally the FBI. Most of the material sent by the FBI was
retained, and cases were opened on numerous subjects who fit the
profile of "another Oswald" but where no overt threats had been
made. Many of the files were established in the expectation that
scientific behavioral analysis techniques would provide us with a
profile of a potential assassin.
During 1967, the Service reviewed the entire file again to
determine which cases would be included in the then new computer
system. At that time, all cases in which insufficient data for
analysis had been obtained were either destroyed or referred to
the field for completion of the investigation. A review of the
master index was also made during that year; and it was purged
of all extraneous material, so that only index cards relating to
existing file jackets remained.
When the PRS was reorganized, the Secret Service attempted to
investigate all information which was received if it decided to
retain the information permanently in its files. In the early days
of the Intelligence Division, however, it was not practicable to do
this because of limited resources and indecision on the method and
possibility of scientific analysis. Consequently, the Service
established an "innocuous file" in which reports or letters were
maintained but where no investigation had been conducted by the
Service. This file was reviewed annually and cases were destroyed,
-9-
but it continued to grow until at one point the file consisted
of 7,000 case jackets.
This file was reviewed and eliminated entirely in 1970. Our
position since 1970 is that, exclusive of information which is filed
temporarily and reports from other agencies handled by the Special
Intelligence Branch, all material is referred for investigation
before a decision is made on its retention.
Various other reviews have occurred from 1970 to the present
with the continuing elimination of unnecessary files as one objective.
All of these changes and improvements originate with the efforts of
the Secret Service to improve its protective intelligence capabilities
along the lines recommended by the Warren Commission:
"Unless the Secret Service is able to deal rapidly and
accurately with a growing body of data, the increased
information supplied by other agencies will be wasted.
[The Intelligence Division] must develop the capacity
to classify its subjects on a more sophisticated basis
than the present geographic breakdown. Its present manual
filing system is obsolete; it makes no use of the recent
developments in automatic data processing which are widely
used in the business world and in other Government offices
The Commission further recommends that the Secret Service
should not and does not plan to develop its own intelligence
gathering facilities to duplicate the existing facilities
of other Federal agencies. In planning its data processing
techniques, the Secret Service should attempt to develop a
system compatible with those of the agencies from which
most of its data will come."
The Intelligence Division has an on-going review of all cases to
determine which names can be eliminated from its files. A built-in
tickler in the Data System Division enables the Secret Service to
determine the length of time a name remains in the system without review.
When these files are reviewed, a decision is made whether the subject
of the file warrants additional inquiry to determine further the extent
of protective interest.
Through a computerized review process in January of each year, all
Intelligence Division files are reviewed except those on which some new
information has been received or those which are, or have been, the
-10-
subject of quarterly investigations. If the abstract does reflect
that there has been any action in the past five years, the file is
reviewed to ascertain whether the Secret Service has a continuing
protective interest in the subject. If the decision is made that no
protective interest still exists, the file is destroyed and the name
removed from the computerized index.
In addition, every two years the Service reviews its files by
means of a computer printout to determine which cases may be deleted
due to advanced age, lack of activity of the subject or changing
circumstances. We consider the review and deletion system to be a
good one in that all names in the system are subject to an on-going
review which removes from the Intelligence Division index those
people who are no longer of protective interest to the Secret Service.
The continually improving process of review and deletion is not
simply a by-product of improving the accuracy and rapidity of retrieval
of data from the protective intelligence files. Instead, an important
goal of the protective mission of the Secret Service" to maintain as
small a file as possible in order that its resources can be concentrated
efficiently to perform its mission.
C. Use of Protective Intelligence Files
As a result of the Warren Commission's recommendation for the
utilization of sophisticated data-processing techniques, the indices
and files of the Protective Intelligence Division began being recorded
by means of a computer system in 1967. Since that time, the system
has been under continual internal review and improvement. The results
to date have produced computerized indices relating to the protective
intelligence mission:
(1) White House and Executive Office Building Pass System
Index (includes press and employees in White House
complex).
(2) Tradesmen System Index (workers cleared for entry to
the White House complex on a regular basis).
(3) Temporary Index of workmen in the White House complex
on an ad hoc basis.
(4) Temporary Index of suicide threats or similar data on
people where protective interest has not yet been
determined (retained for six months).
-11-
(5) Event System Index (Persons coming to Secret Service
attention during a trip or visit of a protectee. No
investigation conducted yet).
(6) Protective Intelligence Index (Persons determined to be
of protective interest.)
I should also distinguish between our protective files index and
the Criminal Record History System index of all persons arrested by
the Secret Service for counterfeiting, forgery and other related crimes.
They are two separate systems which are not co-mingled.
III. Interagency Cooperation
Before closing, I should mention the results of another primary rec-
ommendation of the Warren Commission: that the Secret Service markedly
improve its coordination with other agencies and enter into formal agreements
to insure that the enforcement and intelligence communities provide the
Secret Service with the information it needs.
In response to that recommendation, the Secret Service and other Federal
agencies have increased their coordination for the development of protective
intelligence. The arrangements with investigative and intelligence agencies
have been formalized with written agreements. Thus, today these agencies are
furnished by the Secret Service with detailed descriptions of what is sought,
the manner in which it should be provided and the respective responsibilities
for any further actions that may be required. In return, the Service receives
a mass of unevaluated material based on the criteria it has set.
Since this great volume of information provided as a result of the
Service's request-criteria is raw data, the Secret Service alone has the
responsibility of evaluating its usefulness as protective intelligence. I
think it is to the great credit of the Secret Service that of the mass of
information it receives from other agencies and then processes to cull out
those persons not of protective interest, only 10% is retained in the intelli-
gence files.
CONCLUSION
Madame Chairwoman, I hope my testimony today has contributed to a
better understanding by this subcommittee of the protective intelligence
policies and operations being performed by the Secret Service. The Treasury
Department and the men and women of the Secret Service are aware of your
concern that the improper use of protective intelligence information could
result in wrongful infringement of individual rights. The Warren Commission
was equally cognizant of the potential for abuse in these intelligence
collection and evaluation methods. But, like the members of the Warren
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON. DC 20405
March 17, 1975
Reply to Room 487
OEOB
456-2545
MEMORANDUM TO:
Mr. Paul Rundle
Protective Services
United States Secret Service
FROM:
Thomas P. Wolf
Coordinator, Nixon Presidential Materials
SUBJECT:
Door Check by EPS Patrols
It is hereby requested that in the future EPS officers making corridor
patrols check: the doors listed at the end of this memo. This request
applies primarily to night and weekend hours.
Should any door be found unlocked, the same instructions that apply to
the alarmed rooms under GSA custody should apply; namely, Mr. Wolf or
Mrs. Karabatsos should be alerted immediately.
This request applies to rooms: 403, 405, 417, 419, 421, 423, 425, 427,
428, 428½, 430, 431, 431½, 432, 432½, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439,
440, 442, 443, 474, 492 and 570.
of
TOTO
cc: Philip W. Buchen
Arthur F. Sampson
Robert Snow
Raymond Zumwalt
Inspector Freeman
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