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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 65, folder \"War Powers Resolution Legislative\nHistory (1)\" of the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 65 of the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\n93D CONGRESS\nHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES\nREPORT\n1st Session\nNo. 93-547\nWAR POWERS\nFORD\nSTATE\nOCTOBER 4, 1973.-Ordered to be printed\nMr. ZABLOCKI, from the committee of conference,\nsubmitted the following\nCONFERENCE REPORT\n[To accompany H.J. Res. 542]\nThe committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two\nHouses on the amendment of the Senate to the joint resolution (H.J.\nRes. 542) concerning the war powers of Congress and the President,\nhaving met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend\nand do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:\nThat the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of\nthe Senate and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:\nIn lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate amend-\nment insert the following:\nSHORT TITLE\nSECTION 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the \"War Powers\nResolution\".\nPURPOSE AND POLICY\nSEC. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the\nintent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and\ninsure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the Pres-\nident will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces\ninto hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hos-\ntilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued\nuse of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.\n(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically\nprovided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws neces-\nsary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers\nbut also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Govern-\nment of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.\n(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-\nChief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into\nsituations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indi-\ncated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a decla-\n99-006\n2\n3\nration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national\nForeign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the\nemergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or\nreport is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has ad-\npossessions, or its armed forces.\njourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker\nof the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the\nCONSULTATION\nSenate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 per-\nSEC. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with\ncent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly re-\nCongress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostili-\nquest the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider\nties or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is\nthe report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.\nclearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such intro-\n(3) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is\nduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States\nręquired to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1), whichever is\nArmed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been re-\nearlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed\nForces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required\nmoved from such situations.\nto be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has\nREPORTING\nenacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed\nForces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is\nSEC. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in\nphysically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the\nwhich United States Armed Forces are introduced-\nUnited States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more\n(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involve-\nthan an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies\nment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;\nto the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respect-\n(2) into the territory, airnpace or waters of a foreign nation,\ning the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued\nwhile equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate\nuse of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt re-\nsolely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or\nmoval of such forces.\n6321 in numbers which substantially enlarge United States\n(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States\nArmed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign\nArmed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the\nnation;\nUnited States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of\nthe President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House\nwar or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by\nof Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a\nthe President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.\nreport, in writing, setting forth-\n(4) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United\nCONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR JOINT RESOLUTION OR BILL\nStates Armed Forces;\n(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which\nSEC. 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to sec-\nsuch introduction took place; and\ntion 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the\n(0) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or in-\nsixty-day period specified in such section shall be referred to the\nvolvement.\nCommittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the\n(b) The President shall provide such other information as the Con-\nCommittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be,\ngress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibili-\nand such committee shall report one such joint resolution or bill,\nties with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of\ntogether with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four calen-\nUnited States Armed Forces abroad.\n'dar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in\n(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hos-\nsuch section, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas\ntilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section,\nand nays.\nthe President shall, 80 long as such armed forces continue to be en-\n(b) Any joint resolution or bill 30 reported shall become the pend-\ngaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodi-\ning business of the House in question (in the case of the ,Senate the\ncally on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope\ntime for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and\nand duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he\nthe opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days\nreport to the Congress less often than once every six months.\nthereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and\nnayes.\nCONGRESSIONAL ACTION\n(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be re-\nferred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a)\nSec. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1) shall\nand shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar days before\nbe transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to\nthe expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). The\nthe President pro tempore of the ,Senate on the same calendar day.\njoint resolution or bill 80 reported shall become the pending business\nEach report 80 transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on For-\nof the House in question and shall be voted on within three calendar\neign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on\nH. Rept. 93-547\nH. Rept. 93-547\n4\n5\ndays after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise\n(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before\ndetermine by yeas and nays.\nthe date of the enaçtment of this joint resolution), including any\n(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Con-\nprovision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such pro-\ngress with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses,\nvision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States\nconferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of confer-\nArmed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states\nence shall make and file a report with respect to such resolution or bill\nthat it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization\nnot later than four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-\nwithin the meaning of this resolution; or\nday period specified in section 5(b). In the event the conferees are\n(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such\nunable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their re-\ntreaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the\nspective Houses in disagreement. Notwithstanding any rule in either\nintroduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or\nHouse concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or\ninto such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute\nconcerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such re-\nspecific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint\nport shall be acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of\nresolution.\nsuch sixty-day period.\n(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require\nany further specific statutory authorization to permit members of\nCONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR CONCURRENT RESOLUTION\nUnited States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of\nSEC. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to sec-\nthe armed forces of one or mare foreign countries in the headquarters\ntion 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Afairs of\noperations of high-level military commands which were established\nthe House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations\nprior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to\nof the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution\nthe United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States\nshall be reported out by such committee together with its recommen-\nprior to such date.\ndations within fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise\n(c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term \"introduction of\ndetermine by the yeas and nays.\nUnited States Armed Forces\" includes the assignment of members of\n(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pend-\nsuch armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the move-\ning business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the\nment of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any\ntime for. debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and\nforeign country or government when such military forces are engaged,\nthe opponents) and shall be voted on within three calendar days there-\nor there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged,\nafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.\nin hostilities.\n(c) ,Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be re-\n(d) Nothing in this joint resolution-\nferred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a)\n(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Con-\nand shall be reported out by such committee together with its rec-\ngress or of the President, or the provisions of existing treaties, or\nommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become\n(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the Presi-\nthe pending business of such House and shall be voted upon within\ndent with respect to the introduction of United States Armed\nthree calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by\nForces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in\nyeas and nays.\nhostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which au-\n(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of\nthority he would not have had in the abence of this joint\nCongress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both\nresolution..\nHouses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of\nSEPARABILITY CLAUSE\nconference shall make and file a report with respect to such concur-\nSEC. 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the application\nrent resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is re-\nthereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder\nferred to the committee of conference. Notwithstanding any mile in\neither House concerning the printing of conference reports in the\nof the joint resolution and the application of such provision to any\nRecord or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports,\nother person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.\nsuch report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six calen-\nEFFECTIVE DATE\ndar days after the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees\nare unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their\nSEC. 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its\nrespective Houses in disagreement.\nenactment.\nINTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION\nSec. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces\ninto hostilities or into situations where involvement in hostilities is\nclearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred-\nH. Rept. 93-547\nH. Rept. 93-547\n6\nAnd the Senate agree to the same.\nCLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,\nTHOMAS E. MORGAN,\nWAYNE L. HAYS,\nDONALD FRASER,\nDANTE B. FASCELL,\nJOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE\nPAUL FINDLEY,\nCOMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE\nWM. BROOMFIELD,\nManagers on the Part of the House.\nThe managers on the part of the House and the Senate at the con-\nJ. W. FULBRIGHT,\nference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment\nMIKE MANSFIELD,\nof the Senate to the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 542) concerning the\nSTUART SYMINGTON,\nwar powers of Congress and the President, submit the following joint\nof\nEDMUND S. MUSKIE,\nstatement to the House and the Senate in explanation of the effect\nto\nG. AIKEN,\nof the action agreed upon by the managers and recommended in the\nCLIFFORD P. CASE,\naccompanying conference report:\nJ. K. JAVITS,\nThe Senate amendment to the joint resolution struck out all after\nManagers\nthe\nthe resolving clause and inserted a new text. Under the conference\non\nPart\nof\nthe\nSenato\nagreement the House recedes with an amendment which substitutes a\nnew text explained below except for clerical corrections, incidental\nchanges made necessary by reason of agreements reached by the con-\nferees, and minor drafting and clarifying changes.\nto\nSHORT TITLE\nSection 1 of the Senate amendment substituted \"War Powers Act\"\nas a short title in lieu of the short title \"War Powers Resolution of\n1973\" in the House joint resolution. Section 1 of the conference sub-\nstitute provides a short title of \"War Powers Resolution\".\nPURPOSE AND POLICY\nThe Senate amendment contained a section entitled \"Purpose and\nPolicy\" (section 2) and a section entitled \"Emergency Use of the\nArmed Forces\" (section 3) which defined the emergency powers of the\nPresident to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or\nsituations of imminent hostilities.\nThe House joint resolution did not contain similar provisions.\nThe conference report contains a section entitled \"Purpose and\nPolicy!'. The new section states that:\n(a) the purpose of the joint resolution is to fulfill the intent of the\nframers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the\ncollective judgment of both the Congress and the President will\napply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostili-\nties, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is\nclearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of\nsuch forces in hostilities or in such situations;\n(3) Article I, section 8 of the Constitution provides the basis for\ncongressional action in this area and\n(c) the constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-\nChief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or\ninto situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly in-\ndicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a\n(7)\nH. Rept. 93-547\nH. Rept. 93-547\n8\n9\ndeclaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a na-\ntional emergency created by attack upon the United States, its terri-\nIn section 5 (a) the conferees accepted the provisions of the House\ntories or possessions, or its armed forces.\njoint resolution relating to the transmittal of the presidential report\nSection 2(c) is a statement of the authority of the Commander-in-\nto Congress, with amendments which (1) provide for the possibility\nChief respecting the introduction of United States Armed Forces into\nof reconvening of Congress in case of adjournment in order to consider\nhostilities into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities\nsuch report, and (2) provide that 30 percent of the membership of\nis clearly indicated by the circumstances. Subsequent sections of the\nthe respective Houses may petition for such reconvening.\njoint resolution are not dependent upon the language of this subsec-\nThe House joint resolution provided that use of United States\ntion, as was the case with a similar provision of the Senate bill\nArmed Forces by the President without a declaration of war or specific\n(section 3).\nstatutory authorization could be terminated by Congress:through the\nuse of a concurrent resolution. The Senate amendment provided for\nCONSULTATION\nsuch termination by a bill or joint resolution. The conference Deport\nThe House joint resolution provided for presidential consultation\ncontains the concurrent resolution provision.\nwith the leadership and appropriate committees of Congress before\nThe House joint. resolution provided for termination of certain\nand after the President introduces United States Armed Forces into\npeacetime deployments of United States Armed Forces through the\nhostilities or situations of imminent hostilities. The conferees modified\nelapsing of a time period in which Congress failed to approve such\nthe House provision, to provide for consultation with the Congress.\ndeployments. The Senate amendment did not include such deploy-\nSection 3 of the conference report is not a limitation upon or substitute\nments in its congressional action provisions. The confèrence report\nfor other provisions contained in the report. It is intended that consul-\nrequires presidential reporting on such deployments but section 5 (b)\ntation take plaće during hostilities even when adyance consultation\ndoes not require their termination.\nis not possible.\nREPORTING\nCONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES\nSection 4 of the conference report concerns reporting both the House\nBoth the House joint resolution and the Senate amendment con-\njoint resolution and the Senate amendment contained similar report-\ntained congressional priority procedures. They differed primarily. in\ning provisions requiring the President to report to the Congress on\nthat the House language specifically stipulated resort to a procedure\nspecified actions. In the case of the House joint resolution, the report-\nof committee consideration while in the Senate version any pertinent\ning provisions triggered the subsequent congressional action provi-\nbill or joint resolution was to be considered as reported directly to the\nsions. In the Senate version, congressional action provisions were not\nfloor of the House in question unless otherwise decided by the yeas and\ntriggered by the reporting provision, but were otherwise brought into\nnays. The language agreed to by the conference in sections 6 and 7\nplay. Section 4 of the conference report draws on both the Senate and\ncorresponds to the House version including separately stipulated\nHouse versions. It requires that the President provide such other in-\npriority procedures for consideration of concurrent resolutions re-\nformation as the Congress may request following his initial report on\nquiring removal of forces. The following changes, however, were\nthe introduction of United States Armed Forces, and further requires\nmade:\nsupplementary reports at least every six months SO long as those forces\n(1) language was added at the end of sections 6(a) and 7(a)\nare engaged. The initial presidential report is required to be submitted\nallowing each House to change the procedures by the yeas and\nwithin 48 hours. The objective is to ensure that the Congress by right\nnays;\nand as a matter of law will be provided with all the information it\n(2) the various time frames in section 6 for full cycle consid-\nrequires to carry out its constitutional responsibilities with respect to\neration of a joint resolution or bill were shortened to conform to\ncommitting the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed\nthe change in section 5 (b) from 120 days to 60 days;\nForces abroad.\n(3) following the reporting of a joint resolution or bill or con-\nCONGRESSIONAL ACTION\ncurrent resolution by the appropriate committee it was stipulated\nthat the time for debate in the Senate shall be equally divided be-\nBoth the House joint resolution and the Senate amendment pro-\ntween the proponents and the opponents; and\nvided for termination within a specified time of presidential use of\n(4) section 6(d) and section 7(d) provide for expedited con-\nUnited States Armed Forces without a declaration of war or specific\nference committee procedures in the consideration of pertinent\nprior statutory authorization. The termination period in the House\nlegislation passed by both houses.\njoint resolution was 120 days; in the Senate amendment, 30 days,\nThe conferees agreed on a 60 day period following the forty-eight\nTERMINATION OF CONGRESS\nhour period in which the President is required to report under section\n4. The 60-day period can be extended for up to 30 additional days if the\nSection 7 of the House joint resolution provided a mechanism to\nPresident determines and certifies in writing to the Congress that un-\ninsure that the time period provided for under section 4 of the joint\navoidable military necessity respecting the safety of the troops requires\nresolution would not expire while Congress was in adjournment. The\ntheir continued use in bringing about a prompt disengagement from\nSenate amendment had no similar provision. The conference report\nhostilities.\ndoes not contain the House provision on the grounds that the language\nH. Rept. 93-547\nH. Rept. 93-547\n10\nof section 5 of the conference report had obviated the need of this\nsection.\nINTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION\nThe Senate amendment contained definitions of certain terms. The\nHouse joint resolution, while incorporating some broad interpretations\nof the meaning of the joint resolution, did not contain such definitive\nlanguage. The conferees agreed to combine both definitions and in-\nterpretations in a single section 8 with changes including:\n(1) adoption of modified Senate language defining specific\nstatutory authorization, and defining the phrase \"introduction of\nUnited States Armed Forces\" as used in the joint resolution;\n(2) elimination of House language concerning the constitu-\ntional process requirement contained in mutual security treaties;\nand\n(3) addition of Senate language which makes clear that the\nresolution does not prevent members of the United States Armed\nForces from participating in certain joint military exercises with\nallied or friendly organizations or countries. The \"high-level\nmilitary commands\" referred to in this section are understood to\nbe those of NATO, the North American Air Defense command\n(NORAD) and the United Nations command in Korea (UNC).\nSEPARABILITY CLAUSE\nThe Senate amendment contained a separability clause stipulating\nthat, if any of its provisions or the application thereof to any person\nor circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the\napplication of such provision to any other person or circumstance\nwould not be affected. The House version did not contain a correspond-\ning provision. The conferees accepted the language of the Senate\namendment, with certain technical modifications.\nEFFECTIVE DATE\nBoth the House joint resolution and the Senate amendment con-\ntained language providing that the legislation would take effect on the\ndate of its enactment. This provision was not in disagreement.\nCLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,\nTHOMAS E. MORGAN,\nWAYNE L. HAYS,\nDONALD FRASER,\nDANTE B. FASCELL,\nPAUL FINDLEY,\nWM. BROOMFIELD,\nManagers on the Part of the House.\nJ. W. FULBRIGHT,\nMIKE MANSFIELD,\nSTUART SYMINGTON,\nEDMUND S. MUSKIE,\nG. Aiken,\nCLIFFORD P. CASE,\nJ. K. JAVITS,\nManagers on the Part of the Senate.\nH. Rept. 93-547\n93D CONGRESS\nHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES\nREPORT\n1st Session\nNo. 93-287\nWAR POWERS RESOLUTION OF 1973\nJUNE 15, 1963.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State\nof the Union and ordered to be printed\nMr. ZABLOCKI, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs,\nsubmitted the following\nREPORT\nTOGETHER WITH MINORITY AND\nSUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS\n[To accompany H.J. Res. 542]\nThe Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the joint\nresolution (House Joint Resolution 542) concerning the war powers\nof Congress and the President, having considered the same, report fa-\nvorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the joint res-\nolution as amended do pass.\nThe amendments are as follows:\nOn page 2, line 19, strike out \"forty-eight\" and insert in lieu thereof\n\"seventy-two\".\nOn page 4, line 18, insert \"one such resolution or bill\" immediately\nafter \"and\".\nOn page 5, line 13, insert \"one such resolution\" immediately after\n\"and\".\nOn page 6, immediately after line 2, insert the following:\nTERMINATION OF CONGRESS\nSEC. 7. For purposes of subsection (b) of section 4, in the\nevent of the termination of a Congress before the expiration\nof the one hundred and twenty-day period specified in such\nsubsection (b), without action having been taken by the Con-\ngress under such subsection, such one hundred and twenty-\nday period shall not expire sooner than forty-eight days\nafter the convening of the next succeeding Congress, pro-\nvided that a resolution or bill is introduced, pursuant to such\nsubsection (b), within three days of the convening of such\nnext succeeding Congress.\n(1)\nFORD LIBRARY\n83-006\n2\n3\nOn page 6, line 4, strike out 66799 and insert in lieu thereof \"8\".\nRelating to the power of Congress to declare war.\nOn page 6, line 16, strike out \"hereof\" and insert in lieu thereof \"of\nH.J. Res. 315-Leggett\nthis Act\".\nRelating to the war power of the Congress.\nOn page 6, immediately after line 16, insert the following:\nH.J. Res. 21-Danielson\nH.J. Res. 71-Chappell et al.\nH.J. Res. 72-Chappell et al.\nAPPLICABILITY TO CERTAIN EXISTING COMMITMENTS\nH.J. Res. 89-Matsunaga\nH.J. Res. 250-Dickinson\nSEC. 9. All commitments of United States Armed Forces\nH.J. Res. 271-Fuqua\nto hostilities existing on the date of the enactment of this\nH.J. Res. 409-Chappell et al.\nH.J. Res. 448-Cronin\nAct shall be subject to the provisions hereof, and the Presi-\nRelative to the commitment of U.S. Armed Forces.\ndent shall file the report required by section 3 within seventy-\nH. Res. 112-Rarick\ntwo hours after the enactment of this Act.\nTo define the authority of the President of the United States to intervene\nabroad or to make war without the express consent of Congress.\nOn page 6, line 18, strike out 66899 and insert in lieu thereof \"10\".\nH.R. 3722-Sisk\nOn page 6, lines 4 and 18, strike out \"resolution\" and insert in lieu\nH.R. 4834-Nix\nTo make rules respecting military hostilities in the absense of a declaration\nthereof \"Act\".\nof war.\nBACKGROUND\nH.R. 926-Quie\nH.R. 2616-Railsback\nOn three occasions in the past two sessions of Congress, the House\nH.R. 2740-Tiernan\nof Representatives has passel war powers legislation. In the 91st Con-\nTo make rules governing the use of the Armed Forces of the United States\ngress a joint resolution reported by unanimous vote from the Commit-\nin the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress.\nH.R. 454-Dellenback\ntee on Foreign Affairs was adopted under suspension of the rules in\nH.R. 1454-Ullman\nthe House by a vote of 288 to 39. The House-passed measure was sent\nH.R. 3139-Harrington\nto the Senate where, because of that body's failure to act, it died with\nH.R. 3333-Charles H. Wilson of Calif.\nH.R. 3408-Fish\nthe end of the 91st Congress.\nH.R. 3832-Mazzoli\nIn the 92d Congress, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, again\nH.R. 4725-Sandman\nunanimously, reported House Joint Resolution 1 to the House. It was\nH.R. 4858-Ruppe\npassed unanimously in the House by a voice vote under a suspension\nH.R. 4966-Meeds\nH.R. 5455-Zwach\nof the rules. The Senate, however, passed its own version of a war\nH.R. 5594-Esch\npowers measure, and because of a parliamentary snarl which devel-\nTo make rules governing the use of the Armed Forces of the United States\noped, it became necessary for the House to act once again. The Senate\nin the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress of the United States\nbill was amended with the language of House Joint Resolution 1 in\nor of a military attack upon the United States.\nH.R. 3046-Dennis et al.\nthe House-by. a vote of 344 to 13-and sent to conference. The con-\nH.R. 4295-Rousselot\nferees met once near the end of the 92d Congress but could come to\nH.R. 6318-Dennis et al.\nno agreement and the war powers resolution died once again,\nTestifying were seven Members of the House, two Senators, a spokes-\nman for the Department of State, and five private experts. Four\nACTION IN THE 93D CONGRESS\nmarkup sessions followed at which new language was drafted. A re-\nUpon the opening of the 93d Congress the chairman of the Sub-\nvised war powers resolution was ordered reported to the full commit-\ncommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments,\ntee by a vote of 9 to 1 on May 2. The following day the measure, House\nand 11 cosponsors, introduced a new war powers resolution (House\nJoint Resolution 542, was introduced by the subcommittee chairman\nJoint Resolution 2), somewhat modified from those of prior years.\nwith 14 cosponsors, including Mr. Fountain, Mr. Fraser, Mr. Bing-\nSix days of hearings were held by the subcommittee on that reso-\nham, Mr. Fascell, Mr. Davis of Georgia, Mr. Charles Wilson of Texas,\nlution and other war powers measures which had been referred to\nMr. Findley, Mr. du Pont, Mr. Biester, Mr. Nix, Mr. Broomfield, Mr.\nthe Committee on Foreign Affairs. Among those proposals were:\nPepper, Mr. Hays, and Mr. Holifield. The committee considered the\nbill in markup on May 22, May 31, and June 7. The resolution was\nConcerning the war powers of the Congress and the President.\nreported with amendments on the latter date by a vote of 31 to 4, with\nH.J. Res. 96-Pepper\nH.R. 2058-Matsunaga\none member answering \"present.\"\nH.R. 4378-Gude\nH.J. Res. 408-du Pont\nCONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT\nGoverning the use of the Armed Forces of the United States in the absence\nof a declaration of war by the Congress,\nThe Cambodian incursion of May 1970 provided the initial im-\nH.R. 317-Bingham\npetus for a number of bills and resolutions on the war powers.\nH.R. 4038-Nix\nH.R. 5669-Bingham\nMany Members of Congress, including those who supported the action,\nH.R. 6424-Bingham et al.\nwere disturbed by the lack of prior consultation with Congress and\n5\n4\nthe near crisis in relations between the executive and legislative\nThe objective, throughout the consideration of war powers legisla-\ntion, was to outline arrangements which would allow the President and\nbranches which the incident occasioned.\nThe issue concerns the \"twilight zone\" of concurrent authority\nCongress to work together in mutual respect and maximum harmony\nwhich the Founding Fathers gave the Congress and the President\ntoward their ultimate, shared goal of maintaining the peace and\nsecurity of the Nation.\nover the war powers of the National Government.\nThe term \"war powers\" may be taken to mean the authority in-\nherent in national sovereignties to declare, conduct, and conclude\nTHE INTENT AND EFFECT OF HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 542\narmed hostilities with other states. In the U.S. Constitution the war\nThe issue of the war powers is a complex and challenging one. The\npowers which are expressly reserved to the Congress are found in\ncommittee's objective was to reaffirm the constitutionally given author-\narticle 1, section 8, of the Constitution:\nity of Congress to declare war. At the same time, the committee was\n1. The Congress shall have power\nsensitive to and cognizant of the President's right to defend the Nation\nagainst attack, without prior congressional authorization, in extreme\ncircumstances such as a nuclear missile attack or direct invasion. On\n11. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal,\nthe basis of the deepened understanding generated over recent years,\nand make rules concerning captures on land and water;\n12. To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of\nhowever, it became increasingly evident that the problem did not\ncenter on such extraordinary circumstances. Rather, the main difficulty\nmoney to that use shall be for a longer term than 2 years;\ninvolved the commitment of U.S. military forces exclusively by the\n13. To provide and maintain a Navy;\nPresident (purportedly under his authority as Commander in Chief)\n14. To make rules for the government and regulation of\nwithout congressional approval or adequate consultation with the\nthe land and naval forces;\nCongress.\n15. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the\nAs a result of extensive hearings and the contributions made by\nlaws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;\nmany members of the House who have given thought to, and sponsored\n16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining\nlegislation on, war powers, it was possible to arrive at a consensus as\nthe militia and for governing such part of them as may be\nto what legislation in this important area should encompass. House\nemployed in the service of the United States;\nJoint Resolution 542 embodies that consensus. Briefly, the legislation\n*\n*\ndoes the following:\n18. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper\n1. Directs the President in every possible instance to consult\nfor carrying into execution the foregoing powers vested by\nwith the leadership and appropriate committees of Congress be-\nthis constitution in the Government of the United States,\nfore, and regularly during, the commitment of United States\nor in any department or officer thereof.\nArmed Forces to hostilities or situations where hostilities may be\nimminent;\nThe war powers of the President are expressed in article II,\n2. Requires that the President make a formal report to Con-\nsection 2:\ngress whenever, without a declaration of war or other prior specific\nThe President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army\ncongressional authorization, he takes significant action committing\nand Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the\nU.S. Armed Forces to hostilities abroad or the risk thereof, or\nseveral States, when called into the actual service of the\nplaces or substantially increases U.S. combat forces on foreign\nUnited States *\nterritory;\nThe interpretation and application of these constitutional grants\n3. Provides for a specific procedure of consideration by Con-\nhave varied widely through our Nation's history. Testimony received\ngress when a Presidential report is submitted;\nduring hearings held in the 91st, 92d, and 93d Congresses confirmed\n4. Denies to the President the authority to commit U.S. Armed\nthe view of many Members of Congress and outside observers that the\nForces for more than 120 days without specific congressional\nconstitutional \"balance\" of authority over warmaking has swung\napproval, while also allowing the Congress to order the President\nheavily to the President in modern times. To restore the balance pro-\nto disengage from combat operations at any time before the 120-\nvided for and mandated in the Constitution, Congress must now\nday period ends through passage of a concurrent resolution.\nreassert its own prerogatives and responsibilities.\n5. Stipulates a specific congressional priority procedure for\nIn shaping legislation to that purpose, the intention was not to re-\nconsideration of any relevant bill or resolution which may be\nflect criticism on activities of Presidents, past or present, or to take\nintroduced-in other words, an antifilibuster provision; and\npunitive action. Rather, the focus of concern was the appropriate\n6. Specifies that the measure is in no way intended to alter the\nscope and substance of congressional and Presidential authority in\nconstitutional authority of the Congress or the President, or the\nthe exercise of the power of war in order that the Congress might ful-\nprovisions of existing treaties.\nfill its responsibilities under the Constitution while permitting the\nPresident to exercise his responsibilities.\n6\n7\nCOST ESTIMATE\nand opinions and, in appropriate cireumstances, their approval of\nPursuant to clause 7, Rule XIII, of the House Rules, the commit-\naction contemplated. Furthermore, for consultation to be meaningful,\ntee believes that the adoption and implementation of this war powers\nthe President himself must participate and all information relevant to\nresolution will result in little or no additional cost to the Government\nthe situation must be made available.\nof the United States. If adopted, however, application of the legisla-\nIn the context of this and following sections of the resolution, a\ntion could result in substantial future savings to the Nation, both in\ncommitment of armed forces commences when the President makes\nblood and treasure, by preventing U.S. military combat involvements\nthe final decision to act and issues orders putting that decision into\nabroad which are found by Congress to be not in the national interest.\neffect.\nThe word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed conflict\nSECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS\nduring the subcommittee drafting process because it was considered\nto be somewhat broader in scope. In addition to a situation in which\nSection 1. Short title and introductory clause\nfighting actually has begun, hostilities also encompasses a state of con-\nThe introductory clause simply reads: \"Concerning the war powers\nfrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is a clear\nof Congress and the President.\" Sec. 1, the \"Short Title,\" reads:\nand present danger of armed conflict. \"Imminent hostilities\" denotes\n\"This measure may be cited as the 'War Powers Resolution of 1973'.\"\na situation in which there is a clear potential either for such a state of\nThe word \"concerning\" was chosen because the resolution is merely\nconfrontation or for actual armed conflict.\nintended to elaborate upon the application of the warmaking powers\nSection 3. Reporting\nof the Congress and the President mentioned in the Constitution. By\nThis section contains a reporting requirement obligating the Presi-\ncontrast with other war powers proposals, House Joint Resolution 542\ndent to submit a written report to Congress when \"without a prior\ndoes not attempt any itemized definition of the war powers.\ndeclaration of war by Congress\", he takes certain actions committing\nSection 2. Consultation\nU.S. Armed Forces. The section stipulates the circumstances\nThis section directs that the President \"in every possible instance\nrequiring such a report, prescribes its form, specifies the nature of its\nshall consult with the leadership and appropriate committees of the\ncontents, and states the timing of its submission. A central purpose of\nCongress before committing United States Armed Forces to hostilities\nthe reporting requirement is to cause the President, in the process of\nor to situations where hostilities may be imminent.\ndecisionmaking, to take into account the legal and constitutional\nThe use of the word \"every\" reflects the committee's belief that\nfoundation for his actions, as well as the constitutional role of the\nsuch consultation prior to the commitment of armed forces should be\nCongress in warmaking.\ninclusive. In other words, it should apply in extraordinary and emer-\nThree sets of circumstances which would require a report are\ngency circumstances-even when it is not possible to get formal con-\nenumerated in the resolution as follows:\ngressional approval in the form of a declaration of war or other spe-\n(1) When the President \"commits United States Armed Forces\ncific authorization.\nto hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its posses-\nAt the same time, through use of the word \"possible\" it recog-\nsions and territories.\" This includes all commitments of U.S.\nnizes that a situation may be SO dire, e.g. hostile missile attack under-\nArmed Forces abroad to situations in which hostilities already\nway, and require such instantaneous action that no prior consultation\nhave begun and where there is reasonable expectation that Ameri-\nwill be possible. It is therefore simultaneously firm in its expression\ncan military personnel will be subject to hostile fire.\nof Congressional authority yet flexible in recognizing the possible need\nThe language makes clear that the subsection applies to hostili-\nfor swift action by the President which would not allow him time to\nties outside the territory of the United States, as opposed to at-\nconsult first with Congress.\ntacks directly upon, or within, the territory of the United States.\nThe second element of section 2 relates to situations after a commit-\nThis language implicitly recognizes the President's right to pro-\nment of forces has been made (with or without prior consultation). In\ntect the United States against attacks by all enemies, foreign and\nthat instance, it imposes upon the President, through use of the word\ndomestic. There is no implication whatsoever that the resolution is\n\"shall\", the obligation to \"consult regularly with such Members and\nintended to impair the President's authority to provide such\ncommittees until such United States Armed Forces are no longer en-\ndefense.\ngaged in hostilities or have been removed from areas where hostilities\n(2) Reporting is required when the President \"commits United\nmay be imminent.\"\nStates Armed Forces equipped for combat to the territory, air-\nA considerable amount of attention was given to the definition of\nspace or waters of a foreign nation, except for deployments which\nconsultation. Rejected was the notion that consultation should be\nrelate solely to supply, replacement, repair or training of United\nsynonymous with merely being informed. Rather, consultation in this\nStates Armed Forces\". While subsection (1) refers to the com-\nprovision means that a decision is pending on a problem and that\nmitment of U.S. troops to an area where armed conflict actually\nMembers of Congress are being asked by the President for their advice\nis in progress, subsection (2) covers the initial commitment of\ntroops in situations in which there is no actual fighting but some\n8\n9\nrisk, however small, of the forces being involved in hostilities. A\nIt is the belief of the committee that a report which fulfills the cri-\nreport would be required any time combat military forces were\nsent to another nation to alter or preserve the existing political\nteria set forth above will provide the Congress with adequate informa-\ntion on which to base its deliberations and possible action concerning\nstatus quo or to make the U.S. presence felt. Thus, for example,\nthe commitment of U.S. Armed Forces by the President.\nthe dispatch of Marines to Thailand in 1962 and the quarantine of\nCuba in the same year would have required Presidential reports.\nSection 4. Congressional action\nReports would not be required for routine port supply calls, emer-\nSection 4 has four basic purposes: first, to provide for a specific\ngency aid measures, normal training exercises, and other noncom-\nprocedure of consideration by Congress when a report is submitted\nbat military activities.\npursuant to section 3; second, to provide for the receiving of a report\n(3) Reporting is required when the President \"substantially\nwhen Congress is not in session; third, to deny the President the au-\nenlarges United States Armed Forces equipped for combat al-\nthority to commit U.S. Armed Forces for more than 120 days without\nready located in a foreign nation.\" While the word \"substantially\"\nfurther specific congressional approval; fourth, to authorize both\ndesignates a flexible criterion, it is possible to arrive at a common-\nHouses of Congress to order the President to disengage any forces\nsense understanding of the numbers involved. A 100-percent in-\nfrom hostilities outside the United States at any time during or after\ncrease in numbers of Marine guards at an embassy-say from 5 to\nthe 120-day period through passage of a concurrent resolution.\n10-clearly would not be an occasion for a report. A thousand\nSubsection (a) of section 4 provides that each report submitted by\nadditional men sent to Europe under present circumstances does\nthe President pursuant to section 3 shall be transmitted to the Speaker\nnot significantly enlarge the total U.S. troop strength of about\nof the House and President pro tempore of the Senate on the same day.\n300,000 already there. However, the dispatch of 1,000 men to\nIt further provides that if such a report is received when Con-\nGuantanamo Bay, Cuba, which now has a complement of 4,000\ngress is not in session the Speaker and President pro tempore, if they\nwould mean an increase of 25 percent, which is substantial. Under\ndeem it advisable, shall jointly request the President to convene Con-\nthis circumstance, President Kennedy would have been required\ngress: to provide for consideration of it and allow the Congress to\nto report to Congress in 1962 when he raised the number of U.S.\ntake appropriate action pursuant to this section. There are three rea-\nmilitary advisers in Vietnam from 700 to 16,000.\nsons for this language:\nThe latter half of section 3 deals with the timing, form, and scope\nBy use of the phrase 66* * if they deem it advisable **9 it is in-\nof the report submitted by the President.\ntended that the good judgment of these two officials would determine\n(1) Timing.-Although prior war powers legislation had used the\nwhether the report covered a situation of sufficient urgency, im-\nword \"promptly\" in designating the time period in which a Presiden-\nportance and severity to warrant the extraordinary measure of order-\ntial report had to be submitted following an action specified under the\ning the reconvening of Congress. There may be instances when a report\nresolution, the committee saw the need for more precision and adopted\nis filed on a relatively minor action.\n72 hours as the time limit. This period is assumed to be sufficient for\nThe language 66* * * shall jointly request\" makes clear that both\nthe President to assemble all the pertinent information necessary to\nthe Speaker and President pro tempore would have to concur in the\nmake a full report to the Congress.\nimportance of and urgency of the situation covered in the report and\n(2) Form.-The report by the President is stipulated to be in writ-\nin the desirability of asking the President to reconvene Congress.\ning. Moreover, to the maximum extent possible, it is to be unclassified.\nYet, through use of the word \"shall\" the committee intended to con-\nIf the President desires to make classified information available to the\nvey its strong belief that reports dealing with situations of urgency\nCongress as additional justification for his actions, he is free to do so.\nand importance would obligate these two officials to request the Presi-\nThe procedure of submitting the report to the Speaker of the House\ndent to reconvene Congress. In this connection the committee recog-\nand the President pro tempore of the Senate is a normal one for re-\nnizes that the Constitution states clearly that only the President\nceiving such reports on behalf of Congress.\n\"may\" reconvene Congress.\n(3) Scope.-Five stipulations are made on the contents of the\nThe language * that it may consider the report and take appro-\nreport. By prescriptive language in the resolution, the President is\npriate action * *\" refers to the congressional action and procedures\nto include:\noutlined in section 4 (b) and (c) as well as sections 5 and 6, \"Congres-\n(A) the circumstances necessitating his action;\nsional Priority Procedure.\"\n(B) the constitutional and legislative provisions under the au-\nThe resolution further stipulates that following receipt of the re-\nthority of which he took such action;\nport the Speaker and President pro tempore shall refer \"it to the\n(C) the estimated scope of activities;\nCommittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to\n(D) the estimated financial cost of such commitment or such\nthe ,Senate Foreign Relations Committee.\n*\n*\n*\"\nThe purpose of this\nenlargement of forces; and\nlanguage was to make clear that these two committees have proper\n(E) such other information as the President may deem useful\njurisdiction over declarations of war and with foreign affairs gen-\nto the Congress in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibili-\nerally. Further, in order to make the report available to all members\nties with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use\nof Congress the resolution stipulates that it \"be printed as a docu-\nof United States Armed Forces abroad.\nment for each House.\"\nH. Rept. 287, 93-1-2\n11\n10\nSubsection (b) of the resolution is one of its major provisions. In\nof the committee was simply that the President shall stop the\nbrief, it stipulates that \"within one hundred and twenty calendar *\" days\naction to which he has committed the forces by releasing the\nafter a report is submitted or is required to be submitted * * the\nforces from the order which committed them, and removing them\nPresident would be required to terminate the commitment referred to\nfrom the situation.\nin the report and \"remove any enlargement of U.S. Armed Forces\"\nThe language 66% * * if the Congress so directs by concurrent\nunless the Congress enacts a declaration of war or a specific authoriza-\nresolution\" is the heart of subsection (c). It authorizes the use of\ntion for the use of U.S. Armed Forces. Considerations which entered\na concurrent resolution to \"veto\" or disapprove an action of the\nPresident committing United States Armed Forces to hostilities.\ninto this provision are as follows:\nThe language 66* * * * within one hundred and twenty calendar\nIn effect, the joint resolution \"endows\" this concurrent resolution\ndays * * *99 was used as a means of providing an adequate but\nwith the binding force of statute. Since the language applies to a\nfixed limitation on the period of the Presidential action. The\nsituation where there is no congressional authorization for the\nCongress recognizes that the President has, from time to time,\nPresident's action it thereby avoids the possibility of a Presi-\nassumed a power to act from provision of treaties, laws, and\ndential veto-and resulting impasse-which would be possible on\nresolutions as well as from the Constitution itself which do not\na bill or a joint resolution. A discussion of the use of a concurrent\nconstitute an explicit or specific authorization. This provision\nresolution for this purpose may be found on pages 13-14.\nenables Congress to consider the necessity or wisdom of a Presi-\nSections 5 and 6. Congressional priority procedure\ndent's action and to require the President to abandon such action\nSections 5 and 6 stipulate a specific congressional priority proce-\nif Congress is not persuaded that the action is in the interest of\ndure for consideration of a relevant bill or joint resolution which may\nthe United States, or to endorse the action if Congress believes\nit to be in the national interest. As is made clear in section 8 of\nbe introduced pursuant to section 4(b) or a concurrent resolution\nintroduced pursuant to section 4(c). Sections 5 and 6 are, in other\nthe resolution, this provision is not to be construed as a grant of\nauthority to the President to act for 120 days. Rather, it should\nwords, the \"antifilibuster\" provisions of the resolution. While it was\nrecognized that filibusters are primarily a problem of the Senate, it\nbe considered a specific time limitation upon any power to act\nwas felt that these provisions would protect the interests of the House.\nassumed by the President from sources other than a specific\nIt would achieve that objective, for example, by allowing the House\nauthorization by Congress.\nNor should this limitation and the power contained in subsec-\nenough time to deal with any relevant bill or resolution sent by the\nSenate. Section 5 relates to section 4(b) and section 6 relates to sec-\ntion (c) be interpreted as limiting the means now available to\nCongress and citizens to challenge the authority of the President\ntion 4(c). In both cases, the language provides for referral to relevant\nbills or resolutions to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and\nto act.\nthe Senate Foreign Relations Committee in accord with the tradi-\nThe language \"*** or is required to be submitted *99 takes\ninto account a situation in which the President for whatever\ntional jurisdiction of those committees.\nThe intent of the committee in including sections 5 and 6 is to\nreason may decide not to submit a report. In that case, the 120-\nestablish the status of relevant legislation as \"privileged motions,\"\nday period would begin after the 72-hour period referred to in\napproximate to the procedure followed when a discharge petition is\nsection 3.\nfiled for the consideration of a resolution.\nThe language 66* * * the President shall terminate any com-\nmitment * * *99 obligates the President explicitly to stop the com-\nTIMING OF SECTION 5\nmitment or enlargement and remove U.S. Armed Forces to which\nthe report refers.\nAs prescribed in section 5 which relates to section 4(b), the tim-\nThe phrase 66* * * unless the Congress enacts a declaration of\ning of congressional procedures would be as follows:\nwar or a specific authorization for the use of United States\nForty-five days before end of 120-day period.-Bill or joint\nArmed Forces\" spells out either of the two specific affirmative\nresolution must be introduced to be guaranteed protection of\nactions which the Congress would have to take in order for the\ncommittee consideration.\nPresident to continue his action, namely, a declaration of war or\nThirty days before end of 120-day period.-One such resolu-\na specific authorization in the form of a joint resolution.\ntion or bill must be reported out by committee.\nSubsection (c) is another of the resolution's major provisions. It\nWithin 3 legislative days of being reported by committee.-\nprovides for the termination of the President's action covered in the\nLegislation becomes pending business of either House and shall\nréport through passage of a concurrent resolution by both Houses,\nbe voted on and sent to the other body.\nbefore the end of the 120-day period referred to in section 4(b) and\nFifteen days before end of 120-day period.-Legislation acted\nnotwithstanding section 4(b). It is, in other words, an option of con-\nupon by one body and sent to the other body and referred to\ngressional action. Considerations which entered into the legislative\nappropriate committee shall be reported out.\nlanguage here are as follows:\nWithin 3 legislative days of being reported by committee in\nThe phrase \"shall be disengaged\" has as its antecedent the\nother body.-Legislation SO reported shall become pending busi-\nPresident's action of committing U.S. Armed Forces. The intent\n12\n13\nness and shall be voted on unless such body shall otherwise deter-\nance of the proposition that Executive action alone can satisfy the\nmine by yeas and nays.\nconstitutional process requirement contained in the provisions of mu-\nEnd of 120-day period.-Presidential action must stop unless\ntual security treaties to which the United States is a party.\"\npreviously sanctioned by Congress.\nThis statement is aimed at rejecting those interpretations of the\ntreaty obligations of the United States which hold that mutual secu-\nTIMING OF SECTION 6\nrity treaties such as NATO, SEATO, and ANZUS are \"self-execut-\ning\" and do not require congressional sanction of any kind for Presi-\nThe timing for congressional consideration under section 6, which\ndential actions taken in pursuit of such obligations, including actions\nrelates to section (c) is as follows:\nwhich involve the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities.\nWithin 15 calendar days of introduction of concurrent resolu-\nThe intent of subsection (c) is to emphasize that this resolution\ntion.-One such resolution shall be reported out by committee\ndoes not grant the President any new authority and, in connection\nwith recommendations and shall become pending business.\nwith the 120-day period referred to in section 4(b), that the President\nWithin 3 legislative days of being reported out.-Shall be voted\nwould not have any freedom of action during the 120-day period\non unless otherwise determined by yeas and nays.\nwhich he does not already have.\nWithin 15 calendar days of concurrent resolution passed by one\nSection 9. Applicability to certain existing commitments\nHouse and referred to other body's appropriate committee.-\nShall be reported out by committee and become pending business.\nThis section provides that the resolution would apply to those com-\nWithin 3 legislative days of being reported out by committee.-\nmitments of U.S. Armed Forces to hostilities which are in progress\nShall be voted on unless otherwise determined by yeas and nays.\non the date of its enactment into law. The section further provides\nthat upon enactment of the resolution the President should proceed\n,Section.,7. Termination of Congress\nto file the report as required by section 3 and that the 120-day period\nSection 7 deals with a situation in which a Congress terminates\ncalled for by subsection 4(b) would begin on the date of the filing of\nduring the 120-day period specified in subsection 4(b) without having\nthe report.\ntaken final action to approve or disapprove a commitment of armed\nSection 10. Effective date\nforces.\nThe committee did not wish to force the President to cease a mili-\nThis section states that the resolution, except to the extent otherwise\ntary action abroad simply because Congress was not in session at the\nprovided in section 9, shall take effect on the date of its enactment.\nexpiration of 120 days and it had not been possible to take final action\nUSE OF A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION\nbefore adjournment.\nThus, section 7 provides that in such a case the 120-day period shall\nSection 4(c) provides that an action by the President committing\nnot expire sooner than 48 days after the convening of the next succeed-\nU.S. troops to hostilities or into areas or situations where hostilities\ning Congress, providing that a resolution or bill is introduced pursuant\nare imminent could be terminated by both Houses of Congress acting\nto subsection 4(b) within 3 days of the convening of the next suc-\nthrough a concurrent resolution. Some question has been raised about\nceeding Congress. This language is meant to insure that in any case\nthe constitutionality of the use of a concurrent resolution for this pur-\nin which the 120-day period is interrupted by statutory termination of\npose. After careful study of the issues involved the committee believes\nCongress without congressional action, there would be an extension of\nthat there is ample precedent for the use of the concurrent resolution\nthe period. It also would allow the antifilibuster provisions to come\nto \"veto\" or disapprove a future action of the President, which action\ninto effect.\nwas previously authorized by a joint resolution or bill.\nSection 8. Interpretation of act\nThere are many examples of legislative actions which have the effect\nSection 8 deals with the construction, intent, and effect of the resolu-\nof law without a Presidential signature. Perhaps the most notable is\ntion.\nthe ability of Congress to veto executive branch reorganization plans\nThe intent of subsection (a) is to disclaim any intention of alter-\nunder the Executive Reorganization Act. Other examples are amend-\ning the constitutional grants of war powers to the legislative and\nments to the Constitution of the United States and orders to spend\nexecutive branches. It thereby helps insure the constitutionality of\nmoney appropriated to the use of the Congress.\nthe resolution by making it clear that nothing in it can be interpreted\nFurther, most of the important legislation enacted for the prose-\nas changing in any way the powers delegated to each branch of govern-\ncution of World War II provided that the powers granted to the Pres-\nment by the Constitution. In addition, it reassures U.S. allies that\nident would come to an end upon adoption of concurrent resolutions\npassage of the resolution will not affect U.S. obligations under mutual\nto that purpose. Among those acts were:\ndefense agreements and other treaties to which the United States is\nThe Lend-Lease Act;\nFirst War Powers Act;\na party.\nThe intent of subsection (b) is to state explicitly that nothing in\nEmergency Price Control Act;\nthe resolution \"shall be construed to represent congressional accept-\nStabilization Act of 1942;\nWar Labor Disputes Act.\n14\nIn more recent times both the Middle East Resolution and the Gulf\nof Tonkin Resolution provided for their repeal by concurrent resolu-\ntion.\nThis use of a concurrent resolution has been accepted by various\nauthorities as a constitutionally valid practice. It might be noted that\nSenator Sam J. Ervin, a noted constitutional scholar, has authored a\nSUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVES MAILLIARD, BROOMFIELD,\nbill which would permit international executive agreements to be\nMATHIAS, GUYER, AND VANDER JAGT\n\"vetoed\" by the Congress through passage of a concurrent resolution.\nThis proposal has been endorsed by many constitutional experts and a\nWe voted in committee to report this resolution because we strongly\nformer Supreme Court justice.\nsupport the reporting and consulting provisions of the legislation, al-\nThe constitutional validity of such usage of a concurrent resolution\nthough we have equally strong reservations over the operating pro-\nis based on the capacity of Congress to limit or to terminate the author-\nvisions. In our opinion the House should have the opportunity to de-\nity it delegates to the Executive. In the case of the war powers, the\nbate the resolution.\nConstitution is clear that the power to declare war, as well as the power\nIt is our hope that as the House works its will, the Members will\nto raise and maintain an army and a navy, belong to Congress. Under\ncarefully scrutinize section 4 (b) and (c). In our opinion, section 4(b)\nthe Constitution, the President is designated as the Commander in\nis dangerous and perhaps unconstitutional. It would unwisely put into\nChief to prosecute wars authorized by Congress.\nlaw a provision whereby the failure of the Congress to act could force\nWhen the President commits U.S. Armed Forces to hostilities\nPresidential action with major national and international implica-\nabroad on his own responsibility, he has, in effect, assumed congres-\ntions. Specifically, section 4(b) requires that within 120 calendar days\nsional authority. Under this war powers resolution the Congress can\nafter a report is submitted or required to be submitted pursuant to\nrescind that authority as it sees fit by a concurrent resolution and\nsection 3, the President shall terminate any commitment and remove\nthereby avoid the problem of a Presidential veto. The authority for\nany enlargement of U.S. Armed Forces with respect to which such\nthe Congress to establish a legislative process for rescinding an assumed\nreport was submitted, unless the Congress enacts a declaration of war\npower to act on the part of the President can be found in Article 1,\nor a specific authorization for the use of U.S. Armed Forces. In our\nclause. Section 8, of the Constitution through the \"necessary and proper\"\nopinion, the Congress ought to exercise its powers in a positive way\nand not have major consequences ensue from the inaction of the\nThis authority of Congress was recognized as legitimate when Con-\nCongress.\ngress passed legislation permitting the President to prosecute World\nThere are several objections to terminating the President's authority\nWar II. This authority of Congress was recognized as legitimate in\nin this manner. Recognizing that the war powers are shared by the\nthe passage of the Middle East Resolution and the Gulf of Tonkin\nPresident and the Congress, the President-to cite one example-ob-\nResolution. It is no less legitimate and constitutional today as em-\nviously has the authority to commit U.S. Armed Forces stationed\nbodied in this war powers resolution.\noverseas to hostilities in order that they might protect themselves from\nattack or threat of imminent attack. We doubt that the Congress can\nconsitutionally terminate the President's authority to protect the\nArmed Forces. We further doubt that the Congress can constitution-\nally terminate the President's authority by a failure to act, as pro-\nvided for by section 4(b).\nThis section appears to be as unwise as it may be unconstitutional.\nSection 4(b) could require the disengagement of our Armed Forces\neven in the face of a continuing attack. It could destroy an adversary's\nincentive to reach an early settlement of a dispute, since he surely\nwould hope that the Congress-by failure to act or otherwise-would\ncompel the President to disengage U.S. Armed Forces.\nWe should also consider the constitutionality of section 4(c), which\nwould permit the Congress by a concurrent resolution to require the\nPresident to disengage U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities. We have\nno problem with the policy envisioned in section 4(c) ; namely that in\nexercising a shared constitutional power a majority of both Houses\n(15)\n16\nof Congress should have the power to require the disengagement of\nArmed Forces committed to hostilities by the President without con-\ngressional approval.\nWe would, however, call attention to the constitutional question of\nwhether a concurrent resolution, not requiring the approval of the\nPresident, would be binding upon the President.\nWILLIAM S. MAILLIARD,\nSUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVES BUCHANAN AND WHALEN\nWILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD,\nROBERT B. (BoB) MATHIAS,\nWe concur that there is great need for war powers legislation. Con-\nTENNYSON GUYER,\ngress must possess the means by which it can act on the question of\nGuy VANDER JAGT.\nplacing U.S. Armed Forces in combat. House Joint Resolution 542\ngoes a long way toward providing such a mechanism.\nNevertheless, the language in section 4(b) troubles us. It permits\nthe exercise of congressional will through inaction. It is our opinion\nthat in order to fulfill its constitutional responsibility, Congress must\nact, whether it be in a positive or negative manner.\nTherefore, during the committee's markup of the resolution, we\nsupported replacing the committee's language in section 4(b) with an\namendment similar to the following:\nNot later than one hundred twenty days after the receipt of\nthe report of the President provided for in section 3 of this\nAct, the Congress, by a declaration of war or by the enact-\nment within such period of a bill or resolution appropriate\nto the purpose, shall either approve, ratify, confirm, and au-\nthorize the continuation of the action taken by the President\nand reported to the Congress, or shall disapprove, in which\ncase the President shall terminate any commitment and re-\nmove any enlargements of the United States Armed Forces\nwith respect to which such report was submitted.\nWe shall offer this amendment during floor debate on House Joint\nResolution 542. On an issue which may involve the death of thousands\nof Americans, we cannot delude ourselves that no action at all is an\nappropriate response. Rather, each Member of Congress should de-\nclare his views-through a \"yes\" or \"no\" vote-when the President\ncommits our Armed Forces to combat or substantially enlarges our\nmilitary presence abroad. Passage of our amendment will afford this\nopportunity.\nJOHN BUCHANAN,\nCHARLES W. WHALEN, Jr.\n(17)\n19\nSection 2, and most of section 3, seek to insure reasonable consulta-\ntion with Congress, by requiring submission of reports to Congress by\nthe President whenever he commits the U.S. forces to hostilities or\npotentially hostile situations, or when he enlarges our combat forces\nalready located in foreign nations. Essentially the same provisions\nMINORITY VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVES FRELINGHUYSEN, DERWINSKI,\nhave been enacted previously by the House of Representatives in two\nTHOMPSON, AND BURKE\npreceding Congresses. Section 4(a), which seeks to insure prompt\naction by Congress on such reports, also is the same language as that\nWe are opposed to the enactment of House Joint Resolution 542. Its\nalready twice approved by the House. We consider these requirements\nmost important provisions are probably unconstitutional and certainly\nto be entirely appropriate.\nare unwise. We strongly doubt the wisdom of attempting to draw rigid\nWe have reservations, however, about the wisdom of the inclusion\nlines between the President and Congress in the area of warmaking\nof section 3(d), language which was not contained in the resolutions\npowers. Ironically, enactment of this resolution in some respects would\npreviously approved by the House. Section 3(d) requires that the\nexpand considerably the constitutional authority of the President, and\nPresident communicate to Congress the estimated financial cost of any\nin other respects would severely restrict his authority. In our opinion,\ncommitment of U.S. forces outside the United States. What point\nthe only appropriate way to make such far-reaching changes would\nwould there be in requiring the President to announce at the outset of\nbe by an amendment to the Constitution.\na national security emergency his judgment as to the cost of com-\nWhile we are in accord with the understandable desire of Members\nmitting of our forces? It may be argued that Congress needs a specific\nto assure Congress its proper role in national decisions of war and\nestimate of costs in order to help us make up our minds about whether\npeace, we consider the severe restrictions which this resolution seeks to\nor not to support the President. In our opinion, that information\nimpose on the authority of the President to be dangerous. Should they\nwould be of no particular value to Congress but might be extremely\nbecome effective, they could affect adverşely important national se-\nrevealing to an enemy. We believe that Congress would receive ade-\ncurity interests of the United States.\nquate information under the requirements of the other subsections of\nFlexibility-not the exact delimitation of powers-is a basic char-\nsection 3, and that the advantages to be gained by hostile powers\nacteristic of the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution clearly\nthrough the required financial disclosure would far outweigh any\nhad that aim in mind when they refrained from closely defining the\nincremental benefit to Congress.\nresponsibilities of the executive and legislative branches in the areas of\nSection 4 (b) and (c) are at the heart of our objections to the resolu-\nwarmaking powers. Moreover, throughout our history, Presidents have\ntions. Section (b) provides that the President at the end of 120 days,\nemployed the power which that flexibility has allowed them to en-\nwithout regard even to the immediate safety of our armed forces,\ncourage peaceful resolutions of potentially dangerous situations.\nmust terminate any involvement of U.S. forces in hostilites outside\nWhat is most ironic is that this joint resolution, constructed as it is\nthe United States, and withdraw newly dispatched combat forces\nwith an eye to our unfortunate experiences during the mid-1960's,\nfrom the area of any foreign country (except for supply, replace-\nwould not have prevented our steadily deepening involvement in Viet-\nment, repair or training deployments), unless the Congress by that\nnam, had it been on the books 10 years ago. For example, there is no\ntime has enacted a declaration of war or \"specifically\" authorized the\nreason to believe that Congress after the Gulf of Tonkin incident\nuse of our Armed Forces.\nwould have refused to approve Presidential action through the mech-\nThis effort to limit the President's power-by the failure of Con-\nanism provided in this measure. Congress at the time would have de-\ngress to take affirmative action-strikes us as highly dangerous. For\nclared war, had that been requested, or we would have specifically\nexample, suppose the President were to commit troops in Europe in\nauthorized the use of our Armed Forces.\norder to defend our own country That he has such power as Com-\nHouse Joint Resolution 542 cannot give Congress foresight or wis-\nmander in Chief is not challenged, but the 120-day limitation might\ndom, and will not force an uncooperative Executive to be more forth-\nmake it necessary for him to withdraw troops already fully committed\ncoming. In fact, it may achieve just the opposite effect. A President\nto combat. At best, the limitation could only be construed as an effort\nfaced with a possible congressional veto of his actions might be\nto circumscribe sharply his ability to continue to exercise his power.\ntempted to circumvent Congress. He might, for example, appeal di-\nTo avoid such a reversal of national policy, a President might hur-\nrectly to the American people in order to force Congress to support\nriedly escalate hostilities, to force Congress to support him, or in an\nhim. If that were to happen, Congress could be virtually excluded\neffort to win the conflict within 120 days-or an enemy might seek to\nfrom the decisionmaking process. Moreover, House Joint Resolution\navoid negotiating a settlement in the belief that the President would\n542, which seeks to provide a \"trip wire,\" invoking restrictions on Ex-\nsoon be forced to withdraw our troops. Thus the 120-day provision\necutive action, might well encourage a President to be less than candid\nmight actually promote, rather than deter, our involvement in\nwhen setting forth the circumstances and justifications for his actions.\nhostilities.\nFollowing are our views in more detail with respect to each section\nProponents may argue that in such a situation Congress would\nof the resolution.\nrecognize the necessity of declaring war, or of specifically authorizing\nthe use of troops. As a practical matter, however, Congress does not\n(18)\n20\nalways move quickly and a legislative deadlock might develop. More-\nover, in our opinion it is highly undesirable for Congress, through its\nown inaction, to be able to determine whether a course of Presidential\naction should be continued.\nThe manifold constitutional and national security problems created\nby the 120-day provision of section 4 (b) are compounded by section\n4(c). This section provides that hostilities and deployments may be\nterminated by Congress alone at any time within the 120-day period,\nby means of a concurrent resolution having no force of law.\nIf the Commander in Chief, acting within his constitutional au-\nthority, orders our forces to deploy or to engage in hostilities, Con-\ngress may affect such action if it wishes, but necessarily must do so\nthrough use of its constitutionally granted powers. By seeking to\nprovide that a concurrent resolution shall have the force of law, we are\nembarking on an extremely dangerous, and probably unconstitutional\ncourse of action.\nThere may be cases in which Congress has specifically authorized\nhostilities or deployments by constitutional means other than a dec-\nlaration of war. Under Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, au-\nthority granted by any bill, order or resolution may be repealed or\namended only through the same process; once Congress has given its\nconsent to legislation it may not be withdrawn unilaterally by the\nCongress with less than a two-thirds vote.\nSection 5 is another example of the difficulty of trying to establish\nrigid procedures where, in fact, flexibility is required. During com-\nmittee consideration it was clear that the practical effects of the time\nrequirements were not adequately explored. For example, the question\nwas raised, if the beginning of the last 45 days of the 120-day period\ncoincided with the end of a Congress, would be the 15 days for commit-\ntee consideration be binding upon the next Congress? A related ques-\ntion was whether Congress would be able to organize quickly enough\nto meet the deadline. These questions, in our opinion, were not an-\nswered satisfactorily.\nWhile sections 7 and 8 are generally helpful, given their context, we\nstrongly oppose the requirement of section 9 that this resolution be\napplied retroactively to cover hostilities existing on the day of its\nenactment which were previously authorized and initiated.\nThe proper and most useful role for Congress to play, in decisions\nof war and peace, cannot be developed through confrontation with the\nExecutive. To function effectively, particularly in times of national\ncrisis, our system of government must exhibit a maximum amount of\ncooperation between the two branches-executive and legislative. In\nthe past such cooperation has been the means by which we have\nachieved successful policy decisions. It is to this end that we should\nbe striving. House Joint Resolution 542 will not help-indeed, we be-\nlieve it will seriously impede-the achievement of this objective.\nPETER H. B. FRELINGHUYSEN,\nEDWARD J. DERWINSKI,\nVERNON W. THOMSON,\nJ. HERBERT BURKE.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMay 14, 1975\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Philip W. Buchen\nFRO M:\nJay T. French\nThe paper clips mark those sections of the\nlegislative history which deal with\n\"consultations\".\nBERALD ? FORD\nLEGISLATIVE HISTORY\nP.L. 93-148\nB.\nof\nWAR POWERS RESOLUTION\n&\nof\nP.L. 93-148, see page 614\nin\nth\nHouse Report (Foreign Affairs Committee) No. 93-287,\nfor\nJune 15, 1973 [To accompany H.J.Res. 542]\nno\nSenate Report (Foreign Relations Committee) No. 93-220,\nJune 14, 1973 [To accompany S. 440]\nHouse Conference Report No. 93-547, Oct. 4, 1973\n8\n[To accompany H.J.Res. 542]\na:\nCong. Record Vol. 119 (1973)\nJ.\nIt\nDATES OF CONSIDERATION AND PASSAGE\nth\nHouse July 18, October 12, 1973\nSenate July 20, October 10, 1973\nThe House bill was passed in lieu of the Senate bill. The House\nReport and the House Conference Report are set out.\nHOUSE REPORT NO. 93-287\nHE Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the joint\nresolution (House Joint Resolution 542) concerning the war powers\nof Congress and the President, having considered the same, report fa-\nvorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the joint res-\nolution as amended do pass.\nAPPLICABILITY TO CERTAIN EXISTING COMMITMENTS\nSEC. 9. All commitments of United States Armed Forces\nto hostilities existing on the date of the enactment of this\nAct shall be subject to the provisions hereof, and the Presi-\ndent shall file the report required by section 3 within seventy-\ntwo hours after the enactment of this Act.\nBACKGROUND\nOn three occasions in the past two sessions of Congress, the House\nof Representatives has passed war powers legislation. In the 91st Con-\ngress a joint resolution reported by unanimous vote from the Commit-\ntee on Foreign Affairs was adopted under suspension of the rules in\nthe House by a vote of 288 to 39. The House-passed measure was sent\nto the Senate where, because of that body's failure to act, it died with\nthe end of the 91st Congress.\nIn the 92d Congress, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, again\nunanimously, reported House Joint Resolution 1 to the House. It was\n2346\nWAR POWERS RESOLUTION\nP.L. 93-148\npassed unanimously in the House by a voice vote under a suspension\nof the rules. The Senate, however, passed its own version of a war\npowers measure, and because of a parliamentary snarl which devel-\noped, it became necessary for the House to act once again. The Senate\nbill was amended with the language of House Joint Resolution 1 in\nthe House-by a vote of 344 to 13-and sent to conference. The con-\nferees met once near the end of the 92d Congress but could come to\nno agreement and the war powers resolution died once again.\nACTION IN THE 93D CONGRESS\nUpon the opening of the 93d Congress the chairman of the Sub-\ncommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments,\nand 11 cosponsors, introduced a new war powers resolution (House\nJoint Resolution 2), somewhat modified from those of prior years.\nSix days of hearings were held by the subcommittee on that reso-\nlution and other war powers measures which had been referred to\nthe Committee on Foreign Affairs. Among those proposals were:\nConcerning the war powers of the Congress and the President.\nH.J. Res. 96-Pepper\nH.R. 2053-Matsunaga\nH.R. 4378-Gude\nH.J. Res. 498-du Pont\nGoverning the use of the Armed Forces or the United States in the absence\nof a declaration of war by the Congress.\nH.R. 317-Bingham\nH.R. 4038-Nix\nH.R. 5669-Bingham\nH.R. 6424-Bingham et al.\nRelating to the power of Congress to declare war.\nH.J. Res. 315-Leggett\nRelating to the war power of the Congress.\nH.J. Res. 21-Danielson\nH.J. Res. 71-Chappell et al.\nH.J. Res. 72-Chappell et al.\nH.J. Res. 89-Matsunaga\nH.J. Res. 250-Dickinson\nH.J. Res. 271-Fuqua\nH.J. Res. 409-Chappell et al.\nH.J. Res. 448-Cronin\nRelative to the commitment of U.S. Armed Forces.\nH. Res. 112-Rarick\nTo define the authority of the President of the United States to intervene\nabroad or to make war without the express consent of Congress.\nH.R. 3722-Sisk\nH.R. 4834-Nix\nTo make rules respecting military hostilities in the absense of a declaration\nof war.\nH.R. 926-Quie\nH.R. 2616-Railsback\nH.R. 2740-Tiernan\nTo make rules governing the use of the Armed Forces of the United States\nin the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress.\nH.R. 454-Dellenback\nH.R. 1454-Ullman\nH.R. 3139-Harrington\nH.R. 3333-Charles H. Wilson of Calif.\nH.R. 3408-Fish\nH.R. 3832-Mazzoli\nH.R. 4725-Sandman\nH.R. 4858-Ruppe\nH.R. 4966-Meeds\nH.R. 5455-Zwach\nH.R. 5594-Esch\n2 U.S.Cong. & Adm.News '73-39\n2347\nLEGISLATIVE HISTORY\nP.L. 93-148\nTo make rules governing the use of the Armed Forces of the United States\nin the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress of the United States\nor of a military attack upon the United States.\nH.R. 3046-Dennis et al.\nH.R. 4295-Rousselot\nH.R. 6318-Dennis et al.\nTestifying were seven Members of the House, two Senators, a spokes-\nman for the Department of State, and five private experts. Four\nmarkup sessions followed at which new language was drafted. A re-\nvised war powers resolution was ordered reported to the full commit-\ntee by a vote of 9 to 1 on May 2. The following day the measure, House\nJoint Resolution 542, was introduced by the subcommittee chairman\nwith 14 cosponsors, including Mr. Fountain, Mr. Fraser, Mr. Bing-\nham. Mr. Fascell, Mr. Davis of Georgia, Mr. Charles Wilson of Texas,\nMr. Findley, Mr. du Pont, Mr. Biester, Mr. Nix, Mr. Broomfield, Mr.\nPepper, Mr. Hays, and Mr. Holifield. The committee considered the\nbill in markup on May 22, May 31, and June 7. The resolution was\nreported with amendments on the latter date by a vote of 31 to 4, with\none member answering \"present.\"\nCONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT\nThe Cambodian incursion of May 1970 provided the initial im-\npetus for a number of bills and resolutions on the war powers.\nMany Members of Congress, including those who supported the action,\nwere disturbed by the lack of prior consultation with Congress and\nthe near crisis in relations between the executive and legislative\nbranches which the incident occasioned.\nThe issue concerns the \"twilight zone\" of concurrent authority\nwhich the Founding Fathers gave the Congress and the President\nover the war powers of the National Government.\nThe term \"war powers\" may be taken to mean the authority in-\nherent in rational sovereignties to declare, conduct, and conclude\narmed hostilities with other states. In the U.S. Constitution the war\npowers which are expressly reserved to the Congress are found in\narticle 1, section 8, of the Constitution:\n1. The Congress shall have power * **\n*\n*\n*\n*\n*\n*\n*\n11. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal,\nand make rules concerning captures on land and water;\n12. To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of\nmoney to that use shall be for a longer term than 2 years;\n13. To provide and maintain a Navy;\n14. To make rules for the government and regulation of\nthe land and naval forces;\n15. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the\nlaws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;\n16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining\nthe militia and for governing such part of them as may be\nemployed in the service of the United States;\n*\n*\n*\n*\n*\n18. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper\nfor carrying into execution the foregoing powers vested by\nthis constitution in the Government of the United States,\nor in any department or officer thereof.\n2348\nWAR POWERS RESOLUTION\nP.L. 93-148\nThe war powers of the President are expressed in article II,\nsection 2:\nThe President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army\nand Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the\nseveral States, when called into the actual service of the\nUnited States * *\nr\nThe interpretation and application of these constitutional grants\nt-\nhave varied widely through our Nation's history. Testimony received\nduring hearings held in the 91st, 92d, and 93d Congresses confirmed\nse\nthe view of many Members of Congress and outside observers that the\nn\nconstitutional \"balance\" of authority over warmaking has swung\ng-\nS,\nheavily to the President in modern times. To restore the balance pro-\nr.\nvided for and mandated in the Constitution, Congress must now\nreassert its own prerogatives and responsibilities.\n1e\nIn shaping legislation to that purpose, the intention was not to re-\nas\n:h\nflect criticism on activities of Presidents, past or present, or to take\npunitive action. Rather, the focus of concern was the appropriate\nscope and substance of congressional and Presidential authority in\nthe exercise of the power of war in order that the Congress might ful-\nfill its responsibilities under the Constitution while permitting the\nn-\nPresident to exercise his responsibilities.\nS.\nThe objective, throughout the consideration of war powers legisla-\nn,\ntion, was to outline arrangements which would allow the President and\nid\nCongress to work together in mutual respect and maximum harmony\nve\ntoward their ultimate, shared goal of maintaining the peace and\nsecurity of the Nation.\nty\nnt\nTHE INTENT AND EFFECT OF HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 542\nn-\nThe issue of the war powers is a complex and challenging one. The\nde\ncommittee's objective was to reaffirm the constitutionally given author-\nity of Congress to declare war. At the same time, the committee was\nar\nin\nsensitive to and cognizant of the President's right to defend the Nation\nagainst attack, without prior congressional authorization, in extreme\ncircumstances such as a nuclear missile attack or direct invasion. On\nthe basis of the deepened understanding generated over recent years,\nhowever, it became increasingly evident that the problem did not\ncenter on such extraordinary circumstances. Rather, the main difficulty\ninvolved the commitment of U.S. military forces exclusively by the\nPresident (purportedly under his authority as Commander in Chief)\nwithout congressional approval or adequate consultation with the\nCongress.\nAs a result of extensive hearings and the contributions made by\nmany members of the House who have given thought to, and sponsored\nlegislation on, war powers, it was possible to arrive at a consensus as\nto what legislation in this important area should encompass. House\nJoint Resolution 542 embodies that consensus. Briefly, the legislation\ndoes the following:\n1. Directs the President in every possible instance to consult\nwith the leadership and appropriate committees of Congress be-\nfore, and regularly during, the commitment of United States\nArmed Forces to hostilities or situations where hostilities may be\nimminent;\n2349\nLEGISLATIVE HISTORY\nP.L. 93-148\n2. Requires that the President make a formal report to Con-\ngress whenever, without a declaration of war or other prior specific\ncongressional authorization, he takes significant action committing\nU.S. Armed Forces to hostilities abroad or the risk thereof, or\nplaces or substantially increases U.S. combat forces on foreign\nterritory;\n3. Provides for a specific procedure of consideration by Con-\ngress when a Presidential report is submitted;\n4. Denies to the President the authority to commit U.S. Armed\nForces for more than 120 days without specific congressional\napproval, while also allowing the Congress to order the President\nto disengage from combat operations at any time before the 120-\nday period ends through passage of a concurrent resolution.\n5. Stipulates a specific congressional priority procedure for\nconsideration of any relevant bill or resolution which may be\nintroduced-in other words, an antifilibuster provision; and\n6. Specifies that the measure is in no way intended to alter the\nconstitutional authority of the Congress or the President, or the\nprovisions of existing treaties.\nCOST ESTIMATE\nPursuant to clause 7, Rule XIII, of the House Rules, the commit-\ntee believes that the adoption and implementation of this war powers\nresolution will result in little or no additional cost to the Government\nof the United States. If adopted, however, application of the legisla-\ntion could result in substantial future savings to the Nation, both in\nblood and treasure, by preventing U.S. military combat involvements\nabroad which are found by Congress to be not in the national interest.\nSECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS\nSection 1. Short title and introductory clause\nThe introductory clause simply reads: \"Concerning the war powers\nof Congress and the President.\" Sec. 1, the \"Short Title,\" reads:\n\"This measure may be cited as the 'War Powers Resolution of 1973'.\"\nThe word \"concerning\" was chosen because the resolution is merely\nintended to elaborate upon the application of the warmaking powers\nof the Congress and the President mentioned in the Constitution. By\ncontrast with other war powers proposals, House Joint Resolution 542\ndoes not attempt any itemized definition of the war powers.\nSection 2. Consultation\nThis section directs that the President \"in every possible instance\nshall consult with the leadership and appropriate committees of the\nCongress before committing United States Armed Forces to hostilities\nor to situations where hostilities may be imminent. *\n**\nThe use of the word \"every\" reflects the committee's belief that\nsuch consultation prior to the commitment of armed forces should be\ninclusive. In other words, it should apply in extraordinary and emer-\ngency circumstances-even when it is not possible to get formal con-\ngressional approval in the form of a declaration of war or other spe-\ncific authorization.\nAt the same time, through use of the word \"possible\" it recog-\nnizes that a situation may be so dire, e.g. hostile missile attack under-\n2350\nWAR POWERS RESOLUTION\nP.L. 93-148\nway, and require such instantaneous action that no prior consultation\nwill be possible. It is therefore simultaneously firm in its expression\nof Congressional authority yet flexible in recognizing the possible need\nfor swift action by the President which would not allow him time to\nconsult first with Congress.\nThe second element of section 2 relates to situations after a commit-\nment of forces has been made (with or without prior consultation). In\nthat instance, it imposes upon the President, through use of the word\n\"shall\", the obligation to \"consult regularly with such Members and\ncommittees until such United States Armed Forces are no longer en-\ngaged in hostilities or have been removed from areas where hostilities\nmay be imminent.\"\nA considerable amount of attention was given to the definition of\nconsultation. Rejected was the notion that consultation should be\nsynonymous with merely being informed. Rather, consultation in this\nprovision means that a decision is pending on a problem and that\nMembers of Congress are being asked by the President for their advice\nand opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their approval of\naction contemplated. Furthermore, for consultation to be meaningful,\nthe President himself must participate and all information relevant to\nthe situation must be made available.\nIn the context of this and following sections of the resolution, a\ncommitment of armed forces commences when the President makes\nthe final decision to act and issues orders putting that decision into\neffect.\nThe word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed conflict\nduring the subcommittee drafting process because it was considered\nto be somewhat broader in scope. In addition to a situation in which\nfighting actually has begun, hostilities also encompasses a state of con-\nfrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is a clear\nand present danger of armed conflict. \"Imminent hostilities\" denotes\na situation in which there is a clear potential either for such a. state of\nconfrontation or for actual armed conflict.\nSection 3. Reporting\ny\nThis section contains a reporting requirement obligating the Presi-\nis\ndent to submit a written report to Congress when \"without a prior\ndeclaration of war by Congress\", he takes certain actions committing\n2\nU.S. Armed Forces. The section stipulates the circumstances\nrequiring such a report, prescribes its form, specifies the nature of its\ncontents, and states the timing of its submission. A central purpose of\nthe reporting requirement is to cause the President, in the process of\ndecisionmaking, to take into account the legal and constitutional\nfoundation for his actions, as well as the constitutional role of the\nCongress in warmaking.\nThree sets of circumstances which would require a report are\nenumerated in the resolution as follows:\ne\n(1) When the President \"commits United States Armed Forces\nto hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its posses-\n1-\nsions and territories.\" This includes all commitments of U.S.\nArmed Forces abroad to situations in which hostilities already\nhave begun and where there is reasonable expectation that Ameri-\ncan military personnel will be subject to hostile fire.\nThe language makes clear that the subsection applies to hostili-\nties outside the territory of the United States, as opposed to at-\n2351\nLEGISLATIVE HISTORY\nP.L. 93-148\ntacks directly upon, or within, the territory of the United States.\nThis language implicitly recognizes the President's right to pro-\ntect the United States against attacks by all enemies, foreign and\ndomestic. There is no implication whatsoever that the resolution is\nintended to impair the President's authority to provide such\ndefense.\n(2) Reporting is required when the President \"commits United\nStates Armed Forces equipped for combat to the territory, air-\nspace or waters of a foreign nation, except for deployments which\nrelate solely to supply, replacement, repair or training of United\nStates Armed Forces\". While subsection (1) refers to the com-\nmitment of U.S. troops to an area where armed conflict actually\nis in progress, subsection (2) covers the initial commitment of\ntroops in situations in which there is no actual fighting but some\nrisk, however small, of the forces being involved in hostilities. A\nreport would be required any time combat military forces were\nsent to another nation to alter or preserve the existing political\nstatus quo or to make the U.S. presence felt. Thus, for example,\nthe dispatch of Marines to Thailand in 1962 and the quarantine of\nCuba in the same year would have required Presidential reports.\nReports would not be required for routine port supply calls, emer-\ngency aid measures. normal training exercises, and other noncom-\nbat military activities.\n(3) Reporting is required when the President \"substantially\nenlarges United States Armed Forces equipped for combat al-\nready located in a foreign nation.\" While the word \"substantially\"\ndesignates a flexible criterion, it is possible to arrive at a common-\nsense understanding of the numbers involved. A 100-percent in-\ncrease in numbers of Marine guards at an embassy-say from 5 to\n10-clearly would not be an occasion for a report. A thousand\nadditional men sent to Europe under present circumstances does\nnot significantly enlarge the total U.S. troop strength of about\n300,000 already there. However, the dispatch of 1,000 men to\nGuantanamo Bay, Cuba, which now has a complement of 4,000\nwould mean an increase of 25 percent, which is substantial. Under\nthis circumstance, President Kennedy would have been required\nto report to Congress in 1962 when he raised the number of U.S.\nmilitary advisers in Vietnam from 700 to 16,000.\nThe latter half of section 3 deals with the timing, form, and scope\nof the report submitted by the President.\n(1) Timing.-Although prior war powers legislation had used the\nword \"promptly\" in designating the time period in which a Presiden-\ntial report had to be submitted following an action specified under the\nresolution, the committee saw the need for more precision and adopted\n72 hours as the time limit. This period is assumed to be sufficient for\nthe President to assemble all the pertinent information necessary to\nmake a full report to the Congress.\n(2) Form.-The report by the President is stipulated to be in writ-\ning. Moreover, to the maximum extent possible, it is to be unclassified.\nIf the President desires to make classified information available to the\nCongress as additional justification for his actions, he is free to do so.\nThe procedure of submitting the report to the Speaker of the House\nand the President pro tempore of the Senate is a normal one for re-\nceiving such reports on behalf of Congress.\n2352\nWAR POWERS RESOLUTION\nP.L. 93-148\n(3) Scope.-Five stipulations are made on the contents of the\nreport. By prescriptive language in the resolution, the President is\n1\nto include:\nS\n(A) the circumstances necessitating his action;\n(B) the constitutional and legislative provisions under the au-\nthority of which he took such action;\n(C) the estimated scope of activities:\n(D) the estimated financial cost of such commitment or such\nenlargement of forces; and\nd\n(E) such other information as the President may deem useful\n1-\nto the Congress in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibili-\ny\nties with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use\nof\nof United States Armed Forces abroad.\n1e\nIt is the belief of the committee that a report which fulfills the cri-\nA\nteria set forth above will provide the Congress with adequate informa-\ne\ntion on which to base its deliberations and possible action concerning\nal\nthe commitment of U.S. Armed Forces by the President.\ne,\nSection 4. Congressional action\nof\nSection 4 has four basic purposes: first, to provide for a specific\nS.\nprocedure of consideration by Congress when a report is submitted\nr-\npursuant to section 3; second, to provide for the receiving of a report\n- -\nwhen Congress is not in session; third, to deny the President the au-\nly\nthority to commit U.S. Armed Forces for more than 120 days without\nil-\nfurther specific congressional approval; fourth, to authorize both\ny\"\nHouses of Congress to order the President to disengage any forces\nfrom hostilities outside the United States at any time during or after\nn-\nthe 120-day period through passage of a concurrent resolution.\nn-\nSubsection (a) of section 4 provides that each report submitted by\nto\nad\nthe President pursuant to section 3 shall be transmitted to the Speaker\nof the House and President pro tempore of the Senate on the same day.\nes\nut\nIt further provides that if such a report is received when Con-\nto\ngress is not in session the Speaker and President pro tempore, if they\ndeem it advisable, shall jointly request the President to convene Con-\n00\nler\ngress to provide for consideration of it and allow the Congress to\ned\ntake appropriate action pursuant to this section. There are three rea-\n.S.\nsons for this language:\nBy use of the phrase 66* * * if they deem it advisable * * \"\" it is in-\ntended that the good judgment of these two officials would determine\npe\nwhether the report covered a situation of sufficient urgency, im-\nthe\nportance and severity to warrant the extraordinary measure of order-\ning the reconvening of Congress. There may be instances when a report\nen-\nthe\nis filed on a relatively minor action.\nted\nThe language 66* * * shall jointly request\" makes clear that both\nfor\nthe Speaker and President pro tempore would have to concur in the\nimportance of and urgency of the situation covered in the report and\nto\nin the desirability of asking the President to reconvene Congress.\nrit-\nYet, through use of the word \"shall\" the committee intended to con-\nied.\nvey its strong belief that reports dealing with situations of urgency\nthe\nand importance would obligate these two officials to request the Presi-\ndent to reconvene Congress. In this connection the committee recog-\nso.\nnizes that the Constitution states clearly that only the President\nouse\n\"may\" reconvene Congress.\nre-\nThe language 66* * * that it may consider the report and take appro-\npriate action * * *\" refers to the congressional action and procedures\n2353\nLEGISLATIVE HISTORY\nP.L. 93-148\noutlined in section 4 (b) and (c) as well as sections 5 and 6, \"Congres-\nsional Priority Procedure.\"\nThe resolution further stipulates that following receipt of the re-\nport the Speaker and President pro tempore shall refer \"it to the\nCommittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to\nthe Senate Foreign Relations Committee. * * *\") The purpose of this\nlanguage was to make clear that these two committees have proper\njurisdiction over declarations of war and with foreign affairs gen-\nerally. Further, in order to make the report available to all members\nof Congress the resolution stipulates that it \"be printed as a docu-\nment for each House.\"\nSubsection (b) of the resolution is one of its major provisions. In\nbrief, it stipulates that \"within one hundred and twenty calendar days\nafter a report is submitted or is required to be submitted * * **9 the\nPresident would be required to terminate the commitment referred to\nin the report and \"remove any enlargement of U.S. Armed Forces\"\nunless the Congress enacts a declaration of war or a specific authoriza-\ntion for the use of U.S. Armed Forces. Considerations which entered\ninto this provision are as follows:\nThe language\n66*\n*\n*\n*\nwithin one hundred and twenty calendar\ndays * * *\" was used as a means of providing an adequate but\nfixed limitation on the period of the Presidential action. The\nCongress recognizes that the President has, from time to time,\nassumed a power to act from provision of treaties, laws, and\nresolutions as well as from the Constitution itself which do not\nconstitute an explicit or specific authorization. This provision\nenables Congress to consider the necessity or wisdom of a Presi-\ndent's action and to require the President to abandon such action\nif Congress is not persuaded that the action is in the interest of\nthe United States, or to endorse the action if Congress believes\nit to be in the national interest. As is made clear in section 8 of\nthe resolution, this provision is not to be construed as a grant of\nauthority to the President to act for 120 days. Rather, it should\nbe considered a specific time limitation upon any power to act\nassumed by the President from sources other than a specific\nauthorization by Congress.\nNor should this limitation and the power contained in subsec-\ntion (c) be interpreted as limiting the means now available to\nCongress and citizens to challenge the authority of the President\nto act.\nThe language \"* * or is required to be submitted * * *) takes\ninto account a situation in which the President for whatever\nreason may decide not to submit a report. In that case, the 120-\nday period would begin after the 72-hour period referred to in\nsection 3.\nThe language 66* * * the President shall terminate any com-\nmitment * * *\" obligates the President explicitly to stop the com-\nmitment or enlargement and remove U.S. Armed Forces to which\nthe report refers.\nThe phrase 66* * * unless the Congress enacts a declaration of\nwar or a specific authorization for the use of United States\nArmed Forces\" spells out either of the two specific affirmative\nactions which the Congress would have to take in order for the\nPresident to continue his action, namely, a declaration of war or\na specific authorization in the form of a joint resolution.\n2354\nWAR POWERS RESOLUTION\nP.L. 93-148\nSubsection. (c) is another of the resolution's major provisions. It\nprovides for the termination of the President's action covered in the\nreport through passage of a concurrent resolution by both Houses,\nbefore the end of the 120-day period referred to in section 4 (b) and\n,\nnotwithstanding section 4(b). It is, in other words, an option of con-\nS\ngressional action. Considerations which entered into the legislative\nlanguage here are as follows:\nThe phrase \"shall be disengaged\" has as its antecedent the\n3\nPresident's action of committing U.S. Armed Forces. The intent\nof the committee was simply that the President shall stop the\naction to which he has committed the forces by releasing the\n1\nforces from the order which committed them, and removing them\ns\nfrom the situation.\ne\nThe language 66* * * if the Congress 30 directs by concurrent\no\nresolution\" is the heart of subsection (c). It authorizes the use of\n\"\na concurrent resolution to \"veto\" or disapprove an action of the\n:-\nPresident committing United States Armed Forces to hostilities.\nd\nIn effect, the joint resolution \"endows\" this concurrent resolution\nwith the binding force of statute. Since the language applies to a\nr\nsituation where there is no congressional authorization for the\nit\nPresident's action it thereby avoids the possibility of a Presi-\nle\ndential veto-and resulting impasse-which would be possible on\n5\na bill or a joint resolution. A discussion of the use of a concurrent\nd\nresolution for this purpose may be found on pages 13-14.\not\nSections 5 and 6. Congressional priority procedure\nm\nii-\nSections 5 and 6 stipulate a specific congressional priority proce-\non\ndure for consideration of a relevant bill or joint resolution which may\nof\nbe introduced pursuant to section 4(b) or a concurrent resolution\nes\nintroduced pursuant to section 4(c). Sections 5 and 6 are, in other\nof\nwords, the \"antifilibuster\" provisions of the resolution. While it was\nof\nrecognized that filibusters are primarily a problem of the Senate, it\nId\nwas felt that these provisions would protect the interests of the House.\nct\nIt would achieve that objective, for example, by allowing the House\nfic\nenough time to deal with any relevant bill or resolution sent by the\nSenate. Section 5 relates to section 4(b) and section 6 relates to sec-\nec-\ntion 4(c). In both cases, the language provides for referral to relevant\nto\nbills or resolutions to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and\nent\nthe Senate Foreign Relations Committee in accord with the tradi-\ntional jurisdiction of those committees.\nkes\nThe intent of the committee in including sections 5 and 6 is to\ner\nestablish the status of relevant legislation as \"privileged motions,\"\n20-\napproximate to the procedure followed when a discharge petition is\nin\nfiled for the consideration of a resolution.\nm-\nTIMING OF SECTION 5\nm-\nich\nAs prescribed in section 5 which relates to section 4(b), the tim-\ning of congressional procedures would be as follows:\ni of\nForty-five days before end of 120-day period.-Bill or joint\nites\nresolution must be introduced to be guaranteed protection of\ncommittee consideration.\ntive\nthe\nThirty days before end of 120-day period.-One such resolu-\ntion or bill must be reported out by committee.\nor\n2355\nLEGISLATIVE HISTORY\nP.L. 93-148\nWithin 3 legislative days of being reported by committee.-\nLegislation becomes pending business of either House and shall\nbe voted on and sent to the other body.\nFifteen days before end of 120-day period.-Legislation acted\nupon by one body and sent to the other body and referred to\nappropriate committee shall be reported out.\nWithin 3 legislative days of being reported by cammittee in\nother body.-Legislation SO reported shall become pending busi-\nness and shall be voted on unless such body shall otherwise deter-\nmine by yeas and nays.\nEnd of 120-day period.-Presidential action must stop unless\npreviously sanctioned by Congress.\nTIMING OF SECTION 6\nThe timing for congressional consideration under section 6, which\nrelates to section 4 (c) is as follows:\nWithin 15 calendar days of introduction of concurrent resolu-\ntion.-One such resolution shall be reported out by committee\nwith recommendations and shall become pending business.\nWithin 3 legislative days of being reported out.Shall be voted\non unless otherwise determined by yeas and nays.\nWithin 15 calendar days of concurrent resolution passed by one\nHouse and referred to other body's appropriate committee.-\nShall be reported out by committee and become pending business.\nWithin 3 legislative days of being reported out by committee.-\nShall be voted on unless otherwise determined by yeas and nays.\nSection 7. Termination of Congress\nSection 7 deals with a situation in which a Congress terminates\nduring the 120-day period specified in subsection 4(b) without having\ntaken final action to approve or disapprove a commitment of armed\nforces.\nThe committee did not wish to force the President to cease a mili-\ntary action abroad simply because Congress was not in session at the\nexpiration of 120 days and it had not been possible to take final action\nbefore adjournment.\nThus, section 7 provides that in such a case the 120-day period shall\nnot expire sooner than 48 days after the convening of the next succeed-\ning Congress, providing that a resolution or bill is introduced pursuant\nto subsection 4 (b) within 3 days of the convening of the next suc-\nceeding Congress. This language is meant to insure that in any case\nin which the 120-day period is interrupted by statutory termination of\nCongress without congressional action, there would be an extension of\nthe period. It also would allow the antifilibuster provisions to come\ninto effect.\nSection 8. Interpretation of act\nSection 8 deals with the construction, intent, and effect of the resolu-\ntion.\nThe intent of subsection (a) is to disclaim any intention of alter-\ning the constitutional grants of war powers to the legislative and\nexecutive branches. It thereby helps insure the constitutionality of\nthe resolution by making it clear that nothing in it can be interpreted\nas changing in any way the powers delegated to each branch of govern-\n2356\nWAR POWERS RESOLUTION\nP.L. 93-148\nment by the Constitution. In addition, it reassures U.S. allies that\nall\npassage of the resolution will not affect U.S. obligations under mutual\ndefense agreements and other treaties to which the United States is\ned\na party.\nto\nThe intent of subsection (b) is to state explicitly that nothing in\nthe resolution \"shall be construed to represent congressional accept-\nin\nance of the proposition that Executive action alone can satisfy the\nsi-\nconstitutional process requirement contained in the provisions of mu-\ner-\ntual security treaties to which the United States is a party.\"\nThis statement is aimed at rejecting those interpretations of the\ness\ntreaty obligations of the United States which hold that mutual secu-\nrity treaties such as NATO, SEATO, and ANZUS are \"self-execut-\ning\" and do not require congressional sanction of any kind for Presi-\ndential actions taken in pursuit of such obligations, including actions\nwhich involve the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities.\nich\nThe intent of subsection (c) is to emphasize that this resolution\ndoes not grant the President any new authority and, in connection\nlu-\nwith the 120-day period referred to in section 4 (b). that the President\ntee\nwould not have any freedom of action during the 120-day period\nwhich he does not already have.\nted\nSection 9. Applicability to certain existing commitments\nme\nThis section provides that the resolution would apply to those com-\nmitments of U.S. Armed Forces to hostilities which are in progress\ness.\non the date of its enactment into law. The section further provides\nthat upon enactment of the resolution the President should proceed\nto file the report as required by section 3 and that the 120-day period\ncalled for by subsection 4(b) would begin on the date of the filing of\ntes\nthe report.\ning\nned\nSection 10. Effective date\nThis section states that the resolution, except to the extent otherwise\nili-\nprovided in section 9, shall take effect on the date of its enactment.\nthe\nion\nUSE OF A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION\nall\ned-\nSection 4(c) provides that an action by the President committing\nant\nU.S. troops to hostilities or into areas or situations where hostilities\nuc-\nare imminent could be terminated by both Houses of Congress acting\nase\nthrough a concurrent resolution. Some question has been raised about\nof\nthe constitutionality of the use of a concurrent resolution for this pur-\nof\npose. After careful study of the issues involved the committee believes\nme\nthat there is ample precedent for the use of the concurrent resolution\nto \"veto\" or disapprove a future action of the President, which action\nwas previously authorized by a joint resolution or bill.\nlu-\nThere are many examples of legislative actions which have the effect\nof law without a Presidential signature. Perhaps the most notable is\nthe ability of Congress to veto executive branch reorganization plans\nter-\nand\nunder the Executive Reorganization Act. Other examples are amend-\nof\nments to the Constitution of the United States and orders to spend\nted\nmoney appropriated to the use of the Congress.\nFurther, most of the important legislation enacted for the prose-\nrn-\ncution of World War II provided that the powers granted to the Pres-\n2357\nLEGISLATIVE HISTORY\nP.L. 93-148\nident would come to an end upon adoption of concurrent resolutions\nto that purpose. Among those acts were:\nThe Lend-Lease Act;\nFirst War Powers Act;\nEmergency Price Control Act;\nStabilization Act of 1942;\nWar Labor Disputes Act.\nIn more recent times both the Middle East Resolution and the Gulf\nof Tonkin Resolution provided for their repeal by concurrent resolu-\ntion.\nThis use of a concurrent resolution has been accepted by various\nauthorities as a constitutionally valid practice. It might be noted that\nSenator Sam J. Ervin, a noted constitutional scholar, has authored a\nbill which would permit international executive agreements to be\n\"vetoed\" by the Congress through passage of a concurrent resolution.\nThis proposal has been endorsed by many constitutional experts and a\nformer Supreme Court justice.\nThe constitutional validity of such usage of a concurrent resolution\nis based on the capacity of Congress to limit or to terminate the author-\nity it delegates to the Executive. In the case of the war powers, the\nConstitution is clear that the power to declare war, as well as the power\nto raise and maintain an army and a navy, belong to Congress. Under\nthe Constitution, the President is designated as the Commander in\nChief to prosecute wars authorized by Congress.\nWhen the President commits U.S. Armed Forces to hostilities\nabroad on his own responsibility, he has, in effect, assumed congres-\nsional authority. Under this war powers resolution the Congress can\nrescind that authority as it sees fit by a concurrent resolution and\nthereby avoid the problem of a Presidential veto. The authority for\nthe Congress to establish a legislative process for rescinding an assumed\npower to act on the part of the President can be found in Article 1,\nSection 8, of the Constitution through the \"necessary and proper\"\nclause.\nThis authority of Congress was recognized as legitimate when Con-\ngress passed legislation permitting the President to prosecute World\nWar II. This authority of Congress was recognized as legitimate in\nthe passage of the Middle East Resolution and the Gulf of Tonkin\nResolution. It is no less legitimate and constitutional today as em-\nbodied in this war powers resolution.\nSUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVES MAILLIARD, BROOMFIELD,\nMATHIAS, GUYER, AND VANDER JAGT\nWe voted in committee to report this resolution because we strongly\nsupport the reporting and consulting provisions of the legislation, al-\nthough we have equally strong reservations over the operating pro-\nvisions. In our opinion the House should have the opportunity to de-\nbate the resolution.\nIt is our hope that as the House works its will. the Members will\ncarefully scrutinize section 4 (b) and (c). In our opinion, section 4(b)\nis dangerous and perhaps unconstitutional. It would unwisely put into\nlaw a provision whereby the failure of the Congress to act could force\nPresidential action with major national and international implica-\ntions. Specifically, section 4(b) requires that within 120 calendar days\n2358\nWAR POWERS RESOLUTION\nP.L. 93-148\nafter a report is submitted or required to be submitted pursuant to\nsection 3, the President shall terminate any commitment and remove\nany enlargement of U.S. Armed Forces with respect to which such\nreport was submitted, unless the Congress enacts a declaration of war\nor a specific authorization for the use of U.S. Armed Forces. In our\nopinion, the Congress ought to exercise its powers in a positive way\nand not have major consequences ensue from the inaction of the\nCongress.\n1-\nThere are several objections to terminating the President's authority\nin this manner. Recognizing that the war powers are shared by the\nis\nPresident and the Congress, the President-to cite one example-ob-\nviously has the authority to commit U.S. Armed Forces stationed\na\noverseas to hostilities in order that they might protect themselves from\nbe\nattack or threat of imminent attack. We doubt that the Congress can\nn.\nconstitutionally terminate the President's authority to protect the\na\nArmed Forces. We further doubt that the Congress can constitution-\nally terminate the President's authority by a failure to act, as pro-\non\nvided for by section (b).\nr-\nThis section appears to be as unwise as it may be unconstitutional.\nhe\nSection 4(b) could require the disengagement of our Armed Forces\ner\neven in the face of a continuing attack. It could destroy an adversary's\ner\nincentive to reach an early settlement of a dispute, since he surely\nin\nwould hope that the Congress-by failure to act or otherwise-would\ncompel the President to disengage U.S. Armed Forces.\nies\nWe should also consider the constitutionality of section 4(c), which\nes-\nwould permit the Congress by a concurrent resolution to require the\nan\nPresident to disengage U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities. We have\nnd\nno problem with the policy envisioned in section 4(c) ; namely that in\nfor\nexercising a shared constitutional power a majority of both Houses\ned\nof Congress should have the power to require the disengagement of\n1.\nArmed Forces committed to hostilities by the President without con-\ner\"\ngressional approval.\nWe would, however, call attention to the constitutional question of\non-\nwhether a concurrent resolution, not requiring the approval of the\nrld\nPresident, would be binding upon the President.\nin\nWILLIAM S. MAILLIARD,\nkin\nWILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD,\nem-\nROBERT B. (BoB) MATHIAS,\nTENNYSON GUYER,\nGuy VANDER JAGT.\nELD,\ngly\nSUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVES BUCHANAN AND WHALEN\nal-\npro-\nWe concur that there is great need for war powers legislation. Con-\nde-\ngress must possess the means by which it can act on the question of\nplacing U.S. Armed Forces in combat. House Joint Resolution 542\nwill\ngoes a long way toward providing such a mechanism.\n(b)\nNevertheless, the language in section 4(b) troubles us. It permits\ninto\nthe exercise of congressional will through inaction. It is our opinion\norce\nthat in order to fulfill its constitutional responsibility, Congress must\nlica-\nact, whether it be in a positive or negative manner.\ndays\nFORD\n2359\nLIBRARY\nLEGISLATIVE HISTORY\nP.L. 93-148\nTherefore, during the committee's markup of the resolution, we\nsupported replacing the committee's language in section 1 (b) with an\namendment similar to the following:\nNot later than one hundred twenty days after the receipt of\nthe report of the President provided for in section 3 of this\nAct, the Congress, by a declaration of war or by the enact-\nment within such period of a bill or resolution appropriate\nto the purpose, shall either approve, ratify, confirm, and au-\nthorize the continuation of the action taken by the President\nand reported to the Congress, or shall disapprove, in which\ncase the President shall terminate any commitment and re-\nmove any enlargements of the United States Armed Forces\nwith respect to which such report was submitted.\nWe shall offer this amendment during floor debate on House Joint\nResolution 542. On an issue which may involve the death of thousands\nof Americans, we cannot delude ourselves that no action at all is an\nappropriate response. Rather, each Member of Congress should de-\nclare his views-through a \"yes\" or \"no\" vote-when the President\ncommits our Armed Forces to combat or substantially enlarges our\nmilitary presence abroad. Passage of our amendment will afford this\nopportunity.\nJOHN BUCHANAN,\nCHARLES W. WHALEN, Jr.\nMINORITY VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVES FRELINGHUYSEN, DERWINSKI,\nTHOMPSON, AND BURKE\nWe are opposed to the enactment of House Joint Resolution 542. Its\nmost important provisions are probably unconstitutional and certainly\nare unwise. We strongly doubt the wisdom of attempting to draw rigid\nlines between the President and Congress in the area of warmaking\npowers. Ironically, enactment of this resolution in some respects would\nexpand considerably the constitutional authority of the President, and\nin other respects would severely restrict his authority. In our opinion,\nthe only appropriate way to make such far-reaching changes would\nbe by an amendment to the Constitution.\nWhile we are in accord with the understandable desire of Members\nto assure Congress its proper rolé in national decisions of war and\npeace, we consider the severe restrictions which this resolution seeks to\nimpose on the authority of the President to be dangerous. Should they\nbecome effective, they could affect adversely important national se-\ncurity interests of the United States.\nFlexibility-not the exact delimitation of powers-is a basic char-\nacteristic of the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution clearly\nhad that aim in mind when they refrained from closely defining the\nresponsibilities of the executive and legislative branches in the areas of\nwarmaking powers. Moreover, throughout our history, Presidents have\nemployed the power which that flexibility has allowed them to en-\ncourage peaceful resolutions of potentially dangerous situations.\nWhat is most ironic is that this joint resolution, constructed as it is\nwith an eye to our unfortunate experiences during the mid-1960's,\nwould not have prevented our steadily deepening involvement in Viet-\nnam, had it been on the books 10 years ago. For example, there is no\nreason to believe that Congress after the Gulf of Tonkin incident\n2360\nWAR POWERS RESOLUTION\nP.L. 93-148\nwould have refused to approve Presidential action through the mech-\nanism provided in this measure. Congress at the time would have de-\nclared war, had that been requested, or we would have specifically\nauthorized the use of our Armed Forces.\nHouse Joint Resolution 542 cannot give Congress foresight or wis-\ndom, and will not force an uncooperative Executive to be more forth-\ncoming. In fact, it may achieve just the opposite effect. A President\nfaced with a possible congressional veto of his actions might be\ntempted to circumvent Congress. He might, for example, appeal di-\nrectly to the American people in order to force Congress to support\nhim. If that were to happen, Congress could be virtually excluded\nfrom the decisionmaking process. Moreover, House Joint Resolution\n542, which seeks to provide a \"trip wire,\" invoking restrictions on Ex-\necutive action, might well encourage a President to be less than candid\nwhen setting forth the circumstances and justifications for his actions.\nFollowing are our views in more detail with respect to each section\nin\nof the resolution.\nSection 2, and most of section 3, seek to insure reasonable consulta-\ntion with Congress, by requiring submission of reports to Congress by\nor\nthe President whenever he commits the U.S. forces to hostilities or\nis\npotentially hostile situations, or when he enlarges our combat forces\nalready located in foreign nations. Essentially the same provisions\nhave been enacted previously by the House of Representatives in two\npreceding Congresses. Section 4(a), which seeks to insure prompt\naction by Congress on such reports, also is the same language as that\nalready twice approved by the House. We consider these requirements\nto be entirely appropriate.\nS\nWe have reservations, however, about the wisdom of the inclusion\nof section 3 (d), language which was not contained in the resolutions\npreviously approved by the House. Section 3 (d) requires that the\nPresident communicate to Congress the estimated financial cost of any\ncommitment of U.S. forces outside the United States. What point\nwould there be in requiring the President to announce at the outset of\na national security emergency his judgment as to the cost of com-\nmitting of our forces? It may be argued that Congress needs a specific\nestimate of costs in order to help us make up our minds about whether\n$\nor not to support the President. In our opinion, that information\nwould be of no particular value to Congress but might be extremely\nrevealing to an enemy. We believe that Congress would receive ade-\nquate information under the requirements of the other subsections of\nsection 3, and that the advantages to be gained by hostile powers\nthrough the required financial disclosure would far outweigh any\nincremental benefit to Congress.\nSection 4 (b) and (c) are at the heart of our objections to the resolu-\ntions. Section 4(b) provides that the President at the end of 120 days,\nwithout regard even to the immediate safety of our armed forces,\nmust terminate any involvement of U.S. forces in hostilites outside.\nthe United States, and withdraw newly dispatched combat forces\nfrom the area of any foreign country (except for supply, replace-\nment, repair or training deployments), unless the Congress by that\ntime has enacted a declaration of war or \"specifically\" authorized the\nuse of our Armed Forces.\nThis effort to limit the President's power-by the failure of Con-\ngress to take affirmative action-strikes us as highly dangerous. For\n2361\nLEGISLATIVE HISTORY\nP.L. 93-148\nexample, suppose the President were to commit troops in Europe in\norder to defend our own country? That he has such power as Com-\nmander in Chief is not challenged, but the 120-day limitation might\nmake it necessary for him to withdraw troops already fully committed\nto combat. At best, the limitation could only be construed as an effort\nto circumscribe sharply his ability to continue to exercise his power.\nTo avoid such a reversal of national policy, a President might hur-\nriedly escalate hostilities, to force Congress to support him, or in an\neffort to win the conflict within 120 days-or an enemy might seek to\navoid negotiating a settlement in the belief that the President would\nsoon be forced to withdraw our troops. Thus the 120-day provision\nmight actually promote, rather than deter, our involvement in\nhostilities.\nProponents may argue that in such a situation Congress would\nrecognize the necessity of declaring war, or of specifically authorizing\nthe use of troops. As a practical matter, however, Congress does not\nalways move quickly and a legislative deadlock might develop. More-\nover, in our opinion it is highly undesirable for Congress, through its\nown inaction, to be able to determine whether a course of Presidential\naction should be continued.\nThe manifold constitutional and national security problems created\nby the 120-day provision of section 4(b) are compounded by section\n4(c). This section provides that hostilities and deployments may be\nterminated by Congress alone at any time within the 120-day period,\nby means of a concurrent resolution having no force of law.\nIf the Commander in Chief, acting within his constitutional au-\nthority, orders our forces to deploy or to engage in hostilities, Con-\ngress may affect such action if it wishes, but necessarily must do so\nthrough use of its constitutionally granted powers. By seeking to\nprovide that a concurrent resolution shall have the force of law, we are\nembarking on an extremely dangerous, and probably unconstitutional\ncourse of action.\nThere may be cases in which Congress has specifically authorized\nhostilities or deployments by constitutional means other than a dec-\nlaration of war. Under Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, au-\nthority granted by any bill, order or resolution may be repealed or\namended only through the same process; once Congress has given its\nconsent to legislation it may not be withdrawn unilaterally by the\nCongress with less than a two-thirds vote.\nSection 5 is another example of the difficulty of trying to establish\nrigid procedures where, in fact, flexibility is required. During com-\nmittee consideration it was clear that the practical effects of the time\nrequirements were not adequately explored. For example, the question\nwas raised, if the beginning of the last 45 days of the 120-day period\ncoincided with the end of a Congress, would be the 15 days for commit-\ntee consideration be binding upon the next Congress? A related ques-\ntion was whether Congress would be able to organize quickly enough\nto meet the deadline. These questions, in our opinion, were not an-\nswered satisfactorily.\nWhile sections 7 and 8 are generally helpful, given their context, we\nstrongly oppose the requirement of section 9 that this resolution be\napplied retroactively to cover hostilities existing on the day of its\nenactment which were previously authorized and initiated.\n2362\nWAR POWERS RESOLUTION\nP.L. 93-148\nThe proper and most useful role for Congress to play, in decisions\nof war and peace, cannot be developed through confrontation with the\nExecutive. To function effectively, particularly in times of national\ncrisis, our system of government must exhibit a maximum amount of\ncooperation between the two branches-executive and legislative. In\nthe past such cooperation has been the means by which we have\nachieved successful policy decisions. It is to this end that we should\nbe striving. House Joint Resolution 542 will not help-indeed, we be-\nlieve it will seriously impede-the achievement of this objective.\nPETER H. B. FRELINGHUYSEN,\nEDWARD J. DERWINSKI,\nVERNON W. THOMSON,\nJ. HERBERT BURKE.\nCONFERENCE REPORT NO. 93-547\nJOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE\nCOMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE\nThe managers on the part of the House and the Senate at the con-\nference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment\nof the Senate to the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 542) concerning the\nwar powers of Congress and the President, submit the following joint\nstatement to the House and the Senate in explanation of the effect\nof the action agreed upon by the managers and recommended in the\naccompanying conference report:\nThe Senate amendment to the joint resolution struck out all after\nthe resolving clause and inserted a new text. Under the conference\nagreement the House recedes with an amendment which substitutes a\nnew text explained below except for clerical corrections, incidental\nchanges made necessary by reason of agreements reached by the con-\nferees, and minor drafting and clarifying changes.\nSHORT TITLE\nSection 1 of the Senate amendment substituted \"War Powers Act\"\nas a short title in lieu of the short title \"War Powers Resolution of\n1973\" in the House joint resolution. Section 1 of the conference sub-\nstitute provides a short title of \"War Powers Resolution\".\nPURPOSE AND POLICY\nThe Senate amendment contained a section entitled \"Purpose and\nPolicy\" (section 2) and a section entitled \"Emergency Use of the\nArmed Forces\" (section 3) which defined the emergency powers of the\nPresident to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or\nsituations of imminent hostilities.\nThe House joint resolution did not contain similar provisions.\nThe conference report contains a section entitled \"Purpose and\nPolicy\". The new section states that:\n(a) the purpose of the joint resolution IS to fulfill the intent of the\nframers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the\ncollective judgment of both the Congress and the President will\n2 U.S.Cong. & Adm.News '73-40\n2363\nJune 25, 1973\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\n21\nby the full committee in the bill, the\nforty-eight hours from and after the taking\n[Roll No. 272]\namount of my proposed amendment and,\nof such action.\nAbdnor\nEckhardt\nMills, Ark.\nfinally, the figure for the items covered\nSEC. 3. Not later than ninety days after the\nAdams\nFisher\nMinish\nif my package of amendments should be\nreceipt of the report of the President pro-\nAnderson, Calif.Flynt\nMoorhead,\nvided for in section 2 of this Act, the Con-\nAndrews, N.C.\nFord,\nMoss\nadopted.\ngress, by the enactment within such period\nAshbrook\nWilliam D.\nMurphy, I\nof a bill or resolution appropriate to the\nBadillo\nGibbons\nO'Neill\nBeard\nGray\nPatman\npurpose, shall either approve, ratify, confirm,\nPROPOSED AMENDMENT TO WAR\nBell\nGross\nPepper\nand authorize the continuation of the action\nBlatnik\nGubser\nPowell, Of\nPOWERS RESOLUTION\ntaken by the President and reported to the\nBreaux\nGuyer\nPrice, Tex\n(Mr. DENNIS asked and was given\nCongress, or shall disapprove and require the\nBurke, Calif.\nHanna\nReid\ndiscontinuance of the same.\nBurlison, Mo.\nHeinz\nRodino\npermission to address the House for 1\nSEC. 4. If the Congress, acting pursuant to\nChisholm\nHogan\nRooney, N\nminute, and to revise and extend his re-\nClark\nIchord\nand under the provisions of section 3, shall\nRyan\nmarks and include extraneous material.)\nDanielson\nJarman\nStokes\napprove, ratify, and confirm and shall au-\nDavis, S.C.\nJordan\nThompson\nMr. DENNIS. Mr. Speaker and Mem-\nthorize the continuation of the action taken\nDelaney\nLandrum\nWiggins\nbers of the House, when we consider the\nby the President and so reported to the Con-\nDellums\nMcCormack\nYoung, Al\nwar powers resolution, House Joint Reso-\ngress, the President shall thereafter report\nDerwinski\nMcKinney\nperiodically in writing to the Congress at\nDiggs\nMaraziti\nlution 542, on Wednesday afternoon un-\nder the 5-minute rule, I intend to offer as\nintervals of not more than six months as to\nThe SPEAKER. On this rollcal\nan amendment, in the nature of a sub-\nthe progress of any hostilities involved and as\nMembers have recorded their pre\nto the status of the situation, and the Con-\nstitute, a war powers bill which I have\ngress shall, within a period of thirty days\nby electronic device, a quorum.\ndrawn which would differ in several im-\nfrom and after the receipt of each such six-\nBy unanimous consent, further\nportant respects from that resolution,\nmonth report, again take action by the enact-\nceedings under the call were disp\nnotably in the fact that under my bill\nment of an appropriate bill or resolution, to\nwith.\nan affirmative vote on the part of the\neither ratify, approve, confirm, and authorize\nCongress would be necessary in order to\nthe continuation of the action of the Presi-\ndent, including any hostilities which may be\nCONFERENCE REPORT ON\nrequire the President to terminate hostil-\ninvolved, or to disapprove and require the\nities abroad rather than permitting the\n7447, SUPPLEMENTAL APPROI\ndiscontinuance of the same.\nexpiration of a time by inaction on our\nTIONS, 1973\nSEC. 5. If the Congress shall at any time,\npart which would bring such hostilities\nacting under the provisions of section 3 or\nMr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I c\nto a close.\nsection 4, disapprove the action of the Prest-\nthe conference report on the bill\nMr. Speaker, I insert in the RECORD\ndent and require the discontinuance of the\n7447) making supplemental appr\nat this point my proposed amendment:\nsame, then the President shall discontinue\ntions for the fiscal year ending Ju\nAMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. DENNIS IN THE\nthe action so taken by him and so reported\n1973, and for other purposes, ar\nNATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO THE BILL, HOUSE\nto the Congress, and shall terminate any\nhostilities which may be in progress and shall\nunanimous consent that the statem\nJOINT RESOLUTION 542, AS REPORTED\nwithdraw, disengage, and redeploy the Armed\nthe managers be read in lieu (\nStrike out all after the enacting clause\nForces of the United States which may be in-\nreport.\nand insert in lieu thereof the following:\nvolved, just as expeditiously as may be pos-\nThe Clerk read the title of the 1\nSECTION 1. In the absence of a declaration\nsible having regard to, and consistent with,\nThe SPEAKER. Is there object\nof war by the Congress or of a military\nthe safety of the Armed Forces of the United\nattack upon the United States, its territories\nthe request of the gentleman\nStates, the necessary defense and protection\nor possessions, the Armed Forces of the\nTexas?\nof the United States, its territories and pos-\nUnited States shall not be committed to\nsessions, the safety of citizens and nationals\nThere was no objection.\ncombat or introduced into a situation where\nof the United States who may be involved,\nThe Clerk read the statement.\ncombat is imminent or likely at any place\nand the reasonable safety and necessities, af-\n(For conference report and stat\noutside of the United States, its territories\nter due and reasonable notice, of allied or\nsee proceedings of the House of J1\nand possessions, without prior notice to and\nfriendly nationals and troops.\n1973.)\nspecific prior authorization by the Congress,\nSEC. 6. For the purposes of this Act the\nThe SPEAKER. The gentlemar\nexcept in case of emergency or necessity, the\nPanama Canal Zone shall be taken and\nexistence of which emergency or necessity is\nTexas is recognized for 30 minute\ndeemed to be a territory or possession of the\nto be determined by the President of the\nUnited States.\nGENERAL LEAVE\nUnited States.\nSEC. 7. Nothing contained in this Act shall\nMr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker,\nSEC. 2. Whenever, in the absence of a\nalter or abrogate any obligation imposed on\nunanimous consent that all Mem\ndeclaration of war by the Congress or of a\nthe United States by the provisions of any\nthe House may have 5 legislative\nmilitary attack upon the United States, its\ntreaty to which the United States is present-\nterritories or possessions, the President of\nwhich to revise and extend their r\nly a party.\nthe United States nevertheless determines\nSEC. 8. If any provision of this Act or the\nin the RECORD in regard to the p\nthat an emergency or necessity exists which\napplication thereof to any particular circum-\nconference report on the supple\njustifies such action, and shall, by conse-\nstance or situation is held invalid, the re-\nappropriation bill and also on €\nquence, commit the Armed Forces of the\nmainder of this Act, or the application of\nthe amendments in disagreemer\nUnited States to combat or shall introduce\nsuch provision to any other circumstance or\nthat all Members may have per\nthem into a situation where combat is im-\nsituation, shall not be affected thereby.\nto insert tables and extraneous\nminent or likely at any place outside of the\nSEC. 9. This Act shall take effect on the\nin connection with their remarks\nUnited States, its territories or possessions,\ndate of its enactment but shall not apply\nto hostilities in which the Armed Forces\nThe SPEAKER. Is there objec\nwithout prior notice to and authorization by\nof the United States are involved on the\nthe request of the gentlemar\nthe Congress, as is provided and authorized\neffective date of this Act.\nTexas?\nin such cases under and pursuant to the pro-\nThere was no objection.\nvisions of section 1 of this Act, the President\nMr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I\nshall report such action to the Congress in\nCALL OF THE HOUSE\ngoing to try to make a dramatic\nwriting, as expeditiously as possible and, in\nbut what I am about to say is sign\nall events, within twenty-four hours from and\nMr. WYDLER. Mr. Speaker, I make\nand important and it relates to W\nafter the taking of such action. Such report\nthe point of order that a quorum is not\nconferees have done on this bill\nshall contain a full account of the circum-\npresent.\nwhat all of us as Members of th\nstances under which such action was taken\nThe SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum\nand shall set forth the facts and circum-\ngress have done on appropriati\nis not present.\nstances relied upon by the President as au-\nsince the current fiscal year 197:\nthorizing and justifying the same. In the\nMr. McFALL Mr. Speaker, I move a\non July 1, 1972.\ncall of the House.\nevent the Congress is not in session the\nThis bill is for about $3.3 billi\nPresident shall forthwith convene the Con-\nA call of the House was ordered.\nas large as the $32 billion Labo\ngress in an extraordinary session and shall\nThe call was taken by electronic de-\nbill which will be before us tomori\nmake such report to the Congress as expedi-\nvice, and the following Members failed\nit seems to me it does merit dis\ntiously as possible and, in all events, within\nto respond:\nand explanation.\nJune 25, 1973\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\n21205\nSEC. 103. The Commission is authorized to\nPERSONAL EXPLANATION\nnot expect any new costs as a result of\nperform construction design services for any\nCommission construction project whenever\nMr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, with re-\nenactment of this legislation.\ngard to rollcall No. 273, I was detained\nMr. Speaker, the framers of the Con-\n(1) such construction project has been in-\ncluded in a proposed authorization bill trans-\non official business and did not return\nstitution were explicit in their desire\nmitted to the Congress by the Commission\nuntil after the vote was taken.\nthat the ultimate warmaking powers be\nand (2) the Commission determines that\nHad I been present, I would have voted\nin the hands of the Congress, the repre-\nthe project is of such urgency that construc-\nsentatives of the people.\n\"aye.\"\ntion of the project should be initiated\npromptly upon enactment of legislation ap-\nAlso, Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 274,\nThis is a salutary proposal. I commend\npropriating funds for its construction.\nI was again detained on official business\nthe distinguished Committee on Foreign\nSEC. 104. When so specified in an appro-\nand did not return until the vote was\nAffairs, after long deliberations on the\npriation Act, transfers of amounts between\ntaken.\nsubject, for bringing forth this resolu-\n\"Operating expenses\" and \"Plant and capital\nHad I been present, I would have voted\ntion to be considered by the House.\nequipment\" may be made as provided in such\n\"no.\"\nI therefore urge the adoption of House\nappropriation Act.\nResolution 456 in order that we may dis-\nSEC. 105. AMENDMENT OF PRIOR YEAR AcTs.-\ncuss and debate this very important\n(a) Section 101 of Public Law 91-273, as\nPROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION\nmeasure, House Joint Resolution 542.\namended, is further amended by (1) strik-\nOF HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION\nMr. MARTIN of Nebraska. Mr. Speak-\ning from subsection (b) (1), project 71-1-e,\n542, WAR POWERS OF CONGRESS\ner, I yield myself 5 minutes.\ngaseous diffusion production support facili-\nAND THE PRESIDENT\nMr. Speaker, as the gentleman from\nties, the figure \"$72,020,000\" and substituting\nFlorida has explained, House Resolution\ntherefor the figure \"$105,900,000\", (2) strik-\nMr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, by direc-\ning from subsection (b) (1), project 71-1-f,\n456 provides for an open rule and 3 hours\ntion of the Committee on Rules, I call\nprocess equipment modifications, gaseous dif-\nof debate on House Joint Resolution 542,\nfusion plants, the figure \"$34,400,000\" and\nup House Resolution 456 and ask for its\nthe war powers resolution of 1973.\nsubstituting therefor the figure \"$172,100,-\nimmediate consideration.\nThe resolution directs the President to\n000\", and (3) striking from subsection (b)\nThe Clerk read the resolution, as\nconsult with the Congress before and\n(9), project 71-9, fire, safety, and adequacy\nfollows:\nduring the commitment of U.S. forces to\nof operating conditions projects, various lo-\nH. RES. 456\nhostile situations.\ncations, the figure \"$69,000,000\" and substi-\nResolved, That upon the adoption of this\nThis resolution requires the President\ntuting therefor the figure \"$193,000,000\".\nresolution it shall be in order to move that\nto report to the Congress within 72 hours\n(b) Section 106 of Public Law 91-273, as\nthe House resolve itself into the Committee\nwhenever, without specific congressional\namended, is further amended by adding the\nof the Whole House on the State of the Union\nfollowing sentence at the end of the present\nauthorization, he commits U.S. forces to\nfor the consideration of the joint resolution\ntext of subsection (a) thereof:\n(H.J. Res. 542) concerning the war powers\nhostile situations, or places, or substan-\n\"Notwithstanding the foregoing, authoriza-\nof Congress and the President. After gen-\ntially increases U.S. forces on foreign soil.\ntion of additional appropriations for the con-\neral debate, which shall be confined to the\nSection 4(b) provides that within 120\nduct of Project Definition Phase activities\njoint resolution and shall continue not to\ndays after the report is submitted the\nsubsequent to the execution of the afore-\nexceed three hours, to be equally divided and\nPresident is to. terminate any commit-\nmentioned cooperative arrangement, in the\ncontrolled by the chairman and ranking\nment of U.S. troops covered by the report\namount of $2,000,000, is hereby authorized.\".\nminority member of the Committee on For-\n(c) Section 101 of Public Law 92-314 is\nunless Congress specifically authorizes\neign Affairs, the joint resolution shall be\namended by (1) striking from subsection\nread for amendment under the five-minute\nthe commitment.\n(b) (1), project 73-1-d, component test facil-\nrule. At the conclusion of the consideration\nCongress is also allowed to order the\nity, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, the figure \"$20,-\nof the joint resolution for amendment, the\nPresident to disengage from combat op-\n475,000\" and substituting therefor the figure\nCommittee shall rise and report the joint\nerations at any time before the 120-day\n\"$26,675,000\", and (2) striking from subsec-\nresolution to the House with such amend-\nperiod ends through passage of a con-\ntion (b) (5), project 73-5-h, S8G prototype\nments as may have been adopted, and the\ncurrent resolution. Generally a concur-\nnuclear propulsion plant, West Milton, New\nprevious question shall be considered as\nrent resolution does not require a signa-\nYork, the figure \"$56,000,000\" and substitut-\nordered on the joint resolution and amend-\ning therefor the figure \"$125,000,000\".\nments thereto to final passage without in-\nture by the President.\nSEC. 106. RESCISSION.-(a) Public Law 91-\ntervening motion except one motion to re-\nI should like to analyze very quickly\n273, as amended, is further amended by re-\ncommit.\nand briefly, Mr. Speaker, some of the\nscinding therefrom authorization for a proj-\nprovisions in this joint resolution.\nect, except for funds heretofore obligated,\nThe SPEAKER. The gentleman from\nFirst of all, it requires the President to\nas follows:\nFlorida is recognized for 1 hour.\nreport within 72 hours to the House and\nProject 71-5-a, addition to physics building\nMr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30\nSenate in respect to hostile action by the\n(human radiobiology facility), Argonne Na-\nminutes to the able gentleman from Ne-\nU.S. military. Then the resolution sets\ntional Laboratory, Illinois, $2,000,000.\nbraska (Mr. MARTIN) and pending that\nforth five different reasons which the\n(b) Public Law 92-314 is amended by re-\nI yield myself such time as I may\nscinding therefrom authorization for a proj-\nPresident must report in writing ex-\nconsume.\nect, except for funds heretofore obligated, as\nplaining his actions.\nfollows:\nMr. Speaker, House Resolution 456 pro-\nOne of these is as follows: The esti-\nProject 73-1-1, radioactive solid waste re-\nvides for an open rule with 3 hours of\nmated financial cost of such commitment\nduction facility, Los Alamos Scientific Lab-\ngeneral debate on House Joint Resolu-\nor such enlargement of forces.\noratory, New Mexico, $750,000.\ntion 542, a resolution concerning the war\nMr. Speaker, it is virtually impossible\nThe Senate bill was ordered to be read\npowers of Congress and the President.\nfor the President or any other individual\na third time, was read the third time,\nThe joint resolution provides that the\nto make an estimate as to the cost of fu-\nand passed.\nPresident make a formal report to the\nture activities in this area. This is just\nA motion to reconsider was laid on the\nCongress whenever, without a declaration\none of the weaknesses in this bill.\ntable.\nof war or other prior specific congres-\nThen it provides in section 4(b) that\nA similar House bill (H.R. 8662) was\nsional authorization, he takes significant\nwithin 120 calendar days after a report is\nlaid on the table.\nmilitary action, by either the commit-\nsubmitted or is required to be submitted,\nment of U.S. Armed Forces to hostilities\npursuant to section 3, the President shall\noutside the United States, the commit-\nterminate any commitment or remove\nGENERAL LEAVE\nment of combat-equipped U.S. forces to\nany enlargement of the Armed Forces\nMr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Speaker,\nany foreign nation, or the substantial\noverseas.\nI ask unanimous consent that all Mem-\nenlargement of combat-equipped U.S.\nMr. Speaker, I note that the bill says:\nbers may have 5 legislative days in which\nforces already in a foreign nation.\nWithin 120 calendar days after a report\nis submitted or is required.\nto extend their remarks on the bill just\nHouse Joint Resolution 542 also denies\nEvidently the authors of this legisla-\npassed.\nto the President the authority to commit\ntion are not sure the President will com-\nThe SPEAKER. Is there objection to\nU.S. Armed Forces for more than 120\nply with it. Evidently the authors of this\nthe request of the gentleman from Illi-\ndays without specific congressional\nbill are not sure that the President con-\nnois?\napproval.\nstitutionally has to respond to this ac-\nThere was no objection.\nThe Committee on Foreign Affairs does\ntion by the Congress itself, because they\n21206\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\nJune 25, 1973\nto veto a concurrent resolution action by the\nMr. WOLFF. I refer the gentleman to\nhave put in the phrase, \"or is required\nCongress?\nthe committee report. I am also a mem-\nto be submitted.\"\nSenator ERVIN. That is right. That would\nber of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,\nMr. Speaker, let us take a look at sec-\nbe the second time he would have a chance\nas was the gentleman who preceded me.\ntion 4(c). It states as follows:\nto veto the same proposition really.\nIn the report the use of a concurrent\nNotwithstanding subsection (b), at any\ntime that the United States Armed Forces\nThe SPEAKER. The time of the gen-\nresolution is discussed at length. It evi-\nare engaged in hostilities outside the terri-\ntleman has again expired.\ndences how, during World War II, this\ntory of the United States, its possessions and\nMr. MARTIN of Nebraska. Mr. Speak-\ndevice was used on the Lend-Lease Act,\nterritories without a declaration of war or\ner, I yield myself 2 additional minutes.\nthe Price Control Act, the War Labor Act,\nother specific authorization of the Congress,\nConsequently, Mr. Speaker, you can\nand so forth. So that the device of con-\nsuch forces shall be disengaged by the Presi-\nsee that section 4C does not have much\ncurrent resolution has been used in the\ndent if the Congress so directs by concurrent\nsubstance as far as the Constitution is\npast constitutionally and effectively.\nresolution.\nconcerned and as far as Senator ERVIN'S\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Will the gen-\nThe Commission on Rules, Mr. Speak-\ntestimony before our committee on im-\ntleman yield again on that point?\ner, has held extensive hearings on the\npoundment legislation is concerned.\nMr. MARTIN of Nebraska. I yield to\nimpoundment legislation. This legisla-\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Will the gen-\nthe gentleman.\ntion on which we have held our hearings\ntleman yield to me on that point?\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I might say\nwas authorized by the gentleman from\nMr. MARTIN of Nebraska. I yield to\nthe illustrations used in the committee\nTexas (Mr. MAHON), the chairman of the\nthe gentleman.\nreport with respect to concurrent reso-\nCommittee on Appropriations. Senator\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. As a member\nlutions involve powers granted by the\nERVIN, one of the foremost authorities\nof the Committee on Foreign Affairs, I\nCongress to the President during a time\nin Congress on the Constitution, testi-\nwould like to congratulate the gentleman\nof hostilities with the proposal that those\nfied before our committee.\nfor pointing out some of the weaknesses\npowers can be terminated by concurrent\nThe bill of the gentleman from Texas\nin the language and provisions of the\nresolution. Here we are talking about the\n(Mr. MAHON) has a similar provision in\njoint resolution.\nconstitutional power of the President.\nregard to a concurrent resolution coun-\nWith respect to the concurrent resolu-\nThis is an attempt to deny or abrogate\ntermanding the impoundment of funds\ntion proposal, the pros and cons and the\nthat power.\nby the President. It states that if the\nwisdom and constitutionality of that\nSo the situation with respect to the\nfunds are impounded and the Congress\nprovision were discussed in the commit-\nconcurrent resolutions developed during\nacts within 60 days, with a concurrent\ntee. It should be pointed out at the outset\na war-time period is quite different from\nresolution, the funds would immediately\nof this discussion-and I hope we have a\ntheir attempt to curtail Presidential\nbe released.\nreasonable discussion-that the reason\npower over the disposition of troops as\nMr. Speaker, I questioned Senator\nfor the concurrent resolution was an\nthe Commander in Chief.\nERVIN on this point. Let me read from the\nawareness on the part of the proponents\nMr. MARTIN of Nebraska. I appreci-\ncolloquy I had with Senator ERVIN on the\nthat if a joint resolution were the mecha-\nate the gentleman from New Jersey\nday that he testified. This is Mr. Martin\nnism with which to express disapproval,\npointing that out.\nspeaking:\nthe President would have to participate.\nMr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the\nSenator, the legislation which we have be-\nThis is a deliberate attempt to bypass\ngentleman yield?\nfore us today provides for a concurrent reso-\nthe necessity of an operation which\nMr. MARTIN of Nebraska. I yield to\nlution to be passed by the Congress if we\nwish to override or disagree with impound-\nwould be legislative in effect. The as-\nthe gentleman from Illinois.\nment of funds. I would like to quote from\nsumption is a situation which involves a\nMr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, I think\nJefferson's Manual in regard to the House:\nPresident who would be presumably in\nthat the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr.\n\"A concurrent resolution is binding on\nan opposite camp, opposing what the\nMARTIN) is rendering a service in point-\nneither House until agreed to by both. Since\nCongress is trying to do. It is this aspect\ning to the concurrent resolution provision\nnot legislative in nature it is not sent to the\nof the resolution which disturbs me most\non the war powers legislation now before\nPresident for approval.\"\nof all. The feeling is that there has to be\nus. I assume, however, that the gentle-\nThen I proceed as follows:\nindependence from the President with\nman has no objection to the form of the\nThen I would like to quote from Cannon's\nrespect to these judgments. However, the\nrule that is now pending. Am I correct\nPrecedents of the House:\nvery confrontation which is being invited\non that point?\nby sections 4B and 4C are likely to pro-\nMr. MARTIN of Nebraska. I am not\nThis is volume 7, page 150:\nvoke a situation involving the basic con-\nobjecting to the rule. I want the House\n\"A concurrent resolution is without force\nand effect beyond the confines of the Capi-\nstitutionality of what is being attempted.\nto be able to work its will, and to debate\nIt surely is not eliminating any of the\nthis matter carefully and they will have\ntol.\"\nproblems that presently exist with re-\n3 hours in which to do that.\nThen I proceed as follows:\nspect to the relationship between the\nMr. FINDLEY. I appreciate the clari-\nThen I would like to quote from section\nexecutive and the legislative branches.\nfication, because there is quite an ex-\n7, article I of the Constitution, which I\nThe SPEAKER. The time of the gen-\ntensive set of precedents which support\nthink you referred to, and it states as fol-\ntleman has again expired.\nthe use of concurrent resolutions. The\nlows:\nMr. MARTIN of Nebraska. Mr.\nprecedents go well beyond those cited in\nEvery order, resolution or vote to which\nSpeaker, I yield myself 2 additional min-\nthe committee report; they are very ex-\nthe concurrence of the Senate and House\ntensive. We have broad scholarly support\nof Representatives may be necessary, except\nutes.\non the question of adjournment, shall be\nI yield further to the gentleman.\nfor this position. But, Mr. Speaker, I\npresented to the President of the United\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The colloquy\nthink it would be more appropriate for\nStates and before the same shall take effect\nbetween you and Senator ERVIN points\nme to reserve discussion on that until we\nshall be approved by him or being disap-\nproved by him shall be repassed by two-\nup the weaknesses of the concurrent res-\nare in the Committee of the Whole in\norder to have a more extended time to\nthirds of the Senate and House of Repre-\nolution.\nBut I do want to point out a concur-\ndebate it.\nsentatives.\nThe legislation we have before us provid-\nrent resolution is proposed for a specific\nMr. MARTIN of Nebraska. I would\nreason, namely, to avoid the necessity for\nsuggest that the gentleman from Illinois\ning for a concurrent resolution does not\nPresidential involvement in the process\nwithhold his remarks on these matters\nprovide nor give to the President the power\nto veto. It seems to me it is in violation of\nof expressing disapproval of a Presi-\nuntil we are in the Committee of the\nCannon's Precedents of the House and the\nWhole.\ndential action.\nConstitution itself.\nMr. MARTIN of Nebraska. I appre-\nMr. DU PONT. Mr. Speaker, will the\nSenator ERVIN. It is because it has legisla-\nciate the gentleman's remarks, and I\ngentleman yield?\ntive effect. That is what it is designed to\nbelieve he is exactly right. I think this\nMr. MARTIN of Nebraska. I yield to\nhave. You cannot pass a resolution which\nis not subject to the Presidential veto which\nwill raise more constitutional questions\nthe gentleman from Delaware.\nhas legislative effect. This certainly has\nthan we have at the present time.\nMr. DU PONT. Mr. Speaker, I do not\nMr. WOLFF. Will the gentleman yield?\nwant to prolong the debate on the rule,\nlegislative effect.\nMr. MARTIN of Nebraska. Then, in your\nMr. MARTIN of Nebraska. I yield very\nbut I do think the gentleman from New\nbriefly to the gentleman.\nJersey misstates the constitutional argu-\nopinion, the President would have the power\nJune 25, 1973\nCONGRESSIONAL\n21207\nwithout a clear declaration of war. Such\ndifferent, this legislation would still be\nment very seriously as to what power is\ndelegated by whom. The war power rests\nsituations were not anticipated to be a\nneeded. It will assure deliberation over\nproblem when our Constitution was\nour purpose militarily and it will pro-\nin the Congress, and that is why we\noriginally written, but with the advent\nvide the mechanism for insuring unity\ncan use a concurrent resolution, and the\nPresidential power is not involved when\nof the nuclear age, the so-called unde-\nif that purpose is warranted. The time\nit comes to war making. I will expand\nclared war has become more the excep-\nhas come for Congress to reaffirm and\non that further when we get into the gen-\ntion than the rule due to both modern\nclarify its powers regarding the commit-\neral debate during the Committee of the\ndiplomatic and technological realities\nment of U.S. forces to any armed con-\nWhole. But I do want to add that the\nand developments. These same realtities\nflict, as the framers of the Constitution\ngentleman from New Jersey (Mr. FRE-\nand developments have given rise to the\nso clearly intended. We are not assum-\nLINGHUYSEN) was here and voted for the\nstrong chief executive in the conduct of\ning in this bill an initiative or a prero-\nGulf of Tonkin Resolution-I am sorry,\nforeign policy and response to interna-\ngative of the executive. Rather, we are\nI do not know whether the gentleman\nnational military crises.\nimplementing our function which is to\nvoted for or against the Gulf of Tonkin\nBut the protracted conflict in Indo-\noversee government.\nResolution-but the gentleman was here\nchina and its consequences have given us\nAs reported by the House Committee\nwhen the debate was going on on the\ngood cause to reassess the wisdom in\non Foreign Affairs, House Joint Resolu-\nGulf of Tonkin Resolution which in-\narrogating so much power to one person\ntion 542 does not restrict the President's\ncluded a concurrent resolution repealer,\nwithout the participation of the legis-\nflexibility to deal with an emergency\nand there was no debate in the House\nlative branch in decisions which may\nmilitary situation. This is important. As\nof Representatives as to whether that\ninvolve a major and prolonged commit-\nCommander in Chief he has the respon-\nwas constitutional or not. So, we have\nment. In my testimony before the House\nsibility to repel an attack on the United\nplowed this ground many times before,\nForeign Affairs Committee in July of\nStates. Wisely, the bill speaks only to\nand I do not think we have a prima facie\n1970 on war powers legislation I noted\ncommitments to hostilities abroad. It re-\ncase so far as constitutional interpreta-\nthe growing unease and alarm pervading\nquires that the President report to Con-\ntion is concerned.\nthe general public and the Congress over\ngress within 72 hours after he commits\nMr. MARTIN of Nebraska. Mr. Speak-\nthis imbalance between the President\nU.S. Armed Forces to hostilities\ner, I would hope that this debate would\nand Congress. To quote from that\nabroad, where there has been no prior\nbe deferred until after the rule is adopted.\ntestimony:\nspecific congressional authorization. Fur-\nMr. Speaker, I yield such time as he\nThis sudden upsurge of concern, of course,\nthermore, the resolution states that un-\nmay consume to the gentleman from\nis not difficult to explain: it is the direct\nless Congress enacts a declaration of\nIllinois (Mr. ANDERSON).\nproduct of a long, bitter, divisive war which\nwar or a specific authorization for use\nhas been almost exclusively an Executive\nMr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr.\nof U.S. Armed Forces within 120 days\nundertaking. If the traumatic Vietnam ex-\nafter the submission of the report, then\nSpeaker, I rise in support of the rule.\nperience teaches us anything, it is that such\nMr. Speaker, I think the House Foreign\nheavy commitments of American blood and\nthe President must terminate all such\nAffairs Committee is to be commended\ntreasure must have strong democratic sanc-\nactivities.\non bringing to this body what is basically\ntion if they are to be sustained, they can-\nMr. Speaker, it is important that the\na sound and strong war powers bill. I\nnot be entered into by stealth, dissumula-\nHouse of Representatives accept the\nhave felt for some time now that the\ntion, and deliberate ambiguity on the part\nprinciple of war powers legislation. The\nof the Executive We simply cannot af-\nCongress must take affirmative action to\nprocedures for a congressional role con-\nford to undertake another major commit-\nin this area, especially in view of our\ntained in this resolution are reasonable,\nment in which we begin to falter in mid-\ntragic Vietnam experience. On May 23\ncourse because of public confusion over the\nworkable, and acceptable. It is an imple-\nof this year I introduced my own war\npurposes and legitimacy of Executive initi-\nmentation of the Constitution not a\npowers bill, H.R. 8066, the Defense Emer-\nated actions.\nchange in our basic law.\nI strongly urge the House to act favor-\ngency Procedures Act of 1973.\nI think those words ring just as true\nLike the Zablocki bill, my bill would\nably on the war powers resolution. The\ntoday and explain the basic need for the\nrequire prior consultation between the\nnational interest requires Congress to\ntype of legislation which we are today\nPresident and Congress on committing\nshare responsibility with the executive\nconsidering. The time has come to right\nAmerican forces overseas, would require\nat the onset of all wars. We owe it to\nthat imbalance in a responsible manner\nthat President to make a full report in\nourselves and to the American people\nand to reinvolve the Congress in the\nwriting to the Congress when forces are\nwhom we serve.\nwar making process. I think the Amer-\nMs. ABZUG. Mr. Speaker, I join in\ncommitted, and would provide proce-\nican people fully expect this of us and I\ndures whereby the Congress could ap-\nthink we owe it to the American people\nappealing to my colleagues to follow up\nprove or disapprove that action. Unlike\ntheir historic vote of May 10 by approv-\nafter what we have just gone through.\nthe Zablocki bill, my bill would have ter-\ning today a total ban on the use of any\nMr. MARTIN of Nebraska. Mr.\nfunds to finance American bombing in\nminated the President's authority to use\nSpeaker, I support the rule, and urge its\ntroops without specific authorization\nCambodia and Laos.\nadoption.\nafter 90 days instead of 120 days, would\nWhen the House took its unprece-\nMr. FISH. Mr. Speaker, today we are\ndented action last month it was respond-\nrequire that early termination of the\ndebating not only a piece of legislation\nPresident's authority could only be\ning to the overwhelming desire of the\nbut a principle. We are called upon to\nAmerican people to end once and for all\nachieved by enactment of a bill or joint\ndetermine whether or not the institution\nU.S. military intervention in Indochina.\nresolution rather than by passage of con-\nof the Congress has the will to recap-\nOur vote was limited to a denial of a\ncurrent resolution, and would have es-\nture its proper constitutional role with\ntablished a new Joint Committee on\nrequest by the Department of Defense for\nrespect to warmaking.\n\"transfer authority\" to use funds to pay\nNational Security to consult with the\nThe history of a President engaging\nfor military activities in and over Laos\nPresident on decisions to commit troops\nin military operations without direct\nand Cambodia, but the significance of our\nand to advise the appropriate committees\ncongressional authorization can be traced\naction was clear to the entire world. For\nof Congress with respect to related\nback to Andrew Jackson. But these OC-\nthe first time this body had acted in a\nlegislation.\ncurrences have become frighteningly\nWhile a good part of our debate will\ndecisive way to say no to the adminis-\ncommon since World War II, spurred by\ntration's policy of massive terror bomb-\nbe consumed today and on Wednesday\nthe cold war, and the expansion of our\nin discussing the proper mechanics of a\ning in a distant and tiny Southeast Asian\ndefense role throughout the world. As\nwar powers bill, the truly important as-\nland.\npect of this whole exercise, it seems to\nHenry Steele Commanger has noted:\nDuring the debate last month there\nme, is that the Congress is now willing\nFive times in the past ten years Presi-\nwere some expressions of concern that a\ndents have mounted major military inter-\nto face up to its war powers responsi-\nstand by the House at that point might\nventions in foreign nations without prior\nbilities under article I of the Constitu-\nundercut Henry Kissinger in his negotia-\nconsultations with the Congress.\ntion by prescribing certain guidelines\ntions in Paris. The Paris talks have come\nand procedures for the Congress and the\nIt is not necessary to belabor the sad\nand gone, and we have heard Mr. Kis-\nPresident to follow in those situations\nhistory of this country's involvement in\nsinger's declaration that there is noth-\nin which we are committed to hostilities\nIndochina. Had our recent history been\ning in the new agreement that commits\n21208\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\nJune 25, 1973\nthe United States to cease the Cam-\nNo end to the bombing is in sight un-\nbroached by several of my colleagues, this\nbodian bombing.\nless we act. Henry Kamm of the New\nis not even a question for discussion. It\nWe also have heard the testimony on\nYork Times reports that there is \"no\nwas decided several hundred years ago\nJune 18 of James R. Schlesinger, the pro-\nlikelihood that the Cambodian armed\nin the constitutional conventions which\nposed new Secretary of Defense, who de-\nforces can reach a level of competence\nformed this Government that each\nfended the bombing as necessary. He also\nthat will make the use of American air\nbranch of Government and every elected\nmade the arrogant claim that the bomb-\npower less needed.\" About the only act\nofficial within each branch, was to be\ning in Cambodia lies within the consti-\nof independent self-defense Lon Nol has\ndirectly accountable to the people.\ntutional authority of the President, a\nreportedly been able to mount was his\nCertainly much has changed since that\nstatement for which there is no basis\nregime's recent arrest of astrologers who\ntime, but if you start to talk about\nin fact. Mr. Schlesinger also held out the\nhad predicted his ouster.\nchanging the basic principle of account-\npossibility that the administration might\nWe have a choice today. We can vote\nability then you had better realize that\ndecide to resume bombing in Vietnam\nto accept the Eagleton amendment and\nyou are talking about changing, and\nunder certain circumstances, presumably\nthus end the unimaginable suffering of\nsacrificing, the entire democratic struc-\nwithout any authorization from Con-\nthe Cambodian people. Or we can stand\nture of our Government.\ngress.\npat any say, Yes, last month we voted to\nHowever, it is the congressional ac-\nClearly, if this House leaves it up to\nlimit funds for bombing, but only until\ntion section of the bill which provides\nthe administration to decide when to\nthe end of June, and after June the ad-\nthe meat of the legislation and thus is\nend the bombing, that day may not come\nministration has our blessing to continue\nthe greatest subject of controversy. The\nuntil all of Cambodia is turned into a\nits unconstitutional, cruel, and wanton\nquestion here is not what type of say\nwasteland. It is already on the way to\nbombing of a nation that in no way af-\nwe want in the manipulation of this\nbecoming that. In April, a near record\nfects our security or represents any\ncountry's vital resources, the most vital\nof 54,725 tons of bombs were dropped\nthreat to our people or Government. We\nof which is still her man, and woman,\non Cambodia, the equivalent of two and\nare voting today to prohibit the use of\npower, but if we want any say at all. The\none-half Hiroshimas. Observers reported\ntransfer funds for this kind of activity.\ndegree of our control is a matter which\nthat because of the escalated Cambodian\nHow could we then turn around and\nwill be decided by the dictates of the in-\nbombing, the \"devastation of the coun-\npermit the use of other funds for it?\ndividual situations. Whether or not we\ntryside and the movement of refugees\nI do not believe we can do that. I do\nhave any say at all, is a question to be\nhave reached unprecedented levels.\"\nnot believe that we can welcome the\nsolved by us here, this week, in our pas-\nCivilians, including children, are being\ndetente and hopes for world peace rep-\nsage of a war powers resolution.\nslaughtered. Hospitals and schools are\nresented by the Brezhnev visit and at the\nBut to pass a war powers resolution\nbeing bombed, reportedly by the Cam-\nsame time continue this policy of mad-\nwithout a meaningful congressional ac-\nbodian air force under the direction of\nness in Indochina.\ntivity clause is, well, to simply go on\nAmerican commanders.\nWe have, in this House by our vote,\npassing-passing by your responsibility\nA report in April by a study mission\nthe power to save human lives. We have\nto the thousands of people whose multi-\nrepresenting the Senate Judiciary Sub-\nthe power to save billions of dollars by\nple voices are combined in your one\ncommittee on Refugees presents a tragic\nstopping the bombing. We have the\nvoice, passing by your responsibility to\nportrait of a tiny nation, caught in a\npower-and the duty-to reassert our\nthe thousands of young men who may,\ncivil war, undergoing agonizing punish-\nconstitutional authority to make and\nin the future, have to fight and die for\nment from the skies, with men, women,\nunmake war.\na decision made in the White House,\nand children the victims of bombs\nLet us choose to make peace.\npassing by your responsibility to the\ndropped by American Air Force men who\nMr. MITCHELL of Maryland. Mr.\nConstitution which assumes, that as a\ndo not even see the havoc they create.\nSpeaker, I rise today in support of\nCongressman, you want a meaningful\nInevitably, of course, some American\nHouse Joint Resolution 542, although, to\nsay in the foreign affairs of your coun-\nplanes have been shot down and new\nbe honest, there are parts of the bill\ntry.\nAmerican prisoners of war are being\nwhich should be unnecessary, although\nThere are two objections voiced\ncreated, but what happens to them pales\nunfortunately they are not. I am refer-\nagainst the stipulation of a 120-day pe-\nin comparison to what is happening to\nring to the consultation and reporting\nriod during which time Congress may\nthe people of Cambodia.\nclauses of the bill. It seems to me that\nhalt action and after which time action\nThe Senate subcommittee report\nit should have been the natural state of\nwill be automatically halted unless other-\npoints out. that in the 3 years since\naffairs for the executive branch, as it\nwise stipulated by congressional ruling.\nthe United States invaded Cambodia-\nsought to concentrate more and more of\nThese two objections are, basically, that\nostensibly to end the war in Vietnam-\nthe powers of troop commitment,\nthe President will in time of crisis, launch\nat least one-third of Cambodia's popu-\nhostility escalation and arms provision in\nan unusually hostile attack, feeling\nlation, some 2 million people, have fled\nits own domain to grant Congress the\n\"pushed\" by the 4-month limit.\nthe bombing and battle in the country-\ntoken respect of periodic reports and\nThe other is that a peace settlement\nside. It has become a nation of refugees.\noccasional conferences.\nwill be put off until the end of the 4-\nThousands of civilian casualties have\nHowever, the last few decades of Ex-\nmonth period at which time the United\nbeen reported. Orphans number some\nStates will lose whatever bargaining\necutive activity in this area are surpris-\n260,000. Over 50,000 war widows have\ningly devoid of any consideration of the\npower. she had. The reasonings behind\nregistered with the government.\nconstitutionally invested authority of\nthese two objections, generally put forth\nAnd the report said:\nCongress to make the vital decisions of\nby the same people, are mutually an-\nNowwhere is the tragedy in Cambodia bet-\ntroop and materiel commitment to con-\nnulling. The first idea assumes the possi-\nter seen than in the gaunt faces of the thou-\nflict areas. Therefore we find ourselves in\nbility of a phenomenally rapid escala-\nsands of hungry children our Subcommittee\nthe almost embarrassing position of hav-\ntion; the second, of an equally phe-\nmission saw-little bodies thrown together\nnomenal deescalation. Now, in the wake\nin makeshift camps, the human debris of\ning to legislate two points which should\nof our 10-year involvement in Vietnam,\nthe bombing and war.\nhave been the simplest products of\nthis argument takes on a particular sig-\ncourtesy and logic.\nThis once rich rice-exporting land now\nMoreover, I do not understand what\nnificance. During that time, two very\nimports 75 percent of the rice it con-\npossible objections there could be to the\npowerful, yet very different Presidents\nsumes. War damage to civilian and gov-\ntold us time and again of the need for\nrequirement that the President file a\nernment installations totals over $2 bil-\ntime.\nreport within 72 hours, stating the nature\nlion. Nearly 45 percent of the hospital\nFor 10 years, it was more time that\nand scope of a major action to be taken\nfacilities have been destroyed. Over 40\nthey needed. If we had to make the dis-\nin the name of the American people. Cer-\npercent of the roads are destroyed or\ntinction, some would argue that it took\ndamaged. More than one third of the\ntainly, the President has adequate staff\nus 5 years to escalate and 5 years to de-\nbridges are out. These are the blessings\nto prepare such a report. We are assum-\nescalate. And that was merely for an\nAmerican air power has brought. And\ning that he has sufficient evidence to sub-\nundeclared war in an area the size of\npresiding over this destruction of a na-\nstantiate the need for the action or it\nNew Jersey. It is hard then for me to\ntion is the feeble, discredited, and un-\nshould not be taken. As for the basic\nview with any alarm objections made,\npopular Lon Nol regime.\nconcept of accountability which is being\nbased on the possibility of substantive\nJune 25, 1973\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\n21209\nescalation or deescalation within a 4-\nWAR POWERS OF CONGRESS AND\ntive branches, whether or not we believe\nmonth period.\nTHE PRESIDENT\nin ourselves and the oath of office we\nAgain, I stress the fact that we are\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, I move\ntook.\nhere to discuss a war powers resolution,\nthat the House resolve itself into the\nMadam Chairman, at the conclusion of\nnot a war courtesy resolution. The power\nin this resolution lies in the congres-\nCommittee of the Whole House on the\nthe debate on this issue of war powers,\nsional action section. If we refuse to\nState of the Union for the consideration\nI am confident our colleagues will decide\nof the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 542)\nthe question on its merits. That is as it\naccept that section, we are just wasting\nconcerning the war powers of Congress\nshould be. The basic question is whether\nour time here today.\nand the President.\nHouse Joint Resolution 542 is a practical,\nIf the third section is the congressional\nability clause, then the fourth is certainly\nThe SPEAKER. The question is on the\nequitable, and effective legislative answer\nthe congressional responsibility clause.\nmotion offered by the gentleman from\nto the problem of how this Nation's war-\nBy outlining a definite time sequence to\nWisconsin (Mr. ZABLOCKI).\nmaking powers should be exercised and\nbe followed, it insures that Congress will\nThe motion was agreed to.\nby whom.\nIn an effort to help answer that ques-\nact with the same effectiveness, in terms\nIN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE\ntion, allow me to outline briefly some of\nof thoroughness and speed, that we are\nAccordingly the House resolved itself\nthe background and history of this\ndemanding of the executive branch. It\ninto the Committee of the Whole House\nlegislative proposal, as well as the intent\nemphasizes our contention that we are\non the State of the Union for the con-\nand effect of the provisions. As the Mem-\nnot afraid to accept the rigors of crisis\nsideration of the joint resolution, House\nbers know, this House has passed war-\nsituations. It emphasizes, too, that as\nJoint Resolution 542, with Mrs. GRIF-\nmaking powers three times, in the last\nlarge a body as Congress is, it will not\nFITHS in the chair.\nCongress twice.\naccept the characterization of a lumber-\nThe Clerk read the title of the joint\nMadam Chairman, in the 91st Congress\ning bear whose cumbersome nature and\nresolution.\nHouse Joint Resolution 1355 passed the\nslow movements impede, rather than ex-\nBy unanimous consent, the first read-\nHouse by a vote of 280 to 39 on November\npedite, the course of government, and I\ning of the joint resolution was dispensed\n16, 1970. The Senate failed to act.\nam including here the activities which\nwith.\nIn the 92d Congress House Joint Reso-\nresult from our commitments abroad.\nThe CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the\nlution 1 was introduced and passed the\nAnother source of disagreement seems\ngentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ZA-\nHouse by a voice vote on August 2, 1971.\nto be the question of whether or not a\nBLOCKI) will be recognized for 1½ hours,\nThe Senate passed its own version and\nwar powers resolution should cover our\nand the gentleman from California (Mr.\na parliamentary snarl ensued, and the\npresent commitments. I assume that this\nMAILLIARD) will be recognized for 1½\nHouse was required to act again to pass\nis a point of contention since Mr. Den-\nhours.\nits version, and it did, by a vote of 344\nnis' substitute bill specifically exempts\nThe Chair recognizes the gentleman\nto 13 on August 14, 1972. In this, the\nour present commitments in crisis areas.\nfrom Wisconsin (Mr. ZABLOCKI).\n93d Congress, 30-some bills and resolu-\nThe question as I see it is: Are we going\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Madam Chairman, I\ntions were introduced, and a listing of\nto pass a bill saying, \"Yes, we are going to\nyield myself such time as I may consume.\nthe sponsors of the bills appears on pages\nbe effective-tomorrow,\" or \"Yes, we will\nMadam Chairman, the resolution\n2 and 3 of the report by the committee\nbe effective today.\"\nwhich we are considering today, House\non this war powers resolution. This fact\nLet me stress the fact that House Joint\nJoint Resolution 542, gives this Congress\ncertainly is ample evidence that the sub-\nResolution 542 does not tie the Presi-\na historic opportunity to correct the im-\nject has deep interest.\ndent's hands. It merely slows them up\nbalance in warmaking powers, which\nHearings were held and the subcom-\nto the point where we can see what they\nthrough the practice of recent years have\nmittee has gone into depth in its study\nare doing. There is a carefully inserted\nswung too heavily to the President. I\nand consideration of all the bills intro-\nprovision in the bill which allows for\nthink it was very succinctly stated in\nduced in this session of Congress. After\nthe necessity of an instantaneous deci-\nthe opening statement, the opening sen-\n4 days of markup in the subcommittee\nsion in the case of nuclear attack. How-\ntence, indeed, of our first witness dur-\nand 3 more days in the full committee,\never, in the wake of General Secretary\ning the hearings in this session of Con-\nwe reported the bill, Madam Chairman,\nBrezhnev's visit it should be obvious that\ngress. It was the Senator from New York,\nthat is before us for consideration.\nthe administration itself seeks an em-\nSenator JAVITS. I think he put the issue\nThroughout that extensive effort our pri-\nphasis on detente legislation and no\nin perspective, and I quote:\nmary objective was to find a workable\nlonger on legislation a la Joseph Mc-\nThere is no longer any serious argument\nand equitable solution which would re-\nCarthy.\nas to the existence of a constitutional crisis\naffirm the constitutionally given author-\nIt is still true that the best philosophy\nover the exercise of the nation's war powers.\nity of Congress to declare war.\nof postattack recovery is preattack\nThe pertinent question is what will\nGiven that goal of restoring the bal-\nrestraint. And the best assurance of pre-\nthe Congress and the President do about\nance between the executive and the leg-\nattack restraint is the proper filtering of\nthis crisis? The defacto concentration of\nislative branches intended by the Found-\ndecisions through both the branches of\nplenipotentiary war powers in the hands\ning Fathers, the committee was at the\nGovernment responsible for making\nof the President has subverted the letter\nsame time very sensitive to the Presi-\nthem.\nand the spirit of the Constitution. The\ndent's constitutional war powers. For\nMr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, I have no\nissue of war powers is undoubtedly one\nexample, we were determined to avoid\nfurther requests for time.\nMr. Speaker, I move the previous ques-\nof the most complex and challenging we\nany approach defining or codifying the\nwill ever face. It involves important and\nwar powers of the President. Such an\ntion on the resolution.\nThe previous question was ordered.\nintricate constitutional questions which\naction would draw rigid lines between\ngo to the very heart of our democratic\nthe Congress and the President in the\nThe resolution was agreed to.\nsystem.\narea of warmaking powers.\nA motion to reconsider was laid on the\ntable.\nThe legislation before us deals with a\nWe were also highly cognizant of the\ndemocratic control over that most vital\nPresident's right to defend the Nation\nof national decisions: the declaration to\nagainst attack without prior congres-\nGENERAL LEAVE\ngo to war. The issue of war powers is a\nsional authorization in extreme instances\nsubject that, as I said, is subject to deli-\nsuch as nuclear attack or direct invasion.\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, I ask\ncate constitutional consideration. In the\nOn the basis of the deepened under-\nunanimous consent that all Members\nmay have 5 legislative days in which to\nfinal analysis, however, the question is\nstanding provided in the hearings and\nquite simple: whether we do or do not\nfrom observations over the recent years,\nrevise and extend their remarks on the\nbelieve in our Constitution, whether or\nit became increasingly evident that the\npending resolution, House Joint Resolu-\nnot we believe in the unlimited power in\ntion 542.\nproblem did not center on such extreme\nthis area, and whether this unlimited\ncircumstances. Rather the main dif-\nThe SPEAKER. Is there objection to\npower should rest with one man-the\nficulty involved the commitment of the\nthe request of the gentleman from Wis-\nPresident of the United States, whether\nU.S. troops, Armed Forces, exclusively by\nconsin?\nor not we believe ii the checks and bal-\nthe President without congressional ap-\nThere was no objection.\nances system of the legislative and execu-\nproval or adequate consultation with the\nCXIX—1338-Part 17\n21210\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\nJune 25, 1973\nCongress in overseas areas, in foreign\nMadam Chairman, I urge the adoption\nWhen we deal with the subject of war\ncountries.\nof the war powers resolution without\npowers, we are in the area of shared\nI have gone into both the background\namendment.\npowers of the Congress and of the Presi-\nof the issue and the complexity of the\nMadam Chairman, in an effort to give\ndent. It is almost impossible to draw a\nconstitutional questions which governed\nevery Member an opportunity to discuss\nprecise line where the power of the Pres-\nthe committee in an effort to show the\nthis very intricate legislation, I will with-\nident begins and the power of the Con-\nchallenge we faced. Clearly the problem\nhold a detailed explanation for others of\ngress ends, and vice versa.\ndemanded a balanced and delicate solu-\nthe subcommittee and the full commit-\nHowever, I think that the committee\ntion and a solution was born of con-\ntee to pursue the debate, and we shall all\nand the gentleman have done a very good\nsensus. I believe House Joint Resolution\non the committee attempt to try to reply\njob in this respect. Even more important\n542 represents that solution. As a con-\nto the intricate questions and the pointed\nthan defining or limiting powers is the\nsensus I believe House Joint Resolution\nquestions that may be asked of us.\nact of setting up a mechanism whereby\n542 meets also the test as demonstrated\nMr. FINDLEY. Madam Chairman, will\nboth the Congress and the President can\nby the subcommittee's vote of 9 to 1 and\nthe gentleman yield?\nexercise their shared powers.\nthe full committee's favorable vote of\nMr. ZABLOCKI. I yield to the gentle-\nHowever, I do have a question on page\n31 to 4 with one Member voting\nman from Illinois.\n3, section 4(b), wherein it is stated:\n\"present.\"\nMr. FINDLEY. Madam Chairman, I\n(b) Within one hundred and twenty cal-\nBriefly, the legislation does the follow-\nhave had the great pleasure of working\nendar days after a report is submitted or is\nclosely with the gentleman from Wis-\nrequired to be submitted pursuant to sec-\ning:\nconsin on the subject of war powers now\ntion 3, the President shall terminate any\nDirects the President in every possible\ncommitment and remove any enlargement of\ninstance to consult with the leadership\nfor a least 3 years, perhaps longer, and I\nUnited States Armed Forces with respect to\nand appropriate committees of Congress\nhave had a chance to witness firsthand\nwhich such report was submitted, unless\nbefore, and regularly during, the com-\nthe diligence with which he has ap-\nthe Congress enacts a declaration of war or\nmitment of U.S. Armed Forces to hostili-\nproached the problem, his patience, his\na specific authorization for the use of\nties or situations where hostilities may\nwillingness to listen to all viewpoints, his\nUnited States Armed Forces.\nbe imminent;\ndetermination to see it through, until we\nI would like to ask the gentleman, and\nRequires that the President make a\nfinally get a proper war powers bill on\nthis is what concerns me about the word-\nformal report to Congress whenever,\nthe statute books.\ning of the legislation: Does the gentle-\nwithout a declaration of war or other\nIt has not been an easy task. I know\nman believe that the Gulf of Tonkin Bay\nprior specific congressional authoriza-\nthat his efforts are largely responsible\nresolution would satisfy this requirement\ntion, he takes significant action commit-\nfor the fact that on two previous occa-\nof a specific authorization for the use of\nting U.S. Armed Forces to hostilities\nsions this body did approve a war powers\nU.S. Armed Forces?\nabroad or the risk thereof, he places or\nbill. His efforts are also largely respon-\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Madam Chairman,\nsubstantially increases U.S. combat\nsible for the fact that despite the fact\nthe direct reply to that question is \"yes.\"\nforces on foreign territory;\nthat these two initiatives did not lead to\nThe Tonkin Gulf resolution would satisfy\nProvides for a specific procedure of\na law, he nevertheless had the determi-\nthe provisions of that section, of this\nconsideration by Congress when a Presi-\nnation to bring the subject back out, to\nresolution, section 4(b).\ndential report is submitted;\nwork out a different approach. I certainly\nI might say to the gentleman from\nPrecludes the President from commit-\ncommend the gentleman.\nMissouri that Presidents in recent years\nting U.S. Armed Forces for more than\nI think his efforts will be considered in\nand over the history of our country have\n120 days without specific congressional\nthe light of history as a great contribu-\nassumed certain warmaking powers, and\napproval, while also allowing the Con-\ntion to the longtime efforts which many\nthe Congress was silent too often. Our\ngress to order the President to disengage\npeople have been involved in, to try to\nintentions in this legislation are to bring\nfrom combat operations at any time be-\nestablish a proper relationship between\nus into the formation of policy. There-\nfore the 120-day period ends through\nthe legislative branch and the President\nfore, we have provided for, in a section of\npassage of a concurrent resolution;\nin this most vital of all fields of govern-\nthe proposal for consultation to the ex-\nStipulates a specific congressional pri-\nment action.\ntent possible. We have provided for the\nority procedure for consideration of any\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Madam Chairman, I\nPresident to report to us. Specific con-\nrelevant bill or resolution which may be\nthank the gentleman from Illinois for\ngressional actions will follow, thereby\nintroduced. In this connection, Madam\nhis very generous and kind remarks. I\ntaking care of some of the concerns of\nChairman, I wish to reassure you and\nwould be remiss if I did not call the at-\nmany that the Congress may not act.\nthe other members of this distinguished\ntention of our colleagues to the fact that\nTherefore, the congressional priority pro-\ncommittee that these provisions of House\nthe gentleman from Illinois has indeed\ncedure was included in the legislation.\nJoint Resolution 542-Sections 5 and 6-\ncontributed much to the consideration of\nSection 4(b) would require affirmative\nare in no way intended to bypass or\nwar power resolutions over the years.\ncongressional action within 120 days. I\notherwise violate your proper jurisdic-\nThe reporting section was drawn en-\ncannot imagine that at a time when the\ntion. First and foremost, these two sec-\ntirely as a result of his efforts, as well as\nPresident commits troops a resolution\ntions are intended as so-called antifili-\nsection 4(c) which has come under ques-\nwould not be introduced by one Member\nbuster provisions. Their purpose is to\ntion and debate earlier.\nof Congress in either body which would\nprotect the interests of Congress.\nMadam Chairman, as he has in the\nrequire either the affirmation, the ap-\nSpecifies that the measure is no way\nsubcommittee and in whole committee,\nproval of the President's action, or a res-\nintended to alter the constitutional au-\nI know that when we discuss the legisla-\nolution disapproving it.\nthority of the Congress or the President,\ntion in detail, he will most adequately de-\nTherefore, the very introduction of a\nor the provisions of existing treaties;\nfend his position and that of the\nresolution would trigger the legislative\nand\ncommittee.\nprocedure by which the Congress would\nProvides that the resolution would ap-\nI also wish to commend the chairman\nthereby be required to act. House Joint\nply to those commitments which are in\nof the Committee on Foreign Affairs (Mr.\nResolution 542 provides for affirmative\nprogress on the date of its enactment\nMORGAN) for his wise counsel and assist-\naction.\ninto law.\nance. I also wish to thank the members\nMr. ICHORD. I believe I understand\nIn conclusion, I can assure you, Madam\nof the subcommittee for their help, and\nthe gentleman in the well, but I am still\nChairman, that House Joint Resolution\nfor the contribution of the other cospon-\nconcerned about the extreme difficulty\n542 is the result of much serious thought,\nsors of the resolution.\nwe get into as a free Nation when we\ncomprehensive review, and many hours\nMr. ICHORD. Madam Chairman, wll\nare involved in an undeclared war. Re-\nof careful deliberation. In short, it ful-\nthe gentleman yield?\ngardless of how one has felt about the\nfills our determined objective of pro-\nMr. ZABLOCKI. I yield to the gentle-\nwar in Vietnam, one of the main difficul-\nviding a means whereby the President\nman from Missouri (Mr. ICHORD)\nMr. ICHORD. Madam Chairman, I\nties was that the Government of the\nand the Congress can work together in\nwant to commend the gentleman in the\ncountry had defined certain objectives\nmutual respect and maximum harmony\nwell for the leadership which he has\nbut did not have the body of law to pro-\ntoward their ultimate, shared goal of\nmaintaining the peace and security of\ndemonstrated and exerted in this legis-\ntect the objectives of the U.S. Govern-\nlation.\nment. That is, we had so many acts on\nthe Nation.\nJune 25, 1973\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD\n21211\nthe part of many citizens both within and\nmittee of the Whole House on the State\nand the President, nevertheless, commits\nwithout the country which, in a time of\nof the Union, reported that that Com-\ntroops to combat, he must make a report\ndeclared war, would have been treason.\nmittee, having had under consideration\nto us, and within 90 days, under my\nNever again do I want this Nation to be-\nthe joint resolution (H.J. Res. 542), and\nproposal, we must vote it up or down. We\ncome involved in another undeclared war.\nfinding itself without a quorum, she had\nhave to vote, but we do not make him\nWe are still not solving the problem\ndirected the Members to record their\nstop unless we vote it down.\nas to how we protect the aims and ob-\npresence by electronic device, whereupon\nI cannot help but suggest to the gen-\njectives of the Government if we do not\n320 Members recording their presence, a\ntleman-and I am very, very sincere\nhave a declared war.\nquorum, and she submitted herewith the\nabout this-that if we are going to take\nMr. ZABLOCKI. From the testimony\nnames of the absentees to be spread upon\nsuch an important step and determine\nwe received during the hearings I believe\nthe Journal.\nsuch important policy, we should do it\nit can be assumed that declared wars are\nThe Committee resumed its sitting.\nby an affirmative vote, not just by letting\nprobably something for the pages of his-\nThe CHAIRWOMAN. When the point\n120 days drift by without acting, which\ntory\nof order that a quorum was not present\nthen automatically ends the authority to\nI might say to the gentleman, with the\nwas made, the gentleman from Wisconsin\nconduct the hostility.\nreporting requirements and the consulta-\n(Mr. ZABLOCKI), had the floor and had\nMr. ZABLOCKI. May I say to the gen-\ntion required of the President, I believe\nconsumed 19 minutes.\ntleman from Indiana very sincerely that\nthe Congress will be in a much better\nThe Chair recognizes the gentleman\nwe certainly appreciated the impact the\nposition to deal not only with the com-\nfrom Wisconsin (Mr. ZABLOCKI).\ngentleman made in this area of discus-\nmitment of troops but also with the prob-\nMr. DENNIS. Madam Chairman, will\nsion when he testified before the sub-\nlem the gentleman from Missouri raised.\nthe gentleman yield?\ncommittee. Certainly we are fully cogni-\nMr. ICHORD. I agree with the gentle-\nMr. ZABLOCKI. I yield to the gentle-\nzant of his interest and the legislation\nman that I believe it would be better than\nman from Indiana.\nhe has introduced, and we gave it full\nhaving nothing at all, but I am still con-\nMr. DENNIS. I thank the gentleman\nconsideration.\ncerned about our getting involved again\nfor yielding.\nLet me point out, however, where the\nin an undeclared war situation.\nI should like to join with my colleagues\ngentleman's proposal does not, indeed, re-\nMr. ZABLOCKI. I might say to the\nwho have complimented the gentleman\nturn the balance in the war powers area,\ngentleman from Missouri that we are all\nfrom Wisconsin for his pioneering effort\nas does the provision of section 4(b) that\nconcerned about that development.\nin this very difficult and important field.\nwithin 120 days Congress must act\nTherefore, this legislation is before us\nI join unreservedly in that compliment,\naffirmatively.\ntoday, not only to allay our concern but\neven though I, unfortunately, do not\nIndeed, if it might not be able to pass\nalso to bring about a solution to the prob-\nagree with the gentleman's bill. I do\nany legislation, such a situation could, I\nlem.\nagree with the gentleman's intent on the\nmight add, develop because, as in the\nMr. YOUNG of Florida. Madam Chair-\nsubject of war powers, but there are cer-\ngentleman's bill, if the Congress would\nman, this is too important an issue to\ntain features of the gentleman's bill\npass legislation disapproving the Presi-\nbe discussed before an empty House. I\nwhich give me great concern.\ndent's commitment of troops and if it\nmake the point of order that a quorum\nWhen we rose here a minute ago, the\nwere a bill or a joint resolution the Presi-\nis not present.\ngentleman from Missouri had been talk-\ndent could veto it. If the President would\nThe CHAIRMAN. The Chair will\ning with the gentleman about section 4\nveto the bill it would take a two-thirds\ncount.\n(b). That section gives me great concern,\nvote of Congress to override. Under the\nTwenty-five Members are present, not\ntoo, because that section says that the\nprovisions of section 4(b) if the Presi-\na quorum. The call will be taken by elec-\nPresident must make a report of commit-\ndent vetoes and there is not sufficient\ntronic device.\nting troops to combat when there has\nstrength to override, then a resolution\nThe call was taken by electronic de-\nbeen no declaration of war, and that\nof disapproval is not enacted and after\nvice, and the following Members failed\nthen within 120 days, after that report\n120 days the commitment of troops must\nto respond:\nhas been submitted, his authority to con-\ncease. This could not happen under the\n[Roll No. 279]\nduct the hostility expires, unless the Con-\ngentleman's proposal.\nAdams\nDiggs\nMurphy, N.Y.\nAddabbo\ngress in the meantime has affirmatively\nAs for the gentleman from Indiana's\nEdwards, Calif.\nNichols\nAlexander\nEsch\nacted either to declare war or to other-\nNix\nproposal, I further humbly submit that it\nAnderson,\nEshleman\nOwens\nwise approve the action taken.\ngives the President more power than he\nCalif.\nEvans, Colo.\nPatman\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Or disapprove.\nAnderson, Ill.\nhas now. Indeed, the President in the\nEvins, Tenn.\nPepper\nArcher\nFisher\nMr. DENNIS. That is right, but if it\nPeyser\ngentleman's proposal could veto a con-\nAshbrook\nFlynt\nPowell, Ohio\nis disapproved, of course, it would expire.\ngressional bill of disapproval. If we did\nAshley\nFraser\nRailsback\nThe point I am making is that under\nBadillo\nnot have a two-thirds majority the troops\nGray\nRees\nBaker\nthe gentleman's bill there is no ques-\ncould remain.\nGreen, Oreg.\nReid\nBeard\nGross\nRiegle\ntion but what the very important policy\nWe have given this matter some con-\nBell\nGubser\nRoe\ndetermination of whether hostilities\nBergland\nsideration. If we want to bring in mean-\nHansen, Wash.\nRoncalio, Wyo.\nBingham\nshould continue or not can be decided\nHarvey\ningful legislation we must close all these\nRooney, N.Y.\nBlatnik\nHawkins\nRooney, Pa.\nby our inaction. In other words, if we\nlittle loopholes in war powers legislation.\nBoland\nHays\nRosenthal\ndo not do a thing in the Congress, when\nBolling\nMr. WOLFF. Madam Chairman, will\nHébert\nRunnels\nBowen\nthe 120 days have expired, we have there-\nthe gentleman yield?\nHeckler, Mass.\nSandman\nBreaux\nby made the fateful decision that the\nHogan\nSikes\nMr. ZABLOCKI. I yield to the gentle-\nBroomfield\nHunt\nSteiger, Ariz.\nhostilities commenced by the Executive\nman from New York.\nBurke, Calif.\nJohnson, Pa.\nStubblefield\nshould end.\nBurlison, Mo.\nJones, Ala.\nMr. WOLFF. Madam Chairman, I\nSullivan\nByron\nKarth\nI submit to the gentleman that we\nCarney, Ohio\nSymms\nwould say so far as the Congress not de-\nKing\nCederberg\nTeague, Calif.\nshould have the authority-and the gen-\nclaring war, this is an action in itself\nKluczynski\nTeague, Tex.\ntleman's bill I know grants that-to re-\nChisholm\nKoch\nbecause the full power-and I do not\nClark\nThompson, N.J.\nquire the Executive under those circum-\nKuykendall\nThomson, Wis.\nagree with those who say it is shared\nClay\nLandrum\nConable\nTiernan\nstances to terminate his action, but it\npower-to declare war resides in the Con-\nMathias, Calif.\nVan Deerlin\nseems to me only fair and proper that\nConyers\nMeeds\nCoughlin\nWhitten\nif we want to take an important step\ngress of the United States. I quote John\nMichel\nCrane\nWidnall\nMills, Ark.\nWyatt\nat that time, we should be required to\nMarshall:\nDanielson\nMinshall, Ohio\ntake some vote affirmatively to termi-\nThe war powers being by the Constitution\nDavis, Ga.\nWydler\nMitchell, Md.\nDavis, Wis.\nYates\nnate.\nvested in the Congress, the actions of that\nMizell\nYoung, Alaska\nbody alone can be resorted to as our guide.\nDelaney\nMoorhead, Pa.\nAs the gentleman knows, I, myself,\nDerwinski\nZion\nMoss\nZwach\nhave a war powers bill before the Con-\nThe mere fact that the Congress does\nAccordingly the Committee rose; and\ngress which so provides. Under my bill\nnot declare war is in itself an affirmative\nthe Speaker having resumed the chair,\nif there has been no declaration of war\naction.\nMrs. GRIFFITHS, Chairman of the Com-\nor any attack on the United States-the\nMr. ZABLOCKI. We do intend to com-\nbill does not apply in those two cases-\nplete the general debate tonight, Madam\n21212\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\nJune 25, 1973\nChairman. We have a heavy schedule\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Madam Chairman,\nits powers in a positive way by voting\nfor the entire week. This is important\nthat is not the interpretation at all. If\n\"yes\" or \"no.\"\nlegislation. We would want every Mem-\nwe are going to reassert our constitu-\nThere are some other sections that\nber of the Congress to be here for the\ntional obligation and responsibility, and\nwe ought to look at very carefully. Sec-\ndebate and we will have a further oppor-\nbring balance in the warmaking powers\ntion 4(c) provides that the Congress can\ntunity on Wednesday when we read the\narea, it is necessary that we take such\nby a concurrent resolution force the\nbill for amendment under the 5-minute -\nsteps and enact such legislation where-\nPresident to disengage U.S. Forces when\nrule. We must finish the debate tonight\nin a veto will not negate the outcome\nthey are engaged in hostilities without a\nand I hope we will not have any interup-\na majority of Congress wishes to bring\ndeclaration of war or other specific au-\ntions. I want to make the announcement\nabout. In so doing, I point out to the\nthority. The constitutionality has been\nthat we will finish debate whatever the\ngentleman, 4(b) closes that \"little loop-\nquestioned by many people, and there\nhour. Within the 3 hours, we will hear\nhope\" of a veto that the President can\nare many distinguished lawyers, of which\neverybody's views and try to answer the\nuse in vetoing actions of the majority\nI cannot claim to be one, who suggest\nquestions.\nof the Congress or the majority of the\nthat such a concurrent resolution can-\nMr. DENNIS. Madam Chairman, will\npeople of the United States. The Presi-\nnot be made binding on the President\nthe gentleman yield?\ndent could veto and it would require two-\nsince it does not comply with the con-\nMr. ZABLOCKI. I yield to the gentle-\nthirds of Congress to overrule him. That\nstitutional requirement that anything\nman from Indiana for a question.\nis what I was referring to.\nwith legislative effect be presented to\nMr. DENNIS. I am sure the gentleman\nMadam Chairman, I reserve the bal-\nthe Chief Executive for his approval or\nhas given my bill the utmost consider-\nance of my time.\ndisapproval.\nation, there is no question about it in\nMr. MAILLIARD. Madam Chairman, I\nMadam Chairman, I could discuss the\nmy mind, and I wish the gentleman had\nyield myself such time as I may consume.\nprovisions of this resolution at great\narrived at a different solution, but un-\nMadam Chairman, I am glad the House\nlength, but I believe we know already\nder my bill as the gentleman knows, if\nis considering this war powers resolu-\nfrom the debate what the principal and\nthere has been a declaration of war or\ntion, but I do very much regret that a\nsignificant points are, over which we\nattack on this country the bill does not\nmatter as important and precedent set-\nshould be concerned. The gentleman from\napply at all, and the bill further says\nting as this should be debated so late with\nWisconsin (Mr. ZABLOCKI) has already\nthat we in Congress must be consulted\nso few Members to hear the debate.\ndiscussed the joint resolution very effec-\nfirst except in emergencies.\nBut, Members of this body ought to\ntively. Other Members are interested in\nIt is only in emergency that the Pres-\nhave the opportunity to discuss this res-\nexpressing their views.\nident is going to be able to commit troops\nolution, and this is one of the reasons I\nIn conclusion let me say that when\nwithout consulting us, under the terms\nvoted in the Foreign Affairs Committee\nthe time comes I expect to support the\nof my bill, but if he does that then it\nto report the resolution, even though I\nefforts of two members of our commit-\njust seems to me if we want to call him\nhave considerable misgivings about it.\ntee, the gentleman from Alabama (Mr.\noff and end it, it is only in an emergency\nMadam Chairman, I want to join those\nBUCHANAN) and the gentleman from\nsituation where he can do it at all, and\nwho have commended and complimented\nOhio (Mr. WHALEN) to amend section\nit ought to be incumbent on us to tell him\nthe distinguished chairman of the sub-\n4(b) to correct the shortcomings I have\nour views and to vote them, and we\ncommittee. As ex officio member of that\ndescribed and basically to conform pretty\nshould not decide a question like that\nsubcommittee, I attended as many of the\nmuch to the provisions that are in the\njust by letting 120 days go by and not\nhearings and as much of the markup as\nbill which was introduced by the gentle-\ndoing anything.\nI could, and he certainly gave full atten-\nman from Indiana.\nI would say to the gentleman, in my\ntion to the rather delicate and compli-\nI would urge support of this amend-\nhumble opinion under the legislative set-\ncated problems that are involved here.\nment. I believe then we would have a\nup in the Constitution, we cannot pass\nMembers will recall that on three prior\ngood measure. If the amendment could\na binding law and completely circumvent\noccasions the House has passed legisla-\nbe adopted I would vote \"yea\" on final\nthe Executive as the gentleman tries to do\ntion concerning war powers. Twice in\npassage. As it is, I have very serious\nwith his resolution, if we try to act to\nthe 92d Congress we approved the lan-\nreservations.\nstop the war. If our action is going to\nguage of House Joint Resolution 1,\nI should like also to mention in pass-\nhave the binding force of law, it has to\nwhich contained sections calling upon\ning that I expect to offer what I feel\nbe reported to the Executive. We cannot\nthe President to consult with the Con-\nwill be a perfecting amendment to pro-\navoid the problem of the veto because\ngress before involving the Armed Forces\nvide for contingencies, when the Presi-\nit is built into the constitutional scheme.\nof the United States in conflict, and then\ndent may have to continue hostilities\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Madam Chairman,\nreport to the Congress all actions taken\nafter he has been directed to cease them\nthis resolution is, as I said, a double-\nwithout specific prior authority by the\nin order to disengage our forces with\nbarreled attempt to deal with the issue\nCongress.\nreasonable safety. There is such a pro-\nof war powers in a legislative manner.\nWhile I supported these resolutions\nvision in the Senate bill. I do not know\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Madam\nand still strongly support the consulting\nwhether it was discussed in subcommit-\nChairman, will the gentleman yield?\nand reporting provisions of the resolu-\ntee, but it would seem to me it is almost\nMr. ZABLOCKI. I yield to the gentle-\ntion before us, I must say that I have\nessential to have some mechanism by\nman from New Jersey (Mr. FRELINGHUY-\nreservations-serious reservations-over\nwhich, if the Congress should act posi-\nSEN).\nsome of the operating provisions that\ntively, or after 120 days, if the automatic\nMr.\nFRELINGHUYSEN. Madam\nhave been added to this year's bill. In\nprovision remains in the bill, the Presi-\nChairman, I wonder if I misheard what\nparticular, I am concerned, as others\ndent could take action. If the 120 days\nthe gentleman said. Did I understand\nwho have already spoken have expressed\nare up and he has to undo whatever he\nthe gentleman to say that a decision had\ntheir concern, over section 4(b), through\nhas done it would seem to me certainly\nbeen made in subcommittee against posi-\nwhich the President can be forced to act\nwe would want to let him have authority\ntive action by Congress to upset a Pres-\nas a result of the failure of the Congress\nto let the troops fight their way out with\nidential determination to use troops? Did\nto act.\nmaximum safety, instead of just having a\nhe describe that decision as, \"We must\nUnder section 4(b), the President will\npell-mell automatic dropping of guns\nclose all these little loophopes?\"\nbe required to terminate any commit-\nand leaving.\nIs the gentleman suggesting that the\nment and to remove any enlargement of\nI suppose one could say it was implied.\nPresident's authority to commit troops\nthe U.S. Forces with respect to which a\nI believe the Senate was wise to include\noverseas is a \"little loophole\" that Con-\nreport would be required and had been\nthe provision. If under those circum-\ngress must close? I wrote down what I\nsubmitted to Congress, unless the Con-\nstances he certifies to the Congress that\nthought I understood the gentleman to\nsay. I can hardly believe my ears, if he\ngress enacts a declaration of war or some\nthis is the situation and in order to\nis describing the situation that is pre-\nspecific authorization for the use of the\nsafely withdraw from hostilities the\nU.S. Armed Forces. The effect of 4(b)\nhostilities must go on for a given period\nsented to us by 4(b) as simply an at-\ntempt by his subcommittee to close \"lit-\nwould be to permit the exercise of con-\nof time, this would give him legal au-\ntle loopholes\" now available to our Chief\ngressional will through inaction.\nthority to do it.\nExecutive.\nSurely the Congress ought to exercise\nI do not agree with too much of the\nJune 25, 1973\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\n21213\nSenate bill, but I believe this is one provi-\ners of each of the three branches, and\nIn other words, the constitutional au-\nsion we should copy.\nlimiting overall power as well, knowing\nthority of both the President and the\nMr. SKUBITZ. Madam Chairman, will\nthat unlimited government is tyranny.\nCongress are left intact. We couldn't\nthe gentleman yield?\nThe Congress, and only the Congress,\nchange their respective powers, if we\nMr. MAILLIARD. I yield to the gentle-\nwas given the constitutional authority to\ntried to, not by legislation.\nman from Kansas.\ndeclare war. But, as we have all observed,\nWhat the resolution does do, however,\nMr. SKUBITZ. On page 4 are we really\ndown through many years this power\nis require the President to use his con-\nsaying that the President shall terminate\nhas been dangerously eroded.\nstitutional authority in a responsible\nany commitment and remove any en-\nNo President, however sincere and\nmanner, when he deems it necessary to\nlargement of U.S. Armed Forces unless\ndedicated, ought ever to have unlimited\ninvolve the United States militarily\nthe Congress enacts a declaration of war\npower to commit our Nation to war,\noverseas.\nor a specific authorization for the use of\nwithout the express approval of the Na-\nAt the same time, House Joint Resolu-\nU.S. Armed Forces, on the basis of some-\ntion through its duly elected, locally re-\ntion 542 places a burden on the Congress\nthing similar to the Gulf of Tonkin\nsponsible representatives, in the Con-\nto act responsibly in addressing itself to\ngress of the United States.\nsuch situations.\nResolution?\nMr. MAILLIARD. That is precisely\nAmerica must profit by the sorrowful\nSome Members have expressed uneasi-\nwhat we are saying, yes.\nlessons learned on the mainland of Asia\nness about the mechanism provided in\nMr. FINDLEY. Madam Chairman, will\nduring the course of the past three dec-\nsection 4(b) of the resolution, which\nthe gentleman yield?\nades.\nwould require that any commitment of\nMr. MAILLIARD. I yield to the gentle-\nCongress never declared war, nor did\nU.S. Armed Forces to military action\nman from Illinois.\nit take other clear-cut affirmative action\nmust end after 120 days, if Congress has\nMr. FINDLEY. I thank the gentleman.\nduring the Korean police action. It never\nnot acted affirmatively to endorse the\nI appreciate very much the gentleman\nformally declared war during the Viet-\nPresident's action.\nmentioning the possibility of a perfect-\nnam conflict, although the Gulf of Ton-\nI believe this section to be the key to\ning amendment. I noticed the language\nkin Resolution was looked upon by many\neffective war powers legislation. Perhaps\nin the Senate bill, and I felt that it was\nas having produced that effect.\nthe period for congressional action\nnot necessary, that it was understood.\nAs a result, confusion and uncertainty\nshould be shorter or longer-30 days, 60\nNevertheless, I am sure the gentleman is\nthroughout the Nation has existed about\ndays, 90 days, or 120 days as provided by\nsincere in presenting this as a problem\nthe purpose and objectives of our mili-\nthis measure. On that, reasonable men\nwhich has to be faced.\ntary commitment. As the costs in men\nmay differ-and compromise.\nAs a courtesy to the Members of this\nand treasure escalated, disunity and dis-\nThere can be no compromising, how-\nbody, I wonder if the gentleman would\nsension, confusion and frustration, and\never, on the issue of affirmative action as\nread the language into the RECORD at this\nfears and doubts increased.\nprovided in section 4(b). The people of\ntime, so that it would be in the printed\nSuch a situation just must never be\nthe United States must at some point be\nRECORD and therefore we could examine\nallowed to develop again.\npermitted to have their voices heard\nit in advance, for consideration on\nWe must make every effort to prevent\nthrough their elected representatives in\nWednesday?\nour Nation from ever again embarking\nthe Congress.\nMr. MAILLIARD. I will say to the\non full-scale war without the full moral\nOpponents of the provision have sug-\ngentleman that I may be able to do that\nsanction and support of the American\ngested that we run the risk of requiring\nbefore the debate is over. The Senate\npeople.\nthe President to disengage from combat\nlanguage does not apply directly to our\nIn practical effect, this means that\nabroad simply as a result of congressional\njoint resolution. It had to be rewritten,\nwithout further delay, we the elected\ninaction.\nand I do not have the text yet.\nrepresentatives of the people of the\nSuch a view demeans the seriousness\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Madam Chairman, I\nUnited States must act. We must never\nwith which the Congress conducts its re-\nyield 8 minutes to the gentleman from\nlet ourselves become involved in another\nsponsibilities in issues of war and peace.\nNorth Carolina (Mr. FOUNTAIN).\nwar without appropriate affirmative ac-\nThe attitude proceeds from a kind of\nMr. FOUNTAIN. Madam Chairman,\ntion by the Congress.\n\"worst case analysis\" which overlooks the\nthe issue of war or peace has troubled\nThat is the purpose and effect of the\ntotality of the war powers resolution\nmankind since the creation.\nmeasure before the House today-House\nand the political environment which\nTime and time again throughout his-\nJoint Resolution 542, the War Powers\nwould prevail if events triggered its pro-\ntory, that awesome question has con-\nResolution of 1973.\ncedures.\nfronted every nation. The way in which\nThis landmark measure simply reaf-\nUnder the resolution, the President\nnations have answered that question has\nfirms congressional responsibility under\nwould be expected to consult with con-\noften determined their fate and affected\nthe Constitution. It would require the\ngressional leaders before making deci-\nthe lives of millions of people-for bet-\nPresident to act within constitutional\nsions which would send American fight-\nter or for worse.\nlimits, in any commitment of U.S. forces\ning men abroad into combat.\nSometimes the answers brought forth\nabroad.\nUnder the resolution, the President\nturmoil and terror. Kingdoms were lost,\nThe resolution calls for prompt Presi-\nwould be required to report to the fullest\nempires crumbled, and democracies were\ndential consultation with the Congress\nextent possible on objectives and scope\nsubjugated by dictatorships.\nin any such situation. It provides a pro-\nof the commitment he had undertaken.\nIn other cases, the answers have re-\ncedure for consideration by Congress,\nWithout question, legislation calling\nsulted in democracy-as in the American\nwhen U.S. forces are committed, and it\nfor an affirmation of the President's ac-\nRevolution-and have brought about the\nrequires a withdrawal of those forces if\ntion would be introduced into the Con-\ndefeat of vicious aggression-as in World\ncongressional approval is not forthcom-\ngress, probably immediately after the\nWar II.\ning in 120 days.\ncommitment.\nAlways unwelcome, this question of\nThis resolution was shaped by the For-\nAfter all, it takes only one Member of\nwar or peace is probably the most signif-\neign Affairs Subcommittee on National\neither body-1 out of 535-to drop in\nicant and far-reaching question any\nSecurity Policy and Scientific Develop-\nsuch a bill or resolution of support for\nnation is ever compelled to face up to.\nments, of which I am a member.\nthe President.\nIn a democracy, surely the question is\nIt is the fourth such resolution on war\nOnce that single bill is introduced, the\nnot to be answered by one man alone.\npowers to be reported by that subcom-\nprocedures which require congressional\nConsequently, our debate today, estab-\nmittee in the last 3 years. Moreover, it is\naction would be set in motion, and a final\nlishing responsibie guidelines relative to\nthe most comprehensive and strongest\nvote would have to be taken in both\nthe war powers of the Presidency is a\nmeasure to be reported.\nHouses before the 120-day period ends.\ncrucial one. The manner in which we\nAfter careful study and consideration\nUnder these circumstances, it is im-\nof the voluminous testimony before the\npossible to see Congress not acting at\nsettle it will have long-lasting effects on\nsubcommittee on the issue of war powers,\nall. It must act and it will act.\nthe future of democracy in our country.\nI am convinced that the proposal we are\nI, therefore, urge that this body reject\nOur Founding Fathers very wisely di-\ndebating today neither takes away from,\nany attempts to delete section 4(b)-a\nvided up the powers of the Federal Gov-\nnor adds to the constitutional rights or\ndeletion which would destroy the heart\nernment, defining and limiting the pow-\npowers of the President.\nof the resolution.\n21214\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\nJune 25, 1973\nMadam Chairman, I have stood with\nfact, I emphatically disagree-that this\nmust now reassert its own prerogatives and\nthree Presidents on the need for protect-\nis a practical solution.\nresponsibilities.\ning the American commitment in Viet-\nI do not think it is effective. I do\nIn his letter to Members, the chairman\nnam. Once our forces were fighting there,\nnot think it is fair. I do not think it is\nof the Committee on Foreign Affairs (Mr.\nonce our honor had been committed, I\nequitable. Above all I do not think it\nMORGAN) talked of balance, and the\nbelieved we had to see the conflict\nis workable. I do not think it is sensi-\ngentleman from Wisconsin has also\nthrough.\ntive to the President's constitutional war\ntalked of balance. Dr. MORGAN said:\nThis was particularly Impressed upon\npowers. I do not think it is a delicate\nThere is growing opinion in and out of\nme during a study mission to the Far\nsolution. I do not think there has been\nCongress that in recent years the balance of\nEast in 1969. Our group met with the\nany subversion of the letter or spirit of\nwar-making powers in practice has swung\ndistinguished Prime Minister of Singa-\nthe Constitution which makes this ill-\ntoo heavily to the President.\npore, Lee Kuan Yew.\nadvised effort in order.\nHe impressed upon us that the United\nLikewise I disagree with my eloquent\nCertainly I do not argue over the need\nStates as the \"bulwark of freedom\"-\nfriend, the gentleman from North Caro-\nfor any President to consult closely with\nthose were his very words-could not\nlina. I do not think it will avoid the\nCongress, especially on matters involving\nleave Asia under conditions of defeat,\nrepetition of past mistakes. In fact, I can\nthe use of our troops. There is a need for\nsurrender, or disgrace. His words were,\nsee nothing that would justify the reso-\nhim to report fully and frequently on the\nindeed, convincing.\nlution as written except a compulsion for\nnature of threats to peace or the reason\nAt the same time I have supported\nself-assertion on the part of Congress.\nfor an outbreak of hostilities.\nour Vietnam commitments, however, I\nI know that Members of the House\nFor this reason I fully support the ap-\nhave had grave misgivings about the\nhave all received letters concerning this\nproach of section 3 of House Joint Res-\nlack of consultation and cooperation be-\nresolution, some urging support for the\nolution 542. However, I agree with the\ntween the Executive and the Congress\nmeasure as it came out of committee,\ngentleman from Nebraska (Mr. MARTIN)\nabout the conflict in Southeast Asia.\nand others urging major changes in its\nthat it is unwise to include in those re-\nThe Congress has not been permitted\nlanguage.\nquirements an extension of the financial\nto play the role in these hostilities which\nMy purpose here tonight is to examine\ncost of a commitment of troops. The in-\nthe Constitution mandates. Conse-\nbriefly the reasons for the resolution.\nformation would be of little value to us\nquently, we must have more concrete\nWhat is it that we seek to accomplish?\nin deciding whether the initiative taken\nguidelines for both the President and\nWhat is the mechanism proposed to\nby the President was good, bad, or in-\nthe Congress, if we are to avoid repeti-\nachieve these goals? And even more im-\ndifferent, and it might well be of sub-\ntion of past mistakes.\nportantly, what is the likely result should\nstantial help to an enemy in determining\nMadam Chairman, we are pondering\nthis resolution as written be enacted?\nthe depth of our commitment of troops\nmatters of great significance today. The\nIn recent years many Americans in\noverseas.\noutcome of these deliberations may well\nGovernment as well as in private life\nI should point out in another place in\naffect future decisions on war and peace\nhave voiced concern over what they see\nthe committee report, at the top of page\nfor this Nation.\nas a diminution of the historic role of\n9, in commenting on section 3, it states\nLet us hope and pray that we will\nCongress as the final arbiter of war and\nthat compliance \"will provide the Con-\nnever again be forced to make such\npeace. The proponents of House Joint\ngress with adequate information on\ndecisions. Recognizing the possibility of\nResolution 542 would have us believe that\nwhich to base its deliberations and pos-\nsuch decisions in the future, however,\nthis measure addresses itself to that\nsible actions\" regarding the President's\nlet us be prepared to reach a national\nproblem and helps correct it. In fact,\ncommitment of forces. I agree with that\nconsensus on a course of action before\nnothing could be further from the truth.\nstatement. But if information furnished\nthe Nation has become irretrievably\nThe obvious spot to look to determine\nunder section 3 will provide an adequate\ncommitted.\nthe purpose of the legislation is the re-\nbasis for action by Congress, why is there\nThat is the purpose of the war powers\nport of the committee and, I might say,\nany need for the unfortunate language\nresolution of 1973. I urge its adoption.\nof section 4?\nthe statements of the proponents.\nMr. MAILLIARD. Madam Chairman,\nLet us look at the report. On page 3 it\nThe gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr.\nI yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from\nasserts that the Cambodian incursion of\nZABLOCKI) has attempted to provide an\nNew Jersey (Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN).\nanswer. He said it is to correct an im-\nMay 1970, caused many Members to be\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Madam\nbalance. If there is an imbalance that\ndisturbed by the lack of consultation\nChairman, I feel constrained to begin\nrequires a reassertion of our right to de-\nwith Congress. Another reference on\nby expressing regret that we should be\nclare war, I do not see why that should\npage 5 is to the commitment of U.S.\ndiscussing one of the most important\nbe necessary. Surely no one has ever\nForces exclusively by the President with-\npieces of legislation to be considered\ndoubted that the Constitution specifical-\nout congressional approval or adequate\nthis year at so late an hour. No neces-\nly grants Congress that important power.\nconsultation with the Congress.\nsity compels us to do so. I might point\nAnd I doubt very much, though I wish\nMadam Chairman, if all that were in-\nout that it is now 12 minutes past 7\nvolved in this resolution were the impor-\nit were the case, that the gentleman from\nand I am the fourth speaker on this\ntance of emphasizing the necessity for\nWisconsin is correct in saying that de-\nproposal. I regret that this should be the\nadequate consultation and reporting by\nclared war is something for the pages of\ncase because I sense a feeling among\nthe executive to Congress, I would be for\nhistory. Time alone will tell, but I as-\nproponents that we should not debate\nit, as I have been in favor of previous\nsume if we are to prove anything by this\nthe issue at all. In fact, during the quo-\nexercise, it is to remind us that we have\nwar powers resolutions.\nrum call just now I was asked if I would\nMention has been made by several\nthe inescapable obligation of declaring\nnot submit my remarks for the RECORD.\nMembers with respect to the fact that\nwar if circumstances so indicate. So why\nIf I would do so, it was suggested that\nis there now need to reassert this partic-\nthe House has acted favorably in previ-\nothers who were planning to speak\nular power of declaring war? And just\nwould do likewise. It is my opinion that\nous years on war powers resolutions, but\nwhat are the other powers which must be\nwhat is involved in this legislation is too\nthis resolution is quite different from\nreasserted to restore balance? And why\nimportant for us to treat this so casu-\nwhat we have approved before. What we\nmust these unspecified powers be reas-\nally.\nhave approved previously was basically\nserted at this particular time?\nQuite obviously there are men and\nto underscore the necessity of Congress\nThe gentleman from Pennsylvania\nwomen with good intentions who are\ngetting updated and adequate informa-\n(Mr. MORGAN) says approval of House\nsupporting this joint resolution. But as\ntion so it could play its historic constitu-\nJoint Resolution 542 will express our\nI said when I appeared before the Com-\ntional role.\n\"willingness\"-this is his expression-to\nmittee on Rules, good intentions do not\nIn another place, on page 5 the com-\naccept responsibilities in the war powers\nmake good legislation. My misgivings\nmittee's aim was \"to reaffirm the con-\nwhich were \"intended\" by our fore-\nabout this particular joint resolution,\nstitutionally given authority of Congress\nfathers. Surely he does not mean that\nas it is now phrased, are monumental.\nto declare war.\" The report also declares\nCongress has delegated or could dele-\nWhile I respect my colleague, the\non page 4:\ngate other powers given to us by the\ngentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ZA-\nTo restore the balance provided for and\nConstitution.\nBLOCKI) I do not agree with him-in\nmandated in the Constitution, Congress\nAnd has Congress shown itself unwill-\nJune 25, 1973\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\n21215\nLet us examine the reasons given for\nthere is little likelihood in many cases\ning? And what is the meaning of the\ncryptic statement that Congress must\nthis language. Unquestionably, a basic\nthat Congress will move in any direction,\npurpose must be to force Congress to\nso the deliberate intent of this resolu-\nreassert responsibilities which were \"in-\nreassert itself; that is, declare war, spe-\ntion is to have congressional inaction\ntended\" by our Founding Fathers? At\nthis late date is the Foreign Affairs Com-\ncifically support the President or specifi-\nkick off a key change in national policy.\nmittee trying to spell out the intentions\ncally oppose him. In simple terms, its\nI think this is objectionable. I think it is\npurpose is to goad Congress to discharge\nunconstitutional. Our past record under-\nof those who wrote the Constitution? If\none of its fundamental responsibilities.\nlines the basic responsibility of Congress,\nso, just what responsibilities did the\nFounding Fathers intend to give Con-\nSomehow, it seems to me sad and un-\nas the gentleman has pointed out earlier,\ngress?\njustified that there should be this feeling\nat the very least, positive action by Con-\nThe proponents of this legislation con-\nthat Congress is weak kneed, that we are\ngress should be required if there is to be\nsider section 4 the core, or the key, as\nreluctant or even incapable of action,\na change in the national course begun by\nthe gentleman from North Carolina put\nthat we must be reminded of the urgency\nthe President under his constitutional\nit, of the proposal. The provisions of\nof fully considering the implications of\nauthority as Commander in Chief.\nhostilities in which our own troops are\nMr. DENNIS. Madam Chairman, if the\nsection 4 in my opinion lie at the heart\nof the problem. They taint the entire\ninvolved.\ngentleman will yield again, in the time\nBut, perhaps section 4(b) needs to be\nremaining, I wonder if the gentleman\neffort.\nMr. STRATTON. Madam Chairman,\nread again. It aims, the committee re-\nhas any thought on the different but\nport says, \"to deny the President the\nequally interesting subject as to whether,\nwill the gentleman yield?\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I yield to the\nauthority\" to commit our forces for more\nhad this resolution been in force at the\ngentleman from New York.\nthan 120 days. This is an extraordinary\ntime we got into Vietnam, it would in\nMr. STRATTON. Madam Chairman, I\nproposition. Especially as this denial will\nfact have done anything to prevent that\noccur if there is a failure to act on the\ninvolvement?\ncongratulate the gentleman from New\npart of Congress. The language tacitly\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Madam\nJersey for the very reasonable and sen-\nassumes that the President, as Com-\nChairman, I am glad the gentleman\nsible analysis he is giving of this legis-\nmander in Chief, has the power under\nasked me that question. If I had more\nlation. His contribution in the commit-\nthe Constitution to commit our troops\ntee report was outstanding and I think\ntime, I would be glad to answer at length.\nin times of crisis.\nIt would not. I was here when we passed\nhis contributions in connection with the\nIf he has that power, and I hope there\nthe Tonkin Gulf resolution. Had a Presi-\ndebate on this legislation have been out-\nis no argument on that point, how can\ndent of the United States said, \"The best\nstanding. We are legislating here, and\nI hope to have something to say myself\nthat power be denied him? How can it be\nway to defend the people, I believe, and\nabrogated by the passage of a fixed time\non that point in a few minutes, in a\nto protect our security is to declare war,\"\nschedule? The gentleman from North\nwe would have declared war.\nhighly charged, emotional atmosphere\nCarolina says there is no power taken\nThe conclusion, Madam Chairman,\nwhere fact is fiction and fiction is fact,\naway from anyone under this proposal,\nand I think the gentleman from New\nlet me say that this attempt to limit\nthat nothing is given to Congress or\nthe President's ability to defend the\nJersey is one of the few sound heads in\ntaken away from the President. Well,\nthe Congress today on this subject. We\nUnited States-by failure of Congress\nwhat is this attempt to deny the au-\nto take affirmative action-strikes me as\ncan all feel what the temper of the House\nthority to the President except an at-\nis, but the remarks of the gentleman are\ninexcusably irresponsible. Proponents\ntempt to deny a power which he has\ngoing to ring true in years to come.\nargue that a fixed time period allows\nunder the Constitution as Commander in\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I thank the\nCongress the necessary time to become\nChief?\ngentleman from New York for his com-\nknowledgeable about the nature of the\nMr. DENNIS. Madam Chairman, will\ncrisis and then to decide whether to sup-\npliments.\nthe gentleman yield?\nMy real regret about the nature of this\nport him or not. But, are we in Congress\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I yield to the\ndebate is that it seems to have been\nso impotent that we must attempt to\ngentleman from Indiana (Mr. DENNIS).\ntaken casually by too many Members. I\ntransform our inability to act into a\nMr. DENNIS. Madam Chairman, I was\nhave no intention of calling attention to\npositive policy action? Does common-\ngoing to ask the gentleman from New\nthe fact that there are relatively few\nsense not tell us this is a dangerous\nJersey if the President, as Commander\nMembers on the floor, but I would hope\ncourse?\nin Chief, has a constitutional right in the\nwe are going to have a discussion, pro\nIt must be obvious, moreover, that if\ncase of an emergency such as an attack\nand con, of some of the unwise provisions\nthe President can exercise his authority\nupon the United States, to deploy troops,\nof this bill before the debate concludes.\nwith reasonable assurance only for the\nperhaps on the high seas or even in Eu-\nI do not know whether it is supposed to\n120-day period that he will act differ-\nrope, and I think he does have that con-\nbe a threat that we may be here until\nently than he would if he faced no such\nstitutional right. How can we say that\nmidnight, but I think it is unfortunate\ndeadline. Could we in Congress seriously\nthat constitutional right expires at the\nthat we should have begun the debate\nexpect that a President would merely\nconclusion of 120 days because we do not\nafter 6 o'clock and that we have come\nstand by to await the ponderous inac-\nreaffirm it by a vote in this body?\nsuch a short way into the debate by\ntion of Congress to undermine his con-\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Madam\nalmost 7:30.\nsidered course of action? To win sup-\nChairman, to answer the gentleman's\nIn any event, the framers of the Con-\nport for his actions, he might hurriedly\nquestion, I consider as a practical mat-\nstitution, as I was saying, had flexibility\naccelerate the fighting, he might \"go for\nter, if there is authority in the President\nin mind when they deliberately refrained\nbroke\" when he otherwise would move\nto take these actions, the lapse of a time\nfrom closely defining the responsibilities\nmore deliberately. He might turn a rela-\nperiod could not deprive him of that\nof the legislative and the executive\ntively minor affair into a situation call-\nbranches with respect. to the power to\npower.\nWe should be pragmatic about what\ning for the upholding of national honor.\nmake war. Section 4(a) and section 4(b),\nwe are discussing. The proponents of this\nSimilarly, an enemy might avoid com-\non the other hand, seek to develop a\nresolution realize that inaction is the\ning to terms with our Government, in\nmechanism under which the President\nstrongest weapon Congress has. We have\nthe hope that with the passage of time\nand the Congress would necessarily have\nthe President's authority would expire.\nhad Vietnam as a problem for 10 years,\nto follow a rigid series of procedures.\nThis 120-day limitation, it seems to\nand until today we did not take any pos-\nSection 4(b), in the words of the com-\nitive, direct action with respect to wind-\nme, represents an attempt to deal with\nmittee report, seeks \"to deny the Presi-\nan unforeseeable future situation, al-\ning down that war.\ndent the authority to commit U.S. Armed\nThe CHAIRWOMAN. The time of the\nmost surely of critical importance to\nForces for more than 120 days without\nour Nation's security, in a way which\ngentleman has expired.\nspecific approval\"-by Congress, of\nMr. MAILLIARD. Madam Chairman,\nmight well jeopardize our national in-\ncourse. This termination of our involve-\nI yield 1 additional minute to the gentle-\nterests. Its strict definition, in advance,\nment in hostilities and the enforced\nman from New Jersey (Mr. FRELINGHUY-\nof our mode of operations, would have\nwithdrawal of our forces is uncondi-\nSEN).\nthe effect of upsetting, and quite pos-\ntional. It must be done without regard\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Madam\nsibly destroying, the flexibility by which\neven to the safety of our Armed Forces.\nChairman, the fact of the matter is that\nsuccessful policy decisions are reached.\n21216\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\nJune 25, 1973\nHard as it is to believe, section 4b as\nperiod the executive branch proved to be\nThat, of course, is utter hogwash. Any-\nnow written could create a situation in\nless than forthcoming in its relationship\nbody who was here in Congress during\nwhich no one in the U.S. Government—\nwith Congress.\nthe long time of the Vietnam war, under\nneither the President, nor the Con-\nI, for one, desire, indeed expect, the\nPresident Kennedy, President Johnson\ngress-would have the responsibility for\nExecutive to report fully and consult\nand President Nixon, knows that this\nhandling a national security crisis. The\nclosely with Congress, particularly dur-\nHouse repeatedly supported the action\nsection provides that if the Congress\ning times of crisis. For that reason, I\nthat was taken. There is no question\nfails to act-fails neither to approve or\nwholeheartedly support the reporting and\nabout that.\ndisapprove the deployment of forces\nconsulting approach to warpowers legis-\nI was here at the time of the Tonkin\nabroad to meet a security crisis-then\nlation. The role of Congress would be\nGulf resolution, along with the gentle-\nthe President is enjoined from contin-\nenhanced by legislation which would spell\nman from New Jersey, and this House\nuing the deployment.\nout the circumstances under which com-\ncould hardly restrain ourselves from\nIn other words, let us assume that at\nplete information would be provided\nrushing to put that measure through and\nsome time in the future a situation arises\npromptly. At that point Congress can\nsend it on the way. to the Senate by a\nwhich threatens American security. The\nbest be able to decide what legitimate,\nunanimous vote. In fact, there were only\nPresident meets it by deploying U.S.\nand constitutionally appropriate, steps\ntwo who voted against it in both Houses,\nforces abroad. He reports that action to\nit should take.\nand both of them failed to return to the\nthe Congress. The Congress is unable\nI should like now to digress. Our role\nSenate the next time they were up for\neither to approve or disapprove the\nin the war in Indochina-the obvious\nreelection.\nPresidential action. After 120 days, re-\nmotivating force behind House Joint Res-\nSo there is no question about the fact\ngardless of the situation and regardless\nolution 542-is virtually at an end.\nthat the Congress had plenty of oppor-\nof the threat to the United States, the\nHad House Joint Resolution 542 been\ntunity to repeal the war if we had wanted\nPresident is enjoined from continuing\non the books 10 years ago it would not\nto, and this thing was not slipped over\nto act to meet the situation in his best\nhave changed the role of Congress in that\nbecause of some failure on the part of\njudgment. The threat to U.S. security\nconflict, or in its resolution. It would\nthe Foreign Affairs Committee to devise\ncontinues, and there is no one in the\nhave given us no powers we did not al-\nproper legislation to equal out the bal-\nU.S. Government willing and legally able\nready possess, nor would have given us\nance of power.\nto take the responsibility for making the\nthe wisdom to know what course to take.\nOh, there has been a lot of talk in this\ndecisions necessary to meet the crisis.\nIt is almost certain, had a 120-day dead-\nsession about the need for Congress re-\nIt is one thing for the Congress to\nline been in effect at the time of the\nasserting its control and taking away\ninsist upon being able to participate in\nincident in the Gulf of Tonkin that Con-\nsome of the powers the White House has\nthe decision to deploy forces abroad. But,\ngress would have voted approval of Pres-\nstolen from us. Well, the one area where\nsurely it is altogether another thing to\nident Johnson's decisions, or indeed have\nthere is no question about our authority\nsay that if the Congress is unable or un-\nmade a declaration of war. That kind of\nto control is in appropriations, in the\nwilling to make a decision, then the\naction would not have made our struggle\nbudgetmaking process. We have got the\nPresident also should be legally required\nin Vietnam any easier, in fact, it would\npurse strings, all right, and no constitu-\nto share that paralysis. Must Congress,\nhave tied us more tightly to the massive\ntional lawyer would ever dispute that\nin its desire to \"assert itself,\" leave this\ninvolvement which followed.\nfact. But there are a lot of constitutional\ncountry incapable of taking the steps\nIn trying to discover a more effective\nlawyers who have trouble in trying to\nnecessary to meet some future threat to\nrole for Congress to play-particularly\ndecide exactly where the President's\nthe security of our people? Surely not.\nin times of national crisis-we should not\npowers as Commander in Chief end and\nYet that is exactly what section 4(b)\nbe tempted to embrace anything that\nthe congressional power to declare war\nwould do.\nappears at first glance to contain\nbegins.\nThe manifold constitutional and na-\n\"strong\" provisions. House Joint Resolu-\nOne can get lawyers on both sides of\ntional security problems created by the\ntion 542, while certainly insuring an im-\nthat issue, and we could argue until the\n120-day provision of section 4(b) are\nportant role for Congress, so perverts the\nCOWS come home on it. But here we are,\ncompounded by section 4(c). This sec-\nwarmaking process that there could be\n3 or 4 days away from the beginning of\ntion provides that hostilities and deploy-\nconfusion and confrontation within our\nfiscal year 1974, a year when we are sup-\nments initiated by the President may be\nsystem at a time of major crisis. We\nposed to be asserting the independence\nterminated by Congress alone at any time\nshould recognize the truth of what Jus-\nof the Congress, and the authority to\nwithin the 120-day period by means of\ntice Goldberg once said, \"The Constitu-\nexercise our powers. And yet we have\na concurrent resolution. Concurrent res-\ntion is not a suicide pact.\" The war\nstill not even come up with an alternate\nolutions, of course, do not carry the\npower, we should remember, is the power\nbudget to the one the President has pro-\nweight of law. Previous legislative use\nto wage war successfully.\nposed for 1974 back in January.\nof a concurrent resolution-primarily\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Madam Chairman, I\nThere have been a few Members of\nduring the Second World War-provided\nyield 5 minutes to the gentleman from\nthe other body who have devised an al-\nfor the recall of additional powers\nNew York (Mr. STRATTON).\nternate congressional budget of their\ngranted the Executive by Congress. In\nMr. STRATTON. Madam Chairman,\nown. But I have been urging the leader-\ncontrast, its use in House Journal Reso-\nas I said a moment ago in the colloquy\nwith the gentleman from New Jersey\nship of the House, \"If you do not like\nlution 542 simply represents a bald effort\nthe President's budget\"-and I do not\nto terminate existing constitutional au-\n(Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN), I believe this de-\nlike it too much myself-\"then let us\nthority. Under such a theory, Congress\nbate is taking place today in a kind of\ncome up with an alternate budget.\" But\ncould decide tomorrow that henceforth\nAlice in Wonderland situation, where we\nwe still have not gotten it. And we are\nit could negate by concurrent resolution\nare really forgetting what the true facts\ndragging our feet in developing budget\nany legislation it has ever passed.\nare. We are setting up some fictions; we\ncontrol legislation. We are still back to-\nFurthermore, it is doubtful that this\nare setting up some straw men, and then\nday in the old business of passing indi-\nprovision could ever be workable. As\nwe are knocking them down.\nvidual appropriation bills without know-\nPresidents have throughout our history,\nI do not know whether I can get my\ning what they are likely to add up to.\nit is predictable that a Chief Executive\nremarks in in 5 minutes, but I believe\nthere are some things that ought to be\nSo the one authority we have the clear-\nwill ignore a concurrent resolution if he\ndoes not agree with it. It seems to me\nsaid in this debate and ought to be in\nest and most certain ability to exercise\nparticularly unwise to invite him to do\nthe RECORD to be read.\nwe refuse to exercise; but here we are\nso at a time of national crisis.\nOne of them certainly is the concept\ntrying to take away the powers of the\nthat we got into Vietnam because this\nPresident as Commander in Chief under\nSections 4 (b) and (c) do not aid in\nCongress was unable or unwilling to act;\ncertain dubious interpretations of con-\nclarifying a twilight zone of authority\nthat somehow or other the President\nstitutional distribution of power.\nbetween Congress and the President.\nslipped this war over on us when we\nOf course, everybody knows what we\nRather, they succeed in raising a host of\nwere not looking and we are only now\nare really doing here. We are trying to\nnew problems. In the past decade the\ngetting around to retrieving the \"balance\nrepeal the Vietnamese war. And we are\nUnited States has gone through a sear-\nof power\" between the House and the\ndoing it after that war has come to an\ning experience in Indochina. During that\nWhite House.\nend, or very largely to an end. It was an\nJune 25, 1973\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\n21217\nunpopular war; there is no question about\ntion-certainly not this legislation-\nemy would simply nibble away at our\nit. I do not believe it has been especial-\nwould ever prevent that.\nrights and interests, and perhaps even\nly popular in my district. But I have stuck\nWe simply cannot pass a law to pre-\nour territory, bit by bit the old salami\nwith it because I believe it was in keep-\nvent everything that we do not like. This\ntechnique, and never so dramatically as\ning with all our efforts since World War\nGovernment of ours could never have\nto precipitate a strong and obvious\nII to create a world of stability and free\nfunctioned as long as it has if there had\nmajority in the Congress.\nof aggression. I stuck with President\nnot been some element of mutual under-\nThis of course is what Hitler did suc-\nKennedy. And I believed that just be-\nstanding and mutual respect between all\ncessfully for 3 years in Europe, in the\ncause we changed from President Ken-\nthree of the branches. And not even this\nRhineland, in Austria, and in Czecho-\nnedy to President Johnson was no reason\nlegislation is going to repeal that very\nslovakia. And it is what some people be-\nto change my opinion that our commit-\nnecessary part of a functioning democ-\nlieve some Soviet leaders would like to\nment over there was proper, so I did not\nracy.\nbe able to do in Western Europe, to bring\nchange my mind under President John-\nActually, Madam Chairman, this ef-\nabout the \"Finlandization\" of that con-\nson, and I did not change it later on\nfort to try to set some kind of outside\ntingent, weaken its will to resist, and nib-\nwhen President Nixon became President\ncontrol over the Nation's military activ-\nble away at its territory and its interests.\nand continued a policy carried on under\nity is nothing new. I served back in\nSo I do not support this legislation,\nthree previous Presidents.\n1941 as a congressional secretary here\nMadam Chairman.\nBut it is an unpopular war, no doubt\nand I can remember that one of the\nI am especially disturbed over the pro-\nabout that, and now has finally gotten\nmore famous House Members then was a\nvision of this bill which other speakers\nout of the way. Let us not forget that\ngentleman from Indiana, Louis Ludlow.\nhave referred to, which permits inaction\nthe Congress continued to support this\nLouis Ludlow was the author of the Lud-\non the part of Congress to override and\nwar at every opportunity, including un-\nlow amendment, which was designed to\nrescind an action of the President.\nder President Nixon. But now, that it is\nkeep America out of war especially an-\nIf we are not to undermine the credi-\nfinally over, we are going to try to square\nother world war, simply by requiring a\nbility of our country and our vital deter-\nourselves with the voters by repealing the\nnational referendum before we could go\nrent power, I believe the legislation\nVietnam war by putting this legislation\nto war. Think what might have happened\nshould be amended to require positive ac-\non the books.\non December 7, 1971, if we could not have\ntion of disapproval on the part of Con-\nActually, as the gentleman from In-\nmoved at Pearl Harbor until after a na-\ngress to override the President. The\ndiana (Mr. DENNIS) pointed out, if it had\ntional referendum had been held.\ngentleman from Indiana (Mr. DENNIS)\nbeen on the books at the time it would\nWhat we would really be doing if we\nhas offered an amendment along these\nnot have done any good anyway.\nwere to pass this legislation is under-\nlines, I would support his amendment,\nMadam Chairman, just to show that I\nmining the proper power of the President\nand if it is not successful shall myself\nam not choosing up political sides here\nto speak for the country in foreign af-\noffer a simpler amendment along the\ntonight, let me say that this reminds me\nfairs. Think, for example, what might\nsame lines. We have a precedent for this\nof another futile action, equally futile\nhave happened during the 1962 Cuban\naction in the Reorganization Act, and I\nand equally ridiculous, and equally based\nmissile crisis had President Kennedy\nbelieve something like it would be far\non a fiction. That is the 22d amendment\nbeen restricted by this kind of legisla-\nmore acceptable than the present word-\nto the Constitution, which was an at-\ntion. Would Khrushchev have taken\ning of the bill.\ntempt to repeal the third and fourth\nPresident Kennedy's threats to invade\nMr. MAILLIARD. Madam Chairman,\nterms of President Franklin Delano\nCuba seriously if this legislation had\nI yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from\nRoosevelt years after he was in his grave.\nbeen on the books?\nIllinois (Mr. FINDLEY).\nThe Republicans could not defeat him,\nAnd in that connection, incidentally,\nMr. FINDLEY. Madam Chairman, I\nso when the finally got control of Con-\nlet me say to my Democratic friends who\nhave already paid my compliments to\ngress, they tried to constitutionally\nare supporting this legislation so\nthe distinguished chairman of the sub-\namend those third and fourth terms out\nstrongly that we ought not to overlook\ncommittee which brought this bill be-\nof existence. They did it all right, but\nthe fact that some day we may have a\nfore us today. I would like also to com-\nthey lived to regret it when President\nDemocratic President in the White\npliment several other members of the\nEisenhower became President, because if\nHouse again-in fact that is likely to be\nCommittee on Foreign Affairs. The gen-\nhe had not been mortal he might still\nthe case. I would say, before this legis-\ntleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MOR-\nbe our President. The Rebublicans re-\nlation would actually make much dif-\nGAN), the chairman, rendered great serv-\ngretted that amendment in 1960 and we\nference in our foreign affairs. Do you\nice to this body when he sent a \"Dear\nwill live to regret this bill if we pass it in\nreally want to hamstring a new Demo-\nColleague\" letter to all of us outlining\nthe form it has come out of the com-\ncratic President as he tries to provide\nhis views, and I think eloquently so.\nmittee.\nsome worldwide leadership in building a\nAlso, on the Democratic side my col-\nThe CHAIRWOMAN. The time of the\npeaceful and stable world?\nleague, the gentleman from Florida\ngentleman from New York (Mr. STRAT-\nActually the real effect of this legis-\n(Mr. FASCELL) nearly 4 years ago\nTON) has expired.\nlation, if it passes, will be to undermine\ndropped into the hopper a war powers\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Madam Chairman, I\nour deterrent power rather than enhance\nbill. This by coincidence happened with-\nyield the gentleman 1 additional min-\nit, because a great deal of deterrent power\nin a few days of when I introduced my\nute.\ndepends on keeping the enemy guessing\nfirst proposal. I also compliment the\nMr. STRATTON. Madam Chairman, I\nabout just what we are likely to do. This\ngentleman from Minnesota (Mr.\nthank the distinguished gentleman for\nbill would remove a significant portion\nFRASER) and the gentleman from New\nyielding me another minute.\nof that element of predictability.\nYork (Mr. BINGHAM).\nThe thing that disturbs me most about\nLikewise, this legislation would cer-\nOver these years I have certainly\nthis legislation is that it is based on the\ntainly impair our current treaty commit-\nlearned a lot about this bill. I do not\nassumption that somehow the people of\nments, especially in connection with our\npretend to be an expert at this point,\nthe United States are going to elect a\nNATO Alliance in this new year of\nbut I have learned a lot from the dis-\ndevil and put him in the White House\nEurope.\" Surely this is not the time to\ncussion and the deliberations and the\nand, therefore, we have got to watch\ngive one more body blow to one of our\nconsideration now of three different bills\nhim and tie him up with legislative re-\nmost successful measures of foreign\nwhich have come to the floor.\nstrictions. But this bill is not going to\npolicy-our NATO Alliance.\nMadam Chairman, I also want to pay\nprevent that kind of individual in the\nThe fact is this legislation will not\nmy compliments to two Republican first-\nWhite House from getting us into trou-\nmake us more secure. It will simply force\nterm members of the Committee on For-\nble, because he would still be the Com-\nour enemies or our competitors, if you\neign Affairs, the gentleman from Penn-\nmander in Chief of the Armed Forces\nwish to call them that to shift their tac-\nsylvania (Mr. BIESTER) and the gentle-\nand he would still have at his fingertips\ntics just a little bit. Instead of attacking\nman from Delaware (Mr. DU PONT). Both\nthe nuclear button. And if he really\nus directly, as the Japanese did at Pearl\nof them have contributed greatly to the\nwanted to get us into war, if he really\nHarbor-and thereby turned a strongly\ndeliberations of the subcommittee.\nwanted to get us into trouble, he could\nanti-war Nation overnight into a strongly\nIt is very clear to me after the ex-\nalways push that button and no legisla-\npro-war Nation-a future potential en-\nperience of the past 4 years that our\n21218\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\nJune 25, 1973\nFounding Fathers deliberately left some\ncouple of, I think, very reasonable and\nthe most extreme care before he made a\naspects of the war powers relationship\nvery rational safeguards.\nfundamental commitment.\nvery unclear.\nIt provides, first of all, that the Presi-\nFurthermore, he would also be impelled\nBoth the Congress and the President\ndent may not continue this course of pol-\nto great care by the knowledge that\nwere given the tools for warmaking.\nicy to which the Congress has not yet as-\nat any point from the first day forward\nThese powers were in parallel to a sur-\nsented beyond 120 days. No President is\na majority vote of both Houses could di-\nprising extent, and it may well be that\ngoing to want to be left high and dry and\nrect him to disengage from that commit-\nour forefathers deliberately set the stage\nany President deciding on a course of\nment.\nfor a struggle between the Congress and\naction, whether it be the commitment of\nI might add, Madam Chairman, that I\nthe President in this very imporant field.\nmilitary forces in a foreign field or en-\nwould be glad to keep on yielding here\nIn any event, the struggle has certainly\ngaging in hostilities there, is going to\nto the Members, but I know the con-\nensued, and the debate here this eve-\nthink carefully before he gets himself in\nstitutionality of the concurrent resolu-\nning is a part of that struggle. Regal dless\na position from which he may have to\ntion exists as an issue, and I suspect\nof what we do with this resolution in this\nretire after 120 days. He is going to think\nfrom what the gentleman from Wiscon-\nCongress, I dare say the struggle will\ncarefully before making the fundamental\nsin has said, time will run short before\ncontinue in some form and no doubt will\ndecision, and then, once he has made that\nwe know it. So, I would like to take a\ncontinue as long as the Republic survives.\ndecision and set in train the sequence\nlittle time at this point to deal with that\nThe President has obvious advantages.\nof events which will eventually terminate\nand related questions.\nHe has the opportunity for very swift\nwith the expiration of that period, he will\nThe war powers resolution of 1973 con-\naction, even secret action. He has the\nsurely use that time interval to try to\ntains the machinery to assure more ef-\nunified branch of the Government. He is\nsell his position to the Congress. He will\nfective participation by Congress in fu-\nthe one ultimately who makes the de-\nnot want to be left high and dry.\nture national decisions involving war\ncision. No cumbersome parliamentary\nThe other safeguard that this joint\nand peace. First, in section 3 it requires\nprocedure is required for the President to\nresolution puts into the statute is the\nthe President to report to Congress any\nreach a decision of policy, whether it\nauthority of the Congress, which I say is\ntime he commits Armed Forces to hostili-\napplies to war policy or otherwise. He can\na very reasonable and proper application\nties outside the United States; commits\nact with dispatch.\nof its war powers under the Constitution,\nArmed Forces equipped to combat to the\nHe also has vast resources at his dis-\nto require the President to disengage\nterritory, airspace, or waters of a foreign\nposal which are much greater and much\nfrom hostilities at any time by a simple\nnation; or substantially enlarges the\nmore effective than those available to\nmajority of both Houses.\nnumber of Armed Forces equipped for\nthe Congress to rally public opinion be-\nThat is the concurrent resolution ap-\ncombat already located in a foreign na-\nhind a course of action.\nproach.\ntion. This provision is virtually identical\nIf we were to adopt a very strict read-\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Will the gen-\nto one which passed the House over-\ning of the Constitution and the minutes\ntleman yield?\nwhelmingly in each of the last two Con-\nof the debates of the Constitutional Con-\nMr. FINDLEY. I am glad to yield to\ngresses.\nvention as kept by James Madison, we\nmy friend from New Jersey.\nWhile it is highly important that Con-\nwould probably be considering here a\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I thank the\ngress be involved intimately in decisions\nbill which would prohibit the President\ngentleman for yielding.\nwhich actually engage our forces in mili-\nfrom doing anything with military force\nIn his defense of the 120-day provi-\ntary hostilities, it is also essential that we\nbeyond the borders of the United States\nsion the gentleman seems to be suggest-\nbe similarly involved in decisions which\nunless he had advance approval of the\ning that a President as Commander in\nplace our forces in circumstances where\nCongress. That would be pretty close to\nChief would take a decision to commit\narmed conflict may later develop.\nwhat I deem to be the intent of at least\ntroops lightly really unless there were\nThe decision to place U.S. Armed\nthe majority of those who took part in\nlanguage that he could commit troops\nForces in foreign areas where hostilities\nthe formation of the Constitution. But\nonly for a period of 120 days.\nmay subsequently break out could well\nit is obvious that that procedure has not\nMr. FINDLEY. No. That interpreta-\nhave greater and graver implications\nbeen regarded as proper by most of the\ntion is not justified. Under the terms of\nthan a subsequent decision authorizing\nPresidents throughout history, and in my\nsection 4, I think he would be much more\nsuch forces to continue-or discon-\nview it does not accord with modern day\ncareful in making a decision. I do not\ntinue-their engagement in actual hos-\nwant to suggest that any President would\ntilities.\nnecessities.\nAlmost every President in this century\ntake lightly the commitment of military\nCertainly, the political, psychological,\nhas seen at least one situation in which\nforce any place in the world, but there\nand emotional factors present when the\nhe felt a necessity to act, without in ad-\nare degrees of care and reflection.\nearlier decision is made would be much\nvance getting policy approval of the Con-\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The gentle-\nmore conducive to thoughtful, objec-\ngress. Was he acting in an unconstitu-\nman suggests that the President would\ntive deliberation than later when guns\ntional and unlawful manner when he did\nuse the time to sell his position. This may\nare blazing. On the later occasion, our\nthis? How can anyone really decide, be-\nwell be one of the weaknesses of the pro-\nforces and our flag would be under at-\ncause the Supreme Court traditionally\nposal, because a President may escalate\ntack. Concern would center on the safety\nshies away from any ruling which settles\nhostilities in order to sell the country on\nof our forces and the broad-and impor-\nissues of war powers between the Con-\nthe advisability of the course of action he\ntant-questions of national honor, pres-\ngress and the President.\nis undertaking.\ntige, and influence. At that juncture, the\nThose of us sitting here in this body\nIn other words, it may have quite the\nwisdom of our presence could not re-\nmight well argue that President Kennedy\nopposite effect from what the gentleman\nceive the same dispassionate considera-\nexceeded his authority when he sent\nis assuming. This proposal may well keep\ntion that would have been possible\n18,000 troops to Vietnam-I think it was\na President from making a wise decision\nearlier.\nin 1962-and shortly thereafter con-\nwith respect to commitment, or it may\nMost Americans, I would judge, today\nverted them into combat forces. Where\nhave him make an over commitment in\nbelieve the United States acted unwisely\nwas his authority for so acting? Well, he\norder to emphasize the gravity of the\nwhen it first placed forces equipped for\ndid not have the necessity for finding an\nsituation.\ncombat in South Vietnam. They would\nauthority, because Congress made no re-\nMr. FINDLEY. I argue exactly the op-\nlike to turn the calendar back and not\naction and expressed no approval or dis-\nposite.\nhave them there at all, regardless of the\napproval of what he had done. But still\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I know the\nconsequences for the South. But, pri-\nthe cloud hangs over that decision.\ngentleman does.\nmarily because our forces and our flag\nI think this bill approaches the prob-\nMr. FINDLEY. The certainty, absent\nwere under attack, many of these same\nlem in a very rational manner, recogniz-\ncongressional approval, which would\npeople opposed a quick departure of our\ning that there will be certain circum-\nconfront the President that on the ex-\nforces, and as today's votes show clearly,\nstances in which future Presidents will\npiration of the 120-day period he would\nmany Congressmen still support the\nact without getting advance authority\nhave to withdraw any enlargement of\nbombing of Cambodia.\nfrom the Congress in committing forces\nhis forces, disengage them from hostili-\nUnfortunately, the Congress did not\nbeyond our borders, but it provides a\nties, would surely cause him to exercise\ndeal directly and promptly with the ques-\nJune 25, 1973\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\n21219\ntion as to whether the initial commit-\nHad this reporting requirement been\nis to facilitate the fulfillment by Con-\nment of forces equipped for combat to\nin effect in 1962 when the number of\nVietnam was either constitutional or in\ngress of its responsibility for committing\nU.S. advisers in Vietnam was raised\nthe Nation to war, and also its respon-\nthe national interest.\nfrom 700 without combat gear to 16,000\nsibility to \"provide for the regulation of\nCongress was never called upon to\nequipped for combat, President Ken-\nits Armed Forces.\"\ngrant specific approval in connection\nnedy would have been required to ex-\nCongress can hardly regulate the\nwith the stationing by President Ken-\nplain promptly and in writing to Con-\nArmed Forces as the Constitution re-\nnedy of 16,000 troops equipped for com-\ngress the circumstances necessitating\nquires if it does not even know where\nbat in Vietnam in 1962, troops which were\nhis decision, the constitution or legisla-\nthey are or where they are being sent.\ninitially identified as military advisers\ntive provisions under which he took\nThis expanded reporting requirement\nbut soon were given direct combat re-\nsuch action, and his reasons for not\nwould place congressional influence far\nsponsibility.\nseeking specific prior congressional au-\ncloser to the points and moments of\nWhile we cannot turn the calendar\nthorization.\ngreat decision. It would require the Pres-\nback, hopefully we can profit from this\nThis reporting requirement of itself\nident and his advisers to give thorough\nexperience. You can establish rules which\nmight have caused sober second\nconsideration to the judgment and re-\nwill enhance the likelihood that in simi-\nthoughts by the President. It might have\naction of Congress, as well as to the\nlar future circumstances-before fight-\ncaused him to reconsider. If he went\nrelevant provisions of laws, treaties, and\ning breaks out-Congress will receive\nahead, the report on the action would\nthe Constitution, to which they must\npromptly a formal written report from\nhave provided Congress with a formal\nturn for authority. Consideration of\nthe President detailing and justifying the\ndocument on which to hold hearings.\nlegal justification would become part of\nsteps he has ordered. Upon such a report,\nCertainly the consideration of the re-\nthe decisionmaking process-not a sub-\nhearings could be expected. Congress, if\nport in 1962 would have been in circum-\nsequent exercise of small importance in\nit deemed such advisable, could pass\nstances more favorable to objectivity\nwhich State Department lawyers hand-\njudgment on the wisdom, propriety, con-\nthan existed when the Gulf of Tonkin\ncraft a legal garment to cover the sub-\nstitutionality, and necessity of the action\nresolution was passed in 1964.\nject long after the military action has\nreported.\nTo be sure, this procedure provides no\nbeen decided upon and undertaken. And\nUnder sections 2 and 3 of the war\nguarantee that the Congress will under-\nthe Congress, charged under the Con-\npowers resolution, the President must\ntake an examination of the report, but\nstitution with the power to commit the\ngive attention to a detailed report to\nthe basic information and opportunity\nNation to war, would be better equipped\nCongress at the very time he ponders a\nwould be at hand.\nto fulfill its responsibility.\ndecision to commit military forces to\nReports would be required within 72\nIf enacted, House Joint Resolution\nforeign territory or to enlarge substan-\nhours, with the modest exceptions listed,\n542 will establish for the first time in\ntially forces already there. At the very\nwhenever forces equipped for combat are\nour history a formal statutory relation-\nleast, this would remind the President\nsent to foreign areas for any purpose.\nship between the President and the Con-\nand his advisers forcibly and before the\nWould the reports be so numerous as\ngress with respect to the stationing of\ncommitment is made of congressional\nto bog down both the executive and legis-\nmilitary forces on foreign territory.\nresponsibility and authority in this area.\nlative branches? Based on past history,\nFor the first time the President will be\nAs a practical matter, this reporting\nthe answer must be \"No.\" Reports would\nrequired to inform the Congress prompt-\nrequirement should also cause the Presi-\nbe required only when the original force\nly and in detail as to what he is doing\ndent to consult directly with the legisla-\ncommitment is made, or when forces are\nwith military forces abroad and why.\ntive branch before making the final deci-\nsubstantially enlarged. Additional reports\nSecond, the war powers resolution pro-\nsion on force commitment.\nwould not be required as personnel and\nvides that within 120 days after receiving\nHad Senate Joint Resolution 1 been\nequipment are rotated.\nthis report, the Congress must specifi-\nlaw, it would have required a prompt,\n\"Substantially\" is open to varied def-\ncally authorize the commitment of troops\nwritten detailed report on:\ninitions, but, I do not feel, admit of too\nreported by the President or the troops\nThe Berlin airlift following the block-\nmuch flexibility or is overly vague. A\nmust be withdrawn.\nade of that city in 1948.\nthousand additional men sent to Europe\nThird, within the 120-day period, Con-\nThe intervention of U.S. troops in\nunder present circumstances clearly\ngress may by concurrent resolution order\nKorea in 1950.\nwould not \"substantially enlarge\" our\nthe disengagement from hostilities of\nThe enlargement of our forces in\n300,000 men already stationed there. A\nAmerican troops committed without spe-\nEurope in 1951.\nthousand men sent to Guantanamo Bay,\ncific congressional authorization.\nThe sending of reinforcements to Ber-\nCuba, to \"beef up\" a 4,000-man contin-\nThis latter provision is the safety valve\nlin after the German border was closed\ngent there would indeed be \"substantial.\"\nof the resolution. It serves the dual func-\nin 1961.\nDuring consideration by the committee\ntion of permitting the President maxi-\nThe deployment of our troops in\nof the resolution, a question was raised\nmum flexibility to commit troops for a\nThailand in 1961-62.\nas to the necessity and wisdom of requir-\nrelatively long period of time-120 days.\nThe various troop build-up stages in\ning the President to include within his\nAt the same time, it permits the Congress\nVietnam through August 1964, when\nreport \"the estimated financial cost of\nto fulfill its constitutional responsibility\nCongress approved the Culf of Tonkin\nsuch commitment or such enlargement\nto decide by majority vote whether the\nresolution.\nof forces.\" Some thought \"that informa-\nNation shall continue at war.\nThe sending of Marines to the Do~\ntion would be of no particular value to\nSome objections have been made to the\nminican Republica in 1965.\nCongress,\" forgetting that when it was\nuse of a concurrent resolution for this\nThe bombing of Laos in early 1971.\ncosting us more than $25 billion a year\npurpose. An examination of 200 years of\nPresent activities over Cambodia.\nto fight the Vietnam war, that fact\nAmerican history, as well as the writings\nThese are some of the major events\nseemed quite important to most Amer-\nand opinions of the most prominent con-\nsince the end of World War II involving\nicans who were beset by problems of in-\nstitutional and legal minds of this cen-\nAmerican troops in which neither prior\nflation and poverty caused by the incred-\ntury convinced me, and presumably the\nnor subsequent congressional approval\nible expense of that war.\nForeign Affairs Committee that the use\nwas sought by the President.\nSome also questioned whether the\nof a concurrent resolution to terminate\nEach of these force movements was\nfinancial information also \"might be ex-\nhostilities is both constitutional and wise\nundertaken without specific prior au-\ntremely revealing to an enemy.\" Yet,\npolicy.\nthorization of the Congress. Each in-\nthey raised no similar objection to the\nUse of a concurrent resolution to dis-\nvolved armed conflict or the definite\nrequirement that the President include\napprove Presidential action is hardly\nrisk thereof. Most importantly, several\nin his report \"the estimated scope of\nnew. Beginning in the 1930's, Congress\nof the instances would not have invoked\nactivities.\" Nor do they worry that in\nregularly incorporated provisions for a\nthe provisions of the war powers bill\nany case, the President will be required\nlegislative veto in legislation authorizing\nsponsored by Senator JAVITS and widely\nthe President to effect a reorganization\nto cutline the costs of a military com-\nendorsed in the U.S. Senate, while each\nof agencies in the executive branch of\nmitment in the next defense or supple-\nwould have required a report to Congress\nthe Government. All of the dozen or so\nmental appropriations bill.\nunder House Joint Resolution 542.\nReorganization Acts of this century have\nThe aim of the reporting requirement\ncontained a provision that disapproval\n21220\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\nJune 25, 1973\nof the President's plan by either House\nthat that body might examine them and\nOne of the notable exceptions to this\nof Congress would preclude the President\nveto their going into effect if contrary to\noverwhelming preponderance of legal\nfrom putting his plan into effect.\nthe policy of the legislature.\nopinion in favor of the use of concurrent\nIn the last decade five different reor-\nThe value of the reservation of the power\nresolutions for this purpose is former\nganization plans submitted to Congress\nto examine proposed rules, laws and regu-\nAttorney General and now Secretary of\nby the President have been vetoed by\nlations before they become effective is well\nState William P. Rogers. In 1958, he de-\nunderstood by Congress. It is frequently, as\nsimple resolutions, three times by the\nhere, employed to make sure that the action\nlivered an opinion to President Eisen-\nHouse. On June 15, 1961, the House\nunder the delegation squares with the Con-\nhower that the concurrent resolution\nvetoed President Kennedy's plan to reor-\ngressional purpose\nThat no adverse ac-\nmight be so used only if a two-thirds vote\nganize the Federal Communications\ntion was taken by Congress indicated, at\nwere required. Thus, it is not surprising\nCommission. On July 20, 1961, the House\nleast, that no transgression of legislative\nthat today, as Secretary of State, he\nvetoed the President's plan to reorganize\npolicy was found.\ntakes a dim view of the legislative veto,\nthe National Labor Relations Board. On\nIn addition to the dozens of prece-\ndespite the weight of historical precedent\nFebruary 21, 1962, the House vetoed the\ndents, most legal authorities agree that\nand legal opinion against his position.\nPresident's reorganization plan for the\nthe Congress may use a concurrent res-\nThe use of a concurrent resolution to\nHousing and Home Finance Agency.\nolution as a means of checking Presi-\nrequire the President to disengage U.S.\nMany members of this body were present\ndential decisions. The most eminent\ntroops from hostilities is also wise policy.\nfor these votes, as well as several more\nconstitutional lawyer of the century,\nThis resolution recognizes that often\nrecent votes approving reorganization\nProf. Edward S. Corwin, has written:\nthe President has assumed the power to\nplans, and I do not recall even a whisper\nengage U.S. forces in hostilities, going\nIt is generally agreed that Congress, being\nof criticism of this procedure as being\nfar beyond what can be justified on the\nfree not to delegate power, is free to do so\nunconstitutional.\non certain stipulated conditions. Why, then,\nbasis of his Commander in Chief func-\nThe precedents for use of a simple or\nshould not one condition be that the dele-\ntion, and in the absence of any specific\nconcurrent resolution go far beyond re-\ngation shall continue only as long as the\ndelegation of authority by Congress.\norganization plans. According to the Li-\ntwo houses are of the opinion that it is\nRealizing that certain circumstances\nbrary of Congress:\nworking beneficially To argue other-\nmight make such an assumption of power\nwise is to affront common sense.\nMost of the important legislation enacted\nnecessary and desirable, the committee\nfor prosecution of World War II provided\nProf. Louis Henkin, of the University\ndoes not attempt to preclude the Presi-\nthat the powers granted to the President\nof Pennsylvania and Columbia Univer-\ndent from acting in such circumstances.\nshould come to an end upon adoption of a\nsity, author of a recent book entitled\nIn the Senate, the Javits bill which\nconcurrent resolution to that effect.\n\"Foreign Affairs and the Constitution,\"\npassed that body last year, takes just the\nAmong the examples that the Library\nagrees. Speaking of the use of concur-\nopposite approach. The Senate Foreign\ncites were:\nrent resolutions he states:\nRelations Committee has spelled out four\nLend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941.\nBy the devices described, Congress is not\ncircumstances only in which the Presi-\nFirst War Powers Act of December 18,\nrepealing or modifying the original legis-\ndent may employ U.S. troops in hostili-\n1941.\nlation but is exercising power reserved in that\nties without first coming to Congress for\nEmergency Price Control Act of January 30,\nlegislation. Surely Congress should be able\napproval.\n1942.\nto recapture powers it delegates to the Presi-\nThe House Foreign Affairs Committee\nStabilization Act of October 2, 1942.\ndent without the consent of the agent.\nfelt it would be unwise to draw such rigid\nWar Labor Disputes Act of June 25, 1943.\nThe Senate Foreign Relations Com-\nlines between the President and Con-\nOther precedents where the effect of\nmittee has been considering a bill which\ngress, or to define in advance all of the\nlaw is achieved by resolutions not sub-\nwould permit the Congress by concurrent\ncircumstances under which the Presi-\nmitted to the President include:\nresolution to repeal Executive agree-\ndent could act. To do so might prevent\nments. Testifying in favor of the con-\nthe President from acting in a crisis sit-\nAmendments to the Constitution.\nTo set aside suspensions of the deporta-\nstitutionality of this approach have\nuation. It might cast doubt upon our U.S.\ntion of aliens by the Attorney General under\nbeen: former Supreme Court Justice\ndefense commitment at home or else-\nauthority vested in him by the Alien Reg-\nArthur Goldberg; Prof. Richard Falk of\nwhere in the world.\nistration Act of 1940.\nthe Woodrow Wilson School at Prince-\nIn order to preserve the maximum\nTo disallow or set aside dispositions of\nton; and Prof. Henry Field Haviland,\namount of flexibility in the war powers\nfederally owned property, including obsolete\nvessels owned by the Department of the\nJr., director of the Fletcher School of\nresolution, the Foreign Affairs Commit-\nNavy and surplus rubber plants.\nLaw and Diplomacy at Tufts University.\ntee does not attempt to preclude the\nTo reject executive agreements with other\nProf. Raoul Berger of Harvard Uni-\nPresident from acting in a circumstance\nnations providing for the exchange of atomic\nversity, who testified before the National\nwhere he determines that the need for\nenergy materials.\nSecurity Subcommittee on the war\naction is immediate and precludes prior\nTo override a Presidential determination\npowers bill and who reviewed section 4\ncongressional authorization. Realizing\nnot to abide by an import duty increase\n(c) containing the concurrent resolution\nthat the standards are vague, the House\nrecommendation of the Tariff Commission.\napproach, has written:\nbill requires the President to explain and\nTo effectuate allocations of highway aid\nOf course, I vastly prefer your concurrent\njustify to Congress why he has assumed\nto the States recommended to Congress\nresolution approach to the view that a presi-\nthe power to commit troops to hostilities.\nunder the Federal Highway Act of 1956.\ndential war may be terminated only by joint\nIf Congress approves of the assumption\nTo terminate foreign aid to a given coun-\nresolution, which requires the concurrence\nof power, it may ratify it. If it does not\ntry.\nof the President. The latter approach repre-\napprove, it may let the powers lapse after\nTwo precedents are particularly sig-\nsents still another abdication\n120 days, or terminate them sooner by\nnificant and relevant to the war powers\nSeveral attorneys general have also\nconcurrent resolution.\nbill. The Middle East resolution and the\nsupported the constitutionality of the\nThe point is that the Constitution\nGulf of Tonkin resolution both provided\nlegislative veto, beginning as early as\ndelegates the authority to declare war to\nfor the commitment of U.S. forces to\n1854. In that year, Attorney General\nthe Congress, not to the President. It is\nhostile action, and both provided for\nCushing stated:\nCongress which must raise armies and\nthe termination of that commitment by\nOf course, no separate resolution of either\nnavies, make rules governing them, call\nconcurrent resolution.\nHouse can coerce a Head of Department, un-\nforth the militia, and organize and pay\nThe use of concurrent resolutions for\nless in some particular in which a law, duly\nfor it all. The President's only constitu-\nsuch purposes has also been cited ap-\nenacted, has subjected him to the direct ac-\ntionally specified power is that of Com-\nprovingly by the Supreme Court. In 1941,\ntion of each; and in such case it is to be\nmander in Chief, which is hardly a man-\nin the case of Sibbach against Wilson\nintended, that, by approving the law, the\ndate for Presidential warmaking.\n& Co., the validity of the Rules of Civil\nPresident has consented to the exercise of\nThe war powers resolution would in no\nsuch coerciveness on the part of either House.\nProcedure for the district courts of the\nway inhibit the President from using\nUnited States was challenged. The Court\nIn 1949, a memorandum prepared by\ntroops to defend the United States or\nstated:\nthe Department of Justice found the two-\nrepel attacks. Congress may by concur-\nMoreover, in accordance with the Act, the\nHouse form of the veto to be definitely\nrent resolution order disengagement of\nrules were submitted to the Congress so\nconstitutional.\nU.S. troops from hostilities only when\nJune 25, 1973\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD HOUSE\n21221\nthey \"are engaged in hostilities outside\nexplicit constitutional requirement that\ntraneous matter can, in the opinion of the\nthe territory of the United States, its\n\"Every order, resolution, or vote-shall\ncommittee, be regarded in no other light than\npossessions and territories without a dec-\nbe presented to the President of the\na defacement of the public records and ar-\nlaration of war or other specific author-\nUnited States, and before the same shall\nchives.\nization of the Congress.\" Thus, if there\ntake effect, shall be approved by him.\"\nThus, while the Roosevelt memoran-\nis an attack upon the United States it-\nAgain, the exceptions are legion.\ndum is an interesting historical foot-\nself, a concurrent resolution would not\nHinds Precedents is anything but con-\nnote, it is neither constitutional nor rele-\nbe appropriate. And I might add surely,\nclusive upon the question of whether\nvant to the subject under consideration.\nno Member of Congress would wish to\nsuch a concurrent resolution must be\nIf Roosevelt felt that the concurrent res-\ndisengage our troops under such circum-\npresented to the President for signature.\nolution was unconstitutional, then ac-\nstances.\nIn chapter XCII, Hinds states:\ncording to the Constitution he should\nFinally, if the House in its wisdom de-\n\"In general, orders, resolutions, and votes\nhave vetoed the Lend-Lease Act so stat-\ncides to retain section 4(b) requiring\nin which the concurrence of the two Houses\ning. Anything less was null and void.\nthat Congress act within 120 days to\nis necessary must be presented to the Presi-\nratify the commitment of troops, then it\ndent on the same conditions as bills\" (em-\nIt is a fact that Congress repealed the\nwould be logically inconsistent for the\nphasis added).\nGulf of Tonkin resolution with an\nHouse to delete section 4(c) or to require\namendment to the military sales bill,\nHe then goes on to say:\na joint resolution of disapproval.\nrather than acting upon the concurrent\nAlthough the requirement of the Constitu-\nUnder section 4(b), after 120 days the\nresolution passed by the Senate. This was\ntion seems specific, the practice of Congress\na matter of convenience, not of consti-\nCongress may by inaction force the\nhas been to present to the President for ap-\nPresident to terminate a commitment\ntutional principle. The record does not\nproval only such concurrent resolutions as\nand disengage troops engaged in hos-\nare legislative in effect.\nshow any support whatsoever for infer-\ntilities abroad. It would be ironic indeed\nring that the House acted as it did out\nThus Hinds acknowledges that there\nif the Congress could require the Pres-\nof fear that a concurrent resolution was\nare exceptions.\ninsufficient. What is clear is that the\nident to disengage our troops by inac-\nHinds stopped compiling his precedents\ntion, but could not require the President\nSenate obviously felt that a concurrent\nin 1907. Since then, as noted in the re-\nto disengage those same troops by pass-\nresolution was sufficient to repeal the\nsponse to question one, literally dozens\nGulf of Tonkin resolution.\ning a concurrent resolution as provided\nof bills have specified that Congress may\nfor in section 4(c).\nThe \"necessary and proper\" clause of\nby concurrent or simple resolution take\nthe Constitution states:\nSection 4(c) of the war powers resolu-\nlegislative action. Hinds would today\ntion provides a means of preserving con-\nThe Congress shall have power\nto\nmake\nhave a whole new body of precedents to\ngressional authority and augmenting\nall laws which shall be necessary and proper\ncompile.\nfor carrying into execution the foregoing\ncongressional control in an area that\nNo example has been found wherein\npowers\npresently is not subject to effective con-\nthe Congress used a concurrent resolu-\ntrol through Congress' traditional over-\ntion to repeal the President's authority\nThe war powers resolution is a joint\nsight powers. It strengthens the checks\nresolution which must be signed into law\nunder the five bills cited above. However,\nand balances which the Founding\nby the President in order to have effect.\nCongress has five times in the last decade\nFathers put at the base of our political\nIf the \"necessary and proper\" clause is\nused a simple resolution to repeal the\nsystem. And, at the same time, it pre-\nheld to preclude the use of concurrent\nPresident's authority to carry out certain\nserves essential flexibility to the Presi-\nresolutions such as in 4(c), then it must\nreorganization plans he has proposed.\ndent.\nalso be held to prohibit the use of con-\nPresident Franklin D. Roosevelt asked\nNo attempt is made to equate the\ncurrent and simple resolutions for vir-\nhis Attorney General to prepare a mem-\nprocess by which amendments to the\ntually all purposes I have enumerated.\norandum questioning the constitution-\nConstitution are proposed and section\nSuch a result would be absurd and ob-\nality of section 3(c) of the Lend-Lease\n4(c) of the war powers resolution. The\nviously at variance with the intentions\nAct of 1941, which provided for Congress\nconstitutional amendment procedure is\nto terminate the delegation of powers\nof the Founding Fathers and 200 years of\ncited as one example of a resolution\nconstitutional history.\ncontained in the act by a concurrent\nwhich is not submitted to the President\nresolution. The memorandum was never\nThe CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-\nfor signature, as section 7 of the Con-\ntleman has again expired.\nmade public and was found in Roosevelt's\nstitution would seem to explicitly re-\nMr. YOUNG of Florida. Madam Chair-\nprivate papers after his death. Roosevelt\nquire, but which nevertheless has the\nsigned the Lend-Lease Act without a\nman, I make the point of order that a\neffect of law.\nwhisper of dissent. Thus, it can hardly be\nquorum is not present.\nThe amendment procedure simply\nsaid Roosevelt's private dissent on this\nThe CHAIRMAN. The Chair will\nstates:\ncount.\none section of the act negates 200 years\nThe Congress, whenever two thirds of both\nof constitutional history.\nForty-two Members are present, not\nHouses shall deem it necessary, shall pro-\nThe attempt by Roosevelt to reserve\na quorum. The call will be taken by elec-\npose Amendments to this Constitution, or,\ntronic device.\non the Application of the Legislatures of\nthe judgment upon the effectiveness of\nrepeal by concurrent resolution by means\nThe call was taken by electronic device,\ntwo thirds of the several States, shall call a\nof a written dissent-private or public-\nand the following Members failed to re-\nConvention for proposing Amendments,\nwhich, in either Case, shall be valid to all\nwhile signing the bill into law at the\nspond:\nIntents and Purposes, as Part of the Con-\nsame time is of no force for yet another\n[Roll No. 280]\nstitution, when ratified by the Legislatures\nAbzug\nBroomfield\nreason. Returning to Hind's precedents,\nDiggs\nAdams\nof three fourths of the several States.\nBrown, Calif.\nDorn\nin paragraph 3492 we find that in 1842,\nAddabbo\nBurke, Calif.\nDrinan\nThe Constitution does not state\nPresident Tyler signed a bill and filed\nAlexander\nBurlison, Mo.\nDulski\nAnderson,\nButler\nwhether the President shall sign a reso-\nEdwards, Calif\nwith it his reasons for doing so:\nCalif.\nByron\nEilberg\nlution proposing an amendment, and\nMr. John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts,\nAnderson, III.\nCarey, N.Y.\nEsch\ntherefore the explicit requirement of\nArcher\nsaid that this message was a novelty in the\nCasey, Tex.\nEshleman\nArends\nsection 7 of the Constitution would seem\nhistory of the country. The Constitution re-\nCederberg\nEvans, Colo.\nAshbrook\nChamberlain\nEvins, Tenn.\nto require that the President sign con-\nquired the President, if he approve a bill, to\nAshley\nChisholm\nFish\nstitutional amendments. As early as\nsign it and not accompany his signature with\nBadillo\nClark\nFisher\n1798, the Supreme Court decided in Hol-\nreasons. After dwelling on the dangers of\nBaker\nClawson, Del\nFlynt\nthe precedent Mr. Adams moved that the\nBarrett\nClay\nFord,\nlingsworth against Virginia that a Presi-\nmessage be referred to a select committee.\nBeard\nCollins, Ill.\nWilliam D.\ndential signature was not required, sec-\nBell\nConable\nForsythe\ntion 7 of the Constitution notwithstand-\nThe report of that committee referring\nBevill\nConyers\nFraser\nto the President states:\nBiaggi\nCorman\ning.\nFrey\nBingham\nCrane\nFroehlich\nThus, although the ratification by\nNo power is given him to alter, to amend,\nBlatnik\nDaniel, Dan\nFulton\nthree-fourths of the State legislatures\nto comment or to assign reasons for the\nBolling\nDanielson\nFuqua\nperformance of his duty. His signature is the\nBowen\nDavis, Ga.\nGettys\nmight be analogous to a Presidential\nBrademas\nexclusive evidence admitted by the Constitu-\nDavis, Wis.\nGray\nsignature, it cannot be squared with the\nBreaux\nDerwinski\ntion of his approval, and all addition of ex-\nGreen, Oreg.\nBrooks\nDickinson\nGreen, Pa.\n21222\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\nJune 25, 1973\nGross\nMoorhead,\nShriver\ngoing to fulfill its constitutional obliga-\nsection 8, clauses 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and\nGubser\nCalif.\nSikes\ntions.\nGuyer\nMoorhead, Pa.\nSisk\n16. In comparison there is only one such\nHanna\nMosher\nSmith, N.Y.\nThe need for this legislation does not\ngrant of authority for the President\nHansen, Idaho\nMoss\nStanton,\nsimply arise out of the tragic involvement\nunder article II, section 2, which vests\nHansen, Wash.\nMurphy, N.Y.\nJames V.\nin Southeast Asia. I think the war in\nhim with the powers of Commander in\nHarsha\nNedzi\nStark\nHarvey\nNelsen\nSteed\nVietnam represents the culmination of\nChief of the Armed Forces.\nHastings\nNichols\nSteiger, Ariz.\na historical decline in the assertion of\nThe notes made by both Hamilton and\nHawkins\nNix\nSteiger, Wis.\ncongressional prerogatives in warmaking\nMadison at and after the Constitutional\nHays\nO'Hara\nStephens\nHébert\nOwens\nStubblefield\nauthority. In the early days of the Re-\nConvention support the theory that the\nHeckler, Mass.\nPatman\nStuckey\npublic, the executive and the Congress\nCongress was preeminent in the field of\nHillis\nPerkins\nSullivan\nworked in close cooperation with one an-\nwarmaking. The American Constitution\nHogan\nPeyser\nSymington\nHorton\nPickle\nSymms\nother, often resulting in the President de-\nwas going to avoid the European example\nHoward\nPike\nTeague, Calif.\nferring to the opposition, to an active\nof giving to the Executive broad powers\nHungate\nPoage\nTeague, Tex.\nCongress. By World War II the Executive\nto unilaterally commit the Nation to war.\nHunt\nPowell, Ohio\nThompson, N.J.\nHutchinson\nmade commitments abroad totally in-\nPreyer\nThomson, Wis.\nEven though Hamilton argued that for-\nJohnson, Pa.\nRailsback\nThornton\ndependent of the will of the Congress;\neign policy was inherently an Executive\nJones, Ala.\nRangel\nTiernan\nafter World War II, in Korea, the Do-\nfunction, implementation of that policy\nKarth\nRarick\nTreen\nminican Republic and Southeast Asia,\nmust depend on the independent au-\nKing\nRees\nUllman\nKluczynski\nReid\nVan Deerlin\nthe warmaking powers had shifted com-\nthority of the Congress. Against this\nKoch\nRhodes\nVander Jagt\npletely from the Congress to the Execu-\nbackground, I find unpersuasive argu-\nKuykendall\nRiegle\nVanik\ntive after the fact. Absent any positive\nments that cite the Commander in Chief\nKyros\nRobison, N.Y.\nVigorito\nLandrum\nRoe\nWhitehurst\naction by the Congress, there is little evi-\nclause as the basis for the grant of broad,\nLeggett\nRoncalio, Wyo.\nWhitten\ndence to suggest this trend will reverse.\nindependent warmaking authority. On\nLehman\nRooney, N.Y.\nWidnall\nContinued acquiescence by the Congress,\nthe contrary, I think the limited refer-\nLong, Md.\nRooney, Pa.\nWiggins\ncan only lead to a domination by the\nences to the President's authority make\nMadigan\nRosenthal\nWilson, Bob\nMartin, Nebr.\nRunnels\nWinn\nExecutive in warmaking authority in di-\nhim, as Hamilton stated, \"The first gen-\nMathias, Calif.\nRuth\nWright\nrect conflict with the intent of the fram-\neral and admiral of the confederacy.\"\nMeeds\nRyan\nWyatt\ners of the Constitution. While it is natu-\nAt the very least the Constitution and\nMezvinsky\nSt Germain\nWylie\nMichel\nSandman\nYates\nrally more expedient to conduct warmak-\nits legislative history show that Congress\nMills, Ark.\nSatterfield\nYatron\ning functions through the Executive\nand the President were intended to be\nMinshall, Ohio\nScherle\nYoung, Alaska\nalone, the drafters of the Constitution\npartners in warmaking. The weight of\nMizell\nSchneebeli\nYoung, S.C.\nMontgomery\nShipley\nZion\nconsciously avoided concentrating in the\nevidence suggests that Congress was in-\nExecutive the authority to unilaterally\ntended to be the dominant partner, re-\nAccordingly the Committee rose; and\nlead the country to war. In retrospect,\ntaining the independent authority to\nthe Speaker having resumed the chair,\nthis country has moved too far from this\ncommit the Nation to hostilities.\nMrs. GRIFFITHS, Chairman of the Com-\nideal. We can no longer allow the in-\nThe practice of the Executive, however,\nmittee of the Whole House on the State\nstitutional advantages of the Executive\nhas resulted in a total reversal of the\nof the Union, reported that that Commit-\nto become justification for further ero-\nletter and spirit of the Constitution. As\ntee having had under consideration the\nsion of congressional warmaking power.\nMembers of Congress sworn to uphold the\njoint resolution House Joint Resolution\nMuch will be heard in debate today\nConstitution, we have a duty to protect\n542, and finding itself without a quorum,\nabout the Constitution, about what that\nand exercise the powers granted to us by\nshe had directed the Members to record\nConstitution says or does not say about\nthe Constitution. We have a clear choice\ntheir presence by electronic device,\nthe war powers of the Congress. I would\nof action. We can condone that reversal\nwhereupon 236 Members recorded their\nlike to address myself to that specific\nthat has taken place and allow the prac-\npresence, a quorum, and she submitted\nquestion.\ntice of history to dominate the express\nherewith the names of the absentees to\nI believe that the Constitution gives\nprovisions of the Constitution. That\nbe spread upon the Journal.\nto the Congress, not to the Executive but\nchoice, I believe, would effectively aban-\nThe Committee resumed its sitting.\nto the Congress, the power to commit the\ndon the ideal proposed by the drafters\nThe CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like\nUnited States to a cause of war. Debate\nof the Constitution. Our alternative is to\nto advise the Members that 1 hour and\nduring the Constitutional Convention\nreverse the trend of history, and restore\n36 minutes of time remain, and 100 Mem-\nmade it very clear that the delegates felt\nCongress to a position of partnership in\nbers are a quorum.\nthat the risk of economic and physical\nshaping warmaking policy. House Joint\nMr. MAILLIARD. Madam Chairman,\nsacrifice during a war, and the serious\nResolution 542 is, in my estimation, a\nI yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from\nlegal and moral consequences that flow\nbill which closely reflects the intent of\nDelaware (Mr. DU PONT).\nfrom the use of force against a foreign\nthe Constitution, and would set in motion\nMr. DU PONT. Madam Chairman, I rise\nsovereign, were sufficiently grave that\nthe machinery necessary for making\nin support of House Joint Resolution 542,\nthe elected representatives of the people\nCongress an effective force in shaping\na bill which I believe offers the Members\nshould express their approval of such\nthe Nation's armed policy abroad.\nof this body an opportunity to reassert\naction.\nFirst, House Joint Resolution 542\nthe powers authority vested in them by\nOf course the practice has been very\nwould give the Congress the ability to\nthe Constitution. As a member of the\ndifferent from the theory; we have seen\nfulfill its constitutional responsibilities\nsubcommittee which drafted the bill,\nan almost total erosion or perhaps abdi-\nfor warmaking powers. The consultation\nand as one of its sponsors, I believe it is\ncation of congressional input into for-\npróvisions and the reporting require-\na strong bill, a good bill, and one that\neign policy decisions. The Executive has\nments will give the Congress the intel-\ndeserves passage.\nbeen preeminent.\nligence necessary to carry out the obliga-\nWhen the subcommittee began their\nAll Members of this body have heard\ntions mandated by the Constitution. In\nextensive deliberations on war powers\nthe arguments in support of expanded\nthe past, the Congress has not had ade-\nlegislation, I will be frank to admit that\nExecutive power. I think most of the\nquate information to effectively direct\nI was skeptical about our ability to draft a\narguments are based on Executive prac-\nforeign policy decisions, particularly\nbill which effectively reasserted the war-\ntice rather than on the letter and spirit\nwhen complex issues about directing a\nmaking powers of the Congress but which\nof the Constitution itself. Both the Con-\nwar were at issue. By requiring the Presi-\nalso retained sufficient flexibility to com-\nstitution and the notes taken at the Con-\ndent to keep the Congress abreast of\nport with the design of the Constitution.\nstitutional Convention add great weight\nsignificant changes in our foreign policy\nAs the hearings and markup sessions con-\nto the argument that Congress, not the\nposture, the Congress will be able to\ncluded, I was convinced that the com-\nPresident, was to be vested with the\nimpact the policy at each stage of de-\nmittee had not only drafted a workable\ndominant role in warmaking powers. I\nvelopment. This stands in sharp contrast\nbill, giving Congress an effective role in\nthink it is significant that the Constitu\nwith the present practice of coming to\nwarmaking powers but that passage of\ntion contains six express grants of war-\nCongress after the commitments have\nthe bill is essential if the Congress is\nmaking and related authority in article I,\nalread been made.\nJune 25, 1973\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD\n21223\nrection that our history has taken us:\nclear that the President had the author-\nSecond, section 4 gives Congress the\ncapacity to exert greater control over the\nHowever, I am not ready to abandon the\nity to repel sudden attacks.\nletter and spirit of the Constitution for\nIn contrast to this evidence support-\nExecutive's commitment of Armed Forces\nthe interpretation by the gloss of prac-\ning congressional preeminence in war-\nabroad. I think the heart of this section\nis subsection C which provides that the\ntice.\nmaking authority, the Executive has only\nCongress may direct, by concurrent res-\nI urge the Members to read this bill in\nbeen given express authority to be the\nthe context of the checks and balances\nCommander in Chief of the Armed\nolution, the President to disengage from\nembodied in the Constitution. The draft-\nForces. This is hardly a persuasive grant\nhostilities. I think this procedure is fully\ners intended to safeguard the Nation\nof broad authority in contrast to the\nconsistent with the Constitution. If the\nPresident was going to abide by the letter\nagainst unchecked Executive decisions to\nspecific grants conferred upon the Con-\nof the Constitution he would have to have\ncommit the country to a trial of force.\ngress. A strict reading of that clause\nthe support of a majority of both Houses\nWhile institutional advantages have\nwould make the President, as Hamilton\nof Congress. In fact, a simple majority in\ncaused the Congress to delegate its re-\ntermed it, the \"first general and admiral\none House could block a declaration of\nsponsibilities in foreign policy and war-\nof the Confederacy.\" The President's au-\nmaking authority, this should not ob-\nthority, however, has been considerably\nwar. Therefore, if a President acts with-\nviate the need for requiring safeguards\nexpanded by the interpretation of article\nout the prior consent of the Congress, it\nfrom the body most directly representa-\nII, sections 1 and 3, which give the Pres-\nlogically follows that a simple majority of\ntive of popular sentiment. I can think of\nident executive power and require him\nboth Houses should be able to direct him\nno decision that is more important to\nto take care that the laws be faithfully\nto disengage from hostilities. We have\nexecuted. This has been construed to\nsimply reversed the chronology of the\nbring before the people than the com-\nlegislative process because the Executive\nmitment to war. Such a decision involves\nmean that the President has the power\ndecided to act prior to congressional\na risk of great economic and physical\nto enforce the laws of the United States\nauthorization. It has been argued that if\nsacrifice that should not be incurred\nby any means he finds necessary-In re\nwithout approval from the people and\nNeagle, 135 U.S. 1-and in practice this\nthe Congress passed a bill requiring the\nPresident to disengage Armed Forces\ntheir elected representatives. The very\nhas meant that he has the power to\nabroad, the President could veto it and\nact of war entails moral and legal con-\nmaintain internal order and repel sud-\nboth Houses of Congress would have to\nsequences so significant that an expres-\nden attack.\nsion of popular approval should be re-\nAnalysis of this legislative history sug-\npass it by two-third vote before it became\nquired. I believe that House Joint Res-\ngests that the framers never intended\nbinding. I do not think that the framers\nof the Constitution intended to create\nolution 542 provides that Members of\ntroops to be used outside the country\nthis obstacle to withdrawing the Nation\nthis body with the instrument that will\nwithout congressional consent. Since\nfrom a course of war when the President\ninsure the awesome decision to go to\nneither a standing army or navy was\nacted unilaterally. To remove any doubt\nwar will be brought directly before the\nthought necessary by the framers any\nabout procedure, section 4(c) should be\nbody most directly of the people, a result\nmilitary venture would have by necessity\nenacted to reaffirm the ideal that the\nthat was intended by the Constitution.\nrequired congressional authorization of\nDETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL\nthe expedition by raising troops or call-\nCongress and the President are partners\nBACKGROUND OF HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION\ning up the militia. Even where troops\nin warmaking. I think that is wholly\nwere available for foreign deployment,\nappropriate that when the majority of\n542\nthe Executive came to the Congress dur-\nboth Houses disagrees with a course of\nIt has been frequently contended that\ning the Nation's first 25 years under the\naction, then the President no longer has\nthe powers conferred on the Congress by\nConstitution. Despite this intent and\nthe authority to act. unilaterally. With-\narticle I, section 8 and those conferred\nearly practice, rapid expansion of Pres-\nout the approval of both Houses of Con-\non the President in article II, section 2\nidential use of power abroad took place.\ngress there can be no valid warmaking\nare logically incompatible. While there\nThe expansion began with the theory\npower.\nis an apparent conflict over the delega-\nthat the duties of the President included\nIn another sense this bill conditionally\ntion of warmaking authority, there is\nthe power to protect U.S. citizens and\ndelegates to the President the provisional\nample evidence to show that the drafters\nproperty abroad. By the end of the 19th\nauthority to commit Armed Forces\nof the Constitution intended to give the\ncentury, the power had expanded to the\nabroad. In the context of modern diplo-\nCongress the primary responsibility for\npoint where the executive power in-\nmacy, I think that such a grant is a nec-\nmaking war, consciously avoiding the\ncluded a great variety of interests de-\nessary expedient. It recognizes the need\npattern of broad authority enjoyed by\nfined as foreign policy objectives.\nto give the President flexibility in pro-\nthe monarchs of that period.\nConcurrent with this development of\ntecting national security. At the same\nBecause article I, section 8 is the only\nforeign policy powers, the President was\ntime, however, Congress retains its right\ninstance where warmaking powers are\nrecognized to have the inherent power\nto withdraw that conditional delegation\nexpressly mentioned, constitutional\nto conduct the national defense. Fore-\nof authority.\nscholars have attached great significance\nmost in the minds of those who recog-\nUnfortunately, we have little judicial\nto the amendment that changed clause\nnized the importance of such powers was\nprecedent to look to for guidance. I want\n11 from the power to \"make war\" to the\nthe fear of a territorial invasion. In the\nto point, however, that as Members of\npower to \"declare war.\" Some have sug-\nmodern context, however, global con-\nCongress we are sworn to uphold the\ngested that the change was designed to\nfrontation gave rise to the notion of\nConstitution. We ourselves have the\nrestrict the role of Congress to a more\nlinking the national interest to extra-\nability to make precedent. While I have\nformal or ceremonial function, implying\nterritorial security interests. This re-\nheard objections that this bill contains\nthat the substantive responsibility lay\ncent expansion of power leads the power\nprovisions of dubious constitutionality, I\nwith the Executive. The debate was not\nof the President into collision with the\ndo not see how a return to the letter and\nwell reported, but there is strong evi-\nwarmaking powers of the Congress. While\nspirit of the Constitution could be con-\ndence that the amendment was in no\nit is well recognized that the President\nsidered questionable. We are not creating\nway intended to weaken congressional\nmust still be left with the power to\nany new policies here; we are simply try-\nprerogative. This view is reinforced by\njudge in the first interest whether a given\ning to reverse the persistent erosion of\nthe notes of both Hamilton and Madison.\nevent. constitutes an imminent threat\nour constitutional obligations. In fact,\nHamilton later wrote in the Federalist\nto our survival and demands a response\nI have serious doubts about the exercise\nof Presidential authority that we have\nthat the Executive normally had the\nwhich leaves no time to seek the Con-\nwitnessed in the last 50 years. Critics of\npower to embark on war, but in the\ngress acquiescence in that decision. This\nthis bill refer to Presidential powers\nUnited States this power was deliberately\nlimited discretion falls far short of the\nwhich I see as supported only by the gloss\nreserved for the legislature. There is ad-\nassumption that the President, because\nof practice. Nowhere in the Constitution\nditional evidence, supporting the conten-\nof his defensive powers, may act uni-\ndo I see a requirement that two-thirds of\ntion that the change in wording was de-\nlaterally whenever the interest jeopard-\nboth Houses are required to make a Pres-\nsigned to relieve Congress from the day-\nized is labeled as a \"vital security inter-\nident disengage from hostilities that he\nto-day responsibility for conducting war.\nest.\" The authority for the unilateral\ninitiated unilaterally, without prior con-\nThe most expansive views that is sup-\nacts taken by the Presidents in the last\nsent of Congress. Perhaps that is the di-\nportable is that the wording would make\n20 years rest on questionable constitu-\n21224\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORDHOUSE\nJune 25, 1973\ntional grounds, and at minimum repre-\nshows that we have too easily cast off\ndoes so, however, under the condition\nsents policy which the Congress must\nconstitutional duties to the Executive,\nthat Congress may retract that authority\nseek to curtail.\nbecause of its institutional superiority.\nby majority vote of both Houses. This\nEarly American history indicates that\nWe must reform our institution so that\ndoes not run counter to article 1, sec-\nthe result we have reached today was by\nit meets the demands of the times and\ntion 7, because Congress has simply del-\nno means inevitable. We have endowed\nenables us to implement the duties dele-\negated power in advance and since they\nincreasing amounts of authority in the\ngated to us under the itution.\nare the source of that power, the moment\nPresident yet this seems to be based in\nI believe that House Joint Resolution\nthe power is terminated by concurrence\nexpediency rather than necessity.\n542 makes the necessary institutional\nof both Houses, the President's provi-\nIn the first 125 years of the Republic,\nchanges so that Congress may once\nsional authority has been terminated.\nthere was genuine cooperation between\nagain, effectively and responsibly dis-\nThe essence of this argument is sup-\nthe President and the Congress, often\ncharge its warmaking powers and duties.\nported by Harvard's well-known consti-\nresulting in deference to the legislative\nFirst, the bill will enable the Congress\ntutional law expert, Paul Freund. I wrote\nwill regarding the initiation of foreign\nto have the ability to participate in war-\nhim a letter requesting his opinion of\nconflicts. At one point Jefferson refused\nmaking decisions. Under the reporting\nthe constitutionality of section 4(c) and\nto permit the American naval command-\nprovisions of the bill, Congress will be\nI am enclosing the text of his reply at\ners to do more than disarm and release\nprovided with a steady flow of informa-\nthis point in the RECORD:\nenemy ships guilty of attacks on the\ntion about our foreign policy posture\nJUNE 12, 1973.\nUnited States until he had received con-\nposition abroad, especially as it related\nHon. PIERRE S. DU PONT,\ngressional approval for the First Bar-\nto potentially hostile activities. This will\nU.S. House of Representatives,\nbary War. Congress took an active role\nbe an important factor in making sure\nWashington, D.C.\nin opposing executive action-Pierce in\nthat the Congress will not be confronted\nDEAR CONGRESSMAN DU PONT: I am glad to\nCuba, Seward in Alaska, and Grant in\nwith a situation that is so well devel-\nrespond to your letter of June 1, inviting an\nexpression of my views on the validity of sec-\nSanto Domingo, and. the Executive ac-\noped that the events themselves have\ntion 4(c) of H.J. Res. 542, providing that a\nquiesced.\ndictated future courses of action. Too\nconcurrent resolution of both Houses of\nBetween 1900 and 1945, close coopera-\noften in the past Congress has been\nCongress may require the President to dis-\ntion between the Executive and the Con-\nhanded a fait accompli and given little\nengage military forces from action outside\ngress became the exception rather than\nchoice but to approve and finance the\nthe territory and territorial waters and air-\nthe rule. The trend gained full momen-\naction, think the consultation provision\nspace of the United States, where the com-\nand the broad reporting requirements\nmitment of armed forces was made without\ntum under Theodore Roosevelt. He acted\nunilaterally in South Arterica and in\nwill arm the Congress with the means to\nprior authorization of Congress.\nDuring the past thirty-five years Acts of\nthe Orient, when he sent several thou-\nbecome a responsible partner in foreign\nCongress have not infrequently provided that\nsand troops to the Boxer Rebellion.\npolicy.\nin administering the Act operative legal ef-\nFranklin Roosevelt continued the prac-\nBeyond the reporting provisions which\nfect is to be given to a concurrent resolution\ntice of bypassing the Congress by ex-\nwill give the Congress the ability to carry\nor to the action of one House. This practice\nchanging 50 destroyers for British bases\nout its warmaking responsibilities, sec-\nhas brought forth discussion in and out of\nin the Western Atlantic, by occupying\ntion 4 of House Joint Resolution 542 is\nCongress on the constitutional aspects of the\nthe fulcrum which will give the Con-\nsubject. A survey of pertinent legislation\nIceland and Greenland and by ordering\nand commentary as of 1953, is contained in\nthe Navy to convoy ships carrying lend-\ngress the legislative leverage to assert its\nGinnane, \"The Control of Federal Adminis-\nlease supplies to Englar !.\nwarmaking authority. The bill not only\ntration by Congressional Resolutions and\nWe entered a period of almost total\nprovides a time limit on a President's\nCommittees,\" 66 Harv. L. Rev. 569 (1953).\nacquiescence by the Congress in the\ncommitment of troops without prior con-\nThe present question, however, lies in a\n1950's and 1960's. The broad blanket of\ngressional authorization, but it provides\nnarrow compass. It is well to indicate that\nfor the termination of such commitment\nit does not involve the situations listed be-\nnational security interest provided the\nby concurrent resolution passed by both\nlow, each of which raises distinct questions:\nbasis for a bipartisanship support which\n1. Disapproval of executive action by one\nled us through the cold war. Formosa,\nHouses of Congress. This is at the heart\nHouse, or by a Committee or other agency.\nKorea, Lebanon, Cuba, the Dominican\nof the bill and embraces a policy which\n2. Disapproval by concurrent resolution of\nRepublic, and the initiation of the war\nI think accurately reflects the intention\nexecutive action in a matter over which the\nin Southeast Asia were all Presidential\nof the framers of the Constitution. Be-\nPresident has paramount constitutional\ndecisions.\ncause questions have been raised about\npower-e.g., the appointment of executive or\nUnderstandably, the shift to Presiden-\nits constitutionality, I would like to dis-\nmilitary officers.\ntial hegemony in warmakirg authority\ncuss this mechanism in some detail.\n3. Disapproval by concurrent resolution of\ndid not occur without reason. The exec-\nAs the committee report notes, the\nexecutive action in a matter committed by\nAct of Congress to the executive-e.g., the\nutive branch proved to be institutionally\nuse of a concurrent resolution to veto\nReorganization Act of 1939 and its successors.\nsuperior to the Congress for conducting\nexecutive action has become a common\n4. Termination of statutory authority by\nwars and even for initiating them. The\nlegislative device in the last 40 years.\nconcurrent resolution. See Robert H. Jackson,\nExecutive has the advantage of unity of\nThe report covers this aspect adequate-\n\"A Presidential Legal Opinion,\" 66 Harv. L.\noffice and purpose as well as the com-\nly, and I would only point out that the\nRev. 1353 (1953).\nmand of a vast intelligence network. The\nGulf of Tonkin resolution, which pro-\nThe present question arises in a field where\nvided for termination of authority by\nthe legislative and the executive branch each\nExecutive also has the ability to act\nhas its constitutional responsibilities, the\nquickly and in secret, two attributes not\nconcurrent resolution was passed with no\nCongress (by ordinary legislation) to declare\ncommonly associated with the Congress.\ndebate over that particular provision,\nwar, the President to act as Commander in\nThis, however, is not to suggest that Con-\nnor was there any question about its con-\nChief. The President, it may be premised,\ngress should not still be the ultimate\nstitutionality when it was signed into law\nhas emergency powers to protect American\nrepository of warmaking powers. To the\nby President Johnson.\ninterests abroad by commitment of armed\ncontrary if the framers had decided that\nI think the theoretical basis for this\nforces, but the plenary power to engage in\nexpediency and secrecy were the pre-\nprocedure is well-founded and based in\ncontinuing hostilities is vested in Congress.\nCongress may authorize the continuance of\nmium qualities in warmaking, they would\nthe Constitution. The Constitution\nthe Presidential action through ordinary\nhave vested the power in the President.\ngrants to the Congress warmaking pow-\nlegislation. If, on the other hand, Congress\nInstead they decided that warmaking\ners, and under recognized constitutional\nis unwilling to prolong the emergency action\nmust.necessarily involve popular appro-\nprecedent, the Congress may delegate au-\ninto a state of war it may assert its authority\nval, and the power should lie with the\nthority with which it has been vested.\nfor that purpose. The most appropriate me-\nCongress. We must not substitute ex-\nCongress may also retract that which it\ndium for such assertion by Congress is a con-\npediency for the wisdom of the framers\ndelegates; this is the legal justification\ncurrent resolution. In this way it makes\nclear that one crucial element in the law-\nin establishing their ideal of govern-\nfor the disapproval of reorganization\nmaking process necessary for the making of\nment.\nplans by simple resolution. House Joint.\nwar is lacking-the approval of Congress.\nIf Congress has not been adequate as\nResolution 542 makes such a provision\nMy conclusion is that, on the substantive\nthe body to make warmaking decisions,\ngrant of authority by giving the Presi-\npremises of the bill, the provision respecting\nthen the institution must be changed to\ndent the power to commit troops abroad\na concurrent resolution is a valid and appro-\nmeet the need. Unfortunately history\nwithout prior consent of Congress. He\npriate measure, and does not raise constitu-\nJune 25, 1973\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\n21225\ntional issues of the kind mooted in connec-\narticle I, section 7, clause 3 of the Con-\ntion with other categories of legislation.\nlimited period of time unless the war has\nWith kindest regards,\nstitution which says every order, resolu-\nbeen declared by Congress.\nSincerely yours,\ntion, or vote in which the concurrence of\nI do not think that we should permit\nPAUL A. FREUND.\nthe Senate and the House may be neces-\nour Nation to be engaged in another\nsary shall be presented to the President,\nThe concurrent resolution mechanism\nwar unless the war has a sufficient degree\nhe states that means every resolution or\nis also supported by logical analysis of\nof public support to cause Congress, in\norder which is to have the force of law.\nits collective judgment, to vote a declara-\nthe legislative process. For example, if\n\"Necessary\" here, he says, means neces-\nthe President were faced with a situation\ntion of war. In my opinion, the President\nsary if a resolution is to have the force\nshould not be permitted to conduct a\nwhere no emergency existed and he came\nof law. A concurrent resolution is merely\nfuture war at his own discretion. Con-\nto the Congress for authorization this\nfor a housekeeping matter for the Con-\nwould comport with the intention of the\ngress should specify and assert its proper\ngress. The gentleman says this resolution\nconstitutional responsibility to share in\nConstitution. The Congress would pro-\nhas the force of law.\ncommitting our nation to war.\nceed to consider either a declaration of\nMr. DU PONT. I do not believe when\nI believe that this procedure is in line\nwar or antecedent authorization for use\nthe Congress is carving out an exception\nwith the Constitution which empowers\nof Armed Forces abroad. Under the nor-\nthat that rule applies. I would cite a let-\nCongress to declare war and empowers\nmal process the majority of one House\nter I have which I will make a part of\nthe President to respond to sudden at-\ncould block the authorization and the\nthe RECORD from Professor Freund of the\ntacks and to conduct the war once it has\nPresident would lack the authority under\nDepartment of Constitutional Law at\nbeen declared.\nthe Constitution to proceed unless some\nHarvard University, which states in re-\nMr. BELL. Madam Chairman, I yield\nextraordinary national security issue\nsponse to a specific question about 4C:\n10 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio\nwere at stake. Yet if the President de-\nMy conclusion is that, on the substantive\n(Mr. WHALEN).\ncides to act unilaterally, under extraordi-\npremises of the bill, the provision respecting\nMr. WHALEN. Madam Chairman,\nnary circumstances, the Congress would\na concurrent resolution is a valid and appro-\nmany times throughout the history of\nhave to vote by majority of both Houses\npriate measure, and does not raise constitu-\nour country American troops have been\nto require disengagements. The oppo-\ntional issues of the kind mooted in connec-\nnents to section 4(c) then would argue\ntion with other categories of legislation.\ncommitted to combat without the formal\napproval of the U.S. Congress. Indeed,\nthat the Congress would have to vote by\nSo, in conclusion, I believe it is consti-\nafter World War II U.S. troops have been\ntwo-thirds if the President decided to\ntutional to have a delegation of power\ninvolved in two major conflicts without\nveto the measure. The result is logically\nto the President taken back by a simple\nany formal declaration of war. It seems\ninconsistent. What it boils down to is that\nconcurrent resolution, and I believe that\nto me, therefore, that one of the impor-\nif the President goes to the Congress as\nis the heart of the bill.\ntant problems confronting the Congress\nhe was supposed to under the Constitu-\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Will the\nas we enter this post-Vietnam era is to\ntion a simple majority of one House can\ngentleman yield?\nenact war powers legislation which would\ndefeat his actions. Yet if the President\nMr. DU PONT. I yield to the gentleman.\naccomplish two things:\nacts unilaterally, without prior consent\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The gentle-\nFirst, as suggested by the distinguished\nfrom Congress, in a manner not expressly\nman suggests that a delegation of power\nchairman of the subcommittee (Mr. Za-\nrecognized in the Constitution, but ac-\nby the Congress can be rescinded by a\nBLOCKI) we need a vehicle which would\ncepted as an extraordinary power, then\nconcurrent resolution. The gentleman\nthe House must vote by two-thirds in\nredress the imbalance in the warmaking\nfrom Illinois also talked about delega-\npower. At the present time, without a\neach House to terminate his actions. This\ntion of power by the Congress to the\ndeclaration of war, the President has\nis an unreasonable obstacle to congres-\nPresident. However, I thought that what\ntaken this opportunity of committing\nsional assertion of power. It also would\nwe are talking about is the constitutional\nAmerican troops without the possibility\nencourage the President to act first, be-\nauthority of the President as Commander\nof congressional rejoinder.\ncause it takes far more opposition in\nin Chief to commit troops overseas. Is\nCongress, of course, has seen fit not\nCongress to defeat his actions.\nthe gentleman contending that the Pres-\nto use its appropriation powers in re-\nThe concurrent resolution is fully con-\nident has this power only because Con-\nsistent with the design of the framers.\nsponse, at least, up until today.\ngress in some way delegated it to him?\nSecond, we need a bill which would\nSince war powers were expressly given\nMr. DU PONT. I do not know of any-\nto the Congress, logically all war power\ngive to the Congress an opportunity to\nthing in the Constitution that talks about\nmust flow from Congress. The President's\nexpress its views on the important ques-\nthe power of the President to commit\nauthority then must be delegated by the\ntion of war or peace, life and death of\ntroops overseas.\nAmerican servicemen.\nCongress. Once the majority of both\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. No one sug-\nI think that the measure which was\nHouses withdraw that delegation of au-\ngest the Constitution spells that out in\nbrought out by the subcommittee headed\nthority, his provisional authority has\none way or another. The gentleman is\nexpired and he must accede to the will of\nby the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr.\nnot answering my question. I am asking\nCongress.\nZABLOCKI) goes a long way toward meet-\nif he is suggesting the President's au-\nMr. DENNIS. Madam Chairman, will\ning these objectives. I, therefore, would\nthority, and his decision to commit troops\nthe gentleman from Delaware (Mr. DU\nlike to add my compliments to the gentle-\noverseas, is unconstitutional unless the\nPONT), yield?\nman from Wisconsin (Mr. ZABLOCKI) and\nCongress specifically delegates that\nMr. DU PONT. I yield to the gentleman\nto the members of the gentleman's sub-\nfrom Indiana (Mr. DENNIS).\npower to him, or specifically authorizes\ncommittee for the very fine work that\nthat use of troops before he makes the\nthey have done.\nMr. DENNIS. Madam Chairman, may I\ndecision?\nask, does the gentleman believe that if\nI do believe, however, that the measure\nthe Congress passes a concurrent resolu-\nMr. DU PONT. No. I am saying when\nwhich is before us is defective. Its prin-\ntion under section 4(c) calling for the\nthe President commits troops or com-\ncipal defect, insofar as I am concerned,\nmits the Nation to a course of war he\nceasing of hostilities, that resolution has\nis found in section 4(b). Section 4(b), as\nthe force and effect of law binding upon\nhas an obligation to get congressional\nhas already been discussed, permits the\nthe President?\napproval for that course. I think the\nCongress by inaction to arrive at a major\nMr. DU PONT. Yes, sir, I do, because\nConstitution is pretty clear on that.\npolicy decision regarding the most sig-\nwe have the warmaking power to start\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Madam Chairman, I\nnificant matter confronting the U.S.\nwith, and we are carving out of that an\nyield such time as he may require to the\nCongress-the question of war or peace.\ngentleman from North Carolina (Mr.\nexception and we are giving the Presi-\nI think that is wrong.\nTAYLOR).\ndent the right to conduct warmaking\nI think it is wrong for three reasons:\nMr. TAYLOR of North Carolina.\noperations until such time as the two\nFirst, as written section 4(b) perpetuates\nMadam Chairman, I rise in support of\nHouses by a simple majority agree we\nan imbalance in the warmaking power.\nHouse Joint Resolution 542 and am\nshould not do it.\nIt merely shifts shoes from one foot to\nproud to be a cosponsor of this legisla-\nMr. DENNIS. If the gentleman will\nthe other, from the President to the\ntion which provides that the United\nyield briefly, I would like to point out to\nCongress.\nStates not be taken into any future war\nhim that Professor Corwin, in discussing\nSecond, it perpetuates the tendency on\nexcept a purely defensive action for a\nthe part of Congress to abdicate its re-\nCXIX—1339-Part 17\n21226\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\nJune 25, 1973\nsponsibilities in dealing directly with the\none extreme to the other. What I seek to\nPresident from continuing the action he\nmajor issues confronting our country.\ndo through this amendment is to pro-\ninitiated?\nAnd, third, it may deny to the Mem-\nvide balance.\nMr. WHALEN. If it were a concurrent\nbers of Congress the opportunity to voice\nMr. DU PONT. Madam Chairman, will\nresolution, it would be, in my opinion,\ntheir views on this major question of war\nthe gentleman yield?\nthat it would bind the President. It would\nor peace, life and death of American\nMr. WHALEN. I yield to the gentle-\nnot be subject to a veto. If it were a joint\nservicemen.\nman from Delaware.\nresolution, it would, of course be either\nIn the light of this deficiency, there-\nMr. DU PONT. Under the gentleman's\naccepted or rejected by the President.\nfore, I intend at the appropriate time\namendment if both Houses acted to\nMr. BIESTER. Is it the intent of the\nthis Wednesday to offer an amendment\neither approve or disapprove, it is very\ngentleman in proposing the amendment\nto section 4(b).\nclear what would happen. What would\nthat the language 'resolution\" means a\nMadam Chairman, I would like to read\nthe gentleman's opinion be if one House\nconcurrent resolution? In other words,\nthis amendment for the record, so that\npassed a resolution of approval and the\ndoes the gentleman intend by this\nthe Members of the House will have an\nother House either defeated that resolu-\namendment to make limitation possible\nopportunity to review it in the days\ntion or passed a resolution the other\nby majority rule of the Congress or by a\nahead.\nway? Would the President then be able\ntwo-thirds vote?\nThe amendment reads as follows:\nto carry on, or would he have to with-\nMr. WHALEN. I have responded to the\nWithin 120 calendar days after a report\ndraw?\ngentleman from Illinois that this would\nis submitted or is required to be submitted\nMr. WHALEN. I am afraid I am un-\nbe decided at the time the report required\nby the President pursuant to section 3, the\nable to answer the gentleman's ques-\nby Section 3 was submitted to the Con-\nCongress by a declaration of war or by the\ntion at this time. I have studied this\npassage within such period of a resolution\ngress. This would be determined by the\nappropriate to the purpose, shall either ap-\nquestion in considerable depth, and I\nappropriate committees as to whether it\nprove, ratify, confirm and authorize the con-\nget different sets of answers. One might\nwould be a concurrent resolution or a\ntinuation of the action taken by the Pres-\nequate it with a declaration of war,\njoint resolution.\nident and reported to the Congress, or shall\nwhere failure to declare war in one\nMr. BIESTER. I thank the gentleman.\ndisapprove, in which case the President shall\nHouse would mean that there is no war\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Madam Chairman, I\nterminate any commitment and remove any\ndeclaration. On the other hand, I have\nenlargement of the United States armed\nyield 5 minutes to the gentleman from\nforces with respect to which such report was\nreceived advice that it is necessary that\nFlorida (Mr. FASCELL).\nsubmitted.\nboth Houses must agree.\nMr. FASCELL. Madam Chairman, we\nLet me say this. I intend to research\nhave several choices. One which has\nMadam Chairman, I feel that this\nthis further, and at the time the amend-\nbeen suggested is to do nothing. I find\namendment, if adopted, will do two\nment is introduced, I would hope to have\nthat suggestion very difficult to live with.\nthings. First, it will provide balance to\na more specific answer.\nI think all Members of Congress find it\nthe warmaking powers. It will assure\nMr. FINDLEY. Madam Chairman,\nextremely difficult to live with, too. The\nequality between the President and the\nwould the gentleman yield for a ques-\nCongress in recent years has three times\nCongress. Second, it will give the Con-\ntion?\nby action decided we ought to do some-\ngress an opportunity to voice its opin-\nMr. WHALEN. I yield to the gentleman\nthing and has previously adopted three\nion, to express its views-one way or an-\nfrom Illinois.\nresolutions.\nother-with respect to the question of\nMr. FINDLEY. The gentleman is using\nThis debate is not a new one. It has\nwar or peace.\nthe word \"resolution.\" Does that mean\nbeen raised for a long time. I can remem-\nI therefore hope that this amendment\na concurrent resolution or a joint resolu-\nber many campaigns, as other Members\nwill be adopted at the appropriate time.\ntion?\ncan also, in the last 18 years in which the\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Madam\nMr. WHALEN. I use the word \"resolu-\nprincipal issue or a major issue was the\nChairman, will the gentleman yield?\ntion\" advisedly. This may be either a\nfact that the President had exceeded his\nMr. WHALEN. I yield to the gentleman\njoint resolution or a concurrent resolu-\nauthority and had involved the Amer-\nfrom New Jersey.\ntion, to be decided at the time that such\nican people in warfare. I do not need to\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Madam\nreport is submitted to Congress. Specific-\nitemize those for the Members, whether\nChairman, I would like to commend the\nally, then it could be either a joint or a\nit was Korea, Vietnam, or some other\ngentleman from Ohio for his statement,\nconcurrent resolution.\naction.\nand to ask the gentleman if the gentle-\nMr. FINDLEY. If section 4(c) remains\nSo Congress has been concerned and,\nman is not fearful that proponents of\nin the bill, as I trust it would, this pro-\none way or another, we want to speak and\nthis measure may not feel that inaction\nvides for termination of hostilities by\nsay something. We can debate the con-\nby Congress is a key to what they con-\nconcurrent resolution. Then would not\nstitutional issues, and we should-what it\nsider a way of bringing balance?\nthe presumption be that the reference to\nmeans for the Congress to declare war\nI would guess there has been inaction,\nthe resolution in the preceding subpara-\nand what the powers of the President are\nand inaction characterizes Congress in a\ngraph would also have the same\nas Commander in Chief of the Army and\nnumber of areas, that it is felt that the\nmeaning?\nNavy. By the way, I have been very curi-\nonly way to reverse national policy is\nMr. WHALEN. I do not think so. The\nous about whether he is Commander in\nby having something happen if Congress\nresolution is intentionally flexible. It\nChief of the Air Force and the Depart-\ndoes not act. That is the thing that\ngives to the appropriate committees the\nment of Defense. I will leave that ques-\nmakes me fearful of the prospect for suc-\nopportunity to handle it either in terms\ntion for another time.\ncess of what the gentleman from Ohio is\nof a concurrent resolution or a joint res-\nBut the Constitution is really quite ex-\narguing. If the effort is to underline the\nolution, whichever they see fit.\nplicit that the President is Commander\nnecessity of Congress to face up to its\nMr. FINDLEY. It seems to me the lack\nin Chief of the Army and Navy.\nown responsibility, how could we be\nof precision leaves the status of war au-\nMadam Chairman, over 160 times, for\nagainst it? But if it refuses to face up to\nthority, therefore, too much up in the\none reason or another, the manpower of\nits responsibilities, to say they approve\nair.\nthis country has been committed to war.\nor disapprove, then we get a change by\nMr. BIESTER. Madam Chairman, will\nThis has occurred because of, in spite of,\nthe passage of time. There is an impor-\nthe gentleman yield?\nor without regard to the gray area that\ntant principle involved, recognizing that\nMr. WHALEN. I yield to the gentleman\nexists between the constitutional respon-\nit is an issue the Congress is reckoning\nfrom Pennsylvania.\nsibilities and prerogatives of Congress\nwith.\nMr. BIESTER. I should like to ask a\ndeclaring war and the Executive acting\nMr. WHALEN. I would agree with the\nquestion concerning the gentleman's pro-\nin his own capacity as Commander in\ngentleman that if the present language\nposed amendment. In the event that both\nChief.\nis retained in section 4(b), it would, in\nHouses took action by a majority, would\nIt has been suggested that we do not\nmy opinion at least, mean that Congress\nthat bind the President, even though he\nneed to take the kind of action proposed\nis not facing up to its responsibilities.\nmight disagree with it? In other words,\nin this resolution because we have the\nWe hear a great deal of talk these days\nwould it be subject to a veto in which\npower of the purse and therefore we\nabout Congress reasserting itself. Cer-\nboth Houses would have to marshal a\ncould stop the President. I humbly sub-\ntainly I think we are just going from\ntwo-thirds majority, to restrain the\nmit to the Members that is impossible.\nJune 25, 1973\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\n21227\nUnless we bring down the entire Govern-\nthen we will vote. Of course, we have\nstitutional right of Congress to declare\nment there is no way by stopping any\nthat right anyway.\nwar and stated the sense of Congress\ncurrent appropriation that we can do\nSo, what do we say if we amend 4(b)\nthat the President should consult with\nthat, or to go back and pick up past ap-\nas suggested? Answer: Nothing.\nCongress \"whenever feasible\" before\npropriations which the President has the\nA vote for this resolution is a vote for\nsending U.S. troops into conflict. The\npower to spend. If the President claims\nspecific congressional action now.\nproposal also directed the President to\nhe is exercising his right under the Con-\nThe time to act affirmatively is now on\nreport to Congress whenever he com-\nstitution and spends the money, we have\nthis resolution. We are saying in a very\nmitted troops into combat, sent combat-\nno choice. We may have a clear-cut,\nlimited and careful way that Congress\nready troops into foreign territory or en-\nbeautiful issue and we would be pre-\nwants to be consulted at the very begin-\nlarged the number of U.S. troops in an-\nsented with the question whether we\nning if it is at all possible; then we would\nother nation \"without specific prior au-\nwant to impeach our Chief Executive;\nexpect the President to terminate under\nthorization by Congress.\"\nbut we do not stop the war that way and\nthose very limited conditions set forth in\nwe do not stop expenditures. If the Chief\nThe House passed the resolution by\nthe resolution unless the Congress again\nan overwhelming majority in November\nExecutive claims or exercises the power\npositively acts again.\nof that year, but the Senate failed to act.\nas the Commander in Chief without a\nSo under the pending resolution Con-\nIn 1971 the chairman reintroduced the\ndeclaration of war by the Congress to\ngress would be required to act twice.\nWar Powers Resolution and I was pleased\npush the button on the atom bomb, the\nThat is an affirmative action now, not\nto join as a cosponsor again. The new\nfact that we cut off his money will not\nonly some affirmative action in the fu-\nresolution, House Joint Resolution 1, de-\nstop him from pushing the button. Fur-\nture. This resolution does not tie the right\nleted the phrase \"whenever feasible,\" and\nthermore the issue would be moot.\nof the Congress to act affirmatively again\ndeclared it the \"sense of Congress that\nAnother choice we have is that we can\nif it so desires by a very simple priority\nthe President should seek appropriate\nadopt the pending resolution, as contro-\nprocedure whereby any single member\nconsultations with Congress before in-\nversial as it may be in the minds of some.\ncan offer a resolution that must come to\nvolving\" U.S. forces in armed conflict.\nThe constitutional questions are impor-\nthe floor.\ntant and should be debated although it\nThe resolution passed the House again,\nIt seems to me that we have given Con-\nby voice vote.\nseems to me the committee has made it\ngress two opportunities instead of one\nLegislation passed by the Senate last\nquite clear in its reiteration of the well\nto act on the matter. So I say that what\nyear differed markedly from the resolu-\nrecognized principle of law that no con-\nis involved here is primarily the principle\ntion adopted twice by the House. Efforts\ngressional act can modify the Consti-\nof the Congress stating right now in this\ntution. What is important is the fact\nin conference to resolve the major dif-\nresolution how it feels on future com-\nthat the Congress speaks on the issue of\nferences between the two proposals were\nmitments of U.S. forces by the President.\nunsuccessful, and the issue was left un-\nwar and peace by the determination re-\nWe have been struggling with this is-\nresolved.\nflected in the pending resolution.\nsue a long time. This committee has\nHowever, let us assume for a moment\nThe resolution we are considering to-\nworked very hard over many years. I\nthe pending resolution is unconstitu-\nday is by far the best proposal submitted\ncommend the distinguished gentleman\ntional because it is a denial or a mitiga-\nto this House for our consideration. It is\nMr. ZABLOCKI from Wisconsin and the\ntion or in some way attempts to modify\nwell balanced and achieves, I believe, the\nmembers of his subcommittee who to-\nthe power of the President under the\nobjective we have all sought-namely, to\ngether with the chairman of the full\nConstitution-of course we cannot do\ndefine the relationship within which the\ncommittee the distinguished gentle-\nthat. The President has certain powers\nChief Executive and the Congress could\nman from Pennsylvania (Dr. MORGAN)\nunder the Constitution. If he claims and\nseparately and collectively exercise their\nbrought this bill to the floor of the House\nexercises his right under the Constitution\nrespective constitutional responsibilities\non four occasions.\ncontrary to the intent of this bill, he has\nand preserve the peace and security of\nMadam Chairman, as a cosponsor, I\nthe Nation.\nto do it in the face of the expressed in-\nrise in strong support of House Joint\ntent and will of the Congress of the\nIn addition, I believe it represents a\nResolution 542, the War Powers Resolu-\nUnited States. He can do it; he can dis-\nsignificantly less rigid position vis a vis\ntion of 1973. Again I reiterate that the\nregard the will of Congress but he will\nthe Senate proposal, and its approval\nchairman of the Subcommittee on Na-\nhave to swallow very hard to do it. Some\nmay make possible enactment of effective\ntional Security Policy and Scientific De-\npeople allege Presidents have been disre-\nlegislation. It is imperative that this be\nvelopments, Congressman ZABLOCKI, is to\ndone.\ngarding the expressed will and intent of\nbe commended for his leadership and\nthe people either as expressed by the\nA key to the pending resolution is the\nperseverence in pursuing this vital legis-\npeople themselves or by their Represent-\nlation.\nprovision for prior and ongoing consul-\natives in the Congress, so we would not\ntation by the President with the leader-\nThe need for legislation to clarify the\nbe faced with a new issue but at least for\nship and appropriate committees of the\nrespective responsibilities of the Congress\nthe first time this resolution would have\nCongress. This is of course essential.\nand the President under the Constitu-\non the statute books the expressed will\nThere is, in my judgment, no matter of\ntion to initiate, to conduct, and to con-\nof Congress.\nsuch a sensitive nature that it could not\nclude armed hostilities with other na-\nI want to get to the third alternative\nbe entrusted to Members of the Congress.\ntions became clear to me in May of 1970\nwhich has been recommended today. It\nAnd we must have the benefit of full\nwhen U.S. Armed Forces were committed\nhas been suggested that the Congress\nknowledge if we are to exercise our role\nto combat in Cambodia without prior\nshould act affirmatively, and the way we\nin the most responsible way.\ncongressional consultation or authoriza-\ndo that is to amend 4(b) of the pending\nI have urged throughout our commit-\ntion. In response to the clear need for\nresolution. The truth of the matter is if\ntee's consideration that the strongest\nan affirmative statement of the congres-\nwe examine that proposition very care-\npossible provision be made requiring\nfully and amend section 4(b) of this\nsional responsibility in committing U.S.\nconsultation. It serves a twofold pur-\nresolution, we would be doing nothing but\ncombat forces I had drafted a bill, H.R.\npose. Not only do we have the benefit of\nreiterating the powers which Congress\n17598, which I introduced on May 13,\nall the facts, but I believe, we as Mem-\nalready has. The issue would be more\n1970. I hoped that this proposal would\nbers of Congress could make a significant\nclearly presented by an amendment to\nserve as a vehicle for a reappraisal of the\ncontribution to the Executive's judgment.\nwar powers issue and a catalyst for a dis-\nrepeal section 4(b) or to vote against the\nThe resolution clearly recognizes, as 1t\nbill.\ncussion of the vital constitutional issue\nmust, that in some instances military ac-\ninvolved.\nBecause the truth of the matter is, if\ntion absent a declaration of war may be\nChairman ZABLOCKI concurred with the\nthe Congress can act any time it wants\ntaken. In any such instance involving\ncritical need for a review of the respec-\nto anyway, and we amend section 4(b)\nthe commitment of U.S. forces to hostili-\ntive congressional and executive powers\nto eliminate the 120 day requirement and\nties outside of the United States, com-\nand held extensive hearings during the\nstate that there must be an affirmative\nmitment of combat-equipped forces to\nsummer of 1970. Out of those hearings\nvote of the Congress, we are saying that\nany foreign nation, or the substantial\ncame the first war powers resolution,\nwe do not want to vote on the issue now,\nenlargement of combat-equipped U.S.\nHouse Joint Resolution 1355.\nForces already in a foreign nation, the\nbut wait until sometime in the future,\nThe 1970 resolution reaffirmed the con-\nPresident is required to submit within 72\n21228\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\nJune 25, 1973\nhours to both Houses a written report\nthe clear message of the people and\ntee on Foreign Relations in the Senate,\nclearly setting forth the circumstances\nthe Congress, however, the President\nand that one such resolution or bill shall\nnecessitating his action, the authority\ncontinues the bombing, with no author-\nbe reported out by such committee. Who\nunder which he took that action, and the\nity. The administration has made it\nshall decide what resolution or bill shall\nanticipated scope and cost of the action.\nclear that regardless of whether the\nbe reported out by the committee, of the\nUnlike the legislation passed last year\nCongress denies funding for the bomb-\nmany which may be offered? Who shall\nby the Senate and reported again this\ning, funds will be made available.\ndetermine that the chairman of the For-\nyear by the Foreign Relations Commit-\nIt is such a situation we must guard\neign Relations Committee of the other\ntee, House Joint Resolution 542 does not\nagainst. We must never again let our\nbody will bring the same kind of resolu-\nseek to define those kinds of action which\ncountry go to war, piece by piece, as we\ntion as the chairman of the Committee\ncan be taken absent a declaration of\nhave done in Southeast Asia.\non Foreign Affairs might? They might be\nwar. To do so, in my mind, would further\nThe responsibility belongs in the Con-\nentirely opposite resolutions.\nexpand the President's authority as Com-\ngress to insure against that possibility.\nHow can we be sure that we will not\nmander in Chief. Under the House pro-\nThe responsibility, under the Constitu-\nget into a confused state by the differ-\nposal, it is up to the President to justify\ntion, of committing U.S. troops to armed\ning actions of these committees in the\nhis action and cite the statutory or con-\nconflict is one shared by the legislative\ntwo bodies, so that we shall end up with\nstitutional authority under which he\nand executive branches of Government.\nthe 120 days expired and no action taken\nacted. To specifically define his authority\nThe balance between the two branches\nby the Congress, so the President would\nas S. 440 seeks to do, would give the\nhas swung heavily to the executive and\nbe forced to withdraw the troops, al-\nPresident statutory authority he does not\nwe must act now to restore it.\nthough it might be not in the national\nnow have. House Joint Resolution 542\nI urge your strong support of House\ninterest to do so?\navoids this, and in addition specifically\nJoint Resolution 542.\nI would suggest that as written this\nstates that the proposal does not add to\nMr. MAILLIARD. Madam Chairman,\njoint resolution in this and other re-\nany existing powers of the President.\nI yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from\nspects is a defective resolution.\nA significant change in House Joint\nAlabama (Mr. BUCHANAN).\nI would further suggest in my own\nResolution 542, not included in proposals\nMr. BUCHANAN. Madam Chairman,\nhumble opinion it is not very easy to\nconsidered by the House previously,\nrunning through the course of this de-\nspell out the war powers of the President\nwould terminate within 120 days author-\nbate has been the recurring theme that\nor what they may or may not be except\nity for the continued commitment of\nCongress ought act to affirm and fulfill\nby amendment to the Constitution,\nU.S. Forces unless the Congress takes\nits constitutional responsibilities in the\nwhich this body and the people together\nspecific action to declare war or author-\nevent of military action initiated by the\ncould do if we saw fit to do it and could\nize the continued use of the Armed\nPresident. In the face of a presidential\nagree on the spelling out of the powers.\nForces.\nemergency action, Congress should\nI would agree that we could cut the\nThe other body has proposed that\nstand up and speak out in approval or\nmoney off, as others have suggested, to\nemergency authority exercised by the\ndisapproval.\nstop an action. I would say to my friend\nPresident shall terminate within 30 days\nI find it very hard to understand,\nfrom Florida that nothing would pre-\nunless the Congress acts to authorize its\ntherefore, why it would not be a good\nclude the President from pushing the\ncontinuation.\nidea to not only require the reporting\nbutton on the 119th day under this\nI have argued that such a requirement\nand the consultation as this bill will do,\nmeasure, if he proposed to push the but-\nwould place the Congress in the position\nby the President with the Congress but\nton for a nuclear holocaust, God forbid.\nof ratifying, in a pro forma manner, ac-\nalso to mandate action by the Congress\nI would say, however, Madam Chair-\ntion taken by the President. A call by\nitself, as the amendment which will be\nman, we have the opportunity to make\nthe President to protect the national\noffered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.\nthis joint resolution a better joint reso-\nsecurity, and \"rally round the flag,\"\nWHALEN), and a similar amendment\nlution. We have the opportunity to make\nwould build strong sentiment and emo-\noffered by me in the committee would do.\nit one which will mandate the Congress\ntion that I can scarcely imagine that the\nCongress has a responsibility under\nto act, not to evade action or legislate\nCongress would not quickly act to au-\nthe Constitution, and a responsibility to\nby inaction.\nthorize action.\nthe American people to take definite,\nMr. KEMP. Madam Chairman, will\nOn the other hand, I believe that a\npositive action in such a situation. Yes,\nthe gentleman yield?\n120-day period may be a sufficiently\nthis our prerogative, and Congress must\nMr. BUCHANAN. I yield to the gentle-\nlengthy time to allow emotions to sub-\nact in response to the Presidential action;\nman from New York.\nside and to permit a careful study of all\nup or down; yea or nay.\nMr. KEMP. I appreciate the gentleman\nfacts in proper perspective. The Con-\nThis is positive action, and I would\nyielding. I agree with the gentleman's\ngress and the country could then be\nsubmit it is preferable action to the\nstatement that it is difficult to rigidly\nable to make a rational decision on\nprovision of the present bill in section\ndefine those areas constitutionally in\nwhether the impending action warrants\n4(b), which would simply say that if\nwhich the Commander in Chief is going\nthe continued commitment of the U.S.\nCongress does nothing at all, a major\nto be allowed to be Commander in Chief.\nforces.\npolicy decision is made thereby.\nMy question is, would it not perhaps\nIt is important that there be some\nThere has been reference made to the\npreclude the possibility of successful\nboundary of the discretionary authority\nrequirements of section 5 in this reso-\nquiet diplomacy if in fact this is brought\nwhich the President must have. I think\nlution as to what shall be required and\nto a vote in the Congress within 120 days,\nthe proposal embodied in House Joint\nin case a resolution is presented on this\non an issue that might very well be re-\nResolution 542 meets the objections of\nsubject. May I refer to the language of\nsolved, as I say, through quiet diplomacy;\nemotional ratification, and provides that\nthe bill, section 5(a):\nthat is, the visit by the President to the\nboundary.\nSEC. 5. (a) Any resolution or bill introduced\n6th Fleet at the time of the Soviet-\nThis bill's applicability to the ongoing\npursuant to section 4(b) at least forty-five\nbacked Syrian invasion of Jordan a few\nconflict in Southeast Asia is vital. It is\ndays before the expiration of the one hun-\nyears ago?\nbecause of our military involvement\ndred and twenty-day period specified in said\nAre not some of the successes of this\nthere, and the extremely broad interpre-\nsection shall be referred to the Committee on\nadministration and previous administra-\ntation of Presidential \"Commander in\nForeign Affairs of the House of Representa-\ntions in international affairs better han-\ntives or the Senate Foreign Relations Com-\nChief\" powers to continue and expand\ndled at a quiet level, rather than exacer-\nmittee, and one such resolution or bill shall\nthat involvement, that has led to this\nbated by bringing them to a head?\nbe reported out by such committee, together\ndebate and all those that have preceded\nwith its recommendations, not later than\nMr. BUCHANAN. I would say to my\nit.\nthirty days before the expiration of the\nfriend that I would assume when the\nThe House has again today reiterated\none hundred and twenty-day period specified\nPresident commits American forces to\nits opposition to further military in-\nin said section.\nsome kind of combat situation that the\nsituation is somewhat exacerbated al-\nvolvement in Southeast Asia, and the\nThere may be 50 differing resolutions\nready, and it would hardly seem an ap-\nbombing of Cambodia and Laos. Despite\noffered. The bill says that they shall be\npropriate time for quiet diplomacy.\nthe \"end\" of the Vietnam war, the\nreferred to the Committee on Foreign\nThe CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-\nsigning of two peace agreements, and\nAffairs in the House and to the Commit-\ntleman from Alabaina has expired.\n21229\nMr. MAILLIARD. Madam Chairman,\nhave been interpreted in a situation\nAmerican Fleet, when the sailors were ar-\nwhich is not at all a modern day situa-\nrested in Tampico, issued an ultimatum\nI yield the gentleman 2 additional min-\ntion and perhaps is one from which we\nto the Mexican Government of Huerta\nutes.\nMr. BUCHANAN. I thank the gentle-\nmay extract the heat of passion today. I\nthat they give a salute to the American\nman for yielding additional time.\nshall pose the question to the gentleman\nflag or else action would be taken?\nIs my friend from New York suggest-\nfrom Wisconsin (Mr. ZABLOCKI) rather\nThere was not any authority for that\ning that he thinks the present section\nin the nature of a hypothetical question\nat the time, was there?\nthan in the nature of an historic fact,\nMr. ZABLOCKI. The President or-\n4(b) is a better provision than that we\nbecause the historic facts may be some-\ndered the fleet to move, but, as I under-\nwould offer?\nwhat in dispute.\nstand it, he then came to the Congress to\nMr. KEMP. I have not made up my\nmind. That is what I stated. I am listen-\nMadam Chairman, in 1914 the United\nask permission to act.\ning to the debate.\nStates was engaged in certain difficulties\nMr. ECKHARDT. Under this act,\nThere is a very definite influence of the\nwith Mexico. Several U.S. sailors were ar-\ncould the President act first and then re-\n6th Fleet or the 7th Fleet. Incidentally, it\nrested in Tampico. At that time Vittori-\nport immediately afterward?\ndid not bring about a war in the Mid-\nano Huerta was the rather dictatorial\nThe CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-\nPresident of Mexico, and there was a rev-\ntleman has expired.\neast. It was one of those areas in which\nolution going on in that country. We had\nMr. ZABLOCKI. I yield to the gentle-\nthe President made a successful\noriginally given him clandestine support\nman 1 additional minute.\nmaneuver.\nbut we had gotten tired of him-he was\nMr. ECKHARDT. Could the President\nOnce a President either activates or\npretty dictatorial-and we were more or\nhave acted without prior authority so\nvisits the 6th Fleet or the 7th Fleet, in the\nFormosa Straits, he has taken, at least\nless favorable to Carranza.\nlong as within 72 hours he reported it\nas I understand it, some type of action\nSo on April 14 certain U.S. troops\nto the Congress in a situation of the type\nwhich might prevent war or bring on\nseized the Port of Vera Cruz in order to\nI have described?\nprevent a German merchantman from\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Yes, but the resolu-\nwar. But it has been successful in many\nbringing arms to Huerta.\ntion does not add to the President's\ninstances.\nMr. BUCHANAN. May I say to my\nMadam Chairman, would that in the\npower. And under 4(b) the President\nfriend that the chances are very great in\ngentleman from Wisconsin's opinion, be\ncould continue the commitment for 120\nmany instances this could be handled\none of the acts referred to in section 3(1)\ndays unless Congress took positive action\nwithin the 120 days. Congress would have\non page 2, that is \"committing the U.S.\napproving or disapproving.\nArmed Forces to hostilities outside the\nMr. ECKHARDT. Since my time is\n120 days to act up or down.\nI would also say that the President\nterritory of the United States, its posses-\nvery short, I would say if that be true,\nmight, by quiet diplomacy, convince the\nsions and territories\"?\nthen I think this act purports to expand\nCongress of the rightness of his cause, to\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Yes, it would.\nthe President's constitutional authority\ngive him approval of his action.\nMr. ECKHARDT. Then, had that oc-\nand give him authority to act, at least\nThat is provided for in the amendment\ncurred, the procedures involved in the\nduring that 120 days, far beyond the pro-\nremainder of section 3, that is, the Presi-\nvisions of the Constitution.\nwhich permits approval as well as dis-\ndent's requirement to give 72 hours' no-\nThe best discussion of the President's\napproval. I would hope that would be the\ncase in such instances. I would further\ntice to the Speaker and other authorities\nauthority I think is in Hamilton's Fed-\nnote the language of the Whalen-Bu-\nand to give the circumstances and the\neralist paper 69 wherein he says:\nchanan amendment provides for the ac-\nconstitutional and legislative provisions\nThe President is to be Commander in Chief\nof the Army and Navy of the United States.\ntion it mandates either by declaration of\nunder which the authority existed, would\nwar or the passage of a resolution appro-\nhave had to be carried out, I assume.\nIn this respect his authority would be nomi-\nnally the same as that of the king of Great\npriate for the purpose. Again, this could\nAnd then congressional action would be\nBritain—\nbe a resolution specifically approving a\nprovided under section 4.\nMadam Chairman, the thing that\nThe CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-\nspecific and limited action by the Presi-\ndent or such broader approval or disap-\ntroubles me is the language under sec-\ntleman has again expired.\nproval the Congress might in its wisdom\ntion 8(c) providing that nothing in this\nMr. ZABLOCKI. I yield the gentleman\ngrant. Congress would be free to act ac-\nact \"shall be construed as granting any\n1 additional minute.\ncording to its best judgment, but would be\nauthority to the President with respect\nMr. ECKHARDT. He continues:\nrequired to take definite action on what\nto the commitment of U.S. Armed Forces\nBut in the substance much inferior to it.\nwould surely be an issue of the first prior-\nto hostilities or to the territory, airspace,\nIt would amount to nothing more than the\nity in an area in which in my judgment\nor waters of a foreign nation.\"\nsupreme command and direction of the mili-\ntary and naval forces as First General and\nthe Constitution itself mandates the\nIt would seem to me that the applica-\nadmiral of the Confederacy; while that of the\nCongress to assume responsibility and\ntion of section 8 of the act would recog-\nBritish king extends to the declaring of war\nexercise authority.\nnize that President Wilson's act was il-\nand to the raising and regulating of fleets\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Madam Chairman,\nlegal in the first place.\nand armies, all of which by the Constitution\nwill the gentleman yield?\nNow, is the gentleman saying that be-\nunder consideration, would appertain to the\nMr. BUCHANAN. I am glad to yield\ncause of the provisions of section 3, he\nlegislature.\nto the gentleman from Wisconsin.\nis acting legally until he is called on to\nI submit that the action of Wilson in\nMr. ZABLOCKI. But the provisions in\nremove the troops, although he would\nthat case, if it were permitted for 120\nsection 4(b) and 4(c) do not preclude\nhave been acting illegally, as I read the\ndays, would have utterly destroyed\nthe Congress from giving similar ap-\nlanguage under section 8(c) ?\nHuerta, because by July he had had to\nproval in an expeditious manner, ap-\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Madam Chairman,\nresign, the customhouse at Vera Cruz\nproving the President's commitment of\nthe reason for section 8(c) is to make\nhaving been at that time commandeered\ntroops or whatever action he has taken.\nclear that the resolution does not add\nor at least restricted by American forces\nMr. BUCHANAN. Yes. I am glad the\nany additional powers to the Executive.\nin that area.\ngentleman mentioned that for the sake\nI should add that resolution does not de-\nMr. BELL. Madam Chairman, I yield\nof legislative history.\ntract any power from the President\n10 minutes to the gentleman from In-\nI would say what we seek to do is to\nwhen he acts under the Constitution as\ndiana (Mr. DENNIS).\nmandate action by the Congress. I think\nCommander in Chief.\nMr. DENNIS. Madam Chairman, we\nthis is what the American people want\nIn the specific case of President Wil-\nare debating here this evening probably\nof us, that we act and not fail to act,\nson, to which the gentleman from Texas\nthe most fateful and important matter\nthat we accept our responsibility and not\n(Mr. ECKHARDT) refers, President Wilson\nthat either this Congress or any other\nevade it.\nrequested authority to use the Armed\nCongress is likely to debate. The fact that\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Madam Chairman, I\nForces 2 days before they were actually\nwe are forced to do it at 9 o'clock in the\nyield 5 minutes to the gentleman from\nlanded, and Congress passed a joint reso-\nevening and to largely empty benches is\nTexas (Mr. ECKHARDT).\nlution giving him such authority the day\nnot merely unfortunate, it is outrageous.\nMr. ECKHARDT. Madam Chairman, I\nafter they landed.\nThis is not only an important question\nrise to ask first a few questions.\nMr. ECKHARDT. But do I not recall\nwe are debating, but it is an old one\nI would like to know how the bill would\nthat Admiral Mayo, commander of the\nwhich has been with us more or less\n21230\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\nJune 25, 1973\nthroughout the history of the Republic\nthe Vietnamese war was in progress, I\nof both of them. I have made a very\nand it is one on which it is very difficult\nstill think it is better to look calmly\nserious effort, I will say to the commit-\nto draw legislation, because it inevitably\ntoward future actions rather than try to\ntee, to draw that kind of a bill.\ninvolves constitutional questions. It has\ndeal in this legislation with something in\nI would also like to suggest that I sup-\na long and interesting history which\nwhich we are already involved. We do not\npose we are trying to adopt a measure\nmight be discussed if we had time.\nknow what we will be involved in when\nwhich will be passed into law and which\nThe gentleman from Wisconsin and\nand if the measure is ever adopted. We\nmight stand some possibility, even, of\nthe majority of the committee have pro-\nmay be in a war in the Middle East, for\noverriding a possible Executive veto. I\nduced a bill here for which we can thank\ninstance, by the time this becomes a law,\nsuggest to the Members that the bill I\nthem whether we agree with them or not,\nand under this committee bill it applies\nhave drawn has a better change to pass\nbecause it raises a topic for debate which\neven though the hostilities started before\nand a better chance, if that situation\nought to be debated and considered in\nthis bill was passed.\nshould arise, to sustain itself against any\nthis Congress.\nMr. WOLFF. Madam Chairman, if the\npossible Presidential veto than does the\nIn spite of the work which has gone\ngentleman will yield, does the bill pro-\ncommittee resolution.\ninto that bill by the distinguished com-\nvide for a specific war, or is it for all\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Madam\nmittee, the distinguished chairman and\nwars?\nChairman, will the gentleman yield?\nthe distinguished subcommittee chair-\nMr. DENNIS. Of course it is for all\nMr. DENNIS. I yield to the gentleman\nman, for all of whom I have the very\nwars. But the point I am making is\nfrom New Jersey.\ngreatest respect, I submit to you that\nthat the committee bill says it applies\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I should like\nthere are at least four serious and, I\nto those which are presently existing.\nto commend the gentleman for his state-\nthink, fatal drawbacks to House Joint\nSo I suggest it might be wiser to make\nment, because he does underline some\nResolution 542.\nit apply only to wars which come into\nvery serious weaknesses of the proposal\nOne is the matter which we have dis-\nbeing after the statute has been enacted.\nas it is written. I think it also should\ncussed at considerable length here today,\nMr. WOLFF. It does not say presently\nbe emphasized that the gentleman from\nthat which has the Congress set vital pol-\nexisting wars; this says wars that are in\nTexas underlines another weakness\nicy in this vital field, not by doing some-\nprogress at the time of passage.\nwhich is very dimensional, and that is\nthing, but by failing to do anything. I\nMr. DENNIS. Presently in progress at\nthe extent to which the proposal per-\nfeel that is a very great weakness in this\nthe time of passage, so they have to be\nhaps inadvertently may expand Presi-\nbill. And of course I would support the\npresently existing, they started before\ndential authority far beyand what is\namendment to be offered by the gentle-\nthe passage of the resolution.\npresently understood to be the limits of\nman from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN). But, as I\nMr. WOLFF. So we should disregard\nhis constitutional power. So we have\nwill discuss with you in a moment. I have\nthat war, then?\nboth a contraction and an expansion.\na bill of my own on this subject, which\nMr. DENNIS. It would not disregard\nWe have limitations imposed on him and\nis a complete bill, and which, if the par-\nit under this bill. What I am saying to\nin an arbitrary and probably unconsti-\nliamentary situation permits, I shall offer\nthe gentleman from New York is that\ntutional way.\nas a substitute, that will likewise care for\nI think it would be a wiser measure if\nI think all of this is reason for the gen-\nthat same situation, in the same way,\nwe did not try to apply it to some-\neral concern about the wisdom of what\nand also do certain other things.\nthing which is already in progress when\nhas been proposed.\nMr. STRATTON. Madam Chairman,\nwe passed it.\nMr. DENNIS. I agree with the gentle-\nwill the gentleman yield?\nThe gentleman may disagree with me,\nman from New Jersey, and I will say\nMr. DENNIS. I will be happy to yield\nbut that is a matter of opinion.\nany legislation in this field is extremely\nto the gentleman from New York.\nThe fourth problem-and this is a\ndifficult. I came to the conclusion only\nMr. STRATTON. Madam Chairman, I\npoint which I cover in my bill and which\nsomewhat reluctantly, and after a great\njust want to say to the gentleman that I\nis not covered in the committee bill, and\ndeal of study, even that anything should\nthink his bill is an excellent bill, and I\nwhich I think is a very important point\nbe attempted, but I believe there has been\ncertainly would support it if the gentle-\nin my bill-I provide that not only must\nsufficient erosion of congressional power\nman offers it, and if the parliamentary\nwe vote approval or disapproval within\nto justify the effort, providing we can\nsituation does not prevent its acceptance,\n90 days after the initial commitment of\ndo something with which we have a\nthen I have a similar version which I in-\ntroops, if there has been no declaration\nchance to live, something which can ac-\ntend to offer at the proper time.\nof war, or no attack on this country.\ntually operate, something which merely\nI think what the gentleman from In-\nBut also the President must make pe-\ngives the Congress-and that is all I am\ndiana wants to do is to require positive\nriodic reports, if we approve in the first\ndoing-a tool to use rather than the\naction by the Congress as being the\ninstance, of the progress of affairs, of\nmeat ax approach of the appropriation\nproper way to proceed. And I commend\nthe progress of hostilities, if any, at in-\nprocess, I propose a measure which will\nthe gentleman for his efforts.\ntervals not to exceed 6 months; and\npermit us to go ahead, and to discharge\nMr. DENNIS. I thank the gentleman\nwithin 30 days after each one of those\nour function in this field under the Con-\nfrom New York for his assistance and\nsubsequent 6-months reports we must\nstitution.\nsupport.\nagain vote approval or disapproval. In\nMr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I thank the\nThe second thing which I feel is a\nno case, under my bill, do we stop the\ngentleman.\nserious drawback to the committee bill is\naction unless we vote disapproval, but\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Madam Chairman, I\nthis matter of providing that if we wish\nwe do have a recurring opportunity to\nyield 1 minute to the gentleman from\nto discontinue hostilities which have\ndo that, a continuing oversight of the\nTexas.\nbeen instituted, we can do it by a con-\nsituation; and in each case, both the\nMr. MILFORD. Madam Chairman, I\ncurrent resolution. I do not want to be-\nfirst time within 90 days and there-\nam strongly in favor of a war powers\nlabor the point unduly, but I think this is\nafter every 6 months, within 30 days, we\nresolution that would once again return\nsomething which, if it means anything,\nare required to vote. We have to act. If\nto the Congress its constitutional power\nif it is going to restrain the executive, has\nand when we disapprove, then the Presi-\nto declare war or combat actions.\nto have the binding force of law. I\ndent has to call off the troops.\nI am strongly against House Joint Res-\nsubmit to the Members that all the au-\nMy bill also does not apply to hostili-\nolution 542, in its present form. This res-\nthorities say that if we are going to do\nties which might be existing before it\nolution is dangerous to this Nation, as it\nsomething which has the force of law,\nbecame law, and it does not affect\nis drafted.\nsomething which is legislative in charac-\nexisting treaty obligations, whatever\nWar or combat actions-in any Na-\nter, then we have to go through the nor-\nthey are, which I do not attempt in the\ntion-come about only as a last resort.\nmal legislative process, which, for better\nbill to define.\nWith modern-day weapons, all-out war\nor worse, requires presentiment to the\nI am going to suggest to the Members\nof the World War II variety will prob-\nexecutive. I think there may be an\nthat a bill to be successful in this field\nably never occur again. I think it is ob-\namendment offered on that subject.\nhas to be one which provides for con-\nvious to all that no country could win\nThirdly, the committee bill applies to\ngressional participation, which also does\na nuclear war.\nexisting hostilities. And while that is not\nnot hamstring the Executive, and which\nTherefore, I do not believe that this\nas important as it would have been while\nallows flexibility and action on the part\nCongress shall ever again be assembled\nJune 25, 1973\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\n21231\nfor the purpose of declaring war in the\nmaterial spats between small nations in\nof further procrastination and inaction:\nsense written in our Constitution.\nother parts of the world, may sometimes\nindeed that should be the very cause of\nCombat actions are another story. The\nhave a vital bearing on our survival.\nour present determination to act respon-\nlimited war is a distinct possibility, in-\nIt is very important that this Nation\nsibly and pass this bill. It is no secret that\ndeed, a probability. The world is seeing\nhave the ability to respond rapidly and\nour branch of government, the Congress\nmany of these limited action combat en-\ndecisively, under these circumstances. As\nof the United States has come under in-\ngagements. In all probability, there will\na practical matter, the President could\ncreasing criticism from our people for\nbe many more before the world learns\nnot consult sensibly with the Congress\nhaving abdicated its full role in many\nthat we can live together without killing\nunder the present provisions of House\nsubstantive areas of Federal policymak-\neach other.\nJoint Resolution 542.\ning. Nor are we unaware that in many\nHouse Joint Resolution 542, in its pres-\nIn order to give the President a prac-\nquarters the legislative arm is viewed if\nent form, does not face up to the realities\ntical means of carrying out the desires\nnot quite with contempt, then certainly\nof limited wars. This resolution demands\nof all Members of Congress, we have got\nwith something less than the minimal\nthat the President consult with the\nto establish a responsible vehicle for the\nrespect due to the body which forges the\nCongress. I strongly agree with this\nPresident to communicate with in the\npolicies that guide our Nation's destiny.\nprovision. He should consult with the\nCongress.\nThis sorry state is partially of our own\nCongress.\nThis vehicle could consist of a select\nmaking, for many times we have sought\nHowever, House Joint Resolution 542\ncommittee of responsible Members that\nrefuge in our own self-doubts, and we\ndoes not provide for a practical way for\nare nominated by the Speaker and\nhave yielded to Executive who have told\nthe President to communicate with the\nelected by the House. This select com-\nus that we do not share the wisdom, or\nCongress. This failure negates the value\nmittee must be prohibited, by law under\nthe foresight, or the concern for the gen-\nof a war powers act.\npenalty of prison, from revealing the\neral well-being of our people that the\nWars are conducted as a result of data\nclassified information provided by the\nExecutive can assert.\naccumulated from highly classified in-\nPresident. Having been elected by the\nWith this viewpoint I cannot disagee\ntelligence information. Wars are con-\nHouse. these committee members would\nmore vigorously. But of much greater\nducted on the basis of supersensitive in-\nrepresent the sense of the Congress. In\nsignificance, the very Constitution of\nvolvements that have a vital effect on\nthis manner the President would have a\nthis land, which each and every one of us\nthe nations concerned. These are not\nvaluable input that is not now available\ntakes a solemn oath to protect and de-\nmatters that one can print in the CON-\nto him.\nfend, paints a strikingly different picture.\nGRESSIONAL RECORD.\nI had considered trying to introduce\nIt would hardly be necessary for me to\nTherefore, in House Joint Resolution\nan amendment to House Joint Resolution\nread the words of that brilliant instru-\n542 we are saying, \"Mr. President, by\n542, that would establish such a com-\nment to my colleagues to show our role in\nlaw you must come over here to Congress\nmittee. After consideration, I decided\nthe operation of our National Govern-\nand tell us all of our national secrets\nthat this would be unwise. Being a new\nment; nor do I desire to lecture on the\nbefore you can take actions that might\nMember, I did not feel that I had the\nmeaning of separation of powers as it\nbe vital to our survival.\" This is ridic-\nexperience to author such an amend-\napplies to the division of responsibility\nulous.\nment. Furthermore, it should be care-\nbetween the President and the Congress.\nOn the other hand, as I stated earlier,\nfully drawn by committee action, rather\nRather, I will focus in on the war power,\nI think it is vital that the President\nthan the dubious means of a floor\nas it is described in the articles on the\nshould consult with the Congress before\namendment.\nPresident, and on the Congress. Article\ncommitting this Nation to a combat\nTherefore, at the appropriate time, I\nII, section 2, defines the powers of the\naction.\nhope there will be a motion to recommit\nExecutive with respect to the military\nHouse Joint Resolution 542 does not\nthis bill to committee with the hope that\noperations of the United States:\nprovide a vehicle for responsible con-\nthis vital factor will be added. By the\nThe President shall be the Commander in\ngressional communications. The lack of\naddition of a responsible War Powers\nChief of the Army and Navy of the United\nsuch a vehicle is the prime reason why\nCommittee, both the Congress and the\nStates, and of the militia of the several States\nthe President has been unable to report\nPresident will be better equipped to make\nwhen called into the actual service of the\nto the Congress on the Vietnam and\nthe awesome decision to use or not use\nUnited States;\nTo the Congress, the\nCambodian operations.\nAmerican troops in a combat action.\nConstitution assigned numerous legislative\nNo individual Member, no committee,\nWhen the motion to recommit is made,\nwar powers, among them, in article I, section\nnor the leadership structure has the\nI would hope each of you would sup-\n8, \"To declare war.\"\nnecessary intelligence and information\nport it.\nThe very words of the Constitution\nto make a decision to commit or not\nMr. MAILLIARD. Madam Chairman,\nwould seem to present the case quite\ncommit troops into a combat action.\nI have no further requests for time.\nclearly-the Congress is to declare the\nThat information is available only to\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Madam Chairman, I\nwars in which our Nation is to engage,\nthe administration.\nyield 5 minutes to the gentleman from\nand the President is to be the military\nAs presently structured, the adminis-\nNew York (Mr. WOLFF).\ncommander of our forces in fighting those\ntration has no congressional committee\nMr. WOLFF. Madam Chairman, as I\nwars. It might be argued that this ap-\nor organization with which it can share\nrise today to speak in support of the\nproach is too simplistic; that there are\nsuper-secret information responsibility.\nWar Powers Act of 1973, I am aware of\ntoo many variations and unpredictable\nSure, the President can go to the For-\nthe gravity of this bill and its implica-\nsituations that can arise to adhere too\neign Relations Committee or Armed\ntion for our Nation and, indeed, for the\nclosely to this scheme. Indeed it might\nServices Committee and give them a\nentire world. It is because of the signifi-\nbe argued that the founders could not\nbriefing. However, under present House\ncance of this piece of legislation that I\nhave meant that there should be no flexi-\nrules, individual Members-at their own\nwish to commend the thoughtful and\nbility in this arrangement, for there\ndiscretion-can print it in the papers\nincisive work of Chairman MORGAN and\nwould be too much danger from our\nthe next day.\nChairman ZABLOCKI who chairs the sub-\nenemies to cast such a rigid die. And to\nObviously, that is no way to run a war.\ncommittee and the members of the Na-\na certain extent this is true. Yet if we\nAn army must have only one com-\ntional Security Policy Subcommittee.\nlook to history-if we look to the words\nmander. It cannot have 536, particularly\nTheirs was no easy task, for in this bill we\nand the writings of those who forged the\nwhen 535 of them do not have access to\nsee the lessons of history, the immortal\nUnited States of America from the 13\nthe classified data necessary to make\nconcepts imbedded in the American Con-\nColonies, we will see very clearly what the\nreasonable decisions.\nstitution, and the results of intensive\noriginal intent was, and where there was\nSince the olden days of declared wars,\nand emotional debates on our national\nroom for reasonable men to differ.\nthe United States has become dependent\nstructure of government that have raged\nAlexander Hamilton, one of the draft-\nupon other nations for its survival. Our\nover the last several years.\ners who most strongly supported the con-\nenergy imports are a good example of\nYet the fact that this proposal has\ncept of a powerful executive, defended\nour dependence upon others. No longer\nbeen the subject of deep controversy\nthe proposed Constitution in the \"Fed-\ncan we say that actions in other lands\nwithin and without the organs of gov-\neralist Papers\" with great vigor. In his\nare none of our business. Seemingly im-\nernment should not urge us to the shelter\ndiscussions of the war powers, he com-\n21232\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\nJune 25, 1973\npared the role of the new American Fed-\nGovernment, from acting to repel attacks\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Madam Chairman, I\neral Executive with the then Governor of\non American soil, to defend American\nyield 1 minute to the gentleman from\nNew York and the powers of the King of\ntroops from attacks overseas. But what\nFlorida (Mr. BENNETT).\nthe Constitution does prohibit, is the\nMr. BENNETT. Madam Chairman, I\nEngland by writing:\nThe President will have only the occasional\nPresident acting unilaterally to begin\nhave some reservations about the resolu-\ncommand of such part of the militia of the\nhostilities. This country has separated\ntion as it stands, and I am going to sug-\nnation as by legislative provision may be\nthe military from the civilian function,\ngest some amendments.\ncalled into the actual service of the union.\nand indeed has subjugated the military\nMadam Chairman, the war powers res-\nThe King of Great Britain and the Governor\nto the civilian authorities, for precisely\nolution before us seems to me to grant\nof New York have at all times the entire com-\nthat reason.\nwar powers to the President which are\nmand of all the militia within their several\nThis view was specifically upheld by\nthose of the Congress under the Constitu-\njurisdictions. In this article therefore the\npower of the President would be inferior to\nthe Supreme Court of the United States,\ntion; and which should stay there. I\nthat of either the monarch or the governor.\nin the 1850 case of Fleming against Page,\nwould prefer instead to have a more\nThe President is to be Commander in Chief\nwhich bluntly held that when the Presi-\nmodest proposal.\nof the Army and Navy of the United States.\ndent assumed the role of Commander in\nFor instance, section 2 could read:\nIn this respect his authority would be nomi-\nChief, \"his duty and his power are pure-\nThe President shall consult with the\nnally the same with that of the King of\nly military.\" The theory that the Com-\nleadership and applicable committees of Con-\nGreat Britain, but in substance much in-\nmander in Chief has large powers first\ngress before substantially enlarging United\nferior to it. It would amount to nothing\nappeared during the Civil War, but this\nStates Armed Forces in any foreign nation;\nmore than the Supreme Command and Di-\nor before placing any United States Armed\nrection of the Military and Naval Forces, as\nwas justified, as Lincoln repeatedly said,\nForces in any foreign nation where none\nFirst General and Admiral of the Confed-\nby the emergency of rebellion and in-\nhad been immediately prior to such\neracy, while that of the British king extends\nvasion. Indeed, it was Congressman\nplacement.\nto the declaring of war and to the raising and\nAbraham Lincoln who perhaps most\nregulating of fleets and armies-all which, by\nclearly delineated the reasons for strict-\nThen all of page 2 could be stricken\nthe constitution under consideration, would\nly inhibiting the role of the Executive as\ndown to line 19 and that could be amend-\nappertain to the legislature.\nCommander in Chief, when he said:\ned to read \"Sec. 3. The President upon\nWhen Hamilton wrote those words, he\nAllow the President to invade a neighbor-\ndoing any of the things set forth in Sec.\nwas at the same time arguing for a\ning nation whenever he shall deem it neces-\n2 shall submit within seventy-two.\"\nstrong executive in matters involving the\nsary for such a purpose, and you allow him\nThen at page 3 line 1 add after the\nconduct of war-that is, he was well\nto make war at his pleasure. Study to see if\nsemicolon the word \"and\". Then strike\naware that the President must have full\nyou can fix any limit to his power in this\nlines 2 and 3 of page 3; and at line 4\nauthority to direct the military opera-\nrespect, after having given him so much\nthereof strike the letter \"E\" and replace\npower as you propose\nkings have al-\ntions of the Nation in conflict. But in dis-\nwith \"D.\" Strike lines 9 through 25 at\nways been involving and impoverishing their\ntinguishing from the powers of the King,\npeople in wars, pretending, generally, if not\npage 3.\nhe was clearly saying that role of the\nalways that the good of the people was the\nStrike lines 1 through 12 on page 4.\nCommander in Chief was a military one,\nobject. This, our constitutional convention\nStrike line 14 on page 4, and substitute\nnot a policy role. This view was seconded\nunderstood to be the most oppressive of all\nthe following:\nby Madison in the same series of writ-\nkingly oppressions, and they resolved to so\nSEC. 4. Any resolution or bill introduced\nframe the constitution so that no one man\nto terminate the utilization of United States\nings, who states quite bluntly:\nshould hold the power of bringing oppression\narmed forces as above described. Strike lines\nEvery just view that can be taken of this\nupon us. But your view destroys the whole\n15, 16, 22 and 23 of page 4. Strike the word\nsubject, admonishes the public of the ne-\nmatter, and places our presidents where\n\"section,\" line 17, said page. Strike line 21,\ncessity of a rigid adherence to the simple, the\nkings have always stood.\npage 4 and substitute the following menda-\nreceived, the fundamental doctrine of the\nI can find few better words to concisely\ntions, within thirty days.\nconstitution, that the power to declare war,\nincluding the power of judging the cause of\nexpress the critical need for our action\nStrike lines 5, 6, and 7, page 5, and\nwar, is fully and exclusively vested in the\non the War Powers Act of 1973 that is\nsubstitute \"and shall be reported within\nlegislature; that the Executive has no right,\nnow before us. If Presidents have accu-\nfifteen days. The resolution or bill so\nin any case, to decide the question, whether\nmulated unto themselves the powers that\nreported.\" Strike lines 12 through 25,\nthere is or is not cause for declaring war.\nare rightfully ours, then we must put a\npage 5, and lines 1 through 14, page 6.\nAgain, as though guiding our own de-\nhalt to that practice, for preserving and\nRenumber sections 8, 9, and 10 to read\nliberations, the founders denied the au-\nprotecting the Constitution is what we\nsections 5, 6, and 7. At line 8, page 7,\nthority of the Commander in Chief to\nare sworn to do.\nstrike \"3\" and substitute \"2\".\nbring the Nation into a war, but rather\nIt is surely not enough to state that\nMadam Chairman, as the measure\nlooked only to his power to guide the\nPresidents have acted in such and such\nstands before us unamended, it clearly\nNation once the Congress had so directed.\na manner in the past; indeed that very\ngrants to the President power to involve\nThis historic interpretation is quite dif-\nargument was made and rejected in the\nour country in war. Although I presume\nferent from the situation in which we\nsteel seizure cases before the Supreme\nCongress can legally grant that power,\nhave found ourselves over the last two\nCourt 20 years ago. The accretion of\nsince it can declare war itself, I think\nor three decades, where proponents of\npower beyond the strict confines of con-\nthere is great wisdom in not granting\nthe Presidency seem to be claiming that\nstitutional definition does not change the\nthese war powers to the President. If the\nthe power of the Commander in Chief is\nConstitution and does not alter our form\nbill remains unamended, I therefore in-\nwhat he himself defines it to be in any\nof Government. Mere repetition does not\ntend to vote against, as I have previously\ngiven circumstance. This is simply not\nmake a mode of procedure proper and ac-\ndone on similar proposals in the past.\nthe intent or the content of the Consti-\nceptable, nor, most emphatically, does it\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Madam Chairman, I\ntion under which we operate.\nmake that procedure part of the Consti-\nyield such time as he may consume to\nIn Madison's words again:\ntution. Ours is not an elective dictator-\nour Chairman, the gentleman from\nThose who are to conduct the war, cannot\nship. It is a government in which all\nPennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN).\nelected officials have carefully limited\nMr. MORGAN. Madam Chairman, I\nin the nature of things be proper or safe\npowers. As long as the Constitution reads\nrise in support of House Joint Resolution\njudges, whether a war ought to be com-\nmenced, continued or concluded.\nas it does, and as long as we believe that\n542, the War Powers Resolution of 1973.\nthe framers understood the actions they\nAs you know, I have been chairman of\nMr. Gerry of Massachusetts com-\ntook, then it is our duty to retain the\nthe Committee on Foreign Affairs since\nmented in the Constitutional Conven-\npower to declare war, restate it as we\n1959.\ntion, he \"never expected to hear in a\nmust in this resolution, and not allow\nDuring that period, few-if any-bills\nrepublic a motion to empower the Execu-\nthe Executive, any Executive, to take that\nhave had more thorough study than the\ntive alone to declare war.\" And indeed\npower unto himself.\nmeasure which is before us today.\nthat motion was wisely defeated by an\nPeople have argued this concurrent res-\nIn fact, a major portion of House Joint\noverwhelming margin.\nolution is not binding upon the Presi-\nResolution 542 already has been debated\nIn no way, of course, does the constitu-\ndent-what we are saying here is that\nand approved by the House no less than\ntional scheme inhibit the Executive, as\nthe Constitution is binding and the Pres-\nthree times.\nCommander in Chief and as head of the\nident is bound by the Constitution.\nIn the present Congress-despite past\nJune 25, 1973\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\n21233\nHouse approvals-we once again gave\ncisms. The legal authority of the Pres-\nprocedure for insuring that whenever a\nthe question of war powers very careful\nident to deploy American Armed Forces\nsignificant number of American forces\nconsideration.\ninto hostilities in Indochina has been\nare deployed into combat for a significant\nThe subcommittee chaired by the gen-\nunder constant attack.\nlength of time by the President, the Con-\ntleman from Wisconsin, (Mr. ZABLOCKI)\nMany of us have believed that the\ngress must give its assent.\nonce again held extensive hearings on\nGulf of Tonkin resolution-with its\nPassage of this resolution and its ac-\nthe many war powers bills and resolu-\nbroad and strong wording-provided au-\nceptance by the President would open a\ntions which were referred to the Com-\nthority to the President to conduct hos-\nnew era in the relations between the\nmittee on Foreign Affairs.\ntilities in Vietnam.\nThere were some 37 proposals. Each\nCongress and the Executive in dealing\nThe present administration, however,\nwith the war powers of this Nation.\none of them was given careful considera-\nhas said that its authority for continued\nTherefore, I urge this body to give its\ntion in the formulation of the measure\npursuit of the conflict was not derived\napproval to House Joint Resolution 542-\nwhich is before us today.\nfrom the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.\nas reported from the Committee on For-\nDuring 6 days of hearings, the sub-\nBecause there has been doubt and con-\neign Affairs.\ncommittee heard 16 witnesses, including\nfusion over the right of the President to\nMr. TIERNAN. Madam Chairman, I\neight Members of this body.\nconduct large-scale military actions in\nrise to speak in favor of House Joint\nThe subcommittee subsequently con-\nVietnam without specific prior approval\nResolution 542 which will place signifi-\nsidered all suggested approaches to war\nfrom Congress, national disunity over\npowers and after four long sessions came\ncant restraints on the President's ability\nthe war was accelerated.\nto commit U.S. Armed Forces abroad\nup with the draft which was introduced\nToday, a similar situation exists with\nwithout prior congressional approval.\nas House Joint Resolution 542.\nregard to the continued bombing in\nIn the past 20 years we have seen a\nThe full Committee on Foreign Af-\nCambodia.\ngrowing willingness by our Presidents\nfairs devoted three full sessions to per-\nMany observers believe that continua-\nto bypass congressional approval of in-\nfecting the subcommittee version. The\ntion of those operations requires that the\nvolvement of American Armed Forces in\nresult is-I believe-a measure which\nPresident ask the Congress for specific\nrepresents a consensus of views on how\nauthorization. Once again there is con-\nundeclared conflicts. At the same time,\nCongress should legislate in this vital\nthere has been a continuing usurpation\nfusion and the Nation is divided.\nof congressional power by the Executive.\narea.\nAs the result of our country's experi-\nMadam Chairman, since I have been in\nBoth the 91st and 92d Congresses at-\nence in Korea and Vietnam, one lesson\nthe Congress, the United States has par-\nshould be clear by now to everyone:\ntempted to deal with these problems by\nticipated in two major conflicts. Each\nconsidering war powers legislation. Both\nCongress must play its rightful role in\none of those conflicts has raised impor-\ntimes I argued vigorously that the Con-\nwarmaking-not only to satisfy the de-\ntant constitutional problems concerning\nmands of the Constitution-but also for\ngress should act to. prevent any further\nwar powers.\nthe practical reason of creating the na-\nerosion of the congressional power to\nOn June 25, 1950, North Korean troops\ntional unity and purpose which are\nmake war. Unfortunately, the House and\ncrossed the borders of South Korea trig-\nnecessary for the success of our national\nSenate were never able to agree on a\ngering the Korean war.\neffort.\nformula to limit the President's power\nOn June 27, President Truman an-\nto involve the United States in \"unde-\nOur national security, no less than\nclared wars.\"\nnounced that he had ordered U.S. air\nour national heritage, demands that Con-\nand ground forces to give the Korean\ngress fully participate in the decision to\nIt is my sincere hope that the House\nGovernment troops cover and support.\ngo to war.\nof Representatives will approve House\nFollowing a United Nations resolution\nIn a statement before a House Foreign\nJoint Resolution 542 and that the Sen-\ncalling on members to stop this aggres-\nAffairs subcommittee last year, the Hon.\nate will follow Senator FULBRIGHT'S sug-\nsion, President Truman ordered Ameri-\nMcGeorge Bundy, a former Assistant for\ngestion to adopt similar language.\ncan ground troops to repel the North\nNational Security Affairs to both Presi-\nIf we are to \"preserve, protect, and\nKorean attack.\ndents Kennedy and Johnson-stated\ndefend the Constitution of the United\nCongress was not called upon to de-\nthat the most serious foreign policy\nStates,\" we must act now. Too many\nclare war at the time of the invasion in\nproblem facing the United States is the\ntimes the Congress has shirked its duty\nKorea.\nbreakdown of effective relations between\nand abandoned its authority to declare\nAt that time it was believed by many\nthe executive branch and the Congress.\nwar through inaction or by underwrit-\nin the executive branch, and in the Con-\nHe noted that the breakdown was most\ning the illegal actions of a President by\ngress, that by becoming a member of the\nconspicuous-and damaging-with re-\nenacting resolutions which give him a\nUnited Nations, the United States was\ngard to the Vietnam conflict.\ncarte blanche in the area of military\nobligated by U.N. commitments, includ-\nI believe we all recognize the need for\noperations overseas.\ning commitments to international police\nre-creating a good working relationship\nToday we must realize our respon-\nactions, and that it would be within the\nbetween the White House and the Con-\nsibility under the Constitution and our\npower of the President alone to see that\ngress on vital foreign policy and security\nduty to the American people to preserve\nthose commitments were carried out.\nissues.\nour democracy by once-and-for-all lim-\nAlthough the Congress did not for-\nCongress must not play a junior part-\niting the President's ability to wage ag-\nmally accept this position, neither did\nner role where decisions involving the\ngressive undeclared wars.\ndt as a whole contest the right of the\ncommitment of American troops is in-\nAs written, House Joint Resolution\nExecutive to respond to the call of the\nvolved. Neither should we attempt to\n542 would allow the President to pre-\nUnited Nations Security Council.\nforce such a secondary role upon the\nserve the security of the United States\nSome members, however, were out-\nPresident.\nin case of a national emergency. I agree\nspoken in their view that power of Con-\nOur objective must be to foster a co-\nthat the President must have the power\ngress had been usurped. Among them\noperative relationship which will prevent\nto defend the United States in case of an\nwas the great Republican Senator from\nthe discord over war powers which has\nattack. But I believe that no single man\nOhio, Senator Robert Taft.\nplagued the Nation for a number of years.\nshould have the power to commit our\nAs the war continued into 1951 and\nHouse Joint Resolution 542 fulfills that\nlives and resources to the future Viet-\n1952, Senator Taft's views gained more\nobjective. The resolution does not at-\nnams of the world.\nand more support.\ntempt to impose precise and inflexible\nThe intent of our Founding Fathers\nSome of you may recall that the Kore-\ndefinitions of the war powers on either\nis clear. Article I, section 8, of the Con-\nan conflict came to be called \"Truman's\nthe President or the Congress.\nstitution specifically gives to the Con-\nWar.\" Unfair as that may have been,\nThe resolution does not attempt to de-\ngress the power to declare war and make\nthe phrase reflected that this was a Pres-\nscribe specific conditions in which the\nrules for the regulation of Armed Forces.\nidential war since Congress had not de-\nPresident may or may not deploy\nThe writings of Jefferson, Madison, Mon-\nclared it or given specific authorization\ntroops-for that, too, would introduce\nroe and others make it perfectly clear\nto the hostilities.\nelements of rigidity into our national\nthat no warmaking power is given to the\nIn more recent years, the Vietnam war\nsecurity system.\nPresident.\nhas provided the basis for similar criti-\nRather, this resolution sets forth a\nLincoln reiterated this when he said:\n21234\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\nJune 25, 1973\nAllow the President to invade a neighbor-\nin all hostilities. Our Nation cannot af-\nso that both may wisely exercise their\ning nation whenever he shall deem it neces-\nford any more errors of judgment in our\nconstitutional responsibilities in case of\nsary to repel an invasion, and you allow him\nforeign policy. One small mistake could\nto do so whenever he may choose to say he\nimpending or present foreign crises. Sec-\ndeems it necessary for such purpose, and you\neasily drag us down into the quagmire of\ntion 4(b) goes beyond this objective, in\nallow him to make war at pleasure.\noverbroad commitments and entangling\nstrengthening the warmaking powers of\nhostilities.\nthe Congress at the expense of those of\nWe in Congress do not seek to reclaim\nIf there is one lesson that can be\nthe Executive.\nour right to declare war because we are\nlearned from the events of the sixties, it\nIt is my understanding that a number\nany wiser than the President. We do so\nis that no one man should be allowed\nof amendments to House Joint Resolu-\nfirst and foremost because the future cf\nto monopolize our foreign policymaking\ntion 542 will be offered to delete this ob-\nour democratic form of government, as\nprocess. Full public discussion, whenever\njectionable provision, substituting lan-\nenvisioned by our Founding Fathers and\nfeasible, is an essential ingredient in the\nguage which would require some type of\nestablished by the Constitution, is at\nworking of a democracy. Certainly, the\naffirmative congressional action within a\nstake. Second, it is my belief that Con-\nrecent agreements signed by the world's\nspecific time period after the submission\ngress would use this authority more spar-\ntwo major nuclear powers amplifies the\nof the President's report on his action in\ningly than the President, as one man,\nneed, and increases the opportunity, for\ncommitting U.S. Armed Forces.\nwould. For war is the most crucial issue\nreasoned debate. The Presidency is often\nSpecifically, I would like to direct my\nanyone can deal with, and it should not\nan isolated and lonely office. It is the\ncolleagues' attention to H.R. 8898, leg-\nand cannot be easy to initiate.\nduty of Congress to make sure the will of\nislation introduced by my friend Mr.\nOpen debate by the Congress may\nthe people is heard and adhered to.\nREGULA, which I have cosponsored, and\nbring up risks otherwise overlooked or\nSome of the most significant provi-\nwhich I understand may be offered all or\nalternative courses never considered. It\nsions of this legislation are those that\nin part as a substitute to House Joint\nsubstitutes the experience of many voices\ndeal with the obligation of the executive\nResolution 542. According to the provi-\nfor that of one at a time when no objec-\nto keep both the Congress and the Amer-\nsions of this bill, if, in the case of a na-\ntion is too small. And it may well serve\nican people promptly informed of all\ntional emergency, the President should\nto secure the consent of our citizenry,\ncommitments abroad. Overclassification\ncommit U.S. Armed Forces into combat,\ncertainly a vital factor as the Vietnam\nand excessive secrecy have plagued our\nthe President would submit to Congress\nwar has so painfully proved. The Presi-\nNation throughout the last decade. Both\nwithin 24 hours a report of his actions.\ndent reaches his decision to go to war\nthe legislative and executive branches\nCongress would then be required to then\nthrough private processes, inaccessible to\nmust learn to cooperate in pooling their\ntake affirmative action, within 90 days\nthe individual citizen, Congress provides\nresearch and analysis, since informa-\nafter the receipt of the President's re-\nthat accessibility. Without the moral\ntion is the key to any rational foreign\nport, either approving or disapproving\nsanction of the American people, the\npolicymaking.\nthis commitment of U.S. Armed Forces.\nconsequences of war are no less destruc-\nHow many more billions of dollars\nIf the Congress should approve his ac-\ntive here in our own country than where\nmust this Nation spend before Congress\ntions, the President would nevertheless\nthe bombs are falling. Only by returning\nis willing to assert its authority? How\nbe required to report back to the Con-\nto the dictates of the Constitution can\nmany more lives must be lost? This Na-\ngress at 6-month intervals on the prog-\nwe guarantee that we will never again go\ntion cannot afford another Vietnam\nress of the hostilities in question. In the\nto war without the support of our citizens.\nwhile Congress retreats from its consti-\nevent of congressional disapproval, the\nThe war power resolution is the most\ntutional responsibilities. The time to act\nArmed Forces would be required to be\nimportant consideration on which we\nis now. I urge all my colleagues to join\nwithdrawn as expeditiously as possible.\nwill undertake during this Congress. I\nme in support of this long overdue legis-\nLastly, but most important, in the event\nurge every Member of this body to vote\nlation.\nthe Congress failed to take any action to\nin favor of this measure.\nMr. PARRIS. Madam Chairman, I\neither approve or disapprove the Pres-\nMr. PODELL. Madam Chairman, the\nwould like to take this opportunity to\nident's action, this would in fact con-\ntime has come for the Congress of the\ncomment upon what I consider to be a\nstitute approval of the commitment of\nUnited States to reassert its position of\nvery serious, and indeed dangerous, fault\nU.S. Armed Forces.\nequality with the executive branch. For\nin the legislation which we have before\nI support the provisions of H.R. 8898,\ntoo long, have we allowed ourselves to be\nus. Specifically, I refer to section 4(b) of\nand I hope my colleagues will do likewise\nexploited as a rubberstamp for Presiden-\nHouse Joint Resolution 542, which in ac-\nin the upcoming debate on House Joint\ntial supremacy. This legislation, House\ntuality denies to the President of the\nResolution 542.\nJoint Resolution 542, which severely lim-\nUnited States the authority to commit\nMr. BINGHAM. Madam Chairman,\nits the circumstances under which the\nU.S. Armed Forces into combat without\nHouse Joint Resolution 542, the \"war\nPresident can commit U.S. troops abroad\nspecific congressional approval.\npowers resolution of 1973\" of which\nwithout congressional approval, can be\nAccording to section 4(b) as it is now\nI am proud to be a cosponsor, is of major\nthe first nail in the coffin of congres-\nworded, it is required that pursuant to\nimportance. It reflects successful efforts\nsional complacency.\nsection 3 of the bill, within 120 days\nby the Foreign Affairs Committee, and\nThe Constitution gives the Congress\nafter a report is submitted or required to\nespecially the subcommittee which orig-\nthe power to declare war. Clearly, it was\nbe submitted, the President shall termi-\ninated the legislation, to achieve a com-\nthe intention of the framers of our gov-\nnate any commitment and remove any\npromise bill supported by an overwhelm-\nernment to employ the collective wisdom\nenlargement of U.S. Armed Forces with\ning majority of the committee's members.\nof both the executive and legislative\nrespect to which such report was sub-\nI especially want to compliment the\nbranches, before committing our Nation\nmitted, unless the Congress either en-\nchairman of the subcommittee, Mr. ZA-\nto armed conflict. Yet, today we are told\nacts a declaration of war or a specific\nBLOCKI, for his outstanding leadership in\nthat a declaration of war would prob-\nauthorization for the use of our Armed\nthis regard.\nably mean nuclear holocaust. We have\nForces.\nHouse Joint Resolution 542 is superior\nbeen forced to swallow an expansive set\nI would like to respectfully submit to\nin a number of respects to its sister bill in\nof national commitments which have\nmy colleagues that the Congress cannot\nthe Senate, S. 440, which shares the same\nescaped the careful consideration of this\nand probably would not \"clear its throat\"\nlaudable purpose-of defining the pow-\nbody. The founders of our Government\nin 120 days unless language is written\ners of the President to engage in mili-\nplaced a grave responsibility on the\ninto this bill which would require some\ntary hostilities abroad without a con-\nshoulders of Congress and we can not\naffirmative congressional action in that\ngressional declaration of war.\nshrink from it and still fulfill our duties\ntime period.\nFor one thing, S. 440 yields to the\nof office.\nUnder the Constitution, the power \"to\ntemptation to try to define future cir-\nThis legislation would not in any way\nmake war\" is jointly shared by the\ncumstances in which a President can\ninhibit the ability of the Commander in\nlegislative and executive branches of\ncommit U.S. Armed Forces to hostilities\nChief to respond to a direct threat to the\nour Government. For this reason I\nwithout prior congressional authoriza-\nsecurity of our Nation. It would only en-\nfirmly support legislation which would\ntion. This raises a double-edged problem.\nsure that the Congress be given the maxi-\nstrengthen and enhance the flow of in-\nIf we give a President broad blanket au-\nmum opportunity to advise and consent\nformation to and between both branches,\nthority to send troops into battle when-\nJune 25, 1973\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\n21235\never he judges that there is an immi-\nOur Founding Fathers wisely left an\ncommitted to combat after 120 days. My\nnent threat to the United States, or its\nelement of flexibility in the authorities\ncolleagues, this is a chaotic way to con-\nforces or citizens anywhere, as provided\nof Congress and the President, and this\nduct military actions, or for that matter\nby S. 440, we are giving the White House\nhas enabled Presidents to employ the\nto conduct a government. It is highly un-\nwhat could become a blank check. On\npower which this flexibility has allowed\ndesirable for Congress through its own\nthe other hand, if we try to spell out\nto encourage peaceful resolvements of\ninaction to be able to determine whether\nmore restricted circumstances in which\npotentially dangerous situations.\na course of Presidential action should be\na President could take action, how do\nAlthough I support the constitutional\ncontinued.\nwe know that we may not be unduly\ngrant giving authority to the Congress\nUnder present law, if the Commander\ntying his hands in some unforeseeable\nto declare war, nevertheless, at the same\nin Chief orders our forces to deploy or\nfuture crisis which genuinely threatens\ntime, I support more the President's right\nto engage in hostilities, Congress may\nour national security?\nto defend our Nation against attack or\neffect such action if it wishes, by use of\nIn my own proposed war power bill\neven possible attack without prior con-\nconstitutionally granted powers. But\n(H.R. 5669) I avoided this unnecessary\ngressional authorization.\nseeking to provide that a concurrent res-\neffort to foresee all situations in which\nWe must give the American voter and\nolution shall have the force of law, we\nthe President might have legitimate need\nthe American system of elections full\nare embarking on an extremely dan-\nto use troops. I am happy that House\ncredit for selecting in most instances able\ngerous and probably unconstitutional\nJoint Resolution 542 also avoids this\nmen to be our Presidents.\ncourse of action.\npossible pitfall.\nMadam Chairman, the President must\nDecisions of war and peace by the\nIn this and other respects I feel that\nhave the confidence and support of the\nUnited States should not be developed by\nHouse Joint Resolution 542 is reasonable\nAmerican people in order for him to be\nconfrontation between the Congress and\nand responsible legislation which would\nelected to office. His actions as President\nthe Executive, but rather it should be\ngo far toward reasserting the Congress\nare similarly subject to public opinion. It\ndeveloped by a maximum amount of CO-\nconstitutional power in this area. I\nis most ironic that House Joint Resolu-\noperation between the two branches. I\nstrongly urge its adoption.\ntion 542, which is before us today, and\ntherefore urge that you reçognize that\nI will reserve further comments on the\nwas constructed with an eye toward the\nthis is bad legislation before us today and\nsubstance of the resolution until we\nunfortunate experiences in the mid-\nit should be defeated. It is my opinion\nreach the amendment stage on the bill.\n1960's, would not have prevented our\nthat the constitutional authorities pres-\nMr. BURKE of Florida. Madam Chair-\nsteadily deepening involvement in Viet-\nently in existence are sufficient alloca-\nman, I must rise in opposition to the pas-\nnam had it been on the books since 1789.\ntions of the war powers between Congress\nsage of House Joint Resolution 542, the\nExcept perhaps by hindsight, there is no\nand the executive branch.\nwar powers resolution of 1973, because I\nreason to believe that the Congress would\nMr. HOLIFIELD. Madam Chairman, I\nhonestly feel that it is a mistake to at-\nnot have acted through the mechanism\nintend to vote for passage of the war\ntempt to draw rigid lines between the\nset forth in House Joint Resolution 542,\npowers resolution of 1973, and I com-\nPresident and the Congress in the area\nhad it been in effect at the time of the\nmend the Committee on Foreign Affairs\nof warmaking. Furthermore, even if this\nGulf of Tonkin incident, to declare war,\nfor once again bringing this important\naction was desirable, it should not be\nif this had been the action requested by\nmeasure before the House.\ndone by a joint resolution of Congress,\nPresident Johnson.\nIn my view, the war powers resolution\nbut instead by a constitutional amend-\nYet today we are trying to close the\ndoes two things:\nment. In my humble opinion and in the\nbarn door after the horse is already out,\nFirst, it helps to fill a long existing\nopinion of many lawyers, most of the\nwith this war powers legislation, but what\nconstitutional void.\nimportant provisions of House Joint Res-\nwe are likely to do is to splinter the door\nSecond, it more clearly defines the war-\nolution 542 would probably be declared\ninto fragments so that passage either\nmaking powers of the President and\nunconstitutional.\nway through the door is dangerous and\nguarantees the participation of the Con-\nThe term \"war powers\" may be de-\nthe control of the horse is impossible.\ngress in the foreign policy of this coun-\nfined as the authority inherent in na-\nConstitutional powers should not be\ntry-especially where that policy is en-\ntional sovereignties to declare, conduct,\ntampered with lightly. Our system of\nforced by the use of military power.\nand to conclude armed hostilities with\ngovernment has worked well for almost\nother nations. The U.S. Constitution re-\nI want to emphasize that the Congress,\n200 years, and I honestly feel that his-\nserves the following powers expressly to\nnot just the other body, has a constitu-\ntory will reflect that the action being\nthe Congress in article 1, section 8:\ntional role in foreign policy. This House\ncontemplated by the House today, would\n11. To declare war, grant letters of marque\nhas for too long refused to assert its\nwork to the detriment of our system of\nand reprisal, and to make rules concerning\npowers and has, too often, confined its\ncaptures on land and water;\ngovernment and against the best inter-\nforeign policy role to the appropriations\n12. To raise and support armies, but no\nests of the American people in the future.\nprocess.\nappropriation of money to that use shall be\nSpecifically, section 4 (b) and (c) of\nAs written, our Federal Constitution is\nfor a longer term than 2 years;\nHouse Joint Resolution 542 are in my\nsilent in numerous instances with re-\n13. To provide and maintain a Navy;\nopinion against the best interests of the\nspect to the exercise of congressional,\n14. To make rules for the government and\nUnited States. Section 4(b) provides that\nregulation of the land and naval forces;\njudicial and Presidential powers. Those\nthe President at the end of 120 days,\n15. To provide for calling forth the militia\nwho drafted the Constitution could not\nto execute the laws of the Union, suppress\nwithout regard even to the immediate\npossibly have foreseen the growth of a\ninsurrections and repel invasions;\nsafety of our Armed Forces, must termi-\ntechnological society, or the great com-\n16. To provide for organizing, arming, and\nnate any involvement of U.S. Forces in\nplexities of our foreign relations in a\ndisciplining the militia and for governing\nhostilities outside the United States, and\nnuclear age. During crisis after crisis we\nsuch part of them as may be employed in\nwithdraw newly dispatched combat\nhave been left floundering in a thicket of\nthe service of the United States; and\nforces from the area of any foreign coun-\n18. To make all laws which shall be nec-\ncontroversy over \"inherent powers,\" \"as-\ntry unless the Congress by that time has\nessary and proper for carrying into execu-\nsumed authority,\" and claims of usurpa-\nenacted a declaration of war or specifi-\ntion the foregoing powers vested by this\ntion of the powers of one branch of Gov-\ncally authorized the use of our Armed\nconstitution in the Government of the\nernment by another.\nUnited States, or in any department or offi-\nForces. Section 4(c) provides that hos-\nThe constitutional voids and gray\ncer thereof.\ntilities and deployments may be termi-\nareas having to do with the warmaking\nnated by Congress alone at any time\npowers became apparent very early in\nThe war powers of the President are\nwithin the 120-day period, by means of a\nour national history, and we have had to\nhowever expressed in article II, section 2,\nconcurrent resolution having no force of\ndeal with international situations con-\nwhich states:\nlaw.\ntinuously from 1798 until now without\nThe President shall be Commander in\nAs a practical matter we all know that\nconstitutional or statutory guidance.\nChief of the Army and Navy of the United\nthe Congress does not always move as\nFor example, the hearings of the For-\nStates, and of the militia of the several\nquickly as it should and a legislative\neign Affairs Committee on the war\nStates, when called into the actual service\ndeadlock might develop thereby making\npowers resolution list 199 instances where\nof the United States.\nit necessary to withdraw troops already\nthe United States has engaged in mill-\n21236\nCONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE\nJune 25, 1973\ntary action abroad without a declaration\nThe preservation of representative gov-\nstores as \"loss leaders,\" but they cannot\nof war-from the naval war with France\nernment in all facets of our national life;\ncontinue those losses, so they are can-\nin 1798 to the Jordanian-Syrian crisis\nThe preservation of the Congress and\nceling orders to the poultrymen at a time\nof 1970.\nof this House as the representatives of\nwhen feed ingredient prices are the high-\nContrasted with these 199 instances of\nthe will of the people; and\nest in history.\nPresidential action-supported by the\nThe preservation of the rule of law\nI have urged the President, for action,\nCongress-the Congress has declared\nversus the rule of men.\nby Executive order which will save the\nwar only 5 times.\nIn conclusion, let me say that I have\npoultry industry and protect the family\nBoth declared and undeclared wars\nno desire to inhibit any President or fu-\nfood shoppers of the country.\nhave resulted in great criticism and dis-\nture Congress in the ability to move in\nI shall counsel with other Members\ntrust of both the Presidency and the\nour own national interest. If I believed\nfrom districts where poultry production\nCongress. As a result, our democratic\nthat this resolution would do so, I would\nand processing is important to the econ-\nprocesses of government have often be-\nnot support it.\nomy, but I also call on every Member of\ncome strained and distorted, as they are\nThis resolution will not inhibit the\nthis House to become concerned in this\ntoday.\nPresident or the Congress. It merely as-\nproblem because it is one that vitally\nI believe it is now time to end this dis-\nsures that we, the elected representatives\naffects the entire Nation. An adjustment\ntortion and confusion which has plagued\nof the people, will help decide whether\nof price controls is essential if we are\nus for so long, by defining the roles of\nfuture foreign military operations are in\ngoing to continue to have poultry and\nCongress and the President with respect\nfact in the national interest.\neggs in our retail stores and on our\nto undeclared wars. Our position in the\nThe CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.\ndinner tables.\nworld and our relationships with other\nThe Clerk read as follows:\ngovernments make such action manda-\nResolved by the Senate and House of Rep-\nIMPOUNDMENT LEGISLATION RE-\ntory.\nresentatives of the United States of America\nPORTED BY RULES COMMITTEE\nEarly this year, the State Department\nin Congress assembled,\nfurnished each of us with a 420-page\nSHORT TITLE\n(Mr. MADDEN asked and was given\ndocument listing the treaties and agree-\nSECTION 1. This measure may be cited as\npermission to address the House for 1\nments which we have in force with dozens\nthe \"War Powers Resolution of 1973\".\nminute, to revise and extend his remarks\nof other countries.\nand include extraneous matter.)\nMr. ZABLOCKI. Madam Chairman, I\nMany of these treaties and agreements,\nMr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, on last\nmove that the Committee do now rise.\nwhich we in the House had no part in\nThursday, June 21, the Rules Committee\nThe motion was agreed to.\nmaking, call for military action by the\nreported H.R. 8480, the impoundment\nAccordingly the Committee rose; and\nUnited States. Without doubt, if we are\ncontrol bill to the floor of the House\nthe Speaker having resumed the chair,\nto carry out our solemn agreements with\nwhich will be considered by the mem-\nMrs. GRIFFITHS, Chairman of the Com-\nother nations, while serving our own best\nbership after the Fourth of July recess.\nmittee of the Whole House on the State\ninterests, an undeclared war or the com-\nThis legislation, if enacted into law,\nof the Union, reported that that Com-\nmitment of troops abroad will be neces-\nwill require the President to notify the\nmittee, having had under consideration\nsary in the future.\nCongress whenever he impounds funds,\nIn fact, we would not want to take the\nthe joint resolution (H.J. Res. 542), con-\nto provide a procedure under which the\ncerning the war powers of Congress and\ngrave step of formally declaring war in\nHouse of Representatives or the Senate\nthe President, had come to no resolution\nmost cases because of the grave inter-\nmay disapprove the President's action\nthereon.\nnational implications involved in such a\nand require him to cease such impound-\nstep.\ning and to establish for the fiscal year\nThe resolution before us is not ad-\nPOULTRY CRISIS\n1974 a ceiling on total Federal expendi-\ndressed to any particular war or military\n(Mr. KAZEN asked and was given per-\ntures.\naction. It does not criticize, nor is it\nmission to address the House for 1 min-\nThe Rules Committee held nine pub-\naimed at any President. It does not affect\nute, to revise and extend his remarks and\nlic hearings and took testimony from\nthe President's flexibility in dealing with\ninclude extraneous matter.)\nmany Members of Congress, Government\nany future international crisis.\nMr. KAZEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise to call\ndepartments, and also from Senator\nThese are the things that the resolu-\nattention to a crisis facing poultry grow-\nSAM J. ERVIN, JR., who is the sponsor of\ntion will do:\ners and processors in my south Texas\nan impoundment bill reported by the\nIt assures that the Congress-includ-\ndistrict, and to warn that their problem\nSenate some weeks ago.\ning the House at long last-will be fully\nMembers of the House and Senate\nlooms from one end of the country to\nconsulted and will decide whether to\nthe other. I was in my district over the\nhave been receiving many complaints\ncommit the lives of those we represent\nweekend, and I talked to poultrymen\nregarding the impounding of funds on\nto a foreign conflict.\nwho are drowning and gassing young\nlegislation and various programs enacted\nAlso, the Congress will be provided, at\nchickens because they see no way to re-\ninto law by the Congress during the last\nlong last, with sufficient information to\ncover the money it would cost to feed\ndozen years. I know the Members of\npermit it to intelligently exercise its con-\nthem. They are destroying eggs because\nCongress when they return home over\nstitutional duties and prerogatives in\nthey cannot now expect to provide fryers\nthe Fourth of July recess will receive\nthese situations.\nand broilers to the Nation's markets at\nplenty of protests from the public and\nMost importantly, passage of this res-\na break-even point, let alone gaining a\nvarious organizations on the curtailment\nolution will apply the rule of law to these\nreasonable return for their labor and\nand in some cases complete abatement of\nfuture Presidential actions in the foreign\ninvestment.\nlegislative projects enacted into law by\npolicy area.\nThere is a strong possibility that\nthe Congress. The curtailments and im-\nThe 43 California Members of this\nchickens and eggs will disappear from\npoundments have also halted or greatly\nHouse represent more than 10 percent of\nreduced urban renewal projects, hous-\nthe retail markets of the Nation. Every\nthe young men who would be called upon\ning, pollution, education, and other pro-\none of us knows that the family budget\nto fight an undeclared war. Our constitu-\ngrams passed by the Congress.\nents would be called upon to pay a high\nis being strained these days. With some\nMr. Speaker, I ask unanimous con-\nshare of the costs of such a war. And the\nreluctance, we have recognized the need\nsent to include with my remarks excerpts\nodds are that more of our constituents\nfor controls. But the goal is to stop the\nfrom the New York Times of yesterday,\nwould be buried in the course of any such\nrise in the cost of living, not to eliminate\nSunday, June 24, 1973, setting out the\nwar.\na major source of protein in our daily\nastounding conditions existing in New\nFor no other reasons than these, Cali-\ndiets.\nYork, New Jersey, and Connecticut,\nfornia's people are entitled to their voice\nI have communicated my concern to\ncaused by cuts of funds in health pro-\nin these matters through their elected\nthe President. I have told him that the\ngrams. The facts set out in these articles\nrepresentatives.\nJune 1 to 8 base period for price controls\nas reported by health officials in this area\nBut there are better reasons for sup-\nis striking the poultry industry with bur-\nare similar to what is taking place all\nporting the war powers resolution. These\ndens it cannot sustain. In that period,\nover the Nation, especially in urban\nretailers were pushing chickens in their\ncenters.\nare:\nPublic Law 93-118\n93rd Congress, H. J. Res. 542\nNovember 7, 1973\nJoint Resolution\nConcerning the war powers of Congress and the President.\nResolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United\nStates of America in Congress assembled,\nWar Powers\nResolution.\nSHORT TITLE\nSECTION 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the \"War Powers\nResolution\".\nPURPOSE AND POLICY\nSEC. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the\nintent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and\ninsure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the\nPresident will apply to the introduction of United States Armed\nSEAL\nFORD\nForces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement\nin hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the con-\ntinued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.\n(b) Under article 1, section S, of the Constitution, it. is specifically USC prec.\nprovided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws neces- title 1.\nsary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers\nbut also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Govern-\nment of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.\n(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-\nChief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or\ninto situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly\nindicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a\ndeclaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a\nnational emergency created by attack upon the United States, its ter-\nritories or possessions, or its armed forces.\nCONSULTATION\nSEC. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with\nCongress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostili-\nties or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is\nclearly indicated by the circumstances, and #\nfter every such introdue-\ntion shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States\nArmed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed\nfrom such situations.\nREPORTING\nSec. 4. (a) In the absence of n declaration of War, in any case in\nwhich United States Armed Forces are roduced-\n(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involve-\nment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;\n87 STAT. 555\n(2) into the territory, nirspace or waters of a foreign nation, 07 STAT. 556\nwhile equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate\nsolely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces;\nor\n(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States\nArmed Forces equipped for combat already located in n foreign\nnation;\nTEXTS OF LEGISLATIVE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST REINTRODUCTION OF\nU.S. MILITARY FORCES INTO INDOCHINA\nSecond Supplemental Sppropriation Act of 1973 (PL 93-50)\nSec. 307. None of the funds herein appropriated under this Act\nI why 1, 1973\nmay be expended to support directly or indirectly combat activities ii\nor over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam or off\nthe shores of Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam by\nUnited States forces, and after August 15, 1973, no other funds here-\ntofore appropriated under any other Act may be expended for such\n1.\npurpose.\nFORD\nContinuing Resolution for FY 1974 (PL 93-52, as. extended by\nLIBRARY\nPL 93-118 and 93-124) July 1, 1973\nSEC. 108. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after\nAugust 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be\nobligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat\nactivities by United States military forces in or over or from off the\nshores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.\nState Department Authorization Act for FY 1974 (PL 93-126)\n(Case-Church Amendment)\nOct 18, 1973\nSEC. 13. Notwithstanding any other provision of law. on or after\nAugust 15, 1973, no funds heretofore or hereafter appropriated may\nbe obligated or expended to finance the involvement of United States\nmilitary forces in hostilities in or over or from off the shores of North\nVictnam, South Vietnam. Laos, or Cambodia, unless specifically\nauthorized hereafter by the Congress.\n93-155 (Nov. 1973)\nMilitary Procurement Authorization Act (PL-193)\n$1107 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon enact-\nment of this Act, no funds heretofore or hereafter ap-\npropriated may be obligated to finance the involvement\nof United States military forces in hostilities in or\nover or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Viet-\nnam, Laos, or Cambodia, unless specifically authorized\nhereafter, by the Congress.\n-\n93-189\nForeign\nAssistance Act Dec 17,1973\n$29 No funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other\nlaw may be expended to finance military or paramilitary opera-\ntions by the United States in or over Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.\nAlso - 3839 of PL93-437 (DOD Appropriation F425/\ncombut activities,"
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