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James M. Cannon Files (Ford Administration)
James Cannon's Issues Files
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The original documents are located in Box 4, folder "Automobiles" of the James M.
Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Some items in this folder were not digitized because it contains copyrighted
materials. Please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library for access to
these materials.
OF
airlines
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION
NEWS
UNITED STATES OF
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
DOT 35-76
June 9, 1976
Phone: (202) 426-4321
Secretary of Transportation William T. Coleman, Jr., today
scheduled a public hearing for August 3, 1976, to hear arguments
prior to deciding the future of vehicle occupant restraint systems.
The Secretary also announced that the Department will propose
an extension of the requirements of the present standard for one
year to apply to automobiles manufactured through August 31, 1977.
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208 now
requires manufacturers to provide occupant protection in
vehicles by one of three options: (1) a completely passive
restraint system providing protection in frontal, lateral and
roll-over crashes; (2) a passive restraint system providing
protection in frontal crashes combined with lap seat belts
providing protection in lateral and roll-over crashes; (3) lap
and shoulder belts at the front outboard positions and lap seat
belts for all other positions.
In a notice of public hearing sent to the Federal Register
today Secretary Coleman said, "The attractiveness of passive
restraints is two-fold. First, it has been thought they would
perform more effectively in preventing injuries than would seat
belts; and, second, because seat belts are not used consistently,
passive restraints, which require no action by the occupant, would
ensure more widespread crash protection.
"However," the Secretary said, "the prospect of mandating
passive restraints in automobiles has become increasingly
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
controversial. Questions of effectiveness, cost, and suspected
hazards, as well as the philosophical problems of restricting
individuals' freedom of choice with regard to how much they pay
for safety protection, have been raised by opponents of the air bag.
"It is in the context of this controversy that I must make a
decision as to the future of passive restraints," Secretary Coleman
said.
-more-
Digitized from Box 4 of the James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
2
3 -
Secretary Coleman said he will issue a written decision
on or before January 1, 1977.
These are:
He noted that because of public dissatisfaction with the
1. Continuation of the present three option version of
interlock system required by revision to FMVSS 208 in 1973,
FMVSS 208 and continuation of research directed toward
Congress in 1974 ordered that there be no requirement in the
developing effective passive restraint systems.
future of an occupant restraint system other than seat belts,
unless the requirement is first submitted to Congress subject
2. Continuation of the present three option version of
to disapproval by concurrent resolution.
FMVSS 208 and a concurrent proposal for a new traffic
safety standard requiring the states to adopt and
In proposing a one year extension of the present requirements
enforce safety belt usage laws or otherwise achieve a
of FMVSS 208, which would have expired August 31, 1976, Secretary
usage level much higher than being experienced today.
Coleman said that this action is being taken because of the need
to provide time after the August 3rd hearing for written submissions,
3. Continuation of the present three-option version of
the time necessary to formulate and write a decision and, if
FMVSS 208 while a federally sponsored field test of
necessary, the period required for Congressional review. Because
passive restraints is conducted with the data collected
of these time considerations, he said, a final resolution of any
to be used in formulating a future decision on mandating
proposal to amend FMVSS 208 will not be reached until after the
passive restraints.
expiration of the present requirements, and perhaps not until
substantially after January 1, 1977.
4. Amendment of FMVSS 208 to require passive restraint systems
for all automobiles manufactured after a given date, that
The hearing will be held at the Departmental Auditorium,
date to be determined primarily by the amount of lead
Constitution Avenue between 12th and 14th Streets, N.W.,
time needed by manufacturers to comply with the amended
Washington, D.C., from 9:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from
standard.
2:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on August 3.
5. Amendment of FMVSS 208 to require that automobile manu-
Participants will be permitted a maximum of ten minutes
facturers provide customers with the option of passive
each. Additionally, written presentations may be submitted on
restraints in some models.
or before September 17, 1976, to the Secretary of Transportation,
Washington, D.C. 20590, indicating FMVSS 208 Hearing on the
The notice of public hearing regarding amendment of FMVSS 208
envelope.
is expected to be printed in the June 14, 1976 edition of the
Federal Register. Copies may be obtained from:
Persons wishing to testify should notify the Secretary in
writing no later than July 12, 1976.
Office of the Secretary of Transportation
Office of Public Affairs (S-83)
In issuing the notice of public hearing, Secretary Coleman
Washington, D.C. 20590
recommended that discussion be directed to the following issues:
Phone: (202) 426-4321
The appropriate role of the Federal Government in
prescribing motor vehicle safety standards.
The benefits and costs of alternative occupant
restraint systems.
GERALD LIBRARY FORD
####
Public acceptance of occupant restraint systems.
Secretary Coleman also outlined five possible courses
of action which he will consider individually, in combination
or after refinement.
- more -
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Washington, D.C. 20590
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF
Official Business
TRANSPORTATION
DOT 518
U.S.MAIL
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300
FIRST CLASS
PMERICAN REVOLUTION 1776-1976 BICENTENNAL
@
CC: Quern.
Moore
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
976 SLP 22 AM 7 59
September 21, 1976
+
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JIM CANNON
FROM:
JIM CONNOR JEF
The attached clipping was returned in the President's outbox
with the following notation:
"Detroit Free Press - front page daily
9/16/26
Question"
THE QUESTION
A bill that would have
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
established a federal pro-
gram to develop an elec-
Sound
tric car was vetoedaby
cc: Dick Cheney
President Ford on the
Der PRee PROSS
Off
grounds that private in-
dustry is better suited to
undertake the project. Do
you agree with the presi-
dent' decision?
HOW YOU VOTED
made
2
092203
Transportation
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 14,
July 1976 INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JAMES CANNON
FROM:
JUDITH RICHARDS HOPE
SUBJECT:
Fact Sheet - Auto Industry
1
I attach a Fact Sheet on the United States Automobile
Industry. Highlights include:
Car sales are up 39 percent for the first four
months of this year.
Imports are down by more than one-third.
1976 prospects are for a dramatically improved
car sale year.
Total motor vehicle factory shipments in the
U.S. comprises 2.2 percent of our GNP.
The auto industry consumes 20 percent of our steel
output, 64 percent of rubber, 12 percent of annual
aluminum production. It employees 1 of every 19
workers.
Michigan produces one-third of all domestic auto
production (1975). The next closest states are
Missouri and Ohio, each with 11 percent.
Labor Relations: Contracts between the Big Three
and the UAW expire September 15 of this year.
Job security is high on the UAW's list.
The Rubber Workers' Strike against major tire
manufacturers is now in its fourth week and could
imperil auto production if it runs another two weeks.
Attachment
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
May 13, 1976
FACT SHEET ON AUTO INDUSTRY
AUTO SALES IN THE U. S. MARKET
Thus far in 1976 - Sales of domestically produced cars in the first
four months of 1976 totalled 2.84 million units, up 39 percent from the
2.04 million domestic units sold in January-April of 1975.
Impact of imports - Imports have accounted for 13.7 percent of total
U. S. auto sales thus far in 1976 -- down by more than one-third from the
21.2 percent market share held by imports in the same period last year.
The dramatic decline in imports is entirely accounted for by the fall-off
in Volkswagen and other European makes -- Japanese imports (primarily
Toyota and Datsun) are up, in fact, over 1975 levels for the January-
April period.
Significant market trends - The surge in sales of subcompact cars,
predicted at the time that the 1976 models were launched, has simply not
materialized; subcompacts have declined to 11.6 percent of domestic car
sales in 1976, from 15.3 percent in the first four months of 1975. The
phenomenon of the domestic car market in 1976 is the intermediate (112-
120 inch wheelbase); intermediate sales are 27.7 percent of domestic
makes, up from a 21.5 percent share in January-April of 1975. The
Oldsmobile Cutlass is the best selling make in the United States, running
well ahead of the Chevrolet Impala and the Ford Granada.
1976 Prospects - The consensus both within the industry and on Wall
Street is for 10.2 million new-car sales in 1976, including imports.
Assuming that imports remain in the 14 percent range, this would net out
at 8.8 million domestically-produced units, well above the 7.0 million
units sold in calendar 1975. The trend projection for 1977 is 10.8
million in total sales -- although some General Motors forecasters see
11.2 million as a reasonable target for next year.
Treasury Department's Dumping Decision - The finding of the Treasury
Department on May 4 that Volkswagen, Volvo, Renault and other foreign
manufacturers had been selling cars at lower prices in the U. S. than in
Europe, but accepting the producers' assurances that such "dumping" would
be stopped, was well received in Detroit. Leonard Woodcock, President
of the United Auto Workers, was quoted in the New York Times on May 13
as having indicated that Treasury's decision was "acceptable" to the
UAW.
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
2
INDIVIDUAL AUTO MAKER PERFORMANCES
General Motors - GM reported a 13-fold increase in first quarter
earnings in 1976 -- $800 million as compared to $59 million in the
same quarter a year ago. These earnings represented the second best
first quarter in GM's history, a result in part of General Motors'
increased share of the domestic car market -- up from 51.7 percent
in the first four months of 1975 to 54.6 percent thus far in 1976 --
as well as the general resurgence of domestic car consumption.
Ford - Ford posted a consolidated net income of $343 million
for the first quarter of 1976, or $3.65 per share of common stock --
compared with an ll-cent loss in the period a year ago. Like GM,
it was the second-best first quarter ever. Ford's dollar value of
sales, at $7.4 billion, set an all-time record for the company for
that period.
Chrysler - After five consecutive quarters of losses, Chrysler
reported net income of $72 million for the first quarter of 1976.
Chrysler suffered a disastrous year in 1975, posting a net loss of
$117 million. Chrysler has been particularly fortunate in the
timing of its introduction in 1976 of the Volare and the Aspen,
which have benefitted from the shift in consumer taste away from
subcompact models.
American Motors - AMC reported $1.2 million in net income for the
quarter ending March 31, 1976 -- compared to a loss of $49 million in
the same period last year. This represents the fourth consecutive
quarter of profitable operations for AMC -- although AMC does not
appear to be participating as strongly in the auto industry's
recovery as have GM, Ford and Chrysler.
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF U. S. AUTO INDUSTRY
Proportion of Gross National Product - Total value of motor vehicle
factory shipments from U.S. plants (passenger cars, trucks and busses)
was $33.3 billion in 1975 -- or 2.2 percent of GNP. This figure
represents only direct output from the auto factories, of course, and
does not include any of the prodigious "multiplier" effects which the
auto industry has on the distribution and service sectors of the
U.S. economy.
Employment - One of every 19 workers (5.3 percent of the work-
force) depends directly or indirectly on the auto industry for employment.
The auto industry consumes 21 percent of the nation's steel output,
64 percent of rubber, and 12 percent of annual aluminum production.
At the nadir of the auto industry's slump in February of 1975, 240,000
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
3
production workers were on indefinite layoff. This figure is now --
15 months later -- estimated to be below 35,000.
Production Concentration in Michigan - Exactly one-third of all
domestic auto production in 1975 took place in Michigan. The next
closest states were Missouri and Ohio, each with roughly 11 percent.
FEDERAL POLICY IMPACT ON AUTO INDUSTRY
Emission and Mileage Standards - The auto industry continues to
stress its apprehension over the uncertainties that accompany decision
making on Federal standards with respect both to emission controls and
gasoline mileage efficiency. Emission controls are not scheduled to
be debated on the Senate until after June 2, in the form of amendments
to the Clean Air Act. The House has yet to schedule debate on this
issue.
Decisions on emission standards will clearly have a direct impact
on policy with respect to fuel efficiency standards, now under study by
DOT.
LABOR RELATIONS ISSUES
Contracts - The contracts between the Big Three and the UAW expire
on September 15 of this year. The UAW has already indicated that job
security will be high on its priority list for this year -- in addition
to cost of living protection and wage increases.
Rubber Workers' Strike - The Rubber Workers' strike against the
major tire manufacturers, now in its fourth week, could imperil auto
production if the strike runs more than another two weeks. The auto
companies may begin to put pressure on the tire companies to settle,
as shortages begin to develop; on the other hand, the auto industry is
equally aware of the impact which a "heavy" Rubber Worker settlement
is likely to have on its own bargaining with the UAW in just four months.
GERALD
automobile
OF
DEPARTMENT
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
June 9, 1976
Public Notice Concerning Motor Vehicle Occupant Crash Protection
Today I am proposing for public review and comment several
alternative actions which the Federal government could take to
protect motor vehicle occupants from death or injury resulting from
traffic accidents. The alternatives are (1) to continue the existing
version of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 which requires
that manufacturers provide either seat belts, or passive restraints
(e.g., g., air bags), or a combination of the two; or (2) to require States
to take actions to increase seat belt use; or (3) to conduct a Federal
field test of passive restraints; or (4) to require that manufacturers
provide passive restraints on all cars; or (5) to require that manu-
facturers provide an option of passive restraints on some models.
Adoption of any of these alternatives would involve action by the
Department to extend or amend Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard 208. Some would also require Congressional action. I
am releasing today the text of these alternative rule changes and
directing their publication in the Federal Register.
Because of the degree of public and Congressional interest in this
matter and because of the major policy issues it raises, I will
personally hold a public session in Washington, D.C. on August 3,
1976, for up to six hours, to hear the views of interested groups,
individuals, and public officials. I also welcome written comments
submitted on or before September 17, 1976. I intend to reach a
final decision on or before January 1, 1977, and to issue a final rule
amending FMVSS 208 at that time.
In order to focus public comment, I am also releasing today a
statement of the issues which must be considered in reaching a
decision and the facts as I now see them.
I look forward to receiving the views of interested groups, individuals,
and public officials.
William T. Coleman, Jr.
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
AMENDMENT OF FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD
NO. 208 (OCCUPANT CRASH PROTECTION)
Public Hearing
As Secretary of Transportation, I am ultimately responsible
for deciding whether to amend Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
208, which provides for occupant crash protection in motor vehicles.
My involvement is also required because some of the possible courses
of action involve recommending new legislation. I have decided
that it is in the public interest to set forth the issues prior to such
decision and to hear up to six hours of argument, addressed to
these issues, by interested parties in a public session on August 3,
1976. Written comments on these issues, or issues raised at the
public session, may also be submitted to me on or before September 17,
1976. I will issue a written decision on or before January 1, 1977.
At the outset, I wish to make it clear that no decision has been made
in this matter.
This notice will briefly summarize the background and current
status of FMVSS 208, will set forth in more detail the specific issues,
including pertinent facts and analyses, which must be addressed in
attempting to reach a decision in the public interest, and will describe
the various alternative regulatory and legislative actions under
consideration. This notice, together with the appendices hereto, is
being sent to the Federal Register today for publication and will satisfy
the other requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act for a notice
of proposed rulemaking. The public session on August 3, 1976,
and the subsequent period designated for written comments will satisfy
the other requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act with
regard to rulemaking, and, at the time that I publish my written
decision, I will, unless facts at the hearing develop which make this
an inappropriate procedure, issue a final rule amending FMVSS 208.
In September 1966, Congress passed the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (The Safety Act), the purpose of which
was "to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons
resulting from traffic accidents". Pursuant to the Safety Act, the
Secretary of Transportation is charged with the responsibility of
establishing motor vehicle safety standards to protect the public against
CODE & LIBRAR DERALD
2.
"unreasonable risk of accidents occurring as a result of the design,
construction or performance of motor vehicles" and also against
"unreasonable risk of death or injury to persons in the event accidents
do occur". In January 1968, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), acting upon authority delegated to it by the
Secretary of Transportation, proposed the original version of
FMVSS 208. FMVSS 208 provides that manufacturers must ensure
that their automobiles are equipped with occupant crash protection
systems such as seat belts, air cushions, etc.
The present form of FMVSS 208 was first introduced in 1972
and requires manufacturers to provide occupant protection in vehicles
by one of three options: (1) a completely passive restraint system
providing protection in frontal, lateral, and roll-over crashes, or
(2) a passive restraint system providing protection in frontal crashes
combined with lap seat belts providing protection in lateral and roll-
over crashes, or (3) lap and shoulder seat belts at the front outboard
positions and lap seat belts for all other positions. The vast majority
of manufacturers have adopted the lap and shoulder seat belt option.
The present version of FMVSS 208 was revised in 1973 to require an
ignition interlock system to increase the wearing of seat belts, but
The Secretary's regulations, delegating authority to NHTSA,
exist to ensure that routine business can be conducted without the
Secretary's personal participation and to ensure administrative finality
at the NHTSA level when the Secretary so desires, but do not operate
to divest the Secretary of any authority. The fact that, on this
occasion, I am personally deciding whether, and if so how, to amend
FMVSS 208, does not therefore necessitate a formal revocation
of NHTSA's authority in this matter.
A "passive restraint system" is a system that affords
crash protection without requiring action on the part of the vehicle's
occupant. To date, two passive restraint systems have been
developed which appear to be capable of meeting the injury protection
criteria of FMVSS 208 in frontal crash conditions -- the air cushion
restraint system (air bag) and the passive belt (a shoulder belt and
knee bolster system in which the shoulder belt deploys automatically).
3/
General Motors has offered a passive restraint system, an
air cushion restraint system (air bag), as an option on its luxury cars
for the years 1974, 1975, and 1976; however, G.M. has now announced
its intention not to offer this option in the future. Volkswagen has
recently introduced an optional passive belt system in the 1976 Rabbit.
3.
Congress, as a result of public dissatisfaction with the ignition interlock
system, voided that requirement in 1974 and the rule was amended
accordingly that same year. Because of the public expression of
dissatisfaction with the interlock system, Congress, in its 1974
legislation, also ordered that there be no requirement in the future of
an occupant restraint system other than seat belts, unless such a require-
ment were first submitted to Congress subject to being disapproved by a
concurrent resolution.
Ever since FMVSS 208 was first promulgated in 1968, NHTSA
has anticipated that passive restraints might eventually become required
equipment. Indeed, from 1971 until 1974 when FMVSS 208 was most
recently amended, as described above, the standard explicitly called for
the adoption of mandatory passive restraints in the future. The
attractiveness of passive restraints is twofold. First it has been
thought they would perform more effectively in preventing injuries than
would seat belts, and second, because seat belts are not used consistently,
passive restraints, which require no action by the occupant, would ensure
more widespread crash protection. However, the prospect of mandating
passive restraints in automobiles has become increasingly controversial.
Questions of effectiveness, cost, and suspected hazards, as well as
the philosophical problems of restricting individuals' freedom of choice
with regard to how much they pay for safety protection, have been raised
by opponents of the air bag. It is in the context of this controversy that I
must make a decision as to the future of passive restraints.
In 1974 and 1975 the nation experienced significant reductions
in highway deaths and injuries due, in large part, to the enforcement
of the 55 mph speed limit. To achieve further reduction in deaths and
injuries will require increased use of occupant restraints. It is a
question involving thousands of lives or deaths and tens of thousands
of serious injuries per year. Furthermore, the annual cost to our
society in terms of lost resources represented by those who are killed
or maimed in traffic accidents is perhaps incalculable. However, we
live at a time of increasing citizen awareness of and concern about
the impact of Federal regulations in our lives. Many are
questioning whether increased government regulation is in the
nation's best interest. The public, of course, should always make
a distinction between safety regulation and economic regulation as
we in the Department attempt to do. The success of governmental
regulatory policy in any area, however, will ultimately depend upon the
support it receives within the body politic. Recent Congressional action
4.
to ban ignition interlock systems and to prohibit any Federal
requirement that motorcycle operators wear safety helmets reflect
the belief of many that there are limits to the Federal government's
role in forcing the individual to take action to protect himself or
herself. Thus this case presents a problem of balancing the need
for motor vehicle safety with a concern for the limitations on the
Federal government's role in regulating aspects of our national
life.
This decision also involves the difficult task of assessing and
comparing the safety benefits and costs of alternative occupant
restraint systems. While the legislative history of the Safety Act
indicates that safety is the overriding consideration, the cost of a
standard must also be examined. Marginal increments in safety
benefits which can be achieved only at great cost are not in the
public interest. Of course reducing safety benefits and costs to
quantitative terms which can be measured is extremely difficult.
In addressing the issue of the costs and benefits involved, I will set
forth the data upon which I base my analysis.
There have been prior opportunities for public comment on this
subject. Most recently, NHTSA held hearings on the matter on
May 19-23, 1975. But because the issues involved are so difficult,
because the public and Congressional interest in this matter is so
substantial, and because another hearing is required in any event
prior to a final rule being promulgated, I have decided to conduct
personally up to six hours of discussion in a public session on the
issues which I perceive as being basic to the decision. This will
assure that I have the benefit of the latest views and recommendations
of concerned and knowledgeable citizens, manufacturers of automobiles
and occupant restraint equipment, experts in crash protection, and
public officials, both Federal and State. I invite their comments on and
analysis of the following issues and alternatives. I repeat that no
decision has been made in this matter.
Finally, the current passenger-car requirements of FMVSS
208 apply to automobiles manufactured on or before August 31, 1976,
and expire thereafter. In view of the August 3, 1976, date of the
public hearing, the need to provide time after the hearing for written
submissions to the public docket, the time necessary to formulate
and write a decision, and the period required for Congressional review,
if necessary, of that decision, a final resolution of any proposal to
amend FMVSS 208 may not be reached until substantially after
January 1, 1977. Therefore, in the interim, I have decided to propose
an amendment of FMVSS 208 to extend the passenger-car requirements
of the present standard for one year S0 as to apply to automobiles
manufactured on or before August 31, 1977.
5.
Issues to be Addressed
The following issues are considered relevant to the formulation
of a final rule for occupant crash protection. It is recommended that
all participants at the hearing address their remarks to one or more
of the issues set forth below.
I.
Appropriate Role of the Federal Government in Prescribing Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards
By virtue of the Safety Act, the Federal government has declared
its intent "to reduce deaths and injuries resulting from traffic
accidents". As Secretary of Transportation I am charged with the
duty of effecting this purpose through the promulgation of Federal
motor vehicle safety standards specifying the safety characteristics
and crashworthiness of vehicles.- The goal of motor vehicle safety
expressed in the statute is clear and unequivocal. The question arises,
however, as to the precise nature of the government's duty in this area
and how to achieve the important end of motor vehicle safety
while preserving, to the extent possible, both individual freedom of
choice and the role of the marketplace in making economic decisions.
In the democratic society in which we live, I believe it is my responsibility
as a Federal official to consider these important concerns when
prescribing safety standards.
Under the terms of the Safety Act, the Federal government's duty
in prescribing safety standards is to protect the public "against
unreasonable risk of death or injury to persons in the event accidents do
occur". I believe that what constitutes an "unreasonable" risk of death
or injury is a difficult but critical issue. Some would argue that because
The statute itself states that in prescribing safety standards the
Secretary is required to consider, among other things:
(1) relevant available motor vehicle safety data, including
the results of research, development testing and
evaluation activities;
(2) whether any proposed standard is reasonable,
practicable and appropriate for the particular type
of motor vehicle for which it is prescribed; and
(3) the extent to which such standards will contribute to
carrying out the purposes of the Safety Act.
6.
occupants of motor vehicles are currently provided with lap and
shoulder belts to protect them against injury in traffic accidents,
and that because NHTSA estimates show that lap and shoulder
belts, when worn, are about as effective as any of the passive
restraint systems, passive restraints do not provide protection
against any unreasonable risks. In other words, an individual's
decision not to wear a safety belt should be assumed to be the
act of a reasonable person so that it does not give rise to an
unreasonable risk. Others would maintain that most people do
not wear their safety belts and are consequently exposed to a
substantial risk of death or injury. This becomes an "unreasonable"
risk in the context of the ready availability of passive restraints
which require no action on the part of the occupant, thus offering
the prospect of drastic reductions in casualties. Some contend
that the resolution of this issue lies in whether passive restraints
are in fact feasible, superior in performance, economical, and
reliable; if so, perhaps it does occasion an "unreasonable risk"
not to install them in all automobiles. In any event, a resolution
of this issue is certainly fundamental to my decision.
In considering a mandate of any particular crash protection
system, such as passive restraints, we are talking about government
regulations which restrict individuals' freedom to choose the degree
of safety protection they want and how much they are willing to pay
for it. Individuals should be able to exercise some freedom of
choice about how much they are willing to pay for safety protection in private
transportation systems. Those who put a premium on freedom of
choice contend that it is not the role of the Federal government to
protect citizens absolutely from deaths and injuries in automotive
accidents. Rather, government should only ensure that adequate
protection is provided which individuals can avail themselves of if
they so choose. On the other hand, the stated purpose of the Safety
Act is unequivocally "to reduce deaths and injuries to persons
resulting from traffic accidents". While safety standards must
be "reasonable", according to the statute, individual freedom of
choice is not one of the statutorily explicit prescribed considerations
and, ,arguably, should not be allowed to interfere arbitrarily with the
basic purposes of the Act.
Mandating passive restraints in motor vehicles might create,
additionally, a problem of equity. The issuance of a passive restraint
standard will result in the manufacture of vehicles equipped with air
bags or passive belts rather than lap and shoulder seat belts. These
passive restraint-equipped vehicles will cost more, but, in tests to
date, have been found to provide no materially greater protection
to those individuals who already use lap and shoulder seat belts.
7.
Nevertheless, these individuals will have to pay more for their
automobiles, without any measurable benefit, to help provide passive
restraints to those who choose not to wear seat belts. Thus, those who
currently wear seat belts would be forced to subsidize those who do not.
How public policy should deal with such a subsidy is an issue upon
which I would welcome comment.
Personal convenience is another aspect of individual freedom of
choice. The Federal government's experiences with ignition interlock
systems demonstrate that, despite reasonable cost and demonstrable
safety benefits, personal convenience can be of overwhelming
importance. In this regard, passive restraint systems appear to be
very attractive; they probably are more convenient than safety belts
in that they do not require any action by the automobile occupant to be
effective.
Government regulation in the safety area, as elsewhere, tends
to limit the role of the marketplace in making economic decisions, and
thereby also to inhibit innovation. Certainly, mandating passive
restraints does not comport with the ideal of a free enterprise economy.
On the other hand, there are limitations to the benefits that the free
market can provide. Some people supported the original passage of
the Safety Act because they concluded that the traditional marketplace
mechanism was not effective in satisfying our society's need for
automotive safety. It is difficult to believe, for instance, that there would
be seat belts in every car today if their installation had had to rely on
the demands of the marketplace. The extent to which Federal regulations
governing occupant crash protection should strive to preserve the role
of the marketplace is an issue upon which I invite discussion.
Specific Questions Relating to the Federal Role
1. Does the unwillingness of many people to wear safety belts
expose them to an "unreasonable" risk of death or injury requiring
additional occupant crash protection? Does the government have the
duty to protect a citizen from danger when a citizen has chosen not to
use available means (e.g., lap and shoulder belts) to protect himself?
Does the answer depend on how readily available and feasible the
additional protection is, and at what cost ?
2. What weight should be given to considerations of personal
freedom of choice and convenience in regulations concerning occupant
crash protection?
1030
8.
3. Should individuals who now use their lap and shoulder belts
be required to purchase more expensive passive restraint systems
in order to contribute to achieving a societal goal of increased motor
vehicle safety ?
4. Will passive restraints be available in the marketplace at a
reasonable cost for those who would choose them without government
regulatory action
5. To what extent should regulations governing occupant crash
protection seek to preserve the role of the marketplace in making
economic decisions?
II. Benefits and Costs of Alternative Occupant Restraint Systems
The legislative history of the Safety Act indicates that an assessment
of the "practicability" of safety standards should include consideration of
technical feasibility and economic factors. Therefore, I will briefly
describe the alternative systems available, summarize and compare
their benefits and costs, and discuss the extent to which data is
available to support these analyses. A more detailed benefit/cost
analysis is provided in Appendix A.
A. Feasibility and Performance of Alternative Occupant
Restraint Systems
Occupant restraint systems are of two general types -- active and
passive. The active systems available today are the familiar lap and
shoulder seat belts and lap seat belts. In these, the occupant of a
vehicle is protected by the belts from being thrown about and from
impacting the hard surfaces of the passenger compartment in the event
that an accident occurs. Clearly, to be effective, seat belts must be
used. Provided they are used, lap and shoulder seat belts can reduce
the likelihood of death in severe automobile accidents by roughly 60%
and reduce the severity or avoid the occurrence of injuries by 30%
to 60%.
Two passive restraint systems -- the air cushion restraint system
(air bag) and the passive belt -- have been developed which appear to be
capable of meeting the injury criteria of FMVSS 208 under frontal crash
conditions. The air cushion restraint system consists of an air cushion
and a sensor system which activates it. The sensor detects the impact
of a crash by measuring the vehicle's deceleration. Provided the
deceleration is sufficiently intense -- typically corresponding to an
impact into a fixed barrier at 12 mph -- the sensor sends a signal to a
9.
device which deploys the air cushion by rapidly inflating it. Typical
times for deployment and inflation range from 35 to 70 milliseconds.
In the event of an accident, the passenger, rather than impacting the
hard surfaces of the vehicle passenger compartment, is cushioned
by the air bag. In this way, the incidence or severity of injury is
considerably reduced. The need for protection in lateral and roll-over
crash conditions will likely require that air bag-equipped cars also
have lap belts, although this is a point of some disagreement.
Estimates of the effectiveness of the air bag in reducing the risk of
death and severe injury under crash conditions indicate the air bag
(with lap belt) and lap and shoulder seat belt to be of roughly equivalent
effectiveness -- provided the latter is worn.
The so-called "passive belt" system, recently introduced as an
option in the Volkswagen Rabbit, consists of a shoulder belt that, upon
closing of the door, deploys automatically to protect and restrain the
upper torso and a fixed knee bolster to protect and restrain the lower
torso. Experience with the passive belt is limited, although engineering
judgment would suggest that it is roughly as effective as a lap and
shoulder belt. Its advantage over the lap and shoulder belt is that it
deploys automatically.
In view of the availability today of both the air bag and passive
belts, the technological feasibility of passive restraint systems does
not appear to be a serious issue. Nevertheless, the feasibility of
manufacturing millions of vehicles per year that will be equipped with
passive restraint systems that reliably meet the requirements of the
standard for the lifetime of the vehicle is another question and an
issue upon which I invite comment.
B. Benefits of Alternative Systems
The direct benefits of occupant restraint systems are usually
assessed in terms of the number of fatalities prevented and the number
of injuries avoided or reduced in severity. For some systems, such as
the lap and shoulder seat belts, field data has been accumulated which
can be used to estimate these benefits. The passive restraint systems
have not been evaluated in the field as extensively. In these cases, we
must rely on engineering judgment and laboratory simulations. Laboratory
simulations can, of course, never duplicate the full spectrum of real-
world collisions and thus there is greater uncertainty in the accuracy
of the estimates of the benefits of the passive systems.
Table 1, which follows, shows the estimated number of fatalities
prevented and the number of injuries avoided or reduced in severity
annually for various occupant restraint systems. These estimates show
10.
that a substantial reduction in fatalities and injuries can be achieved
with either passive restraints or lap and shoulder seat belts
provided that belt usage rates are sufficiently high. If a 70% usage
rate could be achieved with lap and shoulder belts, the benefits would
be nearly the same as with full-front air cushion restraints. A 70%
usage rate corresponds to seat belt usage levels achieved through
effective enforcement of laws mandating the wearing of seat belts now
in effect in Australia, New Zealand and many European countries.
Australia was the real pioneer in this area, achieving a stable level
of seat belt use of 70% in urban areas. Canada's Ontario Province
has recently enacted a similar law, and initial usage appears to be
around 60% and rising. Traffic deaths and injuries have dropped
significantly as a consequence.
In the United States, on the other hand, NHTSA believes the
usage levels will likely be only 15% for lap and shoulder belts plus
an additional 5% for the lap belt part of the assembly alone. Using
the results achieved with the ignition interlock system as a guide,
NHTSA has estimated that 35% lap and shoulder belt plus an additional
5% lap belt usage is the probable upper limit to the usage rate that can
be achieved voluntarily. Clearly, the unwillingness of most automobile
occupants to "buckle-up" has caused this nation to forego much of the
potential benefits of safety belts.
In addition to the direct benefits in terms of the reduced number
of deaths and injuries, occupant restraint systems may indirectly
benefit automobile owners through reduced automotive insurance rates.
For example, some insurance companies offer premium reductions
to owners of air bag-equipped automobiles. It has been suggested
that a $1.6 billion saving on automobile insurance would be realized
annually if air bags were mandated. I look forward to hearing from
representatives of the insurance industry as to what they believe the
impact of the various alternative restraint systems would be on the
cost of automobile insurance to consumers.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that these estimates of
benefits apply to the 1975 car population and injury severity
distribution. If the average size of cars becomes smaller, the number
of fatalities and injuries could increase substantially. If so, the
resulting need for effective occupant crash protection systems will
be greater. This is a factor which must be considered in my decision.
Table 1
11.
5/
Benefits of Occupant Crash Protection Systems-
Fatalities Prevented Injuries Reduced or
System
Per Year
Avoided Per Year
Lap and shoulder (15%) and lap
(5%) belts
3,000
159,300
Lap and shoulder (35%) and lap
(5%) belts
6,300
342,600
Lap and shoulder belt (70% usage)
11,500
641,400
Lap and shoulder belt (100% usage)
16,300
916,400
Lap belt (100% usage)
10,900
438,700
Driver-only air cushion⁶/
10
/
9,200
168,600
Full-front air cushion-
11,200
171,80010/
Passive belts
8,200
373,300
Mandatory option9/
5% air cushion
3,400
182,700
10% air cushion
4,100
182,100
25% air cushion
5,400
180,300
5/
These estimates assume the car population and occupant fatality
rates to be that of 1975 (approximately 100 million cars and 27,200 people,
respectively), 10 million cars to be manufactured annually, and the
distribution of injuries by severity to be the same as in 1975. The
discussion in Appendix A gives the basis for these calculations.
Assumes 20% lap belt usage by driver and 15% lap and shoulder
belt plus 5% lap belt by other front seat occupants.
Assumes 20% lap belt usage by all front seat occupants.
GERALE FORD
Assumes 60% passive belt usage, i.e., 40% of people disconnect
the system.
This refers to a situation in which the Federal government requires
manufacturers to make passive restraints available to the consumer as an
option. These estimates assume 20% safety belt wearing by all front seat
occupants.
10/
One obtains these relatively low injury estimates because the air
cushion does not deploy unless the accident severity exceeds that corres-
ponding to a crash into a fixed barrier at 12 mph.
12.
C. Cost of Alternative Systems
The direct cash costs of occupant restraint systems are of three
kinds. First, there are the start-up costs associated with research
and engineering development and design. Second, there are the
individual unit costs which represent the cost of producing the
occupant restraint system for an individual motor vehicle, and third,
any costs of replacement plus higher fuel costs due to the additional
weight of the protection system increase operating costs.
Below, in Table 2, is a listing of the NHTSA estimates of the
total cash costs of various restraint systems expressed in terms of
the cost per automobile. In some cases, high and low estimates are
given to indicate the range of estimates that have been quoted by
various sources other than NHTSA.
Table 2
11
/
Cash Costs of Occupant Crash Protection Systems
Cost Per Automobile ($)
Restraint System
Low
NHTSA
High
Lap belt
30
Lap and shoulder belt
50
60
70
Driver-only air cushion
110
200
12
/
Full-front air cushion
100
190
350
Passive belt
90
These results clearly show that there are significant differences
in the estimated costs of different systems. The NHTSA estimate of
the cost of full frontal air cushions is more than three times that of
the lap and shoulder safety belt. There is a wide variation in the
range of cost estimates for some systems. The air cushion is the most
11
/
These estimates do not include the cost of lap belts for rear
seat occupants. These belts would add roughly $20 to the cost of all
restraint systems.
12
/
This assumes all cars would be equipped with the air cushion.
If the air cushion is offered as an option, a very rough estimate of the
cost is taken to be twice this price because of the greater unit cost
associated with smaller production lots.
13.
controversial in this regard, with cost estimates varying by greater
than a factor of three. I intend to use the public hearing to attempt to
reconcile these differing cost estimates so that I fully understand the
potential economic impact on the consumer of any decision.
Among the indirect costs of a new, more costly occupant restraint
system would be a reduction in automobile sales and attendant loss of
automotive manufacturing jobs that might result from the higher price of
automobiles. Although data is limited, the available information on the
sales/cost elasticity of automobiles yields estimates of from -0.27 to
-1.5, with -1.0 being typical; a sales/cost elasticity of -1.0 means that
an increase of one percent in the cost of an automobile decreases total
sales by one percent. However, the savings in automobile insurance,
medical costs, etc., might ultimately compensate, in terms of the national
economy, for this loss by increasing people's income and thereby
stimulating car sales. In addition, increased business and jobs for the
suppliers of occupant restraint systems might also compensate for
the decrease in automobile sales.
D. Comparison of Benefits and Costs, Benefit/Cost Ratios
In order to compare quantitatively the various alternatives, it is
perhaps useful to consider the ratio of cash benefits to cash costs. Of
course, to do this requires that the benefits and costs be described in
the same terms. Thus, one must address the question of the "value"
of a life and the "cost" of injuries. That is, what is the dollar value
of a life saved, an injury reduced or eliminated? To many, such
notions are abhorrent -- a life saved is of unlimited value and cannot
be measured. Nonetheless, methods have been developed by economists
and actuaries to estimate the dollar value of these benefits. One approach
is to use the lost potential income, medical costs, and legal expenses to
measure the value of a life or the cost of an injury. Alternatively, one
could consider the extent to which individuals will typically risk injury
or death e.g., how much will they spend on automotive safety to reduce
the risk of injury and death Using approaches such as these, economists
and actuaries have developed estimates of the dollar costs of deaths and
injuries which can be used to quantify in dollar proxy terms the value of
the safety benefits of a particular crash protection system. Comparisons
of these dollar benefits with cash costs are given in the following table
for various occupant protection systems.
Again, the wide range of cost estimates for a given system yields a
wide variance in benefit/cost ratios. It must be kept in mind in assessing
benefit/cost ratios that such ratios do not spell out all the benefits and
costs of a given system, only the cash benefits and costs. Finally,
consideration of the total benefits and costs of a proposal are at least as
important as their ratio.
14.
Table 3
Benefit/Cost Ratios of Occupant Crash Protection Systems 13 /
Benefit/Cost Ratio
Low Cost NHTSA Estimated Cost High Cost
Lap and shoulder (15%)
and lap (5%) belt
2.4
2.0
1.7
Lap and shoulder (35%)
and lap (5%) belt
5.0
4.1
3.5
Lap and shoulder belt
(70% usage)
9.1
7.6
6.5
Lap and shoulder belt
(100% usage)
12.2
10.1
6.1
Lap belt (100% usage)
13.7
Driver-only air cushion
3.1
1.7
Full front air cushion
4.2
2.2
1.2
Passive belts
4.0
Mandatory option
5% air cushion
1.8
10% air cushion
1.7
25% air cushion
1.5
13
/
The cost/benefit ratios in Table 3 reflect the so-called steady-
state or equilibrium values that would be achieved over a long period of
time. Because the benefits of an occupant protection system
are realized after the cost is paid, most economists would agree that
the benefits should be discounted to reflect the income lost by an early
safety investment whose payoff comes later. Also, because only about
10% of the fleet would be equipped with any new protection system each
year, the benefits of the system would be realized incrementally -- at
roughly 10% a year -- while the full annual costs are borne immediately.
Because of this transition, it takes several years before a new system
would be cost-beneficial. For example, for the full front air cushion,
it has been estimated that the cumulative benefits would not exceed the
cumulative costs for from 5 to 7 years after this system was required.
15.
E. The Availability of Sufficient Field Data to Evaluate Passive
Occupant Restraints
There exists only limited field experience with passive restraint
systems. General Motors has offered the air cushion as an option in
certain 1974-76 models cars. Although G.M.'s original goal was to
sell 100, 000 air cushion cars per year, less than 10,000 have been sold
to date, and G.M. plans to discontinue the option after 1976. Altogether,
including the original test fleets manufactured by Ford and G.M.,
there are roughly 12,000 air cushion-equipped vehicles on the highway
today, and fewer than 100 air cushion field deployments have been
investigated. 14 / There is even less field data available on the passive
belt.
Because of this limited field experience, some have argued that,
in view of the potentially significant cost of passive restraints, more field
data should be developed before a decision is made on mandating passive
restraints. I invite comment on the desirability and practicability of
a field test of passive restraints.
14 / According to NHTSA, air bag-equipped cars on the road today
have traveled approximately 240, 000, 000 miles. NHTSA has documented
only 89 air bag deployments in that time. In these accidents 4 deaths and
an additional 20 injuries at the moderate level or greater occurred. This
field experience is probably not sufficient to calculate air bag effectiveness
with precision. Of the 4 fatalities resulting from crashes in air bag-
equipped cars, one was a 6-week old unrestrained infant who sustained
a fatal head injury from being thrown into the dash
as a result of emergency braking before the actual crash.
In two others, the crash was so severe the occupant compartment was
destroyed; in these two crashes no restraint system would have been of
any help. The cause of the fourth fatality is uncertain; it appears the
driver was slumped across the steering wheel (either passed out or dead)
at the time his vehicle impacted a tree; an autopsy was not performed to
determine the actual cause of death.
16.
Specific Questions about Alternative Occupant Restraint Systems and
their Benefits and Costs
1.
Are the air cushion and passive belt systems technologically
feasible ?
2. Are the cash estimates presented of the costs and benefits of
various occupant crash protection systems reasonably accurate?
3. What would be the effect of a shift to smaller
cars ?
4. What effect will the decision on FMVSS 208 have on automobile
insurance rates ?
5. What effect will the decision on FMVSS 208 have on sales and
employment in the automotive industry ?
6.
To what extent should benefits, costs, and benefit/cost
ratios be weighed in arriving a decision?
7. Arethere sufficient data available at present to assess
adequately the effectiveness of the various occupant restraint systems ?
8.
Are there other existing feasible active or passive restraint
systems that have not been identified?
III. Public Acceptance of Occupant Restraint Systems
Public acceptance is necessarily of great consequence to the success
of Federal efforts to increase automotive safety. While temporary gains
can be achieved with unpopular and restrictive safety regulations,
experience with the ignition interlock requirement and motorcycle helmet
laws shows that safety regulations which significantly curtail personal
freedom are frequently overturned. And, unfortunately, the public
perception of the safety program usually becomes more negative. A
consideration of reasonableness requires, among other things,
examination of the public acceptability of a proposal.
17.
A. Voluntary Safety Belt Usage
Generally speaking, the concept of voluntary safety belt usage
has met with public acceptance. While some lament the fact that many
of their fellow citizens do not use seat belts, objections to affording
people a choice have been few. The resulting level of usage has been
the source of some debate; safety experts disagree as to the percentage
of people who are now "buckling-up". Estimates range from as low
as 15% to as high as 45%. NHTSA, using experience with the ignition-
interlock as a guide, believes that 40% (35% for the full lap and shoulder belt
plus an additional 5% for the lap belt part of the assembly alone) is a
reasonable upper limit to voluntary safety belt usage with present
safety belt designs. Actual current usage rates are estimated by
NHTSA to be near 20% (15% plus 5%); trends suggest a slight growth of
usage with time.
B. Mandatory Safety Belt Usage Laws
Past experience with State mandatory usage laws suggests that
this approach has very low public acceptability. While citizens of other
countries may find such laws an effective and acceptable way to
promote automotive safety, citizens of the United States have shown
considerable opposition to the enactment of laws which require them
to take actions to protect themselves on the highways. Although the
1973 Highway Safety Act promised additional Section 402 funds to
States which passed mandatory seat belt usage laws, Congress,
concerned primarily with the civil liberties impact of this provision,
never provided funds for the implementation of this section and
completely eliminated this feature in the recently enacted 1976
Federal Highway Act. NHTSA held a National Safety Belt Conference
in November 1973 to help legislators and others work to get safety belt
usage laws passed. In 1974, bills were introduced in or passed by at
least one house of over 20 State legislatures. Only Puerto Rico, however,
in 1974, actually passed a law mandating seat belt usage. Some bills
were re-introduced in 1975-76, but in dwindling numbers. Support for
such laws appears to be waning.
C. Public Acceptance of Passive Restraints
Many argue that passive restraints, especially the air cushion,
would meet with public acceptability because of the personal convenience
they afford when contrasted with safety belts. The additional cost would
be outweighed by the safety benefits and added convenience. Others
FORD
point to the potential hazards of air bags to demonstrate the likely
unacceptability of passive restraints. They say that when one considers
the additional costs of passive restraints and the limited increment in
safety benefits compared to lap and shoulder belts (if worn), the
18.
unacceptability of passive restraints is assured. Mandating passive
restraints would represent a significant and unprecedented increase
in the cost of automobile safety. Public indifference to safety, it is
argued, implies that additional costs of this magnitude are unacceptable.
The G.M. and Volkswagen experiences with offering optional
passive restraints do not give conclusive evidence regarding public
acceptability. The economic situation, the move to smaller cars,
lack of advertising, and the public's general apathy about spending
money for safety all complicate analysis of the G.M. effort to sell
the air cushion -- although it is clear that G.M. sold substantially fewer of
these systems (10,000 total) than they had planned (100,000 annually). The
passive belt has been available only recently, and, although about
30,000 have been sold to date, we simply do not know how the general
public would react to passive belts. I earnestly invite comment on
this question as it will certainly weigh in my decision on occupant
crash protection.
D. Air Bag "Hazards"
In the past, critics of the air bag have argued that there are major
potential safety hazards associated with their use which could outweigh
the benefits they afford in occupant protection. The following have been
prominently mentioned.
1. Hearing damage due to acoustic shock from air bag
inflation
2. Eye damage as a result of eyeglass breakage and
other trauma due to air bag deployment
3.
Toxicity of chemicals used for air bag deployment
4. Unreliability of air bag actuation
a. Inadvertent actuation
b. Failure to actuate when needed
5. Air bag-inflicted injury to improperly positioned
occupants
6. Improper disposal of air bag actuators
19.
Both laboratory experience and the limited field experience during
the past several years indicate that these factors do not constitute a
significant risk. No case of poisoning or hearing or eye damage has been
encountered in thousands of laboratory deployments. Experience with
the G.M. and other fleets has demonstrated the reliability of bag deployment
and has produced no significant air bag injuries to improperly positioned
occupants. Field as well as laboratory results confirm, however, that
improper positioning certainly lessens the degree of protection afforded
by the air bag. This fact reinforces the value of the lap belt, apart from
the basic protection it provides. Improper disposal of air bag actuators
is, of course, a matter of concern to manufacturers because of the
potential product liability considerations, but we have no evidence to suggest
that they will be unable to deal satisfactorily with the problem.
The reliability of any system, particularly any new system, is always
important. There is good reason to believe that the air bag system will
work 15 when it is supposed to and will not "go off" when it is not supposed
to.
This is not to say that, should the air bag system be mandated,
there will not be start-up problems. In any event, I want to encourage
any further discussion that will shed light on this issue.
Specific Questions About Public Acceptance
1. What level of voluntary usage of safety belts is most likely in
the future ?
2. Should State mandatory safety belt usage laws be proposed?
3. What, if any, Federal laws should be enacted to induce the
States to enact such laws ?
4. Are passive restraints -- the air cushion and passive belt
systems -- acceptable to the public from both a convenience and a cost
point of view ?
5. Do "air bag hazards" constitute a meaningful risk'
6. How should the issue of public acceptance weigh in my decision?
15
There have been six recorded non-collision (inadvertent)
deployments of air bags. Three occurred in service garages; inattention
or unfamiliarity with the system by mechanics was the cause in every
case. One occurred during a fire and explosion of a propane tank in a
vehicle -- a highly unusual circumstance. One was caused when sensor
wiring was abraided by a pulley to the engine and resulted in the recall
of 2,000 air bag-equipped vehicles to correct this manufacturing error.
The one remaining incident was traced to the quality control of a sensor
which was actuated apparently by concentrated electromagnetic radiation.
20.
The Alternatives
This section delineates the more plausible alternative courses of
action along with their pros and cons. Appendix B contains the formal
rule changes that would be required by each alternative and, in conjunction
with the foregoing discussion of the issues involved and the following
description of the alternatives, is intended to constitute the formal
notice of proposed rulemaking as required by the Administrative
Procedure Act. While I have attempted to focus on what appear to be
the more plausible alternatives, I also want to encourage those with
additional suggestions to submit their proposals to me either orally at
the public hearing or in writing. I will also be considering the adoption
of various combinations or refinements of the alternatives listed below
and therefore specifically invite comment on such possibilities.
Alternative I: Continuation of Existing Requirement
Under this alternative, the present three-option version of FMVSS
208, described earlier, would be extended for some period into the future,
and research directed toward developing effective passive restraint systems
would continue. While the length of the extension is open to discussion,
the proposed amendment given in Appendix B is written for a three-year
extension -- to August 31, 1979.
Supporters of this alternative would contend that most consumers
appear to favor safety belts over passive restraints and that the Federal
government should respect this choice. Moreover, safety belt usage is
increasing as more comfortable and convenient systems become available.
Thus, the present form of FMVSS 208 is working effectively and should not
be changed. Many would argue that the Federal government has met its
obligation under the Safety Act and to go further would not be consistent
with the appropriate Federal role. Supporters would also point out that
this option minimizes additional cost to consumers and does not place
reliance on what some believe to be the untested technology of passive
restraints. They would conclude that the public is assured under this
alternative that there will be reliable, relatively inexpensive crash
protection systems (e.g., lap and shoulder safety belts) available.
Those opposing this approach would maintain that, in view of low
safety belt usage rates, this alternative will not produce the substantial
additional safety benefits that would result from the other alternatives.
They would view this as a timid approach to highway safety that is
inconsistent with the spirit of the Safety Act. While research on passive
restraints might continue, this decision would likely signal the end of the
availability and further large-scale commercial development of the air
cushion restraint system -- a passive protection system that many
believe offers considerable safety benefits.
21.
Alternative II: State Mandatory Safety Belt Usage Laws
This approach would also retain the present three-option version
of FMVSS 208 for some period of time. Concurrently, the Department
of Transportation would propose a new Traffic Safety Standard which
would cause the States to adopt and enforce safety belt usage laws or
otherwise to achieve a usage level much higher than being experienced
today. Pursuant to the 1973 Highway Safety Act, however, Congress
would have to enact such a Traffic Safety Standard.
Everyone would agree that this approach is the quickest way to
realize substantial safety benefits. Practically all automobiles are now
equipped with safety belts while passive restraints, if mandated, would
be introduced into the fleet at a rate of about only 10% per year, thus
requiring many years before their full benefits could be realized. If a
usage rate of 70% could be achieved, proponents argue, the resulting
safety benefits would be essentially the same as the more expensive
passive systems. They point out that mandatory safety belt usage laws
have worked in other countries and, with effective enforcement, levels
of usage near 70% have been achieved. Not only would usage laws quickly
realize much of the potential safety benefits of safety belts that are now
being lost, it is claimed, they would do so at no additional cash cost to
consumers. Effectively enforced State mandatory safety belt usage laws,
enforced by Federal law, are the most cost-beneficial safety proposal
the Federal government could bring about. While supporters of this option
would rather achieve these high levels of usage through voluntary actions,
they believe it is quite unlikely that usage rates in excess of about 40%
could be achieved voluntarily. Thus unless safety belt usage is increased
by law, they conclude, the nation will not realize the substantial potential
safety benefits seat belts could provide.
Opponents of mandatory usage laws would argue that it is not the
Federal government's role to induce States to require a citizen to protect
himself. They would view the requirement to "buckle-up" as an invasion
of individual liberty and an inconvenience that will not be readily accepted
by the American people. Recent Congressional actions rescinding
regulations mandating the ignition-interlock system and motorcycle helmet
laws, they would argue, demonstrate that the American people are opposed
to requirements which substantially interfere with personal behavior in the
name of safety. Opponents also would point to NHTSA's lack of success in
stimulating mandatory usage laws to indicate the futility of this proposal.
22.
Alternative III: Federal Field Test of Passive Restraints
Under this alternative, the present three-option version of FMVSS
208 would be extended for a period of time while a Federally sponsored
field test of passive restraint systems is conducted. The motor vehicle
safety data collected in this field test would then be used in formulating
a future decision on mandating passive restraints. An adequate field
test and evaluation of data could cost from $50 million to $150 million
and Congressional approval of a supplemental appropriation to NHTSA
would be required.
Among the questions posed by such a field test is how passive
restraints would be introduced into the automobile fleet. Should
manufacturers be subsidized to introduce passive restraints into one
or more of their models? Should the government subsidize individual
consumers who elect to have passive restraints installed in their cars?
Or should the test be conducted by installing passive restraints in
government vehicles? Which approach would ensure that an adequate
number of test vehicles will be developed?
Supporters of a Federal field test generally believe that while
passive restraints may be mandated eventually, there is insufficient
data regarding effectiveness and practicability to justify such a requirement
at this time. In view of the substantial cost of mandatory passive restraints
and the relatively small cost of a field test, they would argue, the Federal
government must ensure that these issues are settled before embarking
on such a program. Furthermore, a field test will undoubtedly cause
further technological development of passive restraints and also reduce
the possibility of serious start-up problems in manufacturing if passive
restraints are later mandated. The air cushion would remain an available
option to consumers under this alternative and the issue of potential
air bag hazards would be even more satisfactorily addressed.
This alternative would likely meet opposition from both those in
favor of and those opposed to mandatory passive restraints. The former
are sufficiently confident of the data available to conclude that a field test
is not needed. And, because of the time needed to prepare for, conduct,
and evaluate the field test, the purported potential benefits of passive
restraints could be delayed for as much as five years. The latter typically
argue that there is sufficient data available to show that passive restraint
systems do not provide significantly better protection than the lap and
shoulder belts -- provided belts are worn -- and yet the passive systems
are more costly. Others opposed to a field test believe that a $50 million -
$150 million expenditure on a field test would be a waste of Federal funds.
23.
Alternative IV: Mandatory Passive Restraints
Under this alternative, FMVSS 208 would be amended to require
passive restraint systems for all automobiles manufactured after a
given date. The effective date of the amendment would be determined
primarily by the amount of lead time needed by automotive
manufacturers to comply with the amended standard. The proposed
amendment set forth in Appendix B would be effective on August 31,
1979, in time for the 1980 model year.
Among the questions entailed in mandating passive restraints
is that of which seating positions should be protected. Because of the
relatively low occupancy rates for rear seats and the protection
afforded rear seat occupants by the back of the front seat, it is generally
agreed that rear seat passive restraints would not be justified.
Since all cars have drivers and the average front-seat occupancy is 1.4,
providing the driver with a passive restraint system would be the most
cost-beneficial action. Also, the technology of the air cushion restraint
system is such that a driver-side passive restraint system appears to
be relatively easy technologically since the air bag could be stored in
the steering wheel column assembly without modification of the rest
of the car interior. Protecting all front seat occupants (a "full front"
air cushion) would additionally require redesign of the dashboard.
With these considerations in mind, the proposed amendment set forth
in Appendix B calls for driver-side passive restraints starting August 31,
1979, and full-front passive restraints starting two years later.
This amendment to FMVSS 208 would not become effective until
sixty calendar days of continuous session of Congress have passed after
its promulgation and only if a concurrent resolution disapproving the
amendment is not adopted during that time by both Houses of Congress.
Those favoring this alternative would argue that, in view of the
low level of safety belt usage and the limited prospects for increased
usage in the future, there is a further "need for motor vehicle safety"
as defined by the Safety Act and that a mandate of passive restraints will
meet that need. They argue that lives will be saved and injuries will be
reduced or avoided at a reasonable cost to consumers. Furthermore,
supporters of mandatory passive restraints believe both laboratory
simulations and field experience have shown passive restraints to be
practicable so that there is no need for additional field data. They
would further argue that the additional cost of passive restraints will be
mitigated, at least in part, by reduced automobile insurance rates.
Finally, they would point out that while comparable benefits could be
achieved at lower cost through a higher rate of usage of safety belts,
voluntary usage will not reach the requisite levels, and mandatory usage
laws are unacceptable to people.
24.
Arguing against this alternative would be those who believe that
a mandate of passive restraints would not be in the public interest
and would unnecessarily reduce the consumer's freedom of choice.
They would claim that experience with passive restraints as an
option suggests that consumers prefer the less costly lap and shoulder
belts to the air cushion restraint system. Furthermore, they would
contend passive restraints, while more costly, would provide no
additional safety benefit to those who have been sufficiently interested
in personal safety to use their safety belts. The subsidization by seat
belt wearers of non-seat belt wearers is claimed to be unfair and
contrary to sound public policy. The lack of sufficient field data on the
effectiveness, reliability, and feasibility of passive restraints is cited
as an additional reason for opposing mandatory passive restraints.
Finally, in view of the need for air cushions to be supplemented by lap
belts to provide protection in non-frontal crashes, it is argued that air
cushions do not constitute a totally passive restraint proposal. The need
to buckle a lap belt for complete protection remains, SO that personal
convenience and actual effectiveness of air cushion passive restraints are
overstated.
Alternative V: Mandatory Passive Restraint Option
Here FMVSS 208 would be amended to require that automobile
manufacturers provide consumers with the option of passive restraints
in some or all of their models. The extent to which the option should be
available is open to discussion. The proposed amendment set forth in
Appendix B requires, that, within each size class, 16/ manufacturers
must make this option available in at least one model. Under this
proposal, most consumers would be able to obtain passive restraints,
if they choose, in a reasonable range of models.
This amendment to FMVSS 208 would not become effective until
sixty calendar days of continuous session of Congress have passed after
its promulgation and only if a concurrent resolution disapproving the
amendment is not adopted during that time by both Houses of Congress.
16/ "Size class" refers to the size of the wheelbase conforming to
the subcompact, compact, intermediate, standard, and full-size division
automobiles.
25.
Those in favor of this option would argue that this alternative
would realize the advantages of passive restraint systems for those
who choose them while preserving the consumer's freedom of choice.
As a consequence, the marketplace would also provide incentives for
the further development of occupant crash protection systems to meet
the safety needs of consumers at the least cost and inconvenience.
Those opposing this option would argue that the safety benefits of
passive restraints would not be realized because consumers would
choose the less expensive, less protective, active systems. And the
optional nature of passive systems would raise their unit cost even
higher, thus further discouraging the purchase of passive systems.
They would argue that the marketplace has not in the past and will not
in the future adequately provide for society's needs in automotive
safety. Some automotive manufacturers have pointed out the potentially
burdensome cost of providing this option on numerous models of
their cars -- especially if consumers do not exercise the option in large
numbers. The extent to which consumers would select optional passive
restraints and the unit costs of passive restraints under this alternative
are difficult to anticipate.
N.YORD
26.
Hearing Procedures
The hearing will be conducted in a manner comparable to a
Congressional hearing, and will be held on Tuesday, August 3, 1976,
at the Departmental Auditorium, Constitution Avenue between 12th
and 14th Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C. The hearing schedule
will be from 9:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 2:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.
We will seek to assure a fair opportunity for proponents of all positions
to present their views.
Participants will be permitted a maximum of ten minutes each.
Written copies of presentations will be helpful, but are not required.
Additionally, written presentation of any interested person, including
those who may not have sufficient time to express their full views at
the hearing, may be submitted directly to me on or before September 17,
1976 (send to Secretary of Transportation, Washington, D.C. 20590,
and indicate FMVSS 208 Hearing on the envelope). These submissions
will be available for public inspection and copying from the docket clerk,
both before and after September 17, 1976, in the Office of the Assistant
General Counsel for Operations and Legal Counsel, Room 10100, Nassif
Building, 400 7th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C., from 9:00 a.m. to
5:30 p.m. local time, Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Requests to testify will be accepted from public officials,
representatives of recognized civic, public interest, or industry
organizations, and concerned and knowledgeable citizens. Time
allotments will be governed by the number of requests received; if the
requests exceed the available time, we will ask prospective witnesses
with similar views to combine their presentations. In the event that
accommodation cannot be made, witnesses will be chosen by lot.
Any public official, representative of an organization, or other
individual desiring to participate at the hearing should write directly
to me at the above address on or before July 12, 1976, providing the
following information.
1.
Name
2.
Business address
3.
Telephone number during normal working hours
27.
4.
Capacity in which presentation will be made (i.e.,
public official, organization representative,
knowledgeable citizen)
5.
Principal issue to be addressed (i.e., appropriate
Federal role, benefits vs. costs, or public acceptance)
and basic position on the issue and the identified alternatives
6.
Time desired, which must be ten minutes or less
7.
Written copy of presentation, if one is to be submitted
Envelopes should be marked FMVSS 208 Testimony, and may
be mailed or hand-delivered to the Executive Secretary, Room 10203,
Nassif Building (DOT Headquarters), 400 7th Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C.
The public and the press are invited to attend the hearing,
which will be transcribed electronically. The transcript and all
written submissions will become a part of the record in this proceeding.
The holding of this hearing should not necessarily be viewed as
a precedent for the way in which I will handle similar matters in the
future.
Issued in Washington, D.C., June 9, 1976.
X
William T. Colemant Jr.
Secretary of Transportation
A-1
APPENDIX A -- BENEFIT/COST ANALYSIS
This appendix details the analysis that led to the benefits and
cost information presented in section II of the basic issues.
I. Societal Cost Base Line
As a base-line condition for the calculations which follow,
estimates are made here of (1) the annual number of fatalities and
injuries to all passenger car front seat occupants and (2) the
associated total societal cost, assuming no restraint system usage.
The severity of such injuries are expressed in terms of the
Abbreviated Injury Severity Scale (AIS Scale):
AIS Injury Level
Description
1
Minor (e.g., simple sprain)
2
Moderate (e.g., simple fracture)
3
Severe (e.g, severe fracture or
dislocated major joints)
4
Serious Non-Fatal (e.g., amputated
limbs, severe skull fracture and
survivable organ injuries)
5
Critical Non-Fatal (e.g., major spinal
cord injury, critical organ injuries)
6
Fatal
Estimates of the number and distribution of severity of such injuries,
derived from recent data, are given below in Table A1.
Table A1
A-2
Severity Distribution of Highway Accident Injuries
AIS Injury Level Number Per Year Percentage of Total
1
2,290,000
84.2
2
332,000
12.2
3
54,400
2.0
4
13,600
0.5
5
2,700
0.1
6
27,200
1.0
Total
2,719,900
The figures for AIS 4 and 5 may appear anomalous with respect
to AIS 6 (fatal); these values result because of the definitions of
the AIS injury levels.
Using estimates of the societal cost per injury at each level of
severity, we can calculate the annual societal cost of injuries. The
results are shown below in Table A2.
Table A2
Societal Costs of Highway Accident Injuries and Deaths*
AIS Injury Level
Annual Society Cost
(Millions of $)
1
710
2
740
3
310
4
1,140
5
510
6
7,790
Total
11,200
*A 7% discount rate has been used for long-term societal costs
or benefits.
A-3
These figures demonstrate the magnitude of the highway safety
problem -- over $11 billion per year in societal costs due to
passenger car occupant injuries and deaths alone. This
table also shows the importance of protection at higher severity
levels if we are to achieve major safety improvements.
II. Benefits
To determine the benefits that result from a particular crash
protection system, both the effectiveness of the system in reducing
or avoiding injuries (when used) and the rate of usage must be known.
II.
1
Occupant Crash Protection System Effectiveness
Available field data do not provide a definitive basis for estimating
the effectiveness of all existing occupant crash protection systems.
However, results of engineering tests involving animals, cadavers, and
human volunteers, subjected to crashes under a variety of controlled
test conditions, do provide a basis for estimating the relative effective-
ness of alternative systems. Using the most extensive field test
results available (i.e., those for lap and lap-and-shoulder belt systems),
taken together with the relative effectiveness estimates from laboratory
data, one can construct the table of occupant crash protection system
effectiveness estimates shown below in Table A3.
Table A3
Occupant Crash Protection System Effectiveness Estimates
Air
AIS
Lap and
Cushion
Passive Belt
Injury
Lap
Shoulder
Air
and
and
Knee
Level
Belt
Belt
Cushion
Lap Belt
Knee Bolster
Bolster
1
.15
30
0
.15
20
.10
2
. 22
. 57
.22
.33 .
* 40
. 15
3
* 30
.59
30
. 45
. 45
20
4-6
. 40
.60
. 40
. 60
. 50
. 25
These effectiveness numbers mean that, at a given injury severity level,
a particular protection system will reduce injuries of that severity (from
that which would occur with no protection) by a fraction whose numerical
value equals the effectiveness number -- e.g., a lap and shoulder belt
reduces the number of fatalities (AIS 6) by an estimated 60 percent.
A-4
Multiplying these effectiveness numbers by the number of occurrences
from Table Al or the societal cost given in Table A2 gives the total
effectiveness at 100% usage. The latter is more appropriate as it more
accurately reflects the impact of a system and also will be useful in
calculating benefit/cost ratios. These results are shown below in
Table A4.
Table A4
Occupant Crash Protection System Benefits at Theoretical 100% Usage
(In Millions $)
Air
AIS
Lap and
Cushion
Passive Belt
Injury
Lap
Shoulder
Air
and
and
Knee
Level
Belt
Belt
Cushion
Lap Belt
Knee Bolster
Bolster
1
110
210
0
110
140
70
2
160
420
160
240
300
110
3
90
190
90
140
140
60
4
460
680
460
680
570
280
5
200
310
200
310
250
130
6
3,120
4,670
3,120
4,670
3,890
1,950
Total
4,140
6,480
4,030
6,150
5,290
2,600
The results in Table A4 show the maximum possible benefits of the
various protection systems listed. If the actual usage rate is less
than the theoretical limit of 100%, the benefits are reduced
commensurately.
II.2
Occupant Crash Protection Usage
Estimates of active belt systems benefits will be made using two
different projections for rates of voluntary usage. The nominal
projection assumes 15% usage of lap and shoulder belt combinations
and an additional 5% usage of the lap belt only. The other "optimistic"
A-5
projection assumes 35% usage of lap and shoulder belt combinations,
plus 5% lap belt only. The nominal projection is believed to
correspond to usage rates that will be experienced in practice
and should represent a lower bound for usage rates in the future.
The optimistic projection is thought to represent the likely upper
limit of belt usage in the absence of mandatory seat belt use laws.
In calculating the benefits of air cushion restraint systems,
we assume a 98% rate of readiness for air bags and a 20% rate
of safety belt wearing. For passive belts, a 60% usage rate
is assumed (e.g., a 40% "system defeat rate").
Mandatory seat belt use laws are assumed to result in a
use rate of 70% for lap and shoulder belts.
Finally, in calculating the benefits for a situation in which
both air cushions and lap-and-shoulder belts were available --
such as with a mandatory passive restraint option -- we shall
assume that air bags are in 5%, 10%, and 25% of the cars with
the remainder of the cars having lap-and-shoulder belts. The
lap belt usage rate with air bags is taken to be 20% as is the
usage rate for lap and shoulder belts.
III. 3 Comparison of Benefits
Table A5 compares the estimated (steady state) annual
savings - in terms of lives saved, injuries reduced or avoided,
and societal costs -- if all vehicles are equipped with the
various protection systems indicated.
A-6
Table A5
Annual Benefits of Occupant Crash Protection Systems
Fatalities
Injuries Avoided
Societal Benefits
System
Saved
or Reduced
(Billions of $)
15% lap and shoulder
5% lap only
3,000
159,300
1.18
35% lap and shoulder
5% lap only
6,300
342,600
2.48
70% lap and shoulder
11,500
641,400
4.55
Air Cushion
and lap belt
full front
11,200
171,800
4.23
driver only
9,200
168,600
3.44
Passive belt and
knee bolster
8,200
373,300
3.62
Mandatory Option
5% Air Cushion
3,400
182,700
1.36
10% Air Cushion
4,100
182,100
1.60
25% Air Cushion
5,400
180,300
2.06
A-7
III. Benefit/Cost Ratios
Table A6 presents a set of benefit/cost ratios derived from
the benefit data in Table A5 and from estimates of total incremental
life cycle costs shown in Table A7.
Table A6
Benefit/Cost Ratio of Occupant Crash Protection Systems
Benefit/Cost*
System
Low
NHTSA
High
15% lap and shoulder
2.4
2.0
1.7
5% lap only
35% lap and shoulder
5.0
4.1
3.5
5% lap only
70% lap and shoulder
9.1
7.6
6.5
Air Cushion and lap belt
full front
4.2
2.2
1.2
driver only
3.1
1.7
Passive belt and knee bolster
-
4.0
-
Mandatory Option
5% Air Cushion
-
1.8
-
10% Air Cushion
-
1.7
-
25% Air Cushion
-
1.5
-
*Assumes 10 million new cars per year.
A-8
Table A7
Cost of Occupant Crash Protection Systems*
Cost
Low
NHTSA
High
Lap belt
30
Lap and shoulder belt
50
60
70
Driver only Air Cushion
110
200
Full-front Air Cushion
100
190**
350
Passive belt and knee bolster
90
* This does not include the cost of lap belts for rear seat
occupants -- typically about $20 per car.
**This assumes all cars would be equipped with the air
cushion. If air cushions are to be offered as an option, a
very rough estimate of the cost is taken to be twice this
price.
A-9
It is useful in comparing the advantages of various alternatives,
to compute the incremental benefits and costs -- e.g., the additional
benefits and costs relative to the current state of affairs. Forming
the ratio of the incremental benefits and costs gives an indication
of the relative merits of the different alternatives. These results,
using NHTSA's cost estimates, are shown below in Table A8.
Table A8
Incremental Benefit/Cost Ratio of Occupant Crash Protection Systems
System
Incremental Benefit/Cost
35% lap and shoulder
Infinite*
5% lap only
70% lap and shoulder
Infinite*
Air Cushion and lap belt
full front
2.4
driver only
4.5
Passive belt and knee bolster
8.1
Mandatory Option
5% Air Cushion
1.1
10% Air Cushion
1.3
25% Air Cushion
1.1
* This infinite value results as the incremental cost of this
option is zero. This, of course, ignores the costs of
enforcement and the time people spend "buckling up".
A-10
All of the discussion of benefits and cost presented to this point has
focused on the steady state, or equilibrum condition -- i.e., that
situation expected to exist long after a particular system has been
put into effect. If one examines the transition period after a new
protection system is mandated, one finds that while the full annual
costs are realized immediately, the benefits are realized in
increments of roughly 10% per year. Thus it takes a period of time
for the cumulative benefits to exceed the cumulative costs -- even for
a system whose steady-state benefit/cost ratio exceeds unity
by a sizeable amount. Depending upon the cost figures used, for
example, it would take 5 to 7 years before a mandatory passive
restraint requirement would break even.
B-1
APPENDIX B -- FORMAL RULE CHANGES
PART I
In consideration of the foregoing, it is proposed that Standard
No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208) be amended in accordance with one of five
alternatives as follows:
ALTERNATIVE I
The dates "August 31, 1976" and "August 15, 1977" would be
changed to read "August 31, 1979" wherever they appear in S4.1.2,
S5.3, S6.2, and S6.3.
ALTERNATIVE II
The dates "August 31, 1976" and "August 15, 1977" would be
changed to read "August 31, 1979" wherever they appear in S4. 1.2,
S5.3, S6.2, and S6.3.
ALTERNATIVE III
The dates "August 31, 1976" and "August 15, 1977" would be
changed to read "August 31, 1979" wherever they appear in S4.1.2,
S5.3, S6.2, and S6.3.
ALTERNATIVE IV
1. S.4.1.2 would be amended to read:
S4.1.2 Passenger cars manufactured from September 1, 1973,
to August 31, 1981. Each passenger car manufactured from
September 1, 1973, to August 31, 1979, inclusive, shall meet the
requirements of S4. 1.2.1, S4 1.2.2, or S4.1.2.3. Each passenger
car manufactured from September 1, 1979, to August 31, 1981, inclusive,
shall meet the requirements of S4.1.2.1, S4.1.2.2. or S4.1.2.3, except
that it shall meet the requirements of S4. 1.3 at the driver's position.
A protection system that meets the requirements of S4.1.2.1 or
S4.1.2.2 may be installed at one or more designated seating positions
of a vehicle that otherwise meets the requirements of S4. 1.2.3.
B-2
2. A new S4.1.3 would be added to read:
S4.1.3 Passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1,
1981. Each passenger car manufactured on or after September 1,
1981, shall --
(a) At each front designated seating position meet the frontal
crash protection requirements of S5. 1 by means that require no action
by vehicle occupants;
(b) At each rear designated seating position have a Type 1 or
Type 2 seat belt assembly that conforms to Standard No. 209 and to
S7. 1 and S7. 2; and
(c) Either --
(1) Meet the lateral crash protection requirements of S5.2 and
the roll-over crash protection requirements of S5.3 by means that
require no action by vehicle occupants; or
(2) At each front designated seating position have a Type 1 or
Type 2 seat belt assembly that conforms to Standard No. 209 and to
S7. 1 through S7.3A, and meet the requirements of S5. 1 with front
test dummies as required by S5. 1, restrained by the Type 1 or Type 2
seat belt assembly (or the pelvic portion of any Type 2 seat belt
assembly which has a detachable upper torso belt) in addition to the
means that require no action by the vehicle occupant.
3. The dates "August 31, 1976" and "August 15, 1977" would
be changed to read "August 31, 1979" wherever they appear in S5.3,
S6.2 and S6.3.
ALTERNATIVE V
1. S4. would be amended in part to read:
S4.1.2 Passenger cars manufactured from September 1, 1973,
to August 31, 1981. Each passenger car manufactured from September 1,
1973, to August 31, 1979, inclusive, shall meet the requirements of
S4.1.2.1, S4. 1.2.2, or S4. 1.2.3. Each passenger car manufactured
from September 1, 1979, to August 31, 1981, inclusive, shall meet the
requirements of S4 1.2.1, S4.1.2.2, or S4.1.2.3, except that, upon
the prospective purchaser's offer of purchase and specification of
passive restraint as described by S4.1.3, a passenger car shall meet
the passive restraint requirements of S4. at the driver's position,
unless its manufacturer produces a passenger car of a different model
B-3
with passive restraint protection that has a wheelbase which falls
within the same wheelbase range as the requested vehicle, based
on the wheelbase ranges specified in (a) through (e). A protection
system that meets the requirements of S4.1.2.1 or S4.1.2.2 may be
installed at one or more designated seating positions of a vehicle
that otherwise meets the requirements of S4.1.2.3.
(a) The wheelbase range that is 100 inches or less.
(b) The wheelbase range that is more than 100 inches and less
than 110 inches.
(c) The wheelbase range that is 110 inches to 120 inches.
(d) The wheelbase range that is more than 120 inches but less
than 123 inches.
(e) The wheelbase range that is 123 inches or more.
2. A new S4.1.3 would be added to read:
S4.1.3 Passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1,
1981. Each passenger car manufactured on or after September 1, 1981,
shall meet the requirements of S4.1.2.1, S4.1.2.2, or S4.1.2.3 of
S4.1.2, except that, upon the prospective purchaser's offer of
purchase and specification of passive restraint as described in (a)
through (c), a passenger car shall --
(a) At each front designated seating position meet the frontal crash
protection requirements of S5.1 by means that require no action by
vehicle occupants:
(b) At each rear designated seating position have a Type 1 or
Type 2 seat belt assembly that conforms to Standard No. 209 and
to S7.1 and S7.2; and
(c) Either --
(1) Meet the lateral crash protection requirements of S5.2 and the
roll-over crash protection requirements of S5.3 by means that require no
action by vehicle occupants; or
EERALE R. FORD
B-4
(2) At each front designated seating position have a Type 1 or
Type 2 seat belt assembly that conforms to Standard No. 209 and to
S7.1 through S7.3A, and meet the requirements of S5.1 with front test
dummies as required by S5.1, restrained by the Type 1 or Type 2 seat
belt assembly (or the pelvic portion of any Type 2 seat belt assembly
which has a detachable upper torso belt) in addition to the means that
require no action by the vehicle occupant. However, a passenger car
need not meet the requirements of (a) through (c) if its manufacturer
produces a passenger car of a different model that has the passive
protection described in (a) through (c) and that has a wheelbase which
falls within the same wheelbase range as the requested vehicle, based on
the following wheelbase ranges: 100 inches or less; more than 100 inches
and less than 110 inches; 110 inches to 120 inches; more than 120 inches
but less than 123 inches; and 123 inches or more.
(3) The dates "August 31, 1976" and "August 15, 1977" would be
changed to read "August 31, 1979" wherever they appear in S5.3, S6.2,
and S6.3.
(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407);
Sec. 109, Pub. L. 93-492, 88 Stat. 1470 (15 U.S.C. 1410(b)
It is hereby certified that the economic and inflationary impacts
of these proposed regulations have been carefully evaluated in accordance
with Office of Management and Budget Circular A-107.
PART II
In consideration of the foregoing, if Alternative II is to be implemented,
in addition to the proposed change to Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208)
set forth above with respect to Alternative II, Highway Safety Program
Standard No. (23 CFR Part 1204) is hereby proposed as follows:
I.
Scope. This standard establishes minimum requirements for
a State highway safety program for safety belt use.
II.
Purpose. The purpose of this standard is to establish State
safety belt use programs which will significantly reduce highway deaths
and injuries and resultant societal costs.
III.
Definition. For the purpose of this standard, "safety belt" means
a lap belt, shoulder belt, or other belt or combinations of belts designed
to be installed in any motor vehicle to restrain the operator and any
passengers in the vehicle during motor vehicle crashes or other sudden
decelerations.
B-5
IV.
Requirements
A.
Each State shall develop and maintain a safety belt use
program to achieve, within three years after the date of the issuance
of this standard, a statewide safety belt use rate of at least 70 percent
by occupants of motor vehicles which have been required by Federal
regulation to be equipped initially with safety belts and which are
operated on the public streets, roads or highways of the State.
B.
Annually, beginning one year after the issuance of this
standard, each State shall conduct a road-side survey providing a
sufficient number of representative observations to estimate reliably
the statewide safety belt use rate. The survey plan and methodology
shall be decided cooperatively by each State and the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.
V.
Supplemental components. Each State shall adopt such of the
following measures as appear necessary to attain the safety belt use rate
specified in section IV:
A.
Safety belt use law and enforcement program. A State safety
belt use law shall be enacted and enforced that --
1.
Requires the use of safety belts by the occupants of motor
vehicles which are in operation on the public streets, roads or highways
of the State;
2.
Exempts any person or class of persons from the law's
requirements upon finding that requiring such person or class of persons
to use safety belts would be unreasonable; and
3.
Provides a fine for a violation equivalent to a fine for a minor
moving traffic law offense.
B.
Safety belt use educational program. An educational program
shall be designed and implemented to encourage safety belt use and to
inform the citizens of the State about the individual and societal benefits
of safety belt use, including:
1.
A public information program;
2.
An elementary and secondary school program; and
3.
In-service training for State and local personnel directly
involved in the development and maintenance of the safety belt use program.
B-6
C.
Safety belt installation and maintenance law.
A State safety
belt installation and maintenance law shall be enacted that requires that
(1) no person shall operate any motor vehicle on the streets, roads
and highways of the State unless each of its seating positions is equipped
with the same number of safety belts with which it was required by Federal
law or regulation to be equipped at the time of the vehicle's manufacture
and all of the safety belts with which it is required by State law or regulation
to be equipped; and (2) no person shall wholly or partially remove or
disconnect any safety belt that was required by Federal law or regulation
to be installed in a motor vehicle at the time of the vehicle's manufacture,
or that is required by State law or regulation to be installed in a vehicle,
except temporarily for cleaning, repair, or replacement with equivalent
or improved safety belts.
(Sec. 101, Pub. L. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731, 23 U.S.C 402)