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Nuclear Policy Statement (1)
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Nuclear Policy Statement (1)
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Presidential campaign, 1976
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The original documents are located in Box 24, folder "Nuclear Policy Statement (1)" of the
James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 24 of the James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Muclean
June 3, 1976
110 file Nuto quote
INTERVIEW WITH THE PRESIDENT
BY
on
OHIO NEWSPAPER EXECUTIVES
Basing (m
THE STATE DINING ROOM
Natebook)
11:20 A.M. EDT
and Partsmonth
THE PRESIDENT: There are no prepared remarks.
It is very informal. I welcome you here to the State Dining
Room. It is a pleasure to see some old friends and make some
new acquaintances. I think we might as well start with the
questions right off.
QUESTION: Mr. President, the rubber strike has gone
now about April 27. Do you have any intention of invoking
the Taft-Hartley Act and when will you make such a decision?
THE PRESIDENT: We have no plans to invoke the Taft-
Hartley Act. It is my understanding that the two sides got
together a day or two ago, resumed their negotiations, we are
monitoring the situation very closely. We believe the
resumption of negotiations is a positive step forward and we
would hope that the matter could be solved by free collective
bargaining.
QUESTION: We are a little bit concerned about our
defense situation. Some like Schlesinger say we are not
strong enough and some say we are. What is our position in
defense?
THE PRESIDENT: The present position is one of
strength. The budget that I submitted a year ago was the
largest defense budget in the history of the United States in
either war or in peace.
MALD FORD LIBRARY
Page 9
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we have been making
announcements for any political purposes. The Government has
to go on. You know, supposing -- to take theother side of
the coin -- we held the Government in limbo from January of
this year until November of this year, with no activity. I
don't believe the American people would approve of that.
We have to make decisions. We have to make certain
that programs are carried out. We make them based on the
needs of the people and the right thing to do as far as the
Federal Government is concerned. I have no individual
projects in mind as far as Ohio is concerned. If some come up
between now and June 8 and it is proper under the regular
procedure to announce them, I will announce them. (Laughter)
We are not going to stop the Government just because
of some political campaign.
Now, of course, you may be familiar with the fact
that last week when I was in Ohio I announced the plans of
this Government as far as the Portsmouth uranium enrichment
project is concerned. I said then that if the Congress
approved the bill that the Joint Committee had recommended,
that I would immediately request $170 million for plans
and design and long lead time procurement for the Portsmouth
facility.
That was a decision made at the request of the
Joint Committee because they are going to the floor of the
House and/or Senate sometime I think this week or next and
they wanted to know my views.
I made the announcement at their request, not at
therequest of any political person involved.
Page 10
QUESTION: On that same question, Mr. President,
how about money to build the facility? Are you going to also
ask for a sum to go ahead with construction and operating
funds?
THE PRESIDENT: That is the next step. But until
we see the two track proposal which is one for Portsmouth
and theother for the possibility of private parties coming in
with their proposals, we have to hold our options open. But
the legislation has to be passed. We are not going to delay
on the things that we can do right away as far as Portsmouth
is concerned and then the parties that are involved in the
private sector have to submit their proposals to the Executive
Branch and we have to submit them to the Congress.
But we can't delay in the interim so we are moving as
rapidly as we can with the Portsmouth project for very good
and sufficient reasons.
QUESTION: Do you prefer that the government operate
this facility or that the private facility be built if that works
out.
THE PRESIDENT: It depends on what kind of
propositions we get from the private sector.
QUESTION: Mr. President, speaking of your trip to
Western Ohio, by any chance has the schedule been completed?
I happen to be from one of the towns along Route 75 and I
wonder whether we might expect you on Monday.
THE PRESIDENT: You will have to check with the
scheduling people. I was not sure, as I indicated, whether the
precise announcement --
QUESTION: We are north of Dayton. I know you were
coming that far. Lima. We are right between.
THE PRESIDENT: I hope I can stop in every town.
Page 11
Busing
QUESTION: Sir, have you given any specific thought--
has your Administration given any specific thought to making
Dayton or any other Ohio city the target city in your busing
test case?
THE PRESIDENT: That is a decision that will be made
by the Attorney General. He made the decision involving Boston.
I think that is his responsibility and I would not pre-judge
him until --
QUESTION: The question was whether your Administration
not you personally, but whether your Administration might give
this any consideration.
THE PRESIDENT: That is a decision that has been left
solely to the Attorney General and I would not want to preempt
by what I say here what his legal opinion might be at some
subsequent time.
QUESTION: Mr. President, you will be coming through
the rich agricultural area of Northwestern Ohio. What will
you say to the farmers there?
THE PRESIDENT: I will say several things. One,
this Administration believes in the full production program
that we have had for American agriculture which has resulted
in the highest net income for farmers in this country in the
history of the United States. It is a policy that has
resulted in $22 billion of exports. last year and probably
more than $22 billion in the current year of American agricultural
products sent abroad.
In addition, I will say to the farmers of Ohio
I believe in the family farm concept and I believe in it being
transferred from the one generation to another so that they
don't get the adverse impact of the estate taxes as they are
today.
THE WHITE HOUSE
ACTION
WASHINGTON
June 22, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
JIM CANNON
June
SUBJECT:
POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AND NEW
U.S. INITIATIVES TO REDUCE PROLIFERATION
DUE TO COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER ACTIVITIES
ERDA Administrator Seamans has recommended (letter at Tab A)
undertaking a major program to provide nuclear fuel reprocessing
in the U.S., permitting foreign participation in this activity,
and using this program as the centerpiece of a major
Presidential statement on non-proliferation.
The problem of weapons proliferation -- because of greater
availability of plutonium from commercial nuclear power
plants -- is gaining steadily increasing attention in the
Congress, the media, and in the public. There are growing
concerns that current U.S. activities to safeguard against
diversion of materials from U.S. exports are inadequate.
Additional attention will be focused on potential proliferation
problems when controversy within the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission over exports to Spain and India becomes public
next week.
We agree that the time has come for considering new
initiatives and, probably, for a major Presidential
statement on nuclear export policy and perhaps on nuclear
energy. However, we also believe that other aspects of the
problem leading to Dr. Seamans' letter need to be considered
and that other proposals should also be evaluated as part of
a complete response to the current situation.
Tab B provides a broader treatment of the matters raised by
Dr. Seamans. It summarizes:
- The current problems;
-
Existing measures and activities to control
proliferation;
- Recent and upcoming events suggesting the need
for action;
- Administration response thus far;
-
Possible additional responses.
FORD LIBRARY
2
Tab C is a preliminary outline of the content of a possible
Presidential statement.
In view of the complex nature of the issues involed, covering
both domestic and foreign policy interests, a number of
agencies will need to be involved in developing and evaluating
possible initiatives and in drafting a proposed statement.
These include: ERDA, State, Defense, NRC, OMB, Commerce,
and possibly some other members of the Energy Resources
Council.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. That you direct that work begin immediately to develop
and evaluate the potential initiatives described briefly
in Tab B, with decision papers presented to you by
mid-July.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
2. That you tentatively decide to issue a statement or
send a message to Congress in late July or early
August on nuclear matters. Depending on the evaluation
of possible initiatives, it could be limited to nuclear
exports and non-proliferation or a more general nuclear
statement.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
3. That you assign responsibility jointly to us (Brent
Scowcroft and Jim Cannon) to develop and carry out
a plan to accomplish the necessary work, in cooperation
with OMB, the ERC, and all of the agencies concerned.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
ENF.R. RESEARCH MASSACHUSETTS
UNITED STATES
ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545
USA
June 9, 1976
The President
The White House
Dear Mr. President:
I believe there is an opportunity and a need for the United
States to take a major initiative to resolve uncertainties
that now exist in the nuclear fuel cycle and to reduce the
risk of international proliferation of special nuclear
materials. This opportunity, if successfully pursued, would
complete your evolving nuclear policy and could be the central
feature of a major Presidential Message.
Background:
Until recently, Federal nuclear policy: (1) stressed Government
funding of enrichment plants; (2) assumed that reprocessing of
spent nuclear fuel and recycling of plutonium and uranium would
be accomplished in the private sector without Government support;
and (3) placed less stress on safeguards against theft or diver-
sion of nuclear material than now seems wise.
Your initiatives in the past two years have substantially re-
formed this policy. Specifically you have:
Limited the Federal role in enrichment by supporting
private entry as the best means for assuring addi-
tional enrichment capacity;
Increased Government research in reprocessing and
recycling so that safe and secure private facilities
could be demonstrated;
Sponsored a major Government program to demonstrate
the safe management and disposal of nuclear waste;
and
Increased stress on materials and physical safeguards
at both Government-owned and private facilities
licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
REVOLUTION
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
NATIONAL SECURITY
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED
INFORMATION
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to
Criminal Sanctions.
(inserf year)
1776-1976
e
CONFIDENTIAL
KBH 8/6/92
CONFIDENTIAL
-2- -
These measures will greatly strengthen the nuclear fuel
cycle and our controls over the handling and utilization of
plutonium in this country. Yet, despite substantial progress,
a final and crucial issue remains unresolved -- the need to
control carefully the world's supply of plutonium. Among
the factors bearing on this issue are:
A recent court decision most likely will prevent the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission from licensing private
reprocessing facilities that would produce plutonium
for recycled use until approval of the generic
environmental statement on mixed oxide fuels probably
years from now:
Uncertainty is growing among other nations about the
United States as a reliable supplier of reactors and
fuel because of (1) final decisions on export licenses
now rest with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and
(2) recent amendments to nuclear legislation indicating
firm Congressional intent to review individual nuclear
initiatives with the private sector.
Other supplier nations are developing national re-
processing and recycling capabilities, and some are
under pressure commercially to sell plants to other
countries desiring to build an integrated indigenous
nuclear power capability, for example, Iran and Brazil.
This trend could multiply the chances of theft or
diversion of plutonium and could lead to a dramatic
increase in the number of nations with nuclear weapons.
Multinational regional reprocessing centers have been
suggested as a means for minimizing this proliferation.
However, the technical; logistical and political
feasibility of the idea has yet to be demonstrated.
Recommendation:
I believe the time is at hand for the United States to address
this basic issue with a major initiative. Such an initiative
might have the following features:
GENELO FORD LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-3-
An offer to supplier and consumer states to join
with the United States to demonstrate the viability
of a multinational reprocessing approach using the
United States as the demonstration site. The question
of excess plutonium and disposal of nuclear waste
resulting from the reprocessing requires further
exploration to optimize the attractiveness to both
the host and participating nations.
A call upon supplier nations to suspend temporarily
the export of reprocessing technology until the
multinational centers or other effective controls
have been agreed to. I have already suggested this
to the Secretary of State in a letter dated May 13
1976:
A commitment to employ in the multinational centers
and to make available advanced United States safe-
guards and security technology.
The key to the initiative is a willingness of the United States
to offer reprocessing and recycling services to other nations
and to open our facilities to international inspection. The
facility could well be a new plant or a partially completed
private plant at Barnwell, South Carolina that was financed
by a consortium composed of Allied Chemical, Gulf Oil Corpora-
tion and Royal Dutch Shell. Arrangements for serving foreign
needs from this facility would, of course, have to be worked
out, however, it is anticipated that the consortium will have
an interest in a governmentally-encouraged demonstration.
In any event, the United States could provide some funding and
appropriate technical assistance and guarantees for the
establishment of an international reprocessing facility in
the United States and invite those nations which would utilize
the services of such a facility to provide a pro rata share
of operating expenses. Of course, a successful international
demonstration, under the auspices of the United States, would
also materially assist in the development of our domestic
reprocessing capability over the long run as increasing nuclear
power production results in needed new reprocessing facilities.
GLEALD FORD VIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- -4-
Such an initiative could become the centerpiece of a truly
comprehensive Presidential policy on nuclear power and non-
proliferation.
Decision:
If you approve, I will pursue and intensify work with appro-
priate departments and agencies to develop a recommended
nuclear reprocessing initiative to be available to you as
soon as possible.
Respectfully yours,
B.b Senas
Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
Administrator
cc: - Elliott Richardson
GERAL FORD LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
(Suggested Presidential response
to letter of June 9, 1976 from
Robert C. Seamans, Jr.)
Honorable Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
Administrator
Energy Research and Development
Administration
Washington, D. C. 20545
Dear Bob:
I agree in principle with the concepts outlined in your letter
to me of June 9, 1976, and direct you to proceed on an accelerated
basis and in coordination with the Energy Resources Council to
review and develop in further detail the policy initiatives that
I should undertake with respect to nuclear reprocessing and related
non-proliferation matters.
In this regard, you should include in your analyses (1) a re-
examination of the validity, necessity, and desirability of
reprocessing spent nuclear fuel; (2) further definition of how
a multinational reprocessing demonstration center in the United
States would be established and operated, including the role of
IAEA; and (3) optimum means for handling excess plutonium
resulting from the reprocessing.
In addition, it would be well to address other nuclear problems
such as waste management which, alongwith reprocessing initiatives,
could provide the framework for a comprehensive nuclear policy
to be adopted and enunciated in 2-3 months.
FORD LIBRANK
-2-
Please strive to complete this review and forward your
recommendations to me by August 15, 1976.
Sincerely,
The President
cc: Elliott Richardson
NEED FOR A PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE ON NUCLEAR
EXPORT POLICY OR NUCLEAR ENERGY IN GENERAL
I. CURRENT PROBLEMS
A. Growing Congressional, press, and public concern
about nuclear weapons proliferation.
Concern is focused primarily upon the greater
availability of plutonium which is extracted from
"spent" fuel elements removed from nuclear power
reactors (i.e., referred to as reprocessing).
Concern has continued to grow since India exploded
a nuclear device in 1974.
B. Growing concern that current U.S. activities to
safeguard against diversion of plutonium for weapons
purposes is not adequate.
Attention is now focused on exports of nuclear
materials and equipment. Some feel that existing
controls (detailed below) have been barely adequate
for safeguarding reactors and are simply not adequate
to guard against diversion of separated plutonium.
C. The U.S. position in the foreign market for nuclear
equipment and materials is weakening.
This is resulting from (a) the lack of uranium
enrichment capacity, (b) growing strength of
foreign competition for nuclear equipment and
fuels, (c) uncertainty as to U.S. policy on
nuclear exports, and (d) potentially, delays
resulting from Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
control of export licenses and growing Congressional
review requirements. As the U.S. loses foreign
orders to other suppliers, the U.S. also loses its
leverage to obtain rigid safeguards agreements.
D. Perception in the media that the Administration is
complacent about potential diversion of plutonium
from commercial nuclear power plants abroad.
By contract, Canada recently cut off nuclear
relationships with India and appears to be imposing
strong safeguards controls in connection with its
exports.
E. Events immediately ahead will exacerbate the above
problems, involving NRC and Congress -- particularly
with respect to exports to Spain and India. (detailed
below.)
-2-
II. EXISTING MEASURES AND ACTIVITIES TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION
A. NPT
Approximately 100 nations have signed the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) foreswearing
activities leading to the proliferation of
weapons. Several important nations have not
signed, including France and India.
B. Bilateral "Agreements for Cooperation" between
the U.S. and about 30 other nations importing
nuclear equipment and materials from the U.S.
These agreements specify safeguards that are
to be maintained.
C. IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency establishes
safeguards standards and has some inspection
capability.
D. Supplier Discussions
State Department is leading negotiations with
other supplier nations, seeking agreement to
impose more rigid safeguards. There has been some
success achieved, but no agreement from other suppliers
to restrict their export of reprocessing facilities.
E. New International Convention
The U.S. is leading an attempt to gain agreement
on a new international nuclear physical security
convention.
F. Pressure on Customer Nations
The U.S. brought pressure on the Government of
South Korea to cancel its order with the French
for a reprocessing plant and is applying similar
pressure on Pakistan to forego acquisition of a
reprocessing plant.
III. RECENT AND UPCOMING EVENTS SUGGESTING THE NEED FOR ACTION
A. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
The independent NRC now plays a major role in
nuclear exports and will attract considerable
attention to the international safeguards issue
soon.
-3-
1. Inadvertently, the final responsibility for approving
nuclear exports was allowed to be vested in the
independent NRC rather than the Executive Branch.
This resulted from the September 1974 law which
created ERDA and NRC.
2. The NRC now has before it for approval proposed
licenses to export additional fuel for reactors
in Spain and India. There appears to be agreement
within NRC that additional controls are needed, but
there is sharp dispute as to whether additional
controls -- beyond those in existing agreements --
should not be imposed as a condition of the exports.
The Commission decision apparently will be accompanied
by written opinion, making public the strong
views of one Commissioner that safeguards in
some agreements for cooperation and U.S. vigilance
have not been adequate.
B. Congressional
The Congress is asking more questions and
tightening controls which will introduce
delays and uncertainties. Examples include:
1. In 1974, a law was enacted requiring that
all future bilateral "agreements for
cooperation" involving significant nuclear
exports be submitted to the Congress for a
60-day period of review.
2. Senate Government Operations Committee
recently reported a bill (S. 1439) which
(a) shifts additional Executive Branch
nuclear export responsibility to State
Department and the independent Nuclear
Regulatory Commission from ERDA and
Commerce Department, and (b) makes the
Congress the referee in disputes between
State and NRC. Bill referred to JCAE
and Foreign Relations for 60 days. It
could come to a vote this session.
3. The Senate version of the Military Aid
Bill includes a prohibition (the "Symington
Amendment") against military assistance
to countries which furnish or receive
nuclear reprocessing or enrichment facilities
not under multinational control and which
do not have IAEA safeguards on all nuclear
facilities. House-Senate Conferees agreed
on June 16 to accept the Symington Amendment
with a proviso that restrictions could be waived
in specific cases upon a finding by the President
of overriding national interest, but Congress would
then have an opportunity to disapprove.
-4-
4. The ERDA 1977 Authorization Bill was amended
on the House floor to provide for Congressional
review of the first export to any nation that
is neither a signer of the NPT nor covered
by any agreement for cooperation approved by
the Congress under the provisions of the 1974
law listed above.
5. A House International Relations Subcommittee
(Zablocki) held hearings on June 10 on an
amendment to the Export Administration Act
designed to prohibit nuclear exports unless
safeguards are tightened.
6. Senator Ribicoff is asking hard questions
of the State Department as to whether (a) any
U.S. materials were used by India in producing
the plutonium used in the device exploded in
1974, and (b) why the U.S. did not respond
more vigorously to that event. This whole
issue will get even more attention as NRC
considers pending export license for India
(mentioned in II (a) (1) above).
C. Executive Branch
Dr. Fred Ikle, Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA), recently gave a speech
revealing his concerns about the adequacy of
safeguards to prevent the diversion of plutonium.
D. Other
Presidential Candidate Carter outlined his
concerns about nuclear exports and proliferation
at the same forum in which Ikle's speech was
delivered.
IV. ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE THUS FAR
A. The Executive Branch has responded to the above
in several ways, but the actions (a) have been
piecemeal and largely defensive, and (b) appear
inadequate in the face of current Congressional
and public attitudes. Responses include:
1. Secretary Kissinger summarized U.S. non-
proliferation efforts in testimony in
opposition to the Glenn-Percy Bill before
the Senate Government Operations Committee.
ERDA, ACDA, and other Administration witnesses
gave supporting testimony.
-5-
2. Informal attempts are being made by State, ERDA,
and others to limit the scope of restrictions and
of Congressional review requirements in pending
bills (e.g., Military Aid and ERDA Authorization)
3. An Executive Order was recently issued setting up
procedures for getting a coordinated Executive
Branch position (State, ERDA, DOD, ACDA, and
Commerce) on nuclear export licenses pending before
the NRC. (State Department notifies NRC of the
corrdinated Executive Branch position.)
V. POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL RESPONSES
Several ideas have surfaced for possible additional
responses to the current situation. Each involves
significant issues that require evaluation and decision.
Possible actions include:
A. Significant hardening of U.S. attitude on nuclear
exports safeguards required before exports are permitted.
There appears to be divided views on this.
Some probably will argue that past and current
controls are as good as can be achieved and/or
that tougher U.S. positions, taken unilaterally
will not be effective. Others will argue that
anything the U.S. can do unilaterally or in
cooperation with others that will help reduce the
opportunity for proliferation is worth doing,
recognizing the threat. Steps that might be considered to
achieve a harder and consistent policy include:
1. Strong public message to other supplier nations
(France and Germany) emphasizing the need to
curb proliferation and urging them to (a) stop
supplying reprocessing or enrichment technology
to other nations, and (b) adopting more rigorous
safeguards requirements.
2. Move to renegotiate safeguards controls under
existing agreements for cooperation as a
condition for further exports, particularly
giving the U.S. a veto on whether and where
U.S. -supplied fuel is reprocessed and
resulting plutonium retained.
3. Appoint a panel of experts not now involved
in U.S. nuclear export activities to review
past and current practices and submit recom-
mendations to you for improvements.
-6--
B. Discourage reprocessing (in the U.S. and abroad) until
better controls (technological and institutional) can
be worked out.
If this policy approach were to be taken, consideration
would have to be given to:
1. Expanding storage for "spent" fuel elements,
possibly making storage available to other
countries.
2. "Buy back" of spent fuel elements from other
countries.
3. Finding ways to replace the energy value of the
plutonium and unused uranium in the spent fuel
elements (which is in the range of 10-30% of the
total energy value if reprocessing and recycle
of plutonium was permitted).
4. Other incentives to discourage the separation
of plutonium through reprocessing.
C. As a means to discourage the spread of reprocessing
centers, provide U.S. reprocessing services to foreign
countries.
No U.S. capacity in operation now.
1. Assist U.S. industry in demonstrating
reprocessing and related technology
(plutonium conversion, waste handling,
safeguards) Such a program is con-
templated in the President's 1977 Budget
for coverage in a 1977 Supplemental
Request.
2. Urge or require U.S. firms planning to
provide reprocessing services to dedicate
a portion of their capacity to serve
foreign needs, thereby potentially
satisfying foreign needs for many years
without the construction of reprocessing
plants abroad.
3. Go beyond #2 above by offering to allow
other governments to participate in the
operation of the first expected reprocessing
plant (Barnswell, South Carolina) as a
demonstration of the concept of a multi-
national reprocessing center.
-7-
D. Propose international storage for excess plutonium
IAEA has authority to establish repositories for
excess nuclear materials. The U.S. could propose
that this authority be implemented, that all
nations store excess plutonium in such repositories
and indicate that the U.S. would participate with
a deposit of its excess plutonium.
E. Strengthen IAEA Safeguards
1. Make available advanced U.S. safeguards
technology to other nations and the IAEA.
2. Consider further strengthening of IAEA
safeguards, expanding the proposal for
a $5 million - 5 year voluntary U.S.
contribution announced by the President
on February 26, 1976.
DRAFT OUTLINE FOR THE CONTENT OF A STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR
EXPORTS (WHICH COULD BE EXPANDED TO
A STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR ENERGY)
A. BASIC OBJECTIVES
1. Prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
2. Make nuclear energy available for peaceful uses
particularly to reduce the current excessive,
reliance on petroleum.
B. POLICIES WE HAVE FOLLOWED
1. Promote signing of the NPT.
2. Require safeguards in agreements for copperation
with countries seeking nuclear equipment and
materials from the U.S.
3. Serve as a reliable and competitive supplier
of nuclear reactors and fuel, which provides
leverage for imposing rigid safeguards
requirements.
4. Urge other supplier nations to impose rigid
safeguards as conditions of export.
C. STEPS NOW BEING TAKEN
1. Urging other supplier nations to withdraw
from any plans to provide enrichment or
reprocessing plants or technology to
other countries.
2. Urging nations that have ordered or are
seeking to order reprocessing plants to
discontinue such activities.
3. Promoting the concept of a "multinational
reprocessing center" in a effort to forestall
the spread of reprocessing plants, particularly
in non-nuclear weapons nations.
4. Ask Congress to approve a $5 million contribution
to IAEA over the next 5 years to strengthen
safeguards.
2
D. RECENT ADVANCES
1. Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act, providing framework
for expansion of uranium enrichment capacity
in the United States (assuming the bill passes).
2. Agreements by other supplier nations to tighten
safeguards.
3. South Korean cancellation of order for a
reprocessing plant.
4. Japanese signing of NPT.
E.
POSSIBLE NEW INITIATIVES
(Outline in more detail on pages 5 to 7 of the paper
describing the need for a Presidential message.)
1. Significant hardening of U.S. attitude on nuclear
export safeguards, with a clear statement of U.S.
policy.
Strong message to other supplier nations
urging (a) moratorium on reprocessing and
enrichment technology exports and (b) more
rigorous safeguards.
Negotiate tighter safeguard controls over
existing agreements for cooperation.
Appoint a panel of experts to review U.S.
nuclear export policy.
2.
Discourage reprocessing (in the U.S. and abroad)
until better controls (technological and institutional)
can be worked out.
Expand storage for spent fuel elements.
Buy back of spent fuel elements from other countries.
Replace energy value of plutonium and uranium
in spent fuel.
3. As a means to discourage the spread of reprocessing
centers, provide U.S. reprocessing services to
foreign countries.
Assist U.S. industry in demonstrating reprocessing.
Urge or require U.S. reprocessing firms to serve
foreign needs.
3
Offer to allow other Governments to participate
in the operation of U.S. reprocessing facility --
as a multinational reprocessing center.
4. Propose international storage for excess plutonium.
5.
Strengthen IAEA safeguards.
Make available advanced U.S. safeguards technology.
Further strengthening of IAEA safeguards resources.
SIGNATURE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 8, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JIM CANNON
FROM:
GLENN Home
SUBJECT:
NUCLEAR POLICY PAPER FOR
THE PRESIDENT
Here is the finally typed version of the memo which Jim
Mitchell, Dave Elliott and I are recommending that you,
Jim Lynn and Brent Scowcroft sign and send to the
President.
I'm forwarding a copy to you now with the hope that this
might help expedite the reviewing and signing process
(if you find it acceptable).
The original is now with Jim Lynn and I'll get that to
you and Brent in turn.
Jim Connor is pushing hard to have the paper by noon
on Friday with the objective of getting the President's
review and approval on Friday afternoon. Connor reviewed
the paper in draft and recommends it.
Assuming the President approves the paper, Connor is
recommending a meeting of Cannon, Lynn, Scowcroft and
Connor on Monday to get agreement on how the enterprise
will be carried out. I'm prepared to discuss my ideas
on this with you at any time you wish.
Recommendation
That you sign the original of the attached memorandum
as soon as we can deliver it to you.
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECISION
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
JIM CANNON
JIM LYNN
SUBJECT:
NUCLEAR POLICY - ISSUES AND PROBLEMS
REQUIRING ATTENTION AND POTENTIAL
POLICY STATEMENT
This memorandum:
-
Identifies nuclear export and weapons proliferation,
reprocessing and waste management problems requiring
early attention.
-
Summarizes growing Congressional, public and media
concern about these problems, including restrictive
legislation now moving through the Congress, criticism
of the Administration and the potential for more of
both in the months ahead.
-
Suggests the need for a major effort over the next
six weeks to develop and evaluate several potential
policy and program actions, followed by a Presidential
statement on nuclear policy by mid-September.
ISSUES
The principal issues presented for your consideration are:
-
Whether you wish to direct that the necessary effort
be undertaken over the next six weeks to develop and
evaluate proposals and present them for your con-
sideration;
-
Whether you wish to approve, tentatively, the concept
of a major nuclear policy statement in September; and
-
If so, where to assign responsibility for assuring that
all necessary work is carried out and issues and a draft
statement are presented for your consideration.
2
BACKGROUND AND STATUS - NUCLEAR POLICY
The acceptability of commercial nuclear power passed a major
test with the defeat of Proposition 15 in California. Also,
we expect that your uranium enrichment proposal will soon
be approved by the Congress, paving the way for expansion
of capacity and thus resolving the principal remaining un-
certainty at the "front end" of the commercial nuclear power
cycle. Some questions continue to be raised about the
adequacy of uranium supply, mining and milling capacity
and nuclear safety, but these appear to be manageable
problems -- with primary responsibility in industry and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). However, these
front-end problems are aggravated by the uncertainties
associated with nuclear fuel reprocessing and waste handling
and storage as described below. The development of advanced
nuclear technologies (e.g., breeder) is adequately funded in
your budget proposals.
However, several major interrelated nuclear power and pro-
liferation issues are now facing us and these are drawing
increased attention in the Congress, public and media. These
involve:
-
U.S. policy on nuclear exports and safeguards to reduce
the potential for weapons proliferation.
-
U.S. policy with respect to reprocessing of spent fuel
from commercial power plants to recover plutonium and
unused uranium, and the commercial demonstration of
technology.
-
The adequacy of U.S. plans for the safe handling and
storage of nuclear wastes, particularly assurances
that repositories will be available for long-term
storage of long-lived and high-level wastes.
The potential solution for these problems are intertwined;
e.g., we cannot resolve policy on reprocessing by other
nations until we know how we are going to handle the problem
in the U.S. The issues involve both domestic and national
security considerations and they affect both the continued
acceptability of nuclear power in the U.S. and our position
as a major free-world supplier of nuclear equipment and fuel
for peaceful purposes. Maintaining our strong position as
a free-world supplier is one of our best means of controlling
proliferation.
3
PUBLIC, PRESS AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS AND OUTLOOK
While the California Proposition failed, other referenda
involving restrictions on commercial nuclear power have
qualified for November ballots in Washington, Oregon, and
Colorado. These referenda together with three restrictive
laws passed in California prior to the moratorium vote, will
keep attention focused on unresolved reprocessing, waste
management and proliferation issues.
Concern about proliferation has lead to a number of restric-
tive provisions in bills now moving through the Congress --
most of which require additional Congressional review of
nuclear exports. These requirements will introduce more
uncertainty and delay, give potential foreign customers new
doubts about the reliability of the U.S. as a supplier of
nuclear equipment and materials, and thus hamper U.S. efforts
to impose rigid safeguards against proliferation.
Congressional developments, including recent strong criticism
from Congressman John Anderson is summarized at Tab A.
The number of press articles is increasing and the tone is
growing more critical. Press attention focused particularly
on the recent actions by the NRC on export licenses involving
Spain and India. (The role and activities of the NRC is also
summarized at Tab A.)
NATURE OF THE EFFORT NEEDED
ERDA Administrator Seamans has recommended (letter at Tab B)
undertaking a major program to provide nuclear fuel repro-
cessing in the U.S., permitting foreign participation in
this activity, and using this program as the centerpiece of
a major Presidential statement on non-proliferation.
We agree that actions on reprocessing should be considered
but we believe that a more comprehensive approach should
be taken when developing proposals and a draft statement
for your consideration. The paper at Tab C outlines in
more detail the scope of the problems requiring considera-
tion and identifies a number of possible actions, all of
which require further development and evaluation before
they are presented to you for consideration. We also
believe that an effort should be undertaken immediately,
particularly in view of the growing concern in the Congress.
In view of the complex nature of the issues involved, a
number of agencies will need to be involved and will need
to devote resources to the effort. These include: ERDA,
State, ACDA, NRC and, to a lesser extent, Interior, EPA,
Commerce, FEA and CEQ.
4
RECOMMENDATIONS
1.
That you direct that work begin immediately to develop
and evaluate the potential initiatives described
briefly in Tab C (and others subsequently identified),
with decision papers presented to you by August 30.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
2.
That you tentatively decide to issue a major statement
on nuclear policy or send a message to Congress in
mid-September.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
3.
That you assign responsibility jointly to us (Brent
Scowcroft, Jim Cannon, and Jim Lynn) to develop and
carry out a plan to accomplish the necessary work
in cooperation with all the agencies concerned.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
A
PRINCIPAL CONGRESSIONAL AND NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (NRC) ACTIONS RELATING
TO NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND REPROCESSING
I. CONGRESSIONAL. Principal Congressional actions --
including legislation passed and pending and a sampling
of recent criticism -- are as follows:
A. A 1974 law requires all bilateral "agreements for
cooperation" involving significant nuclear exports
be submitted to Congress for a 60-day period of
review. This was stimulated by concern over Israeli
and Egyptian nuclear accords.
B. The Military Aid Bill includes a prohibition (the
Symington Amendment) against military assistance
to countries which furnish or receive nuclear
reprocessing or enrichment facilities not under
multinational control or IAEA safeguards.
Restrictions could be waived by the President
in individual cases upon specific findings -
subject to disapproval by a joint resolution of
the Congress within 30 days.
C. The ERDA 1977 Authorization bill includes an amend-
ment (still subject to final wording in conference
after July recess) requiring Congressional approval
of the first exports of nuclear fuel or equipment
to any country that has not signed the NPT or is
not covered by a Congressionally-approved agreement
for cooperation.
D. The House International Relations Committee is
expected to report an amendment to the Export
Administration Act which would require prohibi-
tions against reprocessing of fuel exported by
U.S. or burned in U.S.-supplied reactors, unless
the Secretary of State certifies that there would
be at least a 90-day warning before material could
be used in a nuclear device.
E. The Senate Government Operations Committee reported
a bill (S. 1439) on May 14 sponsored by Senators
Glenn, Ribicoff and Percy, which (a) shifts addi-
tional executive branch nuclear export responsibility
to State Department and the independent Nuclear
Regulatory Commission from ERDA and Commerce
2
Department and (b) makes the Congress the referee
in disputes between State and NRC over the granting
of export licenses. This bill was referred to the
JCAE and Foreign Relations for 60 days, which
period has now been extended through the end of
August. Several Administration witnesses have
testified against the bill and Secretary Kissinger
was expected to testify on June 29 but his testi-
mony has been delayed. The JCAE is pressing the
Administration for alternative proposals.
F. On June 25, Congressman John Anderson publicly
blasted "the White House" for not moving fast enough
to resolve problems relating to reprocessing, nuclear
exports and proliferation. (This occurred despite
our attempts to keep his staff thoroughly informed
of Administration efforts.)
G. Congressman Anderson has since written to JCAE
Chairman Pastore urging extensive hearings over
the next two months -- with the objective of
pressing the Administration for answers on re-
processing, nuclear exports and proliferation
issues. (We have been advised informally by
Anderson's staff that he probably would agree
to urge Senator Pastore to delay hearings if
the Administration plans to come forward with
new proposals.)
H. Senator Ribicoff has been a persistent critic for
the past two years of what he believes is inadequate
executive branch action on reprocessing, nuclear
exports and proliferation. Over the past four weeks
he has been pressing particularly hard with respect
to U.S.-supplied materials (heavy water) in the
Indian reactor used to produce material for the
device exploded by India in 1974. He will almost
certainly use the State Department responses to
press his case even more.
II. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. The NRC now plays a
major role in nuclear exports and will decide whether,
when, and under what conditions reprocessing will be
permitted in the U.S. The NRC role has become particu-
larly important because:
3
A.
Inadvertently, the final responsibility for approving
nuclear exports was allowed to be vested in the
independent NRC rather than the executive branch.
This resulted from the September 1974 law which
created ERDA and NRC.
B. The NRC has just announced decisions on licenses
to export a reactor to Spain and an interim supply
of fuel for the Tarapur reactor in India. The
NRC decisions, including the strong dissent of one
Commissioner have been made public. There appears
to be agreement within the NRC that additional
controls are needed but there is sharp dispute as
to whether additional controls -- beyond those in
existing agreements -- should now be imposed as
a condition of licenses issued under existing
agreements. The view of the dissenting Commissioner
is getting support in the press and from some members
of Congress.
C. The NRC is now working on an environmental impact
statement necessary to its decision -- expected in
early 1977 -- as to whether to permit wide scale
use of plutonium as reactor fuel. This and sub-
sequent decisions on the licensing of reprocessing
facilities will have a major impact on the desir-
ability, feasibility and economics of nuclear fuel
reprocessing. (The decision will also have an
impact on the viability of the liquid metal fast
breeder reactor (LMFBR) which would be fueled with
plutonium and which is a major factor in the
economic justification for reprocessing of spent
fuel elements to recover plutonium and unused
uranium.)
B
SEAMANS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT
PROVIDED EARLIER. IT'S CLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR POWER PROBLEMS
AND POSSIBLE RESPONSES: NUCLEAR EXPORTS,
REPROCESSING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT
Contents
Page
I.
Nuclear Exports
1
A.
Current Problems
1
B. Principal Existing Measures Affecting
Nuclear Export Policy and Control of
Proliferation
2
C. Administration Responses thus Far
3
D. Additional Actions for Development
and Evaluation
4
II.
Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing
6
A. Background
6
B.
Current Problems
7
C. Actions Taken or Underway
9
D. Additional Actions for Development
and Evaluation
10
III.
Nuclear Waste Management
10
A. Background
10
B.
Current Problems
11
C. Actions Taken or Underway
12
D. Additional Actions For Development
and Evaluation
13
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR PROBLEMS
AND POSSIBLE RESPONSES: NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND
PROLIFERATION, REPROCESSING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT
I. NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND PROLIFERATION
A. Current Problems
1. Growing Congressional, press, and public concern
about nuclear weapons proliferation.
Concern is focused primarily upon the greater
availability of plutonium which is extracted
from "spent" fuel elements (i.e., the process
referred to as "reprocessing"). Once separated
plutonium is available, very little time --
hours to days -- is needed to make a nuclear
weapon. Concern has continued to grow since
India exploded a nuclear device in 1974.
2. Growing concern that current U.S. activities to
safeguard against diversion of plutonium for
weapons purposes is not adequate.
Attention is now focused on exports of nuclear
materials and equipment. Some feel that existing
controls (detailed below) have been barely ade-
quate for safeguarding reactors and are simply
not adequate to guard against diversion of
separated plutonium, particularly if it is
accumulated in excess amounts.
3. The U.S. position in the foreign market for nuclear
equipment and materials is weakening.
This is resulting from (a) the lack of uranium
enrichment capacity, (b) growing strength of
foreign competition for nuclear equipment and
fuels, (c) uncertainty as to U.S. policy on
nuclear exports due to our divisive internal
debate, and (d) potentially, delays resulting
from Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) control
of export licenses and growing Congressional
review requirements. As the U.S. loses foreign
orders to other suppliers, the U.S. also loses
its leverage to obtain rigid safeguards agreements.
2
4.
Perception in the media that the Administration is
complacent about potential diversion of plutonium
from commercial nuclear power plants abroad.
Overall, our controls generally are more rigorous
than those applied by most other suppliers, but
this has not helped in the current debate. Also,
Canada's recent action in cutting off nuclear
relationships with India and imposing strong
safeguard controls in connection with its exports
has set a tough standard of comparison.
B. Principal Existing Measures Affecting Export Policy
and the Control of Proliferation.
1. NPT
Approximately 100 nations have signed the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) foreswearing activities
leading to the proliferation of weapons. Several
important nations have not signed, including
France, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa
and Brazil.
2. Bilateral "Agreements for Cooperation" between
the U.S. and about 30 other nations importing
nuclear equipment and materials from the U.S.
These agreements specify safeguards that are to
be maintained.
3. IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency establishes
safeguards standards and has some inspection
capability.
4. Supplier Discussions
State Department is leading negotiations with
other supplier nations, seeking agreement to
impose more rigid safeguards. There has been
some success achieved, but no agreement to
defer the export of reprocessing facilities
until more effective controls are developed.
5. New International Convention
The U.S. is exploring a new international nuclear
physical security convention and other steps to
upgrade physical security standards worldwide.
3
6. Pressure on Customer Nations
The U.S. brought pressure on the Government of
South Korea to cancel its order with the French
for a reprocessing plant and is applying similar
pressure on Pakistan to forego acquisition of a
reprocessing plant, but with less success.
Congressional and press criticism of export
policies of West Germany and France continues
strong even though both countries claim they
are conforming to guidelines recently developed
jointly by supplier nations. Germany still has
a commitment to supply enrichment and reprocessing
technology to Brazil and France is committed to
supply a reprocessing plant to Pakistan. Nature
of commitments to others, such as South Africa,
are unclear.
C. Administration Response Thus Far
The Executive Branch has responded to the above in
several ways, but the actions (a) have been piece-
meal and largely defensive, and (b) appear inadequate
in the face of current Congressional and public
attitudes. Responses include:
1. Secretary Kissinger summarized U.S. non-
proliferation efforts in testimony in opposi-
tion to the Glenn-Percy Nuclear Export
Reorganization Bill (S. 1439) before the Senate
Government Operations Committee. ERDA, ACDA,
and other Administration witnesses gave sup-
porting testimony. Administration witnesses
have also testified before JCAE, except for
Secretary Kissinger who is expected to appear
soon.
2. Informal attempts are being made by State, ERDA,
and others to limit the scope of restrictions
and of Congressional review requirements in
pending bills (e.g., Military Aid and ERDA
Authorization).
3. An Executive Order was recently issued setting
up procedures for getting a coordinated Executive
Branch position (State, ERDA, DOD, ACDA, and
Commerce) on nuclear export licenses pending
before the NRC. (State Department notifies
NRC of the coordinated Executive Branch position.)
4
D. Additional Actions for Development and Evaluation
Several ideas have surfaced for possible alternative
responses to the current situation. Each involves
significant issues that require development and
evaluation before being presented for decision.
Possible actions identified thus far include:
1. Significant hardening of U.S. attitude on nuclear
exports safeguards required before exports are
permitted.
There appears to be divided views on this. Some
probably will argue that past and current controls
are as good as can be achieved and/or that tougher
U.S. positions, taken unilaterally will not be
effective recognizing that the requirements we
impose are already tougher than those of most
other suppliers with whom the U.S. competes for
nuclear markets. Others will argue that anything
the U.S. can do unilaterally or in cooperation
with others that will help reduce the opportunity
for proliferation is worth doing, recognizing the
threat. Steps that might be considered to achieve
a harder and consistent policy include:
a. Strong public message -- to supplement
diplomatic channel efforts now underway ----
to other supplier nations (France and
Germany) emphasizing the need to curb
proliferation and urging them to: (1)
stop supplying reprocessing or enrichment
technology to other nations, and (2)
adopting more rigorous safeguards
requirements.
b. Head of State meetings to carry out (a),
above.
C. Move to renegotiate safeguards controls
under existing agreements for cooperation
as a condition for further exports, par-
ticularly giving the U.S. a veto on whether
and where any fuel irradiated in U.S.
reactors is reprocessed.
5
d. In addition to other actions, but not a
substitute for, appoint a panel of experts
not now involved in U.S. nuclear export
activities to review past and current
practices and submit recommendations to
you for improvements.
2. Intensify efforts to discourage reprocessing
(in the U.S. and abroad) until better controls
(technological and institutional) can be worked
out. (This needs to be considered in connection
with domestic reprocessing issues, discussed in
II, below.)
If this policy approach were to be taken,
consideration would have to be given to:
a. Expanding storage for "spent" fuel elements,
possibly making storage available to other
countries.
b. "Buy back" of spent fuel elements.
C. Finding ways to replace the energy value of
the plutonium and unused uranium in the spent
fuel elements (which is in the range of 10-30%
of the total energy value if reprocessing and
recycle of plutonium was permitted).
d. Other incentives to discourage the separation
of plutonium through reprocessing.
3. As a means to discourage the spread of reprocessing
centers, provide U.S. reprocessing services to
foreign countries.
This depends on development of reprocessing in
the U.S. since we currently have no commercial
reprocessing in operation.
a. Assist U.S. industry in demonstrating
reprocessing and related technology
(plutonium conversion, waste handling,
safeguards), as discussed in II, below.
6
b. Urge or require U.S. firms planning to
provide reprocessing services to dedicate
a portion of their capacity to serve
foreign needs, thereby potentially
satisfying foreign needs for many years
without the construction of reprocessing
plants abroad.
C. Go beyond #2 above by offering to allow
other governments to participate in the
operation of the first expected reprocessing
plant (Barnwell, South Carolina) as a demon-
stration of the concept of a multi-national
reprocessing center.
d. Determine alternatives to returning plutonium
to foreign reprocessing customers -- such as
substituting energy equivalent of reprocessed
fuel in the form of enriched uranium.
4. Propose international storage for excess plutonium.
IAEA has authority to establish repositories for
excess nuclear materials. The U.S. could propose
that this authority be implemented, that all
nations store excess plutonium in such repositories
and indicate that the U.S. would participate with
the deposit of its excess plutonium.
5. Intensify efforts to strengthen IAEA safeguards.
a. Make available advanced U.S. safeguards
technology to other nations and the IAEA.
b. Consider further strengthening of IAEA
safeguards, expanding the proposal for
a $5 million - 5 year voluntary U.S.
contribution announced by the President
on February 26, 1976.
II. NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING AND SPREAD OF REPROCESSING
TECHNOLOGY
A. Background
1. The principal driving forces behind the desire
to establish a U.S. industry to reprocess "spent"
fuel elements from commercial power reactors
are to:
7
a. recover and reuse the plutonium and unused
uranium from elements (with energy value of
10-30% of initial fuel input).
b. provide plutonium to fuel liquid metal fast
breeder (LMFBR) reactors once they are used
commercially.
C. reduce irradiated fuel and associated waste
products to most manageable forms.
2. Technology for reprocessing has been demonstrated
in AEC (now ERDA) operations.
3. Consistent policy followed that the reprocessing
step in the nuclear fuel cycle is the responsi-
bility of industry. Government sponsors R&D.
4. The principal driving forces behind the spread of
reprocessing technology and equipment worldwide
are:
a. Competition among the suppliers of nuclear
energy reactors for sales in third countries;
b. Desire on the part of recipients of the
technology and equipment to place as large
a part of the nuclear fuel cycle as possible
under their own national control;
C. desire by some for a nuclear weapons
capability.
B. Current Problems
1. Demonstrating Technology in Commercial Operations
There is not now any commercial reprocessing
capacity in the U.S.:
a. One plant that was operational (Nuclear Fuel
Services) in Western, N.Y., is closed down
and probably will not reopen.
b. A $70 million plant built at Morris, Illinois
by GE is never expected to operate due to
technological problems.
8
C. A $260 million plant, including only initial
storage and separations stages of reprocessing,
has been built in South Carolina by Allied
Chemical and General Atomics (AGNES) Its
actual operation depends upon:
- obtaining an NRC license;
- either (a) storage of separated plutonium
in liquid form, or (b) construction of a
$150 million conversion facility, for
which Government assistance may be needed;
- construction of a $350 million waste
solidification and packaging facility.
2. Licensing
Licensing of reprocessing facility depends upon
resolution of a number of issues now pending
before the NRC in one major and several other
issues. The principal issue is whether to allow
widespread recycling of plutonium. This depends
upon resolving safety, environmental, economic,
and safeguards issues -- which are being covered
in a Generic Environmental Impact Statement which
should be completed by early 1977, with an NRC
decision in mid-1977.
3. Alternatives
The NRC statement almost certainly will have to
deal with alternatives to reprocessing, some of
which (such as indefinite storage of irradiated
fuel) have not been fully studied. Also, the
extent of the economic advantages of reprocessing
depend upon the likelihood and timing of com-
mercial breeder reactors. (The construction of
the first demonstration reactor at Clinch River,
Tennessee, has not begun, is behind schedule and
is growing in cost.) Assuming reprocessing and
recycle is permitted, NRC will have to issue
complex safety, environmental and safeguards
standards and guidelines. A thorough assessment
of these factors has not been completed.
9
4.
Decisions needed
Decisions are needed on whether and when to
reprocess so that investment decisions can be
made by industry to build either: (a) reprocessing
facilities, or (b) additional storage facilities
for spent fuel elements. One or the other and
maybe both are needed to handle spent fuel from
plants already in operation. The absence of
firm plans is a factor in utility and utility
commission decisions on nuclear power and in
nuclear moratoria referenda.
5. Barnwell Facility
The consortium building the Barnwell reprocessing
facility is experiencing financial problems due
to higher costs and uncertainty about the future
of reprocessing. Abandonment of the operation
is conceivable.
C. Actions Taken or Underway
1. ERDA
a. 1977 Budget. The President's 1977 Budget
included funds for additional R&D needed
for reprocessing. It also contemplated a
supplemental to fund some kind of assistance
program to encourage construction of repro-
cessing facilities, once the right course
of action was decided upon. (In practice,
it may not be possible to implement a program
until NRC decides on recycling of plutonium.)
b. Program Development. In February, ERCA
solicited expressions of interest from
industry on plans for providing reprocessing
and on the types of assistance that might be
necessary or appropriate (with emphasis on a
minimum Federal role). Over 30 reponses
were received and ERDA is now considering
those in the development of its proposed
program.
2. NRC is proceeding with hearings on the completed
portions of the plutonium recycle generic impact
statement and is completing the remaining
portions -- all headed toward a decision in
mid-1977.
10
3. ACDA, ERDA, and State are working to define the
concept of a multinational reprocessing center
and considering the possibility of some kind of
foreign participation in the Barnwell facility.
The desire for non-proliferation benefits has
already attracted some Congressional support
for assisting Barnwell to serve foreign users.
D. Additional Actions for Development and Evaluation.
Resolution of questions about domestic reprocessing
is key to any major nuclear policy announcements.
A major effort will be needed to sort out reprocessing
issues.
1. Immediate action to complete the development,
analysis, and evaluation of the following:
a. The need for, timing of, and alternatives
to reprocessing. This should provide a
basis for executive branch (non-regulatory)
decisions as to whether and when reprocessing
should be encouraged. (Note that a decision
to defer reprocessing might influence other
countries to do the same.)
b. Alternative ways for the Government to work
with industry to provide reprocessing
capacity, assuming that we will proceed
domestically with reprocessing.
2. Explore the potential for various forms of
foreign involvement in domestic reprocessing
facilities -- as outlined in I (D) (3) (pg. 5).
III. NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT
A. Background
1. Government policy has, since early 1970's, been
that the Federal Government would take responsi-
bility for long-term storage of high level wastes.
Private industry is responsible (subject to
regulation) for handling and packaging of wastes
and delivering them in a prescribed form to a
Federal repository for long-term storage.
11
2.
Government policy has regarded the handling and
storage of lower level radioactive wastes as an
industry task, subject to Federal or State
regulation. Some problems have emerged but
these probably can be resolved within existing
arrangements.
3. Approaches to long-term storage have been
considered and then rejected: storage in the
salt mine in Kansas and a temporary near
surface storage facility. The program for
developing acceptable approaches and providing
a permanent repository heretofore has had
relatively low priority.
4. There seems to be general agreement that
technology is available to permit safe long-
term storage, but there is a long way to go
before a respository is in place and ready
to receive wastes.
5. International plans and standards for disposal
of nuclear wastes have not been adequately
addressed.
B. Current Problems
1. The major task facing the Federal Government
is finding an acceptable location (s) for a
repository, constructing it, and opening it
to receive wastes. Current assessments sug-
gest that such a repository should be in place
by 1985 and it is not clear that current plans --
which involve at least five Federal agencies --
will result in achieving this objective.
2. Finding a location for a repository acceptable
to residents of the region selected will be
a difficult task.
3. Related problems involve sorting out the roles
and responsibilities of the several agencies
involved; particularly, ERDA, NRC, EPA, and
Geological Survey, and providing some continuing
needs for inter-agency coordination.
12
4. The absence of convincing plans to have a
high-level repository in place are contributing
to: (a) the efforts by nuclear power opponents
to slow down nuclear power, and (b) questions
by utilities and utility commissions as to the
desirability of committing to more nuclear
plants.
5. Expected increase in nuclear wastes worldwide
between now and 1990 will require development
of international plans standards.
C. Actions Taken or Underway
1. ERDA
a. 1977 Budget. The President's 1977 Budget
includes $65 million in outlays (compared
to $12 million in FY 1976) to proceed with
a waste management program. A large share
of these funds will be used for exploratory
drilling of various kinds of geologic forma-
tions around the country in order to find a
suitable location for a pilot repository
and operational repositories.
b. Technical Alternatives and Generic Environmental
Impact Statement. ERDA has published an
extensive technical alternatives document and
is proceeding with development of the necessary
generic environmental impact statement covering
waste management with the objective of issuing
a draft statement early in 1977 and a final
statement late in 1977.
2. NRC is working on waste handling, packaging,
transportation, and storage regulations and
an associated environmental impact statement
with the objective of completing work in 1978.
3. Interagency Task Force. An OMB-lead interagency
task force is evaluating the schedules and the
interagency relationships among the five agencies
principally involved: ERDA, NRC, EPA, Geological
Survey, and CEQ. This group's work has already
identified potential obstacles that would prevent
13
having a repository available when needed. The
problems include: (a) sequencing of each agency's
activities so that information will be available
to others when needed, (b) overlapping functions
between NRC and EPA, and (c) continuing inter-
agency coordination.
D. Additional Actions for Development and Evaluation
1. Develop a firm plan setting out all major
actions which must be taken over the next
ten years and when they will occur -- covering
all forms of nuclear waste.
2. Develop a clear statement of roles and
responsibilities (including solution of
overlap in EPA and NRC functions), and
develop arrangements for continuing inter-
agency coordination.
3. Consider the extension of our domestic waste
management plans and solutions internationally,
perhaps through one or more of the following:
a. Offer to make waste handling and storage
technology available to other nations.
b. Offer to investigate international waste
disposal sites, either independent of or
in conjunction with reprocessing arrangements.
This will require consideration of controversial
issues such as the storage in one country of
wastes resulting from nuclear energy used in
another country.
ENDA STATE
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECISION
WASHINGTON
July10,1976
MEMORANDUM
PRESIDENT
FROM:
NRC
BRENT SCOWCROFT
CANNON
JIM LYNN
SUBJECT:
NUCLEAR POLICY - ISSUES AND PROBLEMS
REQUIRING ATTENTION AND POTENTIAL
POLICY STATEMENT
-
wastenwing
M
This memorandum:
3)evport
-
Identifies nuclear export and weapons proliferation,
reprocessing and waste management problems requiring
early attention.
Summarizes growing Congressional, public and media
concern about these problems, including restrictive
legislation now moving through the Congress, criticism
of the Administration and the potential for more of
both in the months ahead.
-
Suggests the need for a major effort over the next
six weeks to develop and evaluate several potential
policy and program actions, followed by a Presidential
statement on nuclear policy by mid-September.
ISSUES
The principal issues presented for your consideration are:
-
Whether you wish to direct that the necessary effort
be undertaken over the next six weeks to develop and
evaluate proposals and present them for your con-
sideration;
FORD LIBRARY i 938839
Whether you wish to approve, tentatively, the concept
of a major nuclear policy statement in September; and
If so, where to assign responsibility for assuring that
all necessary work is carried out and issues and a draft
statement are presented for your consideration.
2
BACKGROUND AND STATUS - NUCLEAR POLICY
The acceptability of commercial nuclear power passed a major
test with the defeat of Proposition 15 in California. Also,
we expect that your uranium enrichment proposal will soon
be approved by the Congress, paving the way for expansion
of capacity and thus resolving the principal remaining un-
certainty at the "front end" of the commercial nuclear power
cycle. Some questions continue to be raised about the
adequacy of uranium supply, mining and milling capacity
and nuclear safety, but these appear to be manageable
problems -- with primary responsibility in industry and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). However, these
front-end problems are aggravated by the uncertainties
associated with nuclear fuel reprocessing and waste handling
and storage as described below. The development of advanced
nuclear technologies (e.g., breeder) is adequately funded in
your budget proposals.
However, several major interrelated nuclear power and pro--
liferation issues are now facing us and these are drawing
increased attention in the Congress, public and media. These
involve:
-
U.S. policy on nuclear exports and safeguards to reduce
the potential for weapons proliferation.
U.S. policy with respect to reprocessing of spent fuel
from commercial power plants to recover plutonium and
unused uranium, and the commercial demonstration of
technology.
I
The adequacy of U.S. plans for the safe handling and
storage of nuclear wastes, particularly assurances
that repositories will be available for long-term
storage of long-lived and high-level wastes.
The potential solutions for these problems are intertwined;
e.g., we cannot resolve policy on reprocessing by other
nations until we know how we are going to handle the problem
in the U.S. The issues involve both domestic and national
security considerations and they affect both the continued
acceptability of nuclear power in the U.S. and our position
as a major free-world supplier of nuclear equipment and fuel
for peaceful purposes. Maintaining our strong position as
a free-world supplier is one of our best means of controlling
proliferation.
3
PUBLIC, PRESS AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS AND OUTLOOK
While the California Proposition failed, other referenda
involving restrictions on commercial nuclear power have
qualified for November ballots in Washington, Oregon, and
Colorado. These referenda together with three restrictive
laws passed in California prior to the moratorium vote, will
keep attention focused on unresolved reprocessing, waste
management and proliferation issues.
Concern about proliferation has lead to a number of restric-
tive provisions in bills now moving through the Congress --
most of which require additional Congressional review of
nuclear exports. These requirements will introduce more
uncertainty and delay, give potential foreign customers new
doubts about the reliability of the U.S. as a supplier of
nuclear equipment and materials, and thus hamper U.S. efforts
to impose rigid safeguards against proliferation.
Congressional developments, including recent strong criticism
from Congressman John Anderson is summarized at Tab A.
The number of press articles is increasing and the tone is
growing more critical. Press attention focused particularly
on the recent actions by the NRC on export licenses involving
Spain and India. (The role and activities of the NRC is also
summarized at Tab A.)
NATURE OF THE EFFORT NEEDED
ERDA Administrator Seamans has recommended (letter at Tab B)
undertaking a major program to provide nuclear fuel repro-
cessing in the U.S., permitting foreign participation in
this activity, and using this program as the centerpiece of
a major Presidential statement on non-proliferation.
We agree that actions on reprocessing should be considered
but we believe that a more comprehensive approach should
be taken when developing proposals and a draft statement
for your consideration. The paper at Tab C outlines in
more detail the scope of the problems requiring considera-
tion and identifies a number of possible actions, all of
which require further development and evaluation before
they are presented to you for consideration. We also
believe that an effort should be undertaken immediately,
particularly in view of the growing concern in the Congress.
In view of the complex nature of the issues involved, a
number of agencies will need to be involved and will need
to devote resources to the effort. These include: ERDA,
State, ACDA, NRC and, to a lesser extent, Interior, EPA,
Commerce, FEA and CEQ.
FORD LIBRARY is GERALD
4
RECOMMENDATIONS
1.
That you direct that work begin immediately to develop
and evaluate the potential initiatives described
briefly in Tab C (and others subsequently identified),
with decision papers presented to you by August 30.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
2.
That you tentatively decide to issue a major statement
on nuclear policy or send a message to Congress in
mid-September.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
3.
That you assign responsibility jointly to us (Brent
Scowcroft, Jim Cannon, and Jim Lynn) to develop and
carry out a plan to accomplish the necessary work
in cooperation with all the agencies concerned.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
PRINCIPAL CONGRESSIONAL AND NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (NRC) ACTIONS RELATING
TO NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND REPROCESSING
I.
CONGRESSIONAL. Principal Congressional actions --
including legislation passed and pending and a sampling
of recent criticism -- are as follows:
A. A 1974 law requires all bilateral "agreements for
cooperation" involving significant nuclear exports
be submitted to Congress for a 60-day period of
review. This was stimulated by concern over Israeli
and Egyptian nuclear accords.
B. The Military Aid Bill includes a prohibition (the
Symington Amendment) against military assistance
to countries which furnish or receive nuclear
reprocessing or enrichment facilities not under
multinational control or IAEA safeguards.
Restrictions could be waived by the President
in individual cases upon specific findings -
subject to disapproval by a joint resolution of
the Congress within 30 days.
C. The ERDA 1977 Authorization bill includes an amend-
ment (still subject to final wording in conference
after July recess) requiring Congressional approval
of the first exports of nuclear fuel or equipment
to any country that has not signed the NPT or is
not covered by a Congressionally-approved agreement
for cooperation.
D. The House International Relations Committee is
expected to report an amendment to the Export
Administration Act which would require prohibi-
tions against reprocessing of fuel exported by
U.S. or burned in U.S.-supplied reactors, unless
the Secretary of State certifies that there would
be at least a 90-day warning before material could
be used in a nuclear device.
E. The Senate Government Operations Committee reported
a bill (S. 1439) on May 14 sponsored by Senators
Glenn, Ribicoff and Percy, which (a) shifts addi-
tional executive branch nuclear export responsibility
to State Department and the independent Nuclear
Regulatory Commission from ERDA and Commerce
FORD & LIBRARY 93RVLD
2
Department and (b) makes the Congress the referee
in disputes between State and NRC over the granting
of export licenses. This bill was referred to the
JCAE and Foreign Relations for 60 days, which
period has now been extended through the end of
August. Several Administration witnesses have
testified against the bill and Secretary Kissinger
was expected to testify on June 29 but his testi-
mony has been delayed. The JCAE is pressing the
Administration for alternative proposals.
F. On June 25, Congressman John Anderson publicly
blasted "the White House" for not moving fast enough
to resolve problems relating to reprocessing, nuclear
exports and proliferation. (This occurred despite
our attempts to keep his staff thoroughly informed
of Administration efforts.)
G. Congressman Anderson has since written to JCAE
Chairman Pastore urging extensive hearings over
the next two months -- with the objective of
pressing the Administration for answers on re-
processing, nuclear exports and proliferation
issues. (We have been advised informally by
Anderson's staff that he probably would agree
to urge Senator Pastore to delay hearings if
the Administration plans to come forward with
new proposals.)
H. Senator Ribicoff has been a persistent critic for
the past two years of what he believes is inadequate
executive branch action on reprocessing, nuclear
exports and proliferation. Over the past four weeks
he has been pressing particularly hard with respect
to U.S. -supplied materials (heavy water) in the
Indian reactor used to produce material for the
device exploded by India in 1974. He will almost
certainly use the State Department responses to
press his case even more.
II. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. The NRC now plays a
major role in nuclear exports and will decide whether,
when, and under what conditions reprocessing will be
permitted in the U.S. The NRC role has become particu-
larly important because:
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
3
A.
Inadvertently, the final responsibility for approving
nuclear exports was allowed to be vested in the
independent NRC rather than the executive branch.
This resulted from the September 1974 law which
created ERDA and NRC.
B.
The NRC has just announced decisions on licenses
to export a reactor to Spain and an interim supply
of fuel for the Tarapur reactor in India. The
NRC decisions, including the strong dissent of one
Commissioner have been made public. There appears
to be agreement within the NRC that additional
controls are needed but there is sharp dispute as
to whether additional controls -- beyond those in
existing agreements - should now be imposed as
a condition of licenses issued under existing
agreements. The view of the dissenting Commissioner
is getting support in the press and from some members
of Congress.
C.
The NRC is now working on an environmental impact
statement necessary to its decision -- expected in
early 1977 --- as to whether to permit wide scale
use of plutonium as reactor fuel. This and sub-
sequent decisions on the licensing of reprocessing
facilities will have a major impact on the desir-
ability, feasibility and economics of nuclear fuel
reprocessing. (The decision will also have an
impact on the viability of the liquid metal fast
breeder reactor (LMFBR) which would be fueled with
plutonium and which is a major factor in the
economic justification for reprocessing of spent
fuel elements to recover plutonium and unused
uranium.)
FORD LIBRARY & 02RALD
SEAMANS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT
PROVIDED EARLIER. IT'S CLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
FORD
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR POWER PROBLEMS
AND POSSIBLE RESPONSES: NUCLEAR EXPORTS,
REPROCESSING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT
Page
I. Nuclear Exports and Proliferation
1
A. Current Problems
1
B. Principal Existing Measures Affecting
Nuclear Export Policy and Control of
Proliferation
2
C. Administration Response Thus Far
3
D. Additional Actions for Development
and Evaluation
4
II. Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and Spread of
Reprocessing Technology
6
A. Background
6
B. Current Problems
7
C. Actions Taken or Underway
9
D. Additional Actions for Development
and Evaluation
10
III. Nuclear Waste Management
A. Background
10
B. Current Problems
11
C. Actions Taken or Underway
12
D. Additional Actions for Development
and Evaluation
13
FORD is LIBRARY 028876
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR PROBLEMS
AND POSSIBLE RESPONSES: NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND
PROLIFERATION, REPROCESSING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT
I. NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND PROLIFERATION
A. Current Problems
1. Growing Congressional, press, and public concern
about nuclear weapons proliferation.
Concern is focused primarily upon the greater
availability of plutonium which is extracted
from "spent" fuel elements (i.e., the process
referred to as "reprocessing"). Once separated
plutonium is available, very little time --
hours to days -- is needed to make a nuclear
weapon. Concern has continued to grow since
India exploded a nuclear device in 1974.
2. Growing concern that current U.S. activities to
safeguard against diversion of plutonium for
weapons purposes is not adequate.
Attention is now focused on exports of nuclear
materials and equipment. Some feel that existing
controls (detailed below) have been barely ade-
quate for safeguarding reactors and are simply
not adequate to guard against diversion of
separated plutonium, particularly if it is
accumulated in excess amounts.
3. The U.S. position in the foreign market for nuclear
equipment and materials is weakening.
This is resulting from (a) the lack of uranium
enrichment capacity, (b) growing strength of
foreign competition for nuclear equipment and
fuels, (c) uncertainty as to U.S. policy on
nuclear exports due to our divisive internal
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
debate, and (d) potentially, delays resulting
from Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) control
of export licenses and growing Congressional
review requirements. As the U.S. loses foreign
orders to other suppliers, the U.S. also loses
its leverage to obtain rigid safeguards agreements.
2
4. Perception in the media that the Administration is
complacent about potential diversion of plutonium
from commercial nuclear power plants abroad.
Overall, our controls generally are more rigorous
than those applied by most other suppliers, but
this has not helped in the current debate. Also,
Canada's recent action in cutting off nuclear
relationships with India and imposing strong
safeguard controls in connection with its exports
has set a tough standard of comparison.
B. Principal Existing Measures Affecting Export Policy
and the Control of Proliferation.
1. NPT
Approximately 100 nations have signed the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) foreswearing activities
leading to the proliferation of weapons. Several
important nations have not signed, including
France, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa
and Brazil.
2. Bilateral "Agreements for Cooperation" between
the U.S. and about 30 other nations importing
nuclear equipment and materials from the U.S.
These agreements specify safeguards that are to
be maintained.
3. IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency establishes
safeguards standards and has some inspection
capability.
4. Supplier Discussions
State Department is leading negotiations with
other supplier nations, seeking agreement to
impose more rigid safeguards. There has been
some success achieved, but no agreement to
defer the export of reprocessing facilities
until more effective controls are developed.
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
5. New International Convention
The U.S. is exploring a new international nuclear
physical security convention and other steps to
upgrade physical security standards worldwide.
3
6. Pressure on Customer Nations
The U.S. brought pressure on the Government of
South Korea to cancel its order with the French
for a reprocessing plant and is applying similar
pressure on Pakistan to forego acquisition of a
reprocessing plant, but with less success.
Congressional and press criticism of export
policies of West Germany and France continues
strong even though both countries claim they
are conforming to guidelines recently developed
jointly by supplier nations. Germany still has
a commitment to supply enrichment and reprocessing
technology to Brazil and France is committed to
supply a reprocessing plant to Pakistan. Nature
of commitments to others, such as South Africa,
are unclear.
C. Administration Response Thus Far
The Executive Branch has responded to the above in
several ways, but the actions (a) have been piece-
meal and largely defensive, and (b) appear inadequate
in the face of current Congressional and public
attitudes. Responses include:
1. Secretary Kissinger summarized U.S. non-
proliferation efforts in testimony in opposi-
tion to the Glenn-Percy Nuclear Export
Reorganization Bill (S. 1439) before the Senate
Government Operations Committee. ERDA, ACDA,
and other Administration witnesses gave sup-
porting testimony. Administration witnesses
have also testified before JCAE, except for
Secretary Kissinger who is expected to appear
soon.
2. Informal attempts are being made by State, ERDA,
and others to limit the scope of restrictions
and of Congressional review requirements in
pending bills (e.g., Military Aid and ERDA
Authorization).
FORD i LIBRARY
3. An Executive Order was recently issued setting
up procedures for getting a coordinated Executive
Branch position (State, ERDA, DOD, ACDA, and
Commerce) on nuclear export licenses pending
before the NRC. (State Department notifies
NRC of the coordinated Executive Branch position.)
4
D. Additional Actions for Development and Evaluation
Several ideas have surfaced for possible alternative
responses to the current situation. Each involves
significant issues that require development and
evaluation before being presented for decision.
Possible actions identified thus far include:
1. Significant hardening of U.S. attitude on nuclear
exports safeguards required before exports are
permitted.
There appears to be divided views on this. Some
probably will argue that past and current controls
are as good as can be achieved and/or that tougher
U.S. positions, taken unilaterally will not be
effective recognizing that the requirements we
impose are already tougher than those of most
other suppliers with whom the U.S. competes for
nuclear markets. Others will argue that anything
the U.S. can do unilaterally or in cooperation
with others that will help reduce the opportunity
for proliferation is worth doing, recognizing the
threat. Steps that might be considered to achieve
a harder and consistent policy include:
a. Strong public message -- to supplement
diplomatic channel efforts now underway --
to other supplier nations (France and
Germany) emphasizing the need to curb
proliferation and urging them to: (1)
stop supplying reprocessing or enrichment
technology to other nations, and (2)
adopting more rigorous safeguards
requirements.
b. Head of State meetings to carry out (a),
above.
C. Move to renegotiate safeguards controls
under existing agreements for cooperation
as a condition for further exports, par-
ticularly giving the U.S. a veto on whether
and where any fuel irradiated in U.S.
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
reactors is reprocessed.
5
d. In addition to other actions, but not a
substitute for, appoint a panel of experts
not now involved in U.S. nuclear export
activities to review past and current
practices and submit recommendations to
you for improvements.
2. Intensify efforts to discourage reprocessing
(in the U.S. and abroad) until better controls
(technological and institutional) can be worked
out. (This needs to be considered in connection
with domestic reprocessing issues, discussed in
II, below.)
If this policy approach were to be taken,
consideration would have to be given to:
a. Expanding storage for "spent" fuel elements,
possibly making storage available to other
countries.
b. "Buy back" of spent fuel elements.
C. Finding ways to replace the energy value of
the plutonium and unused uranium in the spent
fuel elements (which is in the range of 10-30%
of the total energy value if reprocessing and
recycle of plutonium was permitted).
a. Other incentives to discourage the separation
of plutonium through reprocessing.
3. As a means to discourage the spread of reprocessing
centers, provide U.S. reprocessing services to
foreign countries.
This depends on development of reprocessing in
the U.S. since we currently have no commercial
reprocessing in operation.
a. Assist U.S. industry in demonstrating
reprocessing and related technology
(plutonium conversion, waste handling,
safeguards), as discussed in II, below.
FORD i LIBRARY 078870
6
b. Urge or require U.S. firms planning to
provide reprocessing services to dedicate
a portion of their capacity to serve
foreign needs, thereby potentially
satisfying foreign needs for many years
without the construction of reprocessing
plants abroad.
C. Go beyond #2 above by offering to allow
other governments to participate in the
operation of the first expected reprocessing
plant (Barnwell, South Carolina) as a demon-
stration of the concept of a multi-national
reprocessing center.
d. Determine alternatives to returning plutonium
to foreign reprocessing customers -- such as
substituting energy equivalent of reprocessed
fuel in the form of enriched uranium.
4. Propose international storage for excess plutonium.
IAEA has authority to establish repositories for
excess nuclear materials. The U.S. could propose
that this authority be implemented, that all
nations store excess plutonium in such repositories
and indicate that the U.S. would participate with
the deposit of its excess plutonium.
5. Intensify efforts to strengthen IAEA safeguards.
a. Make available advanced U.S. safeguards
technology to other nations and the IAEA.
b. Consider further strengthening of IAEA
safeguards, expanding the proposal for
a $5 million - 5 year voluntary U.S.
contribution announced by the President
on February 26, 1976.
II. NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING AND SPREAD OF REPROCESSING
TECHNOLOGY
A. Background
1. The principal driving forces behind the desire
to establish a U.S. industry to reprocess "spent"
fuel elements from commercial power reactors
are to:
FORD is LIBRARY 07/030
7
a. recover and reuse the plutonium and unused
uranium from elements (with energy value of
10-30% of initial fuel input),
b. provide plutonium to fuel liquid metal fast
breeder (LMFBR) reactors once they are used
commercially.
C. reduce irradiated fuel and associated waste
products to most manageable forms.
2. Technology for reprocessing has been demonstrated
in AEC (now ERDA) operations.
3. Consistent policy followed that the reprocessing
step in the nuclear fuel cycle is the responsi-
bility of industry. Government sponsors R&D.
4. The principal driving forces behind the spread of
reprocessing technology and equipment worldwide
are:
a. Competition among the suppliers of nuclear
energy reactors for sales in third countries;
b. Desire on the part of recipients of the
technology and equipment to place as large
a part of the nuclear fuel cycle as possible
under their own national control;
c. desire by some for a nuclear weapons
capability.
B. Current Problems
1. Demonstrating Technology in Commercial Operations
There is not now any commercial reprocessing
capacity in the U.S.:
a. One plant that was operational (Nuclear Fuel
Services) in Western, N.Y., is closed down
and probably will not reopen.
b. A $70 million plant built at Morris, Illinois
by GE is never expected to operate due to
technological problems.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
8
C. A $260 million plant, including only initial
storage and separations stages of reprocessing,
has been built in South Carolina by Allied
Chemical and General Atomics (AGNES). Its
actual operation depends upon:
- obtaining an NRC license;
- either (a) storage of separated plutonium
in liquid form, or (b) construction of a
$150 million conversion facility, for
which Government assistance may be needed;
- construction of a $350 million waste
solidification and packaging facility.
2. Licensing
Licensing of reprocessing facility depends upon
resolution of a number of issues now pending
before the NRC in one major and several other
issues. The principal issue is whether to allow
widespread recycling of plutonium. This depends
upon resolving safety, environmental, economic,
and safeguards issues --- which are being covered
in a Generic Environmental Impact Statement which
should be completed by early 1977, with an NRC
decision in mid-1977.
3. Alternatives
The NRC statement almost certainly will have to
deal with alternatives to reprocessing, some of
which (such as indefinite storage of irradiated
fuel) have not been fully studied. Also, the
extent of the economic advantages of reprocessing
depend upon the likelihood and timing of com-
mercial breeder reactors. (The construction of
the first demonstration reactor at Clinch River,
Tennessee, has not begun, is behind schedule and
is growing in cost.) Assuming reprocessing and
recycle is permitted, NRC will have to issue
complex safety, environmental and safeguards
standards and guidelines. A thorough assessment
of these factors has not been completed.
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
9
4.
Decisions needed
Decisions are needed on whether and when to
reprocess so that investment decisions can be
made by industry to build either: (a) reprocessing
facilities, or (b) additional storage facilities
for spent fuel elements. One or the other and
maybe both are needed to handle spent fuel from
plants already in operation. The absence of
firm plans is a factor in utility and utility
commission decisions on nuclear power and in
nuclear moratoria referenda.
5.
Barnwell Facility
The consortium building the Barnwell reprocessing
facility is experiencing financial problems due
to higher costs and uncertainty about the future
of reprocessing. Abandonment of the operation
is conceivable.
C.
Actions Taken or Underway
1.
ERDA
a. 1977 Budget. The President's 1977 Budget
included funds for additional R&D needed
for reprocessing. It also contemplated a
supplemental to fund some kind of assistance
program to encourage construction of repro-
cessing facilities, once the right course
of action was decided upon. (In practice,
it may not be possible to implement a program
until NRC decides on recycling of plutonium.)
b. Program Development. In February, ERDA
solicited expressions of interest from
industry on plans for providing reprocessing
and on the types of assistance that might be
necessary or appropriate (with emphasis on a
minimum Federal role). Over 30 reponses
were received and ERDA is now considering
those in the development of its proposed
program.
2.
NRC is proceeding with hearings on the completed
portions of the plutonium recycle generic impact
statement and is completing the remaining
portions -- all headed toward a decision in
mid-1977.
FORD : LIBRARY 07VU30
10
3. ACDA, ERDA, and State are working to define the
concept of a multinational reprocessing center
and considering the possibility of some kind of
foreign participation in the Barnwell facility.
The desire for non-proliferation benefits has
already attracted some Congressional support
for assisting Barnwell to serve foreign users.
D. Additional Actions for Development and Evaluation.
Resolution of questions about domestic reprocessing
is key to any major nuclear policy announcements.
A major effort will be needed to sort out reprocessing
issues.
1. Immediate action to complete the development,
analysis, and evaluation of the following:
a. The need for, timing of, and alternatives
to reprocessing. This should provide a
basis for executive branch (non-regulatory)
decisions as to whether and when reprocessing
should be encouraged. (Note that a decision
to defer reprocessing might influence other
countries to do the same.)
b. Alternative ways for the Government to work
with industry to provide reprocessing
capacity, assuming that we will proceed
domestically with reprocessing..
2. Explore the potential for various forms of
foreign involvement in domestic reprocessing
facilities -- as outlined in I (D) (3) (pg. 5).
III. NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT
A. Background
1. Government policy has, since early 1970's, been
that the Federal Government would take responsi-
bility for long-term storage of high level wastes.
Private industry is responsible (subject to
regulation) for handling and packaging of wastes
and delivering them in a prescribed form to a
Federal repository for long-term storage.
BEIALD FORD LIBRARY
11
2.
Government policy has regarded the handling and
storage of lower level radioactive wastes as an
industry task, subject to Federal or State
regulation. Some problems have emerged but
these probably can be resolved within existing
arrangements.
3. Approaches to long-term storage have been
considered and then rejected: storage in the
salt mine in Kansas and a temporary near
surface storage facility. The program for
developing acceptable approaches and providing
a permanent repository heretofore has had
relatively low priority.
4. There seems to be general agreement that
technology is available to permit safe long-
term storage, but there is a long way to go
before a respository is in place and ready
to receive wastes.
5. International plans and standards for disposal
of nuclear wastes have not been adequately
addressed.
B. Current Problems
1. The major task facing the Federal Government
is finding an acceptable location (s) for a
repository, constructing it, and opening it
to receive wastes. Current assessments sug-
gest that such a repository should be in place
by 1985 and it is not clear that current plans --
which involve at least five Federal agencies --
will result in achieving this objective.
2. Finding a location for a repository acceptable
to residents of the region selected will be
a difficult task.
3. Related problems involve sorting out the roles
and responsibilities of the several agencies
involved; particularly, ERDA, NRC, EPA, and
Geological Survey, and providing some continuing
needs for inter-agency coordination.
FORD & LIBRARY
12
4. The absence of convincing plans to have a
high-level repository in place are. contributing
to: (a) the efforts by nuclear power opponents
to slow down nuclear power, and (b) questions
by utilities and utility commissions as to the
desirability of committing to more nuclear
plants.
5. Expected increase in nuclear wastes worldwide
between now and 1990 will require development
of international plans standards.
C.
Actions Taken or Underway
1. ERDA
a. 1977 Budget. The President's 1977 Budget
includes $65 million in outlays (compared
to $12 million in FY 1976) to. proceed with
a waste management program. A large share
of these funds will be used for exploratory
drilling of various kinds of geologic forma-
tions around the country in order to find a
suitable location for a pilot repository
and operational repositories.
b. Technical Alternatives and Generic Environmental
Impact Statement. ERDA has published an
extensive technical alternatives document and
is proceeding with development of the necessary
generic environmental impact statement covering
waste management with the objective of issuing
a draft statement early in 1977 and a final
statement late in 1977.
2. NRC is working on waste handling, packaging,
transportation, and storage regulations and
an associated environmental impact statement
with the objective of completing work in 1978.
3. Interagency Task Force. An OMB-lead interagency
task force is evaluating the schedules and the
interagency relationships among the five agencies
principally involved: ERDA, NRC, EPA, Geological
Survey, and CEQ. This group's work has already
identified potential obstacles that would prevent
FORD is LIBRARY QERALD
13
having a repository available when needed. The
problems include: (a) sequencing of each agency's
activities so that information will be available
to others when needed, (b) overlapping functions
between NRC and EPA, and (c) continuing inter-
agency coordination.
D. Additional Actions for Development and Evaluation
1. Develop a firm plan setting out all major
actions which must be taken over the next
ten years and when they will occur -- covering
all forms of nuclear waste.
2. Develop a clear statement of roles and
responsibilities (including solution of
overlap in EPA and NRC functions), and
develop arrangements for continuing inter-
agency coordination.
3. Consider the extension of our domestic waste
management plans and solutions internationally,
perhaps through one or more of the following:
a. Offer to make waste handling and storage
technology available to other nations.
b. Offer to investigate international waste
disposal sites, either independent of or
in conjunction with reprocessing arrangements.
This will require consideration of controversial
issues such as the storage in one country of
wastes resulting from nuclear energy used in
another country.
FORD is LIBRARY
Cc: Victean assude
AMERICAN NUCLEAR ENERGY COUNCIL CC to
1750 K STREET, N.W. 0 SUITE 300 $ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
Connon
(202) 296-4520
scraw croft
CRAIG HOSMER
PRESIDENT
July 12, 1976
File wl
Mr. L. William Seidman
Assistant for Economic Affairs
The White House
Fri study
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Bill:
The Administration has lost the initiative on the nuclear pro-
liferation/safeguards exports issue by neglect. Hardly a word
has been said since Henry Kissinger blessed the idea of multi-
national nuclear fuel reprocessing last September. Meanwhile,
Jimmy Carter sweeps into the vacuum with his U.N. speech, a
proliferation study group, appropriate words in the Demo plat-
form, etc., etc., etc.
And, in the absence of strong Administration leadership, Congress
is offering bills and amendments on the subject willy-nilly.
Some of these are highly counterproductive from both a strategic
nuclear defense standpoint and from the standpoint of any healthy
U.S. nuclear exports policy.
I will not waste your time with a long recitation of what should
be done. Henry Kissinger knows what should be done and it is im-
portant both for the country and for the President's political
fortunes that he get about doing it.
Therefore I respectfully, but strongly, recommend that you nudge
the President to tell Henry to get busy on this one quickly and
follow through on it.
Any continuing absence of strong Administration leadership here
can allow Congress to do a lot of strategic and commercial damage,
and set up Carter rather than Ford as the man of vision and lead-
ership in this area.
Sincerely, 03
CRAIG Craig HOSMER
President
CH:jh
FORD is LIBRA, 07VN 076879
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230
July 14, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES E. CONNOR
SECRETARY TO THE CABINET
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR POLICY PAPER FOR THE PRESIDENT
Thank you for providing me a copy of the
subject memo for the President. Pursuant to our
conversation on July 12, I provided copies to
members of the ERC Executive Committee on an "Eyes Only"
basis for their prompt comment.
As of this point, no significant disagreement
with the memorandum for the President has been identified.
Attached, for your information, are selected comments
from ERC principals.
Frank Zarb and I--along with other members
of the ERC--do feel strongly on one bureaucratic point
which is relevant to the follow-on work required. That
is: given the subject, "Nuclear Policy," and given that
the ERC has a working cabinet level committee on nuclear
policy, and given that this committee has been dealing
specifically with most of the issues raised in the
subject memorandum, we feel it would be appropriate,
sensible, and in all likelihood more efficient, if the
ERC were to be intimately involved in the follow-on
analysis. We would hope that the memorandum for the
President would be modified to reflect this view.
W
Elliot L. Richardson
Attachments
FORD LIBRARY is BENALD
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
July 14, 1976
SECRET
Dear Elliot:
I have reviewed the draft memorandum to the
President which you forwarded to ERC members on
July 12th.
The Department of State places great importance
on strengthening US. non-proliferation policies, and
both Secretary Kissinger and I have personally sought
to move these policies forward. As outlined in Tab
C of the Presidential memorandum, the US has under-
way or planned a wide range of bilateral, multilateral,
and international non-proliferation efforts -- not
only in response to Congressional concerns, but as
initiatives aimed at reducing the dangers and insta-
bilities associated with the further spread of nuclear
explosives capabilities.
The prospect of a Presidential nuclear policy
statement in mid-September can serve to provide
political impetus at the highest level to our non-
proliferation efforts. It can also demonstrate the
relationship between our domestic nuclear decisions
and our international nuclear objectives. We have
some concern, however, that the intermingling of
domestic and international nuclear policy issues in
a Presidential statement could lead to a real or
perceived emphasis on domestic issues, thereby weak-
ening the non-proliferation impact of such a statement.
We believe, therefore, that we should reserve our
judgment, pending further study of concrete ideas, as
to whether there should be a single statement covering
both areas, separate statements, or some other alter-
natives.
The Honorable
Elliot L. Richardson,
Secretary of Commerce.
SECRET
DECLASSIMED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 39
By
WHM State Dept. NARA, Guidelines Date 5/15/00
SECRET
- 2 -
It should be recognized that not every element
of a non-proliferation strategy would be suitable
for inclusion in a possible Presidential statement.
Many of the elements identified in Tab C of the
Presidential memorandum are best pursued through
diplomatic channels and could be jeopardized by
public discussions, while others may not be ready
for the President to surface in September.
One of the central elements for potential in-
clusion in a Presidential statement is the proposal
by Dr. Seamans to provide nuclear fuel reprocessing
services for foreign customers in the US and possibly
to permit foreign participation in such a facility.
While this proposal has a number of positive aspects,
there remain key issues which must be resolved before
this initiative can be considered for a Presidential
statement. In this connection, I have attached for
your information my reply to Dr. Seamans' request for
comments on his June 9th letter to the President.
Under the arrangements recommended in the Memo-
randum to the President, the Department of State is
therefore prepared to support and participate in the
proposed interagency endeavor which would evaluate
potential nuclear policy initiatives suitable for
inclusion in a possible Presidential statement, with
particular attention to exploring the question of
how our national reprocessing decisions can support
our international non-proliferation objectives.
Within this context and working with other interested
members of the National Security Council, we would
of course continue to take the lead in developing
nuclear non-proliferation policy initiatives for
consideration by the President.
Personal regards,
Sincerely,
Chich
Charles W. Robinson
cc: Brent Scowcroft
SECRET
UNITED STATES
LATTON ENERGY RESEARCH
ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545
USA
July 13, 1976
Honorable Elliot L. Richardson
Secretary of Commerce
Washington, D. C. 20230
Dear Elliot:
This is with respect to the draft memorandum to the
President concerning "Nuclear Policy -- Issues and
Problems Requiring Attention and Potential Policy
Statement" which you circulated to ERC Executive
Committee members for review and comment.
In my judgment, few matters are more essential to the
security of this nation and the world than prompt
resolution of reprocessing and related nonproliferation
issues. At the same time, however, few matters are more
complex. For this reason, it is vital that the best
possible effort be mounted within the Administration to
examine these interrelated issues in the most responsible
and effective way. It is not clear from the draft
memorandum how such an effort would be managed but, for
our part, ERDA fully supports the effort and stands ready
to devote whatever resources are necessary to assure its
swift and successful completion
With respect to the language of the draft memorandum, I
believe a few changes, set forth in the attachment to
this letter, are necessary to correct a possible
misunderstanding of my June 9 letter to the President.
The draft implies that I recommended a "major program in
reprocessing." This is not the case. I recommended that
the U.S. undertake a major initiative in this area, listed
several possible features of such an initiative, and
requested a Presidential direction for a speedy and
coordinated study which would become the centerpiece of a
truly comprehensive Presidential policy on nuclear power
AMERICAN REVOLUTION INFENTENNAL
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
1776-1976
®
- -2-
and nonproliferation, including such matters as nuclear
exports and waste management. The language changes set
forth in the Tab more accurately reflect my recommenda-
tions to the President, and make clear that a policy
with respect to reprocessing is essential to -- and
interrelated with -- the disposition of related non-
proliferation issues.
Sincerely,
B.b
Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
Administrator
CC: Honorable James Connor
Secretary to the Cabinet
GERALD LIBRARY A FORD
Requested Changes in Draft Memorandum
to the President on Nuclear Policy
Page 3, 4th paragraph:
Delete paragraph
Insert: "ERDA Administrator Seamans has recommended
(letter at Tab B) undertaking a major stud
to develop reprocessing and related non-
proliferation initiatives to b.e available
to you as soon as possible. Such an
initiative could have several features
including foreign participation and could
be used as the centerpiece of a major
Presidential statement on nonproliferation,"
Page 3 5th paragraph
Delete first sentence
Insert: We agree that such a study is needed and
would recommend a more express inclusion
of nuclear exports and other nonproliferation
approaches in its scope. "
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 19, 1976
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
JAMES M. CANNON
JAMES T. LYNN
FROM:
JAMES E. CONNOR gee
SUBJECT:
Nuclear Policy -- Issues and Problems
Requiring Attention and Potential Policy
Statement
The President has reviewed your memorandum (undated) on the
above subject and has directed that responsibility be assigned
jointly to Scowcroft, Cannon and Lynn to develop and carry out
a plan to accomplish the necessary work in cooperation with all
the agencies concerned.
Please follow-up with the appropriate action.
cc: Dick Cheney
FORD + LIBRARY DERALD