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1975/12/10 - Cabinet
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1534945
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1975/12/10 - Cabinet
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This file contains an agenda and briefing paper only.
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James M. Cannon Files (Ford Administration)
James Cannon's Meetings Files
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1975
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The original documents are located in Box 54, folder "1975/12/10 - Cabinet" of the James
M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 54 of the James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Mr. Cannon
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 9, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE CABINET
SUBJECT: CABINET MEETING, WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1975
The President has approved the following agenda for the Cabinet meeting
scheduled for Wednesday, December 10th, at 11:00 a.m., in the
Cabinet Room.
Debriefing on the
President's Trip to
the Pacific Basin
The President
15 minutes
Briefing on the Status
of the Budget Process
James Lynn
15 minutes
Briefing on Campaign
Progress
Howard Callaway
45 minutes
Briefing on Cabinet
Members Campaign
Appearances
Secretary Morton
10 minutes
Briefing on Legal
Cuestions regarding
Campaign Participation
Philip Buchen
30 minutes
JAMES E. CONNOR
SECRETARY TO THE CABINET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
D ecember 9, 1975
CABINET MEETING
Wednesday, December 10, 1975
11:00 a. m. (90 minutes)
The Cabinet Room
From: James Julie Connor
I. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN
1. Background: You last met with the Cabinet on November 6th when
you hosted a dinner for them at the Residence. A meeting was
scheduled on November 26th prior to your Pacific Basin trip, but
was cancelled because of your heavy schedule. This meeting will
cover the subjects which had been planned for the November 26th
meeting.
2. Participants: Attached at Tab A
3. Press Plan: Press Photo at Beginning of Meeting and David
Kennerly Photo.
II. TALKING POINTS
1. As you know, I've just gotten back from an extensive trip to the
Pacific Basin. I thought you might like to be debriefed on that
trip. (General Scowcroft has provided talking points for this
item, which are attached at Tab B.)
2. As you all know, the budget process is pretty well along. We are
coming close to the deadline, and I have asked Jim Lynn to give
us a report on the situation. Jim,
3. Since we will be entering a campaign year in 1976, I have decided
to devote the remainder of this meeting to issues concerning the
campaign. We will begin with a progress report from Bo Callaway.
Bo
- 2 -
4.
Rog Morton has recently written to some of the Cabinet members
concerning campaign appearances. I understand some of you
have some questions, and I have asked Rog to discuss this with
us today. Rog,
5.
Finally, Phil Buchen has prepared a briefing on the legal questions
regarding campaign activities to bring us up to date on what we
can and cannot do under the new rules and regulations. Phil
Attendees
Cabinet Meeting
Wednesday, December 10, 1975
The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of the Treasury, William Simon
The Attorney General, Edward Levi
The Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz
The Secretary of Commerce, Rogers C. B. Morton
The Secretary of Labor, John Dunlop
The Secretary of HEW, F. David Mathews
The Secretary of HUD, Carla A. Hills
The Secretary of Transportation, William T. Coleman
The Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Ingersoll (For Secretary Kissinger
who is leaving for Europe today)
The Deputy Secretary of Defense, William P. Clements (for Secretary
Rumsfeld who is abroad)
The Under Secretary of the Interior, D. Kent Frizzell (for Secretary
Kleppe, who is in Los Angeles)
The Counsel to the President, Philip Buchen
The Counsellor to the President, Robert Hartmann
The Director of OMB, James Lynn
The Counsellor to the President, John O. Marsh
The U. S. Representative to the United Nations, Daniel P. Moynihan
The Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Clayton Yeutter
(for Ambassador Dent, who is in Geneva)
White House/Executive Office:
William Baroody, Assistant to the President for Public Liaison
James Cannon, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs
Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President
James Connor, Secretary to the Cabinet
Max Friedersdorf, Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
Willian Greener, Deputy Press Secretary to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
L. William Seidman, Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs
Agencies:
Russell Train, Administrator, EPA
Frank Zarb, Administrator, FEA
Other:
Howard Callaway, PFC
Stewart Spencer, PFC
Mary Louise Smith, Chairman, RNC
TAB B
SECRET
TALKING POINTS
People's Republic of China
1. I went to China with the intention of sustaining and building
on the dialogue which we have established with the leaders
in Peking over the last four years. I believe this serves
the most fundamental interests of our country: to help
shape the evolution of a more stable balance among the
great powers; and to create the conditions for a more
permanent and realistic relationship with a country with
almost a quarter of the world's population.
2. I went to Peking with no illusions. We clearly have basic
areas of disagreement with the Chinese. Quite apart from
the differences of philosophy, culture, and social systems,
they perceive the state of the world in much more ominous
terms than do we. They believe the prospects for a new
world war are substantial. They maintain a bitter hostility
toward the Soviet Union that is reflected in both political and
military confrontation.
3. For all these areas of difference, we did find much in common
with the Chinese. Although our approaches to dealing with the
Soviet Union differ, given our varying positions in the world
and our respective national interests, we share a distrust
of Soviet intentions. The Chinese support a strong NATO,
as we do. They urge the Japanese to maintain strong ties to
the U. S., a policy of obvious value to us. They wish to see
Soviet influence excluded from the Middle East. And we both
are wary of Moscow's efforts to extend Soviet influence directly
or indirectly into such places as Angola, the Indian Subcontinent,
and Southeast Asia. I believe my talks with Chairman Mao
and Vice Premier Teng strengthened the basis for continuing
parallel actions on these issues of common concern. We also
clarified our areas of continuing difference. I indicated, for
example, that our people find it difficult to accept some of
the Chinese criticism of our policies that serve their own
interests as well as ours as in the Middle East.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By WHM NARA. Date 5/15/00
SECRET
2
4.
On Korea, our public policies clearly differ, but my impres-
sion is that the Chinese would not find instability on the
peninsula helpful to their security concerns any more than we
would. I believe they will oppose the stirring up of trouble
there.
5.
On Taiwan and the normalization question, the Chinese did
not press for a change in the present situation. They know
that there are strong feelings in this country, and they see
that our influence there keeps the situation stable. At the
same time, their interest in the eventual completion of the
normalization process has not changed. I believe that it is
important that that should at some point take place - for
the larger strategic interests involved -- but there was no
attempt to resolve the specific timing and the actual modali-
ties of a new arrangement.
6.
As you know from the public announcement, the Chinese very
helpfully provided information on seven MIAs lost in past
years along the Chinese periphery. Hopefully this may
encourage Hanoi to be more forthcoming in accounting for
our Indochina MIAs.
7. To summarize, I believe my four days in Peking contributed
to the strengthening of our relationship with the People's
Republic of China in a manner that will further our efforts
to create a more stable international situation.
Indonesia and the Philippines
1.
My visits to Indonesia and the Philippines were especially
useful parts of the Pacific trip. They put our overall relations
with the region into perspective in the context of my trip to
China and our active dealings with the Japanese this past year.
2.
Both President Marcos and President Suharto said that the
fall of Victnam and Cambodia last spring had produced very
real questions about the future role of the U.S. in their part
of the world.,
SECRET
SECRET
3
3. My visit elicited comments from both of them that they do
not want the U.S. to retreat to a "fortress America. 11 They
want us to play a constructive and responsible role in Asia.
I told them this was precisely our intention. My speech at
the East-West Center in Hawaii on Sunday was designed to
explain to the American people our overall approach to the
Pacific region.
4. I was highly impressed by the receptions we received in both
countries, particularly in the Philippines. We have many friends
and much public good will in these two countries. They are
looking to us for leadership and support. I told them both that
we want to sustain strong and friendly relations.
5. President Marcos is basically concerned with two aspects of
our relationship: achieving more favorable terms of trade for
Philippine products, and revising our base arrangements so
that it does not appear as though they have no control over them.
Marcos genuinely wants the bases to remain. He told me the
Chinese had not in any way pressed him for their removal.
6. We agreed that we would negotiate on both subjects in the near
future. We hope to include investment guarantees that would be
helpful to American investors, as well as trade arrangements
which are in Philippine interests, in our overall treaty. While
we may agree to some changes in the base arrangements, there
will be no reduction in our operating capability.
7. Indonesia is a country which merits our close attention and
interest. It is the fifth most populous country in the world.
It is also rich in oil resources, although its per capita income
is still very low.
8. Indonesia is a member of OPEC, and we have tended to lump it
together with the other OPEC countries when enacting restrictive
or retaliatory legislation. I do not believe this has been a wise
course. Indonesia has not in the past supported the harshest
OPEC actions, such as the embargo and the full amount of the
recent ten percent price increase.
SECRET
SECRET
4
9.
The Indonesians are concerned about the possible spread
of Communist subversion in their country. They keep Peking
and Hanoi at arms length and try to react quickly to possible
threats.
10.
The Indonesians also indicated they want to encourage U.S.
investment in their country.
SECRET