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Nuclear Policy Statement (3)
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The original documents are located in Box 24, folder "Nuclear Policy Statement (3)" of the
James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
DECISION
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 15, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Brent Scowcroft
B
Jim Cannor
Jim Lynn
One
SUBJECT:
NUCLEAR POLICY
The Nuclear Policy Review Group that you created on July 14
has completed its assignment and submitted a report
(Appendix I) which has been reviewed by agencies (their detailed
comments at Appendix II) and your senior advisers.
Problems Requiring Attention
Briefly, the following major problems require
attention:
There is a growing threat of nuclear proliferation abroad
because of the spread of the capability to recover
plutonium from "spent" fuel elements from nuclear power
and research reactors in a step called "reprocessing."
The separated plutonium is intended to be recycled
as reactor fuel. However, the plutonium can also be stolen
or clandestinely diverted and used quite quickly to
make explosives.
The system of controls to prevent such uses is not
adequate for dealing with the growing threat. This
system includes IAEA safeguards and inspections,
FORD LIBRARY & GERALD
physical security programs, and various bilateral
and multilateral agreements.
Concern in the public and Congress about proliferation
abroad is leading toward legislation designed to force
our foreign customers to agree to forego reprocessing
and the accumulation of plutonium stockpiles -- as a
condition for receiving nuclear fuel and equipment from
U.S. suppliers.
U.S. leverage for insisting upon rigorous controls is
declining along with our role as the dominant supplier
of nuclear fuel and equipment.
Digitized from Box 24 of the James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
-2-
Efforts by industry to proceed with commercial scale
reprocessing in the U.S. are stalled because of
uncertainties concerning economics, safeguards and
regulatory requirements. Also, domestic reprocessing
is strongly opposed by some who believe that energy
and economic benefits are outweighed by the problems
resulting from significant quantities of separated and
recycled plutonium. (It should be noted that reprocessing
is useful but not crucial to the pursuit of the nuclear
power option, at least for the next 10 to 20 years.)
Uncertainties about reprocessing and long-term nuclear
waste management (a Federal responsibility) are being
used by opponents of expansion of nuclear power in
the U.S. (Six more states will have anti-nuclear
initiatives on their November ballots.)
Recommended Response
There is general agreement among heads of agencies concerned
and your senior advisers on a recommendation that you issue
a major statement on nuclear policy which:
Reaffirms U.S. intent to increase the use of nuclear power.
Recognizes that other countries will do the same regardless
of U.S. position.
Reflects U.S. intent to be a reliable and competitive
international supplier of nuclear fuel and equipment.
Reflects great concern about the spread of reprocessing
abroad because of the potential for theft by terrorists
or diversion by nations of separated plutonium.
Announces policy changes to deal with this concern,
backed up by a series of specific proposals to tighten
controls, offer incentives to those who cooperate in
restricting reprocessing, and impose sanctions on
those who violate agreements.
Announces Administration position on reprocessing in
the U.S. and a course of action to carry out that position.
Commits the Administration to assure the availability of
a nuclear waste disposal facility when needed about in 1985.
However, with respect to reprocessing here and abroad, there
is disagreement among your advisers on:
-3-
Whether and when reprocessing should be used.
The desirability and effectiveness of U.S. attempts to
get other nations to forego reprocessing.
Issues Requiring Your Attention
If you agree that a Presidential response is warranted to
deal with outstanding nuclear policy problems, your decision
is needed on the critical issue of U.S. policy on reprocessing
here and abroad. (Discussed below.)
In addition, your decision will be needed later on specific
initiatives in support of the general policy decision that
you make. Those specific initiatives will be developed in
greater detail and presented for your approval while the
statement is being developed.
Principal Issue - Policy on Acceptability of Reprocessing
Here and Abroad and the Control of Separated Plutonium
All of your advisers agree that some change of current
policies (summarized in Alt. #1, below) on reprocessing
and the control of separated plutonium are needed. They
disagree as to the nature of the change -- largely
because of different views on:
The relative weight given to non-proliferation and other
foreign policy considerations, and on energy and economic
objectives.
The chances of changing significantly the course of
worldwide events leading to reprocessing, a step which
creates the capability for proliferation.
The probable effectiveness of U.S. attempts to use its
diminishing supplier role to deter other nations from
proceeding with reprocessing.
The impact, here and abroad, of a change in U.S. policy
which now assumes that we will proceed with reprocessing
and recycle of plutonium.
Four principal positions on domestic and foreign reprocessing
and alternatives are identified and described below. The
principal variables among the four alternatives are:
-4-
The toughness of our stand against the spread of
reprocessing abroad.
Our attitude toward reprocessing in the U.S. and the
government role in bringing about reprocessing.
The extent of the consistency between our domestic and
foreign policy on reprocessing.
The importance attached to the breeder reactor -- which
is dependent upon reprocessing and plutonium recycle
(though a decision on breeder commercialization is
not scheduled by ERDA until 1986).
Alt. #1. Continue to resist the spread of reprocessing
abroad but with no significant change in policy or
significant new initiatives. Continue current policy
on domestic reprocessing, which assumes reprocessing,
and recycle of plutonium, encourages the development of
a private reprocessing industry, and provides limited
government assistance on reprocessing R&D.
Your statement announcing this position would stress
concern about the spread of international reprocessing,
stress the need to work cooperatively with other nations,
take credit for past U.S. actions and limited efforts
now underway or planned.
In effect, we would be accepting the inevitability of the
spread of reprocessing and not make a major effort to halt
that spread.
Principal arguments for this approach are that:
- Other nations who view us as overreacting to the
risk of proliferation would be reassured of our
steadiness.
- There would be little additional Federal
involvement in reprocessing now.
Principal arguments against this approach are that:
- It does not deal with the currently perceived
threat of proliferation and would be unacceptable
to the Congress and the public.
- Differences in NRC and Executive Branch attitude
would be obvious since NRC almost certainly will
deny some exports that our trading partners expect
under existing agreements for cooperation.
- Uncertainties about domestic reprocessing would
continue.
-5-
Alt, #2. Significantly strengthen efforts to limit the
spread of reprocessing abroad (but accept its inevit-
ability) and to prevent theft and diversion of separated
plutonium -- hopefully in cooperation with other nations,
but with unilateral moves when necessary. Continue
current policy of encouraging development of a domestic
reprocessing industry, with a commitment to assist with
a Federal commercial scale demonstration.
Your statement announcing this policy would stress
concern about the spread of international reprocessing,
highlight the need for major new steps to avoid this
spread and to strengthen safeguards, tighten our export
restrictions, and offer incentives to customers and
suppliers to cooperate. It will also include a greater
Federal role in demonstrating commercial scale reprocessing
in this country and justify domestic reprocessing plans on
the grounds that capacity is needed to understand economics
and safeguards and to provide reprocessing services for
both U.S. and foreign needs.
In effect, you would be accepting this inevitability of
reprocessing but would be moving vigorously to limit
its spread in other countries. Many nations probably
would go along with this position but (a) Brazil and
Pakistan would proceed with plans for major reprocessing
plants, and (b) Germany and France would continue a more
liberal policy toward assisting others to build reprocessing
facilities. Reactor manufacturers in the U.S. would be
concerned about impact on foreign sales but they, and
others, in the U.S. nuclear industry would welcome the
commitment to reprocessing and the plan to resolve uncer-
tainties.
Principal arguments for this approach are:
- Recognizes that reprocessing will likely be
pursued abroad in any event and that there
will be strong pressures for reprocessing
domestically.
- Offers the basis for a reasonable compromise
with other suppliers: Canada favors tougher
stand against reprocessing; the FRG and France
a somewhat more liberal one.
- Would help resolve some uncertainties restraining
the growth of nuclear energy in the U.S.
- Consistent with current domestic policy on
reprocessing.
- Compatible with plans for developing breeder
reactor (which requires plutonium as fuel).
-6--
Principal arguments against this approach are:
- It does not go far enough to meet the expectations
of some critics in Congress and those who believe
that proliferation risks of reprocessing outweigh
energy and economic advantages.
-- Leaves some inconsistency between our negative
attitude towards reprocessing by others and our
own intentions to proceed.
- Further commits the Administration to
reprocessing and recycle while NRC's decision
on this issue is still pending.
- Calls for significant increase in government
role in reprocessing and also involves
government costs for a domestic reprocessing
demonstrations (upwards of $1 billion through
1985) and buy back of foreign fuel (upwards
of $200 million through 1985 and $3 billion
through 2000).
- In effect, it would commit the government to
assist in starting up a $270 million existing
privately owned spent fuel separations facility
at Barnwell, South Carolina, with the potential
charge of "bailing out" a private venture owned
by Allied Chemical, Gulf Oil, and Royal Dutch
Shell.
Alt. #3. Significantly strengthen our efforts to control
the spread of reprocessing abroad, as in Alt. #2, but also
take strong stand that reprocessing should go ahead
domestically and internationally only if safety,
safeguards, and economic benefits can be demonstrated
clearly. No longer assume that reprocessing and recycle
would be acceptable, but proceed with planning and design
activities necessary to bring reprocessing facilities on
line when needed if a decision to proceed with reprocessing
is made. Provide government assistance in a commercial
scale demonstration of reprocessing to resolve uncertainties.
Launch a significant program to explore and develop
alternative ways of getting energy and economic benefits
from spent fuel, if feasible.
Your statement would make clear that non-proliferation
goals take precedence over energy and economics. The
attitude would be sharply different from Alt. #2, and
place burden of proof on those who want to proceed with
reprocessing. It would also stress strongly your concern
-7-
about the spread of international reprocessing and announce
steps to avoid this spread. The reprocessing demonstration
would be justified primarily as an experiment to develop
and demonstrate safeguards.
The potential of getting other nations -- customers and
suppliers -- to take concerns about reprocessing more
seriously would be greater than in Alt. #2. The budget
impact would be about the same as Alt. #2, though the
expenditures supporting the domestic reprocessing experi-
ment might be somewhat less and the expenditures supporting
research into technical alternatives to reprocessing
somewhat more.
Principal arguments for this alternative are:
- Could improve our ability to persuade sensitive
countries such as Korea, Pakistan, Republic
of China and Iran not to acquire reprocessing
facilities by our removing the argument that
we were seeking to deprive them of capabilities
and benefits that we were exploiting ourselves.
- It recognizes clearly the uncertainties with
respect to reprocessing, including the need not
to commit to reprocessing before an NRC decision
on plutonium recycling.
- Reduces the inconsistency between our plans for
going ahead with reprocessing and our opposition
to spread of reprocessing abroad, thus strengthening
our position with supplier and customer nations.
- It would be more favorably received by U.S.
critics of reprocessing than would Alt. #2.
- Provides utilities assurance that either reprocessing
or spent fuel storage will be available when needed.
- It could be presented to industry as the best way of
proceeding and minimizing delays, recognizing current
hostility to reprocessing.
Principal arguments against this alternative are:
- As a very substantial change or reversal in Government
position on reprocessing, it may add additional un-
certainty about nuclear power -- which could slow
nuclear power growth in the U.S.
- Potential reprocessors may withhold further investment
and involvement in reprocessing plants until after the
Government makes a final decision on reprocessing.
- Adds uncertainty to the viability of the breeder,
but a decision on breeder commercialization will
not be made until 1986.
- Highlighting of alternative technologies (which
have not yet been developed) can raise false ex-
pectations that reprocessing is not necessary and
thus lend credence to opponents' arguments against
proceeding even with a reprocessing demonstration.
- General public may view it as a signal that the
government is less sure about safety of nuclear
energy.
Alt. #4. Strongly oppose the use of reprocessing here and
abroad. Commit the government to a major program to
explore and evaluate the feasibility of alternative
technologies for getting energy value from spent fuel
without separating the plutonium. If unsuccessful,
prepare to dispose of spent fuel without regard to the
energy value or possibly reactivate reprocessing at some
later date.
Your statement would make clear that we view reprocessing
as a serious danger, that we are foreswearing reprocessing
and urge others to do so as well. You could offer to
share our results from developing new technologies with
others and work with industry to assure that spent fuel
storage is available, possibly on an international basis.
Principal arguments for this approach are:
- Could improve our ability to persuade sensitive
countries such as Korea, Pakistan, Republic of
China and Iran not to acquire reprocessing
facilities by our removing the argument that
we were seeking to deprive them of capabilities
and benefits that we were exploiting ourselves.
- Would be quite popular with a few members of
Congress, the press and the public.
O
Principal arguments against the approach are:
- Would forego the use of known reprocessing
technology in return for alternatives whose
feasibility have not been demonstrated.
- Would be unlikely to dissuade France, FRG,
United Kingdom, and possible others from
proceeding with current reprocessing plans.
- U.S. private sector reprocessing interests
would fold, utilities might slow down nuclear
reactor orders.
-9-
- This would signal antipathy toward a plutonium
economy and the breeder might have to be dropped
as a long term energy option.
- Government costs for developing alternative
technologies may be as great or greater than
those for demonstrating reprocessing under
Alt. #2 and #3.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISION ON MAJOR POLICY DIRECTION ON
REPROCESSING
Alt. #1 - Continue current policy of resisting
spread of reprocessing abroad; Continue
current policy on domestic reprocessing.
Alt. #2 - Significantly strengthen efforts to
Commerce,
control reprocessing abroad; Continue assuming
Friedersdorf, and encouraging domestic reprocessing, including
Marsh*
the provision of Federal demonstration assistance.
Alt. #3 - Take stand that reprocessing should
State, DOD,
go ahead domestically and abroad only if safety,
ERDA, FEA,
safeguards and economic benefits can be demon-
Stever, Buchen, strated clearly. Strengthen efforts to control
Scowcroft,
reprocessing spread abroad. Assist in domestic
Lynn, Cannon, commercial scale reprocessing demonstration.
Greenspan
Alt. #4 - Strongly oppose the use of reprocessing
ACDA, CEQ,
here and abroad. Mount major program to
EPA**
develop alternative technologies.
Tab A provides comments made by agency officials upon stating
their preference among alternatives. Their full comments on
the Fri Report are at Appendix II.
*Marsh prefers Alt. #2 but would settle for Alt. #3.
**In response to an earlier paper which did not contain
Alternative #3, Russ Train selected the alternative
identified above as Alternative #4. He is out of town
and would like to read this paper before deciding whether
to remain with Alternative #4 or to switch to Alternative #3.
COMMENTS OF AGENCY HEADS UPON
SELECTING THEIR PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE
Deputy Secretary of Defense Ellsworth
"We support Alternative #3 and we support it strongly."
Under Secretary of State Robinson
"The State Department supports Option 3. In contrast to
Option 2, Option 3 would involve an experimental program
using the AGNS facility at Barnwell, but designed to assess
the viability and desirability of both reprocessing and
alternative technologies. This option would not prejudge
the outcome of the program in terms of either a commercial
reprocessing commitment or further development of alterna-
tives. Such a step by step approach would take full account
of the many uncertainties inherent in reprocessing, and
would permit maximum flexibility to capitalize on techno-
logical developments and to support the essential inter-
national dimensions of our nuclear policies. In budgetary
terms, while overall expenditures for a given period could
be comparable to those under Option 2, this experimental
option would also permit maximum flexibility in allocating
funds among the various program components and help avoid
premature commitments to financing commercial-scale projects."
ERDA Administrator Seamans
"I am selecting Option 3 on the basis that a vigorous
demonstration program of reprocessing, fuel fabrication,
plutonium storage, and waste management will ensue.
Only in this way will the program be consistent with our
stated position on the liquid metal fast breeder and our
plans for handling high level nuclear waste. I agree
that we should go ahead with reprocessing only if safety,
safeguards, and economic benefits can be demonstrated
clearly by the immediate design, construction and test of
all elements in the fuel cycle with Government support as
appropriate. This approach will be accepted positively by
the nuclear industry. However, if the option in fact
contemplates years of studies and debate it will have a
severely negative impact domestically and I believe inter-
nationally as well. We can rally support for our plans
and policies only by establishing a positive, understandable
program."
-2-
ACDA Director Ikle
"From an arms control point of view, Alternative 4 clearly
is the preferred one. It would give the strongest signal
at home and abroad that the U.S. will do everything it can
to steer the development of nuclear energy away from tech-
nologies that cause the most serious risks of proliferation.
"However, Alternative 4 is perhaps drawn too starkly, while
Alternative 3 is too close to Alternative 2:
--
We need not 'foreswear' reprocessing; we
only should postpone pushing reprocessing
with major government subsidies. That is
to say, we should cease favoring this
dangerous technology over safer alternatives.
We should not move towards a budgetary
outlay to support the current private
reprocessing ventures, but more evenly
balance the government effort between a
vigorous program to push alternatives and
a scaled-down (i.e., smaller than in
Alternative 2) research effort to reduce
the uncertainties of reprocessing (and to
keep the option open should it be needed
later on). Reprocessing can be postponed
without a significant economic loss.
"In my view, the defect of Alternative 3 is that it still
envisages government assistance in a commercial scale
demonstration of reprocessing. This would be seen at home
and abroad as a rather massive effort in favor of repro-
cessing, and hence sharply detract from the beneficial
political impact of your overall policy decision. It
could become the focus of criticism at home, and be
distorted abroad as a U.S. effort to simply grab the
reprocessing market. It would thus mar your overall
program on non-proliferation."
FEA Administrator Zarb
"Option 3 represents an even-handed position which could
help to defuse some of the current criticism and create
a better environment to move forward. If this Option is
selected, it should be made clear that it does not in any
way indicate that the government is less sure of the safety
of nuclear power.
-3-
"This position also places an added burden on government
to move ahead promptly and properly demonstate the techno-
logies and make timely decisions so that private investment
will be available when it is needed.'
Secretary of Commerce Richardson
Recommends Option 2, with some modification. He recommends
accepting reprocessing as inevitable -- because he thinks
it is -- but at the same time developing, in cooperation
with IAEA, a reprocessing industry which is multilateral.
The Barnwell complex could be the first such plant.
Secretary Richardson argues that this arrangement will
provide the nuclear power industry worldwide with certainty
as to the future development while maximizing assurances
that the critical reprocessing phase will be under inter-
national control.
CEQ Chairman Peterson
"CEQ supports Option 4 but recommends that the effort to
develop alternative nuclear fission technologies should
be accompanied by a major international effort led by
the United States to conserve energy and to develop solar
energy as a major alternate source by early next century."
OSTP Director Guy Stever
"I favor Alternative #3 because it contains the R&D program
which will keep open the options for the future in repro-
cessing and breeder reactor development, and at the same
time recognizes realistically that we do not have the
power in the world nuclear energy picture to force other
nations into constraining the spread of reprocessing
without setting an example ourselves."
nucler
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 22, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JIM CANNON
FROM:
GLENN SCHLEEDE
SUBJECT:
The Egyptian and Israeli Nuclear
Agreements
Brent Scowcroft has asked for our views on the attached
memo to the President, the bottom line of which is Brent's
recommendation that the President submit the proposed
nuclear agreements to the Congress soon.
Briefly, the alternatives are:
1. Submit the agreement now (State).
2. Submit the agreement after disposition of proliferation
bill (NSC).
3. Submit the agreement after disposition of the prolifera-
tion bill and announcement of the President's
nuclear policy (ERDA).
4. Hold the agreements until the next session (Marsh and
Friedersdorf, with alternative 3 as a second choice).
The principal arguments for sending the agreements now
are:
A commitment made to Israel and Egypt that agreement
would be proposed this session.
Allegedly, "skids are greased" for Congressional
approval of the agreements.
These agreements are tougher than any the U.S. has
previously negotiated.
The principal arguments against sending the agreements now
are:
Congress cannot possibly complete action on the agree-
ments this session (the law provides that the agreements
cannot go into effect until a period of 60 legislative
FORD LIBRARY is GERALD
days has passed during which the Congress does not pass
a concurrent resolution of disapproval).
-2-
Prompt action is unlikely because Senator Mansfield
has appointed a committee of senators led by Ribicoff
and Baker to go to the Middle East to study the impact
and introducing commercial nuclear power there.
The agreements do not contain all of the restrictions
that are called for by (1) the proliferation bills no
extant on the Hill or (2) those recommendations by the
Fri study. Thus, the Administration would be in the
position of justifying these agreements on the grounds
that, while they do not contain all the explicit controls,
in total, they provide a rigorous set of controls.
We would be submitting the agreements at a time of great
emotional concern about proliferation legislation.
RECOMMENDATION
I recommend that you express a preference for alternative
4 but agree with alternative 2, if it looks as though we
will solve that issue over the next few days.
[Sept.1976]
DECISION
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JIM CANNON LYNN
BRENT SCOWCROFT July
L.
SUBJECT:
NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR
FUEL LEGISLATION
When you met with Senator Percy and others on September 17,
you stated that you would urge Senator Baker to remove his
hold from the Senate non-proliferation bill if (a) the
NFAA was scheduled for Senate action under a time agreement,
and (b) an acceptable non-proliferation bill was negotiated.
NON-PROLIFERATION
Bob Fri believes he has reached agreement with Percy on
a reasonable bill. Detailed language must be worked out
and Senator Percy must sell the compromise to his colleagues.
Senator Baker is maintaining his hold, but indicates he
will be guided by your wishes. Senator Percy may attempt
to bring up his compromise next week. Even if it passes
the Senate, it is unlikely to pass the House.
Anderson and Price have introduced their non-proliferation
bill (H.R. 15419) -- which ERDA and State believe is
acceptable -- but there is no chance that it will be taken
up by the House.
NUCLEAR FUEL ASSURANCE ACT
Senate Outlook. Today, the NFAA was put on the Senate
calendar for next week but the opponents probably will
try to table it again. Estimate of those opposed now
ranges from three to six (Proxmire, Clark, Durkin,
McGovern, Abourezk and Glenn). Senator Percy insists
that it is not possible to move the NFAA. Industry
and labor supporters of the bill are focusing their
attention on 27 democratic Senators who are known to
-2-
support the bill -- with the objective of getting
Senator Byrd to debate the bill even though there
is opposition. Industry and labor supporters are
contending that Glenn, Abourezk, and McGovern have
or will remove their "holds."
Percy Compromise. Senator Percy has proposed a
compromise approach to uranium enrichment:
1) Dropping the NFAA as it passed the House;
2) Add to his non-proliferation bill, language to:
- Authorize the Portsmouth plant;
- Authorize you to submit a detailed plan for
encouraging the private uranium enrichment
industry, "including a discussion of specific
terms" of proposed cooperative agreements with
private firms. The plan would be referred to
the JCAE and that Committee would have 60 days
to give its views and recommendations to each
House of Congress together with legislation to
implement their recommendations. (Bob Fri
believes this would permit proposing contracts
and authorizing legislation at the same time as
the plan.)
Fri has proposed, but Percy has not accepted, a further
clause that requires an up or down vote on the JCAE
recommendations within 30 legislative days. Fri believes
Percy would push for this clause if you insisted it is
necessary.
Except for the disputed clause, the compromise provides
no new authority. Specifically, authority for Portsmouth
will be provided in the ERDA Authorization Bill even
without the NFAA and you can submit reports, plans,
proposed contracts and draft legislation anytime.
ALTERNATIVES
There are three principal alternatives available for your
consideration:
Alt #1. Hold to the proposal you presented to Senator
Percy and others on September 17, that you would
urge Senator Baker to remove his hold if (a) the
NFAA was scheduled for Senate floor action under
a time agreement, and (b) non-proliferation legis-
lation acceptable to you was negotiated with
Senator Percy and others.
-3-
- Principal arguments for this approach are that:
(a) it is a logical position in that U.S. ability
to get other nations to accept our non-proliferation
goals depends upon our reliability as a supplier
of uranium enrichment services; and (b) it is
consistent with the position you presented to
Senator Percy and others.
- Principal argument against this approach is that
you will be open to the charge of obstructing
non-proliferation legislation and you may not get
the NFAA anyway.
Alt. #2. Endorse the Percy compromise approach which
adds some kind of uranium enrichment provisions
to the non-proliferation bill.
- Principal arguments for this approach are that:
(a) you would be postured in favor of non-
proliferation legislation and willing to
compromise or give in on uranium enrichment,
(b) it ties non-proliferation and at least
some reference to private uranium enrichment
together, and (c) it may be the only chance
of getting any Senate legislation referring
to uranium enrichment this session.
- Principal arguments against this approach are
that: (a) it would remove all possibility of
getting a vote next week on NFAA, and (b) depending
upon the language on uranium enrichment that is
added to the non-proliferation bill, the result
may be less acceptable than merely accepting
defeat of the NFAA for this session and submitting
a new proposal in January.
Alt. #3. Accept the non-proliferation legislation
without any provision for uranium enrichment,
urge Senator Baker to remove his hold, and let
the NFAA live or die this session separately
from non-proliferation.
- Principal arguments for this approach are that
it (a) postures you in favor of non-proliferation
legislation, (b) leaves options open on uranium
enrichment for next session, and (c) puts the
Senate, at least, on record as to appropriate
nuclear export criteria -- a move that may head
off NRC promulgation of less acceptable criteria.
- Principal arguments against this approach are
that it (a) is a reversal of the position you
have taken with the Senators with respect to
the NFAA, and (b) it foregoes whatever gains
-4-
might be achieved if Percy is able to seel the
vote forcing clause on uranium enrichment that
Bob Fri has proposed.
It may be possible to mitigate the negative effects of
holding fast to Alt. #1 by (1) sending a strong letter
on non-proliferation to the Senate, and/or (2) proceeding
promptly with a major statement on non-proliferation.
The critical importance to non-proliferation of expanded
uranium enrichment capacity should be emphasized.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Alt. #1. Maintain hold on non-proliferation
OMB * ,
legislation unless NFAA is taken up.
Alt. #2. Accept Percy compromise.
ERDA, NSC, State **
Alt. #3. Sever relationship between NFAA and
Domestic Council
non-proliferation legislation
*
OMB favors Alt. #1 with the mitigating step outlined
above. OMB notes that the Fri cluase on uranium
enrichment provides very little unless it permits
ERDA to sign contracts if Congress fails to act.
** If Alt. #2 cannot be accomplished, Alt. #3 would be
the backup recommendation of NSC and State.
[Sept_1976]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECISION
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JIM CANNON
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR
FUEL LEGISLATION
When you met with Senator Percy and others on September 17,
you stated that you would urge Senator Baker to remove his
hold from the Senate non-proliferation bill if (a) the
NFAA was scheduled for Senate action under a time agreement
and (b) an acceptable non-proliferation bill was negotiated.
NON-PROLIFERATION
Bob Fri believes he has reached agreement with Percy on
a reasonable bill. Detailed language must be worked out
and Senator Percy must sell the compromise to his colleagues.
Senator Baker is maintaining his hold, but indicates he
will be guided by your wishes. Senator Percy may attempt
to bring up his compromise next week. Even if it passes
the Senate, it is unlikely to pass the House.
Anderson and Price have introduced their non-proliferation
bill (H. R. 15419) -- which ERDA and State believe is
acceptable -- but there is no chance that it will be taken
up by the House.
NUCLEAR FUEL ASSURANCE ACT
Senate Outlook. Estimate of "holds" now range from
three to six (Proxmire, Clark, Durkin, McGovern,
Abourezk, and Glenn). Senator Percy insists that it
is not possible to move the NFAA. Industry and labor
supporters of the bill are focusing their attention
on 27 democratic Senators who are known to support
the bill -- with the objective of getting Senator Byrd
to schedule the bill even though some holds remain.
FORD LIBRARY is GERALD
-2-
Industry and labor supporters are contending that Glenn,
Abourezk, and McGovern have or will remove their holds.
Percy compromise. Senator Percy has proposed a
compromise approach to uranium enrichment:
1) Dropping the NFAA as it passed the House;
2) Add to his non-proliferation bill language to:
- Authorize the Portsmouth plant;
- Authorize you to prepare a detailed plan for
moving to a private uranium enrichment industry,
including the specific terms of cooperative
agreements with private firms. The plan would
be referred to the JCAE and that Committee would
have 60 days to give its views and recommendations
on your proposal to each House of Congress
together with legislation to implement their
recommendations.
This provides nothing new. Authority for Portsmouth
will be provided in the ERDA Authorization Bill
even without the NFAA. Other authority is already
available.
Alternatives
There are three principal alternatives available for
your consideration:
-- Alt. #1. Hold to the proposal you presented to
Senator Percy and others on September 17, that
you would urge Senator Baker to remove his
hold if (a) the NFAA was scheduled for Senate
floor action under a time agreement, and
(b) non-proliferation legislation acceptable
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
to you was negotiated with Senator Percy and
others.
- Principal arguments for this approach are that:
(a) it is a logical position in that U.S. ability
to get other nations to accept our non-proliferation
goals depends upon our reliability as a supplier
of uranium enrichment services; and (b) it is
consistent with the position you presented
to Senator Percy and others.
- Principal argument against this approach is that
you will be open to the charge of obstructing
non-proliferation legislation and you would not
get the NFAA anyway.
- 3 -
-- Alt. #2. Endorse the Percy compromise approach which
adds some kind of uranium enrichment provisions
to the non-proliferation bill.
- Principal arguments for this approach are that:
(a) you would be postured in favor of non-
proliferation legislation and willing to accept
a compromise on uranium enrichment, (b) it ties
non-proliferation and uranium enrichment
together, and (c) it may be the only chance
of getting any Senate legislation dealing with
uranium enrichment this session.
- Principal argument against this approach is
that, depending upon the language on uranium
enrichment that is added to the non-proliferation
bill, the result may be less acceptable than
merely accepting defeat of the NFAA for this
session and submitting a new proposal in
January.
-- Alt. #3. Accept the non-proliferation legislation,
urge Senator Baker to remove his hold, and
give up for this session on the NFAA.
- Principal arguments for this approach are that
it (a) postures you in favor of non-proliferation
legislation, (b) provides the opportunity to
reiterate the importance of the NFAA and leaves
options open on uranium enrichment for next
session, and (c) puts the Senate, at least, on
record as to appropriate nuclear export criteria,
probably heading off NRC promulgation of less
acceptable criteria.
- Principal arguments against this approach are
that it (a) is a reversal of the position you
have taken with the Senators, and (b) it
foregoes whatever gains might be achieved
in the uranium enrichment language attached
to the Percy non-proliferation bill.
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
I 4 -
It may be possible to mitigate the negative effects of
holding fast to Alt. #1 by (1) Sending a strong letter
on Non-Proliferation to the senate, and/or (2) proceeding
promptly with a major statement on non-proliferation.
There is a strong rumor that Governor Carter is considering
a statement on non-proliferation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Alt. #1. Maintain hold on non-proliferation
legislation unless NFAA is taken up.
Alt. #2. Accept Percy compromise
Alt. #3. Sever relationship between NFAA
and non-proliferation legislation.
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
DECISION
file
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
9/24/76
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT July
JIM CANNON JIM LYNN
SUBJECT:
NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR
FUEL LEGISLATION
When you met with Senator Percy and others on September 17,
you stated that you would urge Senator Baker to remove his
hold from the Senate non-proliferation bill if (a) the
NFAA was scheduled for Senate action under a time agreement,
and (b) an acceptable non-proliferation bill was negotiated.
NON-PROLIFERATION
Bob Fri believes he has reached agreement with Percy on
a reasonable bill. Detailed language must be worked out
and Senator Percy must sell the compromise to his colleagues.
Senator Baker is maintaining his hold, but indicates he
will be guided by your wishes. Senator Percy may attempt
to bring up his compromise next week. Even if it passes
the Senate, it is unlikely to pass the House.
Anderson and Price have introduced their non-proliferation
bill (H.R. 15419) -- which ERDA and State believe is
acceptable -- but there is no chance that it will be taken
up by the House.
NUCLEAR FUEL ASSURANCE ACT
Senate Outlook. Today, the NFAA was put on the Senate
calendar for next week but the opponents probably will
try to table it again. Estimate of those opposed now
ranges from three to six (Proxmire, Clark, Durkin,
McGovern, Abourezk and Glenn). Senator Percy insists
that it is not possible to move the NFAA. Industry
and labor supporters of the bill are focusing their
attention on 27 democratic Senators who are known to
FORD LIBRARY & GERALD
support the bill -- with the objective of getting
Senator Byrd to debate the bill even though there
is opposition. Industry and labor supporters are
contending that Glenn, Abourezk, and McGovern have
or will remove their "holds."
Percy Compromise. Senator Percy has proposed a
compromise approach to uranium enrichment:
1) Dropping the NFAA as it passed the House;
2) Add to his non-proliferation bill, language to:
- Authorize the Portsmouth plant;
- Authorize you to submit a detailed plan for
encouraging the private uranium enrichment
industry, "including a discussion of specific
terms" of proposed cooperative agreements with
private firms. The plan would be referred to
the JCAE and that Committee would have 60 days
to give its views and recommendations to each
House of Congress together with legislation to
implement their recommendations. (Bob Fri
believes this would permit proposing contracts
and authorizing legislation at the same time as
the plan.)
Fri has proposed, but Percy has not accepted, a further
clause that requires an up or down vote on the JCAE
recommendations within 30 legislative days. Fri believes
Percy would push for this clause if you insisted it is
necessary.
Except for the disputed clause, the compromise provides
no new authority. Specifically, authority for Portsmouth
will be provided in the ERDA Authorization Bill even
without the NFAA and you can submit reports, plans,
proposed contracts and draft legislation anytime.
ALTERNATIVES
There are three principal alternatives available for your
consideration:
Alt #1. Hold to the proposal you presented to Senator
Percy and others on September 17, that you would
urge Senator Baker to remove his hold if (a) the
NFAA was scheduled for Senate floor action under
a time agreement, and (b) non-proliferation legis-
lation acceptable to you was negotiated with
Senator Percy and others.
- Principal arguments for this approach are that:
(a) it is a logical position in that U.S. ability
to get other nations to accept our non-proliferation
goals depends upon our reliability as a supplier
of uranium enrichment services; and (b) it is
consistent with the position you presented to
Senator Percy and others.
- Principal argument against this approach is that
you will be open to the charge of obstructing
non-proliferation legislation and you may not get
the NFAA anyway.
Alt. #2. Endorse the Percy compromise approach which
adds some kind of uranium enrichment provisions
to the non-proliferation bill.
- Principal arguments for this approach are that:
(a) you would be postured in favor of non-
proliferation legislation and willing to
compromise or give in on uranium enrichment,
(b) it ties non-proliferation and at least
some reference to private uranium enrichment
together, and (c) it may be the only chance
of getting any Senate legislation referring
to uranium enrichment this session.
- Principal arguments against this approach are
that: (a) it would remove all possibility of
getting a vote next week on NFAA, and (b) depending
upon the language on uranium enrichment that is
added to the non-proliferation bill, the result
may be less acceptable than merely accepting
defeat of the NFAA for this session and submitting
a new proposal in January.
Alt. #3. Accept the non-proliferation legislation
without any provision for uranium enrichment,
urge Senator Baker to remove his hold, and let
the NFAA live or die this session separately
from non-proliferation.
- Principal arguments for this approach are that
it (a) postures you in favor of non-proliferation
legislation, (b) leaves options open on uranium
enrichment for next session, and (c) puts the
Senate, at least, on record as to appropriate
nuclear export criteria -- a move that may head
off NRC promulgation of less acceptable criteria.
- Principal arguments against this approach are
that it (a) is a reversal of the position you
have taken with the Senators with respect to
the NFAA, and (b) it foregoes whatever gains
might be achieved if Percy is able to seel the
vote forcing clause on uranium enrichment that
Bob Fri has proposed.
It may be possible to mitigate the negative effects of
holding fast to Alt. #1 by (1) sending a strong letter
on non-proliferation to the Senate, and/or (2) proceeding
promptly with a major statement on non-proliferation.
The critical importance to non-proliferation of expanded
uranium enrichment capacity should be emphasized.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Alt. #1. Maintain hold on non-proliferation
OMB *
legislation unless NFAA is taken up.
Alt. #2. Accept Percy compromise.
ERDA, NSC, State **
Alt. #3. Sever relationship between NFAA and
Domestic Council
non-proliferation legislation
*
OMB favors Alt. #1 with the mitigating step outlined
above. OMB notes that the Fri cluase on uranium
enrichment provides very little unless it permits
ERDA to sign contracts if Congress fails to act.
If Alt. #2 cannot be accomplished, Alt. #3 would be
the backup recommendation of NSC and State.
Every
THE WHITE HOUSE
Request
WASHINGTON
September 27, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JIM CANNON
FROM:
GLENN SCHLEEDE
SUBJECT:
WORK PLAN
Here is a copy of the draft "work plan"
suggested by Bob Fri. We have discontinued
work on this particular effort -- at least
temporarily -- because:
-- it did not appear to be a useful decision
document, and
-- we began work on the fact sheet and
statement which seem to provide better
vehicles for sorting out the issues.
07
Tab C to Bob's draft memo is the most useful
document, but all aspects of that have not
been agreed to.
With respect to Tab B, OMB has gone beyond
this formulation in their work on the fact
sheet.
Attachment
FORD LIBRARY & DERALD
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Work Plan for Implementing Your
Nuclear Policy
In addition to the major options on the US stance on nuclear
reprocessing (already presented to you), the Fri report recommends
a number of initiatives in which the agencies and your senior
advisers generally concur. However, more work is required to:
(a) determine how best to frame certain initiatives for a
Presidential message on nuclear policy; (b) prepare detailed
program, budget, and legislative material; and (c) begin the
process of refining and implementing the recommendations.
Accordingly, this memorandum requests your approval of a
directive to initiate this work.
The work to be accomplished is set forth in Tabs A, B, and
c, as follows:
1. Tab A describes the international initiatives recommended
for inclusion in a message. The State Department should alert
several other countries that we are considering these initiatives
and should join ERDA in advising key Congressional leaders of your
intentions before the message. If these consultations surface
any serious adverse reactions, these would be drawn to your
attention and your message would be shaped accordingly. In
QUERLA FORD LIBRARY
-2-
his comments on the Fri report, Secretary Kissinger requested
your approval of the necessary international contacts.
2. Tab B describes the work needed to shape the domestic
reprocessing initiative for your message, and to prepare detailed
program and budget proposals for your consideration in formulating
your FY 1978 budget.
3. Tab C contains a consolidated list of assignments that
should be completed to develop a message and to prepare for
implementation of the recommendations of the Fri report. If issues
requiring your decision arise as this work progresses, they will be
presented to you.
If you approve of this work plan, Tabs A, B, And C will be
sent to the appropriate agencies with a directive to take the
actions you have endorsed.
Approve
Disapprove
FORD LIBRARY & GENALD
TAB A
INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES TO BE
DISCUSSED, IN PRINCIPLE WITH OTHER STATES
The Fri report recommends several major international
initiatives, that could be incorporated in a Presidential nuclear
policy message. The Secretary of State has recommended certain
consultations take place before the message is delivered.
Consultation with other states on several of the initiatives
should proceed, to at least alert them that the initiatives might
figure importantly in an overall address the President might
present on US nuclear policy, and, within the time constraints
involved, to reflect the results of these consultations in the
message. Proposals on which consultations should proceed are
outlined below.
Strengthening IAEA Safeguards
IAEA safeguards are a key element in US nonproliferation
strategy but require material strengthening. Other nations
should be alerted that the President will announce the
commitment of additional US technical support to IAEA by:
Offering to establish dedicated groups at one
or two ERDA laboratories to support the IAEA
inspectorate;
Sponsoring safeguards demonstrations in the US
with IAEA participation.
From a longer-term standpoint, State, ERDA, and ACDA
should:
Explore promptly whether more effective IAEA
procedures and rights for surveillance during
construction and shutdown periods are warranted
and negotiable;
Furnish proposals for expanding the
safeguard resources, including manpower, that
are available to IAEA.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-2-
Relatedly, states should be informed that the U.S. will
continue to press for more timely information to gauge the
effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. Also, should it be necessary
to assure the effective safeguarding of sensitive facilities,
the U.S. will reserve the right to supplement IAEA inspectors
with a US presence.
Storage of Excess Spent Fuel and Separated Plutonium Under IAEA
Auspices
The United States has proposed to the IAEA Secretariat and
other suppliers that the IAEA activate a regime under which such
excess stocks of spent fuel and plutonium would be deposited,
temporarily, in IAEA repositories, pending actual need. Title to
the material would remain with the state, and it would be returned
only in quantities justified by prompt use.
To be successful, broad support of the concept will be
needed from supplier and consumer states. The President intends
to: (a) give the concept strong public support; (b) announce
that the US, in principle, is prepared to donate a special
grant to the IAEA (if needed) for the purpose of helping establish
the regime, and to offer to provide a US storage site; and (c)
state that henceforth, consumer state willingness, in principle,
to participate in such will be a US criterion for concluding new
and amended US agreements.
To ensure that the initiative is not perceived as unfairly
discriminatory, the President intends to announce that, in
principle, the US would be prepared to place its own excess
civil designated spent fuel and separated plutonium in IAEA
depositories pending a US need, if a generally satisfactory and
broadly adhered to regime can be developed and established.
It is recognized that details of a storage regime may
require several months to establish. Thus, some might argue
that a US pledge to participate is premature. Nevertheless,
without strong US leadership, it is doubtful whether others
will join, and it is believed the US, in any case, will have
the dominant voice in shaping the structure. However, a US
pledge to participate could put pressure on the UK, France and
others to follow with similar offers. For this reason the
State Department should consult promptly with these and other
countries beforehand. State and ERDA also should consult with
key Congressional leaders to verify that there would be no
serious opposition to the above proposals.
FORD LIBRARY & GENALD
-3-
Restraints to be Applied to US Agreements
US agreements for cooperation typically are of a long-term
nature. We have them with states party and not party to the
NPT. The Indian nuclear explosion created pressure to toughen
our conditions in new agreements, by seeking, inter alia, veto
rights regarding where US supplied nuclear fuel or fuel employed
in US supplied reactors can be reprocessed; assurances that
adequate physical security measures will apply; and assurance
that US-supplied material or facilities not be used in any nuclear
explosive including those for so-called peaceful purposes.
The Fri report recommends some tightening in our overall
terms. However, it strongly cautions against having the US
proceed too far unilaterally, favoring an approach under which
we would seek to tighten existing agreements through negotiation
rather than through unilateral means.
The President intends to announce this overall approach.
To this end the State Department is instructed to alert appropriate
nations of the approach, and that the US plans to apply the
following criteria in negotiating new or amended agreements and
will work to achieve common supplier acceptance of them:
1. Reaffirm the London Suppliers Guidelines (restraints
over retransfer of material, replication of technology,
and physical security) as a minimum requirement.
2. Adhere, in addition to the above minimum requirement,
to the following publicly-articulated criteria to be
considered in review of new and amended agreements:
a. Whether nonweapon recipients are NPT parties
or are clearly planning to adhere to the Treaty,
or are prepared to submit all of their nuclear
facilities to safeguards.
b. Whether they are prepared to foreswear or postpone
for a substantial period the establishment of
national reprocessing or enrichment activities, or
(for nations having these capabilities) are prepared
to consciously shape and schedule their reprocessing
and enriching facilities to foster nonproliferation
goals by delaying until economic needs are real
and by satisfying the requirements of others by
accepting spent fuel for reprocessing through a
multinational or binational approach.
BERALD R. LIBRARY FORD
-4-
C.
Whether they are prepared, in principle, to
participate in an international storage regime
under which excess spent fuel and separated
plutonium would be placed in IAEA custody pending
use.
It would be understood that departures from these standards
would require the President's personal approval.
It is recognized that the problem of public presentation
of these criteria will be difficult, particularly given our
need to preserve flexibility to deal with non-NPT countries
(notably Egypt and Israel) in selected cases when it is in our
nonproliferation interest. It is believed this problem can be
resolved in the preparation of the final text of the Presidential
message.
Sanctions
The State Department should alert other nations that the
President plans to state a sanctions policy, as described below.
Selected other nations (especially suppliers) should be urged to
make similar announcements or to adopt comparable public policies.
1. For its part, the United States would regard any material
violation of a nuclear safeguards agreement, such as a
detected diversion, to be an extremely serious affront
to the world community.
2. Any further nuclear proliferation, regardless of whether
it is under the guise of developing a peaceful nuclear
explosive device, would undoubtedly greatly enhance global
and regional instability and bring the world closer to a
nuclear holocaust.
3. Accordingly, if any state materially violated a safeguards
agreement to which we are a party, we would, as a minimum,
immediately cut off our nuclear fuel supply and cooperation.
FORD LIBRARY is SERVID
Moreover, regardless of whether we, ourselves, are a party
to a safeguards agreement, we would judge a material one
with the IAEA, to be of such grievous concern to warrant
immediate reexamination and broad consultations with all
suppliers and consumers to discuss the nature of the
punitive or remedial actions that should be taken collectivel
As part of our longer-range work program, the State Department
should:
1. Seek supplier agreement to press for an IAEA decision to
direct the curtailment or suspension of nuclear assistance
to a state violating Agency safeguards;
-5-
2. Seek a multilateral agreement to suspend or terminate
cooperation with any additional nonnuclear weapons state
hereafter acquiring or testing a nuclear device regard-
less of whether a safeguards violation is involved;
3. Systematically reinforce its position on sanctions in
its contacts with other nations.
Incentives
The Fri report proposes new policies to encourage other nations
to accept the US view of reprocessing and export restraints:
Consumer Incentives
Offer to nations (those outside Europe and Japan and
preferably NPT parties) that accept our conditions on
reprocessing an opportunity for the US to acquire their
spent fuel, with compensation in cash or fresh, low-
enriched fuel. This buy-back option probably would be
exercised only sparingly, mainly in sensitive areas. In
other areas, reprocessing would be permitted in a few
binational/multinational facilities or such services
could be performed by supplier states.
Offer to these nations technical assistance in arranging
for spent fuel storage in the US or overseas, in
anticipation of the IAEA storage regime.
Extend an offer for immediate fuel exchange at a negotiated
price to nations in highly sensitive areas (India,
being the prime example).
Assure, for nations accepting our restraints policy,
enrichment supply under USG guarantee, subject to capacity
limits, covering both regular enrichment services and
additional services required to implement our fuel exchange
agreements. This assurance would extend to private sector
enrichment plants, in which these nations would be invited
to invest.
Supplier Incentives
Offer tie-in arrangements, particularly to France and FRG,
whereby the USG would guarantee enrichment services at
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
-6-
nondiscriminatory prices to their reactor customers and/or
offer separative work contract opportunities to European
enrichers in connection with US reactor sales if they move
significantly closer to our general constraints policy on
reprocessing. This guarantee could be subject to capacity
limits, and would be couched in terms assuming private
enrichment.
If interest is expressed in such arrangements, invite
suppliers' (as well as consumers') investment in US
private sector enrichment plants in return for assured
supply for tie-in sales.
Seek binational arrangements with Japan leading to
jointly sponsored reprocessing of their fuel at a
mutually agreeable time, and encourage European suppliers
to pursue the United Reprocessors venture (France,
Germany, UK) as a model for multinational plants.
The Department of State is instructed:
To alert other interested countries on a selective
basis of these new policies in very general terms
stressing that they are compatible with positions we
have expressed in the London Suppliers Group.
Stress our interest in evolving our specific terms
and conditions in a collaborative manner with other
suppliers under terms that will avoid our creating any
impression that we are seeking a commercial advantage
unduly.
Tailor the approaches to the FRG, France, Germany and
Japan to above recommendations, but without attempting
to get into detailed negotiations at this juncture.
State and ERDA are also instructed to communicate in a general
way, to other suppliers, our desire to develop an arrangement with
other suppliers for neutralizing competition for fuel cycle services
and facilities. One possible approach favored by the State
Department would be that the US should publicly favor the establish-
ment of a "bank" or "pool" of supplier enrichment and reprocessing
services to meet the needs of other nations. It has been decided
that this idea requires further study before detailed presentation
to other countries, and such internal study should proceed
immediately.
GERALD LIBRARY R. FORD
-7-
Finally, State should pursue a two-year moratorium among
suppliers on transfers of sensitive technology. Should the
President decide to publicly endorse a moratorium, the State
Department will be instructed to hold advance consultations with
other suppliers known to favor a confidential approach.
Uranium Enrichment
Effective implementation of a tougher US stance on
nonproliferation, as outlined in the Fri report, is highly
dependent on perceptions of the US as a stable and reliable supplier
of enriched uranium.
It is anticipated that the Presidential message will include
a strong statement underscoring determination of the US to remain
a reliable supplier, with the specific phrasing dependent on the
then current status of the Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act.
Physical Security
The Fri report notes that the US is the world leader in
promoting effective physical protection, and the principal nuclear
suppliers have recently agreed, as a matter of national export
policy, to require of customers adequate physical security. An
international convention on physical protection has been discussed
with interested countries, with lukewarm response.
On the whole, the report concludes that this is an area
where reasonable progress is being made. The President intends
to announce that the US will continue to press for upgrading
standards worldwide. Accordingly, as part of the longer-range
work program, the State Department, ERDA and other interested
agencies should:
Pursue the international convention on physical
security to the extent of taking diligent soundings
about the real prospects of broad international
support, recognizing that foreign interest only
is moderate.
Continue to promote broad collaboration on developing
and implementing physical security measures (for
example, seek to develop close association with the
European Community to encourage common nuclear
standards).
GERALO FORD LIBRARY
-8-
Nonnuclear Technology Incentives
Collaboration on nonnuclear and advanced energy technologies
should be focused on nations that are prepared to accept our
policy on nuclear export restraints. In particular, benefits
could be achieved near-term by providing selected countries
with: (a) assistance in energy systems analysis and assessment
of energy development strategies; and (b) technological help
in developing indigenous fossil energy resources.
As part of the longer-range program, ERDA and the Department
of State should undertake a joint, detailed review of the new
international cooperative possibilities in these areas, emphasizing
countries of proliferation concern, with a report of action
recommendations to be made to the President in ninety days.
FORD is LIBRARY AERALD
TAB B
DOMESTIC REPROCESSING INITIATIVE
The President has approved as U.S. policy that reprocessing
should proceed only if safety, safeguards, and economic benefits
can be demonstrated clearly. To implement this policy, we will
undertake appropriate technological demonstrations subject to the
following guidelines:
Planning and design of demonstration facilities
are to proceed as necessary to bring reprocessing
on line when needed, if a decision to proceed with
reprocessing is made.
Nonproliferation goals will weigh heavily in the
final decision, along with energy and economic
considerations.
Government assistance in commercial-scale
demonstration of reprocessing will be provided
to resolve uncertainties.
A significant program will be launched to
develop alternative ways to obtain energy and
economic benefits from spent fuel.
General Approach
The following general approach will be followed to implement
the domestic reprocessing initiative:
The President will announce the general U.S. intention
to undertake a major program to assess reprocessing
economics, safeguards, and safety; demonstrate technology,
including waste treatment; and assess alternative
technologies.
International participation will be invited in the
domestic reprocessing demonstration program.
Part of demonstration capacity may be used to serve
foreign reprocessing needs.
Specific requirements for facilities and RD&D
programs will be evaluated and announced in the
fiscal 1978 budget.
Development of spent fuel storage facilities in
the private sector will be encouraged.
FORD LIBRARY is 03RV70
-2-
Implementation Issues
The following are major issues to be resolved in design of
the domestic reprocessing demonstration program:
In what time period will a decision be possible
regarding proceeding with reprocessing and
recycle, given regulatory and technical uncertainties?
How can negative impacts on industry, international
initiatives to contain the spread of reprocessing,
and development of breeder reactor technology be
minimized?
What type and size demonstration facilities are
required to resolve uncertainties?
What role should the existing AGNS facility play and
under what cost-sharing criteria?
What criteria apply to international (IAEA, Japanese
and United Reprocessors) participation?
Implementation Tasks
To be completed by September 25, 1976:
ERDA will evaluate the time period in which the
US would be able to decide on the acceptability
of reprocessing in the US. Impacts to be considered
include: decision dates of private reprocessing
industry; utilities' plans; reaction of nuclear
critics.
ERDA will determine the specific steps required to
develop program and budget proposals for decision
in the FY 1978 budget cycle.
ERDA will provide suggested responses to questions
(expected after the message is delivered) related to
the above issues.
To be completed by October 31, 1976:
State, with ERDA support, will recommend principles
for negotiating foreign participation.
GERALD R. LIBRARY FORD
-3-
State, With ERDA and ACDA support, will establish
a working relationship with IAEA to develop joint
safeguards demonstrations in US facilities.
ERDA, with NRC consultation, will evaluate implementation
strategies in light of GESMO uncertainties.
ERDA, with NRC consultation, will recommend whether
licenses should be sought for demonstration facilities.
ERDA will establish criteria for private sector
cost-sharing and management participation (including
foreign) in the demonstrations.
To be completed by December 31, 1976:
ERDA will negotiate with private participants the
cost-sharing arrangements for demonstration facilities
to be built by USG.
State, with ERDA support, will open negotiations
to ascertain Japanese and United Reprocessors interest
in participating in US demonstrations.
ERDA will prepare detailed plans for use of AGNS
facility, including, as appropriate, reacquiring land
and building facilities for plutonium conversion and
storage, mixed oxide fabrication prototype, and
waste solidification.
ERDA will prepare a program for assessment of
alternative technologies for obtaining energy and
economic value from spent fuel.
OMB, with ERDA and State, will evaluate and recommend
FY 78 budget for the domestic demonstrations program.
FORD LIBRARY & CERALD
TAB C
TASK ASSIGNMENTS
The attached tables present a consolidated list of
assignments for work to be completed in three time periods-
by September 25, 1976; by December 31, 1976; and by March 31,
1977. The tables:
Describe the actions required. In many cases, these
actions are described in Tabs A and B, and are
incorporated by reference in the tables. Otherwise,
a short statement of the action needed is given.
Refer to the appropriate section of the Fri report
for background.
Assign responsibility.
It is expected that the responsible agencies will report
the results of the action taken to the NSC, the Domestic Council,
and the OMB by the date indicated.
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
1. Actions To Be Completed Before September 25, 1976
Action
Reference
Responsibility
A. Prepare message
-
White House
B. Undertake advance consultations
See Tab A
See Tab A
C. Q and A on domestic reprocessing
initiative
See Tab B
See Tab B
D. Prepare Ω and A on application
-
of new policy to India, Taiwan,
Egypt, and Israel
NSC
E. Develop recommendations on
public announcement of two-
See Tab A;
year moratorium
Fri report, p. 23
State
GERNED LIBRARY ? FORD
2. Actions To Be Completed Before December 31, 1976
Reference in
Initiative
Fri Report
Action Required
Responsibility
A. Safeguards demonstrations
Pages 10,
See Tab B
See Tab B
with IAEA
D6-7
B. More effective IAEA
procedures for surveillance
during construction and
shutdown
Page 10
See Tab A
See Tab A
C.
Supplement IAEA resources
Pages 10,
See Tab A
See Tab A
D 8-9
D.
"Sister" laboratories
Pages 10
Develop
ERDA, State
for the IAEA
D 8-9
specific proposal
E. Sanctions
Pages 13-14
See Tab A
See Tab A
F.
Incentives
Pages 21-22
See Tab A
See Tab A
G. Reprocessing demonstration
Pages 29-31,
See Tab B
See Tab B
H 1-2
H. Assured enrichment supply
Page 23
Develop options
ERDA, State
for increasing
assurance of U.S.
supply upon final
action on NFAA
SERALD
R.
FORD
LIBRARY
2. Actions To Be Completed Before December 31, 1976 (Cont'd)
Reference in
Initiative
Fri Report
Action Required
Responsibility
I. Proliferation intelligence
Pages 34-35
Recommended
DCI, DOD, State,
program
ERDA, ACDA
J. Nonnuclear technology
Pages 33-34
See Tab A
See Tab A
K. Waste management
Pages 33,
Develop
OMB
I 2-4
detailed schedules
and organizations
GERALD
R.
FORD
LIBRARY
3. Actions To Be Completed Before March 31, 1976
Reference in
Initiative
Fri Report
Action Required
Responsibility
A. Upgrading existing
Page 17
Develop
State
agreements for
negotiating plan
cooperation
B. IAEA storage regime
Pages 8-9
Develop detailed
State, ERDA
proposal
C. Neutralize fuel cycle
Page 22
See Tab A
See Tab A
competition
D. Physical security
Pages 10-11
See Tab A
See Tab A
E. Nuclear policy
organization
Page 35
Recommend
NSC, Domestic
action, if any
Council, OMB
BIERALD
R
FORD
LIBRARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 27, 1976
MEETING ON NUCLEAR POLICY
Tuesday, September 28, 1976
10:30 a.m. (30 minutes)
The Cabinet Room
From: James E. Connor
I. PURPOSE:
To permit Bob Fri briefly to review the nuclear policy paper
and to elicit comments from those agency and department
heads who may have some strong views on the subject.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN:
A. Background: At your direction, Bob Fri directed a
six-week study of nuclear policy. The study was
recently completed and a memorandum on the subject
was submitted to you on September 15th from Jim Lynn,
Jim Cannon and Brent Scowcroft.
B. Participants: Attached at Tab A.
C. Press Plan: No announcement to the press. David
Kennerly photo only.
III. TALKING POINTS:
Attached at Tab B.
Participants in Meeting on Nuclear Policy
September 28, 1976 (10:30 am)
Robert Fri, Deputy Administrator, ERDA
Charles W. Robinson, Deputy Secretary of State
William P. Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense (for Secretary Rumsfeld,
who is out of the city)
Under Secretary of Commerce, Edward Vetter (for Secretary Richardson
who has speaking engagements out of the city)
Frank Zarb, Administrator, FEA
Russell Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
Robert Seamans, Administrator, ERDA
Fred Ikle, Director, Arms Control and Disarament Agency
James Lynn, Director, Office of Management and Budget
James Cannon, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
James Connor, Secretary to the Cabinet
MEETING ON NUCLEAR POLICY
September 28, 1976 (10:30 am)
TALKING POINTS
1.
All of your departments and agencies have participated in the
comprehensive study directed by Bob Fri regarding nuclear
policy. I want to thank each of you for your participation and
compliment you, particularly Bob Fri, on the quality of your
effort. I have asked Bob briefly to review the study and the
broad options before us. I will then open up the floor for
discussion. Bob,
2.
[At close of the meeting] Thank you all for your views. You
will have my decision shortly.
3.
Again, let me thank you for the effort you have all put
into this study and for being here today.
9/30/76
NON-PROLIFERATION MESSAGE
The promise of nuclear power is great indeed. Nuclear power is
central to the energy independence of many countries. Its wise use
can afford all people an unprecedented opportunity for economic well
being, and protection from those who would use their energy resources
for political purposes.
But we know that we cannot realize the promise of nuclear power
unless we are prepared to deal forthrightly and effectively with its
risks. The risks, like the promise, are great.
Nuclear fuel, once it has been burned to produce power, contains
plutonium. By the relatively simple technique of chemical reprocessing,
this plutonium can be separated and made available to generate additional
power. But the same plutonium, when separated in its pure form, is the
stuff of nuclear explosives. The world community simply cannot afford
to let this dangerous material fall into irresponsible hands.
We must face both the promise and risk of nuclear power. We
must strive to satisfy each nation's legitimate interest in nuclear power
production. But we must also realize that we are all in danger unless
we can insure that nations renounce the explosive uses of the atom,
place adequate controls over the generation and storage of plutonium,
and secure this dangerous materi al against the threat of theft and
diversion.
-2-
During the past two years, no issue has been of greater concern
to me, nor the subject of more intense effort on the part of my
Administration. And we have made remarkable progress in reducing
the threat of nuclear proliferation.
We have taken vigorous steps to slow the spread of plutonium
reprocessing. Our stands in opposing reprocessing in Taiwan and Korea
have been firm and successful. We have negotiated agreements for
nuclear cooperation with Israel and Egypt that are models of restraint
in nuclear cooperation. We have offered to buy back spent nuclear fuel
from India to ensure against its unwise use, and I believe this offer will
be accepted.
Early in my Administration I became concerned that some nuclear
supplier countries were becoming tempted to offer less rigorous safeguards
requirements to potential customers in order to increase their
competitive advantage. I directed the Secretary of State to explore ways
of limiting this dangerous form of competition. The first nuclear
suppliers conference was convened quietly in London in April 1975. Since
then there have been five more meetings plus a host of bilateral sessions.
The results have been gratifying.
We have developed tighter new guidelines to govern nuclear exports --
the first undertaking of its kind. I have adoped these guidelines as U.S.
policy for nuclear exports.
-3-
I have met repeatedly with Members of Congress to hammer out
new legislation on nuclear proliferation. With the particular help of
Senators Percy and Pastore, and Representatives Anderson and
Price, we have agreed on realistic, constructive and imaginative
proposals.
I have proposed legislation that would allow the United States to
retain its position as a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel without imposing
enormous burdens on the taxpayers. The House passed, but the Senate
did not act on this legislation and, in so doing, contributed to a weakening
of our nonproliferation policies. I will continue to press for thi proposal.
We have also shaped our domesti C program with a careful eye to
nuclear safety and nonproliferation. We have deferred for ten years
a decision to place the breeder reactor in commercial operation, in
part because we must prove its safety.
Similarly, I have increased by four fold my budget for our program
to dispose of nuclear waste. We expect to demonstrate a full size waste
depository by 1985. I have recently directed, however, a speed up
of the program to demonstrate the components of waste disposal technology
by the end of 1978. I have also directed that the first repository be submitted fo
licensing by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure its safety
and acceptability to the ptb lic.
-4-
Despite the steps already taken -- steps that give us the strongest
nonproliferation stance this country has ever had -- I recently ordered
a fullscale review of our entire policy in this area. I received the
results of this review before Labor Day, and I have considered its
recommendations carefully.
I particularly directed this review to examine the central issue
of chemical reprocessing, and to evaluate the risks and benefits of
its use.
I have concluded that our interests do not lie in the early
development of plutonium reprocessing. Many have long believed that
this technology is a natural and desirable part of nuclear power. Some
day it may be, because it may extend our energy supply and reduce the
cost of generating nuclear power. That day may come, but it is not
here now.
We must banish from our thinking the belief that pluntonium
reprocessing is inevitable. Our policy must rather be this -- that our
nonproliferation goals must always dominate our economic interests,
and that the burden of proof falls on those who advocate plutonium
reprocessing.
Accordingly, it is the policy of the United States that plutonium
reprocessing should proceed only if its safety, security, and economic
benefits can be clearly demonstrated. This is the policy that we will
follow at home, and the policy we strongly urge on other nations.
-5-
By adopting this policy, we gain the time to make a sober
examination of the wisdom of plutonium reprocessing. Fortunately,
there is little urgency in developing plutonium reprocessing, and
we can take the time we need with little injury to anyone.
But this cannot be an empty policy.
For more than a year the United States has privately urged
supplier nations to stop the export of sensitive nuclear technology.
It is now time for
all supplier nations to cease the
export of enrichment and reprocessing facilities and technology for a
least three years. During this time, we can work out the details of a
program to examine carefully the wisdom of plutonium use. During
this time, our efforts shoul d not be influenced by pressures to approve
the export of these sensitive facilities.
If we can gain the time to act wisely, we must use the time well.
The United States is prepared to do so. And, in this spirit, I am
prepared to commit now to an unprecedented series of initiatives, as
evidence of our commitment to a policy of nonproliferation and as an
earnest for all other nations of the world to join with us.
-6-
Our first task must be to strengthen the system of international
controls over nuclear exports.
Like all parties to the NPT, the United States has a special
responsibility to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy with non-
nuclear states. We have long given highest priority to being a reliable
supplier of nuclear fuel and equipment. We recognize that this is in the
interest of all nations.
However, given the choice between commercial advantage and
promoting our nonproliferation goals, we are readily prepared to sacrifice
the former. There should, however, be no incompatibility if common
nuclear export policies are developed worldwide, and if all suppliers show
common restraint and responsibility.
I believe the supplier nations must adhere to even more rigorous
controls in their export policies, and they should favor those nations
that accept responsible nonproliferation policies. I also believe that
consuming states are fully entitled to understand our ground rules for
nuclear supply, certain in the knowledge that, if they meet our tests,
equipment and materials will be provided on a timely basis.
In the course of the la st 18 months, the progress we made in
discussions with other supplier nations leads me to conclude that they
will be responsive to our leadership in establishing new and more
rigorous criteria for international nuclear agreements.
Accordingly, I have directed that the U.S. Government henceforth
adhere to the following criteria in judging whether to enter into new or
expanded nuclear cooperation with a nonnuclear weapon state.
-7-
Above all, the U.S. will consider whether a nation is party to the
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or is in the process
of adhering to that Treaty, or whether it is prepared to have its entire
civil nuclear program subject to a safeguards arrangement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
The U.S. will seek clear evidence that the cooperating nation is
prepared to forego, or substantially delay, the establishment of further
national reprocessing or enrichment activities, or to delay and shape
these activities to satisfy the needs of others thro ugh the establishment
of appropriate international arrangements. Furthermore, we will
determine whether the nation is prepared in principle to participate
in an international regime for protecting and storing excess civil
plutonium pending actual use and need in civil programs.
I realize that there may be occasions when proliferation interests
would be best served by cooperating with states not yet meeting these
tests. However, before approving any such new cases, I would expect
to make a personal determination that procedures to be followed would
advance our nonproliferation interests.
I believe that these principles should apply to all agreements for
cooperation in nuclear matters. I have therefore directed the Secretary
-8-
State to enter into negotiations to insure that the United States conforms
to these principles in all its relationships with other countires. I have
also directed the Secretary to open discussions with other nuclear
suppliers to shape our common principles along these lines.
The U.S. will strive to implement these new arrangements during the
moratorium on exports of sensitive nuclear.technology.
Such arrangements will protect the world from the threat of
nuclear proliferation while we take up the crucialtask of testing the
wisdom of plutonium reprocessing.
If plutonium reprocessing is to prove acceptable, we must answer
three questions:
First, we must know whether we can develop the system of
international controls that will ensure against the diversion or theft
of plutonium, if and when it is used as a fuel.
Above all, we need to turn our attention to the control of the
plutonium itself. No nation or group can have easy access to it. To
this end, the United States will, in the immediate future, undertake
urgent discussions aimed at the establishment of a new international
regime to place under international custody and control spent reactor fuels
and civil plutonium,
We believe
that such a regime could provide additional assurance to the world
at large that the growing accumulation of spent fuel and plutonium can
be stored safely pending reentry into the nuclear fuel cycle or other
disposition.
-9-
We urge the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is
empowered to establish such a repository, promptly to elaborate
and implement this concept. We are prepared to work cooperatively
with other nations in developing this idea, and we are willing to
pledge additional resources, including U.S. facilities, to the
International Atomic Energy Agency for this specific purpose.
Also, once a broadly representative regime is in force, the United
States is prepared to commit to place our own excess civil spent fuel
and plutonium under IAEA auspices pending a need in our civilian
nuclear power program.
A second element of the international control system is an effective
procedure to safeguard plutonium against diversion, and to secure it
against theft by terrorist groups, when it is outside an international
repository. It is of central importance that our procedure for safeguards
and security be developed to the fullest before we can make a responsible
determination on the safety of reprocessing throughout the world.
For this reason, the inspection system of the International Atomic
Energy Agency remains a key element in our entire nonproliferation
strategy. I ascribe the highest importance to seeing that this system
broadly applies to nuclear power programs throughout the world.
-10-
It is crucial for the world community to insure that the Agency
has the requisite technical and human resources to keep pace with its expanding
responsibility. Accordingly, I have directed a major commitment
of additional financial resources to the IAEA, and also a mobilization
of our best scientific talent. Two of our principal national laboratories
have been directed to provide support, on a continuing basis, to the
IAEA Secretariat.
In the same vein, the terrible increase in violence and terrorism
throughout the world has accentuated our awareness to the need to
assure that sensitive nuclear materials and equipment are rigorously
protected. Fortunately, there is broad awareness of this problem,
and many nations are materially strengthening physical security by
taking into account the guidelines already prepared by the IAEA.
Compliance with adequate physical security measures is also becoming
-11-
a normal condition of supply, and this is an area where all suppliers
and consumers share a common interest.
However, the United States strongly believe that steps are
needed to upgrade physical security systems to meet the international
norms, and to assure timely international collaboration in the recovery
of lost or stolen materials. This is an area that we plan to pursue diligently
both on a bilateral and multilateral level, including the exploration of
an international convention and other techniques.
To build a system of international controls that I have just
outlined is an enormous task, and one on which the U.S. is prepared
to embark with all its resources. However, no system of controls
is likely to be successful if a potential violater judges that his
acquisition of a nuclear explosive will be received with indifference
by other nations.
For its part, the United States will act to dispel any such notion.
We would regard any
violation of a nuclear safeguards
agreement, such as diversion of nuclear material to be an extremely serious
affront to the world community and to all peace-loving nations throughout
the world.
Accordingly, if any state
violated a safeguards agreement
to which we are a party, we would, as a minimum, immediately cut
off our nuclear fuel supply and cooperation. Even more adverse effects
-12-
would undoubtedly occur in our relationship with the state concerned.
Morever, regardless of whether we ourselves are party to the
safeguards agreement, we would judge the material violation of any
safeguards agreement, particularly one with the IAEA, to be of such
grievous concern to warrant immediate reexamination and broad
consultation with all suppliers and consumers to discuss the nature
of the punitive or remedial action that should be taken collectively.
There is a second major question to be resolved before we can
judge the wisdom of plutonium reprocessing. We must determine if
the nations of the world can adapt to a pattern in which not every
nation - indeed, not many nations - have reprocessing facilities.
This is a difficult issue, for it requires nations to balance their
national interest and their international obligations.
On the one hand, the international system of control that I have
just described would be eroded if every nation that uses nuclear power
also engages in plutonium reprocessing. However effective our
international controls, they will not work if we stretch them over
a multitude of national reprocessing facilities. It thus remains the
policy of the United States to oppose the spread of national reprocessing
and it remains our objective to encourage other nations to join us
in this policy.
-13-
But there is another side to the nuclear coin. Nations that
have nuclear power or may require it have a legitimate interest in the residual
value of spent fuel, and in its ultimate disposal as waste. We recognize our
obligation to honor these interests. I believe, therefore, that if
reprocessing is to prove acceptable, we must seek a world in which
all nations have equal and assured access to both reprocessing and
enrichment services, but in which few nations have such facilities
within their borders and in which few nations possess plutonium.
I believe we can develop such a system. As a first step,
the nations that export nuclear fuel should shoulder the responsibility
for it. The United States is prepared to shoulder this responsibility.
Accordingly, I now offer an alternative to national reprocessing
to nations that adopt responsible restraints on their nuclear power
industry. The U.S. is prepared through 1985 to acquire their spent
fuel, and to compensate them in cash or in fresh low-enriched nuclear
fuel. The amount of compensation will be determined at the time the
fuel is ready to be reprocessed, and will ensure against any economic
disadvantage.
I am also prepared to offer to the same nations assistance in
arranging for spent fuel storage in the U.S. or elsewhere, in anticipation
of the IAEA storage regime.
-14-
Finally, I reiterate my pledge that any country accepting responsible
restraints on its nuclear power program can rely on the United States
as an assured supplier of nuclear fuel. To this end, I have directed
the Secretary of State to offer to negotiate binding letters of intent
for the supply of nuclear fuel, to be fulfilled by either new U.S.
Government capacity or by private U.S. suppliers, at U.S. discretion.
These steps will contribute to lessening the pressures for national
reprocessing while the world decides on the wisdom of reprocessing.
In addition it is necessary to show whether we can develop a system in whi ch
all nations share in the benefits of an assured supply of nuclear fuel, even
through the number and location of facilities is limited to meet non-
proliferation goals.
The appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government have been studying
proposals for such a system.
I have specifically directed consultations be undertaken with
Canada, Japan, and the nations of Europe to develop a prototype for
such multilateral institutions.
-15-
Finally, the United States will continue to work with othe r nations
to seek to develop nonnuclear sources of power. In particular, we
are prepared to assist in the analysis of energy development strategies.
We would place special emphasis on providing technological assistance
in developing indigenous fossil fuel resources as an alternative to
nuclear power.
Our third task in assessing the wisdom of plutonium reprocessing
is a technological one. We need the technological foundation on which
we can erect a structure of international controls and assured fuel
supply.
I will propose to Congress in my budget next January, the
details of the program to achieve these goals.
-16-
I do not underestimate the scope and complexity of the program
I have just put forward. It is technically difficult and expensive.
More important, its success depends on an extraordinary coordination
of the policies of all nations toward the common good. The U.S.
is prepared to lead, but we cannot succeed alone.
No nation should underestimate the gravity of the problem.
World order, perhaps even our survival, is at stake. This is not a
time for narrow vision, half-hearted attempts, or national or
partisan advantage. We must move boldly, and together, for our
common interest.