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Science and Technology Policy, Office of (5)
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James M. Cannon Files (Ford Administration)
James Cannon's Issues Files
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President (1974-1977 : Ford). Office of Science and Technology Policy. (5/11/1976 - 1/20/1977)
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The original documents are located in Box 32, folder "Science and Technology Policy,
Office of (5)" of the James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 32 of the James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Jim
Fr your
info
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
regards,
Phil Yeagu
94-10
SciPol
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
PRESS RELEASE
FOR RELEASE: April 2, 1975
FORD is LIBRARY 938870
The full Committee on Science and Technology expects to under-
take the third phase of its 2-year inquiry into Federal science
policy and organization beginning early in June, Chairman Olin E.
Teague (D-Tex.) announced today.
Mr. Teague said that the coming hearings would probably give
special attention to the National Science Policy and Organization
Bill (H. 4461) which he and Rep. Charles A. Mosher (R-Ohio),
Ranking Minority Member of the Committee, introduced on March 6.
He added that if the Senate has acted on similar legislation
or if the White House has indicated relevant preferences by the time
the hearings begin, these would also be given particular attention.
"Our work in this area, going back a decade or so, convinces
us that we need some statutory base in order to obtain a consistent
science and technology policy for the future -- plus effective
organizational structures to implement it," Mr. Teague said. "We
plan, therefore, to cooperate with the Executive Office and with the
Senate in the matter as we go along. This should make our task a
lot easier and the results a lot better."
The Teague-Mosher bill follows a Committee investigation begin-
ning early in 1973 when President Nixon abolished the Office of Science
and Technology and transferred science policy and advisory functions
to the National Science Foundation. The essential elements of the
bill are the establishment of:
1) A definitive National policy for support and use of science
and technology; 2) an advisory mechanism in the Executive Office of
the President to deal with the scientific and technological aspects
of major contemporary issues; 3) a Department of Research and Tech-
nology Operations to house and oversee Federal agencies whose sole
function is "R&D", and to review the total Federal "R&D" effort on
an annual basis; 4) a Science and Technology Information and Utili-
zation Corporation to incorporate, coordinate and synthesize the
activities of the three major Federal science information agencies.
EDWARD E. DAVID, JR.
1000 INTERNATIONAL TOWER BUILDING
8550 WEST BRYN MAWR AVENUE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60631
April 3, 1975
Suria
Admin
Dear Mr. President:
I am taking the liberty of writing to you directly concerning
science in the White House. You may recall that we discussed
this matter some months ago when you were Vice President.
Subsequently, I wrote to you detailing my thoughts during that
conversation.
I am aware that events regarding science in the White House
have progressed, and am knowledgeable about some of the
relevant private discussions. Furthermore, within the
scientific and engineering community itself, there have been
many symposia, conferences, and rump discussions. Still
further, the Congress has moved and bills are in train in
both the House and Senate. All of this activity has revealed
additional dimensions of the problem which were not evident
at the time of our earlier discussion.
To outline the situation as I now see it, let me oversimplify
somewhat. Remembering our previous discussion, I assume
you are still anxious to have sound scientific influences in
Presidential policy-making and execution. The technical
community is unanimous in wanting to see scientific and
technological inputs for government processes at the top
level. However, the community is not unanimous on how
this should be done, though they are anxious to serve. The
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
White House staff and Executive Offices (particularly OMB,
NSC, and the Domestic Council) have in many instances
taken on technical advisers of their own and have operated
satisfactorily with them. Thus, they are reluctant to
relinquish their capabilities to any new science mechanism.
The White House staff has become well knit, and no one that
I have spoken with there sees clearly how a new independent
technical element would fit into the staff, nor what its
function would be. The Congress feels that something is
needed, but is not anxious to legislate a mechansim for the
Executive.
Mr. President - 2
Taking all this into account, it seems to me that the problem
is how to establish a science mechanism which has an accepted
function to perform and sits at a high enough level in government
that it can ensure that the nation's profound technical capabilities
can be brought to bear for our benefit.
This puzzle has a solution, I believe, along the following lines.
Appoint a Counsellor for Science and Technology with a small
staff. He would have two assigned functions: First, have all
federal R&D budgets funneled through his office for approval and
submission to OMB for further action. Second, have the R&D-
intensive agencies "report" to the Counsellor on your behalf.
These agencies are NSF, NASA, ERDA, NOAA, and NBS. Note
that no R&D activity vital to the function of any existing
department would be included. The R&D arms of DOD, HEW,
Interior, Agriculture, and so on would remain in place to
perform their service. Nevertheless, the aggregation under
the Counsellor could be pictured as a budding department of
government, as proposed in the Teague-Mosher bill now in the
House. If the aggregation eventually were legislated as a new
Department of Science and Technology, it could function as
such. Meanwhile, it could provide a focal point for science
and technology. This would be a statesmanlike move and would
I believe satisfy most of the constituencies. At the same time
it would provide you with one of the tools you desire to aid
you in getting the job done.
The question of candidates for the Counsellorship will be a
critical one. I would be happy to advise Mr. Rumsfeld and
his personnel chief Walker in this task should you so desire.
I would be privileged to discuss this matter with you more fully
and to clear up any remaining points.
Yours very truly,
Edward David
The Honorable Gerald M. Ford
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.
FORD LIBRARY & GENALD
DRAFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 17, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JIM CANNON
FORD i LIBRARY DERALD
SUBJECT:
Science and Technology Adviser to the President
BACKGROUND:
Some time ago you requested a recommendation from
the Vice PResident on a Science and Technology Adviser to the
Administration.
The Vice President submitted a proposal, then conducted
additional research and submitted another proposal on March
3, 1975. (Tab I)
You then indicated an interest in having a study made
of what previous Presidential science advisers had actually
accomplished for the Presidents they served. A summary
study is at Tab II, and Dr. James R. Killian's
complementary personal account is at Tab III.
CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION
1. Congress is likely to pass some kind of Science
and Technology bill at this session. The House Committee on
Science and Technology is committed to passage of a bill
creating a Council of Advisers on Science and Technology in
the Executive Office. On March 6, 1975 Representatives Teague
- 2 -
and Mosher introduced a comprehensive bill that would --
a) write into law a national science policy,
b) create a five-member Council of Advisers, with
a Chairman to be Science Adviser to the President.
c) establish a Cabinet level Secretary of
Research and Technology Operations,
d) form a government corporation to promote
public use of research and development.
2. Informal discussions with House Science and
Technology Committee members and staff indicates that the
House Committee is flexible and wants to work with your
staff on passage of a bill that is acceptable to you. But
it appears that Chairman Teague's Committee does want the
President and his Administration to have a strong, effective
and visible scientific advisory group.
3. The Senate is likely to pass a Science and
Technology bill at least as extensive as the proposed House
bill.
FORD LIBRARY "if GERALD
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
THE VP
Suevu
FROM: ANN
Lis hadd but Prus to to
Oscar says that everything he has
hill
heard about Pat Haggerty is favorable. He
That
will do a little more research and let us know.
Two Agun
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
$
*
*
*
41
*
#
" *
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
Pat Haggents
April 17, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Peter J. Wallison Ptter
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
SUBJECT:
Science Advisor
I met yesterday with Dr. Edward David, who
was the head of the Office of Science and Technology
just prior to the abolition of the Office during the
Nixon Administration.
Dr. David suggested that an excellent choice
for a science advisor would be Pat Haggerty, Chairman
of Texas Instruments.
I haven't seen Haggerty's name on any of your
lists, and I thought you might want to keep him in
mind.
let's chick
/
am
M
April 18, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HIL BUCHEN - OK.
MAX FRIEDERS DORF
-
#3.
BOB GOLDWIN
LAN GREENSPAN
ROBERT HARTMANN
#3.
JIM LYNN
ED MARRS
ACK MARSH
ILL SEIDMAN
FROM:
JIM CANNON
SUBJECT:
Science and Technology Adviser
to the President
After the last proposal for a Science and Technology Adviser to the
President was prepared, the President indicated he wanted an analysis
of what previous Presidential Science Advisers had actually accom-
plished.
In light of this additional information at Tabs II and III, I feel it im-
portant to obtain additional views before submitting this package
to the President.
I would, therefore, most appreciate having your comments and rec-
ommendations by Tuesday noon, April 22nd.
Thank you.
Attachment
FORD LIBRARY j GERALD
bcc: Dick Dunham
Jim Cavanaugh
Mike Duval
Glenn Schleede
Jim Connor
Jerry Jones
April 18, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Honorable Russell W. Peterson
Chairman, Council on Environmental
Quality #2 with lot varation
The Honorable Russell E. Train #2
Administrator, Environmental
Protection Agency
The Honorable Frank G. Zarb #3modyfied
96% 6025
Administrator, Federal Energy
John Hill
Administration
SUBJECT:
Science and Technology Adviser
to the President
After the last proposal for a Science and Technology Adviser to the
President was prepared, the President indicated he wanted an analysis
of what previous Presidential Science Advisers had actually accom-
plished.
In light of this additional information at Tabs II and III, I feel it im-
portant to obtain additional views before submitting this package
to the President.
I would, therefore, most appreciate having your comments and rec-
ommendations by Tuesday noon, April 22nd.
Thank you.
James M. Cannon
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
Assistant to the President
for Domestic Affairs
Attachment
bcc: Dick Dunham
Glenn Schleede
Jim Cavanaugh
Jim Connor
Mike Duval
Jerry Jones
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 18, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JIM CANNON
SUBJECT:
Contributions of Science Advisers to
Previous Presidents
SUMMARY:
The Presidential scientific apparatus was a
splendid tool in the early days under President Eisenhower.
It met a visible need to catch up with the Russians, and
was an important political plus for the President.
But in time, the scientists corrected the specific
weaknesses that had at first made them necessary. Then
their proposals became more diffuse, and seemed directed at
preventing ills that had not yet materialized e.g., food
and energy. Thus they lost out to greater demands within
the White House for solutions to problems that were
immediate and pressing. To make matters worse, the
scientific community became politicized during the Vietnam
war, and was perceived as critical and unfriendly.
The 15-year record of the office indicates that
when a Presidential science adviser supported the
President's goals, broadened his range of solutions,
and kept his ego and ambitions in check, he made great
contributions to government and was a major political asset.
EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
James Killian of MIT became science adviser to
President Eisenhower in 1957 and was later succeeded by
George Kistiakowski, a Harvard chemist. This was
probably the most effective and influential period
for science advisers.
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
1. Following SPUTNIK, helped assure the
U. S. public that the country's missile
and space program was in good hands and
moving ahead.
2. Prompted creation of National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.
- 2 -
3. Provided the scientific basis for
President Eisenhower's proposal which
ultimately resulted in the 1963 test ban
treaty.
4. Made a major impact on the ICBM program,
including emphasis on solid fuel rockets.
5. Accelerated the development of a ballistic
missile early warning system and anti-
submarine capabilities.
6. Assisted in advancing photo reconnaissance
by satellite.
7. Helped make available scientific and
technical information for dealing with
such problems as food additives and
environmental health.
8.
Helped strengthen programs for the
education of U. S. scientists and
engineers.
9. Through the respect and prestige they
commanded, Killian and George Kistiakowski,
helped reassure a shaken public that the
U. S. ballistic missile and space programs
would close the "technological gap" between
the U. S. and Soviet Union.
PROBLEMS:
No major problems other than some criticism of
their focus on defense and space-related questions
KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Jerry Wiesner of MIT was President Kennedy's
science adviser. Some of the successes and most of
the problems of this period were a product of Wiesner's
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
personal and his assertive attempts to seek a bigger and
bigger role in government decision making.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
1. Provided valuable guidance leading to
the rejection of a number of Pentagon
proposals which subsequent research
has shown would have indeed been mistakes.
e.g. the Dynasoar space plane.
- 3 -
2. Introduced interests beyond space and
defense and focused on many other areas
of government scientific research such
as health.
PROBLEMS:
1. Bitter public debates with NASA over
techniques to be used in moon landing, which
became a personal struggle between Wiesner
and Wernher von Braun.
2. Alienated the scientific community by high-
handed attitude and suspicion that he was
ambitious to become the "Czar" of American
science.
3. Criticism of the Defense Department. For
example, he boasted that he could make a better
evaluation of defense development projects than
Secretary McNamara.
4. Expanded his authority to the point that
he was attempting simultaneously to be an
unbiased and impartial staff adviser as well
as director of a scientific operations unit
advocating specific programs.
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION:
President Johnson's adviser was Donald Hornig, a
chemist from Princeton. Hornig has a stormy and unfriendly
relationship with the President and therefore appears to
have had very little influence on policy.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
1. Instituted many siginificant long-range
studies, e.g. the potential of the
oceans; the world food problem; restoring
the environment.
2. In 1965 conducted the first major assessment
of the U. S. energy situation.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
- 4 -
PROBLEMS:
1. Despite the predictive merit of his
proposals, Hornig had little impact because
he had no access to the President and little
standing within the White House staff.
2. As the Viet Nam war expanded, the scientific
communitie's mounting opposition to the war
made it even more difficult for Hornig to
serve as an adviser.
NIXON ADMINISTRATION:
Lee DuBridge was President Nixon's first science
adviser and was succeeded by Ed David of Bell Laboratories
in 1970. The decline of influence which began during the
Johnson Administration accelerated until 1972, when President
Nixon abolished the science adviser.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
1. Attempted to develop practical applications.
of science research.
PROBLEMS:
1. Presidential Science Advisory Committee
strongly and publicly opposed SST
proposal at a time when the Administration
was actively seeking support for the SST.
2. Acquired a reputation within the White
House for generating proposals to spend
more Federal money.
3. Scientific community regarded Ed David
as lacking credentials because of his
background as an engineer.
not
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 18, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM :
JIM CANNON
SUBJECT :
Science and Technology Adviser to the President
BACKGROUND:
Some time ago you requested a recommendation from
the Vice President on a Science and Technology Adviser
to the Administration.
GERALD FORD VIBRARY
The Vice President submitted a proposal, then conducted
additional research and submitted another proposal on
March 3, 1975. (Tab I)
You then indicated an interest in having a study made
of what previous Presidential science advisers had actually
accomplished for the Presidents they served. One outside
analysis is at Tab II. An evaluation by Dr. James R.
Killian, Jr., who was the first adviser to President
Eisenhower and one of the best of all science advisers,
is at Tab III.
The 15-year record of the office indicates, in sum, that
when a Presidential science adviser had a clear and specific
objective within the President's broader goals, provided a
wider range of solutions for the President, and kept his
own ambitions and ego in check, he made great contributions
to government and was a major political asset.
The best example of the effectiveness of the Presidential
scientific apparatus came in the late Fifties, under President
Eisenhower. It met a visible need to catch up with the
Russian space and missile technological advances, gave a
sense of confidence to the American people, and thereby
became a political plus for the President.
Today's need for scientific and technological advances to
meet energy needs appears to be somewhat analagous.
Any proposal for a Scientific Adviser would be a new
spending program, and it seems to me it could be justified
only if it were related closely to energy.
2
CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION
1. Congress is likely to pass some kind of
Science and Technology bill at this session. The House
Committee on Science and Technology is committed to passage
of a bill creating a Council of Advisers on Science and
Technology in the Executive Office. On March 6, 1975
Representatives Teague and Mosher introduced a comprehensive
bill that would --
a) write into law a national science policy,
b) create a five-member Council of Advisers, with
a Chairman to be Science Adviser to the President.
c) establish a Cabinet level Secretary of
Research and Technology Operations,
d) form a government corporation to promote
public use of research and development.
2. Informal discussions with House Science and
Technology Committee members and staff indicates that the
House Committee is flexible and wants to work with your
staff on passage of a bill that is acceptable to you. But
it appears that Chairman Teague's Committee does want the
President and his Administration to have a strong, effective
and visible scientific advisory group.
3. The Senate is likely to pass a Science and
Technology bill at least as extensive as the proposed House
bill.
OPTIONS
The Vice President offers three options:
Option 1. A three-member Council of Technology
and Science Advisers with up to 20
assistants, at a cost of $2.5 - $5
million annually.
Arguments for:
Such an approach would be a substantial
committment that would enable initiatives
in a full range of subject areas. It
would be well received by the scientific
and academic community and would probably
satisfy Congress.
3
Arguments against:
It would be a large and costly operation,
and difficult to integrate into the present
White House staff.
Agree
Disagree
Option 2. A single Director of Technology and
Science with up to 17 assistants as
needed. Initial cost would be $1 - $1.5
million annually.
Arguments for:
A single director would provide a better
reactive capacity and a clearer identity.
This option would probably be acceptable
to Congress, and would be less costly than
what Congress is likely to come up with.
The staff would be easier to organize and
integrate than Option I.
Arguments against:
Expenditures and staff additions are still
large and the organization could not be
set up quickly.
Dr. Marrs recommends this option.
Since previous Presidential science advisers were most
effective in solving specific problems subject to scientific
and technological resolution, I would recommend this option,
with the Director specifically directed to work with your
energy group toward reaching your energy independence goals.
But I think the spending could be scaled down.
Agree
Disagree
Option 3. A Science and Technology adviser with up
to three assistants, at a cost of $100,000 -
$200,000 annually.
Arguments for:
Extremely simple approach whose cost would
be relatively minor and such an effort
could be in place quickly. Only adminis-
4
trative action would be required.
Arguments against:
This approach would have limited capability in
terms of issues it could deal with on its own
and thus would have to rely almost exclusively
on outside resources. It probably would not
preclude further action by Congress.
Mr. Marsh and Mr. O'Neill recommend:
Agree
Disagree
Option 4. Phil Buchen recommends a fourth option:
The appointment of the Scientific and
Technology Liaison Adviser to the President
who would serve simply as a point of contact
between the Administration and the scientific
community. (Tab IV)
Arguments for:
Simple step which could be taken immediately
at little cost. It would be understood as
having no substantive responsibility other
than liaison and therefore would not create
false expectations.
Arguments against:
Would probably not satisfy Congress and could
be viewed in the Scientific community as no
more than a token effort.
Agree
Disagree
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 18, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM :
JIM CANNON
SUBJECT :
Science and Technology Adviser to the President
BACKGROUND:
Some time ago you requested a recommendation from
the Vice President on a Science and Technology Adviser
to the Administration.
The Vice President submitted a proposal, then conducted
additional research and submitted another proposal on
March 3, 1975. (Tab I)
You then indicated an interest in having a study made
of what previous Presidential science advisers had actually
accomplished for the Presidents they served. One outside
analysis is at Tab II. An evaluation by Dr. James R.
Killian, Jr., who was the first adviser to President
Eisenhower and one of the best of all science advisers,
is at Tab III.
FORD DESARY
The 15-year record of the office indicates, in sum, that
when a Presidential science adviser had a clear and specific
objective within the President's broader goals, provided a
wider range of solutions for the President, and kept his
own ambitions and ego in check, he made great contributions
to government and was a major political asset.
The best example of the effectiveness of the Presidential
scientific apparatus came in the late Fifties, under President
Eisenhower. It met a visible need to catch up with the
Russian space and missile technological advances, gave a
sense of confidence to the American people, and thereby
became a political plus for the President.
Today's need for scientific and technological advances to
meet energy needs appears to be somewhat analagous.
Any proposal for a Scientific Adviser would be a new
spending program, and it seems to me it could be justified
only if it were related closely to energy.
2
CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION
1. Congress is likely to pass some kind of
Science and Technology bill at this session. The House
Committee on Science and Technology is committed to passage
of a bill creating a Council of Advisers on Science and
Technology in the Executive Office. On March 6, 1975
Representatives Teague and Mosher introduced a comprehensive
bill that would --
a) write into law a national science policy,
b) create a five-member Council of Advisers, with
a Chairman to be Science Adviser to the President.
c) establish a Cabinet level Secretary of
Research and Technology Operations,
d) form a government corporation to promote
public use of research and development.
2. Informal discussions with House Science and
Technology Committee members and staff indicates that the
House Committee is flexible and wants to work with your
staff on passage of a bill that is acceptable to you. But
it appears that Chairman Teague's Committee does want the
President and his Administration to have a strong, effective
and visible scientific advisory group.
3. The Senate is likely to pass a Science and
Technology bill at least as extensive as the proposed House
bill.
OPTIONS
The Vice President offers three options:
Option 1. A three-member Council of Technology
and Science Advisers with up to 20
assistants, at a cost of $2.5 - $5
million. annually.
Arguments for:
Such an approach would be a substantial
committment that would enable initiatives
in a full range of subject areas. It
would be well received by the scientific
and academic community and would probably
satisfy Congress.
3
Arguments against:
It would be a large and costly operation,
and difficult to integrate into the present
White House staff.
Agree
Disagree
Option 2. A single Director of Technology and
Science with up to 17 assistants as
needed. Initial cost would be $1 - $1.5
million annually.
Arguments for:
A single director would provide a better
reactive capacity and a clearer identity.
This option would probably be acceptable
to Congress, and would be less costly than
what Congress is likely to come up with.
The staff would be easier to organize and
integrate than Option I.
Arguments against:
Expenditures and staff additions are still
large and the organization could not be
set up quickly.
Ted
Russ TRain, Russ Petron
Dr. Marrs recommends this option.
Since previous Presidential science advisers were most
effective in solving specific problems subject to scientific
and technological resolution, I would recommend this option,
with the Director specifically directed to work with your
energy group toward reaching your energy independence goals.
But I think the spending could be scaled down.
Agree
Disagree
Option 3. A Science and Technology adviser with up
to three assistants, at a cost of $100,000 -
$200,000 annually.
Arguments for:
Extremely simple approach whose cost would
be relatively minor and such an effort
could be in place quickly. Only adminis-
4
trative action would be required.
Arguments against:
This approach would have limited capability in
terms of issues it could deal with on its own
and thus would have to rely almost exclusively
on outside resources. It probably would not
preclude further action by Congress.
Joch Mr. Marsh, FROM and Mr. O'Neill recommend: MAX FRIEDERS day.
zarh Bor Goldevin
Agree
Disagree
Billsuman
Option 4. Phil Buchen recommends a fourth option:
The appointment of the Scientific and
Technology Liaison Adviser to the President
who would serve simply as a point of contact
between the Administration and the scientific
community. (Tab IV)
Arguments for:
Simple step which could be taken immediately
at little cost. It would be understood as
having no substantive responsibility other
than liaison and thèrefore would not create
false expectations.
Arguments against:
as a point of conract
Would probably not satisfy Congress and could
be viewed in the Scientific community as no
more than a token effort.
Agree
Disagree
4 11
#
6
Xra
0
THE VICE PRESIDENT
is
is
WASHINGTON
0
March 3, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
The Vice President
har
SUBJECT:
Re-establishing a Science and Technology
Advisory Apparatus in the Executive Office
of the President
This is in response to your request for a memorandum concerning
the re-establishment of a science and technology advisory apparatus
in the Executive Office of the President.
INDEX
Tab A - Problem
Tab B - Background
Tab C - Functions
Tab D - Structure
Option 1 - Creation of a Council of Technology
and Science Advisers
Option 2 - Creation of an Office of Technology
and Science
Option 3 - Appointment of a Science and Technology
Adviser to the President
A
A
PROBLEM
PROBLEM
The dissolution of the science advisory structure in
the White House in 1973 was greeted with great dismay
by the scientific community. Pressure is growing
steadily from scientific community leaders for action
to restore some science presence in the White House.
A June 1974 report by a special committee of the
National Academy of Sciences, recommending the crea-
tion of a Council on Science and Technology in the
Executive Office of the President, has heightened this
pressure and has made likely Congressional action to
re-establish some kind of scientific and technical
policy organization in the Executive Office of the
President.
B
B
BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
President Truman
The concept of providing scientific and technical advice
directly to the President in a formal way was initiated
by President Truman in 1951. The Scientific Advisory
Committee in the Office of Defense Mobilization met
occasionally with the President and, in spite of its
location in the Department of Defense, had direct access
to the President. President Truman, himself, recognized
this function of the group and dealt with them as
personal advisers.
President Eisenhower
The "Sputnik" crisis of 1957 created a political situa-
tion that made it advisable to locate a scientific
advisory structure in the White House itself. Accordingly,
the scientific advisory function which was located in
the Office of Defense Mobilization was moved to the
White House and greatly expanded. An official with
the title of Science Adviser to the President was
appointed and a President's Science Advisory Committee
was established.
The President's Science Adviser also served as Chairman
of the new interagency Federal Council on Science and
Technology, which took over the function of coordinating
all of the scientific research and technical develop-
ment going on with the Federal Government.
President Kennedy
In 1962, under a reorganization measure of the Executive
Branch, President Kennedy created a large staff office
in the White House under the Science Adviser to assist
in advising the President and in overseeing the
burgeoning Federal responsibility for science and
technology. This office, called the Office of Science
and Technology, also served as the staff arm of the
President's Science Advisory Committee.
The Office of Science and Technology and the President's
Science Advisory Committee were remarkably successful
in heightening the overall interest in scientific and
technical developments among the various Departments
of the Federal government. In fact, their creation
sparked the establishment of line offices in charge of
scientific research and development in all of the
operating Departments of the Federal government.
Through the early and middle 1960s, the Office of
Science and Technology enjoyed a fairly prominent
position in the White House, as the space and defense
programs dominated the national scene. As the
national focus shifted to the economic and social
problems of the late Sixties, however, the role of
the Office of Science and Technology in national policy
formulation became less clear and its influence in
the White House less substantial.
President Nixon
During the late Sixties and the early Seventies, the
Office of Science and Technology became more and more
of a "special pleader" for its science constituency --
advocating positions and ideologies not always
consistent with Administration policy. Instead of
serving to advise the President, the Office of Science
and Technology often became his critic.
Finally, in July 1973, President Nixon abolished the
position of Science Adviser, the Office of Science and
Technology and the President's Science Advisory Committee.
The functions of the Science Adviser were given to the
Director of the National Science Foundation and those
of the Office of Science and Technology and the
President's Science Advisory Committee transferred to
the National Science Foundation in civilian areas and
the National Security Council in military areas.
Although many scientists viewed the dissolution of
the science advisory structure in the White House as
purely politically motivated, there were several good
reasons for making some kind of change.
1. By the early 1970s, virtually all Federal
Departments had developed their own scientific
and technical arms. This significantly
lessened the need for a large scientific and
technical staff in the White House (which,
after all, had no line functions).
2. The failure of the Office of Science and
Technology's staff to relate to the White
House policy formulating procedure made it
difficult to integrate that Office's
recommendations with those of other advisory
functions in the White House. Therefore, as
emerging national problems began to include
components other than "hard" technology,
the Office of Science and Technology became
less effective and useful in contributing
to Presidential-level decision-making.
3. As the Office of Science and Technology's
allegiance to its constituency grew, its
effectiveness in serving the President
diminished.
C
FUNCTIONS
C
FUNCTIONS
The scientific community is now generally united in the belief
that the President should have available to him an independent
source of scientific and technological judgment on a wide range
of areas, including:
--
social and behavioral sciences;
-- physical and life sciences;
-- medicine;
-- engineering;
-- international aspects of science and technology;
-- science and technology in the private sector;
-- education and training of scientific manpower.
They have pointed out that a White House science and technology
advisory apparatus could perform the following vital functions:
1.
Advising the President in the formulation and review
of national policies in areas involving science and
technology development. Energy, transportation,
environmental planning, health care delivery and food
supply are examples of these.
2.
Providing technical advice for the President and his
staff, including the Domestic Council, the Council of
Economic Advisers, and the Office of Management
and Budget, on specific issues and questions dealing
with science and technology.
3.
Working with the Federal Council on Science and
Technology in coordinating the large existing in-house
capability of the Federal government in scientific
and technological research and development. There
are approximately 100,000 people employed in Federal
research and development establishments, and it is
important to see that this large and sophisticated
work force is properly and effectively employed.
4.
Identifying and reporting on gaps in scientific
research and technological developments in the
public and private sector and initiating studies
where appropriate.
5.
Providing the President with "early warning" of
problems, opportunities or developments that have
a scientific or technological component, including
some longer-range forecasting of such problems,
opportunities and developments.
6.
Consulting with the President on the appointments
of various scientific and technical officials in the
Federal agencies.
Moreover, the scientific community is now in full agreement
that the proper function of such an advisory apparatus is to
advise and service the President -- not to be public advocates.
STRUCTURE
D
D
STRUCTURE
OPTION 1. CREATION OF A COUNCIL OF TECHNOLOGY
AND SCIENCE ADVISERS
The President could propose legislation creating a 3-member
Council of Technology and Science Advisers in the Executive
Office of the President. The Council would be similar in
function to the Council of Economic Advisers. The members
of the Council would be appointed by the President from among
the different disciplines in the science and technology fields.
The Chairman of the Council would also serve as the President's
Technology and Science Adviser.
(VARIATION: Some have proposed creation of a 7-member
Council, composed of four Presidential appointees and the
Presidents of the National Academy of Science, the National
Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine serving
ex officio.)
STAFFING: The Council's staff would consist of an Executive
Assistant to the Chairman and a number of professional assist-
ants (15-20) and supporting clerical staff. The Council would
also be authorized to establish ad hoc committees composed of
governmental and/or non-governmental experts to do in-depth
analyses of selected problems and issues.
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS: $2. 5 - $5 million annually.
ARGUMENTS FOR:
-- In essence, this is the approach embodied in the
"Kennedy bill" passed by the Senate last year. It
incorporates the recommendation of the National
Academy of Science's special committee, and is
fully responsive to the scientific community's
demands.
-2-
-- This assures greater depth in the science and
technology advisory apparatus and greater repre-
sentation and input from the various disciplines in
the science and technology field.
-- This would ensure an ongoing structure in the
Executive Office of the President fully capable of
rendering scientific and technological advice or
performing such other related responsibilities as
the President may assign to it.
-- The authority to create ad hoc groups permits
tapping of the resources of the scientific community.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
-- This structure might be difficult to integrate into
the existing White House operation.
-- It is more susceptible to "politization" both as to
its internal operation (with each of the three members
representing the views of his own constituency) and
as to its relationship with the Administration (because
of the structural autonomy of a council).
-- It would result in a visible increase in the size and
budget of the White House.
-- This structure is larger than is necessary to meet
the problem and is also unwieldy.
OPTION 2. CREATION OF AN OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
AND SCIENCE
The President could propose legislation creating an Office of
Technology and Science in the Executive Office of the President.
The Director of the office would be a highly qualified scientist
appointed by the President, who would serve also as the
President's Technology and Science Adviser.
STAFFING: In addition to the Director, the office would have
a Deputy Director (for administration) and, as is required
-- up to five Assistant Directors (for various specialties);
-- up to twelve professional assistants; and
-- supporting clerical staff.
The Director would also be empowered to establish ad hoc
committees composed of governmental and/or nongovernmental
experts to do in-depth analyses of selected problems and issues.
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS: $1 - $1.5 million annually.
ARGUMENTS FOR:
-- This is largely responsive to the legitimate demands
of the scientific community and could, therefore, be
expected to satisfy the Congress.
-- It assures to the President and his staff the avail-
ability of a broad range of scientific and technical
expertise. This would be tremendously useful to
the Domestic Council, the Council of Economic
Advisers, the Office of Management and Budget,
et al.
-2-
-- This structure will help to assure the development
of an ongoing scientific and technological capacity
in the Executive Office of the President.
-- The authority to create ad hoc groups permits tapping
of the resources of the scientific community.
-- This structure is sufficiently flexible to permit
growth of in-house capacity when and as necessary.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
-- This would involve Congressional action to implement
(and, of course, to undo).
-- There are those who feel that this would unduly
increase the size of the President's staff.
-- Some contend that the need for a science and
technology capacity in the White House does not
justify the creation of an office.
OPTION 3. APPOINTMENT OF A SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT
The President could, by administrative action, appoint a full-time
Science and Technology Adviser to the President to serve on the
White House staff.
STAFFING: The Science and Technology Adviser would be author-
ized a few (1-3) professional assistants and supporting clerical
staff, but would otherwise have to rely on National Science Founda-
tion professional staff for support.
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS: $100,000 - $200,000 annually.
ARGUMENTS FOR:
-- This could be accomplished by administrative act of the
President.
-- It would relieve some of the pressure for Congressional
action on this issue.
-- This would make available to the President and his staff
at least some independent scientific and technological
expertise.
- - This would be relatively inexpensive and would not
significantly increase the size of the President's staff.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST:
-- This approach would satisfy neither the scientific
community nor the Congress and, therefore, it could
not be expected to avert independent Congressional
action on the issue.
-- It is doubtful whether, under this structure, the Science
and Technology Adviser could "cover the waterfront."
Therefore, pressure to increase the size and scope of
this apparatus will continue.
-- This structure is not suitable for the development of an
on-going scientific and technological capacity in the
White House.
-- This structure is not suitable for tapping the resources
of the scientific community on an interim basis since
the Science and Technology Adviser would not be
empowered to create ad hoc panels for special research
purposes.
PRESIDENTIAL DECISION
Proceed with further development of:
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3 gm
Discuss gm
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 10, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JIM CANNON
FROM:
TED MARRS JCM
SUBJECT:
Re-establishing a Science and Technology
Advisory Apparatus in the Executive Office
of the President
Thanks for my inclusion in distribution of the paper on Science Advisory
apparatus. My thoughts are as follows:
1. There is a real advantage in the President's taking action in this matter
to prevent being preempted by establishment of a Congressional creation
which would become a focal point of advocacy and embarrassment to
this and future administrations.
2.
The functions as stated are indeed vital ones, but we should have little
confidence in the scientific community's intent that the advisory role
be kept out. Also, there are strongly polarized elements in that
community which are currently jockeying for future control.
3. Of the three options offered, Option 1, the establishment of a "Council"
would be most acceptable in the highly vocal parts of the politico/scientific
world. Option 3 would probably be ineffective and unproductive and not
acceptable to the Congress or to the scientific community. Option 2
should be modified.
4. Option 2 should have a larger budget if it is intended to have a productive
ad hoc committee capability. This "Office" is a potentially highly pro-
ductive function which can pay its way - if properly managed - by savings
through selectivity and coordination of scientific activities.
5.
Because of the internal battles within the scientific community, considera-
tion should be given to having a well qualified administrator rather than a
well qualified scientist as the Director in Option 2 - a referee rather than
a player. In any event, I would recommend keeping this open at this
stage.
II
TT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 18, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JIM CANNON
SUBJECT:
Contributions of Science Advisers to
Previous Presidents
SUMMARY:
The Presidential scientific apparatus was a
splendid tool in the early days under President Eisenhower.
It met a visible need to catch up with the Russians, and
was an important political plus for the President.
But in time, the scientists corrected the specific
weaknesses that had at first made them necessary. Then
their proposals became more diffuse, and seemed directed at
preventing ills that had not yet materialized e.g., food
and energy. Thus they lost out to greater demands within
the White House for solutions to problems that were
immediate and pressing. To make matters worse, the
scientific community became politicized during the Vietnam
war, and was perceived as critical and unfriendly.
The 15-year record of the office indicates that
when a Presidential science adviser supported the
President's goals, broadened his range of solutions,
and kept his ego and ambitions in check, he made great
contributions to government and was a major political asset.
EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
James Killian of MIT became science adviser to
President Eisenhower in 1957 and was later succeeded by
George Kistiakowski, a Harvard chemist. This was
probably the most effective and influential period
for science advisers.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
1. Following SPUTNIK, helped assure the
U. S. public that the country's missile
and space program was in good hands and
moving ahead.
2. Prompted creation of National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.
- 2 -
3. Provided the scientific basis for
President Eisenhower's proposal which
ultimately resulted in the 1963 test ban
treaty.
4. Made a major impact on the ICBM program,
including emphasis on solid fuel rockets.
5. Accelerated the development of a ballistic
missile early warning system and anti-
submarine capabilities.
6. Assisted in advancing photo reconnaissance
by satellite.
7. Helped make available scientific and
technical information for dealing with
such problems as food additives and
environmental health.
8. Helped strengthen programs for the
education of U. S. scientists and
engineers.
9. Through the respect and prestige they
commanded, Killian and George Kistiakowski,
helped reassure a shaken public that the
U. S. ballistic missile and space programs
would close the "technological gap" between
the U. S. and Soviet Union.
PROBLEMS:
No major problems other than some criticism of
their focus on defense and space-related questions.
KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Jerry Wiesner of MIT was President Kennedy's
science adviser. Some of the successes and most of
the problems of this period were a product of Wiesner's
personal and his assertive attempts to seek a bigger and
bigger role in government decision making.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
1. Provided valuable guidance leading to
the rejection of a number of Pentagon
proposals which subsequent research
has shown would have indeed been mistakes.
e.g. the Dynasoar space plane.
- 3 -
2. Introduced interests beyond space and
defense and focused on many other areas
of government scientific research such
as health.
PROBLEMS:
1. Bitter public debates with NASA over
techniques to be used in moon landing, which
became a personal struggle between Wiesner
and Wernher von Braun.
2. Alienated the scientific community by high-
handed attitude and suspicion that he was
ambitious to become the "Czar" of American
science.
3. Criticism of the Defense Department. For
example, he boasted that he could make a better
evaluation of defense development projects than
Secretary McNamara.
4. Expanded his authority to the point that
he was attempting simultaneously to be an
unbiased and impartial staff adviser as well
as director of a scientific operations unit
advocating specific programs.
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION:
President Johnson's adviser was Donald Hornig, a
chemist from Princeton. Hornig has a stormy and unfriendly
relationship with the President and therefore appears to
have had very little influence on policy.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
1. Instituted many siginificant long-range
studies, e.g. the potential of the
oceans; the world food problem; restoring
the environment.
2. In 1965 conducted the first major assessment
of the U. S. energy situation.
- 4 -
PROBLEMS:
1. Despite the predictive merit of his
proposals, Hornig had little impact because
he had no access to the President and little
standing within the White House staff.
2. As the Viet Nam war expanded, the scientific
communitie's mounting opposition to the war
made it even more difficult for Hornig to
serve as an adviser.
NIXON ADMINISTRATION:
Lee DuBridge was President Nixon's first science
adviser and was succeeded by Ed David of Bell Laboratories
in 1970. The decline of influence which began during the
Johnson Administration accelerated until 1972, when President
Nixon abolished the science adviser.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
1. Attempted to develop practical applications
of science research.
PROBLEMS:
1. Presidential Science Advisory Committee
strongly and publicly opposed SST
proposal at a time when the Administration
was actively seeking support for the SST.
2. Acquired a reputation within the White
House for generating proposals to spend
more Federal money.
3. Scientific community regarded Ed David
as lacking credentials because of his
background as an engineer.
III
JAMES R. KILLIAN, JR.
77 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139
March 20, 1975
The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Vice President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr. Vice President:
In response to your request, I have
prepared the attached list of some of the contributions
to Presidential policy-making in the Eisenhower
administration made by the Special Assistant for
Science and Technology and the President's Science
Advisory Committee. At the beginning of this list,
I have summarized the longer statement which
follows. In listing these contributions made during
the period when I was a participant, may I express
some personal views bearing on the study you are
making of proposed science advisory arrangements.
I fully recognize that present circumstances
differ from those of the Eisenhower years both in the
organization of the Presidential staff machinery and in
the diversity and complexity of the issues faced by the
President.
President Eisenhower looked to his science
advisory mechanism for assistance in the national
defense area and for supporting the work of the
National Security Council. I am aware that the
National Security Council now has staff competence
and consultant panels which are providing 2 tech-
nological dimension to the examination of national
security issues. These did not exist in the Eisenhower
period. This arrangement appears to be working
- 2 -
effectively and to have the confidence of the Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs. I personally
do not recommend that these arrangements be
supplanted by a new science and technology advisory
mechanism but I do feel that the proposals for the
new mechanism are no less essential because these
NSC panels exist. The existing NSC arrangements
have a national security policy focus on a very limited
number of problems, and I am convinced that there
are important issues involved in assuring a healthy
scientific and technological foundation for military
research and development, and the proposals of the
National Academy Committee are directed toward
providing this foundation.
I am also convinced that the scientific and
technical feasibility and soundness of major weapons
systems developments evaluated by objective panels
of the proposed advisory mechanism could serve the
needs of the President and the Office of Management
and Budget as well as the National Security Council
as the NSC might request. In my view it would be a
mistake to exclude the Science Adviser from the
national security area and from the deliberations and
studies of the National Security Council because of the
inseparability of policy and program considerations
and the special perspective and judgments that a
science advisory group could contribute to Presidential-
level discussion of national security issues.
In the Domestic Council area there is, of
course, muth greater emphasis on problems in the
civilian sector, where developments in science and
technology in many instances offer the best hope of
long-term solutions. The existence of the
Domestic Council means that there is a focus for
scientific and technological assessments of domestic
problems and an opportunity to couple scientific and
technological considerations with economic, sociological,
institutional, and political factors, all of which must
- 3 -
be brought to bear in developing options for Presi-
dential consideration. The effectiveness of the
Special Assistant for Science and Technology in
the national security area in past years was in no
small measure attributable to the existence of the
National Security Council as a mechanism for
assuring serious consideration of scientific studies.
In the latter days of the Special Assistants
and the President's Science Advisory Committee
many of the excellent, farseeing studies which were
made by the advisory setup were not systematically
considered and followed up because there was no
mechanism such as the Domestic Council and its
staff to receive and assess them. During the
Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations
there were numerous important studies made by
PSAC and its panels which dealt with environmental
matters, energy policy, and the world food problem
which could have been of great value to the adminis-
tration in the formulation of policy and the taking
of initiative in areas that later came to be of great
national concern. There was a national loss in the
fact that these farseeing studies did not receive
the necessary follow-through attention.
-
In making these observations, I am
mindful of the arguments that by strengthening the
scientific and technical capabilities of the National
Security Council, the Domestic Council, and the
Office of Management and Budget, there may be
less need for a. separate White House level science
and technology mechanism and that a separate
mechanism might have difficulty in relating its
scientific and technological analyses to the issues
as they are perceived by those staff agencies.
These arguments were carefully examined by the
National Academy of Sciences Committee on Science
and Technology, which I chaired. The membership
- 4 -
of that Committee included a former Assistant
Director of the Office of Management and Budget
and a former member of the Council of Economic
Advisers, both of whom were experienced in the
operations of the White House staff. It was the
strongly held view of the Committee that the
scientific and technical capabilities of the National
Security Council, Domestic Council, and OMB
should be strengthened and by so doing there would
be a more effective interaction achieved and a two-
way coupling between those offices and a new
science and technology mechanism. The new
mechanism proposed can look at the totality of the
nation's scientific and technical resources in rela-
tion to national needs and by having this broader
view, can help to offset a fragmented approach
occasioned by the differing missions of the execu-
tive agencies, both at operating and Presidential
staff levels.
The reasons supporting the establish-
ment of a new science and technology mechanism
have been intensively treated in the National
Academy and other excellent reports and articles
in the past year. My interest in making the for-
going observations is to emphasize a few points
arising out of the discussions which were prompted
by the Academy report.
I am in full accord with the comments
made by President Handler of the National Academy
of Sciences when he wrote you recently emphasizing
that the mission of the new science and technology
advisory mechanism which has been proposed shoul d
be to serve the needs of the President. "It should, "
as he wrote, "not bc a privileged means to represent
special interests of the scientific and technological
communities. Nor should it be a privileged advocate
- 5 -
for science and technology per se. To be useful,
its analyses must recognize the essential inter-
dependence of science, technology and fiscal,
economic, social, political, and institutional
factors in developing policy alternatives."
I am grateful for this opportunity to
provide supplemental information and to recall the
many ways in which the scientific mechanism
established by President Eisenhower served him
and successive Presidents and assisted greatly
in the formulation of sound national policies.
Yours respectfully,
Jime J. R. Killian, Jr.
JRK:ep
enclosure