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The original documents are located in Box 33, folder "Strip Mining (4)" of the James M.
Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 33 of the James M. Cannon Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
Last Day: May 20
May 19, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM :
JIM CANNON June
SUBJECT :
H.R. 25 - Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act
In response to your decision to veto H.R. 25, attached
is a proposed veto message. Frank Zarb is scheduled
to brief on the Message at 4:00 p.m. today.
Frank Zarb, Bill Seidman (Porter), Jim Lynn, Jack
Marsh, Max Friedersdorf (Leppert), the Counsel's
office (Lazarus) and I recommend approval of the
message which has been cleared by Paul Theis and
Robert Hartmann.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the veto message at Tab A.
Agree
Disagree
Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Cwa
&
ment
FORD LIBRARY is GENALD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 17, 1975
mike Dulm
MEMORANDUM FOR
DICK DUNHAM
JIM CAVANAUGH
FROM:
JIM CANNON
SUBJECT:
Strip Mining Jun Decision Paper
These are the questions the President asked in the
meeting yesterday which are not answered in the
paper presented to him:
1. On page 4, we say that eleven of the twelve
leading surface mining states, which account
for 87% of 1973 coal mining, now have their
own surface mining laws. He asked which state
does not have its. own surface mining laws.
The answer, given by John Hill, was Kentucky.
I think it would also have been helpful to name
the twelve states' which produce most of the
strip mined coal. Naming the states would
also have been helpful in determining the
job impact.
2. The President asked what was the history of what
had happened to production of coal in those states
that do have their own strip mining laws.
3. In the proposed bill, how is the pot money to be
distributed, state by state, owner by owner, or
how?
4. Why did the conferees reject the fifty-fifty cost
sharing on the land?
GEBALD FORD VIBRARY
[5/20/75]
TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
I am today returning without my approval, H.R. 25,
the proposed Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1975. I am unable to sign this bill because:
1. As many as 36,000 people would lose jobs
when unemployment already is too high.
2. Consumers would pay higher costs -- particularly
for electric bills -- when consumer costs are
already too high.
3. The Nation would be more dependent on foreign
oil -- when we are already overly dependent
and dangerously vulnerable.
4. Coal production would be unnecessarily reduced --
when this vital domestic energy resource is
needed more than ever.
America is approaching a more serious domestic energy
shortage, and we are not facing up to it.
We can develop our energy sources while protecting
our environment. But this bill does not do that. I
have supported responsible action to control surface
mining and to reclaim damaged land. I continue to
support actions which strike a proper balance between
our energy and economic goals and important environmental
objectives.
Unfortunately, H.R. 25 does not strike such a
balance.
Since I submitted my comprehensive national energy
program earlier this year -- a program which included a
tough but balanced surface mining bill -- our energy
situation has continued to deteriorate. With domestic
energy production continuing to drop, we are today more
vulnerable to the disruption of oil supplies than we were
GOAD JERANY
2
during the Mid-East oil embargo. We will be even more
vulnerable as our economy recovers and energy consumption
increases. This vulnerability places us in an untenable
situation and could result in new and serious economic
problems.
Coupled with this steadily deteriorating situation
is the fact that the Congress has yet to act on a compre-
hensive energy program capable of achieving goals on which
we all agree. Several Congressional committees have worked
hard to develop solutions. Unfortunately, their proposals
are inadequate to achieve the energy objectives I have
set.
As the one abundant energy source over which the
United States has total control, coal is critical to the
achievement of American energy independence. In the face
of our deteriorating energy situation, we must not arbi-
trarily place restrictions on the development of this
energy resource.
It is with a deep sense of regret that I find it
necessary to reject this legislation. My Administration
has worked hard with the Congress to try to develop an
acceptable surface mining bill and other energy programs
which could, when taken together, enable us to reduce
energy imports and meet environmental objectives. While
the Congress accepted in H.R. 25 some of my proposals,
it rejected others necessary to reduce the adverse impact
on coal production and to clarify various provisions of
the legislation to make it precise and more workable.
3
The Department of the Interior and the Federal
Energy Administration now advise me that, if this bill
were to become law, a production loss of 40 to 162 million
tons would result in 1977. This would mean that six to
twenty-four percent of expected 1977 coal production would
be lost. Actually, production losses resulting from H.R. 25
could run considerably higher because of ambiguities in
the bill and uncertainties over many of its provisions.
The bill I sent to the Congress in February would have
also entailed production losses estimated between 33 and
80 million tons. Even though these losses would have been
substantial, we could have accepted them if Congress had
enacted the comprehensive energy program I proposed. But,
now the potential losses of H.R. 25 are intolerable.
The reduction in coal production would mean that the
United States will be forced to import more foreign oil.
To demonstrate the seriousness of this problem, it is
estimated that we would be forced to import an additional
215 million barrels of oil a year at a cost of $2.3 billion
for every 50 million tons of coal not mined. At a time
when our dependence on Mid-East oil is expected to double
in just 2-1/2 years, I believe it would be unwise to
further increase this dependency by signing into law H.R. 25.
This kind of setback in coal production would cause our
dependence on Mid-East oil to triple by 1977.
Additional reasons for withholding approval of H.R. 25
are its legislative shortcomings. These include:
-- Ambiguous, vague and complex provisions -- as the
record of Congressional debate indicates. The bill
4
would lead to years of regulatory delays, litigation
and uncertainty against the best interest of achieving
either our environmental or energy objectives.
-- Cumbersome and unwieldy Federal-State regulatory
and enforcement provisions. H.R. 25 would inject
the Federal Government immediately into a field which
is already regulated by most states. Since 1971,
21 states which produce over 90 percent of the
nation's surface mined coal have either enacted
new environmental legislation governing surface
mining or have strengthened laws already on the
books.
-- H.R. 25's tax provisions which would be excessive
and unnecessarily increase the price of coal.
-- Its provisions which enable State governments to
ban surface mining of coal on Federal lands -- thus
preventing a national resource from being used in
the national interest.
-- Its provisions permitting the Federal government to
pay private landowners 80 percent or more of the
cost of reclaiming previously-mined land, leaving
title to the land in private hands, could provide
windfall profits at the expense of coal consumers.
To enable us to move ahead with the development of coal
production while protecting the environment, I have today
directed the Department of the Interior to proceed with the
steps necessary for the promulgation of revised regulations
covering surface mining on Federal lands.
Although the Department has had these regulations under
preparation for some time, their issuance was held up pending
Congressional action to make sure they were compatible with
SCAD
5
the new surface mining legislation. We will now proceed
with these regulations to assure reasonable and effective
environmental protection and reclamation requirements on
Federal lands.
In short, I favor action to protect the environment,
to prevent abuses that have accompanied surface mining of
coal, and to reclaim land disturbed by surface mining.
I believe that we can achieve those goals without imposing
unreasonable restraints on our ability to achieve energy
independence, without adding unnecessary costs, without
creating more unemployment and without precluding the use
of vital domestic energy resources.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
THE WHITE HOUSE
P- Hold
WASHINGTON
May 20, 1975
March
do not want
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JIM CANNON
to distribute Jun
FROM:
GLENN SCHLEEDE
SUBJECT:
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RELATING TO
STRIP MINING
1. Where would the unemployment most likely occur if
H.R. 25 were enacted?
Hardest hit would be West Virginia, Kentucky and
Southwestern Virginia -- largely because of steep
slope and siltation restrictions and because small
mine operators will find it difficult to comply with
requirements (e.g., presenting hydrological data in
order to get a mining permit).
There would be some impact in Tennessee and Western
Maryland for the same reasons as above.
There would be some impact in Wyoming and Montana
because of alluvial valley floor restrictions --
but the impact here will be less in unemployment terms
because the mining is equipment rather than worker
intensive. (100 tons per day per man compared to 32 in
Appalachia.)
2. All of the twelve leading surface coal mining states --
which account for about 87% of 1973 surface coal mining
in the Nation--now have their own surface mining laws:
Kentucky
Montana
Pennsylvania
Wyoming
Ohio
Alabama
Illinois
North Dakota
Indiana
New Mexico
West Virginia
Missouri
3. Since 1971, when Federal legislation began to be considered,
21 states -- including 11 of the 12 leading surface coal
producers -- have enacted or strengthened their surface
mining laws:
- 2 -
(Changes since 1971)
New
Tighten
State
Law
Laws
Arkansas
1971
Colorado
1973
Idaho
1971
Illinois
1971
Indiana
1974
Iowa
1973
Kansas
1974
Kentucky
1972 and 1974
Maryland
1974
Missouri
1971
Montana
1973
1974
New Mexico
1972
North Dakota
1971 and 1973
Ohio
1972
Oklahoma
1971
1972
Pennsylvania
1971
South Dakota
1971
1973
Tennessee
1972
1974
Virginia
1972
1974
West Virginia
1971
Wyoming
1973
1974
- 5 20
FYI
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 20, 1975
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
Styp TO THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
I am today returning without my approval, H.R. 25,
the proposed Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1975. I am unable to sign this bill because:
1. As many as 36,000 people would lose jobs
when unemployment already is too high.
2. Consumers would pay higher costs -- particularly
for electric bills -- when consumer costs are
already too high.
3. The Nation would be more dependent on foreign
oil -- when we are already overly dependent
and dangerously vulnerable.
4. Coal production would be unnecessarily reduced ---
when this vital domestic energy resource is
needed more than ever.
America is approaching a more serious domestic energy
shortage, and we are not facing up to it.
We can develop our energy sources while protecting
our environment. But this bill does not do that. I
have supported responsible action to control surface
mining and to reclaim damaged land. I continue to
support actions which strike a proper balance between
our energy and economic goals and important environmental
objectives.
Unfortunately, H.R. 25 does not strike such a
balance.
Since I submitted my comprehensive national energy
program earlier this year -- a program which included a
tough but balanced surface mining bill -- our energy
situation has continued to deteriorate. With domestic
energy production continuing to drop, we are today more
vulnerable to the disruption of oil supplies than we were
during the Mid-East oil embargo. We will be even more
vulnerable as our economy recovers and energy consumption
increases. This vulnerability places us in an untenable
situation and could result in new and serious economic
problems.
Coupled with this steadily deteriorating situation
is the fact that the Congress has yet to act on a compre-
hensive energy program capable of. achieving goals on which
we all agree. Several Congressional committees have worked
hard to develop solutions. Unfortunately, their proposals
are inadequate to achieve the energy objectives I have
set.
more
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
2
As the one abundant energy source over which the
United States has total control, coal is critical to the
achievement of American energy independence. In the face
of our deteriorating energy situation, we must not arbi-
trarily place restrictions on the development of this
energy resource.
It is with a deep sense of regret that I find it
necessary to reject this legislation. My Administration
has worked hard with the Congress to try to develop an
acceptable surface mining bill and other energy programs
which could, when taken together, enable us to reduce
energy imports and meet environmental objectives. While
the Congress accepted in H.R. 25 some of my proposals,
it rejected others necessary to reduce the adverse impact
on coal production and to clarify various provisions of
the legislation to make it precise and more workable.
The Department of the Interior and the Federal
Energy Administration now advise me that, if this bill
were to become law, a production loss of 40 to 162 million
tons would result in 1977. This would mean that six to
twenty-four percent of expected 1977 coal production would
be lost. Actually, production losses resulting from H.R. 25
could run considerably higher because of ambiguities in
the bill and uncertaintiés over many of its provisions.
The bill I sent to the Congress in February would have
also entailed production losses estimated between 33 and
80 million tons. Even though these losses would have been
substantial, we could have accepted them if Congress had
enacted the comprehensive energy program I proposed. But,
now the potential losses of H.R. 25 are intolerable.
The reduction in coal production would mean that the
United States will be forced to import more foreign oil.
To demonstrate the seriousness of this problem, it is
estimated that we would be forced to import an additional
215 million barrels of oil a year at a cost of $2.3 billion
for every 50 million tons of coal not mined. At a time
when our dependence on Mid East oil is expected to double
in just 2-1/2 years, I believe it would be unwise to
further increase this dependency by signing into law H.R. 25.
This kind of setback in coal production would cause our
dependence on Mid-East oil to triple by 1977.
Additional reasons for withholding approval of H.R. 25
are its legislative shortcomings. These include:
-- Ambiguous, vague and complex provisions -- as the
record of Congressional debate indicates. The bill
would lead to years of regulatory delays, litigation
and uncertainty against the best interests of achieving
either our environmental or energy objectives.
- Cumbersome and unwieldy Federal -State regulatory
and enforcement provisions. H.R. 25 would inject
the Federal Government immediately into a field which
is already regulated by most states. Since 1971,
21 states which produce over 90 percent of the
nation's surface mined coal have either enacted
new environmental legislation governing surface
mining or have strengthened laws already on the
books.
more
3
-- H.R. 25's tax provisions which would be excessive
and unnecessarily increase the price of coal.
-- Its provisions which enable State governments to
ban surface mining of coal on Federal lands -- thus
preventing a national resource from being used in
the national interest.
-- Its provisions permitting the Federal government to
pay private landowners 80 percent or more of the
cost of reclaiming previously-mined land, leaving
title to the land in private hands, could provide
windfall profits at the expense of coal consumers.
In short, I favor action to protect the environment,
to prevent abuses that have accompanied surface mining of
coal, and to reclaim land disturbed by surface mining.
I believe that we can achieve those goals without imposing
unreasonable restraints on our ability to achieve energy
independence, without adding unnecessary costs, without
creating more unemployment and without precluding the use
of vital domestic energy resources.
GERALD R. FORD
THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 20, 1975.
# # #
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 28, 1975
TO:
JIM CAVANAUGH
FROM:
MIKE DUVAL
For your information
Comments:
Please do not distribute
outside the White House.
mine, work
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR
BOB WOLTHIUS
FROM
MIKE DUVAL
SUBJECT:
STRIP MINING VETO
The following is a summary of action items which were
assigned at today's meeting chaired by Max.
Responsible
Deadline
Item
Person
5/28
Distribute Counsel's Office
Duval
anti-lobby memo.
5/29
Prepare list of additional
Falk
governors, mayors, etc. who
support veto. Submit to
Vern Loen.
5/30
Set up briefing for outside
Baroody
groups - plan for June 3-10
time frame.
5/30
Reply substantively to Udall/
Lazarus/Hill
Mink letter. State that Zarb
will represent Administration.
6/2 (noon)
Prepare briefing package on
Hill/Carlson
1) Strip mining and overall
in coordination
energy policy
with CEA, Labor,
2) Production impact
Commerce
3) Unemployment impact
4) Consumer prices
Each package should contain:
A) One-page summary
B) Two- to four-page Fact Sheet
C) Short narrative argument
FORD LIBRARY j 938870
2
6/2
(noon)
Distribute briefing package to:
Duval
Friedersdorf, et al.
Warren
Baroody
FEA (Hill)
Interior (Carlson)
Falk
Senior W. H. Staff
Cabinet (via Connor)
6/2
Prepare brief paper describing
Hill
Inflation Impact Statement for
President's bill and H.R. 25.
6/2 (p.m.)
Friedersdorf and Zarb brief
Friedersdorf/
minority members of Senate
Zarb
and House Committee.
6/2
Press mailer and backgrounders
Warren
6/3
Hearings
Friedersdorf/
Zarb
6/5
President meets with GOP
Friedersdorf
Leadership.
6/8
Present our position at
Falk
National Governors Conference
meeting.
NOTE: After the hearings on June 3, we should
plan to meet again on strategy from then
up to the vote. (Max may want a meeting
on Monday, June 2.)
CC:
Seidman
Baroody
Cavanaugh
Warren
Lazarus
O'Neill
Hill and Frizzell (advised by telephone)
file
FEDERAL ENERGY
FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION
ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20461
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
May 31, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
SUBJECT:
STRIP MINING TESTIMONY
FROM:
JOHN HILL John G. Nico
Attached is a first draft of Frank's testimony for
the Udall strip mining hearings. I need your
comments by 1:00 today in order to complete a second
cut on the testimony by tonight.
Attachment
Addressees:
Jim Lynn
can
Jim Cannon
Mike Duval
Max Friedersdorf
Charles Leppert
Glenn Schleede
Jack Marsh
Jack Carlson
Ray Peck
Tom Falkie
FORD & LIBRARY CERALD
Mr. Chairman:
It is a privilege to be with you today to discuss the reasons
why the President believes that enactment of H.R. 25 would be
against the National interest.
I would like to make several general points at the outset,
because I feel it is important that people realize that
Congress and the Administration share certain views on this
legislation. My first point relates to statements made in
a letter of May 23 from the Chairman and three other members
of the Subcommittee and Representative Mink, Chairperson of
the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining, to their colleagues.
I quote:
"A number of Members who had formerly supported the bill
were concerned with the assertions that enactment of the
legislation would result in the loss of thousands of jobs,
drive up electric utility bills, and preclude the production
of millions of tons of coal."
"Those of us who are close to the development of this
legislation are certain that these charges cannot be
substantiated--our support would be irresponsible if they
could be--and during the next two weeks we will be attempting
to set the record straight."
I could not agree more with the desire that we all act
responsibly. In fact, we hope that these hearings will set
the record straight, and you will see, Mr. Chairman, that the
President vetoed this bill because he felt that to do otherwise
would be irresponsible. The facts and figures that we and
- 2 -
others will present during these hearings should, we feel,
convince you that the responsible course has been taken.
I wish to make one preliminary point. It has been suggested
publicly that this Administration is prepared to tolerate
continuation of environmental abuses that have resulted from
surface mining in the past. That is simply not the case.
The Administration first submitted legislation to impose
minimum Federal standards on surface mining in 1971. Since
then, on numerous occasions in testimony, in correspondence
and in countless conferences with members and staff of this
Committee and its counterparts in the Senate we have stressed
our commitment to the enactment of measures to balance the
compelling environmental and energy considerations involved
in the surface mining of coal.
As recently as February 6, 1975, the President transmitted
to Congress proposed surface mining legislation. In submitting
that legislation, the President specifically identified the
areas of difference between S. 425 and our proposal and
stressed the overwhelming importance of these areas in terms
of lost coal production, unemployment and other adverse
economic impacts.
Notwithstanding this detailed review of the deficiencies of
S. 425, the Congress passed H.R. 25, which would, in many
respects, have had even greater adverse impacts than S. 425.
- 3 -
I am here today to discuss that impact. In doing so, I
must again point out that, in some areas, it is not
quantifiable. For example, there is the issue of coal
miners' health and safety -- an issue of American lives.
Surface mining is intrinsically safer than deep mining.
No one gets black-lung in a strip mine, and the fatalities
in strip mines are at most half what they are underground.
Moreover, differing interpretations of specific language
in H.R. 25 by regulatory authorities and courts could result
in varying degrees of adverse impacts in virtually every area.
As a result, even our most precise estimates must be set
forth as ranges of possible impact rather than as projections
of concrete effects.
Before proceeding to specific provisions of H.R. 25, I wish
to make the further observation in regard to the problem of
interpreting certain of its provisions. Ambiguous language--
and there is a lot of it in H.R. 25 -- breeds litigation,
because the courts are the ultimate arbiters of the
conflicting claims of individual citizens.
Ambiguous language, thus, forces the courts to legislate,
and, while a district court in California may rule one way,
its counterpart in New York may rule another. Then each is
subject to being overruled by its respective Court of Appeals,
and ultimately, after years of uncertainty, by the Supreme
Court.
- 4 -
Recent history -- the case of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline,
for example -- demonstrates how long these periods of
confusion can last. And we cannot afford seven years of
deferred coal production while we wait for the courts to
thrash out problems that should be resolved at the
legislative, not the judicial, stage in the first place.
And recent history -- the case of the "non-significant
deterioration" language of the Clean Air Act, for example --
demonstrates that the courts generally gravitate toward
the more rigid possible interpretations of ambiguous
language -- interpretations that may be far more inflexible
than Congress intended.
Now, as to the specifics of H.R. 25 and our views on its
impact.
On May 23, 1975, Dr. Thomas Falkie submitted to Chairman
Metcalf of the Senate Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials
and Fuels an analysis of the adverse impact that we predict
if H.R. 25 were to become law. I understand that copies of
this material have been distributed to the Committee, but
I would like to submit it at this time for the record.
In general, the low range of our estimates represents the
adverse impact we expect if the bill were to be interpreted
loosely, that is, if its provisions were interpreted in ways
- 5 -
that would minimize production losses, economic costs and
mine closures. The high range of estimates represents those
losses that we would expect if a strict, literal interpre-
tation and vigorous implementation were given to each
provision.
In brief, we have estimated that from 40 to 162 million tons
of annual coal production would be lost during the first full
year of implementation. Losses would occur in three general
categories: reduced production or closures of small mines,
delays or prohibitions arising from the steep slope.. , siltation
and aquifer protection provisions, and bans on mining
operations in alluvial valley floors.
Each of these items is identified in Dr. Falkie's submission
to Senator Metcalf, and he is here today prepared to discuss
them in more detail. I will, however, discuss each of them
briefly.
First, small mines. In preparing our estimates, we have
classified as "small," mines with annual production of 50,000
tons or less. As noted by the Council on Environmental
Quality in its report to Congress in 1973, at that level of
production a mine's capital availability, cash flow and
technical resources are limited. As a result, operators of
this size would simply not be able to bear the front-end costs
of applying for and obtaining permits to mine.
- 6 -
Faced with this inability to obtain a permit, many such mines
would be required to close. Our estimate is that 40% of
projected production from small mines would be precluded under
.H.R. 25, with the principal impact in the East. As the
Council on Environmental Quality pointed out, such mines
accout for up to 56% of current production in some states of
the Appalachia region. I might also note here that these
losses attributed to small mines, which I have just mentioned,
are not included in the loss estimates that I will be
discussing during the remainder of my testimony.
With respect to provisions concerning steep slopes, siltation
and acquifer protection, we have estimated losses ranging
from seven to 44 million tons in the first full year of
implementation. Strict interpretation and application of
H.R. 25's steep slope provisions alone would result in loss
of production from virtually every mine operation on slopes
in excess of 20 degrees -- loss totalling from seven to
25 million tons. Much of this loss is, in our view, unnecessary.
With appropriate environmental restrictions, some variances
from the absolute requirements of H.R. 25 could be provided
that would greatly reduce production losses, without
environmental danger.
The aquifer protection provided by H.R. 25 is also set forth
in absolute terms. Consequently, a literal interpretation of
- 7 -
these provisions could result in termination of all production
near aquifer-fed water sources. We estimate that nine million
tons of actual and projected production is subject to such
a possible ban. Allowing individual operations to accommodate
individual circumstances at individual mine sites could
greatly reduce the losses that this provision might entail.
Earlier versions of this legislation prohibited absolutely
any increase in normal siltations levels during or after
mining operations. Congress recognized the impossibility of
achieving this result and modified the siltation provisions
of H.R. 25 accordingly.
However, a serious problem still remains. As now drafted,
the bill would require operators to use any technology that
exists and that could prevent siltation. Such a requirement
is unrealistic, for it could require operators to apply
technology that, although theoretically available, could be
prohibitively expensive, even to prevent relatively
insignificant siltation. And, again, the bill's lack of
flexibility could result in closures where environmental
concerns could, in fact, be accommodated with continued
production.
Finally, we estimate that the various provisions of H.R. 25
related to alluvial valley floors would cost us from 11 to
- 8 -
66 million tons of coal production during its first full
year of implementation.
It should be noted that what we are dealing with here is a
possible ban on the mining of certain coal. And our experts
tell us that in virtually all of the geological areas involved,
surface mining is the only possible method of extraction.
We are not dealing with mere reductions in production levels,
or closures of mines which might afterwards be reopened.
We are talking about locking away from
to
billion tons
of coal -- placing it permanently off-limits for any and all
surface mining. Thus, the effect of these provisions will be
permanent losses both of production and of reserves.
The fairly wide range of these estimates derives from the fact
that our lawyers are unable to predict how regulatory
authorities or courts would interpret H.R. 25 and its
legislative history. We can not say whether a court would
conclude that an area such as the Powder River Basin is
"undeveloped range land," and thus not subject to the bill's
prohibitions, or whether it would consider this area to be
"potential" farming or ranching land and thus off-limits
for surface mining. Under the first interpretation, a great
proportion of the Powder River Basin would be covered by the
exclusion, and open for mining. Under the latter interpreta-
tion, rexperts tell us that a virtual ban on mining our
great western coal deposits could arise.
- 9 -
This question -- although critically important -- cannot be
resolved on the face of the bill or its legislative history.
But this is only one difficulty of many in interpreting the
language of H.R. 25. In addition to prohibiting mining on
alluvial valley floors, it would prohibit mining that would
have an adverse effect on farming or ranching operations that
are themselves located on such floors. The impact of this
language is even more difficult to assess and proper
interpretation would depend upon the individual geologic
and hydrologic conditions of a given proposed operation.
However, H.R. 25 places the burden of proving the absence
of any such adverse impact upon the applicant for a permit.
Based upon all of these consideration, we estimate a
production loss attributable to alluvial valley floor
provisions ranging from 11 to 66 million tons and a reserve
loss of from 17 to 26 billion tons permanently locked into
the ground.
Our experts have reviewed these figures in detail. They
have made on-site inspections and have analyzed closely the
provisions of the bill. We consider these loss estimates to
be extremely conservative.
In addition to these concerns, there is another, very broad
concern that the President has expressed: Given our present
- 10 -
national energy situation, we must move with extreme caution
as we seek to balance our national objectives. If we take
away from our domestic energy supplies, we must know precisely
how much we are subtracting. And we must find ways to make
up for losses in one area with additional supplies from
another. If we do not -- or if no domestic substitutes are
available -- our imports will continue to rise and our
national energy situation will deteriorate even further.
To date, no comprehensive energy program has been enacted
that will significantly curb consumption. Nor has Congress
turned its attention to measures that will assure the
development of other domestic sources that could offset the
coal production lost because of H.R. 25,
This Nation cannot afford to reduce the availability of our
one abundant domestic energy resource until and unless we
have another to replace it.
We cannot continue the past practice of making piecemeal
decisions and calling them policy.
I would like now to point out some of the consequences that
the Nation will have to suffer if such losses are, in fact,
incurred.
You all know the magnitude and scope of this Nation's energy
problem. Even under the most optimistic circumstances --
assuming Congressional enactment of the President's entire
- 11 -
legislative program and crude oil price decontrol -- we will
still be importing about five million barrels of oil per day
in 1985. With no action on our energy program, we will be
importing more than half the oil we consume, or more than
12 million barrels per day.
No matter what projections are used, one thing is clear --
we will have to greatly expand coal production in the next
ten years. This expansion must occur steadily during this
period if our 1985 goals are to be reached. Coal will be
needed in new and existing powerplants, for direct burning
in some areas, and in a growing synthetic fuel industry.
In the long-run coal will be the essential element to be
converted to liquids and gases for industrial and utility use.
If the strong national energy program proposed by the
President were enacted by the Congress, we could withstand
the losses of coal production that would result from this
bill. The President's conservation and domestic supply actions
would substantially reduce our need for imported oil. But
without such an energy program, the loss of even 40 million
tons of coal per year -- at the low end of our estimate
spectrum -- would increase imports by more than 400,000
barrels per day -- and, at the high end lost production could
mean more than 1.5 million barrels a day in increased imports.
An increase of imports of this magnitude would have to come
- 12 -
from the Middle East - where still higher prices are already
being discussed and where the danger of another embargo
remains very real. Even at current prices such an increase
in imports of Middle East oil would require an additional
$1.9 to 7.8 billion a year.
Still another dimension of the problem lies in what it would
do to other national priorities. One year ago Congress passed,
and the President signed, the Energy Supply and Environmental
Coordination Act. The Administration is firmly committed to
carry out the ESECA mandate, which aims at increasing coal
use in certain power plants and other major fuel-burning
installations. We hope, and believe, that Congress shares
our commitment to this goal. But I must add that ESECA would
be rendered a worthless piece of paper were this bill to become
law. Nor are these the only effects that we would suffer.
For each 10 mine jobs lost, a minimum of an additional eight
jobs would be lost in other sectors of the economy dependent
upon the mining industry. Applying this factor to projected
production losses and manpower efficiency rates applicable
to such losses, we have concluded that from 9,000 to 36,000
jobs would, in fact, be lost as a result of implementation
of H.R. 25.
Two other specific points should be mentioned in this regard.
First, we would expect resulting unemployment to be
concentrated in certain areas and to be especially severe
- 13 -
in Appalachia. New jobs created nationwide in reclamation
efforts could not offset these regional disparities.
Second, to the extent that reclamation activities funded
by H.R. 25 would create jobs, they would do so only at the
expense of other jobs. The reclamation fee would withdraw
significant funds from the economy and reduce employment
elsewhere accordingly. To the extent that these funds
remained unspent in the Federal Treasury, there would be a
direct recesionary impact. To the extent that they were
expended for reclamation purposes, the jobs created would
only replace those destroyed, and any actual offset would
be minimal.
It has been suggested that the shift to underground mining
would create more jobs and offset unemployment of surface
miners. However, as the Council on Environmental Quality
has pointed out, long lead-times and major capital outlays
are required to open or expand underground mines. As a
result, any offset from this source would be years away.
Moreover, as the CEQ : has also noted, the skills required
for surface mining are drastically different from those
required for underground mining. Substantial retraining of
surface mine personnel would be required before they could
work in deep mines.
Underground mining is less efficient in terms of mineral
- 14 -
removal and manpower efficiency. Thus, the costs of such
mining would be substantially greater than those of surface
mining operations.
And, finally, while substantial progress in underground
mine safety has been made, the fact remains -- as I mentioned
earlier -- that underground mining is more dangerous than
surface mining and involves more than twice the risk of
accidents and injuries associated with surface mining.
For all these reasons, the Administration believes that this
bill would preclude the possibility of achieving true balance
among important national objectives for energy, our economy,
our environment and our national security. It has been
called an "anti-energy" bill, but its negative impact is much
broader than that.
We cannot expect the American people to suffer the effects
of such a bill at a time when we are asking them to bear the
burdens of stringent energy conservation and endure the
continuing effects of this Nation's worst recession in more
than a quarter of a century. In the absence of a comprehen-
sive energy program, this bill would only serve to put
thousands of people out of work, add to consumer costs, cut
our energy supplies, and sustain and increase our current
unacceptable reliance upon insecure foreign sources of oil.
It is a bill that runs directly contrary to our National
interests.
- 15 -
Mr. Chairman, I consider this only a brief outline of the
objections and problems which compelled the President to
veto H.R. 25. Many additional issues could and should be
discussed if our efforts here today are seriously concerned
with responsible action. We must consider realistically:
-To what extent would the states, in fact, designate
land areas unsuitable for mining?
-To what extent could H.R. 25 allow frivolous petitions
to operate as an additional obstacle to the granting
of a mining permit after it has been applied for?
-To what extent would the states be able to implement
programs within the narrow time constraints of the
bill, and how much time would an operator have to bring
an existing operation into line with the terms and
conditions of a new permit?
-How many operations presently planned would be
classified as "new" instead of as existing operations
and therefore be subject immediately to the more
stringent, permanent standards set forth in the bill?
-To what extent would the owners of surface lands
overlying Federal coal deposits simply refuse to allow
the mining of coal belonging to the Nation?
-To what extent would the states be able to prevent
development of coal reserves on Federal lands within
their borders?
- 16 -
-To what extent would small mines be forced to close or
sell out to large companies that are able to bear
increased capital and operating costs? And is such an
incentive to market concentration desirable?
-To what extent would the bill affect Clean Air Act
objectives in terms of low-sulfur coal production and
our ongoing efforts to convert oil and gas burning
facilities to the use of coal without unacceptable
environmental risks.
Mr. Chairman, these questions are not frivolous, and they
cannot be ignored. Each derives from ambiguities or
uncertainties in the language of the bill or in its legis-
lative history, and any or all could present questions of
public policy and national security at least as grave as
those issues that I have covered in this statement. In our
view, the Nation simply cannot afford to run the risks
inherent in a regulatory program as important, and as
uncertain, as that contained in H.R. 25.
Coal is the only major domestic resource upon which we can
rely as a secure source of energy in the coming decades.
This bill would have a direct, immediate and long term impact
upon the availability of this resource.
We firmly believe that adequate legislation can be drafted
that will balance environmental concerns with energy needs --
- 17 -
without the uncertainties so clearly present in H.R. 25
and without the burdens that it so clearly would place on
American workers and American consumers. We urge Congress
to proceed with that task.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 2, 1975
24
MEMORANDUM FOR
JIM CANNON
THROUGH:
DICK DUNHAM
Ro
FROM:
MIKE DUVAL
SUBJECT:
STRIP MINING DECISION PAPER
The following are the answers to the questions you raised
in your memo of May 17 (see Tab A).
1. The following States, listed in order of production,
mine 87% of the coal in this country: Kentucky, West
Virginia, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Virginia,
Indiana, Wyoming, Alabama, Montana, New Mexico, Texas.
Of these twelve, only Texas presently has no State
regulation of surface coal mining. Only Montana's
law is comparable to the environmental and administra-
tive provisions of H.R. 25. West Virginia, Pennsylvania,
Ohio, Indiana and Wyoming have laws which approach the
environmental provisions of H.R. 25.
See Tab B for a State-by-State analysis.
2. In general, when a tough State strip mining law was
enacted, there occurred. a sharp dip in production. The
Interior Department advises me that we really do not
have sufficient information, on a long-term basis, to
make a prediction on the production impact of H.R. 25
based on experience with State laws. Often the impact
of the State law is obscured by other events such as pres-
sure to increase strip mining because of the quadrupling
of oil prices. Also, State enforcement is a critical factor.
3. Briefly, the funds in H.R. 25 are distributed as follows:
Twenty percent of the money deposited in the abandoned
mine reclamation fund is available to the Secretary of
Agriculture for use in entering into agreements with
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
2
landowners for reclamation of rural lands. The
landowner retains title to the reclaimed property.
The grants are up to 80% Federal funds, and the
Secretary is authorized to further reduce the
matching cost share if the landowner-grantee is
unable to bear such costs, or if the main benefits
of the project would occur off-site.
Eighty percent of the reclamation fund is available
to the Secretary of the Interior for Federal acquisi-
tion and Federal grants to States for State acquisi-
tion of eligible land. Reclamation work on such
acquired lands could be performed by either the
Federal government or by contract with State and
local governments, or with private persons. Once
reclaimed, the land could be sold by the Secretary
under certain specific criteria and no less than fair
market value. However, the land could be transferred
to a person, with or without monetary consideration,
in areas of rapid development of coal resources.
The bill also authorizes the Secretary of Interior
to make annual grants to any State to reimburse them
for their total cost of implementing this bill during
the initial regulatory period. These grants would be
up to 80% during the first year, 60% the second year,
40% the third and fourth years, at which time they
are phased out.
4.
Although the Administration recommended a 50-50 cost
sharing between the Federal and State governments, this
was not pushed in the latest letter from the President
to Congress. It was not listed in the summary of critical
changes or other important changes which were attached to
his letter. The issue was never considered by either the
Senate or House Interior Committees, during the floor
debate, nor during the deliberations of the conferees.
TAB A
To: Mike Duval
THE WHITE HOUSE
Proparedreply
WASHINGTON
pls.
May 17, 1975
V
MEMORANDUM FOR
DICK DUNHAM
Received
JIM CAVANAUGH
5/29/75
FROM:
SUBJECT:
JIM Strip CANNON Mining m
Decision Paper
These are the questions the President asked in the
meeting yesterday which are not answered in the
paper presented to him:
1. On page 4, we say that eleven of the twelve
leading surface mining states, which account
for 87% of 1973 coal mining, now have their
own surface mining laws. He asked which state
does not have its own surface mining laws.
The answer, given by John Hill, was Kentucky.
I think it would also have been helpful to name
the twelve states which produce most of the
strip mined coal. Naming the states would
also have been helpful in determining the
job impact.
2. The President asked what was the history of what
had happened to production of coal in those states
that do have their own strip mining laws.
3. In the proposed bill, how is the pot money to be
distributed, state by state, owner by owner, or
how?
4. Why did the conferees reject the fifty-fifty cost
sharing on the land?
TAB B
A concise state- by-state analysis is set torth below:
(1) Kentucky - The State law does not approach the environmental
and administrative provisions of H.R. 25. Permits, reclamation plans,
and bonds are required, however, and water quality and revegetation
requirements exist. Steep slope restrictions are limited and there is
a small scale abandoned mine reclamation program.
2. West Virginia - The state law approaches the environmental
provisions of H.R. 25. Permits, reclamation plans and bonds are
required. A limited abandoned mine reclamation program has been
operative for a decade.
3. Pennsylvania - The State law approaches the environmental pro-
visions of H.R. 25. The bonding provisions. of the state law are
also quite similar and permits and reclamation plans are required.
Terracing is permitted. Old mining sites are reclaimed on a
limited scale.
4. Illinois - The State law does not approach the environmental and
administrative provisions of H.R. 25. Permits, reclamation plans,
and bonds are required, however, and water quality requirements
exist. There is no abandoned mine reclamation program.
5. Ohio - The State law approaches the environmental provisions of
H.R. 25. Permits, reclamation plans, and bonds are required. A
state severance tax of 4¢/ton of coal exists, but an abandoned
mine reclamation program has not yet started.
FORD is LIBRARY GFRALD
6. Virginia - The State law does not approach the environmental
and administrative provisions of H.R. 25. Permits, reclamation
plans, and bonds are required, however, and general regrading and
revegetation requirements exist. There are no specific steep
slope requirements. An abandoned mine reclamation program has
been authorized. but is unfunded.
7. Indiana - The state law approaches the environmental provisions
of H.R. 25. Permits, reclamation plans, and bonds are required,
however, and lands have been inventoried in preparation for an
abandoned mine reclamation program.
8. Wyoming - The state law approaches the environmental provisions
of H.R. 25. Permits, reclamation plans, and bonds are required.
There is no abandoned mine reclamation program.
9. Alabama - The state law does not approach the environmental
and administrative provisions of H.R. 25. Permits and reclama-
tion plans are required, but bonds are very limited. Water
quality and revegetation requirements exist, but there are no
specific steep slope requirements. An abandoned mine reclamation
fund is just getting underway.
10. Montana - The state law approaches the environmental and adminis-
trative provisions of H.R. 25. There is no abandoned mine
reclamation program.
11. New Mexico - The state law does not approach the environmental
and administrative provisions of H.R. 25. Permits and reclama-
tion plans are required, but bonds are discretionary. Grading,
water quality, and revegetation requirements exist. There is no
abandoned mine reclamation program.
12. Texas - There is no state law regulating surface and mining
and such legislation has been defeated during the last two
sessions of the legislature.
Fill
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
JUNE Strip 10, 1975 minnig
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY
The President today expressed satisfaction with the House vote
sustaining his veto of H. R. 25. He further indicated his strong
commitment to the principles of reclamation and of preventing
the abuses that have accompanied surface mining in the past. He
is hopeful that Congress and the Administration can sit down on
this issue and develop a program that will assure a proper balance
between our environmental energy and economic goals and adequately
reflect not only the rights of the States in this area but also the
tremendous progress the States have made with their own laws over
the past several years.
###
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 22, 1976
TO:
MAX FRIEDERSDORF
FROM:
GLENN SCHLEEDE
has
As requested.
H Seen
CC: Jim Cannon
Jim Cavanaugh
Art Quern
agree
STRIP MINING - TALKING POINTS
I understand that John Melcher will seek a rule today for
his strip mining bill (H.R. 9725). My people tell me that:
- His bill represents no significant improvement over
the bill I have vetoed twice.
- John (Melcher) may propose some floor amendments but,
thus far, the amendments are largely cosmetic.
- EPA, Interior and FEA are reviewing the production loss
estimates and there is, thus far, no major change from
the 40-162 - million tons estimated for the vetoed bill.
(Melcher is considering amendments to grandfather
certain existing mines which, if passed, could reduce
the high end of the range by about 30 million tons, but
with no impact on the low end.)
- There has been no improvement in the administrative
workability of the bill. The bill still has ambiguous,
vague, and complex provisions that would lead to liti-
gation, regulatory delays and major uncertainties about
the bill's impact -- including production losses in
addition to the 40-162 million ton estimate above.
If the bill were enacted, we would be faced with the same
problems as before:
- Near-term coal production losses.
- Related job losses, particularly in Appalachia.
- More pressure to increase oil imports.
- Higher consumer prices -- not just for higher production
and reclamation costs, but also where it is necessary to
switch to imported oil.
- A new Federal regulatory bureaucracy.
Also, when considering this bill, we should keep in mind
that several changes have occurred since strip mining
legislation was first proposed in 1971:
- All 26 of the states with surface mining now have
their own laws and regulations. (24 are either
new or tighter since 1971).
- Interior Department will soon issue its regulations
covering strip mining and reclamation on Federal lands.
- We now know the risk of dependence on foreign oil.
- We recognize that further expansion of the Federal
regulatory bureaucracy is undesirable -- particularly
where it displaces state efforts.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 10, 1976
JIM CAVANAUGH
Gust But notice for
Geor Thank
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
GEORGE W. HUMPHREYS
SUBJECT:
Strip Mining Regulations --
next
Department of the Interior
time
its.
On Tuesday, May 11, 1976, at 10 a.m., Secretary Kleppe
will announce a new set of Departmental regulations on
strip mining of coal.
Jun
This is a major step by the Administration to ensure
our ability to get at this energy resource on public lands
while trying to preserve the environmental values.
The States and industry people do not basically object,
and CEQ and EPA have written comments of approval on
the new regulations. I expect the organized environmental
groups to attack the regs as not being stringent enough.
CC:
Jim Cannon
Art Quern
FORD is LIBRARY 070838
September 16, 1976
JMC
Charley Leppert's office called -- Congressman
Delaney voted WITH US on strip mining yesterday.
Jeanne
FORD & LIBRARY 038830