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The original documents are located in Box D8, folder "Ford Press Releases - Foreign
Affairs, 1968" of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the
Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box D8 of The Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
February 5, 1968
The Johnson Administration apparently is getting ready to "confess" to
North Korea that the Navy intelligence vessel, the Pueblo, intruded into North
Korean territorial waters.
This comes as a shock to members of Congress who have relied upon earlier
statements by the Administration and by our ambassador to the United Nations,
Arthur J. Goldberg, flatly asserting that the Pueblo had not intruded upon the
territorial waters of North Korea.
What is the truth? Members of Congress have called for a full congressional
investigation of the Pueblo affair. A congressional investigation must include
testimony by the skipper of the Pueblo and the members of the crew upon their
release. This apparently is the only way the Congress can learn the truth
about the course of the Pueble.
The explanations given by Secretary of Defense McNamara for the lack of
protection and lack of U.S. response to the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo
indicates that capture of other U.S. intelligence ships by fifth-rate Communist
powers could become almost an everyday occurrence.
Such an explanation for the lack of protection for the Pueblo and lack of
resistance to capture demands a thoroughgoing review and overhaul of our policy
regarding operation of U.S. spy ships.
###
FORD 2 LIBRARY 97V839
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
February 5, 1968
The Johnson Administration apparently is getting ready to "confess" to
North Korea that the Navy intelligence vessel, the Pueblo, intruded into North
Korean territorial waters.
This comes as a shock to members of Congress who have felied upon earlier
statements by the Administration and by our ambassador to the United Nations,
Arthur J. Goldberg, flatly asserting that the Pueblo had not intruded upon the
territorial waters of North Korea.
What is the truth? Members of Congress have called for a full congressional
investigation of the Pueblo affair. A congressional investigation must include
testimony by the skipper of the Pueblo and the members of the crew upon their
release. This apparently is the only way the Congress can learn the truth
about the course of the Pueblo.
The explanations given by Secretary of Defense McNamara for the lack of
protection and lack of U.S. response to the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo
indicates that capture of other U.S. intelligence ships by fifth-rate Communist
powers could become almost an everyday occurrence.
Such an explanation for the lack of protection for the Pueblo and lack of
resistance to capture demands a thoroughgoing review and overhaul of our policy
regarding operation of U.S. spy ships.
###
GERATE R.FORD LIBRARY
Office
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
April 3, 1968
Statement by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, R-Mich., re: Hanoi response
The public announcement by Hanoi Radio that North Vietnam is willing to
"make contact with U.S. representatives" obviously is a response to the peace
initiative launched by President Johnson last Sunday night.
I am hopeful that it is a step--however tiny--toward peace. It is, never-
theless, only a beginning--and a small beginning--in the long trek toward an
honorable peace in Vietnam.
Certainly all Americans should unite behind President Johnson in his efforts
to bring about an honorable settlement of the Vietnam conflict. I do not think
it is helpful for any American to criticize the President for not having ordered
a complete halt in the bombing of North Vietnam. He could not have done so with-
out endangering the lives of U.S. fighting men in forward positions near the
so-called Demilitarized Zone.
It is true, however, that the President's description of the bombing
limitation was vague and led to some confusion. It now turns out that the 20th
parallel is the bombing halt line. Had the President made this clear last Sunday
night, it would also have become clear that he was proposing a carefully staged
de-escalation of the Vietnam War as urged by Rep. F. Bradford Morse and a number
of other House Republicans last July 10. In my view, the peace initiative currently
underway is a bipartisan peace initiative based on a Republican peace plan which
was suggested almost a year ago. I am pleased that we have had some response to
it from Hanoi.
We must be ever mindful that in Korea the fighting continued for nearly two
years while negotiations were being conducted at Panmunjom. More Americans were
killed after the talks began than before. This should temper any optimism until
we see more meaningful results--although all Americans hope this is the first
step toward peace.
# # #
othere
Cabel
REPUBLICAN
REpublican NATiONAL COMMiTTEE
AMERICAL COMMITTEE
1625 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
NATIONAL 8-6800
NEWS
FOR RELEASE
FRIDAY AM's
April 5, 1968
REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS FIVE-POINT PLAN
FOR DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE
The Repulican Coordinating Committee recommended today a five-point program
to guide United States policy in dealing with the problem of Communist-dominated
Eastern Europe, with the ultimate goal in view of self-determination for Eastern
European peoples.
The proposals of the GOP policy group are embodied in a 12-page report,
recently approved and released today by Republican National Chairman Ray C. Bliss.
The report criticizes the "inconsistency" of the present Democratic Administration's
policy of trying to "build bridges" to European Communism over the heads of
Western European allies, while fighting a war to prevent Communist expansion in
Asia.
Pointing to the "current lack of cohesion" among allies of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the Coordinating Committee said:
"The Democratic Administration's proclivity for trying to 'build bridges' over
the heads of our European allies has encouraged by example the other NATO nations
to undertake their own bilateral negotiations with the East.
"This practice has undermined European confidence in U.S. sincerity and
leadership, and unwittingly served the fundamental Communist goal of disrupting
the North Atlantic partnership."
-MORE-
-2-
Recalling that all Communist governments in Eastern Europe came into power
through the Russian military presence, and that "none has ever dared hold a free
election," the Republican policy-makers recommended the following program to guide
the United States in dealing with the present Eastern European problem:
1. "The United States should never abandon as its basic goal the right to
self-determination for the peoples of Eastern Europe."
2. "The United States should seek to develop a coordinated Western policy
toward Eastern Europe."
3. "The United States should not grant political concessions to the Communist
regimes of Eastern Europe without a quid pro quo."
4. "The United States should make enlightened self-interest the foundation
stone of its economic and trade policy toward Eastern Europe."
5. "Tourism and cultural exchanges between the people of the United States and
the peoples of Eastern Europe should be expanded if possible."
The report adopted by the Coordinating Committee was prepared by its Task Force
on the Conduct of Foreign Relations, of which former Ambassador Robert C. Hill is
Chairman. The basic work on the report was done by a Subcommittee of the Task
Force headed by Nicholas Nyaradi, Director of the School of International Studies
of Bradley University, who was Under Secretary of the Treasury in the Hungarian
Government in 1946 and Minister of Finance in the Hungarian Cabinet in 1947 and 1948.
The Coordinating Committee pointed out that change in Eastern Europe "is
characterized by advance and retrogression."
The Committee said:
"While favoring increased across-the-board communications, and while well
aware of changes which have taken place, Republicans question whether these changes
are profound and significant enough to justify the Democrats' current ardor for a
detente with the Communists.
-MORE-
-3-
"To some extent, liberalization has become a means for altering the image
Western peoples have of Communism, and thus for softening the Western alliance.
"This is not an argument against trying to exploit opportunities created by
liberalization, but it is an argument for viewing liberalization with due detachment
and for probing with maximum perception the realities of change."
The Coordinating Committee emphasized that the United States must continue to
assure Eastern European peoples "who are now forced to live in the dark shadow of
Russian tyranny that America remains true to her great traditions."
The GOP policy group added:
"We should reiterate to these people our great concern that free elections
have not been held since the Communists seized power. We should also keep clearly
in mind that our sole purpose in dealing with the current Communist regimes is to
encourage and promote their evolution.
"Without dropping their military guard the Soviets are now opportunistic, where
once doctrinaire, in their approach to Western Europe. The obvious intention is
to exploit differences among the NATO allies. Our Government would do well to adopt
a similar attitude toward restive Warsaw Pact members.
"We must be imaginative and selective in our approach, for diversities among
Eastern European countries make clear that no single or simple policy will succeed."
On the subject of a coordinated Western policy toward Eastern Europe, the
Coordinating Committee said the "current lack of cohesion among NATO allies and
the low priority attached to Europe by Democratic Administrations" promote the
destruction of the basic condition that induced Russia to adopt its present stance.
"Moreover," the Committee said, "the changes in Eastern Europe are, at least
in part and perhaps principally, the result of Western containment. If NATO had not
barred the way, the Soviets would have expanded westward, and victorious Communism
need not have made any domestic concessions."
-MORE-
-4-
Recalling that an underlying principle of U.S. foreign policy since World War II
has been to foster the development of a united Europe, the Coordinating Committee
said:
"Eastern Europe should, if possible, be part of such a united Europe
"Encouragement of all-European economic and political schemes would seem to
provide the best, even though limited, chance for freeing Eastern Europe from
economic serfdom and political fealty to the Soviet Union."
Pointing out that the United States is the first strong military power in modern
history to abandon the old "divide and rule" tactic, and that it has attempted to
build up Western Europe and emphasizing that this policy "is wise and must be
continued," the Committee said:
"Thus, there is little rationale for the United States to become concerned if
Western Europe takes the lead in developing relations with Eastern Europe. In fact,
we might do better to coordinate our policies with those of Western Europe, rather
than being so persistent about trying to be foremost in all things at all times."
In insisting on a quid pro quo for concessions to the Communist regimes of
Eastern Europe, the Republican policy group said the United States has received
nothing in return for concessions which the Democratic regime has granted to Hungary,
such as acquiescence in shelving the United Nations resolution condemning Hungary
for refusing to admit a U.N. investigating team after the Russian-suppressed
revolution of 1956.
"It has become fashionable in the West," the Coordinating Committee said, "to
talk about liberal reforms in Eastern Europe and even to speculate about 'the end of
the cold war'. While no one would deny that changes have taken place, change is
hardly sweeping through Communist capitals
"The U.S. Government should pursue and disseminate the truth about conditions
in Eastern Europe. We should keep in mind that justified criticism, even ridicule
-MORE-
-5-
of police state methods, can be a stimulant for change in countries which are
attempting reform and seeking acceptance in the world."
In contending that the U.S. should make enlightened self-interest the foundati.
of its economic policy toward Eastern Europe, the Committee said:
"The Johnson-Humphrey Administration's lack of clarity in explaining many of
its policies has clouded the East-West trade issue as well."
Recalling that the State Department said as late as 1965 that economic contacts
would not have great significance in changing political relations between East and
West, and only nine months later was playing up the alleged political values of
the Administration's East-West Trade Relations Act, the Coordinating Committee said:
"The Administration's credibility problem is further complicated by its tendenc
to talk of trade relations with the East in unrealistic terms. The 'bridge building
theme of the Administration ascribes inflated political values to a question which
is more correctly viewed as economic by other nations of the world, particularly
our NATO allies
"Republicans believe the Administration should clearly define the basic
principles involved in East-West trade. At a minimum this would seem to require:
a better definition of, and stricter controls over, the strategic goods list; credit
limitations on trade in non-strategic goods so that trade does not in fact become
'aid'; and some firm distinctions about peace-time and war-time trade policies with
Communist states, whether the wars are declared or undeclared."
The Committee said that, after trading strategy had been clearly established,
the U.S. should seek a comprehensive agreement with big traders among its allies,
such as NATO members and Japan, on trade terms to be offered the East.
"The United States should always be prepared," the Coordinating Committee said,
"to exploit the fact that Communist nations have real need for expanded East-West
trade. Eastern Europe, in particular, should feel great urgency to expand its trade
-MORE-
-6-
with the West, because most of its trade is currently conducted under most unfavor-
able terms with the Soviet Union."
The Coordinating Committee commented that the oppressive nature of Soviet trading
policies was dramatically demonstrated in 1965 by the suicide of East German Planning
Commission Chairman, Erich Apel, right after he was forced to sign a new five-year
trade agreement with Russia.
In calling for an expansion, if possible, of tourism and cultural exchanges
with Eastern Europe, the Committee again voiced the Republican belief that the
cultural exchange program begun by President Eisenhower "plays a very beneficial
role in increasing mutual understanding and respect between the people of Eastern
Europe and the United States."
"While aware," the Coordinating Committee said, "that Eastern European govern-
ments still carefully screen those going abroad, with the result that all travelers
are not necessarily bona fide visitors, we should nevertheless encourage people
living under Communism to see what life is like in the West."
The Committee said that Communist regimes in Eastern Europe had failed to
indoctrinate and motivate their young people ideologically, that these young people
are "Communism's greatest weakness," and that " we must encourage the development
of this intellectual 'fifth column'."
The Coordinating Committee said:
"With a growing number of Americans interested in visiting the Eastern European
countries of their origin, the United States should seek to afford its citizens
better protection against interference and possible harm by Communist officials.
"The abduction of Mr. Vladimir Kazan-Komarek from an international aircraft
by Czech secret police and the mysterious death of Mr. Charles Jordan in Prague are
recent examples which prove the Communists are not above intimidating and terrorizing
our citizens.
-MORE-
-7-
"Now that the governments of Eastern Europe appear to be interested in
improving relations with the United States, American officials should also pursue
vigorously the outstanding financial and other legal claims which U.S. citizens
have against the current Communist regimes."
Summing up its recommendations, the GOP policy group said:
"The recommendations presented above assume that the American Government and
the American people will have the good sense and patience to support the people
of Eastern Europe during an evolutionary process which will inevitably last a
long time."
HIFF
Adopted by
The Republican Coordinating Committee
March 19, 1968
THE UNITED STATES AND EASTERN EUROPE
Prepared under the direction of:
Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
1625 Eye Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
Presiding Officer: Ray C. Bliss, Chairman, Republican National Committee
Former President
Dwight D. Eisenhower
300 Carlisle Street
Gettysburg, Pennsylvahia
Former Presidential Nominees
Barry Goldwater
(1964)
Thomas E. Dewey
(1944 & 1948)
Post Office Box 1601
140 Broadway
Scottsdale, Arizona
New York, New York
Richard M. Nixon
(1960)
Alf M. Landon
(1936)
Nixon, Mudge, Rose,
National Bank of Topeka Building
Guthrie, Alexander & Mitchell
1001 Fillmore Street
20 Broad Street
Topeka, Kansas
New York, New York
Senate Leadership
Everett M. Dirksen
George Murphy, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Senatorial Comm.
Thomas H. Kuchel
Milton R. Young, Secretary
Minority Whip
Republican Conference
Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Chairman
Hugh Scott, Vice Chairman
Republican Policy Committee
National Republican Senatorial Comm.
Margaret Chase Smith, Chairman
Republican Conference
House Leadership
Gerald R. Ford
Bob Wilson, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Congressional Comm.
Leslie C. Arends
Charles E. Goodell, Chairman
Minority Whip
Planning and Research Committee
Melvin R. Laird, Chairman
Richard H. Poff, Secretary
Republican Conference
Republican Conference
John J. Rhodes, Chairman
William C. Cramer, Vice Chairman
Republican Policy Committee
Republican Conference
H. Allen Smith
Ranking Member of Rules Committee
(continued)
REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
continued
Representatives of the Republican Governors Association
John A. Love
Raymond P. Shafer
Governor of the State of Colorado
Governor of the Commonwealth
Denver, Colorado
of Pennsylvania
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
John A. Volpe
Governor of the Commonwealth
John H. Chafee
of Massachusetts
Governor of the State of
Boston, Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Providence, Rhode Island
George W. Romney
Governor of the State of Michigan
Nils A. Boe
Lansing, Michigan
Governor of the State of
South Dakota
Nelson A. Rockefeller
Pierre, South Dakota
Governor of the State of New York
Albany, New York
Daniel J. Evans
Governor of the State of Washington
Olympia, Washington
Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
Donald R. Ross, Vice Chairman
Republican National Committee
Republican National Committee
1625 Eye Street, Northwest
1406 Kiewit Plaza, Farnam at 36th
Washington, D. C. 20006
Omaha, Nebraska 68131
Mrs. C. Wayland Brooks, Assistant Chrmn.
Mrs. J. Willard Marriott, Vice Chrmn.
Republican National Committee
Republican National Committee
1625 Eye Street, Northwest
4500 Garfield Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20006
Washington, D. C. 20007
Mrs. Collis P. Moore, Vice Chairman
J. Drake Edens, Jr., Vice Chairman
Republican National Committee
Republican National Committee
Box 225
Post Office Box 9385
Moro, Oregon 97039
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
President of the Republican State Legislators Association
F. F. (Monte) Montgomery
Speaker of the House of Representatives
State of Oregon
Salem, Oregon
Robert L. L. McCormick, Staff Coordinator
Members of the Republican Coordinating Committee's Task Force on
the Conduct of Foreign Relations
Robert C. Hill, Chairman
United States Ambassador to Mexico, 1957-1961
David N. Rowe, Vice Chairman
Professor of Political Science, Yale University
Gordon Allott
United States Senator from Colorado
Robert Amory, Jr.
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1952-1962
John B. Anderson
Member of Congress from Illinois
Tim M. Babcock
Governor of the State of Montana
Frances P. Bolton
Member of Congress from Ohio
Lucius D. Clay
General of the United States Army, Retired
Philip K. Crowe
United States Ambassador to Union of South Africa, 1959-1961
Joseph S. Farland
United States Ambassador to the Republic of Panama, 1960-1963
Paul Findley
Member of Congress from Illinois
Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen
Member of Congress from New Jersey
Ernest S. Griffith
Dean, School of International Service, American University, 1958-1965
Mrs. Cecil M. Harden Member of Congress from Indiana, 1949-1959;
Republican National Committeewoman for Indiana
Joe Holt
Member of Congress from California, 1953-1959
Walter A. Judd
Member of Congress from Minnesota, 1943-1963
John D. Lodge
United States Ambassador to Spain, 1955-1961
Gerhart Niemeyer
Professor of Political Science. University of Notre Dame
Nicholas Nyaradi
Director of School of International Studies, Bradley University
Roderic L. O'Connor
Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs,
Department of State, 1957-1958
G. L. Ohrstrom, Jr.
Investment Banker
William W. Scranton
Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1963-1967
Richard B. Sellars
Republican National Committeeman for New Jersey
Robert Strausz-Hupe
Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania
John Hay Whitney
United States Ambassador to Great Britain, 1956-61
Kent B. Crane
Secretary to the Task Force
THE UNITED STATES AND EASTERN EUROPE
Introduction
Eastern Europe is one of the most complex areas in the world. Its
half-million square miles of territory are inhabited by some 130 million
people who speak a variety of tongues, and embrace different cultural
traditions and religious faiths.
The region has a tragic history. For centuries it has been a
thoroughfare of conquest and the object of partition and subjugation.
World War II brutally affected the countenance of Eastern Europe. The
land was laid waste, millions of people were slaughtered and the region
fell prey, in turn, to the invading armies of Nazi Germany and Communist
Russia. Finally in 1945, at Yalta, a Democratic President tacitly agreed
to Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.
For the purposes of this paper "Eastern Europe" includes parts of East Central
Europe -- Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia,
Albania, and East Germany. The last two are special cases, and although
it is obvious that a solution to the German question is a central issue
in European policy considerations, the recommendations which follow are
not intended to apply to Albania or the Soviet Zone of Germany.
2/ In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 30,
1967, the noted historian and diplomat, George Kennan, commented on Russian
expansion into Eastern and Central Europe: "We were slow to realize the
dangers of this development, but once it had occurred, and it had occurred
partly with our blessing, we had, I think, little choice but to accept it.
The alternative was to pile another great war onto the one we had just
finished fighting. I do not think anyone in the world wanted to see that
happen. I regarded the sovietization of Eastern and Central Europe as part
of the price that we paid for the ability to defeat Hitler in this war."
-2-
The new Communist empire, however, soon showed signs of strain.
Three years after the war, Yugoslavia defied Moscow's authority. The next
year Mao's Communists triumphed in China, creating for the Soviets an ally
in some respects but clearly a rival in others. After Stalin's death the
situation underwent other alterations. Moscow's control and authority
were shaken throughout the Communist movement by the disorders in Eastern
Germany in 1953; by Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin; by the revolt in
Poland and the armed rebellion in Hungary in 1956; by the Soviet attempt to
patch up relations with Yugoslavia, which appeared to give Russian sanction
to Tito's "independent" course; and finally by the developing Sino-Soviet
conflict.
All of these events unfroze a static situation. An atmosphere in which
change might take place was created, and change which altered the unity of the
Communist Bloc did occur. Yet, change has not come quickly nor has it been
all-embracing. Cautious experimentation by Eastern European governments has
been conditioned by the dynamics of the Communist world and by the overpowering
proximity of the Soviet Union.
All Communist governments in Eastern Europe came to power as a result of
the Soviet military presence, and none has ever dared hold a free election.
All Eastern European troops are fully integrated with and controlled by the
Soviets under terms of the Warsaw Pact. Russian troop units are close at hand
and the bitter lessons of Hungary are not lost on the population of Eastern
Europe. Some countries have chafed against their appointed economic roles in
COMECON (the Soviet response to the Western European Common Market which is used
to perpetuate trading agreements favorable to the USSR), and have expressed
interest in expanding trade with the West. Yet all Eastern European governments
are increasing their total trade with the USSR, and after Soviet requirements
-3-
are satisfied, there is little left with which to finance trade with the West.
Diplomatically some governments have taken individual initiatives abroad, but
all still vote according to the Soviet party line in the United Nations. To
date, on all major questions since becoming the first Communist President of the
General Assembly, Rumania's Foreign Minister Manescu has supported Soviet
positions.
Moreover, change in Eastern Europe is characterized by advance and retro-
gression. Innovations are never made across a broad front all at once. For
example, most of the gains in personal liberties arising from the Polish revolt
in 1956 have now been lost, and recent student protests have so far only in-
creased the regime's oppression. Although Rumania has shown signs of national
independence in its foreign economic and diplomatic policies, the harshness of
its internal police restictions exceed all other Eastern European countries
with the possible exception of East Germany. Developments in Czechoslovakia
bear close watching, but whatever gains are made should be judged against the
exceedingly long tenure which hard-line Stalinist elements have so far enjoyed in
that country.
While favoring increased across-the-board communications, and while well
aware of changes which have taken place, Republicans question whether these changes
are profound and significant enough to justify the Democrats' current ardor for a
detente with the Communists. To some extent, liberalization has become a means
for altering the image Western peoples have of Communism, and thus for softening
the Western Alliance. This is not an argument against trying to exploit opportuni-
ties created by liberalization, but it is an argument for viewing liberalization
with due detachment and for probing with maximum perception the realities of change.
The Johnson-Humphrey Administration should realize that such opportunities
as exist for the United States in Eastern Europe are not of a transient nature --
they need not be seized at once or be forever lost. A deft sense of timing is an
indispensible element in the successful conduct of foreign affairs.
-4-
Recommendations
1. The United States should never abandon as its basic goal the
right to self-determination for the peoples of Eastern Europe.
America's devotion to freedom and independence has been known to Eastern
Europeans from the very beginning of our history as a nation when Polish
patriots Kosciuszko and Pulaski came here to fight in our War of Independence.
Our country, in turn, became the focal point for the independence movements of
Poland's Paderewski, Hungary's Kossuth and Czechoslovakia's Masaryk. It was the
U. S. Government which insisted upon the restoration of Poland after World
War I. The historic 1918 agreement that Czechs and Slovaks would unite to form
a new nation was signed, not in Prague, but in Pittsburg. Moreover, the millions
of American citizens of Eastern European descent, who have so enriched our
culture and national life, are living proof of the fact that "The American Dream"
was known, not only to the elite, but also to the people of Eastern Europe.
We must continue to assure those people who are now forced to live in the
dark shadow of Russian tyranny that America remains true to her great tradi-
tions. We should reiterate to these people our great concern that free elections
have not been held since the Communists seized power. We should also keep
clearly in mind that our sole purpose in dealing with the current Communist
regimes is to encourage and promote their evolution. Without dropping their
military guard the Soviets are now opportunistic, where once doctrinaire, in
their approach to Western Europe. The obvious intention is to exploit differences
among the NATO Allies. Our Government would do well to adopt a similar attitude
toward restive Warsaw Pact members.
We must be imaginative and selective in our approach, for diversities
among Eastern European countries make clear that no single or simple policy
will succeed.
-5-
2. The United States should seek to develop a coordinated Western
policy toward Eastern Europe.
The extent to which Western policy in Europe has become the victim of
its own success is tragic. The fact that Communist policy has evolved toward
a more indirect, long-term style of advancing its interests is mainly due to
the Western Alliance's strategic superiority, high rate of economic growth
and firmness in resisting military pressures. The current lack of cohesion
among NATO Allies and the low priority attached to Europe by Democratic
Administrations paradoxically promote the destruction of the very instrument
which forced the Communists to change their strategy.
Moreover, the changes in Eastern Europe are, at least in part and perhaps
principally, the result of Western containment. If NATO had not barred the way,
the Soviets would have expanded westward, and victorious Communism need not
have made any domestic concessions. The controlled industry of Western Europe
would have been available to supply consumer goods for Eastern European demand.
The Democratic Administration's proclivity for trying to "build bridges"
over the heads of our European Allies has encouraged by example the other NATO
nations to undertake their own bilateral negotiations with the East. This
practice has undermined European confidence in U. S. sincerity and leadership,
and unwittingly served the fundamental Communist goal of disrupting the North
Atlantic partnership.
The Johnson-Humphrey Administration has failed to exploit for common
good the obvious advantages of closer geographic, cultural and historic ties
which Western Europe has in dealing with Eastern Europe. An underlying principle
of our foreign policy since World War II has been to foster the development of a
united Europe. Eastern Europe should, if possible, be part of such a united
-6-
Europe. Since the last invasion by Asian conquerors many centuries ago,
the basic orientation of those European countries now under Communist
domination has been toward the West, not toward the East. Encouragement
of all-European economic and political schemes would seem to provide the
best, even though limited, chance for freeing Eastern Europe from economic
serfdom and political fealty to the Soviet Union.
The United States is the first strong military power in modern history
which has abandoned the old political tactic of "divide and rule" and has con-
sciously attempted to build up another major power (Western Europe). This
policy is wise and must be continued. Thus, there is little rationale for the
United States to become concerned if Western Europe takes the lead in developing
relations with Eastern Europe. In fact, we might do much better to coordinate
our policies with those of Western Europe, rather than being so persistent
about trying to be foremost in all things at all times.
3. The United States should not grant political concessions to the
Communist regimes of Eastern Europe without a quid pro quo.
During the Eisenhower Administration, the United States never conceded any
advantage to the Communists. Initiatives taken by Democratic Administrations
seem to indicate that this is no longer considered a worthy principle by which
to guide our actions. A single example demonstrates the differences in approach.
Following the Hungarian revolution, the Republican Administration expressed its
indignation by maintaining only a charge d'affaires in Budapest and by support-
ing the United Nations' moral quarantine of the Soviet-imposed Hungarian regime.
Now the Johnson-Humphrey Administration has decided to upgrade our mission in
Budapest to Embassy level and has appointed the first American ambassador since
the original Communist take-over after World War II. Moreover, the Democrats
-7-
have acquiesced to the shelving of the long-standing United Nation's resolution
to condemn Hungary for refusing to admit a UN investigating team. It may be
argued that those events in Hungary which so outraged the world took place a
long time ago, but the man the Soviets placed in power after the 1956 revolu-
tion still leads the government, and the United States still finds it necessary
to grant Cardinal Mindszenty asylum in Budapest. And what did the United
States receive in return for the political concessions which the Democrats
granted Hungary? Nothing.
It has become fashionable in the West to talk about the liberal reforms in
Eastern Europe and even to speculate about "the end of the Cold War." While
no one would deny that changes have taken place, change is hardly sweeping
through Communist capitals. Accordingly, the U. S. Government should pursue
and disseminate the truth about conditions in Eastern Europe. We should keep
in mind that justified criticism, even ridicule of police state methods, can be
a stimulant for change in countries which are attempting reform and seeking
acceptance in the world.
4. The United States should make enlightened self-interest the
foundation stone of its economic and trade policy toward Eastern
Europe.
The Johnson-Humphrey Administration's lack of clarity in explaining
many of its policies has clouded the East-West trade issue as well. In July
1965, for example, the Department of State Bulletin quoted the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for European Affairs as follows:
a rapid expansion of trade is not in the offing
(because Eastern Europe lacks the means to pay for
desired goods and has little to export of interest
to Western buyers). Second, the expanding and mu-
tually beneficial economic contacts will not be of
over-riding significance in altering the basic
political relationships between the East and the
West or in inducing changes in the political struc-
ture of the Communist states themselves.
-8-
Nine months later the same publication carried the text of the Administration's
East-West Trade Relations Act, and ever since it has been full of statements
on how important and far-reaching the effects of the Act are likely to be.
The Administration's credibility problem is further complicated by its
tendency to talk of trade relations with the East in unrealistic terms. The
"bridge building" theme of the Administration ascribes inflated political values
to a question which is more correctly viewed as economic by other nations of the
world, particularly our NATO Allies. Former Under Secretary of State Robert
Murphy has criticized the assumption that trade will promote or guarantee peace
by pointing out that, "In no area were trading relations closer than in Europe,
among Germany, the U.K. and France. Yet this did not prevent both world wars,
nor did similar close trade relations between Japan and China keep the peace in
Asia."
Republicans believe the Administration should clearly define the basic
principles involved in East-West trade. At a minimum this would seem to require:
a better definition of, and stricter controls over, the strategic goods list;
credit limitations on trade in non-strategic goods so that trade does not in
/
fact become "aid"; and some firm distinctions about peace-time and war-time trade
policies with Communist states, whether the wars are declared or undeclared.
Having clearly established our trading strategy, the United States should seek
a comprehensive agreement with those of our Allies who are great traders
(NATO members and Japan) on the terms of trade to be offered to the East.
3/ The Johnson-Humphrey Administration has also been fuzzy on deciding when
trade actually amounts to aid. It has declared that trade with Rhodesia con-
stitutes aid to an unrepresentative and authoritarian regime and so is to be
prohibited. Yet no similar criteria about popular support for Communist
regimes is applied when the Administration urges greater trade with Eastern
Europe. Nor does the fact that Eastern European governments have little gold
or hard currency and so must trade on credits from international institutions
for which the United States provides most of the backing, seem to be taken
into account by the Democratic Administration.
-9-
The United States should always be prepared to exploit the fact that
4/
Communist nations have real need for expanded East-West trade. Eastern Europe,
in particular, should feel great urgency to expand its trade with the West,
because most of its trade is currently conducted under most unfavorable terms
with the Soviet Union. The oppressive nature of Soviet trading policies was
dramatically demonstrated in 1965 by the suicide of the East German Planning
Commission Chairman, Erich Apel, right after he was forced to sign a new
five-year trade accord with the USSR.
5. Tourism and cultural exchanges between the peoples of the United
States and the peoples of Eastern Europe should be expanded if possible.
The Republican Party reconfirms its belief that the cultural exchange
program begun by President Eisenhower plays a very beneficial role in increasing
mutual understanding and respect between the people of Eastern Europe and the
United States. While aware that Eastern European governments still carefully
screen those going abroad, with the result that all travelers are not necessarily
bona fide visitors, we should nevertheless encourage people living under
Communism to see what life is like in the West.
We must also inspire those other than the kept Communist intellectuals to
assert their creativeness, because such creativeness is bound to deviate from
established totalitarian norms. Far from being successful in creating the
"New Soviet Man," which was the ideal of Communism in the 1930's, the Communist
regimes in Eastern Europe have failed even to indoctrinate and motivate their
young people ideologically. Thus, they are Communism's greatest weakness, and
41 For example, the Democrats might have attempted to extract some sort of
concession from the USSR in 1963 when it badly needed wheat from the U. S.,
partly in order to fulfill Soviet wheat sale contracts abroad. Had we failed
to obtain concessions, we might better have offered our wheat directly to
Russia's foreign customers, thus exposing the weakness of Communist
agricultural practices.
-10-
we must encourage the development of this intellectual "fifth column." On the
other hand, although the culture and people of Eastern Europe have greatly
enriched American life, our knowledge and understanding of Eastern Europe
remain inadequate. We hope that universities and private groups or foundations
will increase their research and publication in this field without official
government inspiration.
With a growing number of Americans interested in visiting the Eastern
European countries of their origin, the United States should seek to afford its
citizens better protection against interference and possible harm by Communist
officials. The abduction of Mr. Vladimir Kazan-Komarek from an international
aircraft by Czech secret police and the mysterious death of Mr. Charles
Jordan in Prague are recent examples which prove the Communists are not above
intimidating and terrorizing our citizens. Now that the governments of Eastern
Europe appear to be interested in improving relations with the United States,
American officials should also pursue vigorously the outstanding financial and
other legal claims which U. S. citizens have against the current Communist regimes.
Moreover, the U. S. Government should officially deplore the growing anti-
Semitism in Europe and throughout the Communist Bloc.
Conclusions
While we should encourage evolution of the Communist regimes in Eastern
Europe, we must guard against becoming victims of our own wishful thinking on
the opportunities this beneficial process creates. Changes which have so far
taken place are primarily designed to achieve some degree of national indepen-
dence from the domination of the Soviet Union. Personal freedom, which is quite
different from national freedom, is still abridged by police controls internally,
and we can still probably count on the Communists siding with each other if
seriously challenged by the outside world.
-11-
The recommendations presented above assume that the American government
and the American people will have the good sense and patience to support the
people of Eastern Europe during an evolutionary process which will inevitably
last a long time. Change in the Communist world is bound to proceed slowly for
at least two reasons.
First, the repressive police state system inhibits innovators and sets
strict limits on the growth of social and physical mobility. Both of these are
critical factors in stimulating social change.
Second, there is a tendency in the West to consider the Communist states,
particularly the USSR, "developed" countries because they have built up a strong,
modern power base. The Communists try to foster this impression for propaganda
purposes -- to intimidate their enemies and to impress the underdeveloped
world. However, in fact, they are only "semi-developed," because the government
has applied modern technology only to those sectors of society which will
enhance its power and control. As a result, society as a whole has not
experienced the full impact of modern technology. Hence, the prerequisites
for total change are lacking and modifications in the power structure are
bound to come slowly.
Therefore, given the long-range problem we face and the limited
leverage we have to apply, the impatience demonstrated by the Democratic
Administration in abruptly trying to modify our Eastern European policy is
ill-advised at this time. There is a natural American tendency to want to
accomplish things quickly -- to have a smash hit or a rags-to-riches success
story. Republicans feel obliged, however, to be extremely critical of the inconsis-
tency involved in forcibly trying to prevent the expansion of Communism in Asia,
while urgently seeking to "build bridges" into the Communist camp in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union.
#
Mare
capy
REPUBLICAN
REpublican NATiONAL COMMiTTEE
INTERNAL
1625 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
NATIONAL 8-6800
NEWS
FOR RELEASE
NOTICE TO CORRESPONDENTS
The attached Republican Coordinating Committee paper, "United States
Relations with the Soviet Union," is submitted to you for release Tuesday
a.m., April 30, 1968.
The paper was drafted by the Coordinating Committee Task Force on
the Conduct of Foreign Relations, of which former Ambassador and former
Assistant Secretary of State Robert C. Hill is Chairman. The basic work
on the report was done by a subcommittee of the Task Force headed by
Robert Amory, Jr., former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. The report was amended and approved by the Coordinating Committee
subsequent to its meeting in Washington, D.C., March 19th.
Lists of the Task Force on the Conduct of Foreign Relations and of
the Republican Coordinating Committee membership are attached.
4/26/68
Adopted by
The Republican Coordinating Committee
March 19, 1968
UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Prepared under the direction of:
Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
1625 Eye Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20006
REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
Presiding Officer: Ray C. Bliss, Chairman, Republican National Committee
Former President
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Former Presidential Nominees
Barry Goldwater
(1964)
Thomas E. Dewey
(1944 & 1948)
Richard M. Nixon
(1960)
Alf M. Landon
(1936)
Senate Leadership
Everett M. Dirksen
George Murphy, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Senatorial Committee
Thomas H. Kuchel
Milton R. Young, Secretary
Minority Whip
Republican Conference
Bourke B. Hickenlooper
Hugh Scott, Vice Chairman
Chairman, Republican Policy Committee
National Republican Senatorial Committee
Margaret Chase Smith
Chairman, Republican Conference
House Leadership
Gerald R. Ford
Bob Wilson, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Congressional Committee
Leslie C. Arends
Charles E. Goodell, Chairman
Minority Whip
Planning and Research Committee
Melvin R. Laird, Chairman
Richard H. Poff, Secretary
Republican Conference
Republican Conference
John J. Rhodes, Chairman
William C. Cramer, Vice Chairman
Republican Policy Committee
Republican Conference
H. Allen Smith, Ranking Member
of Rules Committee
Representatives of the Republican Governors Association
John A. Love, Governor of Colorado
Raymond P. Shafer, Governor of Pennsylvania
John A. Volpe, Governor of Massachusetts
John H. Chafee, Governor of Rhode Island
George Romney, Governor of Michigan
Nils A. Boe, Governor of South Dakota
Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of
Daniel J. Evans, Governor of Washington
New York
Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
Donald R. Ross, Vice Chairman
Mrs. C. Wayland Brooks, Assistant Chairman
Mrs. J. Willard Marriott, Vice Chairman
Mrs. Collis P. Moore, Vice Chairman
J. Drake Edens, Jr., Vice Chairman
President of the Republican State Legislators Association
F. F. (Monte) Montgomery
Robert L. L. McCormick, Staff Coordinator
Members of the Republican Coordinating Committee's Task Force on
the Conduct of Foreign Relations
Robert C. Hill, Chairman
United States Ambassador to Mexico, 1957-1961
David N. Rowe, Vice Chairman
Professor of Political Science, Yale University
Gordon Allott
United States Senator from Colorado
Robert Amory, Jr.
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1952-1962
John B. Anderson
Member of Congress from Illinois
Tim M. Babcock
Governor of the State of Montana
Frances P. Bolton
Member of Congress from Ohio
Lucius D. Clay
General of the United States Army, Retired
Philip K. Crowe
United States Ambassador to Union of South Africa, 1959-1961
Joseph S. Farland
United States Ambassador to the Republic of Panama, 1960-1963
Paul Findley
Member of Congress from Illinois
Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen
Member of Congress from New Jersey
Ernest S. Griffith
Dean, School of International Service, American University, 1958-1965
Mrs. Cecil M. Harden, Member of Congress from Indiana, 1949-1959;
Republican National Committeewoman for Indiana
Joe Holt
Member of Congress from California, 1953-1959
Walter A. Judd
Member of Congress from Minnesota, 1943-1963
John D. Lodge
United States Ambassador to Spain, 1955-1961
Gerhart Niemeyer
Professor of Political Science. University of Notre Dame
Nicholas Nyaradi
Director of School of International Studies, Bradley University
Roderic L. 0' Connor
Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs,
Department of State, 1957-1958
G. L. Ohrstrom, Jr.
Investment Banker
William W. Scranton
Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1963-1967
Bernard M. Shanley
Republican National Committeeman for New Jersey
Robert Strausz-Hupe
Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania
John Hay Whitney
United States Ambassador to Great Britain, 1956-61
Kent B. Crane
Secretary to the Task Force
UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
No single aspect of American foreign policy is fraught with more
importance to our people and the people of the whole world than our
policy toward the Soviet Union. How the United States and the USSR, the world's
only superpowers, act with relation to one another has and will continue
to determine the course of history in this half century.
So serious is the matter that it would be irresponsible and inexcusable
to approach it in a partisan spirit. For 20 years bipartisan efforts have
checked Communist aggression. Today collaboration in major national security
issues remains as essential as ever.
In that spirit, this paper attempts (1) to analyze the problem of
dealing objectively with the Russians, taking into full account the lessons
of the past two decades, and (2) to offer guidelines for future policy,
with action recommendations to safeguard what we have to date assured, while
offering a prospect for emergence from the dull and negative atmosphere of
the Cold War.
-2-
I. Facts and Principles Underlying Soviet Policy
The Soviet Union is the direct inheritor of Imperial Russia, a state
which only comparatively recently reached its present frontiers after
centuries of defensive and offensive struggle.
The Soviet leaders, despite the schism with the Chinese Communists
and disciplinary problems with other Communist leaders in Eastern Europe
and the free world, still look on themselves as trustees of an historically
ordained revolutionary movement destined ultimately to pervade the world.
There is no evidence that they have abandoned this objective.
Soviet policy over the past half century, and for the foreseeable
future, can be assessed only in the light of the tensions and ambivalence
that arise out of the foregoing controlling factors -- both always in
the picture, with one or the other dominant at different times or on
particular issues.
Both as Russians and as Communists, the Soviets are obsessed with
preserving the security of their state. From this stems the preoccupation
of Soviet leaders with the security of border areas and air space and
with assuring controlled or harmless states around Russia's periphery.
The absorption of the Baltic States in 1940, the invasion of Finland in the same
year, the 1946 occupation of Azerbaijan in Iran, and the establishment of the
satellite regimes in Eastern Europe are examples of steps taken to secure this
policy objective on the frontiers. The violent reaction to President Eisenhower's
1955 Open Skies proposal and the later "U-2" flights are similarlyexplainable.
-3-
For the past twenty years, the Soviet leaders have not been solely
concerned with territorial expansion of their frontiers. Norway, Finland,
Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, two of which have no United States treaties
to rely upon, seem relatively secure from Soviet aggression. This is not
because the Soviets are eagle scouts but because they are realists. They
apparently recognize that territorial aggrandisement does not of itself
necessarily enhance their power.
As long as the United States maintains a decisive arms superiority,
the post-Stalin Soviet leaders seem disposed to regard general or local war
involving their own forces in the nuclear age inexpedient as an instrument
of extending either Soviet control or Communist rule. So held at bay, they
have relegated the active role of their own military establishment to the tasks
of maintaining internal order and preparing for a possible ultimate nuclear
confrontation. Russian expectations, in turn, have become identified with
indigenous revolutionary wars of liberation or, when feasible, with the peaceful
transition to Communist rule of peoples influenced by the example of the
technologically powerful Soviet society.
In short, both as Russians and would-be world leaders, and as realists in
the presence of American strength, they have inclined toward concentration on
the physical, industrial, and military development of their already ample base.
In this they have been notably successful. In 50 years, despite the Hitlerian
ravages and many of their own inept economic policies, they have risen to a
power position which, except for the United States, would be world-dominant.
This achievement has given them internal strength also, for despite repeated
failures in agriculture and a lack of emphasis on consumer production, the
Russian people, still insulated from the full knowledge of Western progress,
seem by and large content with their economic lot.
-4-
Even so, among intellectuals and youth there is clear evidence of revul-
sion at the drabness, the boredom and the repression of dissident or original
ideas that characterize Soviet society. This alienation may well hold the
seeds of a real crisis some time in the future. Yet, for now and probably the
next decade, no realistic United States policy can be based on the expectation
of either revolt or the replacement of the present by a more benign regime.
As a final general proposition, one must understand what the post-
Stalin Soviet leaders mean by "co-existence." It is not a static concept of
enduring stalemate. Rather, it is a dynamic concept envisaging a world in
constant transition with two ever-contending forces which they call "Imperialistic-
Capitalism" and "Revolutionary Communism," each striving to affect the direc-
tion of movement -- shouldering and shoving one another but never squaring
off onto a collision course involving direct war between the superpowers.
Yet, "co-existence" is deemed to afford ample room for opportunism --
seizing chances for disrupting free-world relationships, supporting na-
tional "wars of liberation," and promoting subversion and treason. This
opportunism is bounded by a deeply held aversion to what the Soviets call
"adventurism" -- getting involved in games they cannot win. Nevertheless, this
does not always prevent them from overplaying their hand, as the introduction
of offensive missiles into Cuba, the prolonged military support for Lumumba
and Gizenga in the Congo, etc. will attest.
It must be reemphasized that only a firm attitude on our part can prevent
this opportunism from going too far. If America is indecisive, we in effect
entice these inveterate international gamblers to over-risk. The two super-
powers are bound to spar with one another. It is for us to let the Soviets
know clearly and in advance that we are not willing to stand for too much
probing on our side of the containment line and that America's power is
actually-- and comparatively -- undiminished.
-5-
II. Selected Specific Soviet Policies
(a) In Eastern Europe the Soviets desire above all the legitimization
of the imposed status quo. Doubtless they would like the Allies out of West
Berlin, but they have not used and present indications are that they will not
use force to get us out as long as NATO remains firm. Increased satellite
political and economic ties with the West are encouraged to the extent that
they soften the NATO attitude, but are opposed and constricted once they
threaten a disruption of inter-Communist collaboration and support of the East
German government. Above all in this area the Kremlin professes to fear a
reunified atomic-armed Germany. Under no presently foreseeable circumstances
are the Communists likely to relinquish control over East Germany, and they
might even risk war to prevent West Germany's development of an independent
nuclear capability. While Russia cannot realistically fear conquest again by
Germany alone, it professes to fear that a "revanchiste" Germany could pre-
cipitate a war which would pit the United States against it. Whether or not
this is the actual estimate of the Soviets, they get a lot of propaganda value
from it.
(b) Toward Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance the Soviets
maintain a pervasive and relentless effort to discourage and disrupt efforts
at integration and miss no opportunity to SOW discontent and suspicion among
the NATO allies. The looser the ties that bind Europe economically and
politically into a vital world force, the better the Soviets like it. Even
more they seek to make capital of the latent antipathy of Europeans to
economic, military or political dependence on the United States.
(c) The Soviets' hostility to the present Chinese Communist regime is deep:
As Russians they have been historically concerned with geopolitical exposure
of Eastern Siberia; as Communists they deplore the mess China has made of her
-6-
internal affairs and of the international Communist movement. The adventurism
of Mao and his fanatic coterie causes the Soviets to worry that China might
plunge into war with the United States and drag in the USSR. Yet, should Mao
die or be deposed and his successors be more amenable to Soviet views, the
current feud between Moscow and Peking could be largely composed in
a relatively short time. No doubt such a renewed alliance would be
plagued by mutual suspicions, but it could lead to the adoption of con-
certed policies that would present more difficulties for the United States
than does the current split.
(d) The Vietnam conflict is looked upon by the Soviets as a classic
example of a "war of liberation." They are no doubt content with a lengthy
continuance of the present indecisive struggle designed to exhaust, isolate and
divide the United States, with or without an overlayer of protracted negotiations.
In any event, the USSR's leverage on Hanoi is not unlimited because the Soviets
cannot cut off material support for "fellow Socialist" Ho without unacceptable
loss of face throughout the entire world and abdication of their leadership
among Communist countries. While the Soviets would view an American pullout as
a tremendous victory for world Communism, they almost certainly would have
mixed feelings about exposing all Southeast Asia to dominance by the present
Chinese Communist regime.
(e) The areas where the Soviets' self-interest has led them to act
constructively with free world powers include Antaractica, outer space, and
such problems as nuclear proliferation, though with respect to the latter their
principal aim may well be to exacerbate United States' relations with West
Germany. Moreover, in the 1965 Pakistan-Indian war they played an effective role
as intermediary and pacifier, but this effort may have been primarily designed
to thwart Chinese ambitions. In the Middle East the Soviets have gambled
-7-
heavily in military treasure, but not in direct military involvement,
in order to poison the Arab world against the West. Though ostensibly a
fiasco for their cause, the June 1967 Israeli-Arab war advanced this objective,
and it is increasingly clear that the Soviet leaders cannot be expected to play
a constructive or responsible role in easing the antagonisms of the area.
III. Characteristics of a Sound United States' Policy Toward the USSR
American policy must be two-pronged:
It must maintain the will and the power to deter and if necessary
defeat direct and indirect aggression.
It must at the same time deal with the Soviet leaders on the
postulate that they can be capable of constructive action and are
presently unchallenged by any internal opposition.
Because Soviet restraint in recent years can largely be ascribed to the
existence of the deterrent power of the United States and its NATO Allies,
it would be extreme folly to allow this counterforce to decline, for even
if the present rulers of the Kremlin are not likely to run amok there is always
the chance of more extremist leaders some day ascending to power. Conversely
there is nothing to be gained by challenging the legitimacy of the present
government. We should have as a prime objective the encouragement of the
more pragmatic, humane and friendly elements rather than the doctrinaire,
hostile ones.
We must recognize the hard fact that we can have little direct
leverage on the internal social-political structure of a power as large and
strong and self-sufficient as Soviet Russia. We must concentrate
on protecting in the broadest sense the rest of the world where we do have
enormous leverage to the ends (1) that the Soviets will find a minimum of
-8-
troubled waters to fish in, and (2) that we gain the maximum support for
collective actions to enhance the security and economic development of the
free world. No United States policy toward the USSR is meaningful except in the
context of our world-wide stance.
IV. Selected Policies Toward the USSR
(a) The militant nature of Communist doctrine makes it obvious that we
must be able to deal with the USSR from a position of paramount military
strength. Our nuclear deterrence must be unequaled and unassailable, as it
was during the 1950's when Republicans were in office. Our Alliances, parti-
cularly NATO, must be reinvigorated for Western determination in resisting Soviet
military pressures in the past has been at least partly responsible for the
evolution of Communist policy.
(b) The announced Communist policy of promoting "wars of national
liberation" makes it incumbent upon the United States also to maintain quick
reaction forces, so that insurrection or local aggression in underdeveloped
areas can be quickly checkmated with a minimum of force and of actual or
threatened escalation. Wherever possible indigenous friendly forces should be
employed so as to de-emphasize the impression that America is the world's
sole policeman.
(c) We can see no respite from Communist front organizations seeking
on a world-wide basis to discredit and disrupt free-world progress and
development. We must therefore devise various ways and means to advance
our cause by effective use of the special strengths and talents
of private groups, supported as appropriate by publicly voted funds. The
Democratic Administration's apparent abandonment of the struggle in this
area because of recent embarrassments betrays our responsibilities as free-
world leaders.
-9-
(d) Our position on negotiation should be that the United States desires
a reduction of tension. Yet we must scrupulously avoid appearing to seek
accommodation as a favor to us or at the expense of the fundamental interests
of America or its free-world friends. We should be always willing to enter
negotiations on outstanding issues which are susceptible of resolution by
mutual give-and-take; nevertheless, we should be equally ready to terminate
such negotiations when the Soviet's position turns out to be one of intransigence
or pure propaganda. We should always bear in mind the lessons of history that the
Soviets go to the bargaining table only to secure advantages for themselves, and
we must be equally tough-minded.
(e) Tensions within the Communist camp should be exploited by the West
in an effort to encourage modification of Communist society. Although out influence
may be limited, we should deliberately try to encourage a multiplicity of
interest groups in the Soviet Union, and wherever possible should attempt to favor
those groups which are trying to achieve a degree of individuality and independence
from the all-encompassing dictatorship of the Communist Party.
(f) Communication by political leaders at the highest level should be
fostered both for long-range and potential crisis purposes. Summit meetings
are on balance desirable from time to time, particularly after a change of
leadership on either side. Such meetings should be meticulously prepared and
carefully integrated in consultations with NATO and other principal Allies.
(g) Communications across the board are fundamentally desirable.
Cultural, scientific and business groups should be encouraged to exchange visits
on a reciprocal basis. Areas off limits to Communist visitors should be kept to
the minimum, consistent with obtaining relatively comparable freedom of movement
-10-
for Americans in the Soviet Union. In order to demonstrate the faith we have
in our free and open society, no restrictions should be placed on printed
material coming to the United States, and constant efforts should be made to
widen the distribution of American media in the Soviet Union.
(h) Outer space should be seen as the locus for ever increasing United States-
Soviet collaboration rather than as the site of an endless series of increas-
ingly expensive prestige races. Because our society is open, so much is known
about our space program that inviting Soviet participation in the non-military
projects would be unlikely to endanger national security. By insisting upon
reciprocal privileges we would acquire much additional knowledge about their
space efforts, thus achieving a net gain for United States security. At the same
time, we must not intimate that the Soviets and ourselves have an exclusive
role to play in this area. We must constantly reiterate our willingness to
collaborate with NATO and other Allies in space technology.
(i) Oceanography and Arctic and Antarctic exploration and development,
are other areas which should be characterized by collaboration rather than
rivalry. For the long term we should propose a joint United States, Canadian,
Norwegian, Danish and Russian Commission looking toward maritime and air
development of the Arctic Ocean Basin.
Note: The Republican Coordinating Committee has issued policy statements
on East-West Trade, Eastern Europe and the Middle East which should be considered
in conjunction with this paper.
FOR THE SENATE:
FOR THE HOUSE
Everett M. Dirksen
THE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
OF REPRESENTATIVES:
of Illinois
Gerald R. Ford
OF THE CONGRESS
of Michigan
Thomas H. Kuchel
of California
Leslie C. Arends
of Illinois
Bourke B. Hickenlooper
of Iowa
Press Release
Melvin R. Laird
of Wisconsin
Margaret Chase Smith
of Maine
John J. Rhodes
of Arizona
George Murphy
of California
H. Allen Smith
of California
Milton R. Young
of North Dakota
Bob Wilson
Hugh Scott
Issued following
of California
of Pennsylvania
Leadership
Charles E. Goodell
of New York
PRESIDING:
May 3,
Richard H. Poff
of Virginia
The National Chairman
Ray C. Bliss
William C. Cramer
of Florida
BY THE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP:
Today marks the first day of the 21st year of independence of the
State of Israel. We congratulate the men, women and children of Israel
upon their extraordinary success to date.
Now the Middle East is becoming a tinder-box of fearful dimensions.
And the Johnson-Humphrey Administration still has no firm policy
there.
It is a cold, harsh fact that unless a firm, clear, credible policy
for the Middle East is soon declared and implemented, the Eastern
Mediterranean potential for World War III will take frightening root.
And the Johnson-Humphrey Administration still has no firm policy
there.
Nearly a year ago -- and most recently this month -- the Republican
Party, represented by the unanimous vote of its Republican Coordinating
Committee, made the following specific recommendations:
1. The United States should assume active and imaginative leadership
in the international community and in the United Nations to secure a
political settlement in the Middle East based on the following principles:
a. An end to the state of belligerency between the Arabs
and Israel and recognition by all states in the area of Israel's
right to live and prosper as an independent nation.
(more)
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
Room S-124 U.S. Capitol-(202) 225-3700
Consultant to the Leadership-John B. Fisher
- 2 -
b. As an essential part of a permanent settlement in the
Middle East, the United States should insist on, and aid in,
the rehabilitation and resettlement of the more than one
million Palestine Arab refugees who have been displaced over
the past 20 years.
C. The United States should join with other nations in
pressing for international supervision of the holy places
within the City of Jerusalem.
d. The United States should continue to strive for inter-
national guarantees of innocent passage through international
waterways, including the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal.
2. The United States should propose a broad-scale development plan
for all Middle Eastern States which agree to live peacefully with their
neighbors. This should include the bold imaginative Eisenhower-Strass
Plan to bring water, work and food to the Middle East by construction
of nuclear desalinization plants.
3. The United States must fully recognize the implications of
increasing Soviet activities in the Middle East and North Africa, and
be alert, firm and resourceful in countering them.
4. The United States, in furtherance of peace in the Middle East,
should strive with other nations for agreed limitations on international
arms shipments to the area; but failing such an agreement the United
States should be prepared to supply arms to friendly nations sufficient
to maintain the balance of power and to serve as a deterrent to renewed
open warfare.
5. Finally, the United States should make a determined effort to
expose and isolate the militant troublemakers in the Middle East. We
should support and encourage only non-aggressive non-Communist leaders.
(more)
- 3 -
The Republican Leadership of the Congress now reaffirms and again
endorses each of these recommendations in its entirety.
Let no American be unaware of the fact that Russia has moved into
the Middle East and the Mediterranean with tremendous and increasing
naval and diplomatic strength in the biggest Soviet power-grab since
the end of World War II.
And the Johnson-Humphrey Administration still has no firm policy
there.
Spearhead of the Russian Middle East policy is the modern and
constantly growing Russian navy. Today, for the first time, the
Kremlin has a fleet on permanent duty in the Mediterranean. It has
missile cruisers, missile submarines, a helicopter carrier and amphibious
landing forces with the most modern of equipment. These give the
Kremlin the means of intervening in troubled countries entirely around
the Mediterranean rim.
It is an ominous fact that Russia is dramatically gaining in strength
at sea in the strategic, vital Mediterranean area.
And the Johnson-Humphrey Administration still has no firm policy
there.
The American people, so sorely troubled here at home, can no longer
tolerate such blindness to the danger of World War III present today
in the Middle East. We urge -- no, we demand -- of the Johnson-Humphrey
Administration that it move now -- with courage, clarity and firmness --
to assure the State of Israel and the American people that peace and
progress in the Middle East can and will be won.
FOR THE SENATE:
FOR THE HOUSE
Everett M. Dirksen
THE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
OF REPRESENTATIVES:
of Illinois
Gerald R. Ford
OF THE CONGRESS
of Michigan
Thomas H. Kuchel
of California
Leslie C. Arends
of Illinois
Bourke B. Hickenlooper
of Iowa
Press Release
Melvin R. Laird
of Wisconsin
Margaret Chase Smith
of Maine
John J. Rhodes
of Arizona
George Murphy
of California
H. Allen Smith
of California
Milton R. Young
of North Dakota
Bob Wilson
Hugh Scott
Issued following a
of California
of Pennsylvania
Leadership Meeting
Charles E. Goodell
of New York
PRESIDING:
May 3, 1968
Richard H. Poff
of Virginia
The National Chairman
Ray C. Bliss
William C. Cramer
of Florida
BY THE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP:
Today marks the first day of the 21st year of independence of the
State of Israel. We congratulate the men, women and children of Israel
upon their extraordinary success to date.
Now the Middle East is becoming a tinder-box of fearful dimensions.
And the Johnson-Humphrey Administration still has no firm policy
there.
It is a cold, harsh fact that unless a firm, clear, credible policy
for the Middle East is soon declared and implemented, the Eastern
Mediterranean potential for World War III will take frightening root.
And the Johnson-Humphrey Administration still has no firm policy
there.
Nearly a year ago and most recently this month - the Republican
Party, represented by the unanimous vote of its Republican Coordinating
Committee, made the following specific recommendations:
1. The United States should assume active and imaginative leadership
in the international community and in the United Nations to secure a
political settlement in the Middle East based on the following principles:
a. An end to the state of belligerency between the Arabs
and Israel and recognition by all states in the area of Israel's
right to live and prosper as an independent nation.
(more)
Room S-124 U.S. Capitol-(202) 225-3700
Consultant to the Leadership-John B. Fisher
- 2 -
b. As an essential part of a permanent settlement in the
Middle East, the United States should insist on, and aid in,
the rehabilitation and resettlement of the more than one
million Palestine Arab refugees who have been displaced over
the past 20 years.
C. The United States should join with other nations in
pressing for international supervision of the holy places
within the City of Jerusalem.
d. The United States should continue to strive for inter-
national guarantees of innocent passage through international
waterways, including the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal.
2. The United States should propose a broad-scale development plan
for all Middle Eastern States which agree to live peacefully with their
neighbors. This should include the bold imaginative Eisenhower-Strass
Plan to bring water, work and food to the Middle East by construction
of nuclear desalinization plants.
3. The United States must fully recognize the implications of
increasing Soviet activities in the Middle East and North Africa, and
be alert, firm and resourceful in countering them.
4. The United States, in furtherance of peace in the Middle East,
should strive with other nations for agreed limitations on international
arms shipments to the area; but failing such an agreement the United
States should be prepared to supply arms to friendly nations sufficient
to maintain the balance of power and to serve as a deterrent to renewed
open warfare.
5. Finally, the United States should make a determined effort to
expose and isolate the militant troublemakers in the Middle East. We
should support and encourage only non-aggressive non-Communist leaders.
(more)
- 3 -
The Republican Leadership of the Congress now reaffirms and again
endorses each of these recommendations in its entirety.
Let no American be unaware of the fact that Russia has moved into
the Middle East and the Mediterranean with tremendous and increasing
naval and diplomatic strength in the biggest Soviet power-grab since
the end of World War II.
And the Johnson-Humphrey Administration still has no firm policy
there.
Spearhead of the Russian Middle East policy is the modern and
constantly growing Russian navy. Today, for the first time, the
Kremlin has a fleet on permanent duty in the Mediterranean. It has
missile cruisers, missile submarines, a helicopter carrier and amphibious
landing forces with the most modern of equipment. These give the
Kremlin the means of intervening in troubled countries entirely around
the Mediterranean rim.
It is an ominous fact that Russia is dramatically gaining in strength
at sea in the strategic, vital Mediterranean area.
And the Johnson-Humphrey Administration still has no firm policy
there.
The American people, so sorely troubled here at home, can no longer
tolerate such blindness to the danger of World War III present today
in the Middle East. We urge -- no, we demand -- of the Johnson-Humphrey
Administration that it move now -- with courage, clarity and firmness --
to assure the State of Israel and the American people that peace and
progress in the Middle East can and will be won.
Ollies Cabon
REPUBLICAN
REpublican NATiONAL COMMiTTEE
1625 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
NATIONAL 8-6800
NEWS
FOR RELEASE
WEDNESDAY A.M.'s
June 19, 1968
NOTICE TO CORRESPONDENTS
Attached is a report of the Republican Coordinating Committee, "Democratic
Foreign Policy--The Crisis of Confidence," which is submitted to you for
release Wednesday morning, June 19, 1968.
This report was drafted for the Coordinating Committee by its Task
Force on the Conduct of Foreign Relations, of which former Ambassador and former
Assistant Secretary of State Robert C. Hill is Chairman.
The basic work on the report was done by a subcommittee of the Task Force
headed by Roderic L. O'Connor, Vice President of CIBA Corporation and former
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.
The report was amended and approved by the Coordinating Committee subsequent
to its meeting in Washington, D.C., May 6, 1968.
Lists of the Task Force on the Conduct of Foreign Relations and of the
Republican Coordinating Committee membership are attached.
6/12/68
REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
Presiding Officer: Ray C. Bliss, Chairman, Republican National Committee
Former President
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Former Presidential Nominees
Barry Goldwater
(1964)
Thomas E. Dewey
(1944 & 1948)
Richard M. Nixon
(1960)
Alf M. Landon
(1936)
Senate Leadership
Everett M. Dirksen
George Murphy, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Senatorial Committee
Thomas H. Kuchel
Milton R. Young, Secretary
Minority Whip
Republican Conference
Bourke B. Hickenlooper
Hugh Scott, Vice Chairman
Chairman, Republican Policy Committee
National Republican Senatorial Committee
Margaret Chase Smith
Chairman, Republican Conference
House Leadership
Gerald R. Ford
Bob Wilson, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Congressional Committee
Leslie C. Arends
Charles E. Goodell, Chairman
Minority Whip
Planning and Research Committee
Melvin R. Laird, Chairman
Richard H. Poff, Secretary
Republican Conference
Republican Conference
John J. Rhodes, Chairman
William C. Cramer, Vice Chairman
Republican Policy Committee
Republican Conference
H. Allen Smith, Ranking Member
of Rules Committee
Representatives of the Republican Governors Association
John A. Love, Governor of Colorado
Raymond P. Shafer, Governor of Pennsylvania
John A. Volpe, Governor of Massachusetts
John H. Chafee, Governor of Rhode Island
George Romney, Governor of Michigan
Nils A. Boe, Governor of South Dakota
Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of
Daniel J. Evans, Governor of Washington
New York
Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
Donald R. Ross, Vice Chairman
Mrs. C. Wayland Brooks, Assistant Chairman
Mrs. J. Willard Marriott, Vice Chairman
Mrs. Collis P. Moore, Vice Chairman
J. Drake Edens, Jr., Vice Chairman
President of the Republican State Legislators Association
F. F. (Monte) Montgomery
Robert L. L. McCormick, Staff Coordinator
Members of the Republican Coordinating Committee's Task Force on
the Conduct of Foreign Relations
Robert C. Hill, Chairman
United States Ambassador to Mexico, 1957-1961
David N. Rowe, Vice Chairman
Professor of Political Science, Yale University
Gordon Allott
United States Senator from Colorado
Robert Amory, Jr.
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1952-1962
John B. Anderson
Member of Congress from Illinois
Tim M. Babcock
Governor of the State of Montana
Frances P. Bolton
Member of Congress from Ohio
Lucius D. Clay
General of the United States Army, Retired
Philip K. Crowe
United States Ambassador to Union of South Africa, 1959-1961
Joseph S. Farland
United States Ambassador to the Republic of Panama, 1960-1963
Paul Findley
Member of Congress from Illinois
Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen
Member of Congress from New Jersey
Ernest S. Griffith
Dean, School of International Service, American University, 1958-1965
Mrs. Cecil M. Harden, Member of Congress from Indiana, 1949-1959;
Republican National Committeewoman for Indiana
Joe Holt
Member of Congress from California, 1953-1959
Walter A. Judd
Member of Congress from Minnesota, 1943-1963
John D. Lodge
United States Ambassador to Spain, 1955-1961
Gerhart Niemeyer
Professor of Political Science. University of Notre Dame
Nicholas Nyaradi
Director of School of International Studies, Bradley University
Roderic L. O'Connor
Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs,
Department of State, 1957-1958
G. L. Ohrstrom, Jr.
Investment Banker
William W. Scranton
Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1963-1967
Bernard M. Shanley
Republican National Committeeman for New Jersey
Robert Strausz-Hupe
Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania
John Hay Whitney
United States Ambassador to Great Britain, 1956-61
Kent B. Crane
Secretary to the Task Force
Republican Coordinating Committee
Task Force on the Conduct of Foreign Relations
Approved May 6, 1968
DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY - THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
After nearly eight years of Democratic Administration, the wreckage
of our country's foreign policy is strewn around the world for all to see.
Since 1960 our strategic superiority has slipped. Our alliances have
virtually disintegrated. Our strength has been dissipated in pursuit of
secondary objectives.
In consequence, America is on the defensive throughout the world.
Our friends turn away from us. Our leadership is disputed and openly
challenged. Our prestige is gravely eroded. Our enemies are increasingly
bold.
In this election year the American people have the right, indeed the
obligation, to ask of the Party in power how and why this has happened.
The answer is not difficult to find. Democratic Administrations have
forgotten two fundamentals upon which United States' foreign policy has
traditionally been based:
First, America's policies and actions must always be based on
principles derived from the moral and spiritual values of our
heritage, and thus in accord with the highest aspirations of mankind.
Instead principles have all too often been sacrificed to expediency.
Second, America's military and economic strength must be sufficient
to protect the nation's vital interests anywhere in the world. Above
all, our government's unmistakable determination to use its strength
when necessary must be clear to friend and foe alike. Any doubts
-2-
about either our strength - or our leaders' resolve to use it - impair our
credibility as a world power. Throughout the world, since 1960 our ambivalent
policies have created more anxiety and doubt than confidence in America.
The true measure of our nation's foreign policy is whether or not it
has enhanced the security and well-being of our people. By this test, the
past two Democratic Administrations have failed -- the Bay of Pigs, the Berlin
Wall and the Pueblo incident are only symbolic of the general malaise. The
peace and stability in world affairs that prevailed during the Eisenhower
Administration are gone. Today our nation is less secure. We are less strong.
We are less sure of our purpose. America's prestige and credibility have
crumbled.
How has this happened -- and, more important, how would a new Republican
Administration remedy the situation?
II. The World View
For purposes of strategic planning the world can be viewed in three
parts: the Communist World, the Free World, and the Uncommitted World.
The safeguarding of America's vital interests requires a global strategy
encompassing these major divisions and their complex interrelationships.
Without this strategy our policies become inconsistent and contradictory.
1/ In eleven foreign policy reports issued during the past three years, the
Republican Coordinating Committee has reviewed in detail most of the major
areas of interest to the United States abroad. These papers have
identified errors made by Democratic Administrations and presented specific
recommendations for corrective action. The reports are entitled:
United States Relations with the Soviet Union, U.S. Foreign Policy in
Vietnam, Our North Atlantic Alliance, The United States & Eastern Europe,
The Middle East - Crisis and Opportunity (1967), Continuing Crisis in the
Middle East (1968), Latin America - Progress or Failure?, East-West Trade,
Foreign Economic Assistance, The American Image Abroad, and The United Nations
-3-
During the Eisenhower years, America's successful global strategy was
based upon our preponderance of military and economic strength, buttressed
by free world alliances. These alliances, always sanctioned and sometimes
supported by the United Nations, required agreement on a common danger and a
sharing of the burdens of maintaining the peace.
The strategy worked. An armistice was promptly achieved in Korea.
Communism was contained. As long as Republican policies continued, peace
was maintained. None dared challenge America's might or will. None dared
challenge the free world's collective strength or purpose.
In 1960, after eight years of peace, the Democratic candidate for Pres-
ident charged:
"The Republican peace and prosperity is a myth. We are
not enjoying a period of peace - only a period of stag-
nation and retreat, while America becomes second
"
Members of the new Administration apparently believed this allegation --
proved false by subsequent events -- because they immediately began tampering
with established policies.
Not only were the new policies wrong, but their implementation became
increasingly unsystematic. The National Security Council machinery - so care-
fully structured during the Eisenhower Administration to develop and coordinate
our foreign policy - was dismantled. White House subordinates, unversed in
practical foreign affairs, were permitted to dabble in this critical area. The
professional diplomatic corps was expanded to make room for political appointees
ready to support the new policies. Inevitably confusion and conflict replaced
order and precision. The security of the nation and the well-being of the
American people were placed in jeopardy.
Only because the previous Republican Administration had bequeathed to its
successors a coherent body of foreign policy based upon unrivaled diplomatic,
military and economic strength, were the Democrats able to improvise and
-4-
experiment for so long without having to account for their errors. Slow as the
day of reckoning has been in arriving, it is now clearly at hand. We see it
in the tragic loss of America's stature in the world.
A. THE COMMUNIST WORLD
For two generations and through two world wars the United States has
opposed aggression by hostile totalitarian systems in Europe and Asia. We
have considered such opposition essential to our own security and thus in the
national interest.
Since the late 1940's Soviet and Chinese Communist governments have
been the chief instigators of such aggression. As a result, containment of
Soviet and Chinese Communism has been the foundation stone of American foreign
policy and has received firm bi-partisan support. Throughout the Eisenhower
Administration the worldwide Communist movement was contained without major
armed conflict.
Shortly after the Democratic Administration took power this picture
changed. While rapidly increasing United States assistance to Laos and South
Vietnam, the new Administration simultaneously sought accommodation with the
Russians. Intrigued by the USSR's declining influence over the world Communist
movement and the Soviet's disinclination to continue domestically the worst
excesses of the Stalinist era, our new President decided that the United States
should somehow exploit the situation.
In its zeal to encourage ferment and change within the Communist world,
the Administration gravely misjudged the influence an outside power can exert
for internal reform in a largely self-sufficient totalitarian state. It was
apparently assumed that the Soviets were so eager to raise the living standards
of their own people that they would accept the polycentric and "liberalizing"
-5-
movements developing in the Communist camp.
Such suppositions led Democratic policy makers to focus more on pre-
sumed Soviet intentions than on Soviet actions, many of which continued to be
inimicable to the United States. Wishful thinking induced the Administration
to deal with the Soviets according to what they said, not what they did.
No one would fault the basic aims -- to relax tensions and end the
arms race -- aims espoused long before by President Eisenhower. His Open Skies
and Atoms for Peace proposals and his appointment of our first disarmament ad-
visor created an atmosphere conducive to negotiation. But there was a critical
different in basic approach: in all negotiations Republicans required the
Communists to meet us half-way.
On the other hand, since 1960 our leaders have acted as if we were
obliged to demonstrate our sincerity -- not once, but again and again --
before the Russians could be expected to respond in kind. Disregarding
policies which had sustained our leadership of the free world since World War
II, new policy-makers innovated and improvised.
A prime result of this experimentation has been crippling policy
contradictions. The most glaring include:
-The Administration's eager effort to "build bridges" to Comm-
unism in Europe while fighting Communist expansion in Asia.
Over 80 percent of the weapons used against the United States
in Vietnam have been produced in the USSR and Eastern Europe.
Yet the President announced in 1964 that America would seek to
"build bridges across the gulf" separating Communist regimes in
Europe from the West primarily by offering to increase our
trade with Iron Curtain countries. Such East-West trade ob-
viously could help the Communists kill Americans by proxy
in Asia.
-The Administration's exhortations for Western European nations
to stand firm against Communism while America sought to negot-
iate arms control agreements with the USSR without adequate
consideration of our allies' interests.
-6-
-The Administration's toleration of what has become an aggressive
and openly avowed Communist state in Cuba only 90 miles from
Miami, while American forces disperse all over the world to
frustrate Communist designs. Following the disastrous Bay of
Pigs venture, the Democratic Administration reversed its policy
completely, denying Cuban exiles virtually all hope of returning
home in the near future. Meanwhile, Castro-trained guerrillas
have been active in such countries as the Dominican Republic,
Guatamala, Colombia, Venezuela and Bolivia. Castro-financed
propaganda and subversive activities have spread even beyond
Latin America. Cuban mercenaries fought with the Congo rebels
against the legally constituted government in Kinshasha, and
a Cuban bodyguard unit foiled a coup attempt by indigenous
African troops aimed at ridding the Congo (Brazzaville) of its
leftist President. Conferences in Havana have repeatedly pro-
vided a forum for anti-American invective, including inflamatory
statements urging revolution in the United States by black
power advocate Stokely Carmichael.
-The Administration's eagerness to negotiate non-proliferation
and space treaties without adequate safeguards despite mounting
evidence of the USSR's increasing military capability. In their
zeal to reconcile East-West differences, Democratic policy-makers
even concluded that America's overwhelming military superiority
had become a barrier to dealing successfully with the USSR.
In order to help overcome the imagined Soviet inferiority ccmplex,
United States military policy has tended to emphasize "parity"
in armaments rather than superiority over the Soviets.
Proponents of "parity" believe that our offensive capability is invincible
and therefore that our development of more advanced weapons would merely
increase our existing "overkill" capacity and accelerate the arms race. So
believing, the Administration restricted America's weapons development, then
tried to persuade the Russians to follow suit. The Soviet reaction should have
been foreseen. They feigned interest but simultaneously increased their
military budget and pushed vigorously ahead with new weapons.
For several years the Soviets have narrowed their strategic gap with
the United States. At current relative rates of growth their strategic
missile force will shortly equal ours. They have begun deployment of an ex-
tensive anti-missile system (ABM). After our failure to dissuade them from
this action, not only by exhortation but also by our Defense Secretary's
refusal to expend funds the Congress voted for ABM development, we belatedly
-7-
and half-heartedly started a very thin shield of our own. The Soviets have
also unveiled a new orbital bomb system capable of launching nuclear strikes
from outer space. This development contravenes the spirit, if not the letter,
of a recent treaty hailed by the Administration as preserving outer space
for peaceful use.
Tragically, the Democrats' false charge in 1960 about a "missile gap"
now threatens to become a reality by virtue of policies that they have them-
selves imposed.
While rapidly expanding their missile strength, the Soviets have also
qualitatively and quantitatively enlarged their air and naval power. For the
first time they have displayed large naval forces in the Mediterranean. Their
submarine fleet already exceeds ours numerically and nuclear-powered missile
submarines are rapidly being added. Several new high-performance aircraft,
unknown to the West until the 1967 Domodevodo air show, are operational. By
contrast, America's F-111 aircraft (formerly the TFX), imposed by the Secretary
of Defense over strenuous military objections, is too expensive, too heavy,
too unreliable, and too late.
The Soviet research and development budget for new weapons now surpasses
that of the United States. Expenditures for offensive strategic forces re-
portedly have doubled ours for the past four years. Because of the long lead-
time required to develop major new weapons, the United States may be nearing a
strategic crossover -- the critical point at which the net strategic advantage
passes to the Soviet Union. During the long years when Mr. McNamara was
Secretary of Defense, he emphatically denied this possibility -- with the
same sureness, let it be noted, that he evidenced in repeatedly predicting
an early end to American involvement in Vietnam.
-8-
Asia is vital in any assessment of the Communist world.
In January 1961 Republicans left this area in relative peace. Today,
a major war drags on in Vietnam. South Korea is again actively threatened.
India's borders remain tense after fighting erupted with both China and
Pakistan. Hong Kong's future is uncertain following bloody civil disorders.
Subversion of external Communist origin is active in a half dozen free nations.
In Asia we confront two major Communist powers. Soviet Russia and
Communist China harbor deep antagonisms, but they are united in regarding the
United States as the principal obstacle to their regional and world goals.
They are also united in their determination to weaken our nation. So mot-
ivated, the Soviet and Chinese Communists vie to outstrip each other in aiding
enemies in Vietnam.
Of all nations, Communist China is most openly hostile to the United
States and to a stable world order. For many reasons, including her self-
imposed isolation and belligerent attitude toward the world, Communist China
has turned inward and she has convulsed. Continuing conflict and internal
stress make it impossible now to predict whether the Communists will be able
to retain centralized control of that huge country; or whether China will
disintegrate into regional rule by warlords; or even whether the Chinese people
will regain the freedom to choose a better form of government and then rejoin
the free world. Therefore, this is a time for watchful waiting.
For years Communist China has stirred trouble abroad in order to distract
her people from the deteriorating internal situation. She has twice attacked
India, created disturbances in Macao and Hong Kong, nearly conquered Indonesia
from within, launched wide-spread subversion in Africa, continually probed the
Taiwan Straits, encouraged disgraceful conduct by her diplomats abroad, and mis-
treated foreign diplomats and newsmen in Peking. The world community can not
-9-
condone such tactics.
The stiff and successful British reaction to Communist provocations
in Hong Kong last year provide a good example of what can be accomplished
with a small amount of force applied with unswerving resolve.
-Recommendations-
Under a Republican Administration, we pledge to the American people
that our policies will be based not on euphoric speculation, but on realistic
assessments of Communist capabilities. Our actions will be based on what the
Communists do, not on what they say.
Under a Republican Administration, we pledge America's weapons super-
iority will be maintained, our system of alliances will be revitalized; and
the credibility of our will to protect vital national interests will be
restored.
Under a Republican Administration, we shall seek true détente -- but
through strength, not weakness. No nation can negotiate successfully while
its opponents are allowed to make gains at its expense. No general accomm-
odation with the Communists can realistically be sought without an honorable
settlement to the war in Vietnam.
Under a Republican Administration, we pledge to seek greater knowledge
of Communist China and to offer increased contacts if and when it abides by
the normal rules of conduct in the international community. Although we may
reaffirm our traditional friendship for the Chinese people, this is not the
time for new initiatives which might legitimize current Chinese Communist
rulers or help them overcome their grave internal problems. America should
continue to support the Republic of China, whose energetic government has
developed a viable free enterprise economy on Taiwan, and now stands ready
to play an increasingly important role in Asian affairs.
-10-
In Vietnam, the Republican Party wishes the President well during this
period of peace negotiations. We support his declared objective of an honorable
peace, one that would rule out a Communist take-over. Acceptance of a settle-
ment lacking proper safeguards would betray our allies and the South Vietnamese
people. It would be an outrage in light of the sacrifices made by our men --
living and dead.
B. THE FREE WORLD
At the close of the Eisenhower years mutual defense pacts guaranteed the
security of most of the free world under United States leadership. NATO,
CENTO, SEATO, the ANZUS pact and a number of bilateral treaties coalesced free
world strength and resolve. The Organization of American States (OAS),
functioning as a regional alliance under the United Nations charter, and the
United Nations itself, were used effectively to counter Communist aggression
and maintain world stability.
Today all is changed. The United Nations is rendered increasingly
impotent by factionalism and incipient bankruptcy. Cuban-sponsored subversion
and revolution debilitate the OAS. SEATO defaults in the precise situation
for which it was created. CENTO has largely disintegrated and the Soviets
have at last achieved their goal of becoming a major force in Middle Eastern
affairs.
Worse still is the deterioration of NATO. With no other part of the
world is the United States more closely linked by ties of history, culture and
trade. After World War II, America's stake in Europe grew larger than ever
before. Having invested nearly $50 billion to revive Europe economically, we
led in the creation of the Western Alliance. Thus, the Soviet threat against
Europe was contained, and the earth's second largest concentration of productive
power remained with the free world. When President Eisenhower left office, the
-11-
Western allies stood resolute and united. We and our European friends looked
to the day when our military alliance would evolve into a durable political
c ommunity.
Since then, what has happened in Europe? Today the Western Alliance is
in a shambles. France has withdrawn her military forces and her territory from
NATO. Britain's world-wide influence is a mere shadow of its former self. The
West Germans, perhaps following America's erratic lead, waver between commit-
ment to the West and accommodation with the East. No longer do we enjoy the
confidence or even the support of many of our traditional friends.
Early in the 1960's vacillations in U.S. strategic policy began to under-
mine Europe's trust in our pledge to defend her against Soviet attack:
In 1961, after repeatedly professing our determination to
protect West Germany and West Berlin, the United States stood
idly by while the East Germans erected the Berlin Wall in violation
of the quadripartite covenants governing the status of the former
German capital.
In 1962, the United States imposed a crucial change in defense
policy on its NATO allies by unilaterally moving to a new strategy
of "flexible response." At the time, a Democrat controlled Senate
subcommittee commented caustically:
"There was little or no consultation with our allies,
and the shift was explained in terms which, to say the
least, caused doubt and confusion about what kind of
counterblows the United States might be planning in the
event of a Soviet attack on Europe. To some in Europe
it looked as though the United States would rather switch
than fight. The change in American doctrine forced
modifications in Allied military doctrine as well, thus
painfully underlining for the Allies how little influence
they had on American policies of life and death importance
to them."
Again in 1962, without prior consultation with our allies, all
missiles were withdrawn from Italy and Turkey, leaving the impression
that this was done in return for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles
from Cuba. More recently we unilaterally withdrew troops from
Europe for assignment elsewhere on the subterfuge that they were being
rotated normally.
Also in 1962, the United States cancelled the Skybolt project,
thus dealing a crippling blow to Britain's declining strategic
-12-
capability. Worse, the cancellation cast a pall over the United
Kingdom's economic future, for the crude manner by which America
sought to placate British disappointment afforded France one month
later the rationale for rejecting Great Britain's application to
join the Common Market. Later, after urging other allies into
joint weapons development projects, we unilaterally cancelled
many, such as the Main Battle Tank (MBT) and the Vertical Short
Take-off and Landing (VSTOL) aircraft projects with West Germany.
Finally, Democratic Administrations have repeatedly sought
bilateral negotiations with the USSR on such key matters as nuclear
proliferation and the Washington-Moscow "Hot Line" without ade-
quate regard for European sensitivities and vital interests.
Germany is deeply concerned over the ramifications of the non-
proliferation treaty. France has flatly refused to sign it. The
Washington-Moscow "Hot Line" became symbolic of Europe's concern
both that the decision-making process might by-pass them, and that
they were not considered of sufficient importance to have their own
"Hot Lines" with the White House.
In all such matters, Democratic Administrations have often appeared more
willing to court and placate the Soviets than to assist our European friends.
Small wonder that concern and resentment replaced respect and confidence for
the United States in the capitals of Western Europe.
The fiscal irresponsibility of Democratic Administrations is another key
factor in the world's declining respect and confidence in America. The
reliability of a country which refuses to live within its means at home and
verges upon bankruptcy abroad will be seriously questioned.
While our President boasts of unparalleled domestic prosperity, William
McChesney Martin, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, issues increasingly
stern warnings about the true state of our economy:
"We are faced with an intolerable budget deficit
and also an intolerable deficit in our international
balance of payments. "
"This country today is overextended and overcommitted
It"s time we stopped talking about guns and butter. "
"We have been living, to a certain extent, in a fool's
paradise. "
"The United States faces either an uncontrollable
recession or an uncontrollable inflation if it does not
correct its red ink budget and its balance of payments
deficit We are in the midst of the worst financial crisis
we have had since 1931."
-13-
The world, Europe and Japan in particular, waits with growing
impatience to see if the Administration will take the necessary steps to
avert fiscal crisis. Foreign impatience with America's economic fumbling
concerns all Americans, because foreign creditors now hold three times more
dollars than the United States can redeem with its entire gold supply.
Our gold reserves have fallen to a thirty year low of less than $11
billion, and yet the Democratic Administration continues to delay and temporize.
The President still refuses to treat the root causes of our balance of payments
difficulties by revising his inflationary domestic policies.
The Administration has resorted to temporary palliatives rather than
lasting solutions in dealing with our critical economic problems. In the long
run, the suddenly-imposed executive restrictions on American business abroad
and the proposed restraints on tourist travel are likely to do more harm than
good. Even the two-price gold system adopted by leading financial nations
in March 1968 merely buys time for the United States. Neither this device
nor the proposed Special Drawing Rights (SDR's) to be administered by the
International Monetary Fund will correct the fundamental imbalance in America's
deficit position. America's reckless spending has placed her at the mercy
of Europe's central bankers. Our international viability now depends upon
their continuing good will.
Not only in Europe, but everywhere in the free world people worry over
America's future. They know their own security and economic well-being
will be jeopardized if current policies persist.
In Asia there are many countries long of importance to America -- an
American admiral "opened Japan" to trade with the West in 1853, an American
Secretary of State authored the "Open Door" policy toward China which European
powers subscribed to in 1899, and the last three wars America has fought
-14-
began in Asia. Many nations allied with us today are in Asia, as are three
bellicose enemies -- Communist China, North Vietnam and North Korea. Japan,
the world's third greatest industrial power and, with the exception of Canada,
America's best customer, is increasing her role in Asian affairs. We must
retain her as an ally and a cooperative friend.
How well we handle our security problems -- how imaginatively we approach
development problems once we are freed to accord them more attention -- will
profoundly influence the future of 900 million Asians outside the iron and
bamboo curtains. In tomorrow's world these people may very well hold the
balance of power. We must keep faith with them and they with us.
In Latin America, Democratic Administrations have promised a special
effort to raise our closest neighbors' living standards. To date, only
expectations have been raised. When the Alliance for Progress reached the
half-way point after five years of highly-publicized effort only 7 of 19
countries, representing only 29% of the people in Latin America, had managed
to meet the Alliance's minimum goal of increasing per capita income by 2½ a year.
Yet, if Latin America fails to make economic progress, political instability
and further incursions by international Communism are the inevitable result.
The security problems engendered for the United States by additional Castro-
type regimes are obvious. Even now signs of declining United States' influence
abound -- and are ignored by the Administration. In the past few months
alone, an American Ambassador was expelled from South America and two American
military advisors were murdered while performing their duties in Central
America. The Johnson Administration did not even bother to protest these
outrages. Moreover, the Democrats so mishandled negotiations over the future
status of the Panama Canal that Panamanian discontent has increased despite
our country's remarkable offer to surrender control over that vital
communications link.
-15-
Under the past two Democratic Administrations the confidence of our
friends in America's future has been shattered. It is urgently ncessary to
regain this trust and friendship.
- Recommendations -
We cannot revert to the peaceful and orderly world of 1960. Too many
changes have occurred -- not the least of which are the alarming changes
wrought by our nation's recent errors and failings. Still the fundamental
precepts, the underlying ideals, of the former successful Republican
policies provide useful guidelines for the future.
Under a Republican Administration, with America's spiritual, fiscal
and military strength reestablished, we pledge an informed dialogue with
our friends and allies on how best to restore our unity of purpose. As
a prerequisite we pledge to deal with major Communist powers on issues of strat-
egic importance within the framework of allied unity. Only thus can we hope
to regain the confidence of our international partners.
Under a Republican Administration, we pledge to improve the management
of our foreign commitments. New initiatives may be necessary, but the
United States should never again allow itself to become isolated from its
friends. Only with the loyal support of our allies will the burdens of
maintaining the peace weigh less heavily and exclusively upon us.
Under a Republican Administration, we pledge to organize the immense
resources of the free world which now lie fallow because of allied disunity.
A renewed sense of purpose will not only improve the common security, but
will release talent and resources for a collective assault on the problems
of peaceful development. The United States should encourage greater regional
and subregional cooperation as a means for stimulating other nations to play
larger roles in dealing with their own problems of development and defense.
-16-
We will also indeavor to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations
by calling for charter revision aimed at providing equitable solutions to the
organization's financial insolvency and burgeoning membership.
C. THE UNCOMMITTED WORLD
The political problems accompanying newly acquired independence, and
the economic and social problems created by a headlong rush into the modern
technological world, make most developing nations inherently insecure and
unstable. Only competent local leadership can prevent disorder in situations
where peoples' expectations are likely to rise faster than society's ability
to satisfy them.
Demagogues will inevitably try to exploit the grinding needs and
revolutionary expectations of have-not peoples. This danger would exist
independent of Communists, but they will typically seek to scavenge upon
troubles of the struggling, young countries.
The Communists have put us on notice that they will provoke trouble
wherever possible in the uncommitted world. They announced in 1961 and have
consistently followed a policy of support for "Wars of National Liberation"
aimed at undermining not only colonial administrations but also independent
governments whose actions fail to win Communist approval. Vietnam is but
one manifestation of this policy. How regrettable it is that the Admin-
istration's mismanagement of the Vietnam commitment has prevented any
country from providing much needed leadership elsewhere.
For example, in a political sense most of Africa has emerged onto the
world scene only since 1960. Twenty-nine of Africa's thirty-nine legally
independent states have achieved freedom during the 1960's. As a result,
Africa now accounts for nearly one-third of the votes in the United Nations.
Despite this portentious change, Democratic Administrations have neglected
-17-
the huge continent. During the summer of 1967, for example, one-fourth of
our embassies in Africa were without Ambassadors.
Worse, the Administration's urge to remodel our foreign policies has
prompted our leaders to vie with Communists for the favor of endemic trouble-
makers among the leaders of uncommitted nations. Too much of America's aid
has gone to the Nassers, Sukarnos and Nkrumahs of the world -- men unwilling
to face the hard decisions required for domestic development, yet all too
willing to disrupt the progress of more responsible neighbors. The Democrats'
over-riding desire to be popular among such leaders -- so-called "neutrals"
who regularly display a callous disregard for America and the West -- has often
prompted the United States to give more aid and support to those willing to
injure us than to those inclined to support us.
Thus, America presents the "Third World" with a blurred and puzzling
image -- an image of a powerful but vacillating giant, devoid of principle
and still undecided about basic objectives.
This lack of U.S. leadership is dangerous in the extreme. The under-
developed world holds a menacing potential for violence, even anarchy.
Precisely because turmoil defeats progress, precisely because violence per-
petuates human misery, the United States must promote the stability necessary
for orderly growth and improved living standards. Americans, with a few
other fortunate peoples, cannot exist indefinitely as an island of plenty in
a sea of poverty, hunger, disease and rising resentment. Nor would it be
true to America's great ideals and humanitarian traditions for us to fail to
help close the enormous development gap between the "have" and the "have-
not" nations.
Although the genuine needs of developing areas mount alarmingly, the
Administration appears unable to unwilling to defend even its modest 1968
aid proposal -- the smallest request in foreign assistance history -- much
-18-
less to offer urgently needed new initiatives. The Republican Party has
always endorsed the purposes of foreign aid. Our criticisms have focused
on ineffective and wasteful methods of administration.
- Recommendations -
Under a Republican Administration, we pledge to cooperate with leaders
devoted to evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. Great change is
inevitable; the United States must remain flexible to help direct it into
peaceful channels, but without forsaking our principles to curry the favor of
opportunists and demagogues.
Under a Republican Administration, we will urgently seek new ways of
accelerating economic development abroad. We will encourage the cooperation of
other nations, both those able to help others and those which must help them-
selves. Instead of restrictions on American business overseas, we will develop
incentives to stimulate American enterprise to help solve the problems of
economic development.
Under a Republican Administration, we pledge to follow up on recent
international tariff reductions, which mainly secured advantage for wealthy
nations, by seeking ways to open up the huge American market on a preferred
basis to industrial products and agricultural commodities from selected
developing areas.
III. CONCLUSIONS
In the final analysis, two Democratic Administrations have succeeded
only in fostering a world instability perilous to our nation's security.
This country's confusing policies and unpredictable actions have caused
America to lose both the confidence of her allies and the respect of her
enemies.
-19-
America's credibility as a world power has been impaired by the
absence of global strategy. Lacking an underlying theme our goals have
fluctuated wildly; and even where our professed objectives have remained
consistent our actions have denied our words. It is small wonder that our
allies have drifted away from a leader whose sincerity they mistrust and
whose wisdom and resolve they doubt.
Divisions in the free world and America's diminished stature have caused
peace to become more remote because our confusion simply provokes the
Communists into trying to exploit our weakness. When we fail to support our
basic principles, and shrink from defending our vital interests, we invite
our opponents to challenge our power and test our spirit in additional ways.
Nothing has so dramatically illustrated our deteriorating position in
the world, or so damaged our credibility as a world power, as the Pueblo
incident. After tiny North Korea captured a United States' naval vessel in
international waters, the Secretary of State termed the unprecedented action
an "act of war. " The President sent the attack carrier Enterprise into the
region and called up the Reserves. When the Communists called our bluff,
the mighty United States backed away and meekly accepted defeat and humil-
iation. The Johnson Administration could then devise no better course of
action than to ask the Soviets to intervene on our behalf. The Soviets'
prompt refusal forced the United States into direct talks with North Korea, to
the consternation of our South Korean allies.
Our country's ineptitude and lack of firm resolve in the Pueblo crisis
may well have made plucking the Eagle's feathers an activity which other
fourth-rate powers will presume they too can engage in with impunity.
-20-
In their totality, Democratic foreign policy failures have created a
crisis of confidence in the world.
In 1960, while campaigning for the Presidency, the Democrats made much
of America's alleged decline in prestige abroad. They demanded that the
United States Information Service (USIA) release polls to prove the point.
Once in office the Democrats not only refused to publish further foreign
prestige polls, they even ordered USIA to cancel all future ones which the
Administration suddenly decided "were of no value." It is obvious that the
polls were abandoned because America's presige and popularity abroad had
plummeted.
But the American people do not need such polls; the headlines bear
daily evidence of our nation's declining international stature.
The restoration of American leadership in the world depends upon the
restoration of our government's credibility. The Democrats can neither regain
America's lost reputation nor win back alienated friends. They are unable
to divorce themselves from their own past errors. The Party in power can
neither admit nor rectify its mistakes. Only a Republican Administration,
unencumbered with past error and illusion, can restore credibility to our
nation.
Only a Republican Administration can overcome the current crisis of
confidence and return the United States to its former position of world
leadership.
officeCopy
25 July 1968
IIIII
U. S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE
REP. JOHN J. RHODES, (R.-ARIZ.) CHAIRMAN
1616 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
TELEPHONE 225-6168
10
HOUSE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE STATEMENT ON THE SEIZURE AND DETENTION
OF THE USS PUEBLO
On January 23, 1968 while sailing in international waters, the USS Pueblo was
forcibly stopped, boarded and seized by North Korean armed vessels. The crew of six
officers, 75 enlisted men and two civilians was taker prisoner. The Pueblo was forced
into the North Korean port of Wonsan.
The marks on the Communist prison wall reflect that 183 days have slowly come
and gone. Hope is replaced by despair. Courage is attacked by doubt.
In the beginning, Arthur J. Goldberg, then the U. S. Representative to the
United Nations, confidently stated:
"Now, we will show by times and the course of the vessel exactly what
occurred and you will see from this that the location of the Pueblo
was constantly far away from Korean shores, always away from the 12-
mile limit until it was taken into Wonsan by the North Korean vessels.'
This positive recital has been replaced by the qualified statements of the
Secretaries of State and Defense that there is a possibility that before its capture
the Pueblo had penetrated North Korean waters.
President Johnson spoke for the American people when he declared that this
"wanton and aggressive act cannot be accepted. But his then Secretary of Defense,
Robert S. McNamara, spoke for the Johnson-Humphrey Administration when he conceded
to a nationwide audience that he might discipline the Captain of the Pueblo, "if he
violated his instructions consciously or through negligence.
No wonder the North Koreans have been encouraged to the point of producing
alleged "confessions" and threatening that "the criminals who have violated the sov-
ereignty of another country and perpetrated a provocative act must receive due
punishment.
North Korea's arrogant demand that Washington "admit," "apologize" and "punish"
seems now to be accepted by the Johnson-Humphrey Administration as a basis for negot-
(over)
iations.
From the outset of this humiliating affair, misinformation, miscalculation
and mishandling have been the rule rather than the exception.
On January 6 and January 11, North Korea seized South Korean vessels. On
January 21, North Korea's delegate at Panmunjom protested formally against the United
States "having infiltrated into our coastal waters a number of armed spy boats, es-
pionage bandits together with a groun of South Korean fishing boats."
Despite these overt acts and warnings, precautions were not taken to provide
the Pueblo with surface or air protection. There were only a mere handful of opera-
tional U. S. first-line fighter airplanes in all South Korea and these were loaded
with nuclear weapons and could not be reconfigured with tactical weapons before the
Pueblo reached Wonsan. Obviously no effective contingency plans existed for concerted
American action to prevent or to respond to forcible attacks on exposed and vulnerable
vessels.
For six months, representatives of the United States and North Korea have been
discussing the Pueblo seizure at Panmunjom. After their 19th meeting, the State
Department acknowledged there had been "no progress" made so far toward gaining re-
lease of the men. We have no way of knowing what the Administration has done or is
prepared to do to gain their release. However, a Democratic Senator has predicted
that the United States will apologize for intruding into North Korean waters and pay
$100 million by the end of August for release of the USS Pueblo's 82 surviving crew
members.
Although this statement was flatly denied by the Administration, an abject
apology to North Korea would be in the same pattern as the Johnson-Humphrey Adminis-
tration apology to the Soviet Union which gained the release of an American commercial
airliner from a Soviet base. This apology was given even though there is reason to
believe that the Vietnam bound plane carrying 212 military passengers was illegally
intercepted by Soviet jets over international waters and forced into Soviet airspace.
It also would be similar to the course that was followed after the Bay of Pigs debacle
wherein prisoners held captive by Castro were released in exchange for medicine and
drugs at a cost of millions of dollars to the American taxpayer.
Failure in the conduct of international affairs by the Johnson-Humphrey
Administration, as in the Pueblo affair, has led to the widespread belief that the
United States is indeed a "paper tiger.
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
August 21, 1968
Statement by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, R-Mich., Minority Leader of the U.S. House of
Representatives.
The sympathies of all Americans are with the freedom-loving Czechs so
crudely suppressed by Soviet military might, but the United States should not
become involved in this Communist family fight.
The brutal aggression ordered by Soviet leaders has shattered the dream
world spun by some Americans in the spirit of Glassboro. Once again Red Russia
has been exposed as an enemy of freedom and an enslaver of people.
The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Russia and other Warsaw Pact powers is a
clear violation of Czech sovereignty. It has again been made clear that the
Soviet Union is an imperialistic power which looks upon its Communist neighbors
as its colonies.
The United States should move with extreme caution in this situation, but
certainly it would be appropriate to demand an immediate explanation from the
Soviet Union in the world forum of the United Nations.
# # #
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
August 21, 1968
Statement by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, R-Mich., Minority Leader of the U.S. House of
Representatives.
The sympathies of all Americans are with the freedom-loving Czechs so
crudely suppressed by Soviet military might, but the United States should not
become involved in this Communist family fight.
The brutal aggression ordered by Soviet leaders has shattered the dream
world spun by some Americans in the spirit of Glassboro. Once again Red Russia
has been exposed as an enemy of freedom and an enslaver of people.
The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Russia and other Warsaw Pact powers is a
clear violation of Czech sovereignty. It has again been made clear that the
Soviet Union is an imperialistic power which looks upon its Communist neighbors
as its colonies.
The United States should move with extreme caution in this situation, but
certainly it would be appropriate to demand an immediate explanation from the
Soviet Union in the world forum of the United Nations.
# # #
0 ofice Copy
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR RELEASE ON RECEIPT--
August 23, 1968
Statement by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, R-Mich., Minority Leader of the U.S. House of Reps.
The eyes of the world are focused on Czechoslovakia, where freedom-loving
Czechs are gallantly resisting Soviet oppression. Meantime, in Biafra, women and
children are dying by the thousands as innocent victims of starvation in the Nigerian
civil war.
President Johnson has called upon the United Nations Security Council to
condemn the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia and to demand withdrawal of the
troops--and I applaud that action. But at the same time the White House is silent
about the famine in Biafra caused by the Nigerian Government's refusal to allow
relief supply planes to fly into Biafra over Nigerian territory.
While some supplies have been flown into Biafra by the International Red
Cross despite the Nigerian Government's attitude, the relief thus afforded has been
pitifully small. Now it is reported that the Nigerian Government will allow Red
Cross planes to fly into Biafra if they first land in Nigerian federal territory,
presumably to be searched for arms.
If this report is accurate, President Johnson should immediately move to
implement airlifts of food and other supplies to Biafra. The United States should
be in the forefront of nations going to the aid of the million refugees said to be
starving in the Calabar area of Biafra.
At the very least, the Johnson Administration should immediately seek clear-
cut Nigerian Government permission for Red Cross food airlifts into Biafra. This
probably could be done through the British, who reportedly are giving arms aid to
the Nigerian federal government and therefore must have considerable influence in
Lagos.
We are not talking here about intervening in a civil war. This is not a
question of military assistance or involvement. This is a matter of human decency--
a need to put food into the mouths of starving people.
Here is an opportunity to demonstrate America's great compassion to the world
at the very moment when the Soviet Union is exhibiting the cruelty that results from
a fear of basic freedoms. Let us respond to this cry for help from the starving.
Let us do what we know to be right.
# # #
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
September 9, 1968
Statement by House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford, R-Mich.
Like the legendary Roman hero Horatio of the Bridge, Hubert Humphrey
apparently is the last to learn that his administration has gone off and left
the gallant defenders of Israel's independence without adequate arms to match
the massive Russian buildup in the Middle East.
The Vice-President addressed the Convention of B'Nai Brith here yesterday
and apparently endorsed the position taken by the Republican Leadership of the
Congress and the 1968 Republican Platform that Israel should promptly receive
the latest supersonic jet aircraft from the United States. Does the Vice-
President agree with the steadfast policy of the Johnson-Humphrey Administration
in denying this necessary protection to Israel on the specious grounds that the
Russians may still be persuaded to limit the Middle East arms race?
Since the tragic event in Czechoslovakia, it should be apparent even to
those who have repeatedly ignored the brutal facts of Soviet power politics that
Moscow will make maximum use of its conventional military force in international
affairs.
Senator Dirksen and I long ago warned that the Soviet Union was converting
its 1967 military defeat in the Middle East into a strategic success by rapidly
resupplying its Arab clients with the most modern weapons and military personnel.
Together with other Republicans in the Congress and the Republican Coordinating
Committee we have repeatedly urged the Johnson-Humphrey Administration to move
quickly to redress the imbalance of power at this vital crossroads of the World.
I am happy that the Vice-President, now that he is the Democratic nominee,
has seconded our Republican cause to make good on the long-standing and
non-partisan American commitment to Israel's security which the Johnson-Humphrey
Administration was the first to weaken in the 1967 showdown. But I believe
Mr. Humphrey owes it to the American people to explain whether or not he is
openly repudiating the present Middle East policy, or non-policy, of the
Administration to which he owes his candidacy.
(more)
-2-
The record of the Republican Party and its candidates, Richard Nixon and
Spiro T. Agnew, is consistent and crystal clear on this score. Not alone for
Israel's sake, but in the interests of the United States and the Free World,
further Russian penetration of the Middle East cannot go unanswered forever. If
the Vice-President really favors providing Phantom jets to Israel, he should
argue his case at the White House today. All that is required is President
Johnson's approval, and Hubert Humphrey is his political protege.
# # #
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
September 9, 1968
Statement by House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford, R-Mich.
Like the legendary Roman hero Horatio of the Bridge, Hubert Humphrey
apparently is the last to learn that his administration has gone off and left
the gallant defenders of Israel's independence without adequate arms to match
the massive Russian buildup in the Middle East.
The Vice-President addressed the Convention of B'Nai Brith here yesterday
and apparently endorsed the position taken by the Republican Leadership of the
Congress and the 1968 Republican Platform that Israel should promptly receive
the latest supersonic jet aircraft from the United States. Does the Vice-
President agree with the steadfast policy of the Johnson-Humphrey Administration
in denying this necessary protection to Israel on the specious grounds that the
Russians may still be persuaded to limit the Middle East arms race?
Since the tragic event in Czechoslovakia, it should be apparent even to
those who have repeatedly ignored the brutal facts of Soviet power politics that
Moscow will make maximum use of its conventional military force in international
affairs.
Senator Dirksen and I long ago warned that the Soviet Union was converting
its 1967 military defeat in the Middle East into a strategic success by rapidly
resupplying its Arab clients with the most modern weapons and military personnel.
Together with other Republicans in the Congress and the Republican Coordinating
Committee we have repeatedly urged the Johnson-Humphrey Administration to move
quickly to redress the imbalance of power at this vital crossroads of the World.
I am happy that the Vice-President, now that he is the Democratic nominee,
has seconded our Republican cause to make good on the long-standing and
non-partisan American commitment to Israel's security which the Johnson-Humphrey
Administration was the first to weaken in the 1967 showdown. But I believe
Mr. Humphrey owes it to the American people to explain whether or not he is
openly repudiating the present Middle East policy, or non-policy, of the
Administration to which he owes his candidacy.
(more)
-2-
The record of the Republican Party and its candidates, Richard Nixon and
Spiro T. Agnew, is consistent and crystal clear on this score. Not alone for
Israel's sake, but in the interests of the United States and the Free World,
further Russian penetration of the Middle East cannot go unanswered forever. If
the Vice-President really favors providing Phantom jets to Israel, he should
argue his case at the White House today. All that is required is President
Johnson's approval, and Hubert Humphrey is his political protege.
# # #
Offece Copy Office
[Dictation from Rosemary Woods of Mr. Nixon's office 12:45 p.m. 10/1/68)
DETROIT - October 1, 1968
IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Sheraton-Cadillac Hotel
Immediately after Vice President Humphrey's address to the nation
last evening the Republican leaders of the Senate and House, Senator
Dirksen and Congressman Ford, telephoned the following message to Mr.
Nixon:
"On the numerous occasions that we have been in the
White House with the President, the Vice President,
other members of the National Security Council, and
Congressional leaders to discuss Vietnam problems,
we have never heard the Vice President advocate the
policies he advocated this evening -- never!
"We conclude that his 'new' policies have only a
partisan motivation and purpose and should be so
regarded and, therefore, disregarded."
Senator Dirksen and Congressman Ford requested that this message
be released by Mr. Nixon in their behalf.
FORD is LIBRARY 07VN00
offecocapy
Capy
[Dictation from Rosemary Woods of Mr. Nixon's office 12:45 p.m. 10/1/68)
DETROIT - - October 1, 1 968
IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Sheraton-Cadillac Hotel
Immediately after Vice President Humphrey's address to the nation
last evening the Republican leaders of the Senate and House, Senator
Dirksen and Congressman Ford, telephoned the following message to Mr.
Nixon:
"On the numerous occasions that we have been in the
White House with the President, the Vice President,
other members of the National Security Council, and
Congressional leaders to discuss Vietnam problems,
we have never heard the Vice President advocate the
policies he advocated this evening - never!
"We conclude that his 'new' policies have only a
partisan motivation and purpose and should be 30
regarded and, therefore, disregarded."
Senator Dirksen and Congressman Ford requested that this message
be released by Mr. Nixon in their behalf.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
Statement by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, issued 11 p.m. Oct. 31, 1968
O Office Copy
"We must rely on the President's judgment that the bombingkak halt will not
result in groater American casualties. We can only hope that the cessation of
the bombing will lead to real progress toward a peace settlement. I don't
think we should read too much into this development, although there may be
some indication that bargaining at Paris now will begin in E earnest. I would
not like to believe that the timing of the bombing halt has anything to do with
Tuesday's election. This development does indicate to that a policy of firmness
toward Hanoi--the policy of Johnson and Nixon--produces better results than the
policies advocated by Hubert Humphrey.
LIVERI GERALO
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
November 4, 1968
Statement by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, R-Mich., Republican Leader, U.S. House of Reps.
We have botched up Vietnam again. In only three days since the bombing
halt we have our ally, South Vietnam, hurt and angry. We have made our enemy's
homeland a sanctuary--we have confused the Paris peace talks--we have the war
back in domestic politics--and again America is humiliated before the world.
Yesterday Richard Nixon told the Nation that if he is elected tomorrow
he will work arm-in-arm with our President and Secretary of State to help the
President win his gamble for peace.
I am delighted with that assurance. Even as President-Elect, Richard
Nixon can help us move forward again. But we will be far better off when we get
a clean sweep in Washington.
We must have a new team in Washington. We have to stop fumbling every
international ball we put into play. There is no hope for a better day with
Hubert Humphrey. He is one of the architects of failure. No matter how hard
he tried, he would just give us more of the same.
This is an over-riding reason why everyone who has had enough of trouble
at home and trouble abroad ought to vote tomorrow for Richard Nixon for President.
# # #
NEWS
CONGRESSMAN
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
FOR SATURDAY AM'S RELEASE
DEC. 21, 1968
Statement by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, R-Mich. Minority Leader, U.S. House of Reps.
It is a terrible tragedy that thousands of Biafrans should be starving
to death as a result of the Nigerian civil war, and this is doubly pitiful
during the Christmas season when we talk of "peace on earth good will
toward men.
I therefore take this occasion to urge President Johnson to employ his
personal influence in an effort to bring about a cease-fire in Nigeria and
to greatly augment food and medical relief for the Blairans.
It is reported that the American contribution to Nigerian war relief
has been two-thirds of the international effort. I think we can and should
do more--much more.
One means of quickly expanding the relief effort would be to make
U.S. Government transport planes available for mercy missions to be flown
by private pilots. This could be done in cooperation with the International
Red Cross. Emergency sea and land operations tied in with this airlift
could also be launched.
I believe the United States should scrupulously avoid any kind of
military involvement in the Nigerian civil war. We should not take sides
with either the Nigerian federal government or the insurgent Biafrans.
But in the name of humanity we must expand our obviously inadequate con-
tribution to the relief of starving women and children in Biafra.
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GERALD FORD LIBRARY