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Ford Press Releases - Defense, 1967-1973
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Ford Press Releases - Defense, 1967-1973
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The original documents are located in Box D7, folder "Ford Press Releases - Defense,
1967-1973" of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the
Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box D7 of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Congressional Record
United States
of America
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE
CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 28, 1967
ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT
(Mr. GERALD R. FORD asked and
States was at least even with the U.S.S.R.
kind than offensive systems, and therefore
was given permission to extend his re-
in this technological race. That was 4
more desirable even if they should prove
marks at this point in the RECORD.)
years ago.
more costly.
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker,
More recently, the administration line
While avoiding a direct answer to a ques-
many of us here in the House have long
has shifted to the theme that Soviet
tion on the subject, he gave no encourage-
leaders might be persuaded, in a hopeful
ment to hopes for a moratorium on anti-
been concerned about our national pol-
ballistic missile defense development as a
icy, or lack of policy, on the question of
atmosphere of detente, to agree to stop
means of limiting the arms race between the
an anti-ballistic missile defense. This
the costly ABM race on which they were
great powers.
has not been a partisan concern, but
well along and the United States had
His reply was that "a system that serves to
one of profound differences of judgment
not yet decided to start. But, despite
ward off an attack does not heighten the ten-
between the President and the Secretary
numerous authoritative articles and dis-
sion but serves to lessen the possibility of
of Defense on the one hand, and entire
cussions in the press, there was no of-
an attack that may kill large numbers of
Joint Chiefs of Staff and many of the
ficial administration confirmation of the
people."
most knowledgeable members of Con-
deployment of a Soviet ABM defense
It is difficult not to agree with the
gress, Republicans and Democrats, on
until November 10, 1966-2 days after
Communist leader in the way he dis-
the other.
the 1966 national elections-when Sec-
missed the cost-effectiveness argument
In recent weeks my concern over this
retary McNamara announced there was
favored by Mr. McNamara.
question has greatly increased. However,
considerable evidence to this effect. He
It might be cheaper to build offensive than
in view of the presence of Premier Kosy-
also said it was "much too early to make
defensive systems.
gin in this country and the prospect of
a decision for a deployment against the
his talks with President Johnson I have
Chinese threat." The Red Chinese had
Kosygin said-
withheld detailed comment until now.
just tested a nuclear-tipped 400- to 500-
But this is not the criterion upon which
June 17, 1967, Red China exploded her
mile ballistic missile on October 27, 1966.
one should base oneself in deciding this
That was 8 months ago.
problem.
first Hydrogen Bomb. That was 11 days
ago.
In his latest state of the Union mes-
This was 4 months and 2 weeks ago.
October 16, 1964, Red China detonated
sage, January 10, 1967, President John-
Nevertheless, President Johnson con-
her first nuclear device. That was 2 years
son noted two developments, an increase
tinued to support Secretary McNamara
and 8 months ago.
during the past year of Soviet long-
or vice versa. Testifying March 6, 1967,
range missile capabilities and the begin-
before the House Defense Appropriations
The first atomic explosion by Com-
ning of an antiballistic missile defense
Subcommittee, McNamara conceded the
munist China was rated around 20 kilo-
around Moscow. But his main emphasis
continuing split between himself and the
tons. The latest thermonuclear blast was
was on what he termed his "solemn duty
entire Joint Chiefs of Staff, represented
estimated between 2 to 7 megatons-at
to slow down the arms race between us-
by their Chairman, Gen. Earle G.
least 100 times as powerful as Red
the United States and the U.S.S.R.-if
Wheeler, on the ABM question.
China's first atomic explosion.
that is at all possible, in both conven-
General Wheeler told the House
Each of Red China's six nuclear tests
tional and nuclear weapons and
Armed Services Committee that he had
has evidenced more rapid technological
defenses."
gone to President Johnson, on his own
progress and greater sophistication than
That was 5 months and 2 weeks ago.
initiative, to present the Joint Chiefs'
most U.S. experts had predicted.
In the Republican appraisal of the
case to the Commander in Chief in this
It took the United States 6 years and
state of the Union delivered January 19,
important difference of opinion with the
3 months to get from the first Alamo-
1967, I said:
Secretary of Defense.
gordo atomic test to the first H-Bomb
The Administration has finally admitted
In the heavily censored transcript of
at Eniwetok.
to the American people that the Soviet
committee testimony, it is evident that
It took the Soviet Union 3 years and
Union has increased its Intercontinental
Mr. McNamara still felt that the Rus-
11 months to cover the same stages of
Ballistic Missile capability and is deploying
sians were wasting their resources on
development, after the United States had
an Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense System. In
defensive measures against a missile at-
shown the way.
anticipation of a life-and-death decision on
tack and that the United States should
Red China took 2 years and 8 months
just such a development, Congress has voted
to join the H-bomb club.
millions of dollars which the Administration
not follow suit. He argued that the U.S.
did not seek and apparently has not used.
response to a Soviet ABM system should
Throughout that entire period of peril,
The Congress did its duty and gave the
not be a U.S. ABM system, but a step-up
a one-sided debate has paralyzed ad-
President a clear expression of its will and
in our deterrent offensive capability. If
ministration policy on the life-and-death
the means to carry it out.
we embarked upon an ABM defense, Mr.
question of an anti-ballistic missile de-
Before more precious time is lost, Congress
McNamara assumed that Soviet planners
fense system for the United States. The
and the American people are now entitled
would use the same reasoning as he used
almost unanimous opinion of the Joint
to a clear explanation from the President of
Chiefs of Staff, the Nation's top pro-
the perils and problems facing the United
and increase their offensive capability.
States in the new global balance of strategic
At the same time he acknowledged that,
fessional military experts, and the
power.
even though the United States had
cognizant committees of the Congress
We, too, seek to avoid a costly new round
widely advertised that it was not proceed-
has been in favor of proceeding with
in the nuclear arms race. But the least the
ing with any ABM deployment, the
some form of ABM development and de-
Nation must do now is to speed up its readi-
Soviet Union was increasing its offensive
ployment which, the Defense Department
ness to deploy Anti-Ballistics Missiles in a
missile capability anyway. But he per-
estimates, might save millions or tens of
hurry if our survival requires its.
sisted in the view that the United States
millions of American lives.
That was 5 months and 1 week ago. I
should not expedite an ABM deployment.
The debate has been one-sided because
repeat it again today.
General Wheeler took the position that
President Johnson, as Commander in
In his budget message to Congress on
"the Soviets will undoubtedly improve
Chief, and Secretary of Defense Mc-
January 24, 1967, the President spelled
the Moscow system as time goes on and
Namara, his civilian deputy, have re-
out his decision on an ABM defense for
extend ABM defense to other high-pri-
peatedly deferred this decision and de-
the United States, pledging that during
ority areas of the Soviet Union." He esti-
clined to spend preproduction funds
fiscal 1968 he would-
mated that they have the resources to
appropriated by Congress for ABM
Continue intensive development of Nike-X
do so and are willing to spend whatever it
defense.
but take no action now to deploy an anti-
takes to gain strategic superiority or
At first, the administration argument
ballistic missile (ABM) defense; initiate dis-
strategic parity with the United States.
was that an ABM defense was imprac-
cussions with the Soviet Union on the limita-
On behalf of his colleagues of the Joint
tical and would be a waste of money.
tion of ABM deployment; in the event these
Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler testified
When rumors first spread, through press
discussions prove unsuccessful, we will re-
consider our deployment system.
that the Soviet objective-both in offen-
reports, early in 1963, that the Russians
sive and defensive strategy-is "to
apparently were developing an ABM de-
That was 5 months ago.
achieve an exploitable capability, per-
fense, Secretary McNamara engaged in
Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin gave
mitting them freedom to pursue their
semantic hair-splitting with congres-
an oblique answer at a news conference
national aims at conflict levels less than
sional questioners which seemed to deny
in London on February 9, 1967. This is
general nuclear war."
that the Soviet Union had an ABM
from the New York Times' account:
While the debate on the desirability of
"system"-defining system in the tech-
Premier Kosygin suggested at a news con-
a U.S. ABM defense system has concen-
nical sense of a complete weapons sys-
ference today that defensive anti-ballistic
trated until very recently on sharply
tem-and thus implying that the United
missile systems were less dangerous to man-
varying U.S. estimates of Soviet inten-
more
tions and capabilities, Red China's
There appears to be general agreement
ate threat to the continental United
breakthrough into the select group of
that the current fiscal 1968 Defense Ap-
States, or even to Alaska, Hawaii and
four thermonuclear superpowers injects
propriation, voted 407 to 1, contains as
Guam, what about its threat to Japan,
an entirely new factor.
much money as could be used in the
South Korea, Formosa, South Vietnam,
The timing of Red China's H-bomb
coming 12 months-some $908 million
Thailand, and the Philippines which the
breakthrough was most significant. It
on top of the $4 billion previously pro-
United States has solemn treaty obliga-
came as the whole world was groping to
vided for antiballistic missile research
tions to defend?
assess the lessons of the Israel-Arab war
and development. This includes the extra
Time, unlike money. cannot be re-
and the near-confrontation of great
$167.8 million which Congress voted last
covered. Wasting time is therefore a far
powers that had been averted. The most
year for initial deployment which the
more serious matter than wasting funds.
immediate conclusions from this crisis
administration declined to use.
The arguments about the cost effective-
are:
I can no longer see any logic in delay-
ness of ABM defense which Mr. McNa-
First. As proved by Israel, a sudden
ing this crucial decision for an indefinite
mara has argued for years and years,
and preemptive air strike has not been
time while the United States attempts to
backed by the President, must now give
summarily discarded by military plan-
get agreement with the Soviet Union to
way to the unanimous opinion of the
ners of other nations. This is especially
slow down an expensive ABM race.
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the cognizant
true if the odds against a successful de-
Premier Kosygin threw cold water on
committees of Congress that the United
fense are very unfavorable.
any ABM moratorium at his U.N. news
States cannot risk running second in any
Second. As proved by Nasser, fanatic
conference June 25 and President John-
aspect of this grim game.
and authoritarian regimes do not neces-
son has not revealed any progress on this
If any practical step could conceivably
sarily act rationally or evaluate risks by
subject during their private talks at Holly
save 100 million American lives-or 1
the same standard we do. Furthermore,
Bush.
million or 1,000-how much is too much
they can suffer what a Western govern-
What is perfectly clear is that U.S.
to spend on it? Yet what we lack is not
ment would consider inacceptable hu-
reluctance to move forward on ABM de-
the money but the decision to "Get go-
man and material losses and still survive
fense deployment has in no way slowed
ing." The funds have been provided. I
politically.
the Soviet program, defensively or offen-
call upon President Johnson to act with-
Third. As proved by the United States
sively, nor impaired the thermonuclear
out another day's delay.
and the Soviet Union, when the two su-
progress of Red China. Both are moving
perpowers neutralize each other with
full speed ahead.
their mutual nuclear deterrents, lesser
Gen. Harold Johnson, the Army Chief
nations are pretty much left free to re-
of Staff, summed up the sentiment of
solve regional issues by force.
professional military leaders when he
None of these lessons, I am sure, was
told the House Defense Appropriations
lost on Red China or on the other na-
Subcommittee on March 10, 1967:
tions of Asia.
Now, one cannot argue against discussing
I hope they are not lost upon Secretary
the issues that are to be discussed with the
McNamara, and will cause him quickly
Soviets, you cannot argue that at all. How-
to reverse his 1966 postelection view
ever, the uneasiness that I feel is basically
that it is "much too early to make a de-
this: When do we stop discussing and when
do we reach a decision point?
cision for a deployment against the Chi-
nese threat."
That was 3 months and 2 weeks ago.
Even those who cherish the most op-
Representative GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB
timistic hopes that Russian Communist
of California, ranking Republican on the
leaders will act reasonably and with re-
subcommittee, summed up the House
straint in their thermonuclear strategy
Appropriations Committee's answer to
cannot possibly put the Chinese Commu-
the President and Secretary McNamara
nist leaders in the same category. Peiping
on the House floor June 13, 1967. He
itself does not.
said:
Red China's capability in the field of
In commenting on the reluctance to begin
nuclear weaponry consistently has been
to deploy the Nike-X system on the part of
downgraded and underestimated by ad-
the Administration, our committee report
ministration policymakers. When Red
states:
China achieved atomic status, Americans
"It would appear that the initiation of de-
ployment of light or thin defense, now, may
were told it would take many years for
very well be a most useful first step toward
them to perfect advanced systems for
whatever level of ballistic missile defense
delivering a nuclear weapon. When,
ultimately appears necessary." In other
within 6 months, Red China mounted an
words the report, adopted unanimously by
atomic warhead on a 500-mile ballistic
the committee, says: "Get Going!"
missile, Americans were reassured that it
That was 2 weeks ago. The key word
would be many more years before the
is "now."
Chinese could pose any intercontinental
Four days after the House overwhelm-
threat to the United States.
ingly endorsed this view of the urgency
Secretary McNamara testified on Jan-
to get going on ABM, the Red Chinese
uary 25, 1966 before the House Armed
H-bomb was exploded.
Services Committee that "the Chinese
Initial reports on this significant
Communists have detonated two nuclear
event, overshadowed by the U.N. wrangl-
devices and could possibly develop and
ing on the Middle East, quoted Washing-
deploy a small force of ICBMs by the
ton weapons specialists as surmising that
mid-to-latter part of the 1970's."
"Red China would be more likely to set
Whether this estimate is better or worse
it off on a test stand so that its yield
than Mr. McNamara's previous esti-
and other effects could be measured more
mates on the Vietnam war, the neces-
precisely"-another disturbing sign of
sity of a U.S. merchant marine, the use-
assuming a potential enemy thinks ex-
fulness of Reserve forces and the future
actly as we do.
of manned aircraft and nuclear-pow-
Later, after Japanese atomic scientists
ered ships, cannot yet be determined. His
said their analysis showed the bomb had
danger date, however, is only 8 to 10
been exploded at a high altitude, the
years away.
Washington Post on June 22 quoted
Other Pentagon officials have pointed
Washington intelligence officials as be-
out that a primitive submarine-launched
lieving the Red Chinese H-bomb was
nuclear-tipped missile could be developed
dropped from an airplane. It added
by Red China in a much shorter period,
that-
and conceivably could already exist.
The Pentagon has said of the Chinese H-
Fortune magazine in an authoritative
bomb that it does not require any change in
June 1967 article on ABM defense esti-
U.S. military strategy.
mates that 5 to 7 years, from the time
the go-ahead is given, would be needed
I disagree.
to deploy even a thin U.S. anti-ballistic
With the United States and the
missile defense. Cost estimates, depend-
U.S.S.R. standing each other off in nu-
ing upon the degree of protection pro-
clear deterrents, the possession of even
vided, range from $3 billion to $40 bil-
one Red Chinese nuclear weapon that
lion, spread over a period of years.
can be carried in one conventional bom-
ber radically alters the balance of power
The article quotes Lt. Gen. Austin
in East Asia and the Western Pacific-
Betts, Chief of the Army's Nike X re-
areas which President Johnson has spe-
search and development, as believing the
cifically proclaimed as vital to America's
optimum moment has arrived to begin
national interest and the fate of the free
production. It points out that further
world.
delay could mean the breakup of con-
Printed by the
If the elementary weapons system rep-
tractor teams and the onset of obsoles-
resented by what Red China evidently
Republican National Committee,
cence in components.
has already produced is not an immedi-
1625 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D. C.
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
June 28, 1967
STATEMENT OF REP. GERALD R. FORD (R-MICH.) HOUSE MINORITY LEADER
June 17, 1967, Red China exploded her first Hydrogen Bomb.
That was eleven days ago.
October 16, 1964, Red China detonated her first nuclear device.
That was two years and eight months ago.
The first atomic explosion by Communist China was rated around 20 kilotons.
The latest thermonuclear blast was estimated between 2 to 7 Megatons--at least
100 times as powerful as Red China's first atomic explosion.
Each of Red China's six nuclear tosts has evidenced more rapid technological
progress and greater sophistication than most U.S. experts had predicted.
It took the United States six years and three months to get from the first
Alamo gordo atomic test to the first H-Bomb at Eniwetok.
It took the Soviet Union three years and eleven months to cover the same
stages of development, after the United States had shown the way.
Red China took two years and eight months to join the H-Bomb Club.
Throughout that entire period of peril, a one-sided debate has paralyzed
Administration policy on the life-and-death question of an Anti-Ballistic Missile
defense system for the United States. The almost unanimous opinion of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the nation's top professional military experts, and the cognizant
committees of the Congress has been in favor of proceeding with some form of ABM
development and deployment which, the Defense Department estimates, might save
millions or tens of millions of American lives.
The debate has been one-sided because President Johnson, as Commander in
Chief, and Secretary of Defense McNamara, his civilian deputy, have repeatedly
deferred this decision and declined to spend pre-production funds appropriated
by Congress for ABM defense.
At first, the Administration argument was that an ABM defense was impractical
and would be a waste of money. When rumors first spread, through press reports,
early in 1963, that the Russians apparently were developing an ABM defense,
Secretary McNamara engaged in semantic hair-splitting with Congressional question-
ers which seemed to deny that the Soviet Union had an ABM "system" (defining
system in the technical sense of a complete weapons system) and thus implying that
the United States was at least even with the USSR in this technological race.
That was four years ago.
More recently, the Administration line has shifted to the theme that Soviet
leaders might be pèrsuaded, in a hopeful atmosphere of "detente," to agree to stop
the costly ABM race on which they were well along and the United States had not
yet decided to start. But, despite numerous authorative articles and discussions
in the press, there was no official Administration confirmation of the deployment
of a Soviet ABM defense until Nov. 10, 1966 -- two days after the 1966 national
elections -- when Secretary McNamara announced there was "considerable evidence"
to this effect. He also said it was "much too early to make a decision for a
deployment against the Chinese threat." (The Red Chinese had just tested a
nuclear-tipped 400-500 mile ballistic missile on Oct. 27, 1966.)
That was eight months ago.
(more)
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
-2-
In his latest State of the Union Message, Jan. 10, 1967, President Johnson
noted two developments -- an increase during the past year of Soviet long-range
missile capabilities and the beginning of an Anti-Ballistic Missile defense
around Moscow. But his main emphasis was on what he termed his "solemn duty to
slow down the arms race between us (the U.S. and the USSR) if that is at all
possible, in both conventional and nuclear weapons and defenses."
That was five months and two weeks ago.
In the Republican appraisal of the State of the Union delivered Jan. 19,
1967, I said:
"The Administration has finally admitted to the American people that the
Soviet Union has increased its Intercontinental Ballistic Missile capability
and is deploying an Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense System. In anticipation of a
life-and-death decision on just such a development, Congress has voted millions
of dollars which the Administration did not seek and apparently has not used.
"The Congress did its duty and gave the President a clear expression of its
will and the means to carry it out.
"Before more precious time is lost, Congress and the American people are now
entitled to a clear explanation from the President of the perils and problems
facing the United States in the new global balance of strategic power.
"We, too, seek to avoid a costly new round in the nuclear arms race. But
the least the Nation must do now is to speed up its readiness to deploy Anti-
Ballistics Missiles in a hurry if our survival requires it."
That was five months and one week ago. I repeat it again today.
In his Budget Message to Congress on Jan. 24, 1967, the President spelled
out his decision on an ABM defense for the United States, pledging that during
fiscal 1968 he would:
"Continue intensive development of Nike-X but take no action now to deploy
an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense; initiate discussions with the Soviet
Union on the limitation of ABM deployment; in the event these discussions prove
unsuccessful, we will reconsider our deployment system."
That was five months ago.
Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin gave an oblique answer at a news conference
in London on February 9, 1967. This is from the New York Times' account:
"Premier Kosygin suggested at a news conference today that defensive anti-
ballistic missile systems were less dangerous to mankind than offensive systems,
and therefore more desirable even if they should prove more costly.
"While avoiding a direct answer to a question on the subject, he gave no
encouragement to hopes for a moratorium on anti-ballistic missile defense
development as a means of limiting the arms race between the great powers
"His reply was that 'a system that serves to ward off an attack does not
heighten the tension but serves to lessen the possibility of an attack that may
kill large numbers of people. 111
It is difficult not to agree with the Communist leader in the way he dis-
missed the "cost-effectiveness" argument favored by Mr. McNamara.
"It might be cheaper to build offensive than defensive systems," Kosygin
said, "but this is not the criterion upon which one should base oneself in
deciding this problem."
This was four months and two weeks ago.
Nevertheless, President Johnson continued to support Secretary McNamara, or
vice-versa. Testifying March 6, 1967, before the House Defense Appropriations
subcommittee, McNamara conceded the continuing split between himself and the
(more)
-3-
entire Joint Chiefs of Staff, represented by their Chairman, General Earle G.
Wheeler, on the ABM question.
Gen. Wheeler told the House Armed Services Committee that he had gone to
President Johnson, on his own initiative, to present the Joint Chiefs' case to
the Commander-in-Chief in this important difference of opinion with the Secretary
of Defense.
In the heavily-censored transcripts of committee testimony, it is evident
that Mr. McNamara still felt that the Russians were wasting their resources on
defensive measures against a missile attack and that the United States should
not follow suit. He argued that the U.S. response to a Soviet ABM system should
not be a U.S. ABM system, but a step-up in our deterrent offensive capability.
If we embarked upon an ABM defense, Mr. McNamara assumed that Soviet planners
would use the same reasoning as he used and increase their offensive capability.
At the same time he acknowledged that, even though the United States had widely
advertised that it was not proceding with any ABM deployment, the Soviet Union
was increasing its offensive missile capability anyway. But he persisted in the
view that the United States should not expedite an ABM deployment.
General Wheeler took the position that "the Soviets will undoubtedly improve
the Moscow system as time goes on and extend ABM defense to other high-priority
areas of the Soviet Union." He estimated that they have the resources to do so
and are willing to spend whatever it takes to gain strategic superiority or
strategic parity with the United States.
On behalf of his colleagues of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler
testified that the Soviet objective -- both in offensive and defensive strategy --
is "to achieve an exploitable capability, permitting them freedom to pursue their
national aims at conflict levels less than general nuclear war."
While the debate on the desirability of a U.S. ABM defense system has con-
centrated until very recently on sharply varying U.S. estimates of Soviet
intentions and capabilities, Red China's breakthrough into the select group of
four thermonuclear superpowers injects an entirely new factor.
The timing of Red China's H-Bomb breakthrough was most significant. It
came as the whole world was groping to assess the lessons of the Israel-Arab war
and the near-confrontation of great powers that had been averted. The most
immediate conclusions from this crisis are:
(1) As proved by Israel, a sudden and pre-emptive air strike has not been
summarily discarded by military planners of other nations. This is especially
true if the odds against a successful defense are very unfavorable.
(2) As proved by Nasser, fanatic and authoritarian regimes do not necessarily
act rationally or evaluate risks by the same standards we do. Furthermore, they
can suffer what a Western government would consider inacceptable human and
material losses and still survive politically.
(3) As proved by the United States and the Soviet Union, when the two super-
powers neutralize each other with their mutual nuclear deterrents, lesser nations
are pretty much left free to resolve regional issues by force.
None of these lessons, I am sure, was lost on Red China or on the other
nations of Asia.
I hope they are not lost upon Secretary McNamara, and will cause him quickly
to reverse his 1966 post-election view that it is "much too early to make a
decision for a deployment against the Chinese threat."
Even those who cherish the most optimistic hopes that Russian Communist
leaders will act reasonably and with restraint in their thermonuclear strategy
cannot possibly put the Chinese Communist leaders in the same category. Peiping
itself does not.
Red China's capability in the field of nuclear weaponry consistently has been
downgraded and underestimated by Administration policymakers. When Red China
achieved atomic status, Americans were told it would take many years for them to
(more)
-4-
perfect advanced systems for delivering a nuclear weapon. When, within six months,
Red China mounted an atomic warhead on a 500-mile ballistic missile, Americans
were reassured that it would be many more years before the Chinese could pose any
intercontinental threat to the United States.
Secretary McNamara testified on Jan. 25, 1966 before the House Armed Services
Committee that "the Chinese Communists have detonated two nuclear devices and
could possibly develop and deploy a small force of ICBMs by the mid-to-latter
part of the 1970's.' Whether this estimate is better or worse than Mr. McNamara's
previous estimates on the Vietnam War, the necessity of a U.S. Merchant Marine,
the usefulness of Reserve forces and the future of manned aircraft and nuclear-
powered ships, cannot yet be determined. His danger date, however, is only 8 to 10
years away.
Other Pentagon officials have pointed out that a primitive submarine-launched
nuclear-tipped missile could be developed by Red China in a much shorter period,
and conceivably could already exist.
"Fortune" magazine in an authoritativeJune 1967 article on ABM defense
estimates that five to seven years, from the time the go-ahead is given, would be
needed to deploy even a "thin" U.S. anti-ballistic missile defense. Cost estimates,
depending upon the degree of protection provided, range from $3 billion to $40
billion, spread over a period of years.
The article quotes Lt. Gen. Austin Betts, Chief of the Army's Nike-X research
and development, as believing the "optimum" moment has arrived to begin production.
It points out that further delay could mean the breakup of contractor teams and
the onset of obsolescence in components.
There appears to be general agreement that the current fiscal 1968 Defense
Appropriation, voted 407-to-1, contains as much money as could be used in the
coming 12 months -- some $908 million on top of the $4 billion previously pro-
vided for anti-ballistic missile research and development. This includes the
extra $167.8 million which Congress voted last year for initial deployment which
the Administration declined to use.
I can no longer see any logic in delaying this crucial decision for an
indefinite time while the United States attempts to get agreement with the Soviet
Union to slow down an expensive ABM race. Premier Kosygin threw cold water on
any ABM moratorium at his U.N. news conference June 25 and President Johnson has
not Bush. revealed any progress on this subject during their private talks at Holly
What is perfectly clear is that U.S. reluctance to move forward on ABM
defense deployment has in no way slowed the Soviet program, defensively or
offensively, nor impaired the thermonuclear progress of Red China. Both are
moving full speed ahead.
Gen. Harold Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, summed up the sentiment of
professional military leaders when he told the House Defense Appropriations sub-
committee on March 10, 1967:
"Now, one cannot argue against discussing the issues that are to be discussed
with the Soviets, you cannot argue that at all. However, the uneasiness that I
feel is basically this: When do we stop discussing and when do we reach a
decision point?"
That was three months and two weeks ago.
Rep. Glenard P. Lipscomb of California, ranking Republican on the sub-
committee, summed up the House Appropriations Committee's answer to the President
and Secretary McNamara on the House floor June 13, 1967. He said:
"In commenting on the reluctance to begin to deploy the Nike-X system on
the part of the Administration, our committee report states:
"It would appear that the initiation of deployment of light or thin defense,
now, may very well be a most useful first step toward whatever level of ballistic
missile defense ultimately appears necessary.' In other words the report, adopted
unanimously by the committee, says: 'Get Going!" Lipscomb declared.
(more)
-5-
That was two weeks ago. The key word is "NOW."
Four days after the House overwhelmingly endorsed this view of the urgency
to get going on ABM, the Red Chinese H-Bomb was exploded.
Initial reports on this significant event, overshadowed by the U.N. wrangling
on the Middle East, quoted Washington "weapons specialists" as surmising that
"Red China would be more likely to set it off on a test stand so that its yield
and other effects could be measured more precisely" -- another disturbing sign
of assuming a potential enemy thinks exactly as we do.
Later, after Japanese atomic scientists said their analysis showed the bomb
had been exploded at a high altitude, the Washington Post on June 22 quoted
Washington "intelligence officials" as believing the Red Chinese H-bomb was
dropped from an airplane. It added that "The Pentagon has said of the Chinese
H-Bomb that it does not require any change in U.S. military strategy."
I disagree.
With the United States and the USSR standing each other off in nuclear
deterrents, the possession of even one Red Chinese nuclear weapon that can be
carried in one conventional bomber radically alters the balance of power in East
Asia and the Western Pacific -- areas which President Johnson has specifically
proclaimed as vital to America's national interest and the fate of the free world.
If the elementary "weapons system" represented by what Red China evidently
has already produced is not an immediate threat to the continental United States,
or even to Alaska, Hawaii and Guam, what about its threat to Japan, South Korea,
Formosa, South Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines which the United States has
solemn treaty obligations to defend?
Time, unlike money, cannot be recovered. Wasting time is therefore a far
more serious matter than wasting funds. The arguments about the cost effective-
ness of ABM defense which Mr. McNamera has argued for years and years, backed by
the President, must now give way to the unanimous opinion of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the cognizant committees of Congress that the United States cannot risk
running second in any aspect of this grim game.
If any practical step could conceivably save 100 million American lives --
or 1 million or 1000 -- how much is too much to spend on it? Yet what we lack
is not the money but the decision to "Get Going!" The funds have been provided.
I call upon President Johnson to act without another day's delay.
####
Statement by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, R-Mich., Minority Leader, U.S. House of
Representatives.
WHY A MISSILE DEFENSE?
Whether or not to deploy the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile System has
become a national issue. This is reflected in letters I have received.
There apparently is considerable confusion about the issue. I therefore
would like to make some points which may clarify the situation.
1. The Institute for Strategic Studies in London, England, an independent
and admittedly authoritative agency that keeps an account of the military
capabilities of all nations, recently reported that by mid-1969 Russia
would overtake the United States in intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) and achieve equal status in strategic power.
2. The Soviet Union has already deployed an ABM system which largely
protects Moscow and its surrounding area.
3. The Soviet Union is continuing the deployment of very large ICBMs
(the SS-9) which are capable of destroying our 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs
despite their location in "hardened" sites.
4. The Soviet Union is substantially increasing the size of its submarine-
launched ballistic missile force.
5. The Soviet Union is developing anti-submarine measures which are a
threat to our 656-missile Polaris deterrent force.
6. The Soviet Union has developed a semi-orbital nuclear weapons system
(FOBS), which threatens to rain nuclear destruction down on us from outer
space.
7. Since the Soviet Union apparently will surpass the United States in
numbers of ICBMs by the middle of this year or at least attain equal
status, the American people are faced with a fresh decision on how best
to avoid nuclear war or how best to survive a nuclear holocaust should
it occur.
8. Former Defense Secretary McNamara responded to Soviet deployment of
an ABM system by scheduling an increase in U.S. offensive missilry forces.
There was no public outcry in the United States.
9. Former Defense Secretary McNamara initially opposed U.S. deployment
of an ABM system because he believed a go-ahead on ABM would cause the
Soviet Union to expand its offensive nuclear power. The Soviet Union
greatly increased its offensive nuclear power in any case.
10. In the April 1969 issue of Foreign Affairs, Dr. D. G. Brennan, dean
of U.S. arms control experts, states that U.S. funds committed to increase
our offensive missile forces might better be used to increase our
Page 2/Why a Missile Defense?
defenses. Dr. Brennan argues that an American ballistic missile defense
system such as President Nixon has proposed obviously reduces the
Soviet threat to our national security. At the same time, he asserts,
by concentrating on a missile defense system instead of expanding our
nuclear offensive capability we "reduce both the extent to which the
Soviets might gain by attacking us, and the extent to which we are
intensely motivated to deter the attack."
11. The chief argument made against President Nixon's Safeguard ABM
System or BMD (ballistic missile defense) is that it makes the U.S.
appear provocative and endangers the possibility of arms control talks
and a possible meaningful arms limitation. The facts indicate that the
opposite is true.
12. After the Johnson-McNamara decision to deploy the Sentinel ABM system
was announced in September 1967, some of our allies and neutral friends
attacked the decision on the grounds it threatened approval of the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty. The Soviet Union declared that prospects for
the nonproliferation treaty were not damaged by the U.S. ABM decision, and
this proved accurate.
13. On Feb. 9, 1967, Soviet Premier Kosygin was asked at a press
conference in London, England: "Do you believe it is possible to agree
on a moratorium on the (deployment) of an anti-missile defense system
(then being discussed in the United States) and if possible on what
condition?" Kosygin replied in part: "I believe that defensive systems,
which prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute
a factor preventing the death of people. Some argue like this: What is
cheaper, to have offensive weapons which can destroy towns and whole
states or to have defensive weapons which can prevent this destruction?
At present the theory is current somewhere that the system which is
cheaper should be developed. Such so-called theoreticians argue as to
the cost of killing a man -- $500,000 or $100,000. Maybe an anti-missile
system is more expensive than an offensive ysstem, but it is designed
not to kill people but to preserve human lives. I understand that I
do not reply to the question I was asked, but you can draw yourselves
the appropriate conclusions." And in comment on that Kosygin statement,
Dr. Brennan says: "Indeed, one can."
14. Dr. Brennan asserts in his "Foreign Affairs" article that "the
attitude exemplified by the Kosygin quotation is very widely held in
the Soviet Union."
15. Four days after former President Johnson announced a decision to
ring major American cities with ABM installations, the Soviet Union pro-
posed U.S.-Soviet arms control talks.
16. Dr. Brennan declares in the highly respected publication, "Foreign
Affairs:' "The primary objectives of arms control have often been stated
to be reduction of the likelihood of war or mitigation of its consequences
if it occurs. It seems to me highly probable that deployment of missile
defenses will contribute to both of these objectives, while abstaining
Page 3/Why A Missile Defense?
from defenses will likely contribute to neither. If the deployments
(of missile defenses) are managed with at least modest intelligence on
both sides, there need not be an arms race nor appreciably higher
expenditures.'
17. To rule out any kind of missile defense is to assume that nuclear
war is so unthinkable and therefore impossible that the United States
need not concern itself about either Russian or Red Chinese nuclear
capabilities or to assume that the United States must forever concern
itself with nuclear offensive superiority relative to the Soviet Union.
The latter is a dubious position because of the tremendously powerful
and accurate Soviet SS-9 missile and the fact that the Soviets already
have deployed a defense against our missiles.
18. The United States has already proposed reductions in strategic
offensive forces, but the Soviet Union has consistently opposed inspection
as a guarantee of compliance.
19. Deployment of a U.S. missile defense might reduce the need for such
inspection and thus hasten an actual reduction in offensive missile
forces.
20. Critics say the Safeguard system would not be reliable and might
not work in event of nuclear war, but all tests of the component parts
of the system indicate it should work as planned.
21. The Safetuard system would employ Spartan and Sprint ABMs. The
Spartans would be used to break up high density raids while the Sprint
would operate on an one-on-one basis. Only those enemy warheads coming
within a very limited area would have to be considered for attack. Low
altitude intercepts by Sprint would allow the U.S. to take full advantage
of the separation of real warheads from chaff and decoys by the atmos-
phere. Since the Sprint warheads can be of relatively low yield, radar
blackout problems are minimized.
22. As Freeman Dyson of the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study points
out, what is certain is that a missile defense system saves those targets
which are not attacked. An offense generally is based on the theory
that if a target cannot be destroyed with 95 per cent probability, it
is better not to attack it. As a result, says Dyson, the attacker "passes
over" certain targets and "the defense works independently of whether it
does well in the technical sense."
23. In the case of our Minuteman missiles, Dyson notes, there are a
thousand targets. He comments, "A good defense of the Minuteman force
would be one in which, say, 500 of these survived and it doesn't matter
which 500. So you can concentrate your defenses on particular places,
you can allow a wide margin of uncertainty in the effectiveness of the
defense and you will still have a good defense of your military force.'
Page 4/Why A Missile Defense?
24. The best that we can expect from a missile defense is that the
number of people who would be killed in a nuclear war would be tens
of millions on each side instead of hundreds of millions.
25. But the possibility of even that outcome should be a sufficient
deterrent, Dyson declares. President Nixon's objective is to deter
nuclear war, to use the Safeguard System as a weapon for peace.
26. The choice currently is whether to put our money into offensive or
defensive nuclear weapons, not whether the United States should engage
in unilateral disarmament.
The Safeguard System is estimated to cost $6 to $7 billion over a period
of years. Roughly $800 million would be spent on the system during
fiscal 1970, as compared with the $1.8 billion requested by President
Johnson for the Sentinel ring-around-the-cities system. There are those
who contend all funds programmed for missile defense should be spent on
social needs. I believe both our national security and our social needs
must be met within a balanced framework of fiscal responsibility. The
needs of domestic social programs must be balanced against the threat of
enemy missile attack.
I support President Nixon's Safeguard System because I believe it is a
deterrent to nuclear war. I believe it will facilitate an arms control
agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and that failure to
deploy at least a limited missile defense would be to take an unaccept-
able gamble with the national security of the United States.
# # #
9 August 1967
(IIII
IIIIIII
U. S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE
REP. JOHN I. RHODES, (R.-ARIZ.) CHAIRMAN
140 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
TELEPHONE 225-6168
10
HOUSE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE STATEMENT ON THE DEPLOYMENT
OF AN ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM
The House Republican Policy Committee urges the Johnson-Humphrey Adminis-
tration to provide the American people with an effective, Anti-Ballistic Missile
system. The Soviets have been building and deploying their ABM system for some time.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously support the position that this country should
now proceed to deploy. Congress has appropriated sufficient funds for this purpose.
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has warned. "A low order of magnitude attack
could possibly be launched by the Chinese Communist: the United States by
the early 1970's. At present we do not have an effective anti-ballistic missile
system which could repel such a suicidal for the Chinese) but nevertheless possible
strike." Time and the rush of events demand action.
As early as 1963 there were rumors that the Russians were developing an
ABM defense. However, Secretary McNamara when questioned about this, engaged in a
dialogue of evasion that appeared to deny that the Soviets had such a system. It
was not until November 10, 1966, two days after the 1966 election, that McNamara
announced there was considerable evidence of the existence of a Soviet ABM system.
Moreover, information from the intelligence community now indicates that the Soviets
are indeed deploying one and possibly two ABM systems. Also, the Soviet probably
will extend and improve their defenses over the coming year and they have accelerated
the deployment of hardened offensive intercontinental ballistic issiles.
It is significant that in response to a news conference question about the
Soviet anti-ballistic missile system, General Paul G. Kurochin, head of the Soviet
Frunze Military Academy, stated that missiles fired at the Soviet Union would not hit
their targets. He also stated that, "Detecting missiles in time and destroying them
(over)
in flight is no problem." Under the circumstances, it is little wonder that Soviet
Premier Kosygin has given no encouragement to hopes for a moratorium on anti-
ballistic missile defense development as a means of limiting the arms race between
the great powers.
There is a continuing split between Secretary McNamara and the entire
Joint Chiefs of Staff on the anti-ballistic missile defense question. For years
the Joint Chiefs of Staff have unanimously supported the position that this country
should deploy Nike X. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler,
testified that he had gone to President Johnson on his own initiative to present the
Joint Chiefs' case. According to General Wheeler, "the Soviets will undoubtedly im-
prove the Moscow system as time goes on and extend ABM defense to other high priority
areas of the Soviet Union." In his opinion, the Soviet objective is "to achieve an
exploitable capability, permitting them freedom to pursue their national aims at
conflict levels less than general nuclear war."
On March 10, 1967, General Harold Johnson, the Chief of Staff of the U. S.
Army, in his testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, clearly expressed
the position of the prefessional military leaders when he stated, "When do we stop
discussing and when do we reach a decision point?"
With the shock of the recent Chinese thermonuclear explosion on June 17,
1967, efforts to downgrade the potential menace of Communist China have disappeared.
It took the United States 8 years to move from the atomic bomb to the hydrogen bomb.
It took the Soviet Union 4 years to accomplish the same result. In just 2 years and
8 months, Red China has joined the H-bomb club. In a recent report on the Red
Chinese threat, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy stated:
"We believe that the Chinese will continue to place a high
priority on thermonuclear weapon development. With continued
testing, we believe they will be able to develop a thermonuclear
warhead in the ICBM weight class with a yield in the megaton
range by about 1970. We believe that the Chinese can have an
ICBM system ready for deployment in the early 1970's. On the
basis of our present knowledge, we believe that the Chinese
probably will achieve an operational ICBM capability before
1972. Conceivably, it could be ready as early as 1970-71.
It has been estimated that from 5 to 7 years, from the time the go-ahead
is given, would be needed to deploy even a thin U. S. anti-ballistic missile defense.
Any lingering doubt over whether or not such a system should be developed has been
dispelled by China's amazing progress with nuclear weapons. In a report dated
August 4, 1967, the Senate Committee on Appropriations noted that during fiscal year
1968, there will be approximately $970 million available for an ABM defense system.
The Committee also stated, "The Congress has met its constitutional responsibilities
in this matter, and the responsibility for further delaying this system clearly rests
with the executive branch of the government."
These funds must be put to use without further delay. The secret of
mass destruction is now in the hands of those who may be tempted to use it. Our
defenses must be prepared to meet this challenge.
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
January 24, 1968
Statement by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, R-Mich.
If all sensible attempts at diplomacy fail, the United States must take
whatever military action is necessary to recover the U.S. Navy intelligence
ship, Pueblo. We must be concerned first and foremost with the lives and
safety of the ship's crew, and therefore we must exhaust all diplomatic means
at our command before taking military measures. This approach having been
fruitless, we will be forced to take whatever military actions are most appropri-
ate in response to this act of piracy by North Korea. The North Koreans had
better believe that the United States is not to be trifled with. I am fully
in accord with the decision to send the carrier Enterprise and other U.S. ships
to the scene as a show of force. Above all, the credibility and prestige of
the United States must be maintained The silence at the White House has not
been helpful in this regard.
###
FORD 3 LIBRARY GERALD
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
FOR RELEASE
Wednesday, Jan. 24, and thereafter
Rep. Gerald R. Ford today said the Department of the Army has promised him
"corrective action" will be taken in response to complaints about the Fort Wayne
Examining Station by parents of Grand Rapids area draftees.
Ford drew the pledge from the Commanding General, U.S. Army Recruiting
Command, after forwarding to the Army the numerous complaints he has received
about "rough treatment" of Grand Rapids area inductees at the Fort Wayne
installation.
Ford had demanded "a complete investigation of all complaints and prompt
action to remedy the situation."
In a letter to Ford, Col. J. L. Blackwell, the Army's chief of legislative
liaison, declared: "I have called this matter to the personal attention of the
Commanding General, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, who informs me that he will
direct further investigation into these allegations and take corrective action
where appropriate."
Ford said the Commanding General is to inform him directly at a later date
what his findings are and what has been done to meet the various complaints.
A flood of complaints from Grand Rapids area parents developed after Floyd
Hilliker of 1478 Beech Street S.W., Grand Rapids, declared that his son and other
prospective draftees had gone for 14 or 15 hours without food and had been exposed
to the cold while undergoing pre-induction physical examinations at Fort Wayne.
Other parents told Ford the men handling the draftees swore at their sons.
Col. Peter F. Bermingham, deputy commander of the Recruiting Command Head-
quarters at Hampton, Va., told Ford the Detroit Armed Forces Examining and
Entrance Station will be relocated "in the near future." He said the Fort Wayne
facility has neither central heating nor air conditioning, and that some windows
have to be opened for ventilation.
He said some of the processing was done during the lunch hour on the day the
Hilliker youth and others were examined, and this accounted for their getting
nothing to eat. He promised there would be no recurrence of the incident.
Commenting recently on complaints about Fort Wayne, Col. Arthur A. Holmes,
state selective service director, said the Fort Wayne facility is "inadequate."
He said the remedy is "up to the Department of Defense."
# # #
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
FOR RELEASE
Wednesday, Jan. 24, and thereafter
Rep. Gerald R. Ford today said the Department of the Army has promised him
"corrective action" will be taken in response to complaints about the Fort Wayne
Examining Station by parents of Grand Rapids area draftees.
Ford drew the pledge from the Commanding General, U.S. Army Recruiting
Command, after forwarding to the Army the numerous complaints he has received
about "rough treatment" of Grand Rapids area inductees at the Fort Wayne
installation.
Ford had demanded "a complete investigation of all complaints and prompt
action to remedy the situation."
In a letter to Ford, Col. J. L. Blackwell, the Army's chief of legislative
liaison, declared: "I have called this matter to the personal attention of the
Commanding General, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, who informs me that he will
direct further investigation into these allegations and take corrective action
where appropriate."
Ford said the Commanding General is to inform him directly at a later date
what his findings are and what has been done to meet the various complaints.
A flood of complaints from Grand Rapids area parents developed after Floyd
Hilliker of 1478 Beech Street S.W., Grand Rapids, declared that his son and other
prospective draftees had gone for 14 or 15 hours without food and had been exposed
to the cold while undergoing pre-induction physical examinations at Fort Wayne.
Other parents told Ford the men handling the draftees swore at their sons.
Col. Peter F. Bermingham, deputy commander of the Recruiting Command Head-
quarters at Hampton, Va., told Ford the Detroit Armed Forces Examining and
Entrance Station will be relocated "in the near future." He said the Fort Wayne
facility has neither central heating nor air conditioning, and that some windows
have to be opened for ventilation.
He said some of the processing was done during the lunch hour on the day the
Hilliker youth and others were examined, and this accounted for their getting
nothing to eat. He promised there would be no recurrence of the incident.
Commenting recently on complaints about Fort Wayne, Col. Arthur A. Holmes,
state selective service director, said the Fort Wayne facility is "inadequate."
He said the remedy is "up to the Department of Defense."
# # #
Approved by the
Republican Coordinating Committee
Office
May 6, 1968
Presented by the Task Force on
Capy
National Security
DECISIONS IN NATIONAL SECURITY:
PATCHWORK OR POLICY?
Prepared under the direction of:
The Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
1625 Eye Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20006
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
Presiding Officer: Ray C. Bliss, Chairman, Republican National Committee
Former President
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Former Presidential Nominees
Barry Goldwater
(1964)
Thomas E. Dewey
(1944 & 1948)
Richard M. Nixon
(1960)
Alf M. Landon
(1936)
Senate Leadership
Everett M. Dirksen
George Murphy, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Senatorial Committee
Thomas H. Kuchel
Milton R. Young, Secretary
Minority Whip
Republican Conference
Bourke B. Hickenlooper
Hugh Scott, Vice Chairman
Chairman, Republican Policy Committee
National Republican Senatorial Committee
Margaret Chase Smith
Chairman, Republican Conference
House Leadership
Gerald R. Ford
Bob Wilson, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Congressional Committee
Leslie C. Arends
Charles E. Goodell, Chairman
Minority Whip
Planning and Research Committee
Melvin R. Laird, Chairman
Richard H. Poff, Secretary
Republican Conference
Republican Conference
John J. Rhodes, Chairman
William C. Cramer, Vice Chairman
Republican Policy Committee
Republican Conference
H. Allen Smith, Ranking Member
of Rules Committee
Representatives of the Republican Governors Association
John A. Love, Governor of Colorado
Raymond P. Shafer, Governor of Pennsylvania
John A. Volpe, Governor of Massachusetts
John H. Chafee, Governor of Rhode Island
George Romney, Governor of Michigan
Nils A. Boe, Governor of South Dakota
Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of
Daniel J. Evans, Governor of Washington
New York
Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
Donald R. Ross, Vice Chairman
Mrs. C. Wayland Brooks, Assistant Chairman
Mrs. J. Willard Marriott, Vice Chairman
Mrs. Collis P. Moore, Vice Chairman
J. Drake Edens, Jr., Vice Chairman
President of the Republican State Legislators Association
F. F. (Monte) Montgomery
Robert L. L. McCormick, Staff Coordinator
Members of the Republican Coordinating Committee's Task Force
on National Security
Neil H. McElroy, Co-Chairman
Secretary of Defense 1957-1959
Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Co-Chairman
Secretary of Defense, 1959-1961
Wilfred J. McNeil, Vice Chairman
Assistant Secretary of Defense and Comptroller, 1949-1959
E. Perkins McGuire, Vice Chairman
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics, 1956-1961
Dewey F. Bartlett
Governor of the State of Oklahoma
William H. Bates
Member of Congress from Massachusetts
Arleigh A. Burke
Chief of U. S. Naval Operations, 1955-1961
George H. Decker
Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1960-1962
James H. Douglas, Jr.
Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1959-1961
Harry D. Felt
Commander in Chief in Pacific, 1958-1964
T. Keith Glennan
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1958-1961
Alfred M. Gruenther
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, 1953-1956
Craig Hosmer
Member of Congress from California
William E. Minshall
Member of Congress from Ohio
James B. Pearson
United States Senator from Kansas
Arthur W. Radford
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1953-1957
Bernard A. Schriever
Commander, Air Force Systems Command, 1961-1966
Mansfield D. Sprague
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1957-1958
Nathan W. Twining
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1957-1960
John G. Tower
United States Senator from Texas
Ex-Officio Members:
Robert C. Hill
United States Ambassador to Mexico, 1957-1961
Maurice H. Stans
Director of the Bureau of the Budget, 1958-1961
Anthony J. Jurich
Secretary to the Task Force
DECISIONS IN NATIONAL SECURITY:
PATCHWORK OR POLICY?
"Good national security policy requires
both good policymakers and good policy
machinery. One cannot be divided from
the other."
- U.S. Senate Subcommittee on National
Policy Machinery; Committee on
Government Operations, 1961
War and the threat of war continue to add an ominous dimension to our
search for peace. In an international environment where true peace continues
to elude us, we must maintain the highest priority on efforts to ensure our
nation's security.
Providing for our security absorbs more of our human and material resources
than any other single function of government. Fortunately, our nation is
endowed with these great resources. However, wise policies and efficient
organization and management are as essential as the resources themselves.
Our review concludes that the effectiveness of our security structure has
declined, due to indecisive policies -- faulty policy-making machinery -- over-
centralization in the Department of Defense -- over-management of our security
structure -- over-reliance on cost accounting procedures and computer techniques
-- and a downgrading of seasoned human judgment.
We are concerned with the self-imposed isolation of top civilians in the
Pentagon who have too often dismissed or altered solid recommendations of
the service Secretaries or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and distorted the
authority of unified and field commanders.
-2-
The technological explosion has forced new political - military relation-
ships. The civilian administrator must understand the soldier and the scientist.
The soldier must understand the civilian administrator and the scientist. This
new relationship has fared poorly in recent years, to the detriment of our pol-
icies and policy making machinery. We see the result in dealing with crucial
international events, in years of indecisiveness over Vietnam, in our failure
to develop new advanced weapons systems, and in the erosion of America's prestige
throughout the world.
History sternly warns that weakness invites aggression. The weakness may be
in armaments. But even with ample superior armaments, a nation can invite
aggression by a lack of will and determination. Such a condition is often re-
vealed by a hesitancy or inability to reach timely and forthright decisions.
Responsibility for National Security
Within policies and requirements specified by Congress, the President deter-
mines and directs our national security efforts. By constitutional provision
and historical precedent, he is responsible for the conduct of foreign relations.
He is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He directs all departments and
agencies in the Executive Branch.
National security policy formulation and implementation processes have
become interdepartmental. Not only the Department of Defense, but also State,
Treasury, Commerce, Interior and Agriculture, the Atomic Energy Commission, the
Export-Import Bank, the Development Loan Fund and a score of other agencies are
involved. Almost every major element of the Federal Government is involved to
some extent in national security policy.
National security planning and execution cut across agency and departmental
lines, and make the President's administrative task difficult and complex. The
-3-
effective management of this responsibility, however, remains critical for the
American people.
National Security Policy Making Machinery
In 1961, the National Security Council, its Planning Board and Operations
Coordinating Board, were inherited from the Eisenhower Administration, as org-
anized, functioning and prestigious policy-making instruments. Immediately, and
without careful consideration of possibly fateful consequences, both Boards were
abolished. The effectiveness of the National Security Council was compromised.
The National Security Council, * created by the National Security Act of
1947, is charged with advising the President:
"With respect to the integration of domestic, foreign
and military policy relating to the national security
so as to enable the military services and the other
departments and agencies to cooperate more effectively
in matters involving national security."
The National Security Council was to be the keystone of our nation's
security structure. It was established not to restrict but to advise a President,
by assuring thoughtful analysis and careful coordination of every significant
aspect of national security policy. It assumed competent management of current
problems and contingency planning for the future. It was to be insurance against
hasty action -- a device to ensure that every factor bearing on vital security
policies and programs would be presented to the President for action.
During the Eisenhower Administration, the National Security Council --
meeting frequently and formally throughout the eight years -- proved its
indispensability to the nation.
Its procedures and deliberations were not flawless, but over this span of
* See Appendix I
-4-
time it was invaluable in assuring comprehensive analyses, in producing
timely recommendations in critical security issues, and in coordinating
activities of the members of the Council.
Since then, the entire supporting structure has so changed, or even dis-
appeared, as to now produce little more than mechanical compliance with the law.
The procedures for integrating military, political and economic considerations
often have given way to informal and impromptu consultations with staff assistants
and other individuals or ad hoc groups. The results have been harmful to our country.
National security policies have become unclear and indecisive. Others
urgently needed have been left unmade. Reaction to crisis -- not avoidance of
of crisis -- has been the inescapable result.
Continuous review and planning has been substantially eliminated, in the
downgrading of formal policy planning. Thus, when an immediate crisis looms,
there is hope that crash handling will avoid a fundamental compromise of our
national security. A solid and effective structure can permit the development
of a policy which can be appropriately carried out at the tactical level.
Over-centralization in the Department of Defense
The progression toward a centrally-directed defense establishment began
long before the 1960's. The National Security Act of 1947, and the 1949 and 1958
amendments to the Act, progressively strengthened the role of the Secretary of
Defense as the principal advisor to the President on national security matters. *
In 1961, however, centralization became not policy but dogma, and the Secretary
became "first among equals" as advisor to the President.
Ultimate responsibility for the defense establishment must be exercised by
the Secretary of Defense under Presidential direction and within the statuatory
guidelines set by Congress. The function assumes highest-level policy guidance
* Largely reflecting the recommendations of The Commission on Organization of
the Executive Branch of the Government on National Security Organization
(Hoover Report).
-5-
and the resolution of policy differences -- such policies, for example, as the
formulation of national security operations, criteria for organizing forces,
and the development of the defense budget. In these activities, the civilian
authorities are responsible to the President, the Congress and the electorate.
Under civilian control and within civilian established guidelines, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the uniformed services must direct the planning and
management of all military forces. In force planning and operations, the military
leadership must be responsive through the Secretary of Defense to the President.
A careful delineation of these roles of civilian policy-makers and military
managers is absolutely essential for a secure and balanced national security
posture.
Implementing Policies and Programs
Civilian Operational Planning and Control
Major organizational changes and new procedures have created a serious over-
centralization of civilian management at the top of the defense establishment.
The practice of lower-level civilians in the OSD superimposing themselves in
originating and developing analyses for the Secretary does injustice to the
competence of the military services. The most current and disturbing example
of the reduced role of the military in strategic and tactical decisions is
Vietnam. A policy of gradualism* largely dictated by civilians has been imposed,
which has prolonged the war, increased the casualties and costs and divided
the American people,
Civilian control over the details of the air war has been particularly ques-
tionable. Testimony before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee last
August disclosed that tactical decisions were frequently being made by civilians
in Washington. Military witnesses stated that many target recommendations approved
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were being denied and others delayed, thus impairing
* See Republican Coordinating Committee report "Gradualism -- Fuel of Wars"
March 1968.
-6-
the war effort. The Subcommittee was also advised that operational decisions were
at times being made without the involvement of responsible military professionals
on the scene.
It is axiomatic that when a tactical commander is given a mission, once a
policy has been approved, he must also be given latitude and control over intel-
ligence and military capability to accomplish the mission. Continuing support
within the defense establishment and the Administration is necessary for the
commanders as they carry out assigned tasks.
Civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense have assumed greater
control of contingency planning and military preparedness, and often have
abandoned or ignored contingency plans in favor of rapidly conceived ad hoc
decisions. Military operations, directed principally by civilians, have
occurred, and illustrate suppression of the proper command and military role
in our defense structure.
Research, Development and Procurement Practices
Civilian authority has been administered to over-control research, develop-
ment and procurement. Under present procedures, new weapons systems will not
be approved unless they are justified as a response to a visible new threat.
Nor can a new system be approved until all technology and cost data are "in hand.'
Thus, research and development* policies threaten to deprive our nation of the
military superiority sufficient to maintain our security.
Military judgment -- in a number of cases the considered judgment of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff -- has not been followed in weapons selection and procurement.
Many urgently-needed weapons systems have fallen victim to a misapplication of
the cost effectiveness process, or become lost in a morass of civilian boards
or working groups increasingly capable of vetoing proposals.
* See Republican Coordinating Committee report "Research and Development: Our
Neglected Weapon" May 1968.
-7-
The weapons systems evaluation capability of the Department of Defense is
experienced and comprehensive. The individual services and the OSD Weapons
Systems Evaluation Group prepare extensive evaluations of proposed new weapons
systems. Frequently this process has been compromised, bypassed or ignored, the
findings obscured. Civilian leaders have substituted judgments based on
"other reasons."
A notable example is the TFX contract award. The contractor unanimously
recommended by both the military analysts and the Weapons Systems Evaluation
Group was rejected. Recently, the commonality feature of the aircraft imposed
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense upon the Navy was rejected -- six
years and many millions of dollars later. The development of a new aircraft
for the Navy now will cost considerably more in new expenditure and lost time,
while leaving the service arm with a present complement and types of planes it
feels is inadequate.
A similar incident was the X-22 VSTOL aircraft contract award. The Senate
Preparedness Subcommittee found that both civilian and military evaluators were
over-ridden. The Subcommittee concluded that the final decision was made in
thirty minutes by a Deputy Secretary of Defense with a handful of civilian
advisors, discarding analyses of 75 Navy experts who had spent 4,000 man hours
assessing competing designs.
As a result of frequent OSD rejections and cutbacks, the services have
gravitated toward a policy of "half a loaf," which is simply acquiescence in
inadequacy. This approach is unsound and cannot be condoned.
The Cost Effectiveness Hurdle
Proposed weapons systems for the military services must pass, under current
OSD procedures, a cost effectiveness test -- an analysis requiring precise cost
data, application definitions and a demonstration of utility against a specific
military threat. Over-reliance on a theoretical and mechanical cost effective-
ness procedure has distorted the national security decision-making process.
-8-
Decisions on weapons systems, strategy and tactics demand the additional
input of practical, professional knowledge. Intuition and other human factors
must be introduced into decision-making. War and defense preparations, with
all of their unpredictabilities, are matters of judgment. Innovation cannot
be predicted or quantified. Defense is an inexact science.
A former top civilian official of the Administration recently wrote on
the organizational and procedural changes of the past seven years:
"The second reason for (organizational) change made it essential
for political leadership of the country to consider the implications
of any military move no matter how minor. If war had already become
too important to leave to the generals, the selection and deployment
of weapons and forces to deter war were now at least equally
important.
"The need for more active political management could not have been
made if the tools had not been available, and the tools might not
have been picked up without the need to find and use them.
The "tool" is primarily the cost effectiveness study. Many witnesses
before Congressional committees have testified that the cost effectiveness study
has often been used to cloud issues or to legitimize previously determined
positions.
Appropriate applications of the cost effectiveness technique are necessary
and important in the vast Defense Department structure. Indeed, in response to
Hoover Commission recommendations, then Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal
introduced financial management procedures into the Department. Thereafter the
system was continuously and properly expanded.
Such procedures are vital from a position of fiscal responsibility and
orderliness. However, weaponry cost estimates cannot be allowed to remain as virt-
ually the sole determinant on which national security decisions are based. Our
nation's security demands a flexible assessment system for determining threats and
the most effective response to them.
* See Atlantic Monthly, September 1967
-9-
Misapplications of the cost effectiveness process can create critical con-
ditions, some of which became evident in the Administration's FY 1969 budget.
Items previously reduced or rejected by the Secretary of Defense were suddenly
requested. For example, several thousand additional helicopters, long before
requested by the Army, were provided for, in addition to several billion dollars
for aircraft spare parts for all services. Since national security rests in part
upon adequate "lead time" for the procurement of weapons and supporting materials,
deliveries in the two categories above in 1969 or later may well render a part of
our military establishment vulnerable or incapable of performing at an effective
level.
Under this procedure, rejections or reduction in military requests are most
frequently reported only verbally. Back-up material is not made available.
Committees of the Congress are generally unable to examine cost effectiveness
studies supporting a given decision. The Chairman of the National Security
and International Operations Subcommittee, Senate Government Operations Committee,
concluded after a hearing in 1967 that the analysis process has been so used
that it may well be damaging to our nation's security.
Effects of Over-centralization
Over-centralization ensures greater control. It also can produce delays,
depress creativity and initiative, and can prevent the emergence of new ideas
from lower echelons -- the most fertile source. The Administration's zeal for
over-centralization appears to stem from a desire to control policy, people
and events. It has resulted in numerous instances of control of news, public
information and intelligence.
An example is the TFX program. A policy memorandum was issued
directing that all news releases on the program would uphold the validity of
the decisions of the Secretary of Defense. Such is the internal power of an
-10-
over-centralized, publicly unresponsive structure. Under such circumstances,
it is not surprising that the Administration's credibility has come under
severe and sustained criticism.
The problem reaches into Congress, where defense committees expect to
receive a free exchange of views on critical aspects of our national security.
However, in observance of Administration and Defense Department restrictions,
witnesses testify under a directive stating that they must express the views
of the Administration unless "pressed." When "pressed," before stating his
own views, the witness must first reiterate the views of the Administration.
On completion of Congressional hearings, testimony is examined by Defense
Department officials for the purpose of deleting information the release of
which might harm the nation's security. Frequently, however, deletions have
been made not for security reasons but for political reasons. Examples of this
practice are numerous, and are a matter of public record.
The August, 1967, report by the Senate Preparedness Investigating Sub-
committee reflects the lack of candor between Defense Department civilians and
the Congress. The subject was the war in Vietnam. The bipartisan Subcommittee
arrived at such conclusions as these:
It was clearly implied by the Defense official that few, if any, important
military targets remained unstruck. The great weight of the military testimony
was to the contrary.
The Defense official said that North Vietnam could sustain its required
import rate by way of land, rail and water from Red China. This position
contrasts sharply with the views of military experts.
The Administration has asserted for years that the Defense Department cost
reduction program has been highly effective. A report by the House Armed Services
Committee and the General Accounting Office, on analysis of such claims, con-
-11-
cluded that not more than 50 percent of the alleged savings were valid. Nor
does this figure take into account that Congressional budget cuts, if adhered to
by the DOD, were considered "cost savings."
From the management standpoint, over-centralization of authority inevitably
will produce increased costs and gross inefficiencies in an organization as large
as the Department of Defense. Decisions on routine matters are posponed, and major
decisions must also be delayed or too hastily reached. In many decisions, particularly
those related to combat in Southeast Asia, the time factor is such that when
the decisions are finally made and communicated, circumstances may have changed,
opportunities lost, the decisions no longer applicable.
In research and development, where timing is critical, delays of decision
have caused paralysis. Defense industry spokesmen have indicated that in the past,
some four to six months would be required in the Pentagon between the time
proposals were submitted and final approval. Today, it averages twelve months.
Some take two years. This must be added to the extremely long lead-time of
5 to 10 years common to weapons research projects.
In the current research and development cycle, too many individuals can say
"no" and very few can say "yes." Confusion has resulted from the separation of
responsibility and authority. While a measure of review is necessary and advis-
able, a current typical review of a major new weapons system will be made by 17
different staff agencies and over 700 people before receiving final approval.
As reported in official organization charts,* the recent rapid increase
of personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense has brought into serious
imbalance the process required for sound assessment and implementation of
national security policies. This is another illustration of the structural
dislocations which have come to frustrate comprehensive policy analysis.
* See Appendix II.
-12-
Effect on Morale
The effects of over-centralization on the morale of both military and
civilian personnel are grave. Responsibility without commensurate
authority is frustrating and demoralizing. The exercise of authority, so necessary
to the experience of a military professional seeking a career, is difficult under
current conditions. It is a capability on which this nation must rely in time of
emergencies and conflicts. Further, the initiative necessary for both military
and technical civilian personnel is an imperative for a responsive national
security structure. The cumulative effect of the current policies, procedures
and organization is to weaken this vital ingredient.
Recommendations
The principle of civilian control over our national security structure
requires that authority reside in the President. The two major counselors to him
must be the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. Focus at this level
should primarily assume a broad policy-making and enforcing function.
In view of the threatening international environment, the collapse of time,
and our exceedingly complex governmental structure, adherence to a formal decision-
making process such as the National Security Council is a necessary prerequisite for
effectively providing for the nation's security.
We must have a more articulate definition of our national interests and the
steps required to promote them. Upon such determinations a clear policy must be
set.
A crucial point in the national security process is placing the most capable
people in key positions. Good national security policy requires good policy
makers as well as good policy machinery.
-13-
The policy decision-making process must be planned and organized, and must
make use of the talents of responsible individuals within the structure. Timely
and regular meetings must be held. A coordination function must be established
to ensure prompt and effective implementation. Follow-through and analysis of
the effect of promulgated policies must be reinstituted, with reports from
all involved sectors.
Detailed implementation of both planning and operations should be
delegated to lower echelons, which must have both the necessary authority and
responsibility to carry out assignments.
There must be reaffirmation of the responsibility to better inform both
Congress and the electorate on issues affecting our national security, within
appropriate safeguards.
Budgetary policy guidelines to the services must be clarified. There
should be greater emphasis on the reestablishment of the priority budget concept
utilizing to the extent practicable the "mission" basis.
The role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be reaffirmed, ensuring their
direct and active participation in the development of policy, weapons system
and force planning.
Advanced management techniques should be utilized in their proper role as
tools, not as ends in themselves.
Conclusion
The extreme over-centralization and over-management of our national security
structure on the one hand, and the extensive ad hoc policy deliberations on the
other, developed in the past seven years, have weakened our national security
position and created increased risks. It has brought into question this nation's
ability to respond in a timely and effective manner to crises which threaten
America's vital interests.
-14-
Regarding overcentralization, in 1949 Ferdinand Eberstadt, one of the
foremost students of defense organization, testified before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, stating:
"From shattered illusions that mere passage of a unification act
would produce a military utopia, there has sprung an equally
illusory belief that present shortcomings will immediately dis-
appear if only more and more authority is conferred in the Secretary
of Defense and more and more people added to his staff
I suggest
that great care be exercised lest the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, instead of being a small and efficient unit which deter-
mines the policies of the military establishment and controls and
directs the departments, feeding on its own growth, becomes a
separate empire."
Today the separate empire exists. Balance must be restored, to ensure
our nation's security, and to reinforce our ability to respond quickly to
challenge.
Equally important are policies and an organization structure that will at
all times conform to our representative form of government, with its system of
checks and balances.
APPENDIX I
Title 50 - U. S. Code
Section 402. National Security Council.
(a) Establishment; presiding officer; functions; composition.
There is established a council to be known as the National Security Council
(hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Council").
The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the Council:
Provided, That in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to preside
in his place.
The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect
to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the
national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments
and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving
the national security.
The Council shall be composed of--
(1) the President;
(2) the Vice President;
(3) the Secretary of State;
(4) the Secretary of Defense;
(5) the Director for Mutual Security;
(6) The Chairman of the National Security Resources Board; and
(7) the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive
departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and the Chairman
of the Research and Development Board, when appointed by the President
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at his pleasure.
(b) Additional functions.
In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct,
for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of
the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security,
it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council --
(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the
United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in
the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations
to the President in connection therewith; and
(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments
and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to
make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.
-2-
APPENDIX I (continued)
(c) Executive secretary; appointment and compensation; staff employees.
The Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian executive secretary
who shall be appointed by the President. The executive secretary, subject to the
direction of the Council, is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and
the Classification Act of 1949, to appoint and fix the compensation of such person-
nel as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Council
in connection with the performance of its functions.
(d) Recommendations and reports.
The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such
other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may
require. (July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, Section 101, 61 Stat. 497; Aug. 10,
1949, ch. 412, Section 3, 63 Stat. 579; Oct. 28, 1949, ch. 782, title XI, Section
1106 (a), 63 Stat. 972; Oct. 10, 1951, ch. 479, title V, Section 501 (e) (1),
65 Stat. 378.)
APPENDIX II
ORGANIZATION OF FEDERAL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (exclusive of separate services personnel)
Personnel - 1/1/61
Personnel - 1/1/67
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
Office of the Secretary of Defense
136
DEFENSE
2,124
Secretary of Defense
7
Deputy Secretary of Defense
4
Secretary of Defense
4
Office of Administrative Secretary
25
Deputy Secretary of Defense
5
Administrative Office of the Secretary
100
Director of Defense Research
Director of Defense Research and
and Engineering, Office of
Engineering
265
the Director
212
Office of the Director
234
Advanced Research Projects Agency
138
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
31
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
36
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comp-
Assistant Secretary of Defense
troller)
170
(Administration)
226
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Health and Medical)
11
(Comptroller)
325
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)
212
(Installations and Logistics)
282
Office of Assistant Secretary
185
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Defense Representative, NA and MA
(International Security Affairs)
233
and U.S. Rep. USRO
27
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Man-
(Manpower)
250
power, Personnel and Reserve)
86
Assistant Secretary of Defense
82
(Public Affairs)
87
Office of Assistant Secretary
Reserve Forces Policy Board
4
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Systems Analysis)
142
General Counsel
54
(Properties and Installations)
57
Miscellaneous Activities
40
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Special Staff Assistants
46
(Public Affairs)
74
USRO
32
Assistant Secretary of Defense
NATO Force Planning
11
(Supply and Logistics)
166
Special Project
1
General Counsel
56
Assistant to the Secretary (Atomic
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ORGANI-
Energy)
12
ZATION
467
Assistant to the Secretary (Legislative
Office of the Chairman
14
Affairs)
7
Joint Staff
225
Assistant to the Secretary (Special
Other Joint Chiefs of Staff Activities
228
Operations)
17
Special Programs
15
OTHER DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
73,265
Organization of the joint Chiefs of
Armed Forces Information and Ed-
Staff
302
ucation
403
Office of the Chairman
10
Defense Contract Audit Agency
3,745
Joint Staff
187
Defense Atomic Support Agency
2,198
Other Joint Chiefs of Staff Activities
105
Defense Communications Agency
1,235
Other Activities
223
Classified Activities
3,328
Advanced Research Projects Agency
80
Defense Supply Agency
62,356
Standing Group-NATO
41
Interdepartmental Activities
37
U.S. Court of Military Appeals
38
International Military Activities
59
Interdepartmental Activities
5
Defense Communications Agency
59
Total employees (35 WOC)
75,952
Total employees (47 WOC)
1
1,809
Includes 3,450 part-time and WAE employees, and
I Includes 40 part-time and WAE, and 38 overseas
913 employees outside U.S., of which 415 are American
citizens.
employees.
Office of the Secretary (including
Other Defense Activities)
75,952
Department of the Army
455,523
Department of the Navy
376,879
Department of the Air Force
321,425
Total, DOD (43 WOC)
1,229,779
Includes a total of 20,588 WAE employees and
153,541 employees outside U.S., of whom 35,266 are
American citizens and 118,275 nationals of other count.
ries.
Source:
Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies,
U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations.
APPENDIX II
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (exclusive of separate services personnel)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
As of 1/1/67
Secretary of Defense Area
41
Secretary of the Army Area (Depart-
Office of the Director of Armed Forces
mental and Field)
1,101
Information and Education
39
As of 1/1/61
DOD and Joint Activities
Office of the Secretary and the Under
1,322
Office of Industrial Personnel Access
Joint Brazil-U.S. Defense Commis-
Secretary of the Army
45
sion
1
Authorization Review
2
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army
Secretary of Army Area
671
Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and
(FM)
Joint Mexican-U.S. Defense Com-
17
Office of the Secretary and the Under
ROTC Affairs
40
mission
1
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Army
38
Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs
37
Office, Industrial Personnel Access
(I&L)
56
Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve
Authorization Review
6
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army
Office Assistant Secretary of the Army
Components
20
(R&D)
Industrial College of the Armed
(MP and RF)
26
14
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army
United States Military Academy
1,934
Forces
92
Office, Administrative Assistant to Sec-
(FM)
22
The Adjutant General
4,010
o
National War College
69
retary of the Army
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army
Chief of Chaplains
57
Office, Chief of Public Information
SHAPE Liaison
2
6
Provost Marshal General
156
Office, Chief of Legislative Liaison
Armed Services Explosive Safety Board
12
(Logistics)
28
69
Office, Director of Research and Devel-
Chief of Research and Development
175
Office of General Counsel
21
Defense Supply Service
199
opment
8
Army Physical Review Council
7
Administrative Support Group
35
Defense Telephone Service
95
Office, Administrative Assistant to Sec-
Military Communications and Electronics
Army Board for Correction of Military
Per Diem Travel and Transportation
Board
Allowance Committee
23
retary of the Army
8
2
Records
22
Office, Chief of Public Information
5
Army Special and Joint Activities
2,898
Army Council of Review Boards
11
Defense Language Institute
779
Office, Chief of Legislative Liaison
48
Grievance and Employment Policy Board
Defense Information School
43
13
Office of General Counsel
19
Miscellaneous Area Activities
4
Employment Coordination Service
7
Army Security Agency
1,077
Administrative Support Group
35
Army Air Defense Command
117
Management Office
Army Air Defense Command
295
16
16
Office, Personnel Manager
Combat Developments Command
Armed ServicesBoard of Contract Appeals
15
1,022
11
National Board for Promotion of Rifle
Army Materiel Command
161,007
Armed Services Explosive Safety Board
Civil Functions Corps of Engineers 27,268
Army Board for Correction of Military
Practice
21
Headquarters, AMC
2,601
U.S. Army Tank Automatic Center
6,846
Records
20
Technical Services
Space Management Service
4
208,147
Army Civilian Lawyer Career Committee
3
Office of Civil Defense
720
U.S. Army Aviation Materiel
Army Council of Review Boards
Chief Chemical Officer
14
8,698
Army Staff Area (Departmental and
Command
3,879
Grievance and Employment Policy Board
Chief of Ordnance
7
95,447
Field)
45,451
U.S. Army Electronics Command
11,338
Defense Supply Service
Quartermaster General
177
29,364
Office, Chief of Staff
350
U.S. Army Missile Command
9,851
Defense Telephone Service
103
Chief Signal Officer
24,585
General Staff Committee on National
U.S. Army Mobility Command
4,580
Employment Coordination Office
6
Surgeon General
8,449
Guard and Review Policy
2
U.S. Army Munitions Command
26,522
Management Office
Chief of Transportation
14,630
Special Assistant for Army Informa-
U.S. Army Test and Evaluation
9
Chief of Engineers, Military Functions 26,974
tion and Data Systems
Command
332
12,975
Office, Personnel Manager
15
Office of Management Analysis
5
Comptroller of the Army
285
U.S. Army Supply and Mainte-
National Board for Promotion of Rifle
Continental Army Command
67,445
Army Audit Agency
741
nance
63,075
Practice
20
U.S. Continental Army Command
948
Chief of Information
126
U.S. Army Weapons Command
12,635
Security Review and Security Screening
First U. S. Army
8,271
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Other Activities
510
9,705
Boards
3
10,443
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
887
Continental Army Command
107,154
Second U. S. Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force De-
U.S. Continental Army Command
1,133
Space Management Service
4
Third U.S. Army
15,336
velopment
333
First U.S. Army
31,117
Per Diem Travel and Transportation
Fourth U.S. Army
10,710
Allowance Committee
21
Fifth U.S. Army
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military
Third U.S. Army
27,278
10,543
Army Staff (Departmental and
Sixth U.S. Army
9,269
Operations
258
Fourth U.S. Army
19,310
Field)
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
649
Fifth U.S. Army
14,760
18,717
Military District of Washington,
128
U.S. Army
Chief of Finance
Office, Chief of Staff
1,925
4,659
Sixth U.S. Army
11,139
Alaska
2,793
Office of The Inspector General
44
Military District of Washington,
General Staff Committee on National
Office of the Chief of Military History
74
U.S. Army
2,417
Guard and Review Policy
2
Hawaii
5,032
The Judge Advocate General
235
Military Traffic Management
Comptroller of the Army
260
Service
6,212
Army Audit Agency
1,312
Total continental United
National Guard Buteau
118
Intelligence Corps Command
911
Chief of Information
112
States
330,225
Office of the Chief, Army Reserve
51
Army Strategic Communications
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
477
Total outside continental
Office of the Chief, Reserve Com-
Command
2,681
Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence
948
United States
50,439
ponents
51
Civil Functions, Corps of Engineers
30,701
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military
Office of Personnel Operations
1,122
Miscellaneous
7
Operations
337
Total employees (7 WOC)
380,674
Office of the President
4
Alaska
2,987
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
524
Excludes 5,053 Technical Stoff personnel (depart.
United States Military Academy
2,271
Hawaii
5,899
Chief of Finance
4,186
mental) included with Technical Services.
The Adjutant General
1,467
Total United States
Industrial College of the Armed Forces
104
Data shown for Alaska and Hawaii are by geographi-
Chief of Chaplains
361,941
33
Office of The Inspector General
cal area, not by command
Total outside U.S.
48
Provost Marshal General
58
84,696
Office of the Chief of Military History
63
Includes 1,298 part-time and WAE employees
and 50,439 overseas employees, of which 13,616 are
Chief of Research and Development
559
Total employees (4 WOC)
455,523
The Judge Advocate General
218
American citizens and 36,823 are nationals of other
Chief of Engineers, Military
Armed Forces Information and Education,
countries.
Functions
12,699
Data shown is by geographical area, not by
DOD
385
Chief of Communications-Electronics
360
command
National War College
88
Chief of Support Services
1,050
Includes 7,127 part-time and WAE employee
and 84,696 employees outside U.S. of whom
National Guard Bureau
189
Surgeon General
10,564
are American citizens and 256 are nationals of
(1)
U.S. Aimy Recruiting Command
2,557
other countries
Source: Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies, U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations
APPENDIX II (continued)
As of 1/1/61
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (exclusive of separate services personnel)
As of 1/1/67
Bureau of Medicine end Surgery
375
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Bureau of Nevel Personnel
1,771
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Chief
12
Office of the Chief
10
Assistant Chief for Personnel and
Executive Office of the Secretary
116
Administrative and Management
Professional Operations
157
Division
115
2,144
Assistant Chief for Planning and Logistics
165
Office of Secretary of the Navy
38
Office of Inspector General
1
Executive Office of the Secretary
Assistant Chief for Aviation Medicine
9
Office of Under Secretary of the Navy
9
Office of Liaison and Technical
Office of Secretary of the Novy
25
Assistant Chief to, Dentistry
12
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Information
5
Office of Under Secretary of the Novy
4
Assistant Chief fo:
arch and
(Installations and Logistics)
42
Manpower Information Division
248
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy
16
Military Medical Spec ulties
20
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Assistant Chief for Plans
78
(Material)
(Research and Development)
11
Assistant Chief for Personnel Control
451
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research and Dave opment)
5
Bureau of Nevel Personnel
Office of Assistant Secretary of the
1,699
Assistant Chief for Education and
Navy (Financial Management)
5
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Office of the Chief
Training
157
12
Office of the Special Asst. to Sec. Navy
4
Assistant Chief for Naval Reserve and
Navy (Personnel onc Reserve
Administrative and Management
Forces)
8
Division
113
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts
754
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Naval District Affairs
7
Office of Admin. Ass K Sec. Novy
Office of the Chief
89
the Navy (Manpower)
7
Assistant Chief for Records
Inspector General
465
7
1
Director of Planning
41
Department of the Navy Staff
Office of Analysis and Review
Special Assistant to the Chief for Leader-
Assistant Chief for Performance
41
23
Administrative Office
785
Director of Management Engineering
69
Offices
1,318
Assistant Chief for Morale Services
66
ship
5
Office of the Comptroller
346
Personnel Research Division
23
35
Office of Program Appraisal
14
Director of Industrial Relations
Assistant Chief for Finance
89
Administrative Office
226
Chief of Chaplains
10
Office of the General Counsel
26
Office of Liaison and Technical Infor-
Director of Naval Personnel
26
Office of Industrial Relatic ns
133
Comptroller of the Bureau of Supplies
Office of the Comptroller
237
mation
5
Assistant Chief for Property
Office of Information
13
183
Office of the General Counsel
21
and Accounts
Management
Manpower Information Division
12
220
Navy Management Office
66
Assistant Chief for Plans
61
Assistant Chief for Supply Mgt.
111
Office of Civilian Manpower Manage-
Special Assistant to Chief for Retention
ment
235
Assistant Chief for Transportation
112
Task Force
3
Office of Noval Material
191
Assistant Chief for Personnel Control
442
Office of Information
39
Office of Naval Petroleum Reserves
4
Assistant Chief for Education and
Director of Mutual Security Programs
34
Navy Department Board of Decorations
Office of Management Information
41
Office of Noval Research
400
Assistant Chief for Purchasing
33
and Medals
7
Training
135
Office of Petroleum Reserves
6
Board for Correction of Noval Records
Assistant Chief for Research and
Board for Correction of Records
1
12
Assistant Chief for Naval Reserve and
Office of Naval Research
400
Noval Physical Disability Review Board
16
Novol District Affairs
8
Development
21
Outside Bureau Details
5
Board for Correction of Naval Records
14
Office of Naval Material
460
Naval Physical Review Council
5
Assistant Chief for Records
473
Special Assignments and Details to
Assistant Chief for Performance
39
Bureau of Yerds and Decks
841
Navy Council of Personnel Boards
16
Physical Review Council
6
Office of the Chief
12
Other Agencies
2
Assistant Chief for Morale Services
68
Office of the Chief
33
Office of Legislative Affairs
28
Deputy Chief of Naval Material for Pro-
Electronics Production Resources
Assistant Chief for Finance
73
Assistant Chief for Administration
Armed Services Board of Contract
gram and Financial Management
98
Agency
21
Chief of Chaplains
10
and Comptroller
272
Appeals
35
Deputy Chief of Noval Material for
Office of Industrial Personnel Access
Assistant Chief for Property Manage-
Assistant Chief for Plonning and
Office of the Judge Advocate
Procurement
106
Authorization Review
3
ment
11
Design
228
General
79
Deputy Chief of Naval Material
Office of Legislative Affairs
20
Assistant Chief for Construction
109
Office of Chief of Naval Operations
990
for Development
95
Savings Bonds Office
1
Bureau of Nevel Weapons
3,318
Assistant Chief for Maintenance
Staff Offices
14
Deputy Chief of Naval Material
Navy Punel, Armed Services Board of
and Materiel
113
Office of the Chief and Deputy Chief
8
Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Opera-
for Logistic Support
84
Contract Appeals
12
Assistant Chief for Real Estate
40
Assistant Chief for Program Manage-
tions/Director of Naval Adminis-
Deputy Chief of Noval Material for
256
Assistant Chief of Housing
46
tration
ment
255
Management and Organization
65
Inspector General and Assistant Chief
Navy Program Planning Office
66
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
1,244
Office of the Judge Advocate
for Administration
478
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps 1,083
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
Office of the Commandant
42
General
97
Assistant Chief for Fleet Readiness
426
Office of the Commandant
6
(Intelligence)
150
Assistant Chief of StaH, G-1
22
Office of Counsel
46
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1
20
Assistant Chief of Navol Operations
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
17
Office of Chief of Nevel Operations 1,046
Office of the Comptioller
155
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
20
(Communications)
60
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
40
Office of the Chief of Navol Operations
3
Assistant Chief for Contracts
361
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
16
Office of Anti-Submarine Warfare
Personnel Department
342
26
Assistant Chief for Production and
Personnel Department
311
Programs
10
Administrative Division
Staff Offices
151
Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Opera.
Quality Control
290
Division of Aviation
18
Office of Naval Inspector General
24
Supply Department
309
tiom/Director of Noval Adminis-
Assistant Chief for Research, Develop-
Administrative Division
86
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Inspection Department
3
tration
240
ment, Test, and Evaluation
943
Supply Department
434
(Manpower and Naval Reserve)
39
Division of Information
8
Assistant Chief of Novol Operations
Assistant Chief for Field Support
108
Inspection Division
4
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet
Fiscal Division
158
(Intelligence)
357
Special Projects Office
247
Division of Information
5
Operations and Readiness)
64
Division of Reserve
10
Assistant Chief of Noval Operations
Fiscal Division
47
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Marine Corps Boards
4
(Communications)
76
Bureau of Ships
3,083
Division of Reserve
10
(Logistics)
110
Data Processing Division
138
Deputy Chief of Navol Operations (Per-
Marine Corps Boards
4
Deputy Chief of Noval Operations (Air)
94
Office of the Chief
40
Military Sea Transportation
sonnel and Navol Reserve)
14
Assistant Chief for Plans and Adminis-
Data Processing Division
102
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans
Service
292
and Policy)
tration, and Inspector General
475
33
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Total departmental service
6,597
Operations and Readiness)
35
Assistant Chief for Research and
Total departmental
14,440
(Development)
71
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Development
91
Total United States
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
344,648
Continental U. S.
327
(Logistics)
107
Assistant Chief for Design, Shipbuilding
320,925
Total outside U.S.
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air)
95
and Fleet Maintenance
Overseas
22,054
Office of the Chief
10
32,231
601
Assistant Chief for Personnel and
Total all areas (1 WOC)
Deputy Chief of Navol Operations (Plans
Assistant Chief for Technical Logistics
1,279
376,879
and Policy)
29
Assistant Chief for Field Activities
172
Total all areas (1 WOC)
'342,979
Professional Operations
151
Assistant Chief for Planning and Logistics
126
Includes 9, 790 American citizens and no
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Assistant Chief for Nu lew Propulsion
67
Includes 6,778 American citizens and 15,276 no.
Assistant Chut for Aviation Medicine
Q
nals of other countries
(Development)
64
Contract Division
214
tionals of other countries.
Includes 934 part-time and WAE employees
Assistant Chief for Dentistry
Includes 488 rad-time and WAE employees
12
Comptroller Division
144
Assistant Chief for Research and
Military Medical Specialities
10
Source: Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies, U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations
(2)
APPENDIX II (continued)
DEPARTMENT OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (exclusive of separate services personnel)
AIR FORCE
DEPARTMENT OF THE
Office of the Secretary
307
As of 1/1/61
AIR FORCE
As of 1/1/67
Secretary of the Air Force
6
Under Secretary of the Air Force
6
Office of the Secretary
347
Assistant Secretary of the Air
Secretary of the Air Force
6
Air Force Systems Command
32,238
Force (Materiel)
27
Under Secretary of the Air Force
3
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units
1,148
Assistant Secretary of the Air
Strategic Air Command
Assistant Secretary of the Air
Amold Engineering Development
Force (Financial Management)
12
18,065
Force (Installations and Logistics)
28
Center
145
Special Assistant to the Secretary
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units
1767
Assistant Secretary of the Air
Air Force Flight Test Center
2,074
(Manpower, Personnel and Reserve
Second Air Force
6187
Force (Financial Management)
17
Aeronautical Systems Division
3,364
Forces)
9
Eighth Air Force
4528
Special Assistant to the Secretary
Ballistic Systems Division
740
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
Fifteenth Air Force
5 583
for Manpower
14
Electronic Systems Division
2,277
(Research and Development)
9
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
Air Force Missile Development
Special Assistant for Installations
7
Tactical Air Command
6,649
(Research and Development)
18
Center
1,637
Administrative Assistant
61
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units
1.254
Deputy Undersecretary (International
Space Systems Division
1,114
General Counsel
32
Ninth Air Force
1,194
Affairs)
3
Research and Technology Division
6,260
Office of Legislative Liaison
84
Twelfth Air Force
4196
Air Force Board for the Correction of
Air Proving Ground Center
2,649
Office of Information Services
38
Nineteenth Air Force
5
Military Records
12
Air Force Special Weapons Center
1,263
Secretary of the Air Force Personnel
Administrative Assistant
78
Aerospace Medical Division
1,782
Council
10
Aeronautical Chart and
General Counsel
33
Foreign Technology Division
895
Office, Missile and Satellite Systems
6
Information Center
3,961
Office of Legislative Liaison
83
National Range Division
3,071
Air Defense Commend
9,831
Office of Information
40
Air Force Contract Management
Headquerters, U. S. Air Force
Air Force Accounting end Finance
Secretary of the Air Force Personnel
Division
4,446
3,819
Chief of Staff
9
Center
Council
1,732
12
Strategic Air Command
20,648
Vice Chief of Staff
18
Air Research and Development
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
2,983
Headquarters and SubsidiaryUnits
1,689
Scientific Advisory Board
68
Command
22,956
Chief of Staff
8
Second Air Force
5,802
Assistant Chief of Stoff, Intelligence
122
Air Training Command
23,909
Vice Chief of Staff
14
Eighth Air Force
5,456
Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve
Air University
2,361
Scientific Advisory Board
8
Fifteenth Air Force
6,461
Forces
Continental Air Command
9,761
Director, Secretariat
11
1st Strategic Aerospace Division
1,240
9
The Inspector General
34
Headquarters Command, USAF
6,017
Director of Administrative Services
147
Tactical Air Command
11,292
The Surgeon General
Secretary of the Air Staff
193
Militery Air Transport Service
10,111
141
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units
1,468
The Judge Advocate General
90
U.S. Air Force Academy
1,739
Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve
Ninth Air Force
3,499
Secretary of the Air Staff
277
USAF Security Service
Forces
875
5
Twelfth Air Force
5,586
Directorate of Administrative Services
Chief, Operations Analysis
499
41
Nineteenth Air Force
6
Comptroller of the Air Force
Total continental U.S.
273,033
Chief of Chaplains
12
USAF, Special Air Warfare Center
676
641
Deputy Chief of Staff, Development
122
Overseas
' 33,538
The Inspector General
26
USAF, Tactical Air Warfare
The Judge Advocate General
61
Center
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
32
646
Total employees (46 WOC)
The Surgeon General
USAF, Tactical Air Reconnaissance
Deputy Chief of Staff Plans and Programs
152
'306,571
146
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
112
Center
25
605
'Includes 14,179 American citizens and 19 150
Comptroller of the Air Force
419
Aeronautical Chart and Infor-
Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel
321
nationals of other countries
528
'Includes 755 WAE employees
Deputy Chief of Staff, Programs and
mation Center
Central Control Group
3,728
Resources
Mutual Defense Aid Program
112
476
Air Defense Command
12,511
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
295
Air Force Accounting and Finance
Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and
Center
1,793
Air Material Command
151,013
Development
173
Air Force Communications
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units
17,090
Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems and
Service
4,292
Aeronautical Systems Center
1,372
Logistics
418
Air Training Command
21,860
Ballistic Missiles Center
669
Deputy Chiel of Staff, Plans and
Air University
2,521
Central Contract Management Region
3,177
Operations
204
Continental Air Command
8,938
Eastern Contract Management Region
3,576
Central Control Group
167
Headquarters Command, USAF
6,726
Electronic Systems Center
371
Military Assistance Program
99
Military Air Transport Service
15,236
Western Contract Management Region
3,476
Air Force Logistics Command
131,336
Office of Aerospace Research
1,388
Middletown, Pa., Air Materiel Area 10544
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units
16,522
U.S. Air Force Academy
1,898
Mobile, Ala. Air Materiel Area
15 001
Middletown Air Materiel Area
2,427
U.S. Air Forice Security Service
1,202
Ogden. Utah, Air Materiel Area
11 327
Mobile Air Materiel Area
6,842
Alaskan Air Commandin Alaska
2,422
Oklahoma City, Okla., Air Materiel
Oklahoma City Air Materiel Area
23,191
Pacific Air Forces in Hawaii
2,365
Area
18601
Ogden Air Materiel Area
17,371
Rome, N.Y., Air Materiel Area
7,682
Total United States
Rome Air Materiel Area
285,724
San Antonio Tex., Air Materiel Area
3,072
Total outside U.S.
19596
San Antonio Air Materiel Area
35,701
23,334
Sacramento Calif. AirMateriel Area
13602
Sacramento Air Materiel Area
19,689
Total employees (4 WOC)
321,425
San Bernardino, Calif, Air Materiel
Warner Robins Air Materiel Area
18,888
Area
9 906
includes 9,621 American citizens and 26 080
Warner-Robins, Georgia Air Male
nationals of other countries
riel Area
15023
Includes 4,523 WAE employees
(3)
GERAL
Source:
Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies, U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations
FORD
affeciapy
REPUBLICAN
REpublican NATiONAL COMMiTTEE
COMMITTEE
1625 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
NATIONAL 8-6800
NEWS
FOR RELEASE
MONDAY A.M.'s
May 27, 1968
REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE URGES IMMEDIATE STEPS
TO REBUILD LAGGING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS
The Republican Coordinating Committee today called for an "aggressive"
research and development program in the field of weapons development to reverse
an "appalling record" in which not one new start has been made on advanced
strategic or nuclear weapons systems in the last seven years.
In a 37-page report entitled "Research and Development: Our Neglected
Weapon," the GOP policy group blamed the situation on fear within Democratic
regimes that new improvements would excite "undesirable Soviet reactions," on
acceptance of a policy of parity with Russia, and on an overly optimistic assess-
ment of Soviet intentions.
The report, which was prepared by the Coordinating Committee's Task Force
on National Security, was released today by Republican National Chairman Ray C.
Bliss. Former Secretaries of Defense Neil H. McElroy and Thomas S. Gates, Jr.,
are Co-Chairmen of the Task Force, which consists of civilian and military experts.
Emphasizing that the time lag in producing a new weapons system is from five
to 15 years, the Coordinating Committee warned that the restrictions which
Democratic Administrations of the present decade have imposed on weapons develop-
ment may result in "obsolescent" weapons systems being produced before they reach
the field.
-MORE-
-2-
The Committee said:
"Because of this long lead time--because also each scientific breakthrough
feeds and spurs other discoveries--the nation that falls behind the weapons system
cycle will likely have neither the time nor the capability to catch up."
While the United States has placed shackles on its research and development
program, the Coordinating Committee said, the Russians are pushing forward in
numerous directions, driving relentlessly for superiority.
The Republican policy-makers said:
"Against this obvious Soviet reach for technological and military supremacy,
what has been the U.S. record these past seven years?
"Overall, it is an appalling record. During all this period, there has not
been one new start on advanced strategic or nuclear weapon systems. Every ICBM
and every strategic bomber in America's arsenal today was a legacy from the
Eisenhower Administration
"Even in military space systems the major emphasis has consistently been
on passive satellites until the recent approval of the Manned Orbital Laboratory
program--a program delayed for years. Advanced programs under development by the
Eisenhower Administration--Dyna-Soar and SPAD--were cancelled.
"In the tactical area, the aircraft carrying the burden in Vietnam--the F-4,
F-105, and the A-6--were all initiated in the 1950s. The primary missiles used
by these aircraft, such as Sidewinder, Bullpup, and Shrike, are all Eisenhower
Administration developments
"Still less comprehensible is the Administration's decision to rely on the
F-106 of the early fifties' technological vintage for our air defense forces. For
more than five years we have had far superior Mach 3 fighters such as the F-12
flying on test.
"The F-106 is slower than the French Concorde, a transport. It is at least
one generation behind the F-12 engine, materials and performance figures. The
-MORE-
-3-
fact that for at least three years we could have built F-12 fighters superior to
any aircraft in the Soviet inventory, and to date have deliberately passed the
opportunity by, further suggests that the Administration is less than zealous
in keeping the United States ahead."
The Republican policy group said that the Administration "has also been
content to drift" in the development of smaller tactical weapons, and that forced
to act at last by the Vietnam war "it began a crash program with the high costs,
inefficiencies and waste that always attend such programs."
Pointing to the troubles with the TFX (F-111), the Coordinating Committee
said the plane is costing $6 million each instead of the $2.4 million originally
estimated, that the Navy version has been found unacceptable, and that the bomber
version "does not meet Air Force requirements for an advanced bomber in the 1970
time frame."
To reverse the lag in weapons development, the Committee recommended the
following steps:
--"A firm policy of assuring military superiority for the United States
must be adopted and implemented.
.-"Establishment of priorities for weapons systems development must be
derived from an objective assessment of the threat, on the one hand, and the pace
of technology, on the other, then aggressively pursued with adequate funding.
--"Redefinition of authority at a lower level, restoring responsibility and
initiative to responsible commands of the military departments.
-"Reintroduction of healthy, but controlled, inter-service competition to
include actual weapons development in addition to paper studies.
--"Revision of organization and procedures to help encourage initiative and
foster creativity in research and development.
--"An adequate technical facility base, both government and private, must
be reestablished and maintained.
-MORE-
-4-
--"An increased level of joint research and development effort with our
allies should be encouraged."
The GOP policy-makers said:
"This nation's research and development effort has not been progressing at
a pace equal to either the accelerating spiral of science and technology or
the expanding threat. The Soviets in particular have exhibited an aggressive
research and development effort to win the technological race
"In our view, technological superiority is demanded by both military
requirements and economic necessity. Since the means to achieve superiority
will have been determined years before, and we have already forfeited years,
decisions must be made with great urgency to reorient our research and develop-
ment programs.
"Advances in technology must be exploited in weapons development with
imagination, determination and zeal. At stake is the peace and security of the
United States and the free world."
The Coordinating Committee said the United States could not be content
"with stalemate or parity." Yet, the Committee said, "current policies appear
to accept, if not to seek, parity with the USSR."
The Republican policy group said:
"The Administration's approach has been passive--a sterile, inadequate
'reaction'. New developments have achieved emphasis only when justified as
responses to visible new threats. Yet, new enemy threats can be secretly in
development for five or six years before they are detected. In any area, therefore,
we can fall years behind if our advances in the same area are contingent on the
know progress of other nations."
The Coordinating Committee said that implicit in the present policy "are
conceptual barriers to the pursuit of aggressive research and development."
-MORE-
-5-
The Committee added:
"People powerfully situated in this Administration have believed that for
the foreseeable future the United States and the Soviet Union will be at a
standoff in advanced military technology and little can be done to alter this
balance."
With reference to the slowdown in weapons development, the Committee said:
"This delay is induced by the Administration's inclination to give greater
weight to optimistic assessments of Soviet intentions than to hard-headed
measurements of capabilities.
"For example, the Administration persuaded itself that the Soviets would
probably not deploy an orbital bombardment vehicle or an anti-ballistic missile
system. Part of the problem is 'mirror thinking'. Our leaders having decided
against utilizing these systems, they assumed the Soviets would reason similarly.
It was a gross mistake.
"In a period when science and technology are making significant strides
and the evidence is that the Soviets are aggressively advancing the state of the
art, this nation must weigh heavily the Soviet capabilities.
"An example is the Soviet achievement of 'fractional' orbital capability.
Knowing also that they have adequate control and thrust, we must assume that they
now have or soon will have a complete orbital capability, international treaties
notwithstanding.
"We must not wait until we suddenly discover that such a vehicle is being
tested. This precautionary approach must be applied across the whole weapons
spectrum.
"Although never outwardly stated as policy, it is evident that this Adminis-
tration is applying arms control considerations early in the R and D cycle. This
-MORE-
-6-
is reasonable only if there is concrete knowledge that our enemies are also
applying the same considerations at the same place."
The GOP policy-makers recalled that in February the Director of Research
and Engineering for the Defense Department said that since 1964 the overall
research and technological effort had declined by a "critical" 30 per cent.
The Coordinating Committee said that three basic restrictions have brought
about the lag in weapons development:
--An unwise use of the"cost-effectiveness'" system, in which costs analysts
have become dominant in the decision-making process, and conclusions often are
reached that "discard valid military judgment."
--A requirement that military services show that all necessary technology
is "in hand" as a prerequisite for approving new programs, that is, that the
services must demonstrate that the technology can be produced.
--A demand that "excessive assurance of a clear-cut military requirement"
be given before proceeding with the research and development of a new weapons
system.
With regard to the use made of cost effectiveness in recent years, the
Coordinating Committee pointed out that it is not a new instrument in evaluating
military programs.
The Committee added:
"In recent years, however, the tool has become, not the servant, but the
master of management
"The Congressional Committees concerned with defense have found it extremely
difficult and often impossible to obtain the actual cost-effectiveness studies
upon which critical decisions have been based.
"Second, cost-effectiveness studies demand elaborate costing data. Tech-
nology must be in hand in order for precise costing information to be obtained.
-MORE-
-7-
"A research program pushing the state of the art has too many unknowns to
be costed precisely. Further, a proposed improvement in a system growing out of
a technological advance requires another round of cost-effectiveness analysis
on that system.
"Cost-effectiveness studies as currently developed give maximum priority
to quantifiable data and tend to subordinate subjective factors, even human
life.
"These studies appear modern, scientific and objective. Applied properly,
they can be. But they are misused when their conclusions are permitted to dominate
essentially military decisions or justify predetermined views."
With regard to the requirement that the services show that necessary
technology is "in hand," the Republican policy group said:
"The goal of budget saving has been laudable, but the net effect produces
second-best, obsolescent systems compared to those of countries willing to press
technology forward throughout the development cycle.
"If all technology must be in hand six months to a year before contract,
and five or more years must elapse between contract and delivery, subsequent
technological advances can be incorporated in the final systems only as retrofits.
"Systems so developed are likely to be obsolescent before they reach the
field. However, even with 'technology in hand' there have been proposed new
systems that have been denied."
With regard to the requirement that a clear-cut military requirement be
shown before proceeding with a new weapons system, the Coordinating Committee
said:
"In years past, intelligence estimates permitted responsible planning three
to five years ahead, by identifying new threats, then establishing requirements
for countering systems in time to cope with the conditions.
-MORE-
-8-
"Today the operating commanders cannot forecast requirements with assurance
because the intelligence visibility cannot project far enough. They are, therefore,
unable to establish the concrete requirements demanded by current policy. The
policy is directly at odds with the realities of modern science and technology."
Pointing out that "invention cannot be predicted," the Committee said:
"The scientist must have challenge, opportunity and a program which will
allow him to prove or disprove his concepts.
"Various restrictions imposed by Administration policies--procedural
and intellectual--tend to stifle creativity, the evolution of new ideas, and the
incentive to explore new horizons.
"These creative individuals, not being at the top of the pyramid, have been
increasingly buried by over-centralization and over-regulation."
The Coordinating Committee said that "neither Congress nor the public were
consulted about, or informed of, the portentous shift made in recent years of
the direction of our research and defense policies."
The Committee said that whether or not the total research, development,
test and evaluation budget should be increased or decreased "is not easily
determined."
"On the one hand," the Committee added, "the fiscal juggling, increases in
non-productive studies and excessive red tape would suggest that the budget can
be cut. On the other hand, necessary programs have been delayed, others have not
started, the Soviets continue their aggressive effort and the pace of science and
technology is continuing to spiral, all suggesting a budget increase.
"These and other factors urgently need analysis in depth and an objective
answer developed for the sake of our national security."
5/21/68
Adopted by
The Republican Coordinating Committee
May 6, 1968
Presented by the
Task Force on National Security
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: OUR NEGLECTED WEAPON
Prepared under the direction of:
Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
1625 Eye Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20006
REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
Presiding Officer: Ray C. Bliss, Chairman, Republican National Committee
Former President
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Former Presidential Nominees
Barry Goldwater
(1964)
Thomas E. Dewey
(1944 & 1948)
Richard M. Nixon
(1960)
Alf M. Landon
(1936)
Senate Leadership
Everett M. Dirksen
George Murphy, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Senatorial Committee
Thomas H. Kuchel
Milton R. Young, Secretary
Minority Whip
Republican Conference
Bourke B. Hickenlooper
Hugh Scott, Vice Chairman
Chairman, Republican Policy Committee
National Republican Senatorial Committee
Margaret Chase Smith
Chairman, Republican Conference
House Leadership
Gerald R. Ford
Bob Wilson, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Congressional Committee
Leslie C. Arends
Charles E. Goodell, Chairman
Minority Whip
Planning and Research Committee
Melvin R. Laird, Chairman
Richard H. Poff, Secretary
Republican Conference
Republican Conference
John J. Rhodes, Chairman
William C. Cramer, Vice Chairman
Republican Policy Committee
Republican Conference
H. Allen Smith, Ranking Member
of Rules Committee
Representatives of the Republican Governors Association
John A. Love, Governor of Colorado
Raymond P. Shafer, Governor of Pennsylvania
John A. Volpe, Governor of Massachusetts
John H. Chafee, Governor of Rhode Island
George Romney, Governor of Michigan
Nils A. Boe, Governor of South Dakota
Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of
Daniel J. Evans, Governor of Washington
New York
Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
Donald R. Ross, Vice Chairman
Mrs. C. Wayland Brooks, Assistant Chairman
Mrs. J. Willard Marriott, Vice Chairman
Mrs. Collis P. Moore, Vice Chairman
J. Drake Edens, Jr., Vice Chairman
President of the Republican State Legislators Association
F. F. (Monte) Montgomery
Robert L. L. McCormick, Staff Coordinator
Members of the Republican Coordinating Committee's Task Force
on National Security
Neil H. McElroy, Co-Chairman
Secretary of Defense 1957-1959
Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Co-Chairman
Secretary of Defense, 1959-1961
Wilfred J. McNeil, Vice Chairman
Assistant Secretary of Defense and Comptroller, 1949-1959
E. Ferkins McGuire, Vice Chairman
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics, 1956-1961
Dewey F. Bartlett
Governor of the State of Oklahoma
William H. Bates
Member of Congress from Massachusetts
Arleigh A. Burke
Chief of U. S. Naval Operations, 1955-1961
George H. Decker
Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1960-1962
James H. Douglas, Jr.
Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1959-1961
Harry D. Felt
Commander in Chief in Pacific, 1958-1964
T. Keith Glennan
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1958-1961
Alfred M. Gruenther
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, 1953-1956
Craig Hosmer
Member of Congress from California
William E. Minshall
Member of Congress from Ohio
James B. Pearson
United States Senator from Kansas
Arthur W. Radford
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1953-1957
Bernard A. Schriever
Commander, Air Force Systems Command, 1961-1966
Mansfield D. Sprague
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1957-1958
Nathan W. Twining
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1957-1960
John G. Tower
United States Senator from Texas
Ex-Officio Members:
Robert C. Hill
United States Ambassador to Mexico, 1957-1961
Maurice H. Stans
Director of the Bureau of the Budget, 1958-1961
Anthony J. Jurich
Secretary to the Task Force
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: OUR NEGLECTED WEAPON
"It is customary in democratic countries to
deplore expenditures on armaments as conflicting
with the requirements of the social services.
There is a tendency to forget that the most important
social service that a government can do for its people
is to keep them alive and free."
Air Chief Marshal
SIR JOHN SLESSOR
INTRODUCTION
Peace with freedom is our nation's goal. Strength and determination are
the keys but technological superiority is indispensable to our continued strength.
Only through technological superiority can our nation excel in discover-
ing and developing advanced weapon systems. With the will to maintain military
superiority, our nation can expect to deter war or defeat an aggressor should
deterrence fail.
By 1961 the United States had stayed at peace for eight years through
weapon superiority and skillful use of diplomacy and military power.
The weapon superiority was achieved through aggressive scientific and techno-
logical research and development.
Present defense policies are depriving America of this critical superiority.
There is wishful thinking about our present and future security.
Fearful lest new developments might provoke undesirable Soviet reactions, the
Administration has failed to exploit boldly new concepts in science and technology.
There has been a euphoric hope that the world's pace of military science and
technology can somehow be slowed -- that man's inquisitiveness and ingenuity can
be diverted or curbed. As a result our country's research and development has
not been aggressively pursued and the consequence has been a slowdown in new weapons
development. Decisions so premised seriously endanger the nation.
-2-
A major technological breakthrough can decisively tilt the balance of
power. Lead time -- the time required to advance a new weapons system from
concept to production and use is now five to 10 to as much as 15 years. Because
of this long lead time -- because, also, each scientific breakthrough feeds and
spurs other discoveries -- the nation that falls behind the weapons system cycle
will likely have neither the time nor the capability to catch up.
The outcome of a future major war will probably be determined in scientific
research laboratories and factories long before hostilities start. Never again
can any major nation reasonably expect to prepare and catch up after war has
begun. The technological war is being actively waged today and tomorrow and
the day after tomorrow. On its outcome will hinge the survival of our nation
2/
and the free world.
RECOMMENDED UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES
The United States Government should proclaim America's military scientific
and technological objectives firmly and clearly. At the minimum, these objectives
should include:
*
Retention of a dominant deterrent posture.
*
An aggressive research and development effort
to ensure technological superiority.
* Technological leadership in weapons systems for
both general and limited war.
To achieve these objectives, the United States must pursue preeminence
in all scientific disciplines. This nation cannot content itself with
stalemate or parity.
-3-
PRESENT POLICIES
During the past few years our national security policies and programs
have fallen critically short of these objectives. There has been a lack
of effort to achieve and maintain technological superiority. There has been a
failure to acquire and deploy new systems on a timely basis. We imperatively
require new weapons -- weapons which will maintain for America in the 1970's
the military superiority we have enjoyed in the 1960's as a result of vigorous
research, development and procurement in the 1950's.
Neither Congress nor the public were consulted about, or informed of, the
portentous shift made in recent years of the direction of our research and defense
policies. Until the 1960's we sought clear-cut American superiority. In
contrast current policies appear to accept, if not to seek, parity with the
USSR.
The Administration's approach has been passive -- a sterile, inadequate
3/
"reaction. New developments have received emphasis only when justified as
responses to visible new threats. Yet, new enemy threats can be secretly in devel-
opment for five or six years before they are detected. In any area, therefore,
we can fall years behind if our advances in the same area are contingent on
the known progress of other nations.
For seven years the Administration has concentrated on reducing the risk
and expense in new weapons procurement. It has required the military services
to show that all necessary technology is "in hand" as a prerequisite for
4/
approving new programs. The goal of budget saving has been laudable, but the
net effect produces second-best, obsolescent systems compared to those of
countries willing to press technology forward throughout the development cycle.
If all technology must be in hand six months to a year before contract, and
* See Appendix I
** See Appendix II
-4-
five or more years must elapse between contract and delivery, subsequent
technological advances can be incorporated in the final systems only as retrofits.
Systems so developed are likely to be obsolescent before they reach the field.
However, even with "technology in hand" there have been proposed new systems that
have been denied.
The Administration further demands excessive assurance of a clear-cut
5/
military requirement before proceeding with the research and development of a
new weapons system.
In years past, intelligence estimates permitted responsible planning
three to five years ahead, by identifying new threats, then establishing
requirements for countering systems in time to cope with the conditions.
Today the operating commanders cannot forecast requirements with assurance
because the intelligence visibility cannot project far enough. They are,
therefore, unable to establish the concrete requirements demanded by current
policy. The policy is directly at odds with the realities of modern science
and technology.
Implicit in today's policy and procedural impediments are conceptual
barriers to the pursuit of aggressive research and development.
People powerfully situated in this Administration have believed that for
the foreseeable future the United States and the Soviet Union will be at a
standoff in advanced military technology and little can be done to alter this
balance. The political derivative of this concept has been that the standoff
or stalemate enhances world stability and improves the prospect for peace. The
military derivative has been that, under an umbrella of technological standoff,
future conflicts will be confined to low orders of intensity.
-5-
6/
It is claimed by some that we have reached a technological "plateau.
The contention is that further improvements can contribute only marginally
to our military strength and are likely to disturb the international equilib-
rium, increase tensions, and thereby increase the likelihood of war.
There is increasing concern in the scientific, industrial and military
communities that these policies and concepts will cause us to fall critically
behind.
In February this year the Director of Research and Engineering for the
Department of Defense testified that since 1964 the over-all research and techno-
logical effort has decreased by a "critical" 30 percent. He concluded,
"I have become convinced that the net effect of continuing this trend will be
/
a serious weakening of our long term national security position. "
The trend has been made even more disturbing by
-- unwise application of cost effectiveness*
/
-- misuse of the "building block" approach to research and development
-- current budgetary practices**
-- administrative impediments flowing from overcentralization and
10/
over-regulation in the Department of Defense
11/
-- the stifling of creativity
12/
-- faulty application of arms control concepts, and
-- a lack of leadership and purpose necessary to create a climate
of understanding and participation by the academic community.
THE SHIFTING BALANCE
So restrained and inhibited, the United States has been gradually losing its
technological and military preeminence. Meanwhile, the Soviets have unrelentingly
*
See Appendix III.
**
See Appendix IV.
-6-
pursued superiority. ***
The Administration acknowledges that the Soviets are increasing both
the quantity and quality of their ICBM and submarine forces. For the first
time the Soviets are deploying large naval forces in the Mediterranean. They
have already built and deployed an ABM system. They admit to developing
and testing an Orbital Bombardment System. They are known to be building at
least three new fighter aircraft systems, a supersonic transport, and a
VSTOL system (Vertical Short Takeoff and Landing Aircraft). Their tactical
forces are being equipped with new IRBM's (SCAMP), and their surface fleet
has a new class of surface-to-surface missiles. Their submarine missile
forces are being augmented and modernized with new boats and second generation
missiles. There is every reason to believe that they are still building and
stockpiling very high yield nuclear weapons, 20 to 50 megatons or more, while
testing underground new families of small and. lower yield tactical and naval
nuclear weapons.
In another arena of potential conflict the Soviets are also making great
strides. Their nuclear submarine fleet is overtaking ours in quality and
quantity. While our own development and construction of advanced nuclear sub-
marines have been impeded by top level vacillation, Russia's newest vessels are running
deeper, faster and quieter than previously, according to recent testimony given
to the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee by Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover and Rear
Admiral Eugene B. Fluckey. In another naval development the Soviets are con-
structing aircraft carriers for helicopters and short-take-off aircraft
designed to assist their expanding sphere of influence.
In research and development we must assume the Soviets are working on
multiple warheads (MIRV). This is a serious threat, since their ICBM boosters
*** See Appendix V.
-7-
can carry much greater payloads than ours, thus out-matching the Administra-
1
tion MIRV programs in quantity or yield or both. They are already recognized
2
leaders in cybernetics, and seek to surpass the United States in other
3
technologies such as laser, hypersonic propulsion, biological research, and
4
all aspects of space research. Test facilities are a key to progress; the
5
Soviet wind tunnels, accelerator and test chambers at their science city of
6
Novosibirsk far exceed the capabilities of those we have built in recent years.
7
Against this obvious Soviet reach for technological and military supremacy,
8
what has been the U. S. record these past seven years?
9
Over-all, it is an appalling record. During all this period there has
10
been not one new start on advanced strategic or nuclear weapon systems.
11
Every ICBM and every strategic bomber in America's arsenal today was a legacy
12
from the Eisenhower Administration of the 1950's.
13
Even in military space systems the major emphasis has consistently been
14
on passive satellites until the recent approval of the Manned Orbital Labora-
15
tory program -- a program delayed for years. Advanced programs under development
16
by the Eisenhower Administration -- Dynasoar and SPAD -- were cancelled.
17
In the tactical area, the aircraft carrying the burden in Vietnam -- the
18
F-4, F-105, and the A-6 -- were all initiated in the 1950's. The primary
19
missiles used by these aircraft, such as Sidewinder, Bullpup and Shrike,
20
are all Eisenhower Administration developments.
21
The effort to transform the TFX (F-111) into an all-purpose, all-service
22
aircraft has created serious problems. Against military advice, the F-111 was
23
selected as a superior, yet economical, weapons system based upon a misguided
24
and overstated emphasis on commonality. The aircraft were to cost approximately
25
$2.4 million each. Now they are priced at more than $6 million each. How
26
-8-
ironic that an Administration which has advocated primary reliance on conventional
limited warfare and extolled "cost effectiveness" has fixed upon the TFX for
this role -- a plane designed primarily as a nuclear delivery system and cost-
effective only as such! In view of the recent decision that the F-111B, the
Navy version, is unacceptable and a substitute aircraft has been initiated, the
final cost of the program will increase enormously coupled with years of delay.
The program has resulted in the Air Force having a new aircraft that does not
meet the original requirements nor even the down-graded performance agreed to
when they were forced into the commonality decision. The F-111B Navy version has
been found unacceptable and the FB-111 Bomber version does not meet Air Force
requirements for an advanced bomber in the 1970 time frame.
Still less comprehensible is the Administration's decision to rely on the
F-106 of the early fifties' technological vintage for our air defense forces.
For more than five years we have had far superior Mach 3 fighters such as the
F-12 flying on test. The F-106 is slower than the French Concorde, a transport.
It is at least one generation behind the F-12 engine, materials, and performance
figures. The fact that for at least three years we could have built F-12
fighters superior to any aircraft in the Soviet inventory, and to date have
deliberately passed the opportunity by, further suggests that the Administration
is less than zealous in keeping the United States ahead.
In the development of smaller tactical weapons the Administration has also
been content to drift. Forced at last to act by the war in Vietnam, it began
a crash program with the high costs, inefficiencies and waste that always attend
such programs. Dr. Eugene G. Fubini, Deputy Director of Defense Research and
Engineering from 1963-1965, said that because the many weapons requirements for
-9-
the Vietnam war had not been anticipated, the United States was forced to wage
the war not as it ought to be fought, but according to the weapons available.
After citing a number of new weapons requirements for fighting the limited type
of war, he said, "I hope these requirements are properly documented today, but
13/
I am not sure. "
Shortly after escalation of the conflict in Vietnam, the Department of
Defense submitted to Congress the first of a number of emergency supplemental
requests, including $152 million for research and development. These additional
funds provided for such items as jungle communications equipment, emergency
airfield equipment and jungle boots, all obviously necessary for military
action in a tropical environment. Some work in such areas had been in progress,
but at a far more leisurely pace than dictated by a realistic appraisal of the
threat and need. This dilatory approach typifies the Administration's "crisis-
14/
reaction" approach to preparedness.
This capsulated review illustrates that our nation's efforts in military
science technology and new weapon procurement have been critically deficient
for seven years. In the strategic area alone we should have new advanced
systems in being today. If we did, our deterrent posture and hence the cause
of world peace would be strengthened.
Improvement of existing weapon systems are often cited by the Administra-
tion as proof of its zeal for technological superiority. However, the
improvements have often been parts of original systems concepts and carried
out in the normal development cycle.
Where are the new developments dictated by objective assessment of the
threat and the pace of technology? What will be our security posture five
to ten years from now? What is this Administration's legacy to our nation?
-10-
SOVIET POLICY
The objectives of the Soviet scientific and technological effort have been
openly stated by their leaders and are apparent in their achievements. In
1962, the Soviet Minister of Defense, the late Marshal Rodion Malinovsky,
stated that the USSR had to accelerate its efforts to exploit the strategic
potentials of modern science and technology. He said, "We do not intend to
follow behind in development or be inferior to our public enemies in any way
in the competition for quality or armament in the future
(our)
superiority will evermore increase."
Since the late 1950's, Soviet budgetary allocations for research and
development have been rising sharply.* They are expected to continue to
rise.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In order for the United States to maintain technological superiority to
serve both military and economic ends, the following steps are urgently needed:
*
A firm policy of assuring military superiority for the United States
must be adopted and implemented.
*
Establishment of priorities for weapons systems development must be
derived from an objective assessment of the threat, on the one hand, and the
pace of technology, on the other, then aggressively pursued with adequate
funding.
*
Redefinition of authority at a lower level, restoring responsibility and
initiative to responsible commands of the military departments.
*
Reintroduction of healthy, but controlled, inter-service competition to
include actual weapons development in addition to paper studies.
*
Revision of organization and procedures to help encourage initiative and
foster creativity in research and development.
* See Appendix V.
-11-
* An adequate technical facility base, both government and private, must
be reestablished and maintained.
* An increased level of joint research and development effort with our
allies should be encouraged.
CONCLUSIONS
This nation's research and development effort has not been progressing
at a pace equal to either the accelerating spiral of science and technology
or the expanding threat. The Soviets in particular have exhibited an
aggressive research and development effort to win the technological race.
We must also realize that any other nation may achieve a technological
surprise. A new event can happen in any scientific discipline; innovations
are not restricted to scientists associated only with the military or with
any particular nation.
In our view, technological superiority is demanded by both military
requirements and economic necessity. Since the means to achieve superiority
will have been determined years before, and we have already forfeited years,
decisions must be made with great urgency to reorient our research and develop-
ment programs. Advances in technology must be exploited in weapons development
with imagination, determination and zeal. At stake is the peace and security
of the United States and the Free World.
-12-
APPENDIX I (part 1)
NEW GUIDED MISSILE "STARTS" AND MISSILE TYPES IN PRODUCTION
POST-KOREAN PERIOD
GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEARS
1954-1957
1958-1961
1962-1965
1966-1968
New
In
New
In
New
In
New
In
Starts
Prod.
Starts
Prod.
Starts
Prod.
Starts
Prod.
ICBM
3
0
1
3
0
4
0
2
Air-To-Air
0
3
0
3
1
3
0
2
Air-To-Surface
3
0
3
3
1
6
2
5
Surface-To-Air
1
2
2
7
1
8
1
5
Surface-To-Surface
4
7
2
9
3
13
1
4
ASW
1
0
1
1
0
2
0
2
Totals
12
12
9
26
6
36
4
20
NOTE: Does not include cancelled programs or research programs,
or program definition efforts.
Multiple-use weapons are considered one program.
-13-
APPENDIX I (part 2)
NEW AIRCRAFT "STARTS AND AIRCRAFT TYPES IN PRODUCTION
POST-KOREAN PERIOD
GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEARS
1954-1957
1958-1961
1962-1965
1966-1968
TYPE
New
In
New
In
New
In
New
In
Starts
Prod.
Starts
Prod.
Starts
Prod.
Starts
Prod.
Bomber
0
5
0
4
0
0
0
1
Attack
2
2
0
4
1
6
0
2
Fighter
2
12
1
13
1
4
0
3
Cargo/Transport
3
6
3
7
1
8
0
6
ASW/Surveillance
2
4
2
7
0
4
0
3
Trainer
3
5
0
5
0
5
0
5
Utility
5
6
3
12
0
17
2
12
Totals
17
40
9
52
3
44
2
32
NOTE: Does not include cancelled or research programs, or program
definition efforts.
Multiple-use airframes are considered one program.
-14-
APPENDIX II
INTELLIGENCE VISIBILITY
A fundamental of the decision-making process for research and develop-
ment is the intelligence input.
The intelligence visibility chart (Chart 1), portraying the development
cycle of a weapons system over the average span of 10-15 years, reveals that
we ordinarily receive fairly good intelligence in the early basic research
period. However, once a practical military application or potential is
identified, this visibility usually disappears for the next five to six years.
The new weapons systems then suddenly appear in a Soviet May Day parade or
during testing, having by that point completed the basic development cycle.
Thus, our present policies, which require "hard" evidence before we undertake
an aggressive development program of our own, tend to keep us six or more
years behind.
This delay is induced also by the Administration's inclination to give
greater weight to optimistic assessments of Soviet intentions than to hard-
headed measurements of capabilities. For example, the Administration persuaded
itself that the Soviets would probably not deploy an orbital bombardment vehicle
or an anti-ballistic missile system. Part of the problem is "mirror thinking."
Our leaders having decided against utilizing these systems, they assumed the
Soviets would reason similarly. It was a gross mistake.
In a period when science and technology are making significant strides
and the evidence is that the Soviets are aggressively advancing the state
of the art, this nation must weigh heavily the Soviet capabilities. An
example is the Soviet achievement of "fractional" orbital capability. Knowing
also that they have adequate control and thrust, we must assume that they now
have or soon will have a complete orbital capability, international treaties
notwithstanding. We must not wait until we suddenly discover that such a
vehicle is being tested. This precautionary approach must be applied across
the whole weapons spectrum.
NATIONAL STRATEGY & RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT POLICY
TECHNOLOGICAL WAR CONCERN
HOT AND COLD WAR CONCERN
HIGH
1to3
CHART 1
INTELLIGENCE
VISIBILITY
-15-
YRS
1. New Test
Mil
Scientific
Fac Observ
Intelligence
Papers &
CIA
2. Parades
Meetings
& Shows
LOW
SALES AND
RESEARCH
EXPLORATORY
DECISION
PROPECTION
TEST AND
REDUCTION
10 TO 15 YEARS
No "User" Req. or Clear Mil
Maximum "User"
Application
Threat Visibility
-16-
APPENDIX III
COST-EFFECTIVENESS APPLICATIONS
The use of cost-effectiveness in evaluating military programs is not
new. This management tool has been used for many years. In recent years,
however, the tool has become, not the servant, but the master of management.
This result may not have been intended but has developed in the Department
of Defense as costs analysts have become dominant in the decision-making
process. Not infrequently conclusions so reached discard valid military
judgment.
Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover (Ret.), a frequent critic of the way
"cost-effectiveness" criteria have been applied, asserted that if "cost-
effectiveness" had ruled in 1948, the U. S. would not then have built its
first atomic submarine. He stated also that in calculating the relative worth
of a weapon or type of defense cost-effectiveness studies make no allowance
for the value of human life.
In testimony before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee in
1966, Admiral Rickover revealed a most important flaw in this process, stating
that, "In some cases decisions appear to have been made ahead of time and
subsequently justified." The Congressional committees concerned with defense
have found it extremely difficult and often impossible to obtain the actual
cost-effectiveness studies upon which critical decisions have been based.
The currently used cost-effectiveness procedure impairs new weapons develop-
ments in two ways. It makes the gaining of Defense Department approval for the
development and production of new weapons an extremely involved process,
intruding another time-consuming procedure in an already excessively compli-
cated decision-making process.
Second, cost-effectiveness studies demand elaborate costing data.
Technology must be in hand in order for precise costing information to be
-17-
APPENDIX III (continued)
obtained. A research program pushing the state of the art has too many
unknowns to be costed precisely. Further, a proposed improvement in a
system growing out of a technological advance requires another round of cost-
effectiveness analysis on that system.
Cost-effectiveness studies as currently developed give maximum priority
to quantifiable data and tend to subordinate subjective factors, even human
life.
These studies appear modern, scientific and objective. Applied properly,
they can be. But they are misused when their conclusions are permitted to
dominate essentially military decisions or justify predetermined views.
Prejudgment validation seems to have occurred when the Department of
Defense was attempting to justify its TFX position before the National Security
and International Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations
Committee. Alain Enthoven, Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis, was
asked by the Chairman, Senator Jackson, if a cost-effectiveness study had
been made on the TFX. He replied no, that at the time the cost-effectiveness
technique had not been fully developed. Yet in subsequent discussions he
justified the cancellation of the Skybolt program on the basis of cost-
effectiveness studies developed in the same period the TFX decision was made.
Thousands of studies costing millions of dollars have been undertaken
the past few years. These repeated studies were described by Admiral Rickover
as "fog bombs," serving only to conceal the issues under a blanket of fog.
Atomic Energy Commissioner Ramey expressed the problem in these terms:
"I would conclude that the abuse of the cost-effectiveness techniques can be
just as lethal to a new development project as the unscrupulous use of the
requirements system."
-18-
APPENDIX III (continued)
The combination of the "requirements" and "cost-effectiveness" criteria
have been the major reasons given for not aggressively pursuing such programs
as an advanced bomber, the advance manned interceptor, and military applications
in space.
-19-
APPENDIX IV
BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS
Fiscal responsibility is a requisite in the Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) budget, as in any other budget. Fiscal
responsibility, however, does not mean instituting excessive controls
and red tape. It does mean having an orderly and effective procedure which
enables timely and complete information to be presented for approval. It
means effective controls, but in R&D where developments cannot be precisely
predicted flexibility is required to prevent the stifling of innovation.
The major requirement in research and development is disciplined,
imaginative intelligence. Funds must be provided to support the intelligence,
but the quantity of dollars is not an absolute index of effective research
effort.
Since funds are never unlimited, priorities must be established. Once
they are established, sufficient funding must be applied to produce the
weapons system in the time frame dictated by the pace of technology and the
assessment of the threat.
The Administration contends that in their years of managing defense
research and development programs they have increased the funding by over
300 percent. In gross numbers by current definitions, perhaps this is
correct, but at least two other factors have an important bearing on the
validity of this contention. First, in 1963, the accounting system was
changed. Many items originally considered production funds are now in R&D.
Items such as prototypes that formerly were paid from the production account
are not in the RDT&E account.
Second, inflation and higher wages have imposed cost increases of well
over five percent each year.
An evaluation of these items, coupled with the ever greater cost of more
sophisticated weapons systems, suggests that rather than a 300 percent increase
there has been no increase or even a reduction in the total effective R&D total.
-20-
APPENDIX IV (continued)
Secretary McNamara's Defense Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1969
admitted that basic research funding has declined: "During FY 1965-68,
after adjusting for inflation, research funding declined."
The Statement further described this category as the source for the
development of major systems and added, " the effectiveness of the weapons
systems we will have a decade hence and our technological strength
generally, will depend critically on how well we conduct these two categories
of R&D over the next few years. "
Viewing this problem in perspective requires an evaluation of the past
seven years. There is evidence in this paper of serious, if not critical,
difficulties.
Since most research and development programs are not broadly understood
or appreciated, their funding in times of fiscal stringency is deferrable
without immediate adverse reaction. The complexity of research and develop-
ment programs makes it difficult for those not intimately familiar with
defense R&D requirements to assess their importance. For fiscal and
political reasons, therefore, R&D frequently is subjected to fiscal manipu-
lations, the full impact of which is not felt for five or six years.
For example, in the Fiscal Year 1968 budget, the Administration has asked
the Department of Defense to cut back in an attempt to prevent the need
for a supplemental request during an election year. The cutback figures
reported are in excess of 6 billion dollars. Part of this cutback applies to
research and development funds. The technique is not to discontinue the whole
program, but to reduce the funding level and thereby impose delays.
Whether or not the total Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
budget should be increased or decreased is not easily determined. On the
one hand, the fiscal juggling, increases in non-productive studies and excessive
-21-
APPENDIX IV (continued)
red tape would suggest that the budget can be cut. On the other hand,
necessary programs have been delayed, others have not started, the Soviets
continue their aggressive effort and the pace of science and technology is
continuing to spiral, all suggesting a budget increase. These and other
factors urgently need analysis in depth and an objective answer developed
for the sake of our national security.
-22-
APPENDIX V
THE SHIFTING BALANCE
United States military superiority today is largely an Eisenhower legacy.
In the all-important strategic area, for example, the post-Eisenhower Adminis-
trations inherited both the MINUTEMAN and the POLARIS systems. Our strategic
bombers, the B-52's and the B-58's, were developed prior to the 1960's.
In the strategic aircraft field, there has been no new development of a
bomber as a bomber. The modification of the F-111 does not significantly advance
the state of the art nor can it adequately perform the mission required of a
new strategic bomber in the coming decade.
In the past seven years, this Administration has not developed or produced a
prototype of any new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) system. There
has been significant development effort on multiple individually guided warheads
(MIRV). This program must be given a high priority so that we will have
proven production units as rapidly as possible.
The Air Force WS-120A, the advanced ICBM weapons systems program, repeatedly
delayed, was scheduled to go into contract definition phase in fiscal 1968. It will
not go into that phase until after Fiscal Year 1969, if at all.
In the tactical area, the aircraft carrying the burden in Vietnam -- the
F-4, F-105, and the A-6 -- all were initiated in the 1950's. The primary missiles
being used by these aircraft, such as Sidewinder, Bullpup and Shrike, are all
Eisenhower developments.
In the attack aircraft category, the Administration has introduced the
A-7 (VAL) aircraft which is actually an improved F-8 of 1953 vintage, which
in no way materially advances the state of the art.
The most advanced aircraft we have today is the F-12 or SR-71 whose
genesis was the secret A-11 started in 1958 under security wraps. Although we
have in this aircraft a proven and necessary system, only a few reconnaissance
-23-
APPENDIX V (continued)
versions have been purchased, notwithstanding repeated Service demands
expressing the advantage of an air defense version. This Administration has
not even provided funds to keep open a production line so that additional
aircraft can be readily procured when required at reasonable costs.
In the cargo-transport area, there has been one addition since 1961 -- the
C-5A. In accordance with existing policy, the C-5A, although a new development,
is based upon current technology. It is primarily an increase in size.
The increase in Soviet submarine activity and capability makes our anti-
submarine warfare ability increasingly important. The major aircraft role is
being handled by the P-3, started in 1958. In the anti-submarine warfare
missile category, ASROC and SUBROC were started in 1956 and 1958 respectively.
As of this time, no advanced anti-submarine warfare aircraft has been
developed.
There has been one new development start on an air-to-air missile, the
PHOENIX (SCRAM); two in the surface-to-air, SPRINT and SPARTAN; and two in the
tactical surface-to-surface category, LANCE and TOW.
In the crucial area of military use of space, positive direction and
aggressive effort are lacking. Our efforts have been largely defensive,
rather than a balanced mix of offense and defense. During a Congressional
hearing in 1966, Lieutenant General Ferguson, Chief of Air Force research and
development, was asked how well we are doing in outpacing Soviet technology
in the field of space. He answered, I am frankly concerned at the outlook
"
Various Congressional committees have expressed the same concern. The House
Committee on Government Operations in a 1966 report stated: "The Committee
believes that in the interest of national security the potential manned military
uses of space deserve immediate increased attention.
* Report "Government Operations in Space."
-24-
The Army has been struggling for approval of the development of an
armed helicopter since the early 1960's and finally was given approval
in the Fiscal Year 1966 budget. Even here it should be noted that the
program was not in the original FY 1966 budget request, although by that
time the war in Vietnam had clearly established the need.
In discussing the effects of current policies on Army R&D projects,
General Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, told the Senate Armed
Services Committee in discussing the Fiscal Year 1969 defense budget:
"Repeated stretch-outs of equipment
development projects not only lead to
increases in total costs, but also invite
the risk of fielding new -- but already
obsolescent -- equipment when it finally
is accepted as standard issue. This
provides only marginal improvement of
the replaced equipment, which in the
interim has had to be modified -- at
added cost -- in order to maintain its
usefulness in coping with an everchanging
threat. "
***
"The Soviet government is not limiting itself to
those military means which the adversary has. Undoubtedly,
this would be insufficient. The creation of new methods
of combat which the imperialistic aggressor still does not
possess is a task of Soviet science and technology."
WAR AND POLITICS
USSR Ministry of Defense, 1962
-25-
APPENDIX V (continued)
In 1962, during a closed-door Senate hearing on the FY-66 defense budget,
the Secretary of Defense was asked, "Is it just a matter of time before the
Russians catch up with the U.S. in strategic nuclear forces?" The Secretary
responded, "There is no indication that they are catching up or planning to
catch up -- I am simply saying that there is no indication they are in a race
at this time."
As a result of sustained efforts, the Soviet leaders have made tremendous
strides in their nation's scientific and technological posture and have trans-
lated these gains into the whole spectrum of military hardware. The major
emphasis has been to concentrate on what is called the high payoff area; that
is, nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems for those weapons.
A major acceleration by the Soviets has taken place since the extensive
1961-62 nuclear test series.
Since the 58 megaton test in 1961, they have claimed to possess a 100
megaton weapon. The claim has feasibility. In November 1964, a second genera-
tion ICBM, THE SS-7 or SASIN, was first displayed in a Moscow parade. In the
early 1960's, the second generation ICBM missile SS-8 was deployed. In the
1965 May Day Parade, the Soviets displayed a smaller ICBM -- the SAVAGE which
appears to be similar to the MINUTEMAN. The SCRAG was again shown in November
1965 and the Soviets now claim it is a missile with an orbital bombardment
capability. Also, in 1965, the Soviets first paraded a large mobile missile,
the SCROOGE enclosed in a pod on a carrier. Statements and evidence suggest
that they are developing mobile missiles and launchers for both their ICBM
and IRBM.
Observers at the November 1967 Parade reported a new ICBM, a new generation
I/MRBM, and a new POLARIS-type missile.
-26-
APPENDIX V (continued)
Extensive work is known to be going on in aerospace propulsion and related
items. At least three new air-to-air missiles have been seen since 1962,
each deployed with a different new fighter. The three new missiles have been
code named ALKALI, ASH and AWL. The three new fighters bear the western code
name FISHPOT C (a limited all-weather fighter), FIDDLER (a long-range inter-
ceptor and reconnaissance aircraft) and FLIPPER (also known as Mig 23).
During the 1967 Domodedovo Air Show, three other new aircraft were
shown, including one with VSTOL capability, During this show, Chief Marshal
Vershinin and Marshal Krasovski, emphasized Soviet ability in air launched
strategic missiles. They also indicated intense interest in anti-submarine
warfare, saying that the Soviet naval aircraft, presumably the Beriev Be 8,
had been equipped with "an assortment of means to detect and destroy under-
water vessels."
It is almost certain that the Soviet equivalent of the U. S. Supersonic
Transport (SST) could readily become a bomber.
In naval developments, the Soviets displayed a new ballistic missile -- SARK --
in 1962, which was described as both a shipboard and a field weapon. Two years
later in the November Anniversary Parade, a second generation solid fueled iner-
tially guided Sub-Launched Ballistic missile (SLBM), the SERB, was displayed.
To develop a POLARIS defense the Soviets are diverting part of their bomber
fleet with improved sensing devices and offensive capability. They
also are developing anti-submarine warfare aircraft carriers and a growing
fleet of POLARIS-type nuclear missile submarines.
By the early 1960's, the Soviet service fleet was also being equipped with
new classes of short-range surface-to-surface missiles.
-27-
APPENDIX V (continued)
In the May Day Parade in 1965, the SCAMP, a mobile IRBM with solid propel-
lent, was first displayed.
Certainly the most dramatic Soviet development in recent years has
been the development and deployment of their ABM system. Although its precise
effectiveness and extensiveness is a matter of debate in our intelligence
community, work is continuing.
The recent tests of the Orbital Bombardment System have been said to be
fractional. Nevertheless, the Soviets have exhibited the capability for a
complete Orbital Bombardment System.
Also being reported is Soviet effort in multiple warheads, a dramatic and
serious new development. It is probable a program in this area would include
individually guided warheads.
Development of military transports ranging up to the giant Antonov An-22
are being pursued. Reports also indicate a wide variety of specifically designed
air transportable tanks, armored personnel carriers and self-propelled artillery
with increasing emphasis on the lower levels of weapons.
The Soviets are known to be doing an enormous amount of work in the area
of computers, information process and cybernetics. This capability itself will
provide tremendous assistance to all the other phases of military R&D.
Lasers seem to be an area of particular interest to the Soviets.
Clearly the Soviets are placing extensive effort in new weapons develop-
ments. There are many other examples. Those cited here show the broad spectrum
of activity and the level of effort. The Soviets have not slowed down. They
have not pushed their developments merely as a reaction to U. S. developments.
They clearly appear to be striving for scientific and technological superiority.
(See Charts 2 and 3.)
* Center for Strategic Studies estimate based on published Soviet budgets.
L9. 99. S9. v9. E9, 26 19. 09. 69, 89. LS. 99. SS. ts. ES. zs. IS. 1950
0
001 = 1950 "xeput
001
200
00E
-28-
CHART 2
000
Total
5000
009
Percent
AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS*
ESTIMATED SOVIET RESEARCH
US AND SOVIET EXPENDITURES ON MILITARY RDT&E
70
The maximum-minimum range
of USSR expenditures is based on
analysis by the Strategic Studies Center
60
Maximum
of Stanford Research Institute of pub-
lished Soviet data. US outlays were
CHART 3
BILLIONS OF 1964 DOLLARS
US
plotted from more explicit official
50
Minimum
statistics. (RDT&E related to the
-29-
Vietnam conflict is omitted from
the US curve.)
40
USSR
30
20
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
Air Force Magazine-January1968
-30-
APPENDIX VI
An important measure of science and technology is the level of qualified
manpower. Since about 1952, the Soviet Union has been graduating more
scientists and engineers per year than the United States. (See Chart 4.)
By 1965, the Soviet Union had developed a scientific and technical labor
pool of about 1,700,000 working on research, development test and evaluation.
Comparatively, the United States had 1,077,000. Inclusion of NATO would add
approximately 670,000.
In 1950, the Soviet Union graduated some 35,000 new engineers. Now, more than
150,000 new engineers are graduated each year. At this rate, the Soviets are
graduating about three engineers for every one graduated in the United States.
ENGINEER GRADUATES
US - USSR
ANNUAL
IN THE 1960s
In Thousands
200
150
CHART 4
USSR
-31-
100
50
US
0
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
SOURCES: Soviet estimates taken from "Scientific and Engineering Manpower
Resources of the U.S.S.R. and Its R&D Effort: 1961-1966," by Joseph P. Kozlowski,
to be published by Johns Hopkins University Press, summer of 1968. U.S. figures
taken from the U.S. Office of Education Report, Journal of Engineering Education,
September 1967, p. 44.
-32-
FOOTNOTES -- RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
1/ Although knowledge doubled only once between 1750 and 1900 and again
between 1900 and 1950, the scientific community estimates that it has doubled
again between 1950 and 1960 and will double again by 1970.
2/ This reality is clearly recognized by the Soviets. In an article in
Communist of The Armed Forces, Lt. Col. B. Bondarenko wrote in 1966:
"In the past it was possible to change the relationship
between forces during the course of a war. This was character-
istic even of the Second World War. Now, in connection with
the revolution which has occurred in military matters, the
significance of military technological superiority even in
peacetime has increased greatly. Under the influence of
nuclear weapons
the importance of an early period of a
war has increased and it has become increasingly more difficult
to change the relation between forces during the course of the
war. If
3/ The clearest public expression of this "reaction" policy was given by
Secretary of Defense McNamara on September 18, 1967, in San Francisco when
he was discussing the ABM problem. He stated that we were spending additional
money on offensive weapons systems programs to offset the Soviet ABM deploy-
ment. Then he went on to say:
"But we should bear in mind that it is money spent because of
the action-reaction phenomenon."
4/ Department of Defense Directive No. 3200.9, pp. 4-5. "It is intended that
the technology that is required to meet a system specification not exceed in quanti-
tative performance that which can be demonstrated either in developmental form or
in laboratory form. Projection into Engineering Development of anticipated devel-
opmental achievement will be permitted only when sufficient quantitative results
have been obtained, in laboratory or experimental devices, to allow such projection
with a high confidence. In general, these projections will assume the probability
of Engineering Developments matching but not exceeding laboratory results.'
-33-
FOOTNOTES - R&D (continued)
5/ As Mr. James T. Ramey, Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission, said,
the government must get rid of the "requirements merry-go-rounds." He pointed
out that every new project had to be justified on the basis of "military require-
ments" and that many promising developments particularly in space could never be
pushed or even demonstrated if development had to wait for the establishment of
requirements. As Dr. Edward C. Welch, Executive Secretary of the National
Aeronautics and Space Council, said, "If we had required a clear cut prior mis-
sion, we would probably have developed no airplanes, no space craft or, in fact,
no wheel."
6/ Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., Chairman of the Corporation of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, recently stated that we cannot "rest on our oars" thinking
that the race has been won. "We may be only at the beginning of unexampled scienti-
fic and engineering achievement," he said.
Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson told a Congressional committee on
April 27, 1966:
"It is clear that the Russians do not accept the notion that
military technology has reached a plateau and that the present mili-
tary balance is fixed for the future. They are gambling enormous
resources on the chance that they may score a decisive advance in
weapons systems."
In testimony before Congress on the Fiscal Year 1969 Defense budget,
the Director of Research and Engineering for the Department of Defense stated,
"There is no technological plateau now nor is one about to be created. We are
convinced that research and exploratory development efforts require increased
support during the next few years to insure many options -- a margin of safety --
against technological challenge."
-34-
FOOTNOTES - R&D (continued)
Dr. Harold Agnew, Weapons Division Leader at the Los Alamos Scientific
Laboratory recently stated:
"The apparent drift in national policy on the concept of
balance of power and stability is resulting in a stifling of
innovation. We find ourselves being authorized to build or to
consider only those systems which respond to a clearly defined
threat.
"As a result, we are continually reacting on the defensive.
The initiative no longer seems to be up to us. The initiative
always seems to be in the other fellow's camp.
"Since we react only to those systems or threats which have
been proven to exist, and it takes several years to react, we are
continually in danger of coming up with answers to threats which
have changed, if indeed come up with answers in a time frame
which is relevant at all."
The Director of Defense Research & Engineering for the Department of Defense
stated to the Senate Armed Services Committee during a discussion of the Fiscal
Year 1969 defense budget:
"A lesson reinforced over and over throughout history, especially in our
era, is that science and engineering continuously make possible completely
new military capabilities and threats. National security today is more
directly linked than ever before to the practice of first rank science and
engineering. We have a strong technical-military position today only because
we built a strong research and technology base in the past. We must maintain
this position
"Yet there are some indications that the program is eroding, that we must
act forcefully to reverse the recent funding trend. Some of this reduction
/from Fiscal 1964 to 1968/ has produced healthy belt tightening, a sorting out
of the good from the bad. And we have used these funds -- in a sense savings --
for other high priority projects. But, as I emphasized earlier, the net effect
of continuing this trend will be a serious weakening of our long-term national
security position.
"Moreover, these numbers do not tell the whole story. The cost of doing
research has steadily increased at a rate of at least 5% a year. If we adjust
by this rate, then our research and technology effort in Fiscal 1968 was about
70% that of the Fiscal 1964 level, a critical 30% reduction.
" During the past three years, in terms of dollars not discounted for
increased costs, our exploratory development funding to industry has decreased
by about 35%; to universities by 19%, and to in-house military laboratories
by 8%.
"Last summer, I asked a special panel of the Defense Science Board to
consider the adequacy of our research and technology base to meet future needs.
Their unequivocal answer was that the recent cuts were so deep that the Defense
Dept. may begin to run the risk of not meeting its genuine technological goals."
-35-
FOOTNOTES - R&D (continued)
9/ This Administration, applying its concept of the "building block" approach,
claims to be developing the "options" necessary to blunt any technological sur-
prise by an enemy. Such an approach, to be effective, must be adequatedly funded.
Money alone, however, is not enough; with today's increasingly sophisticated
systems, there is no high degree of assurance that a system will work until it is all
assembled as a working system. As "Kelly" Johnson, Vice President of Lockheed
Aircraft, one of the foremost aviation experts in the world today, has said,
the "building block" system "optimized the component" and does that "more on
paper than in fact" instead of optimizing the entire system.
If a system starts to be pulled together only after a visible threat
appears, generally in the prototype or test stage, there is no time to. complete
development, produce and deploy a system prior to the enemy's deployment.
10/ Progress in research and development has been considerably impeded by over-
centralization and over-regulation in the Department of Defense - a subject to
be covered thoroughly in another paper.
One of the most serious of these "road blocks" is the number of approval
levels a new program must go through. They have increased enormously -- some
16 levels can now comment. Nearly all can stop a program, but very few can
approve. Those responsible for research and development projects have reported
that at times it has taken up to three years to get final approval.
Also, reported by the noted defense writer, Hanson Baldwin, on February 16,
1965, "Before a final contract for a project is signed and actual development
starts, an average of at least 50 signatures or approvals is required -- sometimes
as many as 100 or 200. Some individuals, required by legal or administrative rea-
sons to sign twice, have had to be briefed twice; by the time the second signature
was needed, they had forgotten what the contract was about."
see man 6 inc. Office Capy
REPUBLICAN
REpublicAN NATiONAL COMMiTTEE
HAPIONAL COMMITTEE
1625 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
NATIONAL 8-6800
NEWS
FOR RELEASE
WEDNESDAY A.M.'s
May 29, 1968
REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE SAYS NATIONAL SECURITY
HAS BEEN WEAKENED BY OVER-CENTRALIZATION IN PENTAGON
The Republican Coordinating Committee warned today that the nation's security
has been weakened by an over-centralized civilian control of the defense estab-
lishment, and that "balance must be restored" in the management of defense to
reinforce the ability of the armed services to respond quickly to crises.
In a 20-page report entitled "Decisions in National Security: Patchwork
or Policy?", the GOP policy group pointed to the assumption by the Office of
Secretary of Defense since 1961 of an isolated and dominant control of defense
policies, with the result that the experts frequently have been overruled or
ignored.
The report, prepared by the Coordinating Committee's Task Force on National
Security, was released today by Republican National Chairman Ray C. Bliss.
Former Secretaries of Defense Neil H. McElroy and Thomas S. Gates, Jr., are
Co-Chairmen of the Task Force, which consists of civilian and military experts.
The Committee stressed in particular the need for a revival of the National
Security Council, as it existed in the Eisenhower Administration, as a policy-
making instrument, and deplored the abolition of the Council's planning and
operations coordinating boards and the introduction of informal and piecemeal
decisions by small official groups dealing with individual problems.
-MORE-
-2-
Recalling a warning in 1949 by Ferdinand Eberstadt, a leading student of
defense organization, that care would have to be taken to prevent the Office of
the Secretary of Defense from becoming a "separate empire" rather than a small
and efficient control unit, the Coordinating Committee said:
"Today the separate empire exists. Balance must be restored, to insure
our nation's security, and to reinforce our ability to respond quickly to
challenge.
"Equally important are policies and an organization structure that will at
all times conform to our representative form of government, with its system of
checks and balances
"The extreme over-centralization and over-management of our national
security structure on the one hand, and the extensive ad hoc policy deliberations
on the other, developed in the past seven years, have weakened our national
security position and created increased risks.
"It has brought into question this nation's ability to respond in a timely
and effective manner to crises which threaten America's vital interests."
The Republican policy-makers emphasized that "wise policies and efficient
organization and management" are as essential as resources, and said:
"Our review concludes that the effectiveness of our security structure has
declined, due to indecisive policies, faulty policy-making machinery, over-
centralization in the Department of Defense, over-management of our security
structure, over-reliance on cost accounting procedures and computer techniques,
and a downgrading of seasoned human judgment.
"We are concerned with the self-imposed isolation of top civilians in the
Pentagon who have too often dismissed or altered solid recommendations of the
service Secretaries or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and distorted the authority of
unified and field commanders."
-MORE-
-3-
The Coordinating Committee said the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "should
be reaffirmed, insuring their direct and active participation in the development
of policy, weapons system and force planning."
The Committee pointed out that civilian control of the national security
structure requires that authority rest in the President, and that the Secretary
of Defense and Secretary of State should be his two major advisers.
The GOP policy group said:
"In view of the threatening international environment, the collapse of time,
and our exceedingly complex governmental structure, adherence to a formal decision-
making process such as the National Security Council is a necessary prerequisite
for effectively providing for the nation's security.
"We must have a more articulate definition of our national interests and the
steps required to promote them. Upon such determinations a clear policy must
be set.
"A crucial point in the national security process is placing the most capable
people in key positions. Good national security policy requires good policy-makers
as well as good policy machinery.
"The policy decision-making process must be planned and organized, and must
make use of the talents of responsible individuals within the structure. Timely
and regular meetings must be held. A coordination function must be established
to insure prompt and effective implementation. Follow-through and analysis of the
effect of promulgated policies must be reinstituted, with reports from all involved
sectors.
"Detailed implementation of both planning and operations should be delegated
to lower echelons, which must have both the necessary authority and responsibility
to carry out assignments.
-MORE-
-4-
"There must be reaffirmation of the responsibility to better inform both
Congress and the electorate on issues affecting our national security, within
appropriate safeguards.
"Budgetary policy guidelines to the services must be clarified. There
should be greater emphasis on the reestablishment of the priority budget concept
utilizing to the extent practicable the 'mission' basis."
The Coordinating Committee recalled that in 1961 the incoming Democratic
regime inherited from the Eisenhower Administration the National Security Council,
with its Planning Board and Operations Coordinating Board, as policy-making
instruments.
The Committee added:
"Immediately, and without careful consideration of possibly fateful con-
sequences, both boards were abolished. The effectiveness of the National Security
Council was compromised
"Since then, the entire supporting structure has so changed, or even dis-
appeared, as to now produce little more than mechanical compliance with the law.
The procedures for integrating military, political and economic considerations
often have given way to informal and impromptu consultations with staff assistants
and other individuals or ad hoc groups. The results have been harmful to our
country.
"National security policies have become unclear and indecisive. Others
urgently needed have been left unmade. Reaction to crisis, not avoidance of
crisis, has been the inescapable result.
"Continuous review and planning has been substantially eliminated, in the
downgrading of formal policy planning. Thus, when an immediate crisis looms,
there is hope that crash handling will avoid a fundamental compromise of our
national security."
-MORE-
-5-
The Republican policy-makers recalled that the role of the Secretary of
Defense as the principal adviser to the President on national security matters
had been progressively strengthened by successive acts of Congress.
The Coordinating Committee continued:
"In 1961, however, centralization became not policy but dogma, and the
Secretary became 'first among equals' as adviser to the President.
"Ultimate responsibility for the defense establishment must be exercised
by the Secretary of Defense under Presidential direction and within the statutory
guidelines set by Congress
"Under civilian control and within civilian established guidelines, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the uniformed services must direct the planning and
management of all military forces. In force planning and operations, the military
leadership must be responsive through the Secretary of Defense to the President."
The Committee commented that the practice of lower-level civilians in the
Office of the Defense Secretary "superimposing themselves in originating and
developing analyses for the Secretary does injustice to the competence of the
military services. "
The Committee added:
"The most current and disturbing example of the reduced role of the military
in strategic and tactical decisions is Vietnam. A policy of gradualism largely
dictated by civilians has been imposed, which has prolonged the war, increased the
casualties and costs and divided the American people.
"Civilian control over the details of the air war has been particularly
questionable. Testimony before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee
last August disclosed that tactical decisions were frequently being made by
civilians in Washington.
"Military witnesses stated that many target recommendations approved by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff were being denied and others delayed, thus impairing
-MORE-
-6-
the war effort. The Subcommittee was also advised that operational decisions
were at times being made without the involvement of responsible military pro-
fessionals on the scene
"Civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense have assumed greater
control of contingency planning and military preparedness, and often have
abandoned or ignored contingency plans in favor of rapidly conceived ad hoc
decisions.
"Military operations, directed principally by civilians, have occurred,
and illustrate suppression of the proper command and military role in our
defense structure."
The GOP policy group said the Democratic Administration's "zeal for over-
centralization appears to stem from a desire to control policy, people and
events," and that this had resulted "in numerous instances of control of news,
public information and intelligence."
The Coordinating Committee said:
"An example is the TFX program. A policy memorandum was issued directing
that all news releases on the program would uphold the validity of the decisions
of the Secretary of Defense. Such is the internal power of an over-centralized,
publicly unresponsive structure.
"Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the Administration's
credibility has come under severe and sustained criticism."
The Committee said that the report of the Senate Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee in August, 1967, dealing with the Vietnam war, "reflects the lack of
candor between Defense Department civilians and the Congress."
The Coordinating Committee recalled that the bipartisan Subcommittee arrived
at such conclusions as the following:
"It was clearly implied by the Defense official that few, if any, important
military targets remained unstruck. The great weight of the military testimony
-MORE-
-7-
was to the contrary.
"The Defense official said that North Vietnam could sustain its required
import rate by way of land, rail and water from Red China. This position contrasts
sharply with the views of military experts.
"The Administration has asserted for years that the Defense Department cost
reduction program has been highly effective. A report by the House Armed Services
Committee and the General Accounting Office, on analysis of such claims, concluded
that not more than 50 per cent of the alleged savings were valid. Nor does this
figure take into account that Congressional budget cuts, if adhered to by the DOD
(Department of Defense), were considered 'cost savings'.
"From the management standpoint, over-centralization of authority inevitably
will produce increased costs and gross inefficiencies in an organization as large
as the Department of Defense.
"Decisions on routine matters are postponed, and major decisions must also
be delayed or too hastily reached.
"In many decisions, particularly those related to combat in Southeast Asia,
the time factor is such that when the decisions are finally made and communicated,
circumstances may have changed, opportunities lost, the decisions no longer
applicable."
The Republican policy-makers emphasized that, in the technological explosion
of the present era, there must be mutual understanding among civilian administrators,
soldiers and scientists.
The Coordinating Committee said:
"This new relationship has fared poorly in recent years, to the detriment of
our policies and policy-making machinery.
"We see the result in dealing with crucial international events, in years of
indecisiveness over Vietnam, in our failure to develop new advanced weapons
systems, and in the erosion of America's prestige throughout the world.
-MORE-
-8-
"History sternly warns that weakness invites aggression. The weakness
may be in armaments. But even with ample superior armaments, a nation can
invite aggression by a lack of will and determination. Such a condition is
often revealed by a hesitancy or inability to reach timely and forthright
decisions."
5/22/68
Approved by the
Republican Coordinating Committee
May 6, 1968
Presented by the Task Force on
National Security
DECISIONS IN NATIONAL SECURITY:
PATCHWORK OR POLICY?
Prepared under the direction of:
The Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
1625 Eye Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20006
REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
Presiding Officer: Ray C. Bliss, Chairman, Republican National Committee
Former President
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Former Presidential Nominees
Barry Goldwater
(1964)
Thomas E. Dewey
(1944 & 1948)
Richard M. Nixon
(1960)
Alf M. Landon
(1936)
Senate Leadership
Everett M. Dirksen
George Murphy, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Senatorial Committee
Thomas H. Kuchel
Milton R. Young, Secretary
Minority Whip
Republican Conference
Bourke B. Hickenlooper
Hugh Scott, Vice Chairman
Chairman, Republican Policy Committee
National Republican Senatorial Committee
Margaret Chase Smith
Chairman, Republican Conference
House Leadership
Gerald R. Ford
Bob Wilson, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Congressional Committee
Leslie C. Arends
Charles E. Goodell, Chairman
Minority Whip
Planning and Research Committee
Melvin R. Laird, Chairman
Richard H. Poff, Secretary
Republican Conference
Republican Conference
John J. Rhodes, Chairman
William C. Cramer, Vice Chairman
Republican Policy Committee
Republican Conference
H. Allen Smith, Ranking Member
of Rules Committee
Representatives of the Republican Governors Association
John A. Love, Governor of Colorado
Raymond P. Shafer, Governor of Pennsylvania
John A. Volpe, Governor of Massachusetts
John H. Chafee, Governor of Rhode Island
George Romney, Governor of Michigan
Nils A. Boe, Governor of South Dakota
Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of
Daniel J. Evans, Governor of Washington
New York
Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
Donald R. Ross, Vice Chairman
Mrs. C. Wayland Brooks, Assistant Chairman
Mrs. J. Willard Marriott, Vice Chairman
Mrs. Collis P. Moore, Vice Chairman
J. Drake Edens, Jr., Vice Chairman
President of the Republican State Legislators Association
F. F. (Monte) Montgomery
Robert L. L. McCormick, Staff Coordinator
Members of the Republican Coordinating Committee's Task Force
on National Security
Neil H. McElroy, Co-Chairman
Secretary of Defense 1957-1959
Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Co-Chairman
Secretary of Defense, 1959-1961
Wilfred J. McNeil, Vice Chairman
Assistant Secretary of Defense and Comptroller, 1949-1959
E. Perkins McGuire, Vice Chairman
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics, 1956-1961
Dewey F. Bartlett
Governor of the State of Oklahoma
William H. Bates
Member of Congress from Massachusetts
Arleigh A. Burke
Chief of U. S. Naval Operations, 1955-1961
George H. Decker
Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1960-1962
James H. Douglas, Jr.
Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1959-1961
Harry D. Felt
Commander in Chief in Pacific, 1958-1964
T. Keith Glennan
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1958-1961
Alfred M. Gruenther
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, 1953-1956
Craig Hosmer
Member of Congress from California
William E. Minshall
Member of Congress from Ohio
James B. Pearson
United States Senator from Kansas
Arthur W. Radford
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1953-1957
Bernard A. Schriever
Commander, Air Force Systems Command, 1961-1966
Mansfield D. Sprague
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1957-1958
Nathan W. Twining
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1957-1960
John G. Tower
United States Senator from Texas
Ex-Officio Members:
Robert C. Hill
United States Ambassador to Mexico, 1957-1961
Maurice H. Stans
Director of the Bureau of the Budget, 1958-1961
Anthony J. Jurich
Secretary to the Task Force
DECISIONS IN NATIONAL SECURITY:
PATCHWORK OR POLICY?
"Good national security policy requires
both good policymakers and good policy
machinery. One cannot be divided from
the other."
- U.S. Senate Subcommittee on National
Policy Machinery; Committee on
Government Operations, 1961
War and the threat of war continue to add an ominous dimension to our
search for peace. In an international environment where true peace continues
to elude us, we must maintain the highest priority on efforts to ensure our
nation's security.
Providing for our security absorbs more of our human and material resources
than any other single function of government. Fortunately, our nation is
endowed with these great resources. However, wise policies and efficient
organization and management are as essential as the resources themselves.
Our review concludes that the effectiveness of our security structure has
declined, due to indecisive policies -- faulty policy-making machinery -- over-
centralization in the Department of Defense -- over-management of our security
structure -- over-reliance on cost accounting procedures and computer techniques
-- and a downgrading of seasoned human judgment.
We are concerned with the self-imposed isolation of top civilians in the
Pentagon who have too often dismissed or altered solid recommendations of
the service Secretaries or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and distorted the
authority of unified and field commanders.
-2-
The technological explosion has forced new political - military relation-
ships. The civilian administrator must understand the soldier and the scientist.
The soldier must understand the civilian administrator and the scientist. This
new relationship has fared poorly in recent years, to the detriment of our pol-
icies and policy making machinery. We see the result in dealing with crucial
international events, in years of indecisiveness over Vietnam, in our failure
to develop new advanced weapons systems, and in the erosion of America's prestige
throughout the world.
History sternly warns that weakness invites aggression. The weakness may be
in armaments. But even with ample superior armaments, a nation can invite
aggression by a lack of will and determination. Such a condition is often re-
vealed by a hesitancy or inability to reach timely and forthright decisions.
Responsibility for National Security
Within policies and requirements specified by Congress, the President deter-
mines and directs our national security efforts. By constitutional provision
and historical precedent, he is responsible for the conduct of foreign relations.
He is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He directs all departments and
agencies in the Executive Branch.
National security policy formulation and implementation processes have
become interdepartmental. Not only the Department of Defense, but also State,
Treasury, Commerce, Interior and Agriculture, the Atomic Energy Commission, the
Export-Import Bank, the Development Loan Fund and a score of other agencies are
involved. Almost every major element of the Federal Government is involved to
some extent in national security policy.
National security planning and execution cut across agency and departmental
lines, and make the President's administrative task difficult and complex. The
-3-
effective management of this responsibility, however, remains critical for the
American people.
National Security Policy Making Machinery
In 1961, the National Security Council, its Planning Board and Operations
Coordinating Board, were inherited from the Eisenhower Administration, as org-
anized, functioning and prestigious policy-making instruments. Immediately, and
without careful consideration of possibly fateful consequences, both Boards were
abolished. The effectiveness of the National Security Council was compromised.
The National Security Council, * created by the National Security Act of
1947, is charged with advising the President:
"With respect to the integration of domestic, foreign
and military policy relating to the national security
so as to enable the military services and the other
departments and agencies to cooperate more effectively
in matters involving national security. "
The National Security Council was to be the keystone of our nation's
security structure. It was established not to restrict but to advise a President,
by assuring thoughtful analysis and careful coordination of every significant
aspect of national security policy. It assumed competent management of current
problems and contingency planning for the future. It was to be insurance against
hasty action -- a device to ensure that every factor bearing on vital security
policies and programs would be presented to the President for action.
During the Eisenhower Administration, the National Security Council --
meeting frequently and formally throughout the eight years -- proved its
indispensability to the nation.
Its procedures and deliberations were not flawless, but over this span of
* See Appendix I
-4-
time it was invaluable in assuring comprehensive analyses, in producing
timely recommendations in critical security issues, and in coordinating
activities of the members of the Council.
Since then, the entire supporting structure has so changed, or even dis-
appeared, as to now produce little more than mechanical compliance with the law.
The procedures for integrating military, political and economic considerations
often have given way to informal and impromptu consultations with staff assistants
and other individuals or ad hoc groups. The results have been harmful to our country.
National security policies have become unclear and indecisive. Others
urgently needed have been left unmade. Reaction to crisis -- not avoidance of
of crisis -- has been the inescapable result.
Continuous review and planning has been substantially eliminated, in the
downgrading of formal policy planning. Thus, when an immediate crisis looms,
there is hope that crash handling will avoid a fundamental compromise of our
national security. A solid and effective structure can permit the development
of a policy which can be appropriately carried out at the tactical level.
Over-centralization in the Department of Defense
The progression toward a centrally-directed defense establishment began
long before the 1960's. The National Security Act of 1947, and the 1949 and 1958
amendments to the Act, progressively strengthened the role of the Secretary of
Defense as the principal advisor to the President on national security matters. *
In 1961, however, centralization became not policy but dogma, and the Secretary
became "first among equals" as advisor to the President.
Ultimate responsibility for the defense establishment must be exercised by
the Secretary of Defense under Presidential direction and within the statuatory
guidelines set by Congress. The function assumes highest-level policy guidance
*
Largely reflecting the recommendations of The Commission on Organization of
the Executive Branch of the Government on National Security Organization
(Hoover Report).
-5-
and the resolution of policy differences -- such policies, for example, as the
formulation of national security operations, criteria for organizing forces,
and the development of the defense budget. In these activities, the civilian
authorities are responsible to the President, the Congress and the electorate.
Under civilian control and within civilian established guidelines, the
Joint Chiefsof Staff and the uniformed services must direct the planning and
management of all military forces. In force planning and operations, the military
leadership must be responsive through the Secretary of Defense to the President.
A careful delineation of these roles of civilian policy-makers and military
managers is absolutely essential for a secure and balanced national security
posture.
Implementing Policies and Programs
Civilian Operational Planning and Control
Major organizational changes and new procedures have created a serious over-
centralization of civilian management at the top of the defense establishment.
The practice of lower-level civilians in the OSD superimposing themselves in
originating and developing analyses for the Secretary does injustice to the
competence of the military services. The most current and disturbing example
of the reduced role of the military in strategic and tactical decisions is
Vietnam. A policy of gradualism* largely dictated by civilians has been imposed,
which has prolonged the war, increased the casualties and costs and divided
the American people,
Civilian control over the details of the air war has been particularly ques-
tionable. Testimony before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee last
August disclosed that tactical decisions were frequently being made by civilians
in Washington. Military witnesses stated that many target recommendations approved
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were being denied and others delayed, thus impairing
*
See Republican Coordinating Committee report "Gradualism -- Fuel of Wars"
March 1968.
-6-
the war effort. The Subcommittee was also advised that operational decisions were
at times being made without the involvement of responsible military professionals
on the scene.
It is axiomatic that when a tactical commander is given a mission, once a
policy has been approved, he must also be given latitude and control over intel-
ligence and military capability to accomplish the mission. Continuing support
within the defense establishment and the Administration is necessary for the
commanders as they carry out assigned tasks.
Civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense have assumed greater
control of contingency planning and military preparedness, and often have
abandoned or ignored contingency plans in favor of rapidly conceived ad hoc
decisions. Military operations, directed principally by civilians, have
occurred, and illustrate suppression of the proper command and military role
in our defense structure.
Research, Development and Procurement Practices
Civilian authority has been administered to over-control research, develop-
ment and procurement. Under present procedures, new weapons systems will not
be approved unless they are justified as a response to a visible new threat.
Nor can a new system be approved until all technology and cost data are "in hand."
Thus, research and development* policies threaten to deprive our nation of the
military superiority sufficient to maintain our security.
Military judgment -- in a number of cases the considered judgment of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff -- has not been followed in weapons selection and procurement.
Many urgently-needed weapons systems have fallen victim to a misapplication of
the cost effectiveness process, or become lost in a morass of civilian boards
or working groups increasingly capable of vetoing proposals.
*
See Republican Coordinating Committee report "Research and Development: Our
Neglected Weapon" May 1968.
-7-
The weapons systems evaluation capability of the Department of Defense is
experienced and comprehensive. The individual services and the OSD Weapons
Systems Evaluation Group prepare extensive evaluations of proposed new weapons
systems. Frequently this process has been compromised, bypassed or ignored, the
findings obscured. Civilian leaders have substituted judgments based on
"other reasons."
A notable example is the TFX contract award. The contractor unanimously
recommended by both the military analysts and the Weapons Systems Evaluation
Group was rejected. Recently, the commonality feature of the aircraft imposed
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense upon the Navy was rejected -- six
years and many millions of dollars later. The development of a new aircraft
for the Navy now will cost considerably more in new expenditure and lost time,
while leaving the service arm with a present complement and types of planes it
feels is inadequate.
A similar incident was the X-22 VSTOL aircraft contract award. The Senate
Preparedness Subcommittee found that both civilian and military evaluators were
over-ridden. The Subcommittee concluded that the final decision was made in
thirty minutes by a Deputy Secretary of Defense with a handful of civilian
advisors, discarding analyses of 75 Navy experts who had spent 4,000 man hours
assessing competing designs.
As a result of frequent OSD rejections and cutbacks, the services have
gravitated toward a policy of "half a loaf," which is simply acquiescence in
inadequacy. This approach is unsound and cannot be condoned.
The Cost Effectiveness Hurdle
Proposed weapons systems for the military services must pass, under current
OSD procedures, a cost effectiveness test -- an analysis requiring precise cost
data, application definitions and a demonstration of utility against a specific
military threat. Over-reliance on a theoretical and mechanical cost effective-
ness procedure has distorted the national security decision-making process.
-8-
Decisions on weapons systems, strategy and tactics demand the additional
input of practical, professional knowledge. Intuition and other human factors
must be introduced into decision-making. War and defense preparations, with
all of their unpredictabilities, are matters of judgment. Innovation cannot
be predicted or quantified. Defense is an inexact science.
A former top civilian official of the Administration recently wrote on
the organizational and procedural changes of the past seven years:
"The second reason for (organizational) change made it essential
for political leadership of the country to consider the implications
of any military move no matter how minor. If war had already become
too important to leave to the generals, the selection and deployment
of weapons and forces to deter war were now at least equally
important.
"The need for more active political management could not have been
made if the tools had not been available, and the tools might not
have been picked up without the need to find and use them.
The "tool" is primarily the cost effectiveness study. Many witnesses
before Congressional committees have testified that the cost effectiveness study
has often been used to cloud issues or to legitimize previously determined
positions.
Appropriate applications of the cost effectiveness technique are necessary
and important in the vast Defense Department structure. Indeed, in response to
Hoover Commission recommendations, then Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal
introduced financial management procedures into the Department. Thereafter the
system was continuously and properly expanded.
Such procedures are vital from a position of fiscal responsibility and
orderliness. However, weaponry cost estimates cannot be allowed to remain as virt-
ually the sole determinant on which national security decisions are based. Our
nation's security demands a flexible assessment system for determining threats and
the most effective response to them.
* See Atlantic Monthly, September 1967
-9-
Misapplications of the cost effectiveness process can create critical con-
ditions, some of which became evident in the Administration's FY 1969 budget.
Items previously reduced or rejected by the Secretary of Defense were suddenly
requested. For example, several thousand additional helicopters, long before
requested by the Army, were provided for, in addition to several billion dollars
for aircraft spare parts for all services. Since national security rests in part
upon adequate "lead time" for the procurement of weapons and supporting materials,
deliveries in the two categories above in 1969 or later may well render a part of
our military establishment vulnerable or incapable of performing at an effective
level.
Under this procedure, rejections or reduction in military requests are most
frequently reported only verbally. Back-up material is not made available.
Committees of the Congress are generally unable to examine cost effectiveness
studies supporting a given decision. The Chairman of the National Security
and International Operations Subcommittee, Senate Government Operations Committee,
concluded after a hearing in 1967 that the analysis process has been so used
that it may well be damaging to our nation's security.
Effects of Over-centralization
Over-centralization ensures greater control. It also can produce delays,
depress creativity and initiative, and can prevent the emergence of new ideas
from lower echelons -- the most fertile source. The Administration's zeal for
over-centralization appears to stem from a desire to control policy, people
and events. It has resulted in numerous instances of control of news, public
information and intelligence.
An example is the TFX program. A policy memorandum was issued
directing that all news releases on the program would uphold the validity of
the decisions of the Secretary of Defense. Such is the internal power of an
-10-
over-centralized, publicly unresponsive structure. Under such circumstances,
it is not surprising that the Administration's credibility has come under
severe and sustained criticism.
The problem reaches into Congress, where defense committees expect to
receive a free exchange of views on critical aspects of our national security.
However, in observance of Administration and Defense Department restrictions,
witnesses testify under a directive stating that they must express the views
of the Administration unless "pressed." When "pressed," before stating his
own views, the witness must first reiterate the views of the Administration.
On completion of Congressional hearings, testimony is examined by Defense
Department officials for the purpose of deleting information the release of
which might harm the nation's security. Frequently, however, deletions have
been made not for security reasons but for political reasons. Examples of this
practice are numerous, and are a matter of public record.
The August, 1967, report by the Senate Preparedness Investigating Sub-
committee reflects the lack of candor between Defense Department civilians and
the Congress. The subject was the war in Vietnam. The bipartisan Subcommittee
arrived at such conclusions as these:
It was clearly implied by the Defense official that few, if any, important
military targets remained unstruck. The great weight of the military testimony
was to the contrary.
The Defense official said that North Vietnam could sustain its required
import rate by way of land, rail and water from Red China. This position
contrasts sharply with the views of military experts.
The Administration has asserted for years that the Defense Department cost
reduction program has been highly effective. A report by the House Armed Services
Committee and the General Accounting Office, on analysis of such claims, con-
-11-
cluded that not more than 50 percent of the alleged savings were valid. Nor
does this figure take into account that Congressional budget cuts, if adhered to
by the DOD, were considered "cost savings."
From the management standpoint, over-centralization of authority inevitably
will produce increased costs and gross inefficiencies in an organization as large
as the Department of Defense. Decisions on routine matters are posponed, and major
decisions must also be delayed or too hastily reached. In many decisions, particularly
those related to combat in Southeast Asia, the time factor is such that when
the decisions are finally made and communicated, circumstances may have changed,
opportunities lost, the decisions no longer applicable.
In research and development, where timing is critical, delays of decision
have caused paralysis. Defense industry spokesmen have indicated that in the past,
some four to six months would be required in the Pentagon between the time
proposals were submitted and final approval. Today, it averages twelve months.
Some take two years. This must be added to the extremely long lead-time of
5 to 10 years common to weapons research projects.
In the current research and development cycle, too many individuals can say
"no" and very few can say "yes." Confusion has resulted from the separation of
responsibility and authority. While a measure of review is necessary and advis-
able, a current typical review of a major new weapons system will be made by 17
different staff agencies and over 700 people before receiving final approval.
As reported in official organization charts,* the recent rapid increase
of personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense has brought into serious
imbalance the process required for sound assessment and implementation of
national security policies. This is another illustration of the structural
dislocations which have come to frustrate comprehensive policy analysis.
* See Appendix II.
-12-
Effect on Morale
The effects of over-centralization on the morale of both military and
civilian personnel are grave. Responsibility without commensurate
authority is frustrating and demoralizing. The exercise of authority, so necessary
to the experience of a military professional seeking a career, is difficult under
current conditions. It is a capability on which this nation must rely in time of
emergencies and conflicts. Further, the initiative necessary for both military
and technical civilian personnel is an imperative for a responsive national
security structure. The cumulative effect of the current policies, procedures
and organization is to weaken this vital ingredient.
Recommendations
The principle of civilian control over our national security structure
requires that authority reside in the President. The two major counselors to him
must be the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. Focus at this level
should primarily assume a broad policy-making and enforcing function.
In view of the threatening international environment, the collapse of time,
and our exceedingly complex governmental structure, adherence to a formal decision-
making process such as the National Security Council is a necessary prerequisite for
effectively providing for the nation's security.
We must have a more articulate definition of our national interests and the
steps required to promote them. Upon such determinations a clear policy must be
set.
A crucial point in the national security process is placing the most capable
people in key positions. Good national security policy requires good policy
makers as well as good policy machinery.
-13-
The policy decision-making process must be planned and organized, and must
make use of the talents of responsible individuals within the structure. Timely
and regular meetings must be held. A coordination function must be established
to ensure prompt and effective implementation. Follow-through and analysis of
the effect of promulgated policies must be reinstituted, with reports from
all involved sectors.
Detailed implementation of both planning and operations should be
delegated to lower echelons, which must have both the necessary authority and
responsibility to carry out assignments.
There must be reaffirmation of the responsibility to better inform both
Congress and the electorate on issues affecting our national security, within
appropriate safeguards.
Budgetary policy guidelines to the services must be clarified. There
should be greater emphasis on the reestablishment of the priority budget concept
utilizing to the extent practicable the "mission" basis.
The role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be reaffirmed, ensuring their
direct and active participation in the development of policy, weapons system
and force planning.
Advanced management techniques should be utilized in their proper role as
tools, not as ends in themselves.
Conclusion
The extreme over-centralization and over-management of our national security
structure on the one hand, and the extensive ad hoc policy deliberations on the
other, developed in the past seven years, have weakened our national security
position and created increased risks. It has brought into question this nation's
ability to respond in a timely and effective manner to crises which threaten
America's vital interests.
-14-
Regarding overcentralization, in 1949 Ferdinand Eberstadt, one of the
foremost students of defense organization, testified before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, stating:
"From shattered illusions that mere passage of a unification act
would produce a military utopia, there has sprung an equally
illusory belief that present shortcomings will immediately dis-
appear if only more and more authority is conferred in the Secretary
of Defense and more and more people added to his staff
I suggest
that great care be exercised lest the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, instead of being a small and efficient unit which deter-
mines the policies of the military establishment and controls and
directs the departments, feeding on its own growth, becomes a
separate empire."
Today the separate empire exists. Balance must be restored, to ensure
our nation's security, and to reinforce our ability to respond quickly to
challenge.
Equally important are policies and an organization structure that will at
all times conform to our representative form of government, with its system of
checks and balances.
APPENDIX I
Title 50 - U. S. Code
Section 402. National Security Council.
(a) Establishment; presiding officer; functions; composition.
There is established a council to be known as the National Security Council
(hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Council").
The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the Council:
Provided, That in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to preside
in his place.
The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect
to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the
national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments
and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving
the national security.
The Council shall be composed of--
(1) the President;
(2) the Vice President;
(3) the Secretary of State;
(4) the Secretary of Defense;
(5) the Director for Mutual Security;
(6) The Chairman of the National Security Resources Board; and
(7) the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive
departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and the Chairman
of the Research and Development Board, when appointed by the President
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at his pleasure.
(b) Additional functions.
In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct,
for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of
the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security,
it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council --
(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the
United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in
the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations
to the President in connection therewith; and
(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments
and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to
make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.
-2-
APPENDIX I (continued)
(c) Executive secretary; appointment and compensation; staff employees.
The Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian executive secretary
who shall be appointed by the President. The executive secretary, subject to the
direction of the Council, is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and
the Classification Act of 1949, to appoint and fix the compensation of such person-
nel as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Council
in connection with the performance of its functions.
(d) Recommendations and reports.
The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such
other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may
require. (July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, Section 101, 61 Stat. 497; Aug. 10,
1949, ch. 412, Section 3, 63 Stat. 579; Oct. 28, 1949, ch. 782, title XI, Section
1106 (a), 63 Stat. 972; Oct. 10, 1951, ch. 479, title V, Section 501 (e) (1),
65 Stat. 378.)
APPENDIX II
ORGANIZATION OF FEDERAL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (exclusive of separate services personnel)
Personnel - 1/1/61
Personnel - 1/1/67
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
Office of the Secretary of Defense
136
DEFENSE
2,124
Secretary of Defense
7
Deputy Secretary of Defense
4
Secretary of Defense
4
Office of Administrative Secretary
25
Deputy Secretary of Defense
5
Administrative Office of the Secretary
100
Director of Defense Research
Director of Defense Research and
and Engineering, Office of
Engineering
265
the Director
212
Office of the Director
234
Advanced Research Projects Agency
138
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
31
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
36
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comp-
Assistant Secretary of Defense
troller)
170
(Administration)
226
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Health and Medical)
11
(Comptroller)
325
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)
212
(Installations and Logistics)
282
Office of Assistant Secretary
185
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Defense Representative, NA and MA
(International Security Affairs)
233
and U.S. Rep. USRO
27
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Man-
(Manpower)
250
power, Personnel and Reserve)
86
Assistant Secretary of Defense
82
(Public Affairs)
87
Office of Assistant Secretary
Reserve Forces Policy Board
4
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Systems Analysis)
142
General Counsel
54
(Properties and Installations)
57
Miscellaneous Activities
40
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Special Staff Assistants
46
(Public Affairs)
74
USRO
32
Assistant Secretary of Defense
NATO Force Planning
11
(Supply and Logistics)
166
Special Project
1
General Counsel
56
Assistant to the Secretary (Atomic
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ORGANI-
Energy)
12
ZATION
467
Assistant to the Secretary (Legislative
Office of the Chairman
14
Affairs)
7
Joint Staff
225
Assistant to the Secretary (Special
Other Joint Chiefs of Staff Activities
228
Operations)
17
Special Programs
15
OTHER DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
73,265
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Armed Forces Information and Ed-
Staff
302
ucation
403
Office of the Chairman
10
Defense Contract Audit Agency
3,745
Joint Staff
187
Defense Atomic Support Agency
2,198
Other Joint Chiefs of Staff Activities
105
Defense Communications Agency
1,235
Other Activities
223
Classified Activities
3,328
Advanced Research Projects Agency
80
Defense Supply Agency
62,356
Standing Group-NATO
41
Interdepartmental Activities
37
U.S. Court of Military Appeals
38
International Military Activities
59
Interdepartmental Activities
5
Defense Communications Agency
59
Total employees (35 WOC)
75,952
Total employees (47 WOC)
1
1,809
1 Includes 3,450 part-time and WAE employees, and
I Includes 40 part-time and WAE, and 38 overseas
913 employees outside U.S., of which 415 are American
citizens.
employees.
Office of the Secretary (including
Other Defense Activities)
75,952
Department of the Army
455,523
Department of the Navy
376,879
Department of the Air Force
321,425
Total, DOD (43 WOC)
1,229,779
: Includes a total of 20,588 WAE employees and
153,541 employees outside U.S., of whom 35,266 are
American citizens and 118,275 nationals of other count.
rizs
Source:
Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies,
U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations.
APPENDIX II
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (exclusive of separate services personnel)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
As of 1/1/67
Secretary of Defense Area
41
Secretary of the Army Area (Depart-
Office of the Director of Armed Forces
mental and Field)
1,101
Information and Education
39
As of 1/1/61
DOD and Joint Activities
Office of the Secretary and the Under
1,322
Office of Industrial Personnel Access
Joint Brazil-U.S. Defense Commis-
Secretary of the Army
45
sion
1
Authorization Review
2
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army
Secretary of Army Area
671
Office of the Chief. Army Reserve and
(FM)
Joint Mexican-U.S. Defense Com-
17
Office of the Secretary and the Under
ROTC Affairs
40
mission
1
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Army
38
Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs
37
Office, Industrial Personnel Access
(I&L)
56
Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve
Authorization Review
Office Assistant Secretary of the Army
6
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army
Components
20
(R&D)
Industrial College of the Armed
(MP and RF)
26
14
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army
United States Military Academy
1,934
Forces
92
Office, Administrative Assistant to Sec.
(FM)
22
The Adjutant General
4,010
9
National War College
69
retary of the Army
Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army
Chief of Chaplains
57
Office, Chief of Public Information
SHAPE Liaison
2
6
Provost Marshal General
156
Office Chief of Legislative Liaison
Armed Services Explosive Safety Board
12
(Logistics)
28
69
Office, Director of Research and Devel-
Chief of Research and Development
175
Office of General Counsel
21
Defense Supply Service
199
opment
8
Army Physical Review Council
7
Administrative Support Group
35
Defense Telephone Service
95
Office, Administrative Assistant to Sec-
Military Communications and Electronics
Army Board for Correction of Military
Per Diem Travel and Transportation
Board
Allowance Committee
23
retary of the Army
8
2
Records
22
Office, Chief of Public Information
5
Army Special and Joint Activities
2,898
Army Council of Review Beards
11
Defense Language Institute
779
Office, Chief of Legislative Liaison
48
Grievance and Employment Policy Board
Defense Information School
13
43
Office of General Counsel
19
Miscellaneous Area Activities
4
Employment Coordination Service
7
Army Security Agency
1,077
Administrative Support Group
35
Army Air Defense Command
117
Management Office
Army Air Defense Command
295
16
16
Office, Personnel Manager
Combat Developments Command
Armed Services of Contract Appeals
15
1,022
11
National Board for Promotion of Rifle
Army Materiel Command
161,007
Armed Services Explosive Safety Board
Civil Functions Corps of Engineers 27,268
Army Board for Correction of Military
Practice
21
Headquarters, AMC
2,601
U.S. Army Tank Automatic Center
6,846
Records
20
Technical Services
Space Management Service
4
Army Civilian Lawyer Career Committee
208,147
3
Office of Civil Defense
720
U.S. Army Aviation Materiel
Army Council of Review Boards
Chief Chemical Officer
14
8,698
Army Staff Area (Departmental and
Command
3,879
Grievance and Employment Policy Board
Chief of Ordnance
7
95,447
Field)
45,451
U.S. Army Electronics Command
11,338
Defense Supply Service
Quartermaster General
177
29,364
Office, Chief of Staff
350
U.S. Army Missile Command
9,851
Defense Telephone Service
103
Chief Signal Officer
24,585
General Staff Committee on National
U.S. Army Mobility Command
4,580
Employment Coordination Office
6
Surgeon General
8,449
Guard and Review Policy
2
U.S. Army Munitions Command
26,522
Management Office
Chief of Transportation
14,630
Special Assistant for Army Informa-
U.S. Army Test and Evaluation
9
Office, Personnel Manager
15
Chief of Engineers, Military Functions
26,974
tion and Data Systems
Command
332
12,975
Office of Management Analysis
5
Comptroller of the Army
285
U.S. Army Supply and Mainte-
National Board for Promotion of Rifle
Continental Army Command
Army Audit Agency
nance
67,445
741
63,075
Practice
20
U.S. Continental Army Command
948
Chief of Information
126
U.S. Army Weapons Command
12,635
Security Review and Security Screening
First U. S. Army
8,271
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Other Activities
510
9,705
Boards
3
10,443
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
887
Continental Army Command
107,154
Second U.S. Army
Space Management Service
4
Third U.S. Army
15,336
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force De-
U.S. Continental Army Command
1,133
velopment
First U.S. Army
31,117
Per Diem Travel and Transportation
Fourth U.S. Army
10,710
333
Allowance Committee
21
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military
Third U.S. Army
27,278
Fifth U.S. Army
10,543
Army Staff (Departmental and
Sixth U.S. Army
9,269
Operations
258
Fourth U.S. Army
19,310
18,717
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
649
Fifth U.S. Army
14,760
Field)
Military District of Washington,
128
U.S. Army
Chief of Finance
Office, Chief of Staff
1,925
4,659
Sixth U.S. Army
11,139
General Staff Committee on National
Alaska
22,793
Office of The Inspector General
44
Military District of Washington,
75,032
Office of the Chief of Military History
74
U.S. Army
2,417
Guard and Review Policy
2
Hawaii
The Judge Advocate General
235
Military Traffic Management
Comptroller of the Army
260
Service
6,212
Army Audit Agency
1,312
Total continental United
National Guard Bureau
118
Intelligence Corps Command
911
Chief of Information
112
States
330,225
Office of the Chief, Army Reserve
51
Army Strategic Communications
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
477
Total outside continental
Office of the Chief, Reserve Com-
Command
2,681
Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence
948
United States
50,439
ponents
51
Civil Functions, Corps of Engineers
30,701
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military
Office of Personnel Operations
1,122
Miscellaneous
7
Operations
337
Total employees (7 WOC)
380,674
Office of the President
4
Alaska
2,987
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
524
Excludes 5,053 Technical Staff personnel (depart.
United States Military Academy
2,271
Hawaii
5,899
Chief of Finance
4,186
mental) included with Technical Services.
The Adjutant General
4,467
Industrial College of the Armed Forces
104
Data shown for Alaska and Hawaii are by geographi-
Total United States
33
361,941
Chief of Chaplains
Office of The Inspector General
48
cal area, not by command
Total outside U.S.
Provost Marshal General
58
84,696
Office of the Chief of Military History
63
Includes 1,298 part-time and WAE employees
and 50,439 overseas employees, of which 13,616 are
Chief of Research and Development
559
Total employees (4 WOC)
455,523
The Judge Advocate General
218
American citizens and 36,823 are nationals of other
Chief of Engineers, Military
Armed Forces Information and Education.
countries.
Functions
12,699
Data shown is by geographical area. not by
DOD
385
Chief of Communications-Electronics
360
command.
National War College
88
Chief of Support Services
1,050
Includes 7,127 part-time and WAE employee
and 84,696 employees outside U.S. of whom 440
National Guard Bureau
189
Surgeon General
10,564
are American citizens and 69 256 are nationals of
(1)
US Army Recruiting Command
2,557
other countries
Source: Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies, U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations
APPENDIX II (continued)
As of 1/1/61
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (exclusive of separate services personnel)
As of 1/1/67
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
375
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Chief
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Bureau of Navel Personnel
1,771
12
Office of the Chief
Assistant Chief for Personnel and
10
Professional Operations
157
Executive Office of the Secretary
116
Administrative and Management
Division
Executive Office of the Secretary
Assistant Chief for Planning and Logistics
165
Office of Secretary of the Navy
115
2,144
38
Office of Inspector General
Assistant Chief for Aviation Medicine
Office of Under Secretary of the Navy
1
Office of Secretary of the Navy
25
9
9
Office of Liaison and Technical
Office of Under Secretary of the Navy
4
Assistant Chief to, Dentistry
12
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Information
Assistant Chief for
(Installations and Logistics)
5
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy
rich and
42
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Manpower Information Division
Military Medical Spec ulties
248
(Material)
16
20
Assistant Chief for Plans
(Research and Development)
78
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy
11
Office of Assistant Secretary of the
Assistant Chief for Personnel Control
451
(Research and Dave opment)
5
Bureau of Nevel Personnel
1,699
Assistant Chief for Education and
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Office of the Chief
12
Navy (Financial Management)
5
Training
Navy (Personnel and Reserve
Office of the Special Asst. to Sec. Navy
157
Administrative and Management
4
Assistant Chief for Naval Reserve and
Forces)
8
Division
113
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts
754
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Naval District Affairs
7
Office of Admin. An Sec. Navy
7
Inspector General
1
Office of the Chief
89
the Navy (Manpower)
7
Assistant Chief for Records
465
Office of Analysis and Review
23
Special Assistant to the Chief for Leader-
Director of Planning
41
Department of the Navy Staff
Administrative Office
Offices
Assistant Chief for Performance
41
785
ship
5
Director of Management Engineering
69
1,318
Office of the Comptroller
346
Personnel Research Division
Director of Industrial Relations
Office of Program Appraisal
Assistant Chief for Morale Services
66
23
35
14
Assistant Chief for Finance
Office of the General Counsel
Director of Naval Personnel
Administrative Office
89
26
Office of Liaison and Technical Infor-
26
226
Chief of Chaplains
Office of Industrial Relative ns
133
mation
Comptroller of the Bureau of Supplies
Office of the Comptroller
10
5
237
Office of Information
13
Manpower Information Division
and Accounts
183
Office of the General Counsel
Assistant Chief for Property
220
21
Management
Navy Management Office
66
Assistant Chief for Plans
61
Assistant Chief for Supply Mgt.
111
Office of Civilian Manpower Manage-
12
Special Assistant to Chief for Retention
Office of Noval Material
ment
191
Assistant Chief for Personnel Control
442
Assistant Chief for Transportation
112
235
Task Force
4
34
Office of Information
3
Office of Naval Petroleum Reserves
Assistant Chief for Education and
Director of Mutual Security Programs
39
400
Training
Assistant Chief for Purchasing
Office of Management Information
Navy Department Board of Decorations
Office of Noval Research
135
33
41
and Medals
Office of Petroleum Reserves
7
Board for Correction of Noval Records
12
Assistant Chief for Naval Reserve and
Assistant Chief for Research and
6
Office of Naval Research
Board for Correction of Records
1
Naval Physical Disability Review Board
16
Naval District Affairs
8
Development
21
400
Outside Bureau Details
Board for Correction of Naval Records
5
Naval Physical Review Council
5
Assistant Chief for Records
473
14
Office of Naval Material
Assistant Chief for Performance
Navy Council of Personnel Boards
460
Special Assignments and Details to
39
Bureau of Yards and Decks
841
16
Other Agencies
Physical Review Council
2
Assistant Chief for Morale Services
6
Office of the Chief
68
Office of the Chief
33
12
Electronics Production Resources
Assistant Chief for Finance
73
Office of Legislative Affairs
Assistant Chief for Administration
28
Deputy Chief of Naval Material for P10.
Agency
21
Chief of Chaplains
Armed Services Board of Contract
10
and Comptroller
272
gram and Financial Management
98
Office of Industrial Personnel Access
Appeals
Assistant Chief for Property Manage-
Assistant Chief for Planning and
35
Deputy Chief of Naval Material for
Authorization Review
3
11
Design
228
Office of the Judge Advocate
Procurement
106
ment
Office of Legislative Affairs
General
20
Assistant Chief for Construction
109
79
Deputy Chief of Naval Material
Savings Bonds Office
1
Assistant Chief for Maintenance
Office of Chief of Naval Operations
990
for Development
Bureau of Navel Weapons
95
3,319
Navy Punel, Armed Services Board of
Staff Offices
Office of the Chief and Deputy Chief
and Materiel
113
14
Deputy Chief of Naval Material
8
Contract Appeals
12
Assistant Chief for Real Estate
40
Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Opera-
for Logistic Support
84
Assistant Chief for Program Manage-
tions/Director of Naval Adminis-
256
Assistant Chief of Housing
46
Deputy Chief of Naval Material for
ment
tration
255
Management and Organization
65
Inspector General and Assistant Chief
Navy Program Planning Office
66
Office of the Judge Advocate
for Administration
478
Headquarters, U. 5. Marine Corps 1,083
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
1,244
General
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
Office of the Commandant
97
42
Assistant Chief for Fleet Readiness
426
Office of the Commandant
6
(Intelligence)
150
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1
22
Office of Counsel
46
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1
20
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
Assistant Chief of Staff, G 3
Office of Chief of Navel Operations 1,046
17
Office of the Comptroller
155
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
20
(Communications)
60
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
40
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
3
Assistant Chief for Contracts
361
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
16
Office of Anti-Submarine Warfare
Personnel Department
342
Staff Offices
26
Assistant Chief for Production and
Personnel Department
311
Programs
10
Administrative Division
151
Assistant Vice Chief of Navol Opera.
Quality Control
290
Division of Aviation
18
Office of Naval Inspector General
24
Supply Department
tions/Director of Naval Adminis-
Assistant Chief for Research, Develop-
86
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
309
Administrative Division
Inspection Department
tration
ment, Test, and Evaluation
943
3
240
Supply Department
434
(Manpower and Naval Reserve)
39
Division of Information
Assistant Chief for Field Support
8
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
108
Inspection Division
4
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet
Fiscal Division
158
(Intelligence)
357
Special Projects Office
247
Division of Information
5
Operations and Readiness)
64
Division of Reserve
10
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
Fiscal Division
47
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Marine Corps Boards
(Communications)
76
Bureau of Ships
3,083
Division of Reserve
(Logistics)
4
10
110
Data Processing Division
138
Deputy Chief of Noval Operations (Per-
Office of the Chief
40
Marine Corps Boards
4
Deputy Chief of Noval Operations (Air)
94
Military Sea Transportation
sonnel and Noval Reserve)
14
Assistant Chief for Plans and Adminis-
Data Processing Division
102
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans
Service
and Policy)
292
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet
tration, and Inspector General
475
33
Operations and Readiness)
35
Assistant Chief for Research and
Total departmental
14,440
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Total departmental service
6,597
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Development
91
(Development)
71
Continental U. 5.
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
Total United States
(Logistics)
320,925
344,648
107
Assistant Chief for Design, Shipbuilding
327
Deputy Chief of Navol Operations (Air)
95
and Fleet Maintenance
601
Office of the Chief
Total outside U.S.
Overseas
22,054
10
32,231
Deputy Chief of Novol Operations (Plans
Assistant Chief for Technical Logistics
1,279
Assistant Chief for Personnel and
Total all areas (t WOC)
376,879
and Policy)
29
Assistant Chief foi Field Activities
172
Total all areas (1 WOC)
'342,979
Professional Operations
151
Deputy Chief of Noval Operations
Assistant Chief for Nu lear Propulsion
67
Assistant Chief for Planning and Logistic
126
"Includes 190 American chizens and 441 no
(Development)
Includes 6,778 American citizens and 15,276 no-
64
Contract Division
214
Assistant Chief for Aviation Medicine
o
nals of other countries
tionals of other countries.
Comptroller Division
144
Includes 934 part-time and WAE employees
Assistant Chief for Dentistry
12
Includes 5 498 part-time and WAE employees
Assistant Chief for Research and
Military Medical Specialies
10
Source:
Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies, U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations
(2)
APPENDIX II (continued)
DEPARTMENT OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (exclusive of separate services personnel)
AIR FORCE
DEPARTMENT OF THE
Office of the Secretary
307
AIR FORCE
As of 1/1/61
As of 1/1/67
Secretary of the Air Force
6
Under Secretary of the Air Force
6
Office of the Secretary
347
Secretary of the dir Force
6
Air Force Systems Command
32,238
Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Materiel)
27
Under Secretary of the Air Force
3
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units
1,148
Assistant Secretary of the Air
Arnold Engineering Development
Assistant Secretary of the Air
Strategic Air Command
18,065
Force (Financial Management)
12
Force (Installations and Logistics)
28
Center
145
Special Assistant to the Secretary
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units
1 767
Assistant Secretary of the Air
Air Force Flight Test Center
2,074
6 187
Force (Financial Management)
Aeronautical Systems Division
3,364
(Manpower, Personnel and Reserve
Second Air Force
17
9
Eighth Air Force
4 528
Special Assistant to the Secretary
Ballistic Systems Division
740
Forces)
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
Fifteenth Air Force
5 583
for Manpower
14
Electronic Systems Division
2,277
(Research and Development)
9
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
Air Force Missile Development
Special Assistant for Installations
7
Tactical Air Commend
6,649
(Research and Development)
18
Center
1,637
Administrative Assistant
61
1254
Deputy Undersecretary (International
Space Systems Division
1,114
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units
32
Ninth Air Force
1.194
Affairs)
3
Research and Technology Division
6,260
General Counsel
Twelfth Air Force
Air Force Board for the Correction of
Air Proving Ground Center
2,649
Office of Legislative Liaison
84
4196
Office of Information Services
38
Nineteenth Air Force
5
Military Records
12
Air Force Special Weapons Center
1,263
Secretary of the Air Force Personnel
Administrative Assistant
78
Aerospace Medical Division
1,782
General Counsel
Aeronautical Chart and
33
Foreign Technology Division
895
Council
10
Office, Missile and Satellite Systems
Office of Legislative Liaison
3,861
83
National Range Division
3,071
6
Information Center
Office of Information
Air Defense Command
40
Air Force Contract Management
9,831
Secretary of the Air Force Personnel
Division
3,819
Headquarters, U. 5. Air Force
4,446
Air Force Accounting and Finance
Council
12
Strategic Air Command
20,648
Chief of Staff
9
Center
1,739
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
Air Research end Development
2,983
Headquarters and SubsidiaryUnits
1,689
Vice Chief of Staff
18
Chief of Staff
8
Second Air Force
5,802
Scientific Advisory Board
68
Command
22,956
Vice Chief of Staff
14
Eighth Air Force
5,456
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
122
Air Training Command
23,909
Scientific Advisory Board
Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve
2,361
8
Fifteenth Air Force
6,461
Air University
Director, Secretariat
9,761
11
1st Strategic Aerospace Division
1,240
Forces
9
Continental Air Commend
Director of Administrative Services
147
Tactical Air Command
11,292
The Inspector General
34
Headquerters Command, USAF
6,017
Secretary of the Air Staff
141
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units
1,468
The Surgeon General
193
Military Air Transport Service
10,111
Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve
Ninth Air Force
3,499
The Judge Advocate General
90
U.S. Air Force Academy
1,739
Forces
5
Twelfth Air Force
5,586
Secretary of the Air Staff
277
USAF Security Service
875
Chief, Operations Analysis
41
Nineteenth Air Force
6
Directorate of Administrative Services
499
641
Total continental U. S.
Chief of Chaplains
12
USAF, Special Air Warfare Center
676
Comptroller of the Air Force
273,033
The Inspector General
Overseas
' 33,538
26
USAF, Tactical Air Warfare
Deputy Chief of Staff, Development
122
The Judge Advocate General
61
Center
32
Deputy Chief of Staff Operations
646
The Surgeon General
'306,571
146
USAF, Tactical Air Reconnaissance
Deputy Chief of Staff Plans and Programs
152
Total employees (46 WOC)
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
112
Center
25
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
605
'Includes 14,179 American citizens and 19 190
Comptroller of the Air Force
419
Aeronautical Chart and Infor-
Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel
321
nationals of other countries
Deputy Chief of Staff, Programs and
mation Center
3,728
Central Control Group
528
'Includes 755 WAE employees
Resources
476
Air Defense Command
12,511
Mutual Defense Aid Program
112
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
295
Air Force Accounting and Finance
Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and
Center
1,793
Air Material Command
151,013
Development
173
Air Force Communications
Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems and
Service
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units
4,292
17,090
Aeronautical Systems Center
1,372
Logistics
418
Air Training Command
21,860
Ballistic Missiles Center
669
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and
Air University
2,521
Central Contract Management Region
3,177
Operations
204
Continental Air Command
8,938
Eastern Contract Management Region
3,576
Central Control Group
167
Headquarters Command, USAF
6,726
Electronic Systems Center
371
Military Assistance Program
99
Military Air Transport Service
15,236
Western Contract Management Region
3,476
Air Force Logistics Command
131,336
Office of Aerospace Research
1,388
Middletown, Pa., Air Materiel Area
Headquarters and Subsidiary Units
16,522
U.S. Air Force Academy
1,898
10544
Mobile Ala., Air Materiel Area
Middletown Air Materiel Area
2,427
U.S. Air Forice Security Service
1,202
15 001
Mobile Air Materiel Area
Alaskan Air Command in Alaska
2,422
Ogden. Utah, Air Materiel Area
11 327
6,842
Oklahoma City Air Materiel Area
Pacific Air Forces in Hawaii
2,365
Oklahoma City, Okla., Air Materiel
23,191
Area
18601
Ogden Air Materiel Area
17,371
Total United States
285,724
Rome, N.Y., Air Materiel Area
7,682
Rome Air Materiel Area
3,072
Total outside U.S.
35,701
San Antonio Tex., Air Materiel Area 19596
San Antonio Air Materiel Area
23,334
Sacramento Calif. AirMateriel Area
13602
Sacramento Air Materiel Area
19,689
Total employees (4 WOC)
321,425
San Bernardino, Calif, Air Materiel
Warner Robins Air Materiel Area
18,888
Includes 9,621 American citizens and 26 080
Area
9 906
nationals of other countries
Warner-Robins, Georgia Air Mate.
Includes 4,523 WAE employees
riel Area
15023
(3)
Source:
Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies, U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations
FOR, THE SENATE:
FOR THE HOUSE
Everett M. Dirksen
THE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
OF REPRESENTATIVES:
of Illinois
OF THE CONGRESS
Gerald R. Ford
Thomas H. Kuchel
of Michigan
of California
Leslie C. Arends
Bourke B. Hickenlooper
of Iowa
Press Release
of Illinois
Melvin R. Laird
Margaret Chase Smith
of Wisconsin
of Maine
John J. Rhodes
George Murphy
of Arizona
of California
H. Allen Smith
Milton R. Young
of California
of North Dakota
Bob Wilson
Hugh Scott
of Pennsylvania
Issued following a
of California
Leadership Meeting
Charles E. Goodell
of New York
PRESIDING:
Richard H. Poff
The National Chairman
of Virginia
Ray C. Bliss
July 18, 1968
William C. Cramer
of Florida
REPRESENTATIVE FORD:
IMMEDIATE RELEASE
The defense of the nation is the first duty of any Administration.
In this, the Johnson-Humphrey Administration is failing the American people.
Its short-sighted and wishful defense policies, unless promptly reversed, may
expose our country to grave danger in the decade ahead.
Gen. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said that
"The growth of Soviet nuclear power and the trend of certain defense policies
combine to make me anxious about the nation's future capacity for survival."
When Admiral Rickover, father of our nuclear submarine fleet, was
asked by members of the Senate Armed Services Committee whether he would
today more confidently command the American or the Soviet submarine force
he answered instantly: "The Soviet submarine force."
Many professional military leaders believe our nation will even-
tually be imperilled by recent and present defense policies. In this era
of increasingly sophisticated and complex technology, the lead time of most
weapons systems exceeds the Constitutional limit on Presidential tenure.
Thus, ironically, the far-sighted defense decisions of the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration provide our margin of safety today. But where will we stand in
the 1970's if we continue the Johnson-Humphrey Administration policies?
President Eisenhower sought peace through a defense posture second
to none, the traditional American concept. He was able to bring peace to
Korea and his successor was able to avert war in the Cuban missile crisis
because the United States still had clear strategic superiority. But the
Johnson-Humphrey Administration over the past five years has:
1. Curtailed expansion of our long-range strategic missile force;
2. Watched in bewilderment as the Russians have doubled the number
of their intercontinental ballistic missiles in one year;
Room S-124 U.S. Capitol-(202) 225-3700
Consultant to the Leadership-John B. Fisher
MR. FORD
- 2 -
3. Ended big bomber production, reduced our existing force, refused
to approve an advanced, manned strategic bomber, and wasted time and resources
on development of the TFX aircraft, that, as experts predicted, proved totally
unsuitable for Navy use.
4. Delayed the improvement of our nuclear Navy, permitted the Soviet
Union rapidly to close the gap in nuclear-powered submarines and allowed the
Russians to establish and expand their fleets in the Mediterranean and the
Indian Ocean.
5. Half-heartedly, under heavy pressure from Republicans and con-
cerned Democrats in the Congress, agreed to the deployment of a thin anti-
ballistic missile defense for the protection of our people.
6. Weakened our ability to respond to emergency situations such as
the seizure of the USS Pueblo by concentrating attention on Vietnam and
spreading other available forces, at high risk, too thinly around the world.
(This is the 178th day since the Pueblo's seizure.)
7. Allowed the American merchant marine to shrink into virtual
insignificance and avoided adoption of a comprehensive maritime strategy
and program at the very time the Soviets are stepping up theirs.
8. Diluted and dissipated the successful and prudent posture of
seeking peace through strength, which had been bipartisan American policy
since World War II, to the point where Soviet spokesmen are openly claiming
strategic parity as the price of peace.
It is highly significant that Soviet Communist Party chief Brezhnev
recently assailed the Republican Coordinating Committee's endorsement of
the doctrine of strategic superiority for the United States. Brezhnev said
the Soviet Union would "remain vigilant, increase its military preparedness
and 'keep our powder dry'.
The next U.S. Administration must be equally diligent to keep America's
powder dry, to ensure our long-range survival through adequate defense
planning. The Johnson-Humphrey defense policies have demonstrably failed to
face up to the realities of peace and security in a perilous world. They
have left us with a genuine and growing strategic capability gap that must
be closed quickly.
SENATOR DIRKSEN
July 18, 1968
The defense of the nation is not alone a matter of military force.
It depends also upon foreign policies realistic in concept and unflinching
in spirit.
All around the globe we see our foreign policies in disarray.
In Western Europe there is growing distrust of the United States and
dismay as to the future. NATO, freedom's shield on that continent, has been
allowed virtually to disintegrate. In the Middle East indecision alienates
our friends and heartens our enemies, and Russian diplomatic and military--
especially naval -- power has moved into the vacuum the Administration
has permitted there.
In Latin America, the Administration's fumbling with the alleged
"Alliance for Progress" proves it to be neither an alliance of promise nor
one capable of progress in present hands.
The dangerously disturbed state of affairs almost everywhere alarms
us with good reason, for we fail to see in this Administration's policies,
practices and philosophy any hope of solution for it.
By way of vivid example, we have hoped for months for Administration
support of the atomic desalinization plan placed before it long ago by
Americans of unquestioned eminence and ability and enthusiastically endorsed
by thousands of citizens around the world.
The Middle East is again a powder-keg immensely dangerous to world
peace. Even so, the Administration continues to maintain that this
extraordinary atomic project-for-peace, which promises to replace ancient
hatreds with hope in the Eastern Mediterranean, is "not politically feasible".
This we cannot accept. The proposal is a thoughtful, practical initia-
tive for peace without parallel in recent years. It might well restore
stability in that tormented region. We strongly urge the adoption of that
Eisenhower-Strauss proposal at the earliest possible moment.
The improved military capability of Arab nations with French and
Soviet planes and weapons has created a power imbalance in the Middle East
which is dangerous to peace. It can be corrected only if this nation will
make available suitable and necessary weapons and F-4 Phantom jet planes to
the Republic of Israel.
Mr. Dirksen
The defense of this nation is tied as surely to statesmanlike
economic proposals such as this as it is to military hardware. We serve
neither America nor mankind with sanity by ignoring them.
We repeat that the defense of our nation is the first duty of
this Administration. It is clear and alarming that this primary
responsibility is not being met.
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE-
November 6, 1968
The 1968 election results represent a great advance for the Republican
Party. We would have won control of the House of Representatives as well as the
White House except for complications resulting from the third-party candidacy
of George Wallace and the President's order of a bombing halt just five days
before the election. Those observations aside, there is no doubt in my mind
that the 91st Congress will far more accurately reflect the wishes of the
American people than the 90th and will be still more in line with the thinking
of the people than the rubber-stamp 89th Congress. It will reflect the fact
that the Republican Party has moved upward almost miraculously in the people's
favor since 1964. We will continue to grow in strength. I believe that in 1970
the people will see the wisdom of turning control of the Congress over to the
Republican Party. Apparently this changeover was too much to hope for in '68.
I personally know of nothing we could have or should have done differently in
our congressional campaigns.
# # #
O Office
Copy 1969
"Major Issues" Statement by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, R-Mich., Republican Leader,
U.S. House of Representatives, prepared by the National Federation of GOP Women.
"Safeguard: A Step Toward Peace"
BY JERRY FORD
In deciding to deploy the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile, President Nixon
has but one goal: To preserve world peace.
President Nixon would keep the nuclear peace by protecting our nuclear
deterrent - making certain that no enemy could destroy the U.S. capability of
responding to a nuclear attack.
Former President Johnson had decided to construct ABM installations near
major U.S. cities. In reviewing that decision, Mr. Nixon ruled out the placement
of ABM's near large American cities. Making a judgment in the light of latest
developments, Mr. Nixon decided that the national security dictated placing ABM's
as protectors of our Minuteman missile sites.
Nobody is criticizing President Nixon for abandoning Mr. Johnson's ABM
ring -around-the-cities plan.
But leading Senate Democrats and a few Senate Republicans are opposing
any kind of deployment of the ABM.
Their chief argument appears to be that U.S. action to deploy the ABM to
protect America's ability to strike back at a nuclear attacker will "provoke"
the Soviet Union and will spur the nuclear arms race at a time when arms control
talks with the Russians seem imminent.
A corollary argument is made to the effect that the ABM won't work anyway.
Let's take the first argument first . that deployment of ABM's to protect
our Minuteman missile bases is provocative.
This contention that the President's ABM plan is provocative simply does
not stand up before the facts.
Will the Safeguard plan spur the nuclear arms race and destroy the possi-
bility of arms control?
In that regard, let me quote the following:
"Which weapons should be regarded as a tension factor offensive or
defensive weapons? I think that a defense system which prevents attack is not a
cause of the arms race but represents a factor preventing the death of people."
-2-
Who made that statement? President Nixon? Defense Secretary Laird?
Jerry Ford? No, it was made by Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, when he discussed
anti-ballistic-missiles at a press conference Feb. 9, 1967, in London.
That, I think, is the best possible answer to the argument that deployment
of the Safeguard ABM System to protect Minuteman missile sites will trigger a
new round in the arms race.
Where were Mr. Nixon's critics when Soviet leaders began deploying their
ABM system in areas around Moscow? I do not recall their saying then that the
Soviet Union was engaging in provocative action.
What about the effect of the President's ABM decision on arms control
talks?
Four days after the Johnson Administration's decision to deploy the ABM
around major American cities, the Soviet Union indicated a desire to engage in
arms limitation talks with the United States.
Destroy the possibility of arms control talks? On the contrary, past
experience indicates our decision to deploy the ABM will have the opposite effect
on Soviet leaders.
Critics of the President's ABM decision would do well to remember that
the Soviet Union already has 67 ABM installations around Moscow and is developing
a sophisticated new ABM system.
Will the ABM work? The Russians obviously think so.
There are many prominent scientists who question ABM reliability. Just
so, there were a great number of leading scientists who thought the atom could
not be split and that it was impossible to build an H-bomb. I shudder to think
of the consequences had we not gone ahead with these developments while the Soviet
Union did.
Longrange Nixon Administration plans call for 12 ABM installations --
11 around Minuteman bases and one around Washington, D. c., as the national
command center.
Initial construction involves only two sites -- at Malstrom Air Force Base
in Montana and Grand Forks AFB in North Dakota. Development of these two sites
will provide tests of feasibility.
Why protect our Minuteman missile sites?
The primary reason is that the Soviet Union is reaching parity with the
United States in land-based and submarine-based missiles. And with the SS-9, an
accurate intercontinental ballistic missile with a large warhead, the Soviet Union
-3-
would be capable of knocking out a large portion of the 1,000-missile U.S. Minuteman
force.
What about our Polaris submarine-borne missiles?
Soviet anti-submarine warfare developments are a threat to our 656-missile
Polaris deterrent force.
Thus if the U.S. is to maintain its deterrent strength, we have no
realistic alternative but to protect some of the Minuteman bases with the Safeguard
System.
The Safeguard ABM not only will take on any Soviet land or sea-based
missiles that might be fired at the United States, it also is intended to defend
against the Russian Fractional Orbiting Bombardment System (FOBS).
FOBS is the Russian-developed low-trajectory weapon which would be delivered
by a satellite which travels the southern or trans-Antarctic course to approach
the U.S. from below.
I know of no American who did not shudder with apprehension when former
Defense Secretary McNamara announced that the Soviet Union had developed the FOBS
as a new weapon.
As for the SS-9, the Soviet Union began deploying the monster ICBM in
underground silos in 1966. We learned this only through our reconnaissance
satellites.
In my view, we must protect some of our Minuteman bases with the Safeguard
System if the United States is to maintain its deterrent strength as a preventive
of nuclear war.
To conclude otherwise is to assume that Soviet leaders in years ahead --
no matter what their identity and their mental and emotional makeup -- would never
entertain the notion of launching a first strike against the United States even
if they became convinced of the Soviet Union's nuclear superiority.
To rule out the Safeguard system, one would have to say to himself that
nuclear war could never occur under any circumstances.
Should there be those who are wedded to that view, then they must believe
that neither Soviet nor Red Chinese leaders would ever consider a first strike
against the United States.
Our Defense Department now estimates that the Red Chinese will have 20 to 30
intercontinental ballistic missiles by 1975 -- missiles that could hit the United
States. With its huge land mass and population of more than 700 million, Red
China might seriously consider it acceptable strategy to launch a nuclear strike
against the United States.
-4-
President Nixon has promised that the Safeguard ABM System will be reviewed
annually from three standpoints - the magnitude of the threat from the Soviet
Union, evaluation of the arms control talks we may be having with the Soviet Union,
and technological progress in research and development of defensive missiles.
It is the deterrent power of the United States that has avoided world war
in the decades since World War II. It was U.S. nuclear superiority that persuaded
the Soviet Union to remove intermediate range ballistic missiles from Cuba in 1962.
I think the way of strength is the way of peace. We need to be sufficiently
strong to keep the peace. And the Safeguard ABM system is necessary to give us
sufficient deterrent strength.
I would be remiss in my duty if I did not support the Safeguard ABM system
as a necessary measure to protect our national security. I am convinced there
is no alternative.
###
Office Copy
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
July 10, 1969
Statement by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, Republican leader, U.S. House of Representatives,
regarding overseas reductions in U.S. troops and civilian employes.
President Nixon's order withdrawing 14,900 military personnel from U.S.
bases overseas and reducing federal civilian employes overseas by 5,100 is
meaningful in terms of efficiency, budgetary savings and improvement in our
balance of payments situation.
The cutback does not weaken the U.S. stance abroad in any way. It simply
streamlines our overseas forces and staffs while cutting government costs.
It is important that the United States periodically review the numbers
and operations of its overseas personnel and trim away the fat. If this is not
done, our overseas staffs grow upon themselves and tend to become bloated.
The President has taken a needful step with his cutback order. It is
a proper and desirable action.
I would also applaud the agreement reached between our government and
the West German government under which the West Germans will buy more U.S. goods
to help offset international payments losses resulting from the stationing of
our troops in West Germany.
This agreement will be far more effective and beneficial as regards our
balance of payments situation than the pact which expired last June 30 and
primarily involved West German purchase of U.S. Treasury bonds.
# # #
House Halleries only 11:30 a.m. 1/29/71
Q Office Copy
NEWS
CONGRESSMAN
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
January 29, 1971
Rep. Gerald R. Ford, R-Grand Rapids, today urged "a full and complete"
congressional investigation of the crash of a B-52 bomber in Lake Michigan near
Charlevoix last Jan. 7.
Ford made the statement in response to a plea for such an investigation
from Peter W. Steketee, chairman of the West Michigan Environmental Action
Council with headquarters in Grand Rapids.
Steketee told Ford the plane apparently was using the Consumers Power
Company nuclear power plant at Big Rock, Mich., as a practice bombing target
at the time of the crash and was flying at an extremely low level. He termed
this "an extremely dangerous practice." Steketee speculated that if a B-52
should ever crash into the power plant the result could conceivably be a spread
of radiation and could be disastrous. He urged that all such planes be routed
away from nuclear power plants.
Ford told Steketee he agrees with his demand for an investigation and
said he urged the Air Force prior to the Charlevoix crash to alter the B-52
practice run route. Ford said he had acted at the request of Consumers Power.
He said the Air Force replied that the matter was "under consideration"
and that the efforts were being made to reroute the training runs. Ford said
the Air Force attitude appeared "cooperative.'
###
IIIII
U.S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE
REP. JOHN J. RHODES, (R.-ARIZ.) CHAIRMAN
1616 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
TELEPHONE 225-6168
10
93rd Congress
May 8, 1973
First Session
Statement Number 9
HOUSE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE STATEMENT ON H.R. 7447,
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1973
The House Republican Policy Committee supports the provision
of additional transfer authority of $430 million for the Department of
Defense in H.R. 7447, the Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1973.
The proposed transfer authority would permit the use of funds
from Procurement accounts to cover unanticipated costs related to currency
revaluation, subsistence, and activity in Southeast Asia. Denial of the
authority would require these costs to be financed completely from funds
earmarked for Operation, Maintenance and Personnel. This would cause a
re-ordering of priorities which, in turn, would require a general worldwide
curtailment of our defense efforts in areas other than Southeast Asia.
We cannot degrade the readiness of our armed forces, even for
a few months. The House Republican Policy Committee urges the approval
of the transfer authority of $430 million for the Department of Defense
provided by H.R. 7447, the Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1973.
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
June 21, 1973
Statement by House Republican Leader Gerald R. Ford
The signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Seven Principles
Agreement by President Nixon and Soviet leader Brezhnev is an event
of the greatest significance for the future of world peace.
There is good reason to believe that this agreement will
culminate by the end of next year in a U.S.-Soviet treaty that would
limit and reduce offensive nuclear weapons, a companion pact to last
year's agreements limiting defensive nuclear missiles and submarines.
President Nixon has led us to a most promising point in the
development of peaceful relations between the two superpowers of the
world. The words, a generation of peace, have become a phrase
that accurately sums up the prospect for the future of mankind.
###
U. S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPUBLICAN POLICY
COMMITTEE
REP. JOHN J. RHODES, (R.-ARIZ.) CHAIRMAN
1616 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
TELEPHONE 225-6168
10
93rd Congress
September 10, 1973
First Session
Statement No. 18
HOUSE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE STATEMENT ON H.R. 7645,
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1973
The House Republican Policy Committee opposes the passage of
H.R. 7645, the Department of State Appropriations Authorization Act of
1973, as reported by the Committee of Conference, unless Sections 10
and 13 thereof are deleted.
Section 10 would require advice and consent of the Senate or
approval by concurrent resolution of both Houses of any international
agreement "providing for the establishment of a military installation in
(a foreign) country at which units of the armed forces of the United
States are to be assigned to duty = Such a requirement would strike
at the authority of the President to negotiate and conclude inter-
national agreements and would raise practical difficulties by impairing
the ability of the President to respond quickly to international crises.
The Congress may and does actively participate in decisions to establish
and maintain military installations through its constitutional authority
to appropriate or deny necessary funds. Many agreements, however, involve
relatively minor issues and insignificant expenditures, and many are
designed as quick resolution of unforeseen but minor issues in larger
programs approved by the Congress.
(OVER)
- 2 -
Section 13 would provide an automatic cutoff of all authority
of the Department of State to obligate funds if any documents or other
materials of the Department requested by the Senate Foreign Relations
or House Foreign Affairs Committee are not delivered within thirty-five
days. This legislative attempt to restrict the authority and duty of
the President is of doubtful constitutionality. The requirement would
cripple the Department's ability to exert leadership in the foreign
affairs field; it would inhibit foreign officials from holding confidential
exchanges; it would limit innovative critical examinations essential
to the development of imaginative policies; it would result in sensitive
intelligence being withheld by other government agencies from the
State Department; and it would foster the release of secure personnel
files to public scrutiny. The enactment of this requirement into law
would be a grave and serious mistake.
Sections 10 and 13 of H.R. 7645, as reported by the Conference
Committee, propose intolerable limitations upon the constitutional
authority of the Chief Executive, limitations which the Congress should
oppose. If the Congress is genuinely desirous of eliminating the
present impasse of authorizations for the Department of State, these
provisions must be deleted. Unless such amendments are adopted, the
House Republican Policy Committee opposes approval of the Conference
Report On H.R. 7645, the Department of State Appropriations Authorization
Act of 1973.