Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
4525542
label
Ford Press Releases - Foreign Affairs, 1965-1967
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
4525542
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
Ford Press Releases - Foreign Affairs, 1965-1967
citationUrl
collections
Gerald R. Ford Congressional Papers
Press Releases Subject Files
subjects
China
Israel
Dominican Republic
Cuba
Republican National Committee (U.S.)
Foreign aid
International relations
Legislation
Middle East conflicts
United States-Soviet relations
Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Voyages and travels
iiifBase
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
4525542
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1967-08-31
month
8
year
1967
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1965-05-01
month
5
year
1965
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
url
mediaId
b9fad99b9b595475
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box D8, folder "Ford Press Releases - Foreign
Affairs, 1965-1967" of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at
the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box D8 of The Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
FOR THE SENATE:
THE JOINT SENATE-HOUSE
FOR THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES:
Everett M. Dirksen, Leader
Thomas H. Kuchel, Whip
REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
Gerald R. Ford,
Leader
Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Chr.
of the Policy Committee
Leslie C. Arends, Whip
Leverett Saltonstall, Chr.
Melvin R. Laird,
of the Conference
Press Release
Chr. of the Conference
Thruston B. Morton,
John J. Rhodes, Chr.
Chr. Republican
of the Policy Committee
Senatorial Committee
Issued following a
Clarence J. Brown,
Leadership Meeting
PRESIDING OFFICER:
Ranking Member
The Republican
Rules Committee
May 20, 1965
National Chairman
Bob Wilson,
Ray C. Bliss
Chr. Republican
Congressional Committee
STATEMENT BY SENATOR DIRKSEN:
From the time the President announced to Congressional leaders
that he had sent forces into the Dominican Republic to protect lives
and to thwart the danger of a Communist take-over in that country,
the Republicans in the Congress have given him their support.
Support of the President's action in the circumstances does not,
however, imply blanket approval of Administration policy toward
Latin America.
The Administration has been slow to recognize danger signals in
Latin America. It has permitted problems to grow to crisis propor-
tions before acting. It has been reluctant to provide leadership to
make the Organization of American States an effective agency for the
defense and development of the Western Hemisphere.
Even now, in its reaction to events in the Dominican Republic,
the Administration is not manifesting awareness of the extent and the
danger of Castro - exported Communist subversion in at least half a
dozen other American nations. In the past three years, many thou-
sand citizens of other Latin American countries have received para-
military and ideological training in Cuba and have been sent home to
carry on subversion, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare in Central and
South America. Since the end of November 1964, there has been re-
newed emphasis by Cuba on the use of violence to attain political
power, particularly in Venezuela, Colombia, and Guatemala. In
Guatemala, the activities of 500 terrorists and guerrillas led to
the establishment of a state of siege in February of this year. Haiti,
Panama, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Honduras are all announced targets
of Communist violence.
It 1s regrettable that the Administration did not move to head
off the new outbreak of subversion and violence when it was planned
at the Havana meeting of Latin American Communist leaders in November,
1964.
Clearly there is need now for vigorous and effective action by
the Organization of American States and by the individual American
nations to put an end to the current Castro offensive.
We urge the Administration to present such a plan of action to
the O.A.S. before the tragic drama of the Dominican Republic is re-
played in other L a tin American nations.
Room S-124 U.S. Capitol-CApitol 4-3121 Ex 3700
STAFF CONSULTANT: Robert Humphreys
STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE FORD
May 20, 1965
Today is the 63rd anniversary of Cuban independence. On May 20,
1902, Cuba assumed the status of an independent Republic with the
inauguration of its first president.
On this anniversary, we call for the reestablishment of Cuba's
independence. Since late 1960 the present government of Cuba has been
a military, economic, and political vassal of the Soviet Union. Today
thousands of foreign Communist military personnel remain on Cuban soil.
Cuba's rulers continue to serve the purposes of an alien system by
carrying on a campaign of terrorism, sabotage, subversion, and sporad-
ic warfare against their neighbors, disturbing the peace of the hemi-
sphere and threatening the security of all American nations.
The policy objective of the present administration toward the
Communist government of Cuba has been ambiguous. At times it has
been described as "to get rid of the Castro regime and of Soviet Com-
munist influence in Cuba." So Mr. Johnson declared at Midland, Texas,
on September 30, 1962. At other times it has been described as "to
insolate Cuba to frustrate 1ts efforts to destroy free governments
and to expose the weakness of Communism so that all can see." So it
was formulated by President Johnson on April 20, 1964.
The melancholy events in the Dominican Republic are a forceful
reminder that neither objective has been attained. Cuba has not been
isolated, nor is it rid of Castro and Soviet Communist influence.
Cuba is the breeding ground for Communist subversion throughout this
hemisphere.
President Johnson's recent statement that we "cannot permit the
establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemi
sphere" clouds the purposes of Administration policy toward Cuba still
further.
The Administration should fix clearly SO that all can see the
objective of its policy toward Cuba. The isolation of the Castro
regime and the prevention of the export of Communism from Cuba should
be pursued more vigorously as an immediate policy objective. But the
ultimate objective can be nothing less than the elimination of the
Communist government of Cuba and the restoration of independence under
a government freely chosen by the Cuban people.
This objective is dictated by policies subscribed to by all the
(More)
Rep. Ford (Continued)
nations of the hemisphere at Caracas in 1954. The Caracas Declaration
stated,
" the domination or control of the political institutions of
any American State by the international communist movement, extending
to this Hemisphere the political system of an extracontinental power,
would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence
of the American States, endangering the peace of America
If
In compliance with this doctrine, President Eisenhower said on
July 9, 1960, " Nor will the United States in conft rmity with its
treatyobligations, permit the establishment of a regime dominated by
international Communism in the Western Hemisphere."
IC is time to reaffirm this as our national purpose and the
purpose of the other American nations.
FOR THE SENATE:
THE JOINT SENATE-HOUSE
FOR THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES:
Everett M. Dirksen, Leader
Thomas H. Kuchel, Whip
REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
Gerald R. Ford,
Bourke
B.
Hickenlooper,
Chr.
Leader
of the Policy Committee
Leslie C. Arends, Whip
Leverett
Saltonstall,
Chr.
Melvin R. Laird,
of the Conference
Press Release
Chr. of the Conference
Thruston B. Morton,
John J. Rhodes, Chr.
Chr. Republican
of the Policy Committee
Senatorial Committee
Issued following a
Clarence J. Brown,
Leadership Meeting
PRESIDING OFFICER:
Ranking Member
The Republican
Rules Committee
May 20, 1965
National Chairman
Bob Wilson,
Ray C. Bliss
Chr. Republican
Congressional Committee
STATEMENT BY SENATOR DIRKSEN:
From the time the President announced to Congressional leaders
that he had sent forces into the Dominican Republic to protect lives
and to thwart the danger of a Communist take-over in that country,
the Republicans in the Congress have given him their support.
Support of the President's action in the circumstances does not,
however, imply blanket approval of Administration policy toward
Latin America.
The Administration has been slow to recognize danger signals in
Latin America. It has permitted problems to grow to crisis propor-
tions before acting. It has been reluctant to provide leadership to
make the Organization of American States an effective agency for the
defense and development of the Western Hemisphere.
Even now, in its reaction to events in the Dominican Republic,
the Administration is not manifesting awareness of the extent and the
danger of Castro exported Communist subversion in at least half a
dozen other American nations. In the past hree years, many thou-
sand citizens of other Latin American countries have received para-
military and ideological training in Cuba and have been sent home to
carry on subversion, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare in Central and
South America. Since the end of November 1964, there has been re-
newed emphasis by Cuba on the use of violence to attain political
power, particularly in Venezuela, Colombia, and Guatemala. In
Guatemala, the activities of 500 terrorists and guerrillas led to
the establishment of a state or siege in February of this year. Haiti,
Panama, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Honduras are all announced targets
of Communist violence.
It is regrettable that the Administration did not move to head
off the new outbreak of subversion and violence when it was planned
at the Havana meeting of Latin American Communist leaders in November,
1964.
Clearly there is need now for vigorous and effective action by
the Organization of American States and by the individual American
nations to put an end to the current Castro offensive.
We urge the Administration to present such a plan of action to
the O.A.S. before the tragic drama of the Dominican Republic is re-
played in other L a tin American nations.
Room S-124 U.S. Capitol-CApitol 4-3121 Ex 3700
STAFF CONSULTANT: Robert Humphreys
STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE FORD
May 20, 1965
-
Today is the 63rd anniversary of Cuban independence. On May 20,
1902, Cuba assumed the status of an independent Republic with the
inauguration of its first president.
On this anniversary, we call for the reestablishment of Cuba's
independence. Since late 1960 the present government of Cuba has been
a military, economic, and political vassal of the Soviet Union. Today
thousands of foreign Communist military personnel remain on Cuban soil.
Cuba's rulers continue to serve the purposes of an alien system by
carrying on a campaign of terrorism, sabotage, subversion, and sporad-
ic warfare against their neighbors, disturbing the peace of the hemi-
sphere and threatening the security of all American nations.
The policy objective of the present administration toward the
Communist government of Cuba has been ambiguous. At times it has
been described as "to get rid of the Castro regime and of Soviet Com-
munist influence in Cuba." So Mr. Johnson declared at Midland, Texas,
on September 30, 1962. At other times it has been described as "to
insolate Cuba to frustrate 15s efforts to destroy free governments
and to expose the weakness of Communism so that all can see." So it
was formulated by President Johnson on April 20, 1964.
The melancholy events in the Dominican Republic are a forceful
reminder that neither objective has been attained. Cuba has not been
isolated, nor is it rid of Castro and Soviet Communist influence.
Cuba is the breeding ground for Communist subversion throughout this
hemisphere.
President Johnson's recent statement that we "cannot permit the
establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemi
sphere" clouds the purposes of Administration policy toward Cuba still
further.
The Administration should fix clearly SO that all can see the
objective of its policy toward Cuba. The isolation of the Castro
regime and the prevention of the export of Communism from Cuba should
be pursued more vigorously as an immediate policy objective. But the
ultimate objective can be nothing less than the elimination of the
Communist government of Cuba and the restoration of independence under
a government freely chosen by the Cuban people.
This objective is dictated by policies subscribed to by all the
(More)
Rep. Ford (Continued)
nations of the hemisphere at Caracas in 1954. The Caracas Declaration
stated, " the domination or control of the political institutions of
any American State by the international communist movement, extending
to this Hemisphere the political system of an extracontinental power,
would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence
of the American States, endangering the peace of America
If
In compliance with this doctrine, President Eisenhower said on
July 9, 1960,
"
Nor will the United States in confc rmity with its
treatyobligations, permit the establishment of a regime dominated by
international Communism in the Western Hemisphere."
IC is time to reaffirm this as our national purpose and the
purpose of the other American nations.
Re: Foreign and
FOR THE SENATE:
FOR THE HOUSE
THE JOINT SENATE-HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES:
Everett M. Dirksen, Leader
Thomas H. Kuchel, Whip
REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
Gerald R. Ford, Leader
Leslie C. Arends, Whip
Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Chr.
of the Policy Committee
Melvin R. Laird,
Chr. of the Conference
Leverett Saltonstall, Chr.
Press Release
John J. Rhodes, Chr.
of the Conference
of the Policy Committee
Thruston B. Morton,
H. Allen Smith,
Chr. Republican
Ranking Member
Senatorial Committee
Rules Committee
Bob Wilson,
PRESIDING OFFICER:
Chr. Republican
Congressional Committee
The Republican
National Chairman
Issued following a
Charles E. Goodell,
Chr. Committee on
Ray C. Bliss
Leadership Meeting
Planning and Research
July 22, 1966
STATEMENT BY SENATOR DIRKSEN
IMMEDIATE RELEASE
The foreign aid debate in the House of Representatives last week
and the continuing debate in the Senate reflect increasingly not
merely the concern but the anger and the alarm of the American
people with regard to this program.
At the time of its inception in June of 1947, when our then
Secretary of State, the late General Marshall, stimulated a massive
program of financial assistance to war-torn Europe the need for and
the merit of the program were clear. It is no longer true in Europe
and in countless other nations around the world to whom the American
taxpayers' dollars have been funneled year after year after year.
During these past two decades more than 125 billions of our
peoples' money have been shipped abroad for the announced purpose of
stemming Communism, creating économic stability, encouraging repre-
sentative government and nourishing so-called underdeveloped nations.
Lately, these objectives have been poorly served. This global
dole must be curtailed! The time to start is NOW!
In my more detailed remarks to this end on the Senate Floor I
have offered not only what I believed to be a reliable and a responsible
criticism-in-detail with regard to the total foreign aid problem of
today but have added, in equal detail positive and constructive
suggestions for immediate and ultimate remedy of many of the program's
defects.
Getting dough out of Uncle Sam has become a way of life for the
rest of the world - a very happy way of life for many foreign nations
but a drain upon America's economic lifeblood that can no longer be
tolerated.
Room S-124 U.S. Capitol-CApitol 4-3121 Ex 3700
Staff Consultant - John B. Fisher
GERALD
SENATOR DIRKSEN
Page 2
Here at home, the General Accounting Office has compiled an
almost surgical dissection of the foreign aid program in recent years
which, if publicized in detail, would make not only our taxpayers
but even the angels weep.
Not only has it required weeks of painstaking effort to learn
the true facts about our foreign aid program which I have presented;
it is infinitely more difficult -- if not impossible -- to learn from
our alleged friends abroad just how they are spending our money,
since in countless instances they will not permit even an elementary
auditing of their books. How sharper than a serpent's tooth is an
ungrateful friend!
Despite America's extraordinary generosity, Communism continues
rampant over half the globe. We make no new friends and we are
losing old ones. I am reminded of an old rhyme which reads:
"When I had money, I had friends -
I loaned my money to my friends -
I asked my money of my friends -
And I lost my money and my friends!"
Therefore, our Question-of-the-Week:
Mr. President, Why are we losing
our money AND our friends?
STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE FORD
July 22, 1966
The budget, the President tells us, is in danger -- and he calls
upon Congress to make drastic cuts in it. He tells us that unless
this Democrat-controlled Congress curbs its excessive spending,
inflation is inevitable and that he will face the harsh choice of
imposing controls or asking for a tax increase.
The recklessly swollen budget which he presented to the Congress
is wholly his and his Administration's doing. The excessive spending
to which he alludes with alarm can be stopped, overnight, by a word
from him to his overwhelming Democratic majority in the Congress. Let
me remind the President and his Democratic troops in the Congress
that the Republicans have, for 18 months and more, been urging
drastic cuts in non-essential government spending.
The primary cause of the inflation which he now fears but which
every other American has felt for months is that excessive Federal
spending which from the first days of his Administration has been
planned, proposed, and pushed.
The alternatives for checking this current inflation are indeed
clear: a tax increase as the President intimated, wage and price
controls, or a truly effective reduction in non-essential Federal
spending. A reduction in non-essential Federal spending is the most
desirable and urgent. The President and his top-heavy Congressional
majority can do this at once if they have the will to do SO. Repub-
licans will continue vigorously to support responsible reductions in
non-essential Federal spending.
Senator Dirksen has made crystal clear, as have other Republicans
in both the Senate and the House, one wide-open area in which just
such a reduction in needless spending can be achieved -- that of
foreign aid.
Mounting evidence of waste in our foreign aid program in recent
years is startling and shocking.
It has been pinpointed and
dramatized repeatedly not alone by the Republican minority but by
the sound recommendations of such highly esteemed and wholly objective
private groups as the International Economic Policy Association and
REPRESENTATIVE FORD
Page 2
the Administration's own bipartisan Advisory Committee on Private
Enterprise in Foreign Aid.
1. Emphasis upon private investment projects; 2. increase in
our dollar earnings through Public Law 480; 3. far more selective
allocation of foreign aid; 4. emphasis on aid to "self-help" nations;
5. a re-examination of the financing activities of the international
lending institutions; 6. the imposing of a drastic new discipline
upon the Agency for International Development; 7. development of
these foreign nations' own resources; 8. a hard-headed, cold-eyed
demand that the nations to which we lend or grant funds meet their
obligations to us honorably and in full or be promptly cut off --
these are among the available, the very practical steps the Johnson-
Humphrey Administration and its Democratic majority in Congress can
take -- and can take NOW!
Therefore, our Question-of-the-Week:
Mr. President, Why are we losing
our money AND our friends?
Re: Nixon V. LBJ
FOR RELEASE ON : NOVEMBER 4, 1966
STATEMENT BY REP. GERALD R. FORD RE LBJ ATTACK ON NIXON
It is most regrettable that the President should make such a vicious
personal attack on Dick Nixon. All Mr. Nixon did was to raise legitimate
questions about our foreign policy.
Even more serious questions were raised about the Manila Conference
Conference column by the highly of November is that respected 3rd the President Mr. NEW YORK Reston TIMES and coke, his columnist, associates "The tragedy James at Manila of Reston the Manila really In a
made concessions that were not only generous but from the allied point of
view even dangerous."
The American people should have forthright answers from the White
House.
###
FROM THE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
IMMEDIATE RELEASE 4/6/67
OF THE CONGRESS
Next week the President of the United States will journey
to Punta del Este, Uruguay, for a "summit" meeting of the Organization
of American States. His announced objective will be to encourage and
help stimulate further meaningful action by our Latin American
neighbors toward economic and educational evelopment and political
stability.
We support programs of active cooperal ion with the peoples
of Latin America. We recognize the need for cooperation now and
in the future and also the need or United States assistance to be
accompanied by self-help and self-initiative and effective community
action by the recipients. We wish the President Godspeed and success
in his mission.
We call your attention also to the statement on Latin America by
the Republican National Coordinating Committee to be released Friday,
April 7, 1967.
GERALD R.FORD LIBRARY
[4/6/67] DL
FROM THE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
IMMEDIATE RELEASE
OF THE CONGRESS
Next week the President of the United States will journey
to Punta del Este, Uruguay, for a "summit" meeting of the Organization
of American States. His announced objective will be to encourage and
help stimulate further meaningful action by our Latin American
neighbors toward economic and educational development and political
stability.
We support programs of active cooperation with the peoples
of Latin America. We recognize the need for cooperation now and
in the future and also the need for United States assistance to be
accompanied by self-help and self-initiative and effective community
action by the recipients. We wish the President Godspeed and success
in his mission.
We call your attention also to the statement on Latin America by
the Republican National Coordinating Committee to be released Friday,
April 7, 1967.
COMMENTS BY GERALD R. FORD, TAKEN FROM THE "CONGRESSIONAL RECORD," MAY 23, 1967
THE GROWING CRISIS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST
(Mr. Gerald R. Ford asked and was given permission to address the House for one
minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, a grave situation has been developing in the
Middle East, and it has now become even more serious in view of the Soviet Union's
statement which appears to be a threat to intervene on the side of the Arab States.
I would urge that President Johnson take immediate steps to reestablish a
United Nations presence in this supercharged situation and to restrain all parties
from any premature action that could kindle a conflagration, whether small or
large. It is most unfortunate that Secretary General U Thant took it upon himself
last Thursday to dismantle the peacekeeping machinery without consulting either
the General Assembly or the seven nations which contributed to the U.N. Emergency
Force, solely upon the demand of President Nasser.
During Moscow's May Day celebration, only a few weeks ago, the Soviet Defense
Minister, Marshal Andrei Grechko, issued an order of the day accusing the United
States of "hatching sinister plots to spread agression" in other parts of the
world beyond Vietnam. Anyone who has studied Soviet tactics should have been fore-
warned that Moscow might be doing exactly what it was accusing its adversary of
plotting. In my judgment this may be a bold and reckless move on the part of the
Soviet Communist leaders to divert the attention of the United States and Western
Europe from the struggle in Southeast Asia.
Since the Russian military chief's May Day order, trouble instigated by
Communists has erupted in widely scattered areas of the globe--in the Sea of Japan,
in Korea, in Hong Kong, and now in the Middle East--with the most serious conse-
quences to the free world and to world peace.
This is a time that calls for cool thinking and resolute nerves. I hope and
pray that it is no more than a war of nerves that threatens us, and that President
Johnson will take this opportunity to strengthen and repair the unity among our
allies which has enabled the free world to weather such stomms before. However
grim the facts, I trust the President will take the American people into his confi-
dence before the situation worsens, so that we can all stand together in this time
of crisis.
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR RELEASE AT--
6:30 p.m., Tuesday, June 13, 1967
EXCERPTS FROM A SPEECH BY REP. GERALD R. FORD, R-MICH., HOUSE MINORITY LEADER,
AT A MEETING OF THE PHILADELPHIA REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE, PHILADELPHIA, PA.
Resolution of the Middle East crisis has produced a victory for the West.
To whom do we owe this fortuitous result? To the Johnson Administration? No,
not at all. The Administration's diplomatic moves were completely ineffective.
It was little Israel which saved itself and the West. The United States can
claim no credit. Neither can the United Nations. And to suggest that the Soviet
Union played the role of peacemaker is absolutely ridiculous.
Without one grain of partisanship, I must make the observation that the
United States simply "lucked out" in a situation which could have wrecked all of
our efforts at minimizing Soviet influence in the Middle East and preserving the
balance of power there.
It is little Israel--not the Johnson Administration--which has prevented the
Soviet Union from suddenly becoming the big power that calls the tune in the
Middle East.
It is because of little Israel--not the Johnson Administration--that the
Soviet Union has in fact suffered a serious loss of prestige in the Middle East.
Gallant little Israel has handed the Soviet Union a severe setback because
the Israelis displayed a courage which has been sadly lacking in the western
democracies in recent years.
The Johnson Administration succeeded in only one respect--that of establish-
ing a new credibility gap.
The Administration failed miserably in trying to get other maritime nations
to join with the United States in declaring the Gulf of Aqaba an international
waterway and moving to lift the blockade which was the direct cause of the war.
When the trustworthiness and the effectiveness of the American commitment to
oppose aggression against any Middle East nation crumbled, the entire American
policy in the Middle East crumbled with it. The Johnson Administration succeeded
in creating a credibility gap in that part of the world.
Americans were reluctant to risk getting into war in the Middle East while
500,000 of our men are fighting in Vietnam. I firmly believe the Middle East
(more)
-2-
crisis could have been resolved without war if the Administration had been on top
of the situation from the very beginning--if U Thant had not pulled
out the UN peacekeeping force on his own authority--if the United States and other
maritime nations had called Nasser's bluff on the blockade of Aqaba.
The Johnson Administration may now seek to revive its East-West Trade
proposals on the ground that the Soviet Union acted reasonably and with great
restraint in the Middle East crisis. This is just another Johnson Administration
pipe dream. The truth is the Soviet Union helped create the crisis.
The truth is that the Soviet Union later had no choice but to act reasonably
in the face of the swift and stunning Israeli military successes. The Soviet
Union opposed a UN cease-fire when it thought Egypt would prevail and supported a
cease-fire when it became obvious Israel was winning. The Soviets backed Egypt in
its war-provoking blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, branded Israel the aggressor and
now continues to condemn the Israelis.
It was not the Soviet Union which removed the danger of a Soviet-U.S.
confrontation in the Middle East. The Soviets in fact laid the groundwork for
just such a confrontation. It was the lightning-like swiftness of Israel's
victory over Egypt that dissolved the possibility of a direct Soviet-U.S. clash.
No credit is due the Johnson Administration for the West's victory in the
Middle East. No credit is due the Soviet Union for avoidance of a wider war.
We can only be thankful for the bravery shown the world by the Israelis. Other-
wise the result might have been total disaster.
Now this Nation must diligently seek a settlement of all the problems that
led to the brief Arab-Israeli War.
***
Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, after a visit to Vietnam in 1966,
observed that we had failed to tighten the noose on the Viet Cong. The
Administration record in its "war of measured response" speaks for itself:
Stalemate.
####
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
Friday, June 16, 1967
STATEMENT BY REP. GERALD R. FORD (R-MICH.), HOUSE MINORITY LEADER
Our great country has always been dedicated to humanitarian principles. All
Americans must have been profoundly moved, as I was, by recent news accounts and
photographs of helpless Arab soldiers abandoned by their governments and wander-
ing in the broiling desert sun. These men, surely, are not responsible for the
folly of their leaders nor deserving of slow and horrible death after defeat in
battle.
Therefore I applaud and support the step just announced by the White House,
offering American planes to airdrop water to these unfortunate castaways. Let us
hope that the Israeli and Egyptian governments will give their cooperation
promptly, before the grim desert sun makes our mission of mercy moot. Personally,
I would think emergency food and medical supplies as well as water should be pro-
vided.
While I remain adamantly opposed to the use of American aid to prop up such
demagogic and discredited regimes as Mr. Nasser's, I notified President Johnson
by telegram today of my warm endorsement of this humanitarian step which accords
with our highest religious teachings. Because it is moral and right, it is also
good international politics for the United States at this critical juncture in
Middle East and East-West relationships.
The text of my telegram follows:
Dear Mr. President:
I commend and support our government's offer of American aircraft
to try and save the stranded Arab soldiers in the Sinai desert. It
accords with our country's humanitarian and religious traditions and
effectively answers President Nasser's big lie on the role of American
planes in the recent war. My stated opposition to the use of American
aid to prop up Mr. Nasser's demagogic and discredited regime does not
preclude emergency measures to save soldiers it has abandoned in defeat.
If they live, they might prove a leaven of realism among the Egyptian
population to restrain future follies and threats to world peace. I am
advising the House of Representatives of my views. Respectfully,
Gerald R. Ford, M.C.
#HH
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
Friday, June 16, 1967
STATEMENT BY REP. GERALD R. FORD (R-MICH.), HOUSE MINORITY LEADER
Our great country has always been dedicated to humanitarian principles. All
Americans must have been profoundly moved, as I was, by recent news accounts and
photographs of helpless Arab soldiers abandoned by their governments and wander-
ing in the broiling desert sun. These men, surely, are not responsible for the
folly of their leaders nor deserving of slow and horrible death after defeat in
battle.
Therefore I applaud and support the step just announced by the White House,
offering American planes to airdrop water to these unfortunate castaways. Let us
hope that the Israeli and Egyptian governments will give their cooperation
promptly, before the grim desert sun makes our mission of mercy moot. Personally,
I would think emergency food and medical supplies as well as water should be pro-
vided.
While I remain adamantly opposed to the use of American aid to prop up such
demagogic and discredited regimes as Mr. Nasser's, I notified President Johnson
by telegram today of my warm endorsement of this humanitarian step which accords
with our highest religious teachings. Because it is moral and right, it is also
good international politics for the United States at this critical juncture in
Middle East and East-West relationships.
The text of my telegram follows:
Dear Mr. President:
I commend and support our government's offer of American aircraft
to try and save the stranded Arab soldiers in the Sinai desert. It
accords with our country's humanitarian and religious traditions and
effectively answers President Nasser's big lie on the role of American
planes in the recent war. My stated opposition to the use of American
aid to prop up Mr. Nasser's demagogic and discredited regime does not
preclude emergency measures to save soldiers it has abandoned in defeat.
If they live, they might prove a leaven of realism among the Egyptian
population to restrain future follies and threats to world peace. I am
advising the House of Representatives of my views. Respectfully,
Gerald R. Ford, M.C.
###
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
June 22, 1967
Information has come to me--confirmed by the State Department--that an
American food ship with a 27,000-ton cargo of grain bound for famine-stricken
India is trapped in the closed-down Suez Canal.
The ship is the tanker Observer, which was loaded with P.L. 480 milo, a
corn-like sorghum, about May 15. It has been held up in the Suez Canal since
June 5 when the six-day Arab-Israeli War broke out.
Third-country reports to the State Department say that seven ships have
been sunk at various points in the Suez Canal. News reports indicate that the
Egyptians themselves have sunk these ships and that they intend to keep the canal
closed for months.
Meantime, the government of India has sided with Egypt in the smoldering
Mideast crisis--and hungry crowds in West Bengal State are looting freight trains
and trucks carrying rice, wheat and other food.
The grain for India held up in the Suez Canal may be a small amount in terms
of the overall U.S. program of food for that starving nation but 27,000 tons of
milo would feed a great many people.
According to the State Department, officials at the Indian Embassy here want
to dispose in the Mideast of the grain aboard the Observer. These officials fear
the grain will spoil and be a total loss, the department said. The ship's owners
also want to get rid of the cargo and get the ship's crew out of Egypt. The State
Department has not yet taken a position on the matter. Although the Indians have
paid for the grain--in their own currency--our government's permission must be
obtained before the cargo can be removed from the ship.
It is the cruellest of irony that India should be deprived of 27,000 tons of
American surplus grain by a nation whose side she has taken in an international
dispute.
I would suggest the Indians reconsider their attitude toward the disputants
in the Mideast.
###
GERALD
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
--FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE--
July 10, 1967
Comment by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, R-Mich., on dispatch of U.S. Transport Planes
to Congo
The President appears to have acted without sufficient concern for the
possible consequences of the move.
The United States should not get into the position of playing fireman every
time incendiaries touch off a local conflagration somewhere in the world. The
lives of American youth are too precious to be risked in such casual fashion.
The President should respond in these instances only when the interests of
the United States are involved and only after proper consultation with the
Congress.
###
REPUBLICAN
REpublican NATiONAL COMMiTTEE
NATIONAL COMMINITY
1625 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
NATIONAL 8-6800
NEWS
FOR RELEASE
FRIDAY A.M.'s
August 4, 1967
The attached paper, "The Middle East--Crisis and Opportunity," was
approved by the Republican Coordinating Committee at its meeting in
Washington, July 24.
The paper is released by Republican National Chairman Ray C. Bliss
for publication in AM papers of Friday, August 4, 1967.
8/2/67
Uffire
FORD is LIBRARY
Adopted by
The Republican Coordinating Committee
July 24, 1967
Presented by
The Task Force on the Conduct of
Foreign Relations
THE MIDDLE EAST - CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY
Prepared under the direction of:
Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
1625 Eye Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
Presiding Officer: Ray C. Bliss, Chairman, Republican National Committee
Former President
Dwight D. Eisenhower
300 Carlisle Street
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania
Former Presidential Nominees
Barry Goldwater
(1964)
Thomas E. Dewey
(1944 & 1948)
Post Office Box 1601
40 Wall Street
Scottsdale, Arizona
New York, New York
Richard M. Nixon
(1960)
Alf M. Landon
(1936)
Nixon, Mudge, Rose,
National Bank of Topeka Building
Guthrie & Alexander
1001 Fillmore Street
20 Broad Street
Topeka, Kansas
New York, New York
Senate Leadership
Everett M. Dirksen
George Murphy, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Senatorial Comm.
Thomas H. Kuchel
Milton R. Young, Secretary
Minority Whip
Republican Conference
Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Chairman
Hugh Scott, Vice Chairman
Republican Policy Committee
National Republican Senatorial Comm.
Margaret Chase Smith, Chairman
Republican Conference
House Leadership
Gerald R. Ford
Bob Wilson, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Congressional Comm.
Leslie C. Arends
Charles E. Goodell, Chairman
Minority Whip
Planning and Research Committee
Melvin R. Laird, Chairman
Richard H. Poff, Secretary
Republican Conference
Republican Conference
John J. Rhodes, Chairman
William C. Cramer, Vice Chairman
Republican Policy Committee
Republican Conference
H. Allen Smith
Ranking Member of Rules Committee
(continued)
REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
continued
- 2 -
Representatives of the Republican Governors Association
John A. Love
Raymond P. Shafer
Governor of the State of Colorado
Governor of the Commonwealth
Denver, Colorado
of Pennsylvania
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
John A. Volpe
Governor of the Commonwealth
John H. Chafee
of Massachusetts
Governor of the State of
Boston, Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Providence, Rhode Island
George W. Romney
Governor of the State of Michigan
Nils A. Boe
Lansing, Michigan
Governor of the State of
South Dakota
Nelson A. Rockefeller
Pierre, South Dakota
Governor of the State of New York
Albany, New York
Daniel J. Evans
Governor of the State of Washington
Olympia, Washington
Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
Donald R. Ross, Vice Chairman
Republican National Committee
Republican National Committee
1625 Eye Street, Northwest
1406 Kiewit Plaza, Farnam at 36th
Washington, D. C. 20006
Omaha, Nebraska 68131
Mrs. C. Wayland Brooks, Assistant Chrmn.
Mrs. J. Willard Marriott, Vice Chrmn.
Republican National Committee
Republican National Committee
1625 Eye Street, Northwest
4500 Garfield Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20006
Washington, D. C. 20007
Mrs. Collis P. Moore, Vice Chairman
J. Drake Edens, Jr., Vice Chairman
Republican National Committee
Republican National Committee
Box 225
Post Office Box 9385
Moro, Oregon 97039
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
President of the Republican State Legislators Association
F. F. (Monte) Montgomery
Speaker of the House of Representatives
State of Oregon
Salem, Oregon
Robert L. L. McCormick, Staff Coordinator
Members of the Republican Coordinating Committee's Task Force on
the Conduct of Foreign Relations
Robert C. Hill, Chairman
United States Ambassador to Mexico, 1957-1961
David N. Rowe, Vice Chairman
Professor of Political Science, Yale University
Gordon Allott
United States Senator from Colorado
Robert Amory, Jr.
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1952-1962
John B. Anderson
Member of Congress from Illinois
Tim M. Babcock
Governor of the State of Montana
Frances P. Bolton
Member of Congress from Ohio
Arleigh A. Burke
Chief of United States Naval Operations, 1955-1961
Lucius D. Clay
General of the United States Army, Retired
Philip K. Crowe
United States Ambassador to Union of South Africa, 1959-1961
Joseph S. Farland
United States Ambassador to the Republic of Panama, 1960-1963
Paul Findley
Member of Congress from Illinois
Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen
Member of Congress from New Jersey
Ernest S. Griffith
Dean, School of International Service, American University, 1958-1965
Mrs. Cecil M. Harden
Republican National Committeewoman for Indiana
Joe Holt
Member of Congress from California, 1953-1959
Walter A. Judd
Member of Congress from Minnesota, 1943-1963
John D. Lodge
United States Ambassador to Spain, 1955-1961
Gerhart Niemeyer
Professor of Political Science. University of Notre Dame
Nicholas Nyaradi
Director of School of International Studies, Bradley University
Roderic L. O'Connor
Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs,
Department of State, 1957-1958
G. L. Ohrstrom, Jr.
Investment Banker
William W. Scranton
Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1963-1967
Richard B. Sellars
Republican National Committeeman for New Jersey
Robert Strausz-Hupe'
Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania
Kent B. Crane
Secretary to the Task Force
7/31/67
THE MIDDLE EAST - CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Comprehension of the current Middle Eastern problem requires, that it be
viewed as having two separate and distinct facets, both with long-term impli-
cations for the United States:
First, the basic Arab-Israeli conflict which
has resulted in three wars in the Middle East
in less than 20 years;
Second, the historic Russian drive, constant
under Czars and Commissars alike, to obtain a
controlling position in the Middle East -- a
traditional aim conforming to Soviet tactics
to create many trouble spots around the world
to confuse and confound the free world.
However, in the recent Arab-Israeli war, the proponents of Middle Eastern
instability (the Soviets and certain radical Arab clients) have suffered a
crushing defeat. The resulting situation affords an excellent opportunity to
the United States to work toward a lasting peace. This nation should not look
to others for initiative in this difficult and critical task.
The task is not impossible, but the Administration must move sensibly
and vigorously with policies appealing to moderate groups in every Middle Eastern
country. It is outside pressure that has generated much of the radical and
irresponsible leadership in the area; the United States now is positioned to
encourage moderate, responsible Arab and Jewish leaders to discard the self-
defeating politics of hatred and violence and to join in the pursuit of equitable,
long-term solutions.
The Republican Party recommends these proposals to meet the Middle East
situation:
-2-
II. REPUBLICAN RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The United States should exert its influence to secure a Middle East
peace settlement which will confirm Israel's right to live and prosper as an
independent nation.
Arab refusal to acknowledge permanent boundaries for Israel is an attitude
hardly exceptional in the Middle East.
Most Arab states and Israel have gained their independence only since World
War II. Ever since, difficulties over new boundaries have consumed the region.
Two "neutral zones" were created in the oil-rich Persian Gulf area to help separate
the oil-producing countries of Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The frontiers between
Saudi Arabia and the states on the southern periphery of the Arabian peninsula
are still undemarcated, and strife afflicts Yemen and Aden and threatens south
Arabia. Algeria has provoked border clashes with two of its peaceable neighbors,
Morocco and Tunisia. Morocco claims the entire country of Mauritania and adjacent
Spanish territories. For years the Kurds have been militantly agitating for an
independent state which would comprise lands detached from Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and
possibly Syria.
Clearly, a stable Middle East awaits the permanent solution of all such
boundary disputes, but most important of all is the Arab-Israeli dispute. These
border problems can be best resolved by the parties directly concerned, employing,
if necessary, the good offices of the United Nations or other third parties.
Stability and peace require the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to agree
upon permanent boundaries for Israel. Such territorial arrangements as are deter-
mined must provide security for all and permit the disengagement of opposing
military forces. The United States should be prepared to join other powers in
guaranteeing borders thus confirmed, in order to ensure the permanency of the
peace settlement.
-3-
2. The United States should insist on an international guarantee of
innocent passage through international waterways, including the Straits of
Tiran and the Suez Canal, as an inalienable right of all nations.
This guarantee would help to undergird the strategic and economic viability
of Israel, as well as the Arab states, and would remove a major source of conflict
in the Middle East.
This recommendation reaffirms an explicit Republican view, which was clearly
enunciated by President Eisenhower following the Arab-Israel war in 1956.
3. The United States should join with other nations in pressing for
international supervision of the holy places within the City of Jerusalem.
Circumstances must be created which will provide the best protection of,
and access to, the holy places so that freedom of religious worship in these
places will be assured to peoples of all faiths. The holy places should not
be the subject of political controversy. Their administration by a religious
council comprising all directly-affected faiths is one solution that should be
most carefully weighed.
4. As an essential part of a permanent settlement in the Middle East,
the United States should insist on, and aid in, the rehabilitation and resettle-
ment of the more than one million Palestine Arab refugees who have been displaced
over the past 20 years.
Since 1948, $625 million has been spent by the United Nation's Relief and Works
Agency (UNRWA) to provide simple subsistence to the Palestine Arab refugees. The
United States has voluntarily contributed $425 million, or more than two-thirds
of the total. The U.S.S.R., the strident champion of the Arabs, has never
contributed to this program.
-4-
Before there can be stability in the Middle East, a just and enduring solution
of the refugee problem must be found. As the leading contributor to refugee support,
the United States is uniquely situated to press powerfully for the permanent resettle-
ment of all Arab refugees. Israel, as well as the Arab states, must share substan-
tially in this effort. We, with other nations, should challenge the U.S.S.R. to
prove the sincerity of its professed concern for the welfare of the Arabs by match-
ing future U. S. contributions toward refugee rehabilitation.
5. The United States should propose a broad-scale development plan for
all Middle Eastern states which agree to live peacefully with their neighbors.
The Republican Party would not willingly see the rehabilitation of the
Middle East become a political issue in the United States. Our country's efforts
to bring peace to that war-torn region should continue to be bipartisan. In
this spirit we hope for vigorous Administration and widespread public support for
the bold and imaginative Eisenhower Plan to bring water, work and food to the
Middle East.
This constructive proposal would provide huge atomic plants to desalt sea
water, the first of which would produce as much fresh water as the entire Jordan
River system. This in turn would irrigate desert lands to support the Arab
refugees and bring yearned for prosperity to both Arab and Israeli territories.
The Eisenhower Plan is sufficiently far-reaching to encompass all Middle
Eastern states, and all should be invited to adhere. However, even if some should
decline, the Plan could be initiated pending their later cooperation. The con-
struction of the first plant would require the agreement of only two or three
countries, such as Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, or Lebanon. Once the immense
benefits of the vast increase in water supplies become evident for all to see,
it would be difficult for any Middle Eastern leader to deny his people the
opportunity to share in the prosperity being created.
-5-
6. The United States should make a determined effort to expose and
isolate the radical troublemakers in the Middle East. We should aid only
those states following non-aggressive, non-Communist policies.
Republicans oppose the continuation of past attempts to win over leftist
leaders by giving large amounts of aid. We believe our aid should not reward
our enemies and, in effect, punish our friends.
Nasser has received more aid ($1,133.3 million) than Israel ($1,104.5
million), and nearly double the aid given to any moderate Arab leader (Jordan
/
under King Hussein, for example, has received $572.8 million). By contrast,
the average aid given to the U.A.R. during the Eisenhower years was $31.6 million
per year. The average yearly aid to Nasser rose sharply during Democratic
Administrations to $172.1 million.
Republicans have long opposed such aid. On January 26, 1965, every House
2/
Republican voted to terminate all surplus food shipments to Nasser.
Moreover, at the outbreak of the Middle East war one-quarter of a. billion
3/
dollars was obligated for the seven Arab states which later broke relations with
the United States, partially as a result of Nasser's false charge that American
planes aided Israel. (See Appendix A, "The Administration Ignored Signs of Crisis
in the Middle East.") Republicans believe aid should not be reinstituted to any
of these countries until the United States decides to reestablish diplomatic
relations, restitution has been made for damages to American property and
people, and allegations, which falsely impugn the good name of the United
States before the world, have been retracted.
1/ Analysis of these aid figures is a complex matter. The per capita figures
are disparate -- and the periods, types, and currency and payment require-
ments varied widely.
2/ The New York Times, January 27, 1965.
3/ This figure includes some $200 million earmarked as aid and $51 million in
outstanding Export-Import Bank commitments.
-6-
7. The United States, in furtherance of peace in the Middle East,
should strive with other nations for agreed limitations on international arms
shipments to the area.
Limitation on the wasteful and destructive arms race was temporarily achieved
by the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1958. How-
ever, Soviet shipments of large amounts of sophisticated weapons to the radical
Arab states have thwarted arms controls. There should be unrelenting effort
to obtain Soviet adherence to a workable system of arms control in the Middle
East. Their cooperation could be a significant indication of Soviet desire for
world peace and East-West détente.
8. The United States' leadership and diplomacy must be alert, firm and
resourceful to prevent extension of Soviet imperialism into the Middle East
and North Africa.
The U.S.S.R. has suffered a serious reverse in terms of both power and
prestige in much of the Arab world. The United States should now apply its own
influence toward inhibiting the Soviets from again creating disturbances in this area.
Russian aspirations in the Middle East have not varied for centuries. Their
major aim has been to obtain direct access to warm water ports, and to the
Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. The emergence of many new nations in
the Middle East following World War II provided increased opportunities for
advancing Soviet interests. In 1945-46, the Soviet army moved into northern
Iran, but troops were finally withdrawn after the U. S. and the U. K. objected
in the United Nations. In 1947, as in 1877-78, the Soviets attempted to gain a
dominating position over the Turkish straits, and in 1946-47, they tried to
overthrow the Greek government. The United States responded decisively with its
Greek and Turkish aid programs.
-7-
Following the death of Stalin, the Soviets sought to by-pass the Middle
Eastern countries with which they share a common border and began cultivating
Arabs further to the south. Since then, Soviet aid to the radical states in
the Middle East has been dispensed on a massive scale. The U.A.R. alone has
received about one-sixth of total Soviet economic aid. If economic aid to
Algeria, Iraq, Syria, Somalia and Yemen is added, the total becomes
$1,824 million or nearly one-third of total Soviet economic aid. In addition,
Soviet military aid has clearly been on a massive scale.
Considering the traditional Russian goals and the vast Soviet military and
economic aid to the area, it is not surprising that the Soviets are profoundly
concerned over the results of the recent Middle East conflict.
One area of importance only incidentally affected by recent Arab-Israeli
battles is the Red Sea, the vital link between Europe, Asia, and much of
Africa. The Soviets are deeply involved in promoting instability long the Red
Sea coasts in an effort to dominate this key passage. Via Nasser, the Soviets
have supported a four-year war in Yemen; they are fomenting rebellion in Aden;
they are arming Somalia to stir trouble in the critical region of the African
Horn. It would seriously menace the Western position if Yemen and Aden were
allowed to come under the control of hostile elements, whether Egyptian or
Soviet. We believe the nation can rightly expect its leadership to have the
capability and responsibility to avoid such a tragedy -- a catastrophe for all
the free world should Soviet designs be allowed to succeed.
Appendix A
The Administration Ignored Signs of Crisis in the Middle East
1
Although Republicans reject categorically Arab and Soviet claims that the
2
United States was in any way involved in the Middle Eastern conflict, either
3
overtly or covertly, it is apparent that President Johnson's Administration
4
cannot avoid all responsiblity, or even some blame, for the events which have
5
taken place. In fact, it appears that the Johnson Administration was so devoid
6
of policy ideas on the Middle East that it could not have seriously affected
7
the situation even if it had wanted to.
8
The following points give some idea of how badly the White House misjudged
9
the Middle Eastern situation:
10
1) For the crucial three months preceding the crisis there was no United
11
States Ambassador to the Egyptian government. Moreover, the post of
12
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
13
was vacant from October 19, 1966 to April 7, 1967, a period of nearly
14
six months just preceding the crisis.
15
2) When the new American Ambassador to Cairo, Richard Nolte, arrived on
16
May 21 he was reported by the Baltimore Sun to have asked, "What crisis?"
17
when questioned by a correspondent at the Cairo airport. The Sun com-
18
ments that Nolte was simply reflecting the State Department's thinking,
19
and his bland remark showed how little Washington appreciated the gravity
20
of the situation even at that late date.
21
3) David G. Nes remained Charge d'Affaires of the American Embassy in Cairo
22
even after Nolte arrived, because the new Ambassador never had an oppor-
23
tunity to present his credentials to President Nasser before the war
24
started and diplomatic relations were broken. Nes, a senior career dip-
25
lomat, was so disturbed by Washington's lack of interest in the Mid-
26
dle Eastern situation that he took the almost unheard of step of complain- 27
ing to newsmen that his reports showing a crisis was developing had been
28
totally ignored by the Administration.
29
-1-
4) A resume of events which Nes reported but which he claimed Washington
1
ignored is highly instructive. Quotations are from the Baltimore Sun:
2
"Beginning in January Nes was convinced that Nasser was plan-
3
ning a major confrontation with Israel and the West
The real
4
tip-off to Nasser's intentions was a series of violently anti-
5
American articles published in Cairo's authoritative A1 Ahram
6
early in March at about the time (U.S.) Ambassador Lucius Battle
7
left without a successor being named.
8
"Mohammed Heikal, editor of A1 Ahram and a confidant of
9
Nasser, reviewed United States-Egyptian relations from 1949 to
10
date. The Heikal articles indicated Nasser was headed for and
11
wanted a confrontation with Israel and the West."
12
"Nasser apparently tested U.S. intentions in early April by
13
precipitating the incident which resulted in the removal of the
14
U.S. AID mission from Taiz in Egyptian-controlled Yemen
15
"The final clue to his (Nasser's) intentions was his May 2
16
speech in which he characterized America as the enemy of Egypt."
17
Once the opposing sides had mobilized their troops, and even after hostil-
18
ities had broken out, the actions of the Johnson Administration indicated that
19
our efforts were poorly coordinated. Although it was perfectly obvious from the
20
nature of the policy statements and military preparations on both
21
sides that war was imminent, the Administration floundered about with a
22
make-shift attempt to organize maritime powers of the world into
23
a group which might convince Nasser to back down from his Gulf of Aqaba block-
24
ade.
25
Moreover, the Administration failed to see beyond the impending crisis and
26
appraise the needs for a permanent settlement in the Middle East. Instead of
27
adopting a flexible position, the President stated on May 23, 1967, that
28
"the United States is firmly commited to the support of
29
the political independence and territorial integrity of
30
all the nations of that area."
31
This unilateral declaration even went beyond the 1950 Tripartite Declaration in
32
which the United States, the United Kingdom and France guaranteed boundaries
33
but only on the condition that peace treaties were signed.
34
-2-
During the first days of the conflict the Administration revealed its
1
confusion by changing its stand on the war three times in one day. First,
2
the State Department announced that the United States was "neutral in thought,
3
word and deed." Second, a White House Press Secretary stated that this
4
statement was "not a formal declaration of neutrality." Third and finally,
5
Dean Rusk issued a clarification stating that by "neutral" we meant we were
6
not going to become a belligerent, but this did not mean to imply that we
7
were indifferent to the outcome of the war.
8
Beyond expressing great interest in Middle Eastern events,
9
the Administration never said whether our sympathies were with Israel or the
10
Arabs. By contrast, the declared Soviet position was 100 percent pro-Arab.
11
By subsequent action, the Administration has as much as admitted that it
12
still has no policy for the Middle East: a special committee has been established
13
to study the Middle East, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy has had to be recalled from
14
private life to direct this group's work.
15
Republicans wish to underscore our long-established opinion that the
16
government would do better to rely on the judgment of our professional diplomats,
17
who are familiar with the area in question, than to organize a new committee
18
every time a new crisis develops.
19
-3-
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
Remarks by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, R-Mich., on the Floor of the House of
Representatives, Tuesday, August 8, 1967.
Mr. Speaker, I rise after much reflection to express my grave misgivings,
which have been growing for many months, about the way the war in Vietnam is
going, I believe my concern is shared by many millions of my countrymen, and I
know it is shared by those responsible for fighting the war in Vietnam.
My troubled thoughts were brought into sharper focus last Thursday by the
President's message asking for a 10% Federal income tax surcharge. Most of the
comment on this floor and in the press centered initially on his tax increase
proposals. For my part I reiterated that President Johnson still has not made
a convincing case for higher taxes.
But with his tax message, as an additional and emotionally compelling
argument, the President announced his decision to "authorize an increase of at
least 45,000 in the number of men to be sent to Vietnam this fiscal year."
This will swell the total to 525,000 Americans, not counting those in
adjacent areas, surpassing our peak menpower commitment to the Korean War.
Vietnam is a major war, and has become an American war.
At the end of 1963, when President Johnson succeeded to the Presidency, the
United States had approximately 16,000 men in Vietnam. Only 109 had been killed
in action and about 500 wounded.
By grim coincidence, the Pentagon released the latest casualty figures on
the same day we received the President's tax increase message. The toll of
Americans (as of July 29) now stands at 87,000 12,000 dead and 75,000 wounded.
(Figures rounded.)
Mr. Speaker, I blame nobody but the Communist enemy for these sad statistics.
I have supported the President and our country from the outset and to this hour.
I have heard myself branded a hawk, and worse, for counseling firmness against
Communist aggression and using America's awesome arsenal of conventional arms
to compel a swift and sure peace.
But I am troubled, as I think most Americans are troubled. Recent surveys
show that more than half of our people are not satisfied with the way the war
in Vietnam is being conducted.
(more)
GERALOR FORD LIBRARY
-2-
Mr. Speaker, why are we talking about money when we should be talking about
men? The essential element in President Johnson's tax increase message, I
submit, is not higher revenues but human lives -- not whether every American
should live better but whether hundreds and thousands of Americans are going
to live at all.
This is not an academic exercise with computers. This involves the finest
of our future leaders. This is a question crying for bold leadership and
political courage of the highest order -- even the courage to admit past policies
have been woefully wrong.
I believe everyone in this House would willingly vote any level of taxes
and the American people would willingly pay them if they were convinced it would
bring the Vietnam War to an end. But as I do not believe the grave challenges
we face at home can be countered simply by pouring out more and more money,
neither do I believe the graver challenge in Southeast Asia can be met merely
by pouring in more and more men and by these brave men pouring out more and more
blood.
I am troubled, Mr. Speaker, that the President's ordering 45,000 more
Americans to Vietnam is almost taken for granted, so hardened have we become to
these creeping commitments. I am troubled that the only apparent result of
Gen. Taylor's and Mr. Clifford's circuit of our Pacific allies, besides arrang-
ing another Asian Summit show, was a promise of some 3,000 to 15,000 South Korean
reservists "to release American troops for combat duty" in Vietnam. Shouldn't
it be the other way around?
President Johnson himself set the groundrules for a great debate about our
nation's priorities and goals. I accept them. I hope others will join. In
his tax increase message, Mr. Johnson said:
"This nation has taken a solemn pledge that its sons and brothers engaged
in the conflict (in Vietnam) shall never lack all the help, all the arms, and
all the equipment essential for their mission and for their very lives. America
must and will honor that pledge. It is for this reason that expenditures for
Vietnam -- subject as they are to the variable demands of military operations --
may now exceed our earlier estimates."
After outlining his higher tax plans, the President added:
"The inconveniences this demand imposes are small when measured against
the contribution of a Marine on patrol in a sweltering jungle, or an airman
flying through perilous skies, or a soldier 10,000 miles from home waiting to
(more)
-3-
join his outfit on the line."
Who can question such a comparison?
But the question we may ask -- the question I must ask -- is this:
Why, and how long, must United States Marines patrol that sweltering jungle?
Why, and how long, must U.S. Navy and Air Force pilots brave increasingly deadly
skies because the flow of sophisticated Soviet weapons has not been stopped?
Why, and how long, must American soldiers -- now nearly half a million -- wait
10,000 miles from home to meet and match Asian enemies man to man, body for body?
Mr. Speaker, we must ask another question: Why are we pulling our best
punches in Vietnam?
Is there no end, no other answer except more men, more men, more men?
Of course we will give our fighting men all they need to defend their lives
and carry out their mission. But what is their mission?
Is there any clear, coherent and credible military plan for bringing this
bloody business to a conclusion?
Certainly there are such plans. Our ablest military leaders would be
unbelievably derilict not to have developed a variety of alternative strategies
based on the situation and sound military experience. But up to now they have
not been allowed to put their plans to a real test, or worse, their plans have
been tried piecemeal, in the same senseless way Americans have been fed piecemeal
from 16,000 to 525,000 into this peninsular war, under such high-level restrictions
as to void their validity.
General Eisenhower recently stated pointedly that a "war of gradualism"
cannot be won. The result of our "war of gradualism" against North Vietnam has
been the equivalent buildup of the enemy forces on the ground and the accelerated
hardening of his defenses.
Mr. Speaker, when you have to change a tire, you tighten every lug as hard
as you can. If you only tighten one, or tighten them unevenly, your car will
go on wobbling down the road and wind up in a ditch.
What is especially dishonest is secretly to forbid effective strategic
action and publicly portray it as an honest try. Then, when expected results
are not forthcoming, to belittle the effort and its backers. This is worse than
dishonest -- for meanwhile brave men have died in vain.
I point no accusing finger. I do not want to be partisan or personal.
This is not a Democratic war nor a Republican war but an American war, as all our
wars have been once we were in them. My party has, in fact, stated its support
(more)
-4-
of the war in Vietnam more explicitly and muted its public criticism and dissent
more successfully than the President's party.
Republican policy on Vietnam generally has been based on a very precise
and wholly nonpartisan statement which I helped to draft and to which I have
consistently subscribed for the past 20 months. It was issued December 13, 1965
by the National Republican Coordinating Committee and its main points were
these:
1. "Our purpose is
to repel Communist aggression, to minimize American
and Vietnamese casualties, and to bring about a swift and secure peace."
(Emphasis mine.)
2. "There is a growing danger that the United States is becoming involved
in an endless
land war in Southeast Asia (which) would be to the advantage
of the Communists."
3. "Our first objective should be to impose a Kennedy-type (sea) quarantine
on North Vietnam."
4. "To accomplish our objectives we also recommend the maximum use of
American conventional air and sea power against significant military targets."
Mr. Speaker, when these reasoned, responsible and limited military measures
were urged by the leaders of the loyal opposition party some 20 months ago,
American casualties in Vietnam stood at less than 1500 dead and 6500 wounded;
a total of 8000 as compared to 87,000 today.
Now we are told, and we scarcely question, the President's decision to
dispatch another 10% reinforcement of our ground troops -- 45,000 more men to
Vietnam -- hardly enough to be noticed except by those called and their loved
ones. Surely this is what a nationally respected Washington column has branded
"Horror on the Installment Plan." (Reston, May 14, 1967, NYT)
Reviewing our December 1965 policy statement I am compelled to some tragic
and troubling conclusions.
First, under policies which the President has just pledged to continue
substantially unchanged, our purpose of minimizing American casualties has failed.
Our purpose of securing a swift peace has failed, because it was never tried.
And our purpose of repelling Communist aggression remains, at best, a dubious
stalemate and deadly duel of attrition.
Second, our warning against involvement in a disadvantageous land war in
Asia has gone unheeded. It now is academic. Half a million Americans are deeply
involved, more than 10,000 have lost their lives in the intervening 20 months,
(more)
-5-
and the only answer present leadership has to offer is to order 45,000 more into
battle.
Third, our primary recommendation for a quarantine, or any meaningful
form of seapower sanction against Haiphong harbor, has been rejected. The enemy
meanwhile has had time to develop and defend alternative overland and air supply
routes bristling with imported Soviet weapons. After many months the refitting
of the battleship U.S.S. New Jersey has just been authorized, and will take
almost a year to finish. Meanwhile the enemy has installed in heavy concrete
emplacements along the North Vietnamese coast what may well be Soviet surface-
to-surface missiles capable of sinking a warship at 100-mile ranges.
Fourth, only one small portion of one of our recommendations, the use of
conventional American air and sea power against military targets, has been even
belatedly tried. On June 29, 1966, President Johnson permitted air attacks on
some, but not all, of North Vietnam's petroleum storage depots. As Secretary of
Defense McNamara admitted at the time, the enemy already was well advanced on a
major dispersion plan. But to this day, 13 months later, only about one-fourth
of the known oil storage targets in North Vietnam have been hit by American air
strikes and a significant percentage remain officially forbidden.
Yes, Mr. Speaker, I am deeply troubled. Is this any way to run a war
while casualties increase ten-fold? Is it really necessary, will it do any real
good, to send another 45,000 men to Vietnam?
Before leaving our 20-month old recommendations, largely rejected, let me
stress two other key words in that Republican statement. Nobody was or is
urging "escalation." It was specific about conventional weapons -- the kind we
have been dropping on jungles and individual trucks in prodigious tonnages -- and
about military targets, not indiscriminate bombing of civilians or cities. But
the Communists, as they proved in Korea and other wars, are quite capable of
shielding their most strategic targets with their own women and children. It is
horrible, but effective.
The very word "escalation" has become a bugaboo and its military meaning
abused. The scope of American involvement in Vietnam was really escalated or
enlarged in February 1965 when President Johnson approved the bombing of North
Vietnam. I accept the President's own definition (August 29, 1964) during the
1964 election campaign when he told Americans:
"I have had advice to load our planes with bombs and to drop them on certain
areas that I think would enlarge the war, and result in our committing a good
(more)
-6-
many American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys
of Asia to help protect their own land. And for that reason I haven't chosen to
enlarge the war."
Mr. Speaker, I supported the President when he reversed this decision six
months later. I again supported him when he removed his earlier restraints on
bombing some enemy oil storage depots in June, 1966. Neither of these steps
brought Russian or Red Chinese intervention. What they did bring was a loud
Communist clamor for unconditional U.S. cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam,
and much propaganda about civilian casualties.
Thus we already have accepted whatever real risks or propaganda punishment
might be incurred in maximum use of American conventional sea and air power
against significant military targets in North Vietnam. The whole world thinks
that is what we are doing. The American people have been and still are being led
to believe that is what we are doing. Most Americans wonder why North Vietnam
has not been totally destroyed. They remember what conventional bombing did to
Tokyo and Berlin, to London and Warsaw. They wonder what can be left in North
Vietnam worth bombing.
Over this past weekend, Mr. Speaker, there have been successive reports of
massive American air strikes against North Vietnam. On Saturday we read: "197
Missions Set Record for Raids on North Vietnam." On Sunday it was "U.S. Carrier
Jets Meet Heavy Fire in Hanoi Region," and on Monday, "U.S. Raids North 178 Times
in Day." It also was announced we have lost 636 U.S. planes over North Vietnam.
But when one reads the official spokesmen's account of what was accomplished
on these air strikes, nothing has changed. Strategic bombers from Guam dropped
their bombs on North Vietnamese weapons positions, base camps, storage areas and
trails. U.S. pilots attacked troop concentrations, three artillery pieces, one
bunker, two armored vehicles, one tank, five trucks. Other strikes hit an oil
storage depot, 28 trucks, 10 undescribed buildings, one warehouse area, one
bridge. These are all the details given for what is touted as the biggest American
air assault of the Vietnam War.
Mr. Speaker, we are still pulling our best punch in North Vietnam.
The distinguished first Secretary of the Air Force, Senator Symington,
recently expressed his exasperation over accounts of U.S. bombing of North
Vietnamese targets by saying "Somebody is making available to the press a vast
amount of misinformation.'
(more)
-7-
I believe it is high time the American people knew the truth.
Would the American people believe that in mid-1967, after two and one-half
years of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam -- an area about the sine of Michigan --
only 3 out of every 10 significant military targets had ever been struck by
U.S. air power?
Why are we still pulling our sirpower punch?
Would the American people believe that when Secretary McNamara made his
ninth visit to Vietnam last month, publicly opining that U.S. forces there might
be used more effectively, nearly half the identified top priority targets in
North Vietnam were officially off-limits to air attack under high-level orders
from Washington?
Why are we still pulling our airpower punch?
Would the American people believe that more than a hundred vital fixed
enemy positions h North Vietnam, including most of the air defense control
centers that have accounted for more than 600 U.S. planes, most of his major
airfields and all of his naval facilities, could not be attacked under Washington
orders?
Why are we still pulling our airpower punch?
Would the American people believe that despite the much-publicized and
prayerful Presidential decision to allow bombing of some oil depots a year ago,
about three-fourths of the enemy's petroleum storage targets had not yet come
under attack? Or that despite frequent news reports of raids on power plants,
roughly one-third of North Vietnam's total power targets and all enemy hydro-
electric generating facilities were still forbidden targets by orders from on
high.
Why are we still pulling our air power punch?
Would the American people believe that 60 percent of the key targets that
make up North Vietnam's transportation network were immune from our air attack?
That only about one-fourth of these priority transport targets, one-third of his
railroad facilities and bridges had ever been attacked? That all seaport targets
and canal locks were off-limits? That most of the enemy's repair shops could not
be hit?
Why are we still pulling our airpower punch?
Would the American people believe that high-level directives for more than
two years prevented American airmen from hitting 5 out of 6 of North Vietnam's
key industrial targets? That however primitive, nearly 90% of the targets in
the enemy's war-making industrial base remained unscathed?
(more)
-8-
Would Americans believe that even in the category of purely military
facilities, North Vietnamese army, navy, air force and defense installations,
more than two-thirds of the total targets never had been attacked? That only
ammunition dumps have been significantly hit? That almost half of these
military targets remained officially forbidden by high-level policy restraints?
Mr. Speaker, why are we pulling our airpower punch?
Contrary to the calculated public impression, the real argument at the
highest levels of our government which took Mr. McNamara to Saigon last month
and twice brought Gen. Westmoreland to Washington has not been whether to send
250,000 men, or 100,000 men, or 45,000 men, or 20,000 men to Vietnam. It is
high time the American people knew what the real issue was.
The real issue, Mr. Speaker, was whether we really have any hope of winning
the Vietnam war, in the sense of meaningful and concerted military pressure
that could force the enemy to the negotiating table, or not. If not, I can see
no justification for sending one more American over there, let alone 45,000.
Perhaps we all have been diverted in recent weeks, by the Middle East crisis
and the violence in our cities, from the moment of truth that is confronting
this nation on our future course in Vietnam. But the straws have been in the
wind.
On July 24, at the height of the Detroit riots, the New York Times reported
from obviously authoritative Washington sources that "U.S. Won't Modify Vietnam
Bombing." Predictably, it reported President Johnson as firmly rejecting both
pleas for expanding air strikes by approving new targets and counter-proposals
to restrict bombing to the southern zone of North Vietnam.
On August 1 one of our own colleagues from California, one of the
Administration's sharpest war critics on the other side of the aisle (Mr. Brown)
said in Los Angeles that the latest "agonizing reappraisal" in the White House
had been resolved.
"Temporarily at least the President will follow his customary practice of
going down the middle, making no change in the bombing policy, probably until
after the September 3 election in Vietnam," the gentleman forecast.
On the same day Columnist Joseph Kraft in the Washington Post complained
that "nowhere is the assertion that a specified effort continued over a
particular time ought to yield a defined result. The Defense Secretary talks of
progress, but does not say progress toward what. As a result there is no good
measure for asserting what the United States is doing in Vietnam."
"Maybe the President has some scheme for getting the country out of the war
(more)
-9-
as invisibly as he got it into the war," this columnist continued. "Maybe there
is a program for applying military pressure until the other side breaks. Maybe
there is a plan for negotiations after the elections in South Vietnam next month.
"But none of us can know that. On the contrary, all we can see is a shell
game," Mr. Kraft concluded.
Mr. Speaker, I have quoted others who, while not always in agreement with me,
voice the same gnawing doubts I feel. Yet in his tax increase message last week,
President Johnson only confirmed our worst fears. He revealed no recent change
in his policies or his plans. On the contrary, he took pains to stress that his
words about the Viet-Nam War last January "are even more true today."
The President repeated his bleak estimate that "we face more cost, more loss,
and more agony." He reiterated that nearly half a million Americans "have
deprived the Communist enemy of victory" and that the enemy "can no longer succeed
on the battlefield." He did not say our pressure on the enemy would be intensi-
fied or increased, only this:
"I must say to you that our pressure must be sustained -- and will be
sustained -- until he realizes that the war he started is costing him more than
he can ever gain. I know of no strategy more likely to attain that end than the
strategy of 'accumulating slowly, but inexorably, every kind of material resource'
-- 'of laboriously teaching troops the very element of their trade.' That, and
patience -- and I mean a great deal of patience."
Again I ask: why are we pulling our airpower punch?
Our Navy and Air Force have clear superiority in the air over North Vietnam
and its coastal areas. They have the weapons and resources they need. They
know "the very elements of their trades" superbly. Must we accept as inevitable
that the only way to fight this war is within the territory of South Vietnam,
matching the enemy body for body, bayonet for bayonet, grenade for grenade?
It is one thing to deprive the enemy of victory. It is one thing to say he
can no longer succeed. It is one thing to increase his cost of continuing the
war. Cannot Ho Chi Minh claim he has done the same to us?
Can we match the Asian Communists even in patience?
I for one am running short of patience, Mr. Speaker. I would like to believe
that the President has been misled or misinformed, that with all his aides and
advisors he has been unable to obtain the evidence which I know is available to
him as it is to me.
In his tax increase message President Johnson concluded that "the test before
(more)
10
whether we have the will and the courage to match our
commitments."
Mr. James Reston, commenting in Sunday's New York Times, says this:
"The unsolved problem, obvious for a very long time, which Lyndon Johnson
will not face and which the people intuitively understand or seem to understand,
is the problem of priority."
I believe the test of will and courage is not the people's, but the
President's. I believe that ending the war in Vietnam must have the very
highest of national priorities, now.
Without this, we shall continue to wallow and weave and wobble in what
General Eisenhower called "as nasty a mess as we have ever been in." Neither
more men, nor more money, nor more material will do any good unless there is
more will and more courage at the top.
Who knowsbetter than Gan. Eisenhower that there can be only one course
when a nation resorts to force of arms: to give the war first priority among
national aims; to wage it efficiently and with minimum bloodshed an brutalization
of one's own people; to hit hard enough and convincingly enough to bring it to
an early end. The tiny nation of Israel just reaffirmed this axiom of war.
Have we abandoned it? Why are we pulling our airpower punch?
Mr. Speaker, I hope that the apparent step-up in air attacks over North
Vietnam over the past few days signals a reversal of past mistakes, that targets
of real strategic significance will shortly be struck, and that before the
weather turns bad for another long season this will really cripple the enemy's
warmaking capability. I hope this, but the President has only promised to
sustain the same inadequate level of pressure permitted in the past.
Would Americans believe, Mr. Speaker, that during all of 1966, handcuffed
by such secret restraints, brave American airmen flew more than 100,000 combat
missions over North Vietnam without attacking one of these significant strategic
targets? Would they believe that under this policy, apparently unchanged, only
about 1000 strikes were directed against top priority pressure points during
1966, while 279 U.S. planes were lost?
Can military morale be sustained under such circumstances? Can peace ever
te won this way?
I am not a military expert, but I have full confidence in many dedicated
Americans who are, and in the facts that support their deep and patriotic concern.
I believe the American people deserve to be told the truth about Vietnam. There
(more)
11
is no need to conceal such information from the enemy, unless it be to deceive
one's own countrymen.
The enemy in North Vietnam knows where his vital targets are. He knows
which have been attacked and which enjoy privileged sanctuary. He knows many
of his most vital and vulnerable strategic assets have been spared. Ho Chi Minh
probably asks himself: Why are the Americans pulling their airpower punch?
Mr. Speaker, I do not know the answer. I doubt that Ho Chi Minh knows the
answer. I hope he does not interpret it as proof of America's lack of will and
courage. I hope it does not encourage him psychologically to prolong the
sluaghter as it surely enables him to continue militarily. It is inhuman even
to an enemy to hack him to death by inches.
I do not want to wait until the September 1967 elections in South Vietnam
to start ending this war.
I do not want to wait until the 1968 elections in the United States to bring
this war to an end.
If bringing peace to Vietnam and bringing half a million Americans home alive
would ensure President Johnson's re-election by a landslide, I would gladly pay
that price.
I don't think the President has made a convineing case for a tax increase.
Let us debate that another day. Even less, in view of the evidence I have, has
the Commander-in-Chief made a convincing case for sending 45,000 more troops to
fight a ground war in Viet-Nam.
It is my earnest plea that he will reconsider.
REPUBLICAN
REpublican NATiONAL COMMiTTEE
INVOICE IONAL COMMITTEE
1625 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
NATIONAL 8-6800
NEWS
FOR RELEASE
MONDAY AM's
August 14, 1967
SWEEPING REFORMS IN FOREIGN AID
RECOMMENDED BY REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
The Republican Coordinating Committee recommended today a far-reaching
16-point program for overhauling foreign aid and declared that assistance "should
not ordinarily" be extended to nations that show continued hostility to the United
States or that give military aid to its enemies in ietnam.
In a 23-page report adopted at its meeting in Washington, D.C., July 24, the
GOP leadership group recommended basic reforms which it believed would reduce
abuse and waste in the foreign aid programs and make the more rea istic and
effective.
The document, released today by Republican National Chairman Ray C. Bliss,
stressed such key factors as self-help efforts on the part of nations receiving
aid, more technical assistance rather than large loans, extending United States
agricultural knowledge and techniques to countries in need, reliance on private
enterprise, care not to bolster corrupt regimes, the need for projects that reach
the masses, and concentrating aid in nations of speci importance to the United
States.
The Coordinating Committee declared that, "while not making aid conditional
upon support for our foreign policy, aid should not ordinarily be forthcoming to":
--Nations "whose heads of state (like Nassar) engage in continual intemperate
abuse of the United States."
-more-
GERALD FORD VIDRANT
-2-
--Nations "which give military aid to our enemies in Vietnam or which
engage in military aggression."
--Nations "which, in contravention of international law, harass American
citizens engaged in commerce, or confiscate American-owned property without fair
compensation."
"Aid and comfort," the Committee said, "should not be given by the U.S. to
those who consistently help our enemies or the enemies of other free men. Nor
should aid be given to those who rattle swords or engage in aggression.
"If private representation to the nation's leaders does not produce results,
the Voice of America, in certain instances, might make this fact clear to the
people of a country.
"This does not mean that like Robespierre, Hitler or Stalin we should insist
upon support for our foreign policy in all its aspects. We are dealing with in-
dependent nations and a measure of demonstrated independence from us in certain
matters is often a political necessity for their leaders."
The report adopted by the Coordinating Committee was prepared by a subcommittee
of the Task Force on the Conduct of Foreign Relations headed by Ernest Griffith,
former Dean of American University in Washington. The Chairman of the Task Force
is former Ambassador Robert C. Hill.
Recalling that the Republican Party had always "endorsed the purposes of
foreign aid," and had always promoted ideas aimed at making aid programs more
effective, the Coordinating Committee said:
"Republicans believe that it is again time for innovation and that the methods
used in administering the aid program today fall far short of what the people have
a right to expect."
-more-
-3-
The Committee, which represents the top leadership of the Republican Party,
pointed out that more than $117 billion in assistance has been extended to more
than 100 nations in the 20 years that the aid program has been in operation. It
said:
"We look forward to the eventual termination of all grants in aid and toward
the time in which the normal processes of trade, production and loans will carry
the burden of development."
Vietnam was classed by the Committee as "a special case." The Committee said:
"There are many reasons for our involvement, and the search for order and
stability is but one among many. It is self-evident to all of us that, if and
when peace, security and stability are attained in Vietnam, our national interest
will be greatly enhanced all over the world. It is also clear that in attaining
such peace, security and stability, large-scale economic and technical, as well
as military, aid will be necessary."
The Committee said: "No aid should be extended without commensurate self-help
on the part of those aided." It said that in this connection "the following
activities have been grossly under-emphasized."
Community development, involving the "active participation of people at the
village 'and town level." The Committee named rural cooperatives as an example,
and said "hundreds and even thousands of communities in Latin America, Pakistan,
and elswhere are engaged in cooperative self-help," and that often the least
costly projects are among the most successful.
--Utilization at home of capital funds now exported by nationals of the
countries aided. The Committee recalled an estimate that as much as $17 billion
of indigenous capital is at present invested abroad by Latin-American nationals.
-more-
-4-
--Family planning. In this connection, the Committee stressed the need for
population control, and said that for many nations population increases in excess
of 2.5 per cent a year likely will exceed the practicable annual gains in gross
national agricultural production.
Declaring that many nations are losing ground in the race between population
and food production, the Committee said these nations "must meet this problem."
The Committee added:
"We can cooperate technically and financially, but only a determined effort
on their part to check their population growth can really do the job. At its
present rate of growth, the world's population will double in less than 30 years.
No such increase in food production is in sight."
The Coordinating Committee said that, in seeking to aid the world's hungry,
more emphasis should be placed on the use of United States agricultural technology
and marketing and credit know-how, which the Communists have never been able to
challenge.
Stressing the value of private enterprise as encouragement to development,
the Committee said this requires "a more favorable climate in the nations concerned,"
and that "we on our part must be more ready to share controls with foreign nationals"
and to take other cooperative measures.
The Committee said: "Evidence that technical assistance is often a better
stimulant to growth than large-scale capital transfers should be seriously examined,
particularly in the light of the United States' balance of payments problem."
Other recommendations by the Coordinating Committee:
--Regional marketing plans which would give small developing nations wider
markets for their products should be explored.
-more-
-5-
--Special attention should be given situations "in which substantial aid is
forthcoming from other nations, and in which we are asked to cooperate."
--Means of increasing the earning capacities of developing nations should
be explored.
--The role of the United States ambassador as chief of mission should be
strengthened.
--The techniques and insights of the social sciences should be employed
upon development problems and projects.
--Continued emphasis should be placed on securing qualified personnel to
administer aid.
--More attention should be paid in the United States to a realistic evaluation
of what the aid program actually is accomplishing, and in this respect both the
Executive and Legislative branches of the Government should broaden their super-
vision over the aid program.
- --Generalizations should be avoided, as each nation presents a distinct
problem.
The Committee said: "If we can help to set the developing nations squarely
on the road to prosperity, our trade with them will inevitably increase."
8/8/67
Adopted by
The Republican Coordinating Committee
July 24, 1967
Presented by
The Task Force on the Conduct of Foreign Relations
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
Prepared under the direction of:
Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
1625 Eye Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
Presiding Officer: Ray C. Bliss, Chairman, Republican National Committee
Former President
Dwight D. Eisenhower
300 Carlisle Street
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania
Former Presidential Nominees
Barry Goldwater
(1964)
Thomas E. Dewey
(1944 & 1948)
Post Office Box 1601
40 Wall Street
Scottsdale, Arizona
New York, New York
Richard M. Nixon
(1960)
Alf M. Landon
(1936)
Nixon, Mudge, Rose,
National Bank of Topeka Building
Guthrie & Alexander
1001 Fillmore Street
20 Broad Street
Topeka, Kansas
New York, New York
Senate Leadership
Everett M. Dirksen
George Murphy, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Senatorial Comm.
Thomas H. Kuchel
Milton R. Young, Secretary
Minority Whip
Republican Conference
Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Chairman
Hugh Scott, Vice Chairman
Republican Policy Committee
National Republican Senatorial Comm.
Margaret Chase Smith, Chairman
Republican Conference
House Leadership
Gerald R. Ford
Bob Wilson, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Congressional Comm.
Leslie C. Arends
Charles E. Goodell, Chairman
Minority Whip
Planning and Research Committee
Melvin R. Laird, Chairman
Richard H. Poff, Secretary
Republican Conference
Republican Conference
John J. Rhodes, Chairman
William C. Cramer, Vice Chairman
Republican Policy Committee
Republican Conference
H. Allen Smith
Ranking Member of Rules Committee
(continued)
REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
continued
- 2 -
Representatives of the Republican Governors Association
John A. Love
Raymond P. Shafer
Governor of the State of Colorado
Governor of the Commonwealth
Denver, Colorado
of Pennsylvania
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
John A. Volpe
Governor of the Commonwealth
John H. Chafee
of Massachusetts
Governor of the State of
Boston, Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Providence, Rhode Island
George W. Romney
Governor of the State of Michigan
Nils A. Boe
Lansing, Michigan
Governor of the State of
South Dakota
Nelson A. Rockefeller
Pierre, South Dakota
Governor of the State of New York
Albany, New York
Daniel J. Evans
Governor of the State of Washington
Olympia, Washington
Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
Donald R. Ross, Vice Chairman
Republican National Committee
Republican National Committee
1625 Eye Street, Northwest
1406 Kiewit Plaza, Farnam at 36th
Washington, D. C. 20006
Omaha, Nebraska 68131
Mrs. C. Wayland Brooks, Assistant Chrmn.
Mrs. J. Willard Marriott, Vice Chrmn.
Republican National Committee
Republican National Committee
1625 Eye Street, Northwest
4500 Garfield Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20006
Washington, D. C. 20007
Mrs. Collis P. Moore, Vice Chairman
J. Drake Edens, Jr., Vice Chairman
Republican National Committee
Republican National Committee
Box 225
Post Office Box 9385
Moro, Oregon 97039
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
President of the Republican State Legislators Association
F. F. (Monte) Montgomery
Speaker of the House of Representatives
State of Oregon
Salem, Oregon
Robert L. L. McCormick, Staff Coordinator
Members of the Republican Coordinating Committee's Task Force on
the Conduct of Foreign Relations
Robert C. Hill, Chairman
United States Ambassador to Mexico, 1957-1961
David N. Rowe, Vice Chairman
Professor of Political Science, Yale University
Gordon Allott
United States Senator from Colorado
Robert Amory, Jr.
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1952-1962
John B. Anderson
Member of Congress from Illinois
Tim M. Babcock
Governor of the State of Montana
Frances P. Bolton
Member of Congress from Ohio
Arleigh A. Burke
Chief of United States Naval Operations, 1955-1961
Lucius D. Clay
General of the United States Army, Retired
Philip K. Crowe
United States Ambassador to Union of South Africa, 1959-1961
Joseph S. Farland
United States Ambassador to the Republic of Panama, 1960-1963
Paul Findley
Member of Congress from Illinois
Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen
Member of Congress from New Jersey
Ernest S. Griffith
Dean, School of International Service, American University, 1958-1965
Mrs. Cecil M. Harden
Republican National Committeewoman for Indiana
Joe Holt
Member of Congress from California, 1953-1959
Walter A. Judd
Member of Congress from Minnesota, 1943-1963
John D. Lodge
United States Ambassador to Spain, 1955-1961
Gerhart Niemeyer
Professor of Political Science. University of Notre Dame
Nicholas Nyaradi
Director of School of International Studies, Bradley University
Roderic L. 0' Connor
Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs,
Department of State, 1957-1958
G. L. Ohrstrom, Jr.
Investment Banker
William W. Scranton
Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1963-1967
Richard B. Sellars
Republican National Committeeman for New Jersey
Robert Strausz-Hupe'
Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania
Kent B. Crane
Secretary to the Task Force
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
The Cost of U. S. Foreign Assistance
The post-war efforts of the United States Government to assist other nations
of the globe are now twenty years old.
During that period -- from July 1, 1946 through June 30, 1966 -- the United
States provided more than $117 billion to over 100 foreign nations. This aid
ranged in amount from one hundred thousand dollars to the African state of
Gambia to $9.5 billion to France. (Appendix A is a listing of these expen-
ditures since June 1, 1946.)
The foreign aid program today involves major annual expenditures of funds.
In the fiscal year ended June 30, 1966, foreign aid expenditures totalled $3.4
billion -- some 3.1 percent of the total Federal Budget. To this amount should
be added the agricultural surpluses distributed abroad, loans by the U. S.
Government's Export-Import Bank and the U. S. portion of funds loaned by various
multilateral agencies.
The Problem's Magnitude
The economic gap between the United States and the developing nations is
increasing every year. The per capita Gross National Product (GNP) of the United
States for 1966 was $3,648. For the same year, that of India was $104; Indonesia
$70; Nigeria $117; Bolivia $149 -- an average of $110 for the four. The gap: $3,538.
The United States per capita GNP in 1960 was $2,993; for the same other four
nations it averaged $97. The gap: $2,896.
This gap, in thus widening from $2,896 to $3,538, over six years, increased
by 22.2 percent.
-2-
Our GNP has gone up 21.9 percent since 1960; theirs 13.4 percent. Today,
their GNP as a percentage of ours is 3.0 percent, in 1960 it was 3.3 percent.
This is the situation -- in spite of all the foreign aid efforts of ourselves
and others.
We must recognize that neither the U. S., nor all the prospering powers
of the world combined for that matter, can solve all the world's economic pro-
blems. Such is the stark magnitude of the problem presented to the world in
general, and especially to the United States as its wealthiest nation.
American Attitudes Toward Foreign Aid
Support for the principles of foreign aid, private or public, lies deep
within our framework of national tradition. Americans responded to Belgian
Relief in 1914, the Tokyo earthquake in 1923, and the Arno River flood of 1966
with equal alacrity.
The $117 billion spent by the U. S. Government since 1946 speaks for itself.
Just as surely, Americans recognize that serious flaws exists in our present methods,
and in the response or lack of response of others to these methods. Republicans
believe we should be able to buy more aid and development for much less money.
We cannot abandon the goals; we cannot continue present activities without
major changes.
Republicans Have Always Favored Sensible Forms of Foreign Aid
In many instances, American programs of assistance to foreign nations and
peoples have proved enormously worthwhile; and often Republican leadership made
these successes possible.
The program of relief to Europe after World War I, led by Herbert Hoover,
rescued whole nations from the clutches of famine; nor have the Finns forgotten
-3-
the aid directed to them under Mr. Hoover in 1940. The UNRRA program, whose
first director was the former Republican Mayor of New York City, Fiorello H.
La Guardia, saved millions of lives after World War II.
The Point Four and Marshall Plan programs, of prime importance in the post-
war reconstruction of Europe, would never have come into existence without the
approval and support of the Republican 80th Congress.
The Peace Corps and Food-for-Peace concepts were legally incorporated
into our aid program by the Republican 83rd Congress under the leadership of
President Eisenhower. The International Voluntary Service idea of 1953 was
simply enlarged and renamed Peace Corps by the Democrats. The program of dis-
tributing agricultural surpluses abroad also began in 1953 under Public Law 480
and was merely renamed Food-for-Peace by the Democrats.
The military aid program was a major element in the alliance system
fashioned under the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy.
Even the recent special emphasis status for Latin America stems from the Bogota
meeting of Western Hemisphere heads of state chaired by President Eisenhower.
The enabling legislation for special emphasis aid to Latin America was passed
in 1960 during the Eisenhower Administration. Again the Democrats have developed
no new ideas -- they have simply added the name Alliance for Progress.
Thus it is clear that the Republican Party has always endorsed the purposes
of foreign aid.
Moreover, we have always promoted new ideas and changes in the aid program
aimed at making the large amounts of official capital spent abroad more effective.
Republicans believe that it is again time for innovation and that the methods
used in administering the aid program today fall far short of what the people
have a right to expect.
-4-
PURPOSES OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
The Republican Party supports the following five purposes of foreign
economic aid:
(1) The promotion of peace, security, and stability abroad in our own
national interest.
To a peace-loving nation such as the United States, security and stability
throughout the free and the uncommitted worlds are in our national interest as
well as theirs.
Where domestic economic and political frustrations pile up in the nations
of these worlds, resentful leaders seek foreign enemies to explain domestic failures.
Wars, near-wars, and armaments are costly -- to us as well as to them. Hence,
much of our aid should be directed toward cooperation in securing national
security and stability. Peace is not guaranteed thereby, but the scales are
weighted in its direction. Much of our aid has been and should continue to be
directed toward those nations which are most likely to cooperate in building up
internal order, especially when pointed toward increasing freedom and prosperity.
Korea, the Republic of China, Iran, Turkey, Tunisia, Chile will serve as examples.
All of these -- as with all nations which are in similar stages of development --
have areas of instability, but their chances of progress toward economic and
political maturity have demonstrably been aided by our cooperation. We should
continue such cooperation.
Vietnam is a special case. There are many reasons for our involvement, and
the search for order and stability is but one among many. It is self-evident to
all of us, that if and when peace, security and stability are attained in Vietnam,
our national interest will be greatly advanced all over the world. It is also
clear that in attaining such peace, security and stability, large-scale economic
and technical, as well as military, aid will be necessary.
-5-
(2) The promotion of prosperity in other nations as an aid to prosperity
at home.
It is well known that prosperity increases trade; that most of our trade,
both exports and imports, is with the prosperous nations. Of our total exports
last year, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Japan and Western Europe
accounted for $13.5 billion or about two-thirds of our exports.
As nations increase in prosperity, their purchases from us likewise increase:
they consume even more than they compete. For example, Japan, with a per capita
income of $93 in 1935, bought $225.8 million from us. In 1966, with a per capita
income of $922, it bought $2.9 billion. During the same 30 years, Mexico's
figures were respectively $61 and $66.4 million in 1935, and $470 and $1.7 billion
in 1966. Iran's were $50 and $23.3 million in 1935, and $220 and $83.7 million
in 1966. Venezuela's were $92 and $125.7 million in 1935, and $895 and $1.1
billion in 1966.
If we can help to set the developing nations squarely on the road to prosperity,
our trade with them will inevitably increase.
(3) The attempt to narrow the dangerous gulf between the "haves" and the
"have nots. "
The gap between the Gross National Products (GNP's) of the "haves" and the
"have nots" is increasing dramatically. Despite all foreign aid efforts to date,
the figures at the beginning of this paper indicate that the magnitude of this
problem has been increasing, rather than decreasing, during the 1960's. Attempt-
ing to narrow this gap is a matter of conscience as well as sound policy.
-6-
In the event of a great disaster, our people have always been ready to
respond generously. However, here we are dealing with a long-range situation
in which a single gift from our wealth is not the answer. What is needed is
the wise use of a portion of our growing annual increment in those situations
in which a permanent gain in the productivity of the "have nots" will result.
What is also needed -- needed more perhaps than our money, machines, food sur-
pluses or technical know-how -- is the infusion of our economic philosophy,
with its stress on freedom of opportunity and incentive, which has generated
the spectacular growth in the "have" nations.
As people nurtured in the Judeo-Christian humanitarian tradition, we are
impelled to help others less fortunate than ourselves. Our churches and
synagogues, our schools and colleges are the strongest supporters of this
approach.
(4) The demonstration that the free world can give a more satisfying,
prosperous life than Communism.
Clearly we are anti-Communist. Clearly the Communist way of life outrages
our deep love of freedom and our religious faith. Yet these great values are
not universally shared in the form in which we hold them. Where corrupt govern-
ments, exploiting landowners, and greedy money-lenders are able to bleed their
people, Communism has all too strong an appeal. It is for us in such circum-
stances to demonstrate that alternatives which include freedom as a goal can
do better than either reaction or Communism.
The people in the Republic
of China on Taiwan are dramatically outperforming the regimented Chinese on the
mainland. In scores of other developing nations -- India, Pakistan, Indonesia,
Nigeria, Brazil -- a crucial drama is being played out. If these nations fail,
-7-
it should not be because we denied them assistance. Ours is an affirmative
approach -- to build on what there is, with our eyes fixed steadily on the
end result.
(5) The spread of cooperation and friendly partnership among freedom-
loving nations.
We must encourage other developed nations to increase their assistance
to the "have nots." We should be prepared to cooperate with other "have"
nations in establishing priorities and plans for large projects in develop-
ing countries. For long term aid in support of major development schemes,
cooperation would be increased and U. S. costs reduced by devising consortiums
composed of other non-Communist donors.
The spirit of cooperation must also be shared by those we would aid. The
developing partnerships should not be viewed as being one sided, for the aided
nations have much to give us while working with us for a peaceful world. They
can enrich us with their culture. They can help our students overseas. Above
all, they can and must take the necessary cooperative steps within their own
boundaries to develop and spread the will to work with the West toward mutually
beneficial goals. There are values in such partnerships which pay dividends.
in peace and understanding to all concerned.
-8-
PRINCIPLES AND METHODS
Discouragement and erosion of support for foreign aid have come about, not
initially because of disagreement with these purposes, but because of mounting
evidence of waste, misuse, and downright failure in far too many cases. It is
both easy and fashionable to attack foreign aid itself because of these fail-
ures. In some instances, expectations have been too great; in others, the
recipients themselves have been largely to blame; in still others, administra-
tive short-comings on our part are responsible. Not all of these latter are
blameworthy, except in retrospect, for the foreign aid program itself was
essentially a great experiment.
However, Republicans believe that the United States should attempt to
improve its aid program based on the evidence deriving from past
experience. Unfortunately, successive Democratic administrations have by and
large failed to understand that the amazing and rapid success of the Marshall
Plan could not be quickly duplicated among peoples who have not had in their
history the experience of industrialization or the social conditions making
for progress. Yesterday's problems in Europe are not the same as today's pro-
blems in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The disappointing results of the
Alliance for Progress bear adequate testimony to this -- so far, people's
expectations, rather than their living standards, are often the only thing
which have been raised.
It is obvious that promises of much publicized development programs, if
not fulfilled, can be positively dangerous to the fragile social structure of
developing nations. Therefore, we must realize that the development methods of
the late 1960's must be different in many ways from the reconstruction methods
The Alliance's basic goal was very appropriately stated in human terms -- to
increase per capita income not less than 2.5 percent per year over the next 10
years. At the half-way point in 1966 only 7 of 19 countries had managed to meet
this goal, and they represent slightly less than 30 percent of Latin America's
total population.
-9-
used in Europe in the late 1940's. One crucial point is that the time span
involved will be far longer; recipients must be told this rather than being
given glib promises about what the future can bring.
It appears that the U. S. Government is learning these things the hard
way. It is no service to the objectives of foreign aid to gloss over these
difficulties and failures. However, we believe that such problems will yield to
diagnosis, given the necessary realism in analyzing their principal causes.
Therefore, the Republican Party attaches special importance to the follow-
ing methods and principles, the failures to apply which have accounted for
most of the justified criticism of aid to date. It pledges itself to their
vigorous application.
(1) No aid should be extended without commensurate self-help effort on
the part of those aided. In this connection, the following activities have been
grossly under-emphasized.
(a) Community development, enlisting the active participation of
people at the village and town level. Rural cooperatives are
an example, even though they challenge existing local power
structures. Such power structures often involve, not only the
landlords and politicians, but also the bankers and other money
lenders and at times even the religious leaders. Obstacles of
this character have been noticeable in nations as diverse as
Turkey, India, Brazil, the Philippines.
Painfully but surely, with many mistakes but with many
successes, hundreds and even thousands of communities in Latin
America, Pakistan, and elsewhere are engaged in cooperative
self-help. Often the least costly projects financially are
-10-
among the most successful. Leadership may be local, A.I.D.,
or Peace Corps. A modest knowledge of accounting is obviously
necessary, but even more important is the capacity for dedi-
cated realistic service that recognizes that permanent benefits
can only arise from ultimate local responsibility.
Over-enthusiasm can bring premature multiplication of such
projects, as in Peru; but in Peru also can be found some of the
greatest successes. Wherever the local effort is most hopeful,
aid, however modest, of a financial and technical nature should,
where practicable, be forthcoming. This "grass roots" development
of attitudes is far more productive in the long run future of a
nation than many a grandiose project.
(b) Utilization at home of capital funds now exported by nationals
of the countries aided. It is reliably estimated that billions,
some say perhaps as much as $17 billion, of indigenous capital
is presently invested abroad by Latin American nationals.
This sum may be more than the total U. S. aid to these same nations
since 1945. The late Prime Minister of one of the Asian coun-
tries aided was found to have a vast fortune banked abroad at
the time of his death -- an amount perhaps equivalent to the
total economic and military aid annually extended by us to his
country.
It is not enough merely to criticize these wealthy people;
nor perhaps should we penalize their rank-and-file citizens
therefore. Local people often have the same fears about
investing in their own economies as our capitalists have.
-11-
Inflation, instability, corruption, fears of confiscation
all take their toll. On the other hand, it is neither justifiable
nor possible to bail out nations which are unable or unwilling
to create the necessary conditions for investment. Perhaps a
combination of taxing exports of capital, joint guarantees or
insurance of a substantial portion of investment at home by their
governments and ours, together with quiet but persistent pressure
for a slow but sure improvement of business practices and climate,
may turn the tide.
(c) Family planning. The export of American agricultural surpluses,
and even progress in international agricultural development, are
often at best simply "buying time." Population increases in
excess of 2.5 percent a year are likely to equal or exceed the
practicable annual gains in gross national agricultural production
for many nations. India, the United Arab Republic, Brazil, Indo-
nesia will serve as examples. In Latin America the population
increased 17 percent between 1960 and 1965 while their food pro-
duction increased only 10 percent. Thus many countries are
actually losing ground.
In some fashion these and other nations similarly situated
must meet this problem. We can cooperate technically and
financially, but only a determined effort on their part to check
their population growth can really do the job. At its present
rate of growth, the world's population will double in less than
30 years. No such increase in food production is in sight.
-12-
Even the United States with its diminishing grain surpluses
could not meet the needs of the single nation of India at its
present rate of population growth and need for more than two
or three years longer.
(2) The spread of American agricultural knowledge and techniques should be
emphasized. The great majority of the world's people are poorly nourished and
the Communist system has repeatedly demonstrated it is unable to meet this
challenge. As Professor Don Paarlberg has said, "Agricultural capacity is an
asset which we have, which our friends need and which our rivals lack. " He
suggests we move more decisively in attempting to help the world's hungry people
by putting more emphasis on technical aid designed to exploit our agricultural
technology, capabilities in fertilizers, insecticides and food processing indus-
tries, and agricultural business know-how, especially in developing credit and
marketing facilities.
In this connection, we must instill in the recipients the idea that the
distribution of American agricultural surpluses is an emergency, rather than a
routine, measure. Where necessary they should be asked to agree to improve their
own agricultural capacity as a pre-requisite for receiving Food-for-Peace ship-
ments. All too often in the past the provision of our surplus food has inter-
fered with market forces which otherwise would have encouraged agricultural
production and has thus fostered the continuance of foolish, centralized planning --
usually aimed at building uneconomic industries as in India.
(3) We should rely more on private enterprise to encourage development
abroad. This requires a more favorable climate in the nations concerned.
Threats of nationalization, confiscatory taxation, undue limitations on interest
rates, general hostility to investors from other nations, and the lack of native
managerial ability do not encourage the influx of private capital. We on our
-13-
part must be more ready to share controls with foreign nationals, more ready
to impart our skills and techniques to them so as to stimulate indigenous
investment capable of competing, more willing to accept lower immediate returns
in anticipation of a fair and profitable return over a longer period. Puerto
Rico's progress under Operation Bootstrap is an outstanding example of what can
be accomplished when a liberal private investment climate is created in a
developing area.
(4) Special care should be taken to avoid aid being used to bolster
corrupt and self-perpetuating oligarchies. No error on our part has been more
exploited by the Communists than this. There are the obvious examples, and they
have been far from exceptional. Where corruption has been a way of life and
where oligarchies, military and otherwise, are the general rule, the dilemma of
how to reach the poor man at the bottom is a cruel one. The acid test is whether
the benefits are really reaching the masses of the people in increasing measure --
and are not disassociated from the United States as a source. Constant, unrelent-
ing pressure toward reform in these matters may be labelled "interference" or
"aid with strings attached," but there is no other defensible and permanent
answer. Situations will increasingly arise in which aid should be reduced or
completely cut off pending reform.
(5) We should explore the economic viability of regional marketing plans
which will give small developing nations wider markets for their products. The
success of the Central American Common Market illustrates possibilities for
similar modest groupings in parts of Africa and elsewhere in Latin America. By
extending bilateral aid to individual countries participating in such
cooperatively-planned efforts, we can promote the economic viability of many
of the smaller nations, at least until such time as they prove themselves willing
to go beyond joint planning to closer economic or even political association.
-14-
Extending U. S. bilateral aid to a country which has agreed with its
neighbors on what type of development each will undertake in order to safeguard
against duplication in a small market area, such as Central America, is quite a
different matter from trying to force nations together which have different
aspirations and cultural backgrounds. In this connection, Republicans believe
the Administration's plan, as outlined in the Korry Report, of trying to force
newly independent and highly nationalistic African states into regional group-
ings as a pre-requisite for receiving American aid is unrealistic. Moreover,
trying to give aid to an amorphous regional grouping cannot possibly garner as
much credit for the U. S. as can direct bilateral aid.
Naturally we expect developing countries to place emphasis on productive
efficiency so that they can quickly develop the ability to compete in world
markets. They gain little by simply widening the area in which protected
industries are sustained behind high tariffs or other controls.
(6) More emphasis should be placed on projects that will visibly reach
the masses of people. Land reform accompanied by marketing cooperatives (as in
Chile), land regrouping (as in the Republic of China), and collective availability
of up-to-date agricultural machinery and credit are cases in point. Under such
conditions, there would be encouragement to greater productivity. Simple roads
to market towns, as in Panama, will often mean more than super highways. Schools,
health clinics, instruction in home industries and mechanics, are further
examples.
(7) While not making aid conditional upon support for our foreign policy,
aid should not ordinarily be forthcoming to (a) those nations whose heads of
state (like Nasser) engage in continual intemperate abuse of the United States or
(b) those nations which give military aid to our enemies in Vietnam or which
-15-
engage in military aggression, or (c) those nations which, in contravention of
international law, harass American citizens engaged in commerce, or confiscate
American-owned property without fair compensation. Aid and comfort should not
be given by the U. S. to those who consistently help our enemies or the enemies
of other free men. Nor should aid be given to those who rattle swords or
engage in aggression. If private representation to the nation's leaders does
not produce results, the Voice of America, in certain instances, might make
this fact clear to the people of a country.
This does not mean that like Robespierre, Hitler, or Stalin we should
insist upon support of our foreign policy in all its aspects. We are dealing
with independent nations and a measure of demonstrated independence from us
in certain matters is often a political necessity for their leaders.
(8) Our aid should be concentrated in countries of special importance
to the United States. A limited number of countries should receive the major
portion of our aid, because (a) they are important economically in that they
have an ordered timetable for eliminating the necessity of economic aid --
such as Tunesia, Turkey and Iran; (b) they are important to us militarily
-- such as non-Communist Korea, Vietnam and Turkey; or (c) they are important
politically in that our Communist rivals have failed and a new government
wants help in returning to free enterprise development -- such as Indonesia
and Ghana. In other nations we should consider instituting small aid programs
designed to demonstrate friendship and maintain a minimum presence. In these
latter nations we should attempt to cooperate with the greater efforts of other
developed countries. Our list of priority countries should be flexible so that
new countries can be added, and hopefully so that some countries will develop
to the point that they are able to dispense with our economic aid altogether.
For example, the Republic of China no longer needs our economic aid, and also
-16-
requires less military aid (although it must be kept in mind that termination
of military aid is not controlled solely by development factors), and Turkey
is approaching a similar situation.
We look forward to the eventual termination of all grants in aid and
toward the time in which the normal processes of trade, production and loans
will carry the burden of development.
(9) Evidence that technical assistance is often a better stimulant to
growth than large scale capital transfers should be seriously examined, par-
ticularly in light of the United States' balance of payments problem. It is
becoming increasingly apparent in foreign, as well as domestic, affairs, that
attempts by the Democrats to solve problems by simply applying large amounts of
tax dollars to them do not necessarily work. When aid to less developed countries
was first proposed, experts stressed the need for technical aid and warned
against a large scale public capital investment program. Then, as now, the
absorptive capacity of developing countries was definitely limited by a lack of
administrative and technical skills. Moreover, large scale grants and loans,
particularly program loans which provide balance of payments support, have in
many cases made it possible for recipient countries to persist in policies which
discourage domestic savings and private investment (both foreign and domestic)
and inhibit the development of efficient export production. Republicans
believe future aid should be contingent upon the recipients pursuing policies
calculated to maximize economic efficiency and the utilization of private
capital and know-how.
-17-
The Administration's contention that the adverse effect on our balance of
11
payments of capital outflow under aid programs is slight, because aid is "tied"
12
to procurement of U. S. goods and services, is now widely recognized to be mis-
13
leading. The Department of Commerce published figures in March 1967 showing that
14
the direct balance of payments drain resulting from U. S. foreign aid programs in
15
1966 was nearly three quarters of a billion dollars. Actually the amount may be
16
higher since these figures include all offsets resulting from "tied" aid. Foreign
17
governments all too often meet requirements that they spend our aid money on
18
purchases from the U. S. by attributing normal purchases from the U. S. to our aid
19
disbursements.
The Administration should instruct AID to publish figures showing
20
the true effect of foreign assistance on our balance of payments.
21
(10) Special attention should be given to situations in which substantial
aid is forthcoming from other nations, and in which we are asked to cooperate.
Excellent examples are the International Development Association and the Inter-
American Development Bank both Republican ideas -- and the Asian Development
Bank.
(11) We should explore with developing countries ways and means of increas-
ing their earning capacities. Inasmuch as many developing nations -- Brazil,
Colombia, Nigeria -- have lost more in some years by the fall in the international
price of their export commodities than they have gained by foreign aid, the world-
wide stabilization of raw material prices is one possible solution which should be
considered.
2 The testimony of N. R. Danielian, President of the International Economic Policy
22
Association before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 12, 1967 reports,
23
"An examination of net non-military assistance and the U. S. trade balance with
24
selected countries, which have received between 50 and 60 percent of total U. S.
25
aid for the years 1958-1965, shows clearly that total net U. S. economic assistance
26
exceeded our trade surpluses with these selected countries by an amount fluctuating
27
between $1.3 and $1.7 billion a year." See Appendix B for the I.E.P.A. figures on
28
the trade imbalance. Indications that "tying" often actually amounts to substitu-
29
tion for normal purchases is also demonstrated by the fact that our trade imbalance
30
in 1958 with these 25 countries was $1.8 billion and in 1965, when assistance was
31
substantially "tied," it was $1.6 billion, or nearly the same.
32
-18-
Another possible remedy for one-crop economies is obviously diversification.
However, we should keep in mind that many countries, such as Malaysia and the
Ivory Coast, have built boom economies by simply emphasizing production of
the one or two crops which they produce most proficiently. At the same time,
other countries, such as Indonesia and Ghana, have destroyed what should have
been viable economies, based upon agricultural earnings, by trying to diversify
into uneconomic industrial activity. Still others, such as India, have ignored
the most basic food needs of their people in their haste to industrialize. The
United States should certainly not encourage any such basically uneconomic activity.
(12) We should realize that, while certain problems are common to all or
almost all of the developing nations, each one is in many matters separate and
distinct. Generalizations -- including those in this document -- are dangerous.
Those in the field realize the truth of this more than those in Washington.
These latter attach too much importance to "uniformity."
(13) We should strengthen the Ambassador in his role as chief of mission.
Only the very strongest considerations should be allowed to over-rule his veto;
and, subject only to budgetary limitations, his affirmative recommendations
should normally be accepted. His small discretionary fund of $25,000 for self-
help projects which was recently abolished, should be restored. Increased
flexibility based on the sound Republican principle of decentralization (but with
full accounting) will allow the Ambassador to adapt the U. S. program to the
peculiarities of each different situation.
(14) The techniques and insights of the social sciences should be brought
to bear upon development problems and projects. Social scientists in the coun-
tries concerned should aid in tackling their own problems of economics and
technology. In this way their peculiar knowledge can assist in overcoming the
barriers found in the existing customs of their countries which stand in the
-19-
way of modernization. Tribalism in Africa, the now dwindling hacienda
society in rural Latin America, certain religious traditions and practices
elsewhere will serve as examples.
(15) To insure a more effective aid program, continuous emphasis should
be placed on securing qualified personnel to administer aid. Aid should not
be given unless there are really qualified personnel, both American and local
nationals, available to administer it. Qualifications must include a capacity
to understand the culture in which a person is to work. Without constructive
competency and solid training, aid will be wasted. Many of our failures can
be laid at the door of the limited number of such persons, the inadequacy of
their training, and the absence of the right motivation. It is equally
important that we assist developing nations to produce qualified administrators
who can work with the U. S. and perhaps others in promoting growth.
(16) Much more attention must be paid in the U. S. to the realistic
evaluation of what our aid is actually accomplishing. Both the Executive and
Legislative Branches must broaden their supervision over AID and insure maximum
objectivity. If the sponsoring agency under the present Administration is
unwilling to be realistic in such matters, then Congress must act responsibly
in giving its own time and in employing the necessary qualified staff to perform
this function. This requires much more than a "fishing expedition." It should
be approached constructively.
*
*
*
*
The importance of effective aid cannot be over stressed and the issues
involved in improving the program are far too important for narrow partisanship.
Aid is an expensive humanitarian experiment. The American people have a right
to expect sound administration of their funds and solid progress as a result.
-20-
APPENDIX A
TOTAL UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, BY COUNTRY
JULY 1, 1946 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1965
Near East and South Asia
Afghanistan
$307.1 million
Ceylon
92.2
Cyprus
20.9
Greece
3,685.8
India
5,941.5
Iran
1,550.3
Iraq
102.6
Israel
1,133.1
Jordan
512.3
Lebanon
93.0
Nepal
86.1
Pakistan
2,944.9
Saudi Arabia
136.9
Syrian Arab Republic
84.0
Turkey
3,752.4
United Arab Republic (Egypt)
1,100.3
Yemen
39.1
Central Treaty Organization
52.4
Near East and south A ia egional 1,119,5
Near East and South Asia
total
$22,754.4 million
Latin America
Argentina
$712.9 million
Bolivia
435.9
Brazil
2,871.5
British Guiana
17.1
British Honduras
3.8
Chile
1,130.3
Colombia
734.7
Costa Rica
136.3
Cuba
57.6
Dominican Republic
207.9
Ecuador
248.8
E1 Salvador
99.9
Guatemala
210.7
Haiti
110.6
Honduras
74.8
Jamaica
40.3
Mexico
1,055.1
Nicaragua
112.0
Panama
159.6
Paraguay
90.2
Peru
675.2
Surinam
5.0
Trinidad and Tobago
43.3
Uruguay
113.6
Venezuela
388.1
Other West Indies
3.3
ROCAP
84.1
Latin American regional
740.1
Latin American total
$10,561.7 million (cont.)
-21-
APPENDIX A (Continued)
Far East
Burma
$114.6 million
Cambodia
343.1
China
4,778.2
Hong Kong
55.7
Indochina, undistributed
1,535.2
Indonesia
875.9
Japan
4,138.7
Korea
6,315.9
Laos
418.6
Malaysia
39.1
Phillippines
1,914.8
Ryukyu Islands
325.7
Thailand
442.8
Vietnam
2,383.7
Far East regional
2,723.9
Far East total
$26,405.9 million
Africa
Algeria
$163.7 million
Burundi
72.4
Cameroon
25.1
Central African Republic
2.8
Chad
4.2
Congo (Brazzaville)
2.4
Congo (Leopoldville)
317.4
Dahomey
8.7
Ethiopia
247.6
Gabon
4.8
Gambia
.1
Ghana
170.4
Guinea
70.2
Ivory Coast
26.0
Kenya
36.4
Liberia
237.0
Libya
217.3
Malagasy Republic
7.9
Malawi
8.7
Mali
15.8
Mauritania
2.8
Morocco
529.4
Niger
8.8
Nigeria
163.7
Rwanda
1.7
Senegal
25.0
Sierra Leone
27.2
Somali Republic
47.6
Republic of South Africa
167.4
Southern Rhodesia
7.1
Sudan
91.5
Tanzania
44.0
Togo
9.9
Tunisia
470.3
Uganda
17.3
Upper Volta
5.5
(cont.)
-22-
APPENDIX A (Continued)
Zambia
30.2
East Africa regional
11.2
Regional USAID/Africa
1.0
Africa regional
54.1
Africa total
$ 3,354.6 million
Eurone
Albania
$ 20.4 million
Austria
1,257.1
Belgium-Luxembourg
2,107.3
Czechoslovakia
193.0
Denmark
933.7
East Germany
0.8
Finland
146.7
France
9,465.1
Germany (Federal Republic)
5,149.0
Berlin
131.9
Hungary
31.5
Iceland
76.4
Ireland
195.9
Italy
6,089,4
Netherlands
2,617.7
Norway
1.283.4
Poland
573.6
Portugal
531.1
Spain
1,908.7
Sweden
125.2
United Kingdom
9,269.8
U.S.S.R.
186.4
Yugoslavia
2,761.4
Europe regional
2,796.5
Europe total
$47,852.0 million
Canada
40.0 million
Australia
142.6
New Zealand
21.5
Trust Territory of Pacific Islands
107.4
Nonregional total
5,779.0
Total
$ 6,090.5 million
Total assistance to all
countries
$117,019.1 million
Source: Data obtained from the General Accounting Office by Senator Dirksen
who inserted these statistics into the Congressional Record, July 20
1966, pp. 15714-15750.
U. S. NONMILITARY FOREIGN ASSISTANCE (NET) AND TRADE BALANCES BY COUNTRIES, 1958-1965
(millions of dollars)
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Net
U.
S.
Net
U. S.
Net
U. S.
Net
U. S.
Net
U. S.
Net
U.
S.
Net
U. S.
Net
U. S.
Eco.
b
b
b
b
b
Trade
Eco.
Trade
Eco.
Trade
b
Eco.
Trade
Eco.
Trade
Eco
Trade
Eco.
Trade
Eco.
Trade
Countries
Aid
Balance
Aid
Balance
Aidᵃ
a
a
Aid
Balance
Aid
Balance
Aidᵃ
Balance
Aid
a
Balance
Aid
Balance
Balance
Afghanistan
19
-4
19
-10
13
-10
30
6
13
-8
32
-3
37
6
34
2
Bolivia
22
17
22
14
13
14
23
16
29
20
44
18
33
17
30
7
Brazil
145
-33
35
-216
42
-147
270
-68
157
-117
128
-186
212
-148
149
-183
Cambodia
37
-2
21
-7
25
-
24
9
20
5
20
2
7
-1
2
-
Ceylon
20
-5
19
-12
8
-25
9
-17
8
-19
4
-21
4
-27
4
-23
Chile
47
-7
33
-76
10
-
121
43
87
-24
109
-32
96
-38
104
24
Colombia
92
-147
32
-134
-7
-54
54
-31
43
-50
69
-9
38
-35
34
-80
Ecuador
3
-9
2
-12
7
-11
11
-4
11
-26
14
-11
17
-4
17
-28
India
243
63
320
129
523
412
370
230
528
411
736
509
864
651
849
580
Indonesia
24
-112
17
-123
45
-132
54
-29
88
-15
77
-7
32
-102
-4
-123
Jordan
57
10
60
16
62
17
61
24
53
20
54
37
45
20
37
19
Korea
311
213
232
131
261
148
228
155
233
204
231
211
157
169
165
149
Laos
30
2
35
3
33
1
51
2
30
4
31
6
39
7
58
8
Liberia
8
14
9
59
8
-4
19
17
35
20
11
4
12
-13
25
-11
APPENDIX B
-23-
Malaysia
c
-85
C
-150
1
-138
2
-126
12
-155
6
-150
2
-82
4
-123
Morocco
26
33
45
29
61
29
97
55
48
42
53
49
38
31
51
49
Nepal
6
nss
3
na
8
na
10
na
9
na
14
na
17
na
16
1
Pakistan
145
81
142
65
229
131
218
158
322
243
378
341
377
336
348
291
Philippines
42
18
24
-36
24
-10
11
17
24
-59
8
-34
49
-27
45
-34
Poland
99
75
66
43
127
111
57
34
60
48
46
66
52
84
-6
-31
Thailand
30
-4
48
-28
42
11
29
25
31
32
29
57
18
58
25
67
Tunisia
26
4
30
7
55
21
77
38
53
44
38
25
45
31
54
39
Turkey
122
72
111
44
101
66
153
69
202
106
173
154
126
96
132
81
Vietnam
204
57
168
46
186
48
144
62
148
101
189
114
221
131
300
187
Yemen
-
na
5
na
5
na
6
na
6
na
8
na
6
na
5
na
TOTALS
1,758
251
1,498
-218
1,882
478
2,129
685
2,250
827
2,512
1,140
2,544
1,160
2,478
868
Disbursements less repayments.
b,
Exports and imports, f.o.b.; includes U. S. exports financed by military grants and credits.
Less than $500,000
SOURCES: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade, Annual 1958-1962, pp. 128-130;
na
Not available.
March 1965, pp. 63-64; Annual 1961-1965, p. 285; National Advisory Council,
nss Not statistically significant.
Semiannual Report to the President and Congress, January-June 1964, pp. 75-77;
U. S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Grants and Credits (Wash.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1964 and 1965).
REPUBLICAN
REpublicAN NATiONAL COMMiTTEE
COMMITTEE
1625 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
NATIONAL 8-6800
NEWS
FOR RELEASE
MONDAY AM's
August 14, 1967
SWEEPING REFORMS IN FOREIGN AID
RECOMMENDED BY REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
The Republican Coordinating Committee recommended today a far-reaching
16-point program for overhauling foreign aid and declared that assistance "should
not ordinarily" be extended to nations that show continued hostility to the United
States or that give military aid, to its enemies in Vietnam.
In a 23-page report adopted at its meeting in Washington, D.C., July 24, the
GOP leadership group recommended basic reforms which it believed would reduce
abuse and waste in the foreign aid programs and make them more realistic and
effective.
The document, released today by Republican National Chairman Ray C. Bliss,
stressed such key factors as self-help efforts on the part of nations receiving
aid, more technical assistance rather than large loans, extending United States
agricultural knowledge and techniques to countries in need, reliance on private
enterprise, care not to bolster corrupt regimes, the need for projects that reach
the masses, and concentrating aid in nations of special importance to the United
States.
The Coordinating Committee declared that, "while not making aid conditional
upon support for our foreign policy, aid should not ordinarily be forthcoming to":
--Nations "whose heads of state (like Nassar) engage in continual intemperate
abuse of the United States."
-more-
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
-2-
--Nations "which give military aid to our enemies in Vietnam or which
engage in military aggression."
--Nations "which, in contravention of international law, harass American
citizens engaged in commerce, or confiscate American-owned property without fair
compensation."
"Aid and comfort," the Committee said, "should not be given by the U.S. to
those who consistently help our enemies or the enemies of other free men. Nor
should aid be given to those who rattle swords or engage in aggression.
"If private representation to the nation's leaders does not produce results,
the Voice of America, in certain instances, might make this fact clear to the
people of a country.
"This does not mean that like Robespierre, Hitler or Stalin we should insist
upon support for our foreign policy in all its aspects. We are dealing with in-
dependent nations and a measure of demonstrated independence from us in certain
matters is often a political necessity for their leaders."
The report adopted by the Coordinating Committee was prepared by a subcommittee
of the Task Force on the Conduct of Foreign Relations headed by Ernest Griffith,
former Dean of American University in Washington. The Chairman of the Task Force
is former Ambassador Robert C. Hill.
Recalling that the Republican Party had always "endorsed the purposes of
foreign aid," and had always promoted ideas aimed at making aid programs more
effective, the Coordinating Committee said:
"Republicans believe that it is again time for innovation and that the methods
used in administering the aid program today fall far short of what the people have
a right to expect."
-more-
-3-
The Committee, which represents the top leadership of the Republican Party,
pointed out that more than $117 billion in assistance has been extended to more
than 100 nations in the 20 years that the aid program has been in operation. It
said:
"We look forward to the eventual termination of all grants in aid and toward
the time in which the normal processes of trade, production and loans will carry
the burden of development."
Vietnam was classed by the Committee as "a special case." The Committee said:
"There are many reasons for our involvement, and the search for order and
stability is but one among many. It is self-evident to all of us that, if and
when peace, security and stability are attained in Vietnam, our national interest
will be greatly enhanced all over the world. It is also clear that in attaining
such peace, security and stability, large-scale economic and technical, as well
as military, aid will be necessary."
The Committee said: "No aid should be extended without commensurate self-help
on the part of those aided.' It said that in this connection "the following
activities have been grossly under-emphasized."
Community development, involving the "active participation of people at the
village and town level." The Committee named rural cooperatives as an example,
and said "hundreds and even thousands of communities in Latin America, Pakistan,
and elswhere are engaged in cooperative self-help," and that often the least
costly projects are among the most successful.
--Utilization at home of capital funds now exported by nationals of the
countries aided. The Committee recalled an estimate that as much as $17 billion
of indigenous capital is at present invested abroad by Latin-American nationals.
-more-
-4-
--Family planning. In this connection, the Committee stressed the need for
population control, and said that for many nations population increases in excess
of 2.5 per cent a year likely will exceed the practicable annual gains in gross
national agricultural production.
Declaring that many nations are losing ground in the race between population
and food production, the Committee said these nations "must meet this problem."
The Committee added:
"We can cooperate technically and financially, but only a determined effort
on their part to check their population growth can really do the job. At its
present rate of growth, the world's population will double in less than 30 years.
No such increase in food production is in sight."
The Coordinating Committee said that, in seeking to aid the world's hungry,
more emphasis should be placed on the use of United States agricultural technology
and marketing and credit know-how, which the Communists have never been able to
challenge.
Stressing the value of private enterprise as encouragement to development,
the Committee said this requires "a more favorable climate in the nations concerned,"
and that "we on our part must be more ready to share controls with foreign nationals"
and to take other cooperative measures.
The Committee said: "Evidence that technical assistance is often a better
stimulant to growth than large-scale capital transfers should be seriously examined,
particularly in the light of the United States' balance of payments problem."
Other recommendations by the Coordinating Committee:
--Regional marketing plans which would give small developing nations wider
markets for their products should be explored.
-more-
-5-
--Special attention should be given situations "in which substantial aid is
forthcoming from other nations, and in which we are asked to cooperate."
--Means of increasing the earning capacities of developing nations should
be explored.
--The role of the United States ambassador as chief of mission should be
strengthened.
--The techniques and insights of the social sciences should be employed
upon development problems and projects.
--Continued emphasis should be placed on securing qualified personnel to
administer aid.
--More attention should be paid in the United States to a realistic evaluation,
of what the aid program actually is accomplishing, and in this respect both the
Executive and Legislative branches of the Government should broaden their super-
vision over the aid program.
--Generalizations should be avoided, as each nation presents a distinct
problem.
The Committee said: "If we can help to set the developing nations squarely
on the road to prosperity, our trade with them will inevitably increase."
8/8/67
Adopted by
The Republican Coordinating Committee
July 24, 1967
Presented by
The Task Force on the Conduct of Foreign Relations
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
Prepared under the direction of:
Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
1625 Eye Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
Presiding Officer: Ray C. Bliss, Chairman, Republican National Committee
Former President
Dwight D. Eisenhower
300 Carlisle Street
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania
Former Presidential Nominees
Barry Goldwater
(1964)
Thomas E. Dewey
(1944 & 1948)
Post Office Box 1601
40 Wall Street
Scottsdale, Arizona
New York, New York
Richard M. Nixon
(1960)
Alf M. Landon
(1936)
Nixon, Mudge, Rose,
National Bank of Topeka Building
Guthrie & Alexander
1001 Fillmore Street
20 Broad Street
Topeka, Kansas
New York, New York
Senate Leadership
Everett M. Dirksen
George Murphy, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Senatorial Comm.
Thomas H. Kuchel
Milton R. Young, Secretary
Minority Whip
Republican Conference
Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Chairman
Hugh Scott, Vice Chairman
Republican Policy Committee
National Republican Senatorial Comm.
Margaret Chase Smith, Chairman
Republican Conference
House Leadership
Gerald R. Ford
Bob Wilson, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Congressional Comm.
Leslie C. Arends
Charles E. Goodell, Chairman
Minority Whip
Planning and Research Committee
Melvin R. Laird, Chairman
Richard H. Poff, Secretary
Republican Conference
Republican Conference
John J. Rhodes, Chairman
William C. Cramer, Vice Chairman
Republican Policy Committee
Republican Conference
H. Allen Smith
Ranking Member of Rules Committee
(continued)
REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
continued
- 2 -
Representatives of the Republican Governors Association
John A. Love
Raymond P. Shafer
Governor of the State of Colorado
Governor of the Commonwealth
Denver, Colorado
of Pennsylvania
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
John A. Volpe
Governor of the Commonwealth
John H. Chafee
of Massachusetts
Governor of the State of
Boston, Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Providence, Rhode Island
George W. Romney
Governor of the State of Michigan
Nils A. Boe
Lansing, Michigan
Governor of the State of
South Dakota
Nelson A. Rockefeller
Pierre, South Dakota
Governor of the State of New York
Albany, New York
Daniel J. Evans
Governor of the State of Washington
Olympia, Washington
Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
Donald R. Ross, Vice Chairman
Republican National Committee
Republican National Committee
1625 Eye Street, Northwest
1406 Kiewit Plaza, Farnam at 36th
Washington, D. C. 20006
Omaha, Nebraska 68131
Mrs. C. Wayland Brooks, Assistant Chrmn.
Mrs. J. Willard Marriott, Vice Chrmn.
Republican National Committee
Republican National Committee
1625 Eye Street, Northwest
4500 Garfield Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20006
Washington, D. C. 20007
Mrs. Collis P. Moore, Vice Chairman
J. Drake Edens, Jr., Vice Chairman
Republican National Committee
Republican National Committee
Box 225
Post Office Box 9385
Moro, Oregon 97039
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
President of the Republican State Legislators Association
F. F. (Monte) Montgomery
Speaker of the House of Representatives
State of Oregon
Salem, Oregon
Robert L. L. McCormick, Staff Coordinator
Members of the Republican Coordinating Committee's Task Force on
the Conduct of Foreign Relations
Robert C. Hill, Chairman
United States Ambassador to Mexico, 1957-1961
David N. Rowe, Vice Chairman
Professor of Political Science, Yale University
Gordon Allott
United States Senator from Colorado
Robert Amory, Jr.
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1952-1962
John B. Anderson
Member of Congress from Illinois
Tim M. Babcock
Governor of the State of Montana
Frances P. Bolton
Member of Congress from Ohio
Arleigh A. Burke
Chief of United States Naval Operations, 1955-1961
Lucius D. Clay
General of the United States Army, Retired
Philip K. Crowe
United States Ambassador to Union of South Africa, 1959-1961
Joseph S. Farland
United States Ambassador to the Republic of Panama, 1960-1963
Paul Findley
Member of Congress from Illinois
Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen
Member of Congress from New Jersey
Ernest S. Griffith
Dean, School of International Service, American University, 1958-1965
Mrs. Cecil M. Harden
Republican National Committeewoman for Indiana
Joe Holt
Member of Congress from California, 1953-1959
Walter A. Judd
Member of Congress from Minnesota, 1943-1963
John D. Lodge
United States Ambassador to Spain, 1955-1961
Gerhart Niemeyer
Professor of Political Science. University of Notre Dame
Nicholas Nyaradi
Director of School of International Studies, Bradley University
Roderic L. O'Connor
Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs,
Department of State, 1957-1958
G. L. Ohrstrom, Jr.
Investment Banker
William W. Scranton
Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1963-1967
Richard B. Sellars
Republican National Committeeman for New Jersey
Robert Strausz-Hupe
Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania
Kent B. Crane
Secretary to the Task Force
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
The Cost of U. S. Foreign Assistance
The post-war efforts of the United States Government to assist other nations
of the globe are now twenty years old.
During that period -- from July 1, 1946 through June 30, 1966 -- the United
States provided more than $117 billion to over 100 foreign nations. This aid
ranged in amount from one hundred thousand dollars to the African state of
Gambia to $9.5 billion to France. (Appendix A is a listing of these expen-
ditures since June 1, 1946.)
The foreign aid program today involves major annual expenditures of funds.
In the fiscal year ended June 30, 1966, foreign aid expenditures totalled $3.4
billion -- some 3.1 percent of the total Federal Budget. To this amount should
be added the agricultural surpluses distributed abroad, loans by the U. S.
Government's Export-Import Bank and the U. S. portion of funds loaned by various
multilateral agencies.
The Problem's Magnitude
The economic gap between the United States and the developing nations is
increasing every year. The per capita Gross National Product (GNP) of the United
States for 1966 was $3,648. For the same year, that of India was $104; Indonesia
$70; Nigeria $117; Bolivia $149 -- an average of $110 for the four. The gap: $3,538.
The United States per capita GNP in 1960 was $2,993; for the same other four
nations it averaged $97. The gap: $2,896.
This gap, in thus widening from $2,896 to $3,538, over six years, increased
by 22.2 percent.
-2-
Our GNP has gone up 21.9 percent since 1960; theirs 13.4 percent. Today,
their GNP as a percentage of ours is 3.0 percent, in 1960 it was 3.3 percent.
This is the situation -- in spite of all the foreign aid efforts of ourselves
and others.
We must recognize that neither the U. S., nor all the prospering powers
of the world combined for that matter, can solve all the world's economic pro-
blems. Such is the stark magnitude of the problem presented to the world in
general, and especially to the United States as its wealthiest nation.
American Attitudes Toward Foreign Aid
Support for the principles of foreign aid, private or public, lies deep
within our framework of national tradition. Americans responded to Belgian
Relief in 1914, the Tokyo earthquake in 1923, and the Arno River flood of 1966
with equal alacrity.
The $117 billion spent by the U. S. Government since 1946 speaks for itself.
Just as surely, Americans recognize that serious flaws exists in our present methods,
and in the response or lack of response of others to these methods. Republicans
believe we should be able to buy more aid and development for much less money.
We cannot abandon the goals; we cannot continue present activities without
major changes.
Republicans Have Always Favored Sensible Forms of Foreign Aid
In many instances, American programs of assistance to foreign nations and
peoples have proved enormously worthwhile; and often Republican leadership made
these successes possible.
The program of relief to Europe after World War I, led by Herbert Hoover,
rescued whole nations from the clutches of famine; nor have the Finns forgotten
-3-
the aid directed to them under Mr. Hoover in 1940. The UNRRA program, whose
first director was the former Republican Mayor of New York City, Fiorello H.
La Guardia, saved millions of lives after World War II.
The Point Four and Marshall Plan programs, of prime importance in the post-
war reconstruction of Europe, would never have come into existence without the
approval and support of the Republican 80th Congress.
The Peace Corps and Food-for-Peace concepts were legally incorporated
into our aid program by the Republican 83rd Congress under the leadership of
President Eisenhower. The International Voluntary Service idea of 1953 was
simply enlarged and renamed Peace Corps by the Democrats. The program of dis-
tributing agricultural surpluses abroad also began in 1953 under Public Law 480
and was merely renamed Food-for-Peace by the Democrats.
The military aid program was a major element in the alliance system
fashioned under the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy.
Even the recent special emphasis status for Latin America stems from the Bogota
meeting of Western Hemisphere heads of state chaired by President Eisenhower.
The enabling legislation for special emphasis aid to Latin America was passed
in 1960 during the Eisenhower Administration. Again the Democrats have developed
no new ideas -- they have simply added the name Alliance for Progress.
Thus it is clear that the Republican Party has always endorsed the purposes
of foreign aid.
Moreover, we have always promoted new ideas and changes in the aid program
aimed at making the large amounts of official capital spent abroad more effective.
Republicans believe that it is again time for innovation and that the methods
used in administering the aid program today fall far short of what the people
have a right to expect.
-4-
PURPOSES OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
The Republican Party supports the following five purposes of foreign
economic aid:
(1) The promotion of peace, security, and stability abroad in our own
national interest.
To a peace-loving nation such as the United States, security and stability
throughout the free and the uncommitted worlds are in our national interest as
well as theirs.
Where domestic economic and political frustrations pile up in the nations
of these worlds, resentful leaders seek foreign enemies to explain domestic failures.
Wars, near-wars, and armaments are costly -- to us as well as to them. Hence,
much of our aid should be directed toward cooperation in securing national
security and stability. Peace is not guaranteed thereby, but the scales are
weighted in its direction. Much of our aid has been and should continue to be
directed toward those nations which are most likely to cooperate in building up
internal order, especially when pointed toward increasing freedom and prosperity.
Korea, the Republic of China, Iran, Turkey, Tunisia, Chile will serve as examples.
All of these -- as with all nations which are in similar stages of development --
have areas of instability, but their chances of progress toward economic and
political maturity have demonstrably been aided by our cooperation. We should
continue such cooperation.
Vietnam is a special case. There are many reasons for our involvement, and
the search for order and stability is but one among many. It is self-evident to
all of us, that if and when peace, security and stability are attained in Vietnam,
our national interest will be greatly advanced all over the world. It is also
clear that in attaining such peace, security and stability, large-scale economic
and technical, as well as military, aid will be necessary.
-5-
(2) The promotion of prosperity in other nations as an aid to prosperity
at home.
It is well known that prosperity increases trade; that most of our trade,
both exports and imports, is with the prosperous nations. Of our total exports
last year, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Japan and Western Europe
accounted for $13.5 billion or about two-thirds of our exports.
As nations increase in prosperity, their purchases from us likewise increase:
they consume even more than they compete. For example, Japan, with a per capita
income of $93 in 1935, bought $225.8 million from us. In 1966, with a per capita
income of $922, it bought $2.9 billion. During the same 30 years, Mexico's
figures were respectively $61 and $66.4 million in 1935, and $470 and $1.7 billion
in 1966. Iran's were $50 and $23.3 million in 1935, and $220 and $83.7 million
in 1966. Venezuela's were $92 and $125.7 million in 1935, and $895 and $1.1
billion in 1966.
If we can help to set the developing nations squarely on the road to prosperity,
our trade with them will inevitably increase.
(3) The attempt to narrow the dangerous gulf between the "haves" and the
"have nots."
The gap between the Gross National Products (GNP's) of the "haves" and the
"have nots" is increasing dramatically. Despite all foreign aid efforts to date,
the figures at the beginning of this paper indicate that the magnitude of this
problem has been increasing, rather than decreasing, during the 1960's. Attempt-
ing to narrow this gap is a matter of conscience as well as sound policy.
-6-
In the event of a great disaster, our people have always been ready to
respond generously. However, here we are dealing with a long-range situation
in which a single gift from our wealth is not the answer. What is needed is
the wise use of a portion of our growing annual increment in those situations
in which a permanent gain in the productivity of the "have nots" will result.
What is also needed -- needed more perhaps than our money, machines, food sur-
pluses or technical know-how -- is the infusion of our economic philosophy,
with its stress on freedom of opportunity and incentive, which has generated
the spectacular growth in the "have" nations.
As people nurtured in the Judeo-Christian humanitarian tradition, we are
impelled to help others less fortunate than ourselves. Our churches and
synagogues, our schools and colleges are the strongest supporters of this
approach.
(4) The demonstration that the free world can give a more satisfying,
prosperous life than Communism.
Clearly we are anti-Communist. Clearly the Communist way of life outrages
our deep love of freedom and our religious faith. Yet these great values are
not universally shared in the form in which we hold them. Where corrupt govern-
ments, exploiting landowners, and greedy money-lenders are able to bleed their
people, Communism has all too strong an appeal. It is for us in such circum-
stances to demonstrate that alternatives which include freedom as a goal can
do better than either reaction or Communism.
The people in the Republic
of China on Taiwan are dramatically outperforming the regimented Chinese on the
mainland. In scores of other developing nations -- India, Pakistan, Indonesia,
Nigeria, Brazil -- a crucial drama is being played out. If these nations fail,
-7-
it should not be because we denied them assistance. Ours is an affirmative
approach -- to build on what there is, with our eyes fixed steadily on the
end result.
(5) The spread of cooperation and friendly partnership among freedom-
loving nations.
We must encourage other developed nations to increase their assistance
to the "have nots." We should be prepared to cooperate with other "have"
nations in establishing priorities and plans for large projects in develop-
ing countries. For long term aid in support of major development schemes,
cooperation would be increased and U. S. costs reduced by devising consortiums
composed of other non-Communist donors.
The spirit of cooperation must also be shared by those we would aid. The
developing partnerships should not be viewed as being one sided, for the aided
nations have much to give us while working with us for a peaceful world. They
can enrich us with their culture. They can help our students overseas. Above
all, they can and must take the necessary cooperative steps within their own
boundaries to develop and spread the will to work with the West toward mutually
beneficial goals. There are values in such partnerships which pay dividends.
in peace and understanding to all concerned.
-8-
PRINCIPLES AND METHODS
Discouragement and erosion of support for foreign aid have come about, not
initially because of disagreement with these purposes, but because of mounting
evidence of waste, misuse, and downright failure in far too many cases. It is
both easy and fashionable to attack foreign aid itself because of these fail-
ures. In some instances, expectations have been too great; in others, the
recipients themselves have been largely to blame; in still others, administra-
tive short-comings on our part are responsible. Not all of these latter are
blameworthy, except in retrospect, for the foreign aid program itself was
essentially a great experiment.
However, Republicans believe that the United States should attempt to
improve its aid program based on the evidence deriving from past
experience. Unfortunately, successive Democratic administrations have by and
large failed to understand that the amazing and rapid success of the Marshall
Plan could not be quickly duplicated among peoples who have not had in their
history the experience of industrialization or the social conditions making
for progress. Yesterday's problems in Europe are not the same as today's pro-
blems in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The disappointing results of the
Alliance for Progress bear adequate testimony to this -- so far, people's
expectations, rather than their living standards, are often the only thing
which have been raised.
It is obvious that promises of much publicized development programs, if
not fulfilled, can be positively dangerous to the fragile social structure of
developing nations. Therefore, we must realize that the development methods of
the late 1960's must be different in many ways from the reconstruction methods
The Alliance's basic goal was very appropriately stated in human terms -- to
increase per capita income not less than 2.5 percent per year over the next 10
years. At the half-way point in 1966 only 7 of 19 countries had managed to meet
this goal, and they represent slightly less than 30 percent of Latin America's
total population.
-9-
used in Europe in the late 1940's. One crucial point is that the time span
involved will be far longer; recipients must be told this rather than being
given glib promises about what the future can bring.
It appears that the U. S. Government is learning these things the hard
way. It is no service to the objectives of foreign aid to gloss over these
difficulties and failures. However, we believe that such problems will yield to
diagnosis, given the necessary realism in analyzing their principal causes.
Therefore, the Republican Party attaches special importance to the follow-
ing methods and principles, the failures to apply which have accounted for
most of the justified criticism of aid to date. It pledges itself to their
vigorous application.
(1) No aid should be extended without commensurate self-help effort on
the part of those aided. In this connection, the following activities have been
grossly under-emphasized.
(a) Community development, enlisting the active participation of
people at the village and town level. Rural cooperatives are
an example, even though they challenge existing local power
structures. Such power structures often involve, not only the
landlords and politicians, but also the bankers and other money
lenders and at times even the religious leaders. Obstacles of
this character have been noticeable in nations as diverse as
Turkey, India, Brazil, the Philippines.
Painfully but surely, with many mistakes but with many
successes, hundreds and even thousands of communities in Latin
America, Pakistan, and elsewhere are engaged in cooperative
self-help. Often the least costly projects financially are
-10-
among the most successful. Leadership may be local, A.I.D.,
or Peace Corps. A modest knowledge of accounting is obviously
necessary, but even more important is the capacity for dedi-
cated realistic service that recognizes that permanent benefits
can only arise from ultimate local responsibility.
Over-enthusiasm can bring premature multiplication of such
projects, as in Peru; but in Peru also can be found some of the
greatest successes. Wherever the local effort is most hopeful,
aid, however modest, of a financial and technical nature should,
where practicable, be forthcoming. This "grass roots" development
of attitudes is far more productive in the long run future of a
nation than many a grandiose project.
(b) Utilization at home of capital funds now exported by nationals
of the countries aided. It is reliably estimated that billions,
some say perhaps as much as $17 billion, of indigenous capital
is presently invested abroad by Latin American nationals.
This sum may be more than the total U. S. aid to these same nations
since 1945. The late Prime Minister of one of the Asian coun-
tries aided was found to have a vast fortune banked abroad at
the time of his death -- an amount perhaps equivalent to the
total economic and military aid annually extended by us to his
country.
It is not enough merely to criticize these wealthy people;
nor perhaps should we penalize their rank-and-file citizens
therefore. Local people often have the same fears about
investing in their own economies as our capitalists have.
-11-
Inflation, instability, corruption, fears of confiscation
all take their toll. On the other hand, it is neither justifiable
nor possible to bail out nations which are unable or unwilling
to create the necessary conditions for investment. Perhaps a
combination of taxing exports of capital, joint guarantees or
insurance of a substantial portion of investment at home by their
governments and ours, together with quiet but persistent pressure
for a slow but sure improvement of business practices and climate,
may turn the tide.
(c) Family planning. The export of American agricultural surpluses,
and even progress in international agricultural development, are
often at best simply "buying time." Population increases in
excess of 2.5 percent a year are likely to equal or exceed the
practicable annual gains in gross national agricultural production
for many nations. India, the United Arab Republic, Brazil, Indo-
nesia will serve as examples. In Latin America the population
increased 17 percent between 1960 and 1965 while their food pro-
duction increased only 10 percent. Thus many countries are
actually losing ground.
In some fashion these and other nations similarly situated
must meet this problem. We can cooperate technically and
financially, but only a determined effort on their part to check
their population growth can really do the job. At its present
rate of growth, the world's population will double in less than
30 years. No such increase in food production is in sight.
-12-
Even the United States with its diminishing grain surpluses
could not meet the needs of the single nation of India at its
present rate of population growth and need for more than two
or three years longer.
(2) The spread of American agricultural knowledge and techniques should be
emphasized. The great majority of the world's people are poorly nourished and
the Communist system has wepeatedly demonstrated it is unable to meet this
challenge. As Professor Don Paarlberg has said, "Agricultural capacity is an
asset which we have, which our friends need and which our rivals lack." He
suggests we move more decisively in attempting to help the world's hungry people
by putting more emphasis on technical aid designed to exploit our agricultural
technology, capabilities in fertilizers, insecticides and food processing indus-
tries, and agricultural business know-how, especially in developing credit and
marketing facilities.
In this connection, we must instill in the recipients the idea that the
distribution of American agricultural surpluses is an emergency, rather than a
routine, measure. Where necessary they should be asked to agree to improve their
own agricultural capacity as a pre-requisite for receiving Food-for-Peace ship-
ments. All too often in the past the provision of our surplus food has inter-
fered with market forces which otherwise would have encouraged agricultural
production and has thus fostered the continuance of foolish, centralized planning --
usually aimed at building uneconomic industries as in India.
(3) We should rely more on private enterprise to encourage development
abroad. This requires a more favorable climate in the nations concerned.
Threats of nationalization, confiscatory taxation, undue limitations on interest
rates, general hostility to investors from other nations, and the lack of native
managerial ability do not encourage the influx of private capital. We on our
-13-
part must be more ready to share controls with foreign nationals, more ready
to impart our skills and techniques to them so as to stimulate indigenous
investment capable of competing, more willing to accept lower immediate returns
in anticipation of a fair and profitable return over a longer period. Puerto
Rico's progress under Operation Bootstrap is an outstanding example of what can
be accomplished when a liberal private investment climate is created in a
developing area.
(4) Special care should be taken to avoid aid being used to bolster
corrupt and self-perpetuating oligarchies. No error on our part has been more
exploited by the Communists than this. There are the obvious examples, and they
have been far from exceptional. Where corruption has been a way of life and
where oligarchies, military and otherwise, are the general rule, the dilemma of
how to reach the poor man at the bottom is a cruel one. The acid test is whether
the benefits are really reaching the masses of the people in increasing measure --
and are not disassociated from the United States as a source. Constant, unrelent-
ing pressure toward reform in these matters may be labelled "interference" or
"aid with strings attached," but there is no other defensible and permanent
answer. Situations will increasingly arise in which aid should be reduced or
completely cut off pending reform.
(5) We should explore the economic viability of regional marketing plans
which will give small developing nations wider markets for their products. The
success of the Central American Common Market illustrates possibilities for
similar modest groupings in parts of Africa and elsewhere in Latin America. By
extending bilateral aid to individual countries participating in such
cooperatively-planned efforts, we can promote the economic viability of many
of the smaller nations, at least until such time as they prove themselves willing
to go beyond joint planning to closer economic or even political association.
-14-
Extending U. S. bilateral aid to a country which has agreed with its
neighbors on what type of development each will undertake in order to safeguard
against duplication in a small market area, such as Central America, is quite a
different matter from trying to force nations together which have different
aspirations and cultural backgrounds. In this connection, Republicans believe
the Administration's plan, as outlined in the Korry Report, of trying to force
newly independent and highly nationalistic African states into regional group-
ings as a pre-requisite for receiving American aid is unrealistic. Moreover,
trying to give aid to an amorphous regional grouping cannot possibly garner as
much credit for the U. S. as can direct bilateral aid.
Naturally we expect developing countries to place emphasis on productive
efficiency so that they can quickly develop the ability to compete in world
markets. They gain little by simply widening the area in which protected
industries are sustained behind high tariffs or other controls.
(6) More emphasis should be placed on projects that will visibly reach
the masses of people. Land reform accompanied by marketing cooperatives (as in
Chile), land regrouping (as in the Republic of China), and collective availability
of up-to-date agricultural machinery and credit are cases in point. Under such
conditions, there would be encouragement to greater productivity. Simple roads
to market towns, as in Panama, will often mean more than super highways. Schools,
health clinics, instruction in home industries and mechanics, are further
examples.
(7) While not making aid conditional upon support for our foreign policy,
aid should not ordinarily be forthcoming to (a) those nations whose heads of
state (like Nasser) engage in continual intemperate abuse of the United States or
(b) those nations which give military aid to our enemies in Vietnam or which
-15-
engage in military aggression, or (c) those nations which, in contravention of
international law, harass American citizens engaged in commerce, or confiscate
American-owned property without fair compensation. Aid and comfort should not
be given by the U. S. to those who consistently help our enemies or the enemies
of other free men. Nor should aid be given to those who rattle swords or
engage in aggression. If private representation to the nation's leaders does
not produce results, the Voice of America, in certain instances, might make
this fact clear to the people of a country.
This does not mean that like Robespierre, Hitler, or Stalin we should
insist upon support of our foreign policy in all its aspects. We are dealing
with independent nations and a measure of demonstrated independence from us
in certain matters is often a political necessity for their leaders.
(8) Our aid should be concentrated in countries of special importance
to the United States. A limited number of countries should receive the major
portion of our aid, because (a) they are important economically in that they
have an ordered timetable for eliminating the necessity of economic aid --
such as Tunesia, Turkey and Iran; (b) they are important to us militarily
-- such as non-Communist Korea, Vietnam and Turkey; or (c) they are important
politically in that our Communist rivals have failed and a new government
wants help in returning to free enterprise development -- such as Indonesia
and Ghana. In other nations we should consider instituting small aid programs
designed to demonstrate friendship and maintain a minimum presence. In these
latter nations we should attempt to cooperate with the greater efforts of other
developed countries. Our list of priority countries should be flexible so that
new countries can be added, and hopefully so that some countries will develop
to the point that they are able to dispense with our economic aid altogether.
For example, the Republic of China no longer needs our economic aid, and also
-16-
requires less military aid (although it must be kept in mind that termination
of military aid is not controlled solely by development factors), and Turkey
is approaching a similar situation.
We look forward to the eventual termination of all grants in aid and
toward the time in which the normal processes of trade, production and loans
will carry the burden of development.
(9) Evidence that technical assistance is often a better stimulant to
growth than large scale capital transfers should be seriously examined, par-
ticularly in light of the United States' balance of payments problem. It is
becoming increasingly apparent in foreign, as well as domestic, affairs, that
attempts by the Democrats to solve problems by simply applying large amounts of
tax dollars to them do not necessarily work. When aid to less developed countries
was first proposed, experts stressed the need for technical aid and warned
against a large scale public capital investment program. Then, as now, the
absorptive capacity of developing countries was definitely limited by a lack of
administrative and technical skills. Moreover, large scale grants and loans,
particularly program loans which provide balance of payments support, have in
many cases made it possible for recipient countries to persist in policies which
discourage domestic savings and private investment (both foreign and domestic)
and inhibit the development of efficient export production. Republicans
believe future aid should be contingent upon the recipients pursuing policies
calculated to maximize economic efficiency and the utilization of private
capital and know-how.
-17-
The Administration's contention that the adverse effect on our balance of
11
payments of capital outflow under aid programs is slight, because aid is "tied"
12
to procurement of U. S. goods and services, is now widely recognized to be mis-
13
leading. The Department of Commerce published figures in March 1967 showing that
14
the direct balance of payments drain resulting from U. S. foreign aid programs in
15
1966 was nearly three quarters of a billion dollars. Actually the amount may be
16
higher since these figures include all offsets resulting from "tied" aid. Foreign
17
governments all too often meet requirements that they spend our aid money on
18
purchases from the U. S. by attributing normal purchases from the U. S. to our aid
19
disbursements.
The Administration should instruct AID to publish figures showing
20
the true effect of foreign assistance on our balance of payments.
21
(10) Special attention should be given to situations in which substantial
aid is forthcoming from other nations, and in which we are asked to cooperate.
Excellent examples are the International Development Association and the Inter-
American Development Bank -- both Republican ideas -- and the Asian Development
Bank.
(11) We should explore with developing countries ways and means of increas-
ing their earning capacities. Inasmuch as many developing nations -- Brazil,
Colombia, Nigeria -- have lost more in some years by the fall in the international
price of their export commodities than they have gained by foreign aid, the world-
wide stabilization of raw material prices is one possible solution which should be
considered.
2 The testimony of N. R. Danielian, President of the International Economic Policy
22
Association before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 12, 1967 reports,
23
"An examination of net non-military assistance and the U. S. trade balance with
24
selected countries, which have received between 50 and 60 percent of total U. S.
25
aid for the years 1958-1965, shows clearly that total net U. S. economic assistance
26
exceeded our trade surpluses with these selected countries by an amount fluctuating
27
between $1.3 and $1.7 billion a year." See Appendix B for the I.E.P.A. figures on
28
the trade imbalance. Indications that "tying" often actually amounts to substitu-
29
tion for normal purchases is also demonstrated by the fact that our trade imbalance
30
in 1958 with these 25 countries was $1.8 billion and in 1965, when assistance was
31
substantially "tied," it was $1.6 billion, or nearly the same.
32
-18-
Another possible remedy for one-crop economies is obviously diversification.
However, we should keep in mind that many countries, such as Malaysia and the
Ivory Coast, have built boom economies by simply emphasizing production of
the one or two crops which they produce most proficiently. At the same time,
other countries, such as Indonesia and Ghana, have destroyed what should have
been viable economies, based upon agricultural earnings, by trying to diversify
into uneconomic industrial activity. Still others, such as India, have ignored
the most basic food needs of their people in their haste to industrialize. The
United States should certainly not encourage any such basically uneconomic activity.
(12) We should realize that, while certain problems are common to all or
almost all of the developing nations, each one is in many matters separate and
distinct. Generalizations -- including those in this document -- are dangerous.
Those in the field realize the truth of this more than those in Washington.
These latter attach too much importance to "uniformity."
(13) We should strengthen the Ambassador in his role as chief of mission.
Only the very strongest considerations should be allowed to over-rule his veto;
and, subject only to budgetary limitations, his affirmative recommendations
should normally be accepted. His small discretionary fund of $25,000 for self-
help projects which was recently abolished, should be restored. Increased
flexibility based on the sound Republican principle of decentralization (but with
full accounting) will allow the Ambassador to adapt the U. S. program to the
peculiarities of each different situation.
(14) The techniques and insights of the social sciences should be brought
to bear upon development problems and projects. Social scientists in the coun-
tries concerned should aid in tackling their own problems of economics and
technology. In this way their peculiar knowledge can assist in overcoming the
barriers found in the existing customs of their countries which stand in the
-19-
way of modernization. Tribalism in Africa, the now dwindling hacienda
society in rural Latin America, certain religious traditions and practices
elsewhere will serve as examples.
(15) To insure a more effective aid program, continuous emphasis should
be placed on securing qualified personnel to administer aid. Aid should not
be given unless there are really qualified personnel, both American and local
nationals, available to administer it. Qualifications must include a capacity
to understand the culture in which a person is to work. Without constructive
competency and solid training, aid will be wasted. Many of our failures can
be laid at the door of the limited number of such persons, the inadequacy of
their training, and the absence of the right motivation. It is equally
important that we assist developing nations to produce qualified administrators
who can work with the U. S. and perhaps others in promoting growth.
(16) Much more attention must be paid in the U. S. to the realistic
evaluation of what our aid is actually accomplishing. Both the Executive and
Legislative Branches must broaden their supervision over AID and insure maximum
objectivity. If the sponsoring agency under the present Administration is
unwilling to be realistic in such matters, then Congress must act responsibly
in giving its own time and in employing the necessary qualified staff to perform
this function. This requires much more than a "fishing expedition." It should
be approached constructively.
*
*
*
*
The importance of effective aid cannot be over stressed and the issues
involved in improving the program are far too important for narrow partisanship.
Aid is an expensive humanitarian experiment. The American people have a right
to expect sound administration of their funds and solid progress as a result.
-20-
APPENDIX A
TOTAL UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, BY COUNTRY
JULY 1, 1946 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1965
Near East and South Asia
Afghanistan
$307.1 million
Ceylon
92.2
Cyprus
20.9
Greece
3,685.8
India
5,941.5
Iran
1,550.3
Iraq
102.6
Israel
1,133.1
Jordan
512.3
Lebanon
93.0
Nepal
86.1
Pakistan
2,944.9
Saudi Arabia
136.9
Syrian Arab Republic
84.0
Turkey
3,752.4
United Arab Republic (Egypt)
1,100.3
Yemen
39.1
Central Treaty Organization
52.4
Near East and south Asia regional 1,119,5
Near East and South Asia
total
$22,754.4 million
Latin America
Argentina
$712.9 million
Bolivia
435.9
Brazil
2,871.5
British Guiana
17.1
British Honduras
3.8
Chile
1,130.3
Colombia
734.7
Costa Rica
136.3
Cuba
57.6
Dominican Republic
207.9
Ecuador
248.8
E1 Salvador
99.9
Guatemala
210.7
Haiti
110.6
Honduras
74.8
Jamaica
40.3
Mexico
1,055.1
Nicaragua
112.0
Panama
159.6
Paraguay
90.2
Peru
675.2
Surinam
5.0
Trinidad and Tobago
43.3
Uruguay
113.6
Venezuela
388.1
Other West Indies
3.3
ROCAP
84.1
Latin American regional
740.1
Latin American total
$10,561.7 million (cont.)
-21-
APPENDIX A (Continued)
Far East
Burma
$114.6 million
Cambodia
343.1
China
4,778.2
Hong Kong
55.7
Indochina, undistributed
1,535.2
Indonesia
875.9
Japan
4,138.7
Korea
6,315.9
Laos
418.6
Malaysia
39.1
Phillippines
1,914.8
Ryukyu Islands
325.7
Thailand
442.8
Vietnam
2,383.7
Far East regional
2,723.9
Far East total
$26,405.9 million
Africa
Algeria
$163.7 million
Burundi
72.4
Cameroon
25.1
Central African Republic
2.8
Chad
4.2
Congo (Brazzaville)
2.4
Congo (Leopoldville)
317.4
Dahomey
8.7
Ethiopia
247.6
Gabon
4.8
Gambia
.1
Ghana
170.4
Guinea
70.2
Ivory Coast
26.0
Kenya
36.4
Liberia
237.0
Libya
217.3
Malagasy Republic
7.9
Malawi
8.7
Mali
15.8
Mauritania
2.8
Morocco
529.4
Niger
8.8
Nigeria
163.7
Rwanda
1.7
Senegal
25.0
Sierra Leone
27.2
Somali Republic
47.6
Republic of South Africa
167.4
Southern Rhodesia
7.1
Sudan
91.5
Tanzania
44.0
Togo
9.9
Tunisia
470.3
Uganda
17.3
Upper Volta
5.5
(cont.)
-22-
APPENDIX A (Continued)
Zambia
30.2
East Africa regional
11.2
Regional USAID/Africa
1.0
Africa regional
54.1
Africa total
$ 3,354.6 million
Europe
Albania
$ 20.4 million
Austria
1,257.1
Belgium-Luxembourg
2,107.3
Czechoslovakia
193.0
Denmark
933.7
East Germany
0.8
Finland
146.7
France
9,465.1
Germany (Federal Republic)
5,149.0
Berlin
131.9
Hungary
31.5
Iceland
76.4
Ireland
195.9
Italy
6,089,4
Netherlands
2,617.7
Norway
1.283.4
Poland
573.6
Portugal
531.1
Spain
1,908.7
Sweden
125.2
United Kingdom
9,269.8
U.S.S.R.
186.4
Yugoslavia
2,761.4
Europe regional
2,796.5
Europe total
$47,852.0 million
Canada
40.0 million
Australia
142.6
New Zealand
21.5
Trust Territory of Pacific Islands 107.4
Nonregional total
5,779.0
Total
$ 6,090.5 million
Total assistance to all
countries
$117,019.1 million
Source: Data obtained from the General Accounting Office by Senator Dirksen
who inserted these statistics into the Congressional Record, July 20
1966, pp. 15714-15750.
U. S. NONMILITARY FOREIGN ASSISTANCE (NET) AND TRADE BALANCES BY COUNTRIES, 1958-1965
(millions of dollars)
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
.1964
1965
Net
U.
S.
Net
U. S.
Net
U. S.
Net
U. S.
Net
U. S.
Net
U. S.
Net
U. S.
Net
U. S.
b
b
Tradeᵇ
Tradeᵇ
Trade
b
Eco.
Trade
Eco.
Trade
Eco.
Trade
Eco.
Trade
Eco.
Eco.
Eco.
Eco.
Trade
Countries
Aid
a
Balance
Aid
a
Balance
Aid
a
Aid
a
Aidᵃ
Balance
a
Balance
Balance
Aid
Balance
Aidᵃ
Balance
Aid
Balance
Afghanistan
19
-4
19
-10
13
-10
30
6
13
-8
32
-3
37
6
34
2
Bolivia
22
17
22
14
13
14
23
16
29
20
44
18
33
17
30
7
Brazil
145
-33
35
-216
42
-147
270
-68
157
-117
128
-186
212
-148
149
-183
Cambodia
37
-2
21
-7
25
-
24
9
20
5
20
2
7
-1
2
-
Ceylon
20
-5
19
-12
8
-25
9
-17
8
-19
4
-21
4
-27
4
-23
Chile
47
-7
33
-76
10
-
121
43
87
-24
109
-32
96
-38
104
24
Colombia
92
-147
32
-134
-7
-54
54
-31
43
-50
69
-9
38
-35
34
-80
Ecuador
3
-9
2
-12
7
-11
11
-4
11
-26
14
-11
17
-4
17
-28
India
243
63
320
129
523
412
370
230
528
411
736
509
864
651
849
580
Indonesia
24
-112
17
-123
45
-132
54
-29
88
-15
77
-7
32
-102
-4
-123
Jordan
57
10
60
16
62
17
61
24
53
20
54
37
45
20
37
19
Korea
311
213
232
131
261
148
228
155
233
204
231
211
157
169
165
149
Laos
30
2
35
3
33
1
51
2
30
4
31
6
39
7
58
8
Liberia
8
14
9
59
8
-4
19
17
35
20
11
4
12
-13
25
-11
APPENDIX B
-23-
Malaysia
c
-85
C
-150
1
-138
2
-126
12
-155
6
-150
2
-82
4
-123
Morocco
26
33
45
29
61
29
97
55
48
42
53
49
38
31
51
49
Nepal
6
nss
3
na
8
na
10
na
9
na
14
na
17
na
16
1
Pakistan
145
81
142
65
229
131
218
158
322
243
378
341
377
336
348
291
Philippines
42
18
24
-36
24
-10
11
17
24
-59
8
-34
49
-27
45
-34
Poland
99
75
66
43
127
111
57
34
60
48
46
66
52
84
-6
-31
Thailand
30
-4
48
-28
42
11
29
25
31
32
29
57
18
58
25
67
Tunisia
26
4
30
7
55
21
77
38
53
44
38
25
45
31
54
39
Turkey
122
72
111
44
101
66
153
69
202
106
173
154
126
96
132
81
Vietnam
204
57
168
46
186
48
144
62
148
101
189
114
221
131
300
187
Yemen
-
na
5
na
5
na
6
na
6
na
8
na
6
na
5
na
TOTALS
1,758
251
1,498
-218
1,882
478
2,129
685
2,250
827
2,512
1,140
2,544
1,160
2,478
868
a
Disbursements less repayments.
Exports and imports, f.o.b.; includes U. S. exports financed by military grants and credits.
Less than $500,000
SOURCES: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade, Annual 1958-1962, pp. 128-130;
na
Not available.
March 1965, pp. 63-64; Annual 1961-1965, p. 285; National Advisory Council,
nss Not statistically significant.
Semiannual Report to the President and Congress, January-June 1964, pp. 75-77;
U. S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Grants and Credits (Wash.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1964 and 1965).