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Ford Press Releases - Trade and Tariffs, 1967-1972
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The original documents are located in Box D9, folder "Ford Press Releases - Trade and
Tariffs, 1967-1972" of the Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at
the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box D9 of The Ford Congressional Papers: Press Secretary and Speech File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
FOR THE SENATE:
FOR THE HOUSE
THE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
OF REPRESENTATIVES:
Everett M. Dirksen
of Illinois
Gerald R. Ford
Thomas H. Kuchel
OF THE CONGRESS
of Michigan
of California
Leslie C. Arends
Bourke B. Hickenlooper
of Illinois
of Iowa
Press Release
Melvin R. Laird
Margaret Chase Smith
of Wisconsin
of Maine
John J. Rhodes
George Murphy
of Arizona
of California
H. Allen Smith
Milton R. Young
of California
of North Dakota
Issued following a
Bob Wilson
Hugh Scott
of California
Leadership Meeting
of Pennsylvania
Charles E. Goodell
of New York
PRESIDING:
March 17, 1967
Richard H. Poff
of Virginia
The National Chairman
Ray C. Bliss
William C. Cramer
of Florida
STATEMENT BY SENATOR DIRKSEN
For Release
Noon, March 17, 1967
The Kennedy Round negotiations at least reach crisis point. Our
negotiators in Geneva rightly confess alarm over the magnitude and complexity
of the issues still unsolved after nearly three years of effort.
These prolonged negotiations -- still fruitless even at this late date --
evidence the urgent need for a comprehensive reassessment of America's
foreign trade policy by the 90th Congress.
Republicans in Congress strongly favor truly reciprocal trade. But for
years the United States has not benefited reciprocally from its trade agree-
ments. For seven years straight our commercial balance of trade has declined.
Its alarming state has been misrepresented to Congress and the nation.
A number of basic domestic industries have suffered grievously under
unwisely "liberalized" customs and tariff practices and ineptly administered
trade agreements legislation. Foreign-produced goods have prospered in our
markets. But foreign markets have not reciprocally responded to our products
of America's mines, farms, forests and industry.
We welcome the pledge of Chairman Long of the Senate Finance Committee
to conduct an early review of the nation's foreign trade operations and
particularly the administration of the trade agreements program. This pledge
is in accord with our own earlier recommendations. Our appended statement
outlines areas and problems which the national interest requires be included
in the Committee's investigation and hearings.
Let the Administration understand clearly the import of these remarks:
a simple extension of the present law just will not do. We must proceed --
and in good time -- to give adequate attention to this nation's basic economic
needs, and amend the law accordingly.
Room S-124 U.S. Capitol-(202) 225-3700
(More)
Consultant to the Leadership-John B. Fisher
REPRESENTATIVE FORD
March 17, 1967
If this nation's foreign trade position is not to decline further,
a first order of business must be the creation of a House Select
Committee on Export Controls, a move that has continuously been blocked
by the Johnson-Humphrey Administration. This Committee should maintain
a continuing evaluation of all related developments, including trade in
strategic goods.
We have long recommended urgent solution of our deteriorating
balance of payments position -- a solution constructive for the rest
of the world as well as for ourselves. The problem must be solved.
In this critical area the Johnson-Humphrey Administration has failed utterly.
Like sensible export controls, our balance of payments directly affects
jobs for the American people and the health of American industry. We
therefore urgently advocate these studies. The studies to which I refer
are outlined in our appended statement.
We urge also, in the light of present world conditions, an
objective reappraisal of the size and character of America's world-wide
military and economic commitments. This recommendation is neither new
nor partisan. It is urged by military experts and leaders of both parties.
Its urgency is underscored by the sharp disagreement over it among the
leaders of the President's party.
The Administration and its Democrat majorities in Congress cannot
avoid responsibility for their continuing failure to act decisively on
these problems so vital to every American citizen and family.
THE NEED FOR INVESTIGATION AND PUBLIC HEARINGS BY THE SENATE
FINANCE COMMITTEE BY WAY OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF
THE ADMINISTRATION OF U. S. CUSTOMS, TARIFF,
AND TRADE AGREEMENTS LEGISLATION
On January 18, 1967, the Chairman of the Committee on
Finance, United States Senate, the Honorable Russell B. Long, delivered
an address before the Economic Club of New York in which he declared
that "our trade policies need a thoroughly new look and some hard-headed
American businessmen are needed to devote a great deal of independent
thought and study to the overall program."
The Chairman also made a statement on the floor of the
Senate on February 3 concerning our Nation's foreign trade policy in
which he declared that the developments thus far in the Kennedy Round
and dissatisfaction with the Antidumping Act and other customs and tariff
matters "are dramatic evidence of the necessity for a thoroughgoing
inquiry into our foreign economic policy during the 90th Congress."
The Minority Leader of the Senate, in an address delivered in New York
on December 3, also called attention to the need for Congress to "restore
some semblance of fairness and balance to our foreign trade policy and
procedures. "
The principal Congressional attention to foreign economic
policy in recent years has been centered on the delegation or extension
of authority to the President to enter into trade agreements providing
for a reduction in U. S. rates of duty.
A study of U. S. foreign trade data for recent years prompts
the conclusion that the United States has not received actual reciprocity
in trade benefits in trade agreement negotiations conducted under the
auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Worse, it seems
2.
clear that the Congress has been misled as to the actual status of
our merchandise balance of trade.
Misleading Reports of the Executive Branch
Concerning the U. S. Balance of Trade
According to reports released by the Department of Commerce
on January 25, 1967, the Nation's balance of merchandise trade for the
year 1966 showed an export surplus of $3.4 billion, based on the follow-
ing figures:
Exports of domestic merchandise
(excluding defense shipments)
$28,958.6 million
General imports of merchandise
25,550.3 million
Balance of merchandise trade
$ 3,408.3 million
A substantial part of the exports, however, were noncommercial,
being financed by the U. S. Government. For the first 9 months of 1966,
exports financed by the U. S. Government totaled $2,214 million.* Esti-
mating the fourth quarter of the year at the same rate as the first 3
quarters, the total of Government-financed exports for 1966 was approxi-
mately $2,952 million. This compares with $2,768 million Government-financed
exports for the year 1965.
If these Government-financed exports are subtracted from
the total exports reported by the Department of Commerce, the favorable
trade balance, on a commercial basis, shrinks to $456 million.
The United States balance of trade on a commercial basis
in 1966 was the lowest of the past seven years. This is shown by the
following chart:
*
Merchandise exports financed by U. S. Government grants and capital
outflows as reported by U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Survey of Current
Business, December 1966, pp. 24, 25 (cf. line A 28, p. 25).
3.
$ Billions
$ Billions
30
U.S. MERCHANDISE TRADE
28
Exports
Total Trade Surplus
Aid-financed
26
Commercial
Exports
Excl. Aid
Imports
24
Merchandise Exports and Imports
22
8
Merchandise Trade Surplus
20
6
18
4
16
2
14
0
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966*
*For 1966, data are averages for the first three quarters converted to annual rates. Aid-financed exports are those entailing
U.S. government grants or loans.
SOURCE: Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, The Morgan
Guaranty Survey, January 1967.
Even the $456 million commercial export surplus figure is
misleading. The practice of other nations is to record the value of
their imports on a c.i.f. rather than an f.o.b. origin basis. Thus,
if we are to compare the commercial balance of merchandise trade of the
United States with that of other nations, our import figures should be
converted to a c.i.f. basis.
On February 7, 1967, the Tariff Commission released data
based on an analysis of import entry documents for the year 1965. As
reported by the Commission, these data show that U. S. imports when
4.
reported on a c.i.f. basis would be equal to 110% of the value as
reported by the Department of Commerce. If this adjustment is made
to the data for the year 1966, the true commercial balance of trade
of the United States for comparison with that of other nations would
appear to be as follows:
U. S. merchandise exports as reported by
the Department of Commerce
$28,958.6 million
Less U. S. Government-financed exports
2,952.0 million
Commercial exports, net
$26,006.6 million
Imports, c.i.f. (110% of the value as
reported by the Department of Commerce)
$28,105.3 million
U. S. balance of commercial merchandise
trade
-$2,098.7 million
Thus, it would appear that the net result of the years of
trade agreement negotiations conducted by the Executive Branch of the
Government is a steady worsening of our commercial balance of trade and,
for the year 1966, an actual deficit in the order of $2 billion.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that our trade agree-
ment negotiations in the past have not been reciprocal. The results
appear contrary to the representations which have repeatedly been made
by the Executive Department to the Congress in connection with foreign
trade legislation. It would seem to be a matter of serious concern
that the type of sweeping across-the-board reductions in duty being
pursued by the United States in the Kennedy Round could have an even
worse effect on the trade position of the United States in future years.
5.
*****
Domestic industries have increasingly sought the inter-
vention of the Congress in recent years against the disruptive effects
of rapidly increasing imports, and they have called attention to the
balance of payments consequences to the Nation of the trends of increasing
imports and declining exports. The situation of these industries,
including several of the Nation's basic industries, may indicate that
in the administration of the customs, tariff, and trade agreements
laws of the United States, there has been a lack of balance and a
one-sidedness in judgment which has reduced the protective effects
of our domestic customs, tariff, and trade agreements legislation for
domestic industries while exaggerating or "liberalizing" the administra-
tion of these laws for the benefit of importers of foreign-produced
goods.
A careful investigation of the administration of the laws
in each of these vital areas, which in totality make up the legislative
expression of our foreign economic policy, should be conducted and
completed prior to any consideration of a renewal or enlargement of
the President's authority to enter into trade agreements for the modifi-
cation of U. S. duties or other customs provisions.
It would appear that the Committee on Finance may have
an exceptional opportunity during the next several months to devote
extended consideration to these topics. While corrective legislation
6.
in the area of customs, tariffs, and trade agreements normally
originates in the House of Representatives, an extremely useful
service would be rendered to the Senate and the House if the Committee
on Finance could take advantage of the present opportunity to carry
out its responsibility for legislative oversight of the customs,
tariff, and trade agreement laws of the United States by hearing,
investigating, and reporting on the administration of these laws
and the necessity or desirability, if any, of administrative reform
including appropriate changes in the basic legislation itself.
Such a report should prove to be of exceptional value to
both Houses of Congress in connection with any attention which the
Committees and the Congress are called upon to give an extension of
the Trade Expansion Act or replacement of the program defined by that
Act with some other program responsive to the present and anticipated
situation in the foreign commerce of the United States.
Accordingly, it is recommended that the Committee on
Finance schedule public hearings on, and authorize appropriate staff
investigation of, the following topics:
7.
1. THE PRENEGOTIATIONS SAFEGUARDS OF THE TRADE
EXPANSION ACT (19 U.S.C. §§ 1814-1845): Repeal
of Congressional Policy by Administrative Fiat.
The Trade Expansion Act repealed the "peril point" provision
of the trade agreements legislation under which the Tariff Commission
as a prerequisite to trade agreement negotiations prior to the Kennedy
Round investigated, determined, and reported to the President the extent
to which the rates of duty on articles to be considered in the negotia-
tions could be reduced without causing or threatening serious injury
to domestic industries.
To allay the concern of domestic industries and members
of the Congress concerned with their welfare, there was set forth in
the Trade Expansion Act an elaborate procedure for public hearings
and Tariff Commission advice to the President concerning the probable
economic effect of modifications in U. S. duties. The President was
required to receive and consider such advice prior to entering into
trade agreement negotiations.
Notwithstanding these provisions and the assurances which
accompanied their enactment, the Administration participated in a
meeting of the Ministers of the GATT member countries in May of 1963
and agreed to a resolution providing for linear (across-the-board)
reductions in duty of 50% on all industrial products subject only to
a bare minimum of exceptions, which exceptions were subject to confronta-
tion and justification, and excusable only on the grounds of overriding
national interests.
8.
This commitment was made by the Executive Branch approxi-
mately one year prior to the date upon which the Tariff Commission's
report of the probable economic effect of reductions in duty was sub-
mitted to the President. This commitment was renewed at the meeting
of Ministers in May of 1964 at about the time the President received
the Commission's report, but clearly well in advance of the date on
which he or his delegates could have seriously studied and evaluated
the Commission's advice.
U. S. negotiators have publicly stated that the U. S.
"exceptions" list was indeed kept to a "bare minimum," and that the
United States expected to reduce this "bare minimum" even further
in the course of the negotiations. Evidently, therefore, the policy
of careful evaluation and selectivity in the determination of articles
to be placed in the negotiations, understood and intended by the
Congress as a prerequisite to negotiations, has been ignored, or taken
so lightly as to amount to a virtual dead letter in the Trade Expansion
Act.
9.
2. TARIFF ADJUSTMENT (19 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1902,
1981, 1982): The Total Inoperativeness
of the Escape Clause.
At the urging of the Executive Branch, the Congress repealed
the escape clause provision of the trade agreements legislation under
which Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy had made a few highly
selective withdrawals of tariff concessions found by the Tariff Commis-
sion to have caused or threatened serious injury to domestic industries,
and substituted in its stead the so-called "adjustment assistance"
provision of the TEA.
Under the 1962 Act, such assistance might take the form
of tariff adjustment, assistance to workers in the form of extended
periods of unemployment compensation and retraining and relocation
allowances, or tax incentives or loans to firms requiring such help
in order to transfer their activities to other lines of endeavor. The
criteria for relief in any case was the same, a finding by the Tariff
Commission that due in major part to a tariff concession imports had
increased and were a major factor in causing or threatening serious
injury to a domestic industry, group of workers, or firm.
Thus far in nineteen cases, involving nine industries,
five groups of workers, and five firms, the Tariff Commission has
uniformly refused to make the necessary findings and Administration
officials have acknowledged that the criteria of the Act impose too
severe a standard.
10.
3. CANCELLATION OF PAST ESCAPE CLAUSE RELIEF
[19 U.S.C. § 1981(c)(1)(A)]: Has Administrative
Policy Made a Sham of Fact-Finding?
When the Trade Expansion Act became law, there were in
effect a handful of cases in which tariff concessions had been wholly
or partially withdrawn to correct the serious injury which domestic
industries had suffered under rising imports. The Executive Branch
has now canceled in whole or part all of these escape clause actions
except two textile cases as a part of or prelude to the negotiations
in the Kennedy Round.
The following industries are the victim of decisions which
appear to have been based solely on negotiating policy rather than an
objective consideration of the economic merits of the industry's case:
clinical thermometers, stainless steel flatware, lead and zinc, flat
glass, and jeweled watches.
4. THE NATIONAL SECURITY AMENDMENT (19 U.S.C. § 1862):
The Total Inoperativeness of the Finance Committee's
Particular Remedy.
In the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, the Committee
on Finance fashioned a particular remedy to permit the regulation of
imports affecting basic industries in a manner consistent with the
national security. This amendment was carried forward in the subsequent
Extension Act of 1958.
More than 20 cases have been brought before the Office of
Emergency Planning (and its predecessor agencies), made the investigating
agency by the statute. In only one, petroleum and petroleum products,
11.
acted upon during the Eisenhower Administration, has relief been granted.
Though import competition has been found to be significant in the case
of a number of industries suffering economic distress, the Office of
Emergency Planning has in each instance "explained away" either the
national security importance of these basic industries or of the imports
as a contributing cause of the industry's distress. One case, textiles
and textile manufactures, remains undecided after nearly six years.
In some instances the Director of the Office of Emergency
Planning has cited the opinion of the State Department that import
restrictions would affect the national security interests of the United
States as seen in the international relations of the United States
as a reason for denying relief.
Whereas the Finance Committee intended the national security
provision as a remedy applicable to a number of basic industries, it
has been converted through the policy imperatives of the Executive
Branch into virtually a dead letter of the law.
5. TARIFF COMMISSION INVESTIGATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE
CUSTOMS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, TARIFF RELATIONS
OF THE U. S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES, COST OF PRODUCTION
AND OTHER FACTS PERTAINING TO COMPETITION BETWEEN
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PRODUCTS IN THE PRINCIPAL MARKETS
OF THE UNITED STATES (19 U.S.C. § 1332).
The Tariff Commission was established as a quasi-legislative
body which would, through its investigations and reports, inform and
assist the Congress in its consideration of tariff and trade legislation.
To this end the Congress directed the Commission in Section 332 of the
12.
Tariff Act of 1930 to carry out on a continuing basis a variety of
investigations and to make reports thereon to the Congress on a variety
of topics.
These relate to the effect of customs laws on the industry
and labor of the United States, practices of foreign countries through
commercial treaties, preferential provisions, economic alliances,
export bounties, and preferential transportation rates, and dumping
which affect competition between U. S. and foreign industries; costs
of production of U. S. and foreign-produced articles including the
import costs of articles competitive with U. S. production, and other
facts bearing on competition between articles of U. S. and foreign
origins in U. S. markets.
There has been little attention by the Commission to these
responsibilities in recent years. As a result, the Congress has been
disabled in considering customs, tariff, and trade agreement legislation.
Not in recent years have the Chairman or members of the Tariff Commission
been interrogated by the Committee on Finance of the Senate or the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives. Information
submitted in the name of the Commission to these Committees has frequently
been in the form of unsigned memoranda which may not in fact represent
the carefully considered judgment of the Commission's staff of industry
specialists and of the Commissioners themselves.
In particular, the Commission's continuing responsibilities
to investigate and report on the topics specified in Section 332 as a
means of keeping the cognizant Committees of the Congress fully informed
13.
of developments in customs, tariff, trade agreements, and foreign
trade practices and competitive conditions between U. S. and foreign
industries relating thereto have not been carried out. This makes
it difficult for the Committees to become knowledgeable in these
matters and to keep abreast of significant changes in the relationship
of U. S. and foreign industries and the position of the United States
in world trade.
The Congress has been placed in the position of reacting
to initiatives from the Executive Branch or foreign countries and
industries rather than being forehanded with legislation which would
enable the United States to deal effectively with developments in world
trade. The acute disparity between the growth rate of U. S. imports
and U. S. exports and the sharp decline in the balance of trade of
the United States, especially in trade conducted on a commercial basis,
is one consequence of this situation.
*****
The rules for and manner of administration of customs valua-
tion and of the basic remedies, such as antidumping and countervailing
duties which are designed to prevent the circumvention or avoidance of
the amount of duties intended by the Congress as revenue and domestic
protection measures, have fully as great an impact on total duties
collected as the numerical level of the rate of duty itself. Problems
of administration in the customs valuation, antidumping, and counter-
vailing duties areas match the seriousness of the negative record of
14.
administration of the tariff adjustment provisions of the Trade Expansion
Act in recent years.
1. THE ANTIDUMPING ACT (19 U.S.C. § 160 et seq. :
The Quality of Its Administration and Appropriate
Amendments To Make the Act a More Effective Deterrent
Against Unfair Practices in the Import Trade.
Under the leadership of the then Senator Humphrey, a large
number of the members of the Senate have in recent years requested
substantial amendments in the substance and procedure of the Antidumping
Act. In the 89th Congress, S. 2045, introduced by Mr. Hartke for
himself and 31 other Senators, is representative of this effort.
2. THE COUNTERVAILING DUTIES STATUTE (19 U.S.C. § 1303) :
Its Nonadministration and the Need for Legislative
Direction to Restore the Act as a Check Against the
Subsidization of Exports by Foreign Countries.
The principal way in which foreign countries now pay or
bestow, directly or indirectly, bounties or grants upon the production
or export of articles imported into the United States is through the
remission of the so-called value added or turnover taxes used by those
governments as a principal means of raising tax revenues. By interpreta-
tion the Treasury Department is refraining from imposing countervailing
duties in such instances contrary to the ruling of the United States
Supreme Court in Downs V. United States, 187 U.S. 496, which held that
a tax imposed upon the production of a commodity which is remitted upon
the exportation of this commodity is, by whatever name the practice
may be disguised, tantamount to a bounty upon exportation subject to
countervailing duties.
15.
3. CUSTOMS VALUATION (19 U.S.C. §§ 1401a, 1402) :
Eleven Years' Experience Under the So-Called
"Simplification" of Customs Valuation Rules;
the Need to Reëstablish Valuation Rules Designed
to Check Undervaluation.
Eleven years ago the Congress enacted the Customs Simplifi-
cation Act of 1956 on the urging of the Executive Branch. Two basic
changes were made: the use of the higher of foreign [home market ] or
export value was eliminated as the primary valuation basis, export value
becoming the principal valuation base; and the terms used in defining
the various valuation bases were themselves defined.
The use prior to 1956 of the higher of foreign or export
value as the primary valuation base accomplished three important results:
it was an automatic check against undervaluation; it provided the Customs
Service with a continuous body of foreign price information, thereby
facilitating the administration of the Antidumping Act; and it prevented
foreign exporters from achieving a measure of control over the actual
amount of duties collected in the United States since the price they
charged for exports to the U. S. became the basis of valuation for customs
purposes only where such price was higher than the internal market price.
(In other words, prior to 1956 it was more difficult for
foreign exporters to manipulate both the home market and export price
in order to predetermine U. S. duty collections than the situation which
obtained after 1956 in which the exporter's actual price on goods sold
to the United States tended to become the principal basis for customs
valuation.)
16.
When the Customs Simplification Act of 1956 was considered
in the Senate, the then Majority Leader, Senator Lyndon Johnson, in
presenting and explaining the bill, stated that "Treasury representatives
advised the committee that there would likely be more effective enforce-
ment of the antidumping law" under the new Act because "foreign value
information would continue to be required on customs invoices" so that
there would be available "the information needed to initiate full-scale
investigations whenever dumping was indicated." (Congressional Record,
July 18, 1956, p. 12064)
Unfortunately, following the enactment of the Customs
Simplification Act of 1956, the administration of the Antidumping
Act appears virtually to have collapsed inasmuch as there have been
very few instances in which antidumping duties have been imposed
notwithstanding many hundreds of complaints. In fact, there have
been less than a dozen cases in which antidumping duties have actually
been imposed out of several hundred complaints filed since 1956.
Equally disturbing in the opinion of domestic industries is
the probability that customs personnel at the ports have, under pressure
of the mounting workload of the sharply rising number of import trans-
actions, settled into an administrative practice in which the price
appearing on the commercial invoice covering the goods imported is
accepted as evidence of the export value for customs valuation and duty
purposes. This value is oftentimes significantly lower than home market
prices which, under the definition of foreign value applicable prior
to 1956, would as evidence of "foreign value" represent the basis for
customs valuation for duty purposes.
17.
Thus it is strongly feared that domestic industries are
being injured not only by the nonadministration of the Antidumping
Act, but also by the reduction in the amounts of duties collected as
a result of the acceptance of deflated prices as a basis for customs
valuation under the export value rule.
For the past eleven years domestic industries have suffered
a reduction in duty as a result of the change in customs valuation
rules (in addition to the reductions in duty flowing from the tariff
cuts carried out under the trade agreements program), without any real
protection from dumping which a differential in price between home
market and export prices classically entails.
FOR RELEASE
Monday
March 20, 1967
for p.m.'s
WASHINGTON - House Republicans today asked President Johnson
to send Congress the long secret Tariff Commission report on dairy
imports which the Commission submitted to the President 10 months ago.
In their letter to the President, the 48 House members quoted a
statement by the President on March 9th saying "The Tariff Commission
plays a key role in safeguarding the nation's economic vitality.
the
Commission reports to Congress and the President concerning the effect
of imports on our domestic industries and our workers."
The GOP members pointed out that last year the President exercised
his emergency authority to increase dairy imports for the balance of
quota year 1966. At that time he also asked the Tariff Commission to
report to him on the feasibility of a further increase in dairy imports.
The Republicans said they were now writing Johnson "because we
are concerned about safeguarding the nation's economic vitality, and
because the Tariff Commission's report on the vital subject of dairy
imports has not been forthcoming."
In the calendar year 1966, imports of milk equivalent increased
by 300 per cent (900 million pounds to 2,7 billion) over the preceding
year. Because of loopholes in the quota law, the United States is
importing 12 times as much milk equivalent as is allowable under
present quotas. Other agriculture products from foreign countries are
also flooding the domestic market.
Congressional concern over rising dairy imports has resulted in
48 House bills and 42 co-sponsors to a Senate bill calling for limits
in the amount of such imports.
--END--
Attached are the text of the letter to the President and a list of
those signing.
LIBRARI
FOR RELEASE
Monday
March 20, 1967
for p.m.'s
March 20, 1967
Dear Mr. President:
On March 31, 1966, you took emergency action, under the emergency
provision of Section 22 of the Agriculture Adjustment Act, which
enlarged the quota for Cheddar-type cheeses from 2,780,100 pounds to
3,706,800 pounds for the quota year ending June 30, 1966.
Also, at your request, the Tariff Commission on April 1, 1966,
instituted an investigation to determine, according to its 50th Annual
Report, "(1) whether for the current quota year ending June 30, 1966,
the then existing quota of 2,780,100 pounds could be increased by
926,700 pounds under an emergency action; (2) whether the quota of
2,780,100 pounds could for an indefinite period be enlarged to
4,005,100 pounds, not more than 2,780,100 pounds of which would be
products other than natural Cheddar cheese made from unpasteurized
milk and aged not less than 9 months; and (3) whether for the quota
year beginning July 1, 1966, and ending June 30, 1967, the quota of
2,780,100 pounds could be increased to 9,565,300 pounds, not more than
8,340,300 pounds of which would be products other than natural Cheddar
cheese made from unpastuerized milk and aged not less than 9 months,
without rendering or tending to render ineffective or materially
interfering with the price-support programs of the Department of
Agriculture for milk and butterfat."
The report of the Tariff Commission was submitted to you on May
16, 1966 and a supplementary report submitted to you on June 1, 1966.
Unfortunately, the report has not been filed with or made available to
Members of the Congress of the United States.
In view of the increase of milk equivalent imports by 300% in 1966
over the previous year and in light of the concern Congress holds for
the serious situation that exists with regard to dairy imports, result-
int in 48 House bills and 42 co-sponsors to a Senate bill to limit
imports, we respectfully urge you to forward this report to Congress.
On March 9, 1967, you released a statement on the reorganization
of the Tariff Commission in which you said, "The Tariff Commission plays
a key role in safeguarding the nation's economic vitality. It reviews
our commercial policies and studies how these policies affect competi-
tion between foreign and domestic products. Periodically, after public
investigation, the Commission reports to Congress and the President
concerning the effect of imports on our domestic industries and our
workers.'
Because we are concerned about "safeguarding the nation's economic
vitality," and because the Tariff Commission's report on the vital
subject of dairy imports has not been forthcoming, Mr. President, we
write this letter to respectfully urge you to forward that report to
Congress with all due speed so that we may effectively study this
problem prior to the expiration of the quota year on June 30, 1967.
Respectfully,
FOR RELEASE
Monday
March 20, 1967
for p.m.'s
List of members signing letter to the President.
William A. Steiger
Donald E. Lukens
Gerald R. Ford
Joseph M. McDade
Melvin R. Laird
Robert C. McEwen
Page Belcher
Thomas J. Meskill
John B. Anderson
Robert Price
Mark Andrews
James H. Quillen
W. E. Brock
Tom Railsback
Donald G. Brotzman
Charlotte T. Reid
Clarence J. Brown, Jr.
Ben Reifel
Garry Brown
Howard W. Robison
Elford A. Cederberg
Philip E. Ruppe
Charles E. Chamberlain
Henry C. Schadeberg
Harold R. Collier
William J. Scherle
William O. Cowger
Fred Schwengel
Robert V. Denney
James V. Smith
John J. Duncan
M. G. Snyder
Marvin L. Esch
Sam Steiger
Edwin D. Eshleman
William C. Wampler
James Harvey
J. Irving Whalley
Edward Hutchinson
Larry Winn, Jr.
Carleton J. King
Louis C. Wyman
Thomas S. Kleppe
Roger H. Zion
John Kyl
John M. Zwach
Odin Langen
E. Y. Berry
FOR RELEASE
Monday
March 20, 1967
for p.m.'s
WASHINGTON -- House Republicans today asked President Johnson
to send Congress the long secret Tariff Commission report on dairy
imports which the Commission submitted to the President 10 months ago.
In their letter to the President, the 48 House members quoted a
statement by the President on March 9th saying "The Tariff Commission
plays a key role in safeguarding the nation's economic vitality.
the
Commission reports to Congress and the President concerning the effect
of imports on our domestic industries and our workers."
The GOP members pointed out that last year the President exercised
his emergency authority to increase dairy imports for the balance of
quota year 1966. At that time he also asked the Tariff Commission to
report to him on the feasibility of a further increase in dairy imports.
The Republicans said they were now writing Johnson "because we
are concerned about safeguarding the nation's economic vitality, and
because the Tariff Commission's report on the vital subject of dairy
imports has not been forthcoming."
In the calendar year 1966, imports of milk equivalent increased
by 300 per cent (900 million pounds to 2.7 billion) over the preceding
year. Because of loopholes in the quota law, the United States is
importing 12 times as much milk equivalent as is allowable under
present quotas. Other agriculture products from foreign countries are
also flooding the domestic market.
Congressional concern over rising dairy imports has resulted in
48 House bills and 42 co-sponsors to a Senate bill calling for limits
in the amount of such imports.
--END--
Attached are the text of the letter to the President and a list of
those signing.
FOR RELEASE
Monday
March 20, 1967
for p.m.'s
March 20, 1967
Dear Mr. President:
On March 31, 1966, you took emergency action, under the emergency
provision of Section 22 of the Agriculture Adjustment Act, which
enlarged the quota for Cheddar-type cheeses from 2,780,100 pounds to
3,706,800 pounds for the quota year ending June 30, 1966.
Also, at your request, the Tariff Commission on April 1, 1966,
instituted an investigation to determine, according to its 50th Annual
Report, "(1) whether for the current quota year ending June 30, 1966,
the then existing quota of 2,780,100 pounds could be increased by
926,700 pounds under an emergency action; (2) whether the quota of
2,780,10 pounds could for an indefinite period be enlarged to
4,005,100 pounds, not more than 2,780,100 pounds of which would be
products other than natural Cheddar cheese made from unpasteurized
milk and aged not less than 9 months; and (3) whether for the quota
year beginning July 1, 1966, and ending June 30, 1967, the quota of
2,780,100 pounds could be increased to 9,565,300 pounds, not more than
8,340,300 pounds of which would be products other than natural Cheddar
cheese made from unpastuerized milk and aged not less than 9 months,
without rendering or tending to render ineffective or materially
interfering with the price-support programs of the Department of
Agriculture for milk and butterfat."
The report of the Tariff Commission was submitted to you on May
16, 1966 and a supplementary report submitted to you on June 1, 1966.
Unfortunately, the report has not been filed with or made available to
Members of the Congress of the United States.
In view of the increase of milk equivalent imports by 300% in 1966
over the previous year and in light of the concern Congress holds for
the serious situation that exists with regard to dairy imports, result-
int in 48 House bills and 42 co-sponsors to a Senate bill to limit
imports, we respectfully urge you to forward this report to Congress.
On March 9, 1967, you released a statement on the reorganization
of the Tariff Commission in which you said, "The Tariff Commission plays
a key role in safeguarding the nation's economic vitality. It reviews
our commercial policies and studies how these policies affect competi-
tion between foreign and domestic products. Periodically, after public
investigation, the Commission reports to Congress and the President
concerning the effect of imports on our domestic industries and our
workers.
11
Because we are concerned about "safeguarding the nation's economic
vitality," and because the Tariff Commission's report on the vital
subject of dairy imports has not been forthcoming, Mr. President, we
write this letter to respectfully urge you to forward that report to
Congress with all due speed so that we may effectively study this
problem prior to the expiration of the quota year on June 30, 1967.
Respectfully,
FOR RELEASE
Monday
March 20, 1967
for p.m.'s
List of members signing letter to the President.
William A. Steiger
Donald E. Lukens
Gerald R. Ford
Joseph M. McDade
Melvin R. Laird
Robert C. McEwen
Page Belcher
Thomas J. Meskill
John B. Anderson
Robert Price
Mark Andrews
James H. Quillen
W. E. Brock
Tom Railsback
Donald G. Brotzman
Charlotte T. Reid
Clarence J. Brown, Jr.
Ben Reifel
Garry Brown
Howard W. Robison
Elford A. Cederberg
Philip E. Ruppe
Charles E. Chamberlain
Henry C. Schadeberg
Harold R. Collier
William J. Scherle
William O. Cowger
Fred Schwengel
Robert V. Denney
James V. Smith
John J. Duncan
M. G. Snyder
Marvin L. Esch
Sam Steiger
Edwin D. Eshleman
William C. Wampler
James Harvey
J. Irving Whalley
Edward Hutchinson
Larry Winn, Jr.
Carleton J. King
Louis C. Wyman
Thomas S. Kleppe
Roger H. Zion
John Kyl
John M. Zwach
Odin Langen
E. Y. Berry
FOR THE PRESS
From: John Franklin Carter
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 1, 1967
Associated Counsel
National Press Building
Phone: 244-3876
COMMITTEE TO OPPOSE EAST-WEST TRADE ANNOUNCED
WASHINGTON, D. C., April 30--Formation of a nationwide committee of
ten million citizens to oppose trade and aid to the Soviet Union was announced
today by John Davis Lodge, former Connecticut Governor and American diplomat.
Governor Lodge announced that prominent leaders in the fields of
business and industry, labor and education are associating themselves with
him on the Board of CEASE (Committee to End Aid to the Soviet Enemy), along
with such military leaders as Admiral Arthur W. Radford, former Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In a statement in this connection, Governor Lodge declared:
"At this very moment, American men are being killed and wounded
in Viet Nam. They are being killed and wounded by Soviet bullets
and explosives fired from Soviet weapons delivered to Viet Nam by
Soviet ships and Soviet planes. These weapons are being used
against our men by Soviet-inspired and trained terrorists,
guerillas and soldiers.
"Concurrently, terrorists are active in the four corners of the
world in Soviet-triggered 'wars of national liberation yet there
are those in this country not only trading with the Soviet Bloc,
but seeking to expand U. S. trade and aid to Soviet Russia on a
massive scale.
"We call upon the President and the Congress to end existing
trade and aid, direct and indirect, to the Soviet Union. We
call upon the President and Congress to make it clear that we
will not help the Soviet Union through trade and aid to achieve
its world aims through armed aggression. We speak in the name
(more)
- 2 -
of the millions of American wives, parents and other loved ones
of those now fighting and dying in the remote villages, fields
and jungles of Viet Nam, and of the minimum of ten million
Americans whom we are enlisting actively to aid these fighting
men."
Governor Lodge said that CEASE intends to establish Washington offices
later this week and to announce soon further details on the organization and
its specific plans.
"We are soliciting the signatures of ten million Americans and
their active aid and support in this patriotic effort to back
up our fighting men," Governor Lodge added. "We anticipate
no difficulty in getting these."
Governor Lodge was a member of the 80th and 81st Congresses, serving
on the Foreign Relations Committee. He was elected Governor of Connecticut
in 1950 and served as Chairman of the New England Governors Conference from
1953 to 1955. He was sent as a special envoy for President Dwight D.
Eisenhower to Panama and Costa Rica in 1953 and was named Ambassador to Spain
in 1955, a post in which he served through 1960.
A graduate of Middlesex School, Harvard, and the Harvard Law School,
Governor Lodge is married and has two daughters.
(Governor Lodge can be reached at Westport, Connecticut.)
- 30 -
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
FOR THE PRESS
From: John Franklin Carter
FOR INTEDIATE RELEASE
May 1, 1967
Associated Counsel
National Press Building
Phone: 244-3876
COMMITTEE TO OPPOSE EAST-WEST TRADE ANNOUNCED
WASHINGTON, D. C., April 30--Formation of a nationwide committee of
ten million citizens to oppose trade and aid to the Soviet Union was announced
today by John Davis Lodge, former Connecticut Governor and American diplomat.
Governor Lodge announced that prominent leaders in the fields of
business and industry, labor and education are associating themselves with
him on the Board of CEASE (Committee to End Aid to the Soviet Enemy), along
with such military leaders as Admiral Arthur W. Radford, former Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff
In a statement in this connection, Governor Lodge declared:
"At this very moment, American men are being killed and wounded
in Viet Nam. They are being killed and wounded by Soviet bullets
and explosives fired from Soviet weapons delivered to Viet Nam by
Soviet ships and Soviet planes. These weapons are being used
against our men by Soviet-inspired and trained terrorists,
guerillas and soldiers.
"Concurrently, terrorists are active in the four corners of the
world in Soviet-triggered 'wars of national liberation yet there
are those in this country not only trading with the Soviet Bloc,
but seeking to expand U. S. trade and aid to Soviet Russia on a
massive scale.
"We call upon the President and the Congress to end existing
trade and aid, direct and indirect, to the Soviet Union. We
call upon the President and Congress to make it clear that we
will not help the Soviet Union through trade and aid to achieve
its world aims through armed aggression. We speak in the name
(more)
- 2 -
of the millions of American wives, parents and other loved ones
of those now fighting and dying in the remote villages, fields
and jungles of Viet Nam, and of the minimum of ten million
Americans whom we are enlisting actively to aid these fighting
men."
Governor Lodge said that CEASE intends to establish Washington offices
later this week and to announce soon further details on the organization and
its specific plans.
"We are soliciting the signatures of ten million Americans and
their active aid and support in this patriotic effort to back
up our fighting men," Governor Lodge added. "We anticipate
no difficulty in getting these."
Governor Lodge was a member of the 80th and 81st Congresses, serving
on the Foreign Relations Committee. He was elected Governor of Connecticut
in 1950 and served as Chairman of the New England Governors Conference from
1953 to 1955. He was sent as a special envoy for President Dwight D.
Eisenhower to Panama and Costa Rica in 1953 and was named Ambassador to Spain
in 1955, a post in which he served through 1960.
A graduate of Middlesex School, Harvard, and the Harvard Law School,
Governor Lodge is married and has two daughters.
(Governor Lodge can be reached at Westport, Connecticut.)
- 30 -
FOR THE SENATE:
FOR THE HOUSE
Everett M. Dirksen
THE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP
OF REPRESENTATIVES:
of Illinois
Gerald R. Ford
Thomas H. Kuchel
OF THE CONGRESS
of Michigan
of California
Leslie C. Arends
Bourke B. Hickenlooper
of Illinois
of Iowa
Press Release
Melvin R. Laird
Margaret Chase Smith
of Wisconsin
of Maine
John J. Rhodes
George Murphy
of Arizona
of California
Issued following a
H. Allen Smith
Milton R. Young
Leadership Meeting
of California
of North Dakota
Bob Wilson
Hugh Scott
of California
of Pennsylvania
May 25, 1967
Charles E. Goodell
of New York
PRESIDING:
Richard H. Poff
of Virginia
The National Chairman
Ray C. Bliss
William C. Cramer
of Florida
STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE FORD:
IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Russian guns, Russian bullets, Russian surface-to-air missiles,
Russian MIGS, Communist machine guns and Communist mortars continue
to kill and maim American fighting men and innocent civilians by
the thousands in Viet Nam. Nevertheless, the Johnson-Humphrey
Administration continues to urge that we trade with the enemy by
"building bridges" between us and these Communist dealers in death.
There may be some who find it wholly consistent that Americans
should fight for freedom and survival against Communist aggression on
the one hand, while trading and dealing for Communist enrichment on
the other. We do not We will continue to oppose economic aid to
an enemy whose global goal is the extinction of freedom.
Trade can be an instrument for world peace but only when applied
in the hard-nosed tradition of the Yankee trader, not with the soft-
headed hope that it will somehow sway dedicated Communist governments
from their stated international goals. The extension of most-
favored-nation tariff treatment to ommunist East Europe in existing
circumstances is unwarranted and unwise.
The reduction of export controls on East-West trade in so-called
"non-strategic items" is dangerous, and Congress should carefully
review this whole subject. It may well be that present controls
should be tightened and certainly they should be more clearly defined
by the elected representatives of the people.
Guaranteeing commercial credits to Communist governments is a
form of economic foreign aid heretofore reserved for our friends.
Room S-124 U.S. Capitol-(202) 225-3700
ore)
Consultant to the Leadership-John B. Fisher
Rep. Ford
May 25,1967
Such a policy compels our own people, against their will, to encourage
and strengthen Communism. It is illogical to do this while committing
American lives to a Communist-supported war in Viet Nam.
The May Day order of the day issued by the Soviet Defense Min-
ister, Marshall Andrei Grechko, accused the United States of "hatching
sinister plots to spread aggression"in other parts of the world
beyond Viet Nam. Anyone who has studied Soviet tactics knows that
Moscow always accuses its adversary of doing what the Kremlin itself
is plotting to do.
Since last May 1, violence and trouble clearly instigated by
Communists have erupted almost on signal in widely scattered parts of
the world -- in the Sea of Japan, along the 38th parallel in Korea,
in Hongkong, and the Middle East. The open threat of intervention by
the Soviet Union to support Nasser's reckless gamble in the Gulf of
Aqaba gravely threatens world peace and gives little evidence of any
Russian desire for "building bridges" to the Free World.
In my judgment the Soviet bloc has embarked on a bold and con-
certed effort to divert the attention of the United States and Western
Europe from the grim struggle in Southeast Asia at a time when the
NATO shield is softer than at any time since it was raised by former
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower.
Surely it is no time to WOO the Communist world with trade con-
cessions. Let the Soviet Union and Eastern European Communist govern-
ments first convince us that they truly seek peace in Viet Nam, the
Middle East and elsewhere. Until then we should refuse to be party
to any mercenary deals in which the main advantage is with our avowed
enemies.
We will support mutually-beneficial, really reciprocal political
and economic agreements with Communist governments only when they
prove beyond question, as they easily can, that their policies and
actions are aimed at lasting peace, honorable settlement of the
war in Viet Nam and the crisis in the Middle East, and abandonment
of their support for so-called "wars of national liberation" against
free and independent peoples.
STATEMENT BY SENATOR DIRKSEN
Have you heard of a single Russian, who was reported as a
casualty in Viet Nam? You haven't and you won't. What you see
reported are American and South Vietnamese casulties. On May 25th,
the U. S. Command reported that total American casulties were in
excess of 70,000. This included 10,253 dead. South Vietnamese troop
deaths exceed 46,000.
Here is the dreadful, current tabulation of our losses:
U.S. DEATHS
U.S. WOUNDED
6,235 Army
37,327 Army
307 Navy
1,645 Navy
3,370 Marine
21,283 Marine
341 Air Force
1,170 Air Force
10,253 TOTAL
61,425 TOTAL
Non-combatant
2,058
SOUTH VIET NAM DEATHS
46,626
How were they killed? For the most part by Red Russian weapons
and Red Chinese weapons in the hands of the Red Viet Cong. It's
that simple. And there are more weapons to come.
Our airmen have shot down 71 Russian-built MIGS. It is esti-
mated that another 350 MIGS are available for replacements. Our
military reports that 2,450 Russian-built missiles have been fired
at our planes. Tens of thousands of Russian-built and Chinese-built
rifles and mortars have been found by our troops in the jungles,
fields, and Viet Cong supply dumps. The weapons come from the
Russians and their wretched Red allies. The victims of these
weapons are young Americans and South Vietnamese. The instruments
of death are Red-built. The dead, the amputees, the armless, the
legless are Americans and South Vietnamese.
These are the people with whom we are asked to set up a partner-
ship to "build bridges". These are the people to whom we are asked
to turn the cheek of compassion and embark on a policy of East-West
(more)
Sen. Dirksen
- 2 -
trade. Is trade so sweet and profits so desirable as to be purchased
at the price we now pay in death and agony? The volume of trade
which might be developed would be a pittance compared with our gross
national product. And how durable would such a bridge be when the
trade and traffic which flows over it carries the taint of blood?
Whenever the ghastly business in Viet Nam comes to an end and
the Reds are prepared to become reliable partners in peace, there
will be time enough to talk about "building bridges".
How strange that the Reds are so interested in the American
buck that they are ready to venture into the bridge-building
business even with Yankee imperialists! We doubt however that the
American people are so interested in a few rubles that they are
willing to "build bridges" with American credit, American loans,
American machine tools when the death cries from Viet Nam ring
daily in their ears.
REPUBLICAN
REpublican NATiONAL COMMiTTEE
HAPPIONAL COMMITTEE
1625 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
NATIONAL 8-6800
NEWS
FOR RELEASE
FRIDAY AM's
March 29, 1968
Republican Coordinating Committee Recommends
Congressional Watchdog Group for East-West Trade
The Republican Coordinating Committee recommended today that a Congressional
Watchdog Committee be set up to establish more manageable standards for trade
with Communist nations in "strategic goods," and to control the manner in which
these standards were administered by the executive branch of the Government.
The recommendation was embodied in a report on East-West trade adopted by
the Republican policy group, and released today by Republican National Chairman
Ray C. Bliss.
On the subject of "strategic goods," the Coordinating Committee said:
"Obviously, the category of 'strategic goods' varies with circumstances
which the Executive Branch only partly controls.
"Since very important decisions are made under directives which seem
neither clear nor sufficiently articulated, it would be wise to set up a
Congressional Watchdog Committee, both to formulate adequate criteria for
'strategic goods', and to control the implementation of these principles."
With regard to East-West trade, the GOP policy-makers submitted these two
additional recommendations:
--In negotiating most favored nation treatment with Communist nations, all
such nations should be treated as one bloc. A quid pro quo should be demanded
in exchange for the most favored nation concession, such as adoption of practices
-MORE-
-2-
commonly adhered to in modern international trade, as for example mutual recog-
nition of patents and copyrights, freedom of movement for goods, and establishment
of mixed arbitration tribunals. Removal of the most favored nation treatment
would be mandatory if a Communist nation refused to conform to these common
market practices.
--Payment for goods should be on a strict trade, rather than aid, basis,
which in most cases would preclude long-term credits. Payment balances should
be adjusted periodically either in gold or hard currencies, and conversion of
trade debts into local counterpart funds "should normally be prohibited."
Government guarantees to private concerns exporting to Communist countries
should be the exception rather than the rule.
The report adopted by the Coordinating Committee was prepared by its Task
Force on the Conduct of Foreign Relations, of which former Ambassador Robert
C. Hill is Chairman. The basic work involved in the report was done by a
subcommitee of the Task Force headed by Gerhart Niemeyer, Professor of Political
Science at Notre Dame University.
The Republican policy group pointed out that the designation of commodities
as "strategic goods" has varied with administrative policy.
"At one time," the Coordinating Committee said, "we used to put items on
the list of 'strategic goods' because they were technologically sophisticated,
but that is no longer the case, since very highly developed electronic equipment
has been released for sale to Poland, for instance."
The Committee commented that among the considerations governing the "strategic
goods" list is whether the Communist bloc can produce a certain product or
commodity. If so, the product in practice is removed from the list. The same
standard, the Committee added, applies where products or commodities are
obtainable from America's allies that have been "more broad-minded" in the
handling of the "strategic goods" list.
-MORE-
-3-
The Coordinating Committee branded as "fallacious" what it said seems to
be the most recent governing criteria in allowing sales of particular "strategic
goods" to the Soviet Union and other European Communist regimes, namely, that
these are basically or potentially friendly regimes that could be influenced
favorably by liberal management of the "strategic goods" restriction.
The GOP policy group said decisions on particular sales to European Communist
nations are left to the interpretation of policy by subordinate officials.
The Coordinating Committee pointed out that, since the President and
Secretary of State cannot watch over the ways in which policy governing the
"strategic goods" list is administered, "the decisive factor is really the
impression that subordinate officers have of the drift of our national policy."
Commenting on the peculiar nature of East-West trade, and the tightly-
controlled and power-oriented conditions existing under Communist regimes, the
Coordinating Committee said such trade "is not necessarily trade in the usual
non-political sense of the word."
The Committee added:
"It may be either Cold War strategy, economic aid, conventional aid, or
trade under war-time restrictions."
The Coordinating Committee said that under certain circumstances sale of
goods to Communist countries becomes aid rather than trade, such as sale of
single copies that could be used as prototypes by the Communist nation, the
sale of commodities that would overcome an acute shortage created by inefficiency,
or the sale of goods on long-term credit or conversion of trade credits into
counterpart funds held by the U.S. in local inconvertible currency.
The Committee said:
"Since such sales have suddenly increased under the Johnson-Humphrey
Administration's policy of 'bridge-building', one may assume that the underlying
intention was, indeed, one of extending economic aid
-MORE-
-4-
"The aid consists in giving the Communists technical and managerial
know-how which they lack, helping relieve economic stresses their system has
created, and in effect extending them direct grants, because they have neither
goods we want in exchange, nor ready reserves of gold or hard currency with
which to finance trade.
"Economic aid has been accepted by the American people as part of our
foreign policy on the premise that it be used as a means to keep other peoples
and countries from going Communist. It started as an anti-Communist Cold War
strategem. Extending what now amounts to aid and comfort to our enemies is a
wholly different matter."
With regard to most favored nation treatment, the Coordinating Committee
recalled that this principle is based on the expectation "that mutually beneficial
trade will be promoted and expanded."
"In the case of the Communist countries," the Committee said, "this assumption
should be somewhat qualified.
"First, one must remember that these countries have established a very
tight and orderly scheme of economic cooperation among themselves, a system in
which Soviet planning can assert itself through the great weight of Soviet
economic preponderance.
"Second, the Communist-ruled countries, by and large, have not much that
we need, but we have much that they need. In other words, the concession of most
favored nation treatment to Communist-ruled countries has the character of a
considerable advantage to them.
"In return for conceding this treatment to Communist countries, we should
seek to obtain a quid pro quo."
The Republican policy group recalled that, as a Cold War weapon, trade with
European Communist countries is advocated on the theory that it will wean the
-MORE-
-5-
other side away from Communism through increased affluence, or deactivate the
Iron Curtain by increasing frequency of commercial contacts.
On this point, the Coordinating Committee commented that in a Communist
economy private consumption is effectively controlled with a view to giving top
priority to power aims of the state.
The Committee said:
"Anybody who has had first-hand experience with the massive power structure
of a totalitarian regime is likely to smile at the sanguine hope that something
as limited as foreign trade could change the regime against the will of its
rulers."
The Committee stressed the importance of the East-West trade issue "because
the 'East' consists of countries whose support enables the Vietcong to exact
a rising toll of American lives in Vietnam."
"The Russians are boasting," the Committee said, "that 85 per cent of the
Vietcong's military supplies come from them and their East European satellites.
Poland is levying a 10 per cent surtax on all salaries and wages to finance its
aid to our enemies.
"Neither the Congress nor the Administration will find it advantageous, in
an election year, to propose increased trade with countries which so openly seek
to harm us."
###
Adopted by
The Republican Coordinating Committee
December 11, 1967
EAST-WEST TRADE
Prepared under the direction of:
Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
1625 Eye Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
Presiding Officer: Ray C. Bliss, Chairman, Republican National Committee
Former President
Dwight D. Eisenhower
300 Carlisle Street
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania
Former Presidential Nominees
Barry Goldwater
(1964)
Thomas E. Dewey
(1944 & 1948)
Post Office Box 1601
140 Broadway
Scottsdale, Arizona
New York, New York
Richard M. Nixon
(1960)
Alf M. Landon
(1936)
Nixon, Mudge, Rose,
National Bank of Topeka Building
Guthrie, Alexander & Mitchell
1001 Fillmore Street
20 Broad Street
Topeka, Kansas
New York, New York
Senate Leadership
Everett M. Dirksen
George Murphy, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Senatorial Comm.
Thomas H. Kuchel
Milton R. Young, Secretary
Minority Whip
Republican Conference
Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Chairman
Hugh Scott, Vice Chairman
Republican Policy Committee
National Republican Senatorial Comm.
Margaret Chase Smith, Chairman
Republican Conference
House Leadership
Gerald R. Ford
Bob Wilson, Chairman
Minority Leader
National Republican Congressional Comm.
Leslie C. Arends
Charles E. Goodell, Chairman
Minority Whip
Planning and Research Committee
Melvin R. Laird, Chairman
Richard H. Poff, Secretary
Republican Conference
Republican Conference
John J. Rhodes, Chairman
William C. Cramer, Vice Chairman
Republican Policy Committee
Republican Conference
H. Allen Smith
Ranking Member of Rules Committee
(continued)
REPUBLICAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
continued
Representatives of the Republican Governors Association
John A. Love
Raymond P. Shafer
Governor of the State of Colorado
Governor of the Commonwealth
Denver, Colorado
of Pennsylvania
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
John A. Volpe
Governor of the Commonwealth
John H. Chafee
of Massachusetts
Governor of the State of
Boston, Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Providence, Rhode Island
George W. Romney
Governor of the State of Michigan
Nils A. Boe
Lansing, Michigan
Governor of the State of
South Dakota
Nelson A. Rockefeller
Pierre, South Dakota
Governor of the State of New York
Albany, New York
Daniel J. Evans
Governor of the State of Washington
Olympia, Washington
Republican National Committee
Ray C. Bliss, Chairman
Donald R. Ross, Vice Chairman
Republican National Committee
Republican National Committee
1625 Eye Street, Northwest
1406 Kiewit Plaza, Farnam at 36th
Washington, D. C. 20006
Omaha, Nebraska 68131
Mrs. C. Wayland Brooks, Assistant Chrmn.
Mrs. J. Willard Marriott, Vice Chrmn.
Republican National Committee
Republican National Committee
1625 Eye Street, Northwest
4500 Garfield Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20006
Washington, D. C. 20007
Mrs. Collis P. Moore, Vice Chairman
J. Drake Edens, Jr., Vice Chairman
Republican National Committee
Republican National Committee
Box 225
Post Office Box 9385
Moro, Oregon 97039
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
President of the Republican State Legislators Association
F. F. (Monte) Montgomery
Speaker of the House of Representatives
State of Oregon
Salem, Oregon
Robert L. L. McCormick, Staff Coordinator
Members of the Republican Coordinating Committee's Task Force on
the Conduct of Foreign Relations
Robert C. Hill, Chairman
United States Ambassador to Mexico, 1957-1961
David N. Rowe, Vice Chairman
Professor of Political Science, Yale University
Gordon Allott
United States Senator from Colorado
Robert Amory, Jr.
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1952-1962
John B. Anderson
Member of Congress from Illinois
Tim M. Babcock
Governor of the State of Montana
Frances P. Bolton
Member of Congress from Ohio
Lucius D. Clay
General of the United States Army, Retired
Philip K. Crowe
United States Ambassador to Union of South Africa, 1959-1961
Joseph S. Farland
United States Ambassador to the Republic of Panama, 1960-1963
Paul Findley
Member of Congress from Illinois
Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen
Member of Congress from New Jersey
Ernest S. Griffith
Dean, School of International Service, American University, 1958-1965
Mrs. Cecil M. Harden Member of Congress from Indiana, 1949-1959;
Republican National Committeewoman for Indiana
Joe Holt
Member of Congress from California, 1953-1959
Walter A. Judd
Member of Congress from Minnesota, 1943-1963
John D. Lodge
United States Ambassador to Spain, 1955-1961
Gerhart Niemeyer
Professor of Political Science. University of Notre Dame
Nicholas Nyaradi
Director of School of International Studies, Bradley University
Roderic L. 0' Connor
Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs,
Department of State, 1957-1958
G. L. Ohrstrom, Jr.
Investment Banker
William W. Scranton
Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1963-1967
Richard B. Sellars
Republican National Committeeman for New Jersey
Robert Strausz-Hupe
Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania
John Hay Whitney
United States Ambassador to Great Britain, 1956-61
Kent B. Crane
Secretary to the Task Force
EAST-WEST TRADE
The issue of East-West trade concerns all Americans today, because
the "East" consists of the countries whose support enables the Viet Cong
to exact a rising toll of American lives in Vietnam. The Russians are boasting
that 85 percent of the Vietcong's military supplies come from them and their
East European satellites. Poland is levying a 10 percent surtax on all salaries
and wages to finance its aid to our enemies. Neither the Congress nor the
Administration will find it advantageous, in an election year, to propose increased
trade with countries which so openly seek to harm us.
As long as the East-West trade issue has a relatively low priority, the
opportunity presents itself to clarify some of the underlying concepts and
principles, and to anticipate some desiderata.
The Nature of East-West Trade.
Trade, the exchange of commodities, is one of the basic institutions of
human life. By and large, it has been carried on independently of politics by
private persons seeking to gain reciprocal material advantages. For this reason,
we tend to associate with the word "trade" the notion of something neutral,
-2-
peaceful and beneficial, an activity in which everyone may gain and neither
side need necessarily lose. This notion has played a large if often subliminal
role in the discussion of East-West trade.
In East-West relations, however, certain features deviate from the normal
pattern. First, Communists carry on trade only through officials of a political
regime whose motive, even in trade, is political and power-oriented. Second,
the regimes on the other side are committed to hostility against us, a hostility
that aims at the destruction of our entire society. Third, Communist nations
have very little, if anything, that we need, while we have very much that they
need, not only in commodities, but also in technological and managerial know-how.
Fourth, we look upon Communism as a system that will and must pass away, an
abnormalcy that some time will yield to normalcy, and much of the discussion about
trade has turned on the question whether or not trade can help bring about the
desired change.
If one considers these circumstances, it becomes clear that the sale of
commodities to the "East" is not necessarily trade in the usual non-political
sense of the word. It may be either Cold War strategy, economic aid, conven-
tional aid, or trade under war-time restrictions.
Trade as Cold War Strategy.
If we consider the sale of commoditiesas a lever to pry the other side away
from its commitment to world revolution, we look upon trade as Cold War strategy.
The same thing is true if we refuse to sell in order to increase the internal
pressures on Communist regimes. The latter, however, is not trade, but the
absence of trade. The former is mostly advocated in the hope that the sale of
commodities will either:
-3-
a) wean the other side away from Communism, through increasing
affluence, or
b) de-activate the Iron Curtain through the increasing frequency
of commercial contacts.
In this regard, one should note, though, that the amount of private consump-
tion is effectively controlled by the state in a Communist command economy, and
that these regimes are committed to give first economic priority to their power
purposes. Furthermore, Western trade representatives would enjoy contact only
with a few bureaucrats appointed by the Communist Party who are tested for
political reliability as well as business competence, and who are subject to
removal at a stroke of the pen. Anybody who has had first-hand experience with
the massive power structure of a totalitarian regime is likely to smile at the
sanguine hope that something as limited as foreign trade could change the regime
against the will of its rulers.
When Trade Becomes Aid?
Under certain circumstances the sale of commodities to the Communists is
not trade but economic aid, namely:
the sale of single copies, to be used as prototypes by the East;
the sale of commodities that will overcome an acute shortage
which the East's own inefficiency has created;
the sale of commodities to the East on long-term credit, or the
conversion of trade credits into counterpart funds which the
U.S. Government holds in local inconvertible currency.
Since such sales have suddenly increased under the Johnson-Humphrey
Administration's policy of "bridge-building," one may assume that the underlying
intention was, indeed, one of extending economic aid. Yet, in the case of
-4-
Rhodesia, the State Department went so far as to say that all trade was "aid."
While it may have been a propagandistic exaggeration, it is obvious that in East-
West relations a great deal of trade is actually aid. The aid consists in
giving the Communists technical and managerial know-how which they lack, helping
relieve economic stresses their system has created, and in effect extending
them direct grants, because they have neither goods we want in exchange, nor
ready reserves of gold or hard currency with which to finance trade.
Economic aid has been accepted by the American people as part of our foreign
policy on the premise that it be used as a means to keep other peoples and coun-
tries from going Communist. It started as an anti-Communist Cold War stratagem.
Extending what now amounts to aid and comfort to our enemies is a wholly different
matter.
Sometimes, East-West trade is advocated as a means to "improve the lot of
the subject peoples," which reasoning admits the "aid" character of trade.
The argument overlooks, however, that Communist totalitarian regimes have the
capacity and the will to decide what the consumer's share of the nation's material
goods shall be, and that hitherto such consumption has consistently received a
low priority.
Can East-West Trade be Non-political?
Trade as the exchange of commodities with a hope for reciprocal gain of
a material kind, is something quite different from either Cold War strategy or
economic aid. All the same, in so far as the Cold War has something of the
character of war, it is likely to encroach on otherwise unpolitical trade.
When a nation is in a state of war, trade with the enemy is prohibited. Some
feel that it should be prohibited when war is imminent or the other side's
-5-
intentions are manifestly hostile. An example was the large sale of scrap
iron to Japan on the eve of World War II, a sale which many felt should not
have been permitted by the government.
The American Government's Responsibility.
Private persons who have commodities to sell will trade wherever they can;
that is their business. In so far as trade is considered undesirable for
reasons of national interest, it is up to the government to set up legal barriers
against otherwise normal trade activity. In the present situation, the character
and extent of these limitations are the real problems of East-West trade,
properly speaking:
The prohibitions going under the name of "strategic goods" list;
The exclusion of Communist-ruled nations from "most favored nations
clause" treatment;
The subjection of payments in East-West trade to certain credit,
currency, or shipping requirements.
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Strategic Goods List.
The designation of certain commodities as "strategic goods" has been subject
to criteria that appeared technical but in reality have varied with administra-
tive policy. Moreover, in the nature of things concrete decisions on particular
sales have been left to the interpretation which relatively subordinate officials
have given to our policy. Most recently, the governing criteria seems to have
been that the Soviet Union is a basically or potentially friendly regime which
we could influence in our favor by a very permissive handling of the "strategic
goods" restriction, subject to domestic political acceptance. The same idea
-6-
has been applied to the Communist regimes of East Central European countries.
The idea is of course fallacious. It is important to realize, however, that
the President or the Secretary of State cannot possibly watch over the concrete
ways in which a general policy is implemented on the "strategic goods" list,
and that the decisive factor is really the impression that subordinate officers
have of the drift of our national policy.
Among the considerations governing the "strategic goods" list is the
question whether the other side can or cannot yet produce a certain commodity.
Once they begin to produce it, we remove it from the list of "strategic goods."
The same goes for commodities which the other side could obtain from our Allies
who have been more broadminded in their handling of "strategic goods." At one
time we used to put items on the list of "strategic goods" because they were
technologically sophisticated, but that is no longer the case, since very highly
developed electronic equipment has been released for sale to Poland, for instance.
Obviously, the category of "strategic goods" varies with circumstances which
the Executive Branch only partly controls. Since very important decisions are
made under directives which seem neither clear nor sufficiently articulated, it
would be wise to set up a Congressional Watchdog Committee, both to formulate
adequate criteria for "strategic goods," and to control the implementation of
these principles.
B. Most Favored Nation Treatment.
The "most favored nations clause" is one of the foundations of modern
world trade. Underlying the clause is the expectation that mutually beneficial
trade will be promoted and expanded by the institution of the clause.
-7-
In the case of the Communist countries, this assumption should be somewhat
qualified. First, one must remember that these countries have established a
very tight and orderly scheme of economic cooperation among themselves, a
system in which Soviet planning can assert itself through the great weight of
Soviet economic preponderance. Second, the Communist-ruled countries, by and
large, have not much that we need, but we have much that they need. In other
words, the concession of most favored nation treatment to Communist-ruled
countries has the character of a considerable advantage to them. In return for
conceding this treatment to Communist countries, we should seek to obtain a quid
pro quo. It has been suggested that the opening of trade with Communist nations
should be offered as a concession for a political quid pro quo, for instance as
regards Vietnam. Thus trade would be converted once again into a Cold War weapon,
which has its own logic and justification.
Basically, there is no reason why Communist countries should not be included
under most favored nations treatment. In negotiating this concession, however,
we should
a) treat all members of the COMECON as one bloc;
b) in exchange for most favored nation treatment demand the institution,
on their part, of certain practices that are common usage in modern
trade, such as mixed arbitral tribunals, freedom of movement, respect
for patents and copyrights, and so on;
c) make the lifting of most favored nation treatment mandatory if the
State-run trading corporations refuse to conform to these practices
of the Western market place.
-8-
C. Credit Restrictions.
The financing of payments should be patterned on a strict trade, rather than
aid, basis. In most cases this policy would preclude long-term credits. Payment
balances should be adjusted periodically either in gold or hard currencies.
The conversion of trade debts into local counterpart funds should normally be
1/
prohibited.
Government guarantees to private exporters to Communist countries
should be the exception rather than the rule.
/ Even when the United States makes an agreement in good faith expecting
Communists to uphold their side, we may be in for a rude awakening. As of
January 1967 Poland owed us $30 million due on AID loans from the United States.
The Poles were unable to repay us in U.S. dollars or other hard currency, which
we had a right to demand under terms of the agreement. So the Johnson-Humphrey
Administration agreed to absolve the debt by accepting payment in Polish currency,
which is not convertible and must be used by the United States Government inside
Poland.
REPUBLICAN
REpublican NATiONAL COMMiTTEE
AMERICAL COMMITTEE
1625 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
NATIONAL 8-6800
NEWS
officials
FOR RELEASE
FRIDAY AM's
March 29, 1968
Republican Coordinating Committee Recommends
Congressional Watchdog Group for East-West Trade
The Republican Coordinating Committee recommended today that a Congressional
Watchdog Committee be set up to establish more manageable standards for trade
with Communist nations in "strategic goods," and to control the manner in which
these standards were administered by the executive branch of the Government.
The recommendation was embodied in a report on East-West trade adopted by
the Republican policy group, and released today by Republican National Chairman
Ray C. Bliss.
On the subject of "strategic goods," the Coordinating Committee said:
"Obviously, the category of 'strategic goods' varies with circumstances
which the Executive Branch only partly controls.
"Since very important decisions are made under directives which seem
neither clear nor sufficiently articulated, it would be wise to set up a
Congressional Watchdog Committee, both to formulate adequate criteria for
'strategic goods', and to control the implementation of these principles."
With regard to East-West trade, the GOP policy-makers submitted these two
additional recommendations:
--In negotiating most favored nation treatment with Communist nations, all
such nations should be treated as one bloc. A quid pro quo should be demanded
in exchange for the most favored nation concession, such as adoption of practices
-MORE-
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
November 18, 1969
Comment by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, Republican Leader, U.S. House of Representatives, to
be placed in the Congressional Record immediately after the President's Message on
trade.
Mr. Speaker: President Nixon has today sent the Congress a Message which reaffirms
this Nation's devotion to the principles of free trade. I am pleased that the
President has outlined a course which will steer us toward the objectives of freer
trade but at the same time shows an awareness of the shoals and sandbars along the
way.
I believe the trade policies recommended by the President will be helpful in
restoring our Nation to a position of trade surplus. There is no question that
movement toward freer trade is necessary if we are to move toward the much-desired
goal of a favorable balance of trade.
To that end, I fully support the President's request for authority to make
limited tariff reductions. The President has quite accurately stated that lack of
authority to make such reductions exposes our exports to foreign retaliation.
The Congress also should give serious consideration to the President's request
for elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade. As the President stated, a clear
statement of Congressional intent in this regard is needed to achieve the reciprocal
lowering of non-tariff trade obstacles.
The President's Message on Trade is a prime example of the balance that
President Nixon has brought to our domestic and foreign affairs. I refer particularly
to his realistic recommendations regarding aid for industries and individuals
adversely affected by increased imports and the need to take effective action in
cases where American exports are illegally or unjustly discriminated against.
By and large, the President's trade recommendations commend themselves to the
Congress. Prompt action on these recommendations is vital to our Nation's future
well-being.
#######
a office Copy
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
November 18, 1969
Comment by Rep. Gerald R. Ford, Republican Leader, U.S. House of Representatives, to
be placed in the Congressional Record immediately after the President's Message on
trade.
Mr. Speaker: President Nixon has today sent the Congress a Message which reaffirms
this Nation's devotion to the principles of free trade. I am pleased that the
President has outlined a course which will steer us toward the objectives of freer
trade but at the same time shows an awareness of the shoals and sandbars along the
way.
I believe the trade policies recommended by the President will be helpful in
restoring our Nation to a position of trade surplus. There is no question that
movement toward freer trade is necessary if we are to move toward the much-desired
goal of a favorable balance of trade.
To that end, I fully support the President's request for authority to make
limited tariff reductions. The President has quite accurately stated that lack of
authority to make such reductions exposes our exports to foreign retaliation.
The Congress also should give serious consideration to the President's request
for elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade. As the President stated, a clear
statement of Congressional intent in this regard is needed to achieve the reciprocal
lowering of non-tariff trade obstacles.
The President's Message on Trade is a prime example of the balance that
President Nixon has brought to our domestic and foreign affairs. I refer particularly
to his realistic recommendations regarding aid for industries and individuals
adversely affected by increased imports and the need to take effective action in
cases where American exports are illegally or unjustly discriminated against.
By and large, the President's trade recommendations commend themselves to the
Congress. Prompt action on these recommendations is vital to our Nation's future
well-being.
#######
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
FOR RELEASE AT 12 NOON MONDAY, MARCH 6, 1972, AND THEREAFTER
Rep. Gerald R. Ford Monday introduced a bill he believes will create
thousands of new jobs by expanding American exports at no cost to the U.S. taxpayer.
The bill would boost American exports by using U.S.-owned foreign currencies
to pay foreign import duties charged on American goods and thus make them more
competitive in price with European and Japanese goods in foreign markets.
The savings on import duties would have to be passed along to the foreign
consumer under terms of the bill. In countries where the U.S. has excess and other
foreign currency, foreign buyers could purchase American products duty free under
Ford's proposal.
The export-boosting foreign currencies bill has also been introduced by
Rep. William S. Moorhead, D-Pa., chairman of the House Foreign Operations and
Government Information Subcommittee, and by Rep. William S. Broomfield, R-Mich. a
senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The bill has been sent to the
Foreign Affairs Committee. It is co-sponsored by 15 Democrats and 14 Republicans.
Ford said the plan has the longrange potential of creating 125,000 new jobs,
according to international trade and finance experts in the Library of Congress.
The experts base this estimate on information obtained from the U.S. Labor and
Treasury Departments.
Ford said his bill would not cost the American taxpayer a penny and would
make money for the U.S. Treasury.
He pointed out that the U.S. currently owns and is owed vast amounts of
foreign currencies. America holds more than $2 billion in such currencies. Another
$6 billion in foreign currencies is owed to the U.S. and is in the process of
regular payment. In addition, almost $22 billion in our own currency is owed the
U.S. The overall total is roughly $30 billion.
Since foreign import duties average 10 per cent, these funds would finance
$300 billion worth of American exports over the coming years if used entirely for
foreign duty payments.
Ford also explained how the export-expanding foreign currencies bill would
bring money into the U.S. Treasury. Because of the multiplier tax effects when
U.S. exports increase, every dollar or its equivalent in foreign currency spent to
pay import duties would virtually double U.S. tax income.
###
all Fifth District Media
Office Capy
CONGRESSMAN
NEWS
GERALD R. FORD
HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER
RELEASE
FOR RELEASE AT 12 NOON MONDAY, MARCH 6, 1972, AND THEREAFTER
Rep. Gerald R. Ford Monday introduced a bill he believes will create
thousands of new jobs by expanding American exports at no cost to the U.S. taxpayer.
The bill would boost American exports by using U.S.-owned foreign currencies
to pay foreign import duties charged on American goods and thus make them more
competitive in price with European and Japanese goods in foreign markets.
The savings on import duties would have to be passed along to the foreign
consumer under terms of the bill. In countries where the U.S. has excess and other
foreign currency, foreign buyers could purchase American products duty free under
Ford's proposal.
The export-boosting foreign currencies bill has also been introduced by
Rep. William S. Moorhead, D-Pa., chairman of the House Foreign Operations and
Government Information Subcommittee, and by Rep. William S. Broomfield, R-Mich., a
senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The bill has been sent to the
Foreign Affairs Committee. It is co-sponsored by 15 Democrats and 14 Republicans.
Ford said the plan has the longrange potential of creating 125,000 new jobs,
according to international trade and finance experts in the Library of Congress.
The experts base this estimate on information obtained from the U.S. Labor and
Treasury Departments.
Ford said his bill would not cost the American taxpayer a penny and would
make money for the U.S. Treasury.
He pointed out that the U.S. currently owns and is owed vast amounts of
foreign currencies. America holds more than $2 billion in such currencies. Another
$6 billion in foreign currencies is owed to the U.S. and is in the process of
regular payment. In addition, almost $22 billion in our own currency is owed the
U.S. The overall total is roughly $30 billion.
Since foreign import duties average 10 per cent, these funds would finance
$300 billion worth of American exports over the coming years if used entirely for
foreign duty payments.
Ford also explained how the export-expanding foreign currencies bill would
bring money into the U.S. Treasury. Because of the multiplier tax effects when
U.S. exports increase, every dollar or its equivalent in foreign currency spent to
pay import duties would virtually double U.S. tax income.
###